THE GERMAN PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE SERVICES

By

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Part I

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Maxwell Air Force Base, Montgomery Alabama
PREFACE

In the study submitted here under the title THE GERMAN PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE SERVICES the author makes no claim to have given an exhaustive presentation of the whole complex subject, nor does he claim to have dealt with all areas of this widely ramified field. It has therefore not been possible to go into details except where this was necessary for a comprehension of the large issues and for the application of the experience gained.

The purpose here is, rather, to present a brief review of the historical development of German passive air defense in order then to trace the underlying trains of thought from which the adopted form of organization evolved. Main emphasis is on:

1. The Command Problem in Passive Air Defense
2. The Problem of Coordinated Action by all agencies involved
3. The Fundamental Problems which Evolved in the Development of the Organization.

Besides the subject of organization, appropriate space is devoted to the subject of technology and technological

1. For details on the subject of passive air defense organization and technology see "Strategic Bombing Survey, Final Report," Civil Defense Division.
progress. The study also treats subjects of imminent importance for the preservation of a nation's military potential, namely, speedy damage repair and restoration action and a comprehensively planned program to take care of segments of the civilian population stricken by air warfare, and ends with a summary of the most important experience gained.

The purpose of the numerous sources quoted is to enable the reader to study in more detail the several subjects involved.
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INTRODUCTION</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German Passive Air Defense in World War I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## I. DEVELOPMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF CIVILIAN AIR DEFENSE UP TO 1933 | PAGE |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Top Level Command</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Organization of the Civil Air Defense System</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Legal Bases for Civilian Air Defense: The Civil Air Defense Act and Implementing Decrees</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Organization of Civil Air Defense</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Measures to Make the Public Air-Defense</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## II. ORGANIZATION OF PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE AFTERS 1933 | PAGE |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The Air Raid Warning Service</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Safety and Auxiliary Service</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Industrial or Factory Air Defense</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Individual or Self-Protection Air Defense</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Extended Individual Passive Air Defense</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Special Administrations, such as the Railways, Post and Telegraph, and Waterway Administrations</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III. ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

a. The Wartime Top-Level Command Organization
   1. Passive Air Defense Operations Staff Organization
   2. Air Force Operations Staff
   3. Reorganization in 1945
b. Relations with Reich Ministries

   2. Air District Commands

FIELD AGENCIES OF THE PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE BRANCH

3. Passive Air Defense Missions of the Police Forces
   Commanders of Regular Police
   Local Passive Air Defense Chiefs

4. Organization of the Air Defense Areas

   Sequence of Passive Air Defense Action in Practice
   (a) First Measures
   (b) Missions of Local Passive Air Defense Chief during Attack
   After-Attack Activities of a Local Passive Air Defense Chief

d. Passive Air Defense in Army Zones of Operations

e. Passive Air Defense in Territories under Military Administration
   1. In the West
   2. In the Eastern Theater
VI

1. Passive Air Defense in Occupied and Friendly Countries Placed under German Protection
   127

2. The Reich Institute of the Air Force for Passive Air Defense
   Departments and Missions
   134
   1. The Training (or School) Department
   135
   2. Technical Sciences Department--Testing and Experimental Department
   140
   a. Approval for Items of Passive Air Defense Equipment
   141
   b. Experiments and Tests
   142
   3. Photographic and Files Department
   144

IV. THE SPECIFIC BRANCHES OF THE GERMAN PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
   145
   a. The Air Raid Warning Service
      145
      1. Organization
      146
      2. Personnel
      154
      3. Training
      157
      4. Passive Air Defense Alerting Detachments
      160
      5. Warning Reports and Signals
      164
      6. The Air Raid Warning Service and Industrial Production
      166
      7. Technology in the Air Raid Warning Service
      170
         a. Signal Communications
      170
         b. Alerting and Warning Media
      172
      8. Experience
      163

b. The Safety and Auxiliary Service, Category I, later Designated Passive Air Defense Police
   166
   1. Firefighting Services
   182
   2. Repair Services
   205
   3. Decontamination (Gas Defense)
   217
The "Volks" Gas Mask for Use by the general Public 226
Gas Proof Rooms, Doors, Windows 228
Tests Conducted under Simulated War Conditions to Improve Decontamination Methods 231
4. The Passive Air Defense Medical Services 234
Stationary 235
Mobile 237
5. The Passive Air Defense Veterinary Services 239
Stationary, Mobile 240
c. Individual (or Self-Protection) Air Defense by the Citizen Population 241
1. Origin 241
2. Organization and Missions of the Reich Passive Air Defense Society 245
3. Training 250
4. Directing Self-Protection Activities 266
5. Experience 269
d. The Extended Individual Air Defense or Self-Protection System 274
e. The Factory Air Defense System 276
1. Origin 276
2. Organization 282
3. Training 294
4. Experience in the Field of Factory Air Defense 296
aa. Organization 296
bb. The Economy (Industry) 300
c. Building Construction 304
dd. Provisions for Fire and Gas Protection 306
viii

5. Preservation and/or Restoration
   of Key Installations 308
   ff. Experience 312

f. Passive Air Defense in the Special Administrations
   1. In Military Installations 316
   2. Railway Passive Air Defense
      The Railway Aircraft Reporting and Air
      Warning Service 331
      Measures Taken in Rail Operations 332
      Blackout Measures 333
      Camouflage and Concealment 333
      Fire Prevention and Firefighting 334
      Building Construction 335
      Railway Passive Air Defense Auxiliary
      Service 335
      The Self-Protection System in Railway
      Passive Air Defense 336
      Experience 336

3. Passive Air Defense in the Post and
   Telegraph Service 337

4. Passive Air Defense in the Autobahn
   Superhighway Corporation 343

5. Passive Air Defense in the Reich Labor
   Service 349

6. Passive Air Defense of Ports, Waterways,
   and Ships 353
   aa. Passive Air Defense in Ports 353
   bb. Inland Waterways Passive Air
       Defense 358
       Direction of Waterways Passive Air
       Defense 360
ix
Waterways Passive Air Defense
Forces 361
cc. Passive Air Defense on Ships 363
e. Organization Todt and Excavator Regiments in the Passive Air Defense System 368
1. The Specialized Services Specialist Teams 375
2. Passive Air Defense for Valley Dams 378
1. Passive Air Defense in Rural Areas 382
k. Protection of Works of Culture, Food Supplies, and Animal Feeds 394
l. Care of Bomb-Stricken Populations 398
Activities of a Reich Defense Commissioner During an Attack 406
After An Attack 412
m. Evacuation of a Population 415
PART II

V. PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE FORCES 425


1. Organization and Equipment; Activation 427
   Battalion Headquarters Staff 429
   Strengths 429
   Equipment 429

2. Units of the Motorized Passive Air
   Defense Forces 441

3: Commitment Outside of the Zone of Interior 451
   aa. In the Western Theater of Operations 451
   bb. In Rumania 453
   cc. In Russia 455

4. The Training of Motorized Passive Air
   Defense Troops 458
   Training Manuals, etc. 461

5. Command Principles for Passive Air
   Defense Forces 462
   Commitment of Firefighting Forces 464

EXTRAS

b. Passive Air Defense Smoke Battalions 467

1. Organization 467

2. Smoke Generators 468

3. Operations 469

c. Special Purpose Passive Air Defense
   Battalions 471

d. Bomb Disposal Details or Squads 474
   The Employment of Criminal Prisoners 478

VI. TRAINING 479

a. Officer Personnel 479

b. The Individual Organizations 484
   (1) Air Raid Warning Service 485
   (2) Passive Air Defense Police 485
   (3) Factory Air Defense System 487
   (4) Reich Passive or Civil Air Defense
       Society 487
(5) Special Administrations (Army; Navy; Air Force; Railway, Post and Telegraph Services, Waterways, and Autobahn Super-Highway Administrations)

VII. THE SUPPLY, RESUPPLY, AND REPLACEMENT SYSTEM

a. Initial Equipment
   (1) The Air Raid Warning Service
   (2) Safety and Auxiliary Services
   (3) Factory Air Defense System
   (4) Special Administrations

b. Resupply
   Passive Air Defense Equipment Depots

VIII. TECHNICAL BRANCHES OF THE PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE SERVICES

a. Building Construction
   1. The Passive Air Defense Mission in Area Planning and Township Development
   Important Requirements in Expansion of Cities
   Measures to Improve Existing City Areas
   Settlements
   Urban Settlements
   Rural Settlements

   2. The Passive Air Defense Mission in Selecting Industrial and Other Sites
      (a) The effects of Explosive Bombs
      (b) Incendiary Bombs

   3. The Relocation of Industrial Works
      Movement to Above-Surface Locations
      Movement to Underground Sites

   4. Passive Air Defense Requirements in the Field of Above-Ground Building Construction
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a) With a View to the Effects of Explosive Bombs</th>
<th>528</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(b) With a View to the Effects of Incendiary Bombs</td>
<td>529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Air Raid Shelter Construction</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aa. Shelter Construction within Houses</td>
<td>542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bb. Escape Routes</td>
<td>547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cc. Public Air Raid Shelters</td>
<td>551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Bunker Type Air Raid Shelters</td>
<td>551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Shelter Tunnels</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Shelter Trenches</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Protection against Bomb Fragmentation</td>
<td>569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Special Passive Air Defense Regulations Governing the Construction of Military Installations, Military and Other Hospitals, Sanatoriums, etc.</td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Fire Prevention in Passive Air Defense</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Fire Prevention Precautions</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Independent Water Supplies for Fire-fighting Purposes</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Installations Highly Sensitive to Fire Hazards</td>
<td>599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Blackout Measures</td>
<td>601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Camouflage and the Means Employed for Camouflage Purposes</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Direct Target Camouflaging</td>
<td>612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Smoke Screening</td>
<td>619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Use of Dummy Installations</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>aa. Basic Principles</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bb. The Operation of Dummy Installations</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Bomb Disposal and Bomb Disarming</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Bomb Developments</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Explosive or Demolition Bombs</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incendiary Bombs</td>
<td>653</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Investigation of Newly Introduced 655
2. Bomb Disarming Methods 656
3. Locating and Uncovering Bombs 658

IX THE IMPACT AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE AIR WARFARE
CONDUCTED AGAINST GERMANY 662
a. Chronological Developments 662
b. The Impact of Air Attacks on Industry and
Traffic 668
1. The Aircraft Manufacturing Industry 672
2. The Fuel Supply Situation 673
3. The Ball Bearing Manufacturing Industry 674
4. Communications and Traffic 675
5. General 676
c. The German Civilian Population in Air
Warfare 679
d. German Civilian Casualties through Air
Warfare 684
e. Property Losses 687

X. CONCLUSIONS FROM GERMAN PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE
EXPERIENCE 695

ANNEX A: AIRFIELD MANUALS ON PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE
SUBJECTS 714

ANNEX B: Abbreviations used in German Text 721

ANNEX C: Sources 722

Note by Translator: On the assumption that the English text
will be redrafted for final use, or at least extensively re-
vised, the page numbers of the study given in footnotes in
the German text have been replaced in the translation by the
sections of the study referred to.
APPENDIX

1. Civilian Air Defense (Ziviler Luftschatz), Article by Ministerialdirigent Dr. h. c. Knipfer: DAS SUCH DER LUFTWAFFE; Dr. Michelbaum.

2. Special Annex 10 (Air) to Mobilization Plan (Sonstiger Anlage X zum Plan Luftwaffe)

3. Dr Zeigermann: Legal Problems of Passive Air Defense, with Special Emphasis on Sales Approval for Items of Passive Air Defense Equipment (Luftschutzrechtfrage unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Vertriebsvorschriften für Luftschatzgerät)

4. Top Level Command of Passive Air Defense in Zone of Interior


7. Delimitation of Command Authorities in: General Decree by the Reich Marshal and Commander in Chief of the Air Force/Passive Air Defense Operations Staff, # 3544/42 (11a) dated 17 Dec 42 (Br. Ktl. des RLM des Reichsverteidigungsministers Nr. 1, L. Arbeitsstelle II 7 3544/42 (11a) v. 17. 12. 1942)

8. Passive Air Defense Battle Station at Air District Command III, Berlin

1942 (Siekthundrilim Partieh 14K MJ/1V 1942)

10. Organization of Local Safety and Auxiliary Service


12. Reich Minister for Aviation and CINC, Air Forces, Az. 41 c 10 bo # 2755/44 (L In 13/41 A) dated 31 May 44: Regulations for Passive Air Defense (Reinigung der Luftschutzart.)


14. Passive Air Defense in Territories under Military Administration (Diagram)


16. Layout of Oil Refineries around Ploesti (Photostat Copies)

17. Diagram of a Warning Network

18. Decree by Reich Minister for Aviation and CINC of Air Forces, Az 10 41 b (L In 13) # 2422/40 g, 22 Oct 40: Alerts in 1940 (Auflistung 24 along with the appropriate regulations)

19. Decree by Reich Minister for Aviation and CINC of Air Forces, Az. 41 g 20 Nr. 17376/42 L In 13, 24 Apr 42: Commitment of Firefighting Units against Large-Scale Fires (Einsatz von Feuerlöscherverbänden im Großschadensfall).

21. Table of Organization: Local Self-Protection and Extended Self-Protection System.


23. Composition of Factory Air Defense Service (Local Chapters --Verträumensstellen--).


27. Photostat Copy: Air Attacks against the Meuse, Eder, and Sorpe Valley Dams on 16-17 May 1945 and their Results (Luftangriffe auf die Meuse-, Eder-, and Sorpe-Valleymäander ab 16-17 Mai 1945 und ihre Wirkungen); Article by Hans Rumpf in"Zivil Luftschutz" Koblenz, Vol. 10, 1945.


30. Photos of underground jet aircraft factory at Kahla, near Jena.


32. Photo: Gasoline Works Scholven-Beer.

33. Air Photo: Camouflage Concealment of Koenigplatz Square in Munich.


35. Photo: Dummy Installations at Potslitz.

36. Photo: Dummy Installations at Skoda Works.


39. Photostat Copy from "\[\ldots\] Kuhn" by Hans Rumpf; Verlag F. S. Mittler und Sohn, Barmstadt, 1952: Chronological Survey of Increasing Severity of Air Warfare, particularly over Germany (\[\ldots\] des Luftkrieges besonders über Deutschland), pp. 154-159.

40. The Impact of Air Warfare on the German Economy (\[\ldots\] der Luftkrieges auf die deutsche Wirtschaft), after
4Gr-Cont.: a study in the late Autumn of 1944 by Branch 6 of the Luftwaffe General Staff and based on official figures.


THE GERMAN PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE SERVICES

Introduction: GERMAN PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE IN WORLD WAR I.

For a proper understanding of the German civilian or passive air defense services it is essential to briefly review the historical background of its development.

In World War I the planning and direction of passive air defense measures was a secondary responsibility of the various corps area headquarters. The first air attacks which occurred, that of 8 October 1914 against the zeppelin hangar at Dusseldorf, and that of 15 June 1915 against the city of Karlsruhe, led to a more uniform organisation/the none air defences through the establishment of an Inspector of Antiballoon Artillery (Inspekteur der Reiflonräumen) replaced later by a Commander of Home Air Defences (Kommandeur der Heimstädtli- schutz) under the Commanding General of Air Forces (Kommandeur General der Luftpuppenwehr), who had full command authority in his field. From then on the field of citizen air defense gained steadily in importance. In the few main defense areas extemporized measures were taken to establish an aircraft reporting service, a civilian air raid warning service, air raid shelters, and systems of blackout and camouflage, and in a few cases even to construct dummy installations.

1. General der Flakartillerie Hans Grimm; E.S. Mittler und Sohn, Berlin 1941 (USA); DER FLAKSCHUTZ IM WELTKRIEG.
A total of 6,833 air attacks, in which 15,741 tons of bombs were delivered on targets, produced the following results:

- 7,486 dead
- 1,843 wounded
- Property damage involving approximately 25,000,000 Marks.

1. THE DEVELOPMENT AND ORGANIZATION OF CIVILIAN AIR DEFENSE UP TO 1933.

After the end of World War I Germany was allowed, under Article 198 of the Treaty of Versailles and under the Paris Agreement on Aeronautical Law of 13 October 1919, to take passive air defense measures designed to protect the civilian population, but the political atmosphere at the time precluded official preparations of any type whatsoever. Nevertheless, the problems of passive air defense formed a subject of lively discussion in the responsible circles of the interior administration and in private organizations, such as the Anti-aircraft Artillery Society (Flugabwehrring), and the Reich Union of German Firefighter Engineers (Fechterverband Deutschen Feuerwehrmannschafts). This was at a time when other countries were already conducting sizable civilian air defense maneuvers, which was particularly the case after publication of the


theories of Douhet.

Owing to her geographical situation Germany was particularly vulnerable to air attack. It is a historically established fact

...... that Germany, situated in the center of Europe, has by the very fact of her geographical position in the course of the centuries been involved so frequently in armed conflict and has so often been the general field of battle. There is probably no European state in existence whose soldiers have not been on German soil.

If this threat had already existed in the past, how much greater it would necessarily become as a result of the rapid development of weapons of air attack!

