ORGANIZATION
OF
AAF TRAINING ACTIVITIES
1939 - 1945
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ORGANIZATION OF AAF TRAINING ACTIVITIES

1939 - 1945

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FOREWORD

This study, one of a series relating to the AAF training program, was written by Dr. Martha Loyman, a member of the Administrative History Branch. Like other AAF Historical Studies, it is subject to revision as additional information becomes available. Readers familiar with the subject are invited to contribute criticisms and suggestions, and for this purpose perforated pages are provided at the back of the study.
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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................. 1

I WARTIME DECENTRALIZATION

Air Corps Expansion: 1938-1939 ...................... 4
Training Organization Prior to 1942 .................. 5
Centralization of Training Activities: 1942 .......... 14

II DISPERSION OF TRAINING ACTIVITIES

The Policy of Expediency ............................... 27
Specialization ........................................... 30
Inadequacy of Technical Training ..................... 33
Jurisdictional Conflicts ............................... 34

III RETURN TO CONSOLIDATION ......................... 37

CONCLUSION ............................................. 59

GLOSSARY ............................................... 61

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................... 62

INDEX .................................................... 64
UNCLASSIFIED

CHART

Follows

ORGANIZATION OF TRAINING DIVISION, AG/AS-3 ......... 58
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Organisation of AAF Training Activities, 1939-1945
I N T R O D U C T I O N

In a period of intensive preparation by a military organization, whether for purposes of defense against a potential enemy or active participation in war, there is by necessity a movement toward decentralization of administrative functions. Conversely, in times of peace, administration tends to become centered in the headquarters offices even though there is a realization that such a trend may not be altogether healthy. This tendency results from the scarcity of experienced officers and, in part, from the fact that a few leaders have ability which draws to them more and more responsibilities—sometimes more than they can properly handle. As the military force increases and its responsibilities multiply, the directing officers come to realize that for efficiency the headquarters should confine itself primarily to the formulation of policies and general plans, while the field organization must be relied upon to make detailed plans and put them into effect. This realization does not mean, however, that rapid decentralization will occur, because the movement toward centralization and acquisition of responsibility is difficult to arrest. Further, in a period of crisis the prerogative experience of those persons concentrated in the headquarters offices must be drawn upon constantly for informed decisions and suggestions relating to lower-echelon operations.

In the Army Air Forces as in any other military organization many specific actions—or failures to act—conflict with expressed policies. Trends in administrative organization of the Army Air Forces are, there-
fore, difficult to trace clearly, and only by judging the whole administrative development over an extended period of time may one find that more or less consistent movements have developed. Certain of these trends differ from the official policy expressed at the time. Care must be taken, therefore, to dissociate the expressed or desirable policy from conflicting actions. At the same time, it should be noted that deviations in detail from a policy do not always materially affect the whole movement and that the inflexibility of an organization often outweighs the opinions, hopes, and ideals of the best management planners.

From the time of the creation of the Air Corps in 1926 there were attempts to decentralize authority to the field. Efforts were made from time to time to consolidate headquarters offices and similar effort was evident in the field organization both in delegation of authority to lower echelons and in consolidation of administrative offices. In 1939, on the eve of the war in Europe, these measures had become better defined although stated policy did not clearly show where each step was to lead. As the Air Corps began a conversion of its peacetime training structure into an organization capable of producing air and ground crews for the immediate defense of the nation, these policies were established as goals, but the trends of action in following the policies fluctuated.

During the initial planning period, from 1939 to June 1941, there was a noticeable tendency to reduce the number of separate headquarters offices. With the creation of the Army Air Forces in June 1941, however, this trend appeared to reverse itself, because the policy-forming staff was separated from the operating agency, the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps (OCAO). This divisive movement was carried still further with
the creation of the directorates in March 1942. Then the system of
directorates proved to be unsatisfactory because of the lack of
decentralization of responsibilities among headquarters offices and between
headquarters and the field, the movement toward consolidation was resumed.
That is, a new attempt was made to reduce the number of offices responsible
for carrying out the planning and supervisory functions of the air arm.
After directorates were abandoned in March 1943, there were henceforth
fewer headquarters offices, operations became more completely the res-
ponsibility of the field, and the training agencies were able to curtail
their activities in response to lessening requirements and to develop
their organizations along more realistic lines.

Throughout the war period the air arm supported the theory of
decentralization of command authority to the field. It was not until
the abandonment of the directorates, however, that the policy was actually
put into effect. Even then the policy was not followed consistently.
The exigencies of military demands made it appear necessary at times
consciously or otherwise to reverse the movement.1

1. As used in this study, the term consolidation denotes the contrac-
tion, combination, or merging of headquarters offices and subordinate
echelons, whereas decentralization signifies the delegation of authori-
ty vertically from headquarters to the commands and through them to
lower units.
Chapter I
WAR TIRE DECENTRALIZATION

AIR CORPS EXPANSION: 1938-1939

The wartime developments in the administration of training had their beginnings in the Air Corps expansion plans of late 1938 and early 1939. Reorganization of the training agency got under way on 20 January 1939 when the Chief of the Air Corps created the Training Group to consolidate the training activities of the Training and Operations (T&O), Personnel, and Reserve Divisions.¹ To head the new group he called to Washington Brig. Gen. Barton K. Yount, the Commanding General of the Air Corps Training Center. In his new assignment General Yount continued to function as an Assistant Chief of the Air Corps—a position assigned to the commander of the training center—but he was also charged with the responsibility for organizing and supervising the civil elementary flying program, which at that time involved nine civil contract flying schools. Ten months later, after the completion of the initial planning for the expanded training program, the Training Group ceased to function and the Training and Operations Division again became the headquarters training office.²

The reorganized division consisted of Administrative, Operations, and Training Sections, the last of which was given general supervision over all Air Corps training matters except those which were the concern of

¹. OCAO Memo 10-100, 20 Jan. 1939.
². OCAO Memo 10-10, Oct. 1939.
of the Engineering School and the School of Aviation Medicine. No changes were made in the internal organization of the sections.

Training Organization Prior to 1942

The training organization was not, however, considered to be static; hence, organization studies continued to be made in OCAC. On 9 January 1940, Col. Carl Spaatz, Chief of the Plans Division, recommended that a command and coordinating agency be established somewhere in or near San Antonio for the supervision and control of all individual pilot training. In order to avoid confusion in terminology, the unit was to be designated the Air Corps Flying School. In addition, Colonel Spaatz approved a recent proposal of the TAO Division that the system of giving each of the three phases of pilot training—primary, basic, and advanced—at different schools be abandoned and that the whole flying training program be revamped so that all stages of training would be given in each of a number of separate schools. In support of the plan, the TAO Division had claimed that this would give great flexibility to the school system, as each school would be an entity in itself. Expansion or contraction would then be accomplished by opening new schools or closing old ones. The disadvantages of a system in which each field was a link in the chain would be obviated.4

The same study recommended that technical training be decentralized

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3. This included the supervision of all matters pertaining to the operations of Air Corps special service schools, the management of heavier-than-air pilot training, and the direction of the mechanical training of Air Corps personnel at civil schools and factories. Ibid.

from 0340 by the appointment of a Commanding General, Air Corps Technical School who would not be in command of any Air Corps station but who would be in the chain of command for all elements of the technical school system. It further proposed the creation of an Air Corps Tactical Center to coordinate and expand tactical training for Air Corps commanders and staff officers. Although no immediate action was taken on this study, its submission was an indication that planning was directed toward decentralization to the field.

After consideration of the Plans Division study, the Chief of the Air Corps submitted his proposal for the training organization to the Chief of Staff. It called for the reorganization of flying training into three new Air Corps training centers. When War Department General Staff was dilatory in taking action on the proposal, Lt. Col. Irwin C. Ecker on 21 June urged that the matter be considered at once in order that the headquarters might be activated by 1 July 1940. Funds for expansion and construction would then become available. On 8 July the new training centers were established, each headquarters to consist of a commanding officer and not more than five additional officers. The fact that the headquarters personnel were kept at such a small number of officers was

5. Ibid. There was an Air Corps Tactical School in existence at that time, but apparently this plan contemplated its inactivation.
6. The existing Air Corps Training Center was to be redesignated the Gulf Coast Training Center, with headquarters at Randolph Field, Texas. The West Coast Training Center was to be established at Moffett Field, Calif.; and the Southeast Training Center was to be activated, with headquarters at Maxwell Field, Ala. Memo for 0/5 by Asst. C/O, 24 May 1940, in AAF 532.93, Training and Operations, Training Div.
8. Ibid to 0/1s, Randolph Field, Moffett Field, and Maxwell Field, 8 July 1940, in ibid.
an indication that they were to be restricted to command functions.

In November 1940 there was a similar step toward decentralization of tactical training. The QSF Air Force was placed under the control of the general commanding the field forces, whereas station complements were made subject to the jurisdiction of the corps area commanders. In order to decentralize tactical control and training, four air districts were erected which, on 17 March 1941, were replaced by four domestic air forces in the four defense commands.9

During the fall of 1940 the production of both flyers and technicians was greatly accelerated. This increase in the training program necessitated a greater degree of coordination among the training agencies. To accomplish this coordination some changes were suggested in the internal structure of the Training and Operations Division. In the fall of 1940, after Brig. Gen. Davenport Johnson became an Assistant Chief of the Air Corps, a reorganization of the Training Section on a functional basis was proposed to him. The memorandum pointed out that the Training Section was operating with a skeletonized organization and that the shortage of officers assigned to it had up to that time prevented its functional reorganization. Soon after the proposal, the number of officers was increased and the operation of the section on a functional basis was effected. Three subdivisions were established: Flying Training, Technical Schools, and Training Literature. At the head of the Training Section was a lieutenant colonel. He was assisted by a major, who administered all aerial training other than pilot training, including

flexible车间 training of bombardiers, navigation training, and
army, corps, and division observation training. 10

The 1940 increase in the training program also called for an en-
larged technical training organization, which like that for flying
training had been expanding since 1939. 11 Contracts were made with
seven additional civilian mechanics schools to train technicians, and
facilities at Chanute, Scott, and Lowry Fields were enlarged. 12 To
supervise these rapidly expanding activities the Air Corps Technical
Training Command was established 26 March 1941, with temporary head-
quarters at Chanute Field. 13

In keeping with the changed field organization, a realignment of
the Training and Operations Division in Air Corps Headquarters was ap-
proved on 12 May 1941. Within the Training Section, the nonpilot train-
ing subunits were grouped under a separate unit chief; the pilot train-
ing unit was broken down into three subunits—for elementary and basic
schools, for advanced schools, and for foreign liaison. The Training
Literature unit was enlarged by the addition of subunits to handle (1)
the Air Corps extension courses, (2) the preparation and revision of
technical and field manuals, and (3) the initiation of training film
projects. 14

