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CLASSIFICATION AND ASSIGNMENT
OF ENLISTED MEN IN THE ARMY AIR ARM
1917-1945

Prepared by the USAF
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CLASSIFICATION AND ASSIGNMENT OF ENLISTED MEN IN THE ARMED FORCES 1917-1945

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Air University, U.S. Air Force
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FOREWORD

This monograph describes the establishment and development of classification and assignment of enlisted men, other than flying personnel, in the Army Air Arm. Beginning with American entry into World War I and ending with V-J Day in 1945, this study attempts to analyze principles and policies, to narrate the general procedures and operations, and to discuss some major problems encountered in the classification and assignment system. The study was written by Dr. Victor H. Cohen, Chief, Historical Division, Air Service Command.

Like other Historical Division studies, this history is subject to revision, and additional information or suggested corrections will be welcomed.
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Chapter I

CLASSIFICATION AND ASSIGNMENT BETWEEN WARS

Plato in *The Republic* noted:

... I am myself reminded that we are not all alike; there are diversities of natures among us which are adapted to different occupations. ... Now nothing can be more important than that the work of a soldier should be well done. But is war an art so easily acquired that a man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman, or shoemaker, or other artisan ...? Then it will be our duty to select, if we can, natures which are fitted for the task of guarding the city? ... And the selection will be no easy matter, I said; but we must be brave and do our best.

In ancient times Plato thus prophesied what was to become the basic philosophy for classification and duty assignment in modern warfare—the establishment of a system for selecting the right man for the right job. As he noted, this proved to be no easy matter.

Before World War I the United States Army had not felt the need for inaugurating such a system. When war was declared in 1917 this country was not further advanced in classification and assignment than the "British colonel in the Boer War who had stood at the gang-plank of a troopship in Capetown and tapped each descending recruit with his riding crop, diagnosing by some process of occult divination: 'Infantry! Cavalry! Artillery! Er—Medical Corps!'" Little attempt was made to classify the huge range of individual differences by advance testing or any other method. A number of American commanding officers early in the war seemed to interpret the social philosophy of John Locke and Thomas Jefferson, that "all men are created equal,"
so as to make it include their skills and talents. An adjutant at
Camp Gordon, Georgia, attempted to assign men according to an alpha-
botical arrangement. In other camps, men with certain skills, such as
carpenters, were selected by the order of a company commander who
simply asked all carpenters to step forward. This procedure eliminated
paper work and those who supposedly possessed the particular skill be-
came known.3

The failure to sort manpower before assignment resulted in the
disruption of one division as many as four times by transfers of men
with certain qualifications to other organizations. Consequently, the
division's departure was delayed for weeks. Another division departing
for Europe had to leave one-seventh of its men behind as ineffectives.
Other divisions suffered almost as much. Part of the confusion was
caused by the absence of an adequate centralized Army personnel admin-
istration and the failure to develop a system of classification and
assignment ready for use at the start of mobilisation.4

To conserve and secure more efficient use of manpower, the War
Department on 5 August 1917 created the Committee on Classification of
Personnel in the Army, which was to serve under the direction of The
Adjutant General. This Committee called in business psychologists,
employment managers, and other personnel specialists to help Regular
Army officers in the field establish a personnel system for classifying
soldiers by trades and occupations.5 It immediately set itself to the
task of developing a personnel system of classification and assignment;
within an astonishingly short period of time the famous Army Alpha Test, job descriptions, trade tests, personnel qualification cards, and tables of occupational requirements were put into operation.\footnote{6}

Under the direction of a Trade Test Division of the Classification Committee, trade tests were prepared and standardized for use in selecting men for job assignments. Captain D. S. Seton of the Division of Military Aeronautics, who was personnel adjutant of Aviation Field No. 2 at Garden City, Long Island,\footnote{7}

became so convinced of the importance of trade tests in the selection and placement of airplane mechanics that he attempted to interest the Department of Aeronautics to the extent of having trade tests adopted at all of their stations. This was never accomplished; but due to Captain Seton's unflagging devotion to the ideal there was ultimately established at Garden City a most complete and successful trade test station.

To select officer candidates and men for specialized tasks, general intelligence tests were prepared by a special committee of the American Psychological Association: the Army Alpha Test was a group test for men who could read and write English; the Army Beta Test was a group test for foreigners and illiterates; and three forms were used for individual testing—the Yerkes-Bridges Point Scale, the Stanford-Binet Scale, and the Performance Scale. These tests marked the beginning of large-scale mental testing in the United States.\footnote{8}

The interest generated during 1917 and 1918 in the problem of military personnel classification failed to survive the armistice. Nevertheless, there emerged from World War I the relatively new idea of considering skills, aptitudes, and intelligence for assignment to jobs.
Probably as the result of rapid demobilization and the small size of the peacetime army, elaborate machinery for placing this idea into practical and efficient operation on an Army-wide basis was not installed until World War II. The Army tended to resume its old apprenticeship system and between world wars little attention was given to military psychology or to efficient classification and placement. There were, however, exceptions: the Army's air and signal branches which made use of psychological devices for selection and classification, especially with regard to technical training schools. 9

The Army air arm's technical training program had been instituted 1 October 1917 when the Enlisted Mechanics Training Department was established at Kelly Field, Texas. After the war it was redesignated the Air Service Mechanics School, and in 1921, as a result of overcrowding at Kelly Field, it moved to Chanute Field, Illinois. During the following year, the Photographic School and the Communications School were transferred to Chanute from Langley Field, Virginia, and Fort Sill, Oklahoma, respectively. They were merged then with the Mechanics School to form the Air Corps Technical School (ACTS), consisting of three departments—Mechanics, Photography, and Communications. Departments of Armament, Clerical Instructors, and Basic Instruction were added later. 10

From 1922 to 1938 Chanute Field had the only technical school in the small peacetime Air Corps. Its primary function was the practical and theoretical instruction of officers and enlisted men in the maintenance of all types of technical equipment supplied to the Air Corps. An important aspect of the educational process was trade testing for
assignment to courses in technical training. Prospective students reporting to Chanticleer Field were turned over to the Trade Test Department for mental testing and for classification according to their intelligence rating and their actual and potential mechanical ability. An important part of this classification process was a personal interview wherein the examiner tried to learn the desires of the prospective student and explained in detail the courses of instruction for which his intelligence rating and mechanical ability showed him eligible.

Trade test examiners felt that long experience in the Air Service and observation of the progress of thousands of students enabled them to know the requirements in intelligence, experience, initiative, and potential ability for the proper assimilation of each course of instruction. Validation criteria for such requirements, of a more objective nature, were installed at a later date.

Applicants for the ACTS were required to have a four-year high school education or its equivalent in experience or training. The latter requisite was so nebulous that it was loosely applied, if not disregarded, despite the official interpretation that the educational equivalent referred to was a four-year high school course and not four year’s experience in a grocery store. In addition, all applicants had to show proficiency in the mathematics test, i.e., be able to handle fractions, decimals, ratios, proportions, and square roots without further instructions, and pass the Alpha Test, which was revised in 1938 to measure mental alertness or the extent to which an individual could assimilate verbal and written instructions. Re-examination in
mathematics was permitted at any time, but one year had to elapse before the Alpha could be administered a second time.  

These examinations were graded by the Trade Test Division at Chanute Field. During the school year, 1939-1940, it graded and reported to various Air Corps stations approximately 37,558 Alpha Tests, 31,780 Mathematics Tests, and 55,223 other forms. Then the enlisted force increased from 18,000 to 45,000 under the Air Corps expansion program of 1939, grading was decentralized to newly created trade test units at a number of recruit reception centers—such as Mitchel, Langley, Barksdale, March, Hamilton, and Selridge Fields. These units were to function in a manner prescribed by the Trade Test Division of the Air Corps Technical School. Periodically other Air Corps fields were authorized to conduct and grade tests used to establish the qualifications of enlisted men for courses at technical school. By August 1941, blanket authority to conduct and grade tests was given to all air force activities with an authorized enlisted strength of 800 or more. 

Men who could not qualify immediately for technical training were sent to organizations where they worked as helpers to competent technicians in the trade or vocation appropriate to their background. If they later qualified for technical training, they were sent to the ACTS. On the basis of experience, the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps estimated that 65 per cent of its total enlisted strength was needed to perform technical duties; therefore, it was anxious to qualify as many men as possible for the various courses of instruction conducted at Air Corps technical schools which by 1939 had been located at Chanute, Lowry, and Scott Fields.
Unfortunately, however, the desire for adequate testing was at cross-purposes with the need for enough men. The GHQ Air Force, which had been established in 1935 for the purpose of developing a mobile air striking force, found that 115 of the 543 enlisted men assigned to Langley Field in 1938 failed the Alpha test; 85 failed mathematics. Out of the 2,595 Air Corps enlistments that year, 1,106 failed the Alpha test. Nor did the number of men in the air arm who passed that test indicate those available to fill school quotas. Certain men occupied key positions for which replacements were difficult to find, and their loss would impair the efficiency of the organization to which they belonged. Others were already competent technicians and did not need further schooling at Chanute Field; others had attended service schools in the Navy and Marine Corps. With the coming expansion program, GHQ Air Force was critical of a system of training which failed to provide for as high as 45 per cent. To get enough men to service its planes, GHQ Air Force recommended retesting in the Army Alpha; and if that could not be done, it was suggested that some sort of education examination be given to high school graduates who failed the Alpha in order to qualify them for school. This suggestion was based upon the assumption that high school graduates were capable of absorbing further technical training.

Colonel C. G. Brant, commandant of the ACS, refused to permit re-testing or prior study for the Alpha Test on the theory that mental alertness of an individual was not supposed to change and that the purpose of the test would be defeated if a person had previous knowledge
about it. He considered failure in the Mathematics Test as the primary cause of rejection and felt it was possible to improve capacity for mathematics through study. 16 Without questioning the validity of a system which permitted an abnormally high percentage of failures, the Chief of the Air Corps (C/AC) overruled Colonel Brant and permitted re-examination in the Alpha Test every three months; he also recommended that post schools be established for the general education of enlisted men, especially in the subject of mathematics. 19

Colonel Brant attributed part of the unexpectedly large percentage of failures on the Alpha and mathematics examinations to the lack of a thorough understanding of the approved method of conducting and grading the tests. Therefore, in November 1939, he sent R. W. Faubion, civilian in charge of the Trade Test Division, to visit various trade test centers at Air Corps stations to instruct personnel on the methods used at Chanute Field in grading and classifying the results of the tests. During the academic year, 1939-1940, officers and non-commissioned officers from trade test units were sent to Chanute Field for instruction on testing methods. 20

Despite such activities the number of eligibles for technical training schools was still inadequate for the expanding air force. The next remedy tried was the lowering of admission standards. In January 1940 the approved percentile ratings in the revised Army Alpha Test ranged from 80 to 90 for all courses at the ACTS. Upon the recommendations of the Commandant of the ACTS and the Commanding General of GHQ Air Force, the minimum entrance requirements for all courses...
were lowered on 3 April 1940 to a percentile rating of 75 for all men who otherwise qualified for matriculation. This was considered the approximate equivalent of an I.Q. of 100, the normal adult intelligence level. This change was made retroactive for all Alpha tests given since 1 May 1939.\textsuperscript{21}

The change in the Alpha Test requirement was but one phase of the personnel policy of GHQ Air Force. To secure maximum utilization of manpower, a system for a continuing inventory of personnel available for assignment at each base had been instituted on 1 July 1936. Effective that date all base commanders of GHQ Air Force units were ordered to appoint a classification board consisting of the base personnel officer and two other qualified officers. By reviewing the records of all enlisted men and giving such practical tests as were necessary to determine whether prescribed trade standards were met, this board determined the men's assignments. Trade standards were enumerated in 12 general trade groups listed on GHQ Air Force Form No. 1-1--airplane and engine mechanics, aircraft radio mechanics and operators, aircraft instrument mechanics, clerks, stewards and cooks, aircraft metal workers, aircraft armorers, meteorologists, parachute riggers, auto mechanics, aircraft machinists, and aircraft photo technicians. Enlisted men had to be classified in one of those groups, or in a miscellaneous group, created as a catch-all for unclassified men.\textsuperscript{22}

Distinctions between degrees of skill in trade specialties were indicated by use of the terms journeyman and apprentice. Base commanders were required to publish lists of enlisted men in each trade specialty
who were classified as journeymen, and all orders and rosters pertaining to them were to include in brackets this trade classification. Unit commanders were permitted to recommend reclassification of specialists in the event of a change in efficiency or an error in assignment.\textsuperscript{23}

In theory the classification system of the GHQ Air Force established an ideal objective, but it was difficult to administer. Proficiency standards for journeymen and apprentices were too indefinite. Orders on enlisted men did not include trade classifications because units felt that the additional administrative work was not commensurate with the resulting benefits. The military and occupational specialties prescribed by GHQ Air Force were different from those prescribed in Mobilization Regulations 1-9, dated 10 December 1935, and this fact led to confusion. Finally, the practical tests used to verify a man's trade proficiency were not standard throughout the GHQ Air Force and it is improbable that they were scientifically checked for validity.\textsuperscript{24}

These criticisms of the classification system were reported in the replies to a questionnaire sent out by GHQ Air Force on 1 June 1938, and were confirmed the following year by an Army-wide survey of occupational and military classifications of enlisted men. The study revealed differences in grades and ratings assigned for the same job, and the use of numerous terms to describe the same specialty.\textsuperscript{25}

The planning and establishment of a workable and scientific classification system was stimulated by the military expansion program during the crisis year of 1939. At that time, Maj. John E. Dahlquist in the Office of G-1, War Department General Staff (WDGS), and Maj. Herbert...
C. Holdridge in The Adjutant General's Office (TAGO), were studying the history of classification in World War I and poring over current classification mobilization regulations. At about the same time, the Army Air Corps was independently attempting to improve its classification system by the development and improvement of aptitude tests. The vast number of enlisted technical specialists required to operate, repair, and maintain aviation equipment made it imperative to use effectively individual skills and abilities, both real and potential. On 27 May 1939 the Office of the Chief of Air Corps (00/40) requested the GHQ Air Force to submit recommendations and comments regarding the establishment of suitable standards and methods of classification in trades or vocations. After a study of the problem Maj. Gen. Delos C. Emmons, commander of GHQ Air Force, recommended the establishment and operation throughout the Air Corps of a complete and integrated personnel classification system with the following principal elements: standard names and definitions for each technical specialty; degrees of skill within each specialty to have a fixed number of classes; the preparation of a set of qualifications to permit uniformity in job assignment; the preparation of a standard qualification card; uniform instructions for the conduct of classification and reclassification; and the transmission of classification data upon transfer or discharge of an enlisted man. These were common-sense rules of classification, but had not been uniformly practiced to date.

The emphasis of Air Corps classification, however, remained on selecting students for courses in technical schools. In January 1940,
primarily as the result of the work by R. W. Faubion, the Commandant of the ACTS submitted to the Chief of the Air Corps a comprehensive battery of aptitude tests including two mechanical aptitude tests, a surface development and mechanical movements tests, and a clerical test. Research indicated that they would be of greater value than the current revised Army Alpha for predicting success or failure in such courses as airplane mechanics, sheet metal, welding, armament, photography, parachute rigging, and radio repair and operation. The Alpha examination was found suitable only for use in general selection for school attendance. Colonel Brent recommended that the aptitude tests be used in conjunction with the current Alpha and mathematics tests.\textsuperscript{28} The latter examination was used to insure a knowledge of essential arithmetic basic to all courses of instruction. The former, with the minimum passing percentile of 75, was used to measure mental ability deemed necessary to absorb classroom and textbook material. The Commandant of the ACTS desired a validation and reliability test in the Air Corps before standardizing the aptitude tests as requirements for school entrance.\textsuperscript{29}

These plans were submitted to GHQ Air Force headquarters for comment. This organization viewed the Alpha Test as a satisfactory means of selecting enlisted men for training. If it indicated normal adult intelligence, then any man passing it was capable of specialty training in the Air Corps and GHQ Air Force. The latter organization considered the proposed aptitude tests as valuable adjuncts to determine suitability for a particular type of work, but it objected to their use as absolute
requisites for admission to technical schools. GHQ Air Force found
two basic defects in the use of aptitude tests: they did not measure
the individual's interest; nor did they indicate reliability in measuring
specialty performance in tactical units.\textsuperscript{30} The former objection seemed
invalid, as an aptitude test by definition is not designed to measure
interest but ability. A trial period was suggested by the AACTS to
meet the latter objection. Headquarters of GHQ Air Force approved and
also agreed to make 75 the uniform and minimum percentile rating on
the Alpha test. But it objected to permitting the aptitude tests to
bar a student from technical courses if he passed the Alpha and
mathematics tests.\textsuperscript{31}

Approval for a trial period until 1 July 1940 was granted by OC/AG
with the stipulation that results of the test and recommendations for
its employment be submitted to that Office before 1 August 1940.\textsuperscript{32}
However, it was not until seven months later, 7 March 1941, that the
study of the aptitude test battery was completed and a report ready
for submission. The Mechanical Movements and Surface Development Tests
were found to have a high correlation with success in the mechanics,
armament, photography, radio, machinist, sheet metal, and welding
courses; and the report recommended use of the aptitude tests in
selection and classification of students for Air Corps technical
courses. In general, the recommendations of Colonel Brant remained
basically the same, but had to be modified to some extent to conform
to the recent developments in The Adjutant General's Office which had
inaugurated an Army-wide classification system in September 1940.\textsuperscript{33}
In June of that year Maj. H. C. Holdridge, War Plans Officer in TACO, had announced to the chiefs of the arms and services that his office was engaged in the preparation of intelligence and other psychological tests for personnel placement. At the same time they were requested to furnish information on any similar programs of their own in operation. The Air Corps, one of the few among the arms and services that had conducted such independent experiments, replied that the Air Corps Technical School at Chanute Field had been using the revised Alpha Test as a mental alertness examination, but that there was insufficient data to determine the validity and usefulness for its recently developed aptitude testing program. 34

The AGCT had also been involved in the development of an Army General Classification Test. In 1939 and 1940 Majors Dahlquist and Holdridge, together with Dr. Walter V. Bingham and other consulting psychologists, discussed the shortcomings of the revised Army Alpha Test. They desired to construct a test measuring trainability rather than intelligence or mental age. Late in 1939 their attention was drawn to the work of Mr. Faubion of the Trade Test Division who was trying to develop tests for selecting men for technical training—especially airplane mechanics. Faubion, along with Drs. Marion W. Richardson and Thomas J. Harrell, of the Departments of Psychology of the Universities of Chicago and Illinois respectively, were called to Washington, where under the supervision of Major Holdridge, they developed the initial plans for the new Army General Classification Test (AGCT). On 24 May 1940, Dr. Richardson presented the results to the first meeting of The Adjutant General's Advisory Committee on Classification of Military Personnel;
the Committee adopted the recommendations regarding the new classification test with virtually no changes. This was the go-ahead signal for the Personnel Test Unit of the War Plans Office, which had been organized a month earlier by Mr. Faubion, to devise an experimental test. He "... organized the force of clerks engaged in the development of the AGCT, and assisted in the preparation of test material." 35

Mr. Faubion had more to do with the actual construction of the AGCT than any other person. Dr. Richardson did the planning for the test, presented it to the Advisory Committee, and secured their approval for its adoption. 36 Although Mr. Faubion left the War Department in May and returned to Chanute Field, Drs. Richardson and Harrell remained in Washington and served the newly organized Personnel Research Section of Targo, which included the Personnel Test Unit. This section, with a professional staff of psychologists and personnel technicians, was established in July 1940 for the purpose of developing and installing the AGCT and other tests for the Army as a whole, and to assist in classification. The Trade Test Division at Chanute Field, responsible for experimenting, constructing, and revising test materials for the Air Corps, cooperated and exchanged data with the Personnel Research Section on tests and other research projects. 37

Within three months of its activation, that Section was made the War Department coordinating and responsible agency in matters of personnel research. Its charter of leadership in the personnel research field was announced in a letter of 22 October 1940 from The Adjutant General to the chiefs of arms and services. The letter also
stipulated the necessity for securing TAG's approval before any
military personnel could be used for experimental purposes to try
out new tests.\textsuperscript{38}

This announcement irritated the Air Corps, which had been a leader
in developing tests and conducting other phases of personnel research.
The Trade Test Division had only recently examined a large number of
recruits and students for the purpose of standardizing and establishing
the reliability of Army classification tests. As a result of the
recommendations of the Commandant of the ACTS, the Chief of the Air
Corps requested authorization for the continuance of the current pro-
cedure for trade testing Air Corps enlisted men. The Adjutant General
referred the matter to the Personnel Research Section whose director,
Dr. Walter V. Bingham, approved the request, stating: "The testing
program of the Air Corps Technical Schools has been developing along
sound lines for some time. In examining and selecting men for dif-
ferent kinds of technical training, the results obtained have been
of value not only to the Air Corps, but to other branches of the service
as well."\textsuperscript{39}

Complications also arose about the same time from Army Regulation
615-25, dated 3 September 1940, requiring all enlisted men to take the
AGCT and the Air Corps requirement that all its enlisted men be given
the revised Alpha Test. The former carried out the requirement of the
new Army classification system; the latter helped the Air Corps screen
suitable technical trainees. This was a wasteful procedure since the
AGCT was based on data from the Army Alpha. Headquarters GHQ Air Force
also felt that both tests consumed considerable time and administrative
work. It recommended that the AGCT be substituted for the Alpha Test. The GC/GC, however, did not view this suggestion favorably. About five months later, 7 March 1941, the Air Corps Technical School concurred in this recommendation. Consequently, the Air Corps laid the revised Army Alpha Test to rest after 24 years of service between wars, and after it had supplied data and been used as a guinea pig for its successor, the AGCT.

