Chapter 7

PROBLEMS FACED BY THE LUFTWAFFE GENERAL STAFF

Section I: Hitler and the Luftwaffe General Staff

Hitler's attitude towards the Luftwaffe General Staff was colored by the same factors which motivated his distrust of general staff service as such. His antipathy, which could develop into intense hatred on occasion, was largely due to the subconscious feeling of inferiority which characterized this man who had risen from the bottom, and who always wore the Iron Cross, First Class, awarded in World War I, as his only decoration--apart from his Party emblem--to convince himself and others that he was a military expert of the first water.

Even so, Hitler was too shrewd to neglect using the Reichswehr as the nucleus of the armed force he planned to create. This force was to be the primary instrument of his power politics and was to be groomed and trained for this role from its very inception.

Instinctively he felt that the General Staff, the intellectual elite of this instrument, represented the most serious threat to his plans. And the frank and open battle waged by Generaloberst Beck (the first chief of the Army General Staff) did nothing to dispel this feeling.

In order to clarify the reader's concept of Generaloberst Beck, I have quoted below several passages concerning him which appeared in an article on military policy:1

... Professor Wolfgang Foerster, the last director of the Reichs Archives, has written a book on Beck which bears the title A General Fights Against the War.2

On 1 October 1933, Beck was made chief of the Troop Office in the Reichs Ministry of Defense; on 1 July 1935 his
title was changed to Chief of the Army General Staff. This position, however, was no longer so important as it had been in the days of Moltke, Schlieffen, and Hindenburg. Beck was essentially an "aide" to his superior, the Commander in Chief, Army (General von Brauchitsch, with whom he often disagreed, personally and professionally), and the change in title did nothing to alter his status.

In a speech commemorating the 125th anniversary of the War Academy on 15 October 1935, Beck reminds the future General Staff officers of von Clausewitz' words:

'... The higher we climb on the officer's career ladder, the more necessary it is that objective judgment come to the aid of personal courage, in order to assure that courage does not represent merely a futile and blind outburst of passion. For it is less and less a matter of individual, personal sacrifice; more and more the fate of others and the welfare of the entire whole that are inextricably bound to our actions.'

Foerster, who knew Beck personally, describes him as a '... quiet, serious, thoughtful, responsible, and unselfish man. Despite his energy and ability, nothing could have been farther from his mind than the ambition to push the efficiency of his forces and his own capabilities into the limelight of history.' One can hardly imagine a personality more divergent from Hitler's!

Beck's attitude towards the proper relationship between politics and war is sharply divergent from the views expressed by Ludendorff in his article The Doctrine of Total War, published after World War I. It was Ludendorff's belief that the traditional relationship between political action and war had changed materially, and that in the future war--and not political negotiations--should be given priority, even to the point of subordinating the chief of the political state to the military leader.

Beck repudiated this view. He summarized the
prerequisites for a morally sound political atmosphere as follows: 1) peaceful cooperation among nations in such matters as trade and commerce; 2) diplomatic goals objectively selected in keeping with the geopolitical situation of the nation concerned; 3) settlement of rivalries and conflicting spheres of power through the establishment of recognized spheres of interest and by strict adherence to treaties. He placed the use of armed forces, whose very existence sometimes make their employment seem inevitable, at the very end of the list.

In a critique dated 12 November 1937, Beck had the following to say of Hitler's plans for the future, revealed for the first time officially on 5 November 1937. 

"... Politics is the art of exploiting the possible. All three nations--Germany, France, and England--happen to exist at the same time and in the same place, namely Europe. This means that we should exhaust every possibility of getting along together amicably--especially in view of our relative strengths."

In the same connection, a memorandum prepared by the Chief of the General Staff on 5 May 1938 contains a decisive comment: 

"... Germany's military and political situation simply does not offer the geographical conditions necessary to enable her to sustain a large-scale war on land, at sea, and in the air. World War I has shown us that reliance on the neutrality of other nations is a fallacy. Germany cannot sustain a long-term war, if only by reason of her geographical limitations!"

In three other memoranda issued by Beck during the period 29 May-16 July 1938, all of them warning against the danger of military involvement under conditions unfavorable to Germany, he concludes with the urgent request that 

"... the Commander in Chief, Armed Forces be prevailed upon to desist from the preparations which he has been ordered to undertake for a war against Czechoslovakia."

121
In addition to these memoranda, Beck also presented his views in countless personal conferences. For him it was a matter of a decision which will determine, once and for all time, the continued existence of the nation. He was unsuccessful in his efforts to persuade the top-level Armed Forces leaders to present their objections to Hitler in the form of an ultimatum.

On 27 August 1938, Beck turned the duties of the Chief of the General Staff over to his successor, General Halder, and on 31 October 1938, he retired from the service.

Apparently Hitler was not unaware of the attitude prevailing among his top-level military leaders—particularly those of the Army—, as his complaint indicates: '... what sort of generals are these anyway, that I—as chief of state—have to drive them to war? If they were what they are supposed to be, I would be having a hard time fending off their demands for war!'

Let us point out here that the higher-level officers by no means stood by silently, as popular fancy has had it on occasion. As a matter of fact, thirty-two out of a total of fifty-four generals holding high command posts were dismissed by Hitler because they defended views differing from his own. The total losses in generals and admirals during the last war were made up of the following: 287 killed in action, 49 killed in accidents, and 108 who took their own lives (some of them, to be sure, after the war was over) rather than continue to ignore the dictates of conscience. During World War I sixty-three generals were killed in action. I do not bring this up to gloss over anything, but merely in order to clarify the extent to which the usual opinion in this case may be justified. I feel that it is necessary to examine these facts, since most of the higher-level officers were members of the General Staff Corps.

The following comments by Dr. Hans Frank, former Governor...
General of Poland and a member of Hitler's intimate circle, may also serve to shed some light on Hitler's attitude towards the General Staff.

... It has amused me very much during the last few months to observe the deliberate attempts being made to convince the public that the Armed Forces High Command and the General Staff were bosom friends and that both were eager accomplices of Hitler; for if there was anything at all in German history towards which Hitler felt hostile, it was the General Staff. He used to say that the General Staff had long since '... betrayed, forgotten, and abandoned Moltke and Schlieffen,' and had become nothing but an '... exclusive clique of particularly arrogant dunces and of national pests, characterized by barren sterility, a total lack of creative thinking, abject cowardice, and the empty conceit normally accompanying these qualities.'

Another time he expressed his contempt in the following words: '... At times the gentlemen with the crimson stripe on their trousers disgust me more than the Jews. At least the latter admit frankly that they have no desire to be soldiers, whereas the General Staff people are obsessed with the idea that they--and they alone--are properly qualified for that activity.'

Hitler also originated the widely-cited statement, '... The General Staff is the only Order of Free Masons which I've not yet abolished.'

So much for Frank's comments. There would seem to be no reason for us to doubt them, made as they were by an intimate of Hitler who was sentenced to death at Nuremberg. Hitler's remarks--as quoted here--were originally made in private and did not become public until after his death, at least not within the Luftwaffe General Staff. Examined in retrospect, they leave no doubt whatsoever as to Hitler's personal attitude towards the General Staff.

Although Hitler's distrust of the Army General Staff dated
from the very beginning, it was quite a while before the Luftwaffe General Staff became aware of any disparaging remarks directed against itself. Whereas the Army General Staff had to fight to maintain its position of leadership within the Armed Forces, and thus was bound to come into ideological conflict with the dictates of National Socialism and with its leader, the comparatively new Luftwaffe General Staff had neither the inclination nor the time to worry about such matters as prestige within the Armed Forces. While the leading personalities of the Army and its General Staff frequently gave public expression, by word and deed, to their mistrust of National Socialism, the top-ranking Luftwaffe officers were so fully occupied by their immediate missions that they had neither the time nor the interest for intervention in political matters. A certain feeling of gratitude that Hitler was making it possible for them to tackle a new and fascinating military project may also have played some part; the decisive factor, though, was probably Goering's ability to divert political criticism away from the General Staff and the officer corps of the Luftwaffe. In any case, the Luftwaffe was spared the almost daily friction faced by the Army and its General Staff, and the tension between Hitler and his Armed Forces leaders had far less effect on the Luftwaffe General Staff than on the Army.

This relationship between Hitler and the Luftwaffe General Staff, which we may term a neutral one, lasted through the early war years, possibly because Hitler's instinctive distrust of anyone wearing the General Staff uniform was lulled to passivity in regard to the Luftwaffe General Staff by the extraordinary success enjoyed by the Luftwaffe during this period. In any case, Hitler was definitely amenable to suggestions regarding air armament and the employment of the Luftwaffe forces until 1940. Thus, any mistakes made up to this point in armament planning, organization, or commitment of forces must be laid squarely on the shoulders of Goering and his General Staff chiefs.

Hitler's attitude, however, changed rapidly as soon as the Luftwaffe began to run into difficulty. That these difficulties were due in great part, first, to the fact that he had trusted Goering implicitly and had taken little personal interest in the affairs of the Luftwaffe,
and, second, to his own decisions in the field of armament planning for the Armed Forces, was something he refused to recognize. He simply placed the blame for everything on Goering and the Luftwaffe General Staff.

There is little point in our trying to absolve Goering and his General Staff Chief of all blame for the wrong decisions which were made--on the contrary, both were largely responsible for what happened, as we shall see later on. The decisive point, however, is the fact that in a dictatorship all decisions are ultimately taken by the head of state--either by direct order, by exploitation on the part of the dictator of the fear felt by subordinate agencies, or by the influence he wields over blindly trusting followers. The dictator's word is law; he is infallible, regardless of whether he belongs to the right or left wing. Ultimately a mass psychosis is created which threatens to paralyze the entire nation. It could never have occurred to Goering, as one of Hitler's first converts and as his helper during the early days of his struggle for power, to doubt the rightness of any of Hitler's opinions or decisions, even when Goering's own professional ability (which, to be sure, was not great) ought to have convinced him to the contrary. I know of no better illustration of the relationship between Hitler and Goering than the following scene, which I witnessed myself and have never forgotten:

During the summer of 1937 Hitler faced certain difficult political decisions. Accordingly he called upon the Commanders in Chief of the various Armed Forces branches (including Goering, of course) to brief him on the status of the armament program. With great enthusiasm Goering elaborated on the virtues of the various types of aircraft in use, stating that his bombers were capable of almost anything imaginable. Understandably Hitler was left with the impression that Germany's bomber fleet was unbeatable. There is no way of telling whether Goering deliberately set out to deceive Hitler or whether he was merely carried away by his own eloquence. In any case, Goering was clearly astonished when one of his officers drily pointed out that, at the moment, Germany did not possess a single up-to-date bomb. Hitler, who had let himself be fired by Goering's enthusiasm, was shocked. It was only with difficulty that
he was able to keep his temper.

After the conference was over, Goering turned on his officers with bitter reproaches. He brushed aside their argument that it was absolutely necessary to keep the chief of state accurately informed as to the actual strength or weakness of his armed forces.

Several days later, Hitler—still smarting under the embarrassment created by the recent conference—sent for Goering and several of the top-ranking Luftwaffe leaders. He explained that he had been thinking over the problem of the bomber fleet and had discovered a solution, "... Germany has more than enough of those metal cylinders used for oxygen, acetylene, etc. We can fill them with explosives and use them as bombs!"

One of the officers present dared to point out cautiously that they couldn’t be aimed properly, that they would flip over in the air, and so forth. Hitler was obviously annoyed—these General Staff people always thought they knew better! Goering, however, seeing a chance to make good his slip at the last conference, was quick to seize it, and replied:

"My Fuehrer, may I express my thanks for this wonderful solution! I must admit that none of us could have thought of such an ingenious idea! You, and you alone, have saved the situation. Good Lord, to think that we’re all such dumbbells!, I shall never be able to forgive myself!"

Whereupon Goering’s dumbbells, deeply impressed by the perspicacity of their Commander in Chief, went home to discover, upon close study of the technical data involved, that this brilliant solution was no solution at all!

But Goering was not the only one—his General Staff chiefs, too, were more or less fascinated by Hitler’s daring flights of fancy. Wever, for example, was a devoted believer in National Socialism and was firmly convinced that Hitler was destined to raise Germany from her status as a second-rate nation. He did not live long enough
to recognize the evils inherent in the system. Kesselring and Stumpff were believers, too, although with serious reservations. As older officers in the General Staff chief's post, they could not remain unaware of Hitler's insufficiencies as a military expert, while the younger officers had had no opportunity to judge for themselves during the years before the war.

In the case of the fourth General Staff Chief, Jeschonnek, who took office on 1 February 1939, the situation was quite different. The historian Richard Suchenwirth has the following to say in this regard:

... Politically speaking, the newly appointed General Staff Chief, who had been active in various key posts in the Reichs Air Ministry since the beginning, was personally receptive to the doctrines of the new regime. After all, he was a product of the old Prussian school and did his best to exemplify its ideals (strict discipline, devotion to duty to the exclusion of all personal considerations, subordination of self to a higher purpose, and the tendency to devote oneself to military service with an almost romantic ardor somewhat out of place in a changing world). Reichs Chancellor Hitler, who, after Hindenburg's death, adopted the title Reichs Chancellor and Fuehrer, was wont to emphasize the traditional role of Prussia in his speeches and decrees and to pay homage to Frederick the Great as the epitome of the Prussian ideal. The military aspects of the Prussian ideal also found favor with him, and he lost no time in launching a comprehensive armament program designed to create a strong German armed force. Even Wever had been an enthusiastic follower of Hitler and his new regime, and for Jeschonnek, who was much younger, devotion to this regime soon became the motivating factor in his life. He witnessed Germany's resignation from the League of Nations, the secret rearmament program with the rapid growth of the new Luftwaffe, the reestablishment of Germany's sovereignty as an armed nation, the return of the Saar, and the successful occupation of the Rhineland—all under Hitler's leadership. Prior to World War II still other spectacular successes—the annexation of Austria, the return of the Sudeten
Territory, the reincorporation of the Memel Territory, the establishment of the Protectorates of Bohemia and Moravia, and finally the incorporation of Czechoslovakia in the German sphere of influence--took their place beside the original achievements. It was no wonder that Jeschonnek was imbued with unshakable faith in Hitler's talent for success, in his superior strength, and in his intuition, which had proved itself right time and again in the face of cautious warnings from those traditionally supposed to know, especially from the Army General Staff. Jeschonnek's enthusiasm is all the more understandable when we recall the impression which the collapse of the German Empire must have made on him as a boy in 1918. Even as late as the summer of 1939, it is understandable that his implicit faith in his Fuhrer persuaded him that Hitler would find a way to achieve the other revisions to the Versailles Treaty which he wanted without involving Germany in a European war. After all his demands were limited to Danzig and the Polish Corridor--not even eastern Upper Silesia; he had already renounced Germany's claim to Alsace-Lorraine, given up the German South Tyrol in the interests of friendship with Italy, and had officially declared that the question of the German colonies would not be considered a casus belli.

Jeschonnek was fully convinced, and he accepted Hitler's genius, not only in the political sphere but in the military field as well, as an article of faith. In his case, one must speak of personal devotion to Hitler as a leader rather than of adherence to the doctrines of the National Socialist Party...

I have nothing to add to the well-substantiated comments of Professor Suchenwirth. In accordance with the motto "love begets love," it is clear that Hitler, for his part, had a great deal of esteem for Jeschonnek as a loyal follower. His appreciation of Jeschonnek's military ability grew in direct proportion to the latter's adherence to his own views and to his (i.e. Hitler's) growing realization of Goering's total lack of military aptitude. Hitler's confidence in Jeschonnek, however, did nothing to mitigate his basic distrust in the General Staff, as such. Even so, during Jeschonnek's tenure as Chief of the
Luftwaffe General Staff, he displayed at least some degree of tolerance towards that body.

It is difficult to estimate the degree to which Jeschonnek's faith in the infallibility of his Fuehrer diminished during the course of the war; he was a man of few words, and apparently he never gave expression to his feelings in this regard. It seems clear, however, that his suicide was motivated not by doubts in regard to Hitler but rather by the unbearable situation which had developed between him and his Commander in Chief, Goering, the eternal intrigues of the clique with which the latter surrounded himself, and finally, the nagging fear that he himself might in some way have been responsible for the collapse of the Luftwaffe. An indication of his unswerving faith in Hitler is a memorandum, justifying his actions as Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff and presenting various recommendations for the future development of the Luftwaffe, which he prepared for Hitler shortly before his death. *6

General der Flieger Guenther Korten, Jeschonnek's successor, was also able to win Hitler's confidence. Here again, the difficulties which Korten faced stemmed less from the Fuehrer's Headquarters than from his Commander in Chief and the latter's immediate circle.

General der Flieger Werner Kreipe, however, who succeeded Korten when the latter was killed in the unsuccessful attempt on Hitler's life in July 1944, was to witness a complete break between Hitler and the Luftwaffe General Staff. Kreipe's earnest efforts to persuade Hitler to reorganize his armament program with greater emphasis on home air defense (particularly to authorize production of the jet fighter which Hitler wanted to use as a fast fighter-bomber) met with immediate and adamant resistance. It was at this time that Hitler demanded that Generaloberst Robert Ritter von Greim be appointed to the Fuehrer's Headquarters as Luftwaffe general and that he be given full authority to act for the Luftwaffe. This meant, of course, that both the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, and the Chief

* The exact wording of this memorandum is a matter of controversy; the memorandum, apparently, is no longer in existence. See footnote 6.
of the Luftwaffe General Staff were to be ignored—in short, it was a vote of no-confidence against Goering as well as a categorical refusal to deal with the General Staff. Generaloberst von Greim, however, an officer and a gentleman, soon asked to be relieved from his position at the Fuehrer's Headquarters and, with his resignation, the situation reverted to what it had been. Now Hitler began to depend upon his personal pilot, a former Lufthansa captain named Bauer, for competent advice in questions concerning the Luftwaffe. Although he held the rank of an SS-Gruppenfuhrer and was a Generalleutnant in the police force, Bauer was no more than a layman in military affairs in general and Luftwaffe affairs in particular. His knowledge was limited to the things which any older experienced pilot had to know about his trade. His gems of wisdom, however,--typical of these was his comment that he could fly a Ju-52 to London and back without the slightest difficulty--found a willing and interested listener in Hitler, and had much to do with the latter's tendency to term any objections brought up by the General Staff to his fantastic demands as pessimism, defeatism, and sabotage. Without any doubt it was partly due to Bauer that Hitler's antipathy towards the General Staff gradually turned into intense hatred.

Hitler's attitude towards the General Staff was bound to lead to the conspiracy of Army General Staff leaders on 20 July 1944. They saw in Hitler not only the General Staff's most implacable enemy but also the ultimate ruin of the German people, and felt that it was their duty towards the nation to put a stop to his activity. That no one from the Luftwaffe General Staff participated in this conspiracy was not due to the fact that none of them would have been willing to act against Hitler, but simply that no attempt was made to take anyone from the Luftwaffe into confidence regarding the plot. This, in turn, was probably due to the traditional feeling on the part of the Army General Staff that the Luftwaffe was National Socialist, both in tendency and sympathy, and was not to be trusted with the undertaking at hand.

Even General der Flieger Karl Koller, the last Luftwaffe Chief of Staff, was unable to improve the relationship between the Luftwaffe General Staff and the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. He was successful, with his down-to-earth Bavarian frankness, in
awakening a certain feeling of sympathy in Hitler, which, of course, was of great help to him in pushing through his requests on behalf of the Luftwaffe. However, their personal association did nothing to mitigate Hitler's basic distrust and hatred towards the General Staff as a whole.

In summary, it is clear that, from the very beginning, Hitler relied implicitly on Goering and his all-encompassing promises in all matters pertaining to the Luftwaffe. For this reason, he refrained from interfering in the work of the Luftwaffe General Staff—at least as long as things were going well. Moreover, the excellent work done by the Luftwaffe General Staff in organizing and building up the new force was so apparent to everyone that there was really no basis for criticism. The performance of the young Luftwaffe during the early campaigns of the war was also above reproach, although here the credit did not go so much to the General Staff Chief and his colleagues as to Goering, whom Hitler overwhelmed with praise and honors during this period. Hitler and Goering firmly believed that they alone were responsible for these early military successes and this conviction naturally led to their depending less and less on the General Staff. This attitude led to greater and greater difficulties as the war went on. Hitler arbitrarily considered himself responsible for the victories and blamed the incompetence of the General Staff for the defeats. Inevitably, Hitler's direct intervention in the command function often had a catastrophic influence on the events of the war and also did much to undermine the mutual confidence between the troops and the General Staff.

As far as the Luftwaffe was concerned, the following instances of Hitler's interference proved to have especially serious consequences:

1. Hitler's demand of 6 December 1938 for the establishment of a so-called Fuehrer-program, which called for an expansion of the Luftwaffe completely beyond the available means. The result, of course, was a shift in emphasis from vertical to horizontal growth which made it impossible later on to compensate adequately for wartime losses resulting from the greatly increased scope of activity. The ultimate consequence was the rapid exhaustion of Luftwaffe
striking power because of a lack of adequately trained replacement personnel.

2. Hitler's demand that the Luftwaffe expend every effort to destroy the British army at Dunkirk, although such action was not at all necessary from the standpoint of military efficiency. As a result, the Luftwaffe sustained serious losses without attaining the hoped-for degree of success.

3. The stubborn continuation of the Battle of Britain even after it had become apparent that further efforts were pointless. The result was a further weakening of Luftwaffe strength through losses of materiel and--more important--of experienced personnel, losses which had not yet been made up by the time the war ended.

4. Hitler's order of 11 September 1941 to cease all developmental work which could not be completed within one year. This order put an immediate stop to research and developmental activity on aircraft models and engines and, as the war progressed, resulted in the Luftwaffe's hopeless inferiority to the enemy in these respects. It was particularly catastrophic in that it precluded any further work on the Me 262, a jet fighter aircraft which, if its development and production had been speeded up in time, would have given Germany a considerable advantage over the Allies and might have effected a revolutionary change in the air situation.

5. Hitler's order to supply Stalingrad by air. This resulted in a further weakening of Luftwaffe units which were, in any case, already occupied beyond capacity with air supply operations elsewhere.

6. Hitler's order of 1944 that tank production be given priority over air armament despite the fact that the situation of the Luftwaffe was clearly desperate.

7. Hitler's stubborn insistence on utilizing the jet fighter (on which developmental work had continued despite the order of September 1941) as a fighter-bomber. In the end not a single one of the types developed was ever used as a fighter-bomber at the front. By the
time the aircraft finally did make its debut as a jet fighter, it was
too late for it to do very much good; it was not until nearly the end of
the war that a few were ready for employment at the front. Through
his stubbornness and his conviction that he knew better than anyone
else, Hitler lightly threw away Germany's chance to gain an advantage
over the enemy.

The above instances of interference by Hitler in the fields of
air armament planning and the employment of the Luftwaffe are cer-
tainly not the only ones; however, they were the most decisive in
effect and were clearly factors which helped to bring about the final
collapse of this new and very promising branch of the Armed Forces.
To be fair, on the other hand, we must realize that such interference
would probably have been impossible—at least in the form in which it
occurred—if the Luftwaffe had had as chief a man capable of con-
vincing his Supreme Commander, by well-founded and reasonable
arguments—based on ability and experience—, of the realistic po-
tentialities and requirements of his branch and of the most rewarding
fields for its employment.

Section II: The Armed Forces High Command and the
Luftwaffe General Staff

We have already discussed the organizational structure of the
Armed Forces High Command and the posts allotted to Luftwaffe
personnel serving on that body.

The relationship between the Luftwaffe General Staff and the
Armed Forces High Command—which was the personal planning
staff of Hitler in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces—was influenced first, by the relatively minor position of the
staff in the military hierarchy and second, by Goering's tendency
towards self-glorification. The Chief of the Armed Forces High
Command, Field Marshal Keitel, was not a strong enough personality
to maintain himself against a man like Goering. Goering himself
recognized orders originating in the Armed Forces High Command
only if they were issued specifically in the name of the Fuehrer or
had been discussed and approved in advance by the Luftwaffe General Staff. Goering's testimony at the Nuremberg trials provides eloquent proof of his attitude:

... the Commanders in Chief of the three Armed Forces branches were directly subordinate and responsible to the Fuehrer. They were in no way—in no way whatsoever—subordinate to the Armed Forces High Command...

For example, an order or directive from the Armed Forces High Command to me as Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, would be inconceivable unless it began with the words 'The Fuehrer has ordered...' or 'In the name of the Fuehrer you are informed that...'. To put it drastically, I once told Generaloberst Keitel that the only orders I considered binding were those from the Fuehrer. I explained that the only original orders I ever saw were those bearing the signature Adolf Hitler. All those beginning with 'At the Fuehrer's orders...' or 'In the name of the Fuehrer...' went to my General Staff Chief, and the important points were then summarized for me at the staff conferences. Under these circumstances—and this is what I meant by putting it drastically—I told Keitel that it was completely irrelevant as far as I was concerned whether the signature 'By order of the Fuehrer, Keitel, Generaloberst' or 'By order of the Fuehrer, Meier, Private First Class.' I told Keitel that if he was considering sending me direct orders signed by himself, he might just as well save himself the time and paper, because I wouldn't consider them binding anyway—I was Commander in Chief and as such responsible only to the Fuehrer...

In reality, however, Goering's attitude towards the authority of the Armed Forces High Command did not have any serious effect on the day-to-day business of that office with the Luftwaffe General Staff. Both partners were eager to avoid any friction which would disrupt their work and went out of their way to be cooperative. The common background of General Staff training and experience did much
to ensure smooth coordination and a reasonable degree of unanimity regarding the needs of the military situation. The only deviations of opinion in the latter respect were those occasioned by Hitler's arbitrary demands that military operations be conducted as he saw fit—and this was something against which the General Staff officers of the Armed Forces High Command could do little or nothing. Important military decisions were either made by Hitler alone or were based on factors which lay outside the sphere of influence of the Armed Forces High Command.

