ORGANIZATION OF
MILITARY AERONAUTICS
1935-1945
(EXECUTIVE, CONGRESSIONAL,
AND WAR DEPARTMENT ACTION)

The original of this monograph and the documents from which it was written are in the USAF Historical Division, Archives Branch, blog. 974, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

AAF HISTORICAL OFFICE
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
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Historical Office
Headquarters, Army Air Forces
April 1946

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FOREWORD

This study was prepared in the AAF Historical Office, Administrative History Branch, by Dr. Chase S. Mooney. It continues the narrative developed in AAF Historical Studies: No. 25, Organization of Military Aeronautics, 1907-1935.

The establishment of the GHQ Air Force in 1935 represented the first major advance toward official recognition of airmen's contention that air power was a coordinate striking force and not merely an auxiliary of the ground arm. The movement for greater freedom of action was continued throughout the decade by members of the Air Corps, air-minded Congressmen, and public proponents of air power. Increasing recognition of the military necessity of air supremacy, rapid expansion of the air arm, and the approach of declared warfare hastened organizational changes and brought increased authority for the air forces. In 1944 a special congressional committee held hearings on the organization of the postwar armed forces as a preliminary step toward possible future realignment of the whole military structure. In the fall of 1945, the issue of organization was openly joined by the branches of the armed forces before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs and the public.

This study relates the story of the organizational changes with emphasis upon the efforts to gain an efficient working arrangement; executive, congressional, and War Department action are stressed.

Readers familiar with the subject treated herein are invited to contribute additional facts, interpretations, and constructive suggestions. To this end, perforated sheets, properly addressed, are to be found at the back of this study.
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Organization of Military Aeronautics, 1935-1945
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Chapter I

THE AIR CORPS AND THE GHQ AIR FORCE, 1 MARCH 1935 TO 1 MARCH 1939

The creation of the GHQ Air Force on 1 March 1935 was an important milestone on the road toward recognition by the War Department of the increasing importance of military aviation. The "air arm," coordinate with the four ground arms, was organized and commanded in such a manner that it could cooperate with the ground forces or be employed independently. This consolidation of tactical units under the single command of an air officer greatly increased the authority and responsibility of the air arm. But supply and training units remained under the Chief of the Air Corps, who was on the same echelon of command as the CG, GHQ Air Force, and difficulty and misunderstanding was unavoidable.¹

The grouping of tactical units under the commanding general of the new agency was a definite advance over the former method of having them controlled by the commanders of the several corps areas. Chief among the remaining problems insofar as freedom of action by the Air Corps was involved was that concerning the relation of the Air Corps stations and personnel to the corps area commanders. The CG, GHQ Air Force had complete operational control of the tactical units, but the corps area commanders retained administrative jurisdiction over the bases.

¹ For a discussion of the background of the creation of the GHQ Air Force, see AAF Historical Studies: No. 25, Organization of Military Aeronautics, 1907-1935: Congressional and War Department Action.
Although the CG, GHQ Air Force was responsible for the discipline of his command, he lacked court-martial authority. This function remained with the corps area commanders, and, coupled with area control of the bases, was the cause of conflict between airmen and personnel of other arms. Likewise, the division of authority and concomitant ill-defined spheres of jurisdiction between the Office, Chief of the Air Corps and the GHQ Air Force prevented the air arm from presenting a united front in its relations with higher authority.\(^2\)

The War Department ordered reports from the CG, GHQ Air Force and the Chief of the Air Corps at the end of one year of operation under the new system. The principal difficulties in the system—control of bases and division of authority within the arm—were in evidence long before that time, however, and remedial action had been recommended. The problem relative to bases was a more immediate concern since the freedom of action of the arm was directly affected. The division of responsibilities between the two elements of the arm complicated relations with higher echelons but this issue was tempered by the fact that both groups were airmen and were seeking, though by different means, the same end.

Certain of the Air Corps officials early pointed out the necessity for simplifying command channels and relationships and strongly urged the union of the CCAC and GHQ Air Force, but to no avail.\(^3\) The Browning Board, appointed in September 1935 to study the personnel problems peculiar to the Air Corps, went beyond its stated mission to deal with

2. These relationships are treated in more detail in AAF Historical Studies: No. 10, Organization of the Army Air Arm, 1935-1943.
3. See ibid.
the difficulties arising from a division of authority within the corps areas. It could discover no evidence of "intentional interference with the Air Force operations on the part of any Corps Commander," but there were some minor misunderstandings. The Board could see no justification for the established means of control because "there appears to be no help that can be given the Air Force by corps area commanders other than that now rendered by them to stations on an exempted basis." The existing organisation, it was emphasised, imposed a "real responsibility" on station commanders and divided control; the best remedy appeared to be the placing of "all Air Force stations and all personnel and units thereto solely under the Air Force chain of command."5

While this proposal was being considered, Maj. Gen. Frank H. Andrews, C/3, G-3, Air Force, strongly supported the recommendation for complete exemption of Air Force stations from corps area control. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 held a different view; he not only opposed the exempted status of the stations but also suggested that the elements of the G-3 Air Force be placed under the Field Force army commanders. The Deputy Chief of Staff, however, supported the Board's recommendation. On 8 May 1923 Air Corps stations were exempted from corps area control.6 Court-martial jurisdiction remained with the corps area.

commanders, but the chain of authority otherwise was considerably simplified, removing a primary cause of friction; and the Air Corps advanced further towardarser control of its activities.

Nevertheless several suggestions had been made to unite the CAG and the AF Jr Force. From the standpoint of efficient division was undesirable because it made administration more difficult and uncertain and weakened the position of the air arm by causing the commanders of the two coordinate elements to report individually to higher and separate authority. In early November 1935, General Andrews had emphasized the ineffectiveness of one agency (CAG) controlling funds, selecting equipment and personnel, and prescribing tactics and methods of employment of combat units without having responsibility for combat efficiency, while the other agency (AF Jr Force) was responsible for the results but had no authorized voice in securing the plans to accomplish the desired end.

General Andrews proposed several possible remedies, among them the establishment of an air section in each division of the War Dept and of General Staff; but he believed that the best solution was to establish a separate air division responsible for military aviation. This division, headed by an assistant chief of staff, would furnish the necessary superior control and give the General Staff the proper organization to handle air matters. Such a solution, General Andrews suggested, would have the added advantage of results of quicker committee for a separate air force, unifying the Air Corps, and preventing the recurrence of such condition as made it necessary to separate the tactical units from the Chief of the Air Corps.\(^\text{7}\)

The Chief of the Air Corps, Maj. Gen. C. G. O. Eastover, saw no merit in General Andrews' suggestion for an air section in each division of the General Staff or for such division of the General Staff. He had a higher opinion of the proposal for an Air Corps assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff, but General Eastover in a memorandum of 17 January reiterated his earlier conviction that to place the G-3 Air Force under the Chief of the Air Corps—who would have full responsibility to the Chief of Staff—and the most feasible means of ensuring unity of control.

This same attitude had been expressed by the Training Board only 10 days earlier. That body, in discussing organization, stated:

This organization has divided the Air Corps into two sections... here it is clear that the present organization is unsound, lacking in unity and increasing the amount of overlap necessary for administration and operation... the board believes that the new organization should center around the Chief of the Air Corps. There is at present duplication, overlapping, and confusion. A clear determination of duties and responsibilities is first necessary... The board believes that the creation and continued maintenance of a G-3 to be sound and wise, and that thorough and continuous training for combat operations is vital to it... further... that a consolidation of the Air Corps under one head will permit the Commanding General, G-3 Air Force, to devote his maximum effort to training and administration.

An Air Corps board was convened to study the Board's recommendations. All members except one representative of the G-3 Air Force agreed that they should support the consolidation of the G-3 Air Force under the Chief of the Air Corps, but the members had been unable to reach complete accord on action to be taken. 10 "Owing, on 25 April 1938, the Chief of

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4. "Report of Training Board appointed to survey personal situation of the Air Corps, 7 Jan. 1938, in Cig. 3515, Orders, General.
5. Consolidation would have been for administrative purposes only; the G-3 Air Force would have retained separate operating command. For a full account of this report and the subsequent controversy, see AV 321-2, Board Reports (titled) 27-281-2, G-3 Air Force... Air Corps; and AV 320-2 (9-16-44) pp. 1, sec. 1-b.
the air corps again recommended that the G-2 Air Corps be subordinated to the G-3/G-4. It was contended that this subordination would be in accord with the responsibilities of the Chief of the Air Corps as Chief of an arm of the War Department; the smaller element would come under the jurisdiction of the latter, and the desire of the War Department that all air matters be settled within the air could more nearly be complied with. 11

Four days later the Deputy Chief of Staff recommended that the Chief of the Air Corps be given some functions of a deputy chief of staff; in that manner he would gain more authority than the G-3, G-4 Air Force but would have no command jurisdiction over that officer. 12 Not even this unobtrusive solution, however, was approved by the War Department.

General Strong was impatient with inaction by the War Department and was convinced that an energetic effort to solve Air Corps problems was not being made. In July 1927 he criticized the study made under the direction of the G-2, G-4 for its failure to deal with the fundamental problems of the Air Force. He accused G-2 of entertaining a fear that the Air Corps might "grow to overshadow other elements of the War Department" and asserted that this fear had been partially responsible for the inadequate results obtained. The G-3, G-4 Air Force concluded with the "considered opinion" that the greatest possible benefit would accrue to the War Department if the major effort in national defense were expended in developing air power. 13

At the end of the second year of the existence of the G-2 Air Force,

the commanding General of the Army and the Chief of the Air Corps were still advancing different solutions to the problem created by the division of authority in the Air Corps. The Chief of the Air Corps in a report of 1 May 1937 suggested that he, in addition to other duties, be designated Chief of Aviation, G3, and be placed above the G3, Chief Air Force in the chain of command. General Andrews in a report submitted on the same day re-emphasized the lack of unity of command and stressed the fact that although theoretically the General Staff coordinated air activities, this was actually done by the Chief of the Air Corps. Although G3/CMS lacked legal authority for such coordination, by acting as a superior air general staff it could "exert a high degree of control over the instrument it [the Air Force] intended to serve." On this occasion General Andrews made no specific recommendations. He expressed the view, however, that any action providing for the creation of some coordinating agency should not be considered preferable to the existing organization, he maintained, could not hold an effective striking force; if the G3/Air Force was to remain "skeletonized," there was no reason for such as the administrative overhead. 14

The Chief of the Air Corps remarked in November of that year that he did not care to go into details in rebutting the assertion that the CMS had acted as a general staff over the G3/Air Force, but he did wish to state that

the Chief of the Air Corps and his staff are a part of the War Department and, as such, endeavor to advise the Chief of Staff personally and the War Department General Staff on all matters

15. "Ave for '37, O-2 by Maj. Gen. Oscar Hasek, 2 Nov. 1937, in G3 321.00, G3 Air Force . . . Air Corps. The Chief of Staff in his annual report for 1937 had noted that the subject of organization of the air was one necessitating continuing study. Leman, loc 100 (contd)
A little more than a month before this "reply" by General Hays, however, General Andrews had pointed out that the weaknesses of the Air Corps organization were accentuated by the "continual difficulties" over personnel, equipment, and funds. These problems were held to be practically insoluble as long as the chiefs of the two elements remained on the same echelon, but he suggested three methods for breaking the impasse: (1) the creation of a Chief of Aviation who would control both service and tactical units; (2) the appointment of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation; or (3) the subordination of the CIG Air Force to the Chief of the Air Corps. Of the three solutions he considered the third the least desirable, but it did have the advantageous feature of making the Chief of the Air Corps directly responsible for aviation and reconnaissance units which he could affect; the CIG Air Force and other tactical units. This proposal, like earlier ones, did not receive favorable consideration.

Apparently no specific proposals or comments were made in 1931, but in February 1932 the Chief of the Air Corps again recommended that he be designated Chief of Aviation, CIG. He claimed that the acceptance of this suggestion would have three distinct advantages: (1) the air arm could be organized in such a manner that in the event of hostilities an operating...

16 (cont'd.). Since, he said, that the setting up of the CIG Air Force is an integral part of the military establishment "conforms to the principles of sound military organization. This fact is confirmed by the lessons of air operations in the current warfare abroad." "Anual Report of the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of War," 1937, pp. 12-13.

17. Ibid., p. 11.
staff would be "immediately available" without disrupting the administrative set-up; (2) the missing element in current and future missions of the AAF would not be effective; and (3) the separation of business between the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Air Corps would be expedited.

Less than one month later, in March, the PPA and the AAF were transferred under the administrative jurisdiction of the Chief of the Air Corps. The special duties of the C of AAF were unaffected but his immediate responsibility was to the Chief of the Air Corps and not to the Chief of Staff. In the event of new tactical air units would be controlled by the theater commanders.

Thus, after four years of discussion, the first year saw the division of administrative responsibility between the two elements of the AAF. This resulted especially in division because it came at the time of the increased use of military expansion. Although air officials considered the foundation of the expansion necessary to accomplish expansion objectives, the realization was destined to be short-lived.

Meanwhile, a rational procedure for a direct department of air or single department of national defense in which the Air component would enjoy equality with the Navy is revealed in a contention for Air Corps. During 1921 only since 1930 providing a separate department of Air were increased, and one of these was prior to the expansion of the AAF. The Air Corps was held by the conditions to which the service were referred, and the Air Corps ended an only one of Air.