The four forms of the AGCT saw service through World War II and were administered approximately nine million times, thus succeeding to Army Alpha's title of being the most widely administered test. It was designed and used to test the "learnability" and "trainability" of soldiers. It also served as a predictor of success in training for many types of specialties. In other words, it became a general ability test for classifying men. Although those responsible for the AGCT made no claim for it as an intelligence test, it was referred to as such by commanding officers in their correspondence and published orders. Dr. Walter V. Bingham, Chairman of the Committee on Classification of Military Personnel, as well as head of the Personnel Research Section, asserted that the AGCT was not an IQ test if the words Intelligence Quotient were used correctly. He stated:

An IQ is a ratio. It expresses the rate at which a child's mentality has developed. The ratio of his attained level of intelligence to his age is called his intelligence quotient. During infancy, childhood, and early youth this quotient not only tells the rate of development which has already taken place but also indicates in a general way, although not very precisely in individual cases, the probable rate of subsequent development and the level likely to be reached at maturity.
When a recruit joins up, it is not difficult to ascertain how intelligent he is; but it is too late to ascertain his intelligence quotient, because the information is not available as to whether he had reached his mental maturity at age 18, 17, 16, 15, or 14. This is one reason why the Adjutant General's Office in 1941 emphasized the inappropriateness of expressing adult capacity in IQ terms. Another reason, essentially practical, is that a personnel classification officer is not interested in knowing what a soldier's rate of development has been. Instead, the question is: How intelligent is he now? What can he learn and how fast can he learn it?

Neither is it a matter of practical concern to know what a soldier's native intelligence was at birth, before his mental development had been facilitated in any degree by stimulating surroundings or hampered by a stultifying environment. The assignment officer wants an index of what the new soldier can be expected to learn, rather than a figure which purports to tell what he might have been able to learn if only he had had a better home, no enfeebling illness, and a great deal more education.

The distinction between AGCT and IQ was a technical one, but for many purposes the AGCT was used like an IQ test to predict performance in schools and ability to learn a specialty. The War Department in its administrative manuals tried later to prescribe the manner of interpreting Army test scores:

Raw score, standard scores, and Army grades bear no relation to such concepts as the 'IQ' (intellgience quotient), or 'MA' (mental age). Results on Army tests will therefore not be interpreted in terms of these concepts. A man's performance on a test is generally expressed in terms of an Army grade and a standard score. The standard score compares the particular soldier with all the others who have taken the same test. On every test a standard score of 100 indicates average Army performance... Often it is not necessary to know the exact position of a soldier's standard score but merely the broad category into which his score falls. For this purpose standard scores on the AGCT are divided into five broad groups called Army grades.

The following were the required groups: Grade I, 130 and above, very rapid learners; Grade II, 110-129, rapid learners; Grade III,
90-109, average learners; Grade IV, 60-89, slow learners (at first 70 was the minimum score but distribution of scores brought it down to 60); Grade V, 59 and below, very slow learners (these men were considered for discharge or placed in special training units). The distribution of grades, with certain bases for comparison, can best be seen in the chart in Appendix L. The Army Air Forces received men above the average AGCT because of its great need for skilled technicians. It may be surprising that with special assignment advantages the AAF-Army difference was not greater. One reason was the draining of high AGCT men into officer training. The figures for the AAF included only enlisted men and the Army data included men who later became officers.

Meanwhile Chanute Field by 1939 had become the nerve center of testing and technical training of Air Corps personnel. It supplied cadres of officers, enlisted men, and civilian instructors to branch schools and newly activated replacement training centers. In 1940, Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, was transferred from the Sixth Infantry to the Air Corps and became the first Air Corps Replacement Training Center. It was formally activated on 21 February 1941 and placed under the jurisdiction of the Air Corps Technical School. Its mission was to give basic military training and classify men for Air Corps technical schools. To assist in the performance of the latter function, Captain William R. Fisher and other personnel went to Chanute Field for five days to obtain instruction on the activities of trade test units.
Upon their return a trade test center was established at Jefferson Barracks with a staff of 11 enlisted men. Its function consisted of supervising the execution of an informational card (the 2 RA Form) on which trainees completed items pertaining to their educational background and their choices of technical training schools; it administered and graded the Alpha and mathematics tests, and recorded the scores on the 2 RA cards; and its personnel interviewed trainees for recommendations to specific schools. Before an enlisted man could be shipped to school, the administrative section had to secure a copy of his high school record. This practice was discontinued, however, about March 1941.48

As Air Corps personnel strength rose rapidly, the increasingly large number of recruits shipped to Jefferson Barracks by the spring of 1941 overtaxed the existing facilities with the following results:49

At times, the influx of trainees was so great that men would be required to fill out their 2 RA cards while sitting out on the lawn; as space in the testing room would become available, they would be called and tested. Often space was so inadequate that men would be marched to an open-air boxing arena, where they would be required to sit on one bleacher, writing on the bleacher in back of them while they filled out the cards and were tested and interviewed. Conditions were rather bad, with men continually marching by, trucks passing, not to mention sun-glare and inclement weather. All in all, these testing conditions were very unsatisfactory.

Consequently, larger physical facilities and more qualified personnel were made available to the Trade Test Center during the summer. About the same time, Jefferson Barracks became the testing ground for a series of experimental tests conducted personally by Mr. Faibion. This battery of tests later became known as the Mechanical Movement, Surface Development, Weather Observers, Link Trainer, and Clerical Tests. On
29 August 1941, Mr. Earle Cleveland, assistant personnel technician at Chanute Field, was sent to Jefferson Barracks for the purpose of standardizing mental tests on 1,500 enlisted personnel.\textsuperscript{50}

To alleviate congestion at Jefferson Barracks, replacement training centers were activated in September 1941 at Keesler Field, Mississippi, and Sheppard Field, Texas. Recruits here were given the same kind of training as that given at Jefferson Barracks, and airplane mechanics schools at the new fields drew their students from among their own trainees.\textsuperscript{51} Before the entry of the United States into the war, replacement training was concentrated at those three fields. Inasmuch as Jefferson Barracks was the first training center in the Air Corps, it served as a testing ground and model for personnel and administrative organization and policies. It also contributed to the creation of classification organizations at other stations.

As a result of the creation of the Army Classification System by AR 615-25, 3 September 1940, a classification section was established at Jefferson Barracks in addition to the trade test center. The exact date of its activation is unknown, but in October 1940 two officers from Washington conducted a one-week classification course at Jefferson Barracks. They explained the operation of the initial interview and the proper method of completing, coding, and punching of the Soldier's Qualification Card, War Department, AGO Form 20 which was a cumulative record of military experience as well as civilian background. Early in November the classification section was established in the post gymnasium building by 2d Lt. Albert J. Hand, as officer-in-charge.
Reception centers, however, performed initial testing, interviewing, classifying, and assignment to replacement training centers, which became responsible for further classification.  

Anomalous as it may have seemed, the classification section and the trade test center at Jefferson Barracks, performing similar functions, were entirely distinct. The latter was charged with the administration of Army Alpha, mathematics and aptitude tests, the ACTS informational card, 2RA, as well as personal interviewing. The former concerned itself primarily with personal interviewing, the AGCT and Form 20. It was certain that differences would arise over jurisdiction and authority, despite the willingness to cooperate. A merger of the two was inevitable, and it is surprising that it was delayed until as late as 20 March 1942. The new organization created was designated the Classification Division, under which the entire procedure of receiving, testing, classifying soldiers, and recommending them for schools or jobs was standardized according to existing regulations of the Army and the Air Corps.  

Since the safety and efficiency of Air Corps pilots depended upon the work performed on airplanes by ground crews trained in technical schools, the ACTS took pains to inform officers throughout the Air Corps of the requirements, methods, procedures, and limitations for the selection and classification of enlisted personnel for technical training. By the summer of 1941, the prerequisites for admission to regular technical school courses were: a grammar school education, the attainment of a normal adult level represented by a standard score of 100 on the AGCT, qualifying on the Mathematics Test, and successful completion
of at least one of the Trade Test Division aptitude tests which by this time consisted of two types of mechanical aptitude: Surface Development and Mechanical Movements; and Clerical and Weather Observers Aptitude Tests. Those who failed in mathematics were eligible for re-examination at any time, and those who did not pass the AGCT could be examined after the lapse of a year.\(^{54}\)

The Examining Board at each Air Corps station authorized to have a trade test center made the final selection of students to attend technical school. At other stations the post classification officer, or boards of officers, assumed responsibility for examining and interviewing enlisted men for technical training. Those who scored especially high in the Army General Classification and Mathematics Tests were encouraged to take the more difficult courses of instruction, such as radio repairers and operators, or photography. Examining boards were also responsible for warning applicants that the educational and vocational information placed on the 2 RA cards, the Air Corps Technical School's classification cards, would be verified, but often this was more of a threat than an actuality. These cards also included grades made on all tests. Each Air Corps station was required to maintain a permanent record of all testing results and to furnish that information to another field upon a man's transfer. The 2 RA card was maintained along with the Soldier's Qualification Card, Form 20, required by Army Regulation 615-25. The Army and Air Corps classification cards duplicated many items of information, such as those pertaining to education, civilian and military experience, hobbies, and test scores. The Form 20 shortly superseded the 2RA card.\(^{55}\)
Meanwhile, the rapidly growing Air Corps Technical School had become a vital link in the Air Corps expansion program. On 6 January 1941, the Chief of the Air Corps recommended the establishment of a separate command having jurisdiction over all Air Corps technical training in civilian and military schools. Two and a half months later, the Secretary of War authorized the establishment of the Air Corps Technical Training Command (TTC) with temporary headquarters at Chanute Field. After inspecting a number of possible sites, Maj. Gen. Rush E. Lincoln, the new commanding general, selected Tulsa, Oklahoma, as the permanent location, and headquarters opened for operation at 1201 hours, 7 September 1941. This move also proved to be temporary. When Maj. Gen. Walter R. Weaver succeeded General Lincoln five months later, one of his first announcements upon arrival in Tulsa was that the headquarters of the Technical Training Command would move shortly to Knollwood Field, Southern Pines, North Carolina.56

The new Command at date of establishment, 26 March 1941, included the Mechanics School at Chanute Field, the Communications School at Scott Field, the Photographic and Armament Schools at Lowry Field, a recruit basic training center at Jefferson Barracks, and 17 civilian contract schools. Its wartime mission was to supervise and conduct individual training of military personnel not trained by the Flying Training Command. Specifically, this included the orientation of officers given a direct commission from civilian life, and the technical training of officers in such fields as administration, armament, communications, meteorology, photography, and other related subjects. For enlisted men the mission included orientation, classification, basic and technical training.57
The transition of the ACTS into a command organization was an example of the rapid growth of a small peacetime organization; the same thing, of course, was happening throughout the Air Corps. Aerial warfare in Europe and the Nazi air blitz on England had impressed American military and civilian leaders with the importance of aerial warfare. From the start of the European phase of the war in 1939 to American entry on 8 December 1941, Congress authorized an increase in the air group program from 25 to 34 and in the personnel strength from 44,537 to 437,813. In March of the following year, the Air Corps and the Air Force Combat Command (successor to GHQ Air Force) were merged in the Army Air Forces (AAF) and placed on an equal status with the Army Ground Forces (AGF) and Services of Supply (subsequently renamed the Army Service Forces).

Although Pearl Harbor brought an immediate revision of all requirements and objectives, the Air Corps Technical School and its successor, the Air Corps Technical Training Command, had sufficient experiences—both failures and success—to cope with a rapidly changing and expanding Air Corps requiring 65 per cent of its enlisted personnel to be technicians. To accomplish this it was necessary to have optimum utilization of individual skills and abilities both real and potential. The search for men with such talents and their assignment to units and jobs in proportion and to the extent available was the function of classification.
Chapter II

GENERAL CLASSIFICATION PROCEDURES

The ultimate objective of classification was success in battle through economic and efficient use of personnel. To secure such optimum use of manpower, the classification system provided for the acquisition and recording of all pertinent data concerning a man's intelligence, abilities, aptitudes, education, occupational history, military experience, interests, personal traits, physical limitations, and other qualifications. The actual process for acquiring and using such information varied throughout the war in such particulars as types of tests and methods of administration, forms and records used, interviewing techniques, quality of enlisted intake, and technical school requirements and quotas. In general, classification fell into three stages of development: 1) initial classification with recommendation of assignment to an arm or service; 2) ADF basic training center classification with recommendation to a job or school; and 3) continuing classification during the entire period of a man's active service in order to make proper adjustments for acquired skills and to detect and correct mistakes.

The first stage was accomplished at reception centers under the jurisdiction of army service commands. Here newly inducted men were required to take the AGCT, Mechanical Aptitude, and other tests if needed, such as the Clerical Aptitude, Radio Operators Aptitude, oral trade, and
non-language tests. Following this they were interviewed to get the facts about their background, experience, and interest. This information, in addition to test scores, was recorded on the Soldier's Qualification Card, Form 20. Then the recorded information was studied and evaluated by the classification officer or his representative for recommending an assignment to the Army Ground, Air, or Service Forces. Requirement and replacement rate tables or urgent quota requisitions for a particular arm or service usually determined whether the recommendation was followed.

The second stage of classification at replacement training centers—called basic training centers in the AAF after August 1942—was to discover skills, knowledge, and aptitudes which may have been overlooked during the rapid processing at reception centers. It was the duty of classification personnel at basic training centers to reconsider the Form 20 for correction and verification. Such items as character, loyalty, initiative, and leadership had to be determined as the individual proceeded through his training. Form 20's were kept up to date by means of reports from company commanders. Additional tests* also were given to help determine the advisability of technical school training, bypass to a unit as a specialist, or assignment as a basic soldier for general duty.

The major steps in classification were orientation, testing, interviewing, and assignment or recommendation for a specific job or school.

* See below, p. 140 ff.
Basic training center classification was supposed to supplement, not duplicate, reception center classification. Under the existing Army classification system this duplication could not be avoided and the Inspector General's office considered the duplication justified by the resulting improvement of original classification. Results obtained at training centers, including scores on tests, were more representative of the qualifications of the man because he is better adjusted to Army routine, is more or less rested, has overcome the fear and stress always present during his first days of service, and he has had time to consider how his own experience and training fit into the Army picture.

Airmen became acquainted with the details of the classification process through the orientation lecture, which included a brief description of training available in aircrew, combat crew, ground crew, and technical schools. At times the lectures were "slanted" to encourage interest in schools, such as aerial gunnery, for which few men indicated a desire. One of the greatest values of such talks lay in the reorientation of disqualified air cadets, whose dreams of silver wings had been shattered a few days earlier; now they were told how much the Air Corps needed them and how many opportunities were still available to them.

To supplement orientation lectures airmen were shown films of men at work in certain specialties. Basic Training Center #4 at Miami Beach, Florida, provided a classification library containing course syllabi, pamphlets, training manuals, and other materials. Basic Training Center #3 at Buckley Field, Colorado, published "Dear Rookie," a pamphlet of cartoons and diagrams to explain technical and school requirements, the purpose and nature of classification tests and Form 20s.
On the basis of the information on the Form 20's, the classification divisions of basic training centers usually separated the cards into three groups generally designated as specialists, potential specialists, and non-specialists. As seen by the flow chart in Appendix 2, the first group consisted of men likely to be specialists, for whom the air forces had a great need and who might be assigned directly to units, after recruit training. Only those who proved well qualified as a result of oral trade tests were thus shipped to units as specialists. Those who did not qualify on these tests, but who had 100 or more on the ACT, were considered qualified for technical school training and were so assigned. Those men who did not qualify on the oral trade tests and scored below 100 on the ACT were sent to units, after completing basic training, for general duty.

In the second group were men with ACT of 100 or above, but without the experience required to by-pass technical school and be sent directly to a job in a unit. A series of aptitude tests determined their technical training potential. They were permitted to designate a first, second, and third choice from among the schools for which they qualified. Those who could not qualify on aptitude tests were sent to units, after completing basic training, for general duty.

The third group was composed of men who had no civilian skill, no special aptitudes, and were below the average Army ability to learn. They were sent to units as basic soldiers, after completing their recruit training. In addition to the three main groups, there
were special categories for men such as those with unusual ability, or those who possessed qualifications more useful in a branch or service outside of the Air Corps.\footnote{4}

From 1939 to 1945 about half of the AAF enlisted men fell into the second category of potential specialists as evidenced by 1,310,760 technical training enlisted graduates during that period.\footnote{5} Basic soldiers in units also were able to acquire technician status by on-the-job training or by reaching school eligibility after retesting. The current demand by the AAF for particular types of specialists often made it necessary to disregard students' school choices and their best qualifications. The pressure to fill special school quotas invalidated the work of classification sections. Such urgency also resulted in a policy of bypassing to units only highly skilled specialists, and those less skilled were used to meet quotas when the Technical Training Command was confronted with a shortage of eligible students.\footnote{6}

This led to disillusionment in the classification system among the enlisted men who had been advised during their interview that they would be bypassed as specialists for a particular job or that they qualified for certain technical schools, and then later learned they were to be reassigned to fill school quotas. For example, generally and physically qualified men were assigned to meet aerial gunnery school quotas regardless of their other qualifications, aptitudes, or interests. It was common for men who became quota fillers to make statements such as: "They may send me to a school, but I'll wash out."\footnote{7}
Classification officers made continuous efforts to remedy this practice of arbitrarily filling quotas, but the expanding and constantly changing program of the AAF made such sudden changes in school assignments necessary and beyond control. As a result of the time element, crowded housing conditions, and the training cycles, it was not feasible for training centers to keep a specially qualified man beyond his training period until a position in a unit or a school quota became available for that individual. In cases demanding immediate action to fill a school quota for which there were insufficient numbers, the assignment section often did not consult the classification section as to the best individuals, destined for one school, to be shifted to another. Classification officers felt this coordination to be important inasmuch as the matter of morale and attitudes toward the classification system were involved. 8

No enlisted man would feel satisfied with an arrangement whereby he was carefully classified for a specific kind of training and then 'by-passed' or later shifted, without being consulted or shown the reason for the change. One of the basic needs of men as they passed through basic training was the feeling that they had received proper classification and assignment. This was borne out by reports from Army chaplains.

The consolidation of classification and assignment sections resulted immediately in great improvements. In addition, classification divisions changed their policy of informing unassigned men of their classifications in order to alleviate the problems that had occurred when men were not sent to the schools for which they had been classified because of restricted quotas or the necessity to fill other quotas immediately. 9
Nevertheless, the meeting of technical school quotas with qualified men remained a problem for the AAF. To secure sufficient men with necessary qualifications, the AAF was granted preferential assignment of selectees scoring 100 or above on the Army General Classification Test. When that advantage was temporarily suspended or reduced, the Technical Training Command lowered the AGCT requirement to 85. This also failed to fill technical school quotas and permission was granted to basic training centers to select men with an AGCT score below 85, if in the opinion of the classification officer, they had sufficient experience or background to qualify them. The greatest possible latitude was to be exercised in filling quotas; the deciding factor was whether the recruit would be more valuable to the Air Forces after undergoing technical training even though he may be washed back in one, two, or three phases of technical training.