In general, the opinion prevailed that the Armed Forces High Command and its chief were little more than yes-men. It is no wonder that they enjoyed as little prestige with the Luftwaffe General Staff as with the General Staffs of the other Armed Forces branches. As a result, the Armed Forces High Command was felt to be a parallel rather than a superior agency, whose chief duty was to straighten out family quarrels within the services. Its effectiveness as an instrument of military command becomes conspicuous by its absence when we think of the great authority enjoyed by the top-level command of the Army during World War I.

At the beginning of World War II there was, to be sure, a certain uniformity in the views of the three Armed Forces branches concerning the conduct of operations. But as the war progressed and the military difficulties faced by the German Reich grew more and more critical, the importance of the Armed Forces High Command as an authoritative military instrument dwindled in direct proportion to the growing need for just such an instrument.

The Armed Forces High Command failed completely to supply the effective support which the Luftwaffe General Staff needed so badly. There was a certain reluctance to interfere in any way with Luftwaffe affairs, because no one in the Armed Forces High Command was willing to risk the danger of a clash with Goering—at least not so long as he enjoyed Hitler's favor.

This feeling of reluctance diminished gradually during the course of the war, however, as is evidenced by the fact that the Army
High Command had no compunctions about pushing through its plan to speed up the tank procurement program at the expense of the Luftwaffe armament program--and this without even consulting Luftwaffe leaders.

The comments of General der Flieger Koller, the last Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, are of interest in connection with the relationship between the Armed Forces High Command and the Luftwaffe High Command during the last phase of the war.

In June 1944, in order to counter the many recent attacks on Luftwaffe policy, I took advantage of a small conference at the Oberalzberg to point out the weakness of Luftwaffe armament resources, and voiced my feeling that the Armed Forces High Command, which ought to have supported the Luftwaffe armament program in the interests of the Armed Forces and the nation as a whole, had limited itself to negative criticism. I stated frankly that our top military leaders had simply neglected their duty in this connection.

And with this I had stumbled into a wasp's nest! They refused to consider my arguments and tried to persuade me that Goering would not have countenanced any participation by the Armed Forces High Command in the affairs of the Luftwaffe, that he would have termed it interference and forbidden it. There can be no doubt of the inaccuracy of this contention. To be sure, Goering was not a man to countenance interference, but he would certainly have welcomed constructive support and assistance from the Armed Forces High Command in improving the Luftwaffe's armament situation.

The above passage clearly illustrates the unhealthy tendency of the Armed Forces High Command leaders--most of whom were from the Army General Staff--to refuse to interest themselves in the problems of the Luftwaffe. In fact, one often had the impression that the Army was considered the sole decisive branch of the Armed Forces and that the other two--particularly the Luftwaffe--were merely auxiliary troops and expected to get along on their own. If
Luftwaffe and Navy leaders had been given more responsible posts in the Armed Forces High Command, this attitude might have been avoided. Hitler would never have permitted a reshuffling of his planning staff to this end, because his views on war and its problems were very much those which had prevailed during World War I, and at that time, of course, the Army was the most important military force. On the other hand, neither the Luftwaffe nor the Navy was much interested in having greater responsibility in the Armed Forces High Command, since it would have meant a certain loss in their quite considerable independence of action.

It is a well-known fact that the top-ranking members of the Armed Forces High Command had no influence over the fantastic plans of the Fuehrer. History cannot but reproach them for this. From the vantage point of today it seems incredible that these men let themselves be hypnotized into acquiescence by Hitler's demoniacal fantasies, whose lack of military soundness must have been obvious.

The lower echelons of the General Staffs of all three branches of the service gained little if any accurate knowledge of what was really going on. Few of these lower ranking officers were acquainted with the personalities and military prowess of the men at the top. Fuehrer Directive No. 1* made it impossible for them to obtain adequate information regarding the over-all policies governing the conduct of the war and domestic politics. The troop general staffs trusted their superiors and comrades at the top because they traditionally assumed them to be men of character and officers capable of sound and objective planning. The gradual change in these men, brought about by Hitler's unbelievable successes in both the military and political spheres and by the tremendous influence which his personality exerted over the persons around him, was never clearly recognized by the men in the lower General Staff posts. The change in Field Marshal Keitel, however, became generally apparent, as is indicated by the widespread use of the nickname "Lakai-tel" during

* See Introduction to this study.

† Translator's Note: This is a play on words; the word "Lakai" (accented on the last syllable) means "lackey."
the last years of the war.

Section III: Goering and his General Staff

The relationship of the Luftwaffe General Staff to its Commander in Chief was subject to various and changing influences. Basically, the tone was set by the extremely friendly association existing between Goering and his first General Staff Chief, General Wever. Wever's personal integrity and his tremendous efficiency made a lasting impression on his chief, and were certainly instrumental in inspiring the attitude of trust and confidence which Goering displayed towards all the Luftwaffe General Staff Officers. The success of this early relationship influenced Goering to grant the Luftwaffe General Staff officers complete independence in carrying out their work—at least during the early developmental years.

Field Marshal Kesselring describes the early relationship as follows: 9

In Reichsmarschall Herman Goering, the Luftwaffe had a former flight officer, a National Socialist, and a generous man as its Commander in Chief. He required a great deal from us generals in the Reichs Air Ministry, but he gave us complete freedom of action and shielded us from all political criticism. In my long years as a soldier, I have never been so free of outside influences and so able to act independently as during this early period of Luftwaffe development (from 1933 on), when I served as Chief of the Luftwaffe Administration Office, Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, and as a field commander.

The personal respect which Goering felt for the leading officers in the Reichs Air Ministry facilitated his decision to approve the formation of a Luftwaffe General Staff. In a sense, this decision represented a sincere vote of confidence on Goering's part, especially since all his friends from former days and particularly his State Secretary, Milch, were bitterly opposed to a General Staff for the
Luftwaffe.

The author of this study was himself a witness to a number of sharp and unreasonable attacks on the General Staff idea made by Milch and General Udet during the summer of 1937. Goering's replies were equally sharp and implied unmistakably that he felt their arguments to be the result of petty envy and a feeling of inferiority.

The confidence which Goering felt in his first General Staff Chief certainly had some effect on his attitude towards the subsequent Chiefs. The friction which later developed was not due to a basic change in this attitude, but rather to specific events of the war which we shall discuss more fully later on. It is understandable, of course, that Hitler's antipathy towards the General Staff may have influenced Goering to a certain extent; however, Goering's antipathy was restricted more or less to the Army General Staff, and a certain feeling of closeness and solidarity—as well as a personal need to belong—bound him to his own General Staff. On the other hand, he was easily swayed by the comments of close friends and younger, inexperienced combat officers (particularly those who had distinguished themselves in combat), and when under these influences was quite capable of turning against the General Staff as the proper instrument of command. These moods never lasted very long, however, for he was shrewd enough to realize that he was wholly dependent upon the General Staff in matters of command.

Goering's alleged rages at the General Staff—particularly after a Luftwaffe defeat—were not taken too seriously by that organization; they helped, however, to disrupt his relationship to it on more than one occasion during the war.

Goering's almost pathological vanity made it impossible for him to permit the achievements of his General Staff Chiefs to be praised in public. It was the duty of the Chief to remain in the background—even as far as the Luftwaffe itself was concerned. Generaloberst Jeschonnek, as the first wartime General Staff Chief, was the one to suffer most as a result of Goering's hunger for personal fame. Goering almost never recommended his General Staff officers for
decorations, "after all, they were only aides, and aides have no right
to decorations . . ." 

10 Under no circumstances were the General
Staff members permitted to appear publicly as leading personalities
within the Luftwaffe—which did not deter Goering from demanding
the maximum from them in performance and self-sacrificing devotion
to duty. Inasmuch as this practice was a part of the ancient General
Staff tradition, they accepted it in fairly good grace. In the long run,
however, the rod is not enough to ensure continual top performance—
an occasional pat on the back is also required.

During the course of the war, the Luftwaffe General Staff
gradually built up a kind of defense front against its Commander in
Chief. Thus, Goering gradually lost the confidence of the Luftwaffe
General Staff as the war progressed. When Generaloberst Korten
died of injuries sustained in the unsuccessful plot against Hitler's
life on 20 July 1944, Goering was hard put to find a willing successor
for him. Again, after General Kreipe's comparatively short incum-
bency as General Staff Chief, it was only with difficulty that Goering
was able to persuade General Koller to take over the job.

In this connection the notes which General Koller made after
his interview with Goering are of interest.11

Interviews with Goering in the Wolfschanze* on 5 Novem-
ber [944] from 1400 to 1520, 1800 to 2000, and 2200 to 2400.
Reichsmarschall tells me the entire story of his life, describes
his work, his contributions to the development of the Luftwaffe.
Deeply unhappy, complains of the attacks directed at him from
all sides—Army, SS, Party. Discusses the general situation
and says resignedly that he's had enough—sick and tired of
the whole business and doesn't want to hear any more about
it; wishes he were dead.

Tells me he wanted to join the parachute troops at the
front, but the Fuehrer won't let him go and says that he's the

* "Wolfschanze" was the Headquarters of the Commander in
Chief, Luftwaffe.
only man who can build up the Luftwaffe again.

Reichsmarschall continues, describing his unsuccessful attempts to persuade General Kreipe to stay on as General Staff Chief and the difficulties he had in connection with Generaloberst von Greim and General Generalleutnant Kurt Pflugbeil.*

Reichsmarschall speaks with bitter reproach of a memorandum prepared by von Greim, recommending that all Luftwaffe headquarters be placed under the command of the Chief of Air Operations, (i.e. under von Greim himself), leaving Goering only a few crumbs of authority. (At this point I feel I have to interrupt to explain that von Greim's recommendations were not meant that way at all.) Reichsmarschall agrees reluctantly and says that Colonel Kless† was probably responsible for persuading von Greim to choose the wording he did.

Reichsmarschall says he's reached the end of his rope, has no one besides me on his side . . . asks me to take on the post of Chief of the General Staff.

After much beating around the bush, Goering says there's no other alternative and I have no choice but to accept the assignment.

My reply: Much as I regret it in this instance, I am a soldier and my first duty is obedience. I accept under one condition; that I be permitted to express my opinion frankly and freely and to state the truth as I see it.

Reichsmarschall beams and assures me that this condition goes without saying, shakes my hand twice . . .

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* Both of these officers were considered for the post of Luftwaffe General, Fuehrer Headquarters or, as von Greim suggested it be called, Chief of Air Operations.

† Colonel Kless was Generaloberst von Greim's chief of staff in the Sixth Air Fleet.
The remarks cited above are most illuminating. Not only do they reveal the severe mental depression to which Goering was prey during this period, but they also serve to illustrate his dependence upon the General Staff. It is indicative of his situation that he was overjoyed to accept as General Staff Chief a man whom he had already rejected in this connection under different circumstances, as is revealed by the following passage taken from the diary of General Kriepe, Koller's predecessor, and referring to an interview between Goering and himself: 12

3 October 1944: And then on to Karinhall, * where von Greim was closeted with Goering--Goering apparently in a towering rage. Finally I was summoned to Goering... I found him alone and deeply upset. He complained that they were trying to shut him out, Greim was a traitor, he (Goering) was and intended to remain Commander in Chief, Greim was finished as far as far as he was concerned--might just as well go right back to his Air Fleet. Now he (Goering) had no one to turn to. He begged me not to desert him, said I had to stand by him. I pointed out that I had the impression that the whole business seemed to be a plot directed against him personally. The only thing I could suggest was the assignment of General Koller, who--as far as I knew--still had Hitler's confidence, to the Chief's post. Goering made no comment on my first remark. As far as Koller was concerned, he told me that he had considered him once before, in late July (i.e. after Korten's death), and would prefer to avoid that solution if at all possible--he said that he didn't think he and Koller would be able to work harmoniously together for any length of time.

When Generaloberst Koller took office as General Staff chief on 25 November 1944, Goering delivered a speech before the assembled General Staff officers (an unprecedented thing for him to do). Goering's remarks reveal better than any other source the total

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* Goering's estate, located on the Schorfheide near Berlin.
picture of his personality, his views on Germany's position, and his concept of the General Staff and its mission. His comments are indicative of a certain basic primitiveness, combined with healthy common sense and flavored with humor; the speech is filled with somewhat long-winded argumentation, which may be interpreted as an expression of his feeling of insecurity towards the General Staff. Now that he was alone, abandoned by many of his former friends and associates, fallen from Hitler's favor, and facing the complete collapse of his Luftwaffe, Goering was desperately eager to reassociate himself with that group which had done such a fine job of building the Luftwaffe, i.e. with the Luftwaffe General Staff! The reassociation was not to be of long duration, however, as we shall see later on, nor did it spring from an inner desire on Goering's part, but was motivated rather by the urgency of the moment. This is clear from a study written by General Paul Döchmann, in which he has the following to say regarding the position of the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff during wartime: 13

The relationship existing between Goering and his General Staff Chiefs during the war had little in common with the classic examples of history, such as Blucher/Gneisenau, for example. It resembled much more the legendary relationship between a sultan and his grand vizier, whereby the latter lived in constant dread of being beheaded or thrown into prison at his master's whim. In his book Der letzte Monat (The Last Month), General Koller describes Goering's continual threats of court martial, concentration camp, and execution.

We must admit in all fairness that this unsatisfactory relationship between the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, and his General Staff Chiefs only developed gradually as the war took its course, particularly from that time on when the Luftwaffe began to suffer defeat. However, even at the beginning of the war, the association of these two personalities was not entirely what it should have been. The reasons for this are probably the following:

Goering considered himself the sole creator of the Luftwaffe. Moreover, he was determined that he, and he alone,
should receive credit for its successes; he had no intention of sharing this credit with anyone else. It was for this reason that he limited the power of decision of his General Staff and retained personal control over many minor details. He objected strongly whenever the General Staff Chief dared to make inspection visits to subordinate headquarters or to troop units without him in order to orient himself on conditions.

In the beginning Goering usually attended the conferences with the Fuehrer himself; whenever he was unable to do so (or preferred not to do so, as was almost always the case later on, when the air situation had become so desperately critical), he sent as representative not the General Staff Chief, but some other officer from his staff (frequently the intelligence officer from the Luftwaffe High Command). When he did finally agree to send the General Staff Chief—probably at Hitler's insistence—the latter no longer had any authority to make a final decision anyway.

Whenever Goering made inspection visits together with the General Staff Chief, it was apparent to all observers that the latter functioned only as an order-taker. 'Write this down . . .,' 'See that such and such is done . . .,' were the usual remarks addressed to the General Staff Chief by his Commander in Chief on these occasions.

The General Staff Chief, who had quite enough to keep him busy, spent a great deal of time in fulfilling social obligations and in waiting for Goering. If the latter was in conferences with Hitler, for example, the General Staff Chief was expected to wait hours on end at Fuehrer Headquarters in case he might be needed to furnish information on some particular matter.

Goering's penchant for retiring to remote places, such as the Reichs Hunting Lodge at Rominten (East Prussia), often made it necessary for the Chief of the General Staff to work with a diminished staff in Goering's railroad car for
months at a time. In this connection, General von Waldaus's\textsuperscript{14} diary\textsuperscript{15} gives us a further hint:

'I've been trying to keep my distance from the Chief (i.e. Goering); it's not compatible with work to have to keep company with him and to eat all the time . . . '

It would be unfair if we should try to make the General Staff Chief responsible for certain events over which he had little or no influence. This is particularly true of technological matters, in which the leading role was played by the deputy Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, the State Secretary and Inspector General Erhard Milch. Ernst Heinkel, * in his memoirs,\textsuperscript{16} (the value or rather lack of value of which it is not my province to judge) states:

'The creation of the new position (i.e. Milch's appointment as Goering's deputy) was rather unfortunate in that it prevented the development of a real top-level command agency within the Luftwaffe. There were countless occasions when close contact between Goering and the Chief of the General Staff would have been profitable; in every case Milch's robust figure stood between them and could not be circumvented. '

Heinkel's remarks are essentially accurate. Ever since 1937, when the General Staff was removed from its position of subordination to the State Secretary (after a serious disagreement between Milch and General Staff Chief Kesselring), Milch had been jealously on guard to see that no one from the General Staff should have any say in the technological matters nominally entrusted to him. Thus, since 1937 the General Staff had hardly been in a position to push through its thoroughly justifiable armament requirements (particularly in regard to the development of new aircraft models). The only way was

* Heinkel was the director of the Heinkel Aircraft Works.
to go directly to Goering, but this involved numerous difficulties and, in any case, was rarely successful.* A further factor which served to weaken the position of the General Staff Chief was Goering's penchant for using his personal friends as unofficial advisors. Chief among these were (Karl) Bodenschatz, (Chief of the Ministerial Office, with whom Goering had been associated since before the war), (Bruno) Loerzer, and (Alfred) Keller. As a result, the General Staff Chief not only had to convince Goering of his views, but also had to struggle against prejudices and preconceived notions planted in his mind by these advisors. As the fortunes of war varied, Goering resorted to other advisors as well—a colonel whose hobby was graphology, for example, and a professor from Kassel with an allegedly clairvoyant wand whose gyrations influenced Goering's decisions... 

After the war, Goering came to realize the unhealthy influence of the individuals with whom he had surrounded himself—as is indicated by his comment that 'now he knew who his real friends had been...'

We need add little to the foregoing comments—made by a man who witnessed much at first hand during his association with the Reichsmarschall—in order to obtain a full picture of the personal relationship between Goering and his General Staff Chiefs. The only thing we might point out is the fact that an older officer, such as Wever or Kesselring, would not have countenanced such treatment from Goering; and this is precisely the reason why Goering preferred to have a younger officer as General Staff Chief and, as a matter of fact, to surround himself with younger men. General Jeschonnek cannot escape a good deal of the blame for encouraging this tendency. He deliberately called Goering's attention to younger officers who had

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* This situation changed for the better in 1944 when the Chief of Technical Air Armament, taking the place of the former Chief of Luftwaffe Procurement and Supply, was made directly subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff. By this time, however, it was too late to achieve any real improvement in the technical armament situation.
distinguished themselves in action—men like Storp, Diesing, Harlinghausen, and Peltz*—in order that the Reichsmarschall might obtain an accurate picture of actual conditions at the front. The result, however, was not quite what Jeschonnek intended. As the war continued, Goering tended more and more to go directly to these young men, without consulting his General Staff Chief, and to solicit their advice. Goering overlooked the fact that these young officers could not possibly possess more than limited specialized experience, but that—in their confident immaturity—they might easily be tempted to voice an authoritative opinion in matters of which they had no real knowledge.

In this way the General Staff Chief himself brought unofficial and, in part, irresponsible advisors into the Reichsmarschall's vicinity. One of them, Diesing, went over to Goering's camp entirely and worked so openly against Jeschonnek that the latter was con-
strained to term him a traitor.

Goering's so-called "Kindergarten," a group of young officers under the leadership of Chief Adjutant von Brauchitsch† (all of them much decorated for valor in action) who had succeeded in working their way gradually into the personal staff of the Reichsmarschall, had a decidedly detrimental influence on Goering's attitude towards his General Staff Chief and thus on the work of the General Staff itself.

Not only was their influence—exerted during the course of evening discussions around the fireplace—unhealthy, but they also managed to form a tightly-knit clique with other younger officers and comrades serving in various headquarters staffs and at the front. The collective influence of this clique on Goering made the work of the General Staff unbearably difficult and played a not inconsiderable role in the final break between Goering and Jeschonnek.

The influence exerted by the Reichmarschall's personal circle

* Editor's Note: Generalmajor Walter Storp, Generalmajor Ulrich Diesing, Generalleutnant Martin Harlinghausen, Generalmajor Dietrich Peltz.
† The son of Feldmarschall von Brauchitsch.
of friends was also highly undesirable. The majority of these were
officers whom Goering had known during World War I, men whose
knowledge of modern military operations was sadly limited, but
who--thanks to Goering's patronage--had been promoted with comet-
like rapidity. A number of them were constantly in Goering's vicinity,
and the influence which their comments exerted on him was anything
but conducive to a smooth relationship with the General Staff. A re-
port by the last General Staff Chief, General Koller, serves to en-
lighten us further in this respect:

The Reichsmarschall must also be blamed for the fre-
quency with which conferences and orientation periods were
simply broken off before a decision had been reached. He
solicited the advice of anyone and everyone--the Chief of Luft-
waffe Procurement and Supply, the State Secretary, any young
squadron captains or unit commanders who happened to be
around--no matter how fantastic and immature his ideas might
be. None of them knew what any of the others had said, and
the Chief of the General Staff was almost always the last one
to hear (often quite by accident) what it was all about. Then,
too, Goering was very receptive to the remarks of the often
irresponsible men making up his circle of associates, most
of whom were totally incompetent and had absolutely no idea
of the problems involved...

General Koller, who served for many years as Chief of the
Luftwaffe Operations Staff and ultimately as Chief of the General
Staff, was in a particularly good position to observe events at first
hand. He has the following to say regarding the role played by the
younger General Staff officers in Goering's personal staff:

It was extremely unfortunate that the Reichsmarschall
preferred to fill his personal staff with such young officers,
men from the flying forces, antiaircraft artillery units, or
signal troops who had had only a few years' experience as
soldiers. Most of them had had no really thorough training--
at least no all-around training--and at most only a few
weeks of General Staff experience. It is no wonder that their
views were immature and their professional and personal experience painfully limited. Their training spotty and incomplete, they tended to be conceited and the heady atmosphere into which they came often had the effect of turning them into megalomaniacs and spinners of intrigues. They were taken into the General Staff even before they had had any basic training, and given the right to wear the coveted crimson stripe on their trousers; they were promoted with astonishing rapidity--over the heads of their comrades; and they were accorded a position of influence which they were totally unqualified to fill. These youngsters were infuriatingly quick to pass judgment on anything and anyone--commanders in chief, generals to whom they were abysmally inferior in professional knowledge and personal savoir faire, men who could have been their fathers. They were just as quick to pass judgment on technical matters or on questions pertaining to the employment of forces. That Goering's "court clique" came in for a great deal of adverse criticism from troops and command as well as from leaders in the top echelons of the Luftwaffe itself is a well-known fact.

The several passages which we have cited in this section, stemming from men who had ample opportunity during their period of service as Chiefs of the General Staff to become intimately acquainted with Goering's professional qualifications and personal attitudes, require no further comment. They provide a complete picture of Goering's rather extraordinary personality and of the relationship between him and his General Staff Chiefs, who by rights ought to have been his closest co-workers. He was a man of tremendous energy, quick to explode in impulsive rage, and then--in smug self-conceit--to sit back and let things run their course; a personality characterized by an inordinate degree of self-confidence out of all proportion to his actual professional ability and, at the same time, by a feeling of insecurity in keeping with his lack of ability. Outwardly brutal and ruthless, he was filled with an almost childlike reverence, tempered by fear, for his Fuehrer, which made him constantly eager to anticipate the latter's every wish, regardless of whether or not it might be capable of practical realization. For the General Staff Chiefs, Goering
was an extremely comfortable superior so long as things were going well, but an unbearable burden in a crisis—precisely the time when the positive qualities of a strong commander in chief are most urgently needed to support his co-workers. Instead of doing everything in his power to strengthen the instrument which had performed so well for him, he viewed it with mistrust, belittled it in public and before the troops, blunted it by continual amateurish interference, and, ultimately, was responsible in good part for its defeat and collapse.

Section IV: The State Secretary and the General Staff

The position of the State Secretary, Erhard Milch, within the Reichs Air Ministry had little in common with the post of state secretary within the parliamentary government of a democratic state. This position was created as an aid to Goering, whose many and varied obligations prevented him from devoting as much time to his duties as Minister of Aviation as seemed desirable. Besides, it was necessary to create some sort of post for the director of the Lufthansa (Milch), to whom Hitler had incurred certain obligations during the early struggles of his political career; and the position established had to be one which would utilize his experience in the field of aviation and, at the same time, satisfy his ambition. It is for the latter reason that the State Secretary was designated as the permanent deputy of both the Minister of Aviation and the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe. In the latter capacity, of course, he had authority over the Chief of the General Staff, with his various departments, as well as over the chiefs of the troop staffs.

In keeping with ancient tradition, the Chief of the General Staff is the primary advisor of his commander in chief—a function for which his personality, training, and experience ideally should suit him; obviously, then, serious friction is bound to develop when the post of State Secretary is held by a man who has none of the above-mentioned qualifications, but who insists upon being recognized as the first and only advisor of the minister, even in purely military matters. Thus it is no wonder that the poor relationship between the State Secretary and the Chiefs of the General Staff is an ever recurring theme in this study. I shall not repeat here those comments which I have
already made,

In order that the reader may have a more thorough understanding of the situation, I should like to emphasize here the extraordinarily strong position enjoyed by Milch as a result of his close connection with the Party and with Hitler himself. Taking this fact into consideration, it is easy to understand why Goering—who was anything but fond of Milch—was unable to rid himself of the State Secretary. All attempts to reduce Milch's authority in favor of the Chief of the General Staff were doomed to failure by the State Secretary's ruthless determination to hold on to his position and the privileges appertaining thereto.* Once the war had begun, however, and particularly after 1944, Milch's position grew gradually less important.

In order not to jeopardize the closeness of the ties which bound him to the Party (and also in order to keep himself fully informed on the latest political developments), Milch employed a high Party functionary as special duty staff assistant on his personal staff. He gained the man's loyalty by giving him civil service status and by arranging to have him promoted to high ministerial rank. No one was deceived as to Milch's true purpose, of course, but in the last analysis this man proved to be a boon to the Luftwaffe as a whole; because of him, Milch was able to handle any attacks on the Luftwaffe made by the Party right in his own office, and the Luftwaffe officers did not need to bother about them.

