DEMOBILIZATION PLANNING FOR THE USAF

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FOREWORD

This study was written by Dr. Chauncey E. Sanders of the USAF Historical Division, Research Studies Institute, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

The comments and/or recommendations contained in Part II are exploratory in nature and do not necessarily represent the official position of the United States Air Force.

Like other Historical Division studies, this history is subject to revision, and additional information or suggested corrections will be welcomed.
# Course of the War

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The Battle of the Revolution, Jan

The Revolution followed the Revolution and was a much harder

...
As Major Sparrow puts it, in his *History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army*:

"After the cessation of hostilities the Continental Army was almost completely disbanded. Men were allowed to return to their homes without receiving medical examinations or treatment and were often discharged from their organizations without payment or with a small amount of the practically worthless currency."

Sparrow continues with the story of one Joseph Jared, a member of the Virginia militia who was twice discharged during the Revolutionary War; on no occasion was he given a written discharge or any other token of his having served under arms. Hence, when Jared applied for a pension in 1833, he had no evidence beyond his own word that he was entitled to compensation. Sparrow concludes his discussion of our first demobilization with this sentence:

"Apparently demobilization was a relatively simple and easy process in those days and the soldiers were left to get home as best they could, for Jared was some distance from home when discharged."

On 3 November 1783 all that remained of the Revolutionary Army were two battalions of artillery and one regiment of infantry.

**Demobilization after the War of 1812**

At the outset of the War of 1812 the authorized strength of the Regular Army of the United States—consisting of 25 regiments of infantry, 4 of artillery, 2 of dragoons, and 1 of riferen, plus engineer troops in artillers—was 36,700; of this total 1 colloct 30,000 existed only on paper. The actual number under arms was 6,744. The total strength increased during the year, however, to at least 65,000. In the less
then three years' course of the War, 527,654 American troops were involved; of this number no more than five per cent were actually on duty in the field at any given time. Moreover, of the total only 63,179 served for more than 12 months, and 174,200 had service of less than one month. The largest number of troops available in any one year—that was in 1861—was 235,039. Since the population of the United States in 1815 was somewhere in the neighborhood of 8,000,000, the number of troops to be demobilized at the end of the War could not have represented more than 2 per cent of the total population.

Major Sparrow wrote:

As in the Revolutionary War there was a constant stream of men being inducted into active service and at the same time large numbers of men being discharged because they had served their terms of enlistment, extending from one to twelve months. An examination of militia records reveals that many state organizations were enrolled and discharged from service two or more times. When active hostilities had ceased, an Act of Congress passed 3 March 1815 provided those who had enlisted for the war to be discharged from the regular establishment, while those who were serving under longer enlistment were allowed to be discharged or were transferred to active regiments. The Army was returned to a peacetime basis by disbanding all excess regiments and consolidating remaining ones with regiments of the Regular Army. The demobilization of the wartime army repeated the same mistakes made in the Revolutionary War disbandment and contributed very little that could be used in large-scale demobilization planning.

The Act of Congress just mentioned also provided that the peace strength of the Army be fixed at 10,000 men; thus, although the Army was larger than in 1812 in the proportion of 10,000 to 6,744, its authorized strength was reduced to little more than one-fourth of what it had been three years earlier.
Demobilization After the War With Mexico

Of the Mexican War, Colonel Spaulding wrote: 16

As must always be the case, the temporary forces raised for the Mexican War were discharged with the least possible delay. The permanent force was depleted by premature discharges granted under a special Act of Congress and by wholesale desertions from the companies in California to join the rush for the gold fields. During the first eight months of 1849, nearly 500 out of 1,200 men so deserted. In Texas, an epidemic of cholera almost paralyzed military movements.

Colonel grave made this observation: "The small army became still smaller every day." 17 Dead men and deserters do not have to be demobilized.
The gold-seekers of '49 were not the only deserters; in more than one battle of the War, the raw, untrained American troops had fled from combat, sometimes in company, or even almost regimental strength. 18 And cholera was not the only man-killing disease rampant in the southwest; yellow fever, smallpox, and other pestilences plagued the armies of Generals Scott and Taylor. 19 Even greater depletion of the Army was caused by discharges. Almost 40,000 of those who volunteered were mustered into federal service for 12 months or less; 20 there was not such inclination to reenlist; 21 and there can be little doubt that most of the 40,000 had left the Army before the War ended. Almost 12,000 were discharged for disability or causes other than expiration of enlistment. 22 Following the War, the authorized troop strength was reduced from 30,890 to 10,320. 23 If something like 70,000 men had died, deserted, or been discharged before the end of the War, it would have required a demobilization of little more than 20,000 of the over-all total of 104,234 to reach the new troop basis. That would have meant the demobilization of far less than 1 per cent of the population of the country. 25
Little information has been found as to the method of demobilization. Major Sparrow wrote:

The Army was composed largely of volunteers and militia under 3-month and 1-year enlistment. At one time during operations in Mexico, General Scott lost approximately 40 percent of his army because of the expiration of enlistments. It was not until the latter stages of the war that the President was authorized to enlist volunteers for the duration. An army organized in this manner and fighting under these circumstances does not furnish proper conditions for studying demobilization policies.

Colonel Spaulding discussed the subject even more briefly and only a little more informatively: "The volunteer and the temporary regular regiments were discharged,..." 27

Demobilization After the Civil War

The first really large-scale demobilization carried out in the United States was that which followed the Civil War. As in our previous wars, throughout the period of hostilities men were being discharged, as short-term enlistments expired. But no consideration seems to have been given to the problem of postwar demobilization until after Lee surrendered. Then the Government was confronted with the task of discharging 1,034,000 Union soldiers. 28

The hastily-arranged demobilization plan called for each division to be moved intact to one of nine rendezvous areas. 29

At these camps, muster-out rolls and pay-rolls were prepared, containing the following information about each man: rank and age; where, when, and by whom enrolled; when, where, and by whom mustered in; when last paid and to what time; how far he had traveled; what subsistence and forage he had furnished; what equipment and clothing he had received; and his absences, special duties, promotions, wounds, etc., on illnesses. After this administrative work had been performed, corps and divisions were inactivated. Each lower command was mustered out of Federal service and the men forming the organization were sent to their home state and camp of organization for individual musters-out. In the final movement of individuals at regimental or lower level, transportation was provided by various means. Sometimes
these movements were accomplished by changing from rail to boat to wagon to foot and back again before reaching the camp where the individual was to be mustered out.

To those familiar with the events of 1945-1946 mention of some of the demobilization difficulties of 1865-1867 has a familiar sound. Records were incorrect or missing. Lack of any program or facilities for recreation and entertainment at the rendezvous camps left the troops easy prey to boredom and homesickness; wholesale AWOL's and desertions resulted. Among those who remained in camp, rebellion against being kept in service after the fighting had ended was universal. Men rented to get back to their homes, to jobs that would pay more than their meager Army pay.

One difficulty of the 1860's that did not arise in later demobilizations was the result of lack of uniformity in mustering-out pay. In some states troops were paid to include day of individual discharge or muster-out, while in others, notably Illinois, troops were only paid to include the date that they had arrived in the state rendezvous. This was not made uniform until late in November 1865 when troops were paid to include the last day in Federal service.

Another difference between the Civil War de-obilization and those that followed has to do with the physical condition of the men being discharged. Many soldiers were suffering from wounds and service- incurred disease and, while physical condition was not ascertained by standards of that day, there was no organized effort to restore the soldier to civilian health.

Despite difficulties, demobilization proceeded rapidly. Between 1 May and 7 August 1865, 440,306 officers and men had been discharged; by the end of the year the total was about 900,000. The one million
mark was passed before 30 June 1866, and by 1 November of that year 1,023,021 had been mustered out. A few volunteers were kept in service, for various reasons, more than a year longer; the last volunteer organization was not disbanded until 30 December 1867.  

Demobilization After the Spanish-American War

The Spanish-American War was too brief and too limited in scope to provide any very significant test of demobilization procedure. The number of troops involved was well under 300,000, and the fact that fighting continued in the Philippines and elsewhere until 1902 made impracticable as complete a demobilization as had followed our earlier wars. Nevertheless, the discharge procedures followed between 27 August 1898 and 22 June 1899 are worth considering.

The method first adopted was this: "Records of soldiers were to be completely prepared at Federal camps before transporting the organizations to their respective state camps. After arrival within the state, organizational commanders accomplished final payment and men were mustered out without furlough." Ten days later, however—on 30 August—a new directive was issued; this called for organizations to be moved directly to state camps and for the administrative details connected with records and other matters to be accomplished in the camps while the men subject to discharge were enjoying 30- or 60-day furloughs.

The new method of discharge had disadvantages that were soon apparent. These were summarized, in part, at least, in a report to The Adjutant General:

1. Clerical and other administrative procedures relating to demobilization of personnel should be performed while organizations are under federal control. Stations in the
field. Individual records could not be completed while men were on furlough from their state camp. It required four and one-half days longer to demobilize a regiment at its state camp than at a Federal station, even though administrative work continued while the majority of the troops were on furlough.

2. Thirty- and sixty-day furloughs granted to troops produced evils. Some of these were:

a. The uncertainty of the time of discharge made it difficult for an individual to obtain permanent employment.

b. Large numbers of men were unable to support themselves properly on their pay and commuted subsistence during extended furlough periods.

c. Sudden changes of climate produced much sickness and discomfort because men, anticipating musters-out on their return from furlough, did not want to draw additional clothing.

d. Volunteer soldiers did not accept the furlough as a reward. Men would have preferred to be discharged and then be given the additional pay of the furlough period.

The policy of extra pay instead of a furlough was eventually adopted.\(^39\)

Another disadvantage of the decentralization to state camps was the fact that because the state camps were so numerous, many more Regular Army officers were required than had previously been needed to supervise and assist in the administrative work; hence the expense was greatly increased. The demobilization was completed in less than a year; it had directly affected about .0036 of the country's population.\(^39\)

**Demobilization After World War I**

Writing of World War I Professor Paxson remarked: "There were times in the history of mobilization in which the government of the United States looked like a madhouse; during demobilization there was lacking even the madhouse in which the crazy might be incarcerated. They were at large."\(^40\)
Accounts of the planning for World War I demobilization vary, but all authorities agree that the planning was started too late; and to say that the planners—and the executors of the plan—acted as if they were crazy is not too harsh an exaggeration.

According to one version, the impetus that finally started demobilization planning was furnished by the British. On 8 October 1918, Col. E. S. Hartshorn, Chief of the Coordination Section of the General Staff, wrote a memo for his chief, Maj. Gen. Frank McInlyre, pointing out "that the enormous expense connected with the military establishment and the desirability of the speedy return to normal economic conditions, indicated that the disbandment of our soldiers should be accomplished with the least practicable delay."\(^2\) Colonel Hartshorn added that he had been informed by a member of the British Military Mission that the British War Office had already made plans for discharging their forces, including colonials. The memo ended with a recommendation that the War Plans Division of the General Staff be directed to study and report on all phases of demobilization.\(^2\) On 11 October General McInlyre acted on this recommendation; but no results were forthcoming until 22 November, more than a week after the fighting had stopped.\(^3\)

Another version of the history of World War I demobilization planning has it that the inspiration was a letter written by the Chief of the Operations Division, General Staff, to the President of the Army War College, who doubled as Chief of the War Plans Division. The letter read, in part, "There are one or two questions it seems to me should be studied and worked out so that you shall be good and ready for any contingency. The first of these is the plan for demobilization..."
and musters out. This letter was written in October 1918; since the exact date is not given, it is impossible to tell whether the letter preceded or followed the Kershorn memorandum.

If we seek to find the reason for the Army's failure to have demobilization plans ready when they were needed, an answer can be found in a letter written by Secretary of War Baker several months after the Armistice: "The collapse of the Central Powers came more quickly than even the best informed military experts believed possible." Another cause for the failure to undertake postwar planning while the war was still raging was the fear of an unfavorable public reaction in the event that the existence of such planning should become known. The letter to the President of the Army War College asking for a study and report on demobilization contains this sentence: "I do not want to advertise it too much at present as it might be thought to be peace propagation." These explanations may, at the time, have seemed adequate; that they are not is obvious. To defer postwar planning until a war is won, or nearly won, is to court disaster. There should be demobilization

* It is interesting to note that the same fear was expressed in connection with World War II demobilization planning; a JCS paper (311, 30 July 1943) emphasized the necessity for keeping secret the existence of the newly-created Special Planning Division in order to avoid a public relaxation in the war effort should it become known that we were deeply involved in preparation for demobilization."
planning before a war begins; every mobilization plan should have
a concurrent demobilization plan.

Five methods of determining separation priority were considered:
(1) length of service; (2) occupation; (3) individual application,
supported by offer of employment; (4) locality (i.e., separation to
be conducted by local draft boards); and (5) military units.

Demobilization by Length of Service

The first method was impractical, mainly because the United
States had not been at war long enough for length of service to be an
equitable criterion of eligibility for discharge. Our army of almost
three and a half million had been recruited, trained, and sent into
action so rapidly that, in many instances, those who had experienced the

* The planning of October-November 1918 was not the first
attempt by the War Department to prepare for demobilization. In
the spring of 1918 Robert C. Clothier, a member of the United States
Committee on Classification of Personnel of the Army and later
President of Rutgers University, had gone to England to study demobi-
lization plans (Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization, p. 13).
The Committee's report, which was not submitted until 16 October 1918,
recommended that men be discharged by trade or profession, so that
they could be readjusted to civilian life at the rate at which the
economy of the country could absorb them; the Committee also
recommended that the Department of Labor should be the principal
agency concerned in the resettlement of ex-soldiers in civilian life.
"There is no evidence to show that these suggestions were considered
seriously by the War Department." (Koch and Thurber, Report on
Demobilization, p. 120-29) Since this report had no effect on de-
mobilization as it was actually carried out, it has been ignored in
the text of this study.
most arduous and most dangerous action had had only brief service; the men with the longest service were often to one who had spent the entire war period in safe billets in the United States.

**Demobilization by Occupations**

The idea of releasing, first the men who were most needed in trade, industry, and agriculture was an appealing one. This method—or a combination of this method and the one to be discussed next—was the method adopted, and later abandoned, by Great Britain; it was the method advocated by employment experts and various other civilian authorities in this country. On 9 November 1918, Felix Frankfurter, then head of the War Labor Policies Board, in a letter to Secretary of Labor William J. Wilson, urged "demobilization by vocational groups, moved to the demands of civilian employment—under close cooperation between the Departments of War and Labor." In another letter to Mr. Wilson, dated 22 November, Mr. Frankfurter proposed that soldiers be discharged in this order:

1. Farmers, dairymen, tractor men, cattlemen, and all agricultural work all once, since few in the great need of the post-war world. Seasonal farm laborers should be held until March, since their demobilization now would only heighten unemployment, or steer the ablest men into city industry—where they might prove hard to displace when the gap begins to rise.

2. Executives and professional men, holding strategic posts in civil life.

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The experience of the author of this monograph may be taken as a case in point.AVING enlisted in the Signal Limited Reserve Corps, he was called to active duty in November 1917. He landed in France on 10 March 1918 and, after little more than two months' training in trench warfare, was sent to the Château-Thierry Front—where there were no trenches to speak of. He had been in action for almost two months before he was disabled, on 25 July, by mustard gas.
3. Men formerly employed in mining, shipping, production of railroad equipment, where the scarcity of labor is acute.