In the fall of 1943, after preferential assignment of high grade men to the AAF was abolished, the Training Command found it necessary to consider recruits as technical school candidates if their AGCT or mechanical aptitude scores were 70 or above. The choice of school was contingent upon other test scores, related factors in the recruit's background, and the urgency of meeting school quotas.

The use of unqualified men to fill school quotas increased the rate of elimination and raised the cost of the technical training program. Nevertheless, thousands of men who had civilian mechanical experience but could not pass the original AGCT requirement of 100 were able to graduate. The policy for virtually all military jobs seemed

* See chapter III.
to be: "Do the best possible job of training experts, but in any case train someone."\textsuperscript{12} The quota problem gradually diminished in importance during the latter months of 1943 as the over-all demand for technicians declined and enlisted men were sent to schools in the following order of priority: 1) aircrew, 2) combat crew, 3) Army Specialized Training Program, 4) parachute training, 5) ASJAIF schools, and 6) technical training schools.\textsuperscript{13}

Classification in technical schools consisted of "mopping up" or bringing the Form 20 up to date, and re-testing when necessary. The most important function was to make the proper entries on Form 20's for graduates and eliminees prior to their transfer to a field unit or installation. During the course of his service, a man may become more proficient in the specialty learned in school, he may learn a new skill, or be sent to advanced school for higher technical training. Everywhere classification played a part--records had to be kept current so that the commanding officers knew the qualifications, experience, and aptitudes of his men at all times.

Since the needs of the Air Forces constantly changed, and since airmen changed as they progressed in their duties and training, classification had to be a continuing process.

To effect proper classification, each authorized job performed in the Army was given a title called military occupational specialty (MOS) and designated with a specification serial number (SSN). Numbers below 500 related to civilian occupational specialties (CCS's) which had a counterpart in military jobs, such as cook (060). Numbers above
500 signified jobs peculiar to military units, such as airplane armorer (911).  

Specialty titles and specification code numbers, as Airplane and Engine Mechanic (747), also served as the essential parts of tables of organization which were the bases for personnel requisitions, strength reports, and other records. Army Regulation 615-26, AAF Regulation 35-46, and later AAF Manual 35-1 listed for the AAF all the authorized military occupational specialties and their code numbers, with a brief description of each. These MOS's were also grouped into job families by the publication of lists of civilian occupational specialties convertible to military specialties, suggested military assignments for civilian specialties, and suggested civilian sources for military assignment; but relationships were not shown by any code device. These listings of related jobs gave way in 1944 to specifications which included alternate titles in common usage or were indicative of closely related civilian occupations.

As the number of SSN's grew, the War Department decided in 1944 to use four-digit SSN's. They were limited, however, to numbers constructed out of existing ones by adding a prefix digit to represent a new specialty which had a relationship to the existing one. For example, Antiaircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Crewman had an SSN of 601 and Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Crewman became SSN 2601. This was the first step toward imparting a semblance of coding structure to the specification serial number system.
Serial numbers were used also to designate duty assignments which meant the placement of individuals on jobs authorized by tables of organization. Proper assignment was usually ascertained by matching the individual’s primary MOS with the code number designating his duty assignment to see whether they were the same. For a long time there was a nebulous distinction between SSH entries on Form 20’s relating to classification in military specialties and those relating to principal duty assignments. In 1944, AAF Manual 35-1 clarified the distinction by pointing out that principal duties were subject to change as the soldier was assigned to different duties within the general area of skills represented by his military specialty. The MOS entry on his qualification card, however, was to remain unchanged until he qualified in a new specialty. Thus, for a short period of time it was possible for it to appear that a man was performing a duty for which he had no qualifying specialty listed on his Form 20. Whenever an airman qualified in a new specialty he was to be informed of his new classification, code number, and specifications for his job. Army personnel and classification officers were constantly correcting attempts to award an MOS because a soldier happened to be in a table of organization position requiring that MOS, or because a particular MOS would lead to promotion.

It was AAF policy to limit the number of authorized AAF military occupational specialties to the minimum necessary to designate the functional requirements of enlisted jobs. Consequently, AAF tables of organization were reviewed in 1943 for the purpose of determining obsolete MOS’s, specialties which had been succeeded by more ap-
appropriate ones, military specialties which could be grouped and
authorized under a single SSN, and specialties currently reported
under a group title but which should be reported individually because
of required training differences.18 The result of this study enabled
the AAF to reduce the number of specialties from the 880 listed in AR
615-26 as available for use by the AAF to the 30019 which were
published in AAF Regulation 35-46, 11 December 1943, and its successor,
AAF Manual 35-1, 3 April 1944. Within six months the Deputy Chief of
Staff of the WDAC approved a proposal to study MOS classifications
which could be eliminated in the whole Army.20

The AAF also attempted to standardize enlisted specialties to
provide uniformly correct classification, efficient manning, and more
accurate personnel accounting. Unauthorized MOS's were to be converted
immediately to those authorized, subject to the individual's qualifi-
cation for the authorized MOS. Enlisted men holding an unauthorized
MOS which could not be converted were classified as basics (521)
pending completion of retraining. Their old MOS was placed in
parentheses on Form 20's for information and not for reporting purposes.
Often such men were those transferred from other branches to the AAF,
who had not yet acquired a specialty usable in the Air Force. A
comparison of all SSN's used by the AAF in the new list with those
used by the AGF and ASF revealed that 175 SSN's were common to all
three branches and 106 were peculiar to the AAF alone.21 The reduction
in the number of specialties and changes in SSN's necessitated a review
of all reporting guides, manning tables, and tables of organization
to insure that SSN's entered thereon were correct, current, and
appropriate.22
Additions or deletions from the list of authorized specialties required approval of AG/AS, Personnel. Requests for new specialties were to describe a job rather than a grade, a job requiring special training or special experience, or a job requiring qualifications not already described by an authorized MOS. A number of requests for new and additional specialties indicated that AAF policy in this matter was not understood. Headquarters, therefore, explained that duties necessary to the AAF mission could be performed by personnel classified in one or more of the currently authorized specialties and that training should be geared to qualify a man in at least one of those specialties. To make changes of minor importance often caused more administrative burdens than the changes warranted; consequently, the AAF announced that new military occupational specialties would be considered "only when required as a result of the adoption of radically new and different combat equipment."  ^23

Men classified in military specialties were to be rated on their qualification cards as "Potential," "Semi-Skilled," or "Skilled." "Potential" ratings were used by basic training centers and the Personnel Distribution Command to designate men whose aptitudes indicated that they could qualify as "Semi-Skilled" with additional training. "Semi-Skilled" ratings were used for individuals who, within four months, demonstrated by on-the-job experience that they could perform efficiently under normal supervision. If men could not so qualify, they were to revert to an MOS in which they had already been classified or reassigned to on-the-job training in another specialty. If within seven months (later three months), of on-the-job
experience as "Semi-Skilled" a man demonstrated that he could efficiently and reliably perform a job under minimum supervision, he was given a rating of "Skilled." The establishment of time limits did not preclude a prior assignment of "Semi-Skilled" or "Skilled," nor did it preclude the extension of training time when necessary. In unusual cases, as where a specialty was highly technical or in which a critical shortage existed, a classification board could extend the time limits. If a person failed to demonstrate a reasonable degree of aptitude and progress at any time during his training he could be reassigned.\(^{24}\)

School graduates normally were assigned to duties commensurate with their school training and were classified as "Semi-Skilled." However, if they failed to qualify on-the-job they were reclassified and reassigned to other duties. Reclassification meant a change in the military occupational specialty of a man which could become necessary for a number of reasons: the learning of a new and more significant skill; the inability to carry out an assigned duty; the necessity of transferring from one job to another because of a change in physical qualifications; and the failure to make full use of intelligence, abilities, skills, training, and aptitudes. Changes were upward, downward, or lateral depending on job importance or skill required. For example, lateral reclassification was to grant a man with an MOS in one family group an MOS in another family group requiring approximately the same degree of skill, as cook (060) to baker (017). In downgrading a cook (060) was assigned to duty as mess attendant (590). Enlisted men who earned an MOS as a result of
considerable training or by graduation from an Army school could not have their primary MOS changed downward or laterally without the approval of a classification board. 25

The functions of such boards were to prevent dissipation of specially trained personnel and to assure the maximum utilization of exceptional educational or other experience gained in civilian and/or military life. They also prevented unit commanders from arbitrarily reclassifying men to serve temporary needs or as an indirect form of punishment. Board action, however, was not required for the classification of men in an additional MOS which was of less skill and less importance than his primary MOS. It was the policy of the AAF to grant and record all authorized "Skilled" and "Semi-Skilled" MOS's in which an enlisted man qualified. The primary MOS would be the one requiring the highest level of skill, the longest period of training and experience, and of the greatest value to the AAF. In all correspondence, orders, and messages pertaining to the transfer or assignment of enlisted men, the specification serial number of a man's primary military occupational specialty was to be indicated after his name. 26

Headquarters AAF was solicitous about information received about hundreds of enlisted men who had graduated from technical training schools and were reclassified and assigned to duties other than those for which they had been trained. To remedy this misuse of skills, all commanders concerned were directed not to reclassify such graduates downward or laterally within one year after leaving school, except in cases where they failed to demonstrate their ability in the execution of duties for which trained after being given an opportunity to do so. Another exception was permitted when in the considered opinion of the
station classification board men were better qualified to perform in
a critically needed specialty by virtue of prior training and experience.
Upgrading reclassification in a family group—for example, radio
mechanic to radar mechanic—was permitted at any time. The importance
attached to the reclassification of personnel graduated from technical
schools was evidenced by the fact that from January to November 1943,
proceedings of each classification board on the subject had to be sent
to Headquarters of the AAF for final, although probably routine action.
After the latter date, board reports were sent to headquarters of each
the
training command, but later it became practice to keep them at the
station where the reclassification hearings had been held. 27

Upon publication of AAF Manual 35-1, 3 April 1944, reclassification
of school graduates or highly trained specialists was permanently
prohibited except under circumstances noted above. A check of current
military occupational specialties was made after publication to as-
certain whether personnel met the new or revised job descriptions set
forth in the manual. Results of this survey necessitated considerable
downgrading by reclassification proceedings of personnel who failed
to meet the minimum requirements. 28

A War Department audit team found the question of downgrading—
whether one job was less important than another—to be more a matter of
opinion than fact. It found airmen discussing the subject lengthily,
and those with mediocre ability who had been working at full capacity
felt that their SSN's were inferior and their jobs relatively unimportant.
The audit team recommended that the AAF attempt to sell the idea that
every military job was important to the air mission, no matter how
humble, and no stigma should be attached to any military specialty. 29
Chapter III
PREFERRED PERSONNEL FOR THE AAF

The procurement and training of aircrew and ground crew specialists to "Keep 'Em Flying" round the world presented major personnel obstacles to the phenomenally growing Air Corps. As the following table reveals, the civilian population could not fill the technician requirement (65 per cent of enlisted strength) of the Air Force:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AAF Requirements Per 1,000</th>
<th>Occurrence per 1,000 Civilian Occupations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>127.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armormers</td>
<td>49.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airplane mechanic</td>
<td>258.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks</td>
<td>211.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>645.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To get enough technicians the Army air arm had to train most of its men in military or civilian schools. The chart in Appendix 3 illustrates how the task increased in magnitude as the number of enlisted technical training students rose from 3,296 in December 1939 to 173,176 in March 1943.

This personnel problem was further complicated when, shortly after the United States entered the war, the Air Corps found that it was receiving men below the standard for entrance to technical schools and on-the-job training. For example, in December 1941, 46 per cent of the men received were unqualified for technical training. The Army air arm thought it was entitled to preferential treatment over the other arms and services because of the vital importance of the air
mission and because its table of organization required a higher percentage of technicians for the maintenance of such complex equipment as hydraulic landing gears, high-powered aircraft engines, power-operated turrets, and many types of radio instruments. Therefore, in January the Air Corps recommended to the War Department that of its enlisted manpower allotment 75 per cent should have an AGCT score of 100 or better, a score of 100 being an indication of average adult intelligence. The percentage recommended was based upon past experience which had shown that since loss due to failure at technical schools and training-on-the-job was normally 10 per cent, 75 per cent of their enlisted strength had to be assigned to technical training in order to get the number of technicians needed—65 per cent.  

The War Department was convinced, and the 75 per cent was placed in operation in February 1942. This rule in effect created two systems of assignment, one for the Air Corps based primarily upon intelligence, and the other for the rest of the Army based primarily upon civilian occupational specialties. The consequences of this new policy were: other branches were deprived of their fair share of reception center intake of men of average intelligence; the air forces were deprived of urgently needed occupational specialists; and service commands were hard pressed to meet intelligence quotas at the same time that they were trying to adhere to air force requirement and replacement rate tables for occupational specialists.
The Air Corps earlier had thought of the need for such a special concession in anticipation of receiving draftees. On 10 August 1940, Maj. Gen. H. H. Arnold, Chief of the Air Corps, recommended that not less than 75 per cent of draftees assigned to the Air Corps should have passed the Army Alpha Test, predecessor to the AGCT. However, when selective service was put into operation the following month, the Air Corps did not request selectees and strove hard to meet its quotas with three-year enlisted recruits. Inasmuch as the selectees under the act of 1940 were scheduled to remain in the Army for only a year, the Air Corps did not want to give them expensive technical training, only to have them return to civilian life shortly afterwards. If necessary, it was willing to accept selectees over and above the established personnel quotas, but it actually preferred to have nothing to do with them.3

Rapid Air Corps expansion programs and high enlistment requirements, however, made it more and more difficult for the Air Corps to refuse selectees. These men who were eventually assigned to the Air Corps were not sent to technical schools and requests were made to the War Department for permission to replace them with three-year enlistees, but the War Department refused. In February 1941 it was predicted that the supply of three-year enlistees available for Air Corps technical training would be exhausted within six months. Three possible courses of action were open, any one of which would materially impede the Air Corps expansion program: 1) to slow down the rate of technical training; 2) to enroll improperly qualified three-year enlisted men; or 3) to train one-year selectees.4

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After Pearl Harbor, however, selectees were required to serve for the duration of the war plus six months. The change eliminated the Air Corps major objection to using draftees; hence, under the 75 percent rule, which went into effect in February 1942, drafted men were assigned to the AAF in increasingly great numbers.

Initial military strategy was one of the important factors in the War Department decision to permit assignment to the AAF primarily on the basis of mental ability rather than according to civilian occupations and skills. While the Army was building and training its war machine, the AAF was to hold the enemy at bay; moreover, the first offensive blow would probably be with the air arm. Thus it was necessary for the AAF to have priorities in procurement and training in order to execute its mission. The Commanding General of the Army Ground Forces, Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, appreciated the difficulties in the unprecedented expansion of the air arm necessary to carry out its mission, but it was clearly his duty to point out the harm the 75 percent rule caused the AAF.5

On 2 June 1942, General McNair formally protested against the preferential treatment afforded the AAF. Using figures for a two-week period in April, as examples, he stated that the effects of continuing AAF preference indefinitely would mean: a lowering of the standards of leadership in the ground forces; a lowering of the quality of non-commissioned officers, in a war that already had placed a high premium on leadership in small units; and a limitation on the source for officer candidates. He recommended that the 75 percent rule be

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rescinded and that thereafter all arms and services receive, as far as practicable, their proportionate share of men in all AGCT grades. He also suggested that reception centers classify all men according to aptitude in order to meet specific requirements when there were insufficient occupational specialists. These contentions were supported by Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, Commanding General of the Services of Supply, who denounced the 75 per cent rule as "contrary to the best interests of the Army as a whole." 

When the issue came before the War Department General Staff, Brig. Gen. J. H. Hilldring, G-1, with the concurrence of G-3, supported General McNair and recommended that all arms and services receive their proportionate share of men of various intelligence, aptitudes, and occupational specialists. The 75 per cent policy, General Hilldring stated, "is wasteful of skilled and potentially skilled manpower. It places emphasis on education and intelligence rather than on occupational skill and mechanical aptitude."

General Arnold quickly replied that it was necessary to continue the 75 per cent rule until a better method could be devised to provide qualified students for AAF technical training courses. He pointed out the growing demand for trained men had already necessitated the shortening of courses despite the fact that the type of students available required more rather than less time. Years of experience, he said, revealed the necessity for recruits to have 100 on the AGCT to enable them to absorb and pass their courses. He took the offensive and requested that those men meeting the AGCT requirement should also...
possess a reasonable degree of mechanical aptitude inasmuch as 85 per cent of AAF specialists fell into the military classification of aircraft mechanic, or radio mechanic-operator, and armorer. He concluded his views on the subject stating:

That in determining the proper proportionate share of specialists to be assigned to the various Arms and Services, recognition be given to the fact that in this highly mechanized war certain arms and services, notably the Air Forces, require maintenance of highly specialized equipment on a scale that must be little short of perfect, not only for the preservation of equipment difficult to replace, but for the essential protection of the lives of the operating crews, even more difficult to replace. That further recognition be accorded the current priority for air striking forces in various theaters.

Such arguments were of no avail, and on 16 July 1942 the 75 per cent rule was rescinded effective 1 August. Thereafter, reception centers were to fill personnel requisitions primarily with men having civilian occupational specialties and then with men of potential aptitude proportionate to the actual number of specialists requisitioned by each arm and service. If requisitions were still unfilled, assignments would be made so that all arms and services would receive their share of men of average intelligence proportionate to the remaining balances. The War Department made it clear that assignments would not be made in proportion to the total number of men requisitioned as heretofore under the 75 per cent rule.

The rescission of preferential treatment for the AAF was not destined entirely and justly to equalize the intake for all arms and services. The fact was that the type of men with the necessary skills and learning abilities just were not being found in the draft. Lt. Col. James W. Hill, Classification Officer of the Technical Training Command, estimated

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the national average of men scoring above 100 on the ACGT to be about 53 per cent. 11

Inasmuch as nothing was said by the War Department rescission order about mechanical aptitude, the AAF requested that 50 per cent of the men assigned to the Air Corps have an IA score of 100 or better. It was believed that since the AAF was no longer guaranteed men with above-average intelligence for its highly specialized courses, it should at least receive students of above-average mechanical aptitude as compensation. The AAF also informed G-1 that it could not effectively train recruits who were below average in both intelligence and mechanical aptitude. 12

The abolition of the 75 per cent rule worked a hardship on the Technical Training Command. An ACGT score of 100, plus the attainment of a critical score on one or more aptitude tests, still remained the minimum entrance requirements for technical schools. As the chart in Appendix 3 indicates, the percentage of men processed weekly at basic training centers with ACGT scores of 100 or more dropped sharply from an average of about 75 per cent to about 55 per cent as soon as the 75 per cent rule was revoked. A study of the effects of the change in policy on the problem of procuring an adequate number of qualified students for the technical training courses was undertaken by TSC. 13

Furthermore, a board of officers appointed by Headquarters AAF to review and reorient the technical training program considered the problem during its sessions in August 1942. Anticipating a drop in qualified students to about 50 per cent, the following possibilities for meeting school quotas were presented by Colonel Hill of AAF

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Technical Training Command change the tables of organization to make them call for less than the current request for 75 per cent technicians; lower the AGCT score requirement of 100 for technical schools; lengthen the curriculum for students with low AGCT scores; establish basic technical courses at basic training centers for slow learners; or improve classification procedures at reception centers so that men with aptitudes for specialized training could be assigned to the branches needing them. The latter suggestion already had been urged upon The Adjutant General and Colonel Hill presented it to the board. The effect of such inefficient operations as currently prevailed at reception centers, he said, meant that the Training Command had the unnecessary job of eliminating misfits before selecting technical school students. To support his charges, Colonel Hill cited cases of men arriving at basic training centers with AGCT and MA test scores when they had not taken the tests; of two illiterates arriving at Jefferson Barracks with AGCT scores of 104; of men tested at 0200 hours after a full day of recruit activities; and of incomplete, delayed, or lost Form 20's.\textsuperscript{14}

Although such criticisms were valid, and doubtless there were many more such cases that could have been mentioned, the majority of the millions of men passing through reception centers did not meet the fate of those cited by Colonel Hill. He recognized the exigencies of war to be partly responsible for the difficulties he had enumerated, namely, that "The [Reception] Centers are operating at 500 per cent of capacity; therefore, the men are pushed through without time for
proper classification. Colonel Hill was of the opinion that the
AAF could secure the required students by lowering the AGCT prerequisite
to 90, provided the reception centers improved their selection procedures
by initiating a screening test for the selection of men capable of
technical training.