11. AAF Historical Studies, No. 26, Individual Training in Aircraft
Maintenance in the AAF, 9-11. Chanute, Scott, and Lowry Fields
and seven civil mechanics schools had all been used from 1939 on.
12. Ibid., 12.
13. TCG to C/AC, 21 March 1942, in AAG 321.9A, Air Forces Technical
Training Command—Air Force Flying Training Command; memo for TAG
The creation of the Technical Training Command extended a general Air Corps reorganization, resulting in the establishment of the Army Air Forces on 20 June 1941. Under the new regime the Chief of the Army Air Forces was made directly responsible to the Secretary of War. An Air Staff, with the function of formulating policies, was established to assist the Chief of the AAF. Training responsibilities were divided between the Chief of the Air Corps and the Commanding General of the Air Force Combat Command (formerly the GFL Air Force). The Chief of the Air Corps continued to be directly responsible for the individual training program. No immediate changes were made in the Training and Operations Division whose chief became a member of the newly formed Air Staff. The Commanding General of the Air Force Combat Command was given immediate responsibility for the training of combat units and crews. Although this tactical organization had a lieutenant general at its head, he reported to a major general who was Chief of the Army Air Forces.15

Up to 1941 the command responsibilities of the Chief of the Air Corps with respect to the training program could be discharged effectively in addition to his other duties. But with the speeding up of the expansion program, the situation was changed. By the spring of 1941 a program designed to produce 20,000 pilots a year had been projected. This involved an expansion of over 3,000 per cent above the pre-emergency effort. It became necessary, therefore, for the Chief of the Air Corps to delegate the bulk of his command responsibilities to the Assistant Chief of the Air Corps in charge of training and operations. Although

such action brought good results in the production of trained Air Corps personnel, it involved certain complications in achieving the degree of leadership desired in the direction of the training effort as a whole. This task had reached such proportions that it required one commander unencumbered by other duties. Therefore, Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, Chief of the Air Corps, recommended on 27 June 1941 that an Air Corps Flying Training Command be established under the direct jurisdiction of the Chief of the Air Corps to parallel the recently established Technical Training Command and to relieve that official of immediate supervision overlying training. His advice was not taken on this occasion, and the confusion which had existed for some time continued.

Indicative of the lack of coordination in the training program was an incident which occurred in the summer of 1941. On 11 August the Chief of the Training and Operations Division complained to the Chief of the Air Corps that action had been taken on some matters of considerable importance without coordination by his division. He mentioned specifically board proceedings for the selection of flying school sites at Midland, Texas, and Enid, Okla., acquisition of land at Maxwell Field for the construction of an aviation ordnance replacement center, and decisions regarding the procurement of training airplanes. Disclaiming any intention of criticizing the divisions concerned, the Chief of the TO Division wrote:

> It is realized that they [the other divisions] have important

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17. _Memo for O/G by Chief, TOO Div., 11 Aug. 1941, in AAF 353.9D, Training, Miscellaneous._
responsibility, not all of which pertain to training activities, which they are making every effort to carry out. However, if the Chief of the E.O Division is to relieve the Chief of the Air Corps of concern regarding the effective accomplishment of the entire individual training program the Chief, E.O Division must have first-hand knowledge of all matters affecting these establishments. He does not have that knowledge now and frequently learns only through personal letters from Training Center commanders about important correspondence initiated by them in the hands of other divisions of the Chief's Office.

In view of this situation, the Chief of the E.O Division recommended that a memorandum of protest be sent to the chiefs of all divisions. The memorandum, accordingly, was prepared and dispatched on 18 August 1941. It directed that all matters affecting the training establishments other than those of a routine nature be coordinated with the Chief of the Training and Operations Division, who was authorized to make decisions for the Chief of the Air Corps on all matters pertaining to the three Air Corps training centers and to the Air Corps Technical Training Command.\textsuperscript{18}

On 22 November 1941 the E.O Division was terminated, and in its place three new divisions were created: Communications, Operations, and Training. To the Training Division were given the functions of the Training Section. The Flying Training, Technical Training, Training Literature, and Administrative sections were formed into the new Training Division. The principal change, it will be noted, was the organization of the Flying Training Section, which was subdivided into two branches--Pilot Training and Non-Pilot Training. These, in turn, were broken down into units corresponding to the types of training activities over which they

\textsuperscript{18} See for all div. chiefs by Exec., 12 Aug., 1941, in ibid.
had supervision. 19

Thus, in the fall of 1941, with war an imminent probability, the organizational design of the AAF individual training included a Training Division at Headquarters, AAF, a Technical Training Command, and three flying training centers. All were subject to the command of the Chief of the AAF through the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps. Within the Technical Training Command subordinate commands had not yet been created, though districts for the supervision of contract schools had existed since 1940. 20 Individual flying training was administered by an Assistant Chief of the Air Corps (who was also Chief of the Training Division) through the three flying training centers. Following their individual training, both flying and technical personnel were vested into combat crews and units by the Air Force Combat Command, whose commanding generals were responsible directly to the Chief of the AAF.

As these changes were taking place there was a movement to decentralize specific planning and actual training operations. On 25 August, General Brett had recommended to the Chief of the AAF that the training centers and the Technical Training Command be subdivided and that officers of rank commensurate with their responsibilities be assigned as chiefs of the new commands. In support of this recommendation he called attention to the fact that the training centers would soon

20. These districts, originally four in number, but reduced to three in the early summer of 1941, were not administrative subdivisions. Each one was headed by a supervisor, and each civil school, in turn, was assigned to a reserve officer who acted as a local supervisor. AFRS History, 1 Jan. 1938-7 July 1943, 1, 33-34.
have a strength of 40,000 officers, warrants, and enlisted men, and that
the Technical Training Command would shortly reach a strength of about
100,000 officers and men. Moreover, both flying training and technical
training activities were scattered over a large geographical area. In
his opinion these facts were sufficient to indicate the need for
division into subordinate commands. He recommended specifically that
separate commands be established for (1) all elementary flying schools
and Air Corps replacement centers; (2) all Air Corps basic flying schools;
and (3) all Air Corps advanced flying schools (including single-engine,
twin-engine, navigation, bombardier, and flexible gunnery). Although
this recommendation was in general agreement with the Headquarters,
AAF policy of decentralization, it differed radically from the internal
structure of the flying training organization which had been proposed
by Colonel Spatz in 1940. A further proposal of General Brett was
that each station of the Air Corps Technical Training Command be placed
under the supervision of a brigadier general with complete command re-
sponsibility and subject to the jurisdiction of the Chief of the Air
Corps and the Chief of the AAF.31

On 26 August 1941 orders were issued for the grouping of the major
stations of the Air Corps Technical Training Command into districts.
The first district was to include Scott Field, Lowry Field, and Fort
Logan. The second district was to be composed of Chanute Field, Keesler
was to be assigned to command the first district, while the commander

31. Iено for 0/15 by 0/40, 26 Aug. 1941, in AAF 352.015, Establish-
ment of Schools. See p. 5, this study.
of the second district was to be announced later.\textsuperscript{22}

On 3 September the division of functions between the station commanders and the district commanders was defined. Letters of routine administration, court-martial jurisdiction, and personnel affairs not related to key positions continued to be controlled by the stations. However, communications concerning general training policies, efficiency reports on station commanders and officers subordinate to station commanders, and any disciplinary cases involving these officers were to pass through district headquarters.\textsuperscript{23}

Centralization of Training Activities: 1942

These plans were disrupted by the entrance of the United States into the war on 7 December 1941. Immediate decentralization of technical training was abandoned, and on 11 December the Headquarters First District was inactivated and instructions were issued to the effect that Headquarters Second District was not to be organized.\textsuperscript{24}

Shortly after Pearl Harbor an important change occurred in the Air Force Combat Command. The Second and Third Air Forces of this command became exclusively training agencies. The First and Fourth Air Forces were placed under the jurisdiction of the Eastern and Western Defense Commands respectively; they were primarily defense agencies, with unit training as their secondary mission.\textsuperscript{25}

Attention now shifted to a badly needed reorganization of flying

\textsuperscript{22} AN 60 5, 20 Aug. 1941.
\textsuperscript{23} Technical Training Circular 11, 2 Sep. 1941.
\textsuperscript{24} Change 1, Technical Training Circular 11, 11 Dec. 1941.
\textsuperscript{25} AFB Historical Studies: No. 18, \textit{Pilot Transition to Combat Aircraft}, 58, n. 1.
training. On 23 December 1941, Maj. Gen. Walter A. Weaver, the Acting Chief of the Air Corps, revived the earlier recommendation that an Air Corps Flying Training Command be organized. He described the urgent need of such relief for the Chief of the Air Corps, who at that time had six subordinate commands under his immediate jurisdiction. Calling attention to the success of the Technical Training Command, of which General Weaver himself had been the commander, he urged that authority be given the Chief of the Air Corps to establish a Flying Training Command which would consolidate the activities of the three training centers. The recommendation was favorably received, and on 14 January 1942 the Adjutant General authorized the establishment of a Flying Training Command effective on the 15th. The commanding general of the command would be responsible under the Chief of the Air Corps for the training of pilots, flying specialists, and combat crews. Temporarily headquarters were to be established in Washington, D. C., and General Yoount was made the commanding general.


27. AR 321.3 (1-2-42) I-R-3-AF/41. See also AR 321.3A, Air Force Technical Training Command—Air Forces Flying Training Command.

28. Apparently there was some discussion at this time of establishing headquarters at Beltsville, Md., though no official action was ever taken on the subject. Memo for Maj. Gen. Barton C. Yoount by Acting O/A, 16 Jan. 1942, in AF. A main concern in the problem of location was that of getting the headquarters away from the crowded conditions in Washington. Beltsville was not a good location from this point of view. There was, of course, the question of whether to locate the headquarters where close liaison would be possible with ASF headquarters or to locate the Flying Training Command headquarters in a place more central to its activities.
Shortly afterwards, the Commanding General of the Technical Training Command, in connection on the establishment of the Flying Training Command, advised that the command headquarters be established away from Washington at some central location to flying training activities. Referring to the experience of the Technical Training Command, he wrote: 28

I think the training division in your office will agree that things have been going much more smoothly since the decentralization has been made effective. It has worked out much better than when control was centralized in Washington, and I am sure the same will prove true in connection with the Pilot Training. Of course your office has to determine the broad training policies, but it is much easier for us to work out the details of execution if we are away from Washington, and thus permit us to concentrate on our own problems without being disturbed by the various questions which naturally come up in your headquarters and which have no direct bearing upon our detail work.

Although this advice received consideration in Headquarters AAF, offices of the Flying Training Command remained in Washington until it was moved to Fort Worth, Texas, on 1 July 1942.

