DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING & CONTROL in the AAF

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DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING AND CONTROL IN THE AAF

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FOREWORD

So long as the Army's air arm was limited to a few hundred planes and a few thousand men, there was no apparent need for an administrative planning and control agency. The expansion of the Air Corps after 1939, however, made administrators aware of the importance of a regulatory and coordinating office similar to those which had spread rapidly in the business world in the 1920's and 1930's. By 1940 some efforts had been made to apply various business principles to the administration of the Air Corps, but these beginning attempts had not received general or strong support. Not until late in 1941 did the concept of administrative planning and control become clearly defined. In March 1942 the Directorate of Organizational Planning was established in Headquarters, AAF to improve the organizational structure and administrative procedures, to eliminate duplication of effort, and to establish necessary controls.

This study traces the development and expansion of administrative planning and control in the AAF. An earlier version of the study, prepared by Dr. L. Vaughan Howard and Dr. Chase C. Mooney, which described the development to September 1944, was issued as AAF Historical Study No. 28. In this edition, Dr. Mooney has made some alterations of the earlier history and has supplied additional material on the period from September 1944 to the dissolution of the Office of Organizational Planning in the summer of 1945.

Readers familiar with the subject matter are invited to furnish the AAF Historical Office with criticisms, additional facts, or interpretations. For this purpose, perforated sheets have been inserted at the back of the study.
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CHARTS

Organizational Planning Division, Office of Management Control, 1 January 1944

Procedure for moving a unit overseas

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Chapter I
EVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLANNING, 1930-1940

Administrative planning is a relatively new function of government in the United States. As such it has no stereotyped meaning, but is used to include a number of activities which are of a management nature. The definition which is used here is that it "is concerned with the development of sound organization, the method of staffing the organization, the procedures and practices to be followed, and the direction and coordination of operation."¹

The functions of an administrative planning unit are distinguishable from those of an administrative control unit in only one respect. The former, of a service nature, assists the head of an agency in solving organizational, procedural, or operating problems. The latter is of a supervisory character, and although responsible to the head of an office, is "authorized to work directly with individual division chiefs in planning and organizing various parts of the agency."²

¹ This definition was used by Donald C. Stone, assistant director in charge of administrative management, Bureau of the Budget, in an address before the National Conference on Planning on 12 May 1941. Civilian Personnel Div., Office of the S/H, Administrative Planning Agencies in the Federal Government. ⁷

² Ibid., 14. Administrative control, it might be added, is only one of several types of control to be found in government agencies. The most common is budget and fiscal, which in the Army Air Forces centers in the Budget and Fiscal Office. Another is statistical, and this in the Army Air Forces belongs to the Office of Statistical Control.
Administrative planning in the air branch of the War Department had a nebulous beginning in 1927 when an Inspection Division was re-created in the Office, Chief of the Air Corps. The new division was directed not only to inspect Air Corps activities but also to develop and install systems "for increasing the standards of maintenance of Air Corps equipment and the effectiveness of Air Corps activities." In order to carry out this directive a Development Section was established and continued in existence until the end of 1940. Although it was not strictly an administrative planning agency, its studies represented pioneering efforts in the adaptation of business methods to a military organization.

The Development Section was given some specific management functions in early 1932 when it was charged with responsibility for the development of systems for increasing the standard of maintenance of the Air Corps, its equipment and installations, and for the promotion of management throughout the Air Corps. It should be observed that "development" was limited to systems of maintenance but that "promotion of management" was not similarly circumscribed. As a matter of fact, the work of the Development Section was forced beyond the limits of the Inspection Division's functions. It conducted a number

3. For the history of the previous inspection agency of the air arm, see AAF Historical Studies: No. 14 (rev.), Inspection Control in the AAF, 1926-1945.
4. AC Circular No. 120-1, 6 May 1927.
5. Ibid., 29 Feb. 1932.
of studies at the request of the Executive and, on occasion, lent personnel to aid in the prosecution of studies by other offices.

The studies of the Development Section were not, however, actually administrative planning projects. They were concerned with such matters as accidents and flying time, Air Corps mortality, engine attrition, attrition among Air Corps officers, causes and nature of accidents, and airworthiness of airplanes. From 1928 to 1940 inclusive, approximately 125 such studies were made. In general, they represented an attempt to relate to Air Corps problems the management methods used by large industrial establishments. 6

An activity of the Inspection Division of particular significance was its responsibility for supervising the publication of all Air Corps Circulars. It was specifically charged with the duty of thoroughly coordinating such publications with all interested divisions or sections and with responsibility for correctness of form, numbering, and other details. Later it was given similar supervision over major technical publications, and in 1937 over Circular Letters.

Naturally, publications other than those relating to maintenance and inspection usually originated in other offices, but the supervisory authority given to the inspection agency was an important precedent for the larger powers that later were to be vested in Organizational Planning.

6. For the reports in which these studies are mentioned, see AAG 321.3, passim.
Of more immediate importance in the history of administrative planning was the elevation of the Plans Section to division status in 1930. In addition to a number of duties pertaining specifically to war plans, the office was charged with responsibility for preparing organizational charts, tables of organization (and coordinating them with tables of allowances), and such War Department regulations and orders as might be directed by the Chief of the Air Corps. Also, the coordination of Air Corps building plans and the preparation of legislation for submission to Congress were duties of the Plans Division.\(^7\) It seems evident that administrative planning was intended to be one of the functions of the Plans Division, but since not specifically mentioned it was probably not regarded as of primary importance.

Furthermore, the division had no power to control organization since it had no executive authority. All instructions, orders, or requests for studies had to be referred to the Chief of the Air Corps or his Executive.

As a matter of fact, the opinion existed in some quarters that the Plans Division was not needed at all. It was held that the War Plans Section of the Training and Operations Division could have been expanded so that, in addition to the duties in connection with war plans, it could have developed ideas, prepared studies, and collected statistical data on Air Corps problems referred to it through the Executive or originating within the division. When the detailed work

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7. OCA-9 Memo 10-10, 7 July 1930.
had been completed, the chiefs of the interested divisions and sections
could then have been assembled to function as a planning board. This
idea—which would have kept the agency on too low an echelon for
effective functioning—was rejected in favor of a separate planning
agency with the powers listed above.

Maj. J. C. McDonnell, chief of the Personnel Division, after
recounting the above attitude, criticized the Plans Division on the
ground that it had assumed some of the functions of the existing
"staff" with a resulting duplication of effort and division of re-
sponsibility. He therefore recommended that the division be dis-
continued and that the defects in the previous organization which had
caused its establishment be corrected by strengthening what was the
War Plans Section. 8 Maj. W. F. Volandt, chief of the Finance Division,
opposed any reorganization. He admitted that there was a certain over-
lapping of functions between the Plans and Finance divisions, but
thought that corrective measures should be in the form of administra-
tive action rather than through organization. 9 Regardless of the
merits of the argument, the Plans Division remained in existence until
1935 with a staff of three to six officers.

The power to conduct organizational studies could be derived from
the broad planning functions given to the Plans Division, and the
division frequently initiated or took part in such projects. In 1932,
for example, the organization of the Air Corps was criticized on the

ground that it was not functioning efficiently. Some reasons for the alleged inefficiency were excessive coordination; stagnated office procedures; inactive and ineffective executive authority; ill-defined executive responsibility; unnecessary attention, in some instances, to detailed duties, which tended to choke consideration of important Air Corps matters; improper allocation of work and personnel; and duplication of effort.¹⁰ Many of these difficulties were said to have been caused by the assumption by the Plans Division of certain duties of an executive nature. The result was that the Executive Division had evolved into a "paper routing" rather than a directive office. It was recommended therefore that the OCAC be reorganized with the various divisions grouped under three executives. The executive officers together with the chiefs or assistant chiefs of the main subordinate units would constitute a planning board with executive power. This proposal, which was submitted to the Chief of the Air Corps, was referred to the various divisions for comment. The reactions were so varied that no changes were made.¹¹

This proposal is of interest, however, for several reasons. In the first place, it was one of the few instances during the early years of the Plans Division when an over-all organizational proposal was prepared.¹² Secondly, the 1931 proposal illustrated planning procedure

¹⁰ Memo, Maj. V. R. Weaver to C/AC, 22 Sep. 1931, in 322,082, Organization, OCAC, in AFSHO files.
¹¹ Ibid., and attached correspondence.
¹² In March 1932, 46 studies and projects were being worked on in the division, but few of these had much, if any, relation to Air Corps organization.
throughout the 1930's. Since the plans office did not have executive
authority, its projects were always written up as proposals and sub-
mitted to the Chief of the Air Corps. They were then usually referred
to the division chiefs for study and comment before a decision was
made as to whether they should be put into effect. Finally, it should
be noted that, although the planning agency was given no executive
functions, it tended from the outset to acquire them. This apparently
was due to a more or less general feeling that the agency which pre-
pared the plans in the first instance should also direct their execu-
tion. The plans office, however, did not always share this belief,
as evidenced by the 1931 memorandum cited above. In 1937, also, the
Plans Section declared that it had been asked questions on matters of
an "operating nature" which should have been referred to it only for
purposes of coordination. On most issues the office felt its main
activity should be confined to coordinating the work of the other
offices. 13

Another type of planning technique was involved in the request
submitted by the Executive in October 1933 and again in July 1934 that
each division chief prepare a memorandum on the subject of the signing
of official papers. Each was asked to indicate what papers he thought
could be signed by the chief of the division without submission to the
executive. 14

13. R&I, REL [Lincoln]. Plans to Exec., 00AC, 11 March 1937, in AAG
321.96. Organization. 00AC.
14. Correspondence on this subject is in AAG 321.5A, Correspondence
Regulations.
The question of the proper organization of the proposed GHQ Air Force came before the Plans Division in 1933. A rather full report was prepared in which it was recommended that headquarters of the proposed organization should not be set up at Langley Field. Rather, the Chief of the Air Corps should be made the Commanding General of the GHQ Air Force, and he should be given an additional assistant who would be chief of staff of the GHQ organization. This new assistant also would be made chief of the Plans Division, which would include the bulk of the staff of the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force. 15 An organization chart was prepared which set up headquarters of the GHQ Air Force as a part of the division, and this was submitted to The Adjutant General on 27 December 1933. The recommendations of the Air Corps, however, were not followed, and the GHQ Air Force came into existence on 1 March 1935 as an organization entirely separate from the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps. 16

On 11 March 1935 the Chief of the Air Corps appointed a board of officers to submit recommendations regarding the mission, organization, and personnel of his office. The board held three meetings and heard reports on the organization of various offices, but in the end came to the conclusion that, because of the existing state of flux in the Air

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16. RAR, C/AC to TAG, 27 Dec. 1933, in ibid. For fuller accounts of the establishment of the GHQ Air Force and its later history, see AAF Historical Studies: No. 25, Organization of Military Aeronautics, 1907–1936 (Congressional and War Department Action); No. 10, Organization of the Army Air Arm, 1935–1945.
Corps, it would be inadvisable to make any changes in the organization.\textsuperscript{17} This type of special board was another device occasionally employed to cope with the problem of organizational planning during the period under consideration. The members of such boards were appointed by the Chief of the Air Corps, and their conclusions were in the nature of recommendations to the same authority.

The state of flux in the Air Corps to which the above board referred grew out of the establishment of the GEQ Air Force. Air Corps uncertainty was increased by reason of the fact that the first year of operation of the new air force was a test period, at the end of which a report on organization and activities was rendered by the Commanding General. As a matter of fact, a preliminary report was submitted on 11 October 1935 and a final report at the end of the first year. These reports, together with that of the Browning Board,\textsuperscript{18} were circulated among the divisions, and the chief of each was requested to extract those portions which pertained to the activities of his division and to submit his comments to the Executive Office with a statement of his conclusions and recommendations.

Shortly thereafter a board of officers was convened to consider the recommendations of the Browning Board on the question of integrating the GEQ Air Force with the Air Corps. Brig. Gen. Oscar Westover, Chief of the Air Corps, in his opening statement to the board, pointed out

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\item[17.] OCGAC Personnel Orders No. 18, 11 March 1935; Extract of Report, in AAG 321.90, Organization, OCGAC.
\item[18.] The Browning Board was a War Department board appointed on 13 September 1935 to survey the personnel situation of the Air Corps, ACG 320.2 (9-11-35)0, 13 Sep. 1935.
\end{enumerate}
that proper evaluation of the fundamental problems of the Air Corps necessitated "some continuity of thought and planning," part of which had to come from outside the OCAC. He continued by saying:

We must recognize that the responsibilities that go with command functions vest in the commanders concerned the information which is essential for future progress and planning. The Air Corps General Board, therefore, will be set up as a flexible board of officers which will consist of not more than five, to be selected by the Chief of the Air Corps from among a panel representing the major command and responsibility interest of the Air Corps.

General Westover indicated the likelihood of the integration of the GHQ Air Force with the Air Corps, but before the War Department made such a decision the Air Corps desired to have definite plans worked out. For these planning purposes, the members of the board were limited to representatives of the major activities of the Air Corps.19

The board members could not agree among themselves on the method of integration, no other general board was convened, and it was not until 1 March 1939 that the GHQ Air Force was brought under the control of the Chief of the Air Corps—and then only until 19 November 1940. General Westover's plan to establish such a board on a continuing basis may have been prompted by the fact that in 1935 the independence of the planning agency had been lessened by its relegation to section status in the War Plans-Training Division. In August 1936, however, it was removed to the Executive Office of the Chief of the Air Corps.

19. OCAC Personnel Orders No. 89, 15 April 1936; Board Proceedings, in AM 221.9B, GHQ Air Force and Reorganization of Air Corps.
The administrative planning functions, although not called such, of the newly placed section were to (1) conduct studies at the direction of the Chief or Assistant Chief of the Air Corps; (2) keep informed on current activities and submit recommendations covering new policies, necessary changes, and action to be taken to insure that policies and decisions were executed to the best interest of the Air Corps; and (3) formulate policies and doctrines affecting personnel, coordinate Air Corps building plans, and prepare such legislation as might be required by the Chief of the Air Corps.20 Like its predecessor, the Plans Section had no executive authority but functioned through the Chief and Assistant Chief of the Air Corps. In similar vein, it had no special mandate with respect to administrative planning but derived whatever authority it might choose to exercise in this field from the grant of larger powers.

During the last part of 1936 and most of 1937 and 1938, the Plans Section submitted to the Chief of the Air Corps weekly reports in which it listed the studies under way and the percentage of completion. These reports indicated that the section usually carried on concurrently approximately seven studies, only a very few of which related to organization. At least two reports, however, were made on the GHQ, Air Force. The first, made in October 1936, was entitled "Duties of the Chief of the Air Corps Relative to the GHQ Air Force."21 The second, listed on the

weekly report of 13 November 1937, was a study of the report which had been rendered by the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force on 1 May 1937. The same subject had been the basis of comments by the various division chiefs at a meeting on 12 April 1937. Each individual had submitted his remarks and recommendations to the Plans Section in advance of the meeting, and, to these, Plans added its own comments. The recommendations were not carried out, for the GHQ Air Force underwent no organizational changes in that period.

Not all the administrative planning of this period, however, concerned the GHQ Air Force and its relation to the Air Corps. On 3 November 1936 all division heads were directed to submit to the Executive not later than 15 November a list of the functions and duties with which their divisions were charged and to segregate these by sections. The lists were then referred to the Plans Section, which prepared for the Chief of the Air Corps a proposed reorganization chart and a memorandum for putting the new organization into effect. "In general," wrote Col. Bush B. Lincoln, the chief of the section, "the functions of divisions remain the same, only minor changes having been made in duties to conform to those now being carried out."

In 1936, also, a procedural study was conducted by Lt. Col. William E. Lynd at the direction of Brig. Gen. H. H. Arnold, Acting Chief of the Air Corps. This was a "Study on the Method of Handling Mail, Routing of Correspondence and Method of Keeping Records of

23. Memo for C/AC, 27 Nov. 1936, in AAG 321.96, Organization, OCAOC.
Civilian Employees in the OGAC. For purposes of comparison, Colonel Lynd also studied these procedures in the Quartermaster Corps, the Ordnance Department, the Corps of Engineers, and the Signal Corps. He submitted a 15-page report, which was circulated among the divisions for comment. Apparently, however, no changes resulted from the recommendations.\textsuperscript{24} Again on 1 March 1937 division chiefs were directed to report by 10 March any recommended changes to improve office procedure and efficiency, or to recommend any organizational changes which seemed necessary.\textsuperscript{25} Since the report of the Bryden Board\textsuperscript{26} had just been approved and the Supply Division was most closely concerned with the changes recommended by it, the chief of that division was instructed to have each of his principal assistants also prepare reports. The recommendations were routed to the Plans Section, which reported to the Chief of the Air Corps that it had considered all suggestions but believed no major changes should be made at that time. "Continual reorganization,\textsuperscript{27} the Plans Section stated, "tends to disrupt more than improve the functioning of an office such as this.\textsuperscript{27} Despite this opinion, Air Corps reorganization was apparently a subject of more or less continuing study during the period from 1937 to 1941.