Added to this was the extreme sensitivity of the German homeland to air attack. The most dangerous factor here was the dense concentration of massed populations and manufacturing installations in large cities and industrial regions. Furthermore, residential conditions were far less favorable in Germany than, for example, in Britain. The characteristic feature of the average large German city was its large blocks of tenement buildings, where innumerable people lived in each house. In Britain, in contrast, low-built single
family houses predominated. Thus, the number of persons per house in London was eight, compared with an average of thirty-five in Paris, and seventy-five in Berlin at the least.

Finally, the German communications and electricity systems were extremely vulnerable to attack.

On 10 February 1927 an Air Service Section was established in the Reich Ministry of Defense. In close cooperation with the Department of Interior Administration (Innere Verwaltung) and the Reich Post and Telegraph Services (Reichspost), the new section first set about creating the basic conditions essential for any form of civilian air defense, namely, the creation of an aircraft reporting and air raid warning service. The selection and training of personnel for this purpose was a responsibility of the Ministry for the Interior. The whole service was on an honorary basis, but the members received a per diem allowance and free quarters when called up for maneuvers or exercises.

In this way, and almost unnoticed by the public, aircraft reporting exercises were conducted, in which the air raid warning service with its alerting centers, alerting telephone switchboard stations, and local warning stations came into evidence in the simplest forms.  

Air Service Section: Luftwachstelle


5. Gustav Ewald: Die Ausbildung zur Fliegerufstellen.
After these initial steps had been taken, the department for Internal Administration, particularly after 1928, commenced preparations for introduction of the other measures essential for the build up of a civilian air defense system. Which authorities were to be assigned responsibility for implementation of the various measures evolved logically from the existing fields of responsibility for the specific areas of activities.

One fundamentally important problem, however, still had to be decided: who was to be given local control in the individual civilian air defense localities: the civic administrative authorities, or the State Police? The final decision was made in favor of the police, because the police force had available a widely ramified regional organization equipped with signal communication facilities and vehicles, because police officers had a sound training in command, and because due to these reasons it seemed safe to assume that this solution of the problem would insure the greatest measure of uniformity in all measures to be taken.

In the meantime, the National Air Defense Confederation (Heimwehr-Vertragsverband) had been formed in 1927 and had absorbed the societies already in existence at the time. The thought of air defense gradually took root, and the first
large-scale civilian air defense maneuver, conducted in the
Koenigsberg, Eastern Prussia, area from 1-3 October 1936,
brought into evidence civilian air defense units which, al-
though only organized on an improvised basis, were retained
right up to the end of World War II in the same form. The
organization thus established comprises the Security and au-
thority Services, factory defense units, individual and ex-
tended individual air defense, and the air defense services
of the various specific administrations, such as the Railway,
Post and Telegraph, and Waterways Administrations.

It is only natural that all preparatory work thus done
was largely based on theory, and that it lacked firm consoli-
dation and control, and above all that it suffered from a
lack of adequate financial support.

In accordance with its nature, the Civilian Air Defense
Service had to prepare measures designed to avert the possible
consequences of enemy armed action, and to limit the disas-
trous damage and destruction which such action might cause and re-
duce the harm which might result therefrom. Owing to the lack
of data from German research and to the complete lack of oppor-
tunities for own experiments and tests, recourse had to be
taken for this purpose to the current appraisals of the capabil-
ities of enemy air forces.
as round published in foreign literature on the subject.

Strangely enough, the most prominent subject in discussions of future air warfare was that of the threat of chemical air warfare. Consequently, all efforts in preparations for civilian air defense were strongly influenced, and this not only in Germany, by the assumption that persistent and non-persistent chemical agents would be used in air warfare as a logical development from gas warfare on the ground.

Although attention was drawn occasionally, and at times with emphasis, to the greater threat of a large-scale use of incendiaries, the militarily decisive results which the mass use of incendiary bombs could produce was not clearly realized.

Toward the end of World War I already, Germany had been in possession of the electro-thermite incendiary bomb, but for humanitarian reasons the Army High Command had prohibited the use of these bombs. Consequently, no experience data was available on this weapon, which furthermore had not become publicly known.

Experts on such subjects had certain concepts of the scope or large fire catastrophes and of the immense difficulties encountered in efforts to master them, particularly after the holocaust of San Francisco in 1906. However, not one of the

European countries engaged in preparing measures for civilian air defense conceived the full significance of large-scale incendiary attacks in warfare.

II. ORGANIZATION OF PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE AFTER 1933.

a. Top Level Command. After the national upheaval of 30 January 1933 (Hitler’s rise to power) the civilian air defense program gained strong impetus. One of the first important measures taken by the new Government was the appointment of a Reich Commissioner for Aviation based on the decree issued on 2 February 1933. In this decree the Reich Commissioner was also assigned responsibility for the mission of civilian air defense, previously a responsibility of the Reich Minister for the Interior. With the establishment of the Reich Air Ministry by decree on 5 May 1933, the new ministry explicitly assumed responsibility for all missions of civilian and other passive air defense.

The establishment of the new ministry was to prove of incisive importance for the organization and development of the civilian air defense services in Germany, civilian air defense thereby having been given recognition as an essential element of air defense as a whole.

The ruling thought in this organizational solution of the problem was that close contact had to be maintained with
tactical and technical developments in the Air Force. All
efforts to devise new methods for application in the diversi-
fied fields of civilian air defense had to be adapted to the
current tactical and technical capabilities of the enemy, and
this applied in particular in the fields of building construc-
tion, camouflage, deception, and the removal of bombs dropped
by the enemy, so that very close contact with the own air
forces was the only way to insure prospects of success.

Every officer serving in the civilian air defense was
required to have at least some aviation experience, theoretical
concepts were not considered sufficient.

For the above reasons the Office of the Reich Commissioner
for Aviation and of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe
was the most appropriate agency for the centralized control
and direction of technical development of the civilian air
defense services.

Another factor here was the necessity for a powerful au-
thority able to effectuate its plans without interference by
the various inner-political groups, some of which were at
rivalry, and thereby insure a uniform development of civilian
air defense. Within the scope of the preparations made under
direction by the Supreme Military Command (Oberkommando der
Wehrmacht) it was now possible to make adequate allowances
for the principle of civilian air defense, a matter which at
the time was still considered by many to be a troublesome and
superfluous matter. A civilian authority would always have
remained in a secondary position, at least in dealings with
the three branches of the military forces.

The direction of civilian air defense by a military au-
dority proved a sound solution throughout the war, a fact
which remains unchallenged in spite of the circumstances that
the National Socialist Party towards the end of the war as-
sumed responsibility for individual air raid protection, that
the Reich Minister for Armaments and Wartime Industry assumed
the mission of factory defenses, or that the Reich Minister
for the Interior, through the Chief of German Police Forces,
on 1 March 1945 took over responsibility for civilian air de-
fense within his areas of responsibility. These measures
changed nothing in the overall direction of civilian air defense
activities by the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander
in Chief of the Luftwaffe or in the rights of inspection dele-
gated by him to his subordinate commands.

Within the Reich Air Ministry a newly established Antiair-
craft Artillery and Civilian Air Defense Inspectorate (Inspek-
tion Hor Flakartillerie and New Luftschutzwesen) initially
handled all matters of civilian air defense. The basis for

7. See p. 43
this arrangement was the concept that each important air defense target would be of interest to both the antiaircraft artillery and the civilian (or passive) air defense branches, the latter being involved by the necessity to employ smoke screening forces, to establish dummy installations, to develop factory defenses, and to hold special personnel available for action to prevent or minimize damages. The necessary personnel for these purposes were taken from the officer corps of the Antiaircraft Artillery Arm and were prepared for their mission in appropriate officer training courses at the Reich Institute of the Air Force for Civilian Air Defense (Reichsanstalt der Luftwaffe fuer Luftschutz).

At a later stage a special inspectorate, Air Force Inspectorate 13 (Luftwaffeninspektion 13) was established and responsibilities were divided for Antiaircraft Artillery Defense and Passive Air Defense. From the start the new inspectorate was headed by Ministerialrat* Dr. Knipfer, who was later promoted Ministerialdirektor** and held this position up to the end of 1944. As a member of Germany’s World War I air forces, he displayed great abilities, and through his energetic tenacity in a constant struggle against obstacles succeeded in bringing the German civilian and passive air defense services to a high standard of performances, a fact

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* An administrative official in a ministry with the equivalent rank of colonel. ** with the equivalent rank of Lieutenant General.
which is given general recognition today by all concerned.

In the initial stages it was exceedingly difficult to
raise Civilian Air Defense, burdened as it was with its omi-
nious adjective of "Civilian" to a status equal to that of
the active branches of national defense, the military forces,
and much time passed before it was possible to drop the "Civi-
lian" and adopt the more appropriate term of Air Defense. The
designation "Civilian Air Defense" (Ziviler Lufschutz) had
been adopted prior to 1935 for reasons of concealment.

The higher levels of German command realized only gra-
dually that passive air defense was an essential element of
air defense as a whole, and that in total warfare the military
establishment had to include in its command organization the
subject of passive air defense with all of the special mis-
sions involved. Once this conviction was established, the de-
signation Civilian Air Defense was dropped and replaced per-
manently by the designation Passive Air Defense.**

As the build-up progressed it soon evolved that the
military control and direction of passive air defense activi-
ties was a sound solution, in contrast with the passive air
defense organizations developed in other countries. From the

* It should be noted here that the German military used the
term "Verteidigung" for active defense and "Bunkers" (literally
"protection") for civilian and passive defense. Thus "Ziviler
Lufschutz" would mean specifically Civilian Air Raid Protection
whereas Luftschutz would be more inclusive. The term Passive
Air Defense has been adopted in the translation.

** See n., above.  S. See p. 13
military came the most forceful impulses in both command and organizational matters, the greatest measure of security in the fields of personnel reserves, raw material supplies, and funds, and the possibility to carry out tests at the various military proving grounds.

The direction of passive air defense activities, and this applies particularly at the regional levels of control, calls for the ability to employ forces suddenly at points or concentrated effort without any loss of time. Owing to their lack of any appropriate command organization, civilian administrative authorities are completely incapable of this type of action.

The compilation of a reliable interpretation of the current air situation to serve as a basis for the alerted and the direction of large forces to combat damages, and the control of such forces in action, presupposes the existence of an appropriately trained staff. Above all, preparatory measures in the central authority were an immediate and urgent necessity.

How would it have been possible for any civilian authority to establish, for example, the organization known as the "Enemy Bomb Removal Branch" (Bewältigung von Fliegerfallen Abwurfmunition)?

In the circumstances existing at that time even the further development of the firefighting service could be handled only by

the military. An exceedingly urgent necessity existed to standardize firefighting equipment throughout Germany, but the Office for Interior Administration had no authority to order the necessary measures to this end, because the firefighting services in each of the federal states were a responsibility of the separate state administrations. What was most urgently needed was a standardization of waterhose couplings throughout Germany; replacement of the uncomplicated "air defense" hand water pumps by better models and a general development of all firefighting equipment from handpumps to what were called water cannons; the provision of additional water supply sources, etc.

Finally, constructional changes and changes in the air defense organization within installations and properties of the military forces were necessary. These could not have been carried out in the proper manner without unmistakable directives from the headquarters concerned in each case, and any such failure would have been detrimental to the general capabilities of defense. It is only necessary here to refer to the numerous newly constructed installations.
THE ORGANIZATION OF AIR FORCE INSPECTORATE 13

The responsibilities of the Air Force Inspectorate 13 were of a universal nature. Extending from the organization and direction of civilian and other passive air defense, through the legal and administrative problems involved, to technical problems of a highly diversified nature, the new inspectorate had to explore, develop, and put into practice completely new fields of activities. In the case of the other subject matters dealt with in the Reich Air Ministry matters were considerably less involved. The object was to establish a new branch of the military forces, namely, the Air Force. The functions of the passive air defense service, in contrast, extended beyond the scope of the Reich Air Ministry, with the larger part of its activities extending into the civilian provinces, and thus involving the areas of responsibility of the civilian Reich ministries and other central authorities.

In organizing the inspectorate another point raised was the question whether it would not be possible, as in the case of the other Air Force inspectorates, to keep it as small as possible by assigning responsibility for the passive air defense organization to the Air Force Organizational Branch, the responsibility for legal affairs involved in passive air defense to the Air Force Legal Division, and administrative matters
to the Air Force Administrative Office, while the Air Force Technical Office would assume responsibility for all technological problems involved.

Owing to the highly specialized and complicated nature of the subjects to be dealt with however, it proved necessary to create an inspectorate adequately staffed with specialized personnel, so that it would be able to cope promptly with the flood of missions and tasks which would develop. This led to a compromise solution under which problems of basic significance were handled by the new inspectorate in cooperation with the appropriate branches and offices of the Air Force, while some problems were handled by these branches and offices upon request by the new inspectorate.

A forceful personality was needed to cope with the obstacles and resistance which were naturally often encountered against these entirely new activities, which were in many cases considered an onerous burden.

In its final status Air Inspectorate 13 was organized more or less as follows:

THE INSPECTOR OF PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE
(Temporarily designated, in 1938, as the Chief of Civilian Air Defense Affairs)

The Reich Institute of the Air Force for Passive Air Defense (Later also the Inspector of Passive Air Defense Troops)
Branch 1, later designated Passive Air Defense Policy Staff

Section I: Direction and Operations

Sub-Section Ia: Direction and Operations

Sub-Section Ib: Passive Air Defense in services under separate administration, such as the railway or post and telegraph systems.

Sub-Section Ic: Training, experience reports.

Sub-Section Id: Officer replacements, general personnel matters.

Sub-Section Ie: Regulations.

Section II: Air Raid Warning Service.

Sub-Section IIa: Organization.

Sub-Section IIb: Personnel.

Sub-Section IIc: Technology.

Branch 2: Organization, Training (in Air Raid Warning Service), Administration.

Section 2: Organization and training of safety service.

Sub-Section 2a: Safety and Auxiliary Service.

Sub-Section 2b: Individual protection, Reich Air Defense (passive) Society.

Sub-Section 2c: Factory defenses (Air).

Sub-Section 2d: Air Defense Veterinary Service. (The Air Defense Medical Service was handled later in Air Force Inspectorate 14).

Section II: Administration, Legal Affairs, Press.

Sub-Section IIa: Administration, Personnel.
Sub-Section 2 IIb: Budgeting, etc.

Sub-Section 2 IIc: Procurement.

Sub-Section 2 IIId: Passive Air Defense Law.

Sub-Section 2 IIe: Press and archives.


Section 3 I: Fire prevention, administration of raw material supplies.

Sub-Section 3 II: Passive Air Defense Construction.

Sub-Section 3 III: Gas defense, smoke screening

MISSIONS OF AIR FORCE INSPECTORATE 13

On the basis of the clearly stated mission the primary requirement was the procurement of the necessary funds and raw materials. The original passive air defense program provided for an annual budget of 40,000,000 Marks and had been drawn up for a period of ten years. Including expenditures for large public air raid shelters and for black out measures in respect to the public lighting services (hitherto not provided for in the annual budget), this meant that the budget would be exceeded by 105,000,000 Marks per annum for completion of a four-year program. In a letter dated 1 November 1937, a recommendation was submitted to the Supreme Commander of the Military Forces (Oberbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht), together with a fund distribution plan, that this amount should...
be allocated out of the general military budget.

Grave difficulties were encountered in the requisitioning and allocation of the required raw materials. As a report by the UnderSecretary of State for Aviation dated 30 October 1937 reveals the allocations of iron at that time, which totaled 70,000 tons monthly, sufficed only to complete the following percentages of the program ordered for completion by 1942:

- Aircraft and aircraft weapons approximately 75 percent
- Building construction 33 percent
- Antiaircraft artillery 25 percent
- Civilian air defense 0 percent

The difficulties created by these circumstances were considerable and the consequences were unavoidable.

The development of a passive air defense system suffered under the fallacious opinion of the highest command circles that Germany was so strong in air power that the passive air defense measures already planned would be adequate in a war which was expected to be of short duration. It was not only the construction of air raid shelters which suffered, and it will be remembered here that it was only in 1941 that the so-called Fuehrer Construction Program was established, but even

the preparation of firefighting and fire prevention measures were affected. It was also this opinion which prevented the timely establishment of adequate numbers of mobile passive air defense units.

b. Integration of the Passive Air Defense Services in the National Defense System, Preparations for Mobilization. The highest authority for national defense was the Reich Defense Council (Reichverteidigungsrat), in which the three branches of the military establishment were represented under the chairmanship of the Chief of the Supreme Military Command (Chef des permanenten Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht). The implementing organ of this Council was its Reich Defense Committee, which held regular meetings. It was here that plans, command missions, and the requests of the military establishment were coordinated with existing possibilities and the potentialities of the various national departments concerned, particularly the Departments of Economy, Communications, Finances, and Labor. It was also here that problems of overlapping authority were decided.

As an element of national defense, passive air defense with its requirements extended into the organizations of the military establishment as well as into the various areas of responsibility of the several departments of Reich Government down to the lowest levels. Insofar as the guides and directives compiled by the Office of the Air Ministry and the Commander in
Chief or the Air Force on the basis of these stated requirements were of fundamental significance they were signed by the Office of Air Chief of the Supreme Military Command; in other cases the Ministry and Commander in Chief of the Air Force issued general directives and stated requirements to the other branches of the military establishment "by Order," the same applied to directives to and requirements stated to other central organizations and institutions. Recipients of such directives and statements of requirements were required to fulfill such directives and requirements and in their turn were required to obtain concurrence from the Office of the Air Ministry and Commander in Chief of the Air Force for all decrees, service manuals, basic directives, etc., prepared by them for issue to their subordinate agencies.