On 7 February 1942 General Yount recommended that a general staff and a special staff group be organized for the Flying Training Command and for each of the training centers, inasmuch as the administrative functions performed by the staffs of each of these headquarters were comparable to those performed by the staffs of the various corps areas and headquarters divisions of higher tactical units. 30 The Chief of the Air Corps approved the proposal on 17 February 1942. 31 General Arnold also agreed, following the compliance with his request for more details in order that appropriate recommendations could be made to the War Depart-


31. 1st ind. (AAF to C/AAF, 7 Feb. 1942), CCAC to G/AAF, 16 Feb. 1943, in ABD.
ment. On 16 March 1942 authority to organize and operate with general
and special staffs was granted by the War Department to the Headquarters
of the Flying Training Command and the three subordinate training centers.
Instructions that were relayed to the field, however, contained the require-
ment that officers of these staff posts were to be assigned to the
General Staff Corps. Two days later, 18 March, Maj. Gen. Ralph P.
Cousins, Commanding General of the West Coast Air Corps Training Center,
requested reconsideration of the instructions. He pointed out "that
the system creates inflexibility, that it causes centralization and not
decentralization of personnel authority, that it places the comprogam
and relief of officers in the hands of the War Department rather than
in this Headquarters." Apparently this situation had arisen as result
of an oversight, and a correction was issued on 19 March 1942. The
authority to appoint and relieve officers in the staff posts of the
Flying Training Command was thus given to the commanding general, who
in turn delegated the requisite responsibility insofar as their staffs
were concerned to the three subordinate commanding generals of the training
center.32

Following the reorganization of flying training, attention shifted
again to the needs of technical training. On 27 February 1942, Lt. Col.
John T. Drining, Assistant Secretary of the Air Staff, recommended
that the Technical Training Command be reorganized in view of the 16-fold
increase of the past year. His specific proposal was to create four
technical training districts to "provide more effective control and de-

32. 2d Ind., in ibid.
Centralized operation and command of Technical Training Activities which already have expanded beyond the ability of a single headquarters to properly supervise; and which during further expansion, now approved, demand such subdivision, in the interests of efficiency and the accomplishment of training requirements.\footnote{24}

Favorable action was taken on this recommendation, and on 10 March 1942 the creation of the four Technical Training districts was announced.\footnote{35}

In commenting on the reorganization, General Arnold wrote to General Leever, who had resumed command of the Technical Training Command:\footnote{26}

One of the principles involved in the organization under which we are now operating is to place under the various major commands such as yours, as large a proportion of the work to be done as possible. Another important principle is that responsibility and authority should be decentralized so far as practicable to lower echelons. Conservation of personnel, particularly those in the higher experience brackets, is mandatory and your organization must be so designed and implemented that planning and directing staffs will be held to a minimum.

General Arnold's advice struck a responsive chord with General Leever. On 23 March, in his reply to General Arnold's letter, he pointed out that the Technical Training Command was already operating under the policies advocated by the Chief of the AAF. In regard to personnel,

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{24} Memo for O/S by Lt. Col. Nathan F. Twining, Asst. S/AS, 27 Feb. 1942, in ibid. On 16 February 1942 Technical Training Command 601 had authorized the division of the command into five geographical districts, which were never activated because of the simultaneous Headquarters, AAF plan to create four districts. ARTOC History, 1 Jan. 1939-7 July 1945, I, 191, 195.
\item \footnote{35} AAF to CG, AG/TG2, 5 March 1942, cited in ibid., 194. The First District was to have its headquarters at Greensboro, N.C.; the Second at St. Louis, Mo.; the Third at Tulsa, Okla.; and the Fourth at Denver, Colo.
\end{itemize}
he wrote that all district commanders had been directed to have only two experienced Air Corps officers, one to be the Executive and the other Director of Training, while the over-all headquarters personnel of each district was to be limited to 25.37

The four new technical training districts were activated at a time when the Technical Training Command was in a period of confusion. Headquarters was in the process of being moved from Tulsa, Okla., to Knollwood Field, N.C. Moreover, there were some officers in the Technical Training Command who opposed the division into districts. In fact, in April 1942 a memorandum was drawn up in Headquarters, AAF recommending that the four districts of the Technical Training Command be inactivated because they constituted an undesirable subdivision and did not justify their cost in personnel, administrative overhead, delay in action, and housing and office space. On 18 April the memorandum was presented to General Arnold, who disapproved it; he wanted no alteration in existing arrangements at that time. Meanwhile conflicting directives were being issued by the Tulsa and Knollwood headquarters, and the usual channels of correspondence were being ignored in some cases. For instance, the headquarters at Knollwood was by-passing First District Headquarters, apparently under the impression that the districts would soon be inactivated.38

As the responsibilities of the Technical Training Command increased there was need for an additional district. During 1942 the Officer

38. Ibid., 206-08.
Candidate School, Officers Training School, Radio School No. 2, Basic Training Center No. 4, and other installations had been established in Florida. By autumn they were taking care of 65,000 men, a number which was to increase to 85,000 before the end of the year. This increase in installations created a severe administrative strain on the First District Headquarters. Located at Greensboro, N.C., this headquarters was a thousand miles from the Miami Beach area, and it was soon realized that the district was too large for efficient discharge of its training responsibilities. Consequently, in November 1943 all Technical Training Command activities in the State of Florida were included in the new Fifth District with headquarters at Miami Beach.\(^{39}\)

In March 1943, the AAF had undergone a complete reorganization. The Chief of the AAF became the Commanding General, AAF, CGAC was abolished, and policy and operating functions were divided between two separate staffs. On the policy staff, A-3 was the training and operations office which was charged with the formulation of policies governing its own activities. In addition, the reorganization established an operating staff of directorates. One of the components of the Directorate of Military Requirements was the Directorate of Individual Training, which was charged with maintaining liaison with the Technical and Flying Training Commands, coordinating individual training standards, and harmonizing primary, basic, and advanced technical and flying training activities of the several commands which applied to individual training.\(^{40}\) Thus the new directorate inherited the old Training Division functions, which

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 214-15.

were redistributed among five sections: Combat Crew, Flying Training, Liaison, Technical Training, Liaison, Training Literature, and Special Training. The Combat Crew Section was designed especially to maintain liaison between the several air forces and AAF Headquarters on training matters, and to serve as a planning and information office on all matters dealing with the production of combat crews. The Flying Training and Technical Training Liaison Sections performed similar functions for the flying- and technical training programs. The Training Literature Section supervised the preparation of training manual and aids of various kinds, as it had done under the old Training Division. To the Special Training Section were assigned miscellaneous problems which did not come under the jurisdiction of the other sections. It was divided into subsections bearing the titles of Physical Development, Latin America, Statistical, and Orientation Training.41 Headquarters responsibility for the training of service and maintenance units (with the exception of medical and signal) was placed in the Directorate of Base Services, also a subordinate agency of the Directorate of Military Requirements, which delegated the major portion of the actual training to the Air Service Command.42

Thus by March 1942 the reorganizational efforts were moving toward the centralization of policy-making and broad-planning functions in headquarters and decentralization of specific planning and command functions to the field.43 Within Headquarters, AAF, however, the consolid-

41. Chart prepared by AF.HQ, 13 Mar., 1942, in AFSFO files.
42. Draft AAF Historical Study, "Service and Maintenance Unit Training in the AAF."
tion of the earlier period was giving way to an increase in the number of training agencies.

Between Pearl Harbor and the March 1942 reorganization some important changes had taken place in the tactical arm. The Air Force Combat Command was virtually shorn of its combat functions, and the AAF became primarily a supply and training agency, with the actual combat operations under the control of the theater commanders. During this period the Second Air Force was charged with the entire heavy bombardment development program, both operational and replacement, while the Third Air Force was given medium, light, and dive bombardment OTH as well as pursuit BDU. With the First and Fourth Air Forces had a defense as well as a training mission and in view of this were charged with most of the fighter operational training. Ultimately, however, both fighter and bombardment operational training were conducted in all the continental air forces. In the spring of 1943 the training of troop carrier crews was begun, a function which on 29 June 1943 was assigned to the new Troop Carrier Command. With the reorganization of March 1943 the Air Force Combat Command was discontinued, and further decentralization of tactical training resulted. Prior to the completion of the reorganization, the AAF had been considering the creation of an operational training command to perform the training functions which had been the responsibility of the Air Force Combat Command. The pending reorganization, involving the

44. Pilot Transition to Combat Aircraft, 52-56. OTH: Operational Training Unit. BMD: Replacement Training Unit.
45. Ibid.; draft AAF Historical Study, "Operational and Replacement Training." See also footnote 47, this chapter.
directorates concept, however, prevented its actual establishment. When
the Air Force Combat Command was discontinued there was, therefore, no
centralized control over operational training. In order to tide over
the period during which the directorates were being brought into opera-
tion, Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz was designated supervisor of operational
training units. In that capacity he saw all important correspondence
pertaining to training. After 30 April the supervision of operational
training became the responsibility of A-5, though it was officially
regarded as "a primary obligation of the entire Air Staff." Eventually
general planning on operational training matters became the concern of
the "type directorates." 46

The system of directorates was particularly disadvantageous to the
operational training program. The tendency of the Headquarters, AAF staff
to supervise directly the special training categories in the air forces
denied these categories the flexibility which was so essential to
efficiency. Such a tendency resulted in unnecessary confusion, loss of
time, and reduced efficiency. 47

In view of the creation of the Directorate of Individual Training,
there were some officers in Headquarters, AAF who believed it desirable
to eliminate the Flying Training Command. They believed that the
whole command could be run effectively from Headquarters, AAF. Evidently
they interested General Arnold in the idea, for on 6 May 1942 it was
announced that the Commanding General would "entertain a study of the

46. These subordinate directorates were Bombardment, Air Defense, and
Ground-Air Support. Organization of the Army Air Arm 1933-1945, 68.
47. Lass for Brig. Gen. E. H. Turner by 63, 3d AF, 8 April 1943, in AAG
3323, Unite, CII.
necessity of maintaining a Headquarters Flying Training Command."

Consequently, the Chief of the Air Staff authorized a study to determine
whether the Flying Training Command should be continued or eliminated,
and whether, in event of the latter, flying training should be conducted
by direct contact from the Director of Military Requirements to the
three subordinate training centers. The study was made immediately.

It resulted in three reports, one from Management Control, one from the
Flying Training Command, and the other from A-3. Management Control
viewed the Flying Training Command as an unnecessary liaison and coordinat-
ing agency whose functions since the reorganization of 9 March 1942
overlapped those of the Directorate of Individual Training. On the
other hand, the Flying Training Command and A-3 maintained that the
very training program necessitated the coordination which could be ef-
cected only through the Flying Training Command. Therefore, they re-
commended that it be left intact and continue to function under the
existing system. Over the protests of Management Control, the report
as presented by the Flying Training Command and A-3 was approved by the
Chief of Staff, and the Flying Training Command was not eliminated.

Evidently fearing that the recommendation of Management Control
might affect the relations of the Commanding General of the Flying
Training Command with Headquarters, AAF, General Yo ung wrote a lengthy

48. AAFHC History, 1 Jan. 1939-7 July 1943, I, 385; RAR, DG/AS to AFTC, 4 May 1942, in AFTC 221.9A, Air Forces Technical Training Command—Air
Forces Flying Training Command.