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\textsuperscript{24} This study is filed in 322.082, Organization, OGAC, in AFSC files.
\textsuperscript{25} Memo, Maj. Gen. Oscar Westover, O/AC to chiefs of all div., in AAG 321.90, Organization, OGAC.
\textsuperscript{26} A War Department board, under Col. William Bryden, appointed to survey the materiel activities of the Air Corps.
\textsuperscript{27} RER, Plans Sec. to O/AC, 28 March 1937, in AAG 321.90, Organization, OGAC.
\end{flushleft}
In 1939 the expansion rate of the Air Corps was greatly accelerated, and the planning function became of more significance than ever. The number of officers on duty was increased to 13—there had been only four in 1938—and the section was redesignated a division and placed under a chief with the rank of brigadier general. An office memorandum of 2 May 1940 explained the expansion in the following manner:

It is of the utmost importance that the Air Corps take full advantage of the lessons which can be drawn from the current European war. A determined effort must be made to bring the further development of the Air Corps Expansion Program in line with these lessons for the purpose of organizing the most efficient 30-day air force. With this in mind it is essential that plans for organization, equipment, training, and employment be carefully considered to insure thorough coordination of all essential factors and to produce maximum progress. The current war has brought out the necessity for increased airplane performance, the need for more adequate opposition, and the need for carefully considered strategic and tactical plans.

At that time the Plans Division was divided into four sections which roughly corresponded to the usual staff designations. As in 1930 and 1936, however, the statement of duties contained no specific mention of administrative planning, though such activity could reasonably be implied from the enumerated responsibilities.

During 1939 and 1940 the Plans Division engaged in several organization studies. At least two studies dealt with the relationship of the Air Force to the Air Corps, and other proposals were

28. OGC Memo 10-42, 2 May 1940, quoted in James Sundquist, "Wartime Organization of the Army Air Forces" (draft Bureau of the Budget study) 14-15, in AFSEO files.
to establish an engineer corps in the air arm, to move the assistant
chiefs of the Air Corps to Washington, to study fully the establish-
ment of an adequate intelligence system, to determine the advisa-
bility and practicability of establishing a centralized aerial navi-
gation school, and to establish a maintenance command around the
nucleus of the Field Service Section of the Materiel Division. Among
the subjects assigned to special boards for study and report were
reorganization of the Materiel Division, the flight surgeon situation,
Air Corps intelligence, and the return of air bases and other exempted
Air Corps activities to corps area control.

The most comprehensive study of this period, presented to the
Chief of the Air Corps on 9 January 1940 by Col. Carl Spatz of the
Plans Division, concerned the proper organization of the OCAC, the GHQ
Air Force, and other Air Corps units and agencies to "provide a suita-
ble organization for the control of the larger and more numerous
activities resulting from the Air Corps Expansion Program." This,
in reality, was ten studies covering virtually the entire field of Air
Corps organization: (1) organization of Air Corps base units; (2)
command and control of base and combat units; (3) organization of
wings; (4) organization of air divisions; (5) organization of service
troops of other branches; (6) organization of aviation in overseas depart-
ments; (7) organization and control of the Materiel Division; (8) control of
flying training; (9) control of technical training; and (10) organization

29. Memo, Col. Carl Spatz to G/AC, 9 Jan. 1940, in AC 321.9,
Organization.
and control of activities at Maxwell Field. The study was approved by the Chief of the Air Corps on 12 January 1940 for "continuation of planning purposes."

As indicated in the title of the above study, it was the expansion program which was responsible for the increased planning activity. The burden fell principally upon the Plans Division which, as a result, assumed a position of much greater importance in Air Corps organization. In April 1940 General Arnold outlined a few of the subjects which he thought the Plans Division should study. Those to be given priority were the ones which were predicated upon the building of a wartime force based upon the involvement of the United States in a major war. 30

Later in the same year, 25 October 1940, General Arnold wrote the chiefs of all divisions that (1) continued expansion of the Air Corps made certain changes in organization, functional processes, and managerial procedures necessary in order to accomplish a balanced advancement; (2) it was imperative to move from the creative to the organizing, training, and equipping stage and from there into advancing the operating efficiency of the Air Corps; and (3) with this general thought in mind it was desired that all chiefs submit, prior to 1 November, a general plan of reorganization of their divisions. This plan was to include (1) allocation of officers; (2) detailed duties to be performed; (3) a functional organization chart; and (4) an outline of the recommended administrative and executive procedures, with special emphasis on

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30. Memo, O/O to Plans Div., 8 April 1940, in AAF 321.9, Organization of Plans Div.
the elimination of paper work and decentralization of responsibility so far as was compatible with good management. The chiefs were cautioned that, in the preparation of their plans, all functions implied by the titles of the divisions should be controlled and that the organization should be flexible in order to be adaptable to changing conditions.31

Very shortly after this, 19 November, the air arm organization was disrupted by the separation of the GHQ Air Force from the OCAC.32

Meanwhile, the Development Section of the Inspection Division had made several management studies, and the chief of that section had pointed out the need for an over-all management office in the Air Corps. The main shortcomings of the existing organization, he maintained, were the result of the pressing necessity for expeditious action and the lack of an agency to study interoffice aspects of procedures and administrative actions. This situation had brought about "duplication of records, inflexibility of data, incomplete consideration of daily matters, and doubtful division of responsibility."33

In view of the above it was proposed that a research and statistics section be established in the Executive Division. This new office should (1) conduct a study of intraoffice records, reports, and facilities with a view to establishing centralized records and facilities for compilation of data commonly used by two or more offices;

31. Memo, G/AC to chiefs of all divs., 25 Oct. 1940, in AAO 321.9D, Organization, OCAC.
32. The GHQ Air Force had been established on 1 March 1935 on the same echelon of authority as the OCAC. On 1 March 1939 the GHQ Air Force, for purposes of administration, had been placed under the OCAC.
(2) give centralized statistical services wherever and whenever needed and prepare routing compilations, frequency data, graphs, charts, and reports on matters periodically required by two or more offices; (3) conduct continuous studies in office methods, records, routines, and facilities with a view to coordination and integration with the least interoffice duplication; (4) conduct special studies in management and office procedure pertaining to, and requested by, individual offices; and (5) conduct studies pertaining to management, systems, records, and reports concerning the Air Corps in order to reduce the clerical work and integrate the activities under a centralized control.  

No action came immediately from this proposal, but in October 1940 it was revived as a criticism of the proposed revision of OCAC Memo 10-10 prepared by the Plans Division. At that time it was pointed out that more cognizance should be taken of the important difference between executive and administrative work and that it was necessary to establish a functional organization to provide administrative services. The proposed organization was for an administrative division to be composed of four sections: chief clerk, research and development, reproduction and distribution, and library. There was to be a civilian assistant in each division of the OCAC who would be responsible for administrative matters and who would be functionally controlled by the head of the administrative division. The proposed

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34. Ibid.  
division was established in November 1940 as the Miscellaneous Division, but the recommendation concerning civilian administrators was passed over entirely.

The creation of the Administrative Research and Statistics Section of this division was the first real move in the direction of a separate administrative planning agency. Its functions, as set forth in OCAO Memo 10-10 (23 November 1940) were to develop "improved administrative procedure systems, forms, reports and standard practices" and to compile "such statistical matter as is required by all divisions of the Office, Chief of the Air Corps, [including] statistical analysis service." This new section was thus charged with definite powers in the field of administrative planning. Since it was not equipped to handle such problems until April 1941, it was not necessary until that time to define its relationship to the Plans Division.

Administrative planning from 1930 to the end of 1940 was not a function of any one agency or office. The Development Section of the Inspection Division conducted a number of management studies, but they were directed primarily toward the establishment of maintenance systems and procedures rather than toward the improvement of Air Corps organization and procedures in general. The Plans Division, on the other hand, although not specifically charged with the duty of conducting administrative studies, either initiated or participated in a number of such projects. It had no control powers, however, so its studies were in the nature of recommendations to the Chief of the Air Corps. Of the same character were the recommendations of boards of officers to which organizational questions occasionally were
referred. These were referred also to division chiefs, quite frequently in connection with proposals from the Plans Division. None of these methods represented real administrative planning. Questions of Air Corps organization and procedure were handled not as a continuing problem in administration but as separate problems to be dealt with as expediency might require. With the creation of the Administrative Research and Statistics Section in November 1940, however, definite administrative planning functions were lodged in one agency, and the developments of 1941 were comparatively rapid. The growth of administrative and organizational planning in the Air Arm was following the pattern established by similar developments in the business world.
Chapter II

ESTABLISHMENT AND GROWTH OF ORGANIZATIONAL PLANNING

The specific delegation, in November 1940, of administrative planning functions to the Research and Statistics Section was the first major step toward the establishment of a separate agency to handle such matters. That office, as well as the other air arm organizations, went through many changes in 1941, and the framework of an over-all organizational and administrative planning agency began to take shape.

On 25 February 1941 the Miscellaneous Division became the Administrative Division, but no change was made in the Research and Statistics Section.1 In the latter part of April it was announced that the new section was "equipped to handle some of the administrative problems of the Air Corps." It was explained that many administrative problems were of such a general nature that they affected all divisions. For that reason, the cooperation and collaboration of the various divisions would be necessary in "attacking" those problems, which were to be termed "Administrative Planning Projects" to differentiate them from "combat planning activities." Those projects were further described as follows:2

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2. Office Memo 10-48, 23 April 1941, in AAF 300.6, Office Memos.
to improve and coordinate policies, programs, and management practices. Others will be of a continuing or recurring nature, requiring the collection, processing, and hand or machine tabulation of data such as flying time, accidents, medical examinations, personnel records, etc. These may involve statistical analysis and the presentation of statistical data in the form of tables, charts, graphs, and reports. They will serve as aids to policy formulation, and as guides to the issuance of Air Corps directives.

The conclusions and recommendations resulting from an administrative planning project were to be prepared usually as a report to be submitted to the reporting office by the chief of the Administrative Division. Obviously, the Research and Statistics Section was designed from the outset as an administrative planning agency. Its activities other than those of a statistical nature were performed by a Development Unit, which was the successor to the Development Section of the Inspection Division.

On 30 April the Executive attempted to draw a line of demarcation between the duties of the Plans Division and those of the Administrative Division. The former was directed to "study and analyze the . . . organization of the Office, Chief of the Air Corps, together with the activities operating thereunder, and submit recommendations at the earliest practicable date for improvement where indicated." The latter, on the other hand, was instructed to provide the "data essential to the Plans Division in fulfilling its responsibility." The Administrative Division was also instructed to prepare a set of organization charts, "showing in detail the functions and duties of each Division, Section, and Unit." Each division was to prepare a draft functional chart and to appoint a liaison representative.
with whom the members of the Administrative Division could confer. The charts were to be standardized by the Administrative Division and submitted to the Plans Division when completed. Finally, the Administrative Division was instructed "as a continuing matter" to "maintain up-to-date organization charts accurately portraying the distribution of functions within the Office, Chief of the Air Corps." 3

The Research and Statistics Section had been engaged already in this project, for on that very day, 20 April, an "Organization and Function" chart book was issued. 4 In this volume, the predecessor of the loose-leaf chart book (issued from October 1943 to June 1945), the organization and functions of each of the 12 divisions were shown by section and in some instances by unit. Since this was the first time that detailed charts of the entire OASC had been prepared, the importance of the undertaking is readily apparent.

Prior to the issuance of this work, the Plans Division recommended that Capt. James L. Ferrier, Chief of the Research and Statistics Section, and one civilian assistant be transferred to Plans. It was pointed out that a group of expert researchers and statisticians was needed on the ground that the Plans Division was in process of undertaking the monitoring of urgent Air Corps projects previously under the supervision of Air Department General Staff agencies. Initiation of staff studies has

3. Memo, Col. George J. Stetson, Jr., to Chief of Staff, 20 April 1943, in AAF 321-9, Organization, OASC.
4. Copy in AAFXO files.
also been made a function of this Division and these studies
are no longer recommendations to a superior staff agency . . .
but are accompanied by complete final action papers . . .
Serious errors in the proposals which we put into effect or
in the monitoring and supervision of projects with which
the Chief of the Air Corps is now charged will have a
disastrous effect upon the Air Corps and may profoundly
affect National Defense.

The transfer of Captain Ferrer was approved, and a Statistics
Section was created in the Plans Division. The Research and Statistics
Section of the Administrative Division was not discontinued but seems
to have lost much of its impelling force. There was also in existence
at that time an Organization Control and Administrative Unit in the
Plans Division. One function of this office was to conduct "Studies
designed to improve Air Corps organization, administration and con-
trol policies and administrative and combat organizations of Air Corps
units." 6

Not long after his transfer to the Plans Division, Captain Ferrer
submitted the results of a survey known as "Studies on Organization
Survey." In this report he pointed out that the "lack of objective
planning in many of the sections and divisions is evident . . .
The need for overall planning and the establishment of certain
general planning policies is likewise apparent." It was suggested
that this shortcoming could be partially overcome by the employment
of highly trained civilian analysts who would serve as "administrative
assistants and divisional planning technicians." Among the "much

needed projects" which Captain Newt thought should be undertaken as soon as the Research and Statistics Section secured more personnel were (1) an analysis of all reporting systems and forms used both in the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps and in the field; (2) a survey of the statistical needs and requirements of the Air Corps as a whole; and (3) the development of a standard practice or procedure manual.

Another study, made by the Statistics Section of the Plans Division upon the oral request of Lt. Col. B. A. Gates of the Plans Division, was submitted within the next 30 days. This was entitled "Statistical Analysis of the Administrative Work Load as Related to the Personnel in the Office, Chief of the Air Corps." By assigning a value of 100 to the monthly average of administrative work and personnel for the fiscal year 1938, it was found that in 1939 the work load had increased 91 per cent and the personnel 50 per cent. Corresponding figures for 1939-1941 (to May) were 431 and 247 per cent. A single employee was found to be responsible for an average of 55 per cent more work in 1941 than in 1939. This analysis, the study concluded, indicated a need for a control to anticipate "rapid increases of administrative work" and thereby prevent conditions resulting from the more rapid increase of work than personnel. A suitable control "could be established and maintained whereby

8. In A-12-331.9, Organization of Plans Div.
increases in the administrative work load... could be estimated far enough in advance to determine the corresponding needed increases in personnel."

The coordinate positions of the G-3 Air Force and the G-3A had resulted in a duplication of some activities and a failure to secure the fullest utilization of manpower and material. In March of 1941 the Secretary of War directed that the two Army air arms be placed under one responsible head. The result was the creation on 20 June 1941 of the Army Air Forces—a superstructure to coordinate the activities of the G3A and the Air Force Combat Command (formerly the G3 Air Force). The principal portion of the new agency, the Air Staff, was formed by the elevation of the various sections of the Plans Division. As the Air Staff, the former Plans Division no longer had primary responsibility for administrative planning.* Some of the personnel of the Plans Division, however, remained in the G3A as the Plans Section, attached to the Executive Division. It was from this section that Organizational Planning, a subordinate unit of Manpower Control, was to evolve.

The increased freedom of activity and the greater responsibility placed upon the air arm by the reorganization of 20 June 1941 brought to the fore the need for more administrative planning activity, and agitation for the establishment of a management engineering staff continued with increased vigor. The most complete plan was presented by

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9. 20 July 41. The Statistics Section of the Plans Division became the Statistics Section of the Office, Chief of Air Staff.
James C. Sinnigen, administrative analyst and consultant in the Office of the Air Inspector, in a memorandum of 9 July to Gen. E. H. Hargue and submitted by the latter to General Arnold.

Sinnigen was of the opinion that the expansion program, with its phenomenal demands on all executive functions and facilities, would result in confusion, misunderstanding, and delay unless definite action was taken. It was imperative, therefore, that there be an immediate and corresponding major adaptation and expansion of the means for management planning, the system of communications, and the vehicles of efficiency evaluation. He proposed "to reinforce the executive functions with a staff of management technicians possessing qualifications of a high order." A management engineering section, headed by a G11-15, was to be created in the Office of the Chief of Air Staff. There were to be civilian administrative analysts sufficient in number to place one or more on permanent detail in the Office of the Adjutant General and each division of the CGIC, and on special assignment in other offices or units of the AAF. This staff should (1) plan and execute organizational and procedural surveys to bring about more effective and economical supervision, prevent or eliminate duplication, simplify procedure, and increase production; (2) prepare, coordinate, and issue standardized and codified regulations, orders, and procedural instructions, and design and control

10. Copy in AAM files.
11. Despite the importance of the expansion program, it was the opinion of the author of the memo that the "most dynamic force" then at work in the air establishment was its increased autonomy.
standardized forms; (3) investigate proposed methods, particularly those requiring installations of special equipment or systems to insure selection of the most suitable and economical; and (4) review or prepare all procedures or manuals intended to be issued by office, division, or unit heads. Simi and felt that the Administrative Division must perform these functions because it was not "adequately placed in the air establishment" and was neither "adequately nor altogether suitably staffed." He did not think his proposal was a "cure-all for organizational ills nor a substitute for executive efficiency," but did think it would have a "direct influence on improvement of manual methods" and would "exert a salutary catalytic effect throughout the air establishment."