In order to compensate for the fact that his qualifications for the post of deputy to the Commander in Chief were painfully few, Milch did his best to impress the General Staff Chief and his colleagues with his admittedly unusual talent for organization and his allegedly all-encompassing knowledge of technological matters. Inasmuch as his experience in both fields was based exclusively on his activity as director of the Lufthansa, his audience was less impressed than irritated, thinking—quite correctly—that the principles applicable to the operation of a commercial enterprise such as the Lufthansa could

* See also Chapter 4, above.
not be entirely applicable to military conditions.

The first serious disagreement began to develop when General Kesselring took office as Chief of the General Staff, * and had its climax in Kesselring's voluntary resignation from this post; Stumpff then became General Staff Chief. The State Secretary had won, but his victory was Pyrrhic in that he was relieved of his authority over the General Staff Chief. In a letter dated 21 February 1934, 18 Milch describes the effects of this move as he saw them and evaluates the influence on subsequent events of the over-all reorganization in the Luftwaffe top-level command apparatus:

... In the summer of 1937, Goering reorganized the top-level command apparatus of the Luftwaffe; some of the results of his reorganization were the following:

1. The close cooperation previously existing among the General Staff, the office of the Chief of Luftwaffe Procurement and Supply, the Personnel Office, and the rest of the departments of the Reichs Air Ministry was diminished considerably. A further factor in this connection was the high rate of turnover in the incumbency of key positions, e.g. during the years 1933 through 1945 there were no fewer than eight Chiefs of the General Staff.

2. The Junkers and Dornier four-engine bombers were not approved for mass production, despite the fact that the test models had proved highly promising. As a result Germany had no really adequate aircraft model for use in strategic operations; without any doubt, this is one of the reasons for the failure of the air offensive against Britain and for the Luftwaffe's inability to provide adequate air protection for German submarines at sea.

* See above, pp. 31-32.
† Milch means the Air Technical Office; the office of the Chief of Luftwaffe Procurement and Supply was not established until later.
3. The production of aircraft instruments, which had increased steadily until 1937, was allowed to level off and was not stepped up again until 1942. * The same was true of research and developmental activity on new aircraft types and modern aircraft equipment, such as power units for turbojet engines (a project assigned to Junkers and the Bavarian Motor Works in 1936), new piston-driven engines, etc.

4. According to the plans developed in 1933, bomber aircraft were to have first priority in order to build up a minimum deterrent force to discourage the Western Powers from interfering in Germany's rearmament activity. After 1937-38 top priority was to go to the fighter aircraft, first the day fighters and then the night fighters. This shift in emphasis never took place. And neither the technical performance nor the airborne armaments of the few fighters being produced (approximately 200 per month by the end of the second year of war) had taken full advantage of the technological possibilities.

5. During the period from 1 September 1939 through 15 November 1941, the aircraft production program was subject to no fewer than sixteen thoroughgoing revisions, not a single one of which was carried through as planned. As a result, the industrial plants concerned were thoroughly confused regarding series production and developmental work. During the year 1942, for example, there was no fixed schedule for delivery of new or refitted aircraft and engines to the front. The technological aspect of Luftwaffe development had come to a full stop, both quantitatively and qualitatively, by the end of 1941. A complete reorganization was urgently needed and, indeed, it began to have a favorable effect after about eight months until all progress was stopped by Allied bombardments on the one hand and interference from above on

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* i.e. until Udet's death, at which time Milch took over the duties of the Chief of Luftwaffe Procurement and Supply.
on the other (e.g. the ban on developing and producing the Me-262 as a fighter) . . .

So much for the State Secretary's personal views. While the items which he mentions are certainly contributing factors to the final collapse of the Luftwaffe, he still (21 February 1954) insists on blaming them all on the reorganization of 1937, which removed the Chief of the General Staff--and, incidentally, Udet as well--from his immediate command. He neglects to mention, however, that this situation was changed six months later--at the suggestion of General Stumpff, Kesselring's successor--and that from that time on Milch was once more exclusively responsible for technical air armament, without any possibility of interference on the part of the Chief of the General Staff. * Thus one might be tempted to interpret his statement regarding the stagnation of technological development in late 1941 as an attempt to fix the blame retrospectively on Udet. Even so, Udet--despite the fact that he had direct access to Goering--was technically subordinate to the State Secretary, and it would be manifestly unfair of the latter to try to make Udet entirely responsible for the collapse. 

After Udet's death, the State Secretary assumed responsibility for technical air armament and retained this responsibility until 1944, when it was transferred to the Chief of the General Staff--too late to avert the catastrophe.

It is difficult to understand the reasons for the State Secretary's hatred of the General Staff and its Chief. In the presence of the author, Goering once said to him, 19 "Milch, you don't know what you're talking about! You're simply jealous of the General Staff because they wouldn't accept you when you tried to get in in 1917!"

* Editor's Note: The General Staff, of course, did have some measure of influence in that it was responsible for formulating tactical-technological requirements for the Luftwaffe.

† Editor's Note: The relationship between Milch and Udet--particularly the degree of subordination involved--requires further detailed study,
In view of Milch's desire for power and prestige, it may well be that this was the basis of his antipathy. Thwarted ambition is always a bad thing and it can become dangerous when the person concerned is given a position of power in which he can avenge his wounded feelings. There is no doubt that the disharmony existing between the State Secretary and the General Staff was one of the chief factors in the failure and final downfall of the German Luftwaffe.

Milch probably did the most damage through his decisive influence on the development and production of aircraft models. Here he often used his influence to counter the recommendations made by the General Staff, as the two examples given below will indicate. The following is an excerpt from a report by General Deichmann concerning the General Staff request for a four-engine bomber:20

... Realizing that any future war would involve operations against targets lying in Russia, near and perhaps beyond the Ural Mountains, Luftwaffe leaders submitted a request for the development of a long-range bomber. In keeping with its contemplated employment, General Wever and his colleagues termed this model the "Ural bomber" both orally and in internal correspondence.

The technological requirements established for the Ural bomber were such as to enable it to reach the target indicated in its name.

Even at that early date, the Luftwaffe General Staff was firmly convinced that the standard bomber of the future would have to be a long-range machine.

The next few years of developmental work on bomber aircraft revealed clearly that the necessary technical performance could not be attained by a twin-engine bomber. Very soon thereafter, once Colonel Wimmer, at that time Chief of the Technical Office, had persuaded General Wever of the urgent need for a four-engine aircraft, the Luftwaffe General Staff amended its original request to encompass the larger airplane.
The initial research and developmental work was assigned to three separate aircraft manufacturing firms.

In 1937, after I had become Chief of Branch I, Operations, I learned that the Technical Office was planning to give up any further work on the four-engine bomber. Hereupon I requested permission to present my views on the subject to the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, Herman Goering. General der Flieger Milch also participated in the ensuing conference. I asked Goering to authorize further work on the bomber at all costs, pointing out that information received from abroad as well as the views of a number of recognized engineers indicated clearly that the performance of the four-engine bomber was expected to be so far superior to that attainable by a twin-engine machine that the four-engine aircraft would certainly develop into the air weapon of the future. I emphasized that the four-engine bomber was capable of a far greater flight range than could ever be developed for its twin-engine counterpart, and that the presumably remote targets involved in any future war could be reached only by a four-engine bomber. I continued, explaining that a four-engine bomber was capable of attaining a sufficiently high service altitude to keep it safely out of the range of antiaircraft artillery fire; its considerably greater carrying capacity would permit it to carry not only a greater number of bombs, but also heavier armor plating and more and better airborne armaments. Its higher speed would help to reduce its vulnerability to attack by enemy fighter aircraft.

General Milch interrupted, demanding to know where I had gotten all this information on the "fantastic" performance of the four-engine bomber. He told me that his own aeronautical engineers had come up with far less favorable prognoses. I replied that I was aware of the views held by this particular group of engineers within the Reichs Air Ministry, but that a considerable number of the engineers connected with the Technical Office were of quite a different opinion. The only way to determine which group was right was to let the developmental work continue. At this Milch declared that
all available industrial capacity was needed for the production of Ju-88's. I replied that during the course of my tour of the aircraft plants to inspect camouflage measures, several directors had assured me that they had both the space and the manpower to work on a four-engine bomber in addition to their other projects. Milch's rejoinder was that the men with whom I had spoken obviously were not aware of the full scope of the Ju-88 program.

In summary General Milch pointed out the following facts: 1) the much vaunted advantages of the four-engine bomber were far overrated, both in Germany and abroad; 2) what would be the point of its being able to fly at 32,800 feet? ... according to statistics, in Germany the sky was overcast for so and so many days per year, so that it would be impossible to aim bombs from this altitude (I no longer recall the fantastically high number of days per year mentioned by Milch, but a subsequent check with the weather service revealed that he had exaggerated by 30-40%); our industrial capacity would permit a fleet of only 1,000 four-engine bombers, whereas several times that many twin-engine bombers could be produced; 4) the development of a four-engine bomber, even for limited production as test models, would endanger the Ju-88 program.

In reply I voiced the opinion that 1,000 four-engine bombers, whose longer range, greater speed, and higher degree of invulnerability to enemy attack would enable them to reach their targets safely, were of far more value than 10,000 twin-engine bombers which would probably be shot down by the enemy before reaching their destination. I begged Goering not to decide against the four-engine bomber without further evidence, but to let the developmental work on it continue.

Despite my pleas, Goering determined that work on the four-engine bomber should be dropped inasmuch as it might interfere with successful accomplishment of the Ju-88 program.

General Deichmann's report certainly refutes the charge that the Luftwaffe General Staff never made any definite request for the
development of a long-range bomber. The conference described
above shows quite clearly that the General Staff had indeed taken the
proper action, but that its request was deliberately scuppered by State
Secretary Milch. Only a layman—and Goering was one—could base
such a far-reaching decision on the flimsy arguments advanced by
Milch. Milch's contention that the Ju-88 program would be endangered
by the production of a few four-engine bombers for testing purposes
is so utterly ridiculous that one is curious to know what the real
reasons may have been. At any rate, it seems strange that Milch
now labels Germany's failure to develop a four-engine bomber as a
grave error on the part of Luftwaffe leaders and attempts to blame it
on the reorganization which took place in Luftwaffe top-level command
agencies in the summer of 1937. 21

This was not the only instance in which Milch's interference
had a detrimental effect on the Luftwaffe armament situation. Another
case is also described by General Deichmann: 22

. . . Strangely enough, the Ju-52 transport aircraft had
come to be the standard training aircraft for courses in the C
group (multi-engine aircraft) as well as for courses in instru-
ment navigation. This was understandable in the early years
of Luftwaffe development, for the simple reason that there
were no other aircraft models available. The retention of the
Ju-52 in this capacity, however, was less comprehensible
since it had three engines and a steering wheel, while all the
other models used in the Luftwaffe had either one or two
engines and stick control.

In the early months of the war the practice developed of
borrowing the Ju-52's and the instructional personnel of the
C Schools and Instrument Navigation Schools to take part in
air transport operations. The aircraft which survived were
returned several weeks later, some of them badly damaged;
and the instructors killed in action were practically irre-
placeable. As a result, the training of replacement crews
for bomber and long-range reconnaissance units stagnated
just at the time when such replacements were most urgently
needed at the front.
In 1940, while I was Chief of Staff to the Chief of Training (after the campaign in Poland), I took advantage of a conference with Goering to suggest to him that the Ju-86 be adopted to replace the Ju-52 as a training aircraft. The Ju-86 was a twin-engine bomber with a crude oil engine and had been introduced in a number of bomber units shortly before the war. Since the crude oil engine had not proved entirely satisfactory, and since newer, faster models had become available, the Ju-86 was no longer being used at the front. It would have taken only a few man-hours to adapt the Ju-86 as a trainer by installing double controls and a second instrument panel. By replacing the crude oil engine with a gasoline engine, the Ju-86--with its highly satisfactory flight characteristics--could be made into an ideal training machine. There was one disadvantage involved in the conversion from crude oil to gasoline: the fuel tanks, of course, had been constructed for crude oil and would hold only enough gasoline to keep the aircraft aloft for one and a half hours; however, I did not feel that this was a serious obstacle to its use as a trainer. Moreover, auxiliary fuel tanks could be installed in the wings without any difficulty. Another thing in its favor was the fact that large supplies of the necessary raw materials were available, since its removal from the armament program had come as a surprise. A single small aircraft plant could easily have produced the quantity needed for the C Schools.

Field Marshal Milch, who was also present at the conference, objected strongly to my recommendation, ostensibly on the grounds that the Ju-88 program required every bit of available industrial capacity. He explained that the new aircraft procurement program called for the production of eighty Ju-52's per month, which would easily be enough to meet front requirements for transport aircraft as well as the needs of the schools. He brushed aside my objection that the needs of the front in transport aircraft were practically unlimited. Goering decided against my suggestion. The only concession I was able to obtain was the promise that control of the distribution of all Ju-52 aircraft would be given to the
Chief of Training. In this way, he could at least see that the schools had sufficient training aircraft.

It is a well-known fact that the practice of requisitioning Ju-52's from the training schools continued unabated and, in fact, became more and more common as the war progressed. As a result, of course, the schools were simply unable to fulfill their mission of providing trained replacement personnel for the bomber and long-range reconnaissance forces.

The Battle of Britain provided the earliest indication of the catastrophic consequences of Goering's decision.

In this instance, too, it is obvious that Milch deliberately sabotaged an excellent suggestion with flimsy arguments. Milch was not so foolish that he could have failed to see the advantages to be gained by adopting this suggestion. One can only assume that he turned it down so vehemently in order to impress Goering, who, of course, had no idea of the issue involved, with his own superiority to the General Staff officer. The fact that he could do such a thing without taking the possible effects into account throws rather a revealing light on his character and on his attitude towards the General Staff.

During Jeschonnek's period of service as Chief of the General Staff, the relationship between Milch and the General Staff grew noticeably more and more difficult. In a questionnaire dated 2 September 1955, Milch gives his reasons as follows:

... This is the way it happened. One day I received a report from the Training Wing that an airplane had crashed on the water; the machine had gotten out of control in a low dive over the Bach. The next day two more machines, with

*Translator's Note: Bach (stream) is Luftwaffe jargon for ocean; in this particular case, it refers to the Baltic Sea bay off the shore from Greifswald.
their crews, were reported missing for the same reason. I requested copies of the orders and in them I read the following sentence: 'In practising low-altitude flight, the pilot should make certain that the propeller tips touch the water.' It was reported to me that the comment 'Anyone who doesn't do it this way is a coward!' was added orally.

I now faced the decision of whether or not to initiate court martial proceedings against Jeschonnek. I decided against it, however, and gave him a severe reprimand instead. From this moment on, he was my deadly enemy. If I had gone ahead with court martial proceedings, he could have been sentenced to several years' imprisonment. Ambition and vanity are the basic causes of his enmity towards me. Incidentally, only a man with no experience whatsoever in technical matters could have issued the orders he did.

In the same questionnaire, Milch had the following to say regarding the effects of Jeschonnek's attitude towards him:

... The only time I took Goering's place during the war was in the winter of 1940-41, when he went on leave. At that time I spent about two months at his headquarters near Beauvais, in France. The day I arrived, Jeschonnek took off for Karinhall. His orders were transmitted by telephone to von Waldau...

Goering did nothing to ease the tension between his two chief colleagues. On the contrary, he did his best to stir up friction between them in order to keep them from joining forces against himself. In this respect he was following in the footsteps of his lord and master, even though he may not have been consciously aware of it. Hitler, too, was a past master in the art of sowing the seeds of dissension in such a way as to keep the political leaders, the Party, and the Armed Forces continually at each others' throats and thus too divided to represent a real danger to him.

Section V: Friction within the Luftwaffe General Staff

In the early days, under Wever, Kesselring, and Stumpff,
there was no internal friction of note within the Luftwaffe General Staff. There were occasional differences of opinion, of course, as is the case in any group of intelligent individuals, but these were never of such nature as to give rise to lasting tensions. The first situation of a more serious nature arose in early 1939, when Luftwaffe leaders were requested to submit their plans for a so-called Fuehrer Program. This program called for the rapid expansion of the Luftwaffe on a scale far beyond any practical possibility.

General Kammhuber— at that time Chief of the Organization Staff— describes the conference on the Fuehrer Program and its effects in a report dated 11 October 1954: 24

... On 6 December 1938, Goering relayed to us Hitler's order that we begin work on a new Fuehrer Program for the Luftwaffe. I, that is to say, the Organization Staff of the Reichs Air Ministry, was to be responsible for planning in this connection. I was to have the help of all the office chiefs and of several specially designated branch chiefs in the Ministry.

After a week's discussion with the various office chiefs, I had reached the conclusion that the Fuehrer Program was of such tremendous scope that we simply did not have either the materiel or the personnel necessary to accomplish it within the foreseeable future. For this reason I set up an alternative program of lesser scope, which we termed the Kammhuber Program.

During the first week of January 1939, Milch called a meeting of the office chiefs of the Reichs Air Ministry in order to discuss the Kammhuber Program. Without exception, all of the chiefs (including Stumpff, Chief of the General Staff) disapproved the Fuehrer Program because it required far too much. Most of them however, also disapproved of the Kammhuber Program for the same reason, although it represented only about one-third of the Fuehrer Program in scope.

After the discussion, before Milch and I left to report the
results to Goering, Milch asked once more whether all those present agreed that the Fuehrer Program should be dropped and the Kammhuber Program adopted in its place. Hereupon Jeschonnek rose and stated that he, as Chief of the Operations Staff, was not in favor of dropping the Fuehrer Program. Milch then took Jeschonnek with him to see Goering, and when they came back after about half an hour, the final decision had been made—the Fuehrer Program was adopted, although its realization was entirely out of the question. It did not occur to anyone to report this last fact to the Fuehrer.

Soon thereafter General Stumpff was transferred to another assignment, and Colonel Jeschonnek was named Chief of the General Staff.

The events described by Kammhuber above probably constituted the first instance of real tension within the General Staff. By placing himself at variance with the soundly considered views of his colleagues and future subordinates, Jeschonnek had chosen his course for the future. This course led him farther and farther away from the solid ground of facts and closer and closer to mere speculation. His first step was not calculated to make his subordinates follow him with willing confidence as they had followed his predecessors.

This basic lack of confidence could not be bridged entirely even by the extraordinary successes of the Luftwaffe during the early period of Jeschonnek's incumbency. His uncritical devotion to Hitler was often a matter of worry to the older and more experienced officers on the General Staff. It was for this reason that he much preferred to surround himself with younger colleagues and did his best to see that Goering's inner circle was also made up of younger men. We have already discussed Jeschonnek's patronage of younger officers and have indicated that it was one of the factors which was later to make his own position so difficult. General von Seidel, the former Quartermaster General of the Luftwaffe, makes the following comments on this general situation and its consequences: 25

... His successor as General Staff Chief was Jeschonnek,
who took office on 1 February 1939. At this time Jeschonnek was forty years of age, persona grata with Goering and persona gratissima with Hitler, at least until 1942-43. In the beginning, he also managed to keep Milch (with whom he had served as a young General Staff officer in 1933-34) pretty much on his side, although later the two became the bitterest of adversaries. Jeschonnek was too young and possessed too little knowledge of human nature to master his assignment, and he had too little inner strength to keep from being overwhelmed by it in the end. A man of quick intelligence, with the ability to pick out the essential factors of a military problem and a talent for presenting them concisely and clearly orally or in writing, Jeschonnek had no other interests outside his profession; he had no first-hand knowledge of other nations and their way of life. He was a man of few and simple personal wants, youthful in appearance and behavior and fired by ambition. A National Socialist to the core and deeply devoted to Hitler personally, this man was to guide the fortunes of the Luftwaffe for several long years. Although his name is justly associated with the victories enjoyed by the Luftwaffe during the early blitz campaigns, no objective appraisal of his career can ignore the fact that his abrupt acceptance of Hitler's leadership and the awkward position he occupied between the latter and Goering after 1941 (largely his own fault) were factors which contributed much to the defeat and final collapse of the Luftwaffe. Moreover, the young aides and advisors (particularly in connection with technological matters) with whom he surrounded himself—all of them were as immature as Jeschonnek and most of them were far less scrupulous than he in their all-consuming ambition—had no qualms about indulging in behind-the-scenes intrigues, and were certainly much to blame for the final catastrophe. The names Christian, * Diesing, and Storp stand out particularly in this connection. In my own opinion (which is based chiefly on the first and only long conversation I ever had with Jeschonnek [in July 1943], during which he dropped

* Editor's Note: Generalmajor Eckhard Christian.
the rigid mask of a soldier and revealed the more personal aspects of his character), before he suffered the nervous collapse which resulted in his suicide, Jeschonnek had come to the clear realization that he himself was in part responsible for the defeat of the Luftwaffe, and he knew that the war was already lost.

Even among Jeschonnek's more intimate colleagues, however, the atmosphere was not completely free of tension. In 1940 he appointed his friend, General Hoffman von Waldau, one of the most brilliant General Staff officers of the Luftwaffe, to the post of Chief of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff. This appointment was not only the beginning of the end of their long-standing friendship, but also marked the beginning of a period of rankling tension between the two men in connection with their professional duties. General von Seidel\textsuperscript{26} presents the following picture of the relationship between Jeschonnek and von Waldau:

... Von Waldau, originally a good friend of Jeschonnek's, was a General Staff officer of greater than average ability. A man of sound and sensible views, he evaluated the potential development and employment of the Luftwaffe objectively and was well aware of the dangers of military involvement with the Western Powers. I should like to relate the following incident as characteristic of him: One evening, several weeks before the war began, we were driving home together from the Reichs Air Ministry. As we drove across the Grosser Stern (square in Berlin) with its victory monument overlooking the east-west axis of the city, Waldau suddenly asked me whether I thought we would ever live to see the day when this square would be called Square of the Red Army. Waldau's clarity of vision, his objective evaluation of Germany's top leaders, the military situation, and the inevitable outcome of the war, and his un concealed impatience with Jeschonnek's role as yes-man to Hitler and Goering gradually led him into the disfavor of Jeschonnek and Goering. In early 1942, he was relieved of his assignment in the Ministry and transferred to Africa as Commanding General of the X Air Corps. Shortly thereafter
he met his death in an airplane crash in the Balkans. His personal notebooks, which he kept in the form of a war diary, are one of our most valuable sources for the historical evaluation of the events of his time. A staff and field officer of unusual ability, a man of outstanding character and with all the qualities of a gentleman, von Waldau's death was a grave loss to the Luftwaffe. As far as my own work was concerned, von Waldau had always shown sincere understanding for the problems and tasks of the quartermaster branch and for its importance to the Luftwaffe as a whole, and I could always count on his full and willing cooperation.

In comparison with his successors, most of whom were industrious office workers and yes-men without an idea of their own, von Waldau had proved himself to be extremely capable as Chief of the Operations Staff. Both Goering and Jeschonnek flatly refused to attend his funeral in Saloniki!

Branch V (Intelligence) was one of the most important branches of the General Staff. This branch was responsible for compiling the information needed by the Chief of the General Staff and the top-level command of the Luftwaffe for the day-to-day conduct of the air war and for presenting a daily situation report. This report was to provide the Chief of the General Staff with accurate information on the air situation of the moment as well as on the over-all situation and thus to furnish a background for his daily conferences with the Commander in Chief and the Fuehrer. These situation reports were then studied carefully to determine armament requirements for the Luftwaffe and to plan for its future employment. Thus, it is clear that a great deal depended upon the work of this branch; its conclusions and recommendations could have a decisive effect on major events of the war. Generallieutenant Schmid, who served as Chief of Branch V for many years, describes the attitude of the Chief of the General Staff and the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, towards the work of his branch: 27

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* Editor's Note: An English translation and a copy of the German original are both available in H/1/1, Karlsruhe Document Collection.
... As soon as the tide began to turn against Germany--with the crisis in the East, America's entry into the war, and the increased bombardment of German cities by the Royal Air Force--, Goering's relationship to his General Staff Chief and his Chief of Intelligence (i.e., Branch V) became more and more tense. The reason for this was the unwillingness of Branch V to depart from its tradition of objective evaluation of information.

Intelligence Reports. Unfavorable reports submitted by intelligence officers at the front were simply dismissed as inaccurate. On the other hand it was rather embarrassing for us to have to correct the exaggerated reports of successes sent in by certain corps.

Evaluation of Conditions Abroad. Our reports on the development and expansion of the Russian Air Force during the campaign in the East were interpreted as an expression of a 'defeatest attitude on the part of Branch V.' We were unable to convince Luftwaffe leaders of the tremendous capacity for armament production in Soviet Russia. Our evaluation of the significance for Russia of the supply routes via Archangel, the Far East, and the Persian Gulf was brushed aside as inconsequential.

The recovery of the British aircraft industry and the establishment of a four-engine bomber fleet in England were considered unimportant. Countless oral reports and written memoranda dealing with the American armament program went entirely unnoticed. Our reports on the establishment of a huge American fleet of four-engine bombers, on the first appearance of American aircraft in England and Africa, and on the construction of a large number of airfields in Great Britain (air reconnaissance over Britain had been all but discontinued because of the efficacy of the British fighter aircraft defense; thus we had no aerial photographs to present in support of the last contention)--all of which were of the greatest importance in planning the future conduct of the war--were
not only doubted but held up to ridicule.

Our reports regarding the number of British aircraft appearing over Germany at night were not believed. The importance which the Chief of Intelligence had attributed to the attaché service was dismissed as grossly exaggerated, and the traditional attaché conferences, which admittedly took these people away from their posts temporarily, were severely criticized. Those memoranda submitted by the attaches and reporting on the dissatisfaction of Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and Turkey at the small amount of German support they were receiving wandered into the wastebasket, and the attaches were told to omit all references to political matters from their reports in the future.