50. RAR, DG/AS to AFTC, 4 May 1942; RAR, AC/AS, A-3 to G/AS, 8 May 1942;
RAR No. 2, AFTC 3 to DG/AS, 9 May 1942; RAR, G/AS to AFTC, 10 May 1942,
in ibid.
letter to General Arnold on 13 May in which he reiterated his support of the Flying Training Command and expressed the opinion that when the command headquarters was moved out of Washington to Fort Worth, Texas (a move planned for 1 July 1943), coordination of flying training activities could be made much more effective.51 The next day Lt. Col. Luther S. Smith, the Director of Individual Training, clarified the functions of his office in a memorandum addressed to General Scobtz, "the Commanding General of the Operational Training Command," Bolling Field. He wrote, "It is desired by this office to maintain in every respect its status as a liaison agency for the three commands engaged in training activities. . . . Every effort will be made to maintain the present status, disturbing in no means the Command functions of the Training Command."52

By June 1943 the Commanding General of the Flying Training Command was counseling still further decentralization of flying training. In view of the increase in the number of stations, their geographical dispersion, and the diversity of training, he recommended that a subordinate command echelon, known as a wing, be established between the training center commander and his station commanders. On 10 October 1942, Headquarters, AAF approved this plan, and training wings were subsequently activated.53 Every training center was limited to four wings, each of which was to be headed by a brigadier general with a small staff, all

52. Memo for GS, Operational Training Command by Lt. Col. L. S. Smith, 14 May 1942, in AAF 331.9, 720 Division, Individual Training. For further discussion of General Scobtz's position at this period, see p. 93, this chapter.
53. AAF10 History, 1 Jan. 1939-7 July 1943, I, 339.
personnel to be furnished by the Flying Training Command. The new echelons were supervisory rather than administrative agencies, and the wing commander was an assistant to the commanding general of the training center. His function was limited to inspection and supervision over the execution of training directives and other orders issued by the training center commander. Moreover, his headquarters, with personnel restricted to four officers, was forbidden to be an office of record, was denied supply functions, and was not included within the channels of communication between the training center headquarters and the stations.54

Thus the AAF was theoretically operating under a policy of decentralization to the field. As will be pointed out later, such was not actually the case, for the overlapping of functions under the system of directorates served to deter the implementation of the policy. At the same time both headquarters offices and subordinate field echelons had increased in number. As the AAF fulfilled its training mission, however, it could be expected to return to a greater degree of consolidation of functions both in headquarters and in the field.

54. Ibid., 391.
Chapter II

DISPERSION OF TRAINING ACTIVITIES

Concurrent with the trend toward decentralization in the Training Commands and the domestic air forces was a tendency for both individual and unit training to be dispersed through the various commands and services of the AF. There were three primary reasons for this dispersion. During the early part of the expansion program the training agencies were inadequately equipped in personnel and materiel to provide all of the types of training that were needed. The instruction of men in certain fields, therefore, was undertaken by nontraining agencies as a matter of expediency. In the second place, the necessity for specialization was a determining factor in allocating training activities within the AF. And finally, the charge that the regular training units, in certain cases, were not turning out adequately trained men resulted in additional training being given in the units. Agencies. The dispersion of training activities quite naturally led to some jurisdictional conflicts. The following examples are intended to illustrate the causes and administrative effects of dispersion in the training program.

The Policy of Expediency

The year 1939 found the air arm for the first time in its history supplied with the necessary authorization and funds to provide what it considered to be an adequate peacetime force. Although machinery was set in motion at once to expand the facilities of the training center, the tactical school, the technical school, and the GEAF Air Force, it
was soon evident that the production of training crews and units could be expedited by allocating certain kinds of instruction to extra-training agencies. Perhaps the best example of such a distribution was the assumption early in 1942 of third and fourth echelon maintenance training by the Air Service Command which was greatly expanding its air base and service groups.

In order to staff new units the Air Service Command recruited many men with civilian experience in aircraft maintenance specialties. It also greatly expanded its number of civilian employees. In order that the military group might have third and fourth echelon maintenance training and that the civilians might be given the necessary technical training, the Air Service Command soon found itself deeply involved in the training program. With the approval of the Technical Training Command, which was reluctant to assume this additional training burden, in February 1942 the Air Service Command began to enter into contracts with civilian schools for third and fourth echelon maintenance training. About the same time it inaugurated a program for the instruction of such groups of civilian personnel as laborers, engineers, administrators, and technicians. Through civilian training branches it trained these employees, using post schools, public school facilities, private schools, and factory schools.¹

Until the spring of 1942 the Commanding General of the Air Service Command was entirely responsible for this part of the training program.

In May 1942, however, Headquarters, AAF directed that all individual technical training conducted by AAF commands in contract schools and factories be placed under the general supervision and control of the Commanding General, Technical Training Command, the transfer to take place not later than 1 June 1942. This directive was later modified to allow the Commanding General of the Technical Training Command to delegate his power of jurisdiction. As a result, the ASC continued to provide for the training of much of its personnel in vocational and factory schools.  

Another example of the policy of expediency in determining responsibility for training was the assumption of the training of transport crews by the Ferrying Command and its successor, the Air Transport Command. Until the latter half of 1942 there was only a meager amount of training in the Ferrying Command. In fact, on 26 February 1942 the Executive Officer, replying to an inquiry from Senator Hattie W. Caraway on behalf of one of her constituents, stated that the command was "purely an operative agency and cannot, by the nature of its mission, undertake the performance of training activities." At that time the Civil Aeronautics Administration Standardization Center, Houston, Texas, was preparing advanced flying students for service as civilian pilots to be employed by the Ferrying Command. As the mission of the Ferrying Command became increasingly heavy, however, it was obliged to undertake certain transition training activities. In March 1942 the

2. See p. 35, this study, for a discussion of the controversy over authority.
Ferrying Command provided for the training of enlisted mechanics at the Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. Conditioning School, an activity which was continued after 20 June 1942 by the Air Transport Command. Although this school was transferred in August 1942 to the Technical Training Command, the Air Transport Command continued to contract with factories, universities, and air lines to provide the technical training necessary for its personnel. Apparently this responsibility for training was assumed without specific directive from Headquarters, AAF. The fact that its authority was not challenged was, no doubt, due primarily to the reluctance of the regular training agencies to undertake a further training burden.

Specialization

The need for specialized training was responsible, in a number of instances, for the assumption of an instructional role by extra training services on commands. For example, aviation medical personnel had for many years been training at the School of Aviation Medicine under the supervision of the Medical rather than the training division of the air arm. Similarly, aviation officers had been trained at the Engineering School under the direction of the Materiel Service. Both of these activities played an important part in the preparation of personnel during the expansion and wartime programs.

3. On 30 April 1942 the Air Transport Command was formed to supervise and conduct the organization of air transport units. On 20 June 1943 the command was redesignated the I Troop Carrier Command, and the Ferrying Command became the Air Transport Command, each performing the same function it had performed under its former name. Organization of the Army Air Arm, 1935-1963, 86.

At the School of Aviation Medicine, officers were trained as medical examiners. After a year of satisfactory service with the air arm, they become flight surgeons. Although the school was located at Randolph Field, which was the original training center, its command reported directly to the Chief of the Medical Division and after the reorganization of March 1942 to the Air Surgeon. The principal medical officer of the AAF was also responsible for special training schools such as the Medical Officers Training School at Maxwell Field, Ala. (August-December 1942) and for the medical training of combat areas in the four domestic air forces. Like other parts of the training program, medical instruction was decentralized to the greatest practicable degree. Principal responsibility was placed on the commanders of the schools and on the unit surgeons within the individual air forces. The regular training agencies recognized medical personnel as requiring highly specialized instruction and accordingly gave the chief medical officer of the air arm a free hand in their preparation for combat duty.

The administration of engineering training was analogous in many respects to that of medical training. Since 1928 the Air Corps Engineering School at Wright Field had been giving advanced training to selected officers with degrees in aeronautical engineering. At the head of the school was a commanding officer who was responsible to the Commanding

3. Until the latter part of 1940, graduates of the course had been rated immediately as flight surgeons.
6. Beginning in December 1942 new medical officers were sent to Officers Training School at Keesler Field, Fls.
7. AAF Reg. 20-1B, 1 Dec. 1943.
Officer of the Materiel Service (subsequently the Materiel Command and later the Air Technical Service Command). Except for a brief period between 1939 and 1941 the Engineering School continued to train selected officer engineers.  

Likewise, during most of its history the air arm maintained a tactical school whose function was to give advanced tactical training to specially selected officers in connection with its experimental tactical program. Like the training center and the technical school, it was under the Chief of the Air Corps. In the spring of 1940 this school, which was then located at Maxwell Field, was suspended. During the next two years responsibility for the development of tactics, with training as a concomitant function, was scattered throughout the air arm. It was not until the early winter of 1942 that the AAF School of Applied Tactics was established at Orlando, Flr. The new school was under the direct control of the Commanding General of the AAF, although it was placed under the supervision of the Director of Military Requirements whose subdirectorates served only as coordinating agencies.

A rather curious shuffling of training responsibilities occurred in the creation of the AAF Statistical School at Harvard University. When the choice of a location for the statistical school was to be made, the Technical Training Command gave Southern Pines, N.C., as its choice. The Director of Individual Training and the Director of Statistical Control, however, preferred to have the school in a position to look to

8. History of the Materiel Command and Predecessor Units at Wright Field, Ohio, 1923-1941.
9. For later developments, see Chap. III, this study.
them for instructions. The fact that it was established at Harvard was a victory for the two directorates over the Technical Training Command. Although the latter nominally had command jurisdiction over the school, actual control over trainees, curriculum, and instruction was exercised by the Statistical Control Division of Headquarters, AAF. Such direction, conceded because of the specialized nature of the instruction but never formally transferred, was an anomaly in the training program.  

*Inadequacy of Technical Training*

In some cases AAF units undertook training functions as a critical gesture against the agencies in which responsibility for training lay. For instance, in the summer of 1942 when the Weather Service was experiencing difficulties in securing personnel for the training program, Maj. Gen. Robert Olds of the Second Air Force became greatly irritated by the prospect of a shortage of weather forecasters. He attributed the situation to the failure of the Weather Service to do any advanced planning. He began, therefore, to arrange for the training of both enlisted and officer weather personnel. The program which he set up included the instruction of enlisted observers at Fort George Wright, Wash.; enlisted forecasters at Washington State College; and enlisted and officer forecasters at the University of Utah. The venture was brief, ending in the fall of 1942, but it was a good example of "protest training."

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11. Another element in the situation which helps to explain the action of General Olds was his resentment against having in his command any Army personnel not under his direct control.