19. "...", 1921, 1926, "...", 1921, 1926, 1926, 1926, ...
The bill of the Air Corps pointed out that the terms of the A.A. 3723 were too general; it could be interpreted to allow the transfer of the ordnance department, the signal corps, the office of the Assistant Secretary of War, and the corresponding naval agencies to the new department of air service. On the other hand, it would not permit the transfer of certain agencies essential to the proper functioning of the air units. The bill of the Air Corps concluded with the observation that the amendment of H. J. Res. 787 in its present form would treat the national defense of the United States, and its enactment should be opposed as vigorously as possible by the Air Force and the War Department.\(^{20}\)

Two bills, H. J. Res. 743 and H. J. Res. 828, calling the establishment of a department of national defense were presented.\(^{21}\) H. J. Res. 743 proposed to limit the activities of the national defense establishments to defense purposes only; this could well have been construed to exclude bombardment aviation. The House division, 71-228, recommended that the Air Corps support the creation of a single department of national defense, but the details of the bill were definitely disapproved.\(^{22}\) No official comments were made, and both bills died in committee.

The Air Corps expressed an interest in H. J. Res. 828, introduced by Representative John F. Byrnes (C. C.). This measure led to its primary reference.

\(^{20}\) 8th Ind. (by return to H.J., 16 July 1928), 6/3 to 28, 26 July 1928, in 10 C.D., legislation.

\(^{21}\) Cong., 8th Ind.sess., 1928, 157, 16196. H. J. Res. 743 was identical to H. J. Res. 828 of 11 March 1928 and several other earlier bills introduced by Hon. William H. King (16th).

\(^{22}\) 8th Ind. for 1/2 by Lt. Col. J. C. Scholz, 15 Nov. 1928, in 10 C.D., legislation. The other abortive measures of that year were H. J. Res. 103, to establish a committee to study and report on national defense in army and navy, and H. J. Res. 128 to create the 1928 committee for property co-operations which had been recommended by the Bell Commission. Cong., 8th Ind. sess., 1st Ind. 101, 1928.
purpose the prevention of profiteering and would have given to the
President broad powers in the event of war. The interest of the Air Corps
stemmed from the fact that the President would have been able to create
a Department of national defense or a separate Air Corps without further
congressional authorization. Hearings and legislative action focused
on profiteering and munitions, however, and the interest of the Air Corps
waned.

The advocates of a Department of national defense and a department
for air were either firmly well satisfied that the CFA Air Force was the
answer to the problem of proper organization of the air era or felt that
by refraining from introducing congressional measures authorizing different
setups they would signify their willingness to give the new organization
an adequate trial. At any rate, very few bills were presented until 1935.
During 1936 not a single bill or resolution appeared, and no sentiment of
significance was made in either house of Congress.

In 1937 two measures, H. R. 1488 and H. R. 5732, were introduced to establish
a single Department of national defense. The former, introduced on
5 January by Representative Gerald J. Boilus (D-I1) and very similar to
H. R. 8729 of 1935, was not reported from the Committee on Appropriations
in the House. During discussion on the naval appropriations bill, however, Boilus spoke briefly on his bill, and in an informal session of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union
considering H. R. 5822 for the reorganization of the services of

Legislation; Hearings, 76th Cong., 1 sess., 1938. H. R. 5222, in
an amended form, passed the House but was buried in the Senate
Committee on Finance, the third Senate committee to receive it.
government, he introduced an amendment which would have accomplished the same fundamental purpose as H. R. 1486. On a division vote, demanded by Boileau, the amendment was defeated 122 to 61.\(^\text{24}\)

On 18 January 1937 Representative J. Mark Silcox (Fla.) introduced H. R. 3151 providing for the removal of the Air Corps from the supervision of the General Staff and placing it directly under the Secretary of War.\(^\text{25}\) The Chief of the Air Corps expressed his disapproval of the proposed change. He was convinced that the best interests of the national defense could be served by leaving the Air Corps as a part of the Army. The intent of that portion of the bill which would place supreme command and control of the Air Corps as a whole, including the GHQ Air Force, under the Chief of the Air Corps should, he felt, be made effective in time of peace by War Department directive.\(^\text{26}\)

The Secretary of War was more pronounced in his opposition to this bill. In a letter to the chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs he drew attention to the fact that the bill was a "revival of the old controversy of a separate unified air corps, which has been frequently agitated since the close of the World War." All special investigating bodies, with the single exception of the Croxell Commission of 1919, he pointed out, had deemed it undesirable,\(^\text{27}\) and the President was convinced

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24. \textit{Cong. Rec.}, 74 Cong., 1 Sess., 31, 8847, 8870-71. Nothing further was heard about H. R. 5785 after its reference to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.
26. Memo for AO/5, G-3 by C/AC, 3 Feb. 1937, in AAB 321.9 Bulk (5-16-37). A 59-page statement was prepared for the Chief of the Air Corps to use if hearings were held. In Plans Div. file, AF320.
27. The Lempert Committee, it should be noted, had recommended in 1925 that a single Department of National Defense be created. \textit{Report of the Select Committee of Inquiry into Operations of the United States Air Services}, 8.
of the consequences of these recommendations. The proposed organization would require too elaborate coordinating agency. The Air Department was the proper structure for coordinating such activity and should not be superseeded by what would eventually amount to a super general staff. The bill, according to the Secretary, was so technically deficient that it was doubtful if the existing phreakology could achieve its objective. Finally, the 18,525 officers, 40,000 enlisted men, and indefinite number of reserve officers prescribed for the Air Corps would constitute so large a force that they would "completely overwhelm the Army as a whole." The Secretary cited the argument of his predecessor on p. 7301 (76 Cong., 2 Sess.), that the bill "would provide for Air Corps so far beyond any similar estimate of our defense needs and so costly that its present could be construed by the world only as evidence either of ardent militarism or immediate war." He was "unalterably opposed" to any changes in the existing organization of the Air Department.

The bill died in committee, but an interesting aftermath resulted from the request of the Chief of the Air Corps to circulate the Secretary's communication for the information and guidance of Air Corps officials. The original request was returned on 20 day with the suggestion that it be resubmitted on 1 hour. Upon resubmission, the decision was that the information be Communicated by oral word only. The Chief of the Air Corps thereupon assembled his immediate assistants, explained the Secretary's arguments and the "recent helpful attitude" of the War Department toward the Air Corps, and enlisted the group against any written discussion.

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29. In: "for 50 of 5th. Cn. 34-37. 14 May 137. 1st Ind. to 2/7/30. 29 Ind. to 2/7/30. 24 July 30 to 2/7/30. 25 Ind.; note on 50 Ind. 30 w. ill in ibid. \[REDACTED\]
The reason for this particular method of reconciling the claim with the stand of the Secretary, either separately or as put in written form, paralleling the seeming indifference or satisfaction within the air far itself was the inactivity in Congress in 1919; no bills were introduced and in any event no discussion on the organization of military aeronautics. In early 1919 two bills (H. R. 3791 and S. 1370) seeking the establishment of a department of national defense were the usual pattern—Secretary of War assistant secretaries for War, Navy, and Air—were introduced on 20 January and 15 February, respectively, but neither carried in the Committee on Appropriations in the Executive departments.

During the hearings on H. R. 3791 in early 1920 the question of the organization of the air came up and subject of brief discussion. Secretary of War. In reply to a query from Senator Nash of Ohio, expressed opposition to a separate of national defense and said that the duties of the nation's defense and the air were so different that they could be coordinated under any one of the several branches of the government over which the air should have control. He also asked if the air force should be separate from the rest of the national defense. In closing, Senator Nash said, "I would prefer not to throw this question, air" into the bill.


more or less the same attitude as the General. At the start, the Air Corps was very much in favor of the expansion program, but the energies of its own, we believed, would be better utilized. It was not a function for which the Air Corps was best suited. The Air Corps felt that it was not in a position to provide the assistance which could be rendered by the other services of the Department. "That is the way we feel now," he concluded. 32

Bern Dorsey, president of the Air Defense League, was very outspoken in his criticism of the existing aviation organization. He pointed out the differences between the Army and Air Force special-purpose aviation and that the Air Force had been established in a central, and stressed the need for an agency to control air power. Dorsy would have placed all the special-purpose aviation under a separate administration for air defense; the Army and Navy would retain their own air elements. Then air power had developed a little further, he thought, that it should become coordinate with the Army and Navy in a single department of national defense. In addition to the three assistant secretaries for the combat elements, Dorsy proposed an assistant secretary for industrial mobilization. He, it appears, would have broad powers over production and production controls. Some earlier proposals had included a supply officer on a high echelon, but the powers to be granted him were rather vague compared with those of Dorsy's assistant secretary. 33

Very soon after those hearings the Air Force was consolidated with the GPO, and the organization of military aviation temporarily because of less concern than the fulfillment of the expansion objectives. The rapid growth, however, was to accommodate the problems, and organization and relationships again demanded close attention.

32. Senate, Hearings on H. Res. 311, 76 Cong., 1 Sess., 1940, 52.
The probability of fulfilling the requirements of the accelerated extension program had been increased by giving the Chief of the Air Corps administrative jurisdiction over the 6th Air Force on 1 March 1943. The expansion of the training, materiel, and personnel objectives and the shortage of planes and trained personnel made it essential to have the best possible coordination of effort. Therefore, the necessity for continuing the arrangement of 1 March 1943 was stressed by the Chief of the Air Corps. His advice was unavailing, however, and on 10 November 1943 the 6th Air Force was removed from the jurisdiction of the G5E.1

Injurious effects of this redivision of administrative responsibility between the two elements of the air arm were moderated by the influence of General Arnold, who had recently been appointed Acting Deputy Chief of Staff.2 This appointment, suggested much earlier as a possible remedy for poor coordination of air activities, placed the former chief of the Air Corps in a favorable position to reconcile the differences of the two elements, to prevent duplication of effort, and to direct the efforts of both.

The action of 10 November 1940 also changed the relationship of the

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air arm to the war department. The AF Air Force as an element of the field forces was placed under the control of the General commanding the field forces. The excepted status of the Air stations was re-posed, and the station complements were once again placed under the jurisdiction of the corps area commanders. Thus, the concept of the employment of air power as a separate force had received a setback, and much of the independence of action which had been secured earlier was removed. Many circuits were naturally disappointed with the failure to keep the two elements under one head, but their strongest objection was registered in regard to placing station complements under the corps area commanders. It was emphasized that this reversion to the organization which had been in effect until 8 May 1930 when it had been discarded was unsatisfactory. 3

Vic. Gen. C. C. Scott, Acting Chief of the Air Corps, severely criticized the organization and the lack of centralized control of air activities. He pointed out: (1) that the strain placed upon the war department by the emergency Air Corps expansion program had revealed the existing system to be cumbersome and inadequate; and (2) that the deficiencies of the central system were basic in nature, would not end with the completion of the program, and in one of its major war effort their continued existence would be disastrous. 4 Exalating upon his second point, Scott wrote:

The basic fault in our present system is the lack of centralized authority and responsibility for air direction and control of air matters. There is no one designated authoritative head charged with responsibility and also possessing the necessary authority to carry out that responsibility. The plans and policies


by the best qualified air staff available, in the Office of the
Chief of the Air Corps, are subject to review and approval by a
superior staff, largely composed of personnel lacking the highly
specialized knowledge of air matters essential as a background
for the matters which they are considering. The operation of
this system results in interminable delay, the hampering of
basic plans and policies, disapproval of proposals without de-
veloping substitute proposals, and a general lack of approved
directives essential for the planned and orderly progress of
our great air defense effort.

The imperative need of close coordination and interchange of ideas and
personnel between training, technical, and tactical activities of the Air
Corps was emphasized; as long as the existing separation of functions
between the OCA and the CAF Air Force continued, such direct interchange
was "difficult if not impossible."

As a remedy for this situation, General Brett proposed that there
be three deputy chiefs of staff and three assistant secretaries of war:
one each for ground and air matters and one for services "common to both
the ground forces and the air forces." Each deputy chief of staff would
be assisted by a special staff. The Deputy Chief of Staff (Services)
would act as the mediator between the other deputies in any conflict
concerning requirements. Final authority for the resolution of difficulties
would lie, of course, with the Chief of Staff. There would also be a War
Plans Council and a Budget Section composed of air and ground mem-
bers. The Acting Chief of the Air Corps suggested that the OCA provide the staff
for the Deputy Chief of Staff (Air). The realignment could be put into
operation without any major reorganization, he believed. "All that is
necessary . . . is the shifting of authorities and responsibilities between
existing agencies." No action was taken on General Brett's proposal.

However, the many similarities, particularly the division into three broad

5. Ibid.
categories, to the organization put into effect on March 1/2 are worthy of note.

On the first day following the approval of the initial plans of the Air Corps, 27 October 1919, Mr. R. P. Lord, in charge of the Department of work in the Office of Air Corps, was appointed assistant to the Under Secretary of Air, to serve as a representative of the Under Secretary, on all questions involved in the procurement of airplanes, including purchase and production. He was the deputy chief of staff for Mr. R. P. Lord, and held that position in addition to his duties as assistant to the Under Secretary of Air. In April 1921, Mr. R. P. Lord was elevated to the position of Assistant Secretary of Air, and in June 1921, he was appointed to the position of Assistant Secretary of War.