In the first stages of preparations for mobilization this concurrence was obtained through the Reich Defense Council, through which the civilian plans for mobilization were submitted in the draft form to the Office of the Air Ministry and Commander in Chief of the Air Force. This enabled the Office to integrate passive air defense requirements into the mobilization measures in their proper sequence according to timing, functioning, and organization, and thereby insure that they would be given appropriate consideration.

In line with the guides, stated requirements, and
directives mentioned above, the various governmental departments carried out their part of the passive air defense mission on their own responsibility. In the case of the military this was usually done by the issue of appropriate manuals—Air Force, Army, or Navy Service Regulations or Field Manuals—in the case of civilian governmental departments by means of the issue of appropriate decrees and/or regulations, etc., for example the Manual for Railway Passive Air Defense Directives known as the Fluri Manual, the Post and Telegraph Passive Air Defence Directives, and Directives for Passive Air Defence of the Reich Autobahn highways. Only in matters for which no central authority existed, or in cases where particularly speedy action was necessary (for example, building construction, firefighting) did the Office take direct action, using its own means and its own executive organs for development, testing, and production.

Of decisive importance was the decree giving the Office of the Air Ministry and Commander in Chief of the Air Force to right to convince itself of the execution of required passive air defense measures by all military and civilian authorities. At the intermediate level of command, the generals commanding air fleets and air district commands had this same authority in respect to the military and civilian authorities within their zones.

II. See §§124-126 of German Army.

See IV, 1, 2 and 3, below.

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The work thus done in preparation for mobilization was formulated in "Special Annex 10 to Mobilization Plan (Air Force)" (Besondere Anlage 10 zum Mob.-Plan (Luftwaffe)). The following brief details are offered here from Special Annex 10 (edition 12 or 1 January 1939) to show the chains of command and the organizational status of the Passive Air Defense Service at the beginning of World War II.

The direction of all passive air defense activities throughout the air defense areas within German territories was a responsibility of the local Air District Command Headquarters, the commanders of which had the authority to issue directives consonant with the current requirements of the air situation to all military and civilian agencies within their command areas. This applied also to the army communications zones.

In the naval fortification areas the Passive Air Defense Service, if called out, immediately came under the command of the local Naval Post Command. In matters of basic importance the Office of the Air Ministry and Commander in Chief of the Air Force issued its directives through the Commanding Generals of the Air Fleets, in other matters directly to the officers commanding the various air district commands, and also had the authority to issue directives directly to the various civilian ministries in matters of passive air defense. Within the scope of their conduct of air warfare, the Commanding Generals of the various Air Force Districts received the detailed orders from the Commanding General of the Air Fleet.
Air Fleets directed passive air defense activities.

In accordance with their degree of vulnerability and sensitivity to air attack, the various air defense areas in Germany were classified as Categories I, II, and III (Items 10-12). This classification was necessary for reasons of power concentration and on it depended the allocation of personnel, equipment, raw materials, and funds.

It is unnecessary to go into detail here on the subject of the organization of passive air defense forces. All that need be mentioned is that special units were established for employment off post, a necessary measure because of the lack of a special passive air defense arm, the creation of which was planned (Items 14-19). These special units were given appropriate special equipment.

The call out of the passive air defense forces was initiated by means of a prearranged telegram (SZL) with special provisions for advance warning. Local passive air defense chiefs, factory air defense units, and the units of the extended self-protection system maintained mobilization schedules, which were subject to inspection by the local air district command.

The regulations governing the procurement of personnel were copious, since the forces of the Air Raid Warning Service
end of the Safety and auxiliary Service (supplementary personnel for which were recorded only in Category I air defense areas) could not be called out and inducted by the local military recruiting offices, as could be done with military recruits. Here, the Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force had the status of a "non-military user of personnel." It was a responsibility of the local passive air defense chief to take measures to have personnel of the Air Raid Warning and Safety and Auxiliary Services declared indispensable (Items 27-34).

Supplementary motor vehicles and boats were to be registered in accordance with the Law on the Requisitioning of Property and Services for Defense Purposes (Waffenleistungsgesetz) (Items 30-30).

In view of future developments, provisions had been made to handle all supplies through Air Force channels (Air Force Field Manual--Secret--L.M. g. 90).

Precautionary measures had been taken against the possible necessity to move or evacuate segments of the civilian population because of the current air situation (Item 66).

Finally, Special Annex 10 contained a series of administrative regulations resulting from the specific nature of the whole organization (Items 61-71) as well as regulations governing the stages of blackout becoming effective immediately upon callout.
of the Passive Air Defense Service (Items 72-76).

Organization of the forces of the Passive Air Defense Service proceeded without friction in accordance with the mobilization plans described above, although the indefinite status of the personnel in the service naturally led to difficulties which could only be removed in a later organization.

b. *Temporary Local Directives for Air Raid Protection for the Civilian Population.* Making use of measures previously initiated in this direction, the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force as a beginning speedily issued directives governing the centrally directed development of air raid protection for the civilian population, a subject hitherto handled primarily at the level of the individual states.

Here, Air Forces Inspectorate 13 was able to base its measures on the "Temporary Local Directives for Air Raid Protection for the Civilian Population," which the Reich Minister for the Interior, formerly responsible for civilian air defense, had instructed the Police Institute for Technology and Communications (Polizeiinstitut fuer Technik und Verkehr) to compile, and parts of which were already completed while others were still in process of compilation.

Full emphasis was now placed on work to complete these directives.
Retaining the original title of the directives, the Office issued additional parts by way of decree. The parts thus issued were constantly revised and brought up to date in the light of the latest experience.

The whole compilation known as the Temporary Directives for Air Raid Protection for the Civilian Population was organized as follows:

Section I: Civilian Air Defense (Necessity, purpose, means, and local operations).

II: Directives (Planning Committee, special committees, plans of operations).

III: The local Safety and Auxiliary Service.

IV. Command control in air defense areas.

V. Individual protection activities by the civilian population.


VI. Shelters.


Annex 7: Regulation on the Operation of Gas Traps.
Section VII: Fire Prevention and Firefighting.

Appendix 8: Recommendations for a Simple Fire Extinguisher in a Residential Building.

Appendix 9: Recommended Items of Equipment for an Air Defense Community.

Appendix 10: Ideal equipment for a Firefighting and Salvage Team.

Section VIII: Passive Air Defense Medical Service (with Appendixes).

Section IX: Decontamination Service (with Appendixes).

Section X: Repair Service (with Appendixes).

Section XI: Specialist Teams.

Section XII: Passive Air Defense Veterinary Service (with Appendixes).

The printing of these temporary directives was handled by the civilian authorities. The following revised editions of the individual sections were published and distributed by the Officer of the Air Ministry and Commander in Chief of the Air Force as printed field manuals. They were compiled in agreement with the central authorities responsible for their implementation, including the branches of the military establishment and other organizations, and in their final form were issued as Air Force Field Manuals. Those of them which also applied to the Army and the Navy were also included under 13. "Vorläufige Ortsanweisung für die Luftschutz der Zivilbevölkerung," 4th Edition, 1935. Published by: Der Landrat des "Landkreises Siegen" in Siegen, Westphalia.
appropriate numbers in the Army and Navy catalogues as Army
and Navy Field Manuals.

A list of the Air Force Field Manuals dealing with the
subject of passive air defense is included in this study as
Annex A. In addition to these manuals, the necessity arose
for the issue of a large number of directives, regulations,
and decrees on the various special subjects. Insofar as this
appears necessary within the scope of this study, these will
be referred to at the appropriate time.

The mission of civilian or passive air defense has mean-
while evolved from the formulation of the definition of the
concept, as follows: The civilian or passive air defense sys-
tem was to protect the nation and the homeland, and thereby
also the armed forces and their sources of power, namely, the
economy and traffic and communications, against the hazards
of air attacks, was to alleviate the impact of such
attacks on human life, traffic and communications, and the
economy, and was to prepare
during peace the measures
essential to this end.

The important point now was to consolidate the beginnings
in a firm organization and to create the legal bases for action.
All measures to be taken required full cooperation by the en-
tire population to insure success. It was clear that all pre-
parations would have to be made on as wide a basis as possible
after British General Fuller in his widely read work "On the Coming War" had written as follows:

Air attacks which are to be effective must be directed specifically against the will of the population to resist.

Realizing this danger Hermann Goering, at that time Reich Commissioner for Aviation had established the Reich Air Defense Association (Reichsluftschutzkräfte). This association was to convince the German nation of the vital significance of civilian air defense and secure the active participation of the population in order to create the conditions of morale without which a nation would not be in any position to hold out under the strain of a modern air attack.

d. The Legal Bases for Civilian Air Defense: The Civil Air Defense Act and Implementing Decrees. The organization of civilian air defense was built up in years of tireless labor, was tested in numerous exercises and improved, until it was finally possible, against considerable opposition, to establish a legal basis in the form of the Civil Air Defense Act passed on 26 June 1935.

The main difficulties encountered evolved around the fact...
that the financing of the factory defense system and other
elements of passive air defense activities were a matter of
controversy, the fact that it was found impossible to inte-
grate passive air defense requirements in the Law on the Re-
quisitioning of Services for Defense Purposes (Rekollabilmung
realy) because the services would have to be requisitioned
during times of peace, and to the fact that something entirely
new had to be created in this field.

In view of the innumerable areas of responsibility which
would be involved, the Civil Air Defense Act was intentionally
kept as short as possible with the intention of regulating
the various separate subjects by means of the implementing
decrees.

The Civil Air Defense Act unmistakably described civil
air defense as a mission of the Central Government. One of
the most important points in the Act, however, was the intro-
duction of obligatory service in the civil air defense system.
In terms of Paragraph 2, Item (1) of the Law every German
citizen was required to render service in person or with pro-
perly or by other action, to submit to action or refrain
from action if the performances of civil air defense activi-
ties so required. This obligation to render service in or
to the civil air defense system was also binding on women, and

17. Karlsruhe Document Collection: Vorlage beim Staatssekre-
taer vom 31. 5.1934 betr. Aufbau des Luftschutzes, 1934.
was one of the most important foundation stones providing a basis for the operation of the civil air defense system. In significance it equalled the law concerning obligatory military service.

Implementation of terms of the Act imposing obligatory contribution towards civil air defense was regulated in detail by the decree issued on 30 December 1937 by the Office of the Air Ministry and Commander in Chief of the Air Force. This decree differentiated between

The obligation to render services to or in the civil air defense system;

The obligation to make property available for air defense purposes;

The obligation to behave in accordance with air defense requirements.

The mission of civil air defense was not stated in detail in the Act itself, but was established later in the "First Air Decree in Implementation of the Civil/Defense Act (Staatsverordnung zum Luftschutzgesetz)". A later edition of this decree, dated 31 August 1943, formulates the mission of civil or passive air defense as follows:

to take precautionary measures of an organizational and technical nature which will serve to conserve the combat capability, working capacity, and will to resist or

For more details see Appendix I (or. Footnote 40).
the entire nation against the impact of air attacks,
through speedy action to counteract damages caused by air
attacks, and to prevent catastrophes.

In particular, measures had to be taken

a. to warn the public in general, offices, factories,
and other installations (Development of an air raid warning
system);

b. to render assistance to persons injured and in
the case of damage to property, and to assist in the main-
tenance of public safety and order if these are disturbed
or menaced by air attacks (Establishment of a Safety and
Auxiliary Service);

c. to protect industrial and non-essential installations
and the persons employed therein in order to maintain un-
interrupted continuation of operations (Establishment of
factory defense services);

d. to protect public and private buildings, offices,
and other installations, as well as the persons present
therein (Individual defense activities);

e. to protect public and private offices, factories,
and the persons therein
and other installations; in cases where a specific factory
defense organization is considered unnecessary but where
the personnel involved are not numerous enough to provide
for their own protection (Development of an extended
individial air defense service).

The above served to provide a legal basis for the set-up organizationally already in existence.

In organizing the civil air defense services the creation of new administrative organs was avoided. On the contrary, a course was adopted in which existing organizations were integrated as far as possible within the framework of the civil air defense service and the Minister for Aviation was given control authority over them. For this reason it was stated already in Paragraph 1 of the Civil Air Defense Act that the Minister for Aviation, besides his own agencies, would avail himself of the services of the regular police and the authorities supervising the police forces. Over and beyond this he had the authority to make use of other offices and installations of the several confederate states, of communities, of community associations, and other corporations with legal status.

Whereas this implied that the execution of civil air defense measures to a large extent would be carried out by civilian authorities under instructions from the Minister, the various command headquarters of the Air Force were required to insure within their several command areas that uniformity was maintained in all measures and that all offices concerned cooperated properly with each other.
The First Decree in Implementation of the Civil Air Defense Act also regulated the organization of the fields of civil air defense activities described above and outlined the missions of local civil air defense chiefs, the obligation to contribute towards civil air defense, and the civil air defense measures to be taken by the various special administrations, such as the Railway, Post and Telegraph Service, and Waterways Administrations.

The Second Decree in Implementation of the Civil Air Defense Act, dated 4 May 1937, dealt with building construction and the civil air defense requirements involved and provided the necessary basis for the Air Raid Shelter Rules issued as Decrees in Implementation.

The Third Decree in Implementation of the Civil Air Defense Act, also issued on 4 May 1937, regulated the measures to be taken in clearing the rubble from destroyed or damaged buildings.

19. Concerning the above and also concerning all other Decrees in Implementation of the Civil Air Defense Act see Darsow-Pokken Ger von Harries: "Texte und Gesetze zur Luftschutzrecht."
The Fourth Decree in Implementation, dated 31 January 1938, dealt with the procedures for approval and for the sale or other dispensation of articles needed for civil air defense.

The Fifth Decree in Implementation, dated 31 March 1938, established rules for the medical examination of persons subject to compulsory service in the civil air defense system.

The Sixth Decree in Implementation, dated 15 February 1938, established regulations for the standardization of firefighting equipment.

The Seventh Decree in Implementation (in its latest edition dated 31 August 1943) dealt with the procurement of equipment for individual air defense services.

The Eighth Decree in Implementation, dated 23 May 1939 and modified in a revised edition on 31 August 1943, contained a number of rules regulating organizational, technical, and legal matters affecting blackout activities.

The Ninth Decree in Implementation concerns "Improvisational Civil Air Defense Measures in already Existing Buildings." This decree was also supplemented by numerous rules and directives.

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Footnotes 21, 22, 23 next page.
The Tenth Decree in Implementation contained instructions on "Behaviour during Air Attacks and Passive Air Defense Exercises." The last edition (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 523) was issued on 31 August 1943.

The Eleventh Decree in Implementation, later rescinded Ninth Revised Decree in Implementation of the ADGDA/Civil Air Defense Law, contained the disciplinary and penal code for the Safety and Auxiliary Service and for the Air Raid Warning Service.

The Twelfth Decree in Implementation, known as the Camouflage Decree and the last edition of which was issued on 31 August 1943 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 525), dealt with all matters involved in the problem of camouflage operations.

Because of the large number of diversified problems to be dealt with, the Civil Air Defense Law within a very short while assumed a size which was hardly comprehensible. New experience naturally had an influence on legal results, which led to the issue of numerous decrees, directives, special instructions, and modifications of those already existing.

21. See IV, b, 1: "The Firefighting Service."
22. See IV, c: "Civilian Individual or Self-Protection."
23. See VIII, c: "Blackout"
24. See Footnote 17.
25. See VIII, d: "
e. The Organization of Civil Air Defense. In accordance with the requirements of the First Decree in Implementation of the Civil Air Defense Act, the following organization of the civil air defense services evolved:

1. The Air Raid Warning Service. This service provided the basis for the execution of all civil air defense measures in the event of an air attack. The service received its data from the Aircraft Reporting Service, which in turn was an establishment of the military forces. The Air Raid Alerting Centers established for specific regions transmitted instructions on the current air situation in the form of advance alert reports or, if the situation required, in the form of orders to sound the air raid warning. In both cases the messages were channelled through the special alerting telephone switchboard centers to the local air raid warning stations.

2. The Safety and Auxiliary Service. This service was built up on the existing police force organization of the air defense areas involved. Within this service all governmental, municipal, and private organization which existed already during peacetime for the purpose of public safety and protection were firmly integrated and uniformly controlled. Personnel for the service

(and in the case of Category I air defense areas, where an increase in the number of personnel available was intended in the event of mobilization) this meant the peace-time cadre personnel were furnished as follows:

For the
Safety Service
Firefighting Service
Repair Service
Decontamination Service

Personnel furnished by
Police service
The regular and voluntary firefighting forces in existence.
Technical Auxiliary Service
Municipal street cleaning organizations

26.--Continued


27. See IV, a., below.
28. See IV, b., below.
Medical Services
Public Health establishments and the organization of the Red Cross.

Veterinary Services
Public and private veterinary establishments and organizations.

Specialist Teams
The public utilities maintenance and repair services.

Ship salvage teams in port cities
The shipping and port operating establishments and offices of the Waterways Administration.