This proposal was widely discussed after General Spaatz, Chief of the Inspection Division, recommended its approval. Although previously it had been coordinated with Col. Fairchild, Executive, 6120 and Capt. Parrer, the latter was called upon subsequently for further counsel. Apparently several conferences on the subject were held with General Spaatz and Arnold.12 Some confusion seems to have arisen around this proposal intended to avoid confusion. Captain Parrer noted: "It appears that General Arnold implied removal . . . . but a proposed memorandum for the signature of the Chief of the Air Staff to General Arnold, prepared by the 61 Division, states that the proposal 'is not considered necessary or desirable.'" Captain Parrer himself

was only lukewarm to the proposal and recommended that summary action
not be taken.\textsuperscript{13}

The plan was not adopted but seems to have had some influence
upon laser development. About a week after it was projected, the Chief
of the Air Corps was given the power “within established policies” to
study administrative procedures, systems, methods and devices, and sub-
mit recommendations, upon appropriation, for increasing the efficiency or
simplicity of Army Air Force Administration.\textsuperscript{14} The authority to con-
duct administrative planning projects was thus removed from the Air
Staff to the OCSO, and on 22 August this power was assigned to the
Plans Section.

The administrative planning functions given to the Plans Section
were rather broad:\textsuperscript{15}

1. Direct the preparation, analyze and consolidate reports
to the Chief of the Air Corps on the status of adminis-
tration, operations and procedure of the various
offices, divisions, commands or other Air Corps
agencies.

2. Coordinate and supervise the organizational and manage-
ment planning activities of offices, divisions or other
agencies of the Air Corps.

3. As directed or requested, assist and advise the various
offices and divisions of the Army Air Forces for the
purpose of improving administrative standards, functions
and methods.

4. Plan and supervise the development and maintenance of
materials or instruction or procedure to govern adminis-
trative activities of the Office, Chief of the Air
Corps.

The Plans Section, under the leadership of Lt. Col. E. E. Gates,
was not long in getting a number of projects under way. One of the

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} AFR Reg. 69-1, 18 July 1941.
\textsuperscript{15} Com. Ord. 10-102, 28 Jan. 1941.
first problem, however, was both the relationship and the limitation of spheres of jurisdiction of this unit and the Research and Statistics Section of the Administrative Division. This was solved temporarily by detailing the management engineering personnel of the Development Unit of the former section to the Plans Section, and shortly later (10 October) the statistical and archive tabulation activities were similarly transferred. On 22 October 1941, Simmonon, attached to the Plans Section, submitted a proposal for the reorganization of both the management engineering and statistical agencies.16

On 1 November the management engineering group submitted a full report on the Administrative Division. This paper declared that the results produced by the Research and Statistics Section had been disappointing in the light of the extensive and growing need for administrative and organizational planning. This shortcoming was attributed in large part to the placing of that work, which was basically executive, under the jurisdiction of an office principally engaged in routine administrative services. Under such jurisdiction the management engineering activity had been handled by several echelons of supervisory supervision. It was recommended, therefore, that the transfer of the administrative and statistical work to the Plans Section be made permanent and that the remaining functions be assigned to a new administrative service division.17

17. In MS 221.9, Organization, OS2:—Administrative.
Locomte, on 10 September, the Plans Section was directed to undertake a study of the Air Staff, showing its duties, functions, and interrelationships with other agencies of the AAF and with the divisions of the War Department General Staff, as well as procedures and systems of communications. Captain Faree of the Statistics Section, Air Staff, was designated as coordinator with the further duty of assisting in the prosecution of the study. The resulting studies were a survey of correspondence and other materials from the files of A-1, A-2, A-3, and A-4 for evidences of policy, followed by recommendations regarding the correction of the inadequacies discovered.19

To obtain a more disinterested viewpoint the Air Corps, more specifically the Plans Section, had engaged the services of Wallace Clark and Company, consulting management engineers of New York City. The Clark representatives, assisted by Air Corps consultants, surveyed the A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, and Air War Plans divisions, and the Statistics and Budget Sections of the Air Staff. Brief studies were made of the Public Relations Branch and the offices of the Air Inspector and Air Adjutant General. A report on organization, duties, and recommended changes was submitted as the study of each office was completed.

Finally, a concluding report was prepared summarizing the various recommendations and making certain observations regarding the Air Staff as

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18. R. E., Secretary of Air Staff to Exco., CGA, 10 Sep. 1941, in AAG 321.2, Air Staff, AD.
19. The studies are filed in ibid.
a whole, the reports did not discuss the fundamental relationships of the AG and OSS but did recommend that (1) the Air Staff be freed from operating details and be confined to consideration of policy matters, (2) office methods be standardized, (3) civilian personnel in administrative capacities be increased, (4) Air Staff policies be developed and stabilized, and (5) a plan to meet time objectives be adopted. The immediate results of this study were nil, but some of its recommendations were reflected in the organization of the following spring.

On 8 December the management engineering staff submitted to Lt. Col. E. L. Gates a plan for consolidation of all publications in a master manual of standard practice. This recommendation grew out of the discovery that AG policies, procedures, and forms were specified in no less than 24 series of publications. This "system" was confusing and had resulted in lowered efficiency and loss of time, even among old and experienced personnel. For new and inexperienced personnel it was much more serious. The situation was aggravated by what the Clark survey characterized as a lack of "Uniformity in the flow of papers, a great variety of methods for the handling of routine office services, such as personnel and supplies, and different ways of managing office work."

20. The Clark reports are filed in AG 321.9, Air Staff Office, AG, Special.
In addition to the internal weaknesses of the AD and the CGAC, there was a more fundamental difficulty—the relationship of those two agencies and the relationship of the air arm as a whole to the War Department. In late September the Plans Section undertook an over-all organization survey and requested the Bureau of the Budget to assist in this project. The Bureau agreed to do so, and the study was in progress at the same time as the Wallace Clark survey. Before the Plans Section had completed its task, the United States was in the war, and it was decided to reorganize the entire War Department along less cumbersome lines.\textsuperscript{22}

The War Department reorganization was delayed by the participation of the committee chairman, Brig. Gen. J. H. Mckerney, in the investigation of the attack on Pearl Harbor. An Acting Chief of the Air Corps was appointed, and the CGAC was thoroughly reorganized on 24 December 1941. By this shake-up the Plans Section came to an end, and its duties, along with some others, were lodged in the Assistant Executive for Administrative Planning and Coordination, Lt. Col. E. B. Gates. He was given the power to "plan and coordinate all administrative functions of the Office, Chief of the Air Corps."\textsuperscript{23}

This was the broadest authority given to any such agency or individual up to that time, and in the exercise of his functions Colonel Gates soon clashed with the Air Adjutant General. The

\textsuperscript{22} See AAFHS-10 (rev.).
\textsuperscript{23} CGAC memo 10-102, 24 Dec. 1941. For other functions of this executive see Chap. IV, this study.
letter complained on 22 January 1943 that he had tried to organize the former Administrative Division along the lines of an adjutant's office but that "the main stumbling block was the office of the Assistant Executive for Administrative Planning and Coordination. He declared further that approximately 30 "development, administrative and clerical personnel" had been transferred to the Assistant Executive's office which was "operating many of the details of an Adjutant General's Office." He recommended, therefore, that the Assistant Executive be given explicit instructions that his activities were limited to administrative planning. Such instructions, however, were never issued. Shortly after that time the term "organizational planning" began to be used in correspondence. On 9 February the Chief of the Air Service Command wrote the Assistant Chief of Staff at Wright Field that there had been designated in Headquarters, ASF an organizational planning staff which had been directed to prepare a detailed plan of organization of the Air Force. 24

Meanwhile, the framework for the reorganization of the War Department had been established, and General Arnold was directed to organize the Army Air Forces along similar lines. This task was

24. Memo, Col. W. P. Pearson to 0/AC, 22 Jan. 1943, in AAF-221.94, Organization, COASC. It should be pointed out that there was also an Assistant Executive for Technical Planning and Coordination, but his position did not develop into any importance before the abolition of the office on 9 March 1943.
delegated to Colonel Gates of the Plans Section who had been engaged in an organizational survey for some months. Colonel Gates reconstructed his committee to include himself, three other Air Corps officers, and two members of the Bureau of the Budget staff. This committee "conducted detailed studies to supplement the information which it had on hand, analyzed most of the functions located in基层, and called various key officers in for discussions."26 The main Air Corps problem areas and solutions were set forth in a memorandum of 30 January 1942.27 This communication was submitted by General Arnold to the War Department, some changes were affected, and the new organization was established on 9 March 1942. The Army Air Forces, one of the three coequal components of the War Department, was organized into a policy staff, an operating staff, and commands. Among the offices of the operating staffs, or directorates, was Management Control, which had as one of its subordinate divisions the Directorate of Organizational Planning.28

The performance of tasks such as the one which had just been accomplished by the Plans Section was made one of the functions of the new Organizational Planning directorate, which was given the power to 29

    Several other members of the Bureau of the Budget and the Air Corps attended the meetings of the reorganization committee.
27. In files of the Bureau of the Budget. For a fuller discussion of this reorganization and for the role played by other individuals in the development of organizational planning, see AYES-10 (rev.).
28. Air Circular No. 52, 2 March 1942.
29. Statement of Functions, 6 March 1943, 28, copy in AFHRS files.
conduct studies and surveys of administrative problems relating to the organization, flow of work, procedure, and management practice. ... Develop improved plans of organization and procedure. ... Review and advise upon all proposed changes in organization and procedure which affect the operation of other than the originating subdivisions. Review, coordinate, and give final approval to all proposed administrative publications relating to two or more Army Air Forces subdivisions. ...

To carry out these functions Organizational Planning was divided into four divisions: Administrative, Organization and Functions, Systems and Procedures, and Space Allocation.

Almost two years later, on 1 January 1944, it was divided into five branches: Publications; Personnel, Budget, and Fiscal; Training and Operations; Intelligence; and Supply and Transport. (See chart, "Organizational Planning Division, Office of Management Control," 1 January 1944, on following page.) In the intervening period the Directorate of Management Control had been raised to AG/AS, Management Control in September 1942 and on 29 March 1943 had been attached to the Office of the Chief of Air Staff. On 1 October 1944 the Intelligence Branch and the Personnel, Budget, and Fiscal Branch were combined to form the Administrative Branch. At the same time, a Procedures Branch was added, which was charged with the making of analyses for the improvement of administrative procedures and the development and installation of standardized practices.

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This remained the structure of Organizational Planning until its end. As a part of the withdrawal of functions from Management Control in July and August 1945, the personnel of Organizational Planning were

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transferred to several Headquarters offices when its duties became the responsibility of each major office "in its own sphere of operations." Organizational Planning was thus effectively dissolved. 31

The control concept adopted by the AAF in March 1942 was a new idea in military administration. As such it was obviously an experiment, but one which was destined to succeed because it filled a definite need. As long as the AAF was small, there was no particular reason for managemen control. As the organization expanded, some kind of coordinating mechanism was necessary as an aid to efficient administration. The management control device appeared first in Headquarters, and its supervision embraced the whole staff. Subsequently, however, "other control agencies" began to appear within particular offices in Headquarters and in the commands and continental air forces. By 1 September 1944 there were control offices in the Office of AG/AS, Materiel and Services, the Air Inspector's Office, the four continental air forces, and the Training and Air Technical Service Command.

The Control Office of Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution (MAD) later Materiel and Service, established in March 1943, was composed by December 1943 of the following branches: Analysis and Reports, Organization, Aircraft Distribution Control, Financial, and Price Adjustment. In addition, there was a Special Assistant to the Control Officer for the Scarce Parts Program and an Aircraft Distribution Office, the latter located at Patterson Field, Ohio. 32 It is obvious from the

titles of the branches listed above that the Control Office had
powers over and beyond those of a man-agement nature. The Organization
Branch had the power within HQD (I2O) to (1) conduct surveys of
organization, procedure, and methods; (2) coordinate administrative
publications; and (3) exercise control over the allocation of both
military and civilian personnel. In the performance of these functions
it worked in close collaboration with Organizational Planning.

The Control Division of the Air Inspector’s Office, established
in August 1943, was attached to the Office of the Deputy, the Air
Inspector. Its functions were partly of a control and partly of a
service nature. The former included the power to review and coordinate
all proposed forms and publications relating to inspection, while the
latter included the provision of central office services for the entire
office. The Control Division, as in HQD (I2O), maintained close
liaison with Management Control in the development of organizational
and procedural improvements.

The Management Control Section of the AE Training Command, which
was established on 24 September 1943, consisted of three units: Organiza-
tional Planning, Hanover, and Statistical Control. The functions of
Organizational Planning at that time were to handle, in
coordination with A-3, all matters relating to activation or inactiv-
ation of organizations and stations, the transfer of stations, and

33. I.e., Chart 11. These functions, for a short time previously,
    had been performed by the Administrative Inspection Division
    and before that by the Central Administrative Division, an
    outgrowth of an Administrative Branch established in November
    1942. See ARES-12 (rev.).
the establishment of schools or courses; to allocate office space in
headquarters and plan and direct office moves; to maintain organiza-
tional records and station lists; and to advise the Chief of Staff on
matters in jurisdiction. Subsequently, the duty of allocating
office space and maintaining records thereon was transferred to the
Office of the Adjutant General of the Air Training Command.

Among the important activities performed by the Organizational
Planning Unit after its establishment were (1) a plan to reorganize
installations at the AT Training Center No. 1, Naval Beach, Fla.;
(2) a report setting forth the experiences obtained from consolidation
of the Flying Training Command and the Technical Training Command; (3)
a study of the practicability of substantially reducing the number of
subordinate flying and technical training commands under the Training
Command; and (4) determination of all civilian mechanics, schools,
modification centers, installation points, and accumulation points of
the various technical training commands. Also it compiled a new station
list, a list of surplus units within the various flying and technical
training commands, and organizational charts of both the headquarters
and field installations.\footnote{Project Book of Lt. Gen. E. B. Hooton, copy in AOEO files.}
\footnote{Ibid. The control offices of the four continental
air forces were organized along the same lines as that of Training
Command. The former, however, generally included budget and fiscal
functions, and in some instances were under the control of a deputy
chief of staff.}
In the Materiel Command an Office for Organizational Planning was established in June 1943. Originally it was set up under the direct control of the deputy chief of staff, but on 23 December it was placed under the direction of an Executive for Organizational Planning. The office had the general responsibility of investigating and analyzing problems of organizational structure, utilization of manpower, business and administrative procedures, and management practices, of recommending courses of action for the solution of these problems, and of supervising in a staff capacity the implementation of the recommended courses of action then approved by higher authority. In addition to reviewing and approving the organizational structure of the various elements of the Materiel Command, the Office for Organizational Planning reviewed all command directives prior to their issuance. Its professional assistance also was available to survey, analyze, develop recommendations, and advise on manuveral problems.

The most elaborate control organization in the field was found in the Air Service Command. Here it was recognized that the execution of the mission of the command was "primarily a matter of business management rather than of military operation." It was for this reason that the old type of general staff was replaced by a functional organization, with supply, maintenance, and personnel and training divisions. It was also for this reason that a Control Office was established in the command headquarters, in the three divisions named above, and in the

35. Hq, Materiel Command, 152 23, 15 June 1943.
37. Hq, Materiel Command, 23-1, 15 March 1943, 103-05.
headquarters and divisions of the Air Depot Control Area commands. In command headquarters the Control Office was set up at the administrative echelon. Originally it was divided into four branches: Control Room, Statistical Control, Machine Services, and Organization Planning. The Machine Services and Statistical Control Branches subsequently were combined and transferred from the jurisdiction of the Control Officer. The Organization Planning Branch was divided into four units: Supply, Maintenance, Personnel and Training, and Procedures. Its functions were to maintain liaison with the control sections of the various branches; develop improved organization and procedures; recommend the complements of military and civilian personnel for headquarters, depots, subdepots, and other installations; review, edit, and approve administrative publications relating to organization and procedure; supervise the internal reporting system; and coordinate all requests for statistical information.

The theory underlying both the functional organization and the control office system of the Air Service Command was that of decentralized operation and centralized control. These terms were defined clearly, as follows:

39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.

Decentralized operation means maximum activity at a lower echelon with minimum recourse to higher authority; within the same echelon, it means maximum activity of each individual with minimum reference to his chief. Decentralized operation implies delegated authority.

Centralized control is the necessary complement of decentralized operations; it is a central power to keep
the organization together. It is exercised through organization defined as far as reasonably possible, promulgation of policies, standardized procedure set forth in detail, regular flow of reportsmemo and frequent inspections.

It might be added that with the functional organization and the re-alignment of the control office followed a survey of the Air Service Command by representatives from Organizational Planning in AAF Headquarters. In January and February 1943 a staff from several of the branches of Organizational Planning spent about three weeks at Dayton, Ohio, reviewing the organization and making recommendations for improvements. In the summer of 1943 the Materiel and Air Service Commands were combined, and by 31 August 1944 the process of consolidation had reached such a stage that the official announcement of the creation of the Air Technical Service Command could be made. 41 As a part of this integration the control offices of the two commands were combined into the Control Office of the new command.