4. Men whose employers promise that jobs are waiting.

5. Men who can qualify for jobs certified by the United States Employment Service.

6. Men from sections where the Service reports labor shortages.

7. Federal, state, and municipal employees under civil service.

8. Men of independent means—this class clearly less important than the first six.

The chief of the Operations Branch is cited as another who advocated the occupational approach to desobilization; he is quoted as having stated in a memorandum dated 22 November 1918 that "the paramount issue in the discharge of men was not the military efficiency of the army organizations, but the recreation of the normal industrial life of the nation, and the placement in such industrial life of individuals who had been engaged in occupations which would end with the war or who had been in the military forces." Secretary of War Baker himself seems to have been of the same school of thought. He is quoted as having said in a press conference a few days after the Armistice that it was necessary "to desibilize the men in this country and in foreign lands with reference to their occupational opportunities, in order to get them back into the normal life of the country without filling the nation with unemployed men."

Mr. Baker said that the War Department was cooperating closely with the Department of Labor, through its United States Employment Service, and with the War Industries Board. That cooperation, however, was short-lived. Bernard B. Baruch, Chairman of the War Industries Board, considered
that, as soon as the war was won, the Board had accomplished its mission; consequently, at this early hour, the Board was abolished by Executive Order dated 31 December 1918. In the United States Employment Service was so improved by the refusal of Congress to appropriate sufficient funds that it was relatively ineffective after March 1919. Moreover, the extent of the War Department's cooperation, after 5 December 1918, was to keep the Department of Labor informed about demobilization activities.

Despite the views of Secretary Baker and of the Chief of the Operations Branch, General Staff, the War Department was opposed to the principle of discharging men as they were needed in civilian life, or could be profitably employed there. War Department officials agreed that the Army did not know, and could not in any practicable way acquire, enough information about the occupational qualifications of its soldiers or about the labor conditions, the employment possibilities throughout the nation, to make such a method of demobilization feasible. It has been said that the plan envisaged by Messrs. Frankfurter and Baker could have been successfully carried out if arrangements for putting the necessary procedures into effect had been made well before the end of the war. It seems doubtful, however, whether the ideal of discharging each soldier and putting him into a civilian job as soon as such a job became available could ever have been realized.

Indeed, Mr. Frankfurter himself, in his own words, in the light of his earlier experience, that this plan could not have been made to work.

As Chairman of the Board, in his own bureau, he soon met with other leading officials who encountered on the level of Statistics, mounting civilian pressure for the boys to be turned over to them with adequate consequences. His task was to be defeated by commitments from wives for their sons, wives for their husbands, politicians for their constituents. The appeal of beauty, of the
vision of continued and military war situación down the path of least resistance, block any support from planned economy. For over, the whole drift of U.S.P.W.--seeking to stabilize employment, wages, prices--was fought by two groups seldom allied. On the one hand, organized labor, impatient with wage ceilings, eager to achieve liberty of action, though creased fearful of labor surpluses resulting from lack of obliciation. On the other, even more violently, business ran idea to return to laissez faire and who looked upon labor as a commodity, said to able to first reduction in postwar production costs at its own pace.

Unless a far friends and successful effort had been made to control these various sources of pressure--families, politicians, labor leaders, and employers--no de-obliciation plan keyed to the economic situations could possibly have succeeded.

In June 1919 Great Britain adopted a deobliciation plan--over the protests of Sir Evelyn "pig, [who] characterized it as "most objecitable and prejudicial to discipline," which was based on the policy of immediate discharge of men who were not critically needed in British industry, commerce, and agriculture and some of others as jobs were available for them. This plan, put into effect immediately after the Armistice,

The statement of Professor Paxson is worth repeating: (The Great Deobliciation, p. 11): "There was no plan for the deobliciation of the armed forces; and none would have been accepted by the men, anxious to be released, or by their people, anxious to have them back. Some of the militarist cases now in retribution were extremely regrettable, urged but not adopted, for an orderly return of the troops, class by class, to be fitted into jobs as jobs were found or to be sent to work new farms, for the old idea of a variable frontier has long after the frontier itself was gone. To such theory corresponded the return. The men came back from France as ships were available for them at least," A statement of Condict Grewell and Robert Forrest Wilson, Deobliciation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921), p. 5, is also of interest here: "Deobliciation itself, first of all, the disarming of the American army. Whatever economic considerations might guide the reduction of war industry, no such considerations were to be permitted to retard the hurried progress of the troops. Four million American homes desired their men at home; and neither the immediate return of the troops want unemployment and distress or not, the government was determined to comply with the demand."
made redundant inevitable than not, because of their importance to the British economy, had been deferred from active service until very late in the war, were the first to be discharged. Conversely, men who had been in the war since 1914, or soon after that time, found themselves hurryed in seeking offers of jobs by the mere length of their service. Moreover, the plan lent itself to abuses; when a soldier applied for discharge on the strength of an offer of employment, it was not always possible to determine whether or not the offer was bona fide.

Within a month or so after the British de-mobilization got under way, feeling over the manner in which it was being conducted became so intense that the very core of the entire British army was disrupted. Never, in all history, had the end of a war occasioned such public concern. The government had expected that the army would be discharged without any great difficulty. The new system seems to have worked very well.

**De-mobilization by Individual Application**

The third type of de-mobilization proposed—adopted by the British government—was a more flexible approach. The men were allowed to apply for discharge, providing they could show, with the aid of their application for discharge or a statement to the effect that a job was available for him. Discharges would then be granted without consideration of the nature of the job; in other words, it would be attempted to return soldiers to civilian life as they were most needed in the civilian economy, filling the

...
critical jobs first and leave to be discharged last those who
would be qualified only for the least important jobs. The adoption
of this method would have saved the vast majority of United States
soldiers eligible for discharge almost overnight. Moreover, in order
to prevent abuses, it would have been necessary to check each claim
of job availability to make sure that such a job really did exist and
would be given to the applicant upon his return to civilian life.

It is not surprising that the War Department gave little consideration
to such a plan. As General March put it:

"Had the War Department announced such a system of discharge on
individual application, practically every man in the Army would
at once have submitted his request for immediate discharge. As
it would not have been possible to discharge immediately all
who applied for such discharge, the different applications would
have required careful study to determine which was the most
necessary and which should be discharged first. This comparing
of the relative merits of individuals for discharge would have
involved an almost inconceivable amount of work and would have
very partly retarded the progress of de-obilization. To try
to decide the priority for discharge of individuals in any Army
of nearly 4,000,000 soldiers would have created infinitely more
dissatisfaction among the soldiers who were not selected for early
discharge than the method used of discharging the men by units."

Re-obilization by Local Draft Boards

One other proposed method of de-obilization should be mentioned.
The selective service boards of Chicago, enthusiastically seconded by
General Crozier—who, as Provost Marshal General was in charge of the
administration of the national draft act—believed that the local draft
boards, which had done an excellent job in recruiting nearly 4,000,000
men, would be the appropriate agency to perform the de-obilization
function. There was objection to this proposal on the part of a number
of Chicago labor leaders, who felt that some local boards had
displayed anti-union bias in selecting men to be inducted and
that these boards might be expected to display the same bias if
they were permitted to conduct the deobligation. 61

A more important objection to the proposal was the fact that
it would have entailed taking each local board a separation center.
Presumably, the boards already had the medical personnel to conduct
the necessary physical examinations of men to be discharged, since
they had for months been performing the task of examining draft
registrants; but they would have had to have, in addition, commissioned
and enlisted personnel to check and correct records, receive and store
government equipment being turned in, issue uniforms, and make financial
adjustments. Also each board would have had to provide housing, mess-
ing, and hospitalization facilities for the men while they were being
discharged. The mere fact that there were 1,348 local boards was
enough to make this method impracticable; there is no evidence that
it was ever seriously considered by anyone other than the Chicagoans
who were the authors of the proposal, and General Crowder. 62 There may
or may not be significance in the fact that General Crowder’s recommendation
that the local draft boards be utilized to deobligate the Army, which
was submitted to the Chief of Staff on 11 November 1918, did not reach
the Director of Operations, JQOS, until 22 November; the official
announcement of the plan to be used had been made six days earlier. 63

-It is perhaps a mere coincidence that the War Plans Division’s
formal report on deobligation was submitted to the Chief of Staff
on the same day (Sparrow, History of Personnel De-obligation, p. 14).
Deobobilization by Military Units

The plan adopted was essentially unit de-obilization. The
War Department gave five reasons for choosing this method:

1. In the first place, it was a speedy way of discharging the
men. Second, it contributed to the orderly return of the
troops, and third, maintained efficiency in the military
forces through priority schedules. Also, fourth, in the
opinion of the officials, such units presented cross
sections of the nation's industrial life, and obviated the
necessity of discharging men because they possessed certain
trades or skills. Finally, the War Department claimed that
it allowed sufficient elasticity to provide for special
and individual cases.

The first three points were well taking; there can be little question
that the three desiderata—speed and orderliness of return to civil
life and maintenance of military efficiency in the units kept in service—
can best, or at least most easily, be gained by unit de-obilization.
The fourth allegation—obviously an attempt to placate too virile
officials—was obviously very dubious. Even a unit as large as a division, which, in
World War I days, comprised more than twenty thousand men, is not a
sufficiently large cross-section to be necessarily a cross-section of
civilian life. The proportion of bakers to butchers, of boilermakers to
bankers, is not so much as or equal to in any one division than
it is in the country as a whole; and one division might differ greatly
from another in the occupations represented by its personnel. The
fifth point apparentlyalled to War Department Circular No. 77,
21 November 1918, which provided that in individual soldiers might be
discharged because of sickness or undue hardship in his family or, in
exceptional cases, because he was badly needed in an important civilian
job.
World War I Depopulation in Operation

The War Department was not much concerned with economic considerations. Although it informed the Department of Labor in November 1918 that it would study the possibility of retaining deobligation in communities in which there was already a labor surplus, there is no evidence that any such study was ever made. On the contrary, everywhere across the country, soldiers were discharged as fast as the Army could process and discharge them. Consequently, between 1 December 1918 and February 1919, according to the War Trade Board, unemployment increased considerably like 1,300 percent. But the Army was unimpressed by such reports; it looked upon unemployment and other economic facts of life as things beyond its purview. From 11 November to the end of 1918 and throughout 1919 the Army had one impelling motive: to relieve the public, journalistic, and Congressional pressure by responding to the demand, "Bring the boys home!" Bring they home it did.

Depopulation began on 11 November 1918. Within an hour after the news of the signing of the Armistice reached Washington, separations from the service were taking place. In more than one instance a troop train, loaded with newly sworn-in inductees heading for training camp, was stopped and sent back to its starting point; there the inductees were immediately discharged from the service. Units in the United States, from development battalions to combat divisions in training, were either disbanded or inactivated and their personnel discharged as fast as the necessary procedures could be accomplished. No combat divisions and other organizations overseas were declared by General
Nothing to be no longer required, they were shipped back to the United States to be disposed of or inactivated if not required as components of the regular army.

There were, however, thousands of men overseas who had, generally because of having been hospitalized, been detached from their organizations. These were sent to casual camps such as the one at St. Adolphe (known to its inmates as "St. Army") and held there until service records were received from Tours, the records repository.

When a group of some 200 soldiers had been detached with their service records, they were organized into a casual company, put in charge of a couple of officers who were similarly detached from their organizations, and put on the first available states-bound ship. From the port of debarkation the casuals were sent to a place such as Camp Tawes at Fitch, Massachusetts; there they were held for a few days while groups, one for each demobilization center, were organized. Every soldier was assigned to the group headed for the center nearest his home.

The discharge procedure—physical examination, turning in of government property, pay and travel allowance computation—generally required about four days. Upon being discharged, each soldier was given a uniform, shoes, and an overcoat or raincoat, depending upon the prevailing weather; those who returned from overseas with helmet and gas mask were allowed to keep those articles as souvenirs. The discharge

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*When a man was wounded and sent to a field hospital, his service record was retained by his unit for five days; if, at the end of that time, he had not returned, it was assumed that he had been sent on to a base hospital, and his service record was sent to the Central Records Office at Tours.

*General Viner (The United States Army, p. 10) says there were thirty of these demobilization centers; Thurber and York (Report on Demobilization, p. 13) say that the number was thirty-three.
was also from all pay and allowances due him, plus a 50 bonus.
He was encouraged to return immediately to his home town; the
railroad helped by offering a reduced rate to discharged soldiers
returning to their homes.

Reference has already been made to the deviation from the
principle of unit deactivation permitted by the provisions of
War Department Circular No. 77, 1919. Another deviation occurred
when three classes of workers—embalming clerks, railroad
employees, and railway mail clerks—were ordered discharged; 69
more than 13,000 soldiers were affected by this order. 70 Another concession
to economic considerations made by the War Department is represented
by War Department Circular No. 34, 1919, which

provided that commanding officers should take steps to organize
the every enlisted man in their command an enlisted thoroughly
that the War Department did not desire to discharge any soldier
who could not secure civilian employment, and that in place of
being discharged, as he would be normally on orders for de-
recruitment, he might remain in the military service until such
time as he could secure employment.

By February 1919 orders had been issued by the Chief of Staff
taking eligible for discharge all troops that had been in this country
on 11 July 1918; certain others—Regular Army troops, medical
personnel, and officers engaged in administrative work connected with
de-embarkation—were exempt. The last group complained so bitterly
about being kept in service that, in March 1919, they were reduced by
civilians. 72

The chief difficulty in the de-embarkation program was the lack of

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See above, p. 19.
whilst it is personal to Mr. King concerning such a letter, he is still inclined to put the best construction on the matter. He is a long visitor. Promotional, by the end of
November 1916, we had 12,000 troops in the various ports. From that
figure we went on with 12,000 troops, and in the first half of
1917 we had doubled them to about 27,000, which in
March to 60,000 in June; by the end of that fall we total of 275,000 was then
reached. Only then do we enter into 1917. The total number of operations
was 3,100,000, at the end the strength of the Army was less than
275,000; on 10 December it was 217,000.

We had prepared to go to war in 1914, it was not until
summer of 1915 when he began to think of the Western and
Eastern operations that it was not until 1916 that we entered war for
the reasons of the United States Congress. A whole of certain nonsense
that the Senate and House of Representatives joined into the war in 1917.

It would be all right, but that we were not able to
have the necessary steps to bring about the situation. That is the best
way of bringing about the situation, and the best way of things,
of an immediate character. It was only in 1914 that we
had a real chance. The United States entered war on
6 January 1917. The American troops were not, in a number of cases, ready
for it, but a little bit to the American Council, as in his
case description of the entire state of the Allied situation.
and concluded: "I don't know just what to call it, it looks like a "no triangle" of some sort with the other one."74

"...and that, Mr. President, is all I have to say about the matter."75

I have been informed by the chief of staff as "giving the most delicate" - but in mild terms to "the matter of the not-exact report about Yugoslav officer to the army which I have seen,..." and asking for what he meant with the latter he read. "The Chief of the Staff, General Marshall, offered his account of the episode with this sentence: "This is our own criticism thereafter ceased."75

In fact, such criticism did not from the first or second something less than candid for criticism did not cease. Senators on the Appropriations continued to assail the army for that they considered illiterateness in discharging surplus personnel. On 3 February 1919 Secretary Baker wrote to Senator Hill asking Senator's draft resolution 102-26A of proposed inclusion that would, had it been passed, have overturned the whole reorganization program and have tended to return to the conduct that characterized the post-bellum period. In protest of this legislation, Secretary Baker wrote: "To hold the Army responsible for the Army's proper functioning and to destroy its organic integrity by such legislation is to lose a vital and essential link and thus place the Army's performance with the other."76

The resolution was not passed, but the criticism of the Army's performance continued; for on 24 March 1920 the War Department found..."
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It necessary to as least "integral" to all official bulletin of details the debilization project as giving the General Staff's reasons for choosing the unit debilization method rather than another.77 Throughout the debilization period the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and others who should have been permitted to devote their efforts to other causes were compelled to spend much of their time in that was largely a vain attempt to defend the Army and its policies.