Finally, when the Chief of Intelligence dared to confirm--by means of a detailed report and several diagrams--a statement made by Churchill to the Lower House to the effect that England had employed a force of 1000 aircraft in a night raid on Cologne, his 'defeatest attitude and tendency to theorize' were proved beyond any doubt. The Fuehrer and his immediate staff arbitrarily termed all reports coming from Branch V 'reports of lies.' By this time none of us really enjoyed our work any longer. In addition the Chief of the General Staff ordered that the personnel strength of the Intelligence Branch be reduced to a minimum in order to cut down the 'pointless evaluations of conditions abroad' and to do away with the reports 'which made such unpleasant reading.' It was time for a change and it was not long before the opportunity presented itself.

The irresponsible casualness with which the Chief of the General Staff, Hitler, and Goering treated the carefully prepared reports on conditions abroad is a clear indication of the arrogant and criminal optimism with which they led an entire nation to ruin. It is understandable that clear-thinking General Staff officers, particularly the older ones, were unable to share this optimism, especially if they were familiar with the over-all picture and acquainted with the
methods employed by the top-level military leaders. Although open disagreements were avoided, Jeschonnek was simply incapable of maintaining that feeling of trust and confidence which had bound the General Staff officers to their former chiefs. As far as the rest of the Luftwaffe was concerned, the well-known Fuehrer Directive No. 1 prevented most people from catching a glimpse of the over-all situation.

When Jeschonnek took over the office of Chief of Branch I, Operations from Colonel Deichmann, an unusually able and far-seeing officer, a rather heated argument developed between the two men regarding the problem of the four-engine bomber; Jeschonnek's behavior on this occasion does not do him honor. General Deichmann's report of the incident is given below: 28

... In the fall of 1937, when I was relieved of my assignment as Chief of Branch I, Operations of the General Staff, I brought up the matter of the four-engine bomber to my successor, Colonel Jeschonnek.

After I had officially turned over the office to him, I explained that there was one recommendation I would like to make concerning a matter which I felt to be of extremely great importance. This was the development and production of a four-engine bomber, which the Reichsmarschall had already disapproved. I explained that we had had such excellent reports on the potentialities of this aircraft model that I was personally convinced that we ought to start producing it in quantity as soon as possible.

Colonel Jeschonnek replied that he was of an entirely different opinion. He reminded me that I myself had written a memorandum concerning the conduct of strategic air warfare in which I had stated that the important thing was to destroy the vital part of a target, using the smallest possible number of aircraft and bombs. In illustration of this point, I had pointed out that a single direct hit in the boiler house of a large industrial plant could paralyze it completely. Further
I had stated that such pin-point bombing was impossible from an aircraft flying horizontally at high altitude; what we needed was a dive-bomber, which could approach the target closely and in comparative safety.

He went on to say that we now had what we needed in the Ju-88.

At this point I called his attention to the fact that the really important targets in any future war would probably lie considerably farther away, and that, as far as I knew, the Ju-88 did not possess the necessary flight range. Besides, no aircraft built chiefly for diving performance was capable of developing the speed needed to escape attack by enemy fighter aircraft.

Hereupon Colonel Jeschonnek refused to discuss the matter with me any further, stating that all my arguments were based on theoretical speculation. He, on the other hand, as the former Commanding Officer of the Training Wing, had had practical experience with the Ju-88, and he felt that it was the most suitable model to serve as the standard bomber of the Luftwaffe!

Under Jeschonnek’s successors in the General Staff Chief’s post, there seem to have been no important instances of internal tension within the General Staff. We might perhaps make mention of the attempt made by a number of younger officers from the General Staff and from the front to force an ultimatum on Goering and his General Staff Chief, General Koller. Driven into a corner, the Reichsmarschall had no choice but to agree to the suggestion made by Lt. Col. Werner Baumbach, the well-known bomber pilot, that he should meet with these younger officers for an informal conference at Gatow, near Berlin. At this meeting the officers were to have the opportunity to express their opinions frankly and to make recommendations regarding the organization of the top-level command of the Luftwaffe. During several days of discussion this officer group, known
within the Luftwaffe as the Reichsmarschall's "Aeropag,"* gave vent to its pent-up feeling of discontent and finally presented a formal recommendation for certain changes within the Luftwaffe top-level command organization. They requested the removal of the General Staff Chief, General Koller, suggested a successor, and recommended that the responsibilities attached to the post be modified. (If their suggestion had been followed, the General Staff Chief would have been no more than an administrative office-boy.) They suggested that they themselves be placed in charge of Luftwaffe operations as a kind of collective operations staff. The General Staff Chief sent an information copy of the recommendation to the author for study. For an older and experienced officer, their suggestion contained a good many discrepancies, some of them exceedingly amusing, and showed clearly just how the man in the street imagined the top-level command of the Luftwaffe to be—and this despite the fact that Generalleutnant Adolf Galland and Peltz were among the officers responsible for it. The details of this suggestion are no longer known, but in any case, the Reichsmarschall passed it along to the Chief of the General Staff as a "worthwhile recommendation" and requested the latter to study it and consider ways and means of putting it into effect. Once the General Staff Chief and his colleagues were able to prove to Goering that the recommendations were unfeasible (by means of rather primitive examples—the only ones Goering could understand), the Aeropag suggestions took their place in the wastebasket.

Even though the incident related above is not a direct example of tension within the General Staff itself, it is symptomatic for the overall situation at that time and is a typical example of the sort of problem on which the Chief of the General Staff had to spend time much better used for more constructive purposes.

Section VI: The Influence of the General Staff on Important Problems of the Luftwaffe

It was inherent in the status and mission of the Luftwaffe

* Translator's Note: "Aeropag" is apparently the Luftwaffe version of the Greek Areopag (a court of justice).
General Staff that it should exert an influence on all important problems connected with the Luftwaffe. In the chapter dealing with organization we have already seen that the degree of authority possessed by the Chief of the General Staff was subject to several changes at various times, and his ability to influence important decisions quite naturally varied with his authority. In the fields of operational command, organization, and training the prerogatives of the General Staff were never seriously challenged except on those occasions when the cliques around Hitler, Goering, or Milch attempted to interfere.

The influence of the General Staff on the development of the Luftwaffe was greatest under its first Chief, General Wever. It was due primarily to his initiative and energy that the Luftwaffe was able to develop from scratch into a powerful striking instrument within the space of a few years, Goering was responsible for setting the ultimate goal; it was the Chief of the General Staff who planned and carried out the difficult task of reaching that goal, a uniquely admirable accomplishment.

Selection of Aircraft

In the foregoing chapters we have seen that General Wever was desirous of establishing a Luftwaffe which would be capable of meeting the requirements set by the Italian General Douhet for the conduct of a successful air war. Thus he deliberately placed the emphasis on the creation of a strong bomber force. Both he and his colleagues felt sure that a long-range bomber would be indispensable in case of a war with Soviet Russia, and it was due to Wever's initiative that three firms were set to work on the development of a four-engine machine. It is obvious today that the Luftwaffe would have profited tremendously if this developmental work had been carried to its conclusion. After Wever's death, as we have already mentioned, Milch succeeded in persuading Goering to order this work stopped.

Jeschonnek was the next General Staff Chief to have any influence on the aircraft models used by the Luftwaffe. On the basis of his experience as commander of the Training Wing, he supported
the production of a dive-bomber capable of pinpoint bombing. The model which seemed most suitable to him for this purpose was the Ju-88. Today it is well known that the Ju-88 never fulfilled the hopes placed upon it in respect to diving ability, yet because it was built primarily for diving performance, the other qualities which might have made it an efficient aircraft model, i.e. speed, flight range, and carrying capacity, were more or less ignored.

Because of Jeschonnek's misguided decision to push the Ju-88, his own views on the conduct of strategic air warfare changed, and the Luftwaffe became a primarily tactical instrument. The extraordinary successes which it enjoyed in this role in the beginning of the war disguised the fact that Jeschonnek's decision had been wrong. Later on, during the Battle of Britain and during the Russian campaign, the effects of Jeschonnek's mistake became painfully apparent.

Air Defense

Air defense was another area in which the General Staff was able to exercise a decisive influence. In this case, however, Jeschonnek's complete lack of understanding for the importance of air defense had catastrophic consequences for Germany. Even after it had become obvious that Germany's air offensive against England was doomed to failure by the efficacy of Britain's excellently trained and equipped fighter aircraft defense units, Jeschonnek refused to press for increased production of fighter aircraft for home air defense operations; and this despite the available reports concerning the establishment of ever more and ever larger bomber units by the Allies. State Secretary Milch, responsible for air armament, foresaw coming developments more clearly than Jeschonnek, and offered on several occasions to increase the production of fighter aircraft. Jeschonnek, however, consistently refused his offers, a reaction which seems incomprehensible now.

Air Transport

One of the most serious errors made by Jeschonnek while he
was Chief of the General Staff was to permit the air transport units to continue plundering the pilot training schools.

The air transport units had the misfortune to be assigned to operations which not only exceeded their materiel and personnel strength, but which also entailed high losses (Norway, Crete, Africa, and Stalingrad, to mention but a few of their assignments). As a result, new units were continually being activated in a hopeless attempt to catch up with previous losses. Unfortunately, the pilot training schools--and particularly the instrument navigation schools--were the only source from which the necessary personnel could be drawn. Since Jeschonnek refused to change his policy of horizontal expansion in spite of the objections brought forward by his Organization Staff, the personnel reserve in flying crews, already dangerously small, became even smaller.

The ultimate effect during the last years of the war was total inadequacy, both in quantity and in quality, in the replacement program for flying personnel. Citing the blitzkrieg principle, * Jeschonnek refused to listen to objections or warnings.

Tactical vs. Strategic Air Warfare

Jeschonnek's successor, General Korten, did his best to stop the involuntary development of the Luftwaffe into a purely tactical instrument. In the winter of 1943-44 he requested the withdrawal of the IV Air Corps from operations in the East in order that it might be prepared for strategic operations against Soviet Russian industrial targets.

Although his request was approved, General Korten's plan was

* Translator's Note: The blitzkrieg principle was that of the short-term war, in which decisive victory was gained by the first force committed, thereby obviating the necessity for replacements.
invalidated by the loss of a base from which to carry out strategic raids; by the spring of 1944 the really important targets were out of range of the available aircraft. Moreover, because of the critical situation on the Eastern front, Hitler ordered the commitment of all available forces against the Soviet offensive. With this, the last attempt to shift to strategic air warfare was ended, and it seemed that the role of the Luftwaffe, the force which had been founded on such great hopes, was to remain that of an auxiliary force for the Army, destined to be employed in any critical area like a fire brigade to help to relieve the ground situation as Hitler saw fit.

The most important instances in which the top-level command of the Luftwaffe had any decisive influence on the over-all course of the war were the decisions to use the Luftwaffe to destroy the British forces at Dunkirk and to supply Generaloberst Paulus' Sixth Army at Stalingrad. Although it was Goering himself who provided the initial impetus and who announced the Luftwaffe's readiness to carry out these two undertakings, the Chief of the General Staff cannot escape a share of the blame for the final results. He ought to have exhausted every means at his disposal to keep Goering from making these commitments.

Section VII: The Relationship of the Luftwaffe General Staff to the Troops

The character of the relationship between the Luftwaffe General Staff and the Luftwaffe troop units was determined primarily by the first two General Staff Chiefs, Wever and Kesselring. To a far greater extent than any of their successors, these two men took advantage of every opportunity to visit the troop units during the early years of Luftwaffe development, to obtain an accurate picture of their difficulties and their needs, to provide relief whenever they could, and to gather suggestions and recommendations in practical questions for evaluation and possible application in their work at the Ministry. Their extremely close contact with the troops gave birth to a feeling of mutual trust and confidence, which was fully maintained during the peacetime years. The awareness of a common goal and a common task and the knowledge that command and troops were mutually
dependent upon one another's cooperation in order to reach that
goal—a goal familiar to each and every member of the Luftwaffe—
helped to create a close bond between the two. The traditional
prestige of the General Staff and the recognized ability of its top mem-
bers were sufficient to give it the necessary authority as long as it
performed its task of leadership with integrity and objectivity.

In 1937, when the internal rivalry between the State Secretary
and the Chief of the General Staff occupied the latter to such an ex-
tent that he was unable to maintain the close contact with the troops
which his predecessors had established, a slight, barely noticeable
coolness began to undermine the relationship between Staff and troops;
this coolness was intensified by the rumors of internal strife at top-
level which involuntarily—or perhaps voluntarily, as far as the State
Secretary was concerned—filtered down to the level of the troop
staffs. The latter, of course, were all on the side of the General
Staff, which they recognized to be the traditionally proper and
professionally capable agency of top-level command. Whatever doubts
may have arisen during this period regarding the integrity of top-level
leadership were completely dispelled, however, in early 1939, when
Jeschonnek, a young officer who was generally recognized as a man
of great ability by the troops, took office as Chief of the General Staff.
During his period of service as commander of the Training Wing,
Jeschonnek had gained a reputation as a man of tremendous practical
ability and as the officer responsible for the development of most of
the principles of employment followed by the Luftwaffe. The troops
confidently expected that he would make his influence felt as Chief of
the General Staff, and that he would give new impetus to the develop-
ment and expansion of the Luftwaffe.

Since the older General Staff officers were, almost without
exception, men of obviously superior ability in general military
affairs as well as in those questions specifically applicable to the
Luftwaffe, their right to a position of prestige (and a uniform illustra-
ting this position) and to preferential promotions was accepted by the
troop staffs and the troops themselves without further question.

It was not until the war began, or, more precisely, during its
early stages, that the relationship between the General Staff officers and the troops began to change perceptibly. One of the main reasons for this change lay in Goering's refusal to let his General Staff Chief visit the troop units during wartime lest they be tempted to give the major part of their personal allegiance to the General Staff Chief rather than to Goering himself. Inevitably, of course, this made it difficult for the Chief of the General Staff to procure an accurate picture of the conditions obtaining among the troop units, and also gradually decreased the feeling of closeness between the Staff and the troops. Moreover, the burden of work within the Luftwaffe General Staff itself and within the higher-level field staffs was so great, and the available staff so limited in number, that there was no longer time to maintain the close relationship which had prevailed during peacetime. As a result, the gap between the two finally became so great that the General Staff occasionally issued orders so unrealistic as to cause the troops to doubt the military ability of that body. This sort of situation can develop very rapidly during wartime when the soldier at the front is forced to assert his independence of thinking in order to meet enemy attack and is encouraged, by the praise he receives for successful operations, to consider his self-assertiveness justifiable under all circumstances. Inevitably the soldier at the front has a certain feeling of superiority over the staff officer who has not experienced enemy action, and this feeling—whether it is justified or not—is bound to lead to criticism of the work of higher-level staffs.

This situation was aggravated by the continuing personnel shortage, which made it quite impossible to assign General Staff officers to alternate periods of staff and combat duty. Gradually, the gap between the General Staff and the troops became so great that it could no longer be bridged and the troops began to lose their traditional respect for the members of the General Staff.

One of the chief factors contributing to the loss of prestige of the General Staff among the troop units was the shortening of the General Staff training—made necessary by a critical lack of qualified instructional personnel. The courses at the War Academy became shorter and shorter, and the knowledge and ability of the younger generation of General Staff officers did not always justify their often
overweening self-confidence. True, they had distinguished themselves in action, but their training for leadership was woefully incomplete. Most of them attached no importance to the principle that they should "be more than they appeared to be," and the suddenness with which they took their places in the command apparatus usually precluded their ultimately becoming useful members of it. In order to compensate for their lack of decorations (which, although given very freely in combat, were rarely considered appropriate for members of the General Staff), certain individual officers were no doubt tempted to point with undue pride at the crimson stripe on their trousers as tangible evidence of a superior mental endowment, and this quite naturally annoyed the troop units.

We must admit in all fairness that these individuals were the exception rather than the rule, but unfortunately the repercussions of their behavior were often greater than the incidents themselves warranted. On the whole, however, their influence on the over-all relationship between Staff and troops was not great.

A far greater obstacle to the maintenance of a feeling of confidence were the errors of judgment committed by top-level command and the frequent impasses, especially in the armament question, created by the rivalry between the State Secretary and the General Staff. The troops, who were accustomed to the tradition of the General Staff as the sole responsible instrument of command, were naturally inclined to attribute any and all errors to tension and incompetence within the General Staff itself. Not having the opportunity to become acquainted with the situation behind the scenes, they understandably placed the responsibility for the results of any wrong decision on that agency of command most clearly in evidence, i.e. on the General Staff. And the group of men which had crystallized around Goering and Milch, most of them bitter enemies of the General Staff, took pains to encourage this view during their frequent inspection visits to the troop units. A serious crisis in the relationship between Staff and troops would have certainly occurred if the troops themselves—down to the smallest unit—had not become aware during the course of the war of the dilletantism and incompetence of their Commander in Chief and State Secretary.
The last Chief of the Operations Branch of the Luftwaffe General Staff, Colonel Kurt von Greiff, comments as follows on the relationship between the General Staff and the troop units:

... It happened frequently that the General Staff, in its capacity as the instrument of command, was forced to issue orders demanding more than the troops were in a position to accomplish easily. It was then the responsibility of the General Staff officer to justify these orders to the troops although he himself might not be convinced of their necessity or be even aware of the real reason for them, limited as he was to a knowledge of his own particular field of endeavor or to the particular theater of operations for which he was responsible. It is understandable that criticism of command became more and more intense as the war neared its end, since the troops inevitably tended to blame the command organization for anything that went wrong.

Inasmuch as the troops had no way of knowing what was going on behind the scenes, and since criticism of the top political leaders was out of the question in an authoritarian state, it was natural that the General Staff came in for most of the blame. Undesirable as this situation was, however, it cannot be said that it had any real influence on the relationship between the General Staff and the troops.

Section VIII: The Relationship of the Luftwaffe General Staff to the General Staffs of the Army and Navy

The older officers on the Luftwaffe General Staff had the greatest influence on the development of the Luftwaffe. They had come, without exception, from the Army General Staff. Thus it was quite natural that the organizational structure, the procedures, and the mental outlook of the Luftwaffe General Staff were closely akin to those of the Army General Staff. Moreover, the Chiefs of the Luftwaffe General Staff who had also served as General Staff officers in the Army were fully recognized by their Army colleagues as men of
integrity and ability. Thus they provided a personal guarantee for a smooth and mutually confident relationship between the two staffs. The rest of the older generation of Luftwaffe General Staff officers had completed their staff training with their counterparts on the Army General Staff, and the many personal friendships going back to the days of their academy training made for smooth and comradely cooperation.

We cannot deny that this generally harmonious relationship was disturbed by a certain amount of discord right from the beginning; however, this had no effect on the genuine professional recognition which each Staff felt for the other. The reasons for the sporadic instances of disharmony were largely psychological in nature. We have already pointed out that the attitudes of the Army General Staff were fairly conservative, in keeping with its traditional position of prestige in the eyes of the Armed Forces and the nation as a whole; a position won by the Army's performance during past wars and by the accomplishments of its outstanding Chiefs. From a psychological point of view, it is quite understandable that the members of the Army General Staff Corps were unenthusiastic at the prospect of sharing their prestige with the General Staff of a completely new force, a force, moreover, which—in their opinion—ought to have been a subordinate element of the Army.

Protected by the influence of an all-powerful Minister and Commander in Chief, the young Luftwaffe General Staff had almost complete freedom of action and was frequently in a position to push through its requests in spite of the expressed disapproval of the Army; understandably, the Army's top leaders as well as individual members of the Army General Staff Corps were somewhat less than enthusiastic. Whereas the Army was jealously determined to maintain its position of prestige within the Armed Forces and was reluctant to espouse new and untried principles of warfare, from the very beginning the Luftwaffe General Staff was firm in its contention that the Luftwaffe, as a new branch of the Armed Forces, had a right to equal status within that body, and that the new weapon represented the beginning of a new era in the waging of war.

Thus, the Luftwaffe General Staff made requests and demands
which, by their very nature, elicited professional objections from the Army. Furthermore, cooperation was made difficult by the difference in perspective which characterized the goals of the two branches. In its operational planning, the Army still thought in terms of a war limited to the Continent, while the Luftwaffe, from its very inception, was forced to think internationally.

Whereas the Chief of the Army General Staff, Generaloberst Beck, was the prototype of the cautious, thoughtful, and conservative General Staff officer, those officers who left the Army and Navy to join the Luftwaffe General Staff, and particularly the ones who later served as Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, were far more modern in their thinking and far more receptive to the potentialities of modern technology.

The Army claimed to be the **decisive** branch of the Armed Forces, with the traditional right to force its conceptions on the other branches; while the Luftwaffe General Staff was of the opinion that war could be waged successfully only if the operations of all three branches were carefully coordinated and that the Luftwaffe, once its development had reached its completion, would inevitably become the decisive branch. This difference of opinions shows clearly that the concept of a common agency of command for all three Armed Forces branches was well along the way to acceptance in the Luftwaffe, at least in the General Staff of the Luftwaffe. In contrast, the Army General Staff members were still very much divided on this question. The Luftwaffe General Staff strongly supported the establishment of a joint military academy, whose courses, however, finally had to be discontinued because the Army declared itself unable to spare the students long enough for them to complete training. Thus this attempt to create an over-all Armed Forces General Staff, or at least to make sure that each individual General Staff would have officers who had had training in all three fields, had to be abandoned; neither Hitler nor the Armed Forces High Command was willing to give the plan any support.

During the early years of the Luftwaffe, a certain feeling of discontent developed among the younger Army General Staff officers...
because of the Luftwaffe's policy of rapid promotion. The reasons for this policy had been subjected to very careful considerations, and its purpose—the development of the relatively small group of General Staff officers in the Luftwaffe into an officer corps large enough to meet the requirements of its continuing expansion—was thoroughly justifiable. The resultant discrepancy in rank between Luftwaffe officers and officers of the same age on the Army General Staff, however, did not contribute very much to the popularity of the former, whom many viewed as upstarts. This tendency was further aggravated by the fact that the Luftwaffe officer corps, even within the General Staff, was rather heterogeneous, an additional reason for the Army General Staff to feel justified in viewing the newcomers with a certain degree of condescension.

During the course of the last few years before the war, these difficulties had been fairly well smoothed over, so that they were no longer apparent to outsiders or in the internal relationship between the two staffs. Occasional instances of petty rivalry were relegated to the background by the common anxiety over political developments and the security of the nation. Once the war began, all differences ceased to exist and the relationship between the two staffs was dictated exclusively by the exigencies of war. Apart from a few minor exceptions, official cooperation between the two was exemplary. One important factor in this connection was the extraordinary military success of the Luftwaffe in joint operations with the Army—a success which far exceeded the Army's most optimistic expectations. The reputation thus established by the Luftwaffe during the early phases of the war proved to have such a lasting effect that even in the later phases, when Luftwaffe support for ground operations was all but completely discontinued, the relationship between the two General Staffs suffered little change. The Army was also fully aware of the fact that the collapse of the Luftwaffe could not be blamed entirely on the Luftwaffe General Staff, for the errors made at top level were no less apparent to the Army than to the Luftwaffe.

In Section III of Chapter 5 we have already discussed in detail the internal relationship between the Army and the Luftwaffe General Staff officers serving with Luftwaffe elements attached to the Army.
We know of no instance during the war in which this relationship was subjected to any serious frictions or disrupting differences in opinion.

The fact that cooperation at this level was so smooth was due in large part to the clear and detailed delineation of authority and guidelines contained in the "Handbook of General Staff Service in Wartime," discussed in Chapter 5.

Relations with the Navy Admiral Staff were excellent, since, from the very beginning, they were based on mutual recognition and respect. The problem of the maintenance of prestige, which so often influenced the actions of the Army General Staff, was completely unknown in the Navy. The Navy, like the Luftwaffe, was accustomed to viewing military affairs on a broad perspective, and the large number of Navy officers who went over to the Luftwaffe (both to the General Staff and to the troop units) was an expression of their awareness of a common outlook. The need to plan in terms of extensive geographic areas and the common closeness of the Luftwaffe and the Navy to the problems of modern technology helped to create a realistic relationship between their General Staffs, a relationship which survived both the early years of Luftwaffe development and the war itself without change.

Naturally, there was a great deal of lively discussion in the beginning concerning the advisability of a separate naval air force, and it goes without saying that the Navy's arguments were soundly conceived and objectively presented. When top-level command decided in favor of a single, unified Luftwaffe, the Navy High Command accepted the decision with good grace--although it never really renounced its claim to an air force of its own.

These differences of opinion, however, had no effect on the relationship of the two General Staffs. At all echelons, both Navy and Luftwaffe staffs did their utmost to make the best of a given situation and to cooperate fully in the accomplishment of their joint operations. There is no doubt that this was the case in all theaters of war--we need mention only two examples of exemplary coordination.
here, the breakthrough of the German cruisers* in the Channel and the convoy duty in the Arctic.

As the area of the war extended and the demands made upon the Luftwaffe increased accordingly, it was no longer possible to grant the Navy all the air support it requested--especially in view of the fact that it had become standard procedure in the Navy to request greater support than was actually necessary in order to be sure of having enough after the inevitable cuts had been made! In many cases it was necessary for the Supreme Commander to make a final decision since the support requested by the Navy so far exceeded the resources which the Luftwaffe could spare from its other activities. This whole procedure, of course, was also intended to prove to top-level command that the temporary assignment of air forces to the Navy was not sufficient to assure the successful conduct of war at sea. It is not the province of this study to determine whether or not this view was justified; quite probably its justification varies in accordance with the nature of the over-all strategic plans and the presumable geographic scope of operations. During the last war, in any case, Navy requirements for air support were not adequately met. The lack of a four-engine aircraft made itself most unfavorably felt in this connection. Apart from this one grave error in judgment, it would seem that the policy of uniform air armament and concentration on a few basic aircraft types was quite right in view of Germany's situation and her actual capacity for armament production. Any other policy would have led to a dangerous dissipation of strength, which would neither have permitted the early successes of the Luftwaffe nor changed the final course of the war in any way. The Navy leaders had, however, a perfect right to disagree with this view.