The local Civilian Air Defense Chief was responsible for the consolidation of all these diversified organizations, for their mutual build-up, and for their uniform direction and control. He was also responsible for uniform cooperation between the services listed under Items 3, 4, and 5, below, namely, the factory defense services, the individual or personal defense systems, and the extended individual defense system, and finally for the coordination of all civilian air defense measures with the local authorities of the special administrations, such as the Railway, Port and Telegraph Service, and Waterways Administrations.

The most important unit of the Safety and Auxiliary Service was the police district specified in an "Air Defense District (Luftschatzrevier)" air raid alert. As a rule the district force available was then immediately reinforced by a 29. See IV, 1, 1, below.
firefighting and salvage team, a medical team, and two gas detectors, which represented the operational force. The air defense district headquarters had the mission of deploying its operational forces to eliminate dangers in individual buildings which the tenants with their own means of individual defense were unable to cope with, to rescue injured persons and provide them with medical care, and to detect the presence of chemical war agents.

In larger air defense areas the next level was the Civil Air Defense Sector Headquarters, which corresponded in its area to the police sector. Each such sector maintained reserves in its Safety and Auxiliary Service comprising the same elements as those described for the air district headquarters above plus permanent installations such as first-aid stations, repair and maintenance service pools, and decontamination pools. In addition each sector had experts to head the individual teams, and technical teams to repair damages to the gas, water, and electricity supply system. The overall control was a responsibility of the local police sector chief. In some of the larger cities a number of such civil air defense sectors were consolidated to form civil air defense groups with correspondingly wider areas of responsibility.
Each local civil air defense chief had a special staff available approximating that described above for the civil air defense sector and known as the Local Civil Air Defense Control. In addition, he was required to hold forces available for operations outside of his area.

3. Factory Air Defense. In organizing the factory passive air defense system the important object was to keep to a minimum the damages which were to be expected as a result to restrict air attacks and loss of manhours resulting from air raid alerts. The circumstance that the manufacturing installations of the industry varied widely in their nature created the necessity to apply defense measures which were uniform in principle but were adapted to the specific conditions of each individual factory involved. The solution found here was that of self-administration: The National Board of Industries (Reichsgruppe Industrie) was assigned the responsibility of insuring that the individual factories and installations organized and operated their factory air defense system in consonance with the basic directives issued by the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe. Within the framework of its regional subdivisions the National Board of

30. xxxxxSee III, c, 31 The Local Civil Air Defense Chief, and III, c, 44 The Organization of Air Defense Areas, both below.
31. See IV, e, below.
Industries was required to create a Factory Air Defense Control Organization arranged in regional, district, and local agencies.

Besides numerous measures in the technical fields of air raid shelter construction, camouflage, blackout activities, protection against fragmentation, each factory was required to organize factory air defense units, which generally comprised safety, firefighting, medical, decontamination, and repair services, emergency teams, air observers, and messenger or reporting personnel. Each factory could employ its entire personnel in air defense missions. Organization, training, and equipment was to be such that any damage done could be so far restored that manufacturing operations could be resumed as speedily as possible without recourse to outside assistance so far as this was possible. In large factories the personnel were divided into three groups, one for immediate operations, one to be held in reserve, and one to be used as replacements.

The Operations Group was to be available immediately for action to remove damages. The Reserve Group if necessary was to support the Operations Group and when the occasion arose was to furnish replacements for members of the Operations Group not available for any reason. The rest of the

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33. See VII, a; VIII, c; VIII, o; and VIII, a, 6, below.
the factory personnel formed the Replacement Group.

As a rule the managing director was responsible for
all air defense activities within his concern; the executive
organ was the factory air defense chief. The larger a fac-
tory was, the more difficult it became to direct and control
defense measures. In very large factories it was therefore
necessary to establish a command organization broken down
into factory air defense sectors and in certain circumstances
even into factory air defense groups.

4. Individual Passive Air Defense. In view of the
serious vulnerability and sensitivity of Germany to air at-
tack, civilian air defense was a matter of life and death for
the German Nation. Therefore, it was of importance to make
the entire population aware of the air threat, to organize
an individual air defense for each house, and to provide
thorough training for the persons thus involved. This mission
was accomplished by the Reich Passive Air Defense Association
within an exceedingly short time.

The individual air defense within a building consisted
of the building air warden, a building firefighting team,
and untrained women auxiliaries. The system in each build-
ing was controlled by the building air warden, who was given

34 von Hoques: "Die Grundfragen des Selbstschutzes;" Niehoff
"Organisation und Aufgaben des Reichsflugschutzbundes;"
both in Sammelwerk Külpler-Rumpf, pp. 245, 291.
the status of an auxiliary police official whenever the passive air defenses forces were called out.

In order to secure effective mutual support between closely adjacent buildings, a number of such buildings were grouped together in a passive air defense community. The Reich Passive Air Defense Association carried out its functions through its regional, section, and local groups, placing main stress on propaganda, training and consultation, particularly on the subject of air defense shelter construction.

Public buildings, offices, and small factories were taken care of by the individual passive air defense system in the same manner as dwelling houses.

5. **Extended Individual Passive Air Defense.** In the case of public or privately owned offices or other installations inadequately staffed for self-protection, and in which there was no requirement for a factory air defense system, the Extended Individual Passive Air Defense System was applied.

This category included primarily businesses and banks, schools, hotels and inns, theaters, hospitals, churches, etc. The local passive air defense chief decided which of these belonged in the extended individual air defense category. In each case

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35. See IV, c, below.
36. Dr. Knipper: "*Der Bau der civilen Luftschutzanlagen,*" in *Sammelwerk Ruhlaer Haakte*, p. 114.
The chief official or factory manager was responsible for the implementation of the required passive air defense measures. Control of the required measures was exercised by the Installation Passive Air Defense Chief, who was assigned this mission by a police decree.

The entire system of extended individual passive air defense in all offices and installations within an air defense district was under the overall control of the local passive individual air defense chief. In this field of extended/passive air defense, the Reich Passive Air Defense Association exercised only an advisory function; in the case of governmental offices and other installations the Association acted only on specific request by the office or installation concerned.

In reality the extended individual passive air defense system was nothing but a simplified form of the factory defense system. It also required the establishment of special teams from among the employees, such as safety, installation firefighting, medical, telephone operating, messenger and reporting, and specialist teams composed in consonance with the nature of the office or other installation concerned.

6. Special Administrations (Such as the Railway, Post and Telegraph, and Waterways Administrations). The Navy and the Army with their various installations and real estate property, the Post and Telegraph Service, The Railway Service,

37. See IV, 6, 2, below. 36. See IV, 7 and IV, 6, 6, below.
the Waterways Service, the Autobahn (Superhighway), and the Reich Labor Service (Reichsarbeitsdienst) all belonged in the category of "Special Administrations." Under their own responsibility all of them put into effect in a manner consonant with their particular needs the necessary passive air defense measures in accordance with the directives issued by the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force.

All other central, intermediate and local level authorities came under the category of the extended individual passive air defense system or the factory defense system if their specific nature so required, or under the individual defense system.


Under guidance from the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force, the press, film, and radio broadcasting industries assumed the mission of propagandizing passive air defense. All of these agencies of propaganda were furnished the necessary propaganda material at regular intervals, and their representatives participated in exercises and other functions of the various branches of the passive air defense services. Appropriate short films were made in cooperation with the Reich Institute of the Air Force for Passive Air Defense, and some of these were shown in movies.*

as feature films.

It was essential to awaken the entire nation to a realization that the air threat could only be countered if every German, man and woman, assumed his or her role in the line of defense, prepared him or herself in spirit, and acquired the knowledge and aptitudes which air defense activities would require.

It was essential that this program of education should begin while people were still young. The sooner a start was made in educating youth in the proper spirit, which would lead them to interest themselves in the missions and tasks of passive air defense and to participate actively therein, the sooner it would undoubtedly be possible to encompass the entire Nation.

It was in this sense that the Reich and Prussian Minister for Science, Education, and Public Enlightenment, in agreement with the Reich Minister for Aviation, ordered as early as in February 1934 that one member of the teaching faculty in each school was to be appointed as a passive air defense warden. This warden was to advise the director of his school on all matters of passive air defense and, under his authority, was to insure that the subject of passive air defense was given its proper place in the curriculum and in the program of teaching.

The main burden in the propaganda program was borne by the Reich Passive Air Defense Association, which had quite clearly been assigned the mission of educating the public to the idea of self-protection, or developing the psychological atmosphere essential to this end, and of giving instructions and training to those concerned.

Success in the build-up and performances of a passive air defense system was conceivable and possible only on a community basis. By protecting the community against avoidable damage through enemy air attacks, the passive air defense system also protected the very existence of the community and thereby also its inner cohesion. In this field it was essential for the Reich Passive Air Defense Association to cooperate very closely with certain organizations of the National Socialist Party. It was this successful cooperation alone which later made possible the gigantic and unparalleled performances of the population and all passive air defense forces during and after the large-scale annihilation air attacks against densely populated residential areas.

5. The Passive Air Defense Medal or Honor. As a sign of recognition for conspicuous services in passive air defense

40. Dr. Knipfer: "Ziviler Luftschutz," in Dr. Michelbaum: "Das Buch von der Luftwaffe." Appendix I.

and as an inducement to continued devoted activity, a decoration known as the Passive Air Defense Medal of Honor (Luftschutz-Ehrenzeichen) was instituted by order of the Fuhrer on 30 January 1938. The medal could be awarded in two classes. A decree implementing the order regulated the awarding of the medal and specified the categories of persons who could be recommended to be thus decorated. Members of the armed forces, who served in "special administrations" as understood for the purposes of the Civil Air Defense Act were just as eligible for the decoration as were members of the other organizations of the passive air defense system.

Awards of the decoration were published, those of the First Class in the Reich Official Gazette (Deutscher Reichs-Blatt) and in the Air Force Bulletin of Regulations (Luftwehrenverordnungslat).

There can be no doubt that this medal did much to popularize the passive air defense idea.

III. ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

As part of the general mobilization, the Passive Air Defense Services were called out on 31 August 1939 by means of the prearranged SZL telegram. From that moment on the top-level command organization was in effect, in accordance with

43. "Durchführungsverordnung zur Verordnung über die Continued on p. 51.
the requirements of the Mobilization Plan (Air Force).

44. The War Time Top-Level Command Organization. The top-level command organization applied to the Passive Air Defense Services.

The Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief now assumed command over the Passive Air Defense Services in consonance with the mobilization preparations.

The regulations for this purpose were formulated in the Air Force Service Manual: "Principles for the Control of Passive Air Defense (Grundsatze fuer die Fuhrung der Luftschutze)," known as Air Force Field Manual L. Dw. 751, and in the annexes and supplements to that manual.45

In accordance with these regulations, the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force issued

(a) Orders and directives to offices and other agencies normally under his control;

(b) Directives to

The other branches of the armed forces (Navy and Army);


44. Appendix 4.

45. For L. Dw. 751 see Appendix 5. For register of Air Force Field Manuals see Annex A.
The Reich Commander in Chief of the SS and Chief of the German Police Forces;
The "Special Administrations;"
The other civilian Ministries and highest level Reich authorities.

The armed forces and the other "Special Administrations" under their own authority carried out their passive air defense measures in line with directives from the respective highest authorities and in consonance with the directives issued by the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force. All military units were required to establish what were called Military Auxiliary Attachments (Wahrmachthilfkommandos) for action when large-scale damage was caused by air attacks.

All military and civilian authorities were required to conform to the orders and directives issued for the direction of passive air defense within the overall pattern of air defense, with the proviso that military authorities would do so insofar as such action would not place the employment of troops in hazard.

If the current air situation required immediate action, the Air District Commands and Naval Post Commands within their respective areas were authorized to issue orders and/or directives for immediate compliance to local commands.
and civilian authorities directly and without regard for
the normally prescribed official channels. Such urgent
orders and/or directives took precedence over all other
requirements and directives received by the commands and
authorities concerned from their own higher level authori-

It is obvious that in such cases, which were however

due, friction resulted with the civilian authorities, and
particularly with those of the Office of Internal Admini-

strat

On the other hand it was absolutely essential to insure
the person responsible for the direction of passive air de-
The power

fense/to take immediate and direct action in cases of
extreme emergency. It goes without saying that interference
in any purely executive measures of the locally responsible
agencies was not permissible, but on the other hand again,
prior requirements had to be insured priority, for example,
in the case of an unexpected change in the air situation,
or in the case of new passive air defense forces being
moved into or out of an area.

Air Force Inspectorate 13, responsible for the hand-

ing of all passive air defense matters now became too

large because of the necessity to perform its new mission

46. See Item 16.
47. See §II, b, below.
of command in addition to its ministerial missions in the fields of administration and technology. For this reason personnel from the inspectorate were taken to form anew staff physically separated from the inspectorate and placed in mobilization type premises.

1. The new staff was designated Operations Staff ZL (Z-Abbreviation for Zivilverschluß or Civil Air Defense) and later redesignated Operations Staff F (Fallschutz or Air Defense (Fliegerabteilung F-Abbreviation for Luftschutz), which became a part of Air Force Operations Staff Robinson. The new staff moved into premises in the Reich Passive Air Defense School at Wannsee, Berlin, where the Inspector of Passive Air Defense at the time when the school was under construction had, with a view to the future, prepared appropriate premises, including signal communication facilities.

ORGANIZATION OF OPERATIONS STAFF PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE

Initially the new staff consisted of the entire Branch I or Air Force Inspectorate 15, which was joined later by the Inspector of Passive Air Defense Troops.

The staff also included liaison personnel from Branches II and III of Air Force Inspectorate 15, and the chiefs of these two branches reported regularly to the staff.

The new staff was in a certain sense an operations staff of the Passive Air Defense Services. It maintained
with uninterrupted and direct contact, the Air Force Operations Staff, handled the command, control, operations, and training of the Passive Air Defense forces and of the Air Raid Warning Service, and also stated requirements to the technical branches, Branches II and III, in the fields of building construction, fire fighting, the Safety and Auxiliary Services, equipment of all types, camouflage, blackouts, and the removal of enemy bombs, etc. Of incisive importance was the close contact maintained with the intelligence services. In the fields of organization, command, and operations passive air defense had to be adapted to the combat principles of the enemy and the current types of means of warfare available to the enemy. All planning and technological measures had to be coordinated ahead of time as far as possible with possible future developments in the air situation. Two examples illustrating this necessity are as follows:

1. When it seemed presumable that the enemy, in efforts to disrupt electricity supplies, would attack high-tension lines with what were called cable bombs, special instructions by the Chief, Passive Air Defense Operations Branch, led to the development of terminal clamps, which were mounted along the overland high voltage lines currently most important. The clamps prevented the collapse of the
poles, which otherwise would have been inevitable if the
lines had been struck and the three cables carried by the
poles had been destroyed.

2. Since repeated inquiries produced the information
that the enemy could probably only attack valley dams with
air torpedoes, the Chief of the Passive Air Defense Opera-
tions Staff procured from the Navy torpedo nets, which
were installed with great difficulty at the most important
valley dams. Unfortunately, the new methods of attack did
not become known until it was too late.

It was only in October 1940 that the Fuehrer, in re-
response to oral reports by the Reich Marshal, ordered that
priority was to be given to all measures involved in all
fields of passive air defense, and that wherever necessary
these measures were to be brought to completion. At the
same time Field Marshal Milch received instructions to
initiate all necessary measures on behalf of the Reich
Marshal.

Opinions vary on
/ The results produced by this appointment of Field Mar-
shall Milch, but it is definite that, at least so far as the
command agencies of the Air Force were concerned, the re-
sults were disadvantageous. It is true that the diffi-
culties hitherto encountered in efforts to procure funds
and raw materials were reduced, but they were not
entirely removed.

The utmost energy was expended in building up the passive air defense system, in numerous exercises to test its efficacy, and to improve it. Particularly comprehensive measures were taken in the technical fields of:

- Alerting and warning,
- Fire prevention and firefighting,
- Safety and Auxiliary Services,
- State level planning,
- The construction of air raid shelters,
- Camouflage, blackout activities,
- Development and proving.

The Passive Air Defense Operations Staff was mobile, and the Chief was responsible to the Chief of the Air Force General Staff.

The Staff maintained constant contact with the air fleets and the air district commands, and daily received direct early morning reports by telephone from the air district commands concerning all damage which had occurred, the forces committed in operations, and other particularly

50. See IV, a, 7, below.
51. See VIII, a, below.
52. See IV, b, below.
53. See VIII, a, 1, below.
54. See VIII, a, 5, below.
55. See VIII, d, 1 and 2, below.
56. See III, e, below.
important measures taken. In cases of particular importance the Staff immediately dispatched specialist personnel for on the spot investigations to gather new experience without delay and exploit it. At brief intervals the Staff issued experience reports.

The travel activities of the senior inspector and of the inspector and other officers dispatched on special missions were of the utmost importance in efforts to insure that defensive measures would keep pace with progressing offensive measures taken by the enemy. The battle front, which in this case comprised the air defense areas, armament factories, etc., probably considered these numerous visits as an exaggeration and were none too happy when, immediately after heavy attacks and the severe nervous strain they had been under in hours of command activity, they were required to answer innumerable questions and give endless explanations. On the other hand, however, every day gained in making new experience available to authorities who had not yet been directly affected served to save numerous lives and prevent the destruction of valuable property.

