OPERATIONAL HISTORY

of the

SEVENTH AIR FORCE

7 December 1941

to

6 November 1943

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OPERATIONAL HISTORY
OF THE
SIXTH AIR FORCE

7 December 1941 to 6 November 1943

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AF Historical Office
Headquarters, Army Air Forces
December 1943

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In the words of the AAFPOA editor, "It is not intended that this should be considered a definitive operational history of the Seventh Air Force during the period"; it is rather a first narrative based on the files of the Seventh Air Force. "A definitive study would require in addition the use of the files of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department." Readers are encouraged to submit additional information or corrections, which may be recorded on the perforated sheets to be found at the end of the study.
FOREWORD

This study, which was forwarded in October 1944 by the Historical
Division of Headquarters, Army Air Forces, Pacific Ocean Areas (AAFPOA),
has been reproduced by the AAF Historical Office with few modifications
other than stylistic changes necessary to bring it into conformity with
practices adopted in AAF Historical Studies. Several of the less
pertinent exhibits have been omitted. Also a section of the original
study, constituting pages 26 through 40 in the manuscript, has been
deleted in view of the fact that the operations of Seventh Air Force
units sent to the South Pacific have been analyzed in AAF Historical
Study No. 35: Guadalcanal and the Origins of the Thirteenth Air Force.

Attention is called to the fact that the relatively brief narrative
is supplemented by a detailed chronology and by extensive appendixes.
The appendixes include highly useful collections of materials on the
activities of AAF units during and immediately following the attack on
Pearl Harbor and in the Battle of Midway. These appendixes have been
reproduced verbatim.

The present study deals with the operations of the Seventh Air
Force from the beginning of hostilities on 7 December 1941 to the
establishment of Advanced Headquarters (ADVH) on the Island of Funafuti
in November 1943, preparatory to launching an offensive campaign against
Japanese positions in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. Activities of
the later period are dealt with in AAF Historical Study No. 38: Opera-
tional History of the Seventh Air Force, 6 November 1943 to 21 July 1944.

During the twenty-three months covered here the Seventh Air Force
was primarily a holding force for the defense of Hawaii, serving also
as an agency for the training of combat crews and the modification of
aircraft for tactical units in the South Pacific. On occasion, it
furnished complete combat units for that theater from its own meager
tactical strength. In view of the foregoing, offensive combat operations
could not play the important part in Seventh Air Force activities they
were destined to play in the months to come. Nevertheless, units of the
Seventh Air Force were frequently in active combat during the period
under discussion, notably in the Battle of Midway, in strikes against
Wake, and in bombardment and reconnaissance missions over the Gilberts
and the Marshalls preparatory to the sustained offensive in that area.
Operational history of the Seventh Air Force

7 December 1941 to 6 November 1943
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Chapter I
PEARL HARBOR TO MIDWAY

The operational history of the organization that is now the Seventh Air Force began very abruptly on the morning of 7 December 1941. At that time, the Hawaiian Air Force, predecessor of the Seventh Air Force, had a strength of 754 officers and 6,706 enlisted men, and was organized tactically into the 13th Bombardment Wing (II) and the 14th Pursuit Wing. Headquarters of the Hawaiian Air Force, under the command of Maj. Gen. Frederick L. Martin, was located at Hickam Field, Territory of Hawaii, as was also the headquarters of the 18th Bombardment Wing. Headquarters of the 14th Pursuit Group was at Wheeler Field.

The 18th Bombardment Wing was composed of two heavy bombardment groups, the 5th and the 11th. In the 5th Group were the 33d, 31st, and 72d Bomb Squadrons, and the 4th Reconnaissance Squadron (R). The 11th Bomb Group consisted of the 25th and 42d Bomb Squadrons and the 16th Reconnaissance Squadron (R). In addition to the two groups there were the 58th Bomb Squadron (L) and the 96th Observation Squadron (O/D). Tactical organizations in the 14th Pursuit Wing were the 18th Pursuit Group (I), with the 6th, 19th, 44th, 72d, 73d, and 78th Pursuit Squadrons, and the 15th Pursuit Group (T), with the 45th, 46th, and 47th Pursuit Squadrons.
The Hawaiian Air Force had a total of 331 aircraft of all types, assigned as follows:

- B-17D - 12
- B-17A - 12
- A-20A - 12
- P-400 - 12
- B-24J - 37
- P-38A - 39
- P-38G - 3
- B-13A - 6
- A-12A - 2
- AT-6 - 4
- OA-9 - 3
- OA-6 - 1
- O-47D - 7
- O-46 - 2

Of the foregoing aircraft, the B-17's, B-13's, and A-20's were located at Hickam Field; the O-49's, O-47's, and 12 of the A-20's at Bellows Field; and the remainder at Wheeler Field. None of the aircraft was ready for immediate use, although 6 B-17's, 21 B-13's, 5 A-20's, 64 P-38's, 20 P-38's, 10 P-26's, 1 B-13, 2 A-12's, 3 AT-6's, 3 OA-9's, 1 OA-6, 5 O-47D's, and 2 O-49's were in commission but not loaded with bombs or ammunition. The remainder were out for first, second, or third echelon maintenance.

The first indication of an attack came at 0755 on the Sunday morning of 7 December when nine enemy single-engine, low-wing monoplanes, carrying torpedoes, were observed southeast of the Hickam Field hangar line flying at an altitude of 60 feet in the direction of Pearl Harbor. This flight did not attack Hickam Field, but at almost the same time 12 dive bombers attacked the Hickam Field hangar line and the buildings of the Hawaiian Air Depot, followed shortly by

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16 additional dive bombers, which attacked the Hickam Field hangar line. All airplanes participating in the attack dived at approximately 45 to 60 degrees from altitudes of 3,000 to 5,000 feet and released their bombs at about 1,000 feet. Machine-gun fire was employed before and after the bomb release. The attack lasted about ten minutes.

Hickam Field was again attacked at about 0825 when from six to nine airplanes approached from the south and attacked the Number One Army Hospital, technical buildings immediately behind the hangar line, and concentrated barracks, releasing their bombs from level flight at an altitude of approximately 150 feet. At the same time, aircraft on the parking area were strafed with gunfire. About one minute later, a formation of five or six planes bombed the baseball diamond from a high altitude. This attack lasted between ten and fifteen minutes.

At about 0900 the third and final attack on Hickam Field took place when a flight of six to nine airplanes strafed dispersed aircraft and technical buildings behind the hangar line with machine-gun fire. Simultaneously, a formation of from seven to nine planes bombed the concentrated barracks, parade ground, and Post Exchange from an altitude of approximately 6,000 feet. This attack lasted about eight minutes, and in the course of it a flight of B-17's which had left from the mainland the previous day on a routine ferrying trip began to arrive.

The first attack on Wheeler Field occurred at about 0800 when approximately 25 enemy airplanes dive-bombed the hangar line, releasing their bombs from altitudes of from 300 to 250 feet.
attack, the formation broke and the individual planes maneuvered recklessly in strafing attacks at an altitude of approximately 200 feet, concentrating their fire on aircraft on the hangar line and buildings and personnel in the immediate vicinity. The entire first attack on Wheeler Field lasted about 15 minutes.

Wheeler Field was again attacked a few minutes after 0900, when seven airplanes flying roughly in line at an altitude of approximately 500 feet, machine-gunned aircraft being turned onto the airdrome. The whole attack lasted less than five minutes.

Bellows Field was attacked twice—once at about 0830, when a single fighter came in from the sea to machine-gun the tent area, and again at approximately 0900, when nine airplanes flying in three groups of three planes each strafed the hangar line. They concentrated on a B-17 which had been unable to land at Hickam upon arriving from the mainland and which in attempting to land at Bellows Field had rolled off the end of the runway.

The attacks on all three Air Corps installations, which were, of course, but a part of the attack on Army and Navy installations on the island of Oahu, appeared to have been carefully rehearsed and exceptionally well executed. It was established that no land-based planes were used in the attack, and while there were many rumors of the presence of multi-engine aircraft, it was believed that all of the enemy airplanes were single-engine types. The bombers at both Hickam and Wheeler appeared to have been escorted by fighters, and all planes engaging in strafing attacks descended to extremely low altitudes.
altitudes, using 12.7-mm., 7.7-mm., and 20-mm. ammunition.

The first American fighters to get into the air in opposition to the attack were two P-40's that took off from Wheeler Field at 0855. Twenty minutes later, six P-39's took off from Wheeler Field, and at 0900 five P-40's and six P-36's took to the air. Again at 1200 and 1500, five and eleven P-40's, respectively, took off from Wheeler Field. Aircraft got off from Hickam Field on search missions as follows: four A-30A's at 1127, two B-17D's at 1140, three A-30A's at 1300, and two B-18's at 1330. One O-47 took off from Bellows Field at 0950, three at 1040, and three at 1500. Five P-40's were airborne from Bellows at 1245.

The actual damage caused by the attack is difficult to assess. Casualties among personnel of the Hawaiian Air Force, while light in comparison to those suffered by the Navy, were heavy enough. They were distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Wounded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hickam Field</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheeler Field</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bellows Field</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>336</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Hawaiian Air Depot at Hickam Field suffered serious damage. The engineering, administrative, drafting unit, blueprint and specification file were total losses. The case parachute section was a total loss, as were the overhaul and assembly sections of the Engine Repair Branch. Test equipment was also completely destroyed, and equipment...
of the Aero Repair Branch was 75 per cent wrecked. Of the Depot
property stocks, 90 per cent of Classes O2D, O3A, C3D, and 29 were
destroyed, 66 per cent of Class O2C, and approximately 50 per cent of
the balance of classes were destroyed. The 231 assigned aircraft were reduced by the attack to 157, of
which only 79 were reported as usable. These were distributed among
the various types as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>On Hand</th>
<th>Usable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>After Ha</td>
<td>After Ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-17D</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-18</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-20A</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-400</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-403</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-36A</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-36A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-36B</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-12A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-12A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT-6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OA-9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OA-8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-47B</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-49</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Combat planes

In the feverish days immediately following the debacle of December, the Hawaiian Air Force was faced with the Herculean task of transforming its activities from a peace-time basis to the tactical situation that had been thrust upon it. The immediate mission was the defense of the island of Oahu and the other islands of the Hawaiian chain against a repetition of the attack of 7 December.
In fulfillment of the Air Corps' share of this responsibility, the aircraft of the 18th Bomb Wing flew daily search missions in a broad sector up to 500 miles seaward. Likewise, the 14th Pursuit Wing, redesignated the Hawaiian Interceptor Command ten days after the attack, had as its immediate mission the defense of the Hawaiian group through the operational control of all land-based fighters, control and coordination of all anti-aircraft artillery, the searchlight activities of the Hawaiian Antiaircraft Artillery Command, and aircraft warning activities.

To fulfill its mission, the Hawaiian Air Force at the end of the year had aircraft at its disposal as follows:

**Hawaiian Interceptor Command:**
- 43 P-40's and 27 P-36's in commission.
- 3 P-40's and 1 P-36 out for first echelon maintenance.
- 5 P-40's and 1 P-36 out for second echelon maintenance.
- 67 P-40's, 34 P-39's, and 2 P-36's out for third echelon maintenance.

**18th Bomb Wing:**
- 23 B-17's, 9 B-18's, and 10 A-20's in commission.
- 6 B-17's and 4 B-18's out for first echelon maintenance.
- 1 B-17 and 1 B-18 out for second echelon maintenance.
- 5 B-17's and 7 B-18's out for third echelon maintenance.

**36th Observation Squadron:**
- 5 O-27's and 1 O-49 in commission.
- 1 O-27 out for first echelon maintenance.

Early in February 1943 a redesignation of Air Corps units in the Hawaiian area was effected. The Hawaiian Air Force became the Seventh...
Air Force, the 18th Bombardment Wing became the VII Bomber Command, and the Hawaiian Interceptor Command became first the 7th Interceptor Command and on 22 May 1943 the VII Fighter Command. Beginning with January 1942, the defensive mission of the Seventh Air Force was broadened from time to time by the assignment of various of its units to task groups operating forward of the Hawaiian area. The first of these occasions occurred during the period 16 to 30 January when three P-17s from the 23d Bomb Squadron and three from the 59th Reconnaissance Squadron were placed under the command of Lt. Col. Walter C. Sweeney and assigned as a bomber unit to Task Group 5.9 for the purpose of conducting antisubmarine search missions.

The aircraft departed from Hickam Field on 16 January and arrived at Canton on 17 January, having spent the night en route at Palmyra, where one of the P-17s was so badly damaged in landing that it was unable to continue to its destination. The 18th of January was spent in submarine searches out of Canton, as was most of the time until the group returned to Hickam Field on 30 January, with the execution of two trips made to Funafuti in the Fiji Islands. The first of these was on 21 January with return to Canton on 23 January, and the second was on 25 January with return on 27 January.

A primary significance of the operation was the experience it afforded in the employment of aircraft in the vast Pacific theater.
of war. That this mission was a pioneering one in nature is demonstrated by the fact that prior to the landing of the flight on Palmyra, only three B-17's had used the island's airfield. Servicing facilities at both Canton and Palmyra were very limited, especially in the matter of fueling the airplanes. This was done from 50-gallon drums, and in addition to the time and labor required, the gasoline often proved to be dirty, watered, and to contain corrosive matter. The commander of the Bomb Group strongly urged in his report that before further operations were conducted out of either base Air Corps gasoline trucks be provided. 32 Further, he noted while at Lendi that all of the Lockheed Hudson airplanes used by the TEDAF were equipped with radar, thus enabling, "a small number of airplanes to cover a large amount of search area most effectively." 30

Probably the most significant aspect of Colonel Sweeney's report was the emphasis it placed upon that most important aspect of any aerial operation in the Pacific—navigation. "... The necessity of perfect dead reckoning cannot be too greatly emphasized," he wrote. "It is quite possible to lose either Palmyra or Canton islands within a very few miles and due to restricted visibility fail to see them..." 31

So this, the Commanding General of the VII Bomber Command added: 32

There is one step towards the improvement of navigation which cannot be made by the 7th Bomber Command, but should be

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made by higher headquarters. One particular difficulty which has to be overcome before precision of dead reckoning navigation is made clear to the newly assigned navigator is his reluctance to accept the need for absolute precision in dead reckoning. A large majority of the navigators now assigned to tactical units are graduates of the Pan America School, Coral Gables, Florida. That school does not teach navigation or dead reckoning; hence, nor does it stress the importance of this type of navigation. If the importance of dead reckoning and the necessity for precision in its use were instilled into the mind of the student early in his studies, his mental reluctance to accept that need would not exist. This mental condition is changed only after he has been assigned to a unit which stresses the importance of dead reckoning, and after he has gained experience through its use. The criticism of the Pan America School for its lack of dead reckoning training has been general throughout the Air Corps. The difficulty which exists because of the lack of such dead reckoning training and of the importance of precision in its use can only be overcome when that school is required to teach precision dead reckoning navigation.

The next such operation was conducted in February, when 13 B-17's were detached from the Hawaiian defense forces and released to CINCPAC23 for operations in the South Pacific in anticipation of possible Japanese offensives against New Caledonia and Fiji.24 The heavy bombers were designated the Southern Bomber Group and were ordered to proceed from Cahu to Nadir so as to complete the movement by 13 February. After arrival at Nadir they were to operate as directed by the Commander of Task Force 11 in support of the operations of that force against the enemy. After being released by the Commander of Task Force 11 they were to return to Cahu.25

Unfortunately there is a paucity of information at the level at which this account is being written on the operations of the Southern
Bomber crew. Evidently, however, there were some difficulties. The War Department informed the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department of a report that in an attempted bombing operation only four out of nine airplanes employed reached their objective; two had been abortive because of mechanical difficulties, two collided on take-off, and one had lost its way and returned. The War Department wanted to know whether adequate arrangements had been made for maintaining the B-17's sent to the South Pacific and whether maintenance and combat crews had been furnished by the Hawaiian Department with the airplanes. To this the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department replied that the 12 B-17's had left Cahu with full combat crews, that maintenance crews and service elements had departed by naval surface craft to join the task force at Tauti, and that “present whereabouts of maintenance and service elements were unknown as they were to be moved at discretion of Task Force Commander.”

Before, after, and coincident with the above operations the defense of the perimeter was being maintained. On two occasions in the early months of 1942 the routine of events was broken by actions of special note. On 14 February 1942, the first such action occurred when one B-17 of VII Bomber Command conducted a short reconnaissance of Naka. Adm. C. Nimitz expressed appreciation for the mission: "The information obtained will be of great value in prospective operations and fully warranted the hazards of this"
reconnaissance flight which was so audily and expeditiously made.\(^{38}\)

The second occurred on 4 March 1943 when a lone Japanese bomber
attempted an attack on the island of Oahu. It was first picked up
90 miles northeast of Kauai, from whence it went to Keana Point on
Oahu, then around the north coast until it was opposite Kaneohe
where it turned south to Honolulu. Four 500-pound bombs fell short
of the city and did no damage. Overcast conditions prevented
successful pursuit or the use of antiaircraft. The known presence
of a submarine in the French Frigate Shoals area led to the belief
that it was a multi-motored flying boat from the Marshalls or Wake,
refueling from a submarine.\(^{39}\)

During this period there were no operations in which contact
was made with enemy aircraft, yet the experience gained was of such
a nature as to make observations on the employment of air power possi-
ble. It was felt, for example, that in the Pacific area, where
long sea searches and continuous alerts by both heavy bombers and
fighters were essential, duplicate combat crews were a necessity
for all heavy bombers, and a minimum ratio of 1.5 was necessary
between combat pilots and fighter aircraft.\(^{40}\) Again, it was felt
that the P-40 was an unsatisfactory interdictor airplane because
of its lack of climbing ability and its inability to operate at high
altitudes. The P-38D was also reported as unable to operate at high
altitudes.\(^{41}\)
During this period the VII Bomber Command was under the operational control of Gen. Hink, Two. Until 1 April all aircraft were assigned either to search or a striking force, which permitted very little training of bombardiers and gunners. On 1 April approximately 25 per cent of the airplanes were made available for limited training.42

Meanwhile, events were transpiring which were to give air power in the Pacific its first real test.

In anticipation of a possible Japanese attack on Midway the Seventh Air Force was placed on a special alert on 18 May 1942. From this date until 28 May, the old B-17's were used on search to supplement the B-17's, and most of the latter were held loaded with 500- and 600-pound demolition bombs.43 At the beginning of this period there were 34 B-17's on hand. Of these, seven were Type C or D, none of which was armed sufficiently for combat. This left 27 airplanes fit for combat.44 During the period of alert, however, the VII Bomber Command received a steady influx of B-17's. To accommodate this large increase in available aircraft, the 73d Bomb Squadron was converted from a B-18 to a B-17 squadron. The squadron was not fully equipped until two days before actually committed to battle.45

The period of alert was extended into one of action on 30 May, when six B-17's of the 28th Bomb Squadron were flown to Midway.46 On the next day, six B-17's from the 431st Bomb Squadron, with two

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from the 31st Bomb Squadron and one from the 73d Bomb Squadron were flown to Midway.

Six of these airplanes, with the six from the 35th Bomb Squadron that had arrived at Midway the day before, flew search missions to a distance of 500 miles and return on 31 May and 1 June.

Actual combat began on 3 June 1942, when search planes discovered a Japanese task force heading toward Midway. The Seventh Air Force's first contact with the enemy came at 1623 when six B-17's from the 331st Bomb Squadron, with two from the 31st Bomb Squadron and one from the 73d attached, attacked five Japanese battleships or heavy cruisers bearing 263°, 570 miles from Midway. They dropped 36 x 1000-pound demolition bombs from 8,000 feet, scoring five hits and several near misses.

The first Army air action on 4 June occurred at 0710, when two B-25's from the 18th Reconnaissance Squadron and two P-38's from the 98th Bomb Squadron (U.S.), in conjunction with Navy torpedo bombers, attacked an aircraft carrier from altitudes of 150 to 200 feet. The results of the attack were not observed, but one B-25 from each squadron was shot down by fire from either the many intercepting fighters or the extremely heavy antiaircraft fire from the carrier. One of the lost B-25's was seen to launch its torpedo before crashing. The other two crashed-landed at Midway riddled with holes.

At 0615 a formation of 14 B-17's, composed of six from the 431st Bomb Squadron, five from the 43d, two from the 31st, and one
from the 73d took off to attack the targets bombed the previous after-
noon. In route they reported another task force complete with many
aircraft approaching Midway from 315° at a distance of 145 miles.
They were directed to intercept and climbed to 30,000 feet from
which altitude they dropped 108 x 500-pound demolition bombs, regis-
tering seven hits and several near misses. Three carriers were re-
ported on fire after the attack. Antiaircraft was heavy and at lower
altitude, but generally behind. Many fighters did not seem anxious
to close with the bombers, but of those that did two Zeros were shot
down.51

Late in the day of 4 June, Seventh Air Force bombers struck
three times at the enemy. At 1610, two B-17's of the 43d Bomb Squad-
ron attacked a carrier force at latitude 31°0'0', longitude 178°30',
dropping 16 x 500-pound bombs from 10,000 feet and scoring two hits
and three near misses on a carrier that had been damaged by earlier
American action. Three Zero interceptors were shot down, and one
was possibly shot down.52

At 1830, six B-17's of the 23d Bomb Squadron en route from Oahu
to Midway, each loaded with one-half bomb load and one bomb-bay tank,
attacked the striking force bearing 330°, 170 miles from Midway.
Eight 500-pound demolition bombs were dropped on a carrier and a
destroyer. One hit and two near misses were scored on the carrier
which was already aflame, and one hit was made on the destroyer which

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sank. Antiaircraft fire was heavy, and the bombers were intercepted by eight Zeros fighters of which four were shot down and one was damaged. Two B-17's were damaged so that they were unable to drop their bombs.\textsuperscript{53}

Also at 1330, four B-17's dropped 23 x 500-pound demolition bombs from an altitude of 20,000 to 25,000 feet on a heavy cruiser bearing 334°, 105 miles from Midway. They scored one hit and two near misses, with the results of 13 bombs unobserved.\textsuperscript{54}

On the following day, the first contact was made with the enemy at 0830 when five B-17's from the 33d Bomb Squadron and three from the 42d attacked the Japanese force at 270°, 130 miles from Midway. They made their attack in two elements of four airplanes each. The first element dropped 19 x 500-pound demolition bombs from 20,000 feet, getting two probable hits and three near misses. The second element dropped 30 x 500-pound demolition bombs from 20,000 feet, with one direct hit and four near misses. All hits were on two battleships or heavy cruisers. There was no fighter opposition, and although heavy antiaircraft fire was encountered none of the B-17's was damaged.\textsuperscript{55}

At 1815, three B-17's from the 43d Bomb Squadron, with one from the 33d attached, attacked a heavy cruiser bearing 300°, 300 miles from Midway. Thirty-two 500-pound demolition bombs were dropped from 16,000 feet, with two hits and three near misses. Immediately
thereafter, three other B-17's of the 23rd Bomb Squadron dropped 24 x 500-pound demolition bombs on the same target from 14,000 feet, getting one hit and one near miss. There was no fighter interception and anti-aircraft fire did no damage. 56

The last strike of the Battle of Midway was made at 1835 when five B-17's from the 72d Bomb Squadron attacked a heavy cruiser bearing 320°, 425 miles from Midway. They dropped 15 x 600-pound bombs and eight 300-pound bombs from altitudes ranging from 9,000 to 13,500 feet, with results unobserved. One B-17 was shot down by the extremely heavy anti-aircraft fire coming from the cruiser, and one other was forced down in the water because of a fuel shortage. The crew of the latter was recovered. 57

On 6 June, 12 B-17's were dispatched to Midway. Of these, six from the 26th Bomb Squadron dropped 30 x 1,000-pound demolition bombs on a target that was believed to be an enemy cruiser or destroyer, but which later was identified as a friendly submarine. The target crash-dived as soon as the attack was launched, and suffered no damage. 58

Although extensive searches were conducted during the day by the B-17's at Midway, no contact was made with the fleeing enemy. The Navy was yet to suffer serious damage in the loss of the Yorktown, but insofar as Army units were concerned the Battle of Midway was over, and really had been over since the previous day.

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During the three days, 3 to 5 June, the Seventh Air Force had conducted 16 B-17 attacks involving 55 airplanes, and one torpedo attack with four B-26's. 59 Targets had been battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, transports, and destroyers. Three hundred and fourteen 500- to 600-pound bombs and four torpedoes had been dropped from altitudes of 3,000 to 26,000 feet, with a score of 22 hits, six probable hits, and 48 near misses. Antiaircraft fire had made the observation of results difficult, yet the known results were: one battleship or heavy cruiser hit and two set afire; three aircraft carriers set afire; three hits on carriers already afire; two torpedo hits on one carrier; one torpedo hit on another; one destroyer sunk; and one large transport set afire and another hit. 60

During the entire attack the Japanese dropped only 14 bombs on Eastern Island and 30 bombs on Sand Island. A few 1,000-pound bombs were reported, but most of the total were apparently 100- and 500-pound demolition bombs. Though the bombs did considerable damage, the enemy carefully avoided hitting the runway. If this had been destroyed during the first attack it would have greatly hampered American operations. 61

The B-17's were intercepted by 14 Zeros, of which eight were shot down and two were damaged. The B-26's were intercepted by many Zeros, of which ten were shot down. American losses included: two B-25's shot down, with both crews lost; two B-17's down at sea, and one large transport.
with one crew lost and one recovered; two B-17's damaged, and two B-26's forced to make crash landings at Midway because of damage.  

The aircraft from the following organizations participated in the action:

43d Bomb Squadron, 11th Bomb Group  
41st Bomb Squadron, 11th Bomb Group  
23d Bomb Squadron, 5th Bomb Group  
31st Bomb Squadron, 8th Bomb Group  
72d Bomb Squadron, 8th Bomb Group  
18th Reconnaissance Squadron, 23d Bomb Group  
99th Bomb Squadron (?), 35th Bomb Group  
1st Provisional Squadron

Air units functioned under serious handicaps during the battle of Midway. Probably the most important of these was the lack of either adequate servicing facilities or personnel at Midway. The combat crews not only flew long, grueling search missions daily, but to a large extent were forced to do their own servicing and maintenance. The situation was further complicated by the Japanese attack on Midway which destroyed the power house on Eastern Island, resulting in the complete disruption of the one available system of fueling and making it necessary for tired and over-worked crews to spend long, tedious hours servicing their airplanes from cans and drums. As a result of this condition, and because of the continuous combat missions flown before the attack, many of the combat crews fought missions in an exhausted physical condition.

Brig. Gen. Willis E. Hale, Commanding General of the VII Bomber Command, had strongly protested the use of his B-17's in the above-
mentioned search missions, declaring that such use was in opposition to the Army-Navy agreement that Army bombers would not be employed as a striking force except against known targets. He had further protested repetitiousness of the mission on 1 June on the grounds that his men had not averaged seven hours rest in two days, and no target was yet known to exist. On both occasions, however, he was overruled by the Navy.\^67

Inasmuch as the Battle of Midway furnished the first combat experience for the bombardment aircraft of the Seventh Air Force, the conclusions of Capt. Gen. C. G. Dawidson regarding the action are particularly interesting. On the subject of operations, he wrote:

\textit{Attack with torpedo-bearing aircraft must be well coordinated with dive-bombing or high level bombardment attack; unless heavy loss on torpedo bombers is anticipated. Fighter support, if the range permits, should always be used.}

\textit{Coordination with carrier based aviation is an extremely difficult problem for \textit{ground based} aircraft because carriers normally operate under conditions of radio silence. Every effort should be made to plan attacks well in advance.}

\textit{To great difficulty was encountered in hitting surface ships at altitudes of 4,000 to 25,000 feet. The Japanese apparently have the reverse of a bomb sight mounted on their surface craft and can estimate the time at which the bombardier making his run will have to release his bombs. At this point the ship begins to maneuver, adding to the difficulty of hitting it by precision bombing. In order to aid in this computation, every fighter airplane appeared to be stationed above the fleet for the purpose of giving the exact altitude of our bombers to the ships of the fleet. This aided then in calculating the...}
time of the bomb release and also was a great aid in anti-
aircraft fire. The anti-aircraft gun fire of the Japanese
fleet was heavy but ineffective. The only serious hit ob-
tained by the guns was on the wing of a B-17. On the other
hand, the fire of automatic weapons was quite accurate and
caused some losses.

Japanese carrier forces proved to be highly maneuverable
in their efforts to avoid bomb patterns. In some instances,
complete circles, combined with short turning maneuvers, were
employed to avoid high-level bombers. Photographs of one
large carrier showed a turning radius of about 1700 feet.
They made continuous effort to secure cloud cover.

Anti-aircraft fire from carriers and from the immediate
escorting vessels proved to be more accurate than anti-aircraft
fire from other surface ships.

On the serious problem of maintenance and supply, General
Davidson's comments were as follows:

Power equipment is almost a vital necessity for clearing
debris from runways and operating areas of any airfields under
attack. Many airplanes were disabled from fire destruction caused
by shell fragments and coral thrown up on the runway.

Adequate ground crews and equipment for servicing, mainte-
nance, and care of aircraft must be provided in order not to
over-burden combat crews. Every consideration should be
given to adequate underground facilities for re-supplying and sleep-
ing combat crews. It is believed that the rest and comfort
of combat crews is one of the most important factors in their
accomplishment of assigned missions.

Adequate air transport service facilitates supply and
mainteance to bases distant from supply points. During this
operation an already over-burdened transport service was
forced into almost continuous operation.

At our air bases scattered throughout the Pacific we must
not only have an ample supply of fuel, bombs, and ammunition,
but a supply of spare parts, special equipment, and enough
maintenance personnel to take care of the equipment likely to
be used there until reinforcements can be brought in.
Title installations where dispersion and concealment are impractical must be protected against air attacks.

Regarding the equipment that was getting its first battle test, General Davidson said:

For operation against fighter aircraft and in strafing operations it is believed that the current belt loading of ammunition does not contain sufficient high percentage of tracer ammunition. Combat personnel believe that tracer ammunition should be as high as one in three.

EZ-30 aircraft is considered suitable for search operations, but it is believed that the use of EZ-1's for search in the face of the enemy is not desirable, due to their particularly slow speed and vulnerability to fighter aircraft.

The new twin turrets on EZ-17's proved a very successful installation, and caused only minor electrical difficulty in their operation. In planning the use of electrically operated turrets it should be considered that such installations are a continuous drain on the electrical system of the airplane. Some provision should be made to augment the present source of electrical power since these turrets are in almost continuous operation during combat missions. All fields where bombardment airplanes are stationed should have extra turrets for instruction in maintenance and operation.

Pilots consider the B-17 airplane to be an excellent combat airplane. With the addition of two .50 caliber machine guns in the nose of this airplane, it would be capable of taking care of itself against almost any opposition encountered. The airplane is particularly tough. The major deficiency in the B-17 airplane is its range, and every effort should be made to produce and deliver the B-29 and B-32 types to this area. The B-29 airplane is considered satisfactory as a torpedo bomber but training for crews and ordnance personnel in use of torpedoes must be accomplished and an ample supply of reinforced torpedoes kept on hand.

After the enemy had been repulsed, it was necessary to maintain a defense of Midway and the surrounding area for about 10 days a
force of Z-17's was maintained on the islands, and these conducted long search out to sea. There airplanes were to be returned to Oahu, however, and there was urgent need that the Marine fighter planes that had been almost completely lost during the Battle of Midway be replaced. The Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, Adm. C. W. Nimitz, wrote that it was impossible to undertake the replacement of the lost Marine fighters with Marine or Navy fighting planes, because of the need for replenishing the heavy losses suffered by aircraft carriers. He suggested, therefore, that an Army pursuit squadron be temporarily based at Midway.

In answer to this suggestion, the 73d Fighter Squadron was transferred from Oahu to Midway. The ground echelon arrived at Eastern Island on 17 June 1942. The officers, arriving a few days later on the aircraft carrier Saratoga, flew their 36 P-40E airplanes off the carrier and landed them at Midway. This was the first time such planes had been flown off a carrier in the Pacific theater, and possibly in any theater.

The 73d Fighter Squadron patrolled Midway Islands and the surrounding ocean every day until 23 January 1943, when the 76th Fighter Squadron arrived to replace them. The pilots of the 76th had flown their 34 P-40E airplanes all the way from flying fields to Midway, a distance of 1,103 nautical miles, in the longest over-water massed flight of single-engine airplanes ever attempted.
Three days later the 73d Fighter Squadron flew 28 P-40E and P-40EJ airplanes from Midway back to Kaneohe Naval Air Station, a distance of 1,400 air miles. The 73d Fighter Squadron carried on the patrol of Midway until 23 April 1943, when 23 of the P-40EJ's were flown from Midway back to Pearl Harbor.
Chapter II
FROM MIDWAY TO SAIL GILBERTS

On 4 July 1942, about a month after the Midway action, the War
Department instructed the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Depart-
ment to designate one heavy bombardment group of the Seventh Air
Force as the Hawaiian Mobile Air Force. This was to be a part of
the Seventh Air Force, but it was to be available for action out-
side of the Central Pacific Area." The 11th Bomb Group, under the
command of Col. L. G. Saunders, was so designated, and preparations
were made for its movement to the South Pacific area.

The 11th Bomb Group, consisting of the 35th, 49th, 96th, and
431st Bomb Squadrons, left Hickam Field on 17 July with 35 A-17H
aircraft. Ground personnel of the 11th Group had departed from
Cahu on the U.S.S. Anconne on 10 July, expecting to arrive at
their destination well before the air echelon. Then the Anconne
clocked on 23 July at Noumea, New Caledonia, however, the air echelon
was already there or landing. The 11th Group became a part of a
task force commanded by Rear Adm. John S. McCain. Its mission was
to provide scouting and air cover, to the forces under Vice Adm.
Robert L. Ghormley which were designed to rid Australia and New
Zealand of the menace of Japanese invasion and protect the American
lines of communications to those areas. Approximately two months
after the departure of the 11th Bomb Group, the 72d Squadron of the 5th Bombardment Group moved down into the South Pacific where it was subsequently joined by the remaining squadrons of the group.

This transfer of the 5th and 11th Bomb Groups to the South Pacific took from the Seventh Air Force its only heavy bombardment organizations and virtually denuded it of heavy bombardment aircraft. After the movement of the 11th and prior to the movement of the 5th, the latter comprised the only heavy bombardment available for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Yet during the summer of 1943 it was at times impossible of placing in the air more than 12 heavy bombers completely and adequately equipped. The remainder of the 35 B-17's assigned were judged to be unfit for combat, except in a last-ditch stand.

During the movement of the 5th Bomb Group to the South Pacific, the heavy bombardment strength of the Seventh Air Force was provided in part by the 90th Bomb Group, temporarily in the Hawaiian Islands en route to assignment with the Fifth Air Force, and the 307th Bomb Group, assigned for a short time to the Seventh Air Force. Even so, it was at times difficult for the Seventh to provide the 36 heavy bombers considered the minimum necessary for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands.

The VII Bomber Command was directed to furnish a minimum daily striking force of 18 heavy bombers in three squadrons of six.
aircraft each, one to be on the alert and two on reserve, with the
two on reserve to be available for training purposes except during
the day and dusk alert periods. This was done, but under the
circumstances there was little else that the Seventh Air Force was
able of doing operationally, and until 22 December when a mass
raid was conducted on Waco, the only operations performed by the
Seventh Air Force were small-scale missions over Naha and the
Gilbert Islands.

The missions over Naha were performed on 23 June and 31 July,
with Midway serving as a staging base in both instances. The first
mission was performed by three B-25's and was a night attack in
which 18 x 500-pound bombs were dropped on the airbase area. Al-
though antiaircraft fire of medium intensity was encountered, there
was no interception, and no aircraft were damaged. The second
mission was a photographic reconnaissance conducted by one B-17.
After being intercepted by six enemy fighters, four of which it shot
down, the bomber returned to its staging base with three bullet
holes. The mission over the Gilberts was a photographic reconnais-
sance conducted 29 July 1943 by three B-17's of the VII Bomber
Command, staging through Canton.

The December raid on Naha was planned both as a diversionary
measure and as a means of providing training for future operations.
This was the first of five such missions conducted during the period

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covered by this account against the American outpost which had been captured by the Japanese 21 December 1941, and which was serving the enemy as an advanced Central Pacific patrol base, guarding against United Nations' operations toward Japanese-held positions in the Caroline, Marshall, and Gilbert Islands. Its important facilities included a landing field large enough to accommodate all types of airplanes, a seaplane landing and sheltered anchorage area, repair shops, and anchorage facilities for small naval craft. The 20th Bomb Group was designated to execute the attack with 24 B-24D's, and the Navy was to provide three submarines and one destroyer to furnish navigational aids and perform any necessary rescue missions.