I should like to emphasize once again that these differences of

* Editor's Note: On 11 and 12 February 1942 the Battle Cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the Heavy Cruiser Prinz Eugen, escorted by seven destroyers and provided with air cover, successfully made their way through the English Channel from Brest to Wilhelmshaven and Kiel. For an interesting account of the role played by the GAF in this operation see Adolf Galland, The First and the Last, Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1954, pp. 123-38.
opinion among the High Commands were concerned with purely professional matters; they had nothing whatsoever to do with the personal relationships or the degree of cooperation between staffs, nor did they have any effect on the relations between the troops and their superior staffs.

Section IX: The Relationship of the Luftwaffe General Staff to the National Socialist Party

The relationship of the Luftwaffe and its General Staff to the National Socialist Party was not essentially different from that of the other Armed Forces branches. There were one or two slight differences, however, and these led to the use (albeit jokingly) of the term "National Socialist Luftwaffe" by the other two branches. These differences can be traced to the authority of Goering, who—as a powerful Party chief and as second in command—was able to nip in the bud any criticism directed at the Luftwaffe, his creation. Another factor was the State Secretary, who was also not without influence in the Party and who even employed a Party functionary in his personal staff to maintain his close relationship to that organization. Milch's attempt to influence the composition and the political tendency of the Luftwaffe officers corps through this man was a total failure, thanks to the vigilance of the first Chief of the Luftwaffe Personnel Office, Generaloberst Stumpff. Stumpff was able to guard the Luftwaffe corps against political influence and thus permit it to develop a purely military character like the officer corps of the other Armed Forces branches. His efforts were not in keeping with the desires of the Party, of course, but Goering was successful in diverting any adverse criticism.

The position of preference which the Luftwaffe enjoyed in the allocation of funds and armament production during the early years of its development—a preference which was certainly justified under the circumstances, but which nevertheless was somewhat painfully obvious—was also directly due to the power and influence of its Commander in Chief, although Army spokesmen erroneously attributed it exclusively to the close ties between the Luftwaffe and the ruling Party. To be sure, it was the Party which had made the establishment of this new Armed
Forces branch possible in the first place, and this fact may have made it unconsciously more benevolently inclined towards the Luftwaffe than towards the Army, which made no secret of its criticism of Party developments. After the initial successes of the Luftwaffe, this benevolence increased to exaggerated proportions, resulting in unrestrained propaganda which, combined with Goering’s own public outbursts of enthusiasm, led to an extremely unrealistic picture of the capabilities of the Luftwaffe. After all, the new force had been established from scratch and sent off to war before its development had been fully completed.

The more apparent it became during the war that the Luftwaffe was unable to meet these unrealistically high expectations, the sharper became the criticism directed by the Party against Goering, the Luftwaffe leaders, and the Luftwaffe as a whole. The reaction of the general public was much more objective; despite the suffering brought upon the nation by the defeats sustained by the Luftwaffe, public opinion remained fair and realistic throughout the war. During the last war years, of course, there were isolated instances of bitter criticism, but this was directed almost exclusively at Goering himself and not at the Luftwaffe as an organization. The efforts of the Ministry of Propaganda, which was a past master in the art of reviving hope, and the sporadic successes which the Luftwaffe managed to attain—despite its hopeless inferiority to the enemy—combined to keep public opinion favorable even during the darkest hours.

The intensity of the Party’s attacks on Goering, the Luftwaffe General Staff, and the Luftwaffe itself grew in proportion to the dawning realization that Germany was bound to lose the war. Those responsible for home air defense measures were subjected to particularly devastating criticism as large-scale, enemy bombardment of the Reich’s cities increased. The Area Administrative Commanders (Gauleiters) were particularly careful to prepare detailed but inaccurate reports of Luftwaffe failures after every large attack and to direct them to Hitler personally; they were taking no chances on the public’s failing to realize clearly just who the scapegoats were. 30

These reports invariably had repercussions, and in each case,
the Headquarters, Air Fleet Reich was called upon--either by the
Luftwaffe General Staff or, on occasion, by Fuehrer Headquarters--
to defend its position. Needless to say, this meant a great deal of
additional work for a staff which was already seriously overburdened
and hardly able to find the necessary time to carry out its immediate
mission of operational command. Although Air Fleet Reich was
accused of everything in the book, including treason, there is not a
single instance in which it was possible to prove its staff guilty of
negligence or wrong action. In every single case, the real reasons
for the failure of the home air defense system lay at higher level,
and in some cases even at the highest level, and this statement is
subject to proof. The reports were unpleasant, however, in that
they helped to increase the distrust which Hitler already felt towards
Goering and the Luftwaffe General Staff; and Party Chief Martin
Bormann took full advantage of them, as of every opportunity, to
widen the gulf between the Fuehrer and the Luftwaffe.

The constantly changing attitude of the Party had no influence
whatsoever on the development of the Luftwaffe. General Wever, its
first Chief of the General Staff, had integrated it so firmly into the
over-all Armed Forces organization that it was impossible to single
it out for special treatment. There was no change in the situation
under Jeschonnek; there is no doubt of his unwavering devotion to
Hitler, but he was neither a friend nor a protege of the Party--first
and foremost, he was a soldier. Under Jeschonnek's successors,
the Party was no more successful in its attempts to gain a foothold
within the Luftwaffe. On the contrary, it is common knowledge that
it was precisely because of this that Himmler tried so hard to per-
suade Hitler to permit the formation of an air arm under the aegis of
the SS, so that the Party might have some sort of air force under its
control. In his personal war diary, General Kreipe comments as
follows:

16 October 1944 . . . Goering off deer-hunting at
Rominten; I decide to visit him at his hunting lodge to get
some urgently needed signatures. Reception very friendly,
Goering sympathizes with my troubles, we go for a walk,
during which he tells me he ought to stay at Rominten
permanently so that he can keep an eye on Himmler and Bormann--explains that Himmler has asked him to authorize the assignment of several Luftwaffe squadrons to the SS.

Himmler's efforts to gain approval for an SS air force were effectively countered by Goering and the Luftwaffe General Staff. In turn, the SS (i.e. Himmler) flatly refused to permit volunteers from its ranks to go over to the Luftwaffe as replacement pilots. This impasse assumed critical proportions in the spring of 1944, by which time the older, experienced, fighter crews had been so sadly reduced by personnel losses. At this point the Air Fleet Reich officially requested all Armed Forces branches and the SS (which had the best qualified personnel for the purpose) to release volunteers to the Luftwaffe for rush training and employment as replacement personnel in home air defense operations. All volunteers were frankly warned that the shortened training period would take its toll of some lives in training accidents and that the actual missions against the enemy might also involve deliberate self-sacrifice. The Headquarters, Air Fleet Reich was convinced that there were still enough young men who would be willing to volunteer despite the poor chances for survival. However, all the agencies contacted--Party and SS to the fore--refused to release personnel to the Luftwaffe. 31

After the conspiracy of 20 July 1944, so-called National Socialist Guidance Officers were assigned to all branches of the Armed Forces. They had little influence, however, on the activity of the Luftwaffe General Staff, its relationship to superior command, to the troop units, or to civilian agencies of the Party. Inasmuch as the individual commanders were given some voice in determining which men would fill these positions, it was possible to avoid wholesale infiltration of dyed-in-the-wool Party men.

Although the Guidance Officers were nominally subordinate to the commanders to whose units they were assigned, and not to the General Staff Chiefs, most of them went out of their way to cooperate in the staff activities determined by the Chiefs. Their own activity was usually limited to the evaluation and distribution of propaganda publications, to the delivery of politically-tinted lectures designed to
increase the troops' will to fight, and to reports on troop morale submitted through their own channels. In practice, these reports were usually discussed beforehand and approved by the chief of staff concerned.

It is probable that these men were expected to keep watch over the political attitudes of the officer corps and its leaders, and there may have been isolated cases in which they actually did so; in the vast majority of instances, however, no attempts were made in this direction. If this sort of activity was really expected of the Guidance Officers, then it was extremely foolish to select military men for the role, for most of them have extraordinarily little talent for deception.

In any case, this system was hardly calculated to improve the relationship between the command agencies and the troops on the one hand, or the relationship between the command agencies and the Party on the other. The troops were generally inclined to view this development as an attempt by the Party to interfere in matters of military command and to gain a position of influence in a field which most emphatically was none of its concern.
Chapter 8

CONCLUSIONS

Within the foregoing text we have already mentioned certain aspects of the body of experience gained; there is no need of our repeating them here. The problems of command and technological development have also been dealt with in separate studies,* and the experience gained by Germany in these fields thoroughly discussed. In the present study it is important that we examine the basic principles which may be deduced from the experience gained by the Luftwaffe General Staff within its own particular field of endeavor and within the framework of the over-all command function of the Armed Forces. In our evaluation of these principles, we must bear in mind that the world is becoming smaller day by day through the developments of modern technology, and that it is practically impossible, in this era of atomic and hydrogen bombs, to base the lessons for tomorrow on the experience of yesterday.

The history of the German Luftwaffe and its General Staff has proved once more that each period of history has its own aspects and goes its own way; and this is particularly true of the methods employed in waging war. An officer who refuses to accept this fact will never be a great officer. Anyone who is acquainted with the histories of great military leaders knows full well that almost every one of them has introduced new methods and ideas in some sector of military activity and has thus helped to form the military outlook of his time.

Quite apart from his political views and practices, the question arises as to whether or not Hitler should be considered one of the great military leaders of his day. To begin with, it is clear that his "right" to the last word in military command was based solely on his position as political dictator of the nation; it was certainly not documented by any real experience or ability in the military sector. His

* See list at the end of this study.
Point of view was geographically limited to the Continent, which was quite natural when we take into account that he gained his military experience as an ordinary soldier during World War I. He was incapable of assessing an enemy until that enemy was physically present on the battlefields adjoining the borders of the Reich, and in his opinion it was the very climax of military strategy to defeat him then and there. In this respect, incidentally, his thinking was remarkably akin to that of many members of the Army General Staff, who also had difficulty in thinking in terms of more than Continental involvement. In Hitler's concept the traditional weapons of the Army and the traditional methods of operation were the primary instruments of warfare. Consequently, it was for these that he felt the deepest interest. The Luftwaffe and the Navy interested him only insofar as they could be employed within the framework of Continental warfare. In the last analysis, Hitler was one of those people who see no inconsistency in beginning a war at exactly the same point where the last one stopped.

On the other hand, we must concede that he was also receptive to the introduction of basic innovations in the field of military operations. He granted Goering full power to requisition the resources he needed in order to create a strong and independent Luftwaffe; he supported Guderian--contrary to the recommendations of his chief military advisors--in the creation of a tactical armored force and thus laid the cornerstone of another spectacular success. Going against every traditional principle of military common sense and against the advice of his closest military colleagues, he agreed to General von Manstein's plan to split the French front in the middle, although the terrain was wholly unsuited to tank operations, and thus made a decision which was to provide the key to the initial success of the Western campaign.

A certain touch of genius is unmistakably evident here, but so, on the other hand, are the bigoted conservatism and the overweening self-confidence of a man who thought he could unite all the qualities demanded of a great military leader within himself without ever having had any training for such a mission. In the end it was this presumptuous self-confidence which led to Hitler's downfall.

His biggest mistake--a typical one for his personality--was
his determination to conduct the war as he saw fit, rather than to per-
mit this to remain the province of experienced military men. Goering
made a similar mistake in the Luftwaffe when he refused to grant his
General Staff Chief the necessary authority to carry out the missions
required for the successful conduct of air operations. All of this only
goes to prove that the machinery of modern warfare is so extensive
and so complex that it is no longer possible for one person to control
it effectively. The mighty military apparatus of the Third Reich
needed an over-all Armed Forces General Staff whose chief was pro-
vided with full authority to supervise military preparations and to
direct the conduct of military operations. Since this was not the case
(thanks to Hitler's conviction that he himself and his comparatively
small staff of military assistants were capable of handling everything),
there was no central agency responsible for the over-all supervision
of the many military and civilian agencies whose participation is re-
quired for the successful conduct of a modern war. In the absence of
such centralized control, the General Staffs of the Luftwaffe and the
other Armed Forces branches were forced to concern themselves with
matters which ought not to have been their responsibility.

The concurrent operation of three separate General Staffs
(this includes the Admiral Staff of the Navy) and the often conflicting
activities of countless other military agencies, some of them provided
with all-encompassing special powers, was bound to lead to complete
chaos in the command organization; the present study has shown that
this was the case, on a smaller scale of course, within the command
organization of the Luftwaffe. Any war carried out under these cir-
cumstances against an enemy with almost unlimited resources and
with the freedom to move about over a wide geographical area was
doomed to ultimate defeat.

The lessons to be drawn from the above should be taken to
heart not only by every responsible statesman, but especially by those
who have the task of assuring the security of their nations within the
framework of a collective security system. The problems involved
in collective military preparations during peacetime and in the
collective conduct of military operations in war can be effectively met
only by a permanent centralized command organization. In such a
system, the difficulties experienced by the Third Reich, because of
the lack of centralized control, would be multiplied by the number of
partner nations participating in the system.

Even the problems of the Luftwaffe General Staff, as one of
several service branch staffs, have shown us clearly that a military
staff can no longer restrict itself to purely military questions. Under
present conditions, all aspects of warfare have some influence on the
private life of the population—on administration, economic activity,
traffic and communications, finance, etc. The air offensive of the
Allied powers against Germany, for example, provided ample proof
of the fact that the civilian population of a warring nation is just as
subject to the effects of enemy action as the soldier at the front.
Effective disruption of the sources of military supply and transport
facilities is quite capable of paralyzing a nation's armed forces, and
may be a decisive factor in determining the outcome of the war. All
of this means that a war under modern conditions requires the careful
integration of a great many phases of the life of the nation, and that
complete uniformity in the planning and conduct of operations is abso-
lutely imperative. It would be unrealistic to maintain that the military
is capable of handling all this without help. On the other hand, so long
as wars are ultimately decided by weapons, it seems logical that the
military should continue to occupy a position of priority in matters of
operational command. The question which we must decide is how we
should prepare for a future war and how that war should be conducted.
The conditions which developed within the fairly small framework of
the Axis coalition during World War II can give us certain clues to
the proper answer.

Nearly all of Germany's difficulties during World War II can be
directly or indirectly traced to the lack of a central command organi-
zation. Thus the first prerequisite must be the establishment of a cen-
tral instrument of command, which I shall call an armed forces
general staff. Within the framework of constitutional policy and pro-
cedures, this staff should have authority over all civilian and political
agencies in all questions relating to the defense of the nation; it should
have the status of a superior staff for the general staffs of the service
branches making up the armed forces. In the event of international
alliances, an over-all planning agency should be set up during peacetime and entrusted with the authority and missions on a supranational basis which the armed forces general staff exercises on a national basis.

In keeping with the importance of its missions, the armed forces general staff should be made up of the best qualified General Staff officers from all branches of the service and of outstanding personalities from public life, and these two groups should then be given joint training for their roles in the accomplishment of a joint mission. This training should be carefully designed to orient the members of the armed forces general staff concerning the problems involved in the conduct of a global war and those aspects of global warfare which are bound to affect the life of the nation—or nations in case there is a coalition—in time of war. The nation's best-trained minds should be set to work to evaluate conditions in potentially hostile countries; the men selected for this task may be either active or reserve members of the armed forces general staff; rank or civilian profession should not be permitted to influence the choice. Outstanding representatives from the field of scientific research as well as from all other fields of public endeavor should also be given a seat and a voice on the staff.

The problem of the integration of all these various persons into the work of military preparations and the conduct of military operations is one which will require a great deal of study—a possible future war would be impossible to conduct without these persons. Any nation which buries its best minds in subordinate jobs during wartime merely because they happen to belong to people who have no military rank is guilty of wasting an important part of its best military potential on meaningless activity.

The points which we have discussed above in connection with the armed forces general staff are also applicable, on a smaller scale, to the general staffs of the individual service branches of each nation. The missions assigned to these staffs should be specifically limited in nature and should be determined by the over-all armed forces general staff. Within the restricted framework of these
missions, however, the subordinate general staffs will also require the help of prominent representatives of those fields of civilian endeavor which have some bearing on the mission of their particular branch. In this connection we need only recall the lack of contact between the Luftwaffe General Staff and the agencies responsible for armaments research and development and the unfortunate results it had on the course of the war. The only possible conclusion to be drawn from this is that the decentralization of the various aspects affecting the conduct of war, as it was practiced in the Third Reich--except by Hitler himself--and, strangely enough, earnestly furthered by Goering, must inevitably lead to a weakening of the over-all command apparatus. The establishment of a central command and planning agency is now more necessary than ever before. The military exclusiveness of the traditional General Staff, at any rate, can no longer be justified.

Those principles which are accepted as applicable to the conduct of war on its over-all scale should be equally applicable to the conduct of operations in each individual theater of operations. During the course of World War II, Germany often placed an Army or Luftwaffe commander in command of operations in a particular, remote theater of war (Africa, Norway, Finland, etc.). In most cases these commanders had only their own staffs to assist them, and no matter how well-versed they might be in the affairs of their own particular branch, they were bound to be limited in outlook. Occasionally, liaison officers from the other Armed Forces branches were also available, but these had no command authority over the troop units belonging to their service branches. Ordinarily, the commander had direct authority only over the units of his own service branch, while all other units received their orders from their own local command headquarters. So long as all the parties concerned were convinced of the need for close cooperation, this method was perfectly feasible; in practice, however, one cannot always rely on the good will of all the parties involved. As a matter of principle, remotely located theaters of war should always have a superior operations staff, detached from the armed forces general staff, in order to assure a certain degree of uniformity in the employment of the available forces.

The frequent changes in organizational structure with which
the Luftwaffe General Staff had to contend both before and during the war proved most unfortunate. The troop general staffs, however, were only slightly affected by them. There was never time for the responsibilities of the Staff to become as firmly established as the successful accomplishment of its mission required. We have already discussed some of the disadvantages arising from this situation.

Nevertheless, there would seem to be no doubt but that general staffs ought to be retained in the individual service branches, provided that these staffs restrict themselves to their proper missions of operational command, organization, and training, and that they receive their instructions in this respect from a superior armed forces general staff. The fact that the individual Armed Forces branches were often able to develop their own plans and pursue their own goals during World War II must be attributed to the lack of an Armed Forces command agency capable of issuing competently prepared and unequivocal orders; this lack was bound to lead to a blurring of the lines of authority and responsibility and to a dissipation of forces.

The general staffs of the individual service branches, like the executive agencies of other public service institutions, should be nothing but executive instruments for the armed forces general staff. Their influence on the conduct of war should be limited to those specific operations for which they have been assigned responsibility, for too broad a delegation of command authority tends to weaken the over-all strength.

One very important responsibility of the individual service general staffs would be the selection of their representatives to the armed forces general staff, as well as the careful pre-training of younger candidates for these positions. The officers selected for service on the armed forces general staff should not be too young; they should very definitely have had some experience in the planning and command of operations within their own particular service branches. The experience of the Luftwaffe General Staff during World War II is indicative of the fact that extremely young and inexperienced officers on high-level staffs are capable of doing a great deal more damage than they can later rectify. On the other hand, of course, the officers selected for the armed forces general staff should not be so old that
they are no longer capable of thinking in terms of new and larger problems.

In order to be eligible for promotion to the rank of a general officer, a man should be required to have proved his fitness for service on the armed forces general staff, or, better still, have served successfully with that body. A general officer in any service branch cannot be considered capable of directing the operations of a large number of troops unless he is thoroughly familiar with the problems involved in the over-all conduct of operations and with the potentialities and requirements of the other service branches. The criticism levied at many an otherwise highly capable German general can certainly be attributed in part to his lack of experience outside his own service branch. It is equally certain that a great many of the German generals would not have gone along with Hitler if they had had access to full information and had thus been truly aware of the over-all situation.

An article appearing in Volume 8 of a publication on world politics of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Demokratischer Kreise* contains some interesting comments regarding the future relationship between statesman and military leader:

... In the future, too—in fact, in all probability particularly in the future—there will be general staff officers. These men will have to be familiar with all the many and varied ramifications of military affairs, and will also have to possess a certain degree of familiarity with the equally complex ramifications of developments in the political sphere. Their frame of reference must encompass the entire world; otherwise they will be incapable of filling their posts as competent advisors and aides. The organizational structure of the general staff of the future will be closely akin to that of the political organization of the larger defense areas. Narrow national barriers would only be a danger to the successful accomplishment of its

* (Study Group, Democratic Societies), author unknown.
mission. The traditional concept of military service as duty to the nation—or supranational unit—must remain.

The statesman, who quite correctly claims the right to establish goals for the strategic employment of the nation's armed forces and to place certain limitations on their activity, will have to give ground on one point; he should avail himself freely of the advice and recommendations of the military leader, but he must not, under any circumstances, interfere in matters of strategic or tactical command. These must remain the province of the military leader, who will employ them as he sees fit in order to achieve the strategic goals established by the statesman.

True cooperation between the statesman and the soldier—indispensable to the successful achievement of their common goal—is possible only if the statesman is capable of thinking constructively and realistically in regard to strategy, i.e., the over-all conduct of military operations. The statesman, too, should be at least somewhat familiar with the basic principles of military affairs. Above and beyond the demands of his own particular field, the military leader—particularly at higher level—must be sufficiently at home in the political sphere to comprehend the broad ramifications of developments in politics or diplomacy. He must, of course, be very careful to see that his personal ambition does not lead him into a position of non-critical acceptance of the political regime.

The same thing is true of the members of the general staff.

There are certain basic guidelines whose acceptance will be decisive for the future. We mention them in closing in the hope that they may become firmly entrenched in the thinking of both statesman and military leader.

The political leader, or statesman, bears the responsibility for the fate of his nation. This cannot be otherwise.
Thus, the political leader must be granted the right to make the final decision in matters of preparing the nation for defense or of waging war.

Once the decision has been taken, however, and the political leader has established the over-all objectives, the military leader must take over and must apply his knowledge and experience to the achievement of these objectives.

If the political leader is objective in his evaluation of the nation's position, and if he is confident of the wisdom of the course he is pursuing, then any attempt at war-mongering will be doomed to failure. The political leader will do well to remember that there is a healthy tendency towards pacifism in the make-up of every responsible military man. A soldier knows war and knows what suffering it means for the nation and the armed forces alike. For this reason, he will do his best to avoid war if at all possible . . .

Precisely in connection with the above remarks it might be well to point out that Hitler's "Basic Directive No. 1," discussed in the introduction of this study, was catastrophic in its effects. Because of this directive, no one in a position of military responsibility was ever informed of the ultimate aims of the Fuehrer, and no one—not even the members of the Armed Forces High Command—was given access to sufficient information to construct an accurate picture of the over-all situation. And no military leader, whether he be a member of the general staff or in charge of some other important military function, can fulfill his mission effectively unless he is informed of the ultimate objectives of the political leader and is familiar with the over-all situation. Otherwise he is like a hen who pecks about in the dark and occasionally manages to find a grain of corn.

The selection of individuals to fill the top posts in the political and military life of the nation must be handled with great care so that there will be no risk of the abuse of military security regulations.

As regards the post of Chief of the General Staff, in the sense
which was usual within the German Armed Forces during World War II, one can only conclude that it was an unfortunate one for the Chief of the General Staff as well as for the chiefs of subordinate staffs within the troop organization. The post was adopted from the rich tradition of the past. No attempt, however, was made to give it the traditional authority which might have justified its existence.

If we concede the wisdom of giving the commander of a unit, or even of a fairly large segment within a service branch, full responsibility for directing the operations of the troops under his command, then there would seem to be no need for a Chief of the General Staff. It is difficult to justify the employment of such highly-qualified officers in a post which is practically devoid of responsibility. One remedy would be to consolidate the position of the Chief of the General Staff—of an armed forces branch, a troop general staff, etc.—with that of the deputy commander. In this way, the Chief of the General Staff, by serving at the same time as deputy commander, would have control over the entire element rather than only over portions of it. Administrative functions, as well as any other functions which are not directly concerned with operational command, could be made a specific responsibility of this position. The authority of the commander would thus be secure, even in the eyes of the troops, and the ambiguity of his authority over the staff would be once and for all dispelled. The deputy commander, of course, would have to be a general officer and his training and experience would have to be such as to qualify him for his position in the eyes of the armed forces general staff. All the other officers on the troop general staff could be members of the general staff corps of their particular service branch.

The officers selected for general staff training should be men who have proved their ability and their strength of character; they should not be chosen on the basis of their ability to march correctly, their talent for sports, their skill in aerial combat, or their social accomplishments. Stupidity and vain ambition in the command organization can do more damage than a defeat in battle, for they can undermine the confidence which the troops must feel in their leaders. Experience with the troops and proven ability in action should be made prerequisites for service on the general staff. Spotty or limited
training of the officers occupying high-level positions can also result in the loss of troop confidence. We have come to recognize the fallaciousness of the view that young, inexperienced, and untrained holders of war decorations are more suited for general staff service and operational command than the carefully selected and thoroughly trained general staff officer, unless, of course, these younger men possess the same qualifications as the latter. The experience accumulated by the Luftwaffe General Staff in this respect is as unequivocal as it was unfortunate.