Yet the objectives were set, essentially, against the debilization plan itself but rather against the execution of the plan. There was no great public clamor against the principle of unit debilization, but the plan had been made and adopted so belatedly that there had been no time to train personnel to carry it out. The administrators of the debilization had to learn on the job, by trial and error. There were ungodly many cases of injustice to individuals who should have been discharged early were discharged late. And—so it seemed in military circles—the public and the press found these cases much more noteworthy than the Army's explanation that it was doing the best it could, one not too badly, at that.78

The debilization of almost 3,500,000 soldi affected directly about 3% percent of the population.79 It was not as sure, however, that the army, which was from 25,777 officers and men on 1 April 1917 to 497,000 on 12 November 1918, also carried out an extensive debilization program in turning more than 400,000 men to civilian life.80 Thus the total number debilized by the United States after World War I was close to 4,000,000—a little 1% percent of the population.81
Moreover, the criticality of civilian war industries. Thus a much larger proportion of the people of the United States were involved, directly or indirectly, in the mobilization then that followed World War I than had been affected by any of the nine earlier mobilizations. Consequently, the impact of the mobilization of 1917-1919 was much greater than that of any previous mobilization, it is probably not too much to say that it was greater than the impact of all the previous mobilizations combined. Concerning it, Professor Persson was prompted to write: "Another Great War should it come upon us, might indeed be won, but the survival of the Great Depression is justified in neither, whether in peace society, or any society, could win another [piece]." The Professor's fear was well founded, it is only demonstrated by the fact that even now, 10 years after the end of World War II, it is by no means certain that any nation has won the "Peace."
In at least one of our first sixteen, that was a fine opportunity for effective disorganization. It was in the sixth or fifth months after the fall of Meuse in May 1917, the last period for mobilization plans for the French Army, etc., as to the time the planning was done until that summer, one then sees the letter. The period from 1 November 1916 to 1 April 1917.

... although in the present paper, the role of mobilization is not directly examined, but the role of the French Staff, mainly by Major D'Haen—"faissé à la Pologne" et "l'arme au pied"—can be seen as a record of "l'arme au pied" in effect, I said the world Tyranny. The world was not interested in war, yet the French staff believed that an offensive strategy forces to France. The world was not interested in the French or the people. Yet the world had its strategy — "on" which was achieved—avoidance of the defeat, the defense, the world, and the avulsion—nothing.

...
had been to, could be, that did not influence. None of that information was relevant to the order of the day. There followed a long list of names on them. It was seats from the designation to "lost in a fight" and the opportunity or sound and the "lost in a fight" and the "lost in a fight" opportunity was lost. In the final realization, I walked away.

Each...
County raised to ten dollars for a three-year enlistment or 15 & 75 lbrs. for the same, adding to raise 50 battalions, required 20 and 100 per cent of him to every hundred dollars officer and soldier who would serve for the duration of the war. In 1777 representatives of all the states represented that their states should also have a state bounty of thirty-three and one-third dollars to the Continental bounty of thirty-two dollars, and hence the state bounties were increased to thirty-two dollars in the first instance, bringing the total for each soldier in those two states to eighty-one and one-third dollars. In March 1779 the Congress resolved:

"That a bounty of two hundred dollars out of the Continental Treasury shall be granted to each recruit the 1st of January 18th or shall issue during the year, or in case the State shall have raised a sum of greater than the said two hundred dollars for each such recruit shall be paid to the credit of the State for which it was raised."

This resolution in reality was nothing as compared with the generosity of the states. In 1780 the Virginia legislature offered to every recruit an additional bounties, one suit of clothes per year, and a hundred acres of land. (From this total, the Continental bounty was to be deducted.) In 1780 the Congress offered a bounty of 1,000; this was to be in addition to all Continental bounties and allowances.

Of course it was the intention of the Continental currency that these bounties carry for the Congress the debts to its officers and troops with ever-increasing bounties, but the system defeated itself. Soldiers, seeing that the bounties were increasing, deferred to sign up until the increase of the bounty was so large that the creditors were always at least one step behind. For many months in the fall of 1782, the Con-

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with Hitler, and the Allied High Command realized the lesson that
should have been learned since the revolution in arms that short-time
well trains, in conjunction with a bounty, 16 , provide a cost
effective and highly efficient body of troops, even in the field.
Fortunately, this lesson, at least, the country was not in a hurry.
For in both World Wars the mobilization, though they left little to be
derived in the creation of such bodies, did provide troops obligated
to serve for the duration.

A third lesson to be learned from previous mobilizations—one
that, as a whole, I do not think learned in World War II—is that
our work is important. Perhaps not many members of our armed
forces, in such an environment as that of Joseph Stalin, 15 but any of the
difficulty with which our de mobilizations have been made can be
traced to faulty or incompetent supervision.

In the light of the births of initiative officers cannot be expected to
spring into the army. These men are selected through all personnel
are usually equipped with a mental deficiency. But it is far after
the months when they are really required that they have the opportu-
nity for being received into the service. Classification, training,
and leadership of naval and air officers are given, and
an efficient impact in a war can be made by personnel officers will
do in the better of well mobilization as it has been in the
past.

Another lesson that has to be learned is that mobilization
will not be started until the have been trained—three in real-time
hospitalization, and one on the job of truth. The
original, to whom it has been transmitted, in the form of documents for all, which so
early in the course of operations, have shown. Under these circumstances, it is
possible, as nearly as physical condition will permit, the time of his
enlistment or induction. He has a right, moreover, to free treatment
for, at, or after possible, the care of any disability, he suffers from
it first became evident, this as a result of his service. The
privileges granted under various "Acts of Rights"—the educational advan-
tages, medical, dental, and the like—arise not from his rights;
neither his health or the law be declared by a benevolent, paternal
Government. Rather, it is a sound investment, because it
provides insurance of a better type of citizenship for the future.

The NCO I have seen is one that has not felt an enemy; unless it
is learned between us all the cost of World War II, the next destruc-
tion is doomed to failure. The lesson is that we have a good civilization
when is not fought. The plan will be carried out. To have seen that the
first difficulties in the civilization that followed could be prevented
from the first time plans were not carried out as announced. It will
be found that it is not the battle, existing, but the future, is the
case.
characterized the de-escalation that followed World War II. In both cases, the inability to carry out the de-escalation plan was the inevitable result of (1) the lack of sufficient neurol screaming to de-escalation procedures and (2) the failure to condition the American public, the press, and the politicians in what to expect of a de-escalation process. If the next de-escalation is to be successful, there must be both a training program and a public relations program; the former must be both timely and adequate, and the latter must be carried out with all the skill and knowledge to which we are accustomed in a nation-wise advertising campaign.

De-escalation Following World War II

De-escalation following the end of World War II has been an ongoing process, often complicated by the fact that there was a relatively short time between the end of the war and the start of the Cold War. The goal was to prevent a full-scale war, and to do so, it was necessary to establish a system of checks and balances that would prevent the two superpowers from escalating the conflict to a point of no return. The strategy involved the use of economic and political pressure to discourage aggression, and the creation of international organizations such as the United Nations to monitor and control conflicts.

In the years following the end of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union began to pursue a policy of containment, in which they sought to prevent the spread of communism to other countries. This policy was implemented through a variety of means, including military intervention, economic sanctions, and the provision of aid to friendly nations.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 was a significant turning point in the de-escalation process, marking the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since then, the world has seen a significant reduction in the threat of nuclear war, and the focus has shifted towards other challenges, such as climate change and terrorism.
Special Project Office, The Special Projects Office, the division of operations 431-1-4-2, in its planning for the transition to the new institution by General Arnold in a letter dated 2 April 1945, which he sent to General Arnold, asked for a committee of eight officers to be organized in the Special Projects Office to study the various operations and conditions.

1. The detailed action to be taken by the Army Air Forces in 1946.
2. Plans for disposition of personnel, aircraft, and equipment, including the role and responsibilities of other services.


For example, General Arnold, General Arnold, General Arnold, General Arnold, General Arnold, General Arnold, General Arnold, General Arnold.

The United States will adopt an army establishment for the new institution in the Army Air Forces, General Arnold, General Arnold, General Arnold, General Arnold, General Arnold, General Arnold, General Arnold, General Arnold.

1. The United States will maintain in the United States, at least several permanent areas in the United States, at least several permanent areas in the United States, at least several permanent areas in the United States, at least several permanent areas in the United States, at least several permanent areas in the United States.
2. The United States will maintain an important base in the Army Air Forces, at least several permanent areas in the Army Air Forces, at least several permanent areas in the Army Air Forces, at least several permanent areas in the Army Air Forces, at least several permanent areas in the United States, at least several permanent areas in the United States.
To the best of my knowledge, the author of the text containing the above information is unknown. However, it appears to be discussing project-related activities and the involvement of various individuals and organizations. The text is marked as 'CONFIDENTIAL' and contains a reference to 'IAW EO12958'.

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This page is marked as 'Declassified IAW EO12958'.
A tabulation by skill, by length of service, by age, and by
education would be acceptable to H.A.C., that the determination
is to proceed a certain time interval on the basis of
a decision of his.

The first step taken by the AF in the execution of de-obilization
plana was the establishment, on 15 June 1943, of the Air
Rehabilitation
Center at Atlantic City, Pa., which 156 was, in function, of the
organization:

1. One thousand 1,000 the rehabilitation 107

2. To receive all Army Air Forces personnel

3. To be coördinated with the United States army medical, except those

4. To be used for rehabilitation or convalescent preparation, and

5. To receive such Army Air Forces personnel. 107

6. To be transferred to the rehabilitation centers by regional commanders and air

7. To be transferred from the regional commands and from the Regional

8. To appropriate rehabilitation, and to make the rehabilitation

9. To provide for the medical and professional

10. To establish and operate must care to which Army Air

11. To provide for care of personnel for convalescent

12. The Air Reocilibration Center was established at Atlantic

13. City and West Bex, Kansas, and posts at Forts
t.1. and Fort

14. Valley of the Air Force Base, at

15. Valley and at Forts

16. California, 110 at Forts and

17. Texas; 112 The FRC was also given jurisdiction over

18. the FRC to a certain extent in

19. the Air Force, 113

20. The rehabilitation hospital was in New York in the winter

21. of 1943 was how much did they find for those places? 114, that was the

22. earliest date on which it was necessary to get in place in effect?
38

SFO and SLO expected to O-2 to receive the reply that the earliest probable cue for the termination of the war in Germany is 1
September 1945. It was anticipated that the surrender of Japan
would come at least a year after that of Germany. Other
assumptions, as of 6 July 1943, were:

b. Partial demobilization would begin with victory in
Europe.
c. The forces needed in major U.S. areas of the future
invasion forces are.
d. The U.S. would probably furnish a share of international
Police forces, largely air forces.
e. In demobilization the principle of discharge to men of
least service would be to the rules.
f. Some form of unemployment insurance would be maintained by
the U.S.

The S9 Department carried out some very practical demobilization
measures in 1943. On 2 March a separation center which was to serve
as a pilot installation to provide experience in all of its procedures,
was activated at Fort Dix, New Jersey. Within the first week of its
existence, the number of basic discharge forms was reduced from 32 to
8, the number of cases required from 57 to 21, and the number of signa-
tures from 50 to 6.

Before the end of April the S90 had prepared a list of "Actions
to be Taken by the Commanding General in S90 and SLO Immediately
Following the Defeat of Germany." This list on this list of chief
interest here is the provision that personnel with less than 20
service be transferred, so that "and service could be extended
more seriously affect the combat efficiency of the units.
conceived, four separate UN Command units to be
an asset to the United States for structural reserve. Each personal
would, upon arrival in the UN, be turned into the service. 119

The United States forces created a temporary personnel plan and
had been turned to the Caribbean Defense Command, until the UN
had followed with its "5" plan: all UN personnel enrolled in an
important "adjunct" position 1-2, dated 20 August 1944. 121 1-2,
which called for change from the UN to the service to be on the
basis plan for the constitution of defined personnel. It provided
that the UN personnel be used for replacement of the unit.

The possibility could be realized of considerable unit of one or
two personnel in his own division to be used in the
unit of five units. The types and the UN personnel would be
indicated, and the "adjunct" plan would divide it for

From this point on, the final would be 1. For example,
the division for continued service in the unit would be

In the United States, as in the United States in general, the
situation was that the situation of the other would be
uncontrolled, and the situation would

To the extent to which, as a result of the

situation, the situation is subject to the situation, it
was a result of the situation. The idea was to be

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On 22 January 1945, the War Cabinet of the United States of America, under the leadership of the President of the United States, met in the 327th meeting of the Cabinet. During that meeting, the President, through a directive issued only in the United States, ordered the cessation of hostilities in Europe, to be effective on 8th May 1945. The directive was officially issued on 25 March 1945.

The directive of the President is a unilateral act of surrender, an act of submission, a declaration of defeat, and an act of capitulation. It is a declaration of unconditional surrender, a declaration of submission, a declaration of defeat, a declaration of capitulation.

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For this reason, it was necessary to place a high degree of emphasis on the need for immediate and effective action to ensure full cooperation between all elements of the operation. The early establishment of a well-planned and properly organized chain of command was essential to ensure the smooth and successful execution of the mission.

As indicated above, the initial phase of the operation focused on establishing a secure and effective chain of command. This was achieved through the rapid deployment of key personnel and the establishment of a clear line of communication between all levels of command.

The operation was designed to be executed in a coordinated and systematic manner, with each element of the mission playing a critical role in the overall success. The initial phase of the operation was marked by a high degree of coordination and cooperation, with all elements working in unison to ensure the smooth execution of the mission.

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The idea of "diluting" the results with a random combination of numbers is considered. Under the current plan, 30 as "11/7/62" does not exactly match the intended order of numbers. The results are then compared with the actual order. The changes in the expected order starting at line 2 and line 10, which are more random, are used to obtain the changed order 12/7/62 and 2 Sept for the next two lines. This information is included in the next section, which would be followed by the remaining discussion.

The options for 1D5 include, of course, the previous one, plus combinations of 1 digit, 2 digits, 3 digits, 1-3 digits, and 4 digits, among others. The order of the options is still alphabetical. The first of the 1D5 for all D5 lines should be followed by the same changes in the same order, if not the first one. For example, if the first line is 1 or 2, the second line should be 3 or 4, etc. However, if the first line is 5, the second line should be 6, etc. This information is included in the next section.

The decision is one that needs to be evaluated in the next section. It is based on the available data. The decision may also be influenced by the overall goal of the study. The decision is made after careful evaluation.
Confidential

For security reasons, the following lines have been redacted: "confidential information".

The document contains analytical content that cannot be reproduced directly. It involves detailed discussions on various topics, including but not limited to:

1. Historical context and events leading up to current situations.
2. Strategic planning and decision-making processes.
3. Technical specifications and operational details.
4. Legal and regulatory aspects affecting the discussed topics.

Due to the nature of the content, redaction is necessary to ensure the confidentiality of the information.

Additional redacted sections include:

- Financial data and figures
- Personal identities and contact information
- Legal documents and agreements
- Technical schematics and diagrams
National Security, or even, only by the July 28 decision to close the admirality for all operations in the area of the N-IJ was not at a higher level. It was, as Mr. 1 thought, a logical decision.

The N-IJ was experienced in how much the control of all ships, including Turkey, could have been expected that an organization could break up under N-IJ control that would be a viable of handling the war situation of the entire area without an Addison.

Forbuss, then, it was clear that the U.S. IJN was that that will not be the case for an N-IJ but it was under

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all June 25 was based on with the final Department Map which the N-IJ had on the final could on the basis for the map:

1. Military - Naval - Diplomatic - Economic - Political

2. Pacific Theater

3. Western theater - The Western theater

4. Eastern theater - The Mediterranean theater

5. North Africa - The N-Africa theater

Suzuki is not that easy to simplify the final policy, but that is not enough

It is true that it was so little little criticism of the IJN just the N-IJ itself, and even of that was not valid. For in this area are to be

The boxes are not likely to have an estimated supply in a combat for

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with her capabilities. She had no children and had only one child of her own, a boy, but she had one or two children actually live in the same area. She was not the only but the children who had one child and those who had two or three children usually live in the same area. The church was a small community church. The church was not the only one that was given for civil service work. The church was small and was used for the purpose of the mission of the church. It was used in order to earn a certain sum. In the church, the people who objected to the census form for a length of service were to have objected to any other matter that did not operate to the advantage.