Attached to the Chief of the Passive Air Defense Operations Staff was a liaison officer from the Reich Commander in Chief of the SS and Chief of German Police Forces.

57. See Karl Rabe's Document Collection for specimens of Experience Reports (Erfahrungsberichte), a number of which have been included in appropriate sections of this study.
The mission of this officer was to give advice on matters concerning the Air Defense Police, and he was consulted prior to the issue of any decrees in this field.

2. The Air Force Operations Staff (Luftwaffe/stab). Within the Air Force Operations Staff passive air defense matters were handled by the Antiaircraft Operations Section (Gruppe Flak op 2) in addition to that section's other responsibilities. This section was responsible to the Chief of the Air Force Operations Staff and processed the orders, instructions, and regulations required for the direction of passive air defense activities.

The following is intended as a brief review of command activities in the field of passive air defense showing how it developed during the war, and how it came to be recognized as a necessity due to suggestions and recommendations submitted by the Inspector of Passive Air Defense Services and the Chief of the Passive Air Defense Operations Staff.

Owing to the precautionary arrangements made and measures taken by Air Force Inspectorate 13 and the Passive Air Defense Operations Staff, the work involved was initially insignificant and could be handled by the Antiaircraft Operations Section of the Air Force Operations Staff in addition to its other responsibilities. However, this situation...
changed considerably with increasing enemy air activities at the beginning of 1943, for which reason the Chief of the Air General Force Staff ordered the establishment of a separate section within the Air Force Operations Staff to handle passive air defense command missions. The new section thus established as the Antiaircraft Operations Section 3 was responsible to the Chief of the Air Force Operations Staff. Close cooperation between this section and Air Force Inspectorate 13 and the Passive Air Defense Operations Staff made it possible to currently adapt existing orders to the requirements revealed by the latest experience gained by Air Force Inspectorate 13 in the field of action to counter damage and on the subject of newly introduced weapons of destruction on the enemy side.

The employment of the passive air defense forces was supervised by means of the daily operational reports from the air fleets. With the increasing frequency and size of enemy air attacks the Chief of the Air Force General Staff and the Inspector of Passive Air Defense Services realized that, in view of the expected increasing intensity of air warfare, the available passive air defense forces would not be adequate for successful action against any damage done in such attacks.
Requests for a reinforcement of the existing passive air defense forces were rejected regularly by the Supreme Military Command, the only measure approved being that of the activation of new smoke screening units.

For this reason, and acting on recommendations by the Passive Air Defense Operations Staff, the Chief of the Air Force General Staff in 1943 ordered the return to the German interior of the motorized passive air defense battalions stationed at the time in France. These battalions, as well as the motorized passive air defense battalions withdrawn from the Caucasus front, were assigned under the Home Air Fleet.

In spite of repeated requests, it was not possible during the war to obtain any other reinforcements for the passive air defense forces under the Home Air Fleet. In contrast, the Supreme Military Command continued to promote development of the smoke screening arm.

Following renewed tests in 1942 and the results obtained therein, and after the first successes achieved by means of smoke screening operations, the development of this arm was given a high priority throughout the rest of the war. In agreement with the Minister for Armaments and War Production the Chief of the Air Force General Staff determined which

59. See III, c, below.
60. See VIII, d. 2, below.
targets were to be assigned target screening defenses. The
targets primarily in question here were hydration works, facto-
ries manufacturing fighter planes and parts and submarines
and parts, bridges, valley dams, and viaducts. Smoke screening
concentrations were developed at certain industrial works,
where smoke was the primary and antiaircraft artillery the
secondary factor of defense. As a rule such smoke-screening
concentration areas were only assigned light antiaircraft
batteries and barrage balloons as additional defenses.

However, development of the smoke-screening army also
soon reached the limits imposed by the lack of personnel and
by inadequate smoke producing acids. The Command of the Pas-
sive Air Defense Services succeeded in alleviating the man-
power shortage by recruiting women and Russian auxiliaries
to service the smoke producing equipment, but it remained im-
possible to remedy the shortage in smoke producing acids be-
cause the Supreme Military Command awarded the Navy priority
for all such supplies.

Although the supply of smoke producing acids to the units
was a responsibility of the Chief of Supply and Administration
the Chief of the Air Force General Staff required the Passive
Air Defense Section (Anti aircraft Artillery Operations Section
3) to exert constant efforts to insure such supplies to the
smoke-screening units. This resulted in friction with the
Footnotes 61: See page 62.
Supreme Military Command without doing anything to remedy the situation.

In consequence of the continuous daylight attacks by American air forces, followed by night attacks by British forces, the use of smoke producing acids increased to such an extent that in the autumn of 1943 the field units on an average had available only enough at their positions for one or at the most for two missions. Consequently, smoke screening operations had to cease during continuous attacks, and this in turn led to complaints against the alleged failure of the Air Force in its mission.

Added to the increasingly evident shortage of passive air defense forces within the zone of interior came requests from the territories under German protection for support. Protection of the oilfields in Rumania was an urgent necessity. One of the measures taken here was that of the transfer to Rumania of one of the motorized passive air defense brigades and one smoke screening battalion, units which were so badly needed in the zone of interior.

61. The employment of women in the smoke screening service was contrary to the principles ruling in the Passive Air Defense Operations Staff. The Staff rejected the idea of exposing women defenseless to the secondary hazards of the smoke screening apparatus, against which there was no protection, while the male working personnel at the target were sent into air raid shelters. Pursuant to orders from the Chief of the Air Force General Staff to activate a smoke-screening battalion staffed with women, one such battalion was activated at Jena. Fortunately, Jena did not come under attack before this battalion was again de-activated.
Almost without exception all units of this type were later captured by the Russians.

Protection of the Bremmer rail route created the necessity for smoke protection of the viaducts on the route, and this again led to the withdrawal of valuable smoke-screening units from the zone of interior. Urgent requests by Hungary for smoke protection of its oilfields could not be fulfilled.

From the above it becomes evident that from the outset work was duplicated in this field, which was due to the physical separation of the Passive Air Defense Operations Staff from the Air Force Operations Staff. Within his circumscribed field of responsibilities the Chief of the Passive Air Defense Operations Staff, who at the same time was Inspector of Passive Air Defense Services, issued his orders, directives, and instructions directly to all agencies concerned. In matters concerning the operations of the passive air defense forces, however, and in matters of organization and supply and administration all he could do was to recommend the appropriate measures. For this purpose he initially attached one, and later two, officers from his staff to the Air Force Operations Staff at Robinson and later at Kurfuerst Headquarters. This continued until it became necessary to establish a separate Passive Air Defense Operations Station (Gruppe 13, Op 2)
within the Air Force Operations Staff, as described above.

3. The Reorganization in 1944. As long as enemy air penetrations remained within tolerable bounds, the forces available and the technical measures taken for passive air defense were adequate. As the effectiveness of fighter and antiaircraft artillery defenses against the enemy bomber and fighter forces decreased, however, the burden on the passive air defense services increased. With inadequate means the system was called upon to fulfill impossible missions.

When air warfare reached its apex in the autumn of 1944, large area damages reached catastrophic proportions. Then at least the highest levels of command awoke to a realization of the importance of passive air defense. Now the Air Force was to be held responsible for what others had neglected to do, for measures it had allegedly not taken at the appropriate time. Nobody was willing to accept the blame for the constant rejection of the requests which had been submitted time and again for years past for a reinforcement of the passive air defense forces, for accelerated action in the construction of air raid shelters, and for the transfer and wider spacing of industrial installation which were of vital importance in the war effort.

Bitter reality had raised passive air defense to a position of highest priority in the overall air
defense requirements.

The highly deserving Inspector of Passive Air defense, who at the same time was Chief of the Passive Air Defense Operations Staff, was removed from his post. Although it was he who from the beginning and repeatedly had insisted on intensified passive air defense measures and had waged a wearing struggle with all those who rejected any such idea, his removal took place in a form which was far from honorable. This was due in no small measure to increasing friction between the armed forces and the National Socialistic Party and to the spirit of distrust among Party circles who sought a scapegoat whom they could blame for the omissions of which they themselves were not altogether innocent.

In his Position as Chief of Passive Air Defense it was unavoidable that Dr. Knipfer would come into conflict with the most widely varying agencies of the Party organizations and repeated calumnies and accusations levelled at him brought about his dismissal early in November 1944.

Orders issued in the autumn of 1944 called for a complete reorganization of passive air defense.

The important point now was to relieve the Commander in Chief of the Air Force of responsibility in all those fields

which were more of an administrative nature and which were in actual fact already handled by other central agencies or over which other authorities had continuously striven to obtain control.

For this purpose Air Force Inspectorate 13 was deactivated, some of its responsibilities were transferred to other appropriate agencies, and a new top level organization was created. After much time lost in discussions, the order to this effect was issued on 5 February 1945.

Effective immediately, Air Force Inspectorate 13 was de-together with the Passive Air Defense Operations Staff, activated and a new agency established designated Chief of Passive Air Defense. Personnel of the Passive Air Defense Operations Staff and a few from Air Force Inspectorate 13 were used to form the new agency. The new Chief of Passive Air Defense was responsible directly to the Chief of the Air Force General Staff and retained responsibility for the overall direction of German passive air defense. He was authorized to issue his directives and instructions directly to the several Reich Ministries and other central authorities. These in turn were responsible for the execution of all necessary measures within their areas of responsibility. The new Chief
of Passive Air Defense had the right of inspection only over
the passive air defense forces and the air raid alerting and
warning service. He had functional control over

The Reich Institute of the Air Force for Passive Air
Defense,

The Passive Air Defense Proving station at Ehra-
lessin,

The Passive Air Defense and Air Raid Warning Service
Training and Replacement battalions, and the schools for
women auxiliary air raid warning personnel.

The Chief of Passive Air Defense was the responsible
authority within the Supreme Military Command for all matters
of passive air defense.

This also changed the fields of authority of the Command-
ers of Air District Commands, who from then on no longer had
any authority to issue directives to authorities of the Office
of Interior Administration. This clarified relations with
the Reich Commander in Chief of the SS and Chief of German
Police Forces, who was now solely responsible for the entire
passive air defense police system.

The Reich Minister for Armaments and War Production as-
sumed responsibility for the factory air defense system.

The National Socialist Party took over the entire field
of individual passive air defense activities.

Because of the way in which the air situation was
becoming steadily more and more untenable, it was impossible for the new arrangement to produce any really effective results at this late stage, and no tactical changes occurred in the employment of forces to prevent damage. As had been the case in the past, the Air District Commands continued to furnish passive air defense troops to the local passive air defense chiefs or to the regular police. In spite of the fact that they were almost constantly in action, and in spite of heavy losses, the performances of these troops continued outstanding.

As had been the case with the Passive Air Defense Operations Staff and from 1944 on also with the entire Air Inspectorate 13, the staff of the Chief of Passive Air Defense was in mobilization type premises at Tangermuende. In early April 1945 two staff echelons were created, one for the Northern Area Command and one for the Southern Area Command of Germany. The Chief of Passive Air Defense, together with the 1st Echelon and the Air Force Operations Staff moved to the Southern Area, while the 2d Echelon remained in the Northern Area, initially in premises at the Passive Air Defense Proving Station, Ehra-Lessin.

b. Relations with the Reich Ministries. Cooperation between the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe on the one hand and the several Reich Ministries and...
the other highest level national authorities proceeded without serious friction. Tours of inspection by the Inspector of Passive Air Defense and inspections by the various air district commands revealed that the directives issued by the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe were being put into effect. Field and map exercises within the areas of responsibility of the Special Administrations also served to consolidate and simplify all passive air defense measures.

Difficulties arose only in relations with the Reich Ministry of the Interior—the Reich Command/In Chief of the SS and Chief of German Police Forces. As early as in 1937 it had become necessary to arrange a conference with the Chief of German Police Forces at a high level of control, because his agencies endeavored to inject themselves into the handling of passive air defense matters and thereby delayed a number of urgently necessary measures.

Whereas in time of peace instructions and directives of the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force were usually directed only to the Reich Commander in Chief of the SS and Chief of German Police Forces, the intermediate authorities of the Office of Interior Administration in time of war were placed under command control.

by the air district commands in terms of Annex 10 to the Mo-
obilization Plan 1, Paragraphs 3-6. As previously mentioned, the officers commanding the air district commands were even empowered to intervene in damage control activities, otherwise a responsibility of the regular police, if the air situation required.

This measure, which was essential in order to insure a uniform direction of all air defense activities and had been approved by the Supreme Military Command, was regarded by the Reich Commander in Chief of the SS and Chief of German Police Forces as an encroachment on his fields of authority. Whereas the friction encountered at the intermediate levels was merely a matter of personality clashes and could usually be smoothed out, friction at the highest levels was constant. This friction became evident immediately after the outbreak of war, when the Reich Commander in Chief of the SS and Chief of German Police Forces raised objections against the inspection activities of the Inspector of Passive Air Defense Services. Other cases of sensitiveness to interference arose when Air District Command VI stated its opinion that it would be advisable to replace a number of police officers assigned as passive air defense staff officers in certain air defense areas which had come under attack repeatedly.

66. Appendix 2.
In functional matters, for example in the case of the transfer of five police regiments in consonance with requirements of the current air situation, cooperation was smooth.

When passive air defense, commensurate with the increasing frequency and severity of bombing attacks, gained a steadily increasing importance, those agencies which in the past had adopted a wait-and-see attitude also began to take interest in passive air defense activities. A silent but bitter struggle developed at the central levels against the Air Force and the Commander in Chief, in which the problems of the rights of authority were in the foreground. In the field of "leadership of the people" the National Socialist Party demanded primacy insofar as it was necessary to approach the population (in the matter of individual defense). The Reich Commander in Chief of the SS, on the other hand, aimed at complete control of all home defenses, including the field of passive air defense.

Engaged in bitter warfare as it was at this time, the Air Force, however, was unwilling to relinquish control over some air defense, of which passive air defense was an important part.

As a result of this state of exigency, and in order to avoid basic organizational changes, which would have been

69. Ibid: "Verlegung des Luftschutzpolizeiregiments 3, 1942."
undesirable during the war, a compromise solution was found.
Under this compromise solution responsibilities were redistributed to some extent, and the forces involved were also redistributed accordingly.

Difficulties developed at a different level after establishment of the Reich Inspectorate for the Implementation of Civil Air Defense Measures (Reichsinspektion zur Durchführung ziviler Luftkriegsschutzmaßnahmen). A decree issued by the Fuehrer on 21 December 1943 appointed Dr. Goebbels, Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, to this post. Under instructions from Goebbels, Ministerialdirector Bernt carried out numerous tours of inspection. It is true that a representative of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force, from the Passive Air Defense Operations Staff, participated in these tours of inspection, but the interjection of this third authority into the field of passive air defense activities resulted in a constant overlapping of responsibilities and introduced confusion in the lower level agencies on the subject of who was responsible for what.

Reports from the new Reich Inspectorate were submitted directly to the Fuehrer together with recommendations for orders in the field of passive air defense and of damage control

71. See page 74.
All of this produced the following set of circumstances:

Although the decree by the Fuehrer appointing Goebbels stated expressly that the responsibilities of the Minister for Aviation and Commander of the Air Force in the field of passive air defense were not to be affected by the New Reich Inspectorate, the examination of the measures ordered by the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force required efforts equal to those expended in the examination of those responsibilities which had been assigned to the National Socialist Party and to the Reich Commissioners for Defense in the field of damage control activities. This system produced the following consequences:

1. It was unavoidable that the Reich Inspectorate exercised an influence on measures already ordered by the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force.

2. The information submitted to the Fuehrer at times without regard for modifications recommended by the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force, often stated recommendations and requirements affecting the organization and the preplanned control of equipment for the various air defense areas, or repeated recommendations and/or requirements long
since stated or settled by the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force. Since the allocation of equipment, and this refers particularly to firefighting vehicles, had to be adapted to manufacturing capabilities, preferential treatment of the air defense areas recently inspected logically would result in delayed allocations to other areas which were just as important.

On the other hand, the activities of the new Reich Inspectorate were highly successful in such fields as activation of the population in passive air defense activities, precautionary evacuations, the prevention of the return of evacuees to areas from which they had been removed.

In the field of building construction the Reich Inspectorate stated requirements which led the Reich Minister for Armaments and his Office for Central Planning to fear that these might have a harmful impact in the fields of factory air defense and the redistribution of manufacturing installations, so that doubts were also raised from this quarter on the advisability of injecting a new, third, authority into the field of passive air defense activities.

Of basic significance were the difficulties resulting from participation by the National Socialist Party in the program of passive air defense. Having the mission of guiding and influencing the general public, the Party endeavored to gain control over the Reich Passive Air Defense Association which, as an organ of the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force, had the mission of educating and training the public in passive air defense and in self protection. By means of severe and at times illogical criticism, particularly by the Totaleiter (Provincial Governors appointed from Party members), the various Air Force commands from the level of the airdistrict commands to the level of the air Fleet headquarters were discredited continuously and in a steadily growing degree in what were called justification reports. What was of grave concern here was the fact that the reports compiled by the Gauleiters while they were still under the impression of large-scale attacks were forwarded directly to the Fuehrer and thus came to his attention sooner than did the properly checked reports sent in by the Air Force Operations Staff. One consequence of this was that effort had to expended continuously in answering and refuting charges on matters such as the alleged failure of the warning system,
inadequate smoke-screening, inadequate or too brief assign-
ment of passive air defense forces, or the inadequacy of dis-
persion and evacuation measures taken. The real causes for
any flaws in the system were intentionally disregarded: In
view of the continuous penetrations by enemy air units and
because of the reduced time required by such units for the
approach route it was not always possible to insure perfect
functioning and timing of the warning system. Furthermore, the
passive air defense forces available were nowhere near adequate
to cope with their missions in the newly created damage areas
which increased in size and number by the day. Efforts to
move passive air defense forces from one damage area to anoth-
er more speedily failed because whole sections of the rail
routes were sometimes destroyed, road movements were delayed
because the roads were blocked by masses of refugees, and
the increasingly severe shortage of motor fuel complicated
all road movements.