Although the management control idea was discarded after three and a half years, it was not left without its advocates, its successes, and some admitted failures. Its adoption in March 1942 came as the result of a number of studies and proposals made during 1940 and 1941 by men who believed that the principles of business management could be successfully applied in a military organization. These men were Earl E. Kitzert and James C. Simmsen, Lt. Col. Byron L. Geter, Capt. James H. Farrar, several members of the Bureau of the Budget, and many others who played significant but nameless roles. The idea seems

originally to have been fostered by Bitner, who long had been associated with the Development Section of the Inspection Division. It was strongly supported by Sinnigen and Captain Perron. The role of Colonel Gates was the most dynamic, since it was he who seized upon the idea and actually put it into effect.

It could never have been adopted, however, but for the facts that the need was so obvious and the principle had been supported widely in nonmilitary circles. The air arm of the War Department had suffered in previous years from frequent reorganizations. The weaknesses of the old organization and some of its methods were intensified many times over with the coming first of the expansion period and then of war. Furthermore, there was the factor of greater autonomy. All of these combined to create the need. The result was an experiment as far as military organization was concerned. The experiment, however, was tried by other Headquarters offices and by several major commands of the A.F. These management control offices continued to exist even after the one on the highest echelon had been eliminated.

Opposition seems to have developed to the terms "management" and "control," in this respect, it would seem that the functions calling for administrative guides or managerial aids which affect all staff offices could have been centrally directed without the use of terms inconsistent with traditional military language. Then, too, the functions of Organizational Planning threw into close contact with every other staff office, and the nature of its mission frequently led to differences of opinion between that office and the other offices.

And Management Control, or more specifically Organizational Planning, confined itself more closely to the survey and planning functions and
been less concerned with actual operations; activities, it might better have performed its mission and longer survived the cumulative disapproval of the several offices. Although the functions of Organizational Planning were delegated to the several offices in their "own sphere of operations," the effect could hardly be the same since that was left uns several little groups without any coordinating agency.
Chapter III

ADMINISTRATION AND TaktE

The memorandum of 20 January 1943 which was submitted to General
Arnold by the consultant group on organization enumerated seven major
defects in the existing organizational structure of the air arm. This
chapter is concerned with only one of them, namely, the need for reor-
ganizing to mitigate reorganizations, and its corollary, the planning and
establishment of a more efficient organization. The report of 20 Jan-
uary pointed out that in the practice of making independent changes in
organization within offices, divisions, and sections, problems were
considered individually, "without regard to vertical and horizontal
relationships between units which are executing parts of the
same job." Such "piecemeal reconstruction of subordinate units" nearly
always increased duplication of functions. Also, the reorganizations
often were carried out hastily and were made by officers who could
not be objective since their own powers were involved.1

1. Summary of the report in Sunquist study, "War-time Organization of
the Army Air Force," 23-25. Wallace Clark, president of the
consulting engineering firm which surveyed the Air Staff in the
fall of 1941, stated that many decisions on air force organiza-
tion had been made "according to their expected effect either for
or against the formation of an air force separate from the Army.
This has been unfortunate because it has frequently resulted in
organization to sound principles." (Wallace Clark to Col. G. E. Lober,
7 Oct. 1943, in 7320 file.) This comment is, of course, subject
to differing interpretations and evaluations.
ground work for still further tinkering with the administrative structure. The frequency with which new plans for partial reorganization are introduced, indicates that the attendant plans have been adopted without adequate study of interrelationships. Means should be provided to control the scope and direction of divisional reorganization plans, thereby obviating the faults that are inherent in the present piecemeal approach.

One of the duties given to Organizational Planning in March 1943 was this rather negative function of preventing ill-considered and unauthorized partial reorganizations. The first major task was to monitor the reorganization of March 1942 and in so doing to lay plans for subsequent organizational changes. Circular 80, which affected the War Department reorganization of 9 March 1942, set up a period of three months within which the new Army organization was to be service tested. It was provided that the various divisions of the General Staff and the commanding-generals of the Air Forces, the Ground Forces, and the Services of Supply make recommendations by 9 June 1942. In the ARM the chiefs of all divisions were directed to submit their recommendations to the Deputy Chief of Air Staff before 9 June.

As a result of this directive, complaints came both from Headquarters offices and from the field. The most frequent over-all criticism was that each of the two staffs, instead of confining itself to its own field, was performing many of the functions of the other. Other comments stressed the facts that (1) the failure to delimitate clearly the responsibilities of the policy and operating staffs had prevented a desirable departmentization; (2) the Air Staff did not know what the directorates were doing and vice versa; (3) there was not even coordination among the "A's," much less among the directorates and between
the "A's" and the directorates; and (4) the continual policy and procedural changes reflected poor organization and staff work.  

All comments—some of which dealt with detailed difficulties—were referred to Management Control which, in turn, evaluated them and submitted its own recommendations on 9 July. These proposed a number of changes, the chief of which was the consolidation of policy-making (Air Staff) and operating (directorate) functions. The proposal for the elimination of the directorates was justified as follows:

Experience has proved conclusively that while dealing in shortages of both personnel and material... the organizational need for a policy echelon and the need for an operating echelon within the same organization to execute such policies is more theoretical than practical. Under stated conditions day-to-day policy and even long range policy cannot be formulated with any acceptable degree of accuracy without complete comprehension of operating capacity and of what effect even a slight change might have upon operating schedules. Therefore, it quite obviously follows that in order to achieve the most effective and efficient results, the office responsible for day-to-day and future policy should likewise be responsible for accomplishing desired results from an operating standpoint. Any office can unquestionably be so organized as to perform the task of policy formulation and operation and yet be under the direction of one person. The consolidation of these two functional levels will eliminate one organizational layer which now requires time-consuming coordination, results in divided responsibility, and often results in contradictory directives to lower echelons of command.

This proposal for reorganization was not approved.

On 4 August a conference was held upon a call of Maj. Gen. G. E.

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2. All comments relative to the working of the organization of 9 March 1942 are in AFSO files. For a fuller discussion of this subject, see AAFHS-10 (rev.), Chap. V.

Stratmeyer, Chief of Air Staff, to discuss organizational problems. Many of the comments of June were reiterated and others were added, but it was decided that the organizational structure was, in the main, satisfactory. Some changes followed, however, on 8 September, the principal one from the standpoint of this study being the transfer of Management Control from directorate to policy staff status. Between that date and the following March there were few organizational changes, but the organizational framework was a subject of continuing study.

On 5 February 1943 the Chief of Organizational Planning submitted, through Management Control, to the Commanding General a proposal for reorganization. This plan repeated the recommendations of the previous summer for eliminating the distinction between planning and operating responsibilities in the AAF Headquarters organization and proposed a number of other specific changes. This proposal alone with those made previously established the basis for the reorganization of 29 March 1943. Some modifications and adaptations were made, and the resulting organization eliminated the distinction between operating and policy functions by consolidating the directorates and policy staff offices into six offices of Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff. Some functions formerly performed by the directorates were assigned to field agencies in line with the principle of decentralization. This

4. Brief of comments of officers in conference called by O/AS for purposes of discussing the organization of Mo. AAF, in APSFO files.
growing definitely reduced the span of control in Headquarters
and built an organization along functional lines—one of the guiding
doctrines of all changes brought about by Organizational Planning.6

In addition to planning for the reorganization of March 1945,
Organizational Planning was responsible for numerous organizational
studies both in Headquarters and in the field. These studies almost
duly classification. They took place in the office of every assistant
chief of Air Staff. They were grouped by a variety of reasons, and
the results were varied. Some studies were initiated by Organizational
Planning, but a larger number were requested. The most logical arrange-
ment is to classify them as either (1) functional, (2) jurisdictional,
or (3) procedural. Although these classes overlap to a considerable
extent, the main outlines of each are reasonably clear.7

The functional study was conducted primarily: (1) to determine
who was or was not performing a function, (2) to determine who should
perform a new function, and (3) to eliminate unnecessary functions,
duplication, and conflicts. An example of the former type of study
was the survey of the Air Inspector's office made at the request of
General Arnold in 1943. This office had been investigated previously
by a board of officers, which had reported a serious breakdown in ad-
ministrative inspection over a considerable period of time and recov-

6. It was by the reorganization of 29 March 1942 that Management
Control was attached to the office of the Chief of Air Staff.
7. It is not the purpose of this monograph to discuss, according
to these classifications, all studies of Organizational Planning.
Rather, some examples of each will be set forth.
mended a general overhauling, strengthening, and expansion of AAF activities in this field. Management Control was therefore directed by the Chief of Air Staff to formulate a definite plan for the expansion of existing inspection facilities to provide a well-balanced technical, tactical, and administrative inspection service for all units and activities of the AAF. 8

The study which resulted from the directive reviewed the history of technical inspection from its establishment in 1937 and declared that the system was "complete and proficient." The study recommended that the system be continued but be transferred from the supervision of the Director of Technical Service to the Office of the Air Inspector. Administrative and tactical inspection were found, however, to be underdeveloped. It was therefore recommended that they be extended into systems similar to that in use for technical inspection. The study also outlined a plan of organization for the Air Inspector's office and urged the preparation by that office of regulations and manuals necessary to put the recommendations into effect. 9 The result was the publication of AAF Memorandum No. 132-3 on 23 September 1942, which incorporated the suggestions of Management Control.

Another functional study, in which Organizational Planning assisted, resulted in the establishment of the Air Communications Division of

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8. For a fuller discussion of this study, see AAFES-14 (rev.).
Operations, Commitments, and Requirements (OCTR) with functions which included all major communications activities in Headquarters. The Office of Flying Safety and the Weather Wing were the subject of similar studies, both of which resulted in reorganizations. The activities of the Training Aide Division were reviewed, with resulting reorganization. Similar studies were made in other staff offices in Headquarters, AF.

The second type of functional study was for the purpose of determining the organization or agency which should perform a new function. Such proposals usually came from outside Management Control and frequently were accompanied by studies of the subject matter. An example of this type of proposal is that made to the Commanding General by the Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel on 23 July 1945 on the subject of the disposition of AF officers and enlisted men returned from overseas. The personnel study pointed out that by August 1945 the flow of men from overseas would reach approximately 5,000 a month and would more than double that figure within a year. At the time the study was made these returnees were being assigned directly to the commands whose activities were deemed appropriate to the men's experience. To screening was done to determine the future assignment of these men.

10. See the note for Lt. Col. W. H. S. Strickler by the chief of the various branches of Organizational Planning, 4 Jan. 1941. A summary review briefly the principal accomplishments of each branch during the previous calendar year. (On file in AF510 files) For the role of Organizational Planning and Management Control in the establishment of the Office for Organizational Planning and Control, see AMP-10 (rev.).

11. For study on related matters see files in the Plans and Liaison Division of H/L, Personnel.
disposition or utilization of the hospitalized, retired, incompetent, or contaminated. The study therefore recommended that an Army Air Forces personnel redistribution command be established to receive and dispose of all personnel returned from overseas.

The recommendations having been approved in principle, there remained for Organizational Planning the job of setting up the new agency and defining its mission. After further study and conference with the Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel, AIR Memorandum No. 20-7 was issued on 7 August 1943. It established the Army Air Forces Personnel Redistribution Center, an exempted activity under the direct supervision of AG/13, Personnel. As more men returned from the combat zones the importance of the redistribution activity increased, and on 1 June 1944 the Redistribution Center was redesignated as the AAF Personnel Distribution Command and given broader functions.\(^\text{13}\)

Other examples of offices set up by Organizational Planning to perform new functions included the Special Assistant for Anti-Aircraft, the Special Assistant for the Glider Program, the Office of Legislative Services, the Air Procurement Board, the B-29 Special Projects Office, and the Ground Safety Division of AG/16, Personnel.\(^\text{13}\)

A third type of functional study, intended to eliminate unnecessary functions, was illustrated by the survey, undertaken in the summer and fall of 1944, of the organization and operations of Statistical...
Control. The study pointed out that undoubtedly the mission of the office was being performed and that the achievements had been outstanding (there being no comparable system of fact collection and analysis anywhere else in the armed services). It was pointed out, however, that "every means should be employed to assist the Division in the performance of its mission," and to that end it was desirable to determine the organizational and operating procedure best suited to the most efficient and effective performance of the mission of Statistical Control. The committee felt that neither the organization nor the procedures in effect were the most efficient nor the achievement of the desired ends.

Much of that was considered inefficient and ineffective was attributed to an "uncontrolled" growth of Statistical Control. The office had originally been built to fit the Headquarters organization in vogue at the time of its establishment, and it had not changed with Headquarters reorganization. The pressure of business had frequently forced the addition of new units without much consideration of the fact that their functions cut into those of the old. The scarcity of trained personnel likewise had contributed to a haphazard growth by accretion. The existing branches were not established on a functional basis; nor was there included in any one branch all functions necessary to the production of a finished report of a single category.

14. This study, actually conducted by a committee of Olympus Control, was perhaps the most intensive one made of that office and might also be classified as a procedural study. The documents were located, at the time of use, in the Executive Office, AFL-C; their present location is unknown. For a full account of the study and the fate of the recommendations, see draft AAF Historical Study, "Statistical Control in the AAF."
The results in determining which branch should undertake new work. The tendency to establish new branches for new activities had continued; and, in some cases, duplication and an unclear division of responsibility had resulted. Difficulties could, in the main, be corrected by improved organization.

The two-volume study then discussed the separate branches, their functions, and procedures, and made recommendations for eliminating or combining branches, transferring functions and personnel, and for the institution of more effective procedures.\textsuperscript{15} Discussion with Statistical Control brought adoption of several features of the study, further consideration of others, and rejection of still others. Although not all recommendations were accepted, the end result was a better-organized headquarters office.\textsuperscript{16}

Another kind of functional study, or operation, that did not fit exactly any of the designated classifications of functional studies but had characteristics of all, concerned the transfer of certain functions from the Signal Corps to the A.T.\textsuperscript{17} It appears that Organizational Planning played an insignificant role in the preliminaries to the decision to transfer the functions. Its part, however, in monitoring the project in the actual shifting of functions and facilities was an important one and fraught with many conflicting details. This shifting involved intensive work over a period of co-

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\textsuperscript{15} One recommendation, which would seem to be less sound than any of the others, was that all analysis be done in one branch rather than in the several branches where, naturally, knowledge of a particular report or subject is more intimate.

\textsuperscript{16} For a full account of this transfer, see A.E.S-10 (rev.).
approximately eight months ago had not entirely ended when Organizational Planning ceased to exist and its personnel were transferred to other offices.

Jurisdictional studies were those which involved related or conflicting functions, or which delineated the jurisdiction of offices performing similar activities. Much of this work was of a conference nature; that is, it was settled in conference between representatives of Organizational Planning and of the offices concerned. A great deal of it was also of a procedural nature, or in some cases it resulted in organizational changes. An example of this type of activity is found in connection with a proposal by the IO/AS, OCMR that certain AS photo
graphic units be consolidated. 18 This recommendation was made as a result of a study by the Reconnaissance and Photographic Branch, Reconnaissance Division, OCMR, which showed overlapping responsibilities on the part of the Photographic Technical School (OCT), the Engineer Aviation Photographic Company (1921), the Photo Intelligence Detachment (Intelligence), and the Photo Procurement Detachment (ASMR). OCMR maintained that 25 per cent of the officers and enlisted men (or a total of over 1,000 personnel) could be saved by the consolidation.

The proposal was rejected, however, by Intelligence and by IO/AS, the former maintained that the operations were complementary and that there was no duplication or conflict on functions. 19 The latter listed what it believed to be the functions of reconnaissance aviation and

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declared that "any other functions or activities now carried on or proposed ... are considered to be encroachments on the assigned functions of the Intelligence Officers and will tend to result in duplication of effort." 20

Management Control, after an extensive study of the problem, came to the conclusion that the recommendation of CG&R was "in line with the efforts this office has been making towards developing more functionalized and integrated AF units and organizations for both theater and Zone of Interior operations." 21 Therefore it recommended approval of the recommendation. However, staff supervision of most of these functions came to rest with CG&R. 22

The third type of study made by Organizational Planning was procedural in character. The use of judicious shortcuts in procedure as a means of expediting operations was authorized by the War Department Circular 69 which effected the reorganization of March 1943. As a result, the Chief of the Air Staff ordered all directorates, divisions, and commands "to determine those types of correspondence, particularly those between Washington and permanent installations in the field," that could be "handled circuitously, without transmission up and down the channels of command, and to determine the most direct and expeditious routing of such correspondence." They were instructed further to submit to Management Control a plan for the expeditious handling of the "individual types of correspondence and to make suggestions for other
provements in procedure. Management Control in turn was told to review the proposed plans, procedures that were approved, and ensure revisions of regulations as required. Although a number of recommendations were made by the various offices, no important changes in correspondence regulations were effected at the time.

On 22 August 1942 Headquarters Office Instruction No. 80-16 brought under the jurisdiction of Management Control all procedures, systems, forms, and instructions affecting two or more Headquarters offices. All proposals for change were required to be coordinated with other offices likely to be affected before submission to Management Control for final action.