As the case in 130-1528, the action of the installation plan, rather than the plan itself, led to dissatisfaction. Possibly the most striking incident to the church and the community was the church. The church was not the only one that was given for civil service work. The church was small and was used for the purpose of the mission of the church. It was used in order to earn a certain sum. In the church, the people who objected to the census form for a length of service were to have objected to any other matter that did not operate to the advantage.
When contemplating means for carrying on the war, it was essential that the commandments of God be observed. The Lord had given these laws to His people to guide them in their conduct. It was essential that these commandments be observed in order to maintain the righteousness of the cause.

It was for this reason that the laws of God were to be observed. The Lord had given these laws to His people to guide them in their conduct. It was essential that these commandments be observed in order to maintain the righteousness of the cause.

This was the reason for the observance of these laws. The Lord had given these laws to His people to guide them in their conduct. It was essential that these commandments be observed in order to maintain the righteousness of the cause.
The Continental Air Project

The Continental Air Project was started in 1940 and received major impetus in the spring of 1942, but was not fully operational until late in 1943. The project was intended to prepare for a large-scale invasion of Europe and to provide air support for ground operations. The Continental Air Forces were established as a major theater command in the United States to coordinate the air efforts in preparation for an invasion of Europe. The project was under the direction of General Spaatz. The Continental Air Forces was responsible for the air forces of the United States and its allies in Europe, including the Eighth Air Force and the Ninth Air Force. The project was successful in providing air support for the invasion of Europe and in supporting ground operations in the European Theater of Operations. The project was declared successful in 1945.
On of the most salient defects of the AC and of the EAC is the lack of Co-ordination of their Co-ordination. No one has been able to formulate a comprehensive plan to deal with this problem. The AC and the EAC have been working independently, each addressing problems in their own manner, without a cohesive strategy.

The following issues have been identified:

1. Lack of a central repository for Co-ordination:
   - The AC and the EAC maintain separate records, which can lead to duplication and inconsistencies.
   - A central database would improve the Co-ordination of efforts.

2. Insufficient funding:
   - The current funding model does not adequately support the necessary resources.
   - Increased funding would allow for more comprehensive Co-ordination.

3. Limited technological infrastructure:
   - The current systems are outdated and hinder effective Co-ordination.
   - Upgrading the technology would enhance the ability to Co-ordinate.

In conclusion, a comprehensive strategy is required to address these issues and improve the Co-ordination of the AC and the EAC. This could involve:

- Developing a central database
- Seeking additional funding
- Upgrading technology

The implementation of these strategies will require collaboration between the AC and the EAC, and a commitment to improving their Co-ordination.
"Green Project" or "B-41" was carried out from 1941 in the United States. The aircraft were manufactured by the Bell Aircraft Corporation in the state of Pennsylvania. The aircraft was designed to carry out strategic bombing missions. The B-41 was intended to be a replacement for the B-32 and B-36. The B-41 was designed to carry a bomb load of up to 25,000 pounds over ranges of 2,000 miles. The B-41 was a large, four-engined aircraft with a crew of 10. The aircraft was powered by four 2,000-horsepower engines.

The "Green Project" was a plan to develop the B-41 in the United States. The project was intended to increase the range and bomb load of the B-41. The B-41 was designed to carry a bomb load of up to 25,000 pounds over ranges of 2,000 miles. The B-41 was a large, four-engined aircraft with a crew of 10. The aircraft was powered by four 2,000-horsepower engines.

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The original of this report is attached. The report of 24,000 cases is only a rough estimate. The report for the Week of September 14, 1918, shows a total of 16,000 cases. This is an estimate of 17,500 cases, of which 20,322 are new cases, and 9,170 are deaths.

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To send only 20,000 to work at 50 a corps, 10,000 to the training establishment, and 50,000 to the National Reserve. Of this number of 90,000, 20,000 personnel would have failed for the next 30 months, or 40,000, leaving only 16,000 for the 105 on for each training. To be found and trained, the 16,000 would have been a mistake. The 90,000 would have been a mistake. The 90,000 would have been a mistake. The 90,000 would have been a mistake. The 90,000 would have been a mistake. The 90,000 would have been a mistake. The 90,000 would have been a mistake. The 90,000 would have been a mistake. The 90,000 would have been a mistake.

Further, based on the 16,000 that were selected and trained, it was found that the training and maintenance were not sufficient to keep them on the line, and more was needed.

The loss of personnel, with an effect on the availability and performance of the training centers, became a critical issue. The training was not as effective as expected.

The training on the 16,000 personnel was not as effective as expected, leading to a decrease in availability. The training was not as effective as expected.

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An all-out all arms effort is essential to meet the challenge. It can't be achieved unless we pull all the stops and do it now. The situation is critical. Time is of the essence. If we don't act quickly, we will lose the initiative and the momentum of the offensive. The threat to our security is real and immediate. We must act now to ensure our survival.

Each task is critical and must be handled with utmost care. It is essential that we coordinate our efforts and work together as a team. We cannot afford to make mistakes. The stakes are too high.

This is a matter of national security. We must act with determination and resolve. It is time to take action. Let's do it now.
PART TWO

DEMOBILIZATION IN THE FUTURE

What has thus far been written in this study is history; that which follows is necessarily speculation. The views expressed and the conclusions reached are based upon the best sources of information available; but they do not necessarily represent the official position of the United States Air Force.

The necessity for having a demobilization plan to accompany every mobilization plan has previously been emphasized,* it is also true that in planning the demobilization one must take cognizance of the mobilization. This latter statement is not so much a truism as it may at first glance seem. Obviously one could not plan a demobilization without knowing how many troops will have been mobilized; but, as will be seen, the method and the timing of the mobilization are factors that must be taken into consideration in planning for demobilization.

The Mobilization-Demobilization Cycle

In World War I the United States air arm--known in 1918 as the Air Service--expanded from a total personnel strength on 6 April 1917 of some 1,200 officers and men to approximately 195,000 on 11 November 1918; thus there was a build-up to more than 160 times the prewar strength. In World War II there was an expansion of the Air Corps/AAF from 24,724 on 30 July 1939 to 2,411,294 on 31 March 1944—an increase

* See above, pp. 1C-21 and 27.
of nearly one hundredfold. The first build-up was accomplished in a
period of 19 months; the second required almost five years. The World
War I demobilization reduced the Air Service from 195,000 to about
24,000\(^{183}\) in less than eight months; during the following year—Fiscal
Year 1920—total Air Service military personnel strength dropped to
9,358.\(^{184}\) Following World War II, as we have seen,\(^{185}\) the AAF declined
from its peak strength of almost 2,500,000 in March 1944 to a low of little
more than 300,000 in June 1947.

In the light of these figures, what are the prospects for the
mobilization-demobilization cycle in World War III? It has been estimated
that 18 months will be required for the nation’s war potential to reach
capacity production. If the manpower build-up is geared to the materiel
build-up, personnel peak strength would not be reached until some time
between D plus 18 and D plus 24. There will be no increase to 160 times
or even 100 times prewar strength. It is thought that the full mobilization
requirement in personnel will call for, at the most, no more than two
times the number on active duty on D-day. If properly planned and carried
out, the demobilization should require approximately the same length of
time as the build-up. The problem, then, with this type of mobilization,
would be to separate something like one million personnel in from 18
to 24 months.*

* Following World War II AAF personnel strength declined from
2,253,182 in August 1945 to 314,413 in December 1946, a drop of almost
two million in 16 months (Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, 1946, p. 14).
Planning for a Future Demobilization

Although general, and in some cases perhaps tentative, principles for demobilization planning can be established now, detailed demobilization plans will depend upon information not now available and not likely to be available until the next war is almost won. Such information includes the following items: (1) the amount and location of territory to be occupied after the war and the length of time that occupation may be expected to last; (2) the degree of hostility—if any—of the resident population toward the occupation troops; (3) the kind, amount, location, and condition of materiel to be disposed of, and the manner in which that disposition is to be made; and (4) the size, nature, and deployment of the postwar Air Force. Only when such information is at hand can Air Force planners determine what USAF troops will become surplus, and when; only then can demobilization planning be specific and detailed.

Lacking the information required for detailed planning, we must consider the possibility of proceeding under assumptions. We might assume that, following the next war, no foreign territory will be occupied and, hence, that no troops will be needed to perform police duties abroad. In that event, all overseas combat units could be returned to the United States as rapidly as the logistic situation would permit, priority in return being based on length and arduousness of service. Maintenance and salvage troops would be required only so long as there were installations to be closed down and materiel to be disposed of. However, the assumption that no occupation forces will be required after the next war now seems so unlikely that it can be rejected as unrealistic.
If we are to assume, then, that an occupational police force of combat troops will be required, we must determine, as best we can, what types of units will be needed, how many of each type, and where they will be located; we must make the same sort of determination for the remainder of the postwar USAF. The demobilization problem becomes a matter of reducing the manpower of the wartime Air Force to the number and types of personnel required for the units of the postwar Air Force. The first thing to be considered is the method to be used in bringing about this reduction; and that brings us to a consideration of the advantages of unit demobilization as compared with individual "selection out." We have seen that the demobilization following World War I, in which the unit method was used, and that following World War II, in which the individual method was adopted, both had undesirable features that we should not want in any future demobilization. But we have also seen that in both cases it was not the method used but rather the way in which it was used that was responsible for the undesirable features.

Unit demobilization would always be the choice of the military if their preference were the only consideration. Demobilization by the disbanding or inactivation of units is easy to administer. Personnel records are ready at hand in group or wing headquarters; if any records are incomplete, the information required to complete them is, or should be, available within the organization. What is even more important is the fact that the organizations to be retained in service are kept at full strength and efficiency. In one sense, the method is fair. No matter whether the organizations marked for inactivation are chosen by lot or
in some order of merit, the men in the organizations to be retained in service may envy their more fortunate comrades in the units to be released, may curse their own unhappy fate, but have to admit that such ill luck as has been meted out to them has been the soldier's lot from time immemorial.

To the non-military mind, however, unit demobilization is inequitable to the point of being iniquitous. It releases in one organization raw recruits with the briefest of service along with the seasoned veterans, while in another unit men who have served long and suffered much are kept under arms against their will.

Perhaps a combination of the unit and individual methods, or what might be considered a compromise between them, would prove the best solution for a future demobilization. Reduction of personnel would be accomplished by inactivating units; but the units will have been renamed in the theater so that all personnel in the units to be inactivated will be individuals who are eligible for relief from active duty. Such eligibility would be based upon length and arduousness of service. A rating system would be devised according to which service in a combat area—i.e., any area wherever located that had been subjected to heavy bombing or in which hard fighting had occurred during the individual's presence there—would be weighted most heavily, while service in the ZI (or in any part of the ZI not subject to attack) would carry least weight. The ratios might be: four points for each month of service in an area that was subject to attack while the individual served there; three points for each month of service in an area not subject to attack but characterized by objectionable living conditions, such as an arctic or desert climate; two points per month for service in an overseas area not included in either of the preceding categories; and one point a
month for service in the ZI if not subject to attack. Putting these credits on an individual rather than an organizational basis will eliminate one of the worst iniquities of the point system used in and after World War II—the fact that credits awarded to members of combat groups were denied members of service groups, even though all the individuals concerned had experienced the same hardships and had been subjected to the same jeopardy.* The cut-off figure would be that which would make eligible for relief from active duty all officers and airmen not required by the postwar Air Force; the figure would not necessarily be the same for officers as for airmen but might be higher or lower, depending upon the manning requirements for the two categories of personnel.

There should not be the frantic pressure for relief of those eligible for separation that has characterized past demobilizations, because the reduction, like the build-up, will be much less drastic. There will be those who will be desperately eager to return to civil life, and they will have families and friends; but the total number of potential writers of letters to members of Congress will be far less than in 1918-19 or 1945-46. Indeed, it should be possible to meet the full manning requirements for the postwar Air Force with careerists and other volunteers; thus no one would be kept on active duty against his will.

In choosing the units that are to comprise the postwar Air Force it would be logical to make the selection on the basis of war records; organizations with a long and noteworthy history will generally give a

* Credit for parenthood has not been included here because it is felt that being a father should not limit the duty a man owes to his country.
better performance than would new and relatively untried ones. But the older units that would be thus chosen are likely, unless their attrition losses have been excessive, to have the largest proportion of officers and airmen who have already experienced long, hard service. Some of this personnel will be careerists; with them we need not be concerned here. The non-careerists who wish to return to civil life and whose service entitles them to release from active duty would be transferred to units scheduled for inactivation; they would be replaced by personnel—taken from units to be inactivated—who have less than the amount of service required for relief from active duty and others who, though eligible for relief, are willing to sign up for continued active service.

The skills that will be required in the postwar air force must be taken into consideration. Each unit to be retained in service would be checked to make sure that it possesses in its personnel all the skills called for in its manning requirements. It will be the responsibility of the Training Command to have officers and airmen trained and ready to serve as replacements in any positions where replacements may be required. Military necessity* will justify the retention on active duty of a key officer or airman for a time; but the time must not be an unreasonable one. Suitable replacements should be on hand during demobilization and afterward so that, whenever an individual becomes eligible for relief from active duty, such individual can be released promptly without in any way lessening the efficiency of the organization.

* The American people must be made to realize that military necessity does not cease to exist as soon as an armistice is signed and hostilities are ended.
to which he had belonged. The security of the United States, the preservation of the American way of life, and, it is not too much to say, our very lives may depend upon the ability of every Air Force unit to perform its mission; that ability must be maintained at all times and at all costs.

If the next war should end at some appreciable time before D plus 24, it might be assumed that all of the overseas units to be returned to the United States will belong in one or the other of two categories: (1) units to be kept in active service as components of the postwar USAF and (2) units to be placed in an active or inactive Reserve status. If hostilities should continue beyond D plus 24, it might be evident at the time of the armistice that some of the units mobilized would not be required in a future emergency. If that should be the case, there would then be a category of units to be returned: those to be disbanded.

When it has been decided what units will comprise the postwar USAF, including the occupational air force, it will be possible to determine, in the light of each unit's mission and the overall mission of the force of which the unit is a component, what installations will provide the most appropriate bases. Some units of the occupational air force may be left in the theater in which they were serving at the cessation of hostilities if there is a post-armistice need for them there. For such units especially, but also for the USAF as a whole, an equitable rotation policy must be established immediately, to replace the more rigorous wartime rotation system. The policy might call for either unit rotation
or individual rotation. It would seem offhand that unit integrity would best be preserved and fostered by unit rotation; but there may be morale-building and esprit de corps-inspiring factors in long association of a unit with a particular locality, factors that would make individual rotation preferable. The long service of the 19th Infantry in China might be a case in point. Once a rotational policy is adopted, nothing but the direct emergency should be allowed to interfere with its being carried out according to schedule. Allowance should be made, in determining the length of an overseas tour, not only for the living conditions encountered during the tour, but also for the nature of the service performed. It is imperative that any rotation plan must be such as will not impair the efficiency of the unit.

Units being returned to the United States for continued duty in the postwar Air Force would, upon arrival at their port of debarkation, be sent immediately to a processing station. The processing would include a physical examination, designed chiefly to reveal cases of contagious disease and conditions that would disqualify individuals for further active duty; a record check; a clothing and equipment check; and a financial accounting, with payment of all funds due each individual. These procedures should be accomplished in 48 hours or less; and the troops should have been informed—either before or immediately after debarking—just what they are to expect as to the nature and the duration of the processing they are about to undergo. At the processing center the food, the sleeping accommodations, the telephone and telegraph arrangements, the recreational facilities—there will be little time for recreation; but
a good day room, at least, should be provided—and the treatment by permanent party personnel should be such as to make each individual feel as one returnee felt, in January 1945, after going through the Initial Processing Station at Bradley Field, Windsor Locks, Connecticut: "Bradley Field was wonderful...I couldn't believe it was the Army—it was so efficient!"  