Twenty-six airplanes were flown from Guadalcanal to the staging base at Midway, thus providing two spares in addition to the scheduled attacking force. When the staging base was reached, however, it was decided to send all 26 aircraft on the mission. The 26 B-24D's dropped 136 x 500-pound GP bombs and 21 incendiary clusters on Wake. Of the C bombs, 74 were seen to be hits, 26 were near hits, and 13 were unobserved. Damage assessment was difficult because of clouds and the large number of fires and explosions taking place all over the island. The attack apparently took the enemy completely by surprise, as neither searchlights nor antiaircraft fire were encountered until after the bomb run had been started. Two small hits comprised the only damage to American aircraft, and all returned safely.
to Midway. The operation was a high point in the history of the
Seventh Air Force for the year 1943, being the longest offensive scored
flight attempted up to that time. The aircraft flew 2,650 nautical
miles from Midway to Wake and return, in addition to making the
round trip from Cohn to Midway, with bombs aboard on the first
leg. 16

The raid on Wake was followed a month later with a daylight
photographic reconnaissance mission. On 25 January 1943, six
A-30's of the 371st Bomb Squadron of the 307th Bomb Group staged
through Midway from Cohn to perform the mission. They took photos
at Midway from 14,000 feet and dropped a total of 60 x 100-pound
demolition bombs during the photo runs. Fifty-three of the bombs
were observed to fall on the island, and vertical photos were taken
of the entire island, with obliques being shot from several angles.
Upon completion of the photo runs, the formation was intercepted by
tax to eight Zero fighters, of which one was shot down and four were
possibly shot down. The interceptors were aggressive and the lead
A-30 was hit ten times, with two other fighters being hit once
each. There was some antiaircraft fire, but it was generally mild
and trailing. 17

Wake was not raided again until 15 July 1943 when 18 B-24's of
the 371st and 379th Bomb Squadrons of the 307th Bomb Group were
assigned to a daylight bombing mission of the island from Midway.

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Four of the airplanes were abortive because of excessive gas consumption, and seven failed to find the target. The seven airplanes that did get over the target dropped 34 x 500-pound GP bombs and six 650-pound depth charges from 11,000 feet with results largely unobserved. Although only innocuous anti-aircraft fire was encountered the formation was intercepted by 19 Zeke's and three Hnekos. Four of the enemy airplanes were shot down, one was probably shot down, and eight were damaged. However, four of the J-24's were damaged, and one was shot down. 18

The last two missions against Zako were conducted on the 26th and 28th of July by the airplanes of the reconstituted 11th Zone Group, and like their predecessors were diversionary missions. These particular ones were ordered by the Navy to relieve pressure in the South Pacific and to confuse the enemy as to where the next blow would fall. 19 In both instances the airplanes staged through Midway.

Twelve J-24's were assigned to the first strike, but two did not take off and two returned without finding the target. The eight planes getting over the island dropped seven 500-pound GP bombs, 33 fragmentation clusters and three 650-pound depth charges, scoring hits on the oil storage area, barracks, and gun emplacement area at Peacock Point. 20 As the airplanes approached Peacock Point they encountered opposition from extremely accurate and intense...
medium and heavy antiaircraft guns and automatic weapons. After
the first flight had made its bombing runs, the airplanes were in-
tercepted by 30 to 35 Zeros and one unidentified biplane. A running
fight ensued, with the Zeros following the heavy bombers 50 miles
out to sea. The largest number of passes came from above and below
between 10 and two o'clock. One pilot observed a total of 85 passes
made at his five-airplane formation. Nine enemy fighters were de-
stroyed, four others were probably destroyed, and three were damaged.
One J-24 was lost when it crashed into the ocean after a mid-air
collision with an enemy fighter which was falling out of control.
The crew of the fallen bomber were observed to continue their fire
until they crashed. 31

Again on 23 July only eight airplanes of the 12 assigned got
over the target. These dropped 18 x 500-pound GP bombs, 29 fragmen-
tation clusters, and nine incendiary clusters. Two of the GP bombs
hit the central portion of Scale Island, and five hit the oil storage
area on the western tip of Wake Island. 22 Opposition was first en-
countered about a mile off shore from Scale Island when medium anti-
aircraft guns apparently based on the north shore started firing.
The bombers were fired upon while crossing the lagoon by heavy guns
from Peacock Point and the southeast end of Wake Island. There
was also some medium fire from the southwest end of Wake Island. In
all cases, the antiaircraft was intense and extremely accurate as to
altitude and range. After they had completed their bombing runs, the B-34's were intercepted by approximately 25 enemy Zeros and one airplane that was reported as a possible Focke-Wulf 190, although there is no positive evidence that this type of airplane was ever used in this theater. The Japanese pilots were not as aggressive as those encountered on 24 July, and they did not press their attacks home. Coordinated attacks were made by the enemy in elements of two or three airplanes, mostly from below, with the fighters coming up and into the formation from 10 or two o'clock and from the beam. Eleven Zeros were destroyed, eight were probably destroyed, and 11 were damaged. The B-34's suffered no losses.33

As has been stated, the operations against Wake were, however, merely diversionary actions designed to confuse the enemy. The main emphasis of Seventh Air Force operations during 1943 was against the Japanese outposts in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands. Hence the remainder of this study will be concerned with the activities of the Seventh Air Force prior to the actual invasion and occupation of islands in these two groups.

Evidently there had been some consideration given to using Johnston Island, a little more than 700 miles from Cabo, as a staging base for the raids on the Gilberts and Marshalls. General Lucas wrote CLAIR, advising against this, for the reason that to judge from the Hale experience the maximum radius for a heavily-

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loaded L-2s were believed to be about 1,000 nautical miles. The closest targets in either chain of islands would be well over that distance from Johnston. General Johnson therefore recommended that Funafuti in the Tuamotu Islands be considered the primary operating base for sorties into the Gilberts and Marshalls and that the raids begin as soon as the Commander, South Pacific Area reported the Once procured and available.

The raids began on 25 January 1943, when three L-24D's of the 307th Bomb Group staged through Funafuti to conduct a photographic reconnaissance of Tarawa, Makin, Aorara, Eleni, and Tarawa. Photographs were taken from 20,000 feet, and one medium-sized cargo-passenger-type merchant vessel, anchored in the lagoon at Makin, was bombed with 11 x 500-pound demolition bombs, one near miss possibly causing some damage. From this date until the latter part of April, the first relatively large-scale mission was conducted, the Gilberts and Marshalls were raided as follows:

22 January 1943 - One L-24D of 307th Bomb Group photographed Makin and Eleni. Bombs were not carried. Antiaircraft fire was exceedingly heavy and accurate over Eleni.27

22 February 1943 - Three L-24D's of 307th Bomb Group in photo-bombing mission over northern Gilberts from Canton. Photographs were taken from 13,000 to 14,000 feet of Makin, Makin, and Makin. Nine 500-pound demolition bombs were dropped on ships at Makin, but no hits were observed. There were a few inaccurate bursts of antiaircraft fire at Makin, and heavy concentration of antiaircraft fire from ships in the lagoon and shore positions at Makin, but no damage was sustained by any 2-24.
The first large-scale attack on the Gilberts was conducted on 20 and 21 April by the 371st and 372d Bomb Squadrons, designated Task Force Evolve, under the personal command of General Hale. Their mission was to bomb Makin and Tarawa in order to destroy the military installations, equipment, and shipping of the enemy located there. Upon completion of the bombing, sufficient reconnaissance sorties were to be made to cover all possible aviation bases in the Gilberts except Makin and Tarawa in order to estimate the possibility and practicability of their use either by the Japanese or American forces. The task force was to operate from Funafuti, and the airplanes were to return to Cakou upon completion of their assigned tasks.

General Hale proceeded to Funafuti from Cakou on 18 April with the airplanes, having sent a small boat there some two weeks previously to land the necessary supplies and equipment. On 20 April, 23 B-24’s took off from Funafuti for Makin. One airplane was abortive, but 22 dropped 25 x 1,000-pound G2 bombs, 45 x 500-pound GP bombs, and 45 fragmentation clusters, achieving direct hits on the runway, dispersal, and phosphate plant areas. Oil supplies at the north end of the runway were destroyed. The moonlight weather was excellent for bombing, although it permitted the enemy to observe the approach which, because of the location of the targets, had to be in one direction along the shore line. The first elements were engaged by Zero fighters, and all of the airplanes received heavy
antiaircraft fire. Five of the B-24's were damaged.31 General 
said had the highest praise for the combat crews:32

The men behaved magnificently in that they stayed right 
"down the groove" in order to insure accuracy in bombing, not-
withstanding the heavy attacks being made by antiaircraft and 
fighters. I am positive that it will be many months before 
the Japs can restore their destroyed machinery which was 
involved in the refining of phosphates. . . . Our bombing was 
all done below 8,500 feet. All planes returned to Funafuti 
notwithstanding the damage they had suffered.

The original plan had been to attack Tarawa the day after the 
raid on Pearl, but required required a day's delay. This proved to 
be advantageous, because the Japanese bombed the airfield at Funafuti 
twice before dawn on 22 April, beginning at 0315, the exact hour for 
which the take-off had been planned, and had the mission proceeded as 
scheduled, the Japanese would have caught the heavy bombers taking 
off. As it was, the enemy was able to inflict serious damage on the 
B-24's dispersed along the narrow runway. Direct hits were scored 
on two of the bombers, one of which was already loaded with 3,000 
pounds of bombs. When it exploded, five other airplanes were damaged 
by the falling debris.33

Notwithstanding the damage inflicted, 13 B-24D's took off the 
following day to attack Tarawa, dropping a total of 60 x 1,000-pound 
GP bombs and six 30-pound fragmentation clusters, setting direct 
site in the gas storage and barracks areas.34 The formation had flown 
about 600 miles northward to the east of the Gilbert and Ellice 
Islands to avoid detection by Japanese coast watchers, and had then

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from directly west to Iwo To. They evidently took the enemy by complete surprise, as the leading element had dropped its bombs before any antiaircraft fire occurred. The first firing came from either a cruiser or a destroyer standing offshore, and was followed by "fireworks all over the place," but only one airplane was hit.35

Although, as has been mentioned, the original plan called for following the bombing missions with photographic reconnaissance, General Halsey did not feel that he could risk his heavy bombers on the exposed Kusuma airstrip another night, so he made "the longest and fastest retreat in military history back to Hawaii - 3,000 miles back - arriving the following day after attacking Iwo To."36

The next action was over Kusuma, where three B-24's conducted photographic reconnaissance missions from Canton on the 26th and 27th of May. Approximately 360 pictures were taken each time. On the first mission, 9,000 pounds of 600-pound bombs were dropped on the barracks area, and on the second, six 500-pound bombs were dropped, with results unobserved. The airplanes encountered neither antiaircraft nor fighter interception on either mission.37 The pictures taken showed no chance of military significance on the island, and it was recommended that repetition of a photographic reconnaissance over Iwo To in the very near future be given a low priority.38

Iwo To was hit for the first time since 31 March on the night of 17-18 June by three B-24's of the 18th Bomb Squadron and one from...
Headquarters, VII Bomber Command in a diversionary attack in support of a photographic reconnaissance scheduled for the same night over Jaluit and Mille in the Marshalls. The attack was planned as an harassing action, with the aircranes taking off at approximately two-hour intervals and proceeding individually to the target. One aircrane returned early because of engine trouble, and another was unable to locate the target. The two that did get over the target dropped nine 500-pound GP bombs and 122 x 50-pound fragmentation clusters, rendering 3,600 feet of runway temporarily unserviceable, silencing an antiaircraft battery, and blowing up an ammunition case. Antiaircraft fire was both light and heavy, but ineffective. One aircrane was intercepted by seven Zekes, but escaped undamaged.

The photographic reconnaissance mission for which the attack on Turama was to furnish support was conducted over Mille by three B-24D's of the 432d Bomb Squadron in what was the first night photographic reconnaissance mission performed by the VII Bomber Command. The aircrane accomplished complete photographic coverage of Mille, Fort Finn, and Kolowe Channel. They encountered medium to heavy antiaircraft fire, meager to moderate in intensity, but inaccurate, the only damage being one hole in the left vertical stabilizer of one bomber.

On the next night, three B-24D's, one of which was abortive, conducted a photographic mission over Jaluit, with the mission
being repeated on the night of 19 June. There was some antiaircraft fire both times, but no damage was scored the B-24's. These missions were followed by photographic reconnaissance on 21, 22, and 24 June, as follows:

21 June 1943—One airplane, piloted by Col. C. F. Hegg, executive officer of VII Bomber Command, conducted an armed photographic reconnaissance over Nomuti, Pera, and Nukumar. Three 500-pound 650 bombs were dropped on Nomuti. There was no enemy opposition.

22 June 1943—Three B-24's of the 436th Bomb Squadron conducted daylight photographic mission over Seki, Nukumar, Konekone, Cnoa, Tarewa, and Arorai from Canton. One airplane, after taking photos of Arorai, dropped to 1,000 feet and expended about 450 rounds of ammunition strafing. There was no enemy opposition.

24 June 1943—Three aircraft of 96th Bomb Squadron conducted visual reconnaissance of Nomuti, Tapeteua, Cnoa, Konomi, Arorai, and Nachtuma. They carried no bombs and met with no opposition.

These reconnaissance missions were followed by a large-scale strike against Auru on 23 June. The reconstituted 11th Bomb Group was assigned to this second strike of any size against the rich phosphate-producing Japanese stronghold. The mission proved to be little short of disastrous for the inexperienced personnel of the once battle-seasoned 11th Group. Nineteen of the group's airplanes, together with one from Headquarters, VII Bomber Command, were to be flown to Tunafuti on 27 June. Of these, however, one crashed at Makura en route. The next day, two of the airplanes assigned to the mission were released because of engine difficulties. The first
airplane to take off for Lauer crashed. Six others took off, then another crashed, and General Landon ordered the remaining airplanes to stay on the ground. Four of the airborne aircraft started for Lauer but became separated in a heavy front and two of them failed to find the target. The other two airplanes reached the target individually; one dropped 11 x 100-pound fragmentation clusters from 13,000 feet, and the other dropped 10 from 12,000 feet, with results unobserved. There was interception by 10 Zeros, and opposition from light, medium, and heavy antiaircraft fire, moderately intense but inaccurate. The only damage was the loss of the rudder in the nose of one airplane.47

During approximately the next two months the Seventh Air Force engaged in relatively little offensive action against either the Marshall or the Gilberts. Four B-24's of the 42d Bomb Squadron conducted a photographic mission over Makin and Little Makin from Roi-Neil on 11 July,48 and six airplanes from the same squadron bombed Rotio Island, Tarawa Atoll, on 10 July.49 Meanwhile, the 11th Bomb Group was conducting a diversionary strike against Wake to divert attention from the southern part of the Central Pacific and to confuse the enemy as to where the next strike would occur.50

Coincident with the unconfirmed occupation of Baker by American forces, six B-24's of the 11th Bomb Group began conducting daily search missions out of Canton on 1 September, continuing the missions

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through 14 September.\textsuperscript{51} Also, on 11 September, 19 P-40N's of the 45th Fighter Squadron, escorted by one B-24 and one LB-30 of the 11th Bomb Group, were flown from Canton to Baker, where they were to provide fighter protection for the forces on the island.\textsuperscript{52}

To prevent the enemy from conducting raids on the installations at Baker, as well as those at Makinac and Sanosa in the Ellice Group, a coordinated Army-Navy attack on Tarawa, main Japanese base in the Gilberts, was planned during the month of September. Organized for the purpose was Task Force 15 under the command of Rear Admiral Pownal. Within the task force there were to be two air groups: the Canton Air Group, commanded by Brig. Gen. T. M. Landon, consisting of six F8F's and 12 B-24's; and the Funafuti Air Group, commanded by Brig. Gen. Arvid D. Campbell, USMC, consisting of 12 F4F's, 10 FV-1's, and 12 B-24's. The actual attack was to be made by carrier-based aircraft. The Canton and Funafuti air groups were to support the carrier striking group by search and by attack on Tarawa preceding the carrier-based attack.\textsuperscript{53} The 24 B-24D's in the air groups were furnished by the 11th Bomb Group. They remained at their staging bases on Canton and Funafuti on 14 and 15 September.\textsuperscript{54}

The air group plan of attack was to strike land-based aircraft and air installations by bombing Tarawa on the night of 17-18 September. The attack was to be made with fragmentation bombs as far as possible.\textsuperscript{55} The first three airplanes were to drop 500-
pound GP bombs with delay fuse on the runway at Tarawa to immobilize its use during the carrier strike. The air group was to complete its bombing two hours prior to the initial attack of the carrier striking force. 66

On the night of 16 September, 24 E-2A's--12 from Canton and 12 from Funafuti--took off for Tarawa. Eight aircrews of the Canton flight attacked Betio Island, the primary target, one bombed Makin, and three were abortive. Ten aircrews of the Funafuti flight attacked Betio, one bombed Makin, one bombed Arawa, and one was abortive. Betio was hit by 229 x 20-pound fragmentation clusters, 25 x 27-pound fragmentation clusters, and 24 x 500-pound GP bombs, with excellent results. Twenty 20-pound and 10 x 37-pound fragmentation clusters fell on alternate targets. There was intense enemy and medium antiaircraft fire, but it was inaccurate. There was no interception. 67

On 19 September, 16 E-2A's from Canton and 11 from Funafuti conducted a daylight bombardment and photo reconnaissance mission over Tarawa. Four aircrews were abortive. The remaining 20 dropped 129 x 500-pound GP bombs on Tarawa, and five 500-pound GP bombs on Arawa, in addition to obtaining complete photorecon coverage of Betio, the primary target for the mission of the preceding night. This attack faced considerably more opposition than the night attack, for in addition to fire from medium and heavy
antiaircraft guns, there was interception from between 15 and 20 Zeros. 53

A total of 131 passes made at the B-24's were specifically reported, with 85 per cent of them coming from the 10 to two o'clock positions, and the remainder coming chiefly from the beam, with a few scattered ones from the four to eight o'clock positions. There was some difference of opinion as to the degree of experience of the enemy pilots. The general consensus, however, was that with the exception of a few seasoned leaders most of them were inexperienced. Generally they failed to press their attacks home, breaking away in a half-roll and split "S" which presented a difficult target for the B-24 gunners. Attacks were concentrated on the flight leaders unless indications appeared that one of the other airplanes was in trouble. One B-24 was shot down, and 10 others were damaged. 59

Although there was decided improvement over the July mission in July, and all personnel were congratulated on the successful performance of a difficult mission, it was observed that further training in night formation flying was necessary. It was also observed that the importance of frequent blinder contact between the aircrews should be stressed in training. 60

The bombing of Iwo Jima was the last strike conducted by aircraft of the Seventh Air Force prior to the action connected directly with
the occupation of the Gilberts. In anticipation of this action, the
progressive strength of the Seventh Air Force was augmented by the
addition of one heavy (the 30th), and one medium (the 41st) bombard-
ment group. The 30th Bomb Group was assigned to the Seventh Air Force
on 11 October 1943, and the 41st Bomb Group was assigned on 22
October. On 6 November 1943, Advanced Headquarters (ADVH) of
the Seventh Air Force was established at Funafuti, and the first
large-scale offensive in the sweep of the air, land, and sea power
of the United States across the Central Pacific was begun.

A recapitulation of the offensive action of the Seventh Air Force
during the period under consideration is presented in tables on the
following pages.

It will be seen from the foregoing pages that the period from
the beginning of the war to the establishment of Advanced Headquarters
at Funafuti was one of limited operations for the Seventh Air Force.
Inadequately by lack of both personnel and aircraft, its functions
were limited largely to defensive and training activities. Yet the
air force was able to carry on some offensive operations. These are
important not only for the damage they inflicted upon the enemy, but
also for the experience they furnished in the employment of land-
based Army aircraft in the vast oceanic theater of the Central
Pacific—experience which was to be well utilized in the succeeding
months.
### Seventh Air Force

**Tons of Bombs Dropped over Targets in All Types of Aircraft**

**December 1942 - October 1943 CBI**

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<th>Dec 43</th>
<th>Jun 43</th>
<th>Jul 43</th>
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### LEHDER AIR FORCE

**WAGES TONS OF SUGAR RECAPTURED OVER TERRITORY BY TYPE OF AIRCRAFT**

**JULY 1941-OCTOBER 1943**

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**SECURITY INFORMATION**

THIS PAGE Declassified IAW EO12958
Operations of the Seventh Air Force
7 December 1941 to 6 November 1945

1941

0755 - Nine enemy single-engine, low-wing monoplanes, carrying torpedoes, observed southeast of Hickam Field hangar line, flying toward Pearl Harbor at an altitude of about 50 feet. Twelve dive bombers attacked Hickam Field hangar line and Hawaiian Air Depot, and a few minutes later 16 additional dive bombers attacked Hickam Field hangar line. The entire attack lasted about 10 minutes. (Lt. Col. Kendall J. Fielder, AG/S C-2, took off AG/S C-2, SBSS, 20 Dec. 41. See AR 385.4, History of 7th AF SBSSs. See item 1.)

0800 - Wheeler Field attacked by approximately 25 enemy airplanes, bombing and strafing for approximately 15 minutes. (Ibid.)

0825 - Second attack on Hickam Field: six to nine airplanes in low-level bombing and strafing attack on technical buildings, and consolidated barracks. About one minute later, five to six airplanes bomb the baseball diamond from high level. Second attack lasted between 10 and 15 minutes. (Ibid.)

0830 - Single Japanese fighter strafed Bellows Field in first attack on that area. Four P-40s and two P-38s aircraft took off from Wheeler Field. (Ibid.; ICS for Roberts Command, 20 Dec. 41. See item 2.)

0855 - Two P-40s took off from Wheeler Field. (Ibid.)

0900 - Third attack on Hickam Field: six to nine airplanes strafed technical buildings behind hangar line and disposed aircraft with machine-gun fire; seven to nine airplanes bomb consolidated barracks, parade ground, and Post Exchange from about 6,000 feet. Second attack on Wheeler Field: seven enemy airplanes strafed aircraftbagai, taxis onto airstrip. Second attack on Bellows Field: nine airplanes strafed aircraft on runways. (Ibid., Lt. Col. Kendall J. Fielder to AG/S C-2, SBSS, 20 Dec. 41.)
7 Dec. 41

0615 - Six P-38's took off from Wheeler Field. (Memo for Roberts Com., 26 Dec. 41.)

(contd.)

0830 - Five F-40's and six F-30's took off from Wheeler Field. (Ibid.)

0900 - One 0-47 took off from Bolling Field. (Ibid.)

1045 - Three 0-77's took off from Bolling Field. (Ibid.)

1107 - Four A-20A's took off from Hickam Field to search area 25 miles off Barbers Point for carriers reported there. Returned at 1310. (Ibid.)

1149 - Two A-17D's took off from Hickam Field to search area 25 miles off Barbers Point for carriers reported there. Returned at 1640. (Ibid.)

1200 - Five F-40's took off from Wheeler Field. (Ibid.)

1215 - Five F-40's took off from Bolling Field. (Ibid.)

1300 - Three A-20A's took off from Hickam Field. (Ibid.)

1330 - Two A-17D's took off from Hickam Field to search sector 310°-360°. Returned at 1700. (Ibid.)

1500 - Three 0-47's took off from Bolling Field, and 11 F-40's took off from Wheeler Field. (Ibid.)

1620 - Three A-17D's took off from Hickam Field to search sector 150°-180°, returning at 1830. (Ibid.)

Air strength of Hawaiian Air Force, before and after the enemy attack:

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<th>Type</th>
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<th>Used After Raid</th>
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<td>P-20C</td>
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(Endo for Roberts Col., 26 Dec. 41.)

### 11 Dec. 41

11th Bomb Wing with six B-13's conducted a search and attack mission in sector 200°-270°, 300 miles seaward. (War Diary, A-3, Hawaiian Air Force. See App. 3.)

### 12 Dec. 41

Secured with police guard and crew of six men on route from Lahaina to Aiea airfield. Attack evidently was by enemy aircraft as 11th Bomb Wing reported that none of its aircraft participated. (Ibid. 69 18th Bomb Wing to CIN CIN CIN, 14 Dec. 41.)

### 13 Dec. 41

18th Bomb Wing with five B-17's conducted a search and attack mission in sector 230°-240°, 200 miles seaward. (War Diary, A-3, Ibid.)

### 14 Dec. 41

18th Bomb Wing with 11 B-17's conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in sector 210°-230°, 600 miles seaward. (Ibid.)

### 15 Dec. 41

Leihaina, Maui, shelled, probably by submarine. (Ibid.)

18th Bomb Wing with 11 B-17's conducted a search mission against submarines and surface craft in sector 210°-230°, 600 miles seaward. (Ibid.)

### 16 Dec. 41

18th Bomb Wing with 12 B-17's conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in sector 40°-60°, 600 miles seaward. Submarine sighted between Lahaina and 'Iolani Rock, but contact was lost when it dived. (Ibid.)

18th Bomb Wing with eight B-18's conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in sector 330°-345°, 150 miles seaward. (Ibid.)
17 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing with 12 B-17’s conducted a search mission in sectors 10°–70° and 220°–290°, 600 miles seaward. (Ibid.)

18th Bomb Wing with three B-17’s conducted a search mission in sector 70°–100°, 300 miles seaward. (Ibid.)

18th Bomb Wing, with six A-20’s conducted a search mission in sector 60°–140°, 150 miles seaward. (Ibid.)


Aircraft of the 18th Bomb Wing in following search missions: 10 B-17’s in sectors 60°–120° and 150°–160°, 800 miles seaward; six B-17’s in sectors 90°–130° and 160°–180°, 800 miles seaward. On the latter mission, one 600-pound bomb was dropped in an oil slick, which enlarged to three or four times its former size. (War Diary, 12–3, 1942.)

19 Dec. 41 Aircraft of 18th Bomb Wing in following search missions: 11 B-17’s in sector 310°–320°, 600 miles seaward; one B-17 in sector 200°–220°, 600 miles seaward; six A-20’s in sector 30°–90°, 150 miles seaward. (Ibid.)

20 Dec. 41 Aircraft of 18th Bomb Wing in following search missions: 17 B-17’s in sector 60°–150°, 600 miles seaward; three A-20’s in vicinity of long. 158°, 30°, lat. 22°, 00'. (Ibid.)

21 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing with eight B-17’s conducted a search mission in sector 150°–250°, 600 miles seaward. (Ibid.)

22 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing with 11 B-17’s conducted a search mission in sector 120°–260°, 600 miles seaward. (Ibid.)

23 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing with 12 B-17’s conducted a search mission in sector 120°–240°, 600 miles seaward. (Ibid.)

24 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing with 16 B-17’s conducted a search mission in sector 30°–180°, 600 miles seaward. (Ibid.)

18th Bomb Wing with three A-20’s and one B-17 conducted a search and attack mission against enemy submarines reported between Mihinu and Kawai. Bombs were dropped on what appeared to be two submarines diving. Results were unobserved. (Ibid.)
25 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing with 16 B-17's conducted a search mission in sector 00°-180°, 600 miles seaward.  (Ibid.)

26 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing with 16 B-17's conducted a search mission in sector 00°-180°, 300 miles seaward.  (Ibid.)

27 Dec. 41 Aircraft of 18th Bomb Wing in following search missions: 16 B-17's in sector 00°-180°, 300 miles seaward; 10 A-10's in sector 200°-300°, 150 miles seaward; and six A-20's off Java sea.  (Ibid.)

28 Dec. 41 Aircraft of 18th Bomb Wing in following search missions: 15 B-17's in sector 00°-180°, 600 miles seaward; six A-10's on a course 000°, 250 miles seaward; one B-18, 100 miles out on west leg of Java base and return; and three A-20's on a course 250° from Java Point, 150 miles seaward.  Three submarines were sighted by the B-13's.  One was bombed and probably destroyed.  (War Diary, A-3, AEF.)

29 Dec. 41 18th Bomb Wing with 12 B-17's conducted search mission in sector 60°-90° and 120°-180°, 600 miles seaward.  (Ibid.)

30 Dec. 41 Aircraft of 18th Bomb Wing in following search missions: 13 B-17's in sector 100°-110°, 600 miles seaward; four A-10's in sector 120°-170°, 300 miles seaward; and three A-20's in sector 200°-250°, 150 miles seaward.  (Ibid.)

31 Dec. 41 One of 12 B-17's of 18th Bomb Wing on search missions in sectors 00°-150°, 25°-55°, 95°-110°, and 150°-160°, 600 miles seaward, dropped three 300-lb. bombs on or near submarine.  Other 18th Wing aircraft in search missions as follows: four -18's in sector 65°-85°, 30 miles seaward; and three A-20's in sector 260°-280°, 150 miles seaward.  (Ibid.)

Aircraft status report of Hawaiian Interceptor Command:
- 46 P-40's and 27 P-36's in collision.
- 6 P-40's and 1 P-36 out for first echelon maintenance.
- 6 P-40's and 1 P-36 out for second echelon maintenance.
- 67 P-40's, 24 P-33's, and 2 P-36's out for third echelon maintenance.  (Ibid.)
31 Dec. 41 Aircraft Status Report of 15th Bomb Wing:
(contd.)
28 3-17's, 9 3-1l's, and 10 A-20's in commission.
6 B-17's and 4 B-19's out for first echelon maintenance.
1 B-17 and 1 B-18 out for second echelon maintenance.
6 3-17's and 7 3-18's out for third echelon maintenance.
(Ibid.)

Aircraft Status Report of 86th Observation Squadron:
6 O-47's and 1 O-49 in commission.
1 O-47 out for first echelon maintenance.
(Ibid.)

1942

16 Jan. 42 During this period, three B-17's of 23d Bomb Squadron
and three of the 50th Reconnaissance Squadron served as
a border unit assigned to Task Group 6.9. They departed
Kikima Field on 16 January and arrived at Canton on
17 January. The 16th and 17th of January were devoted
to anti-submarine search missions. On 18 January, the
flight proceeded to Kandi, returning to Canton on 20
January. A second flight was made to Kandi on 22
January, with return to Canton on 27 January. A sub-
marine search to 500 miles west of Canton was made on 28
January, with no contacts reported. The return to Kikima
Field via Fiyava was effected without incident on 29-30
January. (Report of Operations, Bomber Unit Task
Group 6.9 to 23d Bomb Gp., 3 Feb. 42. Sec. 3, p. 4.)

1 Feb. 42 Women's Air Raid Defense (W.A.R.D.) organized and trained.
Ninety women took over in place of enlisted men at
Information Center and moved to Fort Shafter. (VIIighter
Forward History, Dec. 1941-July 1944.)

5 Feb. 42 Hawaiian Air Force redesignated as Seventh Air Force,
consisting of three commands: Porter, Interceptor, and Base.
(20-23, Mar. 42.)

10 Feb. 42 Twelve B-17's, attached from defense forces and released
to CINCPAC for operations in South Pacific, scheduled to
depart from Cahu on 15 to arrive Kandi Airport, Fiji,
13 February. To be assigned to Task Force 11 under
Rear Admiral Brown, and to operate in support of operations
of that force until released by the Commander of the Task
Force, at which time they were to return to Cahu. (CINCPAC
Operations Plan 14-42, 3 Feb. 42; CINCPAC Operations
Restrictions.
Joint Army-Air.

14 Feb. 42 One S-17 of VII Bomber Command in photographic recon-
nos-ance of Wake. (Ltr., Adm. J. H. Towers to CG HAP, 21 Feb. 42; VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission
Reports.)

4 Mar. 42 At 0012 an unidentified aircraft picked up 50 miles north-
west of Iwo Jima, from where it went to Iwo Jima Island on
Guam, then around north coast until opposite Manus, where it
turned south to Honolulu. Four 500-lb. bombs fell short of the
city, and did no damage. Overcast conditions pre-
vented successful pursuit or the use of anti-aircraft.
No known presence of a submarine in the French Frigate
Shells area indicated that it was a multi-colored flying
vessels fly from the Marshall or Wake, refueling from a sub-
marine. (CG-002, Dec. 39, Frank to Chief AAF, 13 June
42, in AG 7AF 370.8, Navy attacks on Guam.)

13-23 Mar. 42 Seventh Air Force on a special alert to meet threatened
censor attack. A majority of the B-17's were sent out
with 500- and 1,000-lb. demolition bombs. (Ltr., Gen.
E. O. C. Davidson, CG 7AF to CG AAF, 13 June 42; J-3
Reports, 7AF, 18-28 May 42.)

13 May 42 Six 3-17's from 36th Bomb Squadron flown to Midway. (Ltr,
CG VII Bomber Command to O-3, 7AF, 6 June 42, in AG 7AF
370.26, Battles and Engagements.)

31 Jul. 42 Six 3-17's from 431st Bomb Squadron, two from the 31st
Bomb Squadron, and one from 32d Bomb Squadron flown to
Midway. (Ltr.)

Six 3-17's from 36th Bomb Squadron and six from 431st
Bomb Squadron (probably) flew search missions to the
distance of 600 miles and return. (Ltr., Gen. E. O. C.
Davidson to CG AAF, 16 June 42.)

1 June 42 One 3-17 flown to Midway. (Ltr., CG VII Bomber Command
to O-3, 7AF, 6 June 42.)

Two squadrons, with six 3-17's each, flew search missions
from Midway to a distance of 600 miles and return.
(Ltr., Gen. E. O. C. Davidson to CG AAF, 13 June 42.)

2 June 42 Six 3-17's from 36th Bomb Squadron returned from Midway
to Wheeler Field. (Ltr., CG VII Bomber Command to O-3
7AF, 6 June 42; Ltr., Lt. Col. L. C. Coettker, CG 36th
Bomb Sq. to CG 11th Bomb Gp., 8 June 42, in AG 7AF
370.4, Battles and Engagements.)

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[Handwritten notes and corrections on the page]
3 June 43  
505  -  One B-17, with maximum gas load and no bomb load, departed for Midway. (Memo, CG VII Bomber Command to 6-3 ZAF, 6 June 42.)

1438  -  Six B-17's from 43d Bomb Squadron departed from Wake Island for Midway, with full load. (Ibid.)

1625  -  Six B-17's from 431st Bomb Squadron, with two from 31st Bomb Squadron and one from 72d Bomb Squadron attached, attacked five Japanese battleships or heavy cruisers, bearing 030°, 570 miles from Midway. Dropped 8 x 500-lb. demolition bombs from 6,000 feet, scoring five hits and several near misses. (Seventh Air Force and the Battle of Midway, 3-6 June 1942, a compilation of Seventh Air Force activity; memo, CG VII Bomber Command to CG ZAF, 14 Sep. 42, in AG 747, 747.0, Battles and Engagements. See App. 6.)

4 June 43  
0710  -  Two B-24's from 18th Reconnaissance Squadron, and two B-24's from 43th Bomb Squadron (1), in torpedo attack on aircraft carrier from altitude of 100 to 200 feet, results not observed. One B-24 from each squadron shot down by fire from many intercepting fighters and/or extremely heavy anti-aircraft fire. The other two airplanes crash-landed at Wake because of damage suffered. (Ibid. See also App. 9.)

0816  -  Fourteen B-17's (six from 431st Bomb Squadron, five from 43d Bomb Squadron, two from 31st Bomb Squadron, and one from 72d Bomb Squadron) attacked striking force bearing 330°, 145 miles from Wake. Dropped 100 x 500-lb. demolition bombs at 6,000 feet, with seven hits and several near misses. (Ibid.)

1230  -  Six B-17's from 39d Bomb Squadron departed for Midway, each with one-half bomb load and one bomb-bay tank. Attacked carrier force bearing 313°, 170 miles distant, at about 1230, before landing at Midway. Eight 1,000-lb. demolition bombs were dropped on one aircraft carrier and one destroyer. One hit and two near misses were scored on the carrier which was already afire, and one hit was made on the destroyer which sank. Anti-aircraft was heavy. There was interception by eight Zero fighters, of which four were shot down and one was damaged. Two B-17's were unable to drop their bombs because of course. (Ibid.; Lt., Br., 33rd Gen. V. C. Davidson, CG ZAF to CG ZAF, 16 June 42.)
4 June 42

1810 - Two B-17's of 43d Bomb Squadron attacked carrier force at lat. 31°, long. 178° 40', dropping 16 x 500-lb. bombs from 10,000 feet, scoring one hit and two near misses on a battleship, and two hits and three near misses on damaged carrier. Three Zero interceptors were shot down, and one possibly shot down. (Ibid.)

1830 - Four B-17's, at least two of which were from the 43d Bomb Squadron, dropped 25 x 500-lb. demolition bombs from 20,000 to 35,000 feet on heavy cruiser bearing 334°, 165 miles from Midway, scoring one hit and two near misses, with results of 10 bombs unobserved. (Ibid.)