Another approach to the problem was made by Richard W. Faubion.
Testifying before the board as an expert witness, he maintained that
on the basis of experience with the Army Alpha Test and the AGCT, the
general school requirement was, on the average about 100. He believed,
however, that the figure should be revised to recognize the difference
in courses. Past results indicated that a parachute rigger with a
score of 85 was better than a man rated higher than 110 because the
work was not sufficiently stimulating for men of greater mental
alertness. On the other hand, a very large percentage of men who
took the armorer courses failed when the requirement for a score of
100 was relaxed. Mr. Faubion's guess was that 85 would be the minimum
score for certain technical courses, and he did not believe that pre-
training at basic training centers would raise the qualifications
of men without the required AGCT rating.

Mr. Faubion, as well as some personnel technicians and psychologists
in The Adjutant General's Office, knew that it was not sound policy to
require an AGCT score of 100 for courses unless validity studies
demonstrated that such a score was necessary for successful completion.
It was also necessary to establish minimum mental, physical, and other
characteristics for every job for which men were trained in technical
schools before a decision would be made as to basic requirements. Such studies were not made and the reversal of emphasis in 1944 from civilian occupational skills to physical status\(^{13}\) demonstrated that such planning in the area of personnel matters as was effected during the early stages of mobilization was inadequate. It was inadequate because the War Department did not find itself in a position to adhere to any of the interim procedures in assignment which it instituted. Had there been adequate planning, based upon a full knowledge of needs, the costly confusion resulting from a vacillating policy emphasizing skills, mental ability, or physical stamina would not have resulted. There would have been available concrete data with which to combat the arguments of those agencies, arms, services, or major forces, which sought for their own peculiar ends to alter the established procedure.

While working to secure a restoration of 75 per cent policy, the AAF made every effort to secure the required number of men with aptitude for technical training by experimenting with screening tests developed by the TTC Classification Division, bypassing to units only those recognized as outstanding in a specialty and filling school quotas with those less qualified, and lowering AGCT school requirements from 100 to 85 when it became impossible to fill quotas with qualified men. Unqualified men were to fill school quotas in proportionate numbers but they were not to be assigned to advanced technical courses. To meet immediate needs, the AAF inaugurated on 1 August 1942 a specialist recruiting campaign to procure men with job experience as aircraft mechanics, radio operators and mechanics, armormen, welders, and metal workers. The campaign lasted until November, and 128,000 experienced men were procured—72,000 more than had been hoped for.\(^{19}\)

* See below, p. 92 ff.
Such efforts, however, met neither technician requirements nor school quotas. The board of officers investigating the technical training program in August 1942 found that the Technical Training Command was faced with a serious shortage of qualified students as a result of the elimination of the 75 per cent rule. The program of the air forces was geared to enlisted men scoring 100 or better on the ACO, and without such manpower the board believed that the AAF could not discharge its mission.20

The new War Department policy on assignments of selectees to arms and services based upon occupational background and aptitudes rather than intelligence was also a matter of major concern to ACO, A-1. The first available figures from the new type of selectees showed that washouts from technical schools increased from 25 to 30 per cent. Col. F. Trubee Davison, A-1, considered the "condition so serious that it has reached the crisis stage."21

On 11 August 1942, Maj. Gen. Walter R. Weaver, Commanding General of the Technical Training Command, warned Headquarters AAF that without the 75 per cent rule it would be necessary for basic training centers to process thousands of extra men to obtain the necessary number of qualified students. In reply, he was informed that it was "useless at present to promote any plan which differs fundamentally from the established policy" of giving all arms and services their proportionate share of civilian skills, potential aptitudes, and intelligence.22
Nevertheless, efforts were even then being made by the AAF to change the established policy. General Arnold on 29 August appealed to the Chief of Staff, USA, to reinstate preferential assignment for the AAF. Units in combat theaters, he said, were seriously handicapped by the lack of trained personnel; this shortage had made it necessary to speed up basic training to a maximum of 4 weeks and reduce technical training from 36 to 18 weeks. The speed-up program, he continued, was only possible with recruits able to score 100 on both the AGCT and WA. Rescission of the 75 per cent rule had made such a program impossible and had created a potential shortage of 15,000 students for October.

General Arnold told the Chief of Staff that:

Based on a time schedule, the Army Air Forces have been charged with the responsibility of committing a specified number of units to combat. Those units require a specified number of trained technicians according to experience and approved Tables of Organization. The entire program of the Air Forces is geared to this supply of trained manpower. The Army Air Forces cannot discharge the mission to which they are committed unless enlisted personnel of quality in sufficient quantity and on the approved time schedules are continuously available.

Lowering technical training standards or extending time for technical instruction was considered impossible under the current urgency to send technically trained men to combat areas. General Arnold recommended that of the 70,000 enlisted men received monthly from reception centers, 52,000 (approximately 75 per cent) should be able to score 100 or better in both the AGCT and WA Tests.

General Vandegrift immediately opposed the recommendation and told the War Department General Staff that the AAF had been handicapped seriously by the operation of the 75 per cent policy from February to
July 1942. Practically all of Arnold's comments applied with equal force to the AGF and McNair believed it would be a simple matter to compile statistics showing that not less than 66 per cent of the men assigned to the AGF had to have an AGCT score of 100 or better if the AGF was to accomplish its mission. Since experience tables, however, indicated that the national average of men with a score of 100 or better was about 50 per cent, it was obvious that any branch receiving men in excess of the national average was securing preferential treatment at the expense of another equally important activity. McNair argued that\textsuperscript{24}

The Army Air Forces have sources of manpower which are not available to the Army Ground Forces. They are permitted to draw the Army Ground Forces of all acceptable material for aviation cadet, aircrew, and glider pilot training. They secure a large number of highly intelligent personnel from recruiting.

The enormous problems of the Air Force are appreciated. They should be assisted in every reasonable way. It is felt that the Ground Forces are already contributing materially in developing the Air Forces and it is desired to increase this aid wherever practicable. While the Air Forces have heavy and important needs in enlisted technicians, they have a large proportion of commissioned officers which should permit the effective utilization of enlisted men of average intelligence, even though higher intelligence brackets obviously are desirable. The Ground Forces admittedly have fewer technical demands than the Air Forces, but need high-grade and intelligence enlisted men as combat leaders. . . . Thus it is reasonable to assert that the needs of the Ground Forces for high-grade leadership by noncommissioned officers counterbalances the needs of the Air Forces for enlisted technicians. It is urged that no branch of the service be accorded preferential treatment in distributing enlisted men according to intelligence.

General Somervell again supported McNair as he felt that the reinstatement of the 75 per cent policy would "result in wastage of skilled manpower, little benefit to the Air Forces, and great harm to the remainder of the Army." Furthermore, he added, both the AGF
and SOS would be seriously handicapped in their training, and particularly in the procurement and development of combat leaders."[25]

Somervell desired to maintain the current War Department policy by which all branches received their proportionate share of occupational skills, aptitudes, and intelligence. Assignment to the Air Forces on the basis of intelligence resulted in the waste or retraining of individuals whose occupational qualifications could have been used to good advantage by ground units.

The problem affected the entire Army and was a difficult one for the War Department to solve with the limited information available on job analyses, validation studies on technical course requirements, and the composition of the national manpower. As a temporary solution, the War Department ordered that at least 75 per cent of all men assigned to the AAF basic training centers, during the months of September and October, should have a score of 100 or better on both the Classification and Mechanical Aptitude Tests. Limited service personnel were permitted to fill Air Corps quotas up to a maximum of 20 per cent. This policy was later extended through November.[26]

The Technical Training Command was pleased. It had adopted the view that[27]

In order to turn out technicians as required by the Army Air Forces, it is essential that the Technical Training Command receive the required number of recruits with general intelligence and mechanical aptitude test scores of 100 or more in order that these technicians can be trained by the Technical Training Command and fed into Air Force units.
The combining of two kinds of ability made these men exceptionally desirable. But the War Department G-1, with the support of G-3, continued to oppose preferential assignment for the AAF—except as a temporary expedient. It was believed that the proportionate policy instituted in July was basically sound and would result in a better balanced team than any other procedure proposed. General McNair also continued to protest against the new policy as an "appalling diversion of the national intelligence from leadership into technical and mechanical jobs."  

The AAF became unhappy with the administration of the new policy—but for a different reason—it was not receiving the quality of men from reception centers prescribed by the War Department directive. Complaints were registered with the Adjutant General in October and November for non-compliance. Less than 60 per cent of AAF recruits being received had scores of 100 or above on both the AGCT and WA, despite the 75 per cent policy ordered by the War Department. As the charts in Appendix A indicates, it was difficult enough for the AAF to secure 75 per cent of its men with an AGCT or WA score of 100 or better without compounding the difficulties by seeking men with the attributes of high scores on both tests. The root of the trouble lay in the fact that the draft was primarily a lottery and not a selective process; consequently, the required percentage of men with desirable scores was not being produced by the draft.  

Despite the opposition of the Inspector General, the commanding generals of the AAF and SOS, and G-1 and G-3 of the War Department
General Staff, it was ruled on 28 November 1942, over the signature
of Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, that preferential
assignment for the AAF would continue on a reduced basis. For the
next seven months—December 1942 through June 1943—55 per cent of
recruits received by the AAF monthly were to be men scoring 100 or
better on both the AGCT and IA. "The Air Force contention must be
recognized," McNarney said, "certain arms and services require a
higher proportion of specialists than others in order to operate ef-
ficiently their equipment." 31

The AAF seemed satisfied with the new rule, but once again it
complained that the intake of Air Corps personnel with 100 on both
the AGCT and IA was consistently below the 55 per cent of intake
authorized by the War Department. The Adjutant General's reply to
such complaints was that statistical reports indicated the national
occurrence of men attaining a score of 100 or better on both tests
was approximately 37.5 per cent. This predicament, together with the
opposition from other branches of the Army, probably was responsible
for the decision to discontinue the 55 per cent policy a month before
it was due to expire. 32

The air arm, however, continued to receive preferential treatment
in a less obvious manner. In June 1943 the War Department directed
that any inductee at reception centers who expressed a desire for
flying training and met certain requirements should be assigned to
the AAF as an aviation cadet. Qualified men in the Ground and Service
Forces were also permitted to apply for flying training, even though
they may have completed specialized training in service schools. The high rate of elimination in flying training provided the AAF with an excellent source of high quality personnel for non-flying positions. At the same time, however, the number of aviation cadets that the AAF could recruit through the Air Corps Reserve was further limited by the new War Department policy of lowering the draft age to 18. Approximately 34,400 flying training students out of a total of 335,800 were eliminated during the last half of 1943. The AAF frequently used eliminaes to fill difficult school quotas. Prior to the consolidation on 7 July 1943, of the Technical Training Command and the Flying Training Command into the Training Command, eliminaes were transferred to basic training centers for disposition. After that date all flying schools were ordered to ship eliminaes directly to technical schools where they were given entrance prioritites.

Since the ground forces objected to preferential treatment in this form, the War Department at the end of the year directed the return to the originating arm or service of all aviation cadets and officer candidates from Army Ground and Service Forces who failed to graduate, except those who qualified for combat crew training. The AAF did not expect to lose many eliminaes because a very limited number failed to qualify for such training.

During the controversy on assignment policy, G-1 expressed the belief that enlisted men in the AAF were not performing duties in keeping with their qualifications and if given the opportunity they could qualify for technical schools. This contention was substantiated by a report of The Inspector General, dated 13 November 1942. In
AAF units totaling 14,121 enlisted men, there were 7,426 privates of whom 2,717 were in AGCT grades I and II. Of those privates, 1,561 were reported as performing such ordinary duties as messengers, guards, orderlies, clerks, firemen, truck drivers, and assistant cooks.\textsuperscript{37} To ascertain the extent of this condition, the Office of The Inspector General made spot checks in other units of various types. The report revealed that the condition was general rather than limited to certain specific units. A list of the 208 delinquent units was submitted to AAF Headquarters upon its request; immediately an effort was made to reassign the men involved to schools.\textsuperscript{38}

To prevent such occurrences thereafter, Col. J. H. Bevans, Director of Personnel, ordered all air force units in the United States to interview periodically each enlisted man in AGCT grades I or II who was performing ordinary duties as a private or private first class. As a result of the interview, such men were to be assigned to a duty commensurate with their level of intelligence, to on-the-job training, to a technical school, or to an officer candidate school in any branch of the service. When a man could not be used in one of these ways, he was to be reported to AAF Headquarters for transfer to an activity where his qualifications could be used.\textsuperscript{39}

A report from continental air forces and commands of the results of this directive revealed that out of 9,920 privates and privates first class in grades I and II, 5,410 were reassigned to jobs commensurate with their ability and/or training; 2,448 were awaiting assignment to technical training schools; 999 were approved for officer candidate schools, and 663 were available for transfer to other components.
of the AAF or to other arms and services. Nevertheless improper use continued to be made of high grade men. On 1 June 1943, Maj. Gen. Virgil L. Peterson, The Inspector General, reported to the Deputy Chief of Staff that a large number—19.8 per cent out of 5,759 records examined—of AAF enlisted men in AGCT grades I and II were performing ordinary duties. The AAF was outraged that its units were not making maximum use of high grade manpower, especially when Headquarters in Washington had been requesting preferential assignment of such men. Unit and station commanders were given a month to transfer enlisted men in AGCT grades I and II, currently performing ordinary duties, to positions commensurate with their abilities. Failure either to use them properly or to report them for transfer was to be considered a matter calling for disciplinary action.

Despite these stern measures, the misuse of enlisted men of high intelligence and having more than three months service continued. Such misuse was not a condition peculiar to the AAF, but existed in each of the three major commands in varying degrees. The Inspector General reported on 10 August 1943 that "of the total number of grade I and II enlisted men of the units visited, 41.1% of those in the Army Air Forces, 42.6% in the Army Ground Forces and 35.2% in the Army Service Forces, are still privates and privates first class." The problem was considered in Washington early the following month at a conference of 4-L's and classification officers of continental air forces and commands. It was noted that the kind of duty performed by men of above-average intelligence, rather than the rank held, was the critical point. Such men with the rank of private could be in
training on-the-job for a higher position. It was suggested that statistical control units using machine records cards should periodically report the talents and intelligence wasted. As the result of a recommendation of this conference, an AAF letter was published listing positions requiring little skill which were not to be filled by men scoring in AGCT grades I and II. The list included such jobs as barber, meat cutter, horse breaker, file clerk, laborer, messenger, orderly, etc. The issue, however, continued to plague the AAF. 

A War Department inspection of 21 bases and 8 commands between 10 and 31 August 1944 revealed that "a considerable number of Grades I and II AGCT personnel are being utilized in semi-skilled and unskilled duties not requiring full utilization of their learning ability."  

AAF Headquarters admitted one reason for this condition was that strict interpretation of directives pertaining to conservation of high-scoring men made it impossible to assign them to ordinary duties, even though, having been tried in more important assignments, they were unable or unwilling to learn. To correct this situation, classification boards were authorized to make exceptions to current directives. In addition, classification officers from the field complained of a shortage of lower grade personnel for maintenance and housekeeping duties. By this time, the fall of 1944, high ranking returnees from overseas further complicated the situation.  

Although the problem of maximum utilization of high-grade personnel never was completely solved during the war, the AAF made continuous efforts to eradicate malassignment through directives, required reports, and inspections. Brig. Gen. Hillard White told a conference of 4-l's.
We have found innumerable cases where men were not being proper utilized. If you waste intelligence after you get it, you will run short. The Army Air Forces, I think, have had the most difficult personnel problem of any part of the Army. From what I have seen of it, they have done a marvelous job. They have grown faster than anybody else. They have expanded in all directions, have had difficult problems to solve and have done a good job.
Chapter IV

MALASSIGNMENT AND THE CAMPAIGN FOR CORRECT CLASSIFICATION AND DUTY ASSIGNMENT

Part of the AAF program to utilize men in AGCT grades I and II to their highest degree of capability, was the campaign to reduce malassignments. Despite the very elaborate system of classification, it was impossible to employ the talents or occupations of every man entering the Air Forces. In the Army as a whole there were less than 1,000 kinds of jobs in which to fit about 8,000 civilian occupations, and there were few civilian counterparts to such military specialists as aerial gunners, armorers, parachute riggers, airplane mechanics, or bombardiers. Although many men may have considered themselves malassigned on the basis of past occupational experience, it must be borne in mind that the criterion had to be the right man in the right job for the Air Corps, not the right man in the right job for the individual. If a man's civilian educational and occupational background could not be used and he had to enter the ranks as an ordinary soldier, his hope for advancement was to capitalize on leadership qualities and learning ability, rather than special civilian skills. In any event, military needs had to be met at any cost and the Army tried to do the best possible job of training men to become experts, but in any case to train someone.

Early in the development of classification and assignment procedures, a static concept was established to the effect that a person was
considered malassigned if he was assigned to any duty other than
the specialty for which he was trained or recommended.²

This theory failed to take into consideration the fact that
the average American is able to adapt himself to many
different types of work, that the average soldier after
a period of training is able to function satisfactorily
in a number of different specialties, and that original
assignments to arms and services are based as much on
requirements existing at the time of the individual’s
processing through a Reception Center as on his particular
qualifications. The record of service units which served
successfully as combat troops when the situation required,
and the success with which technical service organizations
were built from unskilled personnel show the basic error
of this concept.

The most serious and costly type of malassignment in the AAF was
the misuse of airmen trained in military and civilian-contract schools.
In a rapidly expanding Air Force acutely short of specialists and
finding it difficult to secure men qualified for technical training
schools, it was almost criminal to waste such manpower, immediately
upon their graduation as technicians, by assignment to positions alien
to their newly acquired skill. Another type of malassignment occurred
when men properly classified in necessary specialties were not assigned
to an organization but sent to a technical school for training in an
entirely different specialty. This unnecessary re-training was a waste
of money, training facilities, and trained manpower; moreover, it was
a direct violation of classification principles. Worse still was the
fact that reports were received at AAF Headquarters that air forces
and commands were sending enlisted men to technical schools from which
they had already been graduated. Other malassignments occurred when
enlisted men were not performing duties equal to their ranks or 
AGCT scores; when they were not performing duties in conformity with 
their specialty, especially when it was earned through graduation from 
an AAF technical school; and when they had unusual abilities obtained 
through civilian education or training and were improperly utilized 
in their assignment.  

Specific complaints about malassignments had reached AAF Headquarters 
from enlisted men in the field, presidents of civilian factory schools, 
and from the Commanding General of the Technical Training Command. At 
the request of the AAF, the Research Branch of the Special Service 
Division, Services of Supply, conducted a study of job assignments, 
utilization of skills, and job satisfaction in AAF schools and tactical 
units. In December 1942, the Research Branch reported that "Although the 
demand for airplane mechanics, armorers, and radio men is still 
greater than the supply, the study reveals that one man in three in 
the Air Forces had civilian skills in a job family related to these 
jobs is not now doing such work." The examination of the utilization 
of AAF technical school graduates revealed that 17 per cent thought 
they were not using their school training, 7 per cent were uncertain, 
and 76 per cent stated they were using such training. On job-satisfaction, 
the report stated that men working outside their civilian occupational 
fields were not necessarily dissatisfied if the AAF did not use their 
civilian skills. But they griped if they were assigned to jobs not 
of their choice. If they were not given any chance to pick their job, 
then 50 per cent expressed dissatisfaction with duty assignments."
Colonel Davison, AC/AS, A-1, told General Arnold that the Research Branch report gave erroneous impressions of improper use by the AAF of the training and skills possessed by recruits. The Colonel doubted the accuracy of the figures in the report but did admit that enlisted men and officers were being assigned to the wrong jobs. At a conference of A-1's in Washington, 5-8 January 1943, he said that "there are very many enlisted men and officers who are not being assigned to the right kind of jobs; the job that they can best fill and one in which they can give their best efforts."  