Mr. R. P. Lord's position was redesignated as Assistant Secretary of War in 1923. The appointment of Mr. R. P. Lord was viewed as a success for the Under Secretary of Air, and his appointment was highly regarded among the organization.

The relationship between the Office of Air and the Under Secretary established on 19 October 1919 continued until 20 June 1921, when it was determined that the relationship was not to the best interests of the expansion program. In April 1921, the Secretary of War directed that the

...to be given to the Chief of Air and under one responsible head, the best plan is to organize an organization staffed and equipped to provide an effective force with essential equipment and units for the operation of the organization, while at the same time establishing and controlling the staff not to any loss of the system and the organization.

4. The position of Assistant Secretary of War was established in 1920; it was abolished to become vacant in the spring of 1925.
5. Below, to direct 5/3, 10 Dec. 1921, for the naming of the Assistant Secretary of War in the Office of Air, 21 June 1921.
The Secretary expressed the conviction that autonomy of the air arm rather than so-called independence was the best method of obtaining successful results.

In accordance with the Secretary's instructions, steps were taken to achieve the stipulated end. Many conversations were held and several plans proposed. Practically all revolved about the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air as the coordinating agency, with the CINC Air Forces as the CO-S remaining on the same position. One plan, which appears to have been prepared by the Air Corps in early 1940, deserves attention because many of its features seem to have been adopted finally. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Air was also to be designated as Chief of Mission. Directly subordinate to him were to be the Air Council (the chief coordinating agency), over which the Chief of the Air Corps would preside. The Council was to be composed of the Chief of the Air Staff, the CINC Air Force, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, the Chief of Air Service, and such other members as might be appointed, especially by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air. Below this was to be headquarters, CINC Air Forces which would supervise the activities of the CINC Air Force and the Chief of the Air Service. The skeleton of the Air organization would be the Assistant Secretary of War for Air (the Air Planning Staff) of which the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air was to be a member.

9. The composition and function of certain components were not very clear. For instance, the Chief of the Air Staff, probably the most important position in the Air Staff, was not yet to prepare plans and policies for the approval of the Air Council. See note for 6/13 by Secy/OGS, 7 May 1941; note for all division chiefs by Col. G. E. Strother, 20 May 1941; note for 6/6 by Secy/OGS, 6/6/17, 18 May 1941; memo for 6/6, 6/7 by Secy/OGS, 19 June 1941. All in PM 501, Organization 12-12 and 12-13, 1941, Army Regulations.
The Executive, ODAO expressed general satisfaction with the framework of the proposed organization, but many other suggestions were to be made before a final agreement was reached. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 objected to a proposal to establish a sixth division in the War Department General Staff for the express purpose of handling air matters exclusively. He thought that the creation of an air branch in each of the existing divisions would prove more satisfactory. Also, he cautioned that any more tendency to set up a "Ground General Staff" and an "Air General Staff" must be resisted. To that end, he recommended that steps be taken to indicate "that the staff of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and the Chief of the United States Army Air Forces is a small personal or secretarial staff and not a separate Air General Staff." 10

A meeting of the assistant chiefs of staff, the Chief of the Air Corps, the CG of GHQ Air Force, and the Chief of Staff of General Headquarters (GHQ), or their representatives, was evidently held at the War College on 13 June, and compromise agreements were reached on most aspects of the new organization, including terminology. 11 A revised draft of AR 25-5 was then circulated among the interested offices. Some of the assistant chiefs


11. See memo for G/S by Brig. Gen. H. L. Twaddle, 14 June 1941, in AG 321.81 (6-14-41) pt. 1; memo for C/AS by Exec., ODAO, 17 June 1941, in AG 300.3, Army Regulations. GHQ should not be confused with GHQ Air Force. The former was an agency created in July 1940 to decentralize activities of the War Department and to assist the Chief of Staff in his capacity as commanding general of the field armies. GHQ was to exercise jurisdiction similar to that of army commanders "over all harbor defense and mobile troops, including GHQ aviation and the Armored Force, but excluding the overseas garrisons," [AG 320.3 (7-25-40)] (Set) 1-005, 26 July 1940. The Chief, GHQ was Maj. Gen. L. J. McNair who, upon the abolition of GHQ on 9 March 1942, became the CG, Army Ground Forces.
of staff objected to transferring any of the functions of their offices to a corresponding staff office of the Air Force, but General trotter was more concerned with the over-all effect of the document. He did not concur with the proposed draft because it did not satisfy the conditions set forth in Secretary Lovett's memorandum. He felt that the new organization would not give a "responsible subordinate" to the Air Corps, and would leave the Air Force in the same position that the GAF Air Force then held.

The Air Corps chiefs suggested changes in nomenclature to remove the idea that all aviation was still "Army aviation," the insertion of a paragraph to give the new agency a vital role in the preparation of plans for the air defense of the United States, the deletion of the section saying that planning for defense would be done under GAF, and the reassignment of some staff responsibilities to the Air Corps. It also pointed out that the Chief of the Air Corps was legally responsible for all of the functions delegated by the commission to other individuals or offices. Moreover, if the proposal were approved, he suggested that legislation be revised to relieve him of such responsibilities.

On 13 June the Chief of Staff was informed of certain changes in nomenclature in the draft resolution, but these "in my view" were not to have been substantial enough to satisfy the criticisms of the Chief of the Air Corps. Furthermore, the new structure of the air arm was effective on 20 June 1941 by the submission of P-5-6. The Army Air Forces, headed by a Chief who was also the Chief of Staff for Air, was

12. See numerous notes in 13 621.91 (G-1/1) pt. 1, especially note for G-5 by Maj. Gen. G. W. Brett, 18 June 1941. See also note for G-5 by Brett, 19 June 1941, in 13 621.91, Army Interactions.
selected to coordinate the activities of the AFR, Air Force Combat
Corps (formerly the CAF, Air Force), and other air units. The Chief,
AFR, Air Force Combat Corps, will retain direct responsibility for aviation matters,
and he may be instructed to share functions with the AFR. The
creation of this civil position is in keeping with the Secretary's policy of
deconcentrating staff work and giving the Air Force greater scope of
autonomy. The General Staff was fairly outspoken in its opposition,
however, and it was many months before a division of responsibilities
between the staff was completed.

In Air Council that was established, the command of the Assistant
Secretary of War for Air; the Chief, AFR; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Air Force Division; the Maj. Gen. Air Force Combat Corps (ACG); the Chief
of the Air Corps; and such other matters as might be appointed by the
Secretary of War. It was created for the purpose of periodically re-
viewing and properly coordinating all major aviation projects of the
AFR.

The Chief, AFR, Air Force, was directly responsible to the Secretary
of War for establishing and enforcing rules and policies for all aviation
activities. The Chief of the Air Corps and the ACG, AFR, operating under
the jurisdiction of the Chief, AFR, were given direct responsibility
for service and control matters, respectively. In general, command authority
of the Chief, AFR, was greatly increased; his administrative problems were
simplified by the creation to him of a division control and court-martial
jurisdiction over his personnel.

This reorganization did not solve the basic problems of unity of
effort and delineation of functions between the AFR and the ACG. The
legal status of the new structure was uncertain; the AFR, ACG, and the
Chief of the Air Corps resisted on the basis of cohesion, and the Chief, CINC, and the Chief of the Air Corps were charged with fulfilling very identical functions. It was inevitable that conflicts would arise because of poorly defined spheres of jurisdiction.

The relationships of the new structure to the War Department also were not entirely clear. In supply and service problems the War Department General Staff, the Air Staff, and the "staff" of the COE were all involved. The War Department General Staff, the ADC staff, the Air Staff, and the Air Corps had divided responsibility for various areas of activities. In view of the channels of authority and the fractionalizing of responsibilities, tension was increased among the various agencies.

Although the reorganization of 20 June 1941 did not grant the degree of autonomy thought necessary by the COE for its authoritative operation, it was the first significant advance in the movement for autonomy since the creation of the U.S. Air Force in 1939. The real effect of the division into the Army Air Forces and the Air Corps was not entirely apparent, but the desire for more freedom of action and the increasing pressures of expansion were to bring more sweeping changes in early 1942.

The external pressure of congressional activity and public opinion paralleled the cyclical trend within the War Department. As was generally the case between 1936 and 1 March 1939, congressional advocates of a separate air force or department of national defense were not very active or expressive in 1939. In that year only one bill (H.R. 5152) authorizing a changed role for the air arm was introduced. This measure provided for a department of military defense, which was simply another name for the air-proposed department of national defense. The proposal never surfaced.

from the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, but on
17 Mar., Representative Jerry Voorhis (Calif.), sponsor of H. R. 3133,
inserted in the Congressional Record a radio address of Maj. Gen. William
C. Livers (retired). General Livers had stressed the necessity of more
subvention for the air arm, believing it should be coordinated with the
ground and naval arms in a single department. The Air and Navy would
each retain its special-purpose aviation; all else would be under the
new subdepartment. Such an arrangement, he had maintained, would prevent
competition and duplication of effort and provide the essential control
and coordination. The older services would suffer no loss of prestige
inasmuch as they would not be consolidated, and "each would retain its
tradition and have its tactical unity of command, as it present." 15

The large amount of time spent on the many details of the national
defense program probably accounts, in part, for congressional quietude in
1939. As the goals of the defense program became more clearly defined,
in 1940, certain overlapping and duplication of functions became noticeable
and congressional activity concerning organization and administration in-
creased. The result was three bills for a department of national defense
and three for a separate department of air. 16 Although no action was taken
on these proposals, several congressional champions were able, and some
of the columnists began to argue in favor of more authority for the air arm.
The movement, however, only slowly gathered momentum from its relative
sterility of the preceding years.

15. Ibid., pp. 2076. General Livers served for many years in the
Inspector General's Department.
16. The bills were: S. 2060 (27 Mar.), H.R. 10054 (16 June), H.R. 10067
(13 June), S. 1932 (21 May), H.R. 10067 (10 June), and H.R. 10121
(30 June). Con., 73 Cong., 2 sess., 1070, 1072, 1071, 1077, 3750.
Perhaps the most forceful statement of 1940 in favor of a separate airm force was the address of Maj. A. M. Williams before the National Aviation Forum. 17 Williams, one of the leading protagonists of air force, thought it "absolutely foolish to paint a vision of defensive defense until we have, as the first essential, a separate and independent air force which can plan, develop, and operate American air power without interference and restraint from the Army and Navy." 

The airman asserted that the retention of the development of airmen in the "jealous hands of the land army or the society and politicians" would be a "serious national disaster." 

Yet the United States needed, he argued, not "two tiny air services which act as second-class for the Army and Navy," but a united department of air. 

The Supreme Council of Defense, headed by the presidents and composed of members of the House and Senate, should be given the power to coordinate the activities of the army, navy, and air services. The president and congress would then formulate the policy, the Supreme Council of Defense would interpret the policy, and the joint board of secretaries of the army, navy, and air would apply the interpretation. Williams concluded with the assertion that it is "time for Americans to heed the 'beauty of do first' in favor of 'let us begin in order to be ready for battles in which air is now being so crucially fought in Europe today.'

The next excerpt printed hereafter is the editorial in favor of 1939-1940. This argument stated that "the military mind is unaccustomed to habit of being contented with the thought of refusing to

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17. "The ADDRESS OF MAJ. A. M. WILLIAMS." "AMERICAN AIRMAIL" (Feb.) 1940.

18. "A MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP" (Mar.) 1940.
resuming that said to a civilian the obvious is the money sun."

The editorial summed that there are probably the same lack of such work between the army, navy, and the air force in this country as there is in Germany, and suggested that all armed forces be placed under a supreme.

In the early phases of his presidential campaign, Mr. Atwell Hillard proposed that the army, navy, and air forces be placed under the control of a single department of national defense. The legislation (H.R. 4980) fully

The editorials on the national defense, the general the report that there are little reason to be a bit unkind would be given the proper credits deserved by its performance on the other hand there was "much reason to fear that the costly defense program will be undermined by over-placed on older weapons whose effectiveness has been lessened by the vector."

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There are very few, and even to the question of establishing a national system of national defense but I can't comment on it at this time. It requires considerable and careful consideration that I am give. And this minute it looks to me as if it might be a serious mistake to change the existing set-up now we are all using every facility available to take care of the present expansion of the air force.

Some individuals in Congress desire a very thorough study of the national defense structure before any national action is taken. On

21. Mr. Atwell Hillard to the Editor of the Story, 14 June 1940, in AMD 027, Legislation. This document was found in a letter from General Story on 14 June 1940 for information on the attitude concerning C. 1939.
10 January 1945, representative James C. Van Lear (Rep.) introduced H. J. Res. 417 providing for a commission of 20 persons to survey the national-defense, resources and requirements of the United States, including the desirability of adopting a permanent, progressive national-defense policy; the establishment of a department of national defense, a national defense planning board; and for other purposes. 22 This commission was not approved, but Van Lear, several times called the attention of the House to his resolution and expressed his support for a single department of national defense with coordinate air, army, and navy divisions. He cited comments of George E. Mclnt and a letter from General Livers in which both of these individuals expressed concurrence with the majority of the objectives of the measures for a department of national defense. 23

The removal of the 21st Air Force from the administrative jurisdiction of the 61st in November 1944, the subsequent events of: three upon the chance, and the recognition of difficulties resulting from the constantly increasing rate of expansion probably encouraged the introduction of the large number of congressional proposals relating to the department organization in the first half of 1945. The proponents of a department of national defense were not as enthusiastic in the support of their measures as were

22. Cong. Rec., 78 Cong., 2 sess., 560; H. J. Res. 417, 10 Jan., 1945. The commission was to be composed of five representatives; five senators; the secretaries of State, Treasury, War, Navy, and Commerce; the administrator of veterans' affairs; one representative each of agriculture, labor, business, industry, and finance; two Army and two Navy officers (not on the active lists); two lieutenants with a minimum of 10 years' active duty experience; and two women 'recognized for their meritorious service.' The representatives, senators, secretaries, and administrator of veterans' affairs were to select the other members.