Although Organizational Planning was given some degree with respect to AAF Headquarters procedures, it did not do as much in this field as it did in organizational planning. The principal exception was the development and use of so-called "checker charts." These were procedure charts for operations which involved a number of Headquarters offices. Usually they were done in pairs, one showing the existing procedures and the other the recommended procedures. At the end of August 1943 there were approximately 20 such charts either projected or in process of being drafted. Examples are procedures in drafting tables of organization, tables of equipment, tables of distribution, and tables of allowances, in moving a unit to a theater of operations, in equipping and deactivating a station, in allocating and moving aircraft, and in

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23. Memo, G/AS to all directors and chiefs, Eq. AAF and G3's of All Commands, April 1943, in IAC 312.43, Correspondence File.
In addition to drafting "Peter Rabbit," Organizational Planning also did several miscellaneous procedural studies. One of the most important of these dealt with the consolidation of all offices issuing and monitoring instructions on aircraft distribution. An Aircraft Distribution Office was set up in Dayton, Ohio, to perform functions formerly exercised by the Materiel, Air Service, and Air Transport Commands. In addition, a study of all the procedures used in the allocation, distribution, and monitoring of aircraft deliveries and modifications was made, which resulted in the transfer from OAM to MAC of responsibility for the mechanical transmission of orders to the three commands named above.

Organizational Planning also assisted in drawing up a series of AAF procurement instructions comparable to the procurement regulations of the War Department. It thus eliminated a rather hit-or-miss system that had existed in the past, and provided all AAF contracting officers with a single manual of AAF procurement policies and procedures.

In collaboration with the Bureau of the Budget and the Navy Department, Organizational Planning made a thorough survey of security policies and procedures for the General Staff and the Navy. This study was undertaken in the belief that during the defensive phase of the war too much protection had been recorded to relatively

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36. See note following for a "Peter Rabbit" showing the procedure in moving a unit to a theater of operations.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACTIONS</th>
<th>TIME IN DAYS</th>
<th>PART OF PREPARATION</th>
<th>UNIT OF ORIGIN</th>
<th>CCR</th>
<th>THE AIR FORCE</th>
<th>AD/AS</th>
<th>AD/AS</th>
<th>THE ARMY STATISTICAL CONTROL DIVISION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Plan Commitment and Implementation Branch, OCS, receives request from ING, JCSS for a specific type of unit for specific destination. This request will be processed to ensure completion of availability and right of way request from the theater air force commander, both through OCS, etc.</td>
<td>PRIOR TO 120 DAYS</td>
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<td>2. Technical specification of units to fill request is received by Plan Commitment and Implementation Branch, OCS, through coordination with the FAI, FAI-AS, and RSO, and interested headquarters offices. The request is processed in the form of a commitment list or by independent source and is forwarded to OCS with copy to JCSS and as a basis for preparation of carrying force. Copies furnished to the Air Inspector, FAI-AS, Training, and RSO, etc.</td>
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<td>a. A warning order is prepared by OCS and issued to the unit through the air force or JCSS. The unit receives the warning order as issued.</td>
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<td>b. Potential delays are noted and requested for resolution action or appropriate disposition is addressed to FAI-AS, OCS, or JCSS, Training, and other responsible agencies.</td>
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<td>3. Commitment to implementation plan by Theater Commanders and Implementation Branch, OCS.</td>
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<td>a. Contract requirements from Statistical Control, and information from FAI-AS, Training, and FAI-AS, OCS, and other sources pertinent to status report.</td>
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<td>b. Potential delays are noted and requests for resolution action or appropriate disposition is addressed to FAI-AS, OCS, or JCSS, Training, and other responsible agencies.</td>
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<td>4. Equipment questionnaire forwarded by Plan Commitment and Implementation Branch, OCS to FAI-AS, OCS, 30 days prior to readiness date.</td>
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<td>5. Air Inspector schedules a JCSS inspection and accomplishes same in month prior to readiness date.</td>
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<td>6. By fifteen (15) days prior to readiness date, FAI-AS, OCS has received from RE, Signal Corps, and Air Service Command unit equipment information, completes questionnaire and forwards to Plan Commitment and Implementation Branch.</td>
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<td>7. At least ten (10) days prior to readiness date, JCSS report, JCSS, 10 days prior to readiness date.</td>
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<td>8. Definitions upon JCSS report and equipment questionnaire are rated by the Plan Commitment and Implementation Branch, OCS and deficiencies brought to the attention of FAI-AS, OCS, and FAI-AS, Training, for resolution action.</td>
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<td>9. Status report prepared by the Plan Commitment and Implementation Branch, OCS for signature of OCS, JCSS. If major deficiencies of unit are indicated, the agency determining unit requirements is coordinated with the unit to ascertain whether unit can fulfill the major mission. All units with deficiencies are coordinated with FAI-AS, Planning.</td>
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<td>10. Status report signed by OCS, JCSS and forwarded to OCS for approval and transmission to Deputy Chief of Staff.</td>
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<td>11. FAI-AS, OCS approves status report recommendation, forwards to Deputy Chief of Staff for approval, and directs AFM Air Forces to prepare draft of movement order.</td>
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<td>12. Order of movement order from the Adjutant General and sends OCS for draft of movement order.</td>
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<td>13. Order of movement order from the Adjutant General and sends OCS for draft of movement order.</td>
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<td>14. Order of movement order from the Adjutant General and sends OCS for draft of movement order.</td>
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<td>15. Order of movement order from the Adjutant General and sends OCS for draft of movement order.</td>
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<td>16. JCSS receives call from Port of Embarkation within 10 to 10 weeks after receipt of movement order.</td>
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<td>17. JCSS moves to port of embarkation.</td>
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unimportant plants, and that a revision of policies and procedures was desirable. After visits to the Air Service and Materiel Commands, as well as to other installations, recommendations were made regarding proper methods for securing plants and facilities in the continental United States.

Organizational Planning also surveyed procedures used in establishing priorities for air and water transportation. This survey resulted in the creation in ODA of the Office of Transportation Priorities. Another study resulted in the preparation of a guide for the inactivation and discardment of MP stations and organizations. Several procedural studies in the field of personnel also were made. One of these resulted in the establishment of a system for assigning, controlling, and reporting Headquarters military and civilian personnel; another aided in the setting up of civilian payroll audit procedures.

The above examples show that Organizational Planning by no means neglected the procedures field. At the same time, however, it did not do so much there as it did in planning for improved organization. The establishment of the procedures Branch in October 1944 was an indication that more emphasis was to be given to that phase of activity. Although never more than two people were assigned to this branch, important records surveys were made and procedures established for such operations as the activation of tactical units committed for overseas movements, controlling and allotting such personnel in the Zone of Interior, handling bills of lading, and establishing basic military requirements, including tables of organization and equipment, special

lists of equipment, tables of allowances, and training standards. \textsuperscript{26}

If the branch had remained in existence after the termination of hostilities, it might well have made more worth-while contributions to the peace-time A\&F structure.

A project initiated by Monument Control and undertaken by a representative of Organizational Planning in the latter part of March 1945 contained elements of all three types of studies—functional, jurisdictional, and procedural. This was a survey of records maintained by the various Headquarters offices. \textsuperscript{27} SC/IS, training was the first office studied, each division and branch chief being consulted. Information was obtained concerning the types of records and files kept, the sources from which data were obtained, the kind of procedures employed, what persons used the records, how frequently they were consulted, and other factors that would indicate the utility or necessity of the records. It was discovered that there was a definite duplication of effort involved in the records in the Office of the Deputy for Services Training, Unit Operations Division. The surveying officer felt that this intra-office duplication should be eliminated and that a further saving might be effected by adding certain information to the existing SC/IS-31 report prepared by Statistical Control or by allowing the field reports to come directly to the Office of the Deputy for Services Training. The problem was discussed with Statistical Control, \textsuperscript{28} and after

several months of discussion the report was modified to the satisfaction
of AO/AS, training in the spring of 1945.

Surveys of record-keeping agencies of several other staff offices
were made by September 1944 and proposals were presented for inaug-
rating more efficient procedures and eliminating duplication of records, thus
accomplishing a personnel saving of approximately 12 per cent, or 75 people. 29
Some recommendations were accepted and instituted, but the saving was
considerably less than that predicted by Organizational Planning. 30

Organizational Planning made studies not only for AE headquarters
but also for the field. Most of the latter studies were at the air
force or command headquarters level. The following are cited as
examples of this activity.

A staff from the several branches of Organizational Planning spent
three weeks at the headquarters of the Air Service Command assisting
in its reorganization along functional lines. Its recommendations
contributed toward the distribution of the work of the command among
three divisions—Supply, Maintenance, and Personnel and Training. Also
resulting from the reorganization was a stronger Control Office to
monitor the total activities of the command. 31 The Supply and Transport
Branch of Organizational Planning did a detailed survey of the Air
Transport Command headquarters. This study extended not only to the

30. Lt. Col., Chief, HSO to Chief, HSO, 1 Jan. 1945, tab E, in
AOfiles.
31. Lt. Col., Chief, Supply and Transport Br. to Lt. Col. E. B. S. Deichler,
4 Jan. 1945, in AO files.
organization of the command but also to its operations and
and resulted in the writing of organization and functions chart,
the establishment of personnel ceilings, and the adoption of certain
improved procedures. 32

Supply and transport also made a study of organization and pro-
cedures in the Materiel Command. Since the results showed that the
problem involved could not be solved internally, the study was
broadered to include the external relations of the command. The result
was a recommendation for the creation of an air logistics command to
supervise and integrate the activities of the Air Transport, Air Service,
and Materiel Commands. This recommendation was based upon the theory
that since the problems of these commands were interrelated and since
their functions overlapped to some extent, coordination of their activ-
ities was desirable at a lower level of authority than that of the
Commanding General of the Army Air Forces. The proposal, however, was
not adopted. 33

A study of more significance in regard to the Materiel and Air
Service Commands led, in the summer of 1944, to their consolidation.
As early as 16 September 1942 Management Control proposed that the
Air Service, Materiel, and Air Transport Commands be brought under the
consolidated control of a commanding general of an air logistics
command. 34 The proposal was disapproved by the Chief of Air Staff,

32. Ibid.
ARCA files.
34. Ibid., 10/15, Management Control to G/15, 16 Sept. 1942, in ARCA
files.
but on 5 February 1943, when the over-all organization of the AT was under discussion, the consolidation was advocated again as a portion of the so-called "command plan," but it was not presented because the staff plan was more favored. 35

The idea behind these suggestions appeared to have been the creation of a supply force for the air arm. With the same intention the Chief of Air Staff prepared a draft memo for the Commanding General, AT on 16 December 1943 expressing the conviction that the time had come for the AT to consider the advantages of establishing its own services of supply. In considering this suggestion the chief of procurement control was on the opinion that the Materiel, Air Service, and Air Transport Command should be put under an air logistics command, but nothing was done at that time. 26

The problem of consolidation remained in abeyance until the spring of 1944. On 4 April the chief of Organizational Planning pointed out that approximately two and one-half years of experience with the development of the field organization for supply matters had brought certain basic facts into relief. Among these were (1) lack of harmony between Headquarters, AT, the Materiel Command, and the Air Service Command; (2) lack of clearly defined policies and exercise of broad controls; (3) unnatural division created by the segregation of the Materiel and Air Service Commands; (4) overlapping and conflicting

35. See memo, ATT TO CG, AT, 5 Feb. 1943, and related documents, in ATFO files.
boundaries of procurement, distributing, and using agencies in the AAF; 
(5) lack of harmony between the supply and other commands and air forces; 
and (6) lack of adequately qualified personnel. To these problems there 
were two alternative solutions: either a shifting of the existing 
personnel or an organizational change. The latter seemed preferable, 
and it was suggested that a deputy chief of air staff for materiel and 
supply be created and that the Material and Air Service Commands be 
merged. 37

While this proposal was germinating, the Commanding General, Air 
Service Command presented to Headquarters, AAF a plan for the creation 
of an assistant chief of air staff for logistics in order to provide 
better logistics service for his command. This was to be accomplished 
by moving many functions from the AC/AS, MXD to the new office and re-
assigning the remainder to an assistant chief of air staff for research 
and materiel. 38 In view of the proposal already under consideration 
this plan received little attention. 39

One portion of the proposal—the creation of another assistant 
chief of air staff and the splitting of functions—was seized upon as 
an opportunity for proving the greater wisdom of consolidating the two 
commands rather than dividing the Headquarters offices to correspond 
to the existing commands. In a series of about 30 cleverly executed

37. Memo, Lt. Col. R. E. S. Deichler to Brig. Gen. E. S. Perrin, 
4 April 1944, in AFKOP files. It was suggested also that one or 
two AAF general officers be placed in the G-4 Division of the 
War Department General Staff.
39. See attachment to ibid.
charts the representatives of Organizational Planning showed that the creation of two assistant chiefs of air staff would "aggravate the present unnatural separation of these functions between the Air Service and Materiel Commands in the field." Also, it would be violating the principles of functional consolidation recently approved as a basis of organization for all commands and air forces, and would be moving in a direction contrary to the three-deputy plan approved by General Arnold for the postwar air force, extending from the bases through Headquarters, AAF. It was held that the proposed organization, therefore, would not strengthen the supply and maintenance agency in Headquarters but would confuse "its leadership in the commands" and deprive it of "unified leadership in Headquarters." This would result in duplication, waste, and inefficiency in Headquarters and commands, whereas the creation of an assistant chief of air staff for materiel and supply and the amalgamation of the Materiel and Air Service Commands into an air materiel service command would bring about uniformity of organization, a logical succession of activities (for it was felt that planning and action on supply matters should not be split), a streamlining of procedures, and a clear-cut division of authority in Headquarters and command. Such a realignment, moving the merged field organization out of the command line, would correct the many ills surrounding the supply field and erase the incorrect concept that "supply" is a "command" and not a "service." The immediate objective was to redesignate AC/AS,

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40. Chart 3, in AFMOP files.
41. Charts 6, 7, 8, in AFMOP files.
42. It was pointed out also that such a structure would remove vulnerability to public censure and investigation for waste because of lack of coordination and integration in a "field that business and Congress can understand."
MM&D as AC/AS, Materiel and Supply and to create an air materiel service command to coordinate the two existing commands. The ultimate objective was to have the office of an assistant chief of air staff known as air materiel services which would establish broad policies and controls, and the air materiel services command would absorb the two other commands and be the operating agency.  

General Frank approved this plan but believed that the creation of the additional echelon of command was not desirable. Maj. Gen. O. P. Echols, AC/AS, MM&D also approved the principle of the consolidation but stated that the proposal for the DC/AS, M&S, AC/AS, M&S, etc. made him "dizzy" with "layering"—there were too many staff layers and too many command layers, the division of authority was uncertain, and the division of responsibility not clear. The Assistant Secretary of War for Air, referring to several discussions which he had held with Management Control representatives, thought that the establishment of an assistant chief of air staff for air materiel services and a single command to operate under the jurisdiction of that Headquarters office was "sound from an administrative point of view, more economical in headquarters personnel and better adapted to insure coordinated business management." The Assistant Secretary pointed out that the enumeration of duties could be made clearer by the use of the business rather than the military approach. He also emphasized a point which

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43. Chart 9, in AFRICOP files.
frequently has been a determining factor in organizational changes: "Almost any organization will work if it is commanded by unusually competent individuals who are determined to make it work and who will not insist on personal prerogatives and titles. The better the organization the easier the job is and the greater chance there is of effective results with men of average ability." The converse—that an excellent organization would not be effective if commanded by mediocrities—was equally true, so the Assistant Secretary felt that the existing organization had better be retained "unless there are available first-class men to undertake the job outlined in the proposed new setup." 46

The work on reorganization was continued by Organizational Planning, and on 23 June the Chief, Management Control transmitted a proposed AAF Regulation 20- to the Chief of Air Staff creating the assistant chief of air staff for materiel services and the air materiel services command. One week later Lt. Gen. William S. Knudsen, Director of Production for the War Department, visited Wright and Patterson fields. He wrote to General Arnold that he believed consolidation of the two commands should be postponed until after the European war but that the plans should be ready. 47 General Arnold transmitted General Knudsen's proposals to the Chief of Air Staff and expressed the conviction that a directive should be issued making General Knudsen

his representative as head of a new command; Maj. Gen. B. E. Meyers
General Knudsen's deputy; Brig. Gen. K. B. Wolfe head of the Material
The goal was to decentralize so far as possible all materiel efforts
so that the least possible administration would be done in Washington.
The consolidation into one command "should be a gradual growth, be not
hurried, but be consummated say by the end of six months." 48

Consequently, on 14 July the Headquarters of the AAF Materiel and
Services Command was established. Three days later the duties of that
command were given in greater detail and the AC/AS, MM&I was redesignated
the AC/AS, Materiel and Services. 49 AAF Regulation 20-43 of 17 July
1944 stated that one of the responsibilities of the director of the new
command was the ultimate merging of the Materiel and Air Service Com-
mands "into a single command, based upon the policy of complete and
thorough consolidation, integration and functionalization of activities,
operations and facilities under his jurisdiction." This regulation
was replaced by 20-43 of 27 July 1944, but the only difference was a
lessening of the expressed controls of the AC/AS, MM&I over the director
of the new command.