In a war of specialists, malassignments were not intentional. The AAF was as loath to make company clerks out of experienced airplane mechanics as it was to use liaison planes for strategic bombing. The crying need for specialists was the best guarantee that malassignments would be the exception rather than the rule. But the exceptions could reach serious proportions. On the day ending the A-1 conference, the War Department General Staff took cognizance of the situation and wrote the following memorandum to the Commanding General of the AAF:

1. It appears that many technical school graduates are being employed in their squadrons on jobs appropriate for unskilled privates. The proper use of these trained technicians is a command responsibility of the squadron and the higher commanders. A check will be made to ascertain the degree of misassignment and a report made showing the extent of misassignments and corrective action taken.

2. The Inspector General is being instructed to utilize every opportunity in connection with routine inspections to ascertain whether or not trained technicians are being used in positions appropriate for their specialized training, and require an explanation by commanders concerned for misassignments discovered.
A few days later General McNarney told a meeting of the General Council that such occupational casualties were considerable throughout the Army and that the proper use of specialized skills was a command responsibility. Technically trained men who were absorbed by rat hole factories, pet projects, and empire builders had to be unearthed.

It is impossible to determine the exact number of malassignments, but it was sufficiently large to cause concern in Washington. A complicating factor was the absence of definite rules to determine exactly what constituted malassignments. In a number of instances men reported as malassigned were being used in positions foreign to their specialties because of circumstances beyond local control, as in these instances: 1) sufficient equipment was not available with which to utilize the number of specialists assigned; 2) men trained for flight duty were assigned to other positions because of inability to pass the physical examination; 3) men trained in B-25 factory schools were assigned to units equipped with B-26's manufactured by another company and thus wasted a great deal of expensive factory training; 4) types of airplanes assigned to organizations were changed after men trained in the originally assigned aircraft had reported; 5) AAF recruits with civilian experience related to airplanes were sent directly to units as airplane mechanics only to be found unqualified and requiring reclassification.

Although lack of planning and ineptitude may have caused such situations, classification breakdowns also were caused by the requirement that a war be fought at the same time as the air forces were
being built. AAF needs changed as the war progressed, and men had
to be reassigned to units regardless of specialties or desires in
order to provide the most efficient fighting team at the right time.
Air forces and commands, however, were partly responsible for existing
malassignments because of their failure to transfer a man to another
unit in the same command in which his specialty was needed, or be-
cause of their failure to report unusable specialists to AAF Head-
quarters for reassignment. Whenever that Headquarters was notified,
corrective action usually was taken.

To ferret out malassignments, The Inspector General's Office
was requested by the AAF to furnish names of stations and units where
unsatisfactory duty assignments existed. Headquarters also directed
all commanders to conduct an immediate personnel survey and promptly
correct all malassignments. Technical school trainees in excess of
tables of organization were to be reported to higher headquarters for
immediate reassignment. At some fields, commanders were threatened
by higher headquarters with disciplinary action if malassignments
continued to exist.9

Of basic importance for the prevention of malassignment, was the
proper coordination of classification and duty assignment at the
squadron level. Therefore, under the direction of MO/43, A-1, a
conference of representatives from various commands developed in
February 1943, a "Guide to Classification and Assignment at the Squadron
Level." This guide brought together all important procedures prescribed
by Army and AAF regulations to help the squadron commanders maintain
proper classification records and make the most effective use of
manpower.10

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The great concern over malassignments ran from the squadrons to the highest echelons in the AAF. General Arnold was personally interested in the matter. Upon hearing of malassignments at Greenville Army Air Base, he directed that its commanding officer personally correct malassignment of one aircraft mechanic who had been on guard duty for four months and one weldor who was on KP. In addition, HQ/AS Personnel, promised Arnold to visit that base and check compliance by the commanding officer. A few months later than Arnold found a radio mechanic driving a truck on a Fourth Air Force field, he was reported to have said: "On my next trip when I go around and if I find a soldier in the wrong place, I'm going to bust the Base Commander. Tell all the commanders they better get busy and if they have got a good airplane mechanic, or a good radio mechanic, or a bombardier, they had better see that he is in the right spot."  

The following month, May 1943, continental commands and air forces were directed by Headquarters AAF to report their progress in correcting malassignments through indoctrination and guidance of responsible personnel at squadron level, and through supervision, assistance, and audit from command headquarters to the squadron level. The reports indicated that malassignment ranged from 1 to 25 per cent in various squadrons and stations. In a number of instances, however, such malassignments were unavoidable. For example, squadrons in the AAF Antisubmarine Command operated under heavy bombardment tables of organization which did not fit antisubmarine squadrons; in other organizations, required specialists were in short supply despite the fact that requisitions had been submitted. For the Army as a whole,
The Adjutant General's Office at the end of 1943 "found requisitions on hand that were two, three, and even six months old that had not been filled because no men of the right categories were available.\textsuperscript{12}

Constant efforts by the AAF to correct and prevent misassignments were rewarded in a report to the Deputy Chief of Staff from the Inspector General, 1 June 1943\textsuperscript{13}

\ldots only a small per cent of enlisted men are misassigned. Graduates of technical schools, with minor exceptions, were assigned duties commensurate with their classifications. Out of 5,759 records examined, approximately 6\% were misassigned, based upon civilian occupations. The responsible Army Air Force officers are conscious of the misassignment problem, and definite progress is being made with respect to proper classification in accordance with instructions from higher headquarters.

Shortly thereafter, The Inspector General, following a comprehensive investigation of classification and assignment throughout the Army, concluded that "The problem of reassignment and misassignment of personnel is not handled as effectively in the Army Service Forces and Army Ground Forces as it is in the Army Air Forces because of lack of supervision and liaison from higher echelons and lack of effective uniform instruction."\textsuperscript{14} At the same time, August 1943, the War Department Special Service Division reported that 90 per cent of the Air Corps technical school graduates were using their training as compared to 70 per cent in other arms and services. This percentage was an improvement over the 76 per cent in the Air Corps during the previous fall.\textsuperscript{15}
The Chief of the Classification and Replacement Branch of the Adjutant General's Office, Col. George R. Evans, also was impressed with the results of the AAF campaign for correct classification and duty assignment. He planned to incorporate a number of AAF procedures and principles into similar campaigns for the Army Ground and Service Forces. Maj. Gen. W. D. Styer, Chief of Staff of the latter branch, showed interest in the "thorough-going and systematic" approach of the Air Forces and desired the Army Service Forces to benefit from their experience. 16

Malassignments never could be completely abolished in wartime, especially when a relatively small group of human beings was trying to judge and evaluate millions of other human beings; but the AAF was determined to hold it to a minimum. One of the major aspects of the 1943 campaign to accomplish correct classifications and minimize malassignments was the introduction in July of classification audit teams. Trained staffs under A-1's were to be maintained to accomplish periodic personnel audits—generally every three months—to determine the classification and assignment status of each officer and enlisted man. It was hoped that such inspections would improve the operation and efficiency of the classification system, discover and correct malassignments, review and correct classification records, indoctrinate and train field classification personnel, formulate a more accurate picture of shortages and overages of specialized skills with a view toward their proper distribution, and create classification consciousness on the part of commanders and personnel officers. 17
By the end of the year, practically all airmen in the continental United States had been subject to interview and audit; this process revealed malassignment in varying degrees in every command. For example, 668 men in the I Troop Carrier Command were found to be malassigned, and 2,228 in the Air Transport Command. The first audit of the Technical Training Command revealed that 2,820 men out of 82,414 examined were malassigned, and corrections by reassignment were made for 2,116. Of the permanent party personnel in the three technical training commands, 4.8 per cent were found to be malassigned in the Eastern Technical Training Command, 2.8 per cent in the Central Technical Training Command, and 1.6 per cent in the Western Technical Training Command.\textsuperscript{18} As by-products of the initial audit survey, qualifications of classification officers were investigated by A-1's; procedures were prepared for field personnel to indoctrinate them with the principles of proper classification and duty assignment, and to help them correct malassignments. Continuing audits brought about "the salvage of approximately 50,000 highly trained specialists in the United States."\textsuperscript{19}

In the autumn of 1943, the AAF began to realize that a number of malassignments were necessary as a result of the exigencies of war. Despite the best efforts to create tables of organization and manning tables for each type of mission, it was impossible to anticipate all the tasks that would arise. Because of the manpower shortage, it was necessary for specialists to perform tasks out of their fields. Although such activity may have appeared to be malassignment, AG/AS,
Personnel came to consider it as evidence of maximum use of man-hours. He felt that a flexible viewpoint was necessary with regard to duty assignment and that classification officers should be ready to accept the fluidity of war and realize that the maximum use of available man-hours is just as important as each man working at jobs to the highest level of his ability. Every effort must be made to attain both objectives, but, where they conflict, the balance must swing to the objective which it most important at the time. 20

Within a few months The Air Inspector was notified by the AAF that major policy emphasis is now based on the maximum efficient utilization of manpower and man-hours. This requires more accurate classification than ever before but a practical viewpoint with regard to duty assignment so that all personnel will be working full time. 21

For example, an airplane propeller mechanic who did not have sufficient propellers to repair could use his unfilled time working in a machine shop. A cook, unable to work in the kitchen because of poor health, could perform routine squadron tasks. Such temporary malassignments were henceforth permissible. A specialist could even be assigned out of his classification temporarily when there was a surplus in his specialty and no then current need for his highest skill, or if he could not perform his specialty because of some incapacitating factor. The primary criterion for inspectors was to be the efficient use of man-hours rather than just the pure question of malassignment. 22

Assistance in ferreting out malassignments and checking the operation of the AAF classification system came from an unexpected, and at first undesirable source. War Department personnel audit teams were organized...
under WD Circular 312, 30 November 1943, shortly after the establishment of AAF classification and assignment survey audit teams. The War Department teams, consisting of highly trained classification personnel, were assigned to each of four areas--northeastern, southern, central, and western--for the purpose of assisting the War Department in the establishment and control of Army-wide policies and practices relating to classification and assignment procedures. Their work was to be coordinated by TAG's Classification and Replacement Branch, whose major objectives were to maintain uniform standards, secure maximum utilization of manpower, recommend changes in then-current procedure, and to prepare reports concerning WDGS, the findings and the recommendations of the teams for the/G-1 and the commanding generals of the three major forces.23

The AAF informed The Adjutant General's Office that it already had audit teams, qualification committees, Air Inspector investigations, and spot checks by TIG to examine classification operations. Therefore, it was felt that the additional War Department activity would create great confusion unless handled in a manner which would not interfere with the AAF classification system. At a conference of representatives of the three major forces called by TAG, it was arranged that the War Department audit teams would call upon the headquarters of each command and air force to explain its mission, and that they would not assume the role of inspectors or make recommendations for individual reclassifications and reassignments.24
Within the next few months, however, the plans to avoid confusion proved of no avail. AAF organizations complained of the high-handed attitude of the War Department audit teams and their insistence on the use of procedures unauthorized by the AAF. The War Department audit teams, for example, were inclined to continue the old viewpoint that a man was malassigned if he was not used in his primary specialty, whereas the new AAF policy, emphasizing maximum utilization of manpower and man-hours, permitted temporary malassignment under certain circumstances. One particular conflict arose over a team's insistence that a base prepare a report of certain specialists physically qualified for overseas shipment when such statistics were available on standard AAF Form 127.25

In order to clarify the relationship between the War Department and AAF audit teams, the following policy agreements were reached with TAG: the AAF Manual 35-1, Military Personnel Classification and Duty Assignment, 3 April 1944, with amendments, was to be the governing directive for the AAF; members of War Department audit teams were to be indoctrinated in AAF classification rules and procedures; command or air force headquarters would decide whether requested statistical breakdowns were available in other sources; and audit team reports were to be forwarded to organizations by AAF Headquarters. To insure an understanding of AAF personnel policies and procedures, an air force classification and assignment officer was later attached to each War Department area audit team.26
Ultimately the routine inspections of the 3D personnel audit teams aided in the improvement of the AAF classification and assignment system. By 1945 these teams began to place more emphasis on the study of questions affecting major personnel policies beyond the limitations of routine audits which were being accomplished by AAF and also ASF audit teams. Despite a recommendation of The Adjutant General, the AAF did not adopt the personnel auditing procedure.\textsuperscript{27}

The activities of audit teams were only part of the aggressive prosecution of correct classification and duty assignment in the AAF. Another step was taken in August 1943 by the adoption of a simplified plan of four basic classification procedures capable of practical application overseas with minimum effort. One procedure had already been put into operation, namely, a system of personnel audits by experienced classification officers. Another process was to have the Soldier's Qualification Card, Form 20, physically accompany each enlisted man to the unit personnel section so that full information was immediately available for appropriate duty assignment. The third procedure was for every technical specialist to wear a distinctive sleeve patch, so that his specialty could be determined immediately by visual identification. The War Department General Staff in December 1942 had disapproved the use of patches because they did not further proper classification and assignment. In the following month, however, the War Department reconsidered and approved the issuance of sleeve patch insignia for five family groups of technical specialists—engineering, armament, communications, photography, and weather. It was hoped that the patches (see Appendix 5 for examples of symbols
used) would stimulate interest in earning and wearing them.\textsuperscript{28}

The final step in the simplified plan of basic classification procedures was the maintenance by every unit of an informational roster showing the authorized jobs in the unit compared with the important qualifications of personnel assigned. A properly maintained roster embraced in one document the essential facts necessary for correcting shortages and averages, correcting malassignments, leveling of skills and experience within the unit, selecting men with particular skills for emergency duties, recommending changes in tables of organization, and reporting personnel quickly and accurately.\textsuperscript{29}

The informational roster thus served as a basis for the completion of revised AAF Form 127A, report of Air Corps and Arms and Services with the AAF. This was the official personnel status and requisition report for the information and guidance of commanders at each echelon of command up to and including Headquarters AAF. It summarized actual specialists assigned to the reporting organization as compared to authorized specialties. These forms, together with informational rosters, tables of organization or exact manning tables, morning reports, rosters of change, machine record classification-index cards, and classification audit lists, were the records and reports constituting the Personnel Data System which had been established in July 1943.

Although much of the framework for the system was in existence before then, it did not furnish all the necessary essential information, nor did it provide the necessary coordination between the parts to permit uniform results, effective control, and personnel planning.
The Personnel Data System was designed to remedy those conditions and also to control malassignments, select rare specialists when needed, and equalize distribution of skills, experience, and intelligence.

A Personnel Control Committee in the Military Personnel Division of 4C/AS, Personnel was established at the end of the following year and met monthly, after receipt of Form 127's and other reports, to analyze critical shortages or surpluses of trained specialists, determine the efficiency of personnel practices in subordinate echelons, and recommend remedial action and amendments to existing policies and procedures as necessary. 30

The number of AAF regulations and directives governing classification and assignment procedures often was most beneficial in the field. Their republication, however, by commands and air forces with their own series numbers and interpretations created confusion as to the intent of an original directive. Confusion was compounded when subordinate units published regulations amounting to interpretations of interpretations.

Classification procedures were systematized and standaridized in AAF Manual 35-1, Military Personnel Classification and Duty Assignment, 3 April 1944. The manual was a consolidation into a single source of all instructions on that subject; it also gave the latest job descriptions authorized by the War Department for use in the AAF. All prior AAF directives concerning personnel classification and assignment were rescinded, except those dealing with aircrew. 31

The new manual made it unnecessary for commands and air forces to publish much in the nature of supplemental instructions. Only those
absolutely necessary for proper functioning of classification in the commands and air forces were permitted to be issued. Duplication, unnecessary interpretation, restatements, and paraphrasing of information in the Manual were prohibited. Amendments and implementation of War Department directives pertaining to this subject were to be made by the insertion of new pages. Within a month after publication, personnel and classification officers were indoctrinated by members from the office of the AG/AS. Personnel in the policies and procedures contained therein. 32

A War Department memorandum made the manual official within all air forces and commands on the continent and overseas, in lieu of the War Department publications concerning classification and duty assignment. G-3 of the WDGE desired rescission of the memorandum because it meant that War Department tables of organization and equipment would refer to subordinate publications instead of the basic War Department regulations. This technicality was overcome by an agreement whereby the AAF would refer to the WD TM 12-427, Military Occupational Classification of Enlisted Personnel, by reference to AAF Manual 35-1. 33

Another objection was raised against the manual in a report by the WD Personnel Audit Team, Southern Area. It took exception to paragraph 101 which read: "No other directive, either manual, dictionary, memorandum or letter will be considered authority for any phase of personnel classification policy or procedure which is inconsistent with the provisions of this manual." The Audit Team, supported by
G-1, believed that such a provision would prevent action on most directives, including those from the War Department demanding immediate action, unless some clarification came from Headquarters AAF. The Deputy Chief of Air Staff replied that the advantages of having AAF Manual 35-1 as the governing directive on classification and duty assignment included the saving of manpower and time in checking and cross-checking directives, avoidance of erroneous entries on records, taking of unauthorized action, and settlement of disputes with inspectors as to what constituted current regulations.

G-1 was unconvinced and suggested that the offending paragraph be changed to read as follows:

No other directive, either manual, dictionary, memorandum, or letter, except those published by the War Department, will be considered authority for any phase of personnel classification, policy, or procedure, which is inconsistent with provisions of this manual.

This change was made by AAF Letter 35-170, 14 December 1944, but the amendment of 1 February 1945 as embodied in AAF Manual 35-1 read differently: "The implementation of War Department directives pertaining to this subject will be accomplished by incorporation of pertinent new or revised policies and procedures in this manual immediately upon the publication of such directives by the War Department."

The manual represented the culmination of AAF efforts to establish an independent classification system. The AAF and The Adjutant General's office for a long period of time disagreed on whether the execution of classification and assignment policies and procedures was the responsibility of A-1 or AG sections. Part of the confusion resulted from War Department directives which had placed the responsibility...
for the operation of the classification system with The Adjutant
General, but under the direction of the responsible commanders. The
AAF, therefore, placed that function under the A-1 sections where it
was believed that maximum efficiency and more rigid controls could
be acquired. 

The Adjutant General was designated on 9 March 1942, at the time
of the establishment of the three major commands, as the War Department
operating agency for classification and assignment of personnel. His
status had not been clearly defined, and his activities were limited by
the provision that he was to confer on all matters relating to classi-
fication, assignment, and testing procedures directly with the commanding
generals of the AAF, AEF, corps areas, replacement and training centers,
and other organizations for the purpose of using judicious short cuts to
expedite operations. Matters were further complicated by the reorganization
act of 9 March 1942 which had placed The Adjutant General under the
jurisdiction of the Services of Supply. He thus played a dual role—
Adjutant General of the Services of Supply and The Adjutant General of
the War Department. Field commanders often did not notice which hat he
was wearing at a particular time. A-1 admitted that field units generally
considered him to be an agency of the Commanding General of the Services
of Supply rather than of the War Department. 

Maj. Gen. J. A. Ulio, The Adjutant General, told the AAF that all
personnel practices and research had to be centralized in the War
Department in order to avoid duplication of effort, to secure maximum
utilization of the few competent research specialists available, and to acquire a degree of uniformity throughout the military service. He suggested that the AAF control and operate classification and assignment procedures developed or approved by the War Department's operating agency, The Adjutant General.  

The AAF, however, continued to consider personnel policies and operations a command function, and all phases of classification and assignment remained under the responsibility of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-1. In Army Ground and Service Forces, classification was a function of The Adjutant General. In personnel matters the AAF was practically autonomous and its procedures and techniques did not always conform to the Army pattern. Dr. Marion W. Richardson, former Chief of the Personnel Research Section, stated that The Adjutant General's Office, busily engaged in all types of personnel problems, generally permitted the AAF to conduct its own personnel research and operations as long as War Department policies were not violated. TACO, however, was able to benefit from such air force activities.  

Final clarification of The Adjutant General's status came with the publication of War Department Circular 512, 30 November 1943. This reiterated emphatically his position as operating agency of the War Department and provided The Adjutant General with closer control of classification and assignment. However, responsibility and execution of policies and procedures, being a command function, was left to the commanding generals of the major branches of the Army. The AAF, with the concurrence of The Adjutant General, and later the War Department, maintained this responsibility in the A-1 and S-1 sections.
The Inspector General, after a comprehensive inspection of classification and assignment in the three major commands in 1943, had approved AAF integration of personnel operations and reported: "Since Army Air Forces have definitely accepted classification as a command responsibility, have placed control and supervision under 4-1, and have provided qualified classification and assignment personnel in major echelons, classification work has become a dynamic force with gratifying results."  