5 June 42

0830 - Six B-17's from 73d Bomb Squadron departed for Midway. (Memo, 02 VII Bomber Command to 9-3 7AF, 6 June 42.)

0830 - Five B-17's from 294th Bomb Squadron and three from 43d Bomb Squadron attacked enemy force at 2000, 130 miles from Midway, in two elements of four aircraft each. The first element dropped 15 x 500-lb. demolition bombs from 10,000 feet, getting two probable hits and three near misses. The second element dropped 20 x 500-lb. demolition bombs from 20,000 feet, getting one direct hit and four near misses. Heavy AA fire, but no fighter opposition. No damage to any B-17. (Ibid.; Seventh Air Force and the Battle of Midway, 3-6 June 1942; ltr., Brig. Gen. H. C. Davidson, 02 7AF to 02 AAF, 13 June 42; memo, 02 VII Bomber Command to 02 7AF, 15 Sep. 42.)

1205 - Six B-17's from 31st Bomb Squadron, with one bombsAway tank and four 500-lb. bombs, departed for Midway. (Memo, 02 VII Bomber Command to 9-3 7AF, 6 June 42.)

1815 - Three B-17's from 43d Bomb Squadron, with one from the 23d Squadron attached, attacked heavy cruiser bearing 300°, 390 miles from Midway. Thirty-two 500-lb. demolition bombs were dropped from 10,000 feet, scoring two hits and three near misses. Immediately thereafter, three B-17's of the 32d Bomb Squadron dropped 24 x 500-lb. demolition bombs on the same target from 14,000 feet, getting one hit and one near miss. There was no fighter interception, and AA fire did no damage. (Seventh Air Force and the Battle of Midway, 3-6 June 1942; memo, 02 VII Bomber Command to 02 7AF, 15 Sep. 42; ltr., Brig. Gen. H. C. Davidson to 02 7AF, 13 June 42.)
5 June 42

1820 - Five B-17's from 73d Bomb Squadron, attacked cruiser bearing 320°, 425 miles from Midway, dropping 15 x 600-lb. bombs and eight 500-lb. bombs from 9,000 to 13,000 feet, with results unobserved. One B-17 was shot down by extremely heavy AA fire, and one other was forced down in water due to fuel shortage--crew recovered. (Ladd.)

6 June 42

0000 - Six B-17's from 11th Bomb Group, loaded with two 1,100-lb. demolition bombs, departed for Midway. (Ladd, 63d Bomber Command to 6-37 AF, 6 June 42.)

0300 - Six B-17's from 11th Bomb Group, loaded with two 1,100-lb. demolition bombs, departed for Midway. (Ladd.)

1140 - Six B-17's from 36th Bomb Squadron dropped 20 x 1,100-lb. demolition bombs on target that proved to be a friendly submarine, which later reported no damage. Another flight of five B-17's returned to Midway after an extensive search with negative results. (Seventh Air Force and the battle of Midway, 3-5 June 1942; Itt., Lt. Col. L. O. Coddington, 60th Bomb Sq., 60th BS Co., 6 June 42.)

7 June 43

Brig. Gen. H. O. Davidson assumed command of the Seventh Air Force, succeeding Maj. Gen. Clarence L. Tinker who was lost near Midway. (60-51, 7AF, 6 June 42.)

8 June 42

Seventh Air Force reported a striking force of 27 B-17's, 21 B-26's, 5 P-38's, and 1 B-25 at Cahu, with 16 B-17's still at Midway. (60 7AF to C/G USA, Daily Repair for War Department, 8 June 42, in 7AF A-3 file. See App. II.)

17 June 43

73d Fighter Squadron began daily dawn and dusk patrols from Eastern Island, Midway. F-40L aircraft flown from aircraft carrier U. S. S. Saratoga. (History of 73d Fighter Command, Dec. 41-July 44.)

20 June 43


23 June 42

Seventh Air Force aircraft bombed enemy installations on Wake. (CA-43 to C/G USA, 23 June 42, in 7AF 370.24, Battles and engagements.)

10 July 42

Ground echelon of 11th Bomb Group departed from Cahu on U. S. S. Ancon. (Basic History, 11th Bomb Co.)
10 July 43 11th Bomb Group designated as the Mobile Air Force in the Central Pacific. (CL-OUT-1552/18th, Dums, to G/S USA, 10 July 43, in AG 7AF 370.0/4, Hawaiian Mobile Air Force.)

17 July 43 The first squadron of eight B-17's of the 11th Bomb Group departed from Hickam Field for Suva, Fiji Islands, with the remainder of the Group leaving in the next three days. (CL-OUT-1552/18th, Dums, to G/S USA, 17 July 43, in AG 7AF 370.0/4, Hawaiian Mobile Air Force.)

22-23 July 43 Headquarters, air echelon, 11th Bomb Group, and nine B-17's of the 36th Bomb Squadron and nine B-7's of the 48th Bomb Squadron arrived Falealupo Field, Saipan. (Basic History, 36th and 48th Bomb Sq., 11th Bomb Gp.)

23 July 43 Ground echelon on 11th Bomb Group arrived at Honolulu. (Basic History, 11th Bomb Gp.)

Three B-17's of VII Bomber Command in photographic reconnaissance mission over Sakin from Canton. (Ltr., SG 7AF to CL-OUT-1552, 27 July 42, in AG 7AF 373.11, Aerial Operations, Striking and Command Missions.)

24 July 43 101st Bomb Squadron arrived at land, Fiji Group. (Basic History, 11th Bomb Gp.)

25 July 43 Nine B-17's of the 20th Bomb Squadron arrived at Wake. (Basic History, 20th Bomb Sq.)

31 July 43 Ground echelon of 101st Bomb Squadron arrived at Fiji Island in Fiji Group. (Basic History, 11th Bomb Gp.)

One B-17 of the Seventh Air Force in photographic mission over Wake from Midway. Intercepted by six enemy fighters, four of which were shot down. One B-17 returned with three bullet holes. (Ltr., SG 7AF to CL-OUT-1552, 3 Aug. 43, in AG 7AF 004.511.)

VII Bomber Command directed to furnish a minimal daily striking force of 10 heavy bombers, in three squadrons of six aircraft each, one to be on alert and two on reserve. The two squadrons on reserve at any one time were to be available for training purposes except during the
31 July 43  # Time and dust alert periods. (Lt. Col. Gen. Willis
(contd.)  # Maj. Gen. Miller
31 Jul. 43.  # 7AF to 8th Air Force Command, 31 Jul. 43,
in 4C 7AF 376.41. Aerial Operations, Strike and Bomb-
ing Missions.)

1 Aug. 43  # The 431st Bomb Squadron arrived at Tora Ica in Fiji
Group.  # (Basic History, 431st Bomb Sq.)

11 Sep. 43  # 333d Fighter Squadron arrived at Canton to engage in sub-
marine patrol, interception, and training.  (History of
VII Fighter Command, Dec. 43-July 44.)

23 Sep. 43  # Aircraft of the 431st Bomb Squadron began flying search
missions over the Gilbert Islands.  (Basic History, 431st
Bomb Sq.)

25 Sep. 43  # 731st Bomb Squadron of 5th Bomb Group was attached to the
11th Bomb Group.  (Basic History, 11th Bomb Gr.)

1 Nov. 43  # The ground echelon of the 431st Bomb Squadron arrived at
Nauru Island. The air echelon had arrived earlier.
(Basic History, 431st Bomb Sq.)

23 Nov. 43  # The 431st Bomb Squadron was transferred to Nauru Island.
(Basic History, 431st Bomb Sq.)

1 Dec. 43  # South Pacific Area assumed administrative control of the
5th and 11th Bomb Groups and 34th and 44th Fighter Squadrons.

3 Dec. 43  # Following units of Seventeenth Air Force formally transferred
to South Pacific Area.

11th Bomb Group (E), Headquarters & Headquarters
Squadron
306th Bomb Squadron (L)
436th Bomb Squadron (L)
506th Bomb Squadron (E)
431st Bomb Squadron (L)
5th Bomb Group (L), Headquarters & Headquarters
Squadron
335th Bomb Squadron (L)
31st Bomb Squadron (L)
729th Bomb Squadron (L)
394th Bomb Squadron (L)
13th Fighter Squadron
44th Fighter Squadron
422d Ordnance Company (Aviation)

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887th Chemical Company (Aviation Operations) (GO 513d, Hq, 5 Dec 42; 1tr., AG 330.2, 12-29-43, 0-1-42-1, 4 Jan 43.)

22-23 Dec. Twenty-six B-25D's of 390th Bomb Group staged through midway to bomb Jima. They dropped 186 x 600-lb. GP bombs and 21 incendiary clusters. Enemy assessment was difficult because of clouds and the large number of fires and explosions taking place over the island. The attack apparently took the enemy by surprise, as neither searchlights nor AA fire were encountered until after the attack started. No aircraft damaged except two small hits. The Navy furnished three submarines and one destroyer to render navigational assistance and to rescue any crew forced down at sea. (Ltr., Brig. Gen. H. H. Eaker to AG 7AF, 32 Dec 42; 1tr., Maj. Gen. Williams H. Eddy, AG 7AF to Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold, AG A.F., 23 Dec 42, in AG 7AF 373.11, Aerial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions.)

1945

23 Jan. 43 Twenty-four P-40M aircraft of the 79th Fighter Squadron flew from Ewa Airfield to Jima, in the longest over-water mass flight of single-engine airplanes ever attempted. The flight made as the 79th Fighter Squadron relieved the 78th Fighter Squadron in the defense of Jima. History of the VII Fighter Command, Dec. 41-July 44, Dec. 45.)

25 Jan. 43 Six B-24D's of 371st Bomb Squadron in exploit aerial reconnaissance mission over Jima from Sand Island, Jima, dropped 60 x 100-lb. demolition bombs. All, which was first fired after both runs started, was accurate as to height but trailing. The B-24's were attacked by possibly eight Zeros as they completed their runs and reformed. One Zero was definitely shot down, with four possibly shot down. The leading B-24 was hit 10 times, and two other aircraft received one hit each. Vertical photographs were taken of the entire island, and obliques were taken from several angles. (AGO 307th Bomb C., Mission Report, 25 Jan. 43, in VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Reports.)

26 Jan. 43 Twenty-two P-40's and P-40E's aircraft of 70th Fighters Squadron flown from Jima to Anacapa Naval Air Station. (History of VII Fighter Command, Dec. 41-July 44, Dec. 45.)
23 Jan. 43

Three 5-32D's of 607th Bomb Group conducted a photographic mission over Saipan, Iwo Jima, Amcommunications, and Manus from Savo. Photos were taken from 20,000 feet. One 32D, a 100-passenger type merchant vessel anchored in the lagoon at Manus, was bombed with 11 x 1,000-lb. demolition bombs. One near miss may have caused damage. (Ltr., Col. T. H. Loen, 60 VII Bomber Command to CG 7AF, 2 Feb. 43, in AG 7AF 373.11, Aerial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions.)

23 Jan. 43

One 5-32D of 387th Bomb Group photographed Iwo Jima and Okinawa Islands. Bombs were not carried. An exceedingly heavy and accurate over Okinawa. (Ltr.; Summary of VII Bomber Command Missions.)

20 Jan. 43

Aircraft of 335th Fighter Squadron search for submarine which shelled Canton. (Basic history; 335th Fighter Squadron.)

6 Feb. 43

434th Bomb Squadron (B) left Guam for the South Pacific.

17 Feb. 43

Three 5-32D's of 307th Bomb Group in a photographic reconnaissance mission over the northern Gilberts, which was unsuccessful because of heavy smoke. Bombs were jettisoned. No A/A or interception. (Ltr., Brig. Gen. Loen, 60 VII Bomber Command to CG 7AF, 24 Feb. 43, in AG 7AF 373.11)

20 Feb. 43

Three 5-32D's of 307th Bomb Group in photo-bombing mission over northern Gilberts from Canton. Photos were taken from 12,000 to 14,000 feet of Iwo Jima, Amcommunications, and Tarawa. Nine 500-lb. demolition bombs were dropped on shipping at Tarawa, but no hits were observed. There were a few inaccurate bursts of A/A at 10,000, and a heavy concentration of A/A from ships in the lagoon and shore positions of Enewetok. No damage sustained by any AAF. (Ltr.; Ltr., Maj. Gen. Willis K. Eike, 60 7AF to Lt. Gen. A. E. Arnel, 65 AF, 21 Feb. 43, in AG 7AF 373.11, Aerial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions.)

22 Feb. 43

Four aircraft of 335th Fighter Squadron up to intercept enemy bombers at Canton. No contact with enemy. (Basic history; 335th Fighter Squadron.)

27 Feb. 43

Five aircraft of 334th Fighter Squadron at Canton up to intercept enemy bombers. No contact. (Ltr.)
10 Nov. 43  B-17G's moved from Okinawa to Brisbane, Australia, in two flights, each consisting of three 2-75 and one L-39 aircraft. (History of VII Fighter Command, Dec. 1-31, 1944.)

27 Nov. 43  The 46th Fighter Squadron arrived at Canton to take over duties of 333d Fighter Squadron. Aircraft of 333d Fighter Squadron left at Canton for use of 46th. (Basic History, 46th Fighter Sq.)

6 Dec. 43  333d Fighter Squadron arrived at Iwo from Canton. (Basic History, 333d Fighter Sq.)

9 Dec. 43  11th Bomb Group (Heavy) re-assigned to the Seventh Air Force. (Log #2, Hub, 17 Dec. 43.)

20 Dec. 43  Twenty-three L-49D's from 571st and 572d Bomb Squadrons, in bombardment and reconnaissance mission of Nauru from Funafuti. Twenty-two airplanners dropped 25 x 1,000-lb. GP bombs, 20 x 500-lb. GP bombs, and 45 fragmentation clusters, scoring direct hits on runway and dispersal areas. Interception by seven to nine enemy fighters, engaging five L-49D's. One L-49D was destroyed. (Str., Maj. C. B. Kirkland to 57 AF, 23 Dec. 43; memos, Capt. A. A. Patterson and Capt. J. H. Reilly, to Lt. Col. F. E. Malley, 57 AF, 31 Dec. 43, in 57 AF files.)

22 Dec. 43  Japanese bombers attacked Funafuti twice before dawn. The L-49D's of the 571st and 572d Bomb Squadrons were disengaged, and the narrow runway following the attack on Nauru, too were destroyed. 4 and five were damaged. (7AF Intelligence Bulletin No. 33, 26 Dec. 43.)


7th Fighter Squadron returned from Iwo to Saipan. (Basic History, 7th Fighter Sq.)

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL
15 May 43

Eighteen B-24's from 371st and 778th Bomb Squadrons in daylight bombing mission of Zeks from Nadi. Four aircraft abortive because of excessive gas consumption, and seven failed to find the target. Seven airplanos dropped 24 x 500-1 lb. GP bombs and six 650-1 lb. depth charges on target from 11,000 feet. Nineteen Zeks and three ramps intercepted, four of which were shot down, one probably shot down, and eight dropped. There was considerable inaccurate AA fire. Four B-24's were observed and one was forced down in the water. (Int. Brig. Gen. E. H. London to Gen. B. F. D. London by 03 7AF, 16 May 43, Subj. 7AF Reports, in 1AF A-2 files.)

23 May 43

A flight of P-40's from the 78th Fighter Squadron dropped 500-1 lb. bombs on a submarine from 1,500 feet, after which an oil slick and debris were observed. (Basic History, 78th Fighter Co.)

23 May 43

Three B-24's of VII Bomber Command in visual and photo reconnaissance mission over Japan. Took 260 pictures and dropped 9,000 pounds of 500-1 lb. bombs on barracks area, no interception at AA. (Summary of VII Bomber Command Missions since Dec. 22, 1943, in 7AF A-2 files.)

23 May 43

Three B-24's of 431st Bomb Squadron in photographic mission of Japan from Guant. After taking approximately 260 photographs, the aircraft each dropped six 500-1 lb. GP bombs, with results largely unobserved, no AA or interception. (VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Report, 31 May 43, in AG 7AF 3784.11, Aerial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions.)

14 June 43

One B-24 of 58th Bomb Squadron bombed runways at Tarawa from Funafuti. (Basic History, 58th Bomb Sq.)

17-18 June 43

Three B-24's of 58th Bomb Squadron with one from Headquarters, VII Bomber Command, conducted diversionary bombing mission of Tarawa from Funafuti. Dropped 96 x 500-1 lb. GP bombs and 132 x 500-1 lb. fragmentation clusters, rendering 2,500 feet of runway temporarily unserviceable, silencing an AA battery and blowing up an ammunition dump. The airplanos were over the target one at a time, two hours apart. One airplan picked up by seven Zeks. AA was both light and heavy. One of the B-24's was damaged. (VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Report, 28 June 43.)
17-18 June 43
Three B-24D's of 42d Bomb Squadron conducted night photographic reconnaissance mission of Lille. Encountered medium and heavy AAA, heavier to moderate, but inaccurate. Only damage was one hole in left vertical stabilizer of one airplane. Accomplished complete photographic coverage of Lille, Brest, Flins, and Tocqueville Channel. This was the first night photographic reconnaissance mission performed by the VII Bomber Command.
(Lisd., 20 June 43; lst., Lt. Col. J. D. Tutledge, Jr. to 097AF, 27 June 43, in 7AF files.)

18 June 43
Three B-24D's of VII Bomber Command, one of which was narcotics, in night photographic mission over Juluut from Funafuti. Each airplane carried ten 500-lb bombs. Inaccurate AA fire caused no damage. (lst., Sdi., Gen. I. L. Ralston, CQ VII Bomber Command to 097AF, 3 July 43, in 7AF 37311, Aerial Operations, Striking and Bombing Missions.)

19 June 43
Three B-24D's of 30th Bomb Squadron carried out night photographic reconnaissance mission over Juluut from Funafuti. Light and medium AA fire caused no damage. (VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Report, 2 July 43.)

21 June 43
One airplane of VII Bomber Command, piloted by Col. C. D. Beg, Executive Officer of VII Bomber Command, in armed photographic reconnaissance mission over Komot, Deru, and Fatuma. Three 500-lb G.P. bombs were dropped on Komot. There was no enemy opposition. (VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Report, 25 June 43.)

22 June 43
Three B-24D's of 42d Bomb Squadron in daylight photographic mission over Deru, Fatuma, Komot, Canton, Surawa, and Arorai from Canton. One airplane, after taking photos of Arorai, dropped to 1,000 feet and expended about 450 rounds of ammunition strafing. There was no enemy opposition. (Lisd.)

24 June 43
Three aircraft of 30th Bomb Squadron in daylight visual reconnaissance of Komot, Komot, Canton, Surawa, Arorai, and Surawa. They carried no bombs and met with no opposition. (VII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Report, 2 July 43.)

Two aircraft of 42d Bomb Squadron conducted search mission from Canton. (Unit History, 42d Bomb Sqn.)
24 June 43  The 531st Fighter Squadron arrived at Canton. The pilots arrived on C-47s and were instructed to take delivery of 13 new A-36 aircraft. (Jise History, 531st Fighter Sq.)


23 June 43  Looking over mission against Peaaru. Of the airplanes at Funafuti assigned to the mission (see 27 June 43), two were released because of engine difficulties. The first airplane crashed on take-off. Six others took off, then another crashed. General Iordan ordered the remaining airplanes to stay on the ground. Four of the airborne aircraft, all from the 35th Bomb Squadron, started for Peaaru. They were separated in a heavy rain and two of them failed to find the target. The other two reached the target individually—one dropped 110 x 50-lb. fragmentation clusters from 13,000 feet and the other, 100 x 50-lb. fragmentation clusters from 13,000 feet, with results unobserved. Ten Zeros intercepted. Light, heavy, and medium AA, of moderate intensity; but inaccurate, continued all day. After first airplane had made its bomb run, the bombers in the nose of one I-21 shot out. (Ibid.)

4 July 43  Twenty-five new B-24D aircraft delivered by carrier to the 35th Fighter Squadron at Canton to replace the B-24D aircraft left behind by the 353rd Fighter Squadron. (Jise History, 35th Fighter Sq.)

11 July 43  Four B-24D's of 432d Bomb Squadron in photographic mission over Nippon and Little Nippon from Funafuti. One airplane was abortive due to navational difficulties and adverse weather. Two airplanes dropped three 500-lb. G. bombs on the target. No damage was done. Black and white pictures taken at over Nippon moderate. (Itr. Col. D. F. Cap to CG 7.5, 15 July 43.)

13 July 43  Six airplanes from 432d Bomb Squadron in bombing mission over Nippon from Funafuti. (Jise History, 432d Bomb Sq.)

SECRET INFORMATION

SECRET INFORMATION
18 July 43  Aircraft of 46th Fighter Squadron up to intercept
Japanese bombers commuting air raid at Canton. Many
aircraft released bombs over water due to intensity
of anti-air. (Basic History, 46th Fighter Sq.)

23 July 43  Two aircraft of 46th Fighter Squadron took off to in-
tercept two enemy bombers at Canton, but did not make
contact. No bombs dropped. (Ibid.)

24 July 43  Twelve 3-24's of 11th Bomb Group raid at dawn to strike on
Lake from Midway. Bomb did not hit target, and two returned
without hitting target. Nine other aircraft reached
the target and dropped 82 x 500-1, 95 bombs, 23 fragmentation
clusters, and nine incendiary clusters. Two 02 bombs hit central portion of
Peril Island and five hit oil storage area on western
tip of Lake. Medium and heavy AA fire hit extremely accurate and intense. Interception by 20 to
30 Japs and one unidentified aircraft, nine of which were
destroyed, four probably destroyed and three damaged.
One bomber was lost. (Ibid., Frt. Gen. H. H. Landen to
Cin. VII Bomber Comd, 23 July 43; VII Bomber Comd, "Bombing of Peril
Island," in Accréditation Folder.)

25 July 43  Twelve 2-35's of 11th Bomb Group in strike on Lake from
Midway. Hit, of over the target, and dropped 18 x
500-1, 63 bombs, 23 fragmentation clusters, and nine
incendiary clusters. Two 02 bombs hit central portion of
Peril Island and five hit oil storage area on western
edge of Lake. Medium and heavy AA fire hit extremely accurate and intense. After the bombing, two were over,
approximately 25 enemy fighter planes one possible Mono
bomber intercepted, of which 11 were destroyed, eight
probably destroyed and 11 damaged. No damage suffered
by B-24's. (Ibid.)

26 Aug. 43  46th Fighter Squadron arrived at Canton with 19 2-20
aircraft. (Basic History, 46th Fighter Sq.)

1-14  Six 3-24's of 11th Bomb Group conducted daily search
missions out of Canton. Only enemy contact occurred on
3 September when two airplanes encountered a four-on-one
airplane, 50 hits, with about 50 hits, but no visible damage. (Ibid., Capt. John L. Bolling to
Cin. VII Bomber Comd, 9, 11, and 16 Nov. 43, in A-2
721 files.)

SECURITY INFORMATION

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11 Sep. 43. Nineteen P-40's of 45th Fighter Squadron escorted by one B-24D and one B-30 of 11th Bomb Group, flown from Canton to Acker. (Ibid., p. 55, 45th Fighter Sq.)

11-15 Sep. 43. Twenty-five B-24D's of 11th Bomb Group assembled from Canton and Canton on bases at Tarawa and Canton to form a new group which was led by two B-24D's of 11th Bomb Group. (Ibid., p. 55, 45th Fighter Sq.)

19 Sep. 43. Twenty-four B-24D's of 11th Bomb Group, plus General Landan in one from Headquarters VII Bomber Command, conducted a night attack on Truk. Of the 11th Bomb Group aircraft, 12 were from Truk and 13 from Canton, and consisted of six airplanes each from the 26th, 43rd, 53rd, and 431st Bomb Squadrons. Light air masses of the Canton flight attacked Acker Island, the primary target, one covered Acker, and three were abortive. Ten airplanes of the Truk flight attacked Acker, one covered Acker, one covered Acker, and one was abortive. Acker was hit by 259 x 30-lb. fragmentation clusters, 25 x 50-lb. fragmentation clusters, and 14 x 500-lb. 65 bombs, with excellent results. Twenty 30-lb. and 10 x 30-lb. fragmentation clusters fell on alternate targets. Heavy and medium AA fire was intense but inaccurate. There was no interception. (Ibid., p. 55, 45th Fighter Sq.)

19 Sep. 43. Thirteen B-24D's from Canton and eleven from Truk conducted a day bombardment and photo reconnaissance mission over Iwo Jima. Seven of the aircraft were from the 26th Bomb Squadron, six from the 43rd and 431st, four from the 53rd, and one from Headquarters VII Bomber Command. Four airplanes were abortive. The remaining 12 dropped 120 x 500-lb. 65 bombs on Tarawa, five 500-lb. 65 bombs on Angaur. Complete photographic coverage of Truk Island was obtained. Medium and heavy AA fire ranged from inaccurate to accurate. The formation was intercepted by about 15 to 18 Zeros. One B-24 was shot down and 10 were damaged. (Ibid.)

11 Oct. 43. 30th Bomb Group (B) assigned to the Seventh Air Force. (Ibid., p. 55, 45th Fighter Sq., 11 Oct. 43.)

17 Oct. 43. One F-70 of the 6th W64th Fighter Squadron sent up to identify an unknown pilot, who, being caught in anti-aircraft fire, took evasive action. (Ibid., p. 55, 45th Fighter Sq., 17 Oct. 43.)

SECURITY INFORMATION
23 Oct. 43  31st Bomber Group (H) assigned to Seventh Air Force. (CG 4-43, 23 Oct. 43.)

23 Oct. 43  Ten-ton Japanese four-engine flying boat, Kairyu, destroyed 70 miles south of Iwo Jima by one airplane of 45th Fighter Squadron. (Iwo Jima History, 45th Fighter Sq.)

6 Nov. 43  Advanced Headquarters (A/VHQ) of the Seventh Air Force established at Aorare in Iwo Jima. (Ltr., 6072 to 6077 VII AAF, 21 Oct. 43, in 4072A/F 372.5, Zone of Advance.)
# Glossary

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<tr>
<td>CG 7AF</td>
<td>Commanding General, Seventh Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>Classified Message</td>
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<tr>
<td>C/S</td>
<td>Chief of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C/S USA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, United States Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Fighter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GP</td>
<td>General purpose bomb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GO</td>
<td>General Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Heavy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAF</td>
<td>Hawaiian Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>HCPA</td>
<td>Headquarters, Central Pacific Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>HD</td>
<td>Headquarters, Hawaiian Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Interceptor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>Light</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHI</td>
<td>Office of Naval Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNZAF</td>
<td>Royal New Zealand Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCU</td>
<td>Statistical Control Unit</td>
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<td>War Department</td>
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Chapter 1

1. Indl. to 64 Ind., Air Officer to CSE, (Gen. Col. C. in one, 07 Nov.), 03 Nov. 43.

2. Indl. noted 55th Bt. (16), Ind. 43, 33, 39, 05 Nov. 43.

3. Indl. noted 41st Bt. (16), Ind. 43, 39, 20 Nov. 43.


11. Indl.

12. Indl.

13. Indl.


15. A3 T.W. 03/42, for Directing Journals of Events.

16. C. A. F. 3008, Short to Chief A. J. Wright Field, 1 Dec. 41, in A3 T.W. 3008, Records of CSE.


18. Memo, A0/3, 24, 01 Nov. 42.

SECURITY INFORMATION


22. Go 10, MD, 5 Mar. 42. Arabic materials were cited to all of
the organizations until April 42, when they were designated as
indicated in the text.

23. Go 11, MD, 2 Feb. 42.

24. Ibid.

25. Go 12, MD, 1 Feb. 42.

26. Ltr., Lt. Col.alter C. Streety to Go 11th Bomb Grp., 3 Feb. 42,
in "C" 270, Employment, Operation, and Movement of Troops. See
3 Feb. 42.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. 1st inc. (Ltr., Lt. Col.alter C. Streety to Go 11th Bomb Grp.,
3 Feb. 42) Go VII Fighter Command to Go 42, 2 Feb. 42.

33. Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet.

34. CMARC Serial 0299, Operations 1-6, 1-2, 3 Feb. 42; 0-1-1,
1-10, 1-18 in 270, 1-2, 1 1-2, in 270, 270.28,
Operations-Joint-Army-Navy.

35. CMARC Serial 0299, Operations Order 12-2, 2 Feb. 42, in 270,
270.28, Operations-Joint-Army-Navy.

36. 0-1-18-1/10th, 1-2 to Go 42, 2 Feb. 42, in 270, 270.28,
Operations-Joint-Army-Navy.

37. 2nd inc. (0-1-18-1/10th, 1-2 to Go 42, 2 Feb. 42) Go 42 to 0/3,

38. Ltr., Lt. Col. F. L. Hilds, to Go 42, 3 Feb. 42; VII Fighter Command
Consolidated Action Report.


classified

SECURITY INFORMATION
29. O.C.I.C. 295/9th, from Col. W.Y. Lease, 9 Nov. 42, in A.I.W. 287.9, refers to A.D.C. on C.B.C.


33. Ibid., A.D.C. and Operations, 2-17th were used on search during the period, Btr. 3-8 Z.G. reports, Z.G. (22), however, vary from one to seven 2-17th on each search.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid., 38 VII Fighter Command to 03 H.I., 8 June 42, in A.I.W. 287.9, Letters and Engagements.

37. Ibid.


40. Ibid., The 13th Reconnaissance Squadron and the 68th Bomb Squadron were not permanently assigned to the Seventh Air Force, but were attached en route to the South Pacific. Gen. Mac. 28 Consolidated Station List.

41. See sources in no. 43 and 69 above.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.
51. Seventh Air Force and the Battle of Midway, 4-6 June 42; ltr.
    Lt. Col. E. C. Goodon, 94th Bomb Grp., to CG 11th Bomb Cmg.,
    3 June 42.
52. J-2082L, one to 83 USA, 10 June 42, in 3 TF 370.21, Battles and
    Engagements.
53. Ibid.
54. Ltr., Brig. Gen. C. G. Davidson, GB X to Lt. Col. H. V. Arnold,
    CG VII AC, 19 June 42, re: ... 8; Lt. Col. ltr., GB X to CG VII
    AC, 13 June 42, re: 7. It seems probable that the bomb was for the
    lost A-27 and 720 tf.
55. J-2082L, one to GB USA, 11 June 42, the 2-17th lost were
    confirmed from the 1st Provisional Squadron en route from the
    United States to Fiji. (3/4, GB VII AC to GB VII AC, 30 June 42, in
    J-2082L 370.5, Airm. of Status - Aerone), "0 were the 10th Reconnaissance Squadron and the 79th Bomb Squadron.
    However, one of the 1st Provisional Squadron proved were in
    action. See no. 10.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid., GB VII AC to GB VII AC, 10 Jan. 42. In connection
    with the last three units named, see note 6 above.
58. See no. 13-18.
59. Ltr., Brig. Gen. C. G. Davidson, GB X to GB VII AC, 30 June 42.
60. Ltr., Brig. Gen. H. V. Arnold, GB X to GB VII AC, 13 June 42.
61. Ibid.
62. All of the extracts which follow are from ltr. Brig. Gen. C. G.
    Davidson, GB X to GB VII AC, 13 June 42.
63. Ibid. It was while conducting an air raid over the enemy
    that Lt. Col. C. H. Winter, Commanding General, Seventh
    Air Force, was lost. 2-17-272/8, 2-25 to GB VII AC, 30 June 42,
    in GB VII AC 370.21, Battles and Engagements.
64. Ltr., GB VII AC to GB VII AC, 3 June 42, in GB VII AC 370.21,
    Reinforcements.
65. Ibid.
66. "VII Fighter Cmns. In the defense of Midway Island," and over-
    twenty-five flights of 2-10 airplanes, January 1942-April 1942,"
    Ltr., Maj. History on VII Fighter Cmns, to CG, 11 July 42.
73. ILM.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.

RESTRICTED
SECURITY INFORMATION

THIS PAGE Declassified IAW EO12958


3. Airm. Lt. Arthur A. Flora, 5th Air Combat Int., based on information from available records of the 5th Air Combat Int. and discussion with various officers of the crews, subject: Performance, Results of Attainment of B-17 heavy bomber in Gilbert Island Operations - October 10, 1944. Int. Center, Pacific Ocean Area, Oct 17, 1944, in 7:24-4/24 Filer.

4. Eric Parson, 8th Bomb Sq.

5. For an account of South Pacific operations during this period see W.O. Historical Study No. 29, Attack and Defense of the Thirteenth Air Force.

6. In connection with the arrival of the 5th Bomb Group, there arose the problem of effectuating transition from B-17 to B-24 type aircraft. General Arnold wrote General Hales of his fear that because the B-17 had been so lavishly built up in the areas there was a tendency, even among B-17 personnel, to rate it inferior to any other heavy bomber. It said that, in particular, some of the 99th Bomb Group's personnel had been heard to speak disparagingly of the B-24. In reply, General Hales spoke of the "positive action" to make sure that there was no such disparity in view of the erroneous belief that there is not a "true" superior heavy bomber. General Hales implied that he had relieved the two commanders and one squad commander that he had taken action to modify the airframe so as to relieve the complaint in the area, and that the bulk of the 99th's personnel were "enthusiastic about fighting the B-17."


11. [Undecipherable text]

12. [Undecipherable text]

13. [Undecipherable text]

14. [Undecipherable text]

15. [Undecipherable text]

16. [Undecipherable text]

17. [Undecipherable text]

18. [Undecipherable text]

19. [Undecipherable text]

20. [Undecipherable text]

21. [Undecipherable text]

22. [Undecipherable text]

23. [Undecipherable text]

24. [Undecipherable text]

25. [Undecipherable text]

26. [Undecipherable text]

27. [Undecipherable text]

28. [Undecipherable text]

29. [Undecipherable text]


34. Ibid.


37. Ibid.


40. Ibid. VIII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Report, 29 June 42.

41. Ibid., 29 June 42; Ltr., Lt. Col. J. A. Rutledge, Jr. to 8th AAF, 29 June 42, in 7th AAF files.


43. VIII Bomber Command Consolidated Mission Report, July 42.

44. Ibid., 29 June 42.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., 29 June 42.

47. Ltr., Col. J. A. Rutledge, 8th AAF to VIII Bomber Command, 29 June 42, in 8th AAF files.

48. Ltr., Col. J. A. Rutledge, 8th AAF to VIII Bomber Command, 20 July 42.

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THIS PAGE Declassified IAW EO12958
56. Note history, and note on.

57. See p. 30.


61. VII. 530th Div. & C. B. C. Consolidated Air Forces, Nov. 30.

62. There were only 35 in an 11 cluster at 3 a.m., sufficient for two airfields only.


66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid.

71. Ibid.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.

74. Ibid.

75. Ibid. & C. B. C. Consolidated Air Forces, Nov. 30.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Ibid. & C. B. C. Consolidated Air Forces, Nov. 30.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid. & C. B. C. Consolidated Air Forces, Nov. 30.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid. & C. B. C. Consolidated Air Forces, Nov. 30.

83. Ibid.

84. Ibid. & C. B. C. Consolidated Air Forces, Nov. 30.

85. Ibid. & C. B. C. Consolidated Air Forces, Nov. 30.

86. Ibid. & C. B. C. Consolidated Air Forces, Nov. 30.
Annex 1


SECURITY INFORMATION
In reply refer to: 20 December 1941


To: A. G. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. The following facts have been gleaned from numerous reports of eyewitnesses and supplemented or corrected reports sent you by radio.

2. The enemy effort will be covered under three general headings: Hickam Field Area; Wheeler Field Area; Bellows Field Area.

3. HICKAM FIELD AREA: At 7:55 a.m., December 7, 1941, the first indication of an attack was 9 enemy single-engine, low-wing monoplanes, escorted by torpedoes, which were observed southeast of Hickam Field Range line, flying at an altitude of about 50 feet, toward Pearl Harbor. They were in two echelons, 5 planes in the first and 4 in the second. This flight did not strike Hickam Field. At about the same time, however, 9 dive bombers attacked the Aviation Air Depot buildings and Hickam Field hanger line from the south, and 3 additional planes attacked the same objectives from the northwest. Several minutes later 3 additional dive bombers bombed Hickam Field hanger line from the southwest. Immediately thereafter 7 additional dive bombers attacked the Hickam Field hanger line from the east.

All planes dived at approximately 15 to 30 degrees from altitudes of 500 to 5000 feet. Bombs were released at about 1000 feet; the planes pulling out of dive from 300 feet to approximately 300 feet.

Machine-gun fire was exchanged before and after bomb release. This attack lasted about 10 minutes. This attack by strafing ones were supported by fighter planes.