The process of integration of the commands seems to have been
more rapid than anticipated, and on 31 August 1944 the new command was
redesignated the Air Technical Service Command, charged with responsibility
for carrying out the operating program of the AAF in the field of materiel

49. AG 322 (14 July 1944) OB-I-AFSPCG-M, 14 July 1944; AAF Reg. 20-43,
17 July 1944; Hq. AAF, CO #10, 17 July 1944.
and supply. Thus, after a three-year separation into two commands, the greater portion of all AAF materiel and supply activities again was made the responsibility of a single command.

Practically all of the other commands and air forces in the Zone of the Interior were at one time or another surveyed by the Training and Operations Branch of Organizational Planning. The Second Air Force was reorganized along functional lines. The First and Fourth Air Forces were studied with a view to promoting the transfer of complete control over them to the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces. The Troop Carrier and Training Commands likewise were "presented" with new organizations which were adopted and put into operation. Training and Operations also was responsible for the establishment of the Flight Control Command, and later for its dissolution and the creation in its place of the Headquarters Office of Flying Safety. Likewise it studied the exempted activities, that is, those reporting directly to the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, and made recommendations resulting in the assignment of some of their activities to the various commands and air forces. The major study of an exempted activity was of the School of Applied Tactics. So far as field surveys were concerned, the emphasis shifted in 1943 from the air force and command level to the lower echelons. For example, studies were made of base organization, of subdepots, and of Arms and Services inte-


51. A special staff office also was established for communications, some phases of which had been under the jurisdiction of the Flight Control Command.
The study of the AAF School of Applied Tactics (AAFSAT) in Orlando, Fla., was initiated in June 1943 at the request of Maj. Gen. B. M. Giles, Chief of Air Staff. Three representatives of Management Control, including General Gates, visited Orlando and reviewed the organization of the school and of the AAF Board. At that time it was decided that AAFSAT should be reorganized to separate its training activities from the work of demonstration, testing, and research and that this job should be done by the Commandant and his staff.

In the early part of July General Giles forwarded to Management Control a tabulation showing that personnel requests from AAFSAT during the past three months would, if granted, have resulted in a complement of over 45,000 military personnel. He indicated that this number was far in excess of what was needed to do the job, and asked that a thorough study be made of AAFSAT's organization and manning. Accordingly, a representative of Organizational Planning was sent to Orlando. He found that action already had been initiated in line with Management Control's recommendations of the previous month, to separate training from the other activities and to determine how many people were needed to carry on the training program. It was decided then that a complete organizational and manning survey should be made.

Using the manpower requests made by each unit as a basis upon which to work, each activity was analyzed in terms of its relationship to the mission and other activities of AAFSAT and on the basis of the number and type of personnel necessary to carry on the activity. Teaching loads were examined to see if they could be increased and to determine the number of instructors needed in each department. After
thorough analyses of all AAFSAT activities, tentative recommendations of personnel requirements were drawn up for each activity, and after discussion of these with the responsible officers and with the Executive, the Chief of Staff, and the Commanding General, adjustments were made and final recommendations for manning arrived at.\textsuperscript{52}

The study of AAFSAT revealed the existence of a number of problems. The first and foremost was the lack of a clear-cut mission—a deficiency which was attested to by responsible officers throughout the organization. A second problem was the ineffective control which the Commanding General exercised over the elements of his command. This situation was found to exist because too many persons reported directly to him, and a functionalized organization was lacking. Another problem arose out of the tremendous growth in personnel and facilities which had taken place in such a brief period of time.

Upon the basis of this analysis Organizational Planning made a number of recommendations regarding the organization of AAFSAT and its relationship to Headquarters, A.F. On 1 September Generals B. L. Giles, B. E. Cates, L. P. Whitten, R. W. Harper, and Hume Peabody met in Orlando for the purpose of discussing these recommendations. At this time the manning recommendations were accepted, and it was agreed that AAFSAT should be reorganized. Since General Peabody thought that it would be impossible to shift directly to the new functionalized organization, it was agreed that the transition should be in two stages.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{52} See papers in AFDIC files.
\textsuperscript{53} See papers in AFMOP files.
The new organization of AAFSAT was a modified version of the three-directorate plan, a functionalized structure which contrasted sharply with the long-established staff organization. The germ of this plan had come from the Flying Training Command as early as the autumn of 1942. It had been fostered informally by its sponsors in Organizational Planning and Management Control in the following months. Within a year the concept had gained many adherents, and action was taken to make it the official AAF organization.

On 24 April 1944 telegrams were sent to all continental air forces and commands instructing them to place into effect "as rapidly as is consistent with efficient operations" the new system involving a Director of Operations, a Director of Administration, and a Director for Supply and Maintenance, the three of whom under the commanding officer would be responsible for the operations of the agency. It was pointed out that charts would be issued and that a conference on the plan would be held at a later date. The messages emphasized, however, that insofar as the mission of a command or air force did not lend itself naturally to this pattern, the adoption of the new plan would not be required at that time.\(^5\)

The result was the adoption of this organization for all base units and the rather gradual acceptance of it in the higher echelons. In the commands and air forces, however, the Air Inspector, the Budget and Fiscal Officer, and/or some form of Control Office were placed immediately

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55. Copies of telegrams in AFMOP files.
under the commanding officer, and the three-directorate scheme was modified to conform more closely to the mission of the agency. On 7 July 1944 the Chief of Management Control sent out the functional charts, as guides, to the continental air forces and commands, asking for review and suggestions. Comments generally were favorable; only the details involved some difficulties and differences of opinion.

The transmittal of these charts to Headquarters offices on 18 July brought more criticism. AC/AS, Training was the most critical, expressing the feeling that the proposed organization was top-heavy and would work "only where the individuals personally get along together," and that the former system could "better be adjusted to keep abreast of changing requirements." That office did not desire to give the impression of nonconcurrency, but was definitely of the conviction that the new organization "should be given . . . thorough trial by the Air Forces and Commands before it is directed as final." AC/AS, OC&R questioned the efficiency of "metering" the advice of the experts at the bases through a director and pointed out that this type of organization presupposed the integration of the Arms and Services, which integration had not yet taken place. Other comments varied in their enthusiasm for the plan; the undertone of many was that there should be a fourth

56. See charts in AFMOP files. Perhaps the most signal departure occurred in the ATC organization, which had four directors: Personnel and Administrative Services, Operations (including maintenance), Priorities and Traffic, and Supply and Services. ATC Reg. 20-3, 14 July 1944.
57. See comments in AFMOP files.
directorate, which should handle the field activities of that particular Headquarters office.  

On 22 August General Arnold informed the establishments in the Zone of the Interior that the three-directorate plan was official, but that too many commanders and subordinates were unacquainted with the plan and the philosophy back of it. He stressed the fact that if the new organization was to function, it must not only be official but must be understood on all echelons. He urged giving "this matter of base organization . . . careful personal attention. It is one of the most important factors in giving us a hard-hitting machine now and after the war." General Arnold inclosed a letter dated 21 August and addressed to all base commanders. This letter set forth the organizational objective of the AAF and the five organizational doctrines to be followed in achieving that objective. In pursuance of that end, it was noted that the subdepots had been transferred to the AAF. The AS.AAF were being integrated, and a new tactical organization consolidating under the tactical commander both maintenance and combat elements was instituted. The functionalized base organization would integrate units and individuals performing like functions into one team of three complementary elements and would "pay off" by (1) having only a few people reporting to the commanding officer, thus relieving him of many duties and allowing him to spend more time in planning and supervising responsibilities; (2) establishing clear-cut

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60. See R&R's in AFMOP files.
61. CG, AAF to CG, Fourth Air Force et al., 22 Aug. 1944, in AFMOP files.
command lines and eliminating split jurisdiction of command and responsibility; (3) eliminating overlapping operations; (4) providing effective controls; (5) utilizing manpower most effectively; (6) permitting expansion or contraction without fundamentally disturbing the organization; and (7) permitting standardization of base organization throughout the AAF and corresponding standardization of each echelon above. It was noted that the organization had been tested and approved and that minor changes to meet local conditions were encouraged if they meant more efficiency and fell within the broad principles of the plan. By September the three-directorate system was in operation at all AAF bases in the United States, the headquarters of all continental air forces, and in all command headquarters with the exception of the Troop Carrier and Training Commands. 63

The adoption of this type of base organization facilitated, and was facilitated by, the integration of the ASTAF. The story of this accomplishment began in May 1943 with a suggestion to Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, by the Army Service Forces that all service troops have one insignia. The AAF, in turn, was advised informally by General McNarney's office that a similar suggestion from it "would be favorably received and should be presented for consideration in connection with the formal presentation of the Army Service Forces proposal." 64

63. The plan had not been put into operation in the headquarters of the subcommands of the Training Command. Though the Training Command was first to adopt the organization officially for all its bases, there seems to have been some difficulty in "selling" it to the higher echelons for their own use.
Accordingly, Organizational Planning prepared a proposal which
was submitted to General McNarney about 15 June 1943. This study was
returned with some suggestions and a request that it be resubmitted. 65
The proposal was revised by Organizational Planning and returned to
the Office of the Chief of Staff on 7 July 1943. The following para-
graphs are quoted from this document, since they present a clear-cut
statement of the over-all problems: 66

Personnel of Service and other miscellaneous units
with the Army Air Forces retain distinctive insignia.
This "unionization," whereby Ordnance, Quartermaster,
Chemical Warfare, Signal, Finance, Engineer, and Trans-
portation personnel wear distinctive insignia, limits
their respective activities to tightly drawn lines.
This situation causes split channels and loyalties.
In many cases, reports are made to equivalent groups
of higher echelons instead of through command channels.
Waste of manpower, duplication of effort, and unnecessary
inefficiency in matters of personnel, supply, training,
and operations result.

Several categories of activities now performed by
arms and services units with the AAF are functionally
similar to those of purely Air Corps personnel and units.
Glaring examples of this are Ordnance and Armament, Signal
and Communications, supply functions of all arms and serv-
ces and Air Corps supply personnel. The amalgamation and
functionalization of these units and personnel would tend
to a greater saving of manpower. In one bombardment group
when the "unionization" was eliminated, a saving of 25% of
the authorized personnel and 40% of the equipment was
accomplished. Since approximately 30% of the personnel
making up the AAF Program are and will be arms and services
personnel, the extent of the possible saving is high.

The tight categories which result from the existence of
arms and services designated personnel and units as such
within the AAF have resulted in much duplication of effort
and inefficiency. The Quartermaster, the Ordnance, the
Engineer, the Chemical and the Signal Units as well as

65. Memo, Col. Otto Nelson to Col. B. E. Gates, 24 June 1943, in
AFHOP files.
66. Memo, Chief, AFDHC to Chief of Staff, 7 July 1943, in AFHCP files.
the Air Corps units handle motor vehicles in varying
degrees. The Ordnance and Chemical Warfare units both
deal in bombs. All branches have administrative work
of similar types. The Ordnance men wheel the bombs up
to the planes and the Armament men load them on the
planes. The Armament men handle the repair of gun mount,
the Ordnance men, the maintenance of guns. The Signal
men in general limit their interests to ground equip-
ment, the Communications men to air equipment. The
automotive mechanics and airplane mechanics are seg-
regated. The supply men of all categories are seg-
regated. There are multitudinous examples of the
duplication resulting from an old historical organi-
sation being superimposed on the Army Air Forces rather
than a functional organization being integrated into
the AAF.

This study was returned by General McNamara's office with a re-
quest for a more detailed description of tables of organization and
types of organization which would be used under the new system. A
bombardment group in Great Britain was found "to be using a function-
alized table of organization." This group's organization and studies
prepared by the Manpower Division of Management Control were used as
the basis for outlining the type of table of organization and domestic
station organization which the AAF recommended. 67

This bombardment group (the 97th) had had a remarkable record.
It had shot down or damaged a substantial number of the reported
first-line German fighter force with a loss to itself of only one
airplane. In addition, in more than seven months of existence, both
in the United States and in the theater, it had never had a court-
martial. More than 80 per cent of its planes had been ready for action
all of the time. "It operated with 48.7 per cent of the equipment

1943, in AAG 321C, Army Air Forces.
allotted to it, and with 653 less [men] than called for in tables of organization existing when it was organized."

This record had been accomplished in the following manner. The Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron was abolished and the entire group was placed under a single commander with an air executive (operations and tactics) and a ground executive (personnel and supply). In turn each squadron commander had two executives charged with similar functions. Branch distinctions were eliminated and all personnel were considered members of the AAF. When the squadron moved, all its ground personnel moved with it, and the squadron became a self-contained unit.

The record of this squadron and a functional manning table for a typical basic flying school were presented to the Chief of Staff on 23 July 1943 with the recommendations (1) that all Arms and Services personnel on duty with the AAF be detailed to duty with the Air Corps, and (2) that all Arms and Services units be reconstituted into AAF functional organizations with appropriate AAF designations. This study was returned about the middle of August with a request for additional information.

About the same time General McNaury directed the Army Ground Forces, the Army Service Forces, and the Army Air Forces to submit a joint study on the practicability of consolidating and reducing the number of storage and issue services and the number of services

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68. Memo, CG, AAF to Chief of Staff, 23 July 1943, Tab A, in AAFOP files.
responsible for third, fourth, and fifth echelon maintenance.\textsuperscript{69} The study also was to deal with the elimination of units having special designations if they could perform services for two or more of the principal commands. Units being organized for activities which could be considered nonessential also were to be abolished. Shortly thereafter, the AAF named a board of 11 officers under the presidency of Maj. Gen. Delmar H. Dunton to meet at the School of Applied Tactics for the purpose of making such investigations and recommendations as might be necessary to comply with this directive.\textsuperscript{70}

The joint report directed by General McNarney, entitled "Review of Present Organizational Structure of the Army," was in reality three reports, each separately presented but concurred in by all branches.\textsuperscript{71} The AAF section "covered primarily the proposed functional streamlining of Air Force General Depots and Air Maintenance Groups, the latter designed to take the place of the present service groups."\textsuperscript{72} The Service Center at the School of Applied Tactics was found by the Dunton Board to be composed of eight different types of units, each of which was "organized and equipped to perform supply and maintenance functions in connection with the equipment of a particular service." In order to eliminate the resulting duplication in equipment, the AAF School of Applied Tactics set up for service testing a maintenance group.

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\textsuperscript{70} AAF Letter 210,482, 31 Aug. 1943.
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\textsuperscript{71} Filed in AAG 320A, Organization of the Army.
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organized not by service but functionally into three units. Under this organization the headquarters squadron became responsible for all administration; the maintenance squadron, for all maintenance; and the material squadron, for all supply. A new type of general depot also was set up at the School of Applied Tactics to provide fourth echelon supply and maintenance.

The AAF section of the joint report\(^{73}\) therefore recommended that all service centers and general depots be reorganized functionally rather than by branch of service. In order to facilitate the accomplishment of this recommendation, it was further recommended "that action be expedited on the request of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, for elimination of branch distinction of arms and services with the Army Air Forces and theater Air Forces." Thus, it was "rather neatly brought to the attention of General McMarney that the streamlining of Air Maintenance Groups and Air Force General Depots, which was proposed by the joint study then before him, could be implemented by the Air Forces only if we were also authorized to regard all our personnel as simply Air Corps personnel, and use their talents in any jobs for which they were fitted."\(^{74}\)

The office of the Deputy Chief of Staff on 20 October 1943 approved the functional reorganization of both the general depots and the maintenance groups, as well as the elimination of branch

\(^{73}\) The AAF section is Tab C of the report.
distinctions between the Arms and Services with the AAF. The last-
named approval was granted without waiting for the AAF study on the
subject, which was made separately, to be completed and formally pre-
sented to him.

A rewritten consolidation study was submitted to General McNamey
on 20 October 1943. This study pointed out that personnel savings,
improved efficiency, greater flexibility, increased morale, and abolish-
ment of unnecessary paper work would result from the elimination of
ASWAAF and the creation of functionalized Air Corps organization. It
therefore recommended that all ASWAAF personnel, in the United States
and overseas, both military and civilian, be transferred to the Air
Corps. These recommendations were approved promptly by General
McNamey.

The principles of the integration program having been approved,
the next step was to set up a committee to facilitate and monitor the
conversion. This was done by AAF Memorandum No. 20-13 of 9 November
1943, which created a permanent Arms and Service Integration Committee
under the chairmanship of the chief of Management Control and containing
representatives of the staff offices of Management Control; Personnel;
Operations, Commitments, and Requirements; Plans; Materiel, Maintenance,
and Distribution; Training; Budget and Fiscal; the Air Surgeon; the
Air Judge Advocate; Air Communications; and representatives from each
of the Arms and Services with the AAF.