23. Cong. Rec., 78 Cong., 2 sess., Apr. 32, 20, 2620, 4220, 3650. A resolution similar to but not as specific as Van Lear's was introduced by Representative Paul N. Shackle (Rep.) on 28 February. There were no comments on this proposal. Ibid., 1032; H. J. Res. 426, 52 Feb., 1945.
the "crusaders" for a separate air force, but seven resolutions were sponsored for a single department of defense.24

The seven proposals were similar in broad outline and did not differ greatly in detail. Three dropped from the congressional scene with their reference to committee, the sponsors of two spoke further on their proposals; and the War Department expressed its stand on the two Senate resolutions. Representative Jennings Randolph (WVa.), one of the leading advocates of a department of national defense or a separate air force, spoke on the Columbia Broadcasting System on 11 March and later marshaled the arguments of some leadinglemen in an attempt to get action on his H. Res. 3765. In all instances, Randolph stressed the importance of an air force coordinate with the Army and Navy in a department of national defense and noted that the war record of the air arms of the various nations supported his contentions.

He concluded his remarks with a quotation from Bingen herder by Maj. Gen.
H. ... Arnold and Col. Ira C. Eaker:

May feel that eventually the offensive air component of the nation will be given a status coordinate with that of the Army and Navy. Then that time will come, if it does come,

25. Maj. Gen. H. Arnold and Col. Ira C. Eaker, In-Flight Sermon (New York, 1941), 55-56. See Cong., 81st Cong., 1 sess., 77 Cong., 1 sess., 76th Cong., 1 sess., 1922 and 1764, ch. 1291. A very significant portion of the above statement by Arnold and Eaker was omitted by Randolph. This part stated that: "The separate air force idea is not afloat to be risked on false or half-baked theories. It must not be approached with the crate of mind that everything is in existence, or which has been done is wrong. The Army and Navy, the other services, deserve great credit for the tremendous strides they have made in the development of military and naval aviation. There are many essential services which other established services, or military or naval professions, or subdivisions of the Army and Navy now perform for the air arm. These include supply, ordnance-arms and ammunition—signal equipment, food, shelter, clothing, and the protection of air bases from aerial bombardment, etc. Recently formed forces."
is not yet clear. It is in case of the other nations of the world that the pressure of non-attacks, if it is to be effective, must be put in their face in the relative role of forces, or at least, in the preparatory stage and not in the later stage. It may be that eventually air forces for all countries will be separated from land and sea forces for some reasons but sea and land forces were separated more than a century ago.

The following February, Randolph charged that Congress and the Senate in general were "feeling" to give full recognition to the strength of the force which can cope with building our air power to its ultimate degree. He said that he recalled his reported efforts in 1901 to obtain hearings on H. R. 3758.

Representative John Condit (D. C.) on the committee spoke in a half of H. R. 3758. In his remarks of June, he brought in H. R. 3758 as one of the Senate's appeal that air power must be kept back by outside ideas and the jurisdictional disputes between the Army and the Navy. It must take its rightful place as an equal member in the defense of the country. It must be satisfied that neither of the old services will ever give the air force its proper place in the military services. He went on to say that in the last century about flying or the construction or designing of aircraft, and those entirely training and experience had been in a different field, were not likely to "be as exclusive as a subject concerning which they have no knowledge." The only economical and sensible solution he could see was the creation of the "Air Arm of the Army or Navy." 25

In conclusion on the two important issues, H. R. 377 and H. R. 1016, he said that "a government which assumes the attitude that the existing organization is highly

25. Ibid., 77 Cong., 2 sess., 1016.
26. Ibid., 77 Cong., 1 sess., 1017.
27. Ibid., 76 Cong., 1 sess., 1018.
28. Ibid., 76 Cong., 1 sess., 1019.

Restricted
satisfactory and that now, had he had the power, he would not change his mind to create an independent Department of National Defense. The existing agencies, it was maintained, were unable to assure proper coordination of air and ground efforts; the proposed Department of National Defense would fill that gap and ensure proper political non-military link in the chain of command. It was believed that these advantages to the proposed structure, and to a separate Air Force, but the disadvantages were greater. If the change were effected immediately, the "political coercion and delay incident to reorganization might well result in a national tragedy." 29

Three resolutions were introduced in 1941 seeking the establishment of a committee, or commission, to make a thorough study of the national defense and to make recommendations on organization or changes. 30 The Secretary of War was definitely opposed to the creation of any such agency, arguing that it could only be an intermediary between the normal congressional committees and the War Department and other executive agencies. The Secretary revised the charter of the House Military Affairs Committee so that any investigatory roles had recommended against a department of national defense and "the revision of the National Defense Act appears to be desirable in the interests of national defense, and the War Department will support such revision without delay." 31

29. Robert Lovett, Acting Sec'y, to H. J. Walsh, June 20, 1941; letter to Robert H. Peterson, Secretary of War, March 31, 1942, both in 170352, Legislation, Box 32, Folder 2.
30. See above, pp. 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, and 22. Sec'y, etc., 77 Cong., 1 sess., 126, 409, 413. H. J. Res. 101 was sponsored by James H. Long and was identical to H. J. Res. 417 of 1930.
31. Larry L. Benson to Andrew J. May, 22 March 1941, in 170352, Legislation, Box 32.
The advocates of a separate air force also introduced seven bills in 1941 to accomplish their objective of separating control of air forces from the Army and Navy. 32 None of these proposals received any congressional action, but the sponsors of some of them were active in bringing to the attention of Congress that they considered the compelling needs for the particular type of organization provided by their bills.

Representative Frank C. Osborn on several occasions spoke in behalf of one of these bills, H. R. 332. On 4 June he presented arguments to show the primary and essential role of air power in land and sea engagements, the importance of reforming the Air Force while there was opportunity, the expansion of Army and Navy air stations, the undesirable duplication of Army and Navy air facilities and air missions, and the inextricability of leaving the special-purpose aviation attached to the military and naval arms. 33 The following day Osborn called attention to the support among former for an increase in authority for the Air Force and cited General Arnold's statement to the effect that the United States would be fortunate if shifts came into the propatory rather than the fighting stage. This warning had so far not been heeded. "The fighting stage is not yet over, but we are certainly in the preparatory stage. Let us not write it off," Osborn said. 34 On 30 June 1941 when he inserted an article by Secretary into the record. Secretary was harsh in his criticism of the organization of the Air Force, accused the

32. The bills were H. R. 4108, H. R. 4882, H. R. 4730, H. R. 6032, H. R. 4987, H. R. 4101, 76th Congress, 1st Session, H. R. 3672, 77th Congress, 1st Session, 2783, 2784, 2785, 2786, 2787, 6116, 6210. All of these bills were introduced prior to 20 June 1941, the date of the reorganization of the Air Arm.
33. Secretary, 77th Congress, 1st Session, 2783, 2784, 2785, 2786, 2787, 6116, 6210.
34. Secretary, 77th Congress, 1st Session, 2783, 2784, 2785, 2786, 2787, 6116, 6210.
firms of its awareness in the development of aircraft, and called upon
the War Department to rectify its former mistakes and give air power its
proper role. 35

Representative Jennings Randolph was active in support of H. R. 4532.
The arguments he presented were almost identical to those of the other
advocates of a separate air force. In the course of one of his remarks
he inserted an article from the Washington (D.C.) Evening Star of 9 June
1921 which told of the "Billy Mitchell Air Defense Committee." This group,
including "many of the nation's prominent figures in aviation," apparently
was formed to lessen the, Mr., in early June 1921 for the purpose of
protesting sentiment for a separate air force. Several congressional or
aviation groups quickly pledged cooperation, and a resolution was adopted
calling on the President and Congress to provide a separate air force. 36

Randolph was convinced that a separate air force was necessary and felt
that it should be organized immediately.

Another representative, Alfred E. Miller (N. Y.), presented editorials
and articles in support of H. R. 4760, but as in the case of the other
congressmen, his protestations brought no action. 37

The War Department finally expressed its opposition to H. R. 4182,
H. R. 4532, and H. R. 4760, but not until the reopening of 20 June 1941

35. Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 sess., app. 2701-03. Senator's article,
American
36. Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 sess., app. 2702; see also ibid., app. 1703,
2906.
37. Ibid., app. 2699, 2725-26, 2703; Arkin, p, June 1911.

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had been reconsidered. It then stated that:

The letter of the proper for an organization of military aviation had been under serious consideration by the Air Department for some time, but a re-organization of the Air Corps has recently been effected, giving the air a reasonable autonomy within the interests of the War Department.

Other representatives, especially John Rankin (Ills.) and Clinton (Ills.), spoke in favor of a separate air force and cited such writers as Scoville and Gen. Isaac Herter, but the next certain communique of existing military organization in this period was delivered by Representative John G. Sargent (Neb.) on 15 April 1912 in which he confers of report the annual appropriations bill for 1912. Sargent attacked the existing organization, charging to develop aviation tactics for an offensive aerial war, it charged that millions of dollars were being wasted through duplication and that the "Air Bureau Air authority" was responsible for many mistakes the time had come for Congress to get vigorously in "ruthlessness" the creation of a separate air force. This, Sargent maintained, was the only solution because even though the reasons for unified air organization have increased tenfold, . . .


In the United States Navy, a separate unit (G.F. P.) is known as the Aviation Unit (G.F. P.).
power of the dead hands of entrenched bureaucracy have likewise multiplied and constitute a formidable opposition."

It is difficult to specify to determine a definite course of responsibility for the realization of Section 1, named organization of 1942. The introduction of a large number of bills, however, calling either for a separate air force or a single department of national defense, was followed in 1941 by the release of more robustly to the air in, just as in 1936 the unbalanced division in the Senate, corrected these several measures almost to win one division for the air arms. In either instance, the bill is very likely to have been applied by the air invent for fear of more drastic action by the legislators.

The year 1941 there were a large number in congressional expression conservative opposition to the air arms within the next nine months, however, consistent interest in the second half-points and notices of various clubs, associations, and individuals, and public support for a separate air force increased greatly.

The negative votes probably the most effective form of public support for a more autonomous role for the air force. The Intelligence Division, CIO, reported in July 1941 that 67 editorials received, 17 advocated a Department of national defense with air arm to Air, Army, and Navy; 10 supported a separate air force; 6 were neutral; totally 5 spoke against.

40. Ibid., 630-07.
41. Only one bill (H.R. 6373) was introduced in 1941 and March 1942 for reorganization of the Army, Navy, and air elements of the United States, with revenue provided for the creation of a single department of national defense to be known as the Central Labor Council. Ibid., 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 1151, 1152. The air Department reorganization of March 1942 is discussed in Chapter III, below.
Any further change, the CIB called for more study on the subject. The
Philadelphia Inquirer was the next widely circulated of the papers
advocating a department of national defense; the gross circulation of
gazette of the city was 1,562,700; next, those opposed to change
were the Chicago Daily News and the New York Sun; those two had a combined
circulation of 776,812, and the other three papers brought the total
"established" circulation to 3,014,071. The New York Evening Post and Salt
Lake City Tribune advocated more study, but the New York Daily Mirror,
Philadelphia Ledger, Chicago Tribune, and Washington Post would
support the establishment of an independent air force. These papers and
the other six in that category had a total circulation of 2,513,608, or
approximately the same number of readers as the papers of the other three
categories.42

Less than three weeks later a Gallup poll of representative groups
of men and women listed in Who's Who in Industry revealed that 63 per cent
of those queried favored a separate air force under a Secretary of Military
Aviation; 34 per cent were opposed to such an organization; and the remain-
ing 3 per cent were undecided.43

Several aviation clubs and associations, as well as aviation publica-
tions, also favored a reorganizations establishment of a separate air force,
a department of national defense, or a committee to investigate the advis-
ability of such a changed organization among the founders of separate

42. "CIB for Allies, Intelligence Div. by Lt. M. B. Cooper, 7 July 1943,
in 0325.029, Office Air Force, Joint Div. files.
Comp. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 sess., H.Rept. 5699-61.
air force were the Air University Club, the Aero Club (in 1941), and the Aviation Research Association. Some of these criticisms expressed that the organization of 1941 was not satisfactory. The Aero Club charged that personal politics and the fear of official displeasure often prevented an honest expression of opinion by the citizen.

The "independent group" felt that the "semi-autonomous" air force created in June 1941 did not "guarantee the fullest cooperation, coordination, and development which we believe necessary in the land, sea, and air forces." The "independent group" called for a congressional study looking toward the creation of a joint or a national defense with land, sea, and air divisions.

The American Glider Association, on the other hand, did not advocate any particular organization but it was convinced that a select congressional committee should be appointed to study the advisability of creating a separate air force or a joint or national defense.

The new chief proponents of increased recognition for airpower, William and Alexander de Seversky, continued to urge their concepts upon Congress and to enlist the support of men in the Congress.