The second attack occurred at about 8:25 a.m., when between 6 and 8 planes approached from the north and attacked 40,400 sq. feet, technical buildings immediately behind hanger line and consolidated barrack. These planes then first observed were 11,000 feet and released bombs from 11,000 feet. About 150 feet. Diving immediately, after this bombing attack our planes on working crews were attacked with gun fire. About one minute later (8:26) a formation of probably 5 or 6 planes bombed the baseball diamond from a high altitude, evidently believing gasoline storage system to be in that area. The second attack lasted between 10 and 15 minutes.
The third attack occurred about 9:00 A.M., from 1 to 2 planes (previously three or four had already flown from level flight at 1,000 feet and 9:00) attacked the technical buildings behind the line and one direction, some at right angles, to the machine on fire. These attacks came from four directions almost simultaneously. At the same time a formation of from 7 to 9 planes, flying in Y formation at an altitude of 2,000 feet, was attacked from the south, releasing bombs which struck consolidated buildings, nearby around the after area. The third attack lasted about 5 minutes. Our 171st were ordered from the area during the attack. The enemy planes observed the altitudes to be 3,000 feet, and no bombs were released. The exact altitude has not been definitely established. Losses to the enemy believed not to exceed 600 pounds. Enemy aircraft identified to 7,7 and 70 mm.

At 9:00 A.M., Sunday, 7 December 1941, according to 30 planes reported Charles Field, generally from the south and at about 5,000 feet altitude, and was followed to the east. At this point, the north, circled counterclockwise, but its altitude had been reached for at least from west at about 3,000 feet generally perpendicular to the lower line. The formation of the entire group then made a right turn, the规划 with 5 sections of 2 planes each forming the "Y" formation, with the plane on the right of the "Y." A single odd plane flew directly in the rear of the formation. The other three divided the angle of about 15 degrees from the front. The other odd plane flew directly in the rear of the formation of about 300 yards, starting from the midline, which is at the extreme东南 of the lower line. Floors and machine gun fire was observed during this time, the plane on the right being the first to hit the rear of the line and points in rear of the line. The planes were released at altitudes of 2,000 and 2,500 feet. After releasing the bombs, the planes continued to fly for a short distance and pulled out at about 1,000 feet or start of dive. No evidence at this time of the bomber to be larger than 600 pounds.

After the first dive we have the formation broke, correctly in all directions, with individual planes continuing on fire, and without regard to visibility or collision. The area of the last observed as from altitudes of approximately 2,000 feet and the only order of sound needed to be the planes circled counterclockwise, with the front edge of the lower line, the machine gun fire was observed during this time, the plane on the right being the first to hit the rear of the line and points in rear of the line. The planes were released at altitudes of 2,000 and 2,500 feet. After releasing the bombs, the planes continued to fly for a short distance and pulled out at about 1,000 feet or start of dive. No evidence at this time of the bomber to be larger than 600 pounds.
Another attack struck Acker Field for minutes after 9:00 a.m. The attack consisted of 7 enemy planes which approached from the north flying slowly in line at an altitude of about 800 feet. The first machine gun at low altitude opened fire on the airfield but it is believed that no plane fired more than 30 to 50 rounds. All seven planes were small single engine, low wing, monoplanes of the same type. They took off to the north and were never observed to return. The whole second attack lasted only 5 minutes. This could very reasonably have been a group of planes covering the remainder of their mission.

**End of Field Attack:** The attack on Bellows Field was initiated by a single Japanese fighter plane at approximately 9:00 a.m. December 7th. It came directly from the sea (south) and enveloped a single fighter plane on the field apparently expanding all its ammunition in this one attack. At about 9:00 a.m. nine fighters attacked from the north in 3 groups of 3 planes each in Y formation. This attack lasted about 10 minutes and consisted of single fire only. It was initiated with a diving attack of all 9 planes, after which the 3 formations of 3 each circled off and attacked from various directions.

After the single plane, a second attack, a Z17 which had arrived from the mainland and which had been unable to land at Holman Field attacked at 1,000 feet at Bellows Field but rolled off the runway. This plane was reportedly machine gunned by the 9 plane attack.

The attack on Bellows Field spread over well on the beach, returned to the sea and well executed. One plane was reported shot down by Infantry troops defending the area but no part of it was recovered from the sea for identification purposes.

**General Observations Regarding Strofe Planes:** Strofe planes were flown to a very low altitude in practically all cases, from 50 to 200 feet from the ground. Strofe used 50 caliber, 7.7 mm, and 20 mm. The troops planes which were enveloped only against Pearl Harbor case in to sight flying very low and did not change altitude until torpedo were dropped. Any flight discipline was demonstrated by the enemy and accurate to bin evidence. Such a strike could not have been performed without numerous and detailed rehearsals. Enemy movement seemed to have been perfect and was exceptionally well executed. Evidence of battle force intelligence has been maintained but the general tactics of the entire attack has not definitely been reconstructed.

A few torpedos were dropped in Kastulu area, but in all probability the resulted from individual planes clearing bomb racks before departing. A few bursts of machine gun fire were likewise delivered at targets other than military objectives.
Subject: Recent of Attacke Sunday, 7 December '41 - Cont'd

A. O. of S., O.C., or Dept., Washington.

I. SUMMARY: It is impossible at this time to state how many planes or how any carriers were employed, but it is still believed that at least three carriers were involved. Likewise, it is impossible to definitely establish whether or not any planes returned to a carrier, re-loaded and participated in subsequent attacks. It is the opinion of this office that no planes did so. It is more probable that planes were launched from different carriers at different times or that different groups of planes were launched at staggered intervals. It is not believed that a direction or distance the carriers were when the planes were launched, although the Navy believes that at least one carrier operated from 150 miles north of Cohn. It is established that no land bases planes were employed in the attack, and while many reports are in relative to enemy planes with more than one letter no positive identification of such planes have been established. It is believed that all or nearly all reports were our own K-1's, all of which arrived from the mainland during the attack.

(To Head, J. ELLs, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S.C., A. O. of S., U.S.)

FORTHCOMING

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS PAGE Declassified IAW EO12958
In reply refer to:

(C-2)

26 December 1941.

MEMORANDUM: Roberts Commission.

In compliance with informal memorandum, this date, the following information is submitted:

1. The Defense Plan specifying numbers and types of aircraft for Hawaii was submitted by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, but was not returned approved by the War Department. This plan requested the aircraft tabulated below:

   152 - Heavy bombers.
   18 - Dive bombers.
   35 - Torpedo bombers (long range)
   728 - Pursuit.
   33 - Observation planes.
   13 - Reconnaissance.

2. The following airplanes were on hand 7 December 1941:

   (1) B-17D's - 12
   (2) B-18's - 33
   (3) A-20A's - 12
   (4) P-40C's - 12
   (5) P-40B's - 97
   (6) P-23A's - 39
   (7) P-23A's - 2
   (8) P-23B's - 6
   (9) B-19A's - 3
   (10) A-12A's - 2
   (11) A-13E's - 4
   (12) O-A-2's - 3
   (13) O-A-3's - 1
   (14) O-47B's - 7
   (15) O-49's - 2

3. Airplanes ready for immediate use:

   None.
The following airframes were not ready for immediate use and reasons therefor:

1. In commission but not loaded with bombs or ammunition:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Airframe</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-17D's</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-18's</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-20A's</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-40C's</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-40B's</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-35A's</td>
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<td>P-26B 'c</td>
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<td>A-6'I's</td>
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<td>O-47'I's</td>
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<td>O-48'I</td>
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2. Out of commission for 1st echelon maintenance:

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-17D's</td>
<td>4 (1 out for engines since 11-3-41 not available at FtJ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-19'I</td>
<td>9 (1 out for cracked landing gear, 2 out for elevators - lost in stock, 7 miscellaneous)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-6'I's</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-40C's</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-40B's</td>
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<td>P-36A's</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-12A'g</td>
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<td>C-9'I's</td>
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<td>C-8'I's</td>
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<td>C-47'I's</td>
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<td>C-49'I</td>
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3. Out of commission for 2d echelon maintenance:

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<td>E-18'I</td>
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<tr>
<td>A-20A's</td>
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<td>P-40C's</td>
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<td>P-35A's</td>
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<td>B-12A'g</td>
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(c) Cut of personnel for 21 service functions:

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<td>E-131s</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>A-20A's</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-4F-4N's</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-403F's</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-3M's</td>
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<tr>
<td>P-32A's</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>T-203's</td>
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<td>T-202's</td>
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<td>A-31's</td>
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<td>C-91s</td>
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2. The following airplanes were on hand after the raid:

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<tr>
<td>A-20A's</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-403F's</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>P-3M's</td>
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<td>P-32A's</td>
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<td>T-203's</td>
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<tr>
<td>F-403F's</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>P-32A's</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>B-12A's</td>
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<td>A-31's</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-91s</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-91s</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. The following airplanes were usable after the raid:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E-172's</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-131's</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-20A's</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-403F's</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-3M's</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-32A's</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-203's</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-403F's</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-32A's</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-12A's</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-31's</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-91s</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-91s</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECURITY INFORMATION
The following aircraft took to the air at the times indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0300</td>
<td>4 F-40's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0330</td>
<td>2 F-27A's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0335</td>
<td>2 F-40's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0345</td>
<td>6 F-27A's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900</td>
<td>5 F-40's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0930</td>
<td>6 F-27A's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0950</td>
<td>1 C-47B.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>5 C-42B's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1107</td>
<td>4 C-23's</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1110</td>
<td>2 E-17D's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1200</td>
<td>2 F-40's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1205</td>
<td>3 A-20A's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1330</td>
<td>1 E-17D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>11 F-40's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>2 C-47B's.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1520</td>
<td>2 E-17D's.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(t) As of 12 Oct 44,
Major, Air Corps,
A. q. of S., G-8.
1.

2. HOW MANY PLANES OF EACH TYPE WERE ON HAND DECEMBER 7, 1941?

- 12 F-100s
- 87 P-40B's
- 89 P-23F's
- 8 P-30A's
- 6 P-30B's
- 1 C-47B
- 2 B-17A's
- 3 B-18A's
- 3 O-40's
- 1 O-40B
- 4 A-16's
- 1 B-15

3. CAN THESE BE MADE READY FOR IMMEDIATE USE?

None.

4. HOW MANY MORE ARE READY FOR IMMEDIATE USE AND WHY?

a. In commission and unarmed:
- 9 F-40B
- 55 P-40B
- 20 P-36A
- 7 P-36A
- 3 P-26B
- 1 O-47B
- 3 A-16
- 1 B-14A
- 1 B-19
- 3 O-40
- 3 AT-6

b. Cut of commission for 1st echelon maintenance:
- 9 P-40B
- 22 P-40B
- 19 P-36A
- 1 P-36A
- 3 P-26B
- 3 B-17A
- 1 B-15
- 2 B-19
- 1 O-40
- 1 O-40B
- 1 B-14A
- 1 B-16
- 3 AT-6

5. ARE THERE SLOTS, HOW MANY OF EACH TYPE IN EACH COLOR?

a. In commission and unarmed:
- 7 P-40B
- 50 P-40B
- 85 P-36A
- 3 P-36A
- 3 P-26B
- 1 O-47B
- 3 A-16
- 2 B-17A
- 1 B-19
- 1 O-40
- 1 O-40B
- 1 B-14A
- 1 B-16
- 3 AT-6

6. OF THESE HOW MANY WERE USAFED?

a. In commission and unarmed:
- 5 P-40B
- 26 P-40B
- 16 P-36A
- 2 P-36A
- 2 P-26B
- 1 O-47B
- 1 B-17A
- 1 B-19
- 1 O-40
- 1 O-40B
- 1 B-14A
- 1 B-16
- 2 AT-6

b. Cut of commission for 2nd echelon maintenance:
- 7 P-40B
- 3 P-40B
- 19 P-36A
- 1 P-36A
- 3 P-26B
- 3 B-17A
- 1 B-15
- 2 B-19
- 1 O-40
- 1 O-40B
- 1 B-14A
- 1 B-16
- 2 AT-6

7. HOW MANY PLANES OF EACH TYPE TOOK OFF ON DEC. 7, 1941?

- 4 P-40 took off 0200
- 5 P-40 took off 0830
- 2 P-36 took off 0850
- 6 P-36 took off 0830
- 1 P-10 took off 0855
- 5 P-10 took off 1500
- 5 P-73 took off 0515
- 11 P-40 took off 1500

[Security Information]

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In reply refer to:

CUMULATIVE LEDGER

1.

2. How many planes of each type were present Dec. 71?
   12 P-40's  2 C-47's  6 C-47's

3. Of these, how many were ready for immediate use?
   None.

4. How many were not ready for immediate use, and why?
   18 were not loaded. 2 C-47's were out for engine change.

5. After the raid, how many of each type were on hand?
   10 P-40's  6 C-47's  1 C-47

6. Of these, how many were usable?
   6 P-40's  4 C-47's  1 C-47

7. How many planes of each type took to the air Dec. 71?
   5 P-40's took off 1515
   1 C-47 took off 0330
   3 C-47's took off 1500

8. 6 P-40's took off 1549

SECURITY INFORMATION
HEADQUARTERS \ FAMILY AIR FORCE

Office of the Air Force Commander

Michael Field, T.V.

In reply refer to:

HIGH RISK

1.

7. Few any aliens of each type were present Dec. 7, 1941?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E-17D's</th>
<th>E-13's</th>
<th>A-20's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Of these how many were ready for immediate use?

None.

4. How may were not ready for immediate use and why?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E-17D's</th>
<th>E-18's</th>
<th>A-20's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 out for engine, since 11-2-41. | 1 out for overall call by E.O. submitted 11-17-41. | Out at E.O. for over-all check.
| 2 out for repair of fuel tanks by E.A. | 2 out for 50 Hrs. Inspection, 1 out for 250 Hrs. inspection. | 1 out for over-all repair.
| 1 out for 250 Hrs. inspection. | 1 out for overall repair. | 1 out at E.O. for overall check.
| 1 out of commission | 1 out of commission | 1 out of commission |

Total 6 out of commission The other six not loaded with bombs or ammunition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E-18's</th>
<th>A-20's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 out for overall call by E.O. submitted 11-17-41. | Out at E.O. for over-all check.
| 2 out for 50 Hrs. Inspection, 1 out for 250 Hrs. inspection. | 1 out at E.O. for overall check.
| 1 out for overall repair. | 1 out for overall repair.
| 1 out of commission | 1 out of commission |

Total 1 out of commission The other ten were not loaded with bombs or ammunition.

5. After the raid, how many of each type were on 11-40?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E-17D's</th>
<th>E-13's</th>
<th>A-20's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Of these how many were usable?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>E-17D's</th>
<th>E-13's</th>
<th>A-20's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. How many planes of each type took to the air Dec. 7, 1941?

| E-17D's took off 1147 | E-20's took off 1030 |
| E-17D's took off 1147 | E-20's took off 1030 |
| E-17D's took off 1147 | E-20's took off 1030 |

Conclusional

SECURITY INFORMATION

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1. 1107 to 1210, 1 hr. 33 min., four (4) SBD's to search area 20 miles off Barbers Point for carriers reported there.

2. 1100 to 1300, 2 hrs., two (2) SBD's to search area 20 miles off Barbers Point for carriers reported there.

3. 1230 to 1700, 4 hrs. 30 min., two (2) TBF's to search sector 710° - 080°.

4. 1500 to 1540, 40 min., three (3) TBF's to search sector 310° - 090°.

5. 1800 to 1835, 3 hrs. 05 min., three (3) L-17's to search sector 125° - 195°.
MATRIX 3

For Major Unit by A-Z, Russian Air Force,
7 December 1941 to 7 December 1942
7 December 1941

0750 - Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, Bellows Field, Pearl Harbor, Kaneohe, Ewa Field and Fort Shafter attacked by Japanese aircraft in a surprise air raid.

0830 - 4 P-38's and 4 F-25's took off to engage the enemy.

0845 - 2 P-38's took off to engage the enemy.

0915 - 3 F-25's took off to engage the enemy.

0920 - 8 P-30's and 6 P-38's took off to engage the enemy.


0950 - 1 P-23 took off to make a reconnaissance for possible enemy activity.

1040 - 3 P-38's took off to make a reconnaissance for possible enemy activity.

1130 - Pearl Harbor bounced by high altitude horizontal bombers.

1137 - 4 P-38's took off to make a search for enemy surface craft.

1140 - 2 P-38's took off to make a search for enemy surface craft.

1200 - 2 P-23's took off to patrol.

1300 - 3 P-38's took off to make a search for enemy surface craft.

1320 - 2 P-38's took off to make a search for enemy surface craft.

1340 - 11 P-38's and 3 P-23's took off to patrol.

1400 - Command post of Pacific Air Force moved from Hickam Field to Aliamanu Crater.

1500 - 3 B-17's took off to search for enemy surface craft.

1530 - B-24's from Bellows Field. One airplane ready to go with crew on alert.
Zero Hour 1001 (cont)

1713 - Stalo: Corlett Field - Possible for Secret dikeless run may have activity territorial, aircraft or aircraft between Oldham Point and Elkins for radius of fifteen miles out to sea.

Numerous reports of air activity, troops were received from time of first attack throughout the day. These were not confirmed.

1800 - Arrival from Corlett Field - Line tanks in position and ready to go.

3 December 1941

Radio call to the Adjutant General, Washington, D.C., re: "Arrival of -177's on the train of 7 December 1941 unconfirmed. At last report they are stopped for action in the future."

Orders issued to provide 100 gallons of 100 octane gasoline at Elko Airport for planes arriving at Elko. This fuel to be taken from Fort Field.

1000 - areas: Peckford Field - Fort point Armor at Peckford Field reportedly blocked, flying possible.

1100 - 8 of 2-701's and 4-701's available and in condition.

1230 - 61-2-801's available at the 1st Field.


SECURITY NOTE!
9 December 1941

0500 - 23 P-40's, 12 P-23's and 12 Grens available at Trekler Field.

0500 - Teletype message to Commanding General, 13th Air Force, and Commanding Officers, Trekler and Fellows Field:

SUDDEN AND TOTAL FIELD BLOCKED AND ALL DESTINATION MAINTAIN OCEAN AND LANDING HELICOPTER LANDING PATTERNS at LANDING FIELD. ALL FIELD HELICOPTER LANDING PATTERNS at LANDING FIELD.

1000 - 12 B-17's, 10 B-18's and 8 A-20's in commission.

1200 - 26 P-40's and 14 P-66's in commission.

1200 - Telephone call --, received from General Arnold. He requested identification procedure and information on alternate airfields on outlying islands to be included in case of an air attack at time of arrival. 9 B-17's were to leave Wednesday night, 9 on Friday night and 9 on Sunday night.

Radio sent to the Chief of the Army Air Forces: Instructions reference arrival of B-17's from the mainland.

1300 - Teletype message to Commanding General, 13th Air Force:

INSTRUCTIONS ARE THAT FOUR NINE-FOUR-FOURS ARE TO BE BLOCKED BY INSTRUCTION SHARP IN COOPERATION WITH VITAL COMMUNICATIONS PREPARED FOR FOLLOWING PROCEDURE WILL BE CONDUCTED USING A PLACE OF THE ENCLAVE' TIME CONFLICT WITH 30 MINUTES IN A SITTING Position.

1600 - Air raid alarm.

1750 - All clear sounded.
December 12th (cont)

1807 - Information received from Patrol Wing CPO that enemy carrier is 90 miles west of Johnson Island on irregular course.

2300 - 26 P-40's and 10 P-39's available at Felsor Field.

An enemy submarine discovered off Adak Island. One Japanese naval officer captured. Discovered two 125 torpedoes still intact.

10 December 13th

Radio received from Chief of the Arm Air Forces re: Airplanes arriving from the Aleutians will use approach procedure Precedent.

Radio received from Adjutant General, Washington, D.C. re: Number of additional personnel required to control 100 additional pursuit airplanes and the number of heavy bombers required to bring operation strength to 50.

Radio sent from C.G. landing General, Eielson Department to C.A.S. re: Pursuit airplanes have been dispersed to outlying fields on the Island of Canal and the island of Sable for protection.

Radio sent to Adjutant General re: Number of pursuit pilots required to operate 100 additional pursuit airplanes and number of heavy bombers needed to take total of 70.

Radio sent to C.A.S. re: Conclusion drawn from Japanese Air Attack of 7 December 1941, Believe aircraft were launched from carriers with no plans for recovery.

Radio received from Adjutant General re: Information concerning any enemy pursuit specialists available.

0600 - 26 P-40's and 18 P-39's available at Felsor Field.

1200 - 10 P-17's, 6 P-18's, and 2 A-20's in commission.

11 December 1941

Radio sent to Chief of General Staff: General Arnold instructs on convoy targets.

Radio from Commander General, Bolling Field re: departure of 8 B-17’s.

Approach procedure to Island of Cuba published and distributed to all units Army and Navy.

0300 - 8 P-40’s and 16 P-39’s in commission.

18th line with 3 B-17’s conducted rescue and attack mission in sector 270° - 170°, 200 miles recorded.

Radio sent Commander General, Bolling Field re: arrival of 9 P-47’s.

0600 - 9 B-17’s, 11 B-18’s and 9 A-20’s in commission.

2000 - 21 P-47’s and 13 P-39’s in commission.

12 December 1941

Radio sent to GAT re: request for 6 transport airplanes.

Radio sent to GAT re: changes in approach procedure.

Radio received from the Adjutant General re: General Arnold requests Daily Status Report of aircraft in commission.

From American Department: Russian Airlines Ltd., will be in operation on regular schedule 12 December 1941. Army given priority on personnel and cargo.

Instructions sent to units recruiting members of combat crews, B-17, B-24, B-26 to include all qualified personnel to permit units to operate units to operate for all coast air operation.

18th Line notified to have 11 pilots report on effectiveness of blackout during night missions. (See Department).

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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13 December 1941

Radio to CAG re: Daily Status of Aircraft of Marian
Air Force.

Radio to CAG re: Malfunction of many .50 cal. machine
guns on newly arrived aircraft.

Radio from Ilanat Yca re: Army radio equipment moved
underground. Will take very minimum amount to avoid
giving baring to enemy aircraft.

10th Bomb Wing with 5 B-17's conducted search and strafing
mission in Sector 330° - 340°, 300 miles seaward.

1519 - Word received from Commanding Officer, Pearl District, that
Japanese Plane landed on sea off Milneu. Pilot is
threatening residents with machine gun.

1800 - 22 B-17's and 17 B-26's in commission.

1st December 1941

Radio from Adjutant General re: Current Reports will be
sent to Far Eastern Department as soon as possible.

Radio to CAG re: Status Report of Aircraft.

Location and strength of Air Base detachments on outlying
islands furnished Department Commander.

1929 - 33 F-40's and 13 F-25's in commission.

Instructions sent F-18's and Bellows Field that F-3 Periodic
Reports cover the periods 1900 to 1930 the following day.

13th Bomb Wing, with 11 B-17's, conducted search mission
against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sector 310° -
320°, 600 miles seaward. Friendly carrier with escort ships
and two friendly freighters located.

1343 - 21 B-17's, 10 B-19's and 10 A-20's in commission.

SECURITY INFORMATION
16 December 1941

Radio to CAM re: Daily Aircraft Status Report.

Radio from Adjutant General re: Daily Aircraft Status Reports no longer required.

Radio from Commanding General, Hamilton Field, re: Departure of 1 B-24.

0820 - Major Fieke given authorization to contact Hawaiian Airlines re: Use of their Operations Building at Ford Island.

1040 - 13th Wing opposed to exchange of Co-pilots, as suggested by Admiral Herring, due to difference of equipment.
16 December 1941 (contd)

1200 - Two submarines two miles off Tunalua Bay, about eight miles north of Komoro at 1150 traveling south, from Comandante Officer, Enewit Island.

1740 - Under flying called. Runway into territorial wing 6600' by 200' will be completed at Enewit Island by 17 December. Another runway 6000' long will be completed in two weeks.

1900 - 26 A-40's and 17 F-23's in commission.

1900 - 20 B-17's, 10 B-18's and 10 A-40's in commission.

1929 - All units informed Comandante Officer, Enewit Island, authorized to use an aeroplane to take wind and weather at 3000' and 6000' for future communication between Manila, Mariano and Enewit.

2030 - C-3 periodic report, Enewit air force, for period 20 December to 22 December submitted to Department.

2050 - General short concerned about dispersal of B-17's. Note in coming days dispersed immediately at 2000 or 3000'. At st to A-A defense at Enewit in responsibility of Ko. He will contact Admiral Ko for this. 12th War informed.

*18th Bomb Wing, with 15 B-17's, conducted search against enemy submarines and surface craft in sector 150° to 160°, 200 miles seaward. Submarine sighted between Wake and Jaluit attacked but lost contact when it dived. Two friendly destroyers and three friendly destroyers sighted.

19th Bomb Wing, with 13 B-17's, conducted search against enemy submarines and surface craft in sector 240° - 250°, 150 miles seaward. No enemy contacts made.
17 December 1943

Radio to Chief of Staff: Seaplane Base, 11 E. El Alamein field at 1100; 1300 will broadcast all times upon notification of departure of flights to Foggia.

1000 - Stock of 42's reported off Helgoland, Foggia, at 1000 by Flight Officer, Foggia District.

1200 - 78 P-47's and IL-2's in commission. Five P-47's and IL-2's out for 24-hour maintenance.

1300 - 73 P-47's and IL-2's in commission. Five P-47's and IL-2's out for 24-hour maintenance.

1400 - 73 P-47's and IL-2's in commission. 1 C-472 out for maintenance.

1500 - 73 P-47's and IL-2's in commission. 1 C-472 out for maintenance.

1943 - Command Officer, Naval District, reported: E-11 and E-12

13th Bomb Rnd, 143, with 7 E-17's, conducted a search mission against submarine and surface craft in sectors 010° - 060° and 100° - 160°, 200 miles seaward. One friendly carrier with 5 destroyers spotted. No enemy contacts.

13th Bomb Rnd, 143, with 3 E-17's, conducted a search mission against submarine and surface craft in sector 070° - 110°, 200 miles seaward. No enemy contacts.

13th Bomb Rnd, 143, with 6 E-70's, conducted a search mission against submarine and surface craft in sector 090° - 140°, 150 miles seaward. No enemy contacts.

18 December 1943

Radio to Commanding General, "El Alamein Field, ret Arrival 5 E-17's.

Radio to OIC: No corruptions to description of Japanese dive-bombers previously submitted.

Ordered by Departnet to carry on until 15th. New qualified Naval Officer with each flight or squadron sent out on search missions.
12 January 1944

1200 - 25 B-17’s, 10 B-18’s, and 10 B-24’s in operation. 47 B-17’s out of 57 for 1ST echelon maintenance.

1300 - 48 B-40’s and 22 B-25’s in operation. 77 B-40’s and 9 B-25’s out for 1ST echelon maintenance.

1400 - Instructions issued: 41TH and 15TH Army in order Field that all she be out for maintenance for as long as two hours will be drained of all gasoline.

1500 - 200 Aircraft, with 10 B-17’s, conducted a search mission against enemy submarine and surface craft in sectors 370° - 400° and 20° - 90°, 500 mile square. One friendly submarine with destroyer escort and one friendly minesweeper sighted. No enemy contact made.

1600 - 250 Aircraft, with 6 B-18’s, conducted a search mission against enemy submarine and surface craft in sectors 00° - 120° and 160° - 180°, 700 mile square. Sighted one submarine with 2 destroyers, one friendly fighter with 1 friendly destroyer, 2 friendly fighters and 1 friendly destroyer. At 1630 all aircraft were ordered at Int. 179° 20’ N., Long. 15° 10’ W. Crossed over 600 lb. bomb at large end of oil. Oil ran out to be 3 or 4 times it. Former sight. Sighted enemy submarine was destroyed.

1900 - New War

Radio from Commanding General, 4TH Air Force, to 21ST AEF's 1ST echelon maintenance.

Radio to Commanding General, North Field, to 1 ST echelon maintenance.

0700 - 1ST echelon ordered to return 4TH Echelon maintenance units from North Field, 30 December 1944.

0800 - Follow-in instructions to all units:

1. From 00 minutes before sunrise to 0700, and one hour before sunset to 20 minutes after sunset, 1/2 of heavy aircraft and C-47 fighter in air.

 RESTRICTED SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL
12 March 1942 (cont.)

All other Army and Navy planes, excepting those operating from a naval base ready to turn off.

2. Between 0600 and one (1) hour before sunset:

1/3 Army and Navy pursuit in air.
1/3 Army and Navy pursuit on ground and ready to turn on.

All other Army and Navy planes, including flak guns, excepting securing planes, on one hour's notice.

3. One hour after sunset to 30 minutes before sunrise, 1 defense on one hour's notice, 3/4 on four hours' notice.


10th Bomb. Div., with 11 B-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarine and surface craft in Sector ODE - G40, 700 miles south of 40th B-17's, 1 destroyer, 1 corvette and 2 hour cruiser off 30th B-17's, 1 Etcher, 2 destroyers and 2 transports or freighters sighted off of 40th point. No enemy contacts.

11th Bomb. Div., with 17 B-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarine and surface craft in Sector ODE - G40, 700 miles south of 40th B-17's, 1 friendly freighter sighted.

12th Bomb. Div., with 11 B-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarine and surface craft in Sector ODE - G40, 700 miles south of 40th B-17's, 1-friendly freighter sighted.

13th Bomb. Div., with 6 B-25's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarine and surface craft in Sector ODE - G40, 150 miles off 40th. No enemy contacts.

20 Dec. 1941


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SECURITY INFORMATION

This Page Declassified IAW EO12958
21 December 1941 (cont.)

Radio from Commander General 1, Hamilton Field, re: Departure of B-17's.

0700 - Instructions issued Commander General, 18th Army, re: Ration and Relief of Decorator School.

Recalled N. J. orders to retrain Phillip Pahl in Medical Department.

0830 - Mr. Slade requested authority to route his fliers straight from Pearl Harbor out to sea so that economy will be improved. Interceptor Commander to report.

1410 - Instructions issued to all units to make use of maximum diersion of airfields.

1515 - Arrangements made to send ammunition to B-17's via air on 21 December 1941.

1615 - 18th Interceptor requested to run two (2) with signal light furnished by Signal Officer, Foreign Air Force.

1620 - All units ordered to stop clear of Pearl Harbor unless necessary in combat.

1625 - Commander General, 18th Army, directed to have one 1st echelon squadron ready to take off under current protection at 0100. Balance of squadron ordered to take off in 20 minutes, if ordered.

1630 - Instructions issued Commander General, 18th Army, cutting E-W Approach Procedure (Frontal Island) into effect.

1705 - Commander General, Foreign Interceptor Corps, ordered to have one 1st echelon squadron of 17 planes in air at 0100, balance in 1st status until notified by this headquarters.

1800 - Aircraft Status of Foreign Interceptor Corps:
- 40 B-24's and 21 P-38's in commission.
- 2 B-24's and 3 B-25's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
- 3 B-17's out for 2nd echelon maintenance.
- 8 B-17's and 6 F-22's out for 3rd echelon maintenance.

1820 - Aircraft Status of 18th Bomb Wing:
- 21 B-17's, 9 B-18's and 10 B-20's in commission.
- 6 B-17's and 5 B-22's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
- 2 B-17's out for 3rd echelon maintenance.
20 December 1941 (cont'd)

1800 - Aircraft status of 86th Observation Squadron:
4 0-47's and 1 C-49 in commission.
2 0-47's out for 1st echelon maintenance.

1923 - Report of missions accomplished - 86th Observation Squadron:
Two 0-47's and two C-49's were flown.
Three 0-47's continued patrol in area.
Three 0-47's were flown over the ship channel.
Total 285 miles flown.
Mission started at 0500 hours.
Mission ended at 1800 hours.

2030 - Commanding General, 18th Troop Carrier, ordered to report anything unusual and reports made to Army upon completion of missions.

2040 - Commanding General, Honduras Interceptor Command, ordered to report results of dust and dust patrols upon completion of missions.

19th Bombing Division, with 17 B-17's conducted a search mission,
20th Bombing Division, with 22 B-17's conducted a dust mission in sector 050°
180°, 600 miles southeast. No enemy vessels sighted. Friendly
destroyers and 3 friendly freighters sighted.

18th Bombing Division, with 22 B-17's, conducted a search mission in
vicinity of Nams, 180° 30', Lat, 22° 00' against enemy submarines
and surface craft 100 miles southeast. No enemy activities reported.

Honduras Interceptor Command conducted 7 tactical missions (25:40)
and 5 non-tactical missions (3:40).

21 December 1941

0015 - Radio received from Commanding General, 8th Air Force re:
Departure of 2 1-77's, for Brazil.

0730 - Radio to C-2 and Commanding General, Bridston Field re:
Arrival of 2 1-77's.

Radio to 0-47's: Communications instruction for airplanes arriving from Mindanao.


To Gen. Command.
21 Dec: Hom I (contd)

Radio from Commanding General, Hawaiian Department to Commanding Officers, Kauai District, re: Evacuation of all Army personnel, civilian, on equipment from Ford Field to Eleeo.

Radio from the Adjutant General re: Summarizing Japanese Aerial Attak.

Letter from General Toma to Admiral Iye re: Pursuit patrols.

Letter from CINCPAC to Commander, Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier re: Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier Defense.

0900 - Hawaiian Air Force alert terminated until further notice.

Alerts, until further notice from this headquarters, will be re-ordered by Commanding Generals, 16th Bomb Wing and Hawaiian Interceptor Command.

0930 - Devon Mission of Interceptor Command completed with number of ships ordered. Patrol had nothing to report.

1150 - Interceptor Command ordered to maintain an air alert over convoy approaching from the coast from 0500 to 1700, this date. They will remain above the anti-submarine patrol being performed by Patrol Wing. Inc.

1203 - Report to test of signal lights by 16th Bomb Wing. Lights tested at 1100. Red with binoculars 3000' to 6000'. Read without binoculars 2000'. Luminous lights not feasible.

1540 - Report from 30th Observation Squadron on Mililani Patrol. Small section one-half mile off shore and one-half mile west of Kailua Point, Hawaii, at 1600 heading WSW. To sea in it. Not visible for identification.

1600 - Aircraft status of 30th Observation Squadron:
- 4 P-47's and 1 0-40 in commission.
- 4 P-47's out for 1st echelon maintenance.

1600 - Aircraft status of 30th Interceptor Command:
- 12 P-40 and 10 P-47's in commission.
- 1 P-40 and 8 P-40's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
- 6 P-47's and 4 P-47's out for 2nd echelon maintenance.
- 12 P-40's and 6 P-47's out for 3rd echelon maintenance.

1600 - Aircraft status of 16th Bomb Wing:
- 27 B-17's, 11 B-17's and 10 B-29's in commission.
- 6 B-17's and 1 1-1-15 out for 1st echelon maintenance.
- 2 B-17's out for 2nd echelon maintenance.
- 4 P-47's and 2 B-17's out for 3rd echelon maintenance.
18th Dec 1941 (contd)

1920 - 18th Dec 1941, ordered to retain 15 B-17's as striking force.

2014 - Report of patrols - 82nd Observation Squadron:
     25 single patrols struck Iki, Mikuni.
     Three 2-plane patrols poloted - Maid.
     Two 4-plane patrols fired Channel.
     One 1-plane patrol fired Kure.
   Total tactical hour flown this date: 41:50.

2056 - Day mission of striking Interceptor Command completed with
       number of planes ordered. Actual and nothing to report.

0010 - We flew from midship of San Francisco. USS Fillmore left San
        Francisco 17 December 1941 with 17 planes.

0110 - USS Conliff departed San Francisco 17 December 1941 with
        7 planets.

18th Dec 1941, with 8 B-17's, conducted a search mission - instan-
   taneous failures and surface combat in Sector 140° - 153°, 600
   miles southwest. Noticed one army fighter, 5 transports, 52
   Cornells, Okea, and life raft containing several men who
   were believed to be U.S. Officers. Droped position report and
   emergency ration, which were recovered.

Striking Interceptor Command conducted 75 Tactical Missions (37:16)
   and 3 non-tactical missions (3:16).

22 December 1941

0216 - Engineering report: Bocking of aircraft on Catalina Island.

0319 - 12 mission of intercept completed with number of planes ordered.
        Patrols for nothing to report. Reported Cilamor.

1750 - Ordinance officer instructed to remove conditions, material and
        men from Bock Field.

1915 - Ordered 18th Dec to inspect a plane to read to report progress
        of Bocking field and exceptions for their destruction.
        Also one plane to land at Iki, Maid, and Kaneohe. Observe
        Eiler and Fumi. Reports to be rendered. Sein Evans. It
        was particularly concerned to the obstructions that are
        to be removed for landing to provide safe areas, but
        not too close to runway during landing.
22 December 1944 (cont.)

Major Allen called for information for Robert O'Malley:
A. Weather forecast 9 condition 7 December 1944. Also
   time of sunrise.
B. Magnitude of airfield with at disposition of planes
   at time of attack.
C. Positions of barracks secured but not secured end time
   of strafing.