Failure of the AGF to make T/O provisions for trained classification personnel in lower echelons, The Inspector General said, made it difficult to utilize the classification system to the maximum extent. He estimated that 500,000 enlisted men in the AGF were without direct classification supervision. In general, he found units in the Army Service Forces also suffered from lack of instruction and guidance in classification, but within a short time it considered installing the same type of classification and duty assignment procedures as used in the AAF. Air Corps units had adopted the use of enlisted classification specialists in lower echelons, authorized as far down as the squadron, as part of its 1943 special drive to correct malassignments. As a result of the decentralization of classification records to lower echelons, these specialists were able to record changes immediately. To meet the demand for such men, The Adjutant General established a school to train 200 enlisted classification specialists monthly for the AAF. The results of having these men in the lower echelons were so satisfactory, and The Inspector General's report about their use so complimentary, that it was considered essential.
to provide for them in tables of organization so as to permit their
distribution where needed. On 12 October 1943 this was accomplished,
and later AAF Manual 35-1 required at least one classification specialist
to be assigned to each AAF squadron or comparable unit.\textsuperscript{41}

Subsequent withdrawals of classification personnel for overseas
duty, concurrent with increased work loads placed on classification
organizations as a result of the processing of overseas replacements
and returnees, threatened the efficiency of operations. Consequently,
the AAF in 1944 established a training program for classification and
assignment officers, which program soon included enlisted personnel.
The program consisted of indoctrinating and training qualified airmen
in classification schools at Maxwell Field, Alabama, and subsequent
on-the-job training under experienced classification officers. Additional
officers were sent to attend the classification and administration
course at The Adjutant General's School. In addition, standardization,
clarification, and interpretation of classification policies and pro-
cedures were accomplished in the AAF through periodic conferences of
A-1's and classification officers of continental air forces and commands.
These meetings enabled personnel performing the actual operations in
the field to thrash out their problems with the policy makers from
Headquarters AAF. The importance of classification was demonstrated
by the increase in the authorized rank of classification officers.
For example, in several Air Force headquarters the authorized rank
was increased from 1st Lieutenant to Lieutenant Colonel.\textsuperscript{42}
The results of the aggressive prosecution of correct classification and duty assignment led to a decided improvement in AAF personnel procedures and The Inspector General's office in 1943 appraised the classification and assignment program as follows:

Units within the Army Air Forces are now ahead of most units within the other two major commands in matters pertaining to classification and assignment. Dynamic leadership and an effective liaison program within the past few months have produced notable results. Coupled with this recognition of classification importance, most of these units now have a trained classification officer and at least one enlisted specialist in each of their major bases and other comparable installations. These men have been instrumental in bringing the classification records up to a standard which is superior to that existing, for the most part, in the other commands. Reduction in malassignment during the past few months has been accomplished by rigid adherence to AAF directives which set forth correct classification and assignment procedures with emphasis upon the indoctrination of personnel at the squadron level as well as control from command headquarters.
Chapter V

SOME OTHER ASSIGNMENT PROBLEMS

Correct classification was not a goal in itself. Its objective was to facilitate each individual's assignment to a job which would use his skill and experience to the highest degree for the AAF's benefit. Proper assignment results from proper classification; together they aim at the most efficient use of manpower.

Prior to August 1941 the Classification and Assignment Section of the Enlisted Branch of the Adjutant General's Office had been charged with the responsibility for assigning to units personnel from all replacement training centers and schools. After that date the Army Air Corps assumed control of the assignment of all troops under its command except for the initial assignment from reception centers to Air Corps training centers and units.1

Although procedures and responsibilities for scheduling of personnel requirements, procurement, training, and assignment changed as a result of experience and the dynamics of war, the chart in Appendix 6 portrays the general operation of the complex program. The preparation of AAF unit programs by types and months, and converting them into personnel requirements by classifications and months, was the responsibility of AG/AS, Operations, Commitments, and Requirements. These requirements were transmitted to AG/AS, Personnel, who used them in connection with reports on personnel available for assignment in scheduling projected

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allocations and making the actual assignments by classifications and by months to commands and air forces. Teletype messages to Technical Training Command headquarters were the usual forms of notification for the number of men in each specialty to be assigned from technical schools and basic training centers to each particular command.

The flow of trainees through the Technical Training Command varied with the training program. By the fall of 1944 three types of soldiers came to the basic training centers—selectees from reception centers, combat returnees, and aircrew and technical school eliminants. After training and classification these men were usually assigned directly to units or to preflight, flexible gunnery, or technical schools. Graduates of schools were assigned to AAF units all over the world.

A number of technical school graduates were sent to flexible gunnery schools to make them such double-threat combat crowsmen as airplane mechanic-gunner or armorer-gunner.²

The AAF had no control over the assignment of men from reception centers. It was successful, however, in securing War Department directives to assure the assignment from reception centers to AAF basic training centers or directly to units of such specialists as those employed before induction in a mechanical capacity in the manufacture of aircraft, airplane engines, or other aircraft equipment; employees or graduates of aeronautical schools; those who had one or more months of experience in air-line operations; and those who had any experience or training as weather observers and weather forecasters. Although the AAF received high priorities early in the war, proselyting, soliciting, and advertising in the ground forces for personnel for the Air Corps was prohibited, exception being made, however, for the procurement of
aviation cadets. The AAF reciprocated somewhat by ordering basic training centers to report for transfer all men possessing special qualifications not especially necessary in the AAF but whose services could be used to better advantage in the Ground or Service Forces.³

When it appeared that new selective service regulations would permit the induction in summer of 1942 of civilians currently employed by military agencies, the War Department took steps to secure maximum use of their experience by assigning them to the arm or service which had employed them. Each individual, however, had to furnish a letter from his former employer describing his civilian employment, length of service, and a statement that his assignment to that branch was essential. After processing at reception centers they were to be assigned to that branch.⁴

Before the end of 1942, the War Department took action to prevent misuse of technical and professional skills that had been developed in civilian life over many years. It directed that⁵

Enlisted men possessing skills in which a critical shortage exists, who may have been erroneously assigned to basic training centers of the Army Air Forces or replacement training centers of arms or services which do not require their particular skills, will be reported to The Adjutant General as available for reassignment.

Despite these efforts malassignments of such men continued to exist, and it was not until the early part of 1944 that the War Department set up a centralized control over the assignment of critically needed specialists. A current list of such men was published periodically for the guidance of reception centers and the major commands, and those well qualified in the occupations listed were to be assigned by reception
centers to replacement or basic training centers critically needing such specialists. Such men discovered in units of the major commands after their departure from reception centers were to be reported for reassignment. The commanding generals of the major forces were instructed to notify the Adjutant General of specialists critically needed, and each request to place a specialty on the list was to be justified by supporting data. In conjunction with this list, each of the major forces maintained a list of key military specialists in short supply but not meeting the definition of critically needed skills within the meaning of the War Department directives. The latter lists were used to avoid shortages within a major branch by compelling proper utilization of manpower, whereas the objective of the War Department list was to compel transfer between major forces in order to relieve a critical need wherever existing.6

The maintenance of lists of shortages, however, did not automatically fill the vacancies with specialists. When shortages could not be corrected by transfers from other branches or between continental air forces or commands, on-the-job retraining was authorized by Headquarters AAF. Commands securing approval for retraining were responsible for insuring that such retraining was absolutely necessary, that another critical vacancy was not created, and that the new assignment was appropriate to a man's experience. Retraining by continental commands and air forces to adjust shortages and surpluses, however, was permitted only for specialists on AAF lists of critical shortages and critical surpluses.7
The assignment of older men also presented a problem and there was much discussion in Army circles as to the effect of a man's age on his military usefulness; men, from about 35 years of age and above were generally more definitely set in their grooves and not as pliable as younger men. At the direction of Brig. Gen. R. W. Harper, AG/AS, Training, more care in interviewing and screening was given to older men than the younger ones, and greater consideration was given to the physical condition of the former. AAF policy prescribed that older men, even those qualified physically for general service, be assigned to occupations related to their civilian experience and to permanent installations where they could replace younger men for combat duty. The crying need for replacements overseas, however, resulted in a War Department requirement that physically qualified enlisted men under 38 years of age could not remain at a fixed installation in the Zone of Interior over a year unless they had served overseas.

AAF philosophy on older men, however, was not always confirmed by field experience. Aside from natural physical defects of advancing age, older men sometimes were able to adapt themselves more easily than younger men because of their experience, knowledge, maturity, and sense of discrimination. Attempts were made by some AAF stations to use for the older men interviewers of approximately the same age, whose personalities and outlook on life were similar. In the same way, 18 and 19 year old selectees were to be interviewed by men in the lower age groups or by interviewers specially qualified to handle effectively men at that age level. Difficulty in classification and assignment of young men was encountered because of their lack of previous occupations.
or experience. To permit more accurate classification, the Adjutant
General in February 1943 authorized four new SEI's applicable to types
of high school students. Information with regard to interests and
hobbies as well as schooling was especially valuable in the placement
of the younger soldiers. Their test scores were more important factors
in classification and assignment than in the older age groups.9

During the early war years the Army considered civilian occupational
skills as the major determinant of classification and assignment—except
for the AAF which until mid-1943 had prevailed upon the War Department
to make intellectual capacity the prime consideration in assignment
to the AAF.9 Physical ability during the war's early phases was the
least considered factor; not until 1944 did physical classification
achieve the refinement or receive as much time and research as were
given to occupational skill and mental ability. Men in the United
States Army were classified either as fit for limited physical service
or general physical service for any job in the Army. The British
and German Armies, on the other hand, recognized several grades of
physical capacity and assigned men to jobs demanding certain physical
qualifications.10

From mid-1942 a small percentage of men were classified as fit
for limited service. The War Department desired that the AAF take its
share and make maximum use of such personnel in the continental United
States. An agreement was reached whereby the AAF would receive 5 per
cent of its monthly quota in limited service men. As the demand for
ground combat troops increased, elements of the Ground Forces were not
assigned physically limited personnel and large numbers of such men were

* See above, p. 42 ff.
released therefrom. Consequently, the Air and Service Forces had to absorb larger percentages. These men were given the same processing and training except in cases where physical disabilities would work hardships during certain physical exercises. They were also given equal opportunities to attend technical school. As far as practicable, these men were to release an equal number of general service men for combat units. 1

The vast majority of men in the Army were put in general service, and the main basis for classifying and assigning them to jobs was occupational skill. Strategic considerations in 1942 and 1943 gave the AAF preferential treatment in the assignment of men with experience in the airplane industry and in the higher "intelligence" and mechanical aptitude brackets. The mission of the Army Ground Forces was hampered by a declining rate of intake of quality troops caused by preferential treatment for the AAF, temporary withdrawal from the AGF of high quality men for the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), and AGF losses to the aviation cadet program and officer candidate schools in the Army Service and Air Forces.

Civilian occupations in themselves were not adequate bases for assignment to the infantry. Combat soldiers and leaders were not found in civilian life and their jobs had to be learned in the military establishment. The efforts of the AGF to secure revocation of the 75 per cent rule in order to raise its share of AGCT grade I and II personnel was unsuccessful. It was the great demand for replacements overseas in the latter part of 1943 and in 1944 that caused the War
Department to reverse assignment priorities between the AAF and AEF.

As a result of experience, the AEF, with War Department approval, came to believe by the latter part of 1943 that physical rather than occupational classification should be the major emphasis for determining assignments of enlisted men. After an experimental period of about two months, a new policy based upon physical fitness went into effect in May 1944. This reversal of emphasis demonstrated that the AEF and the War Department were deficient in planning in the area of classification and assignment. It is a wonder that emphasis on physical stamina and greater use of limited service personnel were neglected throughout most of the war in view of the lesson published during World War I by The Adjutant General's own Committee on Classification of Personnel in the Army:12

... Proficiency in a specialty is an asset to the Army only when the specialty fills an Army requirement. But the man is wanted always. His strong, healthy body and alert brain are assets, and with each succeeding day of the war those assets increase in value. Even those whose trade skill has military value, if they possess magnificent physique, are now being used for combat purposes, and their specialists jobs are filled by men whose physical classification is inferior.13

Shortly after World War I ended another publication of TACO advised that "Intelligence is perhaps the most important single factor in soldier efficiency, apart from physical fitness."14

The new policy of 1944 established a rough system of physical classification by which the parts and functions of the human body were divided into six groups, each containing four gradations of fitness. On the basis of the induction center physical examination, the reception centers judged each recruit by a physical profile arrived at...
by correlating the various fitness grades—A being the highest grade.

Assignments to the three major forces were based primarily on the pro-
files, which were distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profile A</th>
<th>Profile B</th>
<th>Profile C</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGF 20%</td>
<td>AGF 10%</td>
<td>AGF 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAF 10%</td>
<td>AAF 50%</td>
<td>AAF 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASF 40%</td>
<td>ASF 40%</td>
<td>ASF 20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages were based on the estimated needs of the AGF for trainees
and replacements. Although percentages were changed from time to time,
the AGF was always given preference. Within profile groups, considera-
tion was to be given to occupational specialty whenever possible, and mental
ability was to be distributed in as equal proportions as possible.

Critically needed specialists, however, were classified and assigned
without regard to profile.¹⁴

At first the physical profile plan served only as a guide for
reception centers in allocating men to the three major forces—AAF, AGF,
and ASF; later all continental air forces and commands were directed
to give physical profile designation to all enlisted men classified
in specialties common to all arms and services in order to effectuate
possible transfers between major commands. The program was then ex-
panded to include all AAF enlisted personnel who did not have physical
profile numbers, regardless of specialties or duty assignments.¹⁵

The profile system did not completely meet the needs of the AGF
for physically qualified replacements. The AAF and ASF received more
than the proportion of profile A men allowed. One reason for this
was that men younger than eighteen and a half—predominantly in profile
A—could not be shipped overseas as replacements until other sources
of replacements had been exhausted. These men, however, were needed
to meet the demand for infantry replacements; therefore, effective 1 November 1944, they were made eligible by War Department directive for overseas shipment. Practically all men older than eighteen and a half were assigned to the infantry or the Armored Force. Another situation in which the AGF failed to secure desirable personnel occurred when two men differing in physical capacity were both in profile A, but the stronger was sent to the AAF or ASF if he had a civilian specialty desired by either of those commands. In addition, profiling at reception centers was not very accurate because of the short supply of medical officers. Too much reliance was placed on medical records from induction stations, with only a cursory examination at reception centers. Thus the AGF was not receiving as many men having the highest physical qualifications as anticipated.

Besides the physical profile system, extensive transfers of manpower within the Army was another major concession to the AGF's 1944 need for many good combat replacements. On New Year's Day of 1944, Headquarters AAF directed the Training Command to return personnel from the AGF and ASF if they failed as aviation cadets and then were eliminated from gunnery training school. This order was designed to eliminate a loophole in previous instructions which had permitted the AAF to keep such eliminees.

During the following month, the Army Specialized Training Program became the first large element to be sacrificed for AGF needs. The program was virtually dissolved. Of the approximately 110,000 enlisted men withdrawn, only 478 were allocated to the AAF; the rest were divided
between the AGF and ASF. However, an agreement was reached whereby about 1,400 former AAF technical school graduates would be returned to the AAF and like number of nontechnical personnel sent to the AGF or ASF providing they had equal AGCT scores.\textsuperscript{18}

A short time later, the War Department ordered the return of 29,459 men procured originally by the AAF from the Ground and Service Forces as aviation cadets, but who had not yet entered pre-flight schools. Of this number the AGF received 24,000 and the ASF 5,499.

Most of the men returned were fit for general service and were in AGCT grades I and II. Such action was taken for reasons other than to alleviate the critical manpower shortages in the Ground and Service Forces: AAF losses in the air were actually less than the percentage anticipated, and air supremacy had been secured in every theater, as General Marshall stated, faster than the Army dared hope. To soften the disappointment of those affected, the AAF distributed to each man a copy of the message from General Arnold expressing his regret for such action and explaining the necessity for it. Thereafter, applications for aircrew and ground crew training were not accepted.\textsuperscript{19}

Personal requirements for AGF kept rising; further action was required. General DeWitt, Deputy Chief of Staff, told a meeting of the War Department General Council that there should be no shortage of enlisted men to fill units. With 4,199,000 men in the United States out of an Army of 7,700,000—according to the estimates of 30 April 1944—he believed any shortages of personnel were caused by maldistribution and faulty control. In addition, he rightly called attention
to the fact that agencies always seek troop increases when functions
are enlarged or activities are increased but never voluntarily seek
troop reductions when functions or activities are diminished.20

Further to assist the Army Ground Forces, the War Department in
April 1944 authorized a program encouraging men from other arms and
services to volunteer for the infantry. Within half a year, about
4,548 men from the AAF and 7,051 from the ASF had volunteered for that
branch. This number, in addition to those who transferred to the in-
fantry from other ground force units, was insufficient. The War De-
partment thereupon proceeded to establish a system of involuntary
transfers to the AGF from fixed installations in the Zone of Interior.
The decision to take this action was prompted in part by the failure
of the AAF to rotate its personnel to overseas stations.21

On 14 January 1944, the War Department had directed that men
qualified for overseas duty be reassigned as rapidly as possible to
units destined for overseas shipment. Their replacements were to be
civilians, overseas returnees, WAC’s, and over-age or physically dis-
qualified enlisted men. A report dated 29 February revealed that
598,034 enlisted men in Zone of Interior positions were available
for overseas assignment. The AAF was accountable for 397,954 (66.54
per cent) of them, the ASF had 153,036 (26.42 per cent), the AGF 41,705
(6.97 per cent), and Headquarters Company of the War Department 389
(.07 per cent).22

The Ground and Service Forces were able to comply with the January
directive. As the chart in Appendix 7 illustrates, a total of 404,166
enlisted men were available for overseas assignment by 30 September 1944 and the AGF and ASF had 5,775 (1.43 per cent) and 13,893 (3.44 per cent) eligible men respectively. The AAF, on the other hand, made little progress and it still had 384,596 (95.13 per cent) men eligible for shipment; that number constituted about a third of the total AAF enlisted personnel in the Zone of Interior. Even if there were sufficient replacements for them, reassignment and retraining would have presented a tremendous task. The chart in Appendix 7, however, indicates that AAF progress could have been more rapid; and General McCharny expressed that belief to the General Council. He also told them that over-all improvement was impossible unless made by the AAF. Consequently, the War Department on 12 September 1944 ordered the Ground Forces to transfer to the Air Forces each month, from October through December, 5,000 men not qualified for overseas duty in exchange for a like number of general service enlisted men. Men transferred between forces each month were to be exchanged, as far as possible, on equal basis of AGCT scores, grades and ratings, in proportions of 75 per cent in physical profile A and 25 per cent profile B, and in military specialties common to both commands.23

The continuing critical shortage of qualified infantrymen caused the War Department to take even more drastic action for the transfer of personnel to the AGF for retraining as infantry. A directive of 30 October 1944 ordered the AAF to transfer an additional 25,000 men during the next two months, and the ASF also was to transfer a like number. In addition, an attempt was made at this time to raise the quality of the men shipped by the AAF to the AGF by prescribing 90 per cent in
profile 4 and 10 per cent in profile 3, and a representative cross
section of AGCT scores, excluding grade V. In return for these men,
the AGF was to supply men physically unqualified for overseas duty
and/or in a limited service category as defined in LR 1-9.24

Additional requisitions were made upon the AGF; by V-E Day it had
supplied about 60,000 men for retraining as infantry combat soldiers,
and the AGF had supplied about 22,000. The AGF complained of receiving
personnel below profile 3 and in AGCT grade V despite the specific
War Department directive prohibiting the transfer of such men. Never-
theless, involuntary transferees materially improved the quantity and
quality of manpower available to the AGF during 1944 and 1945. The
AGF received both mentally and physically superior men at the same
time it released men physically unqualified. However, these wholesale
transfers did not result in a proportionate increase in combat efficiency.
The transfusion of new types of personnel into the ground forces did
not begin until early in 1944; and by that time men of lower quality
mentally and physically had been fused into combat divisions already
overseas, or being prepared for shipment. The training of new men
received during the infantry crisis had to be hasty and consequently
fell below training standards.25

As a result of AGF experience, a new philosophy for initial class-
ification and assignment had emerged. Physical capacity, primarily
judged by the physical profile of an individual, finally became the
principal factor in Army classification and assignment. Other factors
in order of importance were: leadership qualities judged by manner of
performance of military duties, intelligence, experience, education, hobbies, athletic participation, disciplinary record, and observation of capacity to accept responsibility; intelligence rated primarily by AGCT scores; and skills both military and civilian, with hobbies also given consideration.  