12. Draft AAF Historical Study, "Weather Training in the AAF."
About the same time the Second Air Force charged that its enlisted technicians had been inadequately trained. Consequently it inaugurated its own technical training program to be carried on in a "chain" of civilica schools. This assumption of a function which had been assigned to the Technical Training Command finally resulted in an open conflict between the air forces and the command which eventually brought about the abandonment of the Second Air Force schools. Even after the closing of the schools, General Olds remained critical of incoming radio specialists. That situation was not relieved until arrangements were made to return men conspicuously below standard to the schools from which they had come.13

Jurisdictional Conflicts

It was natural that such dispersion of training activities as has been described above should result in some jurisdictional conflicts within the AAF. There was a conspicuous absence of disagreement where the element of specialization was the determining factor in the placement of the training function. In certain cases, however, where responsibility for training was determined by expediency or assumed out of criticism for the training agency, disputes over authority did occur.

For example, in the spring of 1942 the Technical Training Command felt that it was prepared to assume further aircraft maintenance training. It desired, therefore, that the functions which it had voluntarily relinquished to the Air Service Command be returned to it. The result was a directive from Headquarters, AAF which ordered that all technical

training of individuals conducted by the AIF commands in contract
schools and factories be placed under the general supervision and con-
trol of the Commanding General, Technical Training Command. It further
directed that when a commander of an air force found men assigned to
his units to be in need of individual training which would require the
assistance of agencies beyond his jurisdiction, he was to submit to the
Commanding General, AAF, attention Director of Individual Training, re-
quests for such training; the commanding general would then issue the
necessary instructions to the Technical Training Command, where the
training would be provided. Complications soon arose over negotiations
which were pending but which could not be completed until after 1 July
1942, the date the directive was to take effect. In order to resolve
the difficulty another directive, issued on 25 July 1942, gave the Com-
manding General of the Technical Training Command the right to delegate
his authority to another command whenever he deemed it to be expedient.
The Technical Training Command subsequently gave up its authority over
the training of civilian employees of the Air Service Command in public
vocational schools and relaxed its control over the making of contracts
with vocational and factory schools, but the Air Service Command was
never satisfied with having to go through the Technical Training
Command and later the Training Command to secure authority for training
over which it was once supreme.  

A similar jurisdictional conflict occurred in 1941-1943 between
the Weather Service and the Technical Training Command over the train-

ing of weather personnel. After a long and arduous discussion of
the problem it was finally agreed that thereafter all weather training
matters would be "routed through" AC/AS, Training. Likewise, a
question arose over authority for the cadet meteorological program.

There were three principal parties to this dispute: the Technical
Training Command and two civilian advisory committees of the Directorate
of Weather. One of the committees represented the universities giving
the cadet meteorological course, while the other consisted of representa-
tives from the schools giving the premeteorology course. As finally
settled, responsibility for such training was given to the Technical
Training Command, although the civilian groups were encouraged to act
in an advisory capacity. Reference has already been made to the
disputes over weather and technician training which resulted from con-


15. For further discussion, see draft AC Historical Study, "Weather
Training in the AAF."

16. Ibi.,

17. See p. 33 , this study.
Chapter III
RETURN TO CONSOLIDATION

It had been hoped that the directorates established in March 1942 would be the answer to the AAF quest for an efficient operating staff. During the latter part of 1942 and early 1943, however, complaints about the system were pouring into the Washington headquarters. There were charges that planning by the Air Staff was inadequate, that great confusion was resulting from the overlapping of functions and responsibilities, and that in reality the decentralization policy was being abandoned.\(^1\) On 7 July 1942, in a letter to the Commanding General, AAF, General Weaver submitted a searching criticism of the directorate plan. Pointing out the conflicting instructions being received by lower echelons in the field, he said:\(^2\)

There is an obvious tendency to fail in making effective the Decentralization Policy of the War Department. It has been observed, especially in the case of Directorates, a trend toward centralization and the effect of which is to attempt to operate field activities in too much detail... One of the most serious matters confronting commanders is the inability to secure fundamental, over-all directives. If provided with the proper over-all directives the commands, with their staffs, due to the intimate contact with their activities, are in a much better position to plan details. For example, it is not necessary or desirable for a headquarters supervising such enormous efforts as the Office of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, to attempt to write, review, or control the syllabus for the training of mechanics. When such details are taken on by a headquarters, such as the Office of the Commanding General, the principle of decentralization is avoided. Decentralization should be carried down through the channels of command as far as it is possible to get results. The further down the channel of command, the more intimate knowledge exists as to the actual problems involved.

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Criticisms of the directorate system continued to pile up during the following months. On 5 February 1943, in recommending to the Commanding General, AAF that a general reorganization of the AAF take place, Organizational Planning proposed that all training and operations activities be placed under the AC/AS, A-3. This meant giving his control over (1) the Director of Military Requirements, (2) the Director of Technical Services, and (3) the Director of Air Traffic and Safety and his subordinate directors. The AC/AS, A-3 was to be responsible to the Commanding General, AAF for the proper functioning of the Flying Training Command, the Technical Training Command, the I Group Carrier Command, the Antisubmarine Command, the Proving Ground Command, and the Second and Third Air Forces.

On 23 March 1943 the reorganization of the AAF Headquarters was accomplished. Although differing somewhat from the proposal of 5 February, the basic principle of coordination and consolidation were followed. The assistant chiefs of the Air Staff were reduced to six, the directorate were abolished as unnecessary links in the chain of command, and their chief functions were redistributed among the various policy staff offices and the commands. One of the assistant chiefs of Air Staff was placed in charge of training. His duties were to supervise the flying, technical, and operational training programs of the AAF, to establish training standards, and to act in the name of the Commanding General, AAF on matters pertaining to flying, technical, and tactical training of all individuals and the operational training of units. He was also to be the channel of communication and supervision.

between Headquarters, AAF and the commands and air forces engaged in training. The authority of AC/AS, Training, did not, however, extend to service units trained by the Material and Air Service Commands, by the Army Airway's Communications System, and by the Army Weather Service. Also, supervision of the School of Applied Tactics after the March 1943 reorganization passed to AC/AS, Operations, Commitments, and Requirements (OCAR). Like the Directorate of Military Requirements, OCAR assumed coordinating and policy-determining rather than command functions.

The new training office, whose functions embraced those formerly performed by AC/AS, A-3 and the Directorate of Individual Training, consisted of four branches—Plans, Analysis, and Reports; Air Crew Training; Unit Training; and Technical Training. Thus it is noted that whereas the Directorate of Individual Training had been composed of five sections, AC/AS, Training had four subordinate offices. By October 1943, however, these had been increased to six. The two additions were the Training Aids and the Staff Course Divisions. A few weeks later the Staff Course Division was discontinued.

5. AAF memo 331 for chiefs of all Ma offices, "Establishment of the Office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Training," 24 March 1943, in AFHQ files; CSM, Organization of the Army Air Arm, 1935-1943, 92 ff.

6. On 2 July 1943 an AAF Regulation authorized the establishment of the LAT Board, of which the commandant of the School of Applied Tactics was a member. It was to have general direction of all test and development activities relating to tactics, to coordinate the work of the proving ground and tactical center, and to determine training standards, with the ultimate function of setting military requirements for the AAF. On 8 October 1943 it was set up independently as an agency of Headquarters, AAF, charged with the determination of all military requirements of the air arm. In practice, however, it was limited to the issuing of training standards and manuals which were tactical. AAF Historical Studies: No. 15, The Development of Tactics in the AAF.

Policies on which the new organization was based included: (1) decentralization of all purely operating functions; (2) establishment of plans and policies for the conduct of operations in the field; (3) production and revision of all integrated programs for the performance of the AAF mission; and (4) exercise of broad supervision over the commands and air forces "to eliminate duplication, resolve conflict, and insure compliance with Directives." The commands and air forces were to be commonly responsible for the decisions as to how to carry out directives. They were to refer problems of policy and program to Headquarters, AAF as might be required, and to effect continuous liaison between the using and producing agencies of the AAF.8

Following this reorganization General Arnold wrote to the commands concerned with operational training: "This Headquarters will tell the Commands and Air Forces what to do but not how to do it."9 In practice, however, the separation of functions did not always work out satisfactorily. Between the Washington headquarters and the air forces was a zone in which responsibilities were ill-defined. In view of General Arnold's stated policy, which the air forces were prone to insist upon, Headquarters, AAF hesitated to issue specific instructions. When detailed directions were given by Headquarters, AAF they were objected to by the field organizations on the grounds that such procedure robbed them of "initiative and flexibility in scheduling." On the other hand, the Air Inspector found that Headquarters, AAF training standards were

8. Ibié.
9. CG, AAF to CG's, 1st, 26, 36, 4th AF's, ETO, MTO, and IOC, 10 April 1943, in AAF 2222, Units, OEU.
so broad and indefinite that they could not be used as measuring roods with which to evaluate the more specific directives emanating from the air forces and commands. Moreover, indefinite directives from Headquarters, AAF occasionally resulted in too little supervision of the tactical training agencies. In 1943 and 1944, for example, the Third Air Force reported crews on hand in excess of its quota. At another time the same air force failed to meet its quota but made no adequate explanation. In spite of its own inexplicit directives, AAF Headquarters was critical of such action by the Third Air Force.  

While plans for Headquarters, AAF were being debated, Generals Yount and Weaver were called to Washington to discuss certain proposed changes in the organization of the Technical and Flying Training Commands. Management Control had proposed to General Arnold that technical and flying training be combined under one command and that preflight training and certain other vaguely defined functions be given to a new organization to be called the "Personnel Indoctrination Command." General Yount was to head the Training Command, while General Weaver was to be placed in charge of the Personnel Indoctrination Command. At the Washington conference General Yount objected to the idea of removing preflight schools from his command since they were an integral part of the flying training program. Finally, General Arnold discarded the proposed reorganization but stated that the time would soon arrive when the two commands should be completely amalgamated. He based this statement on the fact that the number of men being trained in the Technical

10. Draft AAF Historical Study, "Operational and Replacement Training."
Training Command was steadily decreasing, while the program of the Flying Training Command at the time was on the increase.\textsuperscript{11}

No official action was taken until 7 July 1943, when the merger was authorized. The action was explained as a cooperative move on the part of the AAF to aid in meeting the manpower shortage and "accomplish maximum economy of operation, most efficient utilization of personnel, and maximum coordination of training schedules and utilization of facilities." No significant administrative changes were made, and General Yount was put in charge of the entire command, with headquarters at Fort Worth.\textsuperscript{12}

The functions of the new command were outlined in detail by Brig. Gen. Byron E. Gates, Chief of Ordnance Control. Although they were substantially the same as those which had been performed by the Flying and Technical Training Commands prior to the amalgamation, it is significant that General Yount was ordered to refer all questions of major policy and problems concerning division of responsibility between the commands and air forces to Headquarters, AAF.\textsuperscript{13}

Six days after the creation of the Training Command the Chief of the Air Staff, Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, wrote a letter to General Yount explaining his conception of the results expected of the reorganization. He believed the whole command should be integrated from top to bottom, with technical and flying personnel utilizing the same

\textsuperscript{11} N O T E: \textsuperscript{11} T.X., C/AS to CG, AFTCS and CO, AF-28, 13 March 1943, in AFDJC files; note for CG, AFTCS and CO, AFTCS by AFTCS, 23 March 1943, in ibid.; AFTCS History, 1 Jan. 1939-7 July 1943, 1, 388-94.