Mr. Ollinger called re: Blocking of airfield at ‘cui. Due to
their own firing, he requests that blocking materials and
armor into be used but that field be left open during day
for their operations. You could be immediately available
for blocking. Engineers have other instructions and have
field blocked "1111" except "1-20" plane is known to
be coming to land.

1700 - First order following receipts of units of 3rd Army Air
   Force for 27 Dec 44: 375, 779, 27 Dec 44. Details of
   operations and alert instructions from 16 for 1 to 7 Dec 44.

1800 - Aircraft status of 14th BC 5:
   375-1219, 379-1319, 11-14 in condition,
   379-1319 1-13 out for 1st echelon maintenance.
   375-1419 out for 2nd echelon maintenance.
   779-1419 out for 2nd echelon maintenance.

1900 - Aircraft status of 15th BC 5:
   375-1435 in condition.
   11-14 375 out for 1st echelon maintenance.

0000 - Information received from 94th that one plane deserts; Hamilton
   Field 001 002.

0000 - Report on call of 14th BC 5:
   375-1436 in condition:
   14-14 375 out for 1st echelon maintenance.

1114h 13th BC 5, with 11 L-19s, conducted 2-recon mission
over 2nd echelon and returned to sector 11-19 001, 200 miles
north. Members AR 6th

1411h conducted 2nd tactical mission (1113) and 9 th
   tactical mission (0113).
23 December 1950

1000 - 6-7 Bn, 16th Inf, to report to 3rd Lt Uen, 16th Inf, 1st Bn, 16th Inf, to report to 1st Lt. Fields.
6-7 Bn reports to 1st Bn, 16th Inf. 1st Lt reports to 3rd Lt, Uen.

1700 - Picture of Minister's Island received.

2100 - General left instructions re: Mr. Telligman's striking force of 18-17s.

4100 - General made Mr. Telligman restate that the 18-17s are in addition to 17-17s for the search even though it is necessary to reduce the striking force below 18-17s.

1000 - Aircraft in the port:

- 3 0-17s in condition,
- 1 0-17 out for 1st echelon maintenance.

1400 - Aircraft return report of 13th Bomb

- 38 1-17s, 1 17 2-17s in condition,
- 2 2-17s, 7 1-17s out for 1st echelon maintenance,
- 3 2-17s out for 1st echelon maintenance,
- 6 3-17s out for 1st echelon maintenance.

1500 - Aircraft return report of 13th Bomb

- 12 2-17s, 12 2-17s out for 1st echelon maintenance,
- 5 2-17s out for 1st echelon maintenance,
- 6 3-17s out for 1st echelon maintenance.

1600 - Reports of attacks - 15th Cbo 301

- No attacks - 353rd O.S., 300th S.O.S. of Chiho.
- No attacks of Allied planes.
- 1st tactical hour too until 1947.

1700 - Orders to all units that not over 25% of personnel be taken to the air echelon for this.

2040 - To Chief of Staff, "the 15th Cbo 301, 300th S.O.S. of Security retreat, orders, instructions issued.Inner circle.

Restrictive
SECURITY INFORMATION
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22 December 1941 (cont.)

311 - Instructions in use C3a, 15th in - 211-212s, C29s, Hick, 
Cedar, and Yellow field and other detect, re-avail-
ability to aircraft before the Roberts Commission.

220 - Hick - 11 a report no ERC actions this date.

10th Bomb A, 25/11 11-17's, conducted search mission to inter-
sect enemy submarines and surface craft in sector 150° - 240°, 560
miles south. One friendly fighter and one friendly aircraft
sighted.

ERC 11-17's conduct 7 tactical 2 missions (9:30) and 2 non-tactical
missions (2:55).

24 December 1941

0720 - Token escort provided incoming vessels.

0857 - In view of 11-17's crossing, number of planes
ordered. Further details to report.

1250 - From Turner field, "Sighted eight target boats to be
six or seven small subs between 11-17's and

1300 - Aircraft at the Resort of Hick - 11-17's, 19 F-17's in con-
version, 3 B-11's. 4 B-25's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
3 A-20's 2 C-47's out for 2nd echelon maintenance.
4 T-6's. 2 T-6's out for 3rd echelon maintenance.

1:30 - Aircraft at the Resort of Hick 11-17's, 10 B-17's, 2 B-25's, 7 A-20's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
3 A-20's 2 B-17's out for 2nd echelon maintenance.
6 B-17's, 6 B-18's, 1 B-24 out for 3rd echelon maintenance.

1200 - Aircraft at the Resort of Hick: 25 11-17's in con-
version.
11-17's out for 1st echelon maintenance.

1715 - Aircraft 22-17's of 38th Obs. out:
8 C-47's in conversion.
11-17's out for 1st echelon maintenance.

11:17 - Aircraft of 25 11-17's of 38th Obs. out:
Two observers, Gruen, U. S. navy.
Two observers, U. S. navy.
Two observers, U. S. navy.}

This page Declassified IAW EO12958
24 December 1941 (cont'd)

2220 - Col. Powell requested to contact Transport Squadron re: transportation to Hondo to get radio sets.

2230 - HiloAirCom reported no Dusk missions to date.

18th Bomb Wg, with 16 B-17's, conducted a search mission over enemy submarines and surface vessels in sector 080° - 180°, 600 (600) miles seaward. One Destroyer and one submarine; one Freighter, SS Maple, SS Lake Francis, and SS Homedale observed.

18th Bomb Wg, with 3 A-30's and 1 B-17, conducted a search and attack mission against enemy submarines reported between Hilo and Kurei. Two planes saw what were to be two submarines diving. One plane dropped bombs where submarine was believed to be and returned to base due to motor trouble. Other plane dropped two live bombs and one dead where other submarine left oil slick when it dived. Results unknown. Sighted one Destroyer and one Freighter 40 miles off Hilo. One seaman with American flag observed off Burns Field.

HiloAirCom conducted 12 tactical missions (23:40) and 4 non-tactical missions. (3:10).

25 December 1941

Ltr. from CinGinFlt to ComAirMD & ComPac TAO re: "Return of Aircraft to Cahu during Darkness, Use of Lights for."

Radio from CAG to CG, from Dept., re: Giving Procedure of Ferry Flights to Cahu.

Memorandum to CG, from Dept., re: Joint Army and Navy Air Doctrine.

General Hinkler directed that circuit airlanes being assembled at Hilo Air Depot be dispersed.

Ltr. to CG, from Dept., re: Ground Defense of Airdromes.

0758 - Dron mission of HiloAirCom completed with number of planes ordered. Patrol had nothing to report.

SECURITY INFORMATION
25 December 1941 (contd)

1000 - Directed Interceptor Command to hold movement of unit to Kaneohe indefinitely.

1200 - GO, EmCom called re: Moving anti-aircraft gun emplacements being prepared at certain locations.

1230 - Gen. Akin directed 1-4 to take necessary action to see that block of Kuli Airport be executed as desired by the Navy.

1205 - Gen. Akin gave approval of Navy spotting 90, 500 lb bombs at Hickam Wheeler and Bellows Fields.

1300 - Directed 14th Wing to contact FAWINAC re: Carrying bombs on all search missions. 14th Wing to report results.

1305 - Directed 14th Wing investigate possible operation of 9 B-17s from Kaneohe and report to this office.

1315 - Directed EmCom to move 14th Pursuit planes to Kaneohe when communications are established to insure control of unit. Personnel and equipment not needed to remain at Wheeler Field.

1500 - Arranged with Adm. Bellinger for planes of 44th Pursuit Squadron to move to Kaneohe with following: 8 planes (to be increased to 12), 16 officers and 37 men. Navy will furnish gas, truck, food and housing. EmCom directed to write move 20 Dec 41.

1600 - Aircraft Status of EmCom:
   42 F-40's & 21 P-23's in commission.
   4 P-40's & 3 P-36's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
   4 P-40's & 6 P-36's out for 2nd echelon maintenance.
   4 P-40's & 2 P-35's out for 3rd echelon maintenance.

1600 - Aircraft Status of 14th Bomb Wing:
   26 B-17's, 10 B-18's & 3 A-20's in commission.
   4 B-17's & 2 B-19's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
   2 B-14's out for 2nd echelon maintenance.
   5 B-17's and 1 A-20 out for 3rd echelon maintenance.

1800 - Aircraft Status of 36th Cbs 3d:
   5 C-47's & 1 C-49 in commission.
   1 C-47 out for 1st echelon maintenance.
25 December 1941 (contd)

1904 - Report of patrols of 26th Obs Sq:

To 7 plane patrols: 4 + 9 - Midu.
Two 7 plane patrols Holoki - Midu.
One 2 plane patrol Niihau Channel.
Total tactical hours flown this date: 40:40.

13th Bomb UG, with 16 B-17's, conducted a search mission vs. inst enemy submarines in sector 060° - 150°, 600 miles seaward. Four friendly surface vessels observed.

26 December 1941

Received copy of ltr. from CG, 1st Det., to ADM, Fye re: Proposed Air Policy.

Recommend to CG, 1st Det., requiring out of B-17's.

1507 - B-17's mission of EvInCom completed with number of planes ordered. Patrol had nothing to report.

1900 - Aircraft Status of 26th Obs Sq:

6 B-17's & 6 B-47's in commission.
1 B-47 out for 1st echelon maintenance.

1900 - Aircraft Status of 13th Bomb UG:

27 B-17's, 19 B-13's & 9 A-30's in commission.
2 B-17's, 3 B-13's, & 1 A-20 out for 1st echelon maintenance.
6 B-17's, 6 B-13's & 1 A-20 out for 3rd echelon maintenance.

1800 - Aircraft Status of EvInCom:

40 P-39's & 24 P-40's in commission.
6 P-40's & 3 P-38's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
5 P-40's, 2 P-39's & 2 P-35's out for 2nd echelon maintenance.
3 P-39's & 2 P-35's out for 3rd echelon maintenance.

1900 - EvInCom reported no dusk missions this date.

1900 - EvInCom reported no dusk missions this date.

2100 - Radio to Chief Air Service Command re: Ammunition Boxes for 37mm guns on B-29's. Requested delivery by most expeditious means.

2146 - Report of patrols of 33rd Obs Sq:

26 December 1941 (contd)

Total tactical hours flown this date: 23:25.
Total non-tactical hours flown this date: 1:10.

2215 - Radio to MAG re: Correct Approach Procedure for Planes Approaching Sky.  

2400 - EV-InCom reported that P-17E, Pilot Lt. Cooper, landed on water 40 miles South of Kure out of gas. Ship had been reported lost and was working with EV-InCom in an effort to get oriented to return to Hickam Field.

18th Bomb Wg., with 16 B-17's, conducted a search mission for enemy submarines and surface craft in sector 060° - 180°, 200 miles seaward. Sighted 2 Destroyers; Friendly Freighter - SS Atlantic City; and PBY down on water.

EV-InCom conducted 11 tactical missions (18:10) and 5 non-tactical missions (1:10).

27 December 1941

0200 - 18th Wing called re: B-17 down in water. B-17 sent out to position and reported seeing light on water. Destroyer and Coast Guard Cutter enroute.

0749 - EV-InCom reported no dawn missions this date.

1525 - Signal Officer, Hawaiian Air Force, called and stated radio interference is not from out stations, but believed to be from submarine located 8 miles South and West of Keaau Point.

1800 - Aircraft Status of 18th Bomb Wg:
23 B-17's, 19 P-38's & 9 A-30's in commission.
6 B-17's & 3 P-38's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
3 B-17's out for 2d echelon maintenance.
4 P-38's, 6 B-17's & 1 A-30 out for 3d echelon maintenance.

1800 - Aircraft Status of EV-InCom:
42 F-40's & 25 P-36's in commission.
9 F-40's & 1 P-36 out for 1st echelon maintenance.
6 F-40's & 4 P-36's out for 3d echelon maintenance.
25 P-36's, 7 F-40's & 1 P-36 out for 5th echelon maintenance.
27 December 1941 (cont)


2031 - Dust mission of Midway completed with number of planes ordered. Patrol had nothing to report.

18th Bomb Vg, with 16 B-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in sector 030° - 130°, 500 miles seaward. A large oil slick, including debris, was sighted off the West Coast of Mikronesia. Plane descended to 500 ft and periscope was retracted with 30 seconds. The oil slick and debris is believed to be the wreckage of a small surface vessel. No bombs were carried on this plane as it was swinging course with normal long range gas load.

19th Bomb Vg, with 10 B-13's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in sector 050° - 200°, 150 miles seaward. One friendly Destroyer observed. Oil slick, small boxes and loose planks were sighted off Mikronesia. One oil slick sighted life boat and stood by until boat was picked up by Coast Guard.

19th Bomb Vg, with 6 B-25's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines off Edelweiss. Pilots reported no enemy activity.

Evadon conducted 2 tactical missions (11:10) and 4 non-tactical missions (11:40).

28 December 1941

0830 - Information received from Air Service Command that new P-40 and P-17 engines would be shipped by most expedient means.

0930 - Radio from Air Service Command that P-39's planes enroute are complete with 37mm cannons and machine guns. 30 P-40's scheduled for delivery will be complete with 20mm cannons and related equipment.

0940 - Japanese Interceptor ordered to intercept any dummy air-planes are based on dummy airfields, which will be used to give the appearance of bunkers and planes will drop fields occasionally to simulate landings and take-offs.

1025 - 25,000 rounds 27 mm enroute. Chain manifest shows 13,000 now here.
23 December 1941 (contd)

1230 - Informed that Headquarters Belfour Field would move from Plantation Office on 19 December 1941.

1345 - General Eisenhower directs that until further orders, there will be no pursuit planes on the down east coast. This will probably last until Navy escort forces now in Pearl Harbor have departed.

1410 - Colonel Green reported Southern Air Route radar now as follows:
- 5000' of runway at Crete.
- 4000' of runway at Honolulu (5000' by 1st January 1942).
- 5000' of runway at Hondo.
- 5000' of runway at Honolulu.
- 100,000 gallon 100 octane gasoline at all except Hondo.
- Where 70,000 gallons are located. To lubrication, etc. in hydraulic brake fluid. Defense at all U.S. armed forces provided by Army.

1600 - Called 13th Bomb Wing; Operation of Bomber Training Squadron, 47th Squadron, from Belfour as directed by General Green. Three to fly to Hondo each morning and return each evening before dark. Landings for refueling to be made at Hondo.

1800 - Aircraft Status Report of 88th Observation Squadron:
- 8 O-47's and 1 O-49 in condition.

1800 - Aircraft Status Report of 87th Interceptor Command:
- 40 P-40's and 36 P-25's in condition.
- 5 P-40's and 2 P-70's out for 1st echelon maintenance,
- 4 P-40's and 2 P-25's out for 2nd echelon maintenance,
- 20 P-40's, 10 P-25's and 3 P-35's out for 3rd echelon maintenance.

1800 - Aircraft Status Report of 13th Bomb 'Inch:
- 33 B-17's, 9 B-18's and 6 B-20's in condition.
- 7 B-17's, 2 B-18's and 2 B-20's out for 1st echelon maintenance.

1901 - Report of Patrols of 88th Observation Squadron:
- Two 2-plane patrols - 1st - 7th.
- Four 2-plane patrols - 8th - 11th.
- Two 2-plane patrols - 12th - 13th.
- Total tactical hours flown this date: 29:25.
- Total non-tactical hours flown this date: 1:36.

SECURITY INFORMATION
23 December 1941 (contd)

1343 - Desi Mission of Hawaiian Interceptor Command completed with number of planes ordered. Patrols had nothing to report.

1345 - One B-40 damaged in landing.

18th Bomb Wing, with 15 B-17's, conducted a search mission against submarines and surface craft in Sector 060° - 180°, 800 miles seaward. One XBY filled in Sector 090° - 197.5°. Sighted 1 destroyer; USS Halbert with seaplane in tow; and 3 distinct wakes, believed to be submarines, 3 miles off southeast shores of Hawaii. Navy took action.

18th Bomb Wing, with 6 B-18's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft on a course of 260°, 20 miles interval between aircrews, 500 miles seaward. One other B-18 conducted a search mission on the following course: Keizer Point, Guam, Hiram, Huleo Rock, out 150 miles on west leg of Keizer Bern and return. U.S. Navy sighted near water believed to be wrecked; one lifeboat was seen but no ship. Destroyer which was approaching; 3 destroyers; and nine other surface vessels. Three submarines were located. One plane located two but lost one when it submerged. The other submarines, but produced large oil bubbles after being bombed - believed to be destroyed. One other submarine was located and bombed. According to all visible evidence the submarine was destroyed. Large bubbling oil patches were observed after the bombing.

18th Bomb Wing, with 3 B-20's, conducted an attack mission against enemy submarines on a course 305° from Keizer Point, 150 miles seaward.

One plane sighted heavy oil slick area of 3 to 5 square miles and much debris 65 miles from Keizer Point.

Hawaiian Interceptor Command conducted 4 tactical missions (7:30) and 9 non-tactical missions (6:15).

23 December 1941

0939 - Desi Mission of Hawaiian Interceptor Command completed with number of planes ordered. Patrols had nothing to report.

1030 - 18th Bomb Wing directed to disperse 3 B-17's at Bellows Field during hours of darkness daily.
29 December 1941 (contd.)

1000 - 19th Bomb ing directed to make a careful search of the Iwadi, Miharu and Zevina Rocks area for possible enemy submarine bases or fuel caches. Report will be made to this head-quarters of results of this mission.

1350 - Report received that pilot of A-20 found six drums stacked at Opa Kewahma, Miharu. Fired their lord.

1300 - Aircraft Status of Hawaiian Interceptor Command:
42 P-40's and 33 P-36's in commission,
4 P-40's and 3 P-36's out for last echelon maintenance,
4 P-40's and 1 P-36 out for 3d echelon maintenance,
40 P-33's, 19 P-33's and 2 P-36's out for 2d echelon maintenance.

1800 - Aircraft Status of 56th Observation Squadron:
5 0-47's and 1 0-47 in commission,
1 0-47 out for 1st echelon maintenance.

1800 - Aircraft Status of 13th Bomb 'Ing:
35 B-17's, 11 B-13's and 9 A-20's in commission,
5 B-17's and 2 B-18's out for 1st echelon maintenance,
2 B-17's and 1 B-18 out for 2d echelon maintenance,
4 B-17's, 7 B-18's and 1 A-20 out for 3d echelon maintenance.

1850 - Reply sent to the Adjutant General re: Flight of 2 B-17's south.

1855 - Radio received from the War Department stating that our request for additional B-17's was now under consideration.

2024 - Dusk mission of Hawaiian Interceptor Con and complete with number of planes ordered. Patrols have nothing to report.

2105 - Report of Patrols of 26th Observation Squadron:
Two 2-plane patrols Moei-Miharu,
Four 2-plane patrols Kolohai-Kewahma,
Two 2-plane patrols Raru Channel.
Total 24 mission hours flown this date: 23:40,
Total non-tactical hours flown this date: 1:10.

18th Bomb 'Ing, with 10 B-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sectors 060° - 090° and 120° - 180°, 300 miles seaward. Sighted convoy of 1 destroyer, 2 tugs and 2 aircraft tenders. Another plane sighted 2 destroyers and 2 small boats, friendly.
30 December 1941 (contd)

18th Bomb Wing, with B-24's, conducted a search mission for possible submarine refueling bases. Found six fuel drums stacked on shore at O ne Nawiliwili, Piilani. Fired their torpedoes.

Hawaiian Interceptor Command conducted 13 tractor missions (07:40) and 7 non-tractor missions (04:30).

30 December 1941

0810 - Colonel Hovenguh called saying that Federal Communications Commission definitely located submarine at Long. 158° 10' Lat. 31° 15' 43". Information Center notified. They notified Navy. One to her being sent out.

0927 - Submarine reported 5 miles off Keaau Point.

0950 - Drop mission of Hawaiian Interceptor Command completed with number of planes ordered. Patrol had nothing to report.

1020 - Arrangements completed between Hawaiian Interceptor Command and 18th Bomb Wing for planes to test night fighter tactics.


1550 - Notified 18th Bomb Wing that special flight of P-47's would not depart this P. M. Crews released for rest and awaiting further instructions tomorrow.

1650 - 26th Observation Squadron reported as follows: "On patrol today, 30 December 1941, on north shore of Kolokai, West of Kauai, we noted series of birds flying in the area resembling Japanese characters. The area in this vicinity had recently been cleared to prevent landing of enemy planes but this part of the area was too rough for landings regardless of preventive measures". A-20 sent out to inspect.

1750 - 18th Bomb Wing reports results of A-20 inspection were negative.

1800 - Aircraft Status: Report of 18th Bomb Wing:
22 B-17's, 9 B-18's and 10 A-20's in commission.
7 B-17's, and 3 B-18's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
2 B-18's out for 2nd echelon maintenance.
4 B-17's in 7 B-18's out for 3rd echelon maintenance.
30 December 1942 (contd)

1800 - Aircraft Status of 88th Observation Squadron:
4 0-47's and 1 O-49 in commission.
7 0-47's out for 1st echelon maintenance.

1800 - Aircraft Status Report of Hawaiian Interceptor Command:
41 P-40's and 37 P-26's in commission.
4 P-40's and 1 P-26 out for 1st echelon maintenance.
5 P-40's and 1 P-26 out for 2nd echelon maintenance.
79 P-40's and 22 P-26's and 2 P-39's out for 3rd echelon maintenance.

Flash received that Kilo, Hawaii, was being shelled, presumably by enemy submarine.

18th Bombing, with 13 B-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sector 010° - 110°, 80 miles seaward. Got force of 1 destroyer, 2 trawlers, and 1 heavy cruiser observed. 1 friendly freighter sighted. One carrier and 1 cruiser observed. Also sighted wake with oil bubbles rising at end of wake. Another plane sighted on enemy submarine. 1 friendly destroyer within 16 miles headed for it. Instructed to proceed on mission.

18th Bombing, with 4 B-18's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sector 140° - 170°, 200 miles seaward. No enemy contacts made.

18th Bombing, with 3 A-20's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines in Sector 260° - 285°, 150 miles seaward. No enemy activities observed.

Hawaiian Interceptor Command conducted 11 tactical missions (40/45) and 4 non-tactical missions (6/10).

31 December 1942

0730 - Bomb Mission of Hawaiian Interceptor Command completed with number of planes ordered. Patrol had nothing to report.

0745 - Bomb Mission of Hawaiian Interceptor Command completed with number of planes ordered. Patrol had nothing to report.

1020 - Informed by Colonel Lyman that one field at Schofield Barracks is finished.
31 December 1941 (cont.)

1110 - Arrangements completed for Joint Pursuit - Searchlight Ironing Problem.

1403 - Information received from Commanding Officer, Pearl District, that Umea, Hual, is under enemy fire. Shell fire short of Neutralist Pillar. Canvas tarps on fire.

1600 - General urge directed Provision Air Force to take an aerial reconnaissance of Kaneohe, the field and Ford Island where it was reported that carrier-based aircraft are parked in a very small area within an ideal target. This we expect likely true of Kaneohe. Department Commander desires that General Hinkel take this up with proper Naval Commander, if true.

1800 - Aircraft Status Report of Marian Interceptor Command:
- 43 P-40's and 27 P-39's in commission.
- 3 P-40's and 1 P-39 out for 1st echelon maintenance.
- 5 P-40's and 1 P-39 out for 2nd echelon maintenance.
- 67 P-40's, 2 P-39's and 8 P-38's out for 3rd echelon maintenance.

1800 - Aircraft Status Report of 18th Bomb Wing:
- 23 B-17's, 9 B-13's and 10 B-24's in commission.
- 6 B-17's and 4 B-13's out for 1st echelon maintenance.
- 1 B-17 and 1 B-13 out for 2nd echelon maintenance.
- 5 B-17's and 7 B-14's out for 3rd echelon maintenance.

1800 - Aircraft Status Report of 88th Observation Squadron:
- 5 0-47's and 1 O-47 in commission.
- 1 O-47 out for 1st echelon maintenance.

1948 - Dust mission of Marian Interceptor Command completed with number of planes ordered. Patrols nothing to report.

1955 - Report of Patrols of 88th Observation Squadron:
- Two 2-plane patrols Nu'uanu - Paliheu.
- Three 2-plane patrols Paliheu - Hualii.
- One 2-plane patrol Windward Channel.
- One photo recon mission.

1950 - Marian Interceptor Command reported no fuel dispersion of aircraft. Planes bunched up at Ford Island. Kaneohe and Ford Field are C. P.
20 December 1941 (contd)

18th Bomb Wing, with B-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sectors 000° - 010°; 020° - 025°; 040° - 110°; and 120° - 150°, 700 miles seaward. One plane was valve with periscope at end. Periscope submerged. Plane observed submarine surfacing as it made run. Dropped 2 500-lb bombs, one hitting 30 feet right of conning tower and two hit about 100 or 120 feet over the conning tower near the stern. The submarine was visibly shaken, it rolled about 30° and went under. In continuing search, 6 more periscopes were sighted but could not make a run on them. There might have been the same submarine trying to surface. The submarine was dark colored and about 150 to 200 feet long. Friendly convoy sighted by another plane.

18th Bomb Wing, with B-17's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines and surface craft in Sector 050° - 080°, 500 miles seaward. Two small ships sighted near Honolulu.

18th Bomb Wing, with B-24's, conducted a search mission against enemy submarines in Sector 240° - 290°, 150 miles seaward. No enemy activities observed.

Ensign Interceptor Command conducted 14 tactical missions (2:15) and 7 non-tactical missions (4:23).
APPENDIX 4

Letter, Lt. Col. alter C. Hieken, Jr., to Commanding Officer, 11th Bombardment Group (D), Hickam Field, A. S., 2 February 1942; subject: Report of Operations, Bomber Unit 244th Group 3.9, with three incinerators.
BOTH RECONNAISSANCE SQUADRONS (2)*
Office of the Squadron Commander

Mickan Field, L. L.
3 February 1944

S/P: Report of Operations, Bomber Unit 2nd Grp 19

TO: Commanding Officer, 11th Bombardment Grp (E),
Mickan Field, L. L.

1. In compliance with the verbal directive of the Commanding General, Bomber Air Force, the undersigned resumed command of a flight of six (6) airplanes designated, by Operations Plan No. 5-43, United States Pacific Fleet, dated 15 January 1944, as Bomber Unit and assigned to 2nd Group B-25. The following detailed report is submitted covering the operations of this unit.

2. GENERAL: (1) The unit was organized as directed, by taking three airplanes and crews from the 11th Bombardment Squadron (E). Ground crew personnel in the number of twelve (12) were taken from each of the foregoing squadrons and transported to CA'KLA by destroyer. Designated as Unit Group 2-5, the air echelon departed HICKAM FIELD at 0620 EST 16 January and the last airplane landed at PEARL HARBOR at 1330 on that date. Airplane number 41-2620, pilot Lieutenant Sullivan, was severely damaged in landing at PEARL HARBOR when the tail rudder hit short of the runway during off the tail section below the vertical fin. Causes for this accident were: first, very poor visibility due to rain at the time of landing; second, absence of marks at the end of the runway to permit the pilot to judge his elevation and distance out; third, pilot error in adjusting too slow an approach. Investigation revealed that two of the three other airplanes to land previously at this field narrowly passed over exactly the same time of resident for the same reasons.

3. All stripes have since been painted at fifty foot intervals on the runway and have simplified landings at this field.

4. Due to intermittent rain storms and a sudden visibility in the immediate vicinity of the island was very restricted, consequently it was necessary for the ground station at PEARL HARBOR to utilize the navy lost plane procedure and radio to bring in one airplane piloted by Lieutenant. Although this airplane was within approximately one mile of the island at first hundred feet it was impossible to discern the island. Firing by radio causes on all signals transmitted by PEARL HARBOR was impossible due to static and interference. Cooperation

5. 5th Reconnaissance Squadron redeployed to
Cowan (1) on 27 April 1944.
on the part of the permanent personnel at this station was excellent, everything required by the bomber unit was furnished immediately and efficiently, however gassing facilities are inadequate and the planes serviced in a doubtful manner due to water and foreign matter content.

(1) Departure from HMLH was made at 0630 LST, on 17 January, and the last air-line was sent at 0730 LST. Again poor visibility in the vicinity of the terminal made navigation exceedingly difficult and the location of the destination at time of arrival very doubtful. "No of the air-lines came in to the island satisfactorily on dead reckoning alone. Two of the air-lines were by the island on their dead reckoning and were forced to then make a positive error and locate the island by use of a searchlight utilizing a mercator's curve for the sun, fortunately this system was well understood by the navigators and brought them in safely to the island. Two signals were received by any of the foregoing four air-lines, although two of them requested one. The fifth air-line was definitely lost having passed within ten miles of the island in a rain squall. The undersigned immediately warned the crew to proceed to the Foa air station located across the lagoon from the landing strip in an effort to report in the 00 signals were being disengaged. The radio operator on duty was shortly and properly instructed and the fifth air-line coincided with the 10 signals and affected a safe arrival. This air-line reported contact with two enemy submarines sighted off HMLI. One was bombed, result doubtful.

(2) The following day, 18 January was spent in maintenance and patrols to include celestial air swinging of the compasses. Sectors in the vicinity of HMLI for search and attack were assigned to two air-lines. Contact report of a submarine sighted and bombed off HMLI reported, result doubtful.

Facilities at HMLI were limited. Gassing was done and is still being done from fifty gallon drums. This is a very unsatisfactory manner of servicing, it is obvious that for one hour of flight service four drums will be required per air-line for normal missions of heavy bombardment the time for all 11 aircraft average nine hours which will mean between thirty-two and thirty-six drums must be serviced to each air-line, a very tedious and unsatisfactory system. In addition to the time required for servicing, the air-lines obtained proved dirty, watered, and full of metal corrosive. Parts must be provided for handling of heavy bombers on the ground, none were available at any of these bases. The gassing facilities at HMLI are few, however in consideration of the difficulties experienced by the men personnel it must be stressed that they are doing a most commendable job in serving food, properly cooked, of a reasonable variety and are in fact operating a superior mess. Sleeping facilities in tents are adequate. Protective measures other than passive defense are absolutely lacking, this subject will be covered in paragraph one (1) of RECOMMENDATIONS. The bomb shelters...
now being constructed are satisfactory, the appliances for rifles
are not of sufficient height to protect the LI-30 or the B-17G
airplane. Capt. E. R. Bertrum, the Engineer Corps officer on duty at CAMO, 
has been made cognizant of this fact.

(4) The 19th January was devoted to a search mission in accordance 
with the aforementioned operations a.m. Airplane number 41-3439, pilot 
Capt. H. E. Oliver damaged two propellers, and one wheel in landing. 
Acciden was attributable to two causes: first, a strong cross wind from the 
north making landing hazardous, second, pilot error in using excessive 
circulation of brakes rather than maintaining control of the run on the 
ground. The outboard engine, the Seaburger dispatched from CAMO 
to PALMYRA to service two propellers and landing wheels of the B-17G 
41-3430 grounded at PALMYRA. The removal of the parts required 
proceeded according to schedule, however, on taking off from PALMYRA the 
airplane piloted by Lt. Seaburger blew a cylinder head. With no 
additional instructions and in a remarkably short time, a cylinder head 
was taken from the airplane with the damaged tail section. Lt. Seaburger 
returned to CAMO and within six hours of his return to CAMO, 
Capt. H. E. Oliver's airplane was in flying condition. The technical 
difficulties overcome by the enlisted mechanics in this instance deserve 
considered commendation.

(5) According to a.m., on the 21st January the flight proceeded to 
PALMYRA. One airplane, number 41-3438 piloted by Lt. H. M. McPherson 
developed engine trouble in the number three engine. This airplane is still 
grounded at PALMYRA awaiting an engine. The faulty engine has been 
substantially checked by competent enlisted mechanics and by the local 
Wright Company representative, none of whom are able to state exactly 
what is wrong with the engine, however, all are agreed that it is unsafe to 
fly. The housing and servicing facilities with the ENZAF unit stationed 
at the field are adequate. There is an American c-30 being built within 
the three miles of the field where transients may be housed and parked which 
will further improve the facilities. The only runway now available runs 
from the water toward the hills. This is an excellent runway approxi-
ately three hundred (300) feet wide and five thousand (5000) feet long. 
Flights must be cautioned that when a cross wind prevails or when a no 
wind condition exists landing must be made toward the hills as there is 
a definite slope along the hills towards the water. Likewise for take-
off, heavily loaded the runway should be made towards the water, unless a 
strong cross wind is blowing, taking advantage of the down grade to 
pick up momentum. Full conversion was received from the unit commander, 
Squadron Leader White. An agreed procedure for friendly aircraft is 
being issued. This resulted in unannounced American airplanes arriving, 
causing unnecessary alert. This condition is believed to be remedied 
as a recommended procedure has been forwarded from Squadron 
Leader White to the Commanding General Enrison Department. The only 
discomfort existing in this station are the mosquitoes, which appear 
after dark, all personnel visiting the field must bring mosquito bars 
if their sleep and their health are to be preserved.
(5) On the 30th January a flight in a \textup{X} \textup{Z} \textup{B} \textup{D}, deRefilien 36 was made by the undersigned to \textup{L} \textup{A} \textup{S} \textup{U} \textup{S} \textup{I} \textup{O} \textup{S} \textup{I} \textup{E} field approximately fifteen miles from \textup{J} \textup{A} \textup{M} \textup{A} \textup{N} \textup{I} \textup{L} \textup{E}. This field is too close to heavy bombardment in an emergency. Plans are evidently underway to station all or a portion of an American pursuit unit at this field. Unless there is sufficient pursuit being sent to \textup{W} \textup{H} \textup{J} \textup{A} \textup{M} \textup{I} \textup{L} \textup{I} \textup{N} in pursuit on both sides of the island, \textup{J} \textup{A} \textup{M} \textup{A} \textup{N} \textup{I} \textup{L} \textup{E} and \textup{J} \textup{A} \textup{M} \textup{I} \textup{L} \textup{E} \textup{N} \textup{E} sides, this action cannot continue. Defense of \textup{J} \textup{A} \textup{M} \textup{I} \textup{L} \textup{E} by pursuit based on the \textup{J} \textup{A} \textup{M} \textup{I} \textup{L} \textup{E} \textup{N} \textup{E} side of the island would be most unreliable for two reasons, first the weather on the \textup{J} \textup{A} \textup{M} \textup{I} \textup{L} \textup{E} \textup{N} \textup{E} side of the island is generally rainy with low clouds obscuring the sun in places making air from one side of the island to the other hazardous, second the distance of \textup{L} \textup{A} \textup{S} \textup{U} \textup{S} \textup{I} \textup{O} \textup{S} \textup{I} \textup{E} to \textup{J} \textup{A} \textup{M} \textup{I} \textup{L} \textup{I} \textup{N} of ninety miles is believed excessive for line support. Ground defences on both sides of the island consist of infantry and artillery, the exact number of each not divulged. However it is safe to say that there are three thousand ground troops in the vicinity of \textup{J} \textup{A} \textup{M} \textup{I} \textup{L} \textup{I} \textup{N} and approximately the same amount on the \textup{J} \textup{A} \textup{M} \textup{I} \textup{L} \textup{E} \textup{N} \textup{E} side.

(7) Return to \textup{G} \textup{A} \textup{N} \textup{L} \textup{O} \textup{N} \textup{A} \textup{N} \textup{D} was effected on 30th January. This flight was noteworthy only in that although over two hours were flown on instruments at five thousand feet, all air observers came in to \textup{G} \textup{A} \textup{N} \textup{L} \textup{O} \textup{N} \textup{A} \textup{N} \textup{D} with no radio assistance. The importance of radio assistance in dead reckoning navigation had been fortunately brought home to the navigators and pilots concerned with most satisfying results.

(3) In accord with the operations plan, a flight to \textup{J} \textup{A} \textup{M} \textup{I} \textup{L} \textup{I} \textup{N} \textup{E} was made on 25th January. A contact report was submitted by one airplane, 6-9, which sighted and attacked submarine south of \textup{G} \textup{A} \textup{N} \textup{L} \textup{O} \textup{N} \textup{A} \textup{N} \textup{D}, which was destroyed. Although no air drop by the friendly navy fighter was successful, two armed with machine guns, fortunately no casualties were inflicted on either party. One airplane encountered difficulty in landing at \textup{J} \textup{A} \textup{M} \textup{I} \textup{L} \textup{I} \textup{N} due to a strong cross wind and ended up a few miles off the runway at the water's edge. The only damage to the airplane was a bent out right propeller. A replacement was obtained from the airplane grounded for engine change. This nearly disastrous landing serves to emphasize the point previously made that cross wind or no wind landing must be made towards the hills and not from the slope towards the water. In accord with squadron order a survey of a small field adjacent to the main airfield at \textup{J} \textup{A} \textup{M} \textup{I} \textup{L} \textup{I} \textup{N} \textup{E} was made on the 25th January. This field has definite possibilities as a pursuit field. It affords excellent natural cover and a large amount of room for expansion. The actual suitability of the field for pursuit operation is matter for the circuit commander to determine or about the 29th January, is much more easily established than the undersigned.