Williams pointed out that public desire for a "separate, autonomous air force" was growing. The victories of air power over the land and sea elements in the European conflict had proved the soundness of such an organization. He claimed that in one-time career officers were not averse to turn their "visions of American air power into reality," since they were "inspired by the high reigns held by the entrenched powers in the

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44. See Cons. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 sess., 6043, pp. 517, 5737, 6637-38.
Cons. Rec. (Rec. also supported the creation of a separate air force and最好是 bill to accomplish that end.
"Army, in the Navy, and in Congress." Representatives of the Royal Air Force had told him reportedly, Williams contended, that they were hindered in their development because they had to "devote about 80 percent of their energy to defending the extremity of their own branch against the intrigues of the old services." The Germans, on the other hand, had built their air power to effectiveness by the adoption of an "initiation of the females that made America great—which the right man for a job and free these men from interference by those who are not experts at that job." Later, Williams realized that American aviation control was divided among the Army, Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard, resulting in "confusion, jealousies, and lack of cooperation. The greatest contribution to the defense program, he thought, would be the creation of a separate air department."

Soaortsy continued to lash out at the Army and Navy departments for their failure to understand what he declared were the new concepts of warfare and for their treatment of aviation as a mere adjunct or extension of their respective organizations. He asserted bluntly that "American aviation was still in a primitive condition and Dick proposal to put the control of British air forces 'under control of the Army or the Navy would sound so clear as insane.' But that the primacy of air control on the condition for any other type of fighting is apparent, it seems actually ludicrous that we should in our own country still be obliged to urge the matter." 27 Sooortsy later maintained that air power had done away with...
geographic isolation and that "isolation no longer exists outside of geographic vocabularies; the solutions of defensive invulnerability are fairy tales carried over from an earlier period in our history. Official thinking and planning, the writer asserted, had carried over into the new theater of operations (the air) notions which were perfectly valid on the surface of the earth but were "without meaning in the skies." The artificial division of the skies into air-shore-based and air-ocean-based, with one assigned to the shore and the other, could not be fit into "maxr's concept of the air as an "uninterrupted weapon, requiring uninterrupted tactics and uninterrupted authority in order to obtain unity of command in this new sphere." The attempt to meet the new situation by a shuffling of existing concepts was characterized as "irrelevant; only a technical and psychological adjustment to the realities of a constricted world controlled from the third dimension . . . will suffice." To this end, Severely urged that a consensus emerge, on which Army, Navy, and Air would be equally represented, must be taken for granted.

Opponents of a separate air force were not hostile, but they were not so contrary to those who held the favorable view. Some of this inactivity was probably explained by the influence of the necessity for expression of opinion. Their passive resistance was probably very effective in preventing any opposition action. Just prior to the London,

As quoted in Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 sess., 1941, 75-2-53. Later, 13 Nov. 1941, President asserted the need for an army air force of corps level to be "an integral part of our armed forces in order to develop a superior organization and to maintain our position in this air war between our allies (i.e.) England (U.K.) and our allies, 13 Nov. 1941; Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 1 sess., 1941, p. 520.
cost. And, of course, it was his position that the time had come for the establishment of a separate air force. It
seemed that there would be plenty of time for consideration later.

The strongest criticism of the separate air force advocated came
from William Cunningham, whose son was serving as a part of the team by representing him. Cunningham said that the Richthofen were opposed to change, but that they were "suspiciously self-seeking in the sense of trying to force a fight in the air."
He was referring to the early attempts to force a separate air
force, which had been introduced on 10 June 1911. Cunningham realized that the supporters, Secretary Miller, and others, of keeping the air force separate were to try to eliminate political interference. He would concede some degree of truth in the arguments for a separate air force and continued that events in Europe showed such an organization to be unwise.50

In refuting the argument that the "Army is strangling the Air
Corps," Cunningham pointed out incorrectly that in the period 1915-1916 62 per
cent of the Army appropriations had been spent on the Air Corps, and the other 38 percent on all the other arms of the military.51

As the United States moved closer to war, additional pressure
called for more careful examination of the organization for national
protection and, in particular, the War Department, which had been instituted for the purpose of national defense with the expressed authority to the air force. The problem resulting from the existence of a separate air force was the necessity for a redistribution of responsibilities and the establishment of clear control.
Although most items were discontinued with the reorganization of 15 June 1944, this reorganization had several spin-offs to the Air Staff: (1) a coordination center was created to bring together the work of the combat, the training, and supply elements; (2) the creation of the Air Staff helped to lessen some overlapping responsibility with the Military Aviation authorities; (3) court-martial jurisdiction over all elements of the AF was given to the commander general; and (4) general freedom of action by the aviation commanders was fully increased. In the new structure, however, the Air Staff, without its shorter jabs, which were seen pointed out and side efforts to correct.

One difficulty concerned the delimitation of responsibilities between the general staff and the new Air Staff. Intelligence functions were the chief source of confusion in this respect. Although the solution had been reached by 2007, it was the opinion of some officials relative to general aviation that unless there were direct channels between headquarters, the headquarters, ACM, without the interposition of General Headquarters, the autonomy of the Air Force would be destroyed in the utility of the Air Staff would be reduced to an inessential point.

1. In a letter, 7-1-44, by Lt. Col. Orlando Ward, 10 July 1944, in 753.0, Air Staff Notes on AF C.S.F. and recent report of autonomy of the Air Staff by Maj. J. B. McConnell, Jr., 7-1-44, in 753.0 files.
The agitation by some congressmen for consideration of the measures providing for a separate air force spurred airmen to analyze more minutely the inadequacies of the existing setup. These developed a tendency to veer away from the separation idea because of the injury which might result to the preparedness program. As it was expected that congressional hearings on at least three of the measures would begin on 15 September, a meeting was held on 3 September in the office of the Assistant Secretary of War for Air to lay the plans for a defense of the status quo. The decision was to prepare a statement on the past, present, and future conditions: the future to be touched upon very lightly and "left open with the implication that at a future date, when the present organization has been set up and is functioning efficiently, this whole question may be gone into on the basis of its merits." The basic argument to be advanced was that the errors and retarding influences of the past had been corrected by the reorganization of 20 June 1941 by placing the Army Air Forces in control of all air matters for the War Department. 2 An occasion for the presentation of these data did not arise, and early in October the air planners decided to oppose, for the time being, the creation of an independent air force. 3

The attitude prevailed in the AAF in the fall of 1941 that the War Department would oppose any and all of the bills before Congress, but it was thought "quite possible that the War Department will itself sponsor certain legislation for the Air Corps." 4 Accordingly, several of the air

4. R&R, 0/AS to 0/AS, 21 Sep. 1941, in AAG 030, Misc., President-Congress.
officers analyzed critically the existing organization and prepared measures for submission to Congress. The legality of the 20 June 1941 structure was questioned on two principal grounds: (1) there was a conflict with Section 5 of the National Defense Act in that the Air Staff was exercising functions which Congress had granted to the War Department General Staff; and (2) the authority of the Chief of the Air Corps as head of a "combatant arm" was impaired by the superimposition of another authority, thus conflicting with Sections 2 and 13a of the National Defense Act. The President could not remedy the situation because his authority for reorganization of the executive departments had expired.\(^5\) Also, it was contended that real autonomy had not been achieved, as the Air Staff was circumscribed by the General Staff and the conflict between the General Staff and General Headquarters over responsibility for strategic plans complicated matters.\(^6\) The AAF, moreover, was hampered by lack of direct access to the so-called housekeeping services, as well as by the General Staff control of the AAF budget and finances. The relationship between GHQ and AAF was highly undesirable because it enabled the former to siphon off units of the AFGC by creating task forces, placed the AAF in a position of receiving orders from both the General Staff and GHQ, and hindered the direct contact of the War Department Chief of Staff with the theaters of operations.\(^7\)

The existing air organization, as well as any degree of autonomy which

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had been achieved, depended on the "disposition of the War Department not to reverse its actions." Since the Army Air Forces had decided to oppose the establishment of a separate organization, it was felt that agitation for such a development could best be met by a "candid disclosure of the existing situation and by the substitution of a truly autonomous air force operating within the principle of the unity of command."

The War Department, however, was not as receptive to the creation of a "truly autonomous air force" as the airmen had hoped. Brig. Gen. Carl Spaatz, Chief of Air Staff, proposed a reorganization of the War Department which would eliminate General Headquarters and create three autonomous arms: the ground forces, the air forces, and a service command. A small, revised General Staff should be created to fit the new organization. This recommendation received "100 per cent non-concurrences." 

Other members of the AAF pointed out the inadvisability of creating a separate air force at that time, and proposals for the correction of existing inadequacies were presented. On 18 November 1941 the Legislative Analysis Section of A-1 advocated the creation of an organization to be known as the Army Air Forces and to be composed of a combat command, a service command, various air forces, and an air staff, under the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. The ground and air forces were to have equal status and equal access to service and supply agencies. Air Force Combat Command units were to be detached only with the approval of the

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7. Memo for AC/S WPD by CSS, 24 Oct. 1941, in AAG 321-9/DL, Organization AAF; notes used by Brig. Gen. L. J. Kuter in conference with AAF commanders, 6 April 1942, in APFHQ files. The General Staff then had only two Air Corps men on it.
CG, AAF who was to have strategic direction of air operations in air
theaters and control of budgetary and financial matters. In addition he
would be free to reconstruct his organization as he saw best.10

This proposed bill apparently received no consideration, but on
14 November the Army Air Forces had drawn up and submitted to the Chief
of Staff a plan for the reorganization of the War Department not involving
a necessity for congressional action. This proposal pointed out the
fundamental necessity of streamlining the department so that there would
be unity of command within the ground forces and the air forces, as well
as unity of command over both of those "striking arms." To attain this
objective, it was suggested that the various units be consolidated under
commanding generals of the ground forces, the air forces, and the service
command. Each of these arms—coordinate in authority and with direct
contact between the service command and the two combat forces—would have
its own staff, and the important coordination would be effected by a
"superior" staff embracing both ground and air personnel. "Such a staff
would prove invaluable in helping the Chief of Staff to deal effectively

Carl Spaatz, 18 Nov. 1941, APFSN files. In a discussion of the
factors militating against the establishment of a separate air force,
Lt. Col. C. A. Anderson of A-WPD made the following observation con-
cerning organization: "Organization is created for purposes of
direction and control ends not an end in itself. It will never
serve as a substitute for capable leadership. On the other hand, a
proper concept of employment of air-ground forces by task force
commanders should enable effective conduct of field operations under
the present or the proposed organization of the air arms." Memo for
Force, Plans Div. files, AFSHQ.
and impartially with two coordinate fighting agencies: the Armies and the Air Forces."\(^{11}\)

Responsibility for the development of the details of this reorganization plan—basically the same structure as was adopted on 9 March 1942—was delegated to the War Plans Division of the General Staff, and conferences were begun almost immediately.\(^{12}\) The declaration of war a few days later made more imperative the overhauling of War Department machinery not geared to the conduct of operations, but at the same time introduced certain factors that tended to delay, or veer into other channels, any fundamental change.

Hasty changes in the early days of war increased the great confusion. On 11 December 1941 General Headquarters was authorized to deal directly with both the Chief, AAF and the CG, AFCC concerning air reinforcements. The Chief, AAF insisted that clarifying instructions were essential if conflicts in the assignment of units were to be avoided. He thought the War Department was definitely attempting to reduce the AAF to a planning, procurement, training, and supply agency with its combat and related service units under other commands. Other conflicting spheres of jurisdiction, including the important responsibility of air defense of the United States, were pointed out by the Chief, AAF. He stressed the necessity of

\(^{11}\) Memo for C/S by Chief, AAF, 14-28 Nov. 1941, in AFSHO files. The memorandum was prepared by Maj. H. S. Herrsell, Jr. The communication also proposed the creation of a Military Policy Staff of not more than nine members: three each from the Army and Navy, two from the State Department, and one from the Office of Economic Warfare. This staff was to insure unity of command over the Army and Navy and was to serve the President directly. This proposed staff bears some similarity to the Joint Chiefs of Staff established a few months later.

\(^{12}\) Memo for Sec. WDS by Maj. C. K. Gailey, Exec., WPD, 28 Nov. 1941, in AFSHO files; F-X, C/S to OCGS, 4 Dec. 1941, in ibid.
resolving potentials of controversy and defining clearly the functions and responsibilities of the AAF. 13

Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. J. T. McNarney had been recalled from England for the express purpose of conducting the reorganization of the War Department, but the work of the committee which he directed was delayed by the chairman's participation as a member of the Roberts Committee investigating the bombing of Pearl Harbor. The AAF, however, continued to conduct studies in the interests of more efficiency and a more autonomous position. Some members of the Bureau of the Budget, under the general guidance of a committee headed by Lt. Col. E. E. Gates, began participation in these activities in early November. 14

Apparently the events of the first few weeks of war altered the opinions of many as to the validity of the proposals that had been presented prior to open conflict. The Chief of Staff on 9 January 1942 requested recommendations for organizational changes that could be effected by the President under Title I of the First War Powers Act of 18 December 1941. 15 The Air War Plans Division prepared a plan which would remove the air arm from the jurisdiction of the War Department and would create coequal air, ground, and naval arms with unity of command effected by a coordinator of

15. 55 Stat. 885. This act gave the President almost a carte blanche concerning organization.
common services. Under this plan a small staff of air, ground, naval, production and supply, and political and economic warfare representatives would report directly to the President. It was emphasized that the reorganization of 20 June 1941 had not brought a satisfactory answer to the problem of the unity of command, and that many responsibilities were dealt with concurrently by the Air Staff and General Staff "with resultant conflict, delay and confusion." Also, there was need for adequate air representation in all policy-making and staff agencies, consolidation of control of all armed services under a single head, and sufficient liberty for each service to develop its potentialities to the fullest degree.