\textsuperscript{12} AAF Lamp 30-5, 7 July 1943. No further mention was made of the proposed "Personnel Induction Command."

facilities wherever possible and with free interchange of facilities from one to the other. He conceived an organization which would place within each geographical area one commander responsible for both flying and technical training installations. Such a degree of consolidation, he believed, would require an eventual merger of flying training centers with technical training districts and flying training wings with technical training areas. Furthermore, General Stratemeyer advised that deputies on General Yount's staff not be "compartmented" into flying and technical officers. He realized the seriousness of the personnel assignment problem, but counseled General Yount to "be pretty ruthless in recommending for reassignment officers for whom there is no readily responsible position available." 

Between 7 and 28 July 1943 the principal officers of the two former training commands made a joint study of the operational and administrative requirements of the merged program. On the latter date General Yount submitted their recommendations to the Commanding General, AAF. Observing the "principles of economy of operation, efficient utilization of personnel, and maximum coordination of training schedules and utilization of facilities," the plan provided for a Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, AAF Training Command, and six subordinate commands, three flying and three technical. The flying training commands were further broken down into flying training wings, but such action was considered unnecessary in the technical training commands as general officers were provided for the major stations. Headquarters of flying and technical

training columns were to be located in similar geographic areas, thus providing for close liaison and exchange of personnel and facilities. The proposed organization was approved by General Arnold with the notation: "Continuous study will be carried on with the idea of constantly reducing all activities as our new units are formed until we finally reach a point where we train for replacement only."15

Thus the creation of the Training Command was a swing back toward consolidation of training agencies as the vast training program of the earlier war months reached its peak and began to recede. Decentralization of authority to the field continued. For example, on 7 October 1943 the supervisors of the technical training areas (which in 1942 had replaced the old districts created for the supervision of the civilian contract schools) were authorized to act as commanding officers of their subdivisions. Although the responsibilities of the area supervisors had been increased considerably during the preceding months, this final action completed the evolution of the area as a distinct administrative unit under the district.16

There were also steps taken in the direction of a reduction in the number of commands. As early as 26 July 1943 General Arnold stated that he was unconvinced that more troops would be needed by the AAF and that he would not be ready to ask for increases in the AAF troop basis until he had "cleared the fat from training organizations."17 On 20 July,

Col. Gen. Burrey H. Giles, Chief of the Air Staff, notified General Gates that the Commanding General, AAF desired the formulation of a plan whereby a substantial reduction, especially in enlisted personnel, could be made in technical training. General Arnold had pointed out that the AAF had approximately one-half of its groups activated and overseas, and that by March 1944 all of them should be activated and trained, and most of them overseas.\(^{18}\)

On 10 August 1943 General Arnold proposed a reorganization of operational training to the Chief of Staff. He called attention to the fact that most of the fighter and many of the bombardment and service units were being trained in the First and Fourth Air Forces, which were under the command of the Eastern and Western Defense Commands. These air forces were originally included in the defense commands because of the threat of attack on continental United States. When the likelihood of such an attack was considered remote, General Arnold urged the return of the tactical units to the command jurisdiction of the Commanding General, AAF as a necessary step in the accomplishment of the training program. He pointed to several specific disadvantages of the existing system, including lack of flexibility in the number and control of units; assignment of units to regions of unfavorable weather; restrictions on flying in defense areas; and failure to obtain the maximum utilization of training facilities, airfields, and gunnery and bombing ranges.

In view of these factors, he recommended that immediate action be taken to place all unit training under the direct control of the Commanding General.

General, AAF.

On 10 September the First and Fourth Air Forces, including all attached or assigned AAF service units, were removed from the control of the Eastern and Western Defense Commands and placed directly under the Commanding General, AAF, with certain reservations which did not affect the training program. Thus the Commanding General, AAF secured complete control over all training in the continental air forces.

In an effort to provide supervision and end conflicts in AAF Headquarters, the responsibility for service and maintenance unit training was transferred on 30 August 1943 from AC/AS, Material, Maintenance, and Distribution (MMD), to AC/AS, Training. From that time, there was no question of responsibility in Headquarters, AAF, and with the reduction in the training load, activities which had been widely dispersed in the field tended to be drawn together. Likewise, in November 1943, the AAF was authorized to integrate into its organization the AS/HAF's (Arms and Services with the AAF).

20. AAF to C/S's, AAF, HCU, ACO, AS/HAF, 10 Sept. 1943, in ibid.
21. Draft AAF Historical Study, "Service and Maintenance Unit Training in the AAF." The integration of the AS/HAF's was not without its delays. On 3 December 1943, the C/S restricted the integration to tactical organizations in which a 20 per cent saving in personnel could be effected and excluded medical personnel, aviation engineers, and continental U.S. organizations and installations. Not until April 1945 was the restriction on Zone of Interior establishments removed, and though the process continued in an orderly manner, in September 1945 there were still AS/HAF's who had not been integrated into the AAF. Memo for Brig. Gen. E. S. Ferris by Chief, AS/CPE, 27 Jan. 1944, in AAF 321, Integration of Arms and Services into the Army Air Forces; incl. 1 to memo for C/S by Chief, AS/CPE, 23 July 1943, in AFSOH files. See also AAF Historical Studies: No. 28 (rev.), Development of Administrative Planning and Control in the AAF.
The plan was carried still further in 1945. On 16 February the Training Command was given jurisdiction over the AAF Guard School; the First Military Police Training Center; the AAF Chemical School; the Engineer Camouflage School; the AAF Chemical Training Center; and the Crash, Fire-Fighting, Rescue Course, all of which were transferred from the Third and Fourth Air Forces. Thus, the Training Command to a steadily increasing extent consolidated individual training under its control. At the same time the tactical units tended to confine themselves to operational and replacement training.

In an increasing extent also the Training Command came to depend upon the wing commanding officers for the fulfilment of its commitments to Headquarters, AAF. For example, in the spring of 1944 Brig. Gen. Walter E. Kraus became concerned about meeting the requirements for four-engine bomber pilots and called a conference of representatives of the 34th Flying Training Wing and staff members of the Central Flying Training Command to discuss the situation. At this meeting he expressly charged the wing commanding officers with the duties of deputy supervisors responsible to the Commanding General, Training Command for training, maintenance, and supply. To enable them to discharge these increased responsibilities their staffs were increased from four to six officers and were kept comparatively free from heavy administrative burdens.

As this delineation of authority took place, both headquarters offices and the commands were still further reduced. On 1 March 1944

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23. Draft AAF Historical study, "Operational and Replacement Training."
the AAF closed the Central Technical Training Command, with headquarters at St. Louis. At the same time the offices of the Eastern Technical Training Command, which had been operating from headquarters at Greensboro, N.C., were moved to St. Louis. This move was designed to eliminate one headquarters and thereby save personnel, in line with the over-all AAF policy which involved a period of economy in manpower, simplification of organization, and concentration on the training of replacement crews.

In December 1943 AC/AS Training had added to its staff a radar coordination officer who acted as adviser on electronics and radar matters and integrated the entire radar training program. The Plans, Analysis, and Reports Division became the Plans and Liaison Division.

On 15 March 1944 the Air Crew Training and the Technical Training Divisions were abolished, and their functions were made the responsibility of the Individual Training Division. Shortly afterward a Flexible Gunnery Project Office was created in the AC/AS, Training for the purpose of planning and supervising flexible gunnery training in the Training Command and the continental air forces and performing other headquarters functions in connection with flexible gunnery training. By 1 July 1944 this project had become a division of AC/AS, Training. Thus the contraction which had already been partially accomplished in the field was reflected in Headquarters, AAF organization.

25. AFRC, 60-6, 24 Feb. 1944, in AAF 222, Training Command.
27. AAF Chart Book, Organization and Functions of the Army Air Forces, Dec. 1943.
29. AAF Chart Book, Organization and Functions of the Army Air Forces, 1 July 1944.
By the fall of 1944 drastic reductions in over-all training requirements were anticipated, and a specific reduction from 20,000 to 10,000 pilots annually had already been ordered in the pilot training program. In view of these changes the Training Command recommended to AAF Headquarters that two subordinate training units, the Western Technical Training Command and the Western Flying Training Command, be discontinued. The plan was disapproved by Headquarters, AAF on 2 November 1944. Sometime during the next few weeks, however, General Arnold was convinced that if the two commands were abolished advantageous use could be made of officer allotments elsewhere in the AAF. Therefore, he informally advised the Training Command that he was willing to give favorable consideration to the plan. In the meantime, however, the pilot training program had been divided among the three flying training commands and a new directive for the technical training program had been issued. Because of these developments the Training Command no longer desired a reduction in the number of its subordinate echelons and so advised General Arnold. The close of the year 1944 thus found the Training Command with its five subordinate echelons intact, but there was tacit recognition by both Headquarters, AAF and the Training Command that they should be reduced in number when the anticipated strength of the command no longer justified their total retention.

Further indication of consolidation was the consideration given in late 1944 to transferring the training functions of the Air Transport Command and the Troop Carrier Command to the Training Command and the in-

individual air forces. On 5 September 1944 the question of conducting transition training for the AFO in the Training Command was discussed at a conference in the office of AG/AS, Training. At that time the final decision was held in abeyance until the defeat of Germany, when the matter was to be reopened and consideration was to be given to the utilization of excess crews returned from combat to the training system. 31

About the same time, at the direction of General Arnold, OCSR made a study of the possibility of dissolving the I Troop Carrier Command and assigning its responsibilities, including its training functions, to the Third Air Force. In view of the fact that the assumption of these new responsibilities by the Third Air Force would virtually double its work and would require the absorption of the I Troop Carrier Command supervisory personnel, OCSR decided that no saving could be effected in the elimination of that command and therefore advised against the move. 32

During the fall of 1944 and the first part of 1945 consideration was given to a further decrease in subordinate training commands. This suggestion was first made by the Training Command, but was opposed by the Reower Division, Management Control because it was contemplated that the subordinate command headquarters concerned would be used in organizing and staffing the new Continental Air Forces. When the question came up again in the spring of 1945 it was opposed by the AG/AS, Training be-

cause he feared that a reduction in the number of commands would make the remaining ones too large to perform their duties efficiently. He proposed that consolidation be postponed until the training load was considerably decreased from its current level.33

The matter continued to be discussed, however, and on 17 July 1945 Lansower Division informed AC/AS, A-1 and AC/AS, A-3 that to maintain the various command headquarters in the Training Command at their currently allotted strength would make it necessary to rob other AAF activities. Lansower urged that reduction of subordinate commands be accomplished,34 but no action had taken by 15 September 1945.