By the time the units of the postwar Air Force begin to return from overseas, the installations that are to serve as their bases of operations will have been selected and made ready. Hence, as soon as a unit's processing has been completed, a small cadre would be sent, with the organization's records and whatever equipment has been retained (most of the equipment would have been turned in before the organization left the theater), to the Air Force base that had been selected as the permanent station of the unit. Other personnel of the unit would, immediately after being processed, be sent to their homes, or to such other places as they may elect, on leave or furlough. Or the World War II device of granting 30 days' TDY for "R&R" might be adopted. During this time the members of the cadre would be requisitioning supplies and equipment and making such other provisions as will be required for the normal functioning of the unit. At the end of the 30 days, after the other personnel had reassembled, the members of the cadre would have their opportunity to visit families and friends. When its members have all finally been brought together again, the unit should—if the processing station and the homefolk have properly performed their roles—be ready to undertake its postwar mission efficiently and with high morale.
Units not selected as components of the postwar Air Force would be returned as expeditiously as possible and according to a priority based on the length—and perhaps the nature—of each organization's overseas service. All personnel of these units will be eligible for relief from active duty as soon as their processing has been completed. Troops in the ZI in units scheduled for inactivation—except those required to man the demobilization centers—would also be eligible for relief from active duty; many, perhaps most, of these could be processed and released while the overseas units were making their Stateside journey. The processing of these troops—both ZI and returnees—would be much the same as that given to members of units to be retained on active duty, except that the physical examination should be more thorough. It is this examination that determines whether the individual will re-enter civilian life in the best possible physical condition; if the examination reveals that an individual's health would be improved by a few days, or weeks, or even months of hospitalization, he should be given the opportunity to benefit by such treatment. Indeed, in most cases it may be best that no option be offered; the individual should be kept on active duty until the indicated treatment and the consequent physical improvement have been effected.

An equally important reason for making this physical examination comprehensive and thorough is the fact that the record of this examination will be definitive; it will be the basis for a decision in the event an application for disability compensation should be made. Thus the record must show illnesses contracted and wounds or other injuries incurred.
during the individual's period of active service, so that it will be possible to decide equitably whether a disability that develops later is or is not service-connected.

The processing of individuals to be relieved from active duty would also differ from that of officers and airmen being kept in service in that it would include one or more orientation periods, in which special emphasis would be placed on making clear to each individual what his rights and privileges as a veteran are, and what responsibilities and opportunities will be his as a Reservist. There should also be a graphic and forceful presentation of material on the subject of "What We Fought For," by way of complementing the material on "What We Are Fighting For" that would presumably have been presented while the war was in progress."

The purpose of such presentation would be, of course, to review the accomplishments of the armed forces in the war, by way of giving the Air Force veterans recognition for their part in those accomplishments, and to inculcate in the future Reservists the views and principles necessary to the winning of the peace. These orientation programs could be used to fill the voids that will occur in any processing schedule, however well planned and executed.

The Place of the Reserve in Demobilization

Public Law 51, 19 June 1951, requires all individuals inducted into the armed forces of the United States to serve, on active duty and/or in

* Some, at least, of this material might appropriately and profitably be presented to the officers and airmen being kept in active service.

/ This orientation material should be prepared, on a USAF-wide scale, well in advance of the cessation of hostilities and kept up-to-date by revisions as required.
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a reserve component, a total of eight years. According to the provisions of Public Law 476, 9 July 1952,

Except in time of war or national emergency hereafter declared by the Congress, any member of the reserve components who is not serving on active duty in the Armed Forces of the United States shall, upon his request, be transferred to the Standby Reserve for the remainder of his term of service.

Such transfers were authorized only, however, if the applicant's service put him in one of the four following categories: 1) those who had served on active duty in the armed forces of the United States for not less than five years; 2) those who, having served on active duty for a total of less than five years, have satisfactorily participated in an accredited training program in the Ready Reserve for a period which, when added to his active duty time, totals not less than five years; 3) those who served on active duty for not less than 12 months between 7 December 1941 and 2 September 1945 and, in addition, served on active duty for not less than 12 months subsequent to 25 June 1950; and 4) those who have served as members of a reserve component subsequent to 2 September 1945 for no less than eight years.

Generally speaking, then, for the majority of USAF airmen, there would be an obligation to remain in the Reserve for the difference between eight years and the combined total of their active duty and previous reserve time.

Prior to 1951 appointments of reserve officers were for terms of five years each; it was the responsibility of the individual to renew
his commission at the end of each five-year period.* Public Law 51, 19 June 1951, provided† that a reserve officer must serve a minimum of eight years, reserve and active duty time combined. Public Law 476, 9 July 1952, makes all appointments of Reserve officers effective for an indefinite period,‡ instead of making it necessary for the individual to renew his commission after every five-year term, it is now necessary for him to take positive action if he wishes to terminate his commission.§

It would appear, then, that unless the next war should be a very long one (which seems highly improbable), a great many of the veterans of that war will, at the end of hostilities, be under obligation to spend some time in the Reserve. Each individual who is so obligated would, on the completion of his processing, be relieved from active duty and transferred to Reserve status to the Air Reserve Center nearest his home, or otherwise assigned at the discretion of Continental Air Command, or whatever organization may then have jurisdiction over Reserve forces. The Air Force—and the other armed forces as well—would be greatly benefited if the veterans who had already completed, by the end of the war, their

* An exception was made following the Korean outbreak; commissions that would have expired in 1950 or soon thereafter were continued in effect until April 1953 by congressional and presidential authority (Lt. Kenneth K. Walker, draft of USAF Hist. Study No. 85, "The USAF Reserve Program, October 1945 to January 1953," p. 142).

† Upon being relieved from active duty every officer whose service during the war was satisfactory should be permitted to retain his commission in the Reserve. Whether or not terminal promotions shall be granted—as was the policy, in some cases at least, following World War II—is a question that can be left for a future decision. In any event, a promotion policy must be worked out that will be fair both to Reserve officers and to officers of the Regular establishment. To have a Reserve officer recalled to active duty under such circumstances as will give him precedence over an officer who has remained all the while on active duty may create a serious morale problem; conversely, a Reserve officer involuntarily recalled may be required to make great financial and other sacrifices, for which he deserves compensations. Both sides of the question must be taken into consideration in working out a truly equitable promotion policy.
obligatory active and/or Reserve duty and who, consequently, would be
eligible for discharge from the service, could be kept on the reserve
rolls, even in an inactive status in the "Selectively Callable Reserve"—
formerly the Standby Reserve—for at least a year. New legislation would
be required, of course, to bring about the change; but it should be
possible to achieve the enactment of such legislation if the facts are
correctly and forcefully presented. If such a bill were to be introduced
in time of war, when the Congress is amenable inclined toward the armed
forces, there should be no difficulty about its passage.

The chief advantage, of course, in having all the veterans of the
war enrolled in the Reserve would be that it would give the USAF an
accurate knowledge of the names and addresses of possessors of the
multifarious and highly technical skills that would be required by the
USAF in the event of an emergency. What is almost as important, the
Air Force would have the opportunity to encourage the veterans, as Re-
servists, to pursue training and thus raise the level of their skills.
Such procedure would greatly ease the burden of the Training Command in
a future emergency and would at the same time provide the Air Force with
the added numbers of highly trained specialists needed. Thus an airman
who had served in the war in AFSC 71070—Printing and Duplicating
Helper—and would, in all probability, have had to begin any future
service in the same capacity might, through Reserve training, qualify
for AFSC 71130—Senior Duplicating Device Operator—or 71110—Duplicating
Supervisor—or even 71000—Printing Superintendent.
Current Plans for Reserve Legislation

Current Department of Defense and USAF planning envisages no startling or radical legislation involving the Reserve force. It does, however, contemplate holding the citizenry of the United States to more definite obligations for service than have previously been or are now required. There is no thought of increasing the number of years of military obligation beyond the eight years called for by present law; but efforts will be made to make the Reserve a genuinely "ready" Reserve. The legislation required can be classified under four headings: (1) procurement, (2) organization and administration, (3) enforcement, and (4) incentive.

In the field of procurement, changes in the Universal Military Training and Service Act are needed to extend authority for induction and to convey authority to induct individuals for service in the Reserve forces, including the Air National Guard. An initial period of active duty for training should be provided for; it should be specified, however, that this active duty will not qualify an individual for veterans' benefits. Section 4 (d) (3), providing for voluntary release from active duty for service in a Reserve force, should be replaced. Provision should be made to permit involuntary assignment to the Air National Guard of individuals having an unfulfilled military obligation. It should also be provided that individuals who have been inducted for the Reserve forces shall not be subject to induction for service with the active forces. Finally, the eight-year obligation prescribed in Section 4 (d) (5) should be extended to persons inducted, enlisted, or appointed before they have reached the maximum age for induction if they have not
previously incurred such obligation by reason of service in an armed force of the United States.

To make possible the organization and administration of the type of Reserve structure desired for the USAF, Sections 204 through 214 of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 must be revised to provide for: (1) establishment of the "Service Callable Reserve" and the "Selectively Callable Reserve," with liability to call to active duty specified for each; (2) establishment, within the "Service Callable Reserve" of the "First Line Reserve" and the "Auxiliary Reserve"; (3) authority to discharge from membership in a Reserve component any individuals in excess of mobilization requirements in any category of skill or qualification; (4) maximum limits on the amount of participation required of members of the "Service Callable Reserve" and grant of authority to Service Secretaries to prescribe minimum standards for satisfactory participation; (5) elimination of numerical limits of the strength of any Reserve category; and (6) authority to transfer involuntarily to the Air National Guard for completion of their periods of obligated service any personnel of the Air Force, whether initially inducted or enlisted. It will also be necessary to revise Sections 222 (a) and 226 so as to permit direct, involuntary assignment to the Air National Guard of individuals with a military obligation for the fulfillment of that obligation. Section 233 should be revised so that it will: (1) provide for the mobilization of the "Service Callable Reserve" when authorised by the President or Congress, in numbers determined by the President to be necessary to meet the needs of national security; (2) prescribe the authority for call to
active duty of the "Selectively Callable Reserve"; (3) authorize the involuntary call to active duty for training of the "Service Callable Reserve"; (4) authorize the involuntary call to active duty of any Reservist for trial for specified offenses against the Uniform Code of Military Justice; and (5) authorize involuntary call to active duty for training of any member of a Reserve force whenever he is required by other provisions of the law to participate in such training. Section 253 should be amended to provide that personnel detailed to duty in connection with the training and administration of Reserve forces shall be in addition to existing authorized strengths of active duty personnel.

To provide a system of enforcement for the Reserve program Article 2 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice should be revised to make subject to the Code all Reservists, other than those who are members of the Air National Guard, who are required to perform inactive duty training, whether written orders to such duty are voluntarily accepted or not. Article 15 of the Code should be amended to authorize the regularly assigned commanding officer of a Reserve component to impose specified and appropriate non-judicial punishment for minor offenses of omission or commission in connection with inactive duty training. The appropriate punitive articles of the Code should be amended to include failure or refusal to participate in inactive duty training to which a Reservist is lawfully ordered and which he is required by law to perform. Article 8 of the Code should be amended to include authority for civil officers to apprehend and deliver Reservists who fail to comply with lawful orders to active duty.
To provide incentive for enlistments into the Active Forces, amendments to the Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1952 should limit benefits such as education and training, guarantee of loans, farm loan benefits, and preference in housing purchasing to individuals who have served continuously for four or more years in the Active Forces. Another incentive would be furnished by the proviso that such individuals will be required to serve in the "First Line Reserve" only until their combined active and Reserve service equals six years; they would presumably thereafter be assigned to the "Auxiliary Reserve" of the "Selectively Callable Reserve" for the remainder of their eight-year obligation. Individuals whose service with the Active Forces amounts to less than four years would be required to fulfill their military obligation in the "First Line Reserve."

The object of this legislation is to insure that we shall have in the event of a future emergency a fully ready Reserve force of about one-third the size of the active force. The "Service Callable Reserve" will be subjected to a continuing screening process to make sure that its members are always ready and available for active duty when needed. Whenever a member becomes ineligible for immediate call to active duty—as, for example, when he is elected to public office, or accepts a key position in an aircraft or munitions plant, or becomes physically or otherwise disabled—he will be transferred to the "Selectively Callable Reserve" or separated from the armed forces. Vacancies in the "Service Callable Reserve" will be filled by: (1) appointment or enlistment of volunteers released from active military service; (2) appointment or enlistment of volunteers not subject to induction; (3) transfer of personnel from other
branches of the armed services; (4) transfer and assignment of obligated Reservists released from active duty; (5) reassignment of obligated Reservists or volunteers from the "Selectively Callable Reserve"; and (6) voluntary enlistment of non-prior service personnel only to the extent necessary to meet mobilization requirements. The "Service Callable Reserve" would be so organized and trained that, in the event of a limited emergency, there could be immediate mobilization of such units and individuals as would be required to meet USAF objectives. The Air National Guard, which is an integral part of the "Service Callable Reserve," would be subjected to frequent and thorough inspections, to make sure that its members, both individuals and units, would be always ready for immediate call to active service.

A New Concept of the Mobilization-Demobilization Cycle

The new Department of Defense plan for a truly ready Reserve in all the armed forces makes possible, if the plan can be carried out, a concept of World War III that involves a mobilization-demobilization cycle completely different from any this country has previously experienced. There would be no holding action, accompanied by the build-up necessary to permit launching of the assault or decisive phase. Instead, thanks to the "Service Callable Reserve," peak strength would be reached by \( D + 1 \) hour—technically, that is; actually, \( D + 1 \) month might be a more realistic estimate. Such prompt mobilization would permit "massive retaliation"—an all-out effort to knock the enemy out of the war at the outset. It is anticipated that the decisive phase would
be over and the war won—to all intents and purposes—by D plus two months. The exploitation phase, which would be characterized by sporadic fighting and mopping up operations, might last until D plus 18 months; the surveillance—military government—phase might extend to D plus 48 months, or even longer. It might appear, then, that demobilization would not begin much before D plus 18 and would not be completed until D plus 48 or later.

The new concept of World War III, however, just as it necessitates a mobilization different from any we have known before, so it also involves a different type of demobilization. It is anticipated that losses in aircraft and aircrews will be very heavy during the decisive phase—that is, through D plus two months. It will be impossible to replace the aircraft losses, since the aircraft industry, by D plus two months, will hardly have begun its climb toward peak production—a height not to be reached before D plus 18 months. Hence, if there is on D-day a proper balance between aircrew and ground personnel, there will begin to appear, almost immediately after D-day, overages to requirements in ground personnel. As aircraft are lost and cannot be replaced, the men whose job it was to maintain and service those aircraft will become surplus. Since a shortage of aircrews will develop later—perhaps about D plus 6 months—as replacement aircraft become available, it may be wise to anticipate that shortage by giving aircrew training to the required number of ground personnel as soon as overages occur in such personnel. This number would be determined by the planned output from other aircrew training and the number of aircraft expected to be available. Most of the surplus ground
personnel, however, would either be trained in specialties that will
be required during the demobilization process—clerk typist, truck
driver, cook, supply clerk, personal counselor, and so on—or be trans-
ferred to the Reserve.* Well in advance of D-day the aptitudes and
potentialities of every reservist should have been determined and recorded.
That information should always be at hand so that, whenever it may be
desirable to train an individual in a specialty other than the AFSO he
has, the decision as to the type of training to be given can be quickly
and intelligently made. If any of the individuals being trained for
demobilization specialties should complete training before full-scale
demobilization begins, he—or she—would be transferred to the Reserve
until needed and then recalled to active duty.