The Air War Plans Division was convinced that the adoption of its proposal would remedy the existing defects and facilitate the prosecution of the war. 16

The McCarran committee began its deliberations upon the chairman's return from Hawaii, and early in February it established the general outlines of the reorganization. On 28 February 1942 Executive Order 9032 laid the official basis for the realignment which was spelled out by War Department Circular No. 59 of 2 March 1942. By this reorganization--effective on 9 March--the War Department was consolidated under three coordinate forces, each with a commanding general, and with the Army Air Forces and Army Ground Forces having equal access to the Services of

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16. Memo for G/S by A-WFD, 21 Jan. 1942, in AAG 321.95, Organization AAF. In the proposed plan the Chairman of the War Production Board was to be on the same level of authority as the secretaries of the air, ground, and navy arms. This proposal of A-WFD was very similar to the frequently-advocated department of national defense. In fact, A-WFD suggested that legislation be initiated to create a Department of National Warfare by interposing a department secretary between the secretaries of the arms and the President.
Supply (later Army Service Forces). The reorganized General Staff drew approximately 50 per cent of its personnel from the air arm.

The Army Air Forces had, at last, achieved theoretical autonomy within the framework of the War Department. Yet, although circumstances combined to place the AAF in a position coordinate with the Army and the Navy in a "wartime department of national warfare," certain factors tended to make its new position of less importance than its previous one. The greatest single factor that seemed to have decreased legally the significance of the AAF was the restatement of its mission. Between the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the reorganization of 9 March the AECO as a combat agency had virtually ceased to exist. The First and Fourth Air Forces had been assigned to the Eastern and Western Theaters of Operations, respectively, while the Second and Third had become almost exclusively training agencies.

In the combat zones the air units were under the control of the theater commanders, whether air, ground, or naval officers. With the AECO practically eliminated, the newly stated mission of the AAF was "to procure and maintain equipment peculiar to the Army Air Forces, and to provide air force units properly organized, trained, and equipped for combat operations." Thus, the control of the G3, AAF was confined to a portion of the units in the continental United States; the AAF was a supply and training agency, theoretically not concerned with combat operations or strategic planning.

Other circumstances, however, tended to enhance the position of the AAF by giving its commander direct influence in the planning and conduct of combat operations. In the first phases of the war air units of the

17. For a discussion of the detailed implementation of the AAF organization see AAF Historical Studies: No. 10, Organization of the Army Air Arm, 1935-1943.
Army played a major role in helping to stem the Japanese advance in the Southwest Pacific, and the course of the war was proving that air power, along with defensive air supremacy, was a sine qua non for the successful conduct of any type of major operation. Thus, with the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early 1942 the head of the air arm acquired a status equal to that of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, and his membership on the Combined Chiefs of Staff (American and British) gave to him an even more important role in the determination of world-wide strategy. The influence, then, of the CofS, AAF in the councils of war far exceeded any powers that could be implied from the stated mission of the agency which he commanded.

The withdrawal of the AAF from strategic planning was perhaps unrealistic and unwise. The military leadership available for air combat operations was concentrated almost entirely in the AAF, and strategic planning must be based somewhat on operational planning. Also, it was unlikely that the air officers on the General Staff could at once assume full responsibility for the many detailed strategic decisions necessary for the allotment of units and supplies to the theaters. Because of this situation much of the planning was left to the Air Staff. 18

By the reorganization of March 1942 the air arm had gained an official position equal to that of the ground arm, and in the determination of war strategy and policies it had acquired a status comparable to that

18. That key air officers considered the 9 March statement of mission as a "paper" restriction only is indicated by a statement of the Chief of Air Staff. On 10 June 1942 he wrote that the "main objective of the Army Air Forces is to operate effectively against the enemy the maximum number of organized units and airplanes possible." Memo for all AAF units by Maj. Gen. M. F. Harmon, 10 June 1942, in AOG 381, war files; James Sundquist, Wartime Organization of the Army Air Forces, Summer 1942, 36. Draft Bureau of the Budget study, copy in AFSHO files.
of the Navy. The permanent position of the Army Air Forces was still undetermined, however, since the changes had been brought about by the war powers of the President and the exigencies of the military situation. Consequently, the movement to persuade Congress to establish air forces on an equality with land and sea forces continued.
Chapter IV
THE PROBLEM OF POSTWAR ORGANIZATION

Congressional comment on the organization of the nation's combat forces was practically nonexistent during the last nine months of 1942 and for a little more than two years following. During this period, however, 17 measures were introduced which provided for a separate air force or a department of national defense. Several of these bills were identical to ones introduced by the same individuals earlier, and all suffered the same fate--death in committee without hearing.1

In a speech supporting resolutions he had offered for a department of aviation and a Senate committee on military aviation, Senator Alexander Wiley (Wis.) emphasized that what he wanted was an independent air force, not merely a unified air force. Further, he did not consider the creation of a department of military aviation the ultimate answer to the military problems of the United States; rather, he would advocate the eventual establishment of a single department of national defense. Since such an innovation would be so "momentous" that it would perhaps be impossible in

wartime, he was offering his present proposal as the most desirable intermediate step. He supported his position by remarks that he had previously made in the Senate and with the arguments of S1 Williams and others for placing trained airmen in positions where they would have the controlling influence in air matters. Other congressional comment during 1942 and 1943 revolved almost exclusively about the importance of unity of command in the combat theaters.

Unity of command was generally effected in combat areas without great difficulty. In the summer of 1943 a formal statement of the employment of air power gave official sanction to a condition that had existed in the Mediterranean and African area for several months. Field 100-20 of 21 July 1943 stated that "land power and air power are coequal and interdependent forces: neither is an auxiliary of the other." Command of the air elements in a theater of operations was to be exercised through the air force commander; air units were to be attached to ground units only "when such ground force units are operating independently or are isolated by distance or lack of communication." The CG, AAF was to exercise such technical command over units in theaters of operations as was "necessary for the control and supervision of training and the supply and maintenance of equipment peculiar to the Army Air Forces." By this new statement relative to the employment of the air arm, the AAF had finally gained

2. Cong. Rec., 77 Cong., 2 Sess., 3745-46. In the course of Wiley's discussion, Sen. Pat McCarran (Nev.) interjected his regrets that certain airmen's views had not been accepted and expressed the fear that "unless we bring about a unified air force to take care of our land and sea war activities, I have grave fear that this war will last longer than it should." Ibid., 3746. On the same day, 28 April, Wiley introduced S. Res. 239 providing for the establishment of a permanent committee on military aviation.
official sanction of its contention that the air arm was a striking force in its own right, not simply an auxiliary of the ground forces.\(^3\)

Another step that increased the freedom of the air arm was the approval, in November 1943, of the elimination of all arms and service branch distinctions within the AAF and the creation of new functionalized organizations. By this action the personnel of the Quartermaster, Ordnance, Signal, and other arms and services serving with the AAF were to be brought into the AAF, thus increasing the strength of that arm by some 600,000. At the same time manpower was conserved by preventing "unnecessary duplication in matters of personnel, supply, training, and operations," and providing more flexibility for the organization.\(^4\)

Just about the time of 100-20 was approved (but before it became public) the Washington (D. C.) Post began an intensive campaign for more recognition of air power. On 30 July 1943, in a front-page editorial addressed to the President, the Post pointed out the wisdom and soundness of the administrative organization built by Gen. Dwight Eisenhower as Allied commander in North Africa and contrasted it with what was termed the "organization of World War I" in Washington. The President was urged to "Give air power its wings in your counsels... Advance its status and you will advance the bomber line to victory."

Five days later, this time addressing its remarks to the Secretary of the Navy, the Post emphasized that though General Arnold was on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that position gave him no control over naval aviation.

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\(^4\) For an account of this subject, see AAF Historical Studies: No. 28, \textit{Development of Administrative Planning and Control in the AAF}, 72-81.
The Navy was accused of still considering air power as an auxiliary of naval power. Further, competition between Army and Navy had fostered duplication with great resultant waste.\(^5\)

On 10 August the Gallup poll reported that some 17,000,000 members of the "adult voting population had followed the discussions of a separate air force and have formed a definite opinion about its advisability." Of these, 59 per cent favored a separate air force, while 41 per cent were opposed. This was a slight gain over the affirmative vote of 57 per cent of the preceding year, although then only 27 per cent expressed opposition with 16 per cent in the undecided category.\(^6\)

This analysis of public sentiment on the air organization issue seems to have spurred the Post to increased activity. In two additional, powerfully phrased front-page editorials a new position, commensurate with its battle role, was urged for the air force. In the second of these editorials, the Post said that it had been accused of indulging in propaganda. If the latter-day connotation of "ex-grinding and special pleading" was meant, the imputation was denied, for in the controversy "we are not the agent or the associate of any interest, group, faction, or clique." The shoe was, rather, on the other foot, for the Navy had been "suggestionizing the American people with a purely and professionally Navy point of view toward

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\(^6\) Ibid., 11 Aug. 1943; 15 Sep. 1943. Dr. Gallup concluded that it was too early to predict the effects of the campaigns by the Post, Seversky, and other protagonists. Another powerful propaganda vehicle of doctrine favoring a separate air force was the motion picture, "Victory Through Air Power," by Walt Disney and Seversky, based on Seversky's book with the same title published in 1942. Another book of that year which aroused considerable discussion was Francis V. Drake's, Vertical Warfare. The Washington Times-Herald found itself in the rare position of agreeing with the Post on the need for a separate air force.
Pacific strategy." An example was made of Capt. Thomas L. Crotch's 10,000-word article, "The Battle Wagon Fights Back," which under the cover of a thrilling action story returned "again and again to the thesis that the '1942 battleship' was the queen of the seas." Also, according to Crotch, a "great responsibility rests upon our Navy to coordinate air and surface power to meet all situations." "If that is not propaganda," said the Post, "the word has no meaning."7

These editorials evoked comment by several individuals, among them Representative Jennings Randolph and Senators Carl A. Hatch (N. Mex.) and James E. Murray (Mont.). Each of these concluded that the existing air organization was inadequate and supported the Post's contention that air power should be given more recognition. Senator Hatch cited a speech he had prepared for delivery to the Senate on 10 August 1942 but which had instead been released to the New Mexico newspapers. In this he proposed the creation of a single military command; he was convinced that the creation of an air chief having equal rating with the Army and Navy staff heads "would certainly be a step in the right direction."8

Senator McCarran took more direct action. On 20 August 1943 he wrote to the President requesting him to take action immediately to provide a "unified, coordinated, autonomous air force that can make most effective use of the air power with which we must win this war." McCarran noted

8. See ibid., 13, 15, and 17 Aug. 1943. It was at just this time that rumors spread that a directive providing for an independent air force was on the President's desk, and General Marshall was said to have favored its approval. The Navy's air arm was not to have been included. The President was expected, however, to confer with Naval officials before taking any action. Ibid., 16 Aug. 1943.
the lack of unanimity among the President's advisers, both as to the "end to be achieved and the course to be pursued." He urged, however, that the President act to the limits of his powers; if more latitude were necessary, then "Congress should be requested to take further action." The President, upon his return from the Quebec Conference, replied that the subject was under constant consideration, and that the role of the CG, USAF on the JCS and CGS evidenced his recognition of the growing importance of air power. The Chief Executive said further that he hoped the inference would not be drawn that he considered the "ultimate has already been accomplished as far as the organization of our military machine is concerned." He was opposed at that time, however, to any drastic change in the over-all organization because it might result in "serious disruption of the war effort."

The statement of Maj. Gen. Harold George, CG, Air Transport Command, was more extravagant than that of most advocates of air power. General George thought the war had proved beyond question that the "real power is in the air." He contended there was no such thing as sea power as it is popularly known: "Sea power means control of the sea, but does not necessarily mean naval control. Control might come from the air above the water, the surface or beneath the surface." In commenting on the late General Mitchell, General George stated, in part:

But I repeat that in the matter of aviation he was conservative, not radical. All he ever said was that a bomber could sink a battleship, fly an ocean and attain a speed of 200 miles per hour and that we needed a separate air force run by airmen.

9. These letters were released to the press and appeared in ibid., 24 Aug. and 1 Oct. 1943.
10. Ibid., 26 Aug. 1943.
The provisions of MI 100-20 of 21 July were not made public until the middle of October. Whether the release of this statement was prompted by press discussions, it is impossible to ascertain, but the doctrine that air and land forces were to be "coequal and interdependent powers" was hailed by the proponents of more recognition for air power and seems to have arrested most of the expressions of dissatisfaction with the role of air power. 11

The postulates of a separate air force received widespread support among the populace; meanwhile, the sentiment for the merger of the Army and Navy seemed to be gaining ground among the higher military officials. This sentiment was an outgrowth of battle experience. It was nurtured by bitter lessons of inefficiency resulting from duplication of effort and failure to achieve effective cooperation, particularly in matters of supply. 12

In the summer of 1943 Adm. H. E. Yarnell (retired), an outspoken proponent of the creation of a single department, made public his plan. He was aware of the strong opposition from "conservative elements and intrenched interests" against his proposal, but he had become convinced that the solution to the difficulties faced by the military services of the country could only be solved by the creation of "A Department of War." He was emphatic in his pronouncement that the solution to the dilemma facing the country was not a separate air force, for "the final test of the war has failed to support the proponents" of such an organization. Thus, Yarnell was found to be in agreement with a proposal of the War

Department General Staff made several months earlier. This contention by a prominent naval officer gave much emphasis to the arguments of those who favored unification of the armed services.