1943, in AAG 321B, Army Air Forces; memo, Brig. Gen. B. E. Gates
76. This study is filed in AAG 321A, Arms of Service and Departments.
The committee was given the responsibility of developing an operating plan for and making recommendations regarding the efficient and expeditious transfer of AAF personnel to the Air Corps. It was to draw up uniform systems of procurement, ratings, and promotions, establish training procedures, prepare new functionalized tables of organization, tables of distribution, and manning tables, develop new reporting forms and guides, strength and status reports, classification data, and the like, and amend all War Department and AAF publications conflicting with effective functionalization. The guiding principles to be applied were "(a) conservation of manpower and equipment, (b) increased efficiency by functionalization, and (c) proper assignment of personnel according to talents and training." 77

In the meantime, rumors of the conversion had become widespread. In order to allay fears on the part of the persons affected, General Arnold on 6 November 1943 dispatched a reassuring letter "to all personnel of the Army Air Forces," in which he said:

Those of you who are presently identified as "Arms and Services with the Army Air Forces" have my personal assurance that the job of converting all personnel to Air Corps and integrating the arms and services organizations into functionalized Army Air Forces organizations will be done most carefully and thoroughly over a period of time, that all of your special skills will be utilized to the utmost, and that your opportunities for service and advancement will be broadened and enhanced, limited only by your own abilities.

The first meeting of the Arm and Service Integration Committee was held on 16 November 1943. At that time General Gates, as chairman,

77. AAF Memo 20-18, 9 Nov. 1943.
declared that integration was "a real move toward the aim of a separate air force." And indeed it was. More than 600,000 AAF personnel, including approximately 54,000 officers, were no longer to be Ordnance, Quartermaster, Chemical Warfare, Signal, Finance, Engineer, or Transportation personnel, but were to be fully integrated into the AAF. The AAF had grown numerically by approximately 30 per cent and in so doing had taken one more step in the direction of independence.

Eleven meetings of the Arm and Service Integration Committee were held during November and December 1943. At the first meeting, Lt. Col. R. E. S. Deichler, Chief of Organizational Planning, pointed out that there were two main problems involved: (1) time for removal of branch insignia, and (2) tables of organization and functional integration. At later meetings subcommittees were appointed on the following subjects: (1) removal of insignia, (2) tables of organization for service units, (3) tables of organization for tactical combat units, (4) tables of equipment, and (5) classification.

The introduction of the new base organization and the acquiring of additional controls by the AAF over funds and other functions made the process easier. On 11 September 1944 Change No. 13 to AR 170-10 was published. By this regulation practically all functions being controlled by the ASF on Class III installations were transferred to the AAF. These functions were spelled out in detail by War Department Circular No. 388 of 27 September. With this action practically every control had passed

78. Minutes of the First Meeting of Arm and Service Integration Committee, in AFSO files.
79. Ibid.
to the AAF base commander, there was only one commander left at each base, and the functionalized organization promised more efficient operation with no question as to the placing of responsibility and authority.

The process of integration of the AFSAAF was not without its delays. On 3 December 1943, before the proposed War Department circular for integration was presented to the General Staff, the Deputy Chief of Staff restricted the process to tactical organizations wherein a 20 per cent saving of personnel could be accomplished, and excluded from the integration program the AAF medical and aviation-engineer units as well as the continental U. S. organizations and installations. 80 The process was carried on in some of the tactical units, but it was not until April 1945 that the restriction concerning Zone of Interior establishments was removed. This action affected approximately 85,000 ASWAAF officers and enlisted men, and the process was to be a gradual one. The officers assigned to duty with the AAF could request to be detailed in accordance with AR 605–145, while assigned enlisted men could be transferred according to AR 615–200. 81 Though the process continued in an orderly manner, in September 1945 there were still many ASWAAF's who had not been integrated into the AAF. 82

Two other projects in which Organizational Planning played a significant role were the establishment of the AAF Center in June 1945,

80. Memo, Chief, AFMC to Brig. Gen. E. S. Perrin, 27 Jan. 1944, in AAG 321, Integration of Arms and Services into the AAF.
81. AAF Reg. No. 35–37, 9 April 1945; memos, Chief, AFDMC to CG, AAF, 5 April and 6 June 1945, in APSHO files. Medical and Chaplain personnel were still to be reported as ASWAAF.
82. For a comprehensive account of the Arms and Services integration program, see incl. 1 to memo, Chief, AFDMC to O/AS, 23 May 1945, in APSHO files.
and the delineation of responsibilities between Headquarters, AAF and Headquarters, Continental Air Forces. The latter project involved some rather intensive activity from December 1944 to June 1945. 83

The above-discussed projects and achievements are indicative of the more important activities of Organizational Planning. In addition, however, there were a number of duties which were distinctly miscellaneous in character. These consisted of handling routine, day-to-day correspondence; resolving functional disputes; clarifying missions; and "handling telephone and personal inquiries from people who think we know everything." Such tasks consumed "the better part of our time and the larger part of our energies." 84

83. For a discussion of these topics, see AAFHS-10 (rev.).
Chapter IV

ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL IN HEADQUARTERS AND FIELD

Administrative planning offices in the federal government are of two types. One type is the service office, assisting the head of the department or establishment in planning, organizing, and operating the entire agency. The second type is the control office which, although administratively responsible to the head, nevertheless exercises some direct administrative supervision over other parts of the agency. 1 Organizational Planning had some of the characteristics of both of these types. Its organizational studies and surveys, as seen in the previous chapter, were primarily of a service nature. Perhaps it is somewhat more accurate to say that they would have been of a service nature but for the fact that the agency had certain collateral controls which served as aids to compliance. Such controls had several advantages, among which were the avoidance of duplication; the assurance of conformance to established policies; and the insurance of coordinated staff action. The controls themselves extended over publications and over manpower. It is to these that attention is directed in the present chapter. 2

2. Sometimes it was maintained that the controls of Organizational Planning could never be truly effective until it had the power of administrative inspection. The operation of an inspection agency would have fundamentally altered the nature of the work of Organizational Planning and probably jeopardized its effectiveness by detracting from its good will.
The first type of control which Organizational Planning exercised over Headquarters organization was in the publications field. Prior to 1941 the Inspection Division supervised administrative publications. The preparation of new publications or changes in existing ones was the responsibility of the division primarily interested. Before issuance, however, each such publication had to be submitted to the Inspection Division for review of both form and nature of material.  

In 1941 this system was changed. By Headquarters Office Instruction No. 5-2 (10 July 1941) the division or section normally concerned with a particular subject was made responsible not only for the "preparation, in draft form, of a new publication or the revision of an existing" one, but also for obtaining "the coordination or concurrence of all other interested divisions or sections." The draft then had to be submitted to the Air Adjutant General "for editing, including check for form, adequacy, proper titling, and clarity." The Air Adjutant General wrote the final draft, assigned the proper number, and returned the publication to the originating office for check as to completeness and correctness. After further coordination, the final draft was submitted to the Chief of the Air Staff for approval and signature. If approved, it was returned to the Air Adjutant General for publication and distribution.

A survey by James C. Sinnigen in December 1941 indicated that no less than 20 different types of publications were being issued.

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at that time. As already noted, he recommended the publication of a master manual "making readily available to every person all official directives and instructions in a modernized, convenient, and complete handbook." This recommendation, however, was not adopted. Instead, the Assistant Executive for Administrative Planning and Coordination (Lieutenant Colonel Gates) was given the power to:

a. Coordinate and edit publications of an administrative nature.

b. Determine the various types of administrative publications necessary to meet the needs of the Air Corps; review, and reissue where necessary in the new series, the existing Digest of Air Corps Policies, the Air Corps Circulars, Air Corps Circular Letters, and CCAC Office Memoranda.

c. Approve all requests for issuance of new Air Corps forms or revision of existing forms.

d. Consult with designated representatives of various activities regarding the style and content of administrative publications issued pertaining to their activities.

Shortly after the issuance of this directive, Colonel Gates set up a Procedures Section in his office to exercise the powers conferred upon him. This section promptly began to survey existing administrative publications with a view to consolidation and reissue.

The reorganization of 9 March 1942 established the Director of Organizational Planning, who, among other duties, had control of publications. AAF Regulation No. 5-1 (11 May 1942) prescribed the various types of publications, and No. 5-2 of the same date detailed the procedure regarding the preparation, coordination, review, authorization,

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and issuance of administrative publications. The Director of Organizational Planning was authorized to render assistance in their preparation when desired, and whenever necessary to initiate either preparation or revision. He was to be notified when coordination was begun, and was to exercise the power of review on "conformance with Air Force policy or practice; duplication of or conflict with, existing War Department and Army Air Force publications; sufficiency of authority and coordination; and form, grammar, classification, title and publication number." Final approval by the Director of Organizational Planning was to constitute authorization for issuance. Before issuance, however, administrative publications had to be "authenticated by the signature of the Air Adjutant General, or his duly authorized representative or by application of the official seal." In August 1942 the provisions of the above regulation were amended to require the submission to the Chief of the Air Staff before issuance of all publications whose subject matter was controversial or at variance with established policy or which required the announcement of a new policy or carried the nonconcurrence of some agency.6

Organizational Planning thus came into possession of wide powers in the publications field. Not only did it participate in all stages of the publication process, but it also had the power to pass on all new series which might be proposed by any Headquarters office.7 The major difficulty in connection with the exercise of its powers came

7. AAF Reg. No. 5-13, 4 Aug. 1942.
from the requirement of authentication. The Air Adjutant General
maintained that the power to authenticate included the power to give
final approval to the issuance of administrative publications.\(^8\)

Fortunately for Organizational Planning, there was a way out of the
difficulty. This was through the use of the alternative methods of
authentication prescribed in the regulation, namely, authentication
by the duly authorized representative of the Air Adjutant General or
by application of the official seal. Colonel Gates secured the assign-
ment to Organizational Planning of an Assistant Air Adjutant General to
whom publications were then referred for authentication.

The Air Adjutant General had also been issuing an unauthorized
series of AAF Letters which often conflicted with the provisions of
other administrative publications. Following a study by the Publica-
tions Branch of Organizational Planning, responsibility for this pub-
lication was transferred to Organizational Planning on 24 September 1943.\(^9\)

It was not until December 1943, however, that the Air Adjutant General
was completely eliminated from the publications picture. AAF Regula-
tion No. 5-2 of 9 December, which superseded the one whose provisions
are summarized above, provided for authentication by application of the
official seal only.

Administrative publications of the Army Air Forces included AAF
Regulations, AAF Memorandums, AAF Letters, and Headquarters Office
Instructions. In addition, there were until late in 1943 Air Corps

\(^8\) Conversation with Capt. Frederick Mosher, AFACP, 11 Feb. 1944.
\(^9\) Hq. O. I. No. 80-36, 24 Sep. 1943.
Circulars and AAF Memorandums in the "41" and "42" series. All of the latter, however, had been reissued in appropriate form or rescinded by January 1944. At that time, also, only six Air Corps Circulars remained in force. It is interesting to note that 1,065 administrative publications were issued by the Publications Branch in 1943 and 2,060 in 1944.10

The administrative publications relating to organization were in the "20" series; that is, they were numbered 20-. The basic one was AAF Regulation No. 20-1, which was revised and reissued at regular three-month intervals, or whenever a major reorganization was accomplished. It was couched in broad and general language and contained "only such detail as [was] necessary for information to the field." 11 Always included were a brief statement of functions of each Headquarters office and AAF command and air force, and a general organization chart.

Responsibility for administrative publications of an organizational nature belonged to all branches of Organizational Planning. The Publications Branch was responsible for 12

a. Receiving, reviewing, editing, and issuing all organizational publications and charts.
b. Maintaining a master file of all such publications and charts.
c. Keeping all such publications currently up-to-date, and, for this purpose, continuously reviewing all charts and directives.

10. Memo, L. E. Florey, Chief, Publications Branch to Lt. Col. R. E. S. Deichler, 4 Jan. 1944, in AFLOP files; Chief, AFMOP to Chief, AFMG, 1 Jan. 1945, Tab B, in AFSHO files. Apparently some difficulties were encountered with the administrative uses to which AAF Letters were put, for on 9 Jan. 1945 it was stated that these publications would not be issued over the signature of an assistant chief of air staff or a special staff officer but would be prepared for publication as provided in AAF Reg. No. 5-2. Hq. O. I. 80-36, 9 Jan. 1945.
11. Organizational Planning Order No. 34, 14 Aug. 1943.
12. Ibid.
d. Establishing and prescribing procedures, style, and standards for charting and promulgating organizational material, and advising other branches of Organizational Planning accordingly.

e. Carrying on day-to-day liaison with Organizational Planning on organizational changes.

Each other branch was responsible, with respect to the offices and commands in which it had primary interest, for

a. Developing, coordinating, and approving as to content, organizational charts and publications.

b. Keeping the Publications Branch currently advised as to organizational changes.

c. Preparing organizational charts and publications in accordance with the procedures, style, and standards established by the Publications Branch.

In addition to the publications of the "2O" series, Organizational Planning published the "Organization and Functions" book. This publication contained in loose-leaf form detailed organization charts for all Headquarters offices to the branch level and similarly detailed statements of function. It was revised monthly. Detailed charts below the branch level were prepared by the offices concerned and in such detail as was "necessary for management purposes." They were prepared in the same size and form as the "Organization and Functions" book charts and were submitted to the appropriate branch of Organizational Planning for review prior to their reproduction by the Publications Branch. The last issue of the chart book appeared in June 1945. Organizational Planning also published in five volumes "The Air Force in Theaters of Operations: Organization and Functions."

Control over publications was an important part of the work of Organizational Planning. Without it, control over Headquarters

13. Ibid.
organization would have been virtually impossible. The power to determine what was published of an organizational nature was in itself an assurance that there would be no official recognition of organizational changes without proper approval.

Organizational Planning had no authority over administrative publications in the field. It did, however, conduct studies of them in the Materiel and Air Service Commands. In the former, 21 separate categories of administrative directives were found, with considerable duplication, no unified distribution, and no systematic method of filing. Recommendations were made which resulted in the adoption by the Materiel Command of the system used in Headquarters, AAF. Similar recommendations were made for the Air Service Command and were put into effect by May 1944. With the integration of the Materiel and Air Service Commands into the Air Technical Service Command on 31 August 1944, a revision of these publication systems became necessary.

In January 1944 an important step in publication control was taken with the establishment of the AAF Printing Board and a Printing Control Office in each of the 11 area Air Service Commands. The board was composed of representatives of the offices of Management Control; Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution; Budget and Fiscal; and the Materiel and Air Service Commands. In conjunction and cooperation with the Printing Control offices, the board was to govern the procedure and use of reproduction and printing equipment and materiel in the AAF and

to eliminate nonessential publications. With the transfer of the
Publications Branch of Organizational Planning on 1 July 1945, the Air
Adjutant General acquired jurisdiction over publications the control
of which had formerly rested with Organizational Planning.

The second type of control which Organizational Planning exercised
over Headquarters offices was in the manpower field. At the outset
its power was limited to making recommendations with respect to personnel
requirements. By November 1942, however, it had an arrangement with
the Civilian Personnel Division under which the latter would not estab-
lish any civil service positions in the departmental service unless
the organization of the office concerned had received the approval of
Organizational Planning. The approval of an organization chart ex-
tended, however, only to general staffing requirements and was in no
sense final, although relied upon as a guide by Civilian Personnel.
Substantially the same situation also existed respecting military
personnel.

The growing shortage of manpower in the latter part of 1942
caused the President on 22 December to call upon the War Department,
as well as all other departments and agencies of the federal govern-
ment, to institute an aggressive program for the efficient utilization
of civilian personnel. The AAF in turn was directed on 16 January 1943
to formulate specific plans for the fullest and best use of its civilian

17. AAFOP Orders No. 14, 7 Nov. 1942. This action was taken at the
request of the Civilian Personnel Division.
working force and to submit them to the Chief of Staff for the personal approval of the Secretary of War.  

On 13 February 1943 Management Control was directed to take such action as might be necessary to secure the most efficient utilization of manpower in all elements of the Army Air Forces. Specifically, it was authorized to "substitute exact manning tables, where expedient, for tables of organization in all elements (except tactical units)," to establish both in Headquarters and in the commands such controls as might be "required to effect economies in personnel, time and materiel," and to interchange military and civilian personnel whenever necessary.  

All offices in Headquarters and in the commands were directed to cooperate in this undertaking. As a result of this directive the Manpower Branch of Management Control was established on 10 March 1943 to exercise concerning field personnel the powers which had been conferred upon Management Control. At the same time Organizational Planning was assigned similar powers over Headquarters personnel.

The authority of these two agencies was not complete, however, because of the general manpower control exercised by the War Department.

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20. AFRP Orders No. 1, 10 March 1943. This office was renamed the Manpower Division on 29 March 1943.
21. In late 1943 the recommended consolidation of the Manpower and Organizational Planning divisions was justified on the grounds that such a move would "integrate" organizational and manpower policies, activities, studies, and staff within Management Control, thus providing a better control over manpower and manning allotments, and over methods and procedures for reconciling manning requirements in the Zone of Interior. Memo, Chief, AFRP to Chief, AFRP, 4 Nov. 1943, in AAG 310.1, Management Control.
over all its branches. This was exercised through the War Department
Manpower Board (Gesser Board) which was created on 11 March 1943 and
which made over-all manpower allotments to the Army Air Forces, as well
as to the Army Service Forces and the Army Ground Forces. 22

Within Headquarters, AAF, Organizational Planning controlled the
allotment of officers, enlisted men, Wacs, and civilians to the various
offices. This was done through setting up manning tables listing the
various categories of personnel by grade. In the case of civilian
personnel, there was an additional fiscal control. Organizational
Planning prepared the AAF budget for such employees and also controlled
the funds from which they were paid.

Organizational Planning also conducted the manpower conservation
program in Headquarters. On 6 April 1943 Management Control was di-
rected to effect by 1 June a 30 per cent reduction in both military
and civilian personnel on duty in Headquarters on 29 March. 23 This
directive, however, was not fully carried out. Organizational Planning
conducted surveys, held conferences, and received reports, but the best
that it could do was to effect an actual reduction of 9 per cent in
officers, 13 per cent in enlisted men, and 12 per cent in civilians.
However, its report which was submitted on 8 June was approved.

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22. On the relationship of the AAF to the War Manpower Board see memo,
Dept. Manpower Boards and Committees.
23. Memo, C/AS to all Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff and Chiefs of
Officers, Hq. AAF, 6 April 1943, in AFkop files.
24. Memo, Chief, Management Control to CG, AAF, 8 June 1943, in AFDUC
files.
Efforts by Organizational Planning to keep Headquarters personnel to as low a level as possible became a continuing function. Its powers in this field were not as effective as they were in connection with publications. There was apparently more external pressure in the personnel field, and the number of Headquarters offices tended to increase with the increasing tempo of the war, thus making necessary new allotments of personnel. The result may not have been altogether desirable, but it seems to have been more or less unavoidable. It should be borne in mind that the effectiveness of the actions of such an agency as Organizational Planning depends, in great measure, upon the amount of support given by higher authority.

In the field, the results of the efforts to reduce manpower were much more satisfactory. On 21 March 1943 the Commanding General of the Flying Training Command recommended that his allotment of personnel be reduced by 23 per cent—a saving of 80,331 officers, enlisted men, and civilians.25 This recommendation was the climax of extensive studies, initiated in October 1942 at the Gulf Coast Training Center, of the application of exact manning tables to stations of the command. In these studies, participated in by representatives of Organizational Planning, not only had exact manning tables been substituted for tables of organization, but they had been service tested to determine operating results.

The survey of the Flying Training Command "produced not only a substantial saving in manpower but provided a basic technique" for

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similar installations in other branches of the Army Air Forces. Other studies by the Manpower Division followed in the Technical Training, Troop Carrier, Air Transport, and Materiel Commands, and in the Second and Third Air Forces. By the summer of 1944 much studies had been undertaken in all the commands and continental air forces and bulk allotments of personnel made to them.

On 18 December 1943 a system for the allotment and control of personnel throughout the Zone of Interior was set forth by AAF Regulation No. 37-2. This provided that all allotments of personnel, both military and civilian, would be made in bulk and on a quarterly basis to the various commands and air forces by breaking down the over-all allotment made to the AAF by the War Department General Staff. Each command and air force would then sub-allot to stations, installations, and other activities under its jurisdiction. This was to be done through the use of an exact manning table for each such station or installation, upon the basis of which each lower echelon was to prepare its own personnel strength table. This in turn was to be forwarded to the headquarters of the command or air force and after consolidation

26. Ibid.
27. An exact manning table is "a table for an installation showing, by specific section, department, or division, and by grades and ratings and military occupational specialties, the positions necessary to the operation of the installation." A personnel strength table, on the other hand, is "a summary table of an Exact Manning Table or Tables, showing the distribution of grades and ratings, of military occupational specialties by S. S. N. [Specification Serial Number], and of civilian strength for which an allotment has been or is proposed to be made by a higher echelon, when a Personnel Strength Table is approved and authorized, it is issued as a Table of Distribution." AAF Reg. 37-2, 18 Dec. 1943.
sent to Headquarters, AAF (Manpower Division of Management Control).
Here, in collaboration with the appropriate assistant chiefs of Air
Staff, the total requested personnel would be reconciled with the
allotment to the AAF, and personnel strength tables adjusted accordingly.
After clearance with the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel and the
Budget and Fiscal Office the tables were to be sent to Operations,
Commitments, and Requirements where they would be duplicated and dis-
tributed. Finally, each command and air force would be notified by
Management Control of its allotments, and this would be confirmed by
an Adjutant General letter.

This system of control was far simpler than the old plan of issuing
tables of organization for each separate station or installation.
Furthermore, it was much more flexible and resulted in a greater de-
centralization of authority in the utilization of personnel by the
various commands and air forces. It also resulted in considerable
savings of manpower throughout the Zone of Interior.

The manpower conservation program of the Army Air Forces had two
general objectives: (1) "efficient utilization of all personnel" and
(2) "release of general service personnel on duty in this country for
assignment to theaters of combat." The first objective involved:

(1) Elimination of unnecessary and/or duplicating reports.
(2) Elimination of non-essential and curtailment of over-
expanded activities.
(3) Simplification of administrative practices and procedures.

29. Army Air Force Manpower Conservation Program, prepared by Manpower
Div. of Management Control, 1 July 1943, in AFSMO files.
(4) Job analyses to determine the minimum number of persons required to perform efficiently the functions essential to the mission of a command and of each fixed installation comprising that command, where practicable, establishment of a single Exact Manning Table in place of unit Tables of Organization (troop basis of allotting personnel). Adoption of an Exact Manning Table entails a complete and objective survey of an installation to determine the exact number of personnel, by types, both military and civilian, required rather than the allotment of personnel by squadrons or other group units.

(5) Consolidation under fewer persons of functions or responsibilities which are part time in character and conversely, broadening of supervisory powers of subordinates in order to decrease the number reporting to a common commander.

The second objective, release of general service personnel for combat assignment, involved:

1. Substitution of WAC's or civilian women in duties not requiring physical strength.
2. Widespread use of limited service men in positions from which their physical or mental limitations do not bar them.
3. Use of over-age or permanently deferred male civilians where they are available.

This was a laudable program, but one extremely difficult to carry out without rigid controls rigidly enforced.

On 1 July 1945 the Manpower Division was transferred, with its functions intact, to AC/13, Personnel. By the reorganization effective on 23 August it became one of the three units in the office of the Deputy AC/13-1 for Personnel Policy and Management, where it probably belonged as a control agency.

In summary, the administrative controls exercised by Organizational Planning in Headquarters were of two types: publications and manpower.

30. Ibid.
Of these the former was more satisfactory, perhaps because it was older. In addition, it was not the target of so much pressure, and consequently came nearer to being automatic in its operation. In the field, Organizational Planning had no control over publications, though it did conduct studies in some of the commands. Actual control of this function in the field was vested in similar agencies in the commands and air forces. Theoretically it had no control over field personnel, this power being vested in the Manpower Division of Management Control. Actually, however, it did conduct several manpower studies in connection with organizational surveys outside Washington. Relations between these two branches of Management Control were close, and as a result any strict separation of their functions was subject to a number of exceptions for each office. Organizational Planning could certainly claim credit for developing the manning table technique and applying it during the early months of the manpower conservation program.
Chapter V
CONCLUSIONS

One of the most striking administrative characteristics of the
air arm of the War Department has been the frequency with which organ-
izational changes have occurred. Prior to 1941 there was no office
endowed with the authority to control organization. The Plans Division
made a number of studies in this field but could only recommend the
action which it regarded as desirable. The heads of divisions acting
either as individuals or in a body sometimes initiated or passed upon
proposals. Boards of officers also were used occasionally to investi-
gate and make recommendations. None of these can be truly called
administrative planning agencies, however, because they were either
temporary bodies or because administrative planning was only inci-
dental to the performance of other duties.

During the period from 1930 to 1940 the management idea took
root in the Inspection Division, where it developed along somewhat
the same lines as in industry. It was perhaps only natural that the
first proposal for a real administrative planning agency should come
from this source. Nothing might have come out of either this proposal
or others which followed if the terrific strains first of the expan-
sion period and then of war had not revealed the administrative and
procedural weakness of the existing organization.
Management Control was established in March 1942 and charged, among other things, with preventing unauthorized reorganization, with the development of more efficient organization, and with the institution of better operating procedures. These were the responsibilities of the organizational planning office, to which was added control authority in the field of publications and manpower. Under the continuous leadership of General Gates all of these powers were vigorously exercised.

Neither Organizational Planning nor Management Control, of which it was a part, prevented reorganization—nor was that the intention. More changes in organization undoubtedly occurred during 1942 and 1943 than in any preceding period of equal length.¹ Many of these were made necessary by the rapid development of the AAF and the temporary demands. Changing conditions and functions, as well as a change in the nature of aerial warfare, dictated either the creation or discontinuance of an office, and/or a redistribution of functions. These reorganizations did not occur, however, without authorization and consideration of the effects which any shift would have on the entire organizational structure. In the process of initiating or approving changes in organization, certain so-called "organizational doctrines" were developed. The most important ones were that (1) all organizations must be functionalized, (2) teamwork and high morale must be developed, (3) manpower must be effectively utilized, (4) command authority must be commensurate with responsibility, and

¹ Management Control has been defined facetiously as "that outfit which has made changes seem monotonous."
(5) Ineffective administrative practices must be eliminated. Although it is impossible to trace the development of each of these doctrines through the day-to-day operations of Organizational Planning, there is strong evidence to support the claim that considerable progress was made in applying them to the problems of organization and operations.

It should be borne in mind, however, that these doctrines might have been sacrificed, at times, to the organizational objective of the AAF. It is perhaps not too much to say that if the adoption of a sound organizational change ran counter to the ultimate aim of an independent air force, the change would not have been approved. However, the greatest contribution which Organizational Planning could make to the movement for independence was to set up and maintain a sound organizational structure. The long-range objective of an independent air force was not, therefore, a serious handicap to effective organizational planning.

On the other hand, Organizational Planning could not be effective without the existence of well-established controls. These existed in the field of publications and manpower. Control in these fields was more important in and of itself, however, than as an adjunct of the planning function. Organizational Planning did good work in simplifying and standardizing AAF administrative publications. It also did good work in connection with the substitution of manning tables for tables of organization. These were important accomplishments in

themselves—perhaps as important as anything else undertaken by Organizational Planning.

The field in which the least was accomplished was that of administrative and operating procedures. Increased emphasis was given to this phase of activity after October 1944, and substantial beginnings were made in needed reforms. It should be borne in mind, however, that procedural changes are difficult to make because they usually involve a number of offices, and they may be almost useless unless the organization of those offices is sound.

Some of the analyses given in the above pages indicate that the elimination of duplication of effort and the establishment of more efficient procedures presented the greatest obstacle to the work of Organizational Planning. The attainment of those objectives would have resulted in the diminution of the prestige of the individual offices concerned, and consequently "political" pressure sometimes outweighed the merits of the case. As a matter of fact, it seems that the cumulative effect of these pressures was a decisive factor in the dissolution of Organizational Planning.

The parceling of the functions of Organizational Planning among the various offices in their own spheres of jurisdiction deprived theAAF of a central agency to review and recommend improved methods of administrative planning and control. While this action placed a greater responsibility on each office, the personnel who acquired the duties formerly lodged in Organizational Planning could not have the same detached attitude and were subject to even more pressure than were the personnel of the central office.
The question sometimes is raised as to whether the work of such an office as Organizational Planning can ever be entirely effective unless it also has the power of administrative inspection. If such were the case, offices discovered not to be operating in conformance with established organization or specified functions could be forced to comply. The conclusion is not being drawn, however, that Organizational Planning should either have developed or taken over an inspection system. It seems that it should have operated on a service basis and in the realm of good will and persuasion; but, failing in these methods, it should have been backed by the highest administrative authority and thus would have been able to exercise control powers to bring about the desired results. The work was useful though the personnel involved were few in number, but it was the military incongruity of such an office coupled with lack of higher-echelon support which brought about its dissolution.
GLOSSARY

AFSAT  School of Applied Tactics
AAG    Air Adjutant General
AC/AS  Assistant Chief of Air Staff
AFMDC  Management Control
AFOP   Organizational Planning
AFSHO  AAF Historical Office
AFTAI  Air Inspector
AG     Adjutant General
AGSC   Air Service Command
ATC    Air Transport Command
ASAF   Arms and Services with the Army Air Forces
C/AC   Chief of the Air Corps
C/AS   Chief of Air Staff
DC/AS  Deputy Chief of Air Staff
DG/S   Deputy Chief of Staff
GHQ    General Headquarters
Hq. O. I. Headquarters Office Instruction
M&S    Materiel and Services
M&MD   Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution
OCAG   Office, Chief of the Air Corps
ODA3   Office, Deputy [Chief] of Air Staff
OCC & R Operations, Commitments, and Requirements
R&R    Routing and Record Sheet
S/W    Secretary of War
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Official Publications

Army Department

AG 320.2 (9-11-35)C, 13 September 1935
AG 322 (14 July 1944) CB-I-AFRG-M, 14 July 1944
AG 323.3 (30 Aug., 1944) CB-I-AFRG-M, 31 August 1944
AR 92- series
Circular No. 52, 2 March 1942

These papers were of only incidental significance for this study.

Army Air Forces:

Headquarters

AAF Letter 210.4#2, 31 August 1943
AAF Memorandums, 20- series
AAF Regulations, 5- series
AAF Regulations, 20- series
AAF Regulations, 37- series
AAF Regulations, 80- series
AG Circulars, 120- series
AFMAC orders
AFLOP orders
CO #10, 17 July 1944
CO #12, 31 August 1944
CCAC Memorandums, 10- series
OCAO, Organization and Function Charts, 30 April 1941
Statement of Functions [of Headquarters, AAF offices],
6 March 1942
U.S. Army Air Forces, Organization and Functions: 9 September
1942, 25 January 1943, 29 March 1943, and monthly from
1 October 1943 to 1 June 1945

These documents were helpful in ascertaining organization,
functions, and final official action on various recommenda-
tions and/or studies.
Commands

ASC Manual 20-1, 15 March 1943
ATC Regulations, 20- series
Material Command Field Office Memorandums, 20- series

These documents were helpful in revealing the organization and functions of organizational planning agencies in the field.

AAF Central Files (Cited AAG)

230.83 Reduction of Forces
300.6 Office Memos
310.1 Management Control
312.56 Correspondence Regulations
320A Organization of the Army
321A Arms of Service and Departments
321B Army Air Forces
321C Army Air Forces
321.1 Directives, Misc.
321.5A Correspondence Regulations
321.9 AAF Statistical Control
321.9 Air Staff, AAF
321.9 Air Staff Office, AAF, Special
321.9 Organization
321.9 Organization, CDAS—Administrative
321.9 Organization of Plans Division
321.9 Organization . . . Hq., AAF
321.9B GHQ Air Force and Reorganization of Air Corps
321.9B Organization, AAF
321.9C Organization, CGAG
321.9D Organization, CGAG
334 War Dept. Manpower Boards and Committees
360.01C Air Corps Policies
461 Master Manuals

As indicated by the titles these files were valuable primarily for determining organizational development, understanding some of the procedures, and securing information on War Department action on matters that principally concerned the Army Air Forces.

Hq., AAF Office Files

Personal files of Lt. Col. Earl E. Kitzert, Control Office

Colonel Kitzert's files contain documents on the early proposals for, and history of, management engineering agencies in the air arm.
AAF Historical Office

Comments of Headquarters offices and field agencies on the AAF reorganization of 9 March 1942

This loose-leaf book contains invaluable material on that organization and the background of the reorganization that took place on 29 March 1943.

Plans Division files

These files have much information on the organizational functions performed by the Plans Division (or Section) and other agencies, up to 1941.

Project Book of Lt. Gen. B. K. Yount, Commanding General, AAF Training Command

This book was of importance for the present study for information on the Control Office of the Training Command.

Management Control

Manpower Division
Organizational Planning Division

These files are fundamental to a study of organizational planning. The Organizational Planning Division files were the more beneficial for this study, and most of the materials used were located in the files of the various branches of that division.

Special Studies

Office of the Secretary of War


This study was of only incidental significance for the present work.

AAF Historical Office

AAF Historical Studies:

No. 10 (rev.), *Organization of the Army Air Arm, 1935-1945*, July 1946.

No. 25, Organization of Military Aeronautics, 1907-1935 (Congressional and War Department Action). December 1944.

These three monographs discuss more fully many of the points dealt with in this study and set the framework for research and writing on organizational planning.

AAF Historical Study (draft): "Statistical Control in the AAF."

Bureau of the Budget
Sundquist, James, "wartime Organization of the Army Air Forces" (draft). Copy in AFHCO files.

This study, by an individual who attended many of the meetings prior to the reorganization of March 1942, is a good interpretation of the changes and concepts involved in that fundamental administrative move.

Conversations
Conversation with Lt. C. R. Jones, AFHCP, 23 September 1944
Conversation with Capt. Frederick Koster, AFHCP, 11 February 1944
Conversation with Lt. Col. F. V. Quigley, AFHCP, 27 September 1944

These conversations were held with key men in Management Control and the various branches of Organizational Planning. Such contacts were very fruitful in that they provided many viewpoints, opinions, facts, and attitudes which could not be secured from documents.
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