The shifting emphasis throughout the war among the above factors and the drastic upheavals of personnel by mass assignments and transfers, at times without sufficient consideration of the individual's background and preferences, caused a number of morale problems. Although many of these changes in policy were caused by the shifting military situation, it was difficult to convince an enlisted man that he was not misused or malassigned if, for example, his skill as a master carpenter or as an economist was disregarded because he could become a crew chief or the leader of a machine-gun squad. Since the supply of manpower geared to a peacetime economy could not balance the needs of an organization geared to wartime needs, it was the responsibility of the War Department to determine which jobs and which qualities in a man were the most important for the war effort. More emphasis was placed by those in charge of the War Department classification system on analyzing a man and recording all the information about him on a Form 20 than in analyzing each military job to describe the duties and the qualifications necessary for proper job performance. The matching of the right man with the right job is the essence of classification and assignment. Job analysis had to be continuous because of the changing technology of war. The almost total disregard of job family groupings, continuous job analysis,
job reporting and requisitioning, and "... other aspects of the principle of analyzing job needs was [sic] responsible for many of the difficulties which the Army experienced in personnel utilization during World War II."27

The complexity of the job-analysis problem existing during the operation of a war must not be underestimated. The extent of the causes of classification difficulties resulting from lack of statistical data and job analysis, /reasonable foresight at highest War Department levels, or the contingencies and dynamics of war is a complicated problem for military historians. However, enlisted men in the field were unaware of and unconcerned with the causes for classification difficulties. Their primary interest was in securing satisfactory in job assignments and their morale varied/direct ratio to their own judgment as to the correctness of their assignments. Soldiers in all branches of the service—and also their friends and relatives—could cite chapter and verse for "haywire" assignments. Many of these complaints were justified but some were short-sighted. Some people could not understand that job satisfaction of an individual was, from the Army's standpoint, a secondary, though desirable, by-product of the assignment process. Soldiers satisfied with their jobs are better soldiers; but a man who does not like being an infantryman or aerial gunner is better than no infantryman or no aerial gunner.

Whether the soldier's attitude was prejudiced or not, the armed forces had to consider his morale in developing personnel policies. To gather the facts about the attitudes of soldiers, the Research Branch
of the War Department's Information and Education Division was established. One of their studies revealed that the major complaint of men who said they did not have a square deal in the Army had to do with assignment to branch or to job. Fully one-sixth of all comments made about the question of a square deal in the Army—submitted to continental and overseas troops—tackled issue with the Army's classification and assignment system.28

Complaints on this subject among the three major commands appeared to be least prevalent in the AAF. A survey in the United States, midway in the war, disclosed that the AAF was the most respected branch and the one most men would like to be in. It was also the one having the highest job satisfaction, with the ASF and ACF rated next in order. Although a poll conducted in the United States during 1943 showed that 50 and 36 per cent of Air Corps noncoms and privates respectively felt that everything had been done by the Army to place them in jobs where they were best fitted, still 85 and 75 per cent of Air Corps noncoms and privates polled respectively preferred their own branch to others. The Air Corps, as contrasted to the ACF (especially the infantry), had the most advantages. In the eyes of GI's throughout the Army, the Air Corps was the least arduous, least dangerous, and most glamorous of all branches; and of great envy to the GI in the foxhole was the availability of warm food and beds for airmen. During the first half of the war airmen were highly selected for education and intelligence, and were offered the best chances for promotion and for learning a trade which might be useful after the war. The branch which men wanted most to avoid was the infantry. Toward the end of the war, however,
that branch received its share of respect for valor which had been accorded the Air Corps throughout the war. 29

Indicative of the changing attitude toward the infantry was the increase in the number of promotions available for infantrymen, the establishment of the Expert Infantryman and Combat Infantryman badges with additional pay, and the establishment of the Bronze Star Medal for heroic service not involving participation in aerial flight. Combat infantry units were given priority in assignment of men with previous military experience, physical capabilities, and demonstrated leadership.

The initial statement of classification and assignment policy for World War II was published as early as 3 September 1940, and provided for priority assignments to combat units of personnel possessing military training and qualities of leadership. No guide, however, was given for the selection of men with leadership abilities. Although Army personnel researchers made some attempts to isolate leadership factors and measure them, even at the end of the war they had not developed a satisfactory instrument for the testing of either leadership or personality characteristics. The Army Ground Forces recognized that intelligence did not necessarily make leaders, but by its insistence upon getting its fair share of high mentality recruits, the AGF showed that it considered intelligence essential in a leader. 30

No completely satisfactory system for selecting leaders can be developed as long as different types of men will respond to different types of leaders. Another difficulty is that a man's personality changes according to circumstances. A man may be brave and make quick
decisions when things are quiet, but he may go to pieces when
distracted by machine-gun fire; whereas a clear head under conditions of
extreme stress has long been considered as an essential factor in
combat leadership. Nevertheless, leaders had to be chosen somehow and
demonstrated leadership became the most reliable method of selection.
Germany, more than any other country in the world, had shown considerable
interest in evaluating leadership and other personality traits of officers,
noncoms, and specialists. German military psychologists were interested
in the total personality and used the characterological approach so
that development of character in military life was of greater significance
than intelligence in selecting officers and specialists. The emphasis
on leadership and character is understandable when one remembers Germany's
prewar personnel strategy of creating an army ready for rapid expansion.31

For the measurement of leadership ability, America placed its
emphasis on intelligence as determined by the AGCT score. It was a
general rule that a man scoring 110 on that test would likely succeed
in officer candidate school. Some attempts were made to select leaders
by observation and interview, but tests for determining the competency
of persons qualified to judge potential leaders and tests of the qualities
of leadership had not been developed. Consideration was given in this
country to personality tests. Induction stations, special training
units, hospitals, rehabilitation centers, reassignment depots, officer
candidate school boards, and other types of organizations requested
various kinds of personality tests from the War Department. In response
to the need indicated by these requests, attempts were made to validate
and utilize tests of personality measurement, but the results were
generally unsatisfactory.32
On the problems of personality, leadership, and other aspects of classification, an interesting comparison can be made between the American and German systems. In an age of specialization, the United States sought and developed independent abilities; whereas in Germany isolated measures of single abilities were considered useless without the knowledge of the whole personality, and intelligence tests were merged with personality tests. German methods were marked by their subjective nature, although attempts were made to obtain a semblance of objectivity by requiring the agreement of several examiners in the interpretation of a behavior symptom before considering it indicative of a personality trait.33

Under the German system, a personal estimate by a superior officer as to character and capabilities, as well as a record of training, experience, service, and demonstrated skill were recorded on the Beurteilung, the German personnel evaluation record. There were a variety of such forms, all with the same basic purpose and content. The Beurteilung was of extreme importance to all service men because it was a cumulative record—each one added to a man's folder gradually built up a mountain of opinion and evidence about him to be used in questions of promotion, court martial, and assignment. A Beurteilung was to be completed upon a man's discharge, transfer, placement upon detached service for more than eight weeks (four weeks for technical Luftwaffe personnel), and upon special request. It also was to be brought up to date every two years, or upon transfer of the commanding officer of a unit to which an individual belonged. In formulating the Beurteilung, the following points were to be considered: character and personality, spiritual
qualities, physical qualities, military bearing, standing among comrades, reputation among superiors and subordinates, attitude toward world problems, technical knowledge, special abilities and skill. Inasmuch as the Luftwaffe was a complex technical branch, it also was of great value to mention special tactical and organizational abilities, technical knowledge, special technical experience or interests, instructional and coaching ability, special knowledge in the field of navigation, map-reading, use of arms, administrative abilities, knowledge of foreign languages, etc. The importance of the Beurteilung was expressed as follows:

The quality of the Luftwaffe is determined by the quality of its leaders. The striking power of the organization is in a high degree dependent upon their proper selection. The most important means of selecting the right personalities are the Beurteilungen prepared by their superior officers. This places a heavy responsibility upon the officers preparing the Beurteilung.

According to the study of the German Air Force (GAF) personnel plan made in conformity with the American air staff post-hostilities intelligence requirements, the GAF classification system was not as thorough or as well developed as that of the AAF despite a number of similarities. The Germans did not allocate specialty numbers to officers, but main civilian and military occupational specialty numbers with job descriptions were assigned for non-flying or ground enlisted men because they were handled by a separate office. Italizations were easily adjusted by the stroke of the pen of a unit commander, who could change a soldier's specialty at any time to make it correspond to his duty assignment. The GAF Special Trades Manual, more than any other German publication, corresponded to AAF Manual 35-1, but it emphasized job
descriptions and types of organizations that could use GAF specialties. It did not include detailed procedures and controls for classification of enlisted men as found in the AAF Manual.  

German psychological testing principles were clinical, subjective, and non-quantitative; whereas American methods were standardized, objective, and quantitative. The Germans felt that clinical observation of a soldier taking a test was more important than the score. Psychologists were permitted freedom to emphasize their own favorite testing procedures, and final recommendations were based upon the clinical judgment of the examiners rather than upon a standardized procedure for weighing test scores. Extensive psychological testing methods for the selection and classification of specialists, especially of officers, pilots, and navigators, existed from the time of the creation of the Luftwaffe to February 1942, at which time the entire program was reduced because of the lack of time for testing. Moreover,

The examination procedures developed for the peace-time army were not suitable for war conditions. There were not sufficient trained psychologists to continue the elaborate testing procedures. With the use of untrained examiners and with heavy testing loads the testing procedures, which were always subjective and unstandardized, became increasingly unreliable.

In Germany, the use of aviation psychology was limited; it was discontinued before the end of the war for these reasons: Prussian officers, who still wielded considerable power in the Luftwaffe, desired to continue the caste system of officer selection instead of selection and classification based upon individual aptitudes and intelligence; Nazi leaders considered party membership more important in commissioning men than psychological selection; the military organization of the
psychological program was poor, and was carried out by a semi-
military group which had no direct contact with practical problems
of training and personnel utilization; and there was lack of co-
ordination between the psychological testing program and the medical
research program. 37

The GAF, as well as the AAF, required large numbers of specialists
to conduct operations. Requisitions for such men were sent through
Luftgau (air district) channels; if sufficient specialists were not
available, persons with potential aptitude were sent to trade schools
according to recommendations by company commanders. At the end of
the training period, the student had to pass an examination and was
then appointed a noncom or airman in his particular trade. Upon
graduation, a certificate of qualification was issued; and the specialty
was then recorded in the paybook, service record, and unit personnel
roster. A special manual of trades of technical personnel, with reference
numbers, prescribed in which of four areas a specialists may be employed--
workshop units, field workshop units, schools and units, or armament
and GAF technical departments. For example, a flight mechanic could
be employed in school and units area, whereas an aircraft engine fitter
could be employed in any one of the four areas. 38

In general, the German testing program, which gave little attention
to its own reliability, could be characterized as subjective, static,
and unstandardized. The greatest German advantage was in the com-
prehensiveness and thoroughness in which a tremendous variety of individual
aptitudes and abilities were observed. 39 During most of the war, American
soldiers were given a specialty and were considered reassigned if they
performed out of that specialty. It took a long time to remember that Americans had the tradition of being jacks of all trades and could perform satisfactorily in more than one position.

The German supreme command did not vacillate as often as the United States War Department in the assignment of personnel to the ground and air forces. Whereas priorities in numbers and quality of men shifted between those branches in the United States, the Germans at the outset of the war allotted to the Army and Air Force a peak peacetime strength of about 12,000,000 and 2,000,000 respectively. These figures were not revised, and early in 1943 full strength was reached. Losses were replaced with the object of maintaining that strength. Each branch of the armed services, including the Navy, submitted periodic personnel requisitions to the Supreme Command; the Command then set up induction quotas for each of the 19 military districts in Germany and occupied countries. Within the limits of these quotas, an armed forces board in each of the military districts assigned men to the Army, Navy, or Air Force. These boards, on which each of those services was represented, assigned men on the basis of individual desires and civilian experience. Interrogation by the AAF of high officers in the Luftwaffe, after the war, disclosed a basic disagreement as to whether the GAF had a priority on specially qualified or physically superior manpower. The interrogators believed that the Luftwaffe did have top priority on such personnel during the early stages of the war. As a result of ground losses in the winter of 1943, the ground forces of both Germany and the United States began to acquire priorities in
quantity and quality personnel. The Luftwaffe was forced to transfer personnel to the Army, but it tried to maintain nominal control over these men, with the hope of getting them back, by keeping them together in Luftwaffe field divisions. This and other plans of Luftwaffe control proved impractical.\textsuperscript{40}
Chapter VI

SPECIAL GROUP PROBLEMS

Conservation and maximum utilization of manpower were of constant concern to military personnel policy planners. One of the lessons learned from World War I was that lost time, lost effort, confusion and discouragement were caused by the failures to sort out manpower before induction or before assignment. One division during that War left one-seventh of its men behind as ineffectives on its departure overseas. To prevent such an occurrence Mobilization Regulations 1-9, 15 January 1934, prescribed the establishment of special training battalions to train and take care of illiterates, non-English speaking, conscientious objectors, venereal, and others with temporary defects at time of induction. Any man who could not be made useful by special training within three months was to be discharged. The same policy for ineffectives was embodied in the Mobilization Regulations 1-7, 1 October 1940. A change issued the following month required inductees to be able to show an understanding of simple orders given in the English language; no standardized procedure, however, was prescribed for induction stations. To check the ability of illiterates, non-English speaking, and grade V men to learn Army duties, the Non-Language Test was made available at reception centers during the same month. It was a group test minimizing the use of language by having the directions given in pantomime and by using figures and diagrams in the test problems. A high score indicated that the recruit's general mental ability was high and that the low score on the AGCT was due to a language handicap or lack of education.
As the Army began to expand, it also learned of the large numbers of illiterate men who were hindering training as a result of their inability to read orders, instructions, and sign posts. They were being inducted because of the inadequacy of the then current language and intelligence requirements of selective service legislation. Consequently, on 18 April 1941 the War Department directed that

No registrant in continental United States will be inducted into the military service who does not have the capacity of reading and writing the English language as commonly prescribed for the fourth grade in grammar school. All registrants who have not completed the fourth grade in grammar school will be examined at induction stations prior to induction by means of tests to be prescribed by the War Department.

The Minimum Literacy Test was developed to determine fourth grade literacy. This simple written test was used until 1 August 1942, at which time a limited change of War Department policy became effective because of as a result of wartime manpower needs, and the pressure of public opinion against keeping illiterates at home. The new policy authorized the induction of any man who was able to understand simple orders given in English and who possessed intelligence to absorb military training rapidly. However, the number inducted who were unable to read and write English at a fourth-grade standard could not exceed 10 per cent of the registrants processed each day at any recruiting or induction station. To select the more "intelligent" illiterates a non-language examination--entitled the Visual Classification Test--was given at induction centers to all illiterates and non-English speaking registrants. Pantomime was substituted for oral or written instructions; the purpose of the substitution was to improve the screening process for selecting
men who could learn the duties of a soldier if given a small amount of special training. The previous criterion of inability to read and write English at a fourth-grade level no longer would operate to reject men whose inability to read could have meant lack of training or educational opportunity and not lack of mental ability. The term fourth-grade caused considerable misunderstanding throughout the mobilization period because of the difference in fourth-grade education in the North and South.

The new policy increased the induction of illiterates to the point of taxing the capacity of specialist replacement training centers of the Services of Supply—such as Quartermaster, Signal, Engineer, Chemical Warfare, and other services. To alleviate the increased literacy training load, the War Department took two actions. In December 1942 it directed the discharge of all illiterates who were also classified limited service for physical reasons. In February 1943 the 10 per cent limitations for the induction of illiterates and non-English speaking on any given day was reduced to 5 per cent. The great need for manpower, however, soon overshadowed the literacy training problems and within four months, on 1 June 1943, all limitations on the numbers of illiterates who could be inducted were revoked. The only stipulation remaining was that all inductees had to possess mental capacity above the lower three-fifths of AGCT grade V as determined by new screening procedures and qualification tests designed to admit intelligent and physically fit men even though they did not know how to read. To accommodate the expected increase, special training units were established at reception centers to handle illiterates, non-English speaking, and grade V personnel upon acceptance into the service. Training of low-caliber men was thus concentrated; replacement
training centers and field units henceforth were relieved from expending efforts on trainees who could not absorb regular training.\textsuperscript{2}

Prior to the concentration of special training units at reception centers, the Adjutant General on 23 July 1941 had provided for the establishment of such units at reception and basic training centers. Later such units were authorized in armies, corps, service commands, divisions, and field units to care for illiterates who, by-passing organizations replacement training centers, were assigned directly to.\textsuperscript{4} The purpose of these special units was to provide instructions and facilities for training men who were not immediately suited to assimilate successfully the regular basic training program. Army Regulations 615-28, 28 May 1942, spelled out the purpose and the bases for selecting personnel for these units. Special training units were responsible for teaching illiterates, non-English speaking people, slow learners, mentally unstable people, and those who could not perform regular duties because of physical limitations. All men falling in grade V as a result of the AGCT were considered potential candidates for special training units. The course of instruction was generally limited to such fundamental subjects as reading, writing, and arithmetic. Under no circumstance was such training to exceed 12 weeks and if an individual could not reach the minimum level of proficiency during that period he was subject to discharge.

The AAF Technical Training Command was convinced that low mentality groups, regardless of the amount or kind of special training given, could not be of any value except in labor battalions. Inasmuch as men in such groups were unable to carry out orders as individuals, AAFTC

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Headquarters believed they should be worked in gangs. Despite potential ability and considerable degree of inherent intelligence, illiterates were deemed worthless because it would be an inefficient use of supervisory personnel and training facilities to teach them reading and writing in comparatively small groups. The War Department, however, disapproved the establishment of separate special development battalions for illiterates, because such battalions would require additional overhead. The AAF had to assume the responsibility for sub-marginal personnel. Consequently, Headquarters AAF recommended the establishment of special classes for illiterates at basic training centers. Headquarters further suggested that upon completion of special training, illiterates could be assigned to manual labor in arms and services organizations with the AAF. 5

The Second Air Force, nevertheless, received 2,000 grade V personnel and complained that they were not suitable for assimilation. The receipt of such inferior men was considered partly responsible for the difficulties and delays that hampered the accomplishment of the Second Air Force heavy bombardment program. Many reports and inquiries concerning the disposition of increasing numbers of illiterates, non-English speaking, and low mentality personnel reached AAF Headquarters. A study of the situation indicated that between 3 and 5 per cent of enlisted men in AAF units were in grade V as compared to the 8.5 per cent of white men inducted into the Army as a whole from March 1941 to December 1942. 6
Headquarters AAF finally concluded that the number of personnel in need of special training warranted special schooling and instruction. Although a number of AAF organizations had established special training units, as authorized in Army Regulation 615-28, 23 May 1942, it was not until the following May that all basic training centers were directed to establish special training units for the rehabilitation or discharge of low caliber personnel. It was expected that all such units could handle a total student capacity of approximately 8,000. All continental air forces and commands were screened to determine the number of illiterates, non-English speaking persons, mentally unstable individuals, and enlisted men below the minimum educational levels. Quotas were then distributed for the transfer of such men on or about 1 June 1943, to special training units. Effective that date illiteracy was no longer a bar to induction, and reception center special training units were established to handle grade V and non-English speaking personnel entering the Army. However, these units were not intended to train all low grade men already at basic training centers or in units. The result of this revision meant that all future personnel received at basic training centers were supposed to be immediately qualified to undergo basic training. The function of the special training units already existing in the AAF was to be confined to training low caliber personnel already assigned to the AAF.