Two months later, in a study dated 11 October 1943, the Special Planning Division of the War Department General Staff analyzed the existing organization of the nation's armed forces and pointed out the great benefits to be derived from the creation of a single department to coordinate these agencies. The division noted that the lack of real unity of command had hampered the conduct of the war; the various committees and coordinating agencies, although probably the best method as long as separate departments existed, could not be "considered as a satisfactory solution." The delays and compromises resulting from the temporary nature of the coordinating

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14. Admiral Yarnell's plan may be found in the United States Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXIX (Aug. 1943), 1099-1101. In Yarnell's proposed department there would be a civilian head with a military chief of staff. The department would have two main divisions, material and operations, each of which would have special branches for Army, Navy, and Air. The Chief of the operations division would be in charge of all forces in time of war, and all personnel and training in time of peace. All officers in this division would attend a common academy and qualify for solo flying before graduation. They would be assigned to one of the three branches primarily according to their wishes; there would be a single list of all operations officers with exchanges of service among branches. The personnel of the material division would be secured from graduating classes of the leading technical colleges--preferably by competitive examination--and would be given a postgraduate course upon entering the military service. There would be a separate list for the material officers, and officers would not be transferable between the material and operations divisions. This system would prevent an officer who had spent his life in development and production work from being given a field command, and equally important, the converse would be impossible. Yarnell contended that his proposal would provide inflexibility and unity of command; it was logical and coordinated, and would insure efficient use of the sums appropriated for military purposes.
agencies lacked the "quality of prompt and decisive action that springs only from true unity of command." Unity of command should extend from the echelon of the supreme command to that of the smallest task force commander having under his jurisdiction elements of more than one of the three basic forces. The analysis insisted that economy as well as national security demanded that the several Armed Services be mutually coordinated under unified command and that each service be assigned its proper role and mission as a player on a well-balanced war team. . . . This will require the ruthless elimination of all overlapping functions. The creation of a single Department of War seems to be the best organizational mechanism to attain that objective.

The Special Planning Division stressed the point that amalgamation of the Army and Navy into one department should not be accomplished hastily but should follow a "deliberate and scientific study of the roles and missions which each force should be assigned." To that end, the study of the Joint Committee on missions of the Army and Navy prepared for the purpose of eliminating unnecessary duplications in the existing setup would be helpful, but it could not take the place of a study directed toward the specific aim of consolidation. The attitude of the War Department, however, should be determined well in advance of such a study; and to that end it was recommended that the War Department take a positive stand in favor of the type of organization proposed by the Special Planning Division.

This proposal, it was believed, would achieve a fivefold objective. It would (1) shorten the war, (2) promote unity of command, (3) bring about

16. A subordinate organization of the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
17. See chart following p. 60.
NOTE

Under the proposed reorganization the Chiefs of Staff would have the statutory duty to make recommendations to the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief regarding matters pertaining to strategy and the budgetary requirements involved, as indicated on the chart. The Chiefs of Staff would obtain the information regarding budgetary requirements by request to the Secretary of the Armed Forces and they would be required to furnish him with copies of their recommendations to the President in order that he may be prepared to exercise his duty as adviser to the President. Communications in all other matters would be channeled through and would be subject to the direction of the Secretary of the Armed Forces.

1. By "strategy" is meant the military posture and preparations of the United States in time of peace.

UNDER SECRETARY
FOR THE
ARMY

CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE
ARMY

U.S. ARMY

UNDER SECRETARY
FOR THE
NAVY

CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE
NAVY

U.S. NAVY

UNDER SECRETARY
FOR THE
AIR

CHIEF OF STAFF
OF THE
AIR FORCES

U.S. AIR FORCES

DIRECTOR OF
COMMON SUPPLIES

SERVICE

COMMON SUPPLY

SERVICES
needed economies, (4) eliminate duplication in war and peacetime operations, and (5) promote general military efficiency.

The Special Planning Division six months later followed this recommendation with the assertion, on 21 April 1944, that intelligent planning for demobilization demanded a decision on this matter at the earliest practicable moment, and that the missions of the various components should be defined, at least in broad outline.

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Meanwhile, the Washington Post on 26 February 1944 reported that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were considering consolidation of the armed forces and that every indication pointed to the approval of the plan. The proposed organization and its advantages were indicated in much the same manner as the Special Planning Division had set them forth. The Post emphasized that the unity of command in theaters had forcibly brought to the attention of military officials the desirability of unity in the higher echelons and the necessity—particularly in the postwar period—of the elimination of duplication and resultant waste.

Shortly after this article appeared, 8 March 1944, Representative James Walsh (N. Y.) introduced H. J. Res. 465 for the establishment of a Select Committee on Post-War Military Policy. This group, to consist of seven members of the House military affairs committee, seven from the House naval affairs committee, and seven representatives who belonged to neither of these committees, would take testimony and study all matters

relating to postwar problems. The resolution was amended to provide for
nine "outside" members. On 23 March, Representative Clifton Woodrum (Va.)
was appointed to the chairmanship. 19

On 24 April this committee began hearings on the organization of the
armed forces and the advisability of establishing a single department to
include the Army, Navy, and air forces. These hearings are of special
importance because this was the "first competent congressional agency
created to weigh and decide between conflicting ex parte views as to the
relative missions, dimensions, and economies of the several elements of
our national defense system." 20

Among the Army personnel testifying, there was unanimity of opinion
that consolidation into a single department was the most desirable solu-
tion. 21 Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, on 25 April, stressed several
factors during his brief testimony: (1) there was a "vital necessity for
the maximum simplification and improvement of the present organization of
our entire military forces"; (2) voluntary cooperation had been splendid
during the war, but cooperation could never be as effective in the handling
of great military problems as some form of "combination and concentrated
authority at the level of staff planning, supervision, and control";
(3) under the existing organization disagreements had to be resolved at
"very high levels, . . . a necessarily slow and inadequate process"; and

3035; 25 Mar., 3239, 3247. It should be noted that this was an
investigative committee only and was not concerned with any specifc
bill or resolution.
21. Maj. Gen. M. F. Tompkins said that he had discussed the matter with
many officers—ground, air, and service—and each and every one had
thought a single department the best solution. Ibid., 23.
(4) while a single department of the armed forces should not be created during the war, it was of the "greatest importance that the general principle of consolidation be determined upon as soon as possible." 22

Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney supported Stimson's testimony and said he would like to see enabling legislation to provide for consolidation not later than six months after the close of hostilities. 23

The Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Robert A. Lovett, traced briefly the origin of the proposal for the single department and then discussed Army-Navy cooperation through committees. The most significant of these was the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but there were about 70 others in Washington—and this figure did not include the numerous committees in the civilian agencies, particularly the War Production Board. Pressure of the two services to "discharge their somewhat overlapping responsibilities in the shortest possible space of time," and a difference in the fundamental characteristic of Army and Navy air power, had resulted, the Secretary asserted, in "less efficient use of military manpower and facilities than would be tolerable under peacetime conditions or in future wars." 24

The War Department attitude was further corroborated by Brig. Gen. H. S. Hansell, Jr. (a Deputy Chief of Air Staff), Robert P. Patterson (Under Secretary of War), Lt. Gen. Ernest B. Shermell (CG, Army Service Forces), and Maj. Gen. M. G. White (AC/S, G-1). 25 In view of the long

22. Ibid., 30-32. Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, explained the suggested organization and furnished the committee with a chart of the structure. Ibid., 38. This chart was identical to the one drawn by the Special Planning Division in the fall of 1943. See following p. 60, this study.
23. Ibid., 41.
24. Ibid., 49.
25. No representative of the Army Ground Forces, as such, appeared before the committee.
struggle of the air arm for a separate air force, the statement of
General Hansell is more revealing than that of any other of these individ-
uals. On 26 April he said, in part: 26

Those of us who have seen this war fought, either in the
several theaters or on the planning and executive staffs,
realize that there is no place in modern war for a separate
air force, for a separate army, or for a separate navy. The
Army Air Forces advocate, and strongly recommend, the integra-
tion of the Nation's fighting forces into a single unified
organization. Hence, our conviction demands unity rather than
separation. We believe that current history supports this
conclusion.

On the other hand, practically every member of the naval forces
either opposed the creation of a single department of the armed forces
or would delay decision on the question. Under Secretary James V. Forrestal
expressed "complete accord with the desirability of a close and thorough
examination of the operations of our war machinery both as regards military
operations and the procurement of material," but was "not prepared to say
that the Navy believes that the consolidation into one department is
desirable." To this statement the chairman replied that the committee
would hesitate to take any action during the course of the current conflict,
but "I am somewhat disappointed that the Navy does not have some idea on
the over-all general matter of policy, which is not a new thing." 27

26. Ibid., 71. The questions and attitudes of some of the committee
members, especially Representatives Maas and Vinson, constitute an
interesting portion of the testimony. Maas felt that the creation
of an air arm coordinate with the Army and Navy would result in
decentralization and division, not centralization and union. Vinson,
Chairman of the Committee on Naval Affairs, seemed thoroughly in-
doctrinated with the traditional Navy viewpoint.

27. Ibid., 122, 124. Forrestal expressed opposition to any action
during the war. He informed the committee, however, that all naval
officers had been instructed to state "their personal views freely
and frankly" to the committee.
Upon the conclusion of Acting Secretary Forrestal's testimony on 29 April, the day of Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox's death, the committee adjourned until 6 May. On the day of temporary adjournment, the Washington Evening Star commented favorably on the War Department attitude and said that the "whole basic plan makes sense." The experiences of battle, it continued, left "little room for doubt that something like it is not only essential but virtually inevitable." The Washington Post was "comforted" to know that consolidation of the armed forces was no longer considered "harebrained" and was now "thought of as a fit subject for debate." Separate services at headquarters, with combined operations in the field, was viewed as an "anachronism for which this country must pay in casualties, loss of efficiency, duplication, and waste of facilities. It is a drag on the war effort." The Post expressed the fear that if consolidation were delayed until the end of the war, the plan would be put on the "same shelf on which repose [sic] so many other good ideas--remember General Mitchell's fertile suggestions at one congressional inquiry after another?--which ought to have been incorporated into our military organization."28 The Washington Times-Herald also supported the proposal for a single department of the armed forces, but felt sure that if it were not accomplished during war it would not be done, because "jockeying for power and authority is a favorite peacetime pastime of many admirals and generals. • • • they will most likely be able to sink with little or no trace the proposal for a single Department of Defense or whatever it might be called." The paper concluded that if a consolidated department was the proper

organization, then it was proper to initiate its establishment immediately. 29

Among other naval officials who testified were Ralph Bard (Assistant Secretary), Vice Adm. R. S. Edwards (Chief of Staff), Adm. F. J. Horne (Vice Chief of Naval Operations), Lt. Gen. A. A. Vandegrift (Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps), Vice Adm. Russell R. Waesche (Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard), and Artemus L. Gates (Assistant Secretary for Air). These individuals pointed out, among other things, that (1) the size of an organization may defeat all possible economies and may mean a loss to over-all efficiency; (2) the competition in air matters had been healthy in that advances had been more rapid; (3) the existing organization seemed admirably suited to efficiency and continued development; and (4) the advantages ascribed to the proposed unification could be gained through administrative processes. 30

Josephus Daniels, former Secretary of the Navy, strongly supported a single department. Daniels charged that the two older services had not shown sufficient alertness in developing aerial warfare and that the heavy hand of tradition retarded progress and effective cooperation among the armed services. He pointed out that early in his administration he had proposed to Secretary of War Garrison some tentative arrangements to prevent duplication between the Army and Navy and to promote economy. Although Daniels suggested further study to effect the reforms and closer

30. House, Hearings . . . H. Res. 465, 78 Cong., 2 Sess., pt. 1, pp. 175, 197, 222, and passim. Many of the naval officials apparently felt that a reorganization was contemplated soon; to this they were unalterably opposed. While they expressed favor with the idea of continued study, they thought an early union undesirable.
cooperation, Garrison "barely look[ed] at the plan outlined" and said:

"Joe, I don't care a damn about the Navy, and you don't care a damn about the Army. You run your machine, and I will run mine. I am glad if anybody can convince me I am wrong, but I am damn sure nobody lives who can do it. I am an individualist and am not cut out for cooperative effort. I will let you go your way, and I will go my way."

Admiral Yarnell pointed out some possible objections to the current War Department plan of unification and discussed it much as he had in the preceding summer.

Also supporting a single department were Representatives James W. Wadsworth and Jennings Randolph as well as Harold D. Smith, Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Smith's statement was in the form of a study in which he analyzed several duplications and points of possible savings.