The Gauleiter of Hannover, for example, demanded that
the warning detachments should be placed under his command,
others insisted that they could carry out damage control mis-
sions more speedily and more successfully if the motorized
passive air defense battalions were assigned under them.

A result of the latter demand above was that the Reich
Marshal, failing to realize the significant importance of
and the necessity for the presence of the motorized passive
air defense battalions for damage control action within the
vitally important industrial installations still in existence,
ordered transfer of the battalions to the Reich Commander in
Chief of the SS. At the last moment the Chief of the Air
General Staff Force succeeded in having this order rescinded, but only after
the passive air defense command authorities had wasted such
time in transfer negotiations with the Reich Commander in
Chief of the SS.

On the other hand, no objections were raised when the
Reich Passive Air Defense Association, and thereby the whole
field of individual air defense, towards the end of the war
was placed under control by the National Socialist Party.

This measure really relieved the strain on the Reich Minister
for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force, who was
overburdened with missions in the field of passive air defense.

Nevertheless, it introduced added complications, since the
Gauleiters now proceeded to expand their command posts and to
compile their own interpretation of current air situations
and keep the public informed by means of radio broadcasts
concerning developments in the air situation. This led to
an overlapping of functions with the Air Raid Warning Services
the air reports broadcast by radio frequently disguised the
73. See IV, c. 1, below.
public needlessly and afforded the approaching enemy forces undesired information on the extent to which their penetrations over Germany were detected and tracked.


RESPONSIBILITY FOR PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE IN THE HOME THEATER OF OPERATIONS

Initially the Air Region Commands were responsible for the mission of passive air defense in the zone of interior. During later developments, these headquarters became air fleet headquarters.

Air defense in general was the responsibility, in the zone of interior, of the Commanding General, Air Forces Center (Luftwaffenbefehlshaber Mitte), later designated

1. Commanding General, Home Air Fleet, under General (Generalfeldmarschall) Weise, and later under General Stumpf. Within this headquarters the Passive Air defense Section (Ia Op. 3) handled all missions of passive air defense. This section was organized as follows:

   Section Chief
   (With right of personal report to the Air Fleet Chief of Staff and Commanding General)

   Sub-Section 1: Operational and organizational problems

   Sub-Section 2: Operations of the Passive Air Defense forces

   Sub-Section 3: Air Raid Warning Service

74. Appendix 4: Top level wartime organization of passive air defense in zone of interior.
Sub-Section 4: Camouflage, dummy installations

Sub-Section 5: Building Construction Problems.

The missions of the Passive Air Defense Section comprised:

a. Disposition of units of the passive air forces, meaning their allocation among the various air district commands in consonance with the current air situation.

b. Operations and continuous expansion of camouflage installations.

c. Inspection and expansion of dummy installations.

d. Protection for valley dams and bridges.

e. Supervision and support of training standards of all passive air support forces, particularly the regular units and the several services of passive air defense.

f. Development of the smoke-screening arm.

g. Continuous inspection and supervision of the air raid alerting and warning services.

h. Expansion and development of the factory air defense system.

i. Dispersion and widely spaced storage of vitally important raw materials and other commodities otherwise usually stored in concentration.

j. Supervision of passive air defense building construction activities.

k. Supervision of passive air defense in installations of the armed forces.

l. Employment of passive air defense units of the Chief of Regular Police, over which the Section had tactical control.
m. Processing of experience reports received from subordinate agencies.

n. Command exploitation of the experience reported by Air Force Inspectorate 13 of the Reich Air Ministry.

Air Force Headquarters Center, and later the Home Air Fleet, had the authority to convince itself, by means of inspection, of the state of preparedness for passive air defense at all targets, and practiced this right of inspection in its relations with all military and civilian authorities. Usually the Commanding General delegated these missions to the air district commands under his command, and confined himself to inspecting only the most important targets for defense against air attack, placing main emphasis in his activities on the removal of organizational difficulties, which naturally developed in the civilian field from the impact of the passive air defense requirements.

The Chief, Passive Air Defense Branch (JA op. 3) was assigned an airplane to enable him to consult on the spot with the appropriate air district command, chief of uniformed police, local passive air defense chiefs, and factory defense chiefs immediately after each large-scale attack in order to be able to gather the latest experience.

In order to be able to check the camouflage measures at industrial installations, and the efficacy of blackout and smoke-screening measures, the Commanding General,
Air Force Headquarters Center, and later the Commanding General, Home Air Fleet, had available an anchored-balloon battery taken over from the Army for this purpose. With appropriate equipment, including an iconoscope (glißwender), this balloon battery was dispatched from target to target and at the cost of relatively small expenditures produced valuable data. Thus, the battery was able continuously to recommend camouflage improvements, to detect weaknesses in black-out measures, and to develop tactical data for the use of smoke on the ground. With the increased frequency of enemy penetrations, particularly at night, it became impossible to employ the balloon battery except in distant areas. In other areas the mission of checking the efficacy of measures had to be taken over by powered aircraft with photographic equipment.

When the American bomber forces commenced their daylight attacks and the British bombers stepped up their night operations, command activities in the field of damage control entered a new phase. In spite of frequently repeated requests all measures to reinforce the passive air defense forces, including blasting detachments, had been rejected. Hitherto the units of the passive air defense troops had been employed in concentration, but now it became necessary to distribute them throughout Germany, since there were no longer any areas which could be considered safe against the threat of air attack.
The Home Air Fleet now had the task of moving passive air defense units in time to/in which large-scale damages were currently to be expected. At the air fleet command post all reports converged concerning XX/XX take off of enemy bomber forces and their movements to assembly areas, as well as all reports from secret agents concerning presumed target areas and concerning enemy reconnaissance activities. With due regard to meteorological conditions, it was therefore possible to predict with a high degree of probability the targets which would come under concentrated attack. Alerted well ahead of time, the passive air defense units in the air fleet headquarters were therefore moved forward, in the direction of the assumed areas to be taken under attack, while the enemy forces were still on the approach flight. Since these units could at all times be contacted by radio it was possible to redirect them without any serious loss of time if any change of route by the approaching enemy bomber force made this necessary. The units moved at the fastest pace possible, using the Autobahn superhighways whenever possible, and were assigned temporarily to the air district involved with instructions to pull them out of action as soon as possible after they had accomplished their mission of damage control.

In order to provide passive air defense troops for the areas thus temporarily stripped, units from distant areas had
to be moved forward. In such cases it was usually necessary for the Home Air Fleet to use forces of the Commander of the Regular Police, over which it had tactical command authority. The forces thus involved comprised well equipped fire protection police regiments, units of the passive air defense police forces—some of them motorized, and non-motorized passive air defense units, which were moved to their temporary areas by truck companies of the Air Force. All units thus temporarily moved into an area had to be released for return to their posts immediately when it became certain that large-area fires and fire storms were no longer to be expected and that the local passive air defense units were adequate to handle the continued mission of firefighting and of rescuing any persons who might be buried under debris.

Cooperation with the Chief of German Police Forces and with the Commanders of Regular Police functioned smoothly.

As early as in 1942 it became necessary to issue a decree circumscribing the authority and responsibilities of all agencies involved. This decree established that sole responsibility for passive air defense within the zone of interior was vested in the Commanding General, Air Force Headquarters Center and the air district commands under his command. The authority of the National Socialist Party was to be restricted to public guidance and welfare work. Locally responsible for
all measures to remedy conditions of emergency in the fields of welfare and economic distress, and caused by air attack, were the local Reich Defense Commissioners (Reichsverband
-Hilfsaufgabensteher), which were staffs operating under the various Gaue (provinces or districts). In carrying out these missions these staffs were to refrain from any interference in the passive air defense activities of the local Commander of Regular Police or of the local passive air defense chiefs.

In the field of reporting, orders stipulated that all reports on damage resulting from air attacks were to be subject to concurrence by the air district commands concerned before being forwarded. Due to frequent cases of regrettable exaggerated eagerness to be the first, this order was often not adhered to, and the resultant dual reporting gave rise to unpleasant and time-consuming investigations.

Care of the constantly overburdened passive air defense troops required constant very close attention (supplementary rations, decorations, and expressions of appreciation).

2. **Air District Commands.** Each air district command was the executive and responsible agency required to insure proper implementation of all passive air defense measures within its command area. They were the central organs for all

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topfleimen," Archiv des Reichsbahnhofs des Grossdeutschen
Reichs - O. G. E. Arbeitsstab LS Nr. 3344/42 (1 1 A) v. 17. 12. 1942. (See Appendix 7).
organizational preparations and particularly so for the direction of all damage control operations during and after air attacks.

Each air district headquarters staff included a Passive Air Defense Branch with an organization identical to that of the Passive Air Defense Branch at headquarters of the Home Air Fleet and with the right of direct report. In close cooperation with the Commanders of Regular Police, the intermediate level agencies of the "Sepcial Administrations," the regional offices of the Reich Board of Industries, the regional groups of the Reich Passive Air Defense Association, and the various offices of the three branches of the military forces, this branch supervised and inspected all measures taken in the various fields of passive air defense pursuant to the directives issued by the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force, and pursuant to its own stated requirements.

One of the important missions of the air district commander and his Passive Air Defense Branch was that of the allocation and operations of units of the Passive air defense forces.

Motorized Passive Air Defense Battalions were available

75. See III, a, and a, 1, above.
77. See IV, f, and f, 1, below.
to each air district headquarters in a number commensurate with the current air situation. For the proper allocation of these forces it was of incisive importance to recognize accurately and above all in time what the current situation in regard to enemy penetrations was, and to estimate correctly the damage situation which would develop or had already developed. For this reason the Chief of the passive air defense branch of Air District Command III (Berlin), for example, established a command post adjacent to that of the air district command. This special command post had all the technical equipment required, for example an illuminated map with the standard fighter grid, and good signal communication facilities, and was manned when enemy aircraft were reported to have penetrated the German defenses. The command post was excellently equipped and proved highly useful in every respect during the large-scale attacks against Berlin. Direct wire communications were available with the fighter and antiaircraft artillery divisions, with the air raid warning center, with the Commander of Regular Police and the local Chief of Passive Air Defense for Berlin, and with other important centers including the Railway Passive Air Defense Center. Furthermore, the command post was linked up with the trunk line, generally known as the Conference Line, connecting the various Commanders of Regular Police, and the Armed Forces-Police-Industry teletype network, so that the beat 76. See Sketch in Appendix C.
possibilities conceivable existed to gather information on all factors of importance for the development of decisions. In addition to the above, the command post had radio channels to the passive air defense units under its control.

These units the air district headquarters dispatched in good time following the principles described previously for the Home Air Fleet, and for the duration of the current mission assigned them tactically to the local passive air defense chief concerned, who received them through his directing posts.

The information which could be gathered from the observation tower concerning the overall damage situation was no longer adequate in the case of large-scale annihilation attacks. As an experiment, Air District Command therefore resorted to the method of directing large-scale passive air defense operations by means of voice radio from a type Fieseler-Storch liaison plane. From the plane it was possible to clearly recognize large damaged areas and to take timely steps to guide the damage control and rescue forces approaching to their respective areas.

In the case of passive air defense operations involving the dispatch of units to Stettin, Magdeburg, and Leipzig, a liaison plane was also used to guide the approaching units by voice radio messages to their areas.

79. See III, c, 1, above.
It is necessary to emphasize here that in modern warfare successful employment of passive air defense forces in mobile units is only possible if the units involved are fully equipped with radio instruments.

Damage control operations were, and will be in the future, a race against time. The controlling organs, and particularly the air district commands, could not afford to wait until they received requests for reinforcements. They had to act on their own initiative in order to insure that damage would be brought under control as speedily as possible and in order to create conditions which would make it possible to prevent the spread of large fires and their development into areal holocausts. As soon as the air district command in question realized that a large-scale attack which would probably result in large damage areas was imminent, it had to take immediate action and dispatch in the direction of the probable target all passive air defense forces available on the spot and all other such forces which could be moved in from elsewhere. In all cases where this principle was observed, and in this respect the direction of operations by Air District Command III in cooperation with the Commanders of Regular Police concerned was exemplary, it almost always proved possible to prevent the development of large areal fires and fire storms.
The commitment of smoke-screening battalions necessitated exceedingly careful preparations, since the decisive factor in smoke-screening operations was the area and the density of the smoke cover. Meteorological conditions played an important role not only in the initial placing of the smoke projectors but also in the tactical direction of the actual smoke-screening operations. Since the equipment required had to be placed in positions widely distributed in the area to be protected, the personnel involved had to be billeted in separate groups, which was not always a simple matter.

To operate the numerous dummy installations constructed, each air district command had Special Purposes Passive Air Defense Battalions (Luftschutzabteilungen zur Besonderen Verwendung). Owing to the density of population in Germany it became increasingly difficult to find areas suitable for the construction of dummy installations.

The list included as an appendix to this study shows the dummy installations operated in the command area of Air District Command III. The nature of these installations, and the results achieved with them, is described in a later chapter on the subject of the operations of dummy installations.

80. See R imperial, VIII, d, 2, below.
81. Appendix 9; also see Karlsruhe Document Collection: "Stellung anlagen (S-Anlagen) im Bereich LGK III/IV 1942" neb st Skizzen.
82. See VIII, d, 3, below.
Field agencies of the Passive Air Defense Branch.

In areas comprising regions with dense concentrations of industry and which were densely populated, field agencies of the Passive Air Defense Branch were established at the beginning of the war. These field agencies had the following missions:

To supervise passive air defense measures in military installations;

To check and inspect factory air defense measures in cooperation with regional and/or district agencies of the Reich Board of Industries;

To determine damage inflicted by air attack within military installations and installations of the armament industries, and to report to the air district command on the subject.

Field agencies of the Passive Air Defense Branch, acting as organs of the air district command concerned, were located as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In the command area of</th>
<th>At</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air District Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI (Muenster)</td>
<td>Cologne, Ratingen near Dusseldorf, and Paderborn.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI (Hamburg)</td>
<td>Bremen, Kiel, Hannover, Wismar. The command also had a field agency at Aarhus, in Denmark, which operated under special circumstances.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
cooperated closely with the Danish passive air defense services as an advisory but at the same time supervisory organ. Whereas civil air defense in Denmark was controlled by the Danish authorities, passive air defense for the military and for the armament industries, and this applied particularly to such subjects as air raid warning, camouflage, and dummy installations, was handled by German authorities. The executive organ for this purpose was the Aarhus Field Agency. While generally under the command of the CC, German Air Forces in Denmark, it received its functional instructions in matters of passive air defense from Air District Command XI.

III (Berlin)    Dresden
XII/XIII (Wiesbaden)    Nuremberg.

Each field agency was headed by a staff officer, who was assigned between two and four assistant officers according to the size and importance of his area.

The establishment of field agencies proved a very sound measure. The very presence of these agencies and the constant tours of inspection conducted by their personnel served to intensify action by those responsible in the execution of their
passive air defense missions. The inspecting officers were
completely conversant with the structure of their respective
areas and, by reason of their experience, were in a position
to recommend improvements in the various fields involved, for
which reason they were considered very welcome advisors by
many of the installations inspected.


The missions of the police forces evolved logically from the
historical development of the German passive air defense ser-
vices.

Initially, the intention had been to assign the police
forces and their controlling authorities only locally circums-
scribed or at the most regionally delimited missions in passive
air defense. The local commanding officer of police, as the lo-
cal passive air defense chief, was responsible for development
of the entire passive air defense system within his area; he
was responsible for direction of the local passive air defense
forces. For operations outside of his area he was required to
maintain special units, the commitment of which was ordered
by the air district command whenever necessary. The air dist-
trict command gave its instructions to the appropriate agencies
of the Office for Interior Administration.

The chain of command thus established was tried out in
53. Marisfrueh Document Collection: "Die Kriegsherr PoZellotl-
von Jacob, im Sammelwerk Knipfer-Hampe: der Zivile Luft-
field and map exercises. Difficulties developed later, when the police forces were reorganized and the posts of "Inspector of Regular Police" were converted to posts of "Commander of Regular Police." The police remained under command of the officer in command of the appropriate air district command in matters of the direction of passive air defense matters, although the Chief of Regular Police had command authority over the regional Commanders of Regular Police in other matters. This duality of control necessarily resulted in contro-

An important mission which developed for the police forces was that of insuring secure signal communications for the direction of passive air defense activities in the air defense areas, and this was particularly the case in industrial re-

gions threatened by air attack. It was absolutely essential to insure the speedy and secure transmission of reports and orders, and this applied to the use of telephone, teletype, and radio installations. All such installations, unless mobile, had to be in premises which at least were safe against damage by falling debris or by bomb or other fragments. A very special problem was that of communication lines with guards on observation towers. In the large cities the wire

84. See III, b.
lines terminated in loud speakers mounted in the command posts, which insured thorough and continuous orientation during air attacks. In large regions, such as the Rhein-Ruhr region, Berlin, and later also Hamburg, the police developed an interconnected telephone network. During times of acute air threat the lines were linked up in a manner which insured that each command post had a connection with microphone and loud speaker.