The very fact, however, that AAF Headquarters was on the alert for such possible consolidations is further indication of a departure from the dispersion and decentralization of the earlier period toward contracting and consolidating training activities into the Training Command and the four air forces.

Just as changes in the individual training progress had brought consolidation in the Training Command, the shift to replacement training in the air forces brought about a similar consolidation in the tactical training organization.35 In the fall of 1944 the Commanding General of the AAF, in a memorandum for the Chief of Staff, pointed out the heavy administrative load that he was carrying. He claimed the large number of continental agencies with which the AAF had to deal necessitated a

larger Washington staff than was desirable. Moreover, he anticipated that redeployment would create the problems and place increased burdens on the Air Staff. He recommended, therefore, that a "Continental Air Force" be created, with headquarters at Camp Springs, Md. General Arnold proposed that the new unit be charged with the organization or reorganization and training of combat and service units and crews (except air depot groups) for deployment or redeployment to overseas theaters, formation and command of a "Continental Strategic Air Reserve," joint air-ground training, administrative jurisdiction over the four domestic air forces and the I Troop Carrier Command, and the air defense of continental United States. The personnel for the Continental Air Force should become available through a reduction in the authorized strength of AAF Headquarters and the domestic air forces and commands.

It was the opinion of General Arnold further that the reorganization should be activated at only cadre strength but be increased as facilities become available the next spring.\(^{36}\)

Shortly afterward, the Deputy Chief of Staff approved the recommendation, but asked that General Arnold consider the advisability of combining the proposed Continental Air Force with the Training Command and moving the headquarters farther away from Washington.\(^{37}\) In his reply, General Arnold pointed out that the training missions of the Training Command and the air forces were quite different. He preferred to keep the in-

\(^{36}\) Memo for G/S by CG, AAF, n.d. \(\text{prior to 25 Oct. 1944}\), in Historical File, Hq., CAF.
divisional and unit training separately. Moreover, the air forces were to have the additional responsibility of reorganizing, retraining, and re-equipping units returned to the United States to be redeployed and become a part of the strategic reserve. In view of this increase in function of the Continental Air Force, he recommended that the Training Command not be included within that organization, and pledged that the maximum decentralization of authority consistent with over-all problems of the air forces would be made, both in the Zone of the Interior and overseas.\(^{38}\) Following the drawing up of complete plans in AAF Headquarters, the Continental Air Forces (CAF) was authorized, effective 15 December 1944.\(^{39}\)

The new organization was given authority under the Commanding General of the AAF to organize and train the service (except air defense groups) and combat units and crews for deployment or redeployment to overseas theaters. On 26 December 1944, however, the Air Technical Service Command was assigned the continued responsibility for organizing and training air service groups for the period from their activation up to but not including combined training. They received the final phase of their operation, they were to be transferred to elements of the Continental Air Forces.

The activation of Continental Air Forces thus provided consolidation of the training activities carried on in the four air forces and the Iwo Jima Carrier Command, and reduced the burden of administrative work in


Headquarters, AAF. Within the new organization the unit training program was further decentralized. All directives for the component elements of Continental Air Forces were to be made directly to its headquarters, while detailed reports from the air forces and I Troop Carrier Command were to be furnished to Headquarters, AAF in summary form only. Headquarters, Continental Air Forces was to be responsible for visits, inspections, and investigations, and was to keep the records, thus making their duplication in Headquarters, AAF unnecessary.

The original date set for the assumption by CAF of its full responsibilities was 1 September 1945. The officers of the CAF, however, were perfecting the organization with an earlier operational date in mind. They first planned to make it 1 July 1945, but their plans were changed on 12 January when General Arnold outlined the basic principles which would govern the future activities of the Air Staff. These principles were (1) decentralization of operating functions, (2) placing increased emphasis on the planning and policy development functions of the Air Staff, and (3) delegation of command and management responsibility to non-rated officers in the air force of the future. In commenting on these principles the commander general stressed the importance of disentangling the Air Staff from day-to-day operating responsibilities, thereby leaving it free to devote its efforts to the large aspects of development and planning. In view of the urgency of the recommendations, the Chief of the Air Staff moved the target date of the CAF up to 1 April 1945.40 Actually the CAF assumed jurisdiction over its subordinate units.

40. See for O/A3 by Brig. Gen. Eugene H. Reel, 15 Jan. 1945, and notation thereon in Historical File, HQ, CAF.
on 8 May, but its operations were of a limited nature until 1 June when it was charged with complete responsibility. 41

Since the CAF was a new organization during the final phase of the war, and its chief duties were in reemployment, it naturally did not completely satisfy the needs of the postwar period. Lt. Gen. Chief of Staff felt that more emphasis should be placed on the training of the tactical air elements and recommended to General Arnold that a new operational air force be established within the CAF after the cessation of hostilities. It was to consist of two tactical air commands and a bomber command which would be formed by transferring the First Air Force combat crew training load and the related activities to the other three air forces and by allocating the headquarters of I Fighter Command, I Bomber Command, III Tactical Air Command, and I Tactical Air Division to the new Headquarters, First Air Force. The component units would be obtained from those in or scheduled for strategic and Pacific reserves. The headquarters of the new air force would be located in the south-central portion of the United States. It would be responsible for the conduct of air-ground training for combat units and crews, for the furnishing of air force units for all air-ground training with Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces and for joint training with the Navy, and for the maintenance of close liaison with the Navy air support training agencies. The need for such an organization was succinctly stated by the Acting Commanding General, Continental Air Forces, who wrote: 42

41. Fo. G1. 20-30, 8 May 1945; AAF Reg. 20-1, 1 June 1945.
The tactical air force has assumed a major role in modern warfare. Its representation within the AAF by one of the four presently assigned air forces is considered necessary to properly accomplish the assigned mission of air-ground and joint training.

This proposal was carefully studied in the offices of the Air Staff, among which there was general agreement on the desirability of placing more emphasis on training tactical air force elements. Action on the proposal, however, was deferred pending further study of manpower requirements and the possibility of revising existing AAF policy. In

43. 1st ind., 40/AS, OCA to CG, OCA, 29 June 1945, and subsequent correspondence in ibid. During the period that Headquarters, AAF was decentralizing many of its functions to OCA, the Chief of the Training Plans Division suggested the creation of an agency that would facilitate the exchange of training information throughout the world. A proposed Central AAF Training Board, it was maintained, would (1) provide a channel for immediate communication to overseas air forces of new developments, findings, changes, and other pertinent details of the continental training program; (2) furnish immediate and expert aid to the overseas air forces in the improvement of their training and in bringing about changes or additions made desirable by experience in the continental air forces; (3) be a channel to ATC and the training air forces on immediate and complete information in order that the continental program might be modified to meet those findings; (4) assure the continuity and standardization of training, particularly as to operational procedures and avoidance of unnecessary repetition; and (5) study continuously the training program in order to eliminate unnecessary subjects or aspects of training and to fix the relative importance of subjects within the program.

The proposal was referred to the DA/AS, Training, with directions that a board of officers examine and report on, the practicability of the recommendation. The board of officers was convinced that had the board been established two years earlier it would have accomplished "immeasurably good." The flow of information from the theaters had become so established that much which could be expected from the board was being accomplished through other channels. Because of this situation and the manpower shortage (it was estimated the board would require 300 people), it was recommended that the board not be established. Also, any further consideration of such a board should revolve about liaison with the Pacific area only. Memo for 40/AS, Training by Col. C. A. Paget, 30 Jun. 1945, in AAF 583-99, Training Miscellaneous, Vol. 6; memo for Col. F. H. House by Col. A. G. Herber, 6 Feb. 1945, in ibid; memo for Brig. Gen. W. V. Welch by Col. F. H. House, et al., 24 Feb. 1945, in ibid.
the meantime CAF continued to operate from headquarters at Bolling Field, with its removal to Andrews Field, Camp Springs, Md., still a part of future plans.

In the summer of 1945 another fundamental realignment of the offices of the Air Staff took place. This change was principally a return to the five classical staff designations and the elimination of special staff offices. Although the reorganization did not become official until 23 August, it affected the training agency as early as 15 July. On that date it was directed that the existing Office of AG/AS, Training, become the Training Division of a newly designated Office of AG/AS-3. This shifting did not drastically alter the training office; it merely reduced the echelon of the components in keeping with the reduced training load and the peacetime practice of combining the training and operations functions.

The Training Division as organized on 6 August 1945 was composed of five branches: Flying, Radar and Communications, Technical and Services, Plans and Programs, and Special Projects. (See chart, p. 58.) Under the 23 August statement of functions the AG/AS-3 was given the monitoring and coordinating authority over the various elements of his office:

44. Rm. Deputy Commander, AG to AG/AS-3, et al., 16 July 1945, in AFAC
Intr.-Office Procedures. Other components of the new office were: Air Communications Office; Antiaircraft Office; Flying Safety; Organization, Requirements, Commitments, and Operations Analytic Division; and the AG Center and Weather Service Liaison offices. The consolidation of CAF and Training into Organization, Training, and Requirements B3 had been projected in October 1944, but the impending creation of the CAF caused it to be postponed. See, especially, Rm. CG/AS to AG/AS, Oka.3.3 Nov. 1944, in AG 211.2, Army Air Forces; memo for C/AG by W.E.C., 25 Nov. 1944, in AG 310.1, Office Organization and Administration; and notes for all offices of the Air Staff, AG et al., by C/AG, 4 Dec. 1944, in files of Post-War Plans Division, Organization of Headquarters, AAF.
his duties were changed to the more realistic and effective supervision of activities by Op O I 20-1 of 15 September. Thus, a short time after the capitulation of Japan the training office in Headquarters, AAF was completely organized, and the Chief, Training Division was charged with the inclusive functions of establishing "plans, programs, and policies required to train AAF individuals and units; and exercise Headquarters supervision over all AAF training."

45. This organization, actually in effect, differs from the one shown by the chart attached to Op O I 20-1, 23 Aug 1945, which gives the first four listed above and also Flexible Gunnery and Training Aids branches. The organization of 6 Aug 1945 is the same as the one shown on the chart, Organization of the Army Air Forces, 15 Sep 1945. The Training and Operations Office, shown on the 23 August 1945 chart between the Training Division and AG/AS-8, never came into being.