The question of whether or not the general staff officer should wear a distinctive uniform is largely a matter of personal taste. In the case of the Luftwaffe General Staff, it cannot be established that the distinctive uniform had any appreciable influence on its relationship to the troops. On the other hand, the General Staff uniform always provided a certain extra motivation for the young officer to strive for eligibility for General Staff training. At the same time, it served as compensation for the fact that General Staff officers were rarely singled out for military decorations. This fact, deriving from Hitler's and Goering's attitude towards the General Staff, did little to increase the general desire to be associated with it, particularly since military decorations very often brought with them rapid promotions which had little or nothing to do with ability or knowledge. During World War I the situation was different; bravery was rewarded with the highest decorations, but military ability was very definitely a prerequisite for promotion, and the fantastically rapid promotion policy of World War II was unknown. The withholding of decorations from General Staff members on the basis that they were "nothing but aides" created widespread discontent in General Staff circles and did much to diminish the incentive and eagerness to do a good job for General Staff officers at all echelons. And, indeed, one could hardly expect that appointment to the General Staff would be considered a particularly desirable honor so long as General Staff service was evaluated as second-rate. This is an error in judgment which must be avoided in the future; indeed, the troops themselves have every reason to demand that it be avoided, for a second-rate command organization is of no good whatsoever to them.

In closing I should like to mention one other important lesson
taught by Germany's experience. Events have proved beyond any doubt that the rapid turn-over in General Staff chiefs was a catastrophe for the Luftwaffe General Staff. It is probable that the development and expansion of the Luftwaffe and its General Staff would have been far more satisfactory if the first General Staff Chief, General Wever, had been permitted to carry his mission to completion. It lies in the nature of the situation that any new general staff chief--provided that he is a man of character and personality--will try to impress his own personality on both command organization and troops. If he is then removed from his post before his ideas have had time to take effect, he leaves behind an indeterminate structure, and his successor has no alternative but to start experimenting from the beginning. When a general staff has too many chiefs within a relatively short period, as was the case with the Luftwaffe General Staff, the result is proverbial: "Too many cooks spoil the broth!"
FOOTNOTES

Chapter 1

1. Based on material pertaining to the History of the German General Staff, including a summary prepared by Branch 8 of the Luftwaffe General Staff, in A/IV, Karlsruhe Document Collection.

2. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (On War), 16th Edition, Verlag Ferdinand Duemmler, Bonn (this is the same publishing house which brought out the original edition after von Clausewitz' death).

Chapter 2

1. Based on the author's personal experience.

2. Based on personal conversations between the author and General Wever during the author's incumbency as an advisory expert for General Staff officer administration.

Chapter 3

1. The original of this speech has been lost. A copy is contained in "Walther Wever - Zum Gedaechtnis (Sonderdruck)" (Walther Wever - In Memory) (reprint), appearing in the Nachrichtenblatt des Wever'schen Familienverbandes e. V (News Bulletin of the Wever Family Society), Number 12, 1936.

2. D/II/1, Karlsruhe Document Collection.

4. Ibid., p. 4.

5. Kesselring, Der Generalstab des deutschen Heeres unter Zugrundelegung der Fragebogen der Historical Division mit einem kurzgehaltenen Anhang über den Luftwaffengeneralstab (The Army General Staff, based on the Historical Division Questionnaires; including a Brief Appendix on the Luftwaffe General Staff), Karlsruhe Document Collection.


7. Ibid., p. 429


Chapter 4

1. Personnel Office, No. 2654/44, 1/7/44, Karlsruhe Document Collection, A/IV.


5. Der Reichswehrminister Nr. 150/33, geh. Kdos., T2 III B In 1(L), vom 21. 3. 33 (Office of the Reichs Minister of Defense, File 150/33, Classified, T2 III B In 1(L), dated 21 March 1933); quoted in Geschichte des deutschen Generalstabs (Arbeitsmaterial) (M/4), A/IV, Karlsruhe Document Collection.


8. See Figure 2.


10. Gedanken zum Problem Die Fuhrung in der deutschen Luftwaffe (Thoughts on the Problem: Command within the German Luftwaffe); A/1/1a, Karlsruhe Document Collection.


Chapter 6


Chapter 7

1. Vol. 8, "Arbeitsgemeinschaft Demokratischer Kreise" (Study Group, Democratic Societies), author unknown.

2. Professor Wolfgang Foerster, Ein General kämpft gegen den Krieg, Muenchner Dom-Verlag, Munich, 1949.

3. Dr. Hans Frank, Im Angesicht des Galgens (In the Shadow of the Gallows), Munich-Graefeling, 1953, pp. 243-44.

4. See the study by Generaloberst Halder, Die Struktur des OKW und OKH, 1935-1942 (The Structure of the Armed Forces High Command and the Army High Command, 1935-1942), Part I, pp. 2-8; A/1/1, Karlsruhe Document Collection.


8. Karl Koller, **Der letzte Monat** (The Last Month), Mannheim, 1949, p. 105.


10. As the author himself once heard Goering explain.

11. Koller, **Der letzte Monat**.


14. General von Waldau was Chief of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff.

15. H/1/1, Karlsruhe Document Collection.

16. Ernst Heinkel, **Sturmisches Leben** (A Stormy Life), Stuttgart, 1953.
17. Aufgabe und Stellung der Luftwaffe in der Gesamtkriegsführung (Mission and Role of the Luftwaffe in the Over-all Conduct of War), by Colonel Carl von Brauchitsch, July 1945, with a commentary by General der Flieger Koller; F/1/2a, Karlsruhe Document Collection.


19. During the course of a dinner party at Karinhall in the summer of 1937.

20. Warum verfügte Deutschland im 2. Weltkrieg über keinen brauchbaren viermotorigen Bomber? (Why did Germany not have a usable four-motored bomber at her disposal during World War II?) by General der Flieger a.D. Paul Deichmann (1953), C/IV/2cc, Karlsruhe Document Collection.


26. Ibid.

27. Generalleutnant a. D. J. Schmid, Die 5. Abteilung des Generalstabs der Luftwaffe (Ic) vom 1. 1. 38 bis 1. 10. 42 (Branch V (Intelligence) of the Luftwaffe General Staff from 1 January 1938 to 1 October 1942); A/IV, Karlsruhe Document Collection.

28. Warum verfügte Deutschland im 2. Weltkrieg über keinen brauchbaren vier motorigen Bomber? (Why didn’t Germany have a usable four-engine bomber at her disposal during World War II?) by General der Flieger a. D. Paul Diechmann (1953), C/IV/2cc, Karlsruhe Document Collection.


30. Based on the personal experience of the author during his period of service as Chief of Staff of Air Fleet Reich (Luftflotte Reich).

31. Ibid.
Appendix 1

THE ORGANIZATION, CHAIN OF COMMAND, AND FUNCTIONS OF THE LUFTWAFFE GENERAL STAFF AS OF WAR'S END

The final organizational structure of the Luftwaffe High Command and the Reichs Ministry of Aviation represented the sum total of past experience, past error, and the events of the war in respect to the influence they exerted on the function of military command. We must distinguish carefully between the final reorganization, completed in the spring of 1945, and the many provisional modifications, dictated by the exigencies of the immediate situation, which preceded it and which, in many cases, were obvious deviations from the recognized organizational ideal. A great many of the agencies appearing in the wartime top-level organizational structure were retained in the final reorganization of 26 March 1945; organizationally, however, they were no longer a part of the General Staff, but were directly subordinate to the Reichs Marshal.

As we have seen, responsibility for the conduct of military operations had been concentrating itself more and more in the person of the Chief of the General Staff until, after the reorganization of 26 March 1945, this responsibility was his alone. By war's end the office of the State Secretary was restricted to certain purely administrative functions of the Reichs Ministry of Aviation. Inasmuch as the organizational structure and missions assigned to the General Staff by the reorganization of 26 March 1945 were the fruit of the bitter experience of war, it has seemed expedient to devote the following section to a comprehensive summary of them.

Section I: The Reichs Minister of Aviation and Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe

* Based on material contained in A/II/2, Karlsruhe Document Collection.
Responsibilities and Delegation of Authority

The responsibilities of the Reichs Minister of Aviation and Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe were clearly defined in the Luftwaffe Mobilization Plan of 1 August 1938, and in principle they remained the same, viz.:

The Reichs Minister of Aviation and Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe is a single individual. He is the supreme military commander of the Luftwaffe and, at the same time, its highest administrative officer, charged with directing the operations of the Luftwaffe and with issuing the necessary orders for its expansion and equipment in respect to personnel, materiel, and the establishment of industrial requirements. Further, he is charged with responsibility for air defense operations within the German Reich. He is also responsible for enforcing the provisions of German air sovereignty. The National Weather Service is under his supervision.

In order to aid him in the accomplishment of these missions, in 1945 he was assigned two deputies:

1. Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, with the Luftwaffe High Command.
2. State Secretary of Aviation as Chief of Aviation.

Moreover, the following agencies were directly subordinate to him:

1. Chief of the Luftwaffe Personnel Office.
2. Commander of the Replacement Luftwaffe.

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211

4. Supply Operations Staff

5. Chief Judge Advocate, Luftwaffe.

6. Special Missions and Troop Recommendations Staff.

7. Special Commissioner in Charge of Defense against Four-Engine Bomber Units.

8. Special Commissioner in Charge of Defense against Enemy Long-Range Weapons.

9. General Commissioner in Charge of Jet Aircraft.

10. Inspector for Training of Luftwaffe Rocket Equipped Units.

Section II: The Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff

The appropriate service regulations define his responsibilities as follows:*

1. The Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff is the first assistant and advisor to the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, in all matters pertaining to the conduct of air warfare. He is responsible for operational planning and for issuing the necessary orders to subordinate troop elements. It is his duty to keep the Commander in Chief currently informed in regard to these matters.

2. The Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff is directly responsible to the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe. He has the

* Ibid.
status of a commander in chief of an air fleet and the disciplinary authority of a Senior Commander, Luftwaffe in accordance with the provisions of Luftwaffe Service Regulation No. 3/9. His deputy is the Chief of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff.

3. In accordance with instructions issued by the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, the Chief of the General Staff is responsible for establishing the principles to be followed in the preparation of operational orders and in the setting up of armament requirements. He is responsible for authorizing the detachment of Luftwaffe units to other branches of the Armed Forces, as well as for personnel utilization and supply operations within the Luftwaffe. He issues instructions pertaining to the organization, training, equipping, and supply of Luftwaffe and air defense elements.

4. The Chief of the General Staff is responsible for issuing orders pertaining to operational matters directly to the technical services generals and to the Chief Administrative Officer, and—in questions of technical air armament—to the Chief of Technical Air Armament.

5. Insofar as possible the Chief of the General Staff will participate in all conferences held by the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, on matters having to do with his area of responsibility. He is to be informed of the results of all military conferences held by the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe. The Commander of the Replacement Luftwaffe, the Chief of Aviation, and the chiefs of all other offices directly responsible to the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, are required to keep the Chief of the General Staff fully informed of policy decisions within their own offices. The General Staff Chief is authorized to request any documents he may need for his work from any and all Luftwaffe sections.

* Underlined by the author. This passage offers incontrovertible evidence of the status of the Chief of the General Staff as primary military commander.
6. The Chief of the General Staff is to be consulted in the appointment of General Staff officers and in the filling of General Staff and attaché posts, and has the right to voice any objections he may have. In such case, the Chief of the Luftwaffe Personnel Office is required to present these objections to the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, for decision.

7. The Air War Academy and Branch VIII, General Staff are under the direct supervision of the Chief of the General Staff.

The following elements are directly responsible to the Chief of the General Staff:

A. The Chief of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, whose responsibilities are as follows:

a. The Chief of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff is directly subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff, and is the latter's permanent deputy. He has the status of a commanding general and the disciplinary authority of a Senior Commander in accordance with the provisions of Luftwaffe Service Regulation No. 3/9.

b. He submits recommendations for the conduct of air warfare and for the planning of Luftwaffe and air defense operations. At the behest of the Chief of the General Staff, he prepares operational orders for the troops under the command of the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, (including the troops of allied nations) and issues instructions for coordinated operations with other Armed Forces branches.

c. He supervises the evaluation of combat experience for use by combat and training units.

d. After obtaining the concurrence of the Chief of the General Staff, he establishes technological requirements and tactical requirements pertaining to organization, supply, and
training (including the training of Luftwaffe signal communications personnel), and issues such requirements to the other sections of the General Staff, to the technical services generals, and to the Luftwaffe Inspectorates.

e. The following agencies are directly responsible in every respect to the Chief of the Operations Staff:

1) Branch I, Operations, of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff
2) Branch V, Intelligence, of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff
3) Branch VII of the General Staff
4) Chief, Air Weather Service
5) Senior Commander, Troop Gas Defense
6) Chief of Air Defense - (operational subordination only)

B. The Quartermaster General, whose responsibilities are as follows:

The Quartermaster General is responsible to the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff. However, he possesses the right to direct access to the Reichs Minister of Aviation and Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe. He is responsible for keeping the Chief of the General Staff informed at all times in regard to the general status of the supply situation. He has the status of a commanding general, Luftwaffe and the disciplinary authority of a Senior Commander in accordance with the provisions of Luftwaffe Service Regulation No. 3/9.

a. In compliance with instructions issued by the Chief of the General Staff, he directs and supervises supply
operations (personnel and materiel) within the Luftwaffe. He is responsible for the devising of long-range measures to assure that the striking power of the Luftwaffe—including those elements detached to the Army and Navy—is kept intact by adequate and timely supply action. He is charged with responsibility for all matters pertaining to transport within the Luftwaffe.

Further, in accordance with instructions from the Chief of the General Staff, he is responsible for maintaining supply levels adequate to meet the requirements of units at the front, of schools, replacement units, and of newly activated units. He is responsible for the mobilization of personnel and for the handling of all matters connected with the organization of the Luftwaffe during wartime.

The Quartermaster General is responsible for the maintenance of the ground organization and for its expansion, if warranted.

b. At the behest of the Chief of the General Staff, he issues appropriate orders and instructions to subordinate headquarters, to the Commander of the Replacement Luftwaffe, and to the Chief of Technical Air Armament. He issues these instructions by order of the Luftwaffe High Command.

c. The Quartermaster General is responsible for establishing and maintaining rear area services in behalf of the Reichs Minister of Aviation and Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe.

He maintains liaison with the Quartermaster General, Army in connection with the joint use of Army rear area services and, if applicable, with the Chief of Staff, Naval Warfare.

After the reorganization of 1945, the following elements were made directly responsible to the Quartermaster General:
Organization Staff, consisting of: Branches II and IX and Strength and Equipment Authorization Branch; Branch IV; Branch VI; Chief of Supply; Chief of Motor Vehicle Transport; Chief, Medical Service; Chief Engineer, Luftwaffe; Luftwaffe Ground Organization Branch; Chief, Air Liaison Service; Chief of Air Transport for the Armed Forces.

C. General of the Signal Forces, whose responsibilities were as follows:

a. The General of the Signal Forces, Luftwaffe is personally* subordinate to the Reichs Minister of Aviation and Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe; technically and operationally, however, he is subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff. He has the status of a Commanding General, and the disciplinary authority of a Senior Commander in accordance with the provisions of Luftwaffe Service Regulation No. 3/9.

b. His responsibilities are as follows:

1) He directs the operations of the Luftwaffe signal forces, supervises the utilization and maintenance of the entire signal communications network of the Luftwaffe, and supervises the installation and operation of the ground equipment needed to carry out air traffic control, radio navigation, aircraft observation and reporting (including radar-controlled fighter aircraft operations), radio reconnaissance, radar observation, and radio jamming activity. He is responsible for establishing and presenting, to other Armed Forces branches and to civilian authorities, tactical and operational requirements in terms of technological equipment, and for supervising the distribution of such equipment. Further, he is responsible for preparing and revising operational instructions in his field.

2) He directs the training of Luftwaffe signal

* Author's Note: This was a special arrangement, based on considerations of time in rank.
communications personnel, supervising the work of troop unit instructors in this field. He is responsible for both the military and technical aspects of the training of Luftwaffe telecommunications engineers--members of the Engineer Corps or of the Prinz-Eugen Replacement Group--, and directs the advanced training of personnel in the telecommunications field.

3) At the behest of the Chief of the General Staff, he is responsible for the establishment and formulation of tactical technological requirements to be transmitted to the Chief of Technical Air Armament, viz:

   a) for ground communications equipment and other high frequency communications equipment (radar, radio navigation, etc., related fields), in concurrence with the appropriate technical services generals and with notification of Branch VI, Quartermaster General.

   b) for ground communications equipment and airborne radar equipment, at the request of the technical services generals concerned, and with notification of Branch VI, Quartermaster General.

He directs the testing of equipment at troop level and introduces new equipment. He is responsible for establishing procurement requirements for ground communications equipment for transmittal to the Chief of Technical Air Armament and, in conjunction with the Quartermaster General, for the distribution of such equipment.

c. He exercises an advisory function in the following:

   1) the organization and equipment of the Luftwaffe communications forces and aircraft--in close cooperation with the Quartermaster General and the Chief of Technical Air Armament.
2) the utilization of personnel within the Luftwaffe communications forces—in close cooperation with the Quartermaster General and the Luftwaffe Personnel Office.

d. The General of the Signal Forces, Luftwaffe assumes the functions of a Luftwaffe Inspector in the following fields in case of war:

1) all units of the Luftwaffe communications forces.

2) all Luftwaffe signal communications personnel.

3) Luftwaffe supply units in respect to their handling of signal communications equipment.

e. The following agencies are subordinate to the General of the Signal Forces, Luftwaffe:

1) in every respect: Chief of Staff with Branches I through III; Chief, Inspectorate for Signal Communications with Branches IV through VI; Adjutant’s Group; Inspector for Air Safety Control; Inspector for the Aircraft Reporting Service; Inspector for Radio Reconnaissance; Inspector for Radio Communications.

2) operationally subordinate: Senior Signal Officer, office of the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe.

3) subordinate in respect to training: Commanding General, Luftwaffe Signal Communications Training with the Luftwaffe Signal Communications Training Division and the Luftwaffe Signal Communications Replacement Division under his command; (requests relating to the training of airborne radio operators will be originated by the Commanding General, Pilot Training and transmitted to the General of the Signal Forces, Luftwaffe).

It is clear from the responsibilities assigned to the General
of the Signal Forces that the Luftwaffe communications organization enjoyed a very special status. Purely from the standpoint of organizational effectiveness, the special status of the General of the Signal Forces—which, after all, gave him direct influence over operations, organization, training, personnel utilization, development of equipment, and procurement—may not seem particularly desirable. In actuality—chiefly because of the personality involved—this highly unusual organizational set-up proved fully satisfactory, both during the peacetime period of the rapid expansion of the Luftwaffe communications force and during the extremely difficult war years. The service regulation which assigned these responsibilities to the General of the Signal Forces is a perfect example of the reciprocity of personality and organizational form—tailored to fit General Martin. This is, however, a special case and cannot be evaluated without reference to special circumstances.

D. The Chief Administrative Officer, Luftwaffe, whose responsibilities were as follows:

a. The Chief Administrative Officer, Luftwaffe, is the advisor of the Reichs Minister of Aviation and Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe in all matters pertaining to administration. Personally, he is directly responsible to the latter; technically and operationally he is responsible to the Chief of the General Staff.

b. The Chief Administrative Officer, Luftwaffe has the status of a Commanding General and the disciplinary authority of a Senior Commander, in accordance with the provisions of Luftwaffe Service Regulation No. 3/9, over officers of the Specialist Service and the officials of his own agency.

c. The following activities fall within the purview of the Chief Administrative Officer:

1) direction and supervision of all administrative duties, as prescribed by law, regulation, and special instruction, at all command and troop levels (Air Fleet and Air
Administrative Command Headquarters and all subordinate agencies);

2) supervision of all supply distribution normally falling within the purview of the administrative sections;

3) the establishment of troop requirements in the field of administrative services, and the evaluation of the experience gathered in all aspects of the administrative function, as well as the formulation of recommendations to be used by the Chief of Aviation in determining administrative requirements at Ministry level;

4) supervision of the procurement of supplies required for carrying out administrative duties and normally procured by unit administrative sections directly rather than through the Reichs Air Ministry;

5) execution of the administrative function within the Luftwaffe High Command.

d. The Chief Administrative Officer has the authority to issue orders and instructions pertaining to administrative matters to all headquarters and agencies under the command of the Reichs Minister of Aviation and Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe.

e. The Chief Administrative Officer, Luftwaffe has the status of a Luftwaffe Inspector over Luftwaffe administrative officers at all echelons (air fleet, army, air administrative area commands, corps, and division), including all subordinate administrative staff sections, and over the food service units (canteens and mess-halls - operational supervision; baker and butcher companies - administrative supervision) and coal storage depots in the occupied areas of the east.

He is the superior commander of all officers in the Specialist Service—the career field for all administrative
personnel—and of all the civilian officials employed in troop administration activity within the Luftwaffe.

The responsibilities assigned to the new post of Chief Administrative Officer, Luftwaffe are most noteworthy in that they established—for the first time—a channel through which the Chief of the General Staff could exert his influence over administrative matters.

E. The Chief of Technical Air Armament

The post of Chief of Technical Air Armament developed from the former Technical Office of the Reichs Air Ministry, via the Office of the Chief of Procurement and Supply, after administration of the air armament program had been turned over to the Minister of Armament. The creation of the office of the Chief of Technical Air Armament gave the Chief of the General Staff decisive influence over the entire field of technical air armament, a field which, in any case, is closely allied with operational command and should not be separated from it. This promising development suffered a setback, however, because of the tendency towards self-glorification of the Minister of Armament, Speer, who considered himself responsible solely to the Fuehrer, and not to the various Armed Forces branches.

The responsibilities of the Chief of Technical Air Armament were as follows:

a. The Chief of Technical Air Armament is directly responsible to the Chief of the General Staff. He has the status of a Commanding General, and the disciplinary authority of a Senior Commander in accordance with the provisions of Luftwaffe Service Regulation No. 3/9.

b. The Chief of Technical Air Armament is responsible for the following:

1) research, development, testing, and approval of all Luftwaffe equipment, including aviation fuels (the function of approval may also be exercised by the Army or Navy, if
applicable);

2) evaluation and processing of armament development requests originated by the Operations Staff, the technical services generals, etc. and submitted through Branch VI, Quartermaster General;

3) processing of armament requests (quantity, type, and quality of equipment) received through Branch VI, Quartermaster General and the Chief of Supply, and presentation of these requests to the Reichs Minister of Armament and War Production;

4) approval of new equipment for procurement and introduction in the field;

5) devising of long-range measures for the development of new equipment—in cooperation with the Operations Staff, the General, Pilot Training, and the technical services generals;

6) issuance of technical data, operational directions, spare part catalogues, and instructional material for new equipment;

7) compilation and evaluation of complaints regarding technical instruction at troop level, and the instruction of line units on technical matters;

8) issuance to the troops of orders and instructions pertaining to technological matters.

c. The Chief of Technical Air Armament supervises all research and developmental activity on technological equipment being done for the Luftwaffe within the areas of responsibility of the Army and Navy.

d. The Chief of Technical Air Armament is responsible
for representing the Luftwaffe High Command to the Reichs
Minister of Armament and War Production in all matters
pertaining to air armament.

e. The Chief of Technical Air Armament is to be con-
sulted regarding the introduction of new equipment in the
preparation of strength and equipment authorizations.

f. The Chief of Technical Air Armament will serve as
technical advisor in the production of Luftwaffe equipment.

g. In all of his duties, the Chief of Technical Air Ar-
manent will maintain close liaison with the appropriate agencies
of the Luftwaffe High Command and the Reichs Air Ministry,
particularly with the technical services generals.

h. The following agencies are responsible to the Chief
of Technical Air Armament: Headquarters, Testing Service
and all Luftwaffe testing stations (operationally subordinate);
Luftwaffe Air Technical Academy (in respect to the carrying
out of experimental work).

F. Branch VIII of the General Staff, the responsibilities of
which were as follows:

a. The Chief of Branch VIII, Luftwaffe General Staff
is directly responsible to the Chief of the General Staff. He
has the status and disciplinary authority of a brigade commander
in accordance with the provisions of Luftwaffe Service Regu-
lation No. 3/9.

b. In accordance with instructions issued by the Chief of
the General Staff, he is responsible for the preparation of
documentary material for the use of the officer corps and for
use at Luftwaffe training centers for the intellectual education
of the coming generations of officers.

c. He is responsible for keeping an exact historical
record of air war events beginning with the year 1933 and
utilizing all available source materials.

d. This record will be compiled in the following publications:

1) Studies on Air War

2) Military Historical Documents of the Luftwaffe General Staff

3) How We Fight - Luftwaffe Field Regulations

4) A Survey of the Events of Air Warfare since 1933

The Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff will determine the advisability of publication of the above documents.

e. In addition to the responsibilities listed above, the Chief of the General Staff may assign special duties to the Chief of Branch VIII, as follows:

1) preparation of staff studies relating to specific problems of air warfare;

2) review of all material considered for publication on air warfare;

3) representation of the interests of the Luftwaffe in the press, at home and abroad.

f. The Chief of Branch VIII is responsible for maintaining close contact with the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, Luftwaffe headquarters, and all agencies concerned with Luftwaffe armament or questions of Luftwaffe technology.

He is expected to maintain liaison with the Armed Forces press division, with the military history branches of the Army and Navy, and with the special military history officials.
appointed by the Fuehrer.

G. The Air War Academy

The Air War Academy was directly subordinate to the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff. In this way, the latter was able to exert considerable direct influence on the training of the coming generations of General Staff officers.

Section III: The Technical Services Generals and Luftwaffe Inspectorates

The Luftwaffe Inspectorates, from which most of the offices of the technical services generals developed during the war, were an important instrument in the exercise of the over-all command function within the Luftwaffe and, thus, an important aid to the Chief of the General Staff.