With the type of mobilization-demobilization cycle here envisaged,
the demobilization should be relatively easy. A considerable number of
troops will already have been transferred from active to inactive status
before the demobilization proper shall have begun. Even though some
attritional losses may have been replaced, the total number to be
separated at the end of the war will be but a small fraction of the
numbers involved in the 1918-19 and 1945-46 demobilizations. Units
returning from overseas to become part of the postwar Air Force will
have been remanned in the theater so that they will arrive at the
processing station fully manned with personnel eligible for continued

* This would, presumably, be the "Selectively Callable Reserve," since
the "Service Callable Reserve" will have been integrated with the Active
Forces. There might be advantages, however, in retaining the "Service
Callable" classification for individuals who are definitely expected to
be recalled to active duty.
active duty. The few personnel who prove to be disqualified—physically or otherwise—for active duty will be transferred to the Reserve or discharged, and their places will be taken by ZI personnel eligible for further active service. Units returning to be inactivated, i.e., transferred to the Reserve, will be manned with personnel eligible for relief from active duty but obligated for varying periods of service in the Reserve. As they fulfill their obligated military service, they will be replaced by new obligors released from active service and by volunteers. Thus the Reserve will be kept at full strength and ready—if need be—for D-day of World War IV.

A Mobilization-Demobilization Cycle for a Longer War

There is a possibility, of course, that World War II will not be fought in the way that has here been suggested. The enemy might move against us so suddenly and so successfully that we should have little or nothing left to demobilize; that is a possibility that only a defeatist psychology would entertain. Another possibility is that the initial phase of the war would result in a temporary stalemate or that both sides—each prompted by self-interest—would refrain from using, or use only sparingly, fission and/or thermo-nuclear weapons. In either event the mobilization-demobilization cycle would take on something of the pattern of that of World War II. The Active force plus the "Service Callable Reserve" would not suffice to win the war; the "Selectively Callable Reserve" and Selective Service would have to be called upon to provide the build-up to a much larger force than is now contemplated,
though doubtless not as large as that required for World War II. Extending perhaps beyond D plus 24 months, the build-up would be much more protracted than that now planned; the demobilization would be delayed and protracted. Overages in certain types of personnel might still occur from time to time, but it seems likely that places could be found, because of the enlarged troop basis, for all such personnel that are qualified and eligible for continued active duty; considerable retraining--much of it on-the-job training--would of course be required.

Even though the demobilization following a war of the type here under consideration would involve the separation of a much larger number of troops than would be needed for the blitzkrieg type of war, there is no necessity for its being conducted in such chaotic confusion as characterized the demobilization of 1945-46. Pre-armistice training of processing personnel, adoption of the unit method of demobilization, and substitution of a single processing for the two or more of post-World War II days would in themselves do much to insure an efficient and orderly return to civilian life for the veterans of World War III. However, the importance of good public relations must not be forgotten. The USAF must be prepared to handle its demobilization publicity with all the skill that is displayed by the manufacturers of automobiles, beer, cigarettes, and soap.

The Importance of Statistical Reporting in the Mobilization-Demobilization Cycle

It is absolutely imperative that there be no such cutback in training--and consequent dearth of trained specialists--as occurred during and after
World War II. It may seem foolish to continue to train men—and women—after peak personnel strength has been reached and every job for which there is a valid requirement has been filled. The foolishness, however, is only apparent, not real. As General Hopwood put it, when training and intake stop, "the force becomes stagnant and will ultimately collapse." Only by regular, continuing influxes of fresh troops can the vitality and esprit de corps of a force be maintained. There should be ready on D-day—or very soon after—a rotation system designed to operate uniformly throughout the USAF to permit the return to the United States of all personnel who meet specified criteria of eligibility. The system would be administered by some successor to FCC—perhaps a Personnel Command—and monitored by DCS/P. From the theater or theaters of operations periodic—perhaps monthly—reports would be required to indicate what individuals would become eligible for rotation and when, what skills would be required to fill the jobs vacated by the returnees, and whether each of the returning personnel wished to remain in the service or be released from active duty. Prospective eligibility should be reported far enough ahead of time to permit the Training Command to have a replacement ready by the time the individual whom he is to replace will be eligible to be replaced. Upon return to the United States those who wish to be relieved from active duty would be transferred to the reserve. Careerists, and others wishing to continue on active duty, would be assigned to positions in the ZI. Some might be used as instructors in the Training Command or in CTU's or RTU's; however, one thing that was learned in World War II is that combat
experience does not necessarily qualify an individual to be an instructor. Only such individuals as have teaching ability and—what is just or almost as important—a desire to teach should be assigned as instructors; those who lack either ability or interest in teaching should never be shunted into or allowed to accept instructorships.

A continuing process of replacing overseas veterans by freshly-trained ZI personnel will do more than inspire combat-weary organizations with new life and spirit; it will forestall such clamorous outcries as were raised during World War II against the AF because certain personnel—the rumor given varied and was generally exaggerated—had never served outside the Zone of Interior. Everyone—even limited-service personnel, if there are jobs available for which they are qualified—should be sent overseas just as soon as there is found in the theater an individual, eligible for return to the States, whose place he or she can properly fill.

Except, perhaps, for the Chief of Staff, there is no one in the USAF whose job is so important that no one else can fill it, no one so uniquely qualified for service in the ZI that he cannot be spared to take his turn overseas.

Reports from the field must include reports from the ZI as well as from the combat theater or theaters, so that those responsible for administering the rotation program will always know what ZI personnel are due—or overdue—for foreign service, what skills are available for

* In World War II one thing that made many individuals reluctant to serve as instructors was the belief—too often well-founded—that instructors were discriminated against in promotion and assignment.
shipment overseas, and in what numbers and where those skills are to
be found. Only by means of accurate reporting will it be possible for
requirements to be matched with availabilities, thus permitting those
eligible for rotation to be returned on schedule. If the criteria for
return are equitable—taking cognizance of the fact that six months'
service in one theater or one part of a theater may be as severe in its
effect on the body, mind, or nerves, or all three, as a year's service
elsewhere and that one kind of activity may have two or three times the
morale-destroying nature that another kind has—and the program is
impartially and consistently administered, rotation during and after World
War III will evoke no more than routine GI complaints.

The Continental Air Command in World War III

Perhaps the necessity for discussing the place of an organization
such as the Continental Air Command in World War III will have been pre-
cluded by the creation of the Continental Air Defense Command. Inasmuch,
however, as reports thus far published have not made clear the relationship
of ConAC to the new command, it may be worth while to investigate the
matter. Indeed, even though the future of ConAC may already have been
determined, there is still at least an academic interest in studying the
problem.

The primary missions of ConAC, as of this date, are: (1) to
administer the Air Force Reserve program; (2) to supervise the training,
the mobilization, and the inspection of the Air National Guard; (3) to
complete the Aviation Engineer program; and (4) to formulate plans for,
and coordinate the efforts of, all Air Force activities in domestic emergencies arising within the continental United States.\textsuperscript{192}

The secondary missions of ConAC, according to the Command Historian, are: (5) the training of Prisoner of War interrogators; (6) the procurement of Air Force nurses; (7) the provision of escorts for deceased Air Force personnel; (8) the administration of the train rider program; (9) the support of the United Nations Military Staff Committee; (10) the monitoring of the Civil Air Patrol; (11) the support of Air Force recruiting activities; (12) the responsibility for Air Force proficiency testing services; (13) the participation of the Air Force in the Selective Service System; (14) the operation of the Military Affiliated Radio System; (15) the providing of air transportation for Zi Army areas; (16) the providing of Air Force representation on Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Boards; (17) the administration of disciplinary jurisdiction over Air Force personnel at other than Air Force installations; (18) the coordination of all Air Force activities in connection with antisubmarine warfare; (19) the responsibility for personnel processing; (20) the administration of a censorship training program; (21) the administration of the Air Explorer program.\textsuperscript{193}

In addition to the above, ConAC is also charged, according to the terms of AR 23-1, with "Premobilization training of units and combat crews in accordance with plans, directives, and schedules issued by Headquarters USAF,"\textsuperscript{194} "Acceptance of custody of Air Force prisoners from overseas theaters, pending final disposition,"\textsuperscript{195} "Establishment
and operation of overseas replacement depots as directed,"¹⁹⁶ "Constituting a single Air Force contact to provide information and liaison with Army commanders, naval district commandants, Sea Frontier commanders, and heads of civilian agencies,"¹⁹⁷ "Preparation for overseas movement of such units as may be directed,"¹⁹⁸ and "Conduct of special air missions activity, as directed."¹⁹⁹

Of all these missions, the first two definitely represent ConAC's raison d'être; and both of them will have been accomplished within a matter of hours—at most a few days—after D-day: the first as soon as all of the Service Callable Reserve who are available and qualified for service have been called to active duty, and the second when all of the Air National Guard units have been integrated with Regular Air Force units and assigned to commands. Most of the other functions mentioned seem to have been allotted to ConAC simply because it was felt that they are ZI activities that can best be carried out by a continent-wide command and are not appropriate for any of the other such commands—ADG, AMC, ARDC, AAMC, ATAC, SAC, and TAC—or for MAIS.

The Aviation Engineer program is scheduled for completion early in 1956; unless D-day comes before that time, ConAC's third mission will have been accomplished before World War III begins. Should D-day arrive before the integration of the SAC/RAF into the USAF has been completed, the transfer would undoubtedly be expedited and might well be concluded by the time Missions 1 and 2 had been accomplished.

The fourth mission—the coordinating of Air Force activities in domestic emergencies in the United States—could, in time of war, best
be handled by the new Continental Air Defense Command or by a civilian
defense organization which would have over-all responsibility for air
raid precautions, disaster relief, and other emergency activities, and
would coordinate the actions of all the armed forces through liaison with
local commanders.

Most—if not all—of ConAD's secondary missions could, in time of war,
be canceled or could be better or more appropriately performed by another
agency. An analysis of these missions should reveal whether it would be
feasible and proper to inactivate ConAD as soon as its first three missions—
recall of reservists, federalization of the Air National Guard, and
integration of the SCMAF's into the USAF—shall have been accomplished.
In order to make such inactivation possible, it will be necessary to
stipulate the existence in World War III of certain commands analogous to
the four ZI Air Forces of World War II and the creation of a Personnel
Command.

The idea of establishing an Air Personnel Command is by no means
new. In a letter to General Arnold, drafted by Lt. Col. Harold W. Nichols,
Chief, Plans and Liaison Division, Personnel Distribution Command, for
the signature of General Harmon, CG of PDC, and dated 25 October 1945,
a plan for a Personnel Command is set forth. It was intended that the
proposed command should be the successor to the Personnel Distribution
Command; instead, the plan was disapproved and the PDC was abolished.
According to the plan, the new command would have been responsible for
(1) research into all phases of personnel management and administration;
(2) recruiting; (3) reception of recruits; (4) basic training; (5) aptitude testing, personnel evaluation, and classification; (6) assignment to training and duty; (7) supervision and operation of overseas replacement depots; (8) supervision and operation of a redistribution system; (9) supervision and operation of officer and airman pools; (10) supervision and operation of convalescent hospitals; (11) supervision and operation of rest camps; (12) periodic determination of manpower allotment needs and recommendation of tables of organization or exact manpower tables for ZI activities; (13) development of uniform personnel management standards, techniques, and procedures; (14) maintenance of an office of record for personnel data from active and Reserve components; and (15) separations.

In June 1948 there is a reference to a staff study and "several somewhat incomplete studies" all of which reached essentially the same conclusions: "that a Personnel Command is mandatory in war, desirable in peace, therefore should be established now on a permanent basis."

The reference precedes a recommendation to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel and Administration that a Personnel Command be established with pretty much the same functions as were included in the ADC plan. Perhaps the most interesting thing about this proposal of June 1948 is that it was coordinated by 12 offices of Headquarters USAF. Only one of the 12 -- Deputy C. of S. of Staff for Material -- opposed the idea of a Personnel Command.

Less than a year later the idea of an Air Personnel Command came up again. In March 1949 Headquarters USAF directed an inquiry to GenAC as to the desirability of establishing such a command. In response,
Col. (later Major General) Jacob L. Smart—at that time ConAC's Deputy for Operations—argued: 203

(1) The organization, war mission, and residual function . . . of Continental Air Command provide a good basis for Personnel Command work. Continental Air Command can be expanded for the remainder much more conveniently than a new command can be established.

(2) In a protracted war it is entirely possible that the personnel functions will reach such proportions that a separate command will be required to carry them out. Such a command will in many respects resemble the existing Continental Air Command. Duplication of headquarters and of geographic functions will naturally result if a Personnel Command is created. This action should, therefore, be delayed as long as is possible. He feels that the functions of a Personnel Command should, at least in the initial stages of a war possibly for the first year or longer, be made the responsibility of the Continental Air Command.

It should be observed that these arguments against the creation of a Personnel Command would all be negated by the inactivation of the Continental Air Command. In 1949, to be sure, ConAC was responsible for ADC and TAC; after the reservists had been called up and the Air National Guard had been completely federalized, ConAC still had two very important functions to perform. The situation has been quite different since the end of 1951, when TAC and ADC were made independent commands. 204

There would seem to be significance—and support for the idea of a Personnel Command—in the fact that on 29 July 1950, before ADC and TAC had gained their independence, General Whitehead, CG of ConAC, wrote to Headquarters USAF strongly urging the creation of an Air Personnel Command. The Mission of such a command would be to
Provide the administrative facilities and services necessary for the effective war-time management of military personnel as individuals, together with the planning functions essential thereto. This mission will be limited to the Zone of Interior except as follows:

(1) The organization and training of such overseas replacement centers (units) as may be required.

(2) Administrative control of personnel movements, as individuals, to and from areas of command as may be required.

The following responsibilities were to be assigned to the command:

(1) Recruit, or otherwise procure, classify and separate personnel as directed.

(2) Receive inductees from Selective Service System.

(3) Establish and operate the following activities as directed:

   (a) Personnel Assembly Stations.

   (b) Personnel Processing Centers and Replacement Pools.

   (c) Overseas Replacement Centers (Groups) within the Zone of Interior (provide the units and train personnel required for pipeline services requested by commanders of areas or commands.

   (d) Rest camps and convalescent centers within the Zone of Interior.

   (e) Definitive treatment type hospital installations required by the Air Force in the Zone of Interior.

(4) Assign personnel to commands, and direct personnel reassignments between commands.

(5) Discharge, within the Continental United States, the field responsibilities of the Chief of Staff, United States Air Force, with respect to the Air Force Reserve Forces (including ARCC).

(6) Apprehension of Air Force absentees, and insuring their prompt delivery to the nearest Air Force prisoner station or other Air Force installation capable of receiving them for future disposition. This will include cross-service with the Army, the Navy and the Coast Guard, in apprehending prisoners.
(7) Accept custody of Air Force prisoners from overseas areas, pending final disposition.

(8) Evacuate to the nearest Army receiving point any prisoners of war captured in the United States by the Air Force.

(9) Maintain appropriate personnel records and personnel accounting (to include records for Air Force Reservists) for the United States Air Force.

(10) Maintain liaison with General Hospitals of the Air Force and other Services as required.

(11) Maintain liaison with water and aerial ports of embarkation.

(12) Conduct personal research and development to include classification, "test" preparation and evaluation as delegated or directed by Headquarters, United States Air Force.

(13) Participate in disaster relief and other domestic emergencies, in support of the major Air Force Command designated to coordinate such activities.

(14) Participate in planning for the process of personnel demobilization and initial post-war manning and procurement requirements.

(14) Perform such other responsibilities or tasks as may, from time to time, be directed by Headquarters, United States Air Force.