(8) Return to \textup{G} \textup{A} \textup{N} \textup{L} \textup{O} \textup{N} \textup{A} \textup{N} \textup{D} on 27th January was effected without incident. A survey of the fields \textup{J} \textup{A} \textup{M} \textup{I} \textup{L} \textup{I} \textup{N} \textup{E} and \textup{J} \textup{A} \textup{M} \textup{I} \textup{L} \textup{I} \textup{N} \textup{E} \textup{N} \textup{E} was made and as far as could be determined there was no evidence of German occupation of either of these islands.
the radio tower on [IA] on 23 January, no contact reported.


2. Conclusion

(1) Guam is essential as a base for ferry operations by both American and Japanese forces. In its present unfortified state it may well be destroyed by a very small force of the enemy. Pending the arrival of complete ground defense units it is suggested that continued off-shore patrol by at least two destroyers be maintained.

(2) Weather makes it imperative that all legs of the flight along the north Pacific route be flown during the hours of daylight and in view of the necessity required in navigation that they be as short as possible. It is recommended that personnel ferrying airplanes through the night be vectored, be organized into flights of two or more airplanes under the command of the senior pilot. Flying in a loose formation at visibility distance will assist in interception of the island base even under very limited visibility conditions.

It is advisable that an experienced pilot be in charge of each flight to evaluate the weather, meteor conditions and the any details in flight maneuvers which are bound to arise.

(3) In connection with the foregoing, the necessity of perfect dead reckoning cannot be too greatly emphasized. It is quite possible to miss either FAMABA or Guam islands within very few miles and due to restricted visibility, fail to see them. Radio navigation by signal or radio compass alone is insufficient, however accurate dead reckoning results it is essential that prior to any flights of this nature the installed navigation equipment be thoroughly calibrated with the local area carried installed. Air swinging of the course by means of sights at celestial body are exceedingly difficult in the FAMABA airplane with no pelorus available. It is suggested that from terrestrial courses be carried out in the vicinity of WO44, H390 at approximately 200 intervals for the convenience of pilots in air swinging the compasses frequently.

(4) The arrival and departure message confirming start and landing route are not being satisfactorily processed. A system similar to the normal operation for enemy messages is required. Security of messages on circuit cannot be over-stressed, however, it must be intelligently secured and the details of the communications throughout the route simplified.
(c) It is interesting to note that all of the Lockheed Hudson airships belonging to the NAFL and to the L.E.L. were equipped with r.m. r.y. This enabled a small number of airships to cover a large amount of search area most effectively. It is recommended that airships of the command be given priority on installation of equipment of this nature.

(e) Refueling at NAFL was quite expedient due to the presence of Army Air Corps servicing trucks. It is believed essential for rapid service of Army Aircraft at NAFL and at L.E.L. that similar gasoline trucks be delivered to both of these islands. The gasoline service through these tanks would be of a much better quality as the tank cars to a large generator.

(f) It is believed that much less information of movement of airships will be divulged to the enemy if a rearranged daily schedule of 16 bomb circles is put into effect at each base, such as signals for five minutes on each hour. It would eliminate the large amount of radio traffic now required for airship routine bombing signals.

(10) At each base on the southern route there should be stationed an Air Corps officer representative and one maintenance personnel. The officer and selected personnel referred to above have arrived at NAFL, however, there were no Air Corps personnel stationed at L.E.L.

(g) The camouflage of these airships when parked on airfields is not particularly effective as reference to the works done then at NAFL and L.E.L. will disclose. In the air the rust color shows most predominately. It is suggested that a broken pattern camouflage be adopted consisting of various shades of blue from dark blue to light cobalt blue. It is believed that this will result in less visibility when flying over water and little more noticeable than the present colors. When the airship is parked on the ground, above all it is recommended that the printing of the rubber 'ileges' be discontinued immediately as this destroys any camouflage effect which may have been obtained by the multi-colored painting of the airship.

(110) The undersigned desires to recommend all of the officers and enlisted personnel in this unit. No one could ask for more cooperation and splendid spirit than we displayed by this crew during this entire period. It is matter of pride to be permitted to command such a fighting unit.

[Signature]

Lt. Col. Air Corps
Commanding.
1. Forwarded for your information. The recommendations contained in paragraph 1 b have been or will be acted upon as tabulated below:

Par 1 b (1): Defense force for Canton are on route.

Par 1 b (2): This recommendation will be followed as far as possible in all future ferry flights.

Par 1 b (3): The method of canvas covering outlined is now being used by the Bomber Command.

Par 1 b (4): Secrecy of these measures must be preserved. It is believed that additional signal personnel not assigned to or enroute to these islands will eliminate most communication difficulties.

Par 1 b (5): A letter was sent to the Chief of the Air Corps, dated 11 February 1944, requesting that equipment for aircraft of the Bomber Command. Commander 1st Zone Air Defense states that most of this equipment has been made available to the Navy in Hawaii.

Par 1 b (6): Servicing trucks are now in operation at Christmas and Canton. It is understood that the Navy intends to send a servicing truck to Paluma.

Par 1 b (7): A daily schedule of LCIs is in operation now at Christmas and Canton.

Par 1 b (8): Since Christmas Island is ready for operation, extensive use of Helgyro is not contemplated.

Par 1 b (9): A study is being made of the desirability of changing the color of the camouflage particularly on lava to green that seems far out to sea. The nonseepable blue oil, repainted used on Navy patrol planes seem the most effective. Any differences of opinion exist on the desirability of red or white tail stripes. Carrier based and Interceptor Command pilots favor the stripes while the Bomber Command prefers no tail stripes. This is a subject for further investigation.
1. In furtherance of the recommendations contained in paragraph 1 h (5), Report of Operation Bomber Unit Task Force 8,9 submitted by Lieutenant Colonel Walter C. Sweeney, the following steps have been taken:

2. A method of calibrating compasses has been devised and proven, which method is to be made standard throughout the 7th Bomber Command. This method involves the use of the upper gun turret. It will allow the calibration of the compass under all load conditions without corrective errors.

3. In the training of the navigators within the Bomber Command School, precision of navigation by dead reckoning means is stressed repeatedly throughout the course.

4. The importance of the precision of dead reckoning navigation is impressed upon the minds of the newly assigned qualified navigators.

5. The close coordination and cooperation of the pilots-navigators team, in order to navigate precisely, is stressed as a basic requirement by all units of this command.

6. Pilots are requiring navigators to return to this base by means of dead reckoning navigation alone, and without the aide of radio navigation.

7. Navigation logs are closely checked by Squadron Navigation Officers, and from time to time by the Group Commanders.

8. Daily experiences on search missions have improved the degree of accuracy of all navigators. The navigator’s precision is directly proportional to the amount of his dead reckoning, overwater flight experience. This is proven by the following two facts:

   (1) There has been a marked decrease in the number of circlones lost on return from search missions within the 7th Bomber Command.

   (2) Lieutenant Colonel Sweeney reported that the number in which the navigators of the Bomber Unit Task Force 8,9 performed their missions after their first return flight was much more precise than that of their first trip.

9. There is one step towards the improvement of navigation which cannot be made by the 7th Bomber Command, but which must be made by higher headquarters. One particular difficulty which has to be overcome before precision of dead reckoning navigation is made clear to the newly assigned navigator is his reluctance to accept the need for ‘flying by the seat of his pants’.
A large majority of the navigators now assigned to tactical units are graduates of the Pan American School, Coral Gables, Florida. *The school does not teach navigation by dead reckoning methods, nor does it stress the importance of this type of navigation. If the importance of dead reckoning and the necessity for precision in its use were instilled in the mind of the student early in his studies, his mental resistance to reject that need would not exist. This mental condition is changed only after he has been assigned to a unit which stresses the importance of dead reckoning, and after he has gained experience through its use.

The criticisms of the Pan American School for its lack of dead reckoning training have been general throughout the Air Corps. The difficulty which exists because of the lack of such dead reckoning training and of the importance of precision in its use can only be overcome when that school is required to teach precision dead reckoning navigation.

3. Before count recommendations can be made regarding camouflage of aircraft under this command, the following decisions are requested.

a. Are airfields to be camouflaged only for the terrain from which they are not overflown?

b. Is it desired that a universal camouflage be used for all airfields in this territory?

c. Is it desired that a universal camouflage be used for all airfields from which this area may be required to overfly?

d. Is it desirable to camouflage for over-water flight or for ground marking?

e. Would half the present size of markings on the terrain surfaces be of sufficient size for ground identification?

For the Commanding General:

/s/ A. F. Hagenberger,  
/t/ A. F. Mixell,  
Colonel, Air Corps,  
Executive.
February 7, 1942


To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Report of recent operations with Army Bombing Unit.

1. We submit report of recent operations of the Army bombing unit composed of six B-30A's (B-30A: Fortresses) to which I was assigned as Naval Observer consists of the following enclosure:

(A) History of the operation.
(B) Chronological record.
(C) List of submarine contacts.
(D) Comments on each base visited.
(E) General comments and recommendations.

O. C. GREER,
Lieutenant Commander, U.S.N.,
Naval Observer.
(A) HISTORY OF OPERATIONS.

1. At 0830 on Tuesday, January 16th, 1944, two Army B-17’s took off from MacDill Field at ten minute intervals, took departure from Tampa Bay, and set course for Algiers. At 1030 one of our B-17 planes, probably on its way to target, radioed from somewhere about ten miles distant. At the expiration of our estimated time of arrival (ETA) at Algiers, the radio failed to make contact with the bomb bay. Visibility was reduced to 2-4 miles and the wind was blowing a gale or more. A second plane flown but there was still no sight of Algiers. The bomb bay of the second plane was not in sight. Visibility was reduced to 2-4 miles and the wind was blowing a gale or more. A second plane flown but there was still no sight of Algiers. Visibility was reduced to 2-4 miles and the wind was blowing a gale or more. A second plane flown but there was still no sight of Algiers. Visibility was reduced to 2-4 miles and the wind was blowing a gale or more.

2. On Wednesday, January 17th, the takeoff order at 0830 by 3327, the B-17 plane, the sixth to be able to continue its journey, still required major repairs. The weather between Tampa Bay and Cuba was doubtful. At 0930 an attempt was made to continue the flight without the bomb bay, but it was too late to take off the bomb bay without it. The flight proceeded to land in the front end for several miles of instrument flight, except for several miles of instrument flight, except for several miles of instrument flight, except for several miles of instrument flight, except for several miles of instrument flight. The flight was not in sight, so the course was continued for about ten minutes and then reversed. There were numerous low cloud banks, interspersing clear and cloudy areas, with a visibility of 2-4 miles and the wind was blowing a gale or more.

3. At 1810, the B-17 plane, the sixth to be able to continue its journey, still required major repairs. The weather between Tampa Bay and Cuba was doubtful. At 0930 an attempt was made to continue the flight without the bomb bay, but it was too late to take off the bomb bay without it. The flight proceeded to land in the front end for several miles of instrument flight, except for several miles of instrument flight, except for several miles of instrument flight, except for several miles of instrument flight. The flight was not in sight, so the course was continued for about ten minutes and then reversed. There were numerous low cloud banks, interspersing clear and cloudy areas, with a visibility of 2-4 miles and the wind was blowing a gale or more.

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The submarine was deeply submerged. It G-0 round to be, with one tenth second delay for setting. It was dropped in the estimated position of the submarine with negative result. Other dishes searched in flight around the island.

4. On Monday, January 15th, J 317C's made their scheduled search to the south to distance of 400 miles. The results of this search were negative. RMBs 13-15 were completed and J 317C's returned after only 100 mile search. Their track indicates that his deviation of 15 miles considered in error. In landing on the only complete strip (L - D) in a twenty knot current, he rounded the end of the run and did the right hand and one half.

5. Tuesday, January 16th, we spent in instructions and return to White Wole for a mission. 1 J 317C was sent to Palauma to obtain parts from an derelict bomber there in order to repair the damaged bomber at Canton.

6. Wednesday, January 17th, we took off at 0815 and made a screened attack to Nadi (pronounced ladli) on the northwestern coast of Viti Levu, Fiji Islands. They arrived at 1450.

7. In Secret of the Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Meeler, and other officers and myself, were flown to Nadi on January 17th, to a landing field at Nadi, to the north of Nadi, where we took a plane to_Q_S_5, in Fiji. A conference was held with Lieutenant Commander Roberts, QM; Lieutenant Commander J. Gray, U.S. Navy, (ret), Naval Observer, C.O. in Nadi, U.S. Army, Military Observer, and several officers in the intelligence and communication sections. It was found that the alpha adl of the field between Lieutenant Commander Gray and the local New Zealand military forces (all New Zealand officers make very high alpha of Lieutenant Commander Gray) that sufficient information was not being received for proper action. As an exercise, upon receipt of dispatch notifying them of our intended arrival, they had landed two houses and erected four houses of their own troops to provide quarters for our party. Believing it to be permanent station there, I believed it best to wait for their own discomfiture of the dispatch. Similarly, the arrival of the two houses and erection of the boys, without previous notification, came to their notice, probably because of curiosity about the arrival of bombers on ferry without previous notification. Admittedly the men, probably because of curiosity, went in to see what the new wing, the aerodrome, the aerodrome, was. This led to the command that the arrival of two men in addition to the errand which had already arrived. It is believed the situation will be a bit tiring cleared up. After the conference which extended into the afternoon, and later in inspection of the proposed aerodrome base at Lautoka, the return flight to Nadi was made there it was found that 3 - 2111 had arrived before receipt of a request. All of these crewmen were eventful and quartered at Flotilla.
8. The next day, Sunday, January 25th, (plus 1st time) oil on two 117's departed at 0600 for Canton arriving at 1400. One 177, 8-1-427, in engine trouble, was turned back to re-enter 117's at Boston; all oil left since their arrival. Later it was found that the engine bore a beat connecting rod in one of the lower cylinders. There were no replacements available in the area. The flight north was pretty rough as it was necessary to work through turbulence at tropical front. As few instruments between two and three hours, this emphasizes the necessity of accurate weather forecasts, if possible, else the desirability of all flights being made during daylight unless military necessity desires otherwise. Due to low visibility in the Canton Island area the radio station was turned to send 10's in order to check landing. Using a picture of inexperienced radio operators these 10's were sent on frequency, not on the receiver coil of the radio equipment. Fortunately, they are all cleared for short period as we were prior to the writing of this report and have left this area. This indicates the necessity of all civilian and military experienced personnel in such areas for otherwise valuable personal and planes may be lost at needlessly.

9. Saturday, January 26th, our first in existence and where and with the arrival of Lieutenant Gander and Present with structural cargo work was immediately started in 177-41-0429 on completion. This was completed close to mid day.

10. At 0615, Sunday, January 27th, 8 117's, 4 177's, and 2 3-24's, which had arrived at Canton the day before, departed on a search from Canton to Hong, then south southwest of Shanghai and two carrier based planes were flown out of the area on 117-41-0429, 3-24 Hickey, pilot, and 177-41-0429, 3-24 Black, pilot, Porttual-tal 3-24, which was also fired and no hits seen. However, another plane should be used to investigate the area out of range and then were flown south to search from some of the other areas. The letter to reach should be reserved for training only. Force 17 was sighted by the planes on the left flank of the security line. At about 0800 (plus 1st time) a submarine surfaced and the ship was detected by plane 117-41-0429, 3-24 Hickey, pilot, in latitude 26° 15' south, longitude 174° 10' west. So 3-24 sound bombs at one tenth sec. 100-foot fuse setting were dropped about 70' to the left. Observers in the airplane said the submarine turned to starboard, righted itself, and then went straight down. However, no oil became visible. Plane remained in area about ten or twelve minutes. Submarine possibly damaged, but positive ringle, colorful.

11. As the Royal New Zealand Air Force personnel were at an inspection of the officers of the Air Force, no transportation was available to fly, so no further contacts were made at this end. A dramatic event in relation to the weather of planes and in inspection of the location and progress of the "American Camp" (no plant) under construction with the landing strip, uncentered but levelled, 350' x 100', cradle of landing of Camp of Wood.
12. On January 30th, (plus 11th) 6:17 A.M. and 1:12 made the return search to Canton Island by 001º. The flight took the direct line with one bomb thrower to Pago Pago and to the west. The New Zealanders had received intelligence reports that Eniwetok Island had been attacked and in a Japanese flying boat had no reports received since, one of our planes was flying over Eniwetok and took pictures of the air. Apparently everything was all right as the British ships were still flying and people were almost crushed and moved as they identified us as an American line. Another bomber performed a similar tour over Pago Pago. The flight arrived Canton at 0815, (plus 10th), ElAl 647, was forced to return at 0811 until receipt of a new mission.

13. On Wednesday, January 31st, the flight continued as carried out by 6:17 A.M. and 1:12 P.M. The bombers covered the sectors whose centers were 330º 2, 225º 0, 260º 1, and 285º 2, to 350º miles. The results were negative. The flight left Canton at 0840 and the return at 1225. During the morning they identified and two destroyers arrived with supplies, engines, targets, and returnees.

14. At 0840, Thursday, January 31st, four M.P.'s took off from Canton Island for Pago Pago and arrived at 1140 (plus 10th). The flight continued as carried out by 6:17 A.M. and 1:12 P.M. The bombers covered the sectors whose centers were 330º 2, 225º 0, 260º 1, and 285º 2, to 350º miles. The results were negative. The flight left Canton at 0840 and the return at 1225. During the morning they identified and two destroyers arrived with supplies, engines, targets, and returnees.

B. GEOLOGICAL RECONNAISSANCE

Lieutenant Colonel J. G. Mcenery, Air Corps, Commanding.

50th Reconnaissance Squadron

Pilot 1st Lt. C. C. Andrews

Co-pilot Lt. Col. B. C. Conley

Navigator Lt. Col. E. J. Nixon

Bombardier Lt. Col. J. Moore

41-2492

41-2492

Pilot Capt. Hickey

Co-pilot Lt. Col. B. C. Conley

Navigator Lt. Col. E. J. Nixon

Bombardier Lt. Col. J. Moore

41-2492

41-2492

Pilot 1st Lt. C. C. Andrews

Co-pilot Lt. Col. B. C. Conley

Navigator Lt. Col. E. J. Nixon

Bombardier Lt. Col. J. Moore

41-2492

41-2492

Pilot Lt. Col. C. C. Andrews

Co-pilot Lt. Col. B. C. Conley

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41-2492

Pilot 1st Lt. C. C. Andrews

Co-pilot Lt. Col. B. C. Conley

Navigator Lt. Col. E. J. Nixon

Bombardier Lt. Col. J. Moore
2. OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1250</th>
<th>13-35</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>1st Lt... Sullivan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co-Pilot</td>
<td>Lt Col... Lite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navigator</td>
<td>2/Lt C... Peterson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombardier</td>
<td>Lt... Janes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Other enlisted personnel of planes not listed.

Friday, January 16th, 1942 (Zone plus 10° H. M. T.).

0230 Look off from Hick's Field in B-17G bomber 41-2608. Ave lone followed in two minute intervals. Course 085° true, speed indicated 110 miles per hour.

1000 Left one United States central plane on southern course, distance, 2,000 miles, altitude 10,000 feet. Crowed well astern. Did not examine recognition signals.

1500 Left at Palermo. One lone B-17G, First Lieutenant Sullivan, pilot, arrived beyond immediate perimeter in landing.

Flight time 9 hours.

Saturday, January 17th, 13° (Zone plus 10° H. M. T.).

0615 Five B-17G's took off in succession.

1415 Dared at Genoa.

1810 Lost lone B-17G, Captain Alley, 1500 feet. Noted object striking the submarine at Hull Island about 1000 feet. Doubled over one.

Flight time 6 hours, 20 minutes.

Sunday, January 18th, 14° (Zone plus 12° H. M. T.).

0645 All B-17G's took off for patrol to Sydney and Hull Islands in search of submarines.

0715 Submarine in net of 2,000 yards 780°, 1,000 yards from Sydney Island, 30° N by 6° 23.5°. First Lieutenant, pilot, positions: negative result.

One B-17G maintained on patrol. Frigates 100 and 200 cut out to protect twenty-five mile direct firing range west of 10° W. to stop search.

CONFIDENTIAL
LONDON, January 15th, 1942 (Zone plus 1 1/2 hr).

0500 Five L-17’s were sent south to southern to 65 miles in area of 10°. The area was divided into sections 20°, 30°, 40°, 50°, 60°, 70°, 80°. R asleep (L-17) at 0500, covering the area of the 80°. Later returned after going only 100 miles due to heavy thundersground. Loaded 20 tons in one hour and 30 minutes. R search results negative.

Tuesday, January 16th, 1942 (Zone plus 1 1/2 hr).

0600 One L-17 (L-17A), First Lieutenant L. E. Curts, desert out for Peleliu to fly for structural part for L-17. One hour flown in landing the previous day.

Wednesday, January 17th, 1942 (Zone plus 1 1/2 hr).

0745 Z 2-L7’s took off for Peleliu and left to Viti Levu, Fiji Islands.

1100 Arrived Peleliu. Viti Levu. Flight time 1 hour, 45 minutes.

Thursday, January 18th, 1942 (Zone plus 1 1/2 hr).

0825 Took off from Peleliu in F-14s for second air force plane and Peleliu to Viti Levu. Loaded 20 tons in one hour, 30 minutes.

1230 Loaded F-14s.

1257 Took off from Viti Levu.

FBI, January 19th, 1942 (Zone plus 1 1/2 hr).

0600 One L-17 took off from Peleliu.

1400 Loaded second L-17. Flight time 2 hours.

Friday, January 20th, 1942 (Zone plus 1 1/2 hr).

Spent in training. One plane - L-17. One L-17, First Lieutenant L. E. Curts, return to Peleliu from Peleliu with structural work for L-17. A-2-52.

Saturday, January 21st, 1942 (Zone plus 1 1/2 hr).

0630 C 2-L17’s and 2-L17’s took off for Peleliu.

1015 Arrived Peleliu. Flight time 2 hours.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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January, January 23, 1942. (Zone plus 10 time).

Maintenance and upkeep.

Tuesday, January 27th, 1942. (Zone plus 10 time).

0520 4 E-17's plus 1 WJ take off for Canton. 1 E-17.L vent by try or Sundari. One E-17.L vent by try of Sula Leilir.

1516 Arrive at Canton. 1141 at time 3 hours.

Wednesday, January 28th, 1942. (Zone plus 10 time).

0620 4 E-17's search to a distance of 600 miles, covering the same three declination 250 N, 240 N, 230 N.

1210 Arrive at Canton.

Thursday, January 29th, 1942. (Zone plus 10 time).

0620 4 E-17's took off from Canton.

1340 Arrived Falmouth. Flight time 3 hours, 40 minutes.

Friday, January 30th, 1942. (Zone plus 10 time).

0600 4 E-17's took off from Falmouth.

1240 Arrived Picken Field. Flight time 3 hours, 40 minutes.

End of OPERATION POLARIS.

1. At 1300, (plus 10 time), January 27th, 1942, two submarines sighted by radar circling Full Island. These submarines were at periscopes depth, one distant about 500 miles. Plane 41-2492, sent in Blythe, pilot, proceeded to the attack and dropped the 500 pound bombs in the rear of one submarine. All submarines, however, immediately submerged. No hits were scored on either vessel and results were undoubtedly negative.

2. On January 30th, at about 0740 (plus 10 time) a submarine in the act of submerging was detected bearing 270° T, distant 250 yards from Sydney. I.L. from plane 41-272, first lieutenant E. F. Perry, Air Corps, U.S. Navy, pilot. The plane, after turning to the attack, but by the time the attack was completed (about two minutes) the submarine was deeply submerged. The 500 pound bomb hit the one tenth second delay fuse set in a very exposed part of the submerged submarine. Results were no hit.

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SECURITY INVADE SNAP

THIS PAGE Declassified IAW EO12958
8. On the same date a 15' arrow to the United States submarine on
the surface, about 15 miles. The submarine bore about 90°,
distant 20 miles from Okinawa and headed towards it. It is probably
submerged and no action was taken. The submarine may have been
taken to have been located at Half Island the day before.

9. At about 0830 (plus 1/2 hour) January 27th, 1945, a submarine
approached and was spotted by a 40 mm gun, 10 miles in distance, at
latitude 29° 13' south, longitude 140° 10' west. The 500 round
charge with one tank's second deep-bomb setting was dropped about 75' to
the left. Course in the 10° south, submarine 10° east, and then went straight down. However, as oil became visible,
01° 10' was on oil and no positive claims were made.

1. OFFICIAL.

There are seven irregularly spaced revetments capable of
landing 500 tons on the beach and well
covered. Another 50' is being cleared and the completed should have
room for lands on a 30° off of the rear of plane. The
revetments are on the beach that are still 60% of the total. A second runway
will consist of about 600' to the present in being completed and should
cover the rear of all the present 70° of the direction. The runway
will provide landing at any point 500' long by 100' wide but it is believed
all landings will be able to land on it due to the force of the
wind until the clearing in the direction. Vertically loaded airplane can
therefore land on the runway.

There are at present seven irregularly spaced revetments capable of
landing 500' at 10° or 30° off the plane. The revetments have enough room on
both sides for a on a clear day. The present seven
revetments are on the beach and well
covered. Another 50' is being cleared and the completed should have
room for landing at a 30° off of the rear of plane. The
revetments are on the beach that are still 60% of the total. A second runway
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wind until the clearing in that direction. Vertically loaded airplane can
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With the completion of 50', some of the larger aircraft will be able to
land on it due to the force of the
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therefore land on the runway.
From lengths received it is apparent that clear concept of the development of Canton Island is not clear. Canton Island is really two islands far apart with a narrow passage between them. The north channel is the broad of a narrow and is used only for boats or 300' of light draft. It is a 5 knot current at the full force of the wind. While inland we found the rather severe weather, lack of travel facilities, and the low condition of the British representatives. The island is really in the American, the Japanese, and the Chinese, and the island is really in the control of the French representatives. The island is really in the control of Japan.

An area of ten to one island to another required at least trip of about twenty minutes, thinning an inverted U-shaped (U) course, cut to the center of each island. The trip was made after sundown due to blackout and inability to use markers of course. Except to the narrow entrance channel and the total area of the island is covered with coral reefs.

Communication between the two islands was by radio or messenger. With the arrival of the last supply aid is believed sufficient time has been allowed to install all telephone sets. All of the land equipment is used, with the exception of the radio equipment and the oxygen equipment. One of the British officials had one set, and the other was held in the control of the British representatives. There is a decided lack of trained and experienced radio operators. These are essential to ensure a system within six or seven miles of the islets (using methods of radio equipment, low visibility) one to write to see it, and in the case of the use of radio visual devices are necessary. The installation of oxygen equipment on Canton Island is highly desirable, for the viewpoint is that of the defense of the island and the safety of personnel.

There are no underground structures in the main trunked area or entirely far from ground for an excellent field. Over the top there are outlets for hump to hump from where all supplies are refueled. The only of the for long-range is water in deep wells.

SECURITY INFORMATION CONFIDENTIAL
(2) VIETNAM WAR AND VIETNAM

3. VIETNAM

Red or lendi - it is called - is a field about the size of 500 acres. At present it has one surfaced runway, laid to the prevailing wind, 2000 x 100 and it is being lengthened to 3000. Another 1,000 x 100 of the northwest end is under construction. It is not connected to the rest of the airfield. There are no apron, fuelproofs, or holding fields. The land is all concrete and the parking is almost completed. The field off the paved strips is filled with grass and mud. The 1,750 in the rear view condition (about 20,000 pounds) are all stored on the paved area.

17 St anxious building is a concrete, 1 story, 2nd story, building. In the rear is the operations, communications, and recreation of the officer. The officer for securing confidential letters are CALLED IN and any letter to officer could probably cause them with a message. Corps and the facilities are very limited.

Until the American 35th come, the only house will be a 10 x 10 box with complete quarters and working facilities are very limited, especially the rest room facilities. The main area is a concrete, 1 story, 2nd story, building. In the rear is the operations, communications, and recreation of the officer. The officer for securing confidential letters are CALLED IN and any letter to officer could probably cause them with a message. Corps and the facilities are very limited.

Only the locked down are operated at the field and daily news in the newspaper is sent to 6 miles. It is not possible to get a special edition with a call for 6 miles. The other news is sent daily. In the rear is a truck out line from a make close to the field. A two-man is retained in the rear at 6 miles. The 14th are stationed.

It is understood that New York has being developed and will have 2000 runways. About 50 locked down are to be built there. There are also under construction for Air Force personnel, 125, to institute a reconnaissance control center which could cover the area from New York to London, to Paris, to Moscow, to New Zealand. A satellite field with the same 500 x 100 is under construction about five or six miles to the southwest of 500. The field is on a collar, terrain near the N to 700.

(2) CONCLUSION AND TAKEDOFF

3. VIETNAM (continued)

On the south or left side of the island is a west east field about 2500 x 500 in the 100 at Petersburg, 600 miles to the northeast of New York. This field has absolutely no facilities except for survival
of 5000. There was reported large amount of jet fuel, one 50,000 gallon capacity, situated in the lower ground. It is believed this field could soon become ready for fuel under extensive cover and, possibly the use of the field to be developed by the Air Corps, U.S. Army, could assist in this effort.

Another aerodrome base, at Lathold, started by Lend-Lease and located about five miles to the southeast of the aerodrome in the vicinity of town. It is understood that a large number of aircraft and tanks are to be built up there and be ready for movement there. The site selected for this project is a large area of concrete base. The site selected for this project is a large area of concrete base.

Conversation with a number of persons of the Lend-Lease indicated that Lend-Lease is not building more facilities at this time. The site selected for this project is a large area of concrete base. The site selected for this project is a large area of concrete base.

(2) OPERATIONAL CLUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. In view of the recent increase in the number of American and British units moving around and the construction activity, it is recommended that the following measures be taken:

   a. Portable engine shelters should be sent to Lend-Lease, Lend-Lease.

   b. Fuel and gasoline should be sent to Lend-Lease, Lend-Lease.

   c. Plans and specifications should be sent to Lend-Lease, Lend-Lease.

   d. Portable fuel storage tanks should be installed at Lend-Lease, Lend-Lease.

   e. Defense control and security measures should be strengthened at Lend-Lease, Lend-Lease.
6. Controls included in use of or on better defense units. In the absence of a "..." in the text. The context indicates a need for "...".

7. Controls should be suspended for all persons, vessels or facilities in need of action on any of the vessels and "...".

8. Plans on forest racks and "..." call it, not as much, it will prevent inexperienced pilots from the time to become inefficient in them. It is necessary to determine their route. This vital information should be made available to the pilots. All pilots should be rotated to at least one of their operations during their flight. It is also necessary to "..." in its entirety, particularly during the months of November to March or April and in May for any "..." situations and allotment. It is desirable temporary to keep for all the times certain of the vessels should be used to work in a "...".

9. Included with all the need of larger vessels it is absolutely necessary that certain of the vessels already before confirmed on "..." vessels should be used to exercise or on others. It is expected that these "..." between major and "..." field at the top 90/434 throughout their "..." experience and state on "..." of the vessels that need to be used, "...".

10. It is strongly recommended that the conditions of the return to duty and return to the situation be "..." periodically. It is necessary because the various vessels should be "..." during the "..." alone may be "..." and neither "..." nor ""..." in "..." of the various vessels, "..." them. It is desirable that "..." facilities "..." vessels, "..." vessels. As a result of these "..." if they are "..." and "..." the vessels be kept or "..." facilities.

11. There are five it is "..." both new and "..." pilots should be thoroughly trained.

12. (1) Last, recognition of our own type of "..." or 07/30/1943 of the "...". Similarly, "..." to "..." recognition at 27 pilot. The one"..." is immediately "..." in the area by the vessel and he "..." fire. He could have "..." to the "..." oil, fire and "..." out of the way.
(3) Lack of line recognition is nil.

(4) Remember, an error in the correct course back to the correct line destroys the line.

(5) Repeated line procedure. Should indicate a faint radio line by short and only one direction, or the one direction is available (Canton).

(6) Communication procedure of not much of the service. No correct radio over turns are confused with the procedure of the other service. Could joint line and line procedure be established? It is said connection is impossible that only one user of each called "line" personnel be sent to outlining areas. This would only depend on their ability, initiative, and resourcefulness.

11. In an operation such as this, it is necessary that the mission might be carried out, but the mission might be practically accomplished if only one line of action were used. Although the highest of cooperation is obtained, communications between the units is considered difficult. In Fido, Fido, and Fido are 130 miles apart or more, about 19 by 19. Interline connections are definitely available is some, while others are parallel. Having communications is definitely available is some, while others are parallel. The situation might be only 10 miles away. No other lines exist only in the outline. It is best run at night.

12. In training officials, there is an outline of the area should be given that the training will be held into the following: There will be instruction on chart, chart, and line. Each official will be given the chart and line. It is best run at night.

13. For communication through line personnel, it is essential that the teach be taught. The line personnel will not be efficient unless they are familiar with the radio equipment. They are taught and trained in all radio communications, with their equipment, etc. This may take two or three or more. Since they consider it necessary that the line personnel be sent to the line, the radio communication in the outline of equipment in order. If it is necessary the personnel are instructed in their equipment. I believe it would lead to a closer understanding.

N.N.D.: 1/6 Nov 62 Flt Als-7/25 (Oo, 101) 80.1.1 "Special 100" over time of aircraft in Clinton 145-161 are 13-20 Jnr. 90."
4th Ind.
3/26. 39. After receiving an inferior report,
consider it incomplete or lacking.
Recommend or submit a complete
report, covering the events of action taken
formerly approved in section V. Recommend the
teacher of machine gun instruction letter to be informed
of such concerns and continued in action
Apr. 4/2.

J. H. C.

6th Ind.
3/26. 4/3. For consent to recommendation or
termination of this section.

J. H. C.

5th Ind.
3/26. to 3/30. Reference Section VII, for
entire recommendations follow:

1. It is in the interest of the Army that
updated reports
2. No plans of the crew are available in the
Russian
3. No consent.
4. A new equipment has been installed.
5. The contents of Section V have been
6. The book have been reviewed.
7. All the reports are scheduled in

Security Information

THIS PAGE Declassified IAW EO12958
9. The establishment of the combat zone including the arrival of additional forces in each Christchurch, Christchurch, and Christchurch.:

10. In the event of a prearranged schedule not being Christchurch, and Christchurch.

11. (1), (2), (3) Soviet troops attending schools on the "advance" of silhouettes of our forces and entry in the under areas, sites and other recognition signs, radio blinks, etc.

(1) No lost zone procedure is identical with the one used in the Far East Command. (2) Joint Service radio procedure to be established, and Communication Units from the Air Forces will also be Air Defenders. Publishing a joint communication policy for "outlying" islands.

12. To convey.

13. Concur.

14. To convey.

For the Commander General.
INDEX 5

Lt. General E. P. Arnold,
Commanding General, Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Arnold:

I am giving below my personal reaction to the lessons learned in the Battle of Midway. This information is sent in the form in order not to mislead or convey the Department Commander, especially with reference to the utility of battlecruisers.

1. Japanese battlecruisers apparently did not obtain information of the loss of their carrier force on the morning of June 4th and two of them continued to steam toward Midway. Ten stout carriers out on June 5th, they were attacked by Z-17's that crossed 20,000 feet. We attacked from 30,000 feet, obtaining one bomb hit, two more hits, and seven near misses. We can see how much the combat in the battlecruiser in the Pearl Harbor battle did not fire a shot. The battlecruisers were particularly useless. The main effect they had were to attract 75 bombs on the 5th and 25 bombs on the other days. The losses could have been more profitably employed on other targets. Battlecruisers should be used on a low-priority list.

2. There is a need for a long-range fighter to accompany bombers. Since the fighter will have to have at least equal range and speed with the bomber, replace the 2-17's with a medium fighter with protective armor and equipment. The 2-17's will be less vulnerable to enemy aircraft. However, due to the targets under attack, not very few fighters were encountered and the battleship should not draw too many conclusions on bombers versus fighters.

3. Luck and good planning were on our side at Midway. If we had the good fortune to take out all four of the carriers during the early part of the day, under those conditions, we would have been able to destroy a large part of their fleet, including the carriers. If luck had been the other way, we would have lost many of our powerful carriers and would have had a battle of Midway. No lesson learned in either war would nor carriers are able to continue against long-range land-based bombers.
4. There is need for booms with at least 2000 mile tactical range and for 4000 mile. The existing use of the zero markers to close with the J-17s does the same for one reason. Apparent and local weather conditions should be the prime remuneration of the booms. Second, there desirable, should be subordinate to these two.