The police service teletype network, which was equipped for two-way communications, played an important role in the speedy transmission of reports and orders.

Radio channels were of importance particularly for the transmission of instructions to the directing stations and to passive air defense units while en route.

On the whole the wire communication networks survived the air attacks in a good condition, with only local interferences in many cases occurring. Although inadequately protected, the other technical equipment for the most part remained undamaged.

COMMANDERS OF REGULAR POLICE

At the intermediate level of command, the commanders of regular police were responsible for the supervision, training, control, and operations of the passive air defense forces. To handle these responsibilities each commander of regular police established special staffs, command posts, and alternate command.
posts. These command posts were well equipped with signal
communication facilities and had lists showing all units of
the Passive Air Defense Police within their areas, together
with the details necessary for their commitment outside of
their areas; in addition, each such command post had maps of
all air defense areas in the command, showing the locality of
directing posts.

The air defense district headquarters commanders cooperated
with the commanders of regular police by advising them, on
their own initiative, passive air defense forces whenever an
air attack seemed imminent, and by taking measures to secure
for them military auxiliary detachments immediately after an
air attack.

In the Rhein-Westphalia industrial region it was nothing
unusual for up to eighty or even ninety of the available
fightertowing and medical teams to be absent on operations
outside of their home areas. In order to make such large-scale
operations possible, the commanders of regular police organized
special operations staffs, which included specialist personnel,
and gave them appropriate training in their passive air defense
officer schools.

The commanders of regular police also found themselves
on the defensive against encroachments by the Gauleiters, who
87. See IV, b, below. 88. See III, c, 3, below.
89. See III, c, 2, above.
90. Erhard Gruene Document Collection: Schmiede: „Erfahrungen bei
den Luftangriffen im 2. Weltkrieg im Rheinisch-Westfäl-
ischen Industriengebiet“, p. 36.
endeavored to interject themselves into the control of the passive air defense system. However, the Gauleiters were successfully restricted to their own specific passive air defense missions, namely, those of managing welfare and evacuation problems involving the civilian population.

The commanders of regular police proved fully equal to their responsibilities and, because of the availability to them of a police officer corps with thorough training in the subject of command, were able to master their problems, which in many cases were exceedingly difficult and highly diversified.

It appears necessary to stress here once again that the police are the only body which can be suitable for missions of the type dealt with here, which require very speedy decisions, since the police are thoroughly conversant with all features of their respective areas and by reason of their normal duties must have available a corps of police officers trained to control and direct their units. What other administrative body is there in existence which has a similar organization? What other organized body can exercise the same authority, particularly in view of the fact that police units will always have to be employed during damage control activities to close off areas and to prevent plundering?

91. See IV, 1 and IV, m, below.
LOCAL PASSIVE AIR DEFENSE CHIEFS

Each local passive air defense chief had under his control the Safety and Auxiliary, and later also Passive Air Defense Police forces shown in the table of organization. This table of organization applied not only for air defense areas of Category I, but also for those of Category II and Category III.

Initially, the command post of the local passive air defense chief as a rule was established in the basement of the local police headquarters or of the local police administration premises. Too little attention was given to the selection of a proper location for these command posts. During the war it became evident, however, that the locality of the command post was the decisive factor for the direction of passive air defense activities within the command area concerned. In some cases passive air defense command posts became neutralized during air attacks because they were surrounded by fires, in other cases they were rendered incapable of action because the debris blocking roads made them inaccessible.

Each local passive air defense chief within his area commanded the forces and installations of the Safety and Auxiliary Service (First Draft), and later of the Passive Air Defense Police, as well as the Safety and Auxiliary (II and III draft), and later of the Passive Air Defense Guard.

92. Appendix 10. 93. See III, c, 4, below.
95. See III, c, 4, below. 96. See III, c, 5, below.
The forces described above were distributed among the passive air defense group and sector headquarters, with the proviso that the local passive air defense chief retained certain units under his own direct control as a local reserve and other units which he was required to hold available as a mobile reserve for commitment outside of his area.

4. Organization of His Air Defense Zones. Initially, these were divided into Category I, Category II, and Category III Passive Air Defense Zones. The deciding point as to in which category a town or an industrial center was to be placed was the degree of sensitivity to air attack and the degree of the air threat.

Due to the limited funds available, the shortage of raw materials from the very outset, and the initially secondary consideration given to the subject of passive air defense, it was not possible to take the steps which would have been necessary in the fields of increased personnel, equipment, and the construction of air raid shelters. Therefore all measures taken were based on the concentrated effort principle, and those areas which could be considered as probably most seriously exposed to air attack were placed in Category I, for all priority allocations.

The localities thus designated as Category I were selected in agreement with the Supreme Military Command, the Ministry
Ministry for Economy, the Ministry for Traffic and Communications, and the Ministry for the Interior.

The same principle was applied in deciding the problem of antiaircraft artillery protection for the primarily threatened areas.

In these matters close cooperation took place with the Air Defense Target Registry (Luftschutzmelderegister).

In passive air defense localities of Category I the Safety and Auxiliary Service, the individual protection Service, and the extended individual protection service, as well as the factory air defense system were fully organized. The Safety and Auxiliary Service received personnel reinforcements and supplementary equipment (Safety and Auxiliary Services Class I——Hilfshilfe und Hilfsplan Nr. I. Urkunde).

In passive air defense localities of Category II only measures taken were to place the national, communal, and other installations existing already during peace under control by the local passive air defense chief, and to organize them accordingly (Safety and Auxiliary Services Class II). The factory air defense, individual protection, and extended individual protection systems were put into effect in the same manner as in Category I localities.

In passive air defense localities of Category III, meaning all not included in Category I or Category II, the existing
peacetime national, communal, and other installations were required to be made available for the purposes of civilian air defense activities (Safety and Auxiliary Services Class III).

No special command and control organization was established. Operations were conducted on the basis of catastrophe protection. The factory air defense, individual protection, and extended individual protection systems were put into effect in the same manner as in Category II localities.

The number of passive air defense localities listed as Category I was 106.

The number listed as Category II was 161.

Of those classified as Category II, 24 were listed for classification as DANGER Group I. In the first years of the war this classification proved sound. Consonant with the penetration capabilities of aircraft in those days, the areas of Central Germany had been given only secondary consideration after the western and northwestern areas, and consequently were not as well developed and equipped for passive air defense. Reclassification measures ordered later produced results which were only partially satisfactory, and this applied particularly to the construction of air raid shelters, a matter of primary importance.

97. See Special Annex 10 to Mobilization Plan (Air), Items 10-12 and Appendixes E, C, and D, in Appendix 2 to this study.
With the reorganization of the Safety and Auxiliary Service and the assignment of that service under the Reich Commander in Chief of the SS and Chief of German Police, the designation of Passive Air Defense Area (or Locality) Category I, II, or III was discontinued.

Those in Category I were now designated Passive Air Defense Localities with Passive Air Defense Police (Laffechnutzungs localized mit Luftschutzpolizei), those in Category II and Category III as Passive Air Defense Localities without Passive Air Defense Police. There was no organizational differentiation between these two types of localities or areas. The existing governmental, communal, and other installations placed under uniform control by the Chief of Local Passive Air Defense were now designated "Passive Air Defense Guards." "Laffechnutzungs lokalität."


In terms of the Annex the local chief of passive air defense was responsible for the uniform direction of and for cooperation between the several elements of the passive air

99. Appendix II.
defense services with the primary mission of taking steps to bring public and economic activities back to normal as speedily as possible after an air attack.

If necessary, the local chief of passive air defense was to request support in good time from adjacent areas, was to commit military auxiliary detachments and, through the appropriate commander of regular police (Air District Command), was to request support by mobile forces from outside his area. In localities which had no remote control major alert installations, the local chief of passive air defense was required to order the sounding of the alert and of the all-clear signal.

A precise knowledge of local circumstances was of primary importance for a sound appraisal of the current situation and for the making of sound decisions. Buildings and other installations which were of vital importance for the war effort inspected and or for other reasons were to be registered systematically as part of the local familiarization program and in agreement with the appropriate authorities, and the necessary measures for their protection were to be integrated into the local air raid protection plan.

For the channeling of orders principles had been established which corresponded to those used by field troops in tactical action.

In view of the large number of specialized terms and IUC. See Paragraphs 23-28, previously referred to.
designations used in passive air defense activities it became necessary to establish certain concepts in order to avoid misunderstandings in the various branches, particularly during operations. This was done for the last time on 31 May 1944 by a decree of the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force, through Air Force inspectorate 101.

All offices and other installations of agencies within the passive air defense locality which were required to carry out their own protective measures, received instructions to maintain contact with the local passive air defense command or its subordinate agencies.

Air Force Field Manual 751/1 (L. Dw. 751/1) also contained instructions on the chain of command in directing the operations of forces moved in from outside areas and on the manning of directing points. The tactical symbols used in the passive air defense services were contained in Air Force Field Manual L. Dw. 751/3. In practice the commander of security police, as an organ of the local Chief of Police Administration or of the chief mayor exercised command control.

Whenever necessary the staff under the local chief of passive air defense could include representatives from the 101. Appendix 12: "Bestimmungen im Luftschutz," Ab. H. 24.

"Special Administrations," the National Socialist Party, the local agency of the factory air defense system, and the Reich Passive Air Defense Association, as well as liaison officers from the military forces.

In large localities proclaimed as passive air defense localities, the city area was subdivided into what were called passive air defense groups. The staffs of these groups were appropriately manned under control by the local police group commander.

It was the passive air defense sector commands, under the local police sector commanders, which bore the brunt of all passive air defense activities. The main missions of a sector command were to recognize the main danger points, to commit its forces appropriately, to order roads or areas blocked off and/or evacuated, and to insure proper rotation of personnel in action, proper food supplies, and a proper balance of forces.

The passive air defense precinct, which usually corresponded in area to the appropriate police precinct, had the following missions: to clear of traffic busy streets and squares; to guard and close off damage areas; to take damage control action with its assigned forces; and to collect persons who had become homeless.
In operations it was of paramount importance to avoid any
dispersal of forces and effort. Operations were to commence
even while the attack was still in process and without regard
for its probable duration. The general rule was to first dis-
patch detachments held under immediate alert to inspect the
damage area and take initial action to extinguish fires.
Larger firefighting forces were then dispatched as the situation
required and permitted. In the case of damage which involved
serious hazards for the general public, damage control action
with strong forces was to commence immediately without regard
for the possibility that such action might ultimately turn
out to have been premature.

Air observers were to be posted to warn forces in opera-
tion of special dangers. To insure timely recognition of the
size of an attack and a proper appraisal of the situation it
was absolutely essential to have adequate numbers of good
obervers on towers. The practice proved sound of assigning
a particularly suitable officer as a chief tower observer.
Plugged in to the ring telephone line this officer could from
his post on a tower to some extent direct the activities of
the other tower observers, who as a matter of principle should
always be posted in pairs.

It was naturally not possible to assign each passive air
defense locality such strong forces from the beginning that it would have enough even for action to counter the effects of large-scale attacks. As soon as it was possible to assume or to recognize the target penetrating enemy forces intended attacking, the appropriate commander of regular police, from his local reserve, dispatched passive air defense police to the appropriate directing points; at the same time the air district command dispatched an appropriate number of motorized passive air defense battalions from his passive air defense force.

The Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force had ordered the establishment of directing posts at an early stage, a measure which proved sound in every respect. It proved exceedingly difficult to always have an adequate number of personnel stationed at these directing posts, particularly during periods of repeat attacks. Another difficulty, and this applied especially to the personnel acting as guides, was to keep them constantly informed on impassable sections of roads. It was at these directing posts that arriving units were assigned their areas of operations and received their orders, and without them it would have proved impossible to avoid delays and consequent heavy loss of time.
It would have been necessary, however, to furnish better voice radio equipment to all command posts, all mobile units of the passive air defense police, all tower observation guards, and above all to all traffic guide posts. Having better communication equipment than the other units, the motorized passive air defense battalions of the air district commands usually reached their areas of operations sooner than those dispatched by the commanders of regular police.

In each passive air defense locality the preparations already made and the measures to still be taken were consolidated already during peace in a passive air defense plan. A specimen plan had been issued by the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force to serve as a pattern. The plan comprised town maps; maps showing the location of utility supply lines; special danger points; the organization of the factory air defense system, of the special administrations, and of the individual protection systems; the locality of each command post and its communications lines; the locality and nature of fixed installations, billets and quarters and shelters, observation towers, traffic guide posts, fire hydrants, etc. Careful measures were necessary in industrial towns to regulate the problem of changing shifts. Where a number of industrial installations were
closely massed, thousands of workers would be on the streets at certain hours, for all of whom the space available in the existing public shelters under no circumstances would have sufficed. Under instructions from the local chief of passive air defense, the factories in such towns were therefore required to coordinate the times at which they changed shifts.

Chemical factories, as an example, represented very grave sources of secondary hazards, and appropriate protective measures had to be taken in their neighborhood.

Finally, directing and collecting points had to be prepared for persons who had lost their homes and at which they could be taken care of by the National Socialist Welfare Organization (Nationalsoziditatsamt).

The sequence of action by a local passive air defense chief when approaching enemy air forces were reported was more or less as follows:

a. First Measures Taken. The command post was at all times occupied by an official at his telephone. When enemy planes were reported to have penetrated German defenses, the appropriate warning detachment transmitted continuous messages to the command post giving the course, type, and strength of the enemy units by telephone.

103. See IV, e, 2, below. 104. See IV, e, 4, aa, below.
At the command post the course of the approaching enemy forces was tracked by means of entries posted on a map.

If it seemed possible that the approaching enemy forces would attack or pass over the passive air defense locality, the command post was occupied by the following personnel:

- the local passive air defense chief and his staff;
- the local chief of fire fighting services;
- the local chief of salvage and repair services;
- the local chief of medical services;
- a representative of the municipality;
- ranking specialists from the utility services;
- motorcyclists and messengers.

As soon as it appeared from the approach route of the enemy forces that an attack was to be expected, the local chief of passive air defense ordered the alert for all passive air defense forces, observation towers, and directing and guiding posts. The ring telephone lines to the observation towers, comprised police sectors (of which there were between 5 and 7 police precincts each), and the commander of regular police were plugged in. When the enemy planes reached the warning perimeter the local passive air defense chief, in towns with antiaircraft artillery defenses under instructions from the local commanding
officer of antiaircraft forces, ordered sounding of the air
raid warning for the civilian population.

(b) **Mission of the Local Passive Air Defense Chief dur-
ing the Attack.** The warning perimeter was approximately ten mi-

nutes flying distance from outer borders of the town, and after
the enemy forces had crossed this line and the air raid warning
had been sounded the local passive air defense chief, besides
continuing orientation by the warning detachment, received
information from his observation tower observers concerning
the action of the enemy aircraft. Usually these messages,
which came in over the ring telephone line, stated the number
of aircraft involved (which at night was estimated by sound),
their course, their light signals, bombings and the types of
bombs used (incendiary, air mines, or demolition bombs). The
observation towers were so located that each town sector could
be kept under observation from two different directions. The
reported
observers on these towers by the orientation clock (**Plata-
mada**). This method made it possible at the command post to
determine quickly and accurately by the point of intersection
system the point at which bombs had landed. The police pre-
cinct office in the area affected immediately dispatched a
patrol to the point to determine the damage done. The pre-
cinct office then immediately reported the nature and scope
of the damage to the local passive air defense chief, who
was thus in possession of the facts, within the shortest possible space of time, concerning the scope and location of the damage. It was thus possible without any appreciable loss of time to dispatch suitable passive air defense forces to the damaged area.

For proper commitment of the passive air defense forces it was of inelastic importance to determine the size of the attacking enemy force as early as possible, and to remain posted on any other enemy forces which might follow up the initial attack. If only one enemy force was involved without any other forces to follow up the attack the local passive air defense chief could commit his forces immediately. According to the locality of the damage areas and the situation there he was able to dispatch large forces to the main areas of damage and smaller forces to the others. If the air situation was such, however, that continuous attacks had to be expected, it was necessary for him to withhold his forces for dispatch to the main areas of damage which would become evident later, and to leave action against smaller incidences of damage to be taken care of by the individual protection system until support from outside could reach him.

In spite of repeated efforts to explain this to the public, it was impossible to get them to understand it, so that reproaches frequently resulted, which were completely
In damage control and rescue operations the local passive air defense chief relied exclusively on his own forces, without requesting outside support, in the case of small or medium-size attacks. In these operations he received valuable support from the individual protection system, voluntary auxiliaries (both male and female), the Red Cross Organization, and the various organizations of the National Socialist Party, such as the National Socialist Welfare Organization, the SA units, and the Hitler Youth Movement. The latter in particular rendered outstanding services as messengers during large-scale attacks, when the telephone network was disrupted.