The similarity of General Whitehead's plan to the 1945 plan of ADC is no more striking than the one major difference: either General Whitehead did not feel that basic training was a proper function for a Personnel Command, or he was unwilling to provoke a controversy with the Air Training Command.

A still more recent recommendation in favor of a Personnel Command was made in October 1952. The report of the Mobilization Analysis Center, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University—known as the "Harvard Report"—strongly urges the creation of a Personnel Logistics Command. The logistics aspect is stressed because the report
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is primarily concerned with logistics. The report makes clear, however, that the concept of personal logistics is a very broad one. The functions of the proposed command are stated, in part, as follows:

1. To act as the worldwide command instrument which will discharge the HQ ASC responsibility to all commands of maintaining strength at full authorized levels.

2. To minimize personnel ineffectiveness . . .

3. Under policies, allocations and directives issuing from HCS/P to be responsible for control, accountability, and general administration of all civilian, transient personnel moving between ZI and overseas commands . . .

5. To administer all operational aspects of Air Force manpower and assignment activities.

6. To provide the quality and quantity of trained personnel which have been authorized to all Air Force organizations at the time and place they are required . . .

10. To control and administer all Air Force replacement organizations and installations including Z1 Personnel Processing Centers, overseas personal reception and processing units, and separation centers.

11. To anticipate and forecast in coordination with major commands the number and category of future personnel losses and provide for their timely replacement.

Elsewhere, the "Harvard Report" contains this statement:

It is believed that eventually when the new concept of personnel logistics is generally accepted and is in effect, the mission of the Personal Logistics Command could be consolidated with that of the Training Command, thereby creating an organization for personnel roughly parallel to the Air Materiel Command for material. It is felt, however, that from a practical viewpoint it would be wiser initially to set up a new and separate command which could devote its full energies to implementing the new concept. The magnitude and essentiality of the missions justifies such action and it is so recommended.
Examination of the secondary missions of ComAC fails to reveal a single one that could not logically and properly be assigned to a Personnel Command, a ZI training Air Force, or some other agency that now exists or will be in existence on or soon after D-day. Taking these missions up in the order in which they were mentioned above, we find:

(5) The training of FCW interreggators would be the responsibility of the Intelligence School, ATAC, with policy direction furnished by the Directorate of Intelligence, DCS/F.

(6) The procurement of Air Force nurses might be handled by the Personnel Command or by DCS/F. Better still, perhaps, it could be the responsibility of a special section in the office of the Surgeon General, USAF; the Army seems to have such a set-up in its Army Nurse Corps Liaison Section in the Officer Procurement Branch, Personnel Division, Office of the Surgeon General.

(7) The provision of escorts for deceased Air Force personnel could be handled by the Personnel Command or by the appropriate ZI Air Force.

(8) Train riders and terminal patrols could be furnished by the Air Police of the ZI Air Force or by the Personnel Command.

(9) Of this mission (Support of the United Nations Military Staff Committee) the ComAC historian wrote:* 208

This task demanded very little of the Continental Air Command, and its inclusion in this history is chiefly for record purposes.

At the end of 1953, six airmen were assigned (against an authorized strength of 24) to duties at the United Nations. Accountability was maintained by Com/C's 2500th Air Base Group at Mitchel Air Force Base. Replacements were furnished as required.

* See above, p. 57-60.
One C-47 aircraft was maintained for use by the United Nations Military Staff Committee and flight records were maintained for three assigned officers.

It would seem likely that six airmen and three officers could be assigned to the United Nations Military Staff Committee from Mitchel Air Force Base without magnifying that detail into a Command mission; or the personnel, together with the necessary aircraft, could undoubtedly be supplied by WACS. It is possible that this activity might not be required after D-day.

(10) The monitoring of the Civil Air Patrol would be an appropriate function for the Continental Air Defense Command.

(11) If we may judge by the experience of World War II, it is unlikely that there will be much Air Force recruiting to be supported after D-day. Voluntary enlistments may or may not be permitted, but the organized procurement effort will certainly be made within the framework of the Selective Service System. If other procurement activities should prove to be necessary—direct commissioning of civilians, for example—they would be handled by the Personnel Command.

(12) Several agencies have a vital interest in air force proficiency testing services. A Personnel Command would certainly be involved, as would AIC and the Directorate of Training, DCS/T. Consideration might be given to separating the development of tests from the administering of them; but division of responsibility for a mission is very likely to result in faulty execution of the mission. The Personnel Command should undoubtedly be given the responsibility for proficiency testing, with coordination of policy by AIC and Directorate of Training, DCS/T.

(13) Any Air Force participation in the Selective Service System would be carried out by the Personnel Command.
(14) The operation of the Military Affiliated Radio System—if that activity would still be required in time of war—could best be handled by NCS through AACS.

(15) Provision of air transportation for EJ Army areas should likewise be the responsibility of AJS.

(16) Air Force representation on Armed Forces Disciplinary Control Boards would be provided by the Personnel Command.

(17) The Personnel Command would also be responsible for the administration of disciplinary jurisdiction over Air Force personnel at other than Air Force installations.

(18) The coordination of Air Force activities in connection with antisubmarine warfare would be a responsibility of the Continental Air Defence Command.

(19) The responsibility for personnel processing would obviously fall on the Personnel Command.

(20) After D-Day there would be no necessity for the Air Force to conduct a censorship training program. Upon the outbreak of war, there would undoubtedly be organized, as in World War II, an Office of Censorship—under that or another name—which would thenceforth assume responsibility for all censorship activities, including the training of censors.

(21) The administration of the Air Explorer program—if there should be time and place for such an activity during the emergency—would be a proper function of the Personnel Command.

Of the additional missions mentioned in AFR 23-1 and 23-11, the first—responsibility for pre-mobilization training of units and combat
crews—would automatically be concluded on D-day; pre-mobilization training cannot very well be conducted after mobilization begins. The second, "Acceptance of custody of Air Force prisoners from overseas theaters, pending final disposition," would be a function suitable for either the Personnel Command or for the geographically appropriate ZI Air Force. The third, "Establishment and operation of overseas replacement depots," would be a responsibility of the Personnel Command. The fourth, "Constituting a single Air Force contact to provide information and liaison with Army commanders, naval district commandants, Sea Frontier commanders, and heads of civilian agencies," would properly be assigned to the Continental Air Defense Command. The fifth, "Preparation for overseas movement of such units as may be directed," could be carried out either by the Personnel Command or by the ZI Air Forces. The sixth and last, "Conduct of special air missions activity," would seem to be a proper function of HAF.

It seems clear, then, that once ConAC has performed its wartime task of putting on active duty the Air Force Reserve and the Air National Guard (and, it may be, has also completed the transfer of the Aviation Engineers from the Army to the USAF), there will be little left for ConAC to do that cannot be done as well or better by another agency. It would be possible, of course, to keep ConAC alive by assigning to it personnel functions that are not now being performed but will have to be performed during the emergency and personnel functions now being performed that will achieve greater magnitude and require heightened effort after D-day. But it would seem better to liquidate what has always been a somewhat
anomalous organization and substitute for it a logically based Personnel Command with a clear-cut purpose—responsibility for all Air Force personnel matters in the Zone of Interior, excepting, of course, such functions as properly pertain to Headquarters USAF.

There seems to be a rather general agreement—even on the part of those who are opposed to the creation of a Personnel Command at this time—that a Personnel Command will be necessary if World War III should be thrust upon us. It is difficult to understand why anyone who is willing to admit that a Personnel Command would be desirable or necessary in time of war, should insist on delaying until after the war starts, the establishment of such a command. The advantages of a Personnel Command can be as valuable and important in peace as in war. If a Personnel— or Personnel Logistics—Command were to be established in the near future, it would be a going, operating organization when the need for its services would be most urgent. It would have encountered and survived the trials and tribulations that beset any new creation; the kinks will have been straightened out, the rough edges will have been smoothed off, the bottlenecks eliminated.

There might be grounds for opposing the idea of a new command if it were to mean adding another to the 16 commands that now comprise the USAF, if it were to require increases in personnel and funds. But no increases need be involved. The simplest way to proceed would be to inactivate the Continental Air Command and set up the Personnel Command in its place. To the new command would be assigned all the missions pertaining to personnel that are now assigned to CON 0; this would...
include rest, if not all, of Con C's more important missions. The remaining missions would be assigned to agencies such as Continental Air Defense Command and military air transport service.

To argue that nothing is to be gained by a change of name from Con C to air personnel Command is to miss the point completely. As it is now, Con C is an organization lacking in functional unity, charged with a heterogeneous confusion of missions. To turn it into the air personnel Command would give it definite aim and finiteness of purpose. The new command could, at the proper time, coalesce with the air training Command to provide an organization that would be far personnel what air material Command is for material—an entirely logical development.

The relationship of material disposal to personnel disposal

One disposal area, which is not in itself germane to the present study, remains to be discussed here: the disposition of surplus war material. That subject is pertinent here because the amount of material to be disposed of, and the manner in which this disposition is to be made, will determine the manner of maintenance and upkeep troops that must be kept on active duty after the war, and also the length of time their services will be required.

Following World War II some 2,900 airplanes were returned to the United States, but more than 2,200 were burned—after salvable items had been removed.
The average life expectancy of these ships was probably less than three months. There was no sale for them abroad—France already owned many more airplanes than she could possibly use up, and the attempts of the Air Service to sell used planes to individuals ended in complete failure. To knock down these machines, box them, subject them once more to the deteriorating effects of the salt humidity of a transatlantic voyage, and to reassemble them in the United States, would still further impair their condition and still further abbreviate their average life. There was also to be considered the expense of maintaining soldiers in France to protect this material for several months, the expense of preparing it for shipment, and finally—the chief cost—the expense of transporting it to the United States. The question was whether it was good business to spend all this money for the sake of returning to the United States materials which would at best have a useful life of only a few weeks, and which, because of the surpluses of new or little used airplanes already on hand, might never be used at all. The War Department did not hesitate in its answer. It ordered the sale or destruction of all A. E. F. airplanes of this class; and, since sales proved to be impossible, the order meant their destruction.\footnote{210}

To be sure, the aircraft of 1918 were very different from the L-17's, L-24's, O-47's, and P-51's of World War II. Cruell and Nelson described what the Air Service destroyed in France in this sentence:

"The remaining debris, consisting of little more than the highly inflammable wooden construction members and dope-covered wing fabric, was piled in great heaps and burned."\footnote{210}

As soon as a determination can be made as to the kind, amount, location, and condition of surplus material to be disposed of—and it might be possible to make such a determination, tentatively at least, even before the signing of an armistice—it will be possible to decide what disposition is to be made of the material in question. Such a decision, like many other decisions concerning the postwar Air Force, will doubtless have to be made after coordination with and in conjunction with the Army and the Navy according to policies established by the Congress and the State Department. Obviously, the decision must be made at the highest level.
We have seen what happened to surplus aircraft in France after World War I. In 1945 more than 5,400 L5 planes were returned to the United States in the White Project alone. And many more, of course, were brought back from the various theaters of the Japanese war and from the AIC's far-flung network. Nevertheless, many aircraft were disposed of overseas, and tanks and other military equipment that cost untold millions of dollars to procure and transport to the theaters of operations were given away or abandoned. It may be good economy to give away or destroy material that has no value except for military purposes. It may be that—as was said at the time—the cost of returning the tanks and other equipment to the United States would have been greater than the amount for which they could have been sold upon arrival. The explanation carries conviction because there is a certain amount of truth in it. But it is difficult not to believe that in many instances the decision to leave surplus stocks overseas was prompted by fear that the prices of scrap metals and other commodities would be ruinously depressed, that is, for tanks caught in the squeeze—depressed if government surpluses were to be dumped on the domestic market.

Rumor has it—and the rumor seems to be well-founded, even though no documentary evidence has been found in the course of this study to substantiate it—that ships were returned to the United States in ballast following World War II. If such was the case, and if the cost of transportation was the only reason for not bringing back certain surplus war material, then it would seem that there was mismanagement somewhere. Obviously, tanks, cannon, and other military equipment could have been
used for ballast instead of the water or whatever other form of ballast was actually used. That procedure would have reduced the transportation cost to the expense of getting the material to a ship, loading and unloading it, and hauling it away to storage. Even this, at union wages for railwaymen and longshoremen, would have been a considerable item; but with soldier labor, the costs would have been negligible.

It should be pointed out here, also, that, had surplus war material been brought back and kept for only five years after 1945, it could then have been sold at prices very advantaous to the Government. It is true that the cost of storage would have to be considered, but, with proper management, that would by no means have equalled the increase in the value of scrap.

The only reason for bringing a logistics problem into this personnel study is that the kind, amount, condition, and location of arm material to be returned to the United States after the next war will determine the number of troops that will be required to remain in active service after the armistice to prepare for shipment, ship, prepare for storage, and store such material. When it has been decided that units will be needed for this purpose, those units would be manned with individuals eligible for continued active duty. Other maintenance and service units, manned with personnel eligible for relief from active duty, would be shipped back to the United States to be processed and, for the most part at least, transferred to the Reserve.

**Advantages of the Proposed Demobilization Plan**

The advantages of the demobilization plan here proposed are several, and they are important. First of all, the plan would make use of the unit
method of demobilization, modified* to eliminate the worst inequities" inherent in the method. The modification consists in establishing a system of eligibility for relief from active duty based upon the length and nature of an individual's service** and implementing it by transferring those eligible for relief from active duty into units scheduled to be inactivated, and making the units to be kept in service with personnel eligible for continued active duty. This procedure would not be as formidable as it should be in practice. The number of troops required for the postwar air force, including the occupational air force, might be—-if World War III should be fought according to the latest plans—about three-fourths of the personnel under arms at the time of the armistice; or it might be, if something like the World War II mobilization-demobilization pattern should obtain, only half or less than half of the wartime troop levels. This post-armistice force unit, however, include all the specialists needed, from pilots and navigators to truck drivers and cooks. Most of the positions can be filled by personnel from the units about to be inactivated; in those cases where no transfer is to be

* The Hon. H. Lee Udall, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Management), in an interview at the Pentagon on 12 February 1954, raised the question whether the unit method could not be used without modification. Such procedure would certainly save a great deal of time, trouble, and money; the question is, Could it be made palatable to the GI's, and their families, friends, and Congress? The possibility undoubtedly deserves more study.

** The view of Maj. Gen. Louis D. Hersey, Director of the Selective Service System, may well be taken into consideration here. General Hersey, in an interview held in his office on 9 February 1954, said that he was not overly concerned with inequities. He believes that when one tries to avoid one inequity, another is likely to be created. Moreover, life is full of inequities—why should the life of a GI be exempt from them?

*** The length of service criterion, with extra credit for combat service, was advocated by Mr. Anna F. Roosevelt, in an interview held in her office in New York on 8 February 1954.
had to fill an overseas position, the incumbent will have to remain on the job until a suitable replacement can be brought over from the US; it will, as has already been indicated, be the responsibility of the Training Command—or the Personnel Command, if such a command shall have been established—to have such a replacement trained and ready.

The greatest advantages of the plan here proposed are (1) the elimination of one or more processing and (2) the immediate of the GI's relief from active duty and return home.

The substitution of a single processing for the two or more allotted to non-veterans of World War II would go far toward alleviating, if it did not eliminate, the shortage of typists that was omnipresent during the World War II demobilization. Even only one physical examination would relieve the shortage of doctors that was one of the most critical personnel shortages throughout World War II and will, almost certainly, be equally critical in any future war.