The missions of an inspectorate are pretty much the same in the armed forces organization of every nation. The Luftwaffe inspectorates, however, were somewhat unusual in that they not only carried out the normal functions of an inspectorate, but also frequently acted as an executive instrument of command. Thus, their influence on the growth and development of the particular service branches they represented was often decisive. Both before and during the war it frequently happened that the basic principles of commitment, organization, and training were far more the intellectual product of the inspectorates and the technical services generals than of the appropriate sections of the General Staff. This is not particularly surprising in view of the fact that the inspectorates were usually staffed with men who were acknowledged specialists in their fields, whereas the majority of the members of the General Staff were embarking on fields of endeavor which were completely new to them—-as we have seen in the preceding sections dealing with the development of the General Staff and the many difficulties which it faced.

Under these circumstances, it was only sensible to assign the
inspectortates to the Chief of the General Staff—rather, at that time, to the Chief of the Air Command Office—during the early period of Luftwaffe development, inasmuch as he was primarily responsible for guiding such development. On the other hand, it was a grave violation of military common sense that the inspectortates were later permitted to become pawns in the game of power played by the State Secretary and the Chief of the General Staff and to be assigned first to one and then to the other.

The most important technical inspectortates (i.e., offices of the technical services generals) were maintained until the end of the war. Others, established as a last resort to meet a momentary need, were disbanded or absorbed into other agencies as soon as their mission was accomplished.

The inspectortates provided a valuable channel for bringing important material to the attention of command. In many cases, the General Staff simply could not have fulfilled its mission had not the inspectortates—which had direct contact with the field units—been on hand with helpful recommendations and to clarify the objectives of the General Staff Chief to the troops. So that the reader may have a clearer concept of the interrelationship between these two instruments of command, I have presented the missions and chain of command of all the inspectortates and offices of the technical services generals in existence at that time. For those agencies still in operation and under the command of the Chief of the General Staff at the end of the war, the responsibilities have been quoted verbatim from applicable service regulations.

A. The General of the Reconnaissance Forces—formerly Luftwaffe Inspectorate 1

The office of the General of the Reconnaissance Forces became subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff again in 1941. The general himself was responsible to the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe. His responsibilities were as follows:

a. The General of the Reconnaissance Forces is
personally subordinate to the Reichs Minister of Aviation and Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe. For technical and operational supervision, he is under the command of the Chief of the General Staff. He has the status and disciplinary authority of a division commander in accordance with the provisions of Luftwaffe Service Regulation No. 3/9.

b. The General of the Reconnaissance Forces is responsible for assuming the functions of a Luftwaffe inspector over all air reconnaissance units (land-based), weather reconnaissance squadrons, reconnaissance schools, reconnaissance personnel replacement units, and over the Aerial Photography School. Moreover, he is in charge of all aerial photography sections at all Luftwaffe headquarters, higher-level command staffs, and units.

c. 1) In connection with military operations planned by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, the General of the Reconnaissance Forces makes recommendations for the commitment and organization of the available reconnaissance units, taking into consideration their training, combat experience, personnel strength, and technological equipment.

2) The General of the Reconnaissance Forces is responsible for making periodic inspections of the reconnaissance units and weather reconnaissance squadrons in order to satisfy himself as to their standard of training, combat preparedness, and utilization of weapons and equipment. He makes reports of his findings to the Chief of the General Staff, the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, the commanders in chief of the air fleets, the commanding generals of the air corps, and the appropriate agencies of the office of the Reichs Minister of Aviation and Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe. In conjunction with the above agencies, he is responsible for devising means to correct any defects he may have noted.

d. The General of the Reconnaissance Forces is to be consulted in all matters pertaining to the activation, organization, conversion, equipment, and supply of air reconnaissance
units, weather reconnaissance squadrons, and aerial photography sections. He is expected to cooperate closely with the Quartermaster General, the Chief of Technical Air Armament, the General of the Signal Forces, the Chief Engineer, the Commander, Testing Stations, and the Commanding General, Pilot Training. He will also act as advisor to the above agencies in all questions concerning his field of endeavor. He will also be consulted in the planning of new activations within the aerial photography service.

e. In conjunction with the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, the General of the Reconnaissance Forces is responsible for the establishment of technological requirements for the development of both long-range and close-range reconnaissance aircraft, including airborne equipment, weapons, and ammunition.

f. The General of the Reconnaissance Forces is responsible for establishing technological requirements for the development of the equipment needed for aerial photography and for the evaluation of aerial photographs.

g. In accordance with instructions issued by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, the General of the Reconnaissance Forces establishes training requirements for the Commanding General, Pilot Training and makes periodic inspections to make certain that uniformity is maintained in the training of air reconnaissance units and weather reconnaissance squadrons committed at the front, the reconnaissance personnel replacement groups, and the units temporarily assigned to him for refresher training.

h. In accordance with instructions issued by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, Operations Branch and Branch VI or Branch IV, Quartermaster General, the General of the Reconnaissance Forces directs the distribution of aircraft equipment and aviation fuels, as well as the assignment of personnel, to the reconnaissance personnel replacement
groups and to the units temporarily assigned to him for refresher training.

i. The General of the Reconnaissance Forces is responsible for the compilation, evaluation, and application of military experience within his field of endeavor. Material pertaining to tactics will be routed to the Luftwaffe Operations Staff. In conjunction with the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, Operations Branch, he is responsible for the preparation of instructions, memoranda, operational and training directives for the air reconnaissance forces and the aerial photography service.

j. At the direction of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, the General of the Reconnaissance Forces maintains close liaison with the Operations Branch, Army, in connection with air reconnaissance and aerial photography service for the Army. He acts as advisor to the Training and Organization Branches of the Army in the preparation of training directives pertaining to air reconnaissance and aerial photography.

k. The General of the Reconnaissance Forces is to be consulted in connection with the testing of new aircraft models, weapons, and equipment whenever these items concern his own field of endeavor.

l. The General of the Reconnaissance Forces is to be consulted in the determination of the airfields to be used by the training and replacement units under his command and by reconnaissance units temporarily relieved of duty at the front to undergo refresher training.

m. The following agencies are subordinate to the General of the Reconnaissance Forces in respect to technical supervision and training: Commanders of the Reconnaissance Personnel Replacement Groups, with subordinate units; 24th Training and Testing Headquarters; Luftwaffe Aerial Photography Section.

n. The General of the Reconnaissance Forces is not
authorized to issue independently operational orders to troop or staff sections, with the exception of those sections which are specifically operationally subordinate to him.

B. General of the Bomber Forces--formerly Luftwaffe Inspectorate 2.

The General was made subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff once more in 1941. His responsibilities were as follows:

a. The General of the Bomber Forces is personally subordinate to the Reichs Minister of Aviation and Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe. For technical and operational supervision, he is under the command of the Chief of the General Staff. He has the status and disciplinary authority of a division commander in accordance with the provisions of Luftwaffe Service Regulation No. 3/9.

b. In time of war the General of the Bomber Forces is responsible for assuming the functions of a Luftwaffe inspector over all long and close-range bomber units, all special duty bomber wings (Air Torpedo and Long-range Bomber Wings), and other units assigned to his command.

c. 1) In connection with military operations planned by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, the General of the Bomber Forces makes recommendations for the commitment of the available close and long-range bomber units, taking into consideration their combat experience, training, personnel strength, and technological equipment.

2) The General of the Bomber Forces is responsible for making periodic inspections of assigned units in order to satisfy himself of their standard of training and utilization of weapons and equipment. He reports his findings to the appropriate agencies and seeks that necessary action is taken to correct any faults he may have noted.
d. The General of the Bomber Forces is to be consulted in all matters pertaining to the activation, organization, equipment, and conversion of the close and long-range bomber units. He is expected to cooperate closely with the Quartermaster General, the Chief of Technical Air Armament, the General of the Signal Forces, the Chief Engineer, the Commanding General, Pilot Training, and the Commander, Testing Stations. He will also act as advisor to the above agencies in all questions concerning his field of endeavor. He is responsible for making periodic inspections of the close and long-range bomber units in order to assure himself of their combat preparedness. He will report his findings to the appropriate agencies and, in conjunction with these agencies, take the necessary action to secure immediate amelioration of any defects he may have noted.

e. In conjunction with the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, the General of the Bomber Forces is responsible for the establishment of technological requirements for the development of medium and long-range bomber aircraft, including airborne equipment, weapons, and ammunition. Moreover, he is responsible for guiding the development of bombardment techniques and navigation systems (coordinating with the General of the Signal Forces in questions concerning radio navigation).

f. The General of the Bomber Forces is responsible for assuring that the necessary degree of uniformity is maintained in the training of the close and long-range bomber units at the front, the replacement units, the units temporarily assigned to him for refresher training, and the units assigned to him for special duty.

To this end, he is responsible for the preparation of training material covering all aspects of bombardment activity (bombardment techniques, navigation, etc.), obtaining the concurrence of the other technical services generals whenever necessary. This material will be reviewed by the Luftwaffe
Operations Staff and approved by the Chief of the Luftwaffe
General Staff prior to publication. The General of the
Bomber Forces is responsible for supervising the use of this
material in the replacement units and units temporarily
assigned to him for training. He is to be consulted in the
selection and training of the required instructional personnel.

g. In accordance with instructions issued by the Luft-
waffe Operations Staff and Branch VI or Branch IV, Quartermaster General, the General of the Bomber Forces directs
the distribution of aircraft equipment and aviation fuels, as
well as the assignment of personnel, to the replacement
groups and the units temporarily assigned to him for refresher
training.

h. The General of the Bomber Forces, in accordance
with instructions issued by the Chief, Luftwaffe Personnel
Office, may make recommendations for the filling of top-level
posts within the close and long-range bomber units.

i. The General of the Bomber Forces is responsible for
the compilation, evaluation, and application of military expe-
rience within his field of endeavor. Material pertaining to
tactics will be routed to the Luftwaffe Operations Staff.

j. The General of the Bomber Forces is to be consulted
in connection with the testing of new aircraft models and the
training of their crews, whenever these items concern his own
field of endeavor.

k. The General of the Bomber Forces is to be consulted
in the selection of the airfields to be used by the training and
replacement units under his command and by bomber units
temporarily relieved of duty at the front to undergo refresher
training.

l. The General of the Bomber Forces is not authorized
to issue orders independently to troop or staff sections, with
the exception of those sections which are specifically operationally subordinate to him.

m. The following agencies are subordinate to the General of the Bomber Forces:

1) directly subordinate: the Chief of Air Torpedo Weapons; the Chief of Pilot Training, Baltic.

2) subordinate in respect to training and operations: 101st Bomber Group; 102d Bomber Group, assigned to the Chief of Air Torpedo Weapons; Unit Commanders' School, 101st Bomber Group; Luftwaffe Navigation School.

3) subordinate in respect to training only: the replacement units serving the forces under the command of the General of the Bomber Forces, unless otherwise determined by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, Operations Branch; other units temporarily assigned by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff to the General of the Bomber Forces for refresher training.

C. The General of the Fighter Forces--formerly Luftwaffe Inspectorate 3--whose responsibilities were as follows:

a. The General of the Fighter Forces is personally subordinate to the Reichs Minister of Aviation and Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe. For technical and operational supervision, he is under the command of the Chief of the General Staff. He has the status and disciplinary authority of a division commander in accordance with the provisions of Luftwaffe Service Regulation No. 3/9.

b. In time of war, the General of the Fighter Forces is responsible for assuming the functions of a Luftwaffe inspector over all single-engine day fighter, twin-engine fighter, and night fighter units, as well as over the training schools in these fields.
c. 1) In connection with military operations planned by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, the General of the Fighter Forces makes recommendations for the commitment of the available single-engine day fighter, twin-engine fighter, and night fighter units, taking into consideration their combat experience, training, personnel strength, and technological equipment.

In accordance with general instructions issued by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, he is responsible for coordinating the methods to be used in directing day and night fighter operations with the General of the Signal Forces.

2) The General of the Fighter Forces is responsible for making periodic inspections of assigned units in order to satisfy himself as to their standard of training, combat preparedness, and utilization of weapons and equipment. He makes reports of his findings to the Chief of the General Staff, the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, the commanders in chief of the air fleets, the commanding generals of the air corps, and the appropriate sections of the Luftwaffe High Command and the Reichs Air Ministry. In conjunction with the above agencies, he is responsible for devising means to correct any defects he may have noted.

d. The General of the Fighter Forces is to be consulted in all matters pertaining to the activation, organization, equipment, and conversion of the single-engine day fighter, twin-engine fighter, and night fighter units, as well as in the planning of new areas of operations. He is expected to cooperate closely with the Quartermaster General, the Chief of Technical Air Armament, the General of the Signal Forces, the Chief Engineer, the Commanding General, Pilot Training, and the Commander, Testing Stations. He will also act as advisor to the above agencies in all questions concerning his field of endeavor.

e. In conjunction with the Luftwaffe Operations Staff,
Operations Branch, the General of the Fighter Forces is responsible for the establishment of technological requirements for the development of single-engine, twin-engine, and night fighter aircraft, including airborne equipment, weapons, and ammunition.

f. The General of the Fighter Forces is responsible for the development of the techniques to be used in the aiming and firing of airborne weapons, and for the preparation of appropriate operational and training directives.

g. In accordance with instructions issued by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, the General of the Fighter Forces is responsible for establishing training requirements for the Commanding General, Pilot Training and makes periodic inspections to make certain that uniformity is maintained in the training of the single-engine fighter, twin-engine fighter, and night fighter units at the front, the replacement units serving these, and the units temporarily assigned to him for refresher training.

He directs the selection and training of instructional personnel.

h. In accordance with instructions issued by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, Operations Branch and Branch VI or Branch IV, Quartermaster General, the General of the Fighter Forces directs the distribution of aircraft equipment and aviation fuels, as well as the assignment of personnel, to the replacement groups and the units temporarily assigned to him for refresher training.

i. In cooperation with the Quartermaster General, the General of the Fighter Forces is authorized to order adjustments in the distribution of equipment (day and night fighter aircraft, aircraft equipment, radar equipment, special technological equipment, etc.) to the various fighter operations areas. The Luftwaffe Operations Staff, Operations Branch,
is to be informed whenever such adjustment may be expected to have any effect on combat preparedness in the areas involved.

j. The General of the Fighter Forces, in accordance with instructions received from the Chief, Luftwaffe Personnel Office, may make recommendations for the filling of top-level posts within the single-engine day fighter, twin-engine fighter, and night fighter units and their headquarters staffs.

k. The General of the Fighter Forces is responsible for the compilation, evaluation, and application of military experience within his field of endeavor. Material pertaining to tactics will be routed to the Luftwaffe Operations Staff.

l. The General of the Fighter Forces is to be consulted in connection with the testing of new aircraft models and the training of their crews, insofar as these matters concern his own field of endeavor.

m. The General of the Fighter Forces is to be consulted in the selection of the airfields to be used by the training and replacement units under his command and by fighter units temporarily relieved of duty at the front to undergo refresher training.

n. The following agencies are subordinate to the General of the Fighter Forces:

1) subordinate in every respect: the Inspector for the Day Fighter Forces; the Inspector for the Night Fighter Forces,

2) subordinate in respect to training: all replacement units serving the single-engine day fighter, twin-engine fighter, and night fighter forces.

3) in respect to the development of aiming and firing
techniques (airborne weapons): the Luftwaffe Gunnery School at Vaerlose.

o. The General of the Fighter Forces is not authorized to issue independently operational orders to troop or staff sections, with the exception of those sections which are specifically operationally subordinate to him.

D. The General of the Antiaircraft Artillery Forces, Office of the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, whose responsibilities were as follows:

a. The General of the Antiaircraft Artillery Forces is the advisor of the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, and the Luftwaffe High Command in all matters pertaining to the use of antiaircraft artillery. He has the right of direct access to the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, but is required to inform the Chief of the General Staff in advance if he wishes to make use of this right.

He is personally directly responsible to the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe; however, he is expected to work closely with the Chief of the General Staff.

In case of emergency, he is authorized to issue orders in the name of the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe, without clearing through the Chief of the General Staff in advance. He is not authorized to issue orders affecting the organization of forces.

b. The General of the Antiaircraft Artillery Forces may be given special assignments and special powers by the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe. These will be established by separate regulation.

c. In time of war the General of the Antiaircraft Artillery Forces is responsible for assuming the functions of a Luftwaffe inspector over all antiaircraft artillery units, including supply
depots, and over all other Luftwaffe units engaged in air defense, aircraft reporting, and aircraft identification duty with the troops.

d. Special duties:

1) In connection with military operations planned by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, he makes recommendations for the commitment of the available antiaircraft artillery units, taking into consideration their combat experience, training, personnel strength, and technological equipment.

2) He is responsible for making periodic inspections of the antiaircraft artillery forces in order to satisfy himself as to their standard of training and utilization of weapons and equipment. He reports his findings to the appropriate agencies and, in conjunction with these, takes the action necessary to secure immediate amelioration of any defects he may have noted.

3) He is responsible for assuring the necessary degree of uniformity in training by preparing training directives and instructions for the Commanding General, Antiaircraft Artillery Training.

4) He is responsible for the establishment of requirements for the development and production of the weapons, instruments, ammunition, and equipment needed by the antiaircraft artillery forces.

He maintains close liaison with the Inspector for Training of Luftwaffe Rocket-Equipped Units in connection with the administration of all units thus equipped under his command.

5) He is responsible for directing a testing program at troop level, and for the introduction of new weapons, instruments, ammunition, and equipment at troop level.

6) He is to be consulted in all matters pertaining to
the activation, organization, and equipment of the antiaircraft artillery forces.

7) He is expected to cooperate closely with the Quartermaster General, the Chief of Technical Air Armament, the General of the Fighter Forces, and those headquarters responsible for guiding fighter aircraft operations. He also acts as advisor to the above agencies in all questions pertaining to the use of antiaircraft artillery.

8) In cooperation with the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, Intelligence Branch, he is responsible for the compilation, evaluation, and application of military experience in the field of antiaircraft artillery operations.

9) He is to be consulted in the filling of all posts within the antiaircraft artillery forces from regiment commander upwards.

E. Luftwaffe Inspectorate 5, Air Traffic Control and Equipment

Luftwaffe Inspectorate 5 was disbanded in 1943 and its missions taken over by the Inspector of Air Traffic and Air Safety under the command of the Chief of the General Staff.

F. The Chief of Motor Vehicle Transport, Luftwaffe

The office of the Chief of Motor Vehicle Transport, Luftwaffe, was established in 1943 from Luftwaffe Inspectorate 6 and the Motor Vehicle Supply Branch, and placed under the command of the Quartermaster General. Its responsibilities were as follows:

a. The Chief of Motor Vehicle Transport, Luftwaffe, is directly responsible to the Quartermaster General. He has the status and disciplinary authority of a division commander in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 18, Luftwaffe Service Regulation No. 3/9.

His permanent deputy is the Chief of Staff, office of
the Chief of Motor Vehicle Transport.

b. In time of war the Chief of Motor Vehicle Transport is responsible for assuming the functions of a Luftwaffe inspector over all motor vehicle transport activity within the Luftwaffe.

c. 1) The Chief of Motor Vehicle Transport is responsible for making periodic inspections in order to determine the standard of training, utilization, and combat preparedness of motor vehicle transport personnel and to assess the need for additional supplies of transport equipment.

   He is further responsible for reporting any discrepancies to the appropriate agencies and for requesting whatever action may be necessary to correct them.

   2) The Chief of Motor Vehicle Transport is responsible for directing the initial and advanced training of all motor vehicle transport personnel. Moreover, he is to be consulted in the selection and evaluation of such personnel, including personnel employed as supply column and transport service leaders.

d. In connection with military operations planned by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff, the Chief of Motor Vehicle Transport makes recommendations for the organization and utilization of the motor vehicle transport service, the motor vehicle maintenance service, and the motor vehicle supply depots. In conjunction with Branch IV, Quartermaster General, he directs the assignment of maintenance units and issues instructions for the employment of motor vehicle supply units.

e. The Chief of Motor Vehicle Transport is responsible for the following activities:

   1) motor vehicle transport planning and allocation within the Luftwaffe and presentation of Luftwaffe requests for transport service to the Armed Forces High Command.
2) maintenance of records regarding the disposition of all available motor vehicles (those allocated from new production as well as those reconditioned by the maintenance service).

3) supervision of the supply and distribution of motor vehicle equipment.

4) compilation and evaluation of experience in the field of motor vehicle transport, review of inventions and improvements in this field, and issuance of technical manuals and instructional materials.

5) development of special equipment for motor vehicles and conversion of vehicles to generator gas (dry distillation).

6) enforcement of the laws and ordinances pertaining to motor vehicle traffic, the registration and licensing of Luftwaffe vehicles, and the assignment of the red chevron used to designate the vehicles of high-ranking commanders.

7) issuance of directives pertaining to the utilization of motor vehicle equipment, the control of motor vehicle traffic, and the processing of accident reports, losses and damages of motor vehicles.

I. The Chief of Motor Vehicle Transport is responsible for supervising the development of motor vehicle equipment. He directs the necessary testing and directs the introduction of new equipment.

He establishes requirements for the development of special equipment as well as modifications in existing equipment (in conjunction with the General of the Antiaircraft Artillery Forces, the General of the Signal Forces, the Chief of Air Defense, and the Chief of Technical Air Armament).

He orders the introduction of modifications and
supervises their accomplishment.

g. The Chief of Motor Vehicle Transport is responsible for the motor vehicle maintenance service of the Luftwaffe. He issues directives ordering the accomplishment of reorganizations, supply, and equipment desired by the General Staff. He supervises the coordination of motor vehicle maintenance activities between the Luftwaffe and the Armed Forces High Command and other branches of the Armed Forces.

h. He issues directives pertaining to the testing and evaluation of motor vehicle equipment, the procurement of such equipment, and the application of established criteria pertaining to motor vehicle performance.

i. He submits procurement requests for motor fuels, fuel storage facilities, and tires for vehicle-drawn antiaircraft artillery equipment and for aircraft servicing cars (the latter in cooperation with the Chief of Supply, Luftwaffe), and supervises the issue of these items together with Branch IV, Quartermaster General.

j. The Chief of Motor Vehicle Transport is responsible for administration of the funds allotted to motor vehicle operations.

k. The Chief of Motor Vehicle Transport is to work closely with the agencies indicated below in the following activities:

1) activation of new motor vehicle units and authorization of supplies and equipment (with Branches IX and VI, Quartermaster General).

2) establishment or alteration of motor vehicle equipment authorizations (with Luftwaffe Strength and Equipment Authorization Branch).

3) filling of motor vehicle personnel vacancies (with
Luftwaffe Personnel Office, Chief of Aviation, and Air Defense).

4) planning of construction work pertaining to motor vehicle operations (with Ground Organization Branch, Quartermaster General, and Chief of Luftwaffe Construction).

5) administration of clerical employees and workers engaged in motor vehicle operations -- salaries and wages, clothing, insurance coverage, etc. -- (with Chief of Aviation).

6) testing and introduction of special uniforms for motor vehicle personnel (with Chief of Aviation).

1. The following agencies are subordinate to the Chief of Motor Vehicle Transport:

1) directly subordinate: Luftwaffe Automotive School; liaison officers assigned to the office of the General of the Motor Vehicle Depot Forces East and West.

2) subordinate in respect to training: motor vehicle transport training units and schools maintained by the Luftwaffe; replacement battalions serving the motor vehicle maintenance units of the Luftwaffe.

m. The Chief of Motor Vehicle Transport is a member of the Motor Vehicle Commission appointed by the Reichs Minister of Weapons and Ammunition and serves as Luftwaffe representative on the central Motor Vehicle Committee.

G. Luftwaffe Inspectorate 7, Signal Communications

The Luftwaffe Inspectorate 7 was disbanded in accordance with the Luftwaffe Mobilization Plan of 1940. Its missions were taken over by the office of the General of the Signal Forces, (see above).

H. Luftwaffe Inspectorate 8, Naval Aircraft

Luftwaffe Inspectorate 8 was abolished in 1942 and its
missions taken over by the Luftwaffe General, Navy High Command. In 1944 the latter post, as well as the Luftwaffe Inspectorate 16, Air-Sea Rescue Service, was also abolished and the duties of both combined under the General for Naval Affairs, which office assumed responsibility for the administration of all Luftwaffe naval aircraft engaging in air-sea rescue and salvage operations, as well as for the training of personnel employed in these activities.

I. Luftwaffe Inspectorate 9, Pilot Training Schools

Until 1944 Luftwaffe Inspectorate 9 was under the command of the Chief of Training. It was disbanded in 1944 after the position of General for Pilot Training and the 1st through 4th Pilot Training Divisions had been established.

J. Luftwaffe Inspectorate 10, Troop Service and Training

In 1944 Luftwaffe Inspectorate 10 was redesignated as the Office of the General for Military Training and placed under the command of the Chief of the General Staff. In 1945 it was disbanded and its duties assumed by Branch III, General Staff and the technical services generals.

K. Luftwaffe Inspectorate 11, Parachute and Airlanding forces

Luftwaffe Inspectorate 11 was disbanded in 1940; its duties were assumed at first by the 7th Air Division, or rather by the Headquarters, XI Air Corps, and later by the Commander in Chief, Parachute Forces.

L. Luftwaffe Inspectorate 12, Navigation

Luftwaffe Inspectorate 12 was disbanded in 1942 and its duties assigned to the General of the Bomber Forces. In 1944 the post General for Navigation was created; during that same year, however, the post was abolished and the duties divided among the technical services generals.
M. Luftwaffe Inspectorate 13, Air Defense

During the period from 1940 until 1945, Luftwaffe Inspectorate 13 remained under the command of the Chief of Air Defense (later Chief of Aviation), since its work—carried out under the direction of the Air Defense Planning Staff—was essentially in the administrative field (issuance of directives and liaison with other ministries). In 1945, when the position Chief of Air Defense was created, this Inspectorate was disbanded.