The Technical Training Command then decided to centralize the program at the basic training centers located at Keesler Field, Mississippi, and Sheppard Field, Texas, and at the technical school at Lincoln Air Field, Nebraska. All academic rehabilitation programs at other training
centers were to be discontinued. The types of enlisted men to be sent to special training units were illiterates, non-English speaking individuals, slow-learners, and mentally unstable personnel. Three months was the maximum period of time allotted to any trainee in these units before final disposition had to be made of his case by reclassification disposition boards. Instructional materials were supplied by the Special Training Division of The Adjutant General's Office. Headquarters of the Technical Training Command established the objectives for these units to be:

a. To reclalm for military purposes enlisted men of the Army Air Forces now unusable.
b. To give opportunity to the soldier who was underprivileged as a civilian.
c. To make better future citizens of these enlisted men.

The first shipments of personnel to air force special training units, were used as means to get rid of undesirable cases, despite a forewarning against such a practice. For example, undesirable men who had made AGCT scores which qualified them for officer candidate schools were transferred to special training units. The Training Command was instructed to return to organizations of origin those men not found in need of special training, and a report was to be sent to AAF Headquarters of the numbers returned and the reasons for their being returned. The Air Inspector recommended disciplinary action against officers who grossly violated instructions pertaining to transfers to special training units.

As of 8 July 1943, there were 16,000 illiterate, non-English speaking, inept, and slow-learning personnel in the AAF. Approximately
7,000 were assigned to special training units for up-grading or discharge and it was expected to take six more months to dispose of the remaining 11,000. General Arnold was of the opinion that it was a waste of manpower for low caliber men to hold air force positions when they were capable of performing effective service in agriculture or industry. On 12 August 1943, he recommended to the Chief of Staff that the AAF be permitted to discharge the lower three-fifths of AGCT grade V personnel and to give the upper two-fifths special training. This was in line with the current induction policy of accepting only the latter group. The request was rejected on the basis that existing discharge procedures were adequate for the elimination of those demonstrating inaptness for military service. The AAF thereupon used these procedures with the result that out of 14,736 men sent to special training units by January 1944, 3,384 had been discharged, 9,140 had completed training and returned to air forces and commands, and the remaining 2,212 men in training were to be discharged or returned to organizations prior to 1 March 1944. By that date, the special training units were to be discontinued because the personnel for whom they were established would, by that time, have been discharged or sent to air forces and command. But this did not mean that illiteracy had been wiped out in the AAF; there still existed all degrees of illiteracy. The conclusion of a survey on 2 September 1944 by Headquarters of the Western Technical Training Command revealed that 500 illiterates were still assigned or attached to the Command. It was also noted that 48 graduates of special training units who had been pronounced literate, had retrogressed to illiteracy. This Command found low caliber personnel useful when
placed in jobs compatible with their mentality and state of learning.

The Commanding General of Lincoln Army Air Field, Brig. Gen. E. W. Duncan, drew the following observations from his supervision of one of the three special training units in the Training Command:

1. It was highly undesirable to associate serious-minded school trainees with men having unfavorable disciplinary records.

2. Any enlisted man under observation or being considered for discharge should not be sent to a special training unit.

3. The morale and attitude of the trainees were adversely affected through association with those undergoing regular training. Consequently, it would be desirable to operate the school as a separate function.

4. Daily and accurate notations should be kept on each trainee's progress; as soon as the evidence was conclusive, proper disposition should be made of the case at once.

5. The training accomplished in the Special Training Unit has proven useful and profitable to the men involved. Several thousand trainees have been returned to duty with improved education and the ability to hold more responsible positions in the Army. The men who were discharged from the service are those whose contributions to the war effort were not equal to the cost of maintaining them in the service. The additional education and training they received will make them better citizens upon return to civilian life.

A detailed study of the illiteracy program of the entire United States Army confirmed General Duncan's conclusion that the program was worth while:

... there is no gainsaying the fact that the special training program was a highly successful one. In the Army, many illiterate, non-English-speaking, and Grade V men learned
to read and do number work at a fourth-grade level, and acquired other specified academic and military skills, in a phenomenally short time. . . .

Although a number of those who graduated from special training were unable to maintain successful performance and were subsequently discharged, the great majority were able to complete regular training and serve in some useful capacity. Without doubt, many more of the illiterate, non-English-speaking, and Grade V men would have proved incapable of assimilating regular training had it not been for the highly successful special training program. The loss of these men to the service, considering urgent manpower needs, would have been serious.

The success of the Army program could be explained by the existence of five special circumstances usually absent from civilian educational efforts: 14

1. Men had an incentive to read and write in order to communicate with friends and families, and to remain in the Army.

2. Men were able to devote full time to their special training activities.

3. The Army was not hampered in its training program by monetary considerations.

4. The Army had a huge manpower reservoir from which to procure suitable instructors and was financially able to hire competent civilian instructors.

5. The literacy program was a new type of venture; therefore, traditions did not hamper the use of new materials, methods, and techniques.

The plans for establishing special training units at basic training centers of the AAF in 1943 included the possible need for accommodating large numbers of colored personnel. The special and regular training of these troops was not only complicated by the race factor, but whether because of lack of good education and/or environment, a large number
were classified in grade V as very slow learners. From March 1941 to December 1942 as high as 49.2 per cent of the Negroes inducted during that period were placed in grade V as a result of their scores on the AGCT.\textsuperscript{15}

Throughout the war, the War Department endeavored to absorb Negroes into the Army at the rate of 10.6 per cent\textsuperscript{16} of its total strength in an effort to make the proportion of colored troops to white troops the same as the proportion of Negroes to whites in the total population of the United States. The AAF, as well as the War Department, was faced with the problem of formulating plans and policies for the maximum utilization of Negro manpower. The racial aspect of the Negro problem was the complicating factor, and often it became a limiting and snarling cause of assignment difficulties. Military planners, however, were unable to ignore that aspect because the sociological effect of any plan would have a direct bearing on its effective execution. Thus, AAF policy was to give segregated but equal opportunities for training and duty assignment. Despite considerable opposition during the war from groups opposing segregation, the War Department adhered to the policy it had announced in 1940. As explained by General Arnold:\textsuperscript{17}

It is the policy of the War Department not to intermingle colored and white enlisted personnel in the same regimental organization. The condition which has made this policy necessary is not the responsibility of the Department, but to ignore it would produce situations destructive of morale, and, therefore, definitely detrimental to the preparations for national defense in this emergency. This existing policy had been proven satisfactory over a long period of years. It provides for a full percentage of colored personnel and a wide variety of military units. Our colored regiments have splendid morale, and their high percentage of re-enlistments is evidence of the wisdom of the present system.
As a result of the heightened racial tensions brought about when northern negroes were assigned in the south and asserted rights in conflict with existing local customs, the War Department tried to assign negroes in areas from which procured, if permitted by the military situation. However, the location of the majority of air bases in the southern part of the United States, in order to profit by as much good flying weather as possible, made it difficult for the AAF to execute that plan.\textsuperscript{18}

At first colored trainees of the AAF were shipped from reception centers direct to units for on-the-job training. After the air forces were directed, in the latter part of 1942, to train not only men assigned to the Air Corps but also troops in the arms and services with the AAF, the number of colored recruits increased to a point where new facilities for their basic and technical training became necessary. In December 1942 there were 71,695 colored enlisted personnel in the AAF, and by the end of the following year their number had doubled.\textsuperscript{19}

Facilities at Tuskegee, Alabama, were inadequate to handle increasing personnel and Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, was suggested as the location for an all-negro station capable of giving basic, technical, and officer-candidate training. Jefferson Barracks was chosen because it is near a large city centrally located in the United States, and social and recreational facilities for large numbers of colored men were available. This project, however, was disapproved by Headquarters AAF, and Judge William H. Hastie, colored civilian aide to the Secretary of War, who had criticized this segregation project, was so informed on 17 December 1942. Shortly thereafter, it was announced that a negro officer candidate
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School would be opened at Jefferson Barracks on 15 January 1943. This news, contrary to the information Judge Hastie had received earlier, was the final blow in his battle with the Air Forces on the race question. He immediately resigned, but not without letting it be publicly known that he took that step because it was the only way he could inform the public of the unsatisfactory treatment of negro soldiers by the AAF.20

The project for a colored officer candidate school turned out to be the result of action taken by the Director of Individual Training without coordination with the office of Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-1. This plan "was in distinct contravention of the policy of the War Department and the commanding General, Army Air Forces."21 Immediately upon receiving news of the proposal to establish a negro OSS at Jefferson Barracks—and the reaction to that proposal—Maj. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer, Chief of the Air Staff, phoned the Directorate of Individual Training and sharply made it known that he did not "want any colored school any place to be conducted as a segregated school. With reference to colored Officer Candidates at Miami Beach, I want them treated just like white Officer Candidates. They will go to the same classes, to the same drill, and eat in mess halls the same as whites."22 This policy was enforced; segregation at the Miami Beach school extended only to housing.23

Judge Hastie's letter of resignation was also severely critical of the AAF's policy in the utilization and assignment of colored personnel. In October 1942, the Chief of Air Staff had24 felt that the quota of colored personnel can be most efficiently employed by apportioning it in units as Aviation Squadrons (Separate), Air Base Security Battalions, Hospital Detachments, Quartermaster Companies, Truck (Aviation), and construction and transportation units. As these units are activated with colored personnel, white personnel are released to perform airplane maintenance and combat crew duties.
It was the execution of this policy that aroused the wrath of Judge Hastie and led him to say:\(^{25}\)

... The Negro problem began with the organization of several so-called Aviation Squadrons (Separate). Of these units, now greatly increased in number, it is sufficient to say that they were organized to serve no specific military need; that they have never had a defined function; and that, except as some commanders on their own initiative have found some military function for particular small groups of soldiers, their characteristic assignment has been the performance of such odd jobs of common labor as may arise from time to time at air fields. Such labor as may be the part time fatigue duty of other soldiers is the principal business of these units. There are no equivalent white organizations. I believe I am justified in expressing the opinion that Aviation Squadrons (Separate) would never have existed except for the necessity of making some provision for Negro enlisted men in the Air Forces.

Judge Hastie's angry blast at the AAF was hardly justifiable, at least with respect to the establishment of Aviation Squadrons (Separate). The War Department and each of its major branches had seriously investigated and considered the problem of negro utilization. The decision to assign them as basics or general duty soldiers was not based upon racial but on military considerations. The low educational level and lack of technical and administrative experience of the vast majority of negroes made it difficult to assign them to responsible or technical positions, or to send them to schools other than special training units.

From June 1941 to February 1942, 77.8 per cent of the colored inductees were in Army General Classification Test grades IV and V as compared to 29.1 per cent for whites. Another survey of scores for the second half of 1943 revealed that 79.4 per cent of the colored inductees and 24.7 per cent of the whites were in grades IV and V.\(^{26}\)
The educational and other shortcomings of the negro were also found among other underprivileged groups. It was not the function of the military to change the pattern of society, but to make the most effective use of the material made available to it. Whether or not the Army General Classification Test was defective in failing to remove purely cultural and socio-economic factors— if such a thing could be done— it was one of the important determining instruments in assignment to responsible positions and in selection to technical schools, officer candidate schools, and the Army Specialized Training Program. Those factors were taken into consideration in reaching the decision to establish aviation squadrons (separate). The duties assigned to them were things that had to be done, such as: labor tasks required for the maintenance and operation of an airdrome; truck driving; interior guard duty; assistance around the hangar line; airdrome maintenance; defense against airborne and ground attack; and other housekeeping and labor duties. Low caliber negroes were not the only men assigned to such general duties; low caliber white men also were assigned to such tasks as were appropriate for personnel grades IV and V. On 1 July 1943 the following units were stationed within the United States: 218 negro and 32 white aviation squadrons; 13 negro and 12 white engineer general service regiments; 3 negro and 1 white engineer separate battalions; 87 1/2 negro and no white medical sanitary companies; 40 negro and 2 white quartermaster service battalions; 18 negro and 10 white quartermaster truck regiments; 4 negro and no white quartermaster fumigation and bath battalions; 33 negro and 13 white troop transport companies. 27
Of course, a number of colored individuals and units were of high
caliber and performed meritoriously, but it was the majority and not
the exceptions that confronted Headquarters A&F with a negro problem.
In classification and assignment, the problem of low caliber personnel
was not one of negro inefficiency per se but of military deficiency
caused in large part by lack of education and technical skills, which
in turn stemmed from the sociological and economic complexities in
the nation. As of the summer of 1943 the comparative educational picture
was as follows: 28

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Negro</th>
<th>White</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduates</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School-Hon Graduates</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade School-Graduates</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures, unfavorable to negroes though they are, actually give an
exaggerated idea of the educational level because they do not reflect the
fact that standards in negro schools are generally lower than in white
schools; consequently, graduation from negro schools is easier than
graduation from white schools.

Mr. Truman K. Gibson, Jr., successor to Judge Hastie as the Secretary
of War's advisor on negro affairs, minimized the idea that utilization
of negroes was complicated by low intelligence ratings on the basis that
those responsible for the AGCT claimed it not to be an intelligence
test. 29 It was true that the Army referred to it as an intelligence
test, whereas its designers viewed it as a test to measure "learnability"
and "trainability" for military duties. Whatever the AGCT purported to
measure, an individual's fund of knowledge and his ability to use it
were necessary for success on the test. Therefore, it was not surprising...
to find that men with a poor environmental and educational background were found in grades IV and V which comprised the slow learners and very slow learners respectively. Even on non-verbal tests, successful performance would depend on a minimum of relative social-cultural-economic experience. Objective tests were given to determine intellectual qualifications for assignment; the Army was not charged with determining the innate intelligence of the negro race or the comparative intelligence of colored and white citizens. It was not responsible for improving the sociological level of its inductees; its only concern was to utilize those inductees as effectively as possible in the task of winning the war. The time was not an opportune one for attempting to compensate negroes for their handicaps and their deficiencies, nor was the Army the proper agency to undertake such reforms. The raising of the educational level of negro inductees by means of special training units, the development of improved teaching techniques, and the extension of training periods had but one object: to make those negroes more useful soldiers. If any other purpose was served, if any other benefits accrued, such gains—from the Army's point of view—were purely coincidental.

The attitude of Headquarters AAF toward the negro problem was probably expressed best by Col. John R. McCormick, Deputy Assistant Chief of Air Staff, A-1, in his frank comments on Judge Hastie's letter of resignation.

"... There is no doubt," he wrote, 30 that the Air Forces have been honestly and seriously doubtful of the Negroes' ability to further the National Air effort. However, Negroes who meet the standards for Air Force duties as established for white men cannot justly be denied the privilege of performing those duties solely because of his race.
But comparatively small numbers were able to qualify.

G-3 of the War Department General Staff estimated that units could only absorb about 15 per cent grade V personnel without reduction in efficiency. The AAF assigned quotas to technical schools for colored airmen on the basis of their assigned strength in each command. To secure maximum use of colored troops, a conference of personnel officers held at AAF Headquarters made it a special point to recommend that the correct classification and duty assignment campaign be as vigorously applied to negroes as to whites. AAF commands which had not conducted survey audits of negro troops were directed to do so immediately. Headquarters AAF Tactical Center audited 1,850 colored enlisted men and found 75 misclassified and 61 malassigned. The reasons offered for such conditions were the oversupply of truck drivers and the inability to absorb colored specialists in the categories in which they qualified. The Second Air Force interviewed 6,519 negroes and found 532 malassignments out of which 513 were reassigned within the Air Force. In the Proving Ground Command, 339 were found malassigned from a total of 2,497 interviewed, and they were reassigned or reported for transfer.\textsuperscript{31}

Jefferson Barracks and Greensboro and Gulfport Fields gave basic training to large numbers of negro inductees. During the training period, classification procedures were complicated and delayed by racial tensions. For example, at Jefferson Barracks the classification officer was orally directed to enforce a strict segregation in classification buildings by not permitting negroes in the building while whites were being processed. This eventually became a contributing factor for the establishment of a negro classification unit in the north area of

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Jefferson Barracks. It was staffed entirely by high caliber negro men except for the officer in charge, and it undoubtedly helped to put at ease colored recruits undergoing classification. In addition to classification of negro troops, that unit concerned itself with the cadet program, organization of special training units, the practical testing program, and the Army Specialized Training Program. During the eight month period beginning with July 1943, the north area classification unit classified 10,701 colored men among whom 2,997 were recommended for technical schools.32

After negro troops had been assigned by training centers, their use in the AAF presented a two-fold problem: first, the average low mentality of negroes taken as units made it difficult to assign them to highly technical organizations in the AAF; secondly, theater commanders were reluctant to accept negro units in lieu of white ones. The situation was further complicated by War Department decisions not to use certain types of negro units overseas, and by political pressure to use colored troops in different types of aviation. Racial issues plagued the AAF throughout the war.33

Nevertheless, members of minority racial groups were found in the Army during World War II in numbers proportionately greater than at any other time in American history; the ensuing problems were of constant concern to the War Department. John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, stated:34

Experience gained during the current war have shown that though over a period of years the General Staff, Army War College, and other military agencies have studied the problem of the inclusion and utilization of Negro soldiers in our Army, in the main
the Army was unprepared to deal with the large number of Negroes who entered the service under the provisions of the Selective Service Act. Therefore, policies with respect to the training and use of Negro military personnel developed in response to specific problems. Many sources of racial irritation persisted over considerable periods of time because of this inadequate preparation prior to the period of sudden expansion.

As a result of McCloy's recommendations for the establishment of a definite workable policy for the inclusion and effective utilization of minority racial groups in the postwar military organization, the War Department shortly after V-E Day directed each of the three major forces to conduct a comprehensive study of negro personnel. Their reports and recommendations embodied all phases of negro activities in the United States and overseas. The AAF study indicated:

1. Negroes had to meet the same standards and qualifications as whites for attendance at technical schools. They were given the same training time and their proficiency compared favorably with that of whites.

2. The bulk of colored personnel were assigned to semi-skilled and unskilled jobs because of low intelligence, limited education, and low mechanical aptitude.

3. Sixty-five per cent of the white enlisted men in the AAF had technical or administrative specialty numbers as compared to 15 per cent for negro enlisted men (figures from Office of Statistical Control).

4. Utilization of negroes was affected by educational handicaps, lack of specialized skills and quick technical perception, and a lesser degree of adaptability.
5. Low AGCT scores limited the number who could qualify for attendance at AAF technical schools and determined the type of training they could assimilate. However, selected students graduated as qualified specialists.

6. The AAF conformed generally to AGCT scores in assignment of negroes to types of jobs.

7. The few negroes performing highly skilled jobs were very efficient; those in duty assignments to their liking performed efficiently; the others who were assigned as general duty soldiers and had little interest in their jobs did no more than the minimum work required.

8. Military occupational specialties in which negroes overseas performed most satisfactorily were munition workers, duty soldiers, cooks, carpenters, and entertainers; performance was satisfactory when they were assigned as auto equipment operators, bakers, auto mechanics, painters, construction workers, duty non-commissioned officers, toxic gas handlers, welders, cable splicers, military policeman, basic telephone operators, guard patrolmen, fire fighters, linemen, construction machine operators; performance was unsatisfactory when they served as clerks (typists, non-typists, supply, and intelligence), classification and administration specialists, surveyors, heavy equipment operators, draftsmen, electricians, aerial gunners, ordnance supply technicians, highway construction machine supervisors, supply clerks, demolition specialists, and construction foremen.

a. The Far East Air Forces perhaps best summarized this phase of the study by its report that "Negroes have been both satisfactory and unsatisfactory in practically every type of MOS. The determining factor
is not whether the man is negro or white, but whether he has a high enough AGCT score, and has been adequately selected and trained."

The recommendations with respect to those findings for negro participation in the postwar military establishment were: negroes in the Army should be assigned proportionately to the size of each major force, but the number of negroes in the air forces was not to exceed 10 per cent; qualified specialists should be obtained by careful screening and selection; negroes should be utilized and assigned to jobs and units consistent with their qualifications and abilities. In general, recommended policies in regard to the negro were essentially the same as those practiced during the war. The emphasis on the racial question in the military establishment after World War II seems to be on the subject of segregation rather than on utilization and assignment.

Charges of discrimination within the AAF were not confined to the colored race. The Arms and Services with the Army Air Forces (ASWAFF) also felt discriminated against in job assignments because they were not integral parts of the Air Corps. Many instances existed in which men trained in service schools such as Quartermaster's were sent to the Air Forces and they were used as orderlies, laborers, or firemen, or in other unskilled