46. AAF Rep 20-1, 15 Sep 1945.
ORGANIZATION OF TRAINING DIVISION, AC/AS-3

6 August 1945*

Chief
2 Deputies

Administrative and Publications Services

Executive Office

Flying Branch

Order and Communications Branch

Technical and Services Branch

Special Projects

Plans and Processes

Fixed Signal Services

Training Aids

Protests

Radio Maintenance

AAF School

Poster Plans and Special Studies

Weather

Foreign

Evaluation and Research

Air Force

Civilian Components

Tactical and Joint Plans

Pilot

Radio

Cannery

Reconnaissance

Refiner

Airborne

Emergency Rescue

* In AFOCU files.
CONCLUSION

The history of the organization of training in World War II is the story of the mushrooming of a simple training structure into a complex machine capable of producing aviation personnel for a modern army whose first objective was air supremacy.

During the planning period of 1939 the organization was simple in design. It consisted of a headquarters office, a technical school, and a flying training center, with the training of medical and engineering personnel under the supervision of their respective services. Although decentralization of operating functions to the field had been an Air Corps policy since 1936, it received an impetus in the creation of the Technical Training Command in 1941 and the Flying Training Command early in 1942. With their amalgamation into the Training Command during the summer of 1943, decentralization of individual training reached its peak. Likewise, in the four domestic air forces and the Troop Carrier Command the training of combat units and crews was decentralized from headquarters, a movement which finally culminated in their becoming the integral parts of the new Continental Air Forces. Under these agencies the wing commanders, commanding officers of subcommands, and supervisors of areas were given increasing responsibility as the training program progressed.

While the training plans were still in their formative stage, headquarters offices were large in number, but as the AAF progressed toward its objective in training crews and units, these offices, with some
Fluctuation, decreased in number as did the commands and subordinate echelons in the field.

Outside the regular training commands and air forces, various other AAF agencies came into the training picture as expediency, the necessity for specialization, and the results of insufficient training determined the assumption of training responsibility. As was to be expected, such diffusion resulted in some conflicts of jurisdiction. As time passed, the training functions of these agencies tended to be drawn back into the Training Command and the domestic air forces.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAC</td>
<td>Air Adjutant General</td>
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<td>TWC</td>
<td>West Coast Training Center</td>
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</table>
BIBLIOGRAPHY

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321.9 550 Division, Individual Training
321.9l Air Forces Technical Training Command--Air Forces
      Flying Training Command
321.92 Training and Operations--Trainin Division
321.9D Operations and Letters
321.1 AAF Letters
321.3 Army Air Forces
321.42 Organization of the Air Corps
322 Training Command
322B Units, OTU
3227 Commands
352.010 Establish.ment of Air Service Schools and Staff
358.01D Establishment of Schools
358.9D Training, Miscellaneous

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development of the training program both in Headquarters, AAF and in
the field.

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miscellaneous files in AAF Historical Office.

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Staff. Some use was made of miscellaneous correspondence in this
office relating to organizational changes in the AAF training
program.
Historical file in Historical Division of Continental Air Forces. This file, contained in two volumes, is composed of miscellaneous correspondence pertaining to the organization of the AAF.

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INDEX

A

AAF Center, 57 (n 44)
AAF Chemical School, 47
AAF Chemical Training Center, 47
AAF Guard School, 47
AAF School of Applied Tactics, 32, 39
AAF Statistical School, Harvard University, 32
AC/AS-3, 57
AC/AS, A-1, 51
AC/AS, Material, Maintenance, & Distribution (MM&D), 46
AC/AS, Operations, Commitments, & Requirements, (OC&RR), 39, 50
AC/AS, Training, 36, 39, 46, 48, 50, 56 (n 43), 57
Adjutant General, The, 15
Administrative Sec., T&O, 4
Air Communications Office, 57 (n 44)
Air Corps Engineering School, Wright Field, 30-32
Air Corps Flying School, 5
Air Corps Flying Training Command, 10, 15
Air Corps Tactical Center, 6
Air Corps Tactical School, 6 (n 5)
Air Corps Technical School, CG, 6
Air Corps Technical Training Command, 8, 11-13
Air Corps Training Center, 6 (n 6)
CG, 4
Air Crew Training Br., 39
Air Crew Training Div., 43
Air Force Combat Command, 12, 14, 22-23
CG, 9
Air Inspector, 40-41
Air Service Command, 21, 28, 34-35
CG, 28-29

Air Staff, 38, 52, 54, 56-57
Chief of, 42, 45, 54
Air Surgeon, 31
Air Technical Service Command, 32, 53
Air Traffic & Safety, Director of, 38
Air Transport Command, 29-30, 49-50
Andrews Field, Camp Springs, Md., 57
Antiaircraft Office, 57 (n 44)
Antisubmarine Command, 36
Arms and Services with the AAF (ASWAAF's), 46
Army Airways Communications System, 39
Army Weather Service, 39
Arnold, Gen. H. H., 18, 40, 44-45, 50, 52, 54-55
Asst. Chief of Air Corps, 7, 9, 12
Asst. Chief of Air Corps for Personnel & Training Services, 15 (n 26)
Aviation Medicine, School of, 30-31

B

Basic Training Center No. 4, 20
Beltsville, Md., 15 (n 28)
Doolittle Field, D. C., 25, 27
Brett, Maj. Gen. G. H., 10, 12-13

C

Camp Springs, Md., 52, 57
Caraway, Senet Hattie, 29
Central AAF Training Board, 56 (n 43)
Central Flying Training Command, 47
Central Technical Training Command, 48
Charute Field, 8, 13
Chief of Air Corps, 4, 6, 10, 12, 15-16, 32
Chief of Army Air Forces, 9, 12, 18, 20
Chief of Staff, 24, 45, 51, 55
Civil Aeronautics Administration
Standardization Center, 29
Combat Crew Sec., 21
Commanding General, AAF, 20, 32, 35, 37-38, 43, 45-46, 51, 53
Commitments Div., 57 (n 44)
Communications Div., 11
Continental Air Forces (CAF), 50-56
Acting CG, 55-56
Hq., 54
"Continental Strategic Air Reserve," 52
Cousins, Maj. Gen. R. F., 17
Crash, Fire-Fighting, Rescue Course, 47
Curry, Maj. Gen. J. F., 13-14

D
Denver, Colo., 18 (n 35)
Deputy Chief of Staff, 46, 52
Directorate of Base Services, 21
Directorate of Individual Training, 20, 23-24, 39
Director of, 32, 35
Directorate of Military Requirements, 20-21, 32, 39
Director of, 24, 38
Directorate of Technical Services, Director of, 38
Directorate of Weather, 36

E
Eaker, Lt. Col., I, C., 6
Eastern Defense Comd., 14, 45-46
Eastern Technical Training Comd., 48
Engineer Camouflage School, 47
Enid, Okla., 10

F
1st Air Force, 14, 45-46
Hq., 55
1st Bomb Comd., 55
1st District, 18 (n 35)
Hq., 14, 19-20
1st Fighter Comd., 55
1st Military Police Training Center, 47
1st Tactical Air Div., 55
1st Troop Carrier Comd., 22, 30 (n 3), 38, 49-50, 52-54
4th Air Force, 14, 45-47
4th District, 18 (n 35)
Ferrying Comd., 29
Flexible Gunnery Br., 58 (n 45)
Flexible Gunnery Project Office, 48
Flying Br., 57
Flying Safety Office, 57 (n 44)
Flying Training Comd., 15, 20, 23-24, 38, 43-42, 59
Hq., 17, 24
CG, 24-25
Flying Training Liaison Sec., 21
Flying Training Sec., 11
Flying Training unit, 7
Fort George Wright, Wash., 33
Fort Logan, 13
Fort Worth, Tex., 25, 42

G
Gates, Brig. Gen. B. E., 42
General Headquarters Air Force, 7, 27
General Staff, WD, 6
General Staff Corps, 17
Giles, Maj. Gen. B. E., 45
Greensboro, N. C., 18 (n 35), 20, 48
Gulf Coast Training Center, 6 (n 6)

H
Harvard University, 32-33
N
Non-Pilot Training Br., 11

Office of the Chief of Air Corps
(OCAC), 5, 20
Officer Candidate School, 19-20
Officers Training School, 20,
31 (n 6)
Olds, Maj. Gen. Robert, 33
Operations Analysis Div., 57 (n 44)
Operations Div., 11
Operations Sec., 4
Organization Div., 57 (n 44)
Organizational Planning, 38
Orientation Training Subsection, 21
Orlando, Fla., 32

P
Personnel Div., 4
Personnel Indoctrination Cmd., 41
Physical Development Subsection,
21
Pilot Training Br., 11
Plans, Analysis, and Reports Br.,
39
Plans, Analysis, and Reports Div.,
48
Plans Div., 6
Chief of, 5
Plans and Liaison Div., 48
Plans and Programs Br., 57
Proving Ground Cmd., 38

R
Radar and Communications Br., 57
Radio School No. 2, 20
Randolph Field, Tex., 6 (n 6),
31
Requirements Div., 57 (n 44)
Reserve Div., 4
S

2d Air Force, 14, 22, 33-34, 36, 38
2d District, 18 (n 35)
HQ., 14
St. Louis, Mo., 18 (n 35)
San Antonio, 5
Scott Field, 6, 13
Sheppard Field, 13
Smith, Lt. Col. L. S., 25
Southeast Training Center, 6 (n 6)
Southern Pines, N. C., 32
Spaatz, Gen. Carl, 5, 13, 23, 25
Special Projects Br., 57
Special Training Sec., 21
Staff Course Div., 39
Statistical Control, Director of, 32
Statistical Control Div., 33
Statistical Subsection, 21

T

3d Air Force, 14, 22, 38, 41, 47, 50
3d District, 18 (n 35)
III Tactical Air Command, 55
34th Flying Training Wing, 47
Technical Services Br., 57
Technical Schools unit, 7
Technical Training Br., 39
Commanding General, 16, 35
Technical Training Div., 48
Technical Training Liaison Sec., 21
Technical Training Sec., 11
Training Aids Div., 39
Chief, 56 (n 43)
Training Comd., 36, 42, 47-50, 52-53, 58 (n 43), 59-60
CG., 47
HQ. & HQ. Sq., 43
Training Div., 11-12, 20, 57
Chief, 12, 58
Training Gp., 4
Training Literature Sec., 11, 21
Training Literature Unit, 7-8
Training and Operations Div. (T&O), 4-5, 7-8, 10-11
Chief, 16-11
Training and Operations Office, 58 (n 45)
Training Sec., 4, 7-8
Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc. Conditioning School, 30
Troop Carrier Comd., 59
Tulsa, Okla., 18 (n 35), 19
Twining, Lt. Col. N. F., 17

U

Unit Training Br., 39
Utah, University of, 33

W

Washington State College, 33
Weather Service, 33, 35, 57 (n 44)
Weaver, Maj. Gen. W. R., 15, 18, 37, 41
West Coast Air Corps Training Center, 6 (n 6), 17
Western Defense Comd., 14, 45-46
Western Flying Training Comd., 49
Western Technical Training Comd., 49

Y

Yount, Brig. Gen. B. K., 4, 24-25, 41-43
IMPORTANT: FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES;  
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Training Activities, 1939-1945
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