5. During the June 30th booms attack on J-17s they destroyed only 20 ft. boom on Eastern Island and 30 ft. boom on Jalap Island. Of these were 1000 yards, but not 100 and 500 yards. There is a tendency to move. It seems generally agreed that the weather. If this had been destroyed, would have finally harmed our operations. The destruction caused by the booms on J-17s on June 30th should be remembered. If we can begin the attack from a held island, those to be crossed the following follow:

a. Full local force to move.

b. Enemy bay near hill one 2x with all equipment completely demolished.

c. One tank elevation shot for bricky bater destroyed; one remaining.

d. Japanese a building completely demolished; installations thereon destroyed. Follow: Eleven 30 L2 boilers completely demolished, one 250-barrel dispenser completely demolished, one 250-barrel dispenser completely demolished, three 300-barrel dispensers and electrical wires unfit for use being returned to Pearl Harbor for possible repair or replacement, one electrical control panel destroyed, three 200-barrel dispenser electric engines about 80 destroyed but repairable, three 200-barrel dispensers completely demolished.

e. Direct hit a vessel, oiling still and fuel lines and salt water supply to crew, new restored.

f. Item-to item “C” destroyed.

g. Seven lines locally destroyed, now restored.

h. Seven lines locally destroyed, now restored.

i. One tank “B” destroyed, now restored.

j. Various repairable section of tanks, now undo equipment.

k. One switch three vessels and 100 ft. area; two switches three vessels for 30 ft. area; 100 ft. high air discharge 500 line starters, 90; not recoverable service of 200 line starters, 90, repairable.

\[\text{Security Information Confidential}\]

THIS PAGE Declassified IAW EO12958
in the vicinity three wires 60 cycle 720 volts. 2. Overhead wire and electric line lead to old O.D. pipe over concrete and turned, other line down but unreadable.

1. One well in vicinity of electric line was destroyed.
2. No elevators and one station was demolished.

1. Electric water line, both pipes and salt, to Provide cost to be built by direct hit.
2. Both water lines broken in several places over the camp, not restored.
3. So of fire sluice destroyed.
4. 700,000 gallons water taken up at dawn since destroyed.
5. Three fuel oil storage tanks, two 10,000 barrels and one 5,000 barrel destroyed completely by fire.
6. Old stone tank destroyed.
7. Dry laundry building seriously destroyed, one corner demolished, remainder of steel frame in good condition. Equipment recoverable.
8. New machine shop, point storage building and two buildings destroyed except steel frame and foundations. Equipment not destroyed - building usable.
10. Corroded and damaged building, destroyed beyond economical repair. Foot and line has created a twisted steel frame.
12. Iron shop, shop area was used for one corner demolished, 50% of steel frame unaltered.
13. Cold frame building was destroyed and salt melted. Remains of building slightly burned but remainder not entirely recoverable. Line for fire was established.

SECURITY INFORMATION

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A. Contractor entered and allowed to fire.

B. Contractor burned No. 104 and 105 and plane.

C. Remainder of building has been but nonexistent. Current not in operation.

D. Concrete removed Number 2 and 3 walls and foundation heavily damaged but frame and foundation intact.

E. Furnaces damaged and all demolished by the direct strike on fire.

F. Three 60-76 transformers in basement and unit under heating equipment destroyed.

G. Three contractor equipment in motor building burned but repairable and one could be salvaged.

H. Wire completely burned and twisted into a fire condition.

I. Army and Navy administration building fully destroyed by concussion.

J. Four exterior windows blown out by concussion.

K. Fuel oil and interior building_a little damaged.

L. Power house fuel storage tanks and equipment, locks blown out.

M. Four two diesel and fuel oil storage tanks damaged by bomb fragments and arcing, locker now reduced.

N. Service electrical control panel in building west, electrically and electrically burned with exception of the circuit board. Dynasol, 163. R-L valve switch and fuse board. In office building, all lights and power panels intact; however, all lights and power panels covered; all control used, one light on panel 100-120 volt three-phase wiring; six circuits; 100-volt connections, two light panels 125-120 volt three phase four wire circuit, two over walls, three along floor, Cold Store lighting; three of the emergency power Maxi inter-ruptor electrical switch installed 0.60 volt three phase.

Sincerely,

M. F. [Signature]

Security Information

[Handwritten note: Security Information]
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, VII Troop Command

TO: Commander, VII Troop Command

FROM: Commander, Seventh Air Force

SUBJECT: Commanding General, Seventh Air Force, 12 September 1944

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CONFIDENTIAL

S. O. 10

March 13, 1944

General, General Staff, Army Air Force.

The following is a compilation of the extent of participation of units of the Royal Air Force (including aircraft units) during the battle of Lützen:


June 8, 1943: 6 squadrons, 35 aircraft, all 35 aircraft from 24,000 feet. One aircraft lost. The armament in the Form of defensive armament included: 4,000 feet, 1,000 feet and 750 feet. The pilot in the aircraft does the armament. One aircraft returned from all missions.


June 8, 1943: 8 squadrons, 60 aircraft, all 60 aircraft from 20,000 feet. One aircraft lost. The armament in the Form of defensive armament included: 4,000 feet, 1,000 feet and 750 feet. The pilot in the aircraft does the armament. One aircraft returned from all missions.


June 8, 1943: 8 squadrons, 60 aircraft, all 60 aircraft from 20,000 feet. One aircraft lost. The armament in the Form of defensive armament included: 4,000 feet, 1,000 feet and 750 feet. The pilot in the aircraft does the armament. One aircraft returned from all missions.
LETTER

To: Commander, 7th Air Force, 1st Lt. [Name]

Subject: Summary of Recent Operations

I. 71st Reconnaissance Squadron, 8th Bombardment Group: Afternoon of June 24th, 1943, 3 reconnaissance aircraft, in possible hit on heavy cruiser. Two aircraft failed to return from mission. The crew (less 1 enlisted man) rescued by a patrol vessel on 5 June 1943 (see also L, above).

II. 8th Bombardment Squadron, 5th Air Force: (See L, above).

III. 13th Reconnaissance Squadron, 2nd Air Force: Two aircraft of the 13th Reconnaissance Squadron (1) carried out a reconnaissance flight on enemy forces on the morning of 5 June 1943. The probable hit on one vessel and one possible hit on another. Two aircraft failed to return from mission, 1 crew of 8 crewmen perished, and 1 crew of 9 crewmen shot down, and possible another.

IV. 23rd Reconnaissance Squadron (1), 7th Bombardment Group: (See L, above).

For the Commanding General:

[Signature]

1st Lt., 7th Air Force, 1st Adjutant.

[Security Information]

Confidential

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AMENDMENT 7

13 June 1942.

From: Capt. Joe L.,

To: Com. C. C., Naval Ordnance Depot.

Following is a list of damage done by enemy air attack on 11 June: Damage is estimated at 100 feet.

1. Building destroyed and all equipment completely demolished.

2. Elevator destroyed and all equipment completely demolished.

3. Door destroyed and all equipment completely demolished.

4. Door destroyed and all equipment completely demolished.

5. Door destroyed and all equipment completely demolished.

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100. Door destroyed and all equipment completely demolished.

SECURITY INFORMATION

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High on shore utter liner, 19 of 20 x 20 ft., to be made over turn out for 40 feet by direct hit.

Bulldozer" alter liner broken in several places over the deck, now restored.

20 of 15,000 gallon oil tanks destroyed.

4,000 gallon oil tank on shore destroyed.

4,000 gallon oil tank on shore destroyed.

Fuel oil stored tanks, two 10,000 barrels and one 3,000 barrel destroyed completely by fire.

Old new fuel tanks destroyed.

New laundry building, severely damaged, one corner demolished.

Bunkers of steel frame in good condition, sufficient remaining.

Older, older, older, older, older, older, older, older, older, older, older, older, old, older. One of the major steel frame buildings destroyed. Building usable. Building usable.

New co-planter cube and metal shop buildings, seriously damaged, except steel frame and foundation. Buildings usable. Equipment slightly damaged but repairable.

Admitted to burnt buildings destroyed beyond economical repair.

Water supply turned on and restored to steel frame.


Handrons' warehouse considerably damaged, one corner demolished.

80% of steel frame undamaged.

Older steel building, used for storage, still erect. Remaining of buildings slightly damaged but repairable. Equipment usable, one repair done, accomplished.

Contractor's quarters demolished by fire.

Contractor's stores No. 150 and 105 demolished by fire.

Mv. were bell-yel-low and brl-demolished. Remainder of buildings damaged but repairable. Loss not final, now in operation.

Several buildings on 1st and 4th floors and second floors demolished but steel frames and foundations remain.


Accidents in storage and unit water systems equipment destroyed.

Bases: contractor equipment, quarters, buildings, damaged but repairable and one completely demolished.

Four more steel buildings, 90% of steel frame in good condition.

New and old administration buildings slightly damaged by concussion.

New officers' recreation building slightly damaged.

Base fuel storage tanks damaged by fragments, lost being replaced.

Four navy diesel and fuel oil storage tanks, one destroyed by fragments and not usable.
Ltr., To Seventh Air Force, 17 June 1945, Subject: Water Damage, cont'd:

ROY L. CLEGG (cont'd):

Everyone electrical control panels in buildings were destroyed as follows: Necessary: 11 electric and non-total rec'd - 2' exception of 24 panel boxes; 1 laundry; 20 1-barrel 25 square switch boxes; 1 in building; 1 ill the 2nd floor rec'd total rec'd 12 1-barrel 25 square switch boxes; 11 storage, one 1-lit. all lit. 1 12-volt 120-volt three phase four line thirteen circuits; 1 12-volt 230-volt three phase four line thirteen circuits; 1 10-volt 120-volt three phase four line thirteen circuits; 1 12-volt 120-volt three phase four line thirteen circuits; 1 20-volt 60-volt three phase four line thirteen circuits; 1 12-volt 120-volt three phase four line thirteen circuits; 1 11-lit. 1 12-volt 120-volt three phase four line thirteen circuits; 1 11-lit. 1 12-volt 120-volt three phase four line thirteen circuits; 1 11-lit. 1 12-volt 120-volt three phase four line thirteen circuits; 1 11-lit. 1 12-volt 120-volt three phase four line thirteen circuits; 1 11-lit. 1 12-volt 120-volt three phase four line thirteen circuits; 1 11-lit. 1 12-volt 120-volt three phase four line thirteen circuits; 1 11-lit. 1 12-volt 120-volt three phase four line thirteen circuits; 1 11-lit. 1 12-volt 120-volt three phase four line thirteen circuits.

For the Commanding General:

R. L. BLOY,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Deputy Chief of Staff.
APPENDIX B
Preliminary mission report, battle of Iwo Jima

A - Search mission, 2-3 June 45
B - Afternoon mission, 3 June 45
C - Morning mission, 4 June 45
D - Afternoon mission, 4 June 45 (493-84, 272)
E - Afternoon mission, 5 June 45 (493-84, 272)
F - Afternoon mission, 6 June 45 (493-84, 272)
G - Morning mission, 5 June 45
H - Afternoon mission, 5 June 45 (110)
I - Afternoon mission, 5 June 45 (110)
J - Morning mission, 6 June 45
K - Search mission, 6 June 45
L - Search mission, 7 June 45
M - Secchi report, 30 June 45
Appendix 31

(Covered Report 1st Fie on 8 June 1943)

June 12, 1943.


MIKAT1.  LiLe to LiLe - 0300 H. to 0900 H.  Intrunatrop - Latin Right.

MIKAT2.  LiLe to LiLe - 1000 H. to 1200 H.  Sent out to track enemy forces over 200 - 300 miles.  Fired on.  Then: to

6lile to 6lile - 0900 H. to 0900 H.  Sent out to track certain forces out.  Soviet and a German force

there out to help.

At 200 miles out, between 2510 from LiLe No. 1, we found

3 transports, 2 destroyers, and 2 lighter.  Handmade.  LiLe found 2 ships and

contact reports to 6lile No. 2, 100 to 300 H.  Only one unmeasured (in circle), as it is a short time.  It stopped firing.  About 2 hours,

returning to LiLe at that night.

MIKAT3.  LiLe to LiLe - 0100 H. to 0100 H.  Took off

with striking force to continue the observe of the pictures

of the things in LiLe.  There we found 6lile No. 2, 0410 H.

(100).  The first ship in a back-straining ever at the end of a carrier

and a transport plane (in time) towards the next carrier.  Darn for an

hour or so.  Came to LiLe No. 2, back the pictures and started

back to LiLe.  No orders to be taken this time as we circle and

come here to be visible.

On return of and the following... we disabled:

 mast (LiLe No. 2).

On return of and the following... disabled: from the end of carrier...

(mast 1 of ship)

In/ Lt. 1st 31th
30th Field
Vedder, Field, A.

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SECURITY INFORMED.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Attack June 2, 1943, 4:30 to 5:30 AM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Enemy damaged by our snipers and mortars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Enemy tank destroyed by our forces - lost in action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Enemy tank destroyed by our forces - lost in action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Enemy tank destroyed by our forces - lost in action</td>
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<tr>
<td>6.</td>
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<td>7.</td>
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<td>8.</td>
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<td>9.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Enemy tank destroyed by our forces - lost in action</td>
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<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Enemy tank destroyed by our forces - lost in action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Enemy tank destroyed by our forces - lost in action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

/Signature/
Afternoon of June 2nd.

1. Date: 7 June 1945 Hrs. 23° 20' 44" W, 17° 17' 11" N, Lat, 18° 25' 2.
2. Weather: 7/10 scattered.
4. EMERGENCY: Looking after.
5. EMERGENCY: At 01:10 JUNC: Battle Junc or Near Cruiser.
6. EMERGENCY: Lim
   Time (5) 01:10.
7. EMERGENCY: Section (Meeting of Time).
8. EMERGENCY: Circling in to be.
9. EMERGENCY: At 01:10 JUNC: 5500 in at 30° at 2000, left
   target on course of north, zero in altitude.
10. EMERGENCY: At 01:10 JUNC: 5500 in at 30°, 2000, left
    target on course of north, zero in altitude.
11. EMERGENCY: At 01:10 JUNC: After instruction, zero in altitude and
    direction leading to target.
12. EMERGENCY: 43° 20' 1/10 sec. delay.
13. EMERGENCY: (Certain) Poor aim on port side,
    (Latia) possible chance to side plater.
14. EMERGENCY: At 01:10 JUNC: Tone.
15. EMERGENCY: Cluster of bores in very close to cruiser.

/s/ Lt. Col. X Jr.
Lt. Colonel,
Staff of Junc 3a (N)
Columbia.

SECURITY INFORMATION

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Appendix IV (cont)

U. S. MILITARY

After June 15, 1953, the following information:

1. Unit: 15 June 1953 date 21° 27' 49" 10° 17' 17" - 10° 17' 17"

2. Stability: 10/10 scattered.


6. Entry 2-12-10

Due to the force of either

7. F-100, or later aircraft and

8. F-100 or other aircraft.

9. Entry 2-12-10, (cont).


12. Entry 2-12-10, (cont).

SECURITY INFORMATION


In 1965 (cont'd)

Attacked on June 7th, 1965, antrakiniaies under attack (cont'd)

12. Check O1. G.P. Bonne

15. 

16. 

18. 

19. 

/1/

O. C. H. #.

Cont'd, 10. Flat 6400 ( )

Identity of G.P.

11th in position of 1st element.
Annex I (cont)

U.S. NAVY: S M 20 R. I. A. Y

1. Date: 7 June 1944
2. Time: 3:16 est
3. N/A
4. 40° 30' N 160° 17' W 170° 17' W 170° 17' W
5. 3/10 sec.
6. NA
7. NA
8. NA
9. NA
10. NA
11. NA
12. NA
13. NA
14. NA

/8/ I. D. I. D. I. D.
1st Lt., N. C.

[Signature]

SECURITY INFORMATION

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ANNEX A (contd)

U.S. Government — Classified - INC

Attention: Captain of Gunner

1. HTH. 28° 23' - A.T. 17° 17' I - 1821
2. MT. 20° 30' I - 810 H.M. I - 1792
3. H.M.R. 23° 45' I - 810 H.M. I - 1792
4. MT. 23° 45' I - 810 H.M. I - 1792
5. A.T. 17° 17' I - 810 H.M. I - 1792

6. MT. 17° 30' I - 810 H.M. I - 1792

7. HHT. 20° 30' - Laid to bin 2 skin element
8. A.T. 20° 30' - Short turn to right
9. L.H. and R.H. C. S. - Course 20°, 10° off right
10. A.T. 20° 30' - Short run
11. A.T. 20° 30' - Short run
12. A.T. 20° 30' - Short run
13. A.T. 20° 30' - Short run

Batt. (Curtin) have taken cover in the forward section, ordered to be definitely on fire.

I.H. - 20° 30' - Lower end of done nailed in (believed caved & concealed).

/3/ C.C. Atlee
Capt., A.D.
Chief of (V)

SECUR. INFORMATION

CLASSIFIED

THIS PAGE Declassified IAW EO12958
appendix III (cont.)

U.S. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY

1. XII/5: 3 June 1944, Lt. Col. 392° 17' 21' 0. 7 18° 37' 16'.
2. XII/6: 2/10 hour contacts.
3. XII/7: 2/10 hour contacts.
4. XII/8: Intercept, contacts, no reports.
5. XII/9: Intercept, contact, no reports.
6. XII/10: Intercept, contact, no reports.
7. XII/11: Intercept, contact, no reports.
8. XII/12: Intercept, contact, no reports.
9. XII/13: Intercept, contact, no reports.
10. XII/14: Intercept, contact, no reports.
11. XII/15: Intercept, contact, no reports.
12. XII/16: Intercept, contact, no reports.
13. XII/17: Intercept, contact, no reports.
14. XII/18: Intercept, contact, no reports.
15. XII/19: Intercept, contact, no reports.

SECURITY INFORMATION

THIS PAGE Declassified IAW EO12958
On 20 May 1955, the Assistant Chief of Staff, J2, issued an Order on Section J2 of the J2G.

1. Order: "On 20 May 1955, the Assistant Chief of Staff, J2, issued an Order on Section J2 of the J2G."

2. Order: "On 20 May 1955, the Assistant Chief of Staff, J2, issued an Order on Section J2 of the J2G."

3. Order: "On 20 May 1955, the Assistant Chief of Staff, J2, issued an Order on Section J2 of the J2G."

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5. Order: "On 20 May 1955, the Assistant Chief of Staff, J2, issued an Order on Section J2 of the J2G."

6. Order: "On 20 May 1955, the Assistant Chief of Staff, J2, issued an Order on Section J2 of the J2G."
ATTACK SEQUENCE OF JUNE 16th.

1. TIME: 9 June 1910 Hrs., 090 Secs. HRS, 170° 17′ - AMD 1921
2. WEATHER: 7/10 scattered.
4. SMEAR: 070° LARG: Ranging attack or contact.
5. NAGE: OPE: Lrg: Large target transport.
6. PHASE 7: (A)
   On
   9 3-17′
   Eject 
   In report, Order, 
   To traverse, return.
7. ALTITUDE: (wna)
   2800 feet.
8. WEATHER: More hazy and circling at 2500 feet.
   10,000 feet, release to be, ‘Null’ into run.
10. PHASE 6: (na)
    On
    Ceiling
    2000 feet.
11. ALTITUDE: (na)
    Attacked five guns - it was low run
    and traversed continually.
12. ALTITUDE: (na)
    Ceiling
13. SMEAR: One hit - right side of - io. by right wing gun (canister).
    (canister) Tone.
14. SMEAR 6: (na)
    Tone
15.
16. SMEAR: One hit on the right wing at the tail end of
    and contact. We traversed at the top line on the inside
    of its run. Smell of the smoke coming from the area. One
    bomb did not hit just to the rear of the transport but
    failed to explode.

SECURITY INFORMATION
Declassified IAW EO12958
Third day afternoon of June 3, 1942.

1. DATE: 3 June 1942 Wn. 1200 Z
   W. 1705 173 17° 10' S

2. WEATHER: 5/10 scattered


5. SIGHTED ENEMY: Large from transport.

6. KILLED 16:
   Enr.
   3 B-17s

   Enemy transports, Cruisers, Destroyers

7. KILLED 212 (F-42) 6 ship elements

8. KILLED 212 (F-42)

9. BOMBED AND HIT: 4 aircraft; 17,000 lbs. of bombs dropped; 3 hit payload on transport.

10. BOMBED ENEMY;
    A.

11. BOMBED ENEMY:
    2 hit transport; 1 hit transport.

12. BOMBED ENEMY:
    1 - 500 lb. bomb.

13. BOMBED (Stern) Torpedo, L-3. (Attached) Possible hit on transport.

14. BOMBED NO HIT:

15. BOMBED NO HIT:

16. BOMBED:
    Refer to Capt. Veillemont's report.

/

1LT R. Veillemont
1st Lt., M.C., 10th Bn. 1st A.A.
Appendix 3B (cont'd)

U. S. squarely -- attacked at sea

Attack afternoon of June 1st

1. Date: 3 June 1944 LAT. 20° 28' N LONG. 170° 17' W

2. Weather: surface scattered

3. U. S. AIRCRAFT: 9,792 CIV. VICTIM: B-17G

4. OBJECTIVE: Bombing of enemy seacraft

5. OBJECTIVE:レトルト: Large troop transport

6. FORCES HITTED
   Cvn
   Fine (3) B-17G

   ENEMY
   Transports, Cruisers,
   Destroyers, Cargo and
   Tankers

7. AREA OF ATTACK
   (Cvn)
   7 elements

8. ENEMY A.A.: Seething turned into bombs

9. ENEMY AIRCRAFT: 10,000 from the sun, withdrew
   into the sun for return

10. MARTINEZ KILLED
    Cvn
    800 lbs. bombs
    ENEMY
    Anti-aircraft fire

11. MARTINEZ SUNK. CIVILIAN: Shore closing down

12. MARTINEZ SUNK: 4,500 lbs

13. REACTION: (Certain) One water line hit, livestock

14. MARTINEZ ON FIRE
    Tone

   REASON: One bomb hit near transport at water line hit, livestock, and was
   seen sinking after run. To be reported at 100 interval.

/s/ MEL T. BEAL
1st Lieut., A.G.

SECURITY INFORMATION
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Appendix B (Contd)

U. S. ARMY - 740TH TACTICAL AIR DEFENSE

Situation at 1800 hours: June 2, 1944

1. E. T. A.: 0600 hours

2. W. O. B.: 500, 1000, 1500, 2000

3. W. O. B.: 0600, 1100, 1600, 2100

4. M. O. B.: Convolved: Bombing on transport, large

5. M. O. B.: Convolved: Enemy transport, large

6. M. O. B.: Convolved: Enemy transport, large

7. M. O. B.: Convolved: Enemy air attack, 10,000 feet

8. M. O. B.: Convolved: Enemy air attack, 10,000 feet

9. M. O. B.: Convolved: Enemy air attack, 10,000 feet

10. M. O. B.: Convolved: Enemy air attack, 10,000 feet

11. M. O. B.: Convolved: Enemy air attack, 10,000 feet

12. M. O. B.: Convolved: Enemy air attack, 10,000 feet

13. M. O. B.: Convolved: Enemy air attack, 10,000 feet

14. M. O. B.: Convolved: Enemy air attack, 10,000 feet

EXTRA: Use additional sheet if necessary (circled)
Amendment 3

5.3.4.2(4) ATTACK I - B I Y

Attack Operation - June 4th.

1. Date: 4 June 1944 1115 LST, 0010 1317 J LST, 1730 1317 J LST 0315
2. Weather: 8/10 broken tops 5000'
4. Attack Date: U.S. Aircraft, Attack
5. U.S. Aircraft: Airplane Carrier
6. Radio Message

Ctn
Sixteen (16) 3-17.4

Show large enemy task force
includes: Battleships, Carriers, Cruisers and Destroyers

9. J.E.C. Aircraft (Our)
Section (12) (15-18).

10. U.S. Aircraft: Torpedo Carriers turned to join attack

Anti-aircraft

11. U.S. Aircraft: Torpedo Carriers turned to join attack

12. U.S. Aircraft: Hit on stern of carrier

13. Summary: One (1) hit on stern of carrier

14. Notes: One (1) hit on stern of carrier causing heavy strike, no effective (15-18) damage to the carrier.

15. Notes: One (1) hit on stern of carrier causing heavy strike.

16. Notes: One (1) hit on stern of carrier causing heavy strike.

17. Notes: One (1) hit on stern of carrier causing heavy strike.

18. Notes: One (1) hit on stern of carrier causing heavy strike.

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99. Notes: One (1) hit on stern of carrier causing heavy strike.

100. Notes: One (1) hit on stern of carrier causing heavy strike.

U. J. D. 1 /etc/)

ATICTION: J. iere June 1, 1943 (continued)

1. Lte: 4 June 1943. ETA 50° 1.2 Y. LATS, 170° 31'. W.L. 9:30

2. CLOUD: Heavy cloud patch at 18,000 feet, broken

3. U.T.I. FROM 0: 4 VLF S.I. BLOCKS, 3-171

4. "ARK" C. ON YU: Attaching enemy vessels

5. SPECIFIC WINDOW: Aircraft Carrier

6. VERTICAL LIMIT:

   Lat
   8°-17°

   Corring, Dribors, Cutterman, Deveill

7. VERTICAL LIMIT: (C/n) Level flying

8. U.T.I. FROM 0: Turning to cloud coverage

9. U.T.I. FROM 0: CLOUD: (6000 feet) approximately -10° to right

10. "ARK" FROM LONG:

     Lat
     5°-80° N. Lat.

     Zero flights, no anti-aircraft voice

11. "ARK" FROM IND. LINDS: Flying, turn to right

12. "ARK" FROM IND. LINDS: B - 2500 lb. bombs, 1/10 delay

13. "ARK" C. (Certain) Did not see results

14. "ARK" C. (Certain) None

15. "ARK" C. (Certain)

16. "ARK" C. Did not see results. Lte note one flight: no damage (enemy HIT...)

/s/ O. J. D. 1

Confidential

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Aircraft in 10 (contd.)

U.S. AVIATION: 9.10. I. 3-17

At sea on arrival on June 4, 1942.

1. Date: 1. June 1942 LST 2309 115 V 1103, 1730 45° W 11.34 0215

2. FLIGHT: 8/16 Lover Broken, took at 600 feet

3. WEATHER: 00° 15' 00' 10' 00' 10' 00' 15' 00' 10'

4. VARIOUS CONDITIONS: Enthusiastic

5. OPERATIONS: Carrier

6. ROBERT R. LARRY

Com 15 3-17

Decry

Pursuit, Carriers, Ordinins, Destroyers

7. IT C. A. 10: (Cm) 1200 to 1800, 3 - 300 bombs internin

8. 21:00 0215: Anti-aircraft, anti-take on, to high water cloulds

9. 21:00 0215: 1800, 10,000 feet, 2 right shot of carrier, 3 left right turn to withdraw

10. ROBERT R. LARRY

Com 3 - 300 Bombs

Decry

Anti-aircraft, pursuit

11. ROBERT R. LARRY: Quick turn and cloud cover

12. INTERFERENCE: 2 - 500 lbs, 1/10 second delay

13. RADIO: Tone

14. RADIO: Tone

15. Etc.


/s/ C R. B. OSBORN

Probing, 20 W 45° 10' 00' 10' 00' 10' 00' 10' 00' 10' 00' 10'

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Appendix 53 (cont'd)

U. S. NAVY - 1945 - JULY

Attack on Guadalcanal, Jan., 1943.

2. Sedge: 8/10 days.
3. U/I 001-142. 81/2-240. 001-102. 4-171.
4. Name of Aircraft: Tomcat on carrier.
5. SALT IS CERTIFIED: Aircraft carrier.
6. Possible L.O.L:
   Ctn
   3-147
   Ready
   Carrier

7. M.F.C. 1-404. (Ctn) To Black. 1st foot interval, single ship.

9. H/M. 3161-1. 1000:
   Altitude 600 feet
   Results: 0-1. 0-1/10 foot interval
   Alternate: 1-1/2 knot Full throttle.

10. M.V. 3011. 
    Ctn
    1-404. Limits
    Easy anti-aircraft of fighter.

11. SALT IS CERTIFIED: None

12. A/VT. 3161-1:
    4-500. L.W. 1/10 s-cold fuse.
    1-2 cal. B. side gun.

13. Aircraft: (Certified) None on carrier. One fighter destroyed.

14. Aircraft: C. A.


16. Aircraft: C. A. 1-100. On carrier. No retained directly below estimated 1000 feet. Ca. 2 to 4 miles on our course directly in line for about 10 minutes. Then ret. at 1000 feet. Ca. in front center. Aircraft turned to starboard. U.S. carrier fixed and aircraft distinct over. Never called out. Aircraft remains to a carrier. Ctn. For full text insert...
Appendix D (cont'd)

3. I/O DATA:

1. Date: 4 June 1945
   Time: 1:14
   I/O: 120, 130

2. I/O 120: Scattered clouds, 15,000 ft.

3. I/O 130: IV-4 (2), IV-6 (2)

4. I/O 120 EFFECT: Destroyed and damaged

5. I/O 130 EFFECT: Corrider

6. ENEMY REACTION:
   G8 150
   13 80
   17 78
   07 97
   G8 150
   13 80
   17 78
   07 97

7. ENEMY ACC: Attack by fighters, west of 150, 8 - 2000 lbs

8. ENEMY AIR: Enemy AA, few fighters attempted to intercept

9. ENEMY AIRCRAFT OF ATTACK: Alt. 40,000 ft. No sign of damage; 1000 ft. altitude: 1180

10. ENEMY G8 150:
    G8 150
    13 800
    17 750
    07 965

11. ENEMY AIR: Enemy aircraft, right wing to left at 3000 ft.

12. ENEMY FIRE:
    1 - 200 lbs

13. ENEMY FIRE:
    G8 150

14. ENEMY FIRE:
    None

15. * *

16. * *

// S/Sgt J. J. J. Slama
   Pilot

SECURITY INFORMATION

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Appendix 35 (cont.)

U. S. AIRCRAFT 10:45 A.M.

1. INT: June 19, 1945 Lt. 33° 10'0" E 210° 17'0" H: 450 (Ltr) 25 420°

2. NAV: Ironclad 001° 6.5 - 001°

3. VDG: 14 175° 54 175° E 175°

4. INCL: 15° 30' L/C: 6n: on every 30 trk force

5. REV 0015: 30° 00' Carriers

6. FORCES left: 1:
   - 17:17 001° 15° 17° Carriers
   - 17:17 001° 15° 17° Carriers

7. L/C: 17° 00' 15° 17° altitude to fire

8. L/C: 17° 00' 15° 17° check to depth

9. T/M: 001° 15° 17° (150°) to 30° 00' 17° track

10. L/C: 17° 00' 15° 17° Carriers

11. L/C: 17° 00' 15° 17° Carriers

12. L/C: 17° 00' 15° 17° Carriers

13. L/C: 17° 00' 15° 17° Carriers

14. L/C: 17° 00' 15° 17° Carriers

15. L/C: 17° 00' 15° 17° Carriers

16. L/C: 17° 00' 15° 17° Carriers

17. L/C: 17° 00' 15° 17° Carriers

18. L/C: 17° 00' 15° 17° Carriers

19. L/C: 17° 00' 15° 17° Carriers
Appendix J (cont)

U. S. AIRCRAFT LANDINGS


date: June 1, 1943

1. Date: 1 June 1943. LLA: 76° 1' N 116° 17' W 40° 30' E. LLA: 1115

2. 

3. U.S. AIRCRAFT: 

4. U.S. AIRCRAFT: 

5. U.S. AIRCRAFT: 

6. CARRIER: 

7. 

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Appendix F (cont’d)

U. S. NAVY – M. A. R. Y

Action covering June 8, 19 -

1. Date: June 10th

2. Weather: 6/10 Broken Clouds C1001

3. Wind: 170° 30°

4. Radio Location: Radio; Attacking

5. ACREO OCEAN MAMAL Airline Carrier

6. TACTICAL: Sixteen (16) D-178

7. TACTICAL: (Cont’d)

8. NEL THEORY: Enemy carrier turned to harbor at

9. NEL THEORY: Horizontal bomb at 50,000 feet

10. NEL Theory: Right (R) of Scull; Bombs (6) Enemy - anti-

11. NEL Theory: Enemy at 500 yards; Short target:

12. NEL Theory: 300 - 60 rounds of 50 cal.

13. NEL Theory: Certain one (1) hit on stern of carrier

14. NEL Theory: Long

15. NEL Theory: One (1) bomb hit on stern of carrier; caused

16. NEL Theory: Other hits (this element thought did no current damage as could be determined.

/s/ J. A. SMITH
/t/ W. O. SMITH

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In order C (cont)

U. S. ZERO-CHI - ADVICE

Attention Service: June 2, 1971

1. DATE: June 2 / Time: 23:00 / Lat. 23° 18' / Long. 179° 37' / W1 = 0-15
2. AIR LOST: 6/16 Broken - 3000 feet above 2000 feet
3. FAIR WEATHER: 7-32 (7) / FLIGHT: 2-172
4. CIVILIAN CIVILIAN: No min. Attraction on Carrier
5. WEATHER CIVILIAN: Large carrier

6. WEATHER


Carriers, Drivers, Lecturers

7. TAC ON RADAR: (Con) F sick element
8. FLIGHT: "Vertical circling"
9. WEATHER: "FAIR WEATHER CIVILIAN: 29er at carrier front, standard at 3000 feet. 301 minutes for better run. Carrier ... out crystal to grade building due to lower cloud know under visibility."
10. WEATHER: 


Carrier

11. WEATHER: Adverse weather for necessary evacuation continually
12. WEATHER: LOST - N: 35° 2, 1/19 7-32, 2 3 rounds, 20 cal. - 10 rounds, 30 cal.
13. BACK (Certain) Chance - 1 35 - 32 - 32 and next ten. (N was the 20 cal. round base."
18. "Dakota" nice carrier use under thin layer of cloud. They all went up. They believed the carrier to not under because it was no water anywhere. There is no record on fire so far. This was about 12 minutes -. 2 without opposition.}

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Attention carrier: June 1, 1945

1. Date: 4 June 1945. Lwt. 300 1st. 70. 300 17 30 0 17 710 0 710 0 3.

2. CLIMATE: H/10 3/0.6 feet tops of cloud.


4. DURATION OF ATTACK: Combined Sea Forces

5. ADMIRAL CROAT'S: Lean on carrier.

6. ATTACKER: C/21:
   Carrier, Cruisers, Destroers

7. TYPICAL ATTACK: (On) 3 ships: carriers from stern.

8. ADVANCE: Leaning, turning and all fire.

9. ATTACKER: Attacked carrier from starboard stern at 3,600 feet.

10. CARRIER: C/21:
     Carrier, Cruisers, Destroers

11. ATTACKER: C/21:
    Stormy, turning turn.


13. ATTACKER: (Shinrin) Elements - one hit port bow of carrier, a near miss. (Estimated) For six hit on starboard bow of carrier.

14. ATTACKER: C/21:
    Alighting

15. 

16. ATTACKER: Refer to Capt. Pullmer's report.

/l/ [Signature]

1st Lt. AC

20th July 45
Aircraft: 13 (coats)
V. J. nid. 10 - 10:15

Comrades:

1. Date: June 8, 1941. Lat.: 51° 11' N. Long.: 173° 45' W. Time: 10:15
2. Weather: 8/10 broken cloud, 3,000 ft.
3. WIND: N 10 to 15 knots, 2-4 Beaufort.
4. H. V. C. (At 8:30 A.M.): 2-1700, 2-1700, 2-1700, 2-1700, 2-1700
8. H. V. C. (At 11:00 A.M.): 2-1700
9. H. V. C. (At 12:00 A.M.): 2-1700
10. H. V. C. (At 1:00 P.M.): 2-1700
11. H. V. C. (At 2:00 P.M.): 2-1700
12. H. V. C. (At 3:00 P.M.): 2-1700
13. H. V. C. (At 4:00 P.M.): 2-1700
14. H. V. C. (At 5:00 P.M.): 2-1700
15. H. V. C. (At 6:00 P.M.): 2-1700
16. H. V. C. (At 7:00 P.M.): 2-1700
17. H. V. C. (At 8:00 P.M.): 2-1700
18. H. V. C. (At 9:00 P.M.): 2-1700
19. H. V. C. (At 10:00 P.M.): 2-1700
20. H. V. C. (At 11:00 P.M.): 2-1700

Cabinet (10) B-1700

Carriers, Destroyers, and Cruisers

Navy

June 8, 1941

10:15 A.M.
At 1100Z (cont'd)

1. The situation is as follows:

   a. Date: 03 June 19xx
   b. Time: 1300Z
   c. Weather: Overcast, visibility 5 miles
   d. Airfield: 15 miles north of target
   e. Carrier: 3rd Division
   f. Range: 20 miles
   g. Bombardment: 500 lb. bombs
   h. Escort: 2 fighter planes

2. Enemy positions:

   a. 10 miles west of target
   b. 15 miles south of target
   c. 20 miles east of target

3. Bombing Pattern:

   a. High altitude: 10,000 feet
   b. Low altitude: 1,000 feet

4. Carrier Activity:

   a. Partially loaded
   b. Ready to launch 10 planes

5. Target Information:

   a. Target identified as an airfield
   b. Bombs released at 1400Z

6. Observations:

   a. Clear skies
   b. No enemy activity

7. After Action Report:

   a. Bombs dropped accurately
   b. No casualties reported

8. Casualties:

   a. 5 killed
   b. 10 wounded

9. Summary:

   a. Mission accomplished
   b. No enemy interference

10. Conclusion:

    a. Mission successful
    b. No enemy casualties

11. Remarks:

    a. Weather conditions ideal
    b. Bombing accuracy excellent

12. Special Instructions:

    a. Continue bombing for another 30 minutes
    b. Return to base

13. Signature:

    /s/ Capt. Smith


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Appendix 3C (cont.)