While much might be accomplished by improving the internal organization of each department, the Director said:

"I am forced to conclude, . . . that along with the internal improvement of the services it is necessary to combine the War and Navy Departments into a single department of national defense if we are to achieve the maximum of effectiveness and economy. I believe further that the alternative is an acceleration of two present trends—separation of the Army Air Forces from the other elements of the War Department, and development of the Navy air arm to rival the land based forces of the Army Air Forces. The problems of achieving coordination will multiply, as will the internal stresses in the services. Recognizing that there is no easy solution and that the problems of organization are colossal, it is nevertheless my judgment that a single department of national defense offers the best available basis upon which to build the coordinated structure we desire."

Upon termination of hearings the committee reported that it thought

31. Ibid., 241-53. The shift of the attitudes held by Secretaries of War and Navy over the quarter-century period is worthy of note.
32. Ibid., 265-73. See above, pp. 58-59.
much good had been done because discussion of the subject had set in
motion several studies and surveys which doubtless would eliminate some
of the existing duplication. Many more lessons would be learned, however,
and the experiences and judgment of many of the commanders in the field
should be available to Congress before detailed legislation was submitted.
To that end, diligent study was urged. 34

In the early summer of 1944 a special committee of the JCS was
appointed to study the question of the organization of the armed forces
into one, two, or three departments. 35 After 10 months of study,
discussion, investigation, and interviewing, involving 82 meetings (exclusive
of overseas hearings), 232 hours of discussion and hearings in Washington,
and the taking of testimony of 24 key personnel in Washington and 50 over-
seas, the committee, with the exception of the senior naval member,
recommended, in April 1945, the establishment of a single department of
the armed forces. 36 The committee presented its idea of a satisfactory

34. H. Rep. No. 1645, 78 Cong., 2 Sess. Three days before, on 12 June
1944, at meeting in Assistant Secretary of War Mcloyd's office it
was decided that "no pressure whatsoever" should be brought to bear
on the committee while preparing a report. However, Mcloyd was
going to "have a talk with Mr. Wasdworth to the effect that the
committee could have great effect on the Joint Chiefs of Staff
committee studying this problem with the hope that sufficient heat
would be put on to force an agreement on consolidation." Daily
Activity Report, AFSC, 13 June 1944, in AFSC files. S. 1955,
introduced on 29 May 1944, seems to have been prompted by the
committee hearings. This bill provided for a Department of Armed
Forces. The Committee on Post-War Military Policy was reestablished,
in the 79th Congress, by H. Res. 55. H. R. 514 and H. R. 622 sought
to make the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Secretariat permanent

35. The committee was composed of Rear Adm. M. F. Scheffel, Maj. Gen.
H. L. George, Maj. Gen. W. F. Tompkins, and Adm. J. O. Richardson
(retired). Col. F. Trubee Davison was the Army alternate.

36. Report of Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization
of National Defense, April 1945.
organization and pointed out that the many differences on details would have to be resolved as the new framework was put into effect. It was strongly urged that action be taken before the expiration of the war powers of the President, that enabling legislation be enacted without delay, and that the reorganization be effected not later than six months after the end of the war. The views of the committee were concurred in by MacArthur, Eisenhower, Nimitz, Halsey, and a substantial number of other field commanders and officers in Washington. 37

The committee emphasized that much had been learned during the war but that inconsistencies, lack of understanding, jealousies, and duplication still existed. Reorganization would not automatically cure these, but the proposed framework would be conducive to the development of complete integration of effort. Joint education and training would tend to cure the other ills. 38 After certain fundamental agreements had been reached by the committee, the organizational proposal was evolved. These agreements were that: (1) the Navy maintain an aeronautical organization commensurate with its needs and also maintain the Marine Corps; (2) the Army have its specialized aviation; and (3) the part of the aeronautical organization of the armed forces which does not form an integral part of the Army or the Navy be maintained as the U. S. Air Force, coordinate with the Army and Navy.

37. Ibid. See accompanying chart for proposed organization. It should be noted that the conclusions of this committee were not revealed until after the cessation of hostilities with the Japanese and after hearings had begun before the Senate military affairs committee on S. 84 and S. 1482, introduced on 6 Jan. and 15 Oct. 1945, respectively. Cong. Rec. (Daily), 6 Jan. 1945, 60; 15 Oct. 1945, 9796.

38. Report of Joint Chiefs • • •, 5.
Various potential objections to a single department were skilfully countered in the committee's report. Economy, efficiency, and rapidity of operation as well as the most effective utilization of the nation's personnel and matériel were claimed as the outstanding advantages of a single department. A "federalization" of the three components of the armed forces was visualized as the ultimate end to be desired.

Adm. J. O. Richardson (retired) submitted a short minority report in which he stated as his reasons for not approving a single department that: (1) the existing organizations were the results of 150 years of experience; (2) the characteristics of the postwar armed forces were "so indistinct" that it was not wise to design an organization at that time; (3) a single department would inevitably hamper the full and free development of the Army and Navy whose interests were so divergent and missions so distinct; (4) he feared concentrating authority over the armed forces in one man; (5) he was not convinced that an air force should be set up on a basis coordinate with the Army and the Navy; and (6) the organization would be too large for efficiency.

By September 1945 the study of the special committee and opinions concerning its validity had not been made public. The lessons learned from combined operations as well as the desire for economy and efficiency appeared to be powerful centripetal forces leading to a unification of the armed forces.

39. See ibid., especially 46-47.
In 1935 the War Department acceded to the airmen's contention that air power might be used independently of the ground forces. Combat air units, formerly under the jurisdiction of the corps area commanders, were consolidated under the GHQ Air Force with a commanding general at its head. While this action was a significant advance in the recognition of the increasing importance of the air arm, authority over the combat element and the training and supply element of that arm was divided between the CG, GHQ Air Force and the Chief of the Air Corps, with the General Staff serving as the coordinating agency. This undesirable division was closed on 1 March 1939, but the schism was re-established in November 1940.

The creation of the GHQ Air Force temporarily reduced the congressional agitation and public support for a separate air force or department of national defense; but as the expansion and preparedness programs developed, the movement for more freedom and responsibility for the air arm gathered momentum. In late 1940 a special assistant to the Secretary of War was appointed, and a few months later this official became the Assistant Secretary of War for Air. Also, in November 1940 General Arnold was appointed Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.

The GHQ Air Force had been removed from the administrative jurisdiction of the Chief of the Air Corps, however, and the appointment of the Assistant Secretary and the Acting Deputy Chief was not sufficient to insure the most effective utilization of manpower and materials—both of which were short—in the fulfillment of the ambitious objectives of the air element.
The European conflict daily illustrated the significance of air power; airmen, Congress, newspapers, and the public protested the inadequate and clumsy structure of the Air Corps. At the direction of the Secretary of War, steps were taken to place the Army air agencies under one head and in a more favorable position in the War Department. The result was the creation on 20 June 1941 of Headquarters, Army Air Forces to coordinate the activities of the OJAC and the AFCU (formerly the GHQ Air Force). The Air Staff, the major component of Headquarters, AAF, became a policy-making body to which was delegated some of the functions formerly performed by the War Department General Staff. While this structure was more complicated than the previous one, it did have the merits of making one agency primarily responsible for aviation matters, of giving some planning and policy functions to the airmen, and of generally increasing the freedom of action of aviation organizations.

Autonomy was thought not to be complete, legal objections to the new structure were raised, and the airmen felt that circumscription of their actions by the General Staff was neither desirable nor justifiable since that body had virtually no Air Corps officers in its membership. The increasing probability of United States participation in the war and the fear that creation of a separate air arm would seriously disrupt the defense program were primarily responsible for the decision to oppose a separate department of air. The public support for such an organization was rapidly increasing, and the feeling was prevalent in the AAF that the only effective way of stemming this sentiment was to grant true autonomy within the War Department to the air arm.

Before any such step was taken, war had come and the framework of the
War Department was found unsuited to the efficient conduct of combat operations. Many proposals were presented. The plan of the air forces was strikingly similar to the structure established on 9 March 1942. By this change the Army Air Forces became one of three coequal arms of the War Department, and had equal access with the Ground Forces to the Services of Supply (later Army Service Forces). The role of the CG, AAF on the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff tended to make the AAF equal to the Army and Navy in a "wartime department of national defense."

This elevation of the Army Air Forces quieted most of the advocates of a separate air arm until the summer of 1943, when a concerted campaign seems to have begun. The movement was partially emasculated by the terms of FM 100-20 which declared that air and ground power were coequal and interdependent forces, neither being the auxiliary of the other. This new statement of the employment of air power was a recognition of the thesis which many airmen had propounded for years. The freedom and authority of the Army Air Forces was further increased later in the year by the approval of the integration of the ASWAAF into the AAF.

As the war progressed and unified command proved effective in theaters of operations, attention began to focus on the postwar organization of the armed forces. Public sentiment for a separate department of air increased, but among Army men the consensus favored a single department comprising the air, army, and naval forces. This was evidenced in the hearings before the congressional committee on postwar military policy. Equally evident was the Navy's wariness of such an organization. The Army attitude remained unchanged, but the Navy's wariness had turned to active opposition by the autumn of 1945.
In the 10 years under review the air forces made rapid strides
toward becoming the equal of the Army and Navy arms. Combat experience
showed the absolute necessity of air power and defensive air supremacy.
While the war tended to disprove some of the earlier extreme postulates
of air power advocates, it proved forcefully the truth of the basic
doctrines. Most important of all, the principles of unity of command
were accentuated.
GLOSSARY

AAF
Army Air Forces
AAG
Air Adjutant General
AC/AS
Assistant Chief of Air Staff
AC/S
Assistant Chief of Staff
AFASP
Special Projects
AFCC
Air Force Combat Command
AFOP
Organizational Planning
AFOLS
Office of Legislative Services
AFSHO
AAF Historical Office
AG
Adjutant General
AR
Army Regulation
ASW\AAF
Arms and Services with the Army Air Forces
ATC
Air Transport Command
A-WPD
Air War Plans Division
C/AC
Chief of the Air Corps
C/AS
Chief of Air Staff
CCS
Combined Chiefs of Staff
CG
Commanding General
C/S
Chief of Staff
D/C/S
Deputy Chief of Staff
GHQ
General Headquarters, war Department
GHQ, AF
General Headquarters Air Force
IGD
Inspector General's Department
JCS
Joint Chiefs of Staff
N.A.A.
n.d.
National Aeronautic Association
no date
OCAC
Office, Chief of the Air Corps
R&R
Routing and Record Sheet
WPD
War Plans Division
WDGS
War Department General Staff
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Congressional Record. 74 Congress, 1 Session-77 Congress, 2 Session.
Daily Congressional Record. 78 Congress, 1 Session-79 Congress, 1 Session.

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Senate:
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United States Statutes at Large.

These materials constitute the principal printed sources for this study. Most important for the expression of attitudes was the appendix of the Record while the House hearings on H. Res. 465 are the most significant single item. Since no culminating action was taken by Congress these sources are not of as great utility as they have been for previous similar studies.

War Department:

Annual Report of the Chief of Staff, 30 June 1937
AR 25- series
Circular No. 52, 2 March 1942
FM 100-200, 21 July 1943
Press Release, 21 June 1941

These papers were of incidental significance, showing the final action taken concerning the position and role of the air arm.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Report of Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for Reorganization of National Defense, April 1945.
A good study on the organization of the armed services.

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AG 320.2 (5-5-36) Misc. (Ret) MC
AG 320.2 (7-25-40) M(Ret) M-OCS
AG 320.2 (11-14-40) M-C-X
AG 321.91 (6-14-41) pt. 1
AG 322.2 AAF (6-18-41) pt. 1
AG 381 (1-19-42) pt. 2

These two sets of records were the most valuable for this monograph. They give the origin, discussion, compromises, and final decisions that were reached concerning organization of the air arm.
Hq., AAF Office Files

Historical Office:

Files of the Plans Division, OCAC

These contain the background of, and Air Corps reaction to, many of the legislative and other proposals up to 1941.

AAF Historical Studies:


No. 16, Legislation Relating to the AAF Personnel Program, 1939-May 1944.


These three studies, treating various phases of the rapid expansion of the AAF, have corollary value for this discussion.

No. 10, Organization of the Army Air Arm, 1935-1943.

In this study the treatment of the internal organization of the air arm is preceded by a general discussion of the place of the Air Corps (air forces) in the War Department.

No. 25, Organization of Military Aeronautics, 1907-1935; Congressional and War Department Action.

A companion study.

No. 28, Development of Administrative Planning and Control in the AAF.

Contains much more information on the AS:AAF than was necessary to include in this monograph.
Other Sources:


Interview with L. W. Hoelscher, Bureau of the Budget, 27 July 1943.

Notes used by Brig. Gen. I. S. Kuter in conference with AAF commanders, 6 April 1942.

Sundquist, James, Wartime Organization of the Army Air Forces [summer 1942]. Draft Bureau of the Budget study.

Information contained in these items was especially important in understanding and interpreting the reorganization of March 1942.

Organizational Planning:

Certain papers in these files proposed new organizations for the War Department and analyzed the shortcomings (from the airman's standpoint) of the existing structure.

Books and Magazines

United States Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXIX (1943).

The three books probably had more effect in formulating a public opinion favorable to greater authority for the air arm than any other factor in the period. The Proceedings contain Admiral Yarnell's plan for a Department of War.

Newspapers

Labor, 14 May 1940
New York Daily News, 1941
New York Times, 1941, 1943
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These newspapers were valuable in determining public opinion and reaction to action, or lack of action, by Congress and the War Department.
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