N. Luftwaffe Inspectorate 14, Medical Service.

In 1944 this Inspectorate was redesignated the Office of the Chief, Luftwaffe Medical Service and assigned to the Quartermaster General.

O. Luftwaffe Inspectorate 15, Air Defense Zones

After the establishment of the Western Air Defense Zone, this Inspectorate was deactivated. Its missions were assigned to the General of the Anti-aircraft Artillery Forces, Fortifications Branch.

P. Luftwaffe Inspectorate 16, Air-Sea Rescue Service

Originally set up in 1940, this Inspectorate was combined with the office of the General for Naval Affairs in 1944.

Q. Luftwaffe Inspectorate 17, Construction Troops and Prisoners of War

Luftwaffe Inspectorate 17 was established in 1942. In 1944, when the Luftwaffe construction units were taken over by Organization Todt, it was redesignated as the Inspector for Luftwaffe Engineer Construction Units, Home Guard Units, and Transport Escort Platoons. The administration of prisoners of war was assumed by the General for Foreign Personnel and the Inspectorate for Eastern Personnel.
R. Luftwaffe Inspectorate 18, Luftwaffe Field Units

Luftwaffe Inspectorate 18 was established during the winter of 1942 at the time the Luftwaffe field divisions were activated. In 1944, after these divisions had been absorbed by the Army, the Inspectorate's mission was finished and it was disbanded.
### List of Equivalent Luftwaffe and USAF General Officer Ranks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Luftwaffe Rank</th>
<th>USAF Equivalent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reichsmarschall des Grossdeutschen Reiches (Goering's rank: Reichs Chief of the Pan-German Reich)</td>
<td>No equivalent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalfeldmarschall</td>
<td>General of the Air Force (Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generaloberst</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General der Flieger (der Flak, etc.)</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalleutnant</td>
<td>Major General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generalmajor</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3

LIST OF GAF MONOGRAPH PROJECT STUDIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>150</td>
<td>The German Air Force in the Spanish War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>The German Air Force in Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152</td>
<td>The German Air Force in France and the Low Countries (including Airlanding Operations in Belgium and the Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>153-155</td>
<td>The German Air Force versus Russia on the Eastern Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>156</td>
<td>The Battle of Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157</td>
<td>Operation Sea Lion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158-160</td>
<td>The German Air Force versus the Allies in the West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161</td>
<td>The German Air Force versus the Allies in the Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162</td>
<td>The Battle of Crete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163 &amp; 165</td>
<td>German Air Force Close Support and Air Interdiction Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164</td>
<td>German Air Force Air Defense Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166</td>
<td>German Air Force Counter Air Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167</td>
<td>German Air Force Airlift Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>168</td>
<td>German Air Force Air-Sea Rescue Operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

249
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>169</td>
<td>Training in the German Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>170</td>
<td>Procurement in the German Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171</td>
<td>Intelligence in the German Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>172</td>
<td>German Air Force Medicine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>173</td>
<td>The German Air Force General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>174</td>
<td>Command and Leadership in the German Air Force (Goering, Milch, Jeschonnek, Udet, Wever)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>175</td>
<td>The Russian Air Force in the Eyes of German Commanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>176</td>
<td>Russian Patterns of Reaction to the German Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>177</td>
<td>Russian Use of Airlift to Supply Partisan Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>178</td>
<td>Problems of Fighting a Three-Front Air War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179</td>
<td>Problems of Waging a Day and Night Defensive Air War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>The Problem of the Long-Range Night Intruder Bomber</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181</td>
<td>The Problem of Air Superiority in the Battle with Allied Strategic Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>182</td>
<td>Fighter-Bomber Operations in Situations of Air Inferiority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183</td>
<td>Analysis of Specialized Anglo-American Techniques</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>184</td>
<td>Effects of Allied Air Attacks on German Divisional and Army Organizations on the Battle Fronts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

250
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Study No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>185</td>
<td>Effects of Allied Air Attacks on German Air Force Bases and Installations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>186</td>
<td>The German Air Force System of Target Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>187</td>
<td>The German Air Force System of Weapons Selection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>188</td>
<td>German Civil Air Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189</td>
<td>Historical Turning Points in the German Air Force War Effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190</td>
<td>The Organization of the German Air Force High Command and Higher Echelon Headquarters within the German Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English</td>
<td>German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjutant's Group</td>
<td>Gruppe Adjuntur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjutant's Office (1848)</td>
<td>Adjuntur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Subordination</td>
<td>Truppenfilstliche Unterstellung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral Staff</td>
<td>Admiralstab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advance Airfield Command</td>
<td>E-Hafenkommando</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Photography Branch</td>
<td>Abteilung Luftwaffenbildwesen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Photography School</td>
<td>Fliegerbildschule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Administration Office,</td>
<td>Verwaltungsamt, Luftkommandoamt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Command Office</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Administrative Area</td>
<td>Luftkreis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Administrative Area Command</td>
<td>Luftkreiskommando</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Administrative Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Attache</td>
<td>Luftgaukommando</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Command Office</td>
<td>Luftattache</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Corps</td>
<td>Luftkommandoamt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Branch, Air</td>
<td>Fliegerkorps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Office</td>
<td>Luftschutzabteilung, Luftkommandoamt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Office</td>
<td>Luftschutzamt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Planning Staff</td>
<td>Arbeitsstab Luftschutz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Division</td>
<td>Fliegerdivision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Fleet</td>
<td>Luftflotte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Fleet Headquarters</td>
<td>Luftflottenkommando</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Fleet Reich</td>
<td>Luftflotte Reich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Branch (Armed Forces</td>
<td>Wehrmachtsluftabteilung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armaments Office)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Operation Branch,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Command Office</td>
<td>Fliegerfuhrungsabteilung, Luftkommandoamt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Organization Branch,</td>
<td>Fliegerorganisationabteilung, Luftkommandoamt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Command Office</td>
<td>Fliegereausbildungsabteilung, Luftkommandoamt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force Training Branch,</td>
<td>Fliegerverbindungsoffizier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Command Office</td>
<td>Luftfahrtsministerium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Liaison Officer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Ministry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Air Ordnance Group
Air Ordnance Office
Air Technical Academy
Air Technical Office, Air Command Office
Air Torpedo and Long-Range Bomber Wings
Air War Academy
Airfield Area
Airfield Commandant
Antiaircraft Artillery Group
Antiaircraft Artillery Liaison Officer
Area Administrative Commander
Armed Forces
Armed Forces Armaments Office
Armed Forces High Command
Armed Forces High Command, North
Armed Forces High Command, South
Armed Forces Office
Armed Forces Operations Staff
Armed Forces Supply Office
Armed Forces War Academy
Army Directorate
Army General Staff (1814)
Army General Staff
Army Great General Staff
Army High Command
Army Ordnance Office
Army War Academy
Assistant Chief of Staff
(general's assistant)
Aviation Office
Battle Order

Luftzeuggruppe
Luftzeugamt
Lufttechnische Akademie
Lufttechnisches Amt,
Luftkommandoamt
Lufttorpedo- und Fernkampfgeschwader
Luftkriegsakademie
Flughafenbergreich
Fliegerhorstkommandant
Gruppe Flak
Flakverbindungsoffizier
Gauleiter
Wehrmacht
Wehrmachtrüstungsamt
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
(O. K. W.)
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Nord
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Sued
Wehrmachtamt
Wehrmachtführungsstab
Wehrmacht Nachschubamt
Wehrmachtakadémie
Heeresleitung
Generalstab der Armee
Generalstab des Heeres
Grosser Generalstab der Armee
Oberkommando des Heeres (O. K. H.)
Waffenamt des Heeres
Heereskriegsakademie
Fuehrer Gehilfe (cover name from period of Reichswehr)
Luftamt (LB)

Kriegsgliederung

253
Branch
Branch Chief
Branch I, General Staff
(Operations)
Branch II, General Staff
(Organization)
Branch III, General Staff
(Training)
Branch IV, General Staff
(Intelligence)
Branch VII, General Staff
(Mapping & Aerial Photography)
Branch VIII, General Staff
(Military History)

Abteilung
Abteilungschef
1. Abteilung des Generalstabs
2. Abteilung des Generalstabs
3. Abteilung des Generalstabs
4. Abteilung des Generalstabs
5. Abteilung des Generalstabs
6. (Karten- und Luftbild) Abteilung des Generalstabs
7. (Kriegswissenschaftliche) Abteilung des Generalstabs

Kabinettkriege
Kadettenkorps
Zentralabteilung (ZA), Reichsluftfahrministerium
Zentralamtsgruppe
Chefintendant der Luftwaffe

Chef Wetterdienst
Chefingenieur der Luftwaffe
Chef Richter der Luftwaffe
Chef der Luftwaffen rechtspflege
Chef des Sanitätswesens
Chef des Luftwaffen personalamtes

Chef der Luftwaff
Chef des Luftschutzes
Chef des Verbindungsluftwesens
Chef der Luftkriegs fuhrung
Bevollmaechtigte fuer die Lufttorpedowaffe
Chef der Flugsicherheit
Lufttransportchef der Wehrmacht

Chief of Air Traffic Control
Chief of Air Transport for the Armed Forces
Chief of Aviation
Chief of High Frequency Communication
Chief of Luftwaffe Procurement and Supply
Chief of Motor Vehicle Transport, Luftwaffe
Chief of Personnel Utilization and Supply Planning
Chief of Pilot Training, Baltic
Chief of Procurement and Supply, Luftwaffe
Chief of Signal Communications
Chief of Staff, Naval Warfare
Chief of Supply
Chief of Technical Air Armament
Chief of the Army Directorate
Chief of Training
Chief of Training
Chief, Technical Office
Civil Aviation Offices
Commander
Commander in Chief
Commander in Chief, Army
Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe
Commander, Naval Air Forces (East and West)
Commander, Replacement Luftwaffe
Commander, Testing Stations
Commanders of the
Reconnaissance Personnel
Replacement Groups with Subordinate Units
Commanding General, Luftwaffe Signal Communications Training
Commanding General, Pilot Training
Chef der Luftfahrt
Chef Hochfrequenz
Generalluftzeugmeister
Chef des Kraftfahrwesens der Luftwaffe
Chef der personellen Ruestung und Nachschubfuhrung
Ausbildungsfuehrer Ostsee Luftzeugmeister
Chef des Nachrichtenverbindungswesens
Chef des Stabes der Seekriegsleitung
Chef des Nachschubwesens
Chef der technischen Luftwesestung
Chef der Heeresleitung
Chef der Ausbildung
Chef des Ausbildungswesens
Chef des technischen Amtes
Zivile Luftaemter
Befehlshaber
Oberbefehlshaber
Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres
Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe
Fuehrer der SeeLuftstreitkraefte
(Ost und West)
Befehlshaber der Ersatzluftwaffe
Kommandeur der Erprobungsstellen
Kommodore der Ergaenzungsaufklaerungsgruppen mit Ergaenzungseinheiten
Kommandierender General der Luftwaffenichtrenenausbildung
Kommandierender General der Fliegerausbildung
Communications Service

Defense Office
Department
Department Chief
Department Chief
Direct Subordination
Duty and Position Roster

Economics Office
Engineer Corps

Field Forces
Foreign Air Forces, Air
Command Office
Fortifications Branch
Fuehrer Headquarters

General Air Office
General Army Office
General Commissioner in Charge of all Rocket Weapons, directly responsible to the Fuehrer
General Commissioner in Charge of Jet Aircraft, directly responsible to the Reichsmarschall
General for Air Traffic Control and the Ground Organization
General for Foreign Personnel
General for Naval Affairs

Nachrichtenverbindungsdienst

Wehramt
Amtsgruppe
Amtsgruppenchef
Ressortchef
Immediatstellung
Dienst- und Stellenplan

Wirtschaftsamt
Ingenieurkorps

Feldheer
Fremde Luftwaffen, Luftkommandoamt
Abteilung Befestigung
Fuehrerhauptquartier

Allgemeines Luftamt (LB)
Allgemeines Heeresamt
Generalbevollmaechtigter des Fuehrers fuer alle Raketenwaffen

Generalbevollmaechtigter des Reichsmarschalls fuer Strahlflugzeuge

General des Flugbetriebs und der Fliegerbodenorganisation

General fuer auslaendisches Personal
General des Seewesens
General for Personnel Utilization
General for Troop Technical Services
General of Pilot Training
General of the Air Transport Forces
General of the Antiaircraft Artillery Forces, Office of the Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe
General of the Bomber Forces
General of the Close-Support Forces
General of the Fighter Forces
General of the Luftwaffe Construction Forces, Office of the Chief of Luftwaffe Construction
General of the Motor Vehicle Depot Forces, East and West
General of the Reconnaissance Forces
General of the Signal Forces
General Staff
General Staff of the Field Forces
General's Hill
German Air Force
Great General Staff
Group
Group Leader
Group I (Tactics)
Group II (Organization)
Group III (Training)

Headquarters
Headquarters Commandant

General fuer den Personaleinsatz
General fuer Truppentechnik
General der Fliegerausbildung
General der Transportflieger
General der Flakwaffe des Ob. d. L. (Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe)
General der Kampfflieger
General der Schlachtflieger
General der Jagdflieger
General der Luftwaffenbautruppen beim Chef des Luftwaffenbauwesens
General der Kraftfahrparktruppen Ost and West
General der Aufklärungsflieger
Generallnachrichtenfuhrer
Generalstab
General Stab des Feldheeres
Feldherrnhuegel
Luftwaffe
Grosser Generalstab
Gruppe
Gruppenleiter
Gruppe I (Taktik)
Gruppe II (Organisation)
Gruppe III (Ausbildung)

Hauptquartier, Generalkommando
Kommandant des Hauptquartiers
Headquarters, Testing Stations
High Command
Home Defense Branch

Inspector for Aerial Mines
Inspector for Air Safety Control
Inspector for Antiaircraft
Artillery and Air Defense
Inspector for Luftwaffe Engineer
Construction Units, Home
Guard Units, and Transport
Escort Platoons
Inspector for Radio Communications
Inspector for Radio
Reconnaissance
Inspector for the Aircraft
Reporting Service
Inspector for the Day Fighter
Forces
Inspector for the Flying Forces
Inspector for the Night Fighter
Forces
Inspector General
Inspector, Navy
Inspector of the Air Transport
Forces
Inspector of the Ground Organiza-
tion and Air Traffic Control
Inspectorate for Aircraft Equip-
ment, Air Defense Office
Inspectorate for Air Safety
and Equipment
Inspectorate for Eastern
Personnel
Inspectorate for the Air-Sea
Rescue Service

Kommando der Erprobungsstellen
Oberkommando
Abteilung Landesverteidigung

Luftmineninspizient
Flugsicherungsinspizient
Inspekteur der Flakartillerie und
des Luftschatzes
Inspekteur der Luftwaffenpioniere,
Landesschuetzen und
Transportbegleitkommandos
Funkinspizient
Funkaufklarungsinspizient
Flugmeldeinspizient
Inspekteur der Tagjaeger
Inspeziert der Fliegertruppen
Inspekteur der Nachtjaeger
Generalinspekteur
Inspeziert See
Inspekteur der Transportflieger

Inspekteur der Fliegereboden-
organisation und des Flugbetriebs
Fliegeregeaetinspektion,
Luftschatzamt
Inspektion Flugsicherheit und
Geraet
Inspektion fuer ostvolkisches
Personal
Inspektion fuer den Seenotdienst
Inspector for Training of Luftwaffe Rocket-Equipped Units
Inspectorate General, Luftwaffe Inspectorate of Air Technical Troop Services Inspectorate of Schools Instrument Navigation Schools

Judge Advocate, Luftwaffe

Luftwaffe Administration Office, Air Command Office Luftwaffe Advanced School Luftwaffe Automotive School

Luftwaffe Command, Austria Luftwaffe Commander (at army headquarters) Luftwaffe Commanding General

Luftwaffe Defense Office Luftwaffe General, Fuehrer Headquarters Luftwaffe General Staff Luftwaffe General Staff Luftwaffe General with Commander in Chief, Army

Luftwaffe General with Commander in Chief, Navy Luftwaffe Group Luftwaffe Group Command Luftwaffe Ground Organization Branch

Inspekteur ueber alle mit Kampfmitteln durch Raketenantrieb ausgestatteten Einheiten der Luftwaffe bis zur Frontreife Generalinspektion der Luftwaffe Inspektion des fliegertechnischen Truppendienstes Inspektion der Schulen Blindflugschulen

Luftwaffenrechtspflege

Luftwaffe Gunery School
Luftwaffe High Command
Luftwaffe Inspectorate
Luftwaffe Inspectorate 5 (Air
Safety and Equipment
Luftwaffe Inspectorate 6 (Motor
Vehicles)
Luftwaffe Inspectorate 7 (Signal
Communications)
Luftwaffe Inspectorate 8 (Naval
Aircraft)
Luftwaffe Inspectorate 9 (Pilot
Training Schools)
Luftwaffe Inspectorate 10
(Troop Service and Training)
Luftwaffe Inspectorate 11 (Para-
chute and Airlanding Forces)
Luftwaffe Inspectorate 12
(Navigation)
Luftwaffe Inspectorate 13 (Air
Defense)
Luftwaffe Inspectorate 14
(Medical Services)
Luftwaffe Inspectorate 15 (Air
Defense Zones)
Luftwaffe Inspectorate 16 (Air-
Sea Rescue Service)
Luftwaffe Inspectorate 17
(Construction Troops and
Prisoners of War)
Luftwaffe Inspectorate 18
(Luftwaffe Field Units)
Luftwaffe Liaison Staff, North
Luftwaffe Mobilization Plan
Luftwaffe Navigation School
Luftwaffe Operations Staff
Luftwaffe Organization Staff
Luftwaffe Personnel Office, Air
Command Office

Schiessschule der Luftwaffe
Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (O. K. L.)
Luftwaffeninspektion
Luftwaffeninspektion 5
(Flugsicherheit und Geräte)
Luftwaffeninspektion 6
(Kraftfahrwesen)
Luftwaffeninspektion 7
(Nachrichtenverbindungswesen)
Luftwaffeninspektion 8 (Seeflieger)

Luftwaffeninspektion 9
(Flugzeugführerschulen)
Luftwaffeninspektion 10
(Truppendienst und Erziehung)
Luftwaffeninspektion 11 (Fallschirm-
und Luftlandetruppen)
Luftwaffe Inspektion 12 (Navigation)

Luftwaffeninspektion 13 (Luftschutz)

Luftwaffeninspektion 14
(Sanitätswesen)
Luftwaffeninspektion 15
(Luftverteidigungszonen)
Luftwaffeninspektion 16
(Seenotdienst)
Luftwaffeninspektion 17 (Bautruppen
und Kriegsgefangene)

Luftwaffeninspektion 18 (Luftwaffen-
felderheinheit)
Luftwaffenverbindungsstab Nord
Mobilisationsplan der Luftwaffe
Navigationsschule der Luftwaffe
Luftwaffenführungsstab
Luftwaffenorganisationsstab
Luftwaffenpersonalamt
Luftkommandoamt
Luftwaffe Service Regulation
Luftwaffe Signal Communications
Replacement Division
Luftwaffe Signal Communications
Training Division
Luftwaffe Supply Office
Luftwaffe Testing Station

Mapping and Aerial Photography
Branch
Mapping Group
Medical Officer, Air Admin-
istrative Command
Medical Services
Medical Services Branch, Air
Administrative Command
Military Area
Military History Branch, General Staff
Minister of Armament
Minister of Aviation
Ministerial Office
Miscellaneous Branch, Air
Command Office
Miscellaneous Office, Reichs
Air Ministry
Motor Vehicle Branch
Motor Vehicle Commission
Motor Vehicle Committee
Motor Vehicle Group
Motor Vehicle Supply Branch

National Army (Austrian)
National Socialist Guidance
Officer

Luftwaffendienstvorschrift
Luftnachrichtenersatzdivision
Luftnachrichtenausbildungsdivision
Luftwaffennachschubamt
Erprobungsstelle der Luftwaffe

Karten- und Luftbildabteilung
Gruppe Kartenwesen
Luftgarz
Sanitaetseinrichtung
Luftgausanitaetsabteilung
Wehrkreis
Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung
des Generalstabs
Ruestungsminister
Luftfahrtminister
Ministeramt
Allgemeine Abteilung,
Luftkommandoamt
Allgemeines Amt, Reichsluftfahrt-
ministerium
Abteilung Kraftfahrtwesen
Kraftfahrzeugkommission
Kraftfahrzeugausschuss
Gruppe Kraftfahrwesen
Nachschubabteilung fuer
Kraftfahrzeuge

Bundesheer
Nationalsozialistischer Fuehrungs-
offizier
National Weather Service
Navy Group Command
Navy High Command

Reichswetterdienst
Marinegruppenkommando
Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine
(O. K. M.)

Office
Office Chief
Office of the General for Military Training
Operational Planning Branch (1814)
Operational or tactical subordination
Operations Branch, Air Command Office
Operations Staff
Operations Staff, Weather Observation
Ordnance Inspectorate
Ordnance Office
Organization Branch, Air Command Office

Amt
Amtschef
General fuer militaerische Ausbildung
Plankammer*

Einsatzmaessige Unterstellung
Fuehrungsabteilung, Luftkommandoamt
Fuehrungsstab
Wetterwartefuehrungsstab
Waffeninspektion
Waffenamt
Organisationsabteilung,
Luftkommandoamt

Personnel Branch, Air Command Office
Personnel Office
Policy Section, Air Command Office
President of the Reich

Personalabteilung, Luftkommandoamt
Personalamt
Chefgruppe, Luftkommandoamt
Reichspraesident

Quartermaster
Quartermaster, Air Command Office

Quartiermeister
Oberquartiermeister,
Luftkommandoamt

* Editor's Note: More recently, Plankammer has been used to mean "Map Office."

262
Quartermaster General
Quartermaster General, Army
Quartermaster General's Staff
Quartermaster Service

Reichs Air Ministry
Reichs Chancellor
Reichs Commander of the SS
and Minister of the Interior
Reichs Commissioner of Aviation
Reichs Marshal of the Pan-German Reich and Commander in Chief, Luftwaffe
Reichs Minister of Armament and War Production
Reichs Minister of Aviation
Reichs Minister of Defense
Reichs Minister of War
Reichs Minister of Weapons and Ammunition
Reichs Ministry of Aviation
Reichs Ministry of Defense
Reichs Ministry of Defense
Right of direct access to superior (1883)

Senior Commander
Senior Commander, Troop Gas Defense
Senior Flying Officer
Senior Signal Officer
Senior Signal Officer, Office of the CInC, Luftwaffe
Signal and Aircraft Reporting Service, Air Administrative Command

Generalquartiermeister
Generalquartiermeister des Heeres
Generalquartiermeisterstab
Quartiermeisterdienst

Reichsluftfahrtministerium
Reichskanzler
Reichsfuehrer SS und Reichsminister des Innern
Reichskommissar fuer die Luftfahrt
Reichsmarschall des Grossdeutschen Reiches und Oberbefehlshaber der Luftwaffe
Reichsminister fuer Ruestung und Kriegsproduktion
Reichsminister der Luftfahrt
Reichswehrminister
Reichskriegsminister
Reichsminister fuer Bewaffnung und Munition
Reichsministerium der Luftfahrt
Reichsverteidigungsministerium
Reichswehrministerium
Immediatvortrag

Hoeherer Befehlshaber
Hoeherer Kommandeur fuer Truppenasschutz
Hoeherer Fliegerkommandeur
Hoeherer Nachrichtenfuehrer
Hoeherer Nachrichtenfuehrer des Ob. d. L.
Luftnachrichten- und Flugmeldewesen im Luftgau
Signal Branch, Air Administrative Command
Special Commissioner
Special Commissioner for Torpedo Weapons
Special Commissioner in Charge of Defense against Enemy Long-Range Weapons
Special Commissioner in Charge of Defense against 4-Engine Bomber Units
Special Duty General Officer

Special Military History
Officially Appointed by the Fuehrer

Special Missions and Troop Recommendations Staff

Specialist Service

State Secretary and Inspector General, Luftwaffe

State Secretary of Aviation

Strength and Equipment Authorization Branch

Substaff

Supply Group

Supply Office, Air Command Office

Supply Planning Operations Staff

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

Technical Aide

Technical General Staff

Technical Office (Reichs Air Ministry)

Technical Service General

Luftgaunachrichtenabteilung

Sonderbevollmaechtigter Bevollmaechtigter fuer Torpedowaffen

Sonderbeauftragter fuer Abwehr feindlicher Fernkampfmittel

Sonderbeauftragter fuer Abwehr 4-Motoriger Kampfverbaende

General z. b. V (zur besonderen Verwendung)

Sonderbeauftragter des Fuehrers fuer die Kriegsgeschichte

Stab fuer Sonderauftraege und Truppenvorschlaege

Truppensonderdienst

Staatssekretaer und Generalsinspekteur der Luftwaffe

Staatssekretaer der Luftfahrt

Abteilung Staerke und Ausruestungsnachweis

Referat

Gruppe Nachschub

Nachschubamt, Luftkommandoamt

Nachschubfuhrungstaff

Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht

Referent

Technischer Generalstab

Technisches Amt (I.C)

Waffengeneral
Top-Level Organization
Topographical Branch
Training Branch
Training Staff
Training Wing
Troop General Staff
Troop Office
24th Training and Testing Headquarters

Unit Commander

War Academy
Wartime Top-Level Organization
Western Air Defense Zone

Spitzengliederung
Abteilung Aufnahmen
Ausbildungsabteilung
Ausbildungsstab
Lehrgeschwader
Truppengeneralstab
Truppenamt
Lehr- und Erprobungskommando 24

Verbandsführer

Kriegsakademie
Kriegsspitzenliegerung

Verteidigungszone West