1. 20th June 1943

2. 

3. UNLOAD 1200

4. UNLOAD 0015

5. 

6. G-01 to unload

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

/s/ i. e. C. Williamson
Attachment E

Correction

I made two side correction in 18 to 9 on 10 east, 11 south 10 east, 11 south. I continued in a souther direction.

After trying unsuccessfully to attract attention on the radio, I called up the Last Home list and was informed that I would be instructed to attack 18 to 9 on 10 east, 11 south. I continued in a souther direction to the east of 18 to 9 on 10 east, 11 south. I then, after being instructed by radio, continued east.

I dropped in the right bank on the first run and was not seen by the enemy. I called out 20 to 25, short and left.

On the second run I dropped five bombs across the stern of the carrier, one definite hit on the carrier, one probable hit on a small ship. Other runs within 100 yard of vessel short and over.

/s/

Capt. M. A. S.
Capt. Navy's Crew

Correction June 7, 1943 10:00 A.M.

From my position, the carrier I could see our last five to be dropping the bomb on the carrier, our first one. The run on 10 east, 11 south, 10 east. 11 south.

/s/

Capt. E. D. Wolf
K.P.C. Air Corps
Gunner
Capt. Navy's Crew
Amendment 02

F.D., 4TH I.A. 4TH XV

1. Date: June 10th, evening 273, east 170 from Demo, late 1950

2. Weather: scattered clouds - 10,000 feet

3. Time: 17:30, flight 40 to 50 Cotauriere 600 feet, late 31:15

4. Target: E. Unknown, Vixen of unknown identity

5. 

6. Unknown 2100:

7. 

8. 

9. 

10. 

11. 

12. 

13. 

14. 

15. 

16. 

Security Information

THIS PAGE Declassified IAW EO12958
1. 8:15 Z-5 June 1870 Bearing SSO Dist 150 from 4-10 plane 1500

2. Weather: Fog, cloudy, overcast at 7000 feet, visibility 3-10 miles


4. Loran A Coordination: Formation heading

5. BEETLE (cont.): On approach destroy enemy carrier

6. FLYING MAMMOTH - Zero fighters - 10-12 carrier planes which include 2 carriers, 1 battleship, 19-20 heavy cruisers, 2 destroyers

7. FLYING BARN: Header 3/4 from 2000 feet, attacked in formation

8. FLYING MAMMOTH: Heavy anti-aircraft fire, destroy fighter 2nd row, attacked by 4 zero fighters

9. BEETLE (cont.): Headed north objective at 8000 feet altitude on course 080° with wind at 30° and turning right to 070° at 4000 feet on that course and on to 060°. 1000 feet altitude of 8000 feet

10. FLYING MAMMOTH: Zero anti-aircraft fire (scheme), 2000 ft. altitude, machine gun fire

11. FLYING BEETLE: As soon as possible turn to 100° to right and hit of collision course, to climb in altitude and disappear into the cloud. 1000 feet altitude, machine gun fire

12. FLYING MAMMOTH: Approximately 200 feet of neutralization 3-10 plane with 1/10 sec. fuse

13. (cont.) Cap hit one enemy carrier - two more Zero fighters but none destroyed. Do not approach any enemy ships from our relative gun fire

14. (cont.) Zero fighters in action. Ballen in air

15. (cont.)


1. Date: 4 June 1944
2. Time: 1732.
3. Weather: 1050 feet, S.W.
5. Action: Aircraft 4,700 feet.
7. Anti-circuit:
8. Additional:
9. Note:
10. Course:
11. Aircraft:
12. Distance:
13. Additional:
14. Note:
15. Course:
16. Aircraft:
17. Distance:
18. Note:

Capt. J. E. B. IV

THIS PAGE Declassified IAW EO12958
1. Date: 2 June 1944
   Lt. Herring: 33°45' Long Distance 170 Miles 1800
   EZ

2. Event: Bunker about 1800 ft.

   Lt. Herring: 14:00
   Lt. Miller: 14:00
   Lt. Parks: 14:00
   Lt. Mott: 14:00


5. 1830: 10 and 719: Aircraft Carrier

6. 0600 C.T.:
   "Zero" fighter
   "Zero" fighter
   "Zero" fighter
   "Zero" fighter
   "Zero" fighter

7. Event: Lt. Miller: 0600 Zeros took out of range, horizontal to ship, ran at 1,000 feet from out of range

8. Event: Lt. Miller: Zeros took out of range, horizontal to ship, ran at 1,000 feet from out of range

9. Event: Lt. Miller: Zeros took out of range, horizontal to ship, ran at 1,000 feet from out of range

10. Event: Lt. Miller: Zeros took out of range, horizontal to ship, ran at 1,000 feet from out of range

11. Event: Lt. Miller: Zeros took out of range, horizontal to ship, ran at 1,000 feet from out of range

12. Lt. Miller: Zeros took out of range, horizontal to ship, ran at 1,000 feet from out of range

13. Event: Lt. Miller: Zeros took out of range, horizontal to ship, ran at 1,000 feet from out of range

14. Event: Lt. Miller: Zeros took out of range, horizontal to ship, ran at 1,000 feet from out of range

15. Event: Lt. Miller: Zeros took out of range, horizontal to ship, ran at 1,000 feet from out of range

16. Event: Lt. Miller: Zeros took out of range, horizontal to ship, ran at 1,000 feet from out of range
Assembly 59 (cont.)

U.S. NAVY

1. DATE: 6 June 1979  Attacker 107  Attacker 108
2. TASK: Interception of enemy attacks at 1000
3. Obj. No.: The Task (10) to hit target (10 km) Hawaiian 2-17-79
4. Type of Control: Attack on enemy target
5. Attacker 107 and 108 attack enemy carrier
6. ORDER:
   On Hawaiian 2-17-79
   Order No. 2-17-79
   Air Corp Aircraft
   ID 4-4500
   Fire 4-4500

7. Type of Aircraft: Low altitude bombing attack on two enemy flights. On every 10th in second flight
8. EMERGENCY ORDER: Attack by Zeros and torpedoes on all surface vessels and aircraft carrier by aircraft and Zeros
9. EMERGENCY ORDER: Attack by Zeros on all enemy surface vessels and aircraft carrier by aircraft and Zeros
10. LA 32 17:45:
    Order to attack Zeros in zero altitude carrier.

11. EMERGENCY ORDER: Attack by Zeros and torpedoes on all surface vessels and aircraft carrier by aircraft and Zeros
12. EMERGENCY ORDER: Attack by Zeros on all enemy surface vessels and aircraft carrier by aircraft and Zeros
14. EMERGENCY ORDER: Attack by Zeros on all enemy surface vessels and aircraft carrier by aircraft and Zeros
15. EMERGENCY ORDER: Attack by Zeros in zero altitude carrier.
16. EMERGENCY ORDER: Attack by Zeros on all enemy surface vessels and aircraft carrier by aircraft and Zeros
17. EMERGENCY ORDER: Attack by Zeros in zero altitude carrier.
18. EMERGENCY ORDER: Attack by Zeros on all enemy surface vessels and aircraft carrier by aircraft and Zeros
20. EMERGENCY ORDER: Attack by Zeros on all enemy surface vessels and aircraft carrier by aircraft and Zeros
22. EMERGENCY ORDER: Attack by Zeros on all enemy surface vessels and aircraft carrier by aircraft and Zeros
23. EMERGENCY ORDER: Attack by Zeros in zero altitude carrier.
24. EMERGENCY ORDER: Attack by Zeros on all enemy surface vessels and aircraft carrier by aircraft and Zeros
25. EMERGENCY ORDER: Attack by Zeros in zero altitude carrier.
26. EMERGENCY ORDER: Attack by Zeros on all enemy surface vessels and aircraft carrier by aircraft and Zeros
27. EMERGENCY ORDER: Attack by Zeros in zero altitude carrier.
28. EMERGENCY ORDER: Attack by Zeros on all enemy surface vessels and aircraft carrier by aircraft and Zeros
29. EMERGENCY ORDER: Attack by Zeros in zero altitude carrier.
30. EMERGENCY ORDER: Attack by Zeros on all enemy surface vessels and aircraft carrier by aircraft and Zeros
Activity in (area) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9.

4. MISSION OBJECTIVE: Destroy all enemy submarines.

5. MISSION MISSION: Above on a permanent force.

6. MISSION MISSION: Zero minute kill rate.

7. MISSION MISSION: Two minutes to kill all (').

8. MISSION MISSION: Four minutes to kill all (').

9. MISSION MISSION: Five minutes to kill all (').

10. MISSION MISSION: Six minutes to kill all (').

11. MISSION MISSION: Seven minutes to kill all (').

12. MISSION MISSION: Eight minutes to kill all (').

13. MISSION MISSION: Nine minutes to kill all (').

14. MISSION MISSION: Ten minutes to kill all (').
# Appendix E

## 1. C. Notes

- Date: 3 June 1945
- Time: 2150
- Target: K.3, 1789
- Force: 1750 Z.

## Mission

- **Operation**: Bomb 2000. Target: K.3

## Aircraft

- **Type**: B-17
- **Force**: 4th Force

## Observations

1. **Aircraft**: N/A
   - **Attacker**: 2000, attacked from 2000 to 3000
2. **Aircraft**: N/A
   - **Attacker**: 2000, attacked from 3000 to 4000
3. **Aircraft**: N/A
   - **Attacker**: 2000, attacked from 4000 to 5000
4. **Aircraft**: N/A
   - **Attacker**: 2000, attacked from 5000 to 6000
5. **Aircraft**: N/A
   - **Attacker**: 2000, attacked from 6000 to 7000
6. **Aircraft**: N/A
   - **Attacker**: 2000, attacked from 7000 to 8000
7. **Aircraft**: N/A
   - **Attacker**: 2000, attacked from 8000 to 9000
8. **Aircraft**: N/A
   - **Attacker**: 2000, attacked from 9000 to 10000
9. **Aircraft**: N/A
   - **Attacker**: 2000, attacked from 10000 to 11000
10. **Aircraft**: N/A
    - **Attacker**: 2000, attacked from 11000 to 12000

## Notes

- **Position**: N/A
  - Result: Attacked
  - **Target**: N/A
  - **Leader**: N/A
  - **Weapon**: N/A
  - **Formation**: N/A

## Conclusion

- **Note**: N/A
  - Jobs not observed. No radar reports.
1. Date: Oct 8th
2. Weather: Calm
3. FLIGHT CAPT: Sep 16th 0700 GMT
4. FLIGHT OFFICER: B N
5. A/C ID: 211 651 083 0000 010
6. FLIGHT LOG:
   Tour (1) 17.00
   Convoy, Flot Offs and
   Flt Sects
7. HI: C. M. A. K.: 2 miles ahead
8. A/C CAPT: Oceania 1st Lt.
9. A/C ID: 211 651 083 0000 010
   Altitude 5,000 ft, conf 17.00
   Over 1/10 chance of collision, attack - 'em
   wallet. Thunder
10. FLIGHT LOG:
    Tour (1) to 1/10 1st Lt.
    anti-aircraft
11. HI: C. M. A. K.: BWT: BWT and coming
12. WILLY: 4000 ft, 0 to 10
13. WI: 2 hits on starboard 1st Lt. O'Day
14. WILLY: 1 hit off port 1st Lt.
15. WILLY: 1 hit off port seen as result of direct 8th hit on stern
   of Flt O'Day.

/"I James B. Lively,
1st Lt., A/C
41st Detachment, (L)
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/\ 1st Lt. Instructor
1st Lt. C. Pilot
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Attachment C (cont'd)

U.S. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

ATTACHMENTS ON 16 JUNE 1945

1. Last of June 1945
2. *NOTE*: 3/10 Broken off at 9:00 a.m.
3. *NOTE*: 12 P.M. EST.
4. INSTRUCTIONS TO: Captain Smith
5. *NOTE*: 2 P.M. EST.

6. *NOTE*: 11:00 A.M.

7. *NOTE*: 10 A.M.
8. *NOTE*: 10:30 A.M.

9. *NOTE*: 11:00 A.M.

10. *NOTE*: 11:30 A.M.

11. *NOTE*: 12:00 A.M.
June 30th, 1942

Lieut. Commander E. J. Senior

8 JUNE 1942

Flight Log

Too-offs in SB-17H: 18 1/2 hrs... 6 JUNE 1942 recommissioned Lt. Commander in another SB-17H located at HLA-564. flew on course 54 degrees. saw by (5) decked carriers, ten (7) battleships or heavy cruisers and six (6) or eight (8) light destroyers. At four (4) miles range, using one (1) -dropped two (2) bombs on battle ship from 9,800 feet indication altitude at 10,000 feet. Indicated dropped formation of six (6) 2-17's at lower altitude reported two battleships hit one (1) destroyed, second three (3) damaged. Very heavy anti-aircraft at this altitude. Run two (2) -dropped one (1) bomb on destroyer which turned and was hit about 100 feet short. Run three (3) - Climbed to 12,000 feet indicated, by two (2) -dropped one (1) bomb on cruiser. Hit at least one (1) battleship and one (1) carrier and by two (2) over. 4-17's seen on lower course. 1-21 continued anti-aircraft until 1800 hit. jettison (1) 500-lb. bomb, 1-125 continued. 1-21 set course on second wave.

Due to electrical fire trouble two (2) planes of V-29 were unable to take off on the return flight on 8 JUNE, 1942. 1-21's were killed and a tank of one (1) 500-lb. bomb.

By Lt. K. H. D.,

Naval Air Corps

Pilot
1. Date: June 6, 1865
   Lt. Col. Hiram L. Lewis, 11th Mass. Inf., 2nd Division, 3rd Corps, Army of the Potomac

2. Weather: speech cloud at 6 a.m.

3. Wind: 

4. Line of Battle: 7:00 (Mostly) 12th Corps

5. Advance of Union forces

6. Line to 12:20 P.M., frontal attack - battle of the smaller unit

7. Enemy:

8. Notes:

9. Casualties:

10. Casualties:

11. Casualties:

12. Casualties:

13. Casualties:

14. Casualties:

15. Casualties:

16. Casualties:

17. Casualties:

18. Casualties:
I'm not sure what this document is about, but it appears to be a report or letter. The handwriting is difficult to read, but I can make out some parts:

"In June 1943...

From our turret position on the second floor, I saw the Stuka dive bomb our formation. In our fourth run, before we started to climb, a German anti-aircraft gun opened fire on us.

In the second dive run, we turned to the right. We were in our half of the formation, but I was behind the others.

[Signature] 2nd Lt. [Name]
Loran turret gunner
Lt. Coertje's crew

Afternoon mission June 8th, 1943.

From our position on the turret, I saw a Stuka dive bomb our formation. The Stuka attacked from the left, coming in with a 60-degree angle just over the nose. When it was close, I started firing. The pursuit started into the sky, and I knew I was losing the Stuka when I could follow the war.
In June 1944

Over, etc.

Red 1. No (n) to be, see (s) C. C.

Red 2. No (n) to be, see (s) C.

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Red 121. No (n) to be, see (s) C.
Army's SW (co ty)

...ran in position 3:00-11:00 over ... distinctly hit of our bombs on enemy iron:'

Afternoon of June 1.

... that I am one direct hit a ... over the carrier. At the instant of impact the collision caused the carrier to capsize. At the instant of impact the collision caused the carrier to capsize. The bomb struck right below the water line of the carrier. The carrier hit the water, ... and ... 

/2/ M. G. Viegut, Jr.,

The Base, Air Corps
1. **Section 1**
   
   **The Initial Conditions:**
   
   1. Initial Temperature: 70°F, Initial Humidity: 40%
   2. Sunlight: Clear
   3. Wind Speed: 15 mph
   4. Barometric Pressure: 29.5 in Hg
   5. Weather Conditions: Overcast
   6. **MILITARY OPERATIONS:**
      
      1. **AREA OF INTEREST:**
         
         - **Target Area:** Central City
         - **Operational Area:** South District
      2. **OPERATIONAL PLAN:**
         
         - **Objective:** Secure the area
         - **Strategy:** Divide and conquer
      3. **SPECIALIZED TACTICS:**
         
         - **Tactical Units:** Reconnaissance Team
         - **Equipment:** Night Vision Goggles
      4. **LOGISTIC SUPPORT:**
         
         - **Supplies:** Food, Water, Medical Kits
         - **Transport:** Helicopters

8. **SITUATIONAL REPORT:**
   
   - **Status:** Operating
   - **Objectives:** Achieved

10. **RECOMMENDATIONS:**
    
    - **Action:** Proceed with caution
    - **Note:** Monitoring ongoing

11. **NEXT STEPS:**

**SIGNED:**

   [Signature]

   [Date]
1. Lt: 3 Jun 19__; 090° dist. 0.1 mi; CR 150°; Mix 30kts.

2. 1000; mix or unlimited

3. CR 150°, dist. 0.1 mi; CR 150°, Mix 30kts.

4. Lt: Unit formation 4/12;

5. PD 150°, 4/12; Center to 1000, 0.1 mi; Mix 30kts.

6. 1000; Mix 30kts.

7. 1000; (Un) Radar 0.1 mi; Mix 30kts.

8. Lt: Unit formation 4/12;

9. Lt: 3 Jun 19__; 090° dist. 0.1 mi; Mix 30kts.

10. Lt: 3 Jun 19__; 090° dist. 0.1 mi; Mix 30kts.

11. Lt: 3 Jun 19__; 090° dist. 0.1 mi; Mix 30kts.

12. Lt: 3 Jun 19__; 090° dist. 0.1 mi; Mix 30kts.

13. Lt: 3 Jun 19__; 090° dist. 0.1 mi; Mix 30kts.

14. Lt: 3 Jun 19__; 090° dist. 0.1 mi; Mix 30kts.

15. Lt: 3 Jun 19__; 090° dist. 0.1 mi; Mix 30kts.

16. Lt: 3 Jun 19__; 090° dist. 0.1 mi; Mix 30kts.
11. FIRE-AIMED盧火： FIRE AT THE TARGET
1. FIRE AT THE TARGET WITH 11/10 SECONDS WA
2. WEATHER (BEST) IN A 1/10 CHANCE
3. FIRE AT THE TARGET
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100. ---
1. The ship's course is 090°.

2. The speed is 17 knots.

3. The altitude is 8,000 feet.

4. The climb is 2,000 feet per minute.

5. The turn is 90°.

6. The heading is 180°.

7. The pitch is 45°.

8. The roll is 30°.

9. The yaw is 15°.

10. The nose is up 3°.

11. The wings are level.

12. The throttle is 100%.

13. The elevator is 20°.

14. The ailerons are 10°.

15. The rudder is 0°.

16. The flaps are 10°.

17. The gear is down.

18. The brakes are off.

19. The throttle is 75%.

20. The speed is 300 knots.

21. The climb is 1,000 feet per minute.

22. The bank is 30°.

23. The roll is 20°.

24. The pitch is 15°.

25. The yaw is 15°.

26. The turn is 45°.

27. The altitude is 10,000 feet.

28. The speed is 200 knots.

29. The climb is 500 feet per minute.

30. The bank is 15°.

31. The roll is 20°.

32. The pitch is 10°.

33. The yaw is 10°.

34. The turn is 20°.

35. The altitude is 12,000 feet.

36. The speed is 180 knots.

37. The climb is 300 feet per minute.

38. The bank is 10°.

39. The roll is 15°.

40. The pitch is 5°.

41. The yaw is 5°.

42. The turn is 10°.

43. The altitude is 14,000 feet.

44. The speed is 160 knots.

45. The climb is 200 feet per minute.

46. The bank is 5°.

47. The roll is 10°.

48. The pitch is 0°.

49. The yaw is 0°.

50. The turn is 0°.

51. The altitude is 16,000 feet.

52. The speed is 140 knots.

53. The climb is 100 feet per minute.

54. The bank is 0°.

55. The roll is 0°.

56. The pitch is 0°.

57. The yaw is 0°.

58. The turn is 0°.

59. The altitude is 18,000 feet.

60. The speed is 120 knots.

61. The climb is 0 feet per minute.

62. The bank is 0°.

63. The roll is 0°.

64. The pitch is 0°.

65. The yaw is 0°.

66. The turn is 0°.

67. The altitude is 20,000 feet.

68. The speed is 100 knots.

69. The climb is 0 feet per minute.

70. The bank is 0°.

71. The roll is 0°.

72. The pitch is 0°.

73. The yaw is 0°.

74. The turn is 0°.

75. The altitude is 22,000 feet.

76. The speed is 80 knots.

77. The climb is 0 feet per minute.

78. The bank is 0°.

79. The roll is 0°.

80. The pitch is 0°.

81. The yaw is 0°.

82. The turn is 0°.

83. The altitude is 24,000 feet.

84. The speed is 60 knots.

85. The climb is 0 feet per minute.

86. The bank is 0°.

87. The roll is 0°.

88. The pitch is 0°.

89. The yaw is 0°.

90. The turn is 0°.
1. Enter 19 (20.2)  

2. 4.01 - 8.30 I. M. Z

3. 1. 1st: 8.30 AM

4. 2ND: 11:00 AM - 12:30 PM

5. 3rd: 12:30 PM - 2:00 PM

6. 4th: 2:00 PM - 4:00 PM

7. 5th: 4:00 PM - 6:00 PM

8. 6th: 8:00 PM - 10:00 PM

9. 7th: 10:30 PM - 12:00 AM

10. 8th: 12:00 AM - 2:00 AM

11. 9th: 2:00 AM - 4:00 AM

12. 10th: 4:00 AM - 6:00 AM

13. 11th: 6:00 AM - 8:00 AM

14. 12th: 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM

15. 13th: 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM

16. 14th: 12:00 PM - 2:00 PM

17. 15th: 2:00 PM - 4:00 PM

18. 16th: 4:00 PM - 6:00 PM

19. 17th: 6:00 PM - 8:00 PM

20. 18th: 8:00 PM - 10:00 PM

21. 19th: 10:00 PM - 12:00 AM

22. 20th: 12:00 AM - 2:00 AM

23. 21st: 2:00 AM - 4:00 AM

24. 22nd: 4:00 AM - 6:00 AM

25. 23rd: 6:00 AM - 8:00 AM

26. 24th: 8:00 AM - 10:00 AM

27. 25th: 10:00 AM - 12:00 PM

28. 26th: 12:00 PM - 2:00 PM

29. 27th: 2:00 PM - 4:00 PM

30. 28th: 4:00 PM - 6:00 PM

31. 29th: 6:00 PM - 8:00 PM

32. 30th: 8:00 PM - 12:00 AM

1st 4th, 26
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<tr>
<th>Column 1</th>
<th>Column 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Item 1</td>
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Note: The text continues with more items and data entries.
April 7, 1949

I am induced to believe that the condition under which I am to

remain 100 (100) if I am transferred from the experiment to

the experimental group. I like to be the one at the top of the

full list but in (2, 100). I am allowed to

the conditions at the experiment to not elaborate. I am

also to be ensured that (100) will not interfere. I am

to be trained prior to this point. Hence, I am not divided, but there will be

limited in the anti-circuit, no line.

I appeal to the oil, according to the course

of section 2. I learned to list before 180. I was told

(Change)

Capt. Glan, U.S.N., 27

Dr. Jan, 52.
1. 3 to 1/2 12.0 M. MIN. MAX. Zn.

2. 1000

3. U.S. D destroyed in 1/31

4. Name of C. B. Ill.
   Horizonal origin

5. Scouting 300 YD
   Driller

6. Fire at 3 in. (include model and caliber)
   1st
   7-1-17
   1 Cruiser

7. To or from (include bow or stern)
   Type

8. Rate of Fire
   Type

9. Total 3 in. (include 13,000 ft. per min. or ex-
   pect 3000 and direction of salvo to hit Bravo)
   3 holes released at 3000 for 3

10. 2000 W.T.

11. 2000 W.T.

12. 2000 W.T.

Note
As can be seen:

12. 

17. 

Ever more sophisticated devices (until the theoretical limits of what can be done...)

18. 

SIGNED

[Signature]

Declassified by C-3, VII Central Office
2 June 1977.
1. Date June 5, 1967

2. Time

3. Weather

4. Type of Fire

5. ROM CR

6. Type of Bomb

7. Birth Date

8. Rank

9. Name

10. Length

11. Target
5. RED B-24s. (En route to and)
    6. FUNK H-44s. (in the air to and)
    7. H-44s (flying to and)
    8. FUNK H-44s. (En route to and)
6. FUNK B-24s. (En route to and)
5. RED B-24s. (En route to and)
4. FUNK B-24s. (En route to and)
3. FUNK B-24s. (En route to and)
2. FUNK B-24s. (En route to and)
1. FUNK B-24s. (En route to and)
...e-1 (cont)

1. WILL BE INDICATED (instructor) for retarders. Instruct

right side first.

2. WILL BE (instructor)

on your normal return to 21.

(11111111)

later...

3. WILL BE (instructor)

8:30 to 9:00, end of

session 2.

Later 2:00, end class.
3. By 6 June 1943, 1,000 merchant ships had been sunk.

4. 200 naval vessels were sunk.

5. And 2,500 vessels were damaged or disabled by Allied forces.

12. Action to be...
17. **M.A.L.** (include the first and last, plus middle if any)
In order to, or in connection with
18. **End of**

One bit or item of certain [handwritten]

19. **End of**

One bit to lit

lit

lit

This Page Declassified IAW EO12958
1. ...
UNIT REFORMING: Capt Seeburger, Ldr 23rd Bomb Sq (H) Type Planes B-17 E

1. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

2. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

3. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

4. "I" is specified

5. Service (Service not marked in original).

6. UNCLASSIFIED

7. "I" is specified

8. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

9. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

10. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

11. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

12. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

13. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

14. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

15. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

16. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

17. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

18. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

19. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

20. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

21. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

22. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

23. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

24. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

25. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

26. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

27. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

28. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

29. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

30. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

31. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

32. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

33. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

34. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

35. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

36. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

37. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

38. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

39. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

40. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

41. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

42. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

43. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

44. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

45. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

46. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

47. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

48. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

49. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.

50. 50 N. 38° 06' 45" W. 10,164 L. A.C.T.
A sender E (c.o.

1. 10:00 a.m. 15/41 7/41 10/41 15/41 15/41

2. 17/41 12/41 10/41

3. 11/41 10/41 1/41 10/41 15/41

4. 10/41 10/41 10/41 10/41 10/41

5. 10/41 10/41 10/41 10/41 10/41

6. 10/41 10/41 10/41 10/41 10/41

7. 10/41 10/41 10/41 10/41 10/41

8. 10/41 10/41 10/41 10/41 10/41

SECURITY INFORMATION

THIS PAGE Declassified IAW EO12958
1. DATE: 10 April 1945
2. SUBJECT: Seizure of Dr, Wood
3. WARD: Intake of 462Staff
4. INTAKE OF 462STAFF: Intagiation of 462Staff
5. O.C.I.D OF 462STAFF: None
6. SCANNED: None
7. FILED: None
8. REVIEWED: None
9. FILED AS 462STAFF: None
10. SCANNED AS 462STAFF: None
11. SECURITY INFORMATION:

THIS PAGE Declassified IAW EO12958


11. First Item, Second Item...

1. Item 

2. Item 

3. Item 

4. Item 

5. Item 

6. Item 

7. Item 

8. Item 

9. Item 

10. Item 

11. Item 

12. Item 

13. Item 

14. Item 

15. Item 

16. Item 

17. Item 

18. Item 

19. Item 

20. Item 

21. Item 

22. Item 

23. Item 

24. Item 

25. Item 

26. Item 

27. Item 

28. Item 

29. Item 

30. Item 

31. Item 

32. Item 

33. Item 

34. Item 

35. Item 

36. Item 

37. Item 

38. Item 

39. Item 

40. Item 

41. Item 

42. Item 

43. Item 

44. Item 

45. Item 

46. Item 

47. Item 

48. Item 

49. Item 

50. Item 

51. Item 

52. Item 

53. Item 

54. Item 

55. Item 

56. Item 

57. Item 

58. Item 

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62. Item 

63. Item 

64. Item 

65. Item 

66. Item 

67. Item 

68. Item 

69. Item 

70. Item 

71. Item 

72. Item 

73. Item 

74. Item 

75. Item 

76. Item 

77. Item 

78. Item 

79. Item 

80. Item 

81. Item 

82. Item 

83. Item 

84. Item 

85. Item 

86. Item 

87. Item 

88. Item 

89. Item 

90. Item 

91. Item 

92. Item 

93. Item 

94. Item 

95. Item 

96. Item 

97. Item 

98. Item 

99. Item 

100. Item
First Paragraph

Second Paragraph

Third Paragraph
1.  At 0.00.00 Zulu 01/01/1985, the forecast winds were 100° at 15 knots.

2.  The cloud cover at 01/01/1985, 00:00:00 Zulu was moderate to heavy, with visibility reduced.

3.  The visibility was 1 mile at 01/01/1985, 00:00:00 Zulu.

4.  The maximum temperature at 01/01/1985, 00:00:00 Zulu was 5°C.

5.  The minimum temperature at 01/01/1985, 00:00:00 Zulu was -5°C.

6.  The precipitation at 01/01/1985, 00:00:00 Zulu was 0.5 inches.

7.  The barometric pressure at 01/01/1985, 00:00:00 Zulu was 1015.5 mb.

8.  The sea level pressure at 01/01/1985, 00:00:00 Zulu was 1015 mb.

9.  The wind direction at 01/01/1985, 00:00:00 Zulu was 225°.

10.  The wind speed at 01/01/1985, 00:00:00 Zulu was 15 knots.

11.  The dew point at 01/01/1985, 00:00:00 Zulu was 5°C.

12.  The relative humidity at 01/01/1985, 00:00:00 Zulu was 80%.

13.  The visibility at 01/01/1985, 00:00:00 Zulu was 1 mile.

14.  The precipitation at 01/01/1985, 00:00:00 Zulu was 0.5 inches.

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

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SECRET

1. This mail is for the use of Mr. J. D. and Mrs. J. D. by the author. 

2. The contents of this mail are considered confidential.

3. The sender and recipient of this mail are authorized to read it.

4. The letter is addressed to Mr. J. D. and Mrs. J. D.

5. The date of this letter is unknown.

6. The sender's name is unknown.

7. The recipient's name is unknown.

8. This letter contains security information.

SECURITY INFORMATION
\[ \text{Security Information} \]

\[ \text{Confidential} \]

THIS PAGE Declassified IAW EO12958
... (cont.)

E.H.: Hell, ...

G.B.: I'm trying.

E.H.: I want your ( )

G.B.: Well, ...

E.H.: (cont.)

G.B.: It's not clear yet...

E.H.: (cont.)

G.B.: I'm trying...

E.H.: (cont.)

G.B.: Seventy thousand on...
SECURITY INFORMATION
Annex 10

(No. 0256-2M-5548. A recent incident)

(Author: Mr. A. M. 2M. 5548) 

(Mr. A. M. 2M. 5548) 

(June 1943)

SCOPE:  

(Author: Mr. A. M. 2M. 5548)

COL: Co. auq. General, covert air force, etc.  5548

Notices of the report are to be submitted to the commanding officer for immediate action. If any action is taken, the report will be submitted.

Below is a compilation of all incidents, period 21-2 June 1943, by covert crew, identified to the covert crew commander:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2nd Flight</th>
<th>(Captain)</th>
<th>(Flying)</th>
<th>3rd Flight</th>
<th>(Flying)</th>
<th>4th Flight</th>
<th>(Flying)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>(Captain)</td>
<td>(Flying)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Flying)</td>
<td>(Flying)</td>
<td>(Flying)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4th Flight</th>
<th>(Flying)</th>
<th>3rd Flight</th>
<th>(Flying)</th>
<th>2nd Flight</th>
<th>(Flying)</th>
<th>1st Flight</th>
<th>(Flying)</th>
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<td>(Flying)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(Flying)</td>
<td>(Flying)</td>
<td>(Flying)</td>
<td>(Flying)</td>
<td>(Flying)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Security Information

This Page Declassified IAW EO12958
CONTINUED

5. Following a report of a veritable upsurge in the number of routine cases, the following was submitted to [redacted]:

- Increased [redacted]
- Increased [redacted]
- Increased [redacted]

6. It is recommended that all personnel be informed of this development.

7. Enclosure:

a. [Redacted]

b. [Redacted]
\[\text{Table 1 (cont.)}\]

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Name & Rank & Unit & Location \\
\hline
John Smith & 1st Lt & 1st Platoon & Company A \\
Jane Doe & Capt & Battery C & 2nd Battalion \\
Bob Johnson & Maj & Headquarters & 1st Brigade \\
Sue Lee & Capt & 3rd Platoon & Company B \\
Tom Brown & 1st Lt & Battery D & 2nd Battalion \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\section*{Notes}

- John Smith was promoted to 1st Lt on 1/1/20.
- Jane Doe transferred to 2nd Battalion on 2/1/20.
- Sue Lee was moved to 3rd Platoon on 4/1/20.
- Tom Brown was reassigned to Battery D on 5/1/20.

\section*{Confidential Information}

- Confidential information is marked with the word 'CONFIDENTIAL'.
This Page Declassified IAW EO12958
CONFIDENTIAL

27th February

Page 10 (cont.)

<table>
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<td>Full Name</td>
<td>Rank</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Full Name</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Unit</td>
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<td>Rank</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Serial No.</td>
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<td>Rank</td>
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<td>Serial No.</td>
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<td>July</td>
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<td>Rank</td>
<td>Unit</td>
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<td>Full Name</td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Unit</td>
<td>Serial No.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>July</td>
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<th>July</th>
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<th>Unit</th>
<th>Serial No.</th>
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<td>Rank</td>
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<td>Serial No.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>July</td>
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27th March

Security Information

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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>C-15</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>alternate</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>C-15</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>alternate</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>C-15</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>alternate</td>
<td>1/26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>C-15</td>
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<tr>
<td>alternate</td>
<td>1/27</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>C-15</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

This page is confidential, and any further discussion is restricted to those individuals authorized to receive such information.


This Page Declassified IAW EO12958
APPENDIX 11

Daily Reports to War Department from Hawaiian Air Force

30 May 1942 to 15 June 1942
2.  2" Hit (2x 2")

   Sidestream or Direct hit (Comm. only)

   1.  Dead
   2.  Out
   3.  Out
   4.  Out
   5.  Out

For the next Interval:

---

This Page Declassified IAW EO12958
...
CONFIDENTIAL

AIR WAY (d/f)

Int'l

Collared Oil

7/25/45

1 Per

1 Pk

2.5per

100

100

1. Int'l.

Collared Oil

7/25/45

1 Per

1 Pk

2.5per

100

100

1. Int'l.

Collared Oil

7/25/45

1 Per

1 Pk

2.5per

100

100

1. Int'l.

Collared Oil

7/25/45

1 Per

1 Pk

2.5per

100

100

1. Int'l.

Collared Oil

7/25/45

1 Per

1 Pk

2.5per

100

100

1. Int'l.

Collared Oil

7/25/45

1 Per

1 Pk

2.5per

100

100

1. Int'l.

Collared Oil

7/25/45

1 Per

1 Pk

2.5per

100

100

1. Int'l.

Collared Oil

7/25/45

1 Per

1 Pk

2.5per

100

100

1. Int'l.

Collared Oil

7/25/45

1 Per

1 Pk

2.5per

100

100

1. Int'l.

Collared Oil

7/25/45

1 Per

1 Pk

2.5per

100

100

1. Int'l.

Collared Oil

7/25/45

1 Per

1 Pk

2.5per

100

100

1. Int'l.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ARMY AIR FORCES:
(Attention AAF Historical Office)

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