The matter was different in the case of large-scale attacks in which large areas were damaged. In such cases support had to be requested from outside, since the forces available locally were inadequate, unless the responsible Air District Headquarters and the Commander of Regular Police had already dispatched adequate reinforcements on their own initiative.

The reinforcements involved were as follows:

Passive air defense units (motorized battalions);

Firefighting units;

Units of the salvage, repair and maintenance,
and medical services;

Blasting detachments;

Military auxiliary support detachments.

Through the ring telephone system, to which all of the category! Passive air defense localities within the command zone of the appropriate commander of regular police were plugged in, the local passive air defense chief received messages on the time of departure and size of replacements dispatched to support him and on the directing posts to which they would report. Each directing post immediately reported to the chief the arrival of each supporting unit as it arrived, so that the local chief was currently oriented on the strength of the passive air defense forces committed.

Each passive air defense chief did his utmost while the attack was still in progress to inform himself on the size of each damage area and the scope of the damage involved. In these efforts he was supported by reports from the observation towers and from the various police precincts. Damage control work frequently commenced during the attack, which was the case particularly when follow-up attack did not seem likely and when the size of the attacking enemy force was known.

For the local passive air defense chief damage control activities involved firefighting and rescue operations;
movement of the civilian population from areas on fire, which
was taken care of by locally well oriented police forces; care
of injured persons; and the commitment of blasting detachments.

In firefighting operations the most important mission
for the local passive air defense chief was to prevent the
spreading of fires and to prevent the development of large
area fires.

AFTER-ATTACK ACTIVITIES OF A LOCAL PASSIVE AIR
DEFENSE CHIEF

Actually, the major part of the work of a local passive
air defense chief only started after an attack in the case of
large-scale attacks. Then it became necessary to determine
precisely the major areas damages, the size of these areas
and the extent of the damage, and to so direct the operations
of his firefighting forces in the main areas on fire that he
could prevent the development of large-scale fires and what
were called fire storms. Outside reinforcements had to be
directed to the areas most seriously endangered; salvage and
rescue teams had to be sent to the areas where the largest
number of people were buried under debris; damaged buildings
which might collapse had to be blasted; blasting teams had
to be posted at traffic centers and within the striken areas
to protect the damage control forces working there against
the hazards of time-fuze bombs or duds; and excavators had
to be procured and employed to clear passages wherever necessary and to uncover air raid shelters which might be covered by debris.

It was self-understood that the passive air defense chief, as soon as the situation was such that he could leave his command post, proceeded to the area or areas most seriously struck, in order to direct operations on the spot, supervise the activities of the various damage control forces, and give the sorely tried population all possible assistance.

A highly important mission was that of removing the population from danger zones in time. The central areas of cities, where there were usually large numbers of very old buildings, presented a particularly serious hazard. Small fires in such areas frequently spread with alarming rapidity and developed into large area fires. The reflected heat from these fires and the fire storm which usually resulted made it impossible for the inhabitants to escape. Special organizational and technical measures had been developed to rescue people in such cases and proved highly successful.

Other responsibilities included steps to arrange with the local agencies of the several special administrations (the Railway, Post and Telegraph, and Waterways Administrations) concerning the employment of available forces and com-
concerning mutual support in damage control operations. The Fort Passive Air Defense System was also under tactical control by the local passive air defense chief. The important point here was to regulate properly the concentrated employment of floating and shore firefighting units.

The immense scope of the responsibilities of a local passive air defense chief during and after large-scale attacks against large cities is illustrated strikingly, apart from the attacks against the Rhine-Wesphalia industrial region—previously mentioned, by the examples of Hamburg and Cologne.

In each case the experience gathered in damage control operations was evaluated immediately. All concerned participated in the first discussions, a requirements which the exhausted leading personnel probably considered particularly onerous. From the point of view of those responsible, however, this first and immediate discussion of all problems and incidents was of incisive importance for a speedy use of the experience gained in the fields of command, organization, and technology, as well as for the development and testing of new and improved means and methods of prevention and control action.

It can be said that the local control organization proved

106. Allied Air Attacks against Hamburg.
108. For example: "Ergebnsberichte vom 1.1.1941" (Ministerialrat Dr. Knipfer). In Karlsruhe Document Collection, vol. 13-E 3.
sound and satisfactory in every respect. The authority of police officials the/insured that the friction which was unavoidable in the integrated operations of so widely differing agencies would be overcome and that firm control would be maintained right up to the last moment. This factor was clearly brought out in the various experience reports of the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force published by the Inspector of Passive Air Defense.

In heavily attacked areas experience brought into prominence the important requirements that the entire passive air defense control system must be located outside of the defense locality. Everything possible has to be done to avert the possibility that the command posts become inoperable by being isolated owing to the roads being blocked by the debris from collapsing houses; furthermore, they must be so located that they are accessible to messengers at all times. Measures admittedly had been taken in advance to to establish alternate command posts, but it had only been possible to provide them with improvised equipment, and this applied particularly to signal communications, so that they could not serve their purpose to full satisfaction.

From the above evolves the requirements that the command posts must be liberally equipped with wireless communication facilities. In the case of damage reports and the commitment
of damage control forces every minute counts, the object being to rescue people surrounded by fire and/or to prevent the development of large-area fires.

Finally, it is essential to employ helicopters to keep a constant watch over the development of fires and over the operations of the damage control forces, since this is the only possible way to insure complete observation of the whole area damaged, and to insure the timely dispatch of forces.

It was due to these considerations that Air District Command III made use, with great success, of a Type Storch liaison plane equipped for voice radio communications.

In the Floesti Oil region of Rumania an Me-110 plane was used with success to secure precise information on any damage done in air attacks.

3. Passive Air Defense in Army Zones of Operations. Apart from unit air defense activities, no general passive air defense measures had been prepared for implementation in the 1939 campaign in Poland. Immediately after the cessation of hostilities in that campaign, the damage done by German bombs, and the impact on the civilian population, were inspected and investigated.


110. See II, a, 2, above.

111. See III, f, below.
and the experience thus gained was applied in the
fields of command, organization, and technology. Above all,
the knowledge thus obtained serve to confirm the already exis-
ting realization that it was essential to prepare for the
implementation of passive air defense measures within the
zones of operations of army forces.

The points involved here were

1. Measures to restore to operability as speedily as
possible installations which were vitally important
for the war effort and/or to protect them against damage.

2. To provide passive air defense services for trans-
portation routes, particularly for railroad installations
and waterways.

3. To preserve monuments of historical and/or cul-
tural importance.

The various field army headquarters and the communi-
cations zone headquarters issued the necessary order in accor-
dance with the directives received from the Commander in
Chief of the Luftwaffe for the implementation of passive air
defense measures.

In order to provide the necessary data for such pur-
poses and to expedite the development of motorized passive
air defense units, each army level headquarters in the 1940
campaign in the west was assigned an Air Force officer who
was trained in the subject of passive air defense and could request support from the specialized passive air defense units following the advance on the ground and recommend the manner of their employment.

Initially this involved units of the Safety and Auxiliary Services (motorized). These units had special equipment for the control of oil fires and also special repair and maintenance equipment, and rendered valuable support in the preservation of bulk oil storage depots and the repair of destroyed or damaged traffic installations, besides preventing the destruction of numerous monuments of historical and/or cultural importance. Firefighting activities were of particular significance, since part of the French population had fled and since those who had remained behind were unable to make use to the necessary extent of the local firefighting installations.

As the German ground forces advanced westward certain mobile units of the then existing Motorized Safety and Auxiliary Services, which had already been moved forward for the purpose, advanced with the troops. The units were employed with outstanding success already in some of the border towns to put out large fires which had developed during the fighting. In addition they employed to clear away debris, to remove rubble and wrecked vehicles from the routes of advance.

See IV, b. below.
and later again to combat large fires in Belgium and France. Later, these units were assigned responsibility for protection of particularly important and valuable objects, such as port installations and mineral oil depots, primarily along the entire coastline from the Bight of Heligoland to Bordeaux.

Although under exceedingly difficult conditions, the Safety and Auxiliary Battalions, supported by the Firefighting Police Regiment assigned at the same time, accomplished these missions with a great measure of success throughout the duration of the German occupation. The motorized passive air defense battalions, which were incorporated with the Luftwaffe in 1942, were assigned under Third Air Fleet Headquarters. The companies of the Firefighting Police Regiment, in contrast, were assigned each under the military government headquarters of the area in which it was committed.

It was found in practice that it was essential to assign each army level or even each division level headquarters special passive air defense units. Unfortunately, rivalry between the Army and the Air Force prevented the finding of a practicable solution.

Similar methods were employed in the Russian campaign, the only difference being that the passive air defense units initially were assigned exclusively under Army control, with later assignment under the Special Air District Command, which
was controlled by the Fourth Air Fleet. Here they had the
special mission of assuming responsibility for the passive
air defense of the oil regions to be occupied.

In Russia again, a number of motorized passive air de-
defense battalions and the 1st Firefighting Police Regiment ad-
vanced together with the troops. Later the firefighting regi-
ment was transferred to the Romanian oil region, while the
motorized passive air defense battalions, consolidated to
form the 3d Special Passive Air Defense Regiment was to as-
sume responsibility for passive air defense in the Maikop and
Grozny oil regions in the Caucasus under the First Panzer
Army. The 42d and 16th Motorized Passive Air Defense Battal-
ions were deployed for these missions and the Fourth Air Fleet
reported regularly on their operations and successes.

After the advance of the First Panzer Army came to a
halt, the units of the 3d Special Passive Air Defense Regiment
assigned to that army were employed in the front areas around
Maikop and Pyatigorsk. Assigned by companies and platoons,
the battalions assumed responsibility for passive air defense
activities in the oil regions. As part of the Mineral Oil
Brigade (Brigade Mineralöl) smaller forces were assigned the
mission of restoring to operability any installations, such
as oil pumps, found during the advance. These units were also
available to the troops for employment all manner of special
missions, and at times the companies were even committed in
infantry combat action, as was the case, for example, at Kista
Nalchik, Leskental, and Tolugun.

During the German withdrawal in the winter and spring of
1942-43 elements of the units endeavored to cross the Sea of
Asov on the ice at Yeisk, or marched by way of Krasnodar to
Taman, from where they were returned to Germany, after estab-
lishment of the Kuban bridgehead, by way of Kerch-Ishankol-
Saporosye, because of their low combat capabilities.

The operations of these units in the eastern theater,
where numerous and widely varied missions developed, illus-
trated strikingly the value of a highly qualified and well-
equipped passive air defense force. In all cases, whether they
were employed in technical missions or in infantry combat mis-
sions, the units performed excellently.

Another point which merits mention here is that the re-
treating Russians everywhere either took along or destroyed
all firefighting equipment. Attempts were madd by the Germans
to organize firefighting services with Russian personnel in a

114. Karlsruhe Document Collection: Sulzbach: "Luftschutzhin-
weis, mit Bildern.
im Besatzungsbereich und angespindelt Luftschutzenkorden," a report by Major Erhard, 26 Sep 1939.
116. Bericht des Inspektors des Luftschutzes vom 21.5.1942:
number of towns. No appreciable results were achieved, however, because the firefighting apparatus found in existence gave the impression of stemming from the Middle Ages. For this reason the German passive air defense units represented the only firefighting forces available within a radius of hundreds of miles.


1. In the West. After the cessation of operations in the west, the occupied territories there were placed under military administration. The staff of the Military Governor included a specially qualified passive air defense officer. The Air Fleet Headquarters and each of the three air district commands, one each for Holland, Belgium-Northern France, and Western France, under that headquarters included a passive air defense section with functions similar to those of such sections in the German interior. Units of the Passive air defense forces were stationed in the territory under military administration, where they were employed with success by the air district commands for the protection of installations of military importance and other objects. In addition a Passive Air Defense Training and Replacement battalion was formed. Air raid warning services and a factory
defense system were organized, wherever necessary under orders from the Military Administration. An example is offered in the appendix to this study.

Apart from the above, the passive air defense units were frequently committed also in other operations not strictly of a military nature. Thus, for example, that the cathedral at Rouen escaped destruction is due to the efforts of the 34th Motorized Passive Air Defense Battalion, supported by the 1st Passive Air Defense Police Regiment, after an air attack in the summer of 1944.

So far as the Army was concerned, Air Force officers with special training in the subject of passive air defense were attached to each army headquarters concerned, thus, to headquarters of the Military Governor, to all military government area headquarters, and in some cases to the sub-area headquarters.

The Navy had its own trained passive air defense officers to take care of its installations, and had no territorial responsibilities.

The table of organization in force for the territories under military government are included with this study as Appendix 14.

The overall control of local passive air defense in each

area was a responsibility of the branch of the military services concerned. In the cases of Le Havre, Brest, Lorient, for example, and St Nazaire, where important installations of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force were located, such as naval ship building yards, submarine bases, air defense installations, Army installations, that service was responsible which had the most important target to protect, without regard for the rank of the officers concerned, and with the authority to requisition the passive air defense and auxiliary forces of other installations and commands within the area for damage control operations. Arrangements such as these were established from case to case by the Supreme Military Command on recommendations from the Reich Minister for aviation and Commander of the Air Force through the Passive Air Defense Operations Staff.

The passive air defense measures implemented in territories under military administration were inspected regularly by personnel from Air Fleet Headquarters or from the air district commands. On such occasions organizational problems were cleared up and the passive air defense installations, etc. of the passive air defense troops and of the air raid warning services were also inspected.

2. In the Eastern Theater. Only very limited passive air defense measures were necessary in the eastern theater because of the size expensiveness involved, the small activity of the enemy in air attack, and the resultant insignificant hazards to which the majority of the targets involved were exposed.

A directive from the Commander in Chief of the Air Force/Passive Air Defense Operations Staff, ordered the appropriate air district commands, namely, Air District Commands I, II, Moscow, Kiev, and Rostov, to take only the indispensably essential measures, and these only insofar as they were necessary for the safety of German military forces and installations and to maintain production in factories manufacturing commodities of vital military importance. Wherever there was no possibility to organize reliable passive air defense units from the indigenous population, organizational preparations were to be made for operations by German military auxiliary teams.

More comprehensive regulations were issued only concerning the air raid warning services, and these measures proved completely adequate.

1. Passive Air Defense in Occupied/Friendly Countries Placed under German Protection.

121. Karl S:he Document Collection: "Luftschutz in Russland 1942"
In the so-called "newly acquired territories" the German Passive Air Defense Act was applied with appropriate modifications promulgated in the German Official Gazette (Reichsgesetzblatt). This method was applied already after the annexation of Austria by means of a decree dated 25 July 1938, and continued for the areas of the Sudetenland by a decree dated 31 March 1939.

Introduction of the German Passive Air Defense Act in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (Rump Czechoslovakia) was ordered by decree on 9 July 1941.

Individual problems were handled as follows:

Organization of a factory defense system was ordered by a decree of the German Governor (Reichspräsident) dated 9 July 1941.

A decree dated 26 May 1942 regulated welfare for those subject to mandatory passive air defense service.

Police methods involved in the mandatory air defense service were regulated by decree dated 4 July 1942.

The funding problems for individual protection measures were regulated by decree dated 3 September 1942.

The financial problems involved in the construction of provisional air raid shelters and the construction of openings in party or fire walls were regulated by decree dated 30 June 1943.

Footnotes 122-125 see next page.
In other matters the directives and instructions issued by the Reich Minister for Aviation and Commander in Chief of the Air Force/Air Force Inspectorate 13 were forwarded to the German Governor, while the German military agencies acted within their respective command areas in accordance with normal regulations and with orders received from their superior headquarters. Factory defense systems were organized in all installations which were of importance for the war effort.

For this purpose an "Action Union for Factory Defense (Zwischenkraft für den Werks-flutwach)" was established under supervision by the German Governor, an organization corresponding approximately to the regional commands within Germany.

For civil air defense purposes the Commander of Regular Police, acting under instructions from the German Governor, by whom he was appointed, instituted the necessary measures by placing the existing organizations, such as the police forces, the firefighting services, and the technical and medical services, under consolidated control by local passive air defense chiefs, and organizing them in a manner similar to that in force in Germany.

122. "Verordnung über die Einführung des Luftschutzrechts im Lande Österreich" vom 25.7.1938 (ibid., p. 158).
123. "Verordnung über die Einführung des Luftschutzrechts im Lande Österreich" vom 25.7.1938 (ibid., p. 158).
125. The orders and decrees (mentioned above) issued by the German Governor are contained in the text volume of "Luftschutzrecht" by Barmow-Sokken-Graf von Horries.
On the whole collaboration with the indigenous police forces in the Protectorate proceeded smoothly.

Numerous decrees of implementation were promulgated pursuant to the "Order Concerning the Introduction of the Passive Air Defense Law in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia (Verordnung über die Einführung des Luftschutzes im Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren)" of 9 July 1941, of which only the "Fifth Decree of Implementation (Fünfte Ausführungsverordnung betreffend) concerning" Instructions on the nature and size of contributions towards the construction of provisional air raid shelters and of openings through party or fire walls," dated 30 June 1943, need be mentioned here.

This decree, which was designed for the protection of the civilian population, laid down that contributions could take the following forms:

the making available of suitable premises;

the supply of construction materials, equipment, etc.;

labor;

the making available of installations, fittings, furniture, etc.;

the furnishing of monetary contributions.

The protective measures carried out in this way were accepted without demur by these sections of the population.