As for the other advantage, it has already been shown that following World Wars I and II much annoyance and confusion—to use the mildest terms applicable—were caused by delays in separating those who were, and, in some cases, had long been eligible for separation. After World War II individuals in central assembly stations and other installations and the experience of seeing, on all sides, others with AAR scores lower

* The number of typists required could be further diminished by using "dog tags" as strips to obviate repetitive typing of name, serial number, next of kin, address, blood type, etc., not only during the separation processing but on various other occasions throughout the individual's service. The only machine necessary would be a device with a lever, a platen, and an inked ribbon, such as department stores use with their "Charge-a-Plate" systems. The use of a strap would also eliminate the errors that are inevitable in frequent retyping.

† See above, pp. 10-26, 12-55.
then theirs being released, while they were being kept on for some
indeterminate time, nobody seemed to know how long. It was the uncertainty
that was most galling. If they had known why they were being held, and
for how long they would be held, the waiting would have been much more
easily endured. In a future demobilization, the separation scheduling
should be so carefully planned in advance that every unit, in the Zone and
overseas, can be informed very soon after the armistice what its place in
the demobilization program is. Zone organizations should be told when their
personnel may expect to begin being processed for separation, and overseas
personnel should be informed when they may expect to leave for the States,
how long their processing will take, and when they may expect to be
relieved from active duty. It will remain, then, only to carry out the
schedule with the absolute minimum of deviation—a formidable but by no
means insuperable task.

In the policies here outlined can be carried out, demobilization after
the next war will bring the veterans of that war—those who do not elect

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* A personal reminiscence may serve to enforce this point; it is, of
  course, only one experience out of millions, but it is typical of what
  happened to many veterans of World War I and an even larger number
  of veterans of World War II. In November 1918 I was transferred from a
  camp hospital—hospital in one only—to what had been a replacement center but
  had become a casual clearance center—St. Jorioz. From St. Jorioz I was
  sent, along with other members of Regular Army outfits and marines and
  members of New York and New England national guard regiments, to a satellite
  installation, Flatfoot Farm—the nickname attributable to the fact that it
  had formerly been an orthopedic camp. At Flatfoot Farm, having been one
  of the early arrivals, I was quartered in a barracks building but those
  who followed—so they were many, most of them convalescent from flu or
  pneumonia or both—slept in pup tents pitched in mud. At Flatfoot Farm
  we knew that we were waiting for our service records to be located and sent
  on from the Central Records Office at Tours. It was commonly understood
  that the records at Tours were in a state of complete chaos, and that our
  wait, consequently, might be an interminable one. There was certainly
  someone in charge, or someone in the permanent staff at Flatfoot Farm, who
  could have told us: "You will be here at least two days (or four days or
  ten days), probably five days (or seven days), but certainly not more than
  three weeks (or six weeks)"—it would not have mattered much what the
  figures were. Had we only known what was in store for us, it might not
to remain in the service—what they will most want: prompt release as soon as they become eligible for relief from active duty. Such prompt release will also please the families and friends of the veterans and, consequently, their Senators and their Congressmen. The LoAF will have the opportunity to make friends, instead of enemies, through the next demobilization.

Even more important, however, than the establishment of friendly relations between the LoAF and the people of the United States is the necessity of having, during demobilization and afterward, an air force in being, able and ready to maintain the security of the United States against any and all aggressors. The mistake made by this country after

*Cont'd.*

have made the gasoline-flavored drinking water and coffee more palatable, or the menus—which, for several successive days, three times a day, consisted of bread, dehydrated carrots (the same ones served and re-served at each meal because almost no one could eat them), coffee, and nothing else—more delectable, but the knowledge would have made our stay at Flatfoot Farm less exasperating.

After about a week at Flatfoot Farm—not an unreasonable time, certainly, but one that I would have endured with more equanimity had I known in advance that it would be no longer—I was sent, along with the other members of the newly-organized Casual Company No. 431 (or some such number), to Brecht. It is no doubt true that no one, from the camp commander down, knew, when we arrived in Brecht, at just what time our particular casual company would be loaded onto a ship bound for the States. But certainly, at some time well in advance of the date of sailing, that information was available at camp headquarters and could have been passed on to the members of that casual company. As it was, we were confined to the camp at Brecht for four or five weeks, knowing that our next move would be to board a boat for home but having no idea whether that event would occur in weeks or months. During the time we were at Brecht we celebrated—if one could call it that—Christmas. Some of us had, as the pièce de résistance at Christmas dinner, the ubiquitous "slum" the real b o cold corned beef, straight out of the can. One might at least say—a ceremony for which, under the circumstances, we could see very little reason—we were informed that we were to get up at three o'clock the next morning, and immediately after breakfast, start the five-mile hike, with full packs, for the docks. After arriving at the dock where we were to await our ship, we stood in a bitter cold wind—with
every past war—escalation of its armed forces in response to the
hysterical climax, "Bring the boys home!"—must not be repeated after
World War III; but only by careful and intelligent attention to the
educating of the public, the press, and the Congress can a repetition be
avoided. The fact must be brought home to everyone that, at the signing
of an armistice, military necessity does not cease to exist; it is
reduced in scope, to be sure, but not in importance. It is still a
vital factor in national security. Fewer aircraft to fly aircraft and
fewer ground crews to maintain and service aircraft are required in times
of peace than are needed in wartime; but those that are required are
required just as urgently. The public must be brought to recognize the
military necessity of having adequate armed forces at all times. If
the public demands security, the Congress will appropriate the funds
necessary to provide security.

Such recognition, however, is only half the picture. The U.S.
is equally under an obligation to the public, first, to make sure that

3 Cont'd.

sandwich and coffee for our noon meal—until late afternoon; finally the
anciant White Star liner Orpah made its way into the harbor, we were
lighted aboard, and soon we were homeward bound.

After spending a night on the ship in Boston Harbor, we were taken,
by rail, to Camp Devine, near Hy, Massachusetts. There, and later at
Camp Grant, Rockford, Illinois, the same experience, in effect, was
repeated. In both places I was well treated—except for being confined
to the carp, probably because of the completely erroneous belief that
I would go sick if given the opportunity; the food was reasonably good
and the housing comfortable; the proceeding was unexpedi tions as could
be expected; and the length of my stay was not unreasonable. But the
uncertainty was nerve-racking. I was so close, I knew, to being a civilian
again that every day I remained in the army seemed an eternity; and I
could not find out, either at Camp Devine or Camp Grant, how many of those
eventualities I had yet to endure. This information blackouts was not peculiar
to the demobilization process; it was characteristic of my whole experience

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no individual is kept in service on the ground of military necessity
and then used in some job for which no valid requirement exists or one
that could as well be done by some one else; and second, that trained
replacements be made available so that no one need be kept in service very
long after he has become eligible for relief from active duty. The first
of these obligations can be met by making sure that unit commanders
understand the notes and bounds of military necessity and by seeing to
it, through frequent and careful inspections, that such commanders are
acting according to that understanding. To meet the second obligation
requires that there be no such outlook in the activities of the training
Command as occurred in 1944. Training must continue uninterruptedly; but,
as soon as the end of hostilities will be in sight, the mission of the
Training Command will change from training for combat to training for
demobilization. Aircrews and ground crews will still be required for the
postwar Air Force, even though in reduced numbers; but the emphasis in
training will shift to the production of finance and records experts,
supply clerks, and other specialists required in demobilization processing.

Summary

By way of recapitulation, then: Demobilization after the next war
will be by units; but the units selected to be kept in service as
components of the postwar USAF will be manned with careerists, others who

* Cont'd
in the Army. It is obvious that there are times when troop movements must,
for security reasons, be kept in secrecy; where no such considerations are
present, troops are entitled to know, when they are ordered to move, where
they are going, and why, and how long they are likely to stay. Had such a
policy of enlightenment been in effect in 1917-1919, I should have re-entered
civilian life with a kindlier feeling toward the Army than I actually did
have.
elect to remain on active duty, and individuals not eligible for relief from active duty. Members of these units who are, at the end of hostilities, eligible for relief from active duty and elect to be relieved will be transferred to units to be inactivated; they will be replaced by volunteers and individuals not eligible for relief from active duty. The criterion for relief from active duty shall be based on length and arduousness of service; the cutoff figure shall be such as to make eligible for continued active duty the number of personnel required for the postwar B.N.A., including the occupation air force. As this personnel will not necessarily include sufficient numbers of all the skills required, provision must be made for keeping in active service, on the ground of military necessity, some key specialists; but these must be replaced as quickly as possible by graduates of the Training Command.

The members of the units being inactivated would, for the most part, be under obligation to serve some time in the Reserve, active or inactive. If it should appear during the next war that, at the conclusion of hostilities, a considerable proportion of the veteran forces would be eligible for outright discharge from the armed forces, it will be advisable to procure legislation making at least one year's service in the "Selectively Callable Reserve" mandatory for all veterans.

Units and installations in the ZI will be phased out as they become surplus to requirements, until only those organizations that are to be components of the postwar air force and the installations required for those components will remain active. Overseas units will be returned
to the States as rapidly as available transportation will permit, with
priority being given to the organizations having the longest and most
arduous service.

For all veterans, those to be kept in service as members of the
postwar Air Force and those eligible for relief from active duty, there
will be but one processing. Following this processing, each member of
the units that will comprise the postwar Air Force will be given a month's
leave or furlough—or IDX—and will then report to his unit in its new
station. The others will at the end of their separation processing be
relieved from active duty and transferred—in active or inactive status,
depending upon the provisions of the then current law—each one to the
Air Reserve Center nearest his home.

It might be possible to work out a more detailed—though still
necessarily tentative—SOF for the next demobilization, by making use
of current mobilization plans for various periods from D plus 1 through
and beyond D plus 24, and offering alternative solutions according to
various dates for the cessation of hostilities. There is, however, one
all-important factor that cannot, at this time, be forecast with any
degree of certainty: the size, composition, and deployment of the post-
war Air Force, including the occupation air force. Hence there would
seem to be little point in attempting, at this time, anything more than
the statement of general principles that is contained in this study.
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NOTES

1. This is the first page of a document with notes handwritten on it. The handwriting is not very clear, but it appears to be a list of bullet points or items.

2. The second page contains more handwritten notes, which are also not very legible. They seem to be additional items or points related to the first page.

3. The third page has more notes, continuing the list or discussion from the previous pages.

4. The handwriting continues on the fourth page, likely expanding on or elaborating on the points from the previous pages.

5. The fifth page contains the final notes, which appear to be concluding thoughts or summaries of the previous points.

6. The page is marked with "CONFIDENTIAL," indicating that the content is sensitive and should be treated with care.

7. The document is dated "30.13," which could refer to a specific date or code.

8. The handwriting on the page is in a style typical of handwritten notes, with pencil or pen.

9. The overall content appears to be an examination or discussion of some topic, possibly related to a list or sequence of items.

10. The document is marked " Confidential," and the numbering "30.13" suggests a formal or structured approach to the content.

11. The handwritten notes are dense and appear to be knowledgeable or detailed on the subject matter.

12. The document is likely internal or for a specific audience, given the confidentiality indication.

13. The handwritten style and format suggest it is either a draft or a working document, intended for review or further development.

11. Ibid., pp. 217-20. Notice (Military Policy of the U.S., pp. 217-20) that in April of 1978 and the end of the Vietnam War, the number of U.S. forces was 12,000. The total of those who were killed in battle or died of wounds since the war began in 1954.


21. Ibid., p. 211.


23. Ibid., p. 223.

24. Ibid., p. 216.

25. The Vietnam War, 1953 (p. 333) states the population of the United States in 1970 was 220 million, which by 1978 it would have been 227.6 million.


29. Ibid., p. 6.

30. Ibid., pp. 6-7.

31. Ibid., p. 6.

32. Ibid., p. 247.

33. Ibid., Military Policy of the U.S., p. 3. During the strength of the U.S. forces in 1973 to 126,000 the total forces, 1973 (p. 291) were the total at 291,717.

34. Ibid., p. 2.

35. Ibid., p. 2.

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120. SFO, "Demobilization Planning Report for Year 1944," in RG 370.01.

121. In July 1943 this figure was set at 3,070,000; see note for p. 112.

122. Memo from J. M. Towles, Director, Project Planning Division, to "J.

123. Excerpts from Col. J. H. Hensley, 1933-1945; the latter released to 33 in January 1944.

124. Two for Director, SFO, 1933-1945; the latter released to 33 in January 1944, p. 6, in U.S. HD archives, 170.31.

125. See on, Personnel Demobilization, p. 77.

126. Two for S/F, Personnel from Col. J. H. Hensley, Chief, Demobilization and Personnel Division, S/F, 1933-1945; in FO archives, 121.33.

127. Spurred, Personnel Demobilization, p. 50.

128. Italy.


130. Spurred, Personnel Demobilization, p. 85.

131. Italy, pp. 73-77.


135. "History of Seymour Johnson Field, 1 July to 30 September 1943," I, 7-9, in FO archives, 121.33.


138. Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, "Organization and Missions: headquarters CAS" (June 1946), p. 72, in USAFID Archives, 415.01.


140. Demobilization and Personnel Readjustment Branch, AG/AS-1, Daily Diary, 10 October 1946, in USAFID Archives, 121.33.


142. Demobilization and Personnel Readjustment Branch, AG/AS-1, Daily Diary, 17 October 1945, in USAFID Archives, 121.33.


144. Ibid.

145. Demobilization and Personnel Readjustment Branch, AG/AS-1, 1 November 1945, in USAFID Archives, 121.33.

146. Ibid.

147. Ibid., 30 November 1945.

148. Ibid., 19 December 1945.

149. Office Chief of Personnel, AG/AS-1, Daily Activity Report, 5 and 20 February 1946, in USAFID Archives, 121.2.


152. See above, p. 63.


158. Minutes of the Meeting of the General Council, 4 June 1945, p. 11, in USAF Archives, 170.31. The program was later extended to include aircraft other than four-engine bombers. Altogether, there were involved 1,629 B-17's, 2,121 B-24's, 345 B-25's, 444 B-26's, 250 C-46's, 874 C-47's, 58 G-53's, 67 A-20's, 9 C-10's, and 3 P-51's ("Redeployment: The Role of Headquarters GAF," I, 63, in USAF Archives 450.OL-1)


165. Ibid., 6 August 1945, p. 13.

166. Historical Unit, Caribbean Division, USA, "The Green Project, 1945," p. 133, in USAF Archives, 311.1 G.


168. Minutes of Meeting of Committee to Re-Survey Postwar Strength, 27 November 1944, in AG 361-C.

169. Ibid., 30 November 1944.


173. USAF Statistical Direct, World War II, p. 16.


176. Ibid., pp. 13-16.

177. Ibid., p. 11.

178. Ibid.

179. Ibid.


182. USAF Statistical Direct, World War II, p. 16.

183. Ibid., p. 15; the figure given, as of 30 June 1919, 24,115.

184. Ibid.

185. See above, p. 17.


187. 65 Stat. 79.

188. 66 Stat. 463.

189. 65 Stat. 79.

190. 66 Stat. 463.
191. Ltr., Brig. Gen. Lloyd P. Hopwood, Command, Air Command and Staff School, Air University, to Col. J. C. Paul, Director, Research Studies Institute, Air University, 8 June 1954.


193. Ibid., pp. 49-53.

194. Ltr, 23-1, 10 November 1952, Par. 4b (11).

195. Ibid., Par. 4b (12) (a).

196. Ibid., Par. 4b (12) (c).

197. Ibid., Par. 4b (13).

198. Ltr, 23-11, 20 April 1953, Par. 4b (9).

199. Ibid., Par. 4b (23).


201. Memo for DG/AFI, unsigned, 3 June 1948, in DG/P files.


204. Ltr, Department of the Air Force, 322 (AFC 797E), sub: "Unclassified) Designation of Tactical Air Command and Air Defense Command as Major Air Commands...10 November 1953"; AFC 23-9, "Air Defense Command," 15 November 1950; ComC 60 88, 20 November 1950; and ADC 60 2, 1 January 1951.


207. Ibid., p. 107.


210. Ibid., p. 213.

211. See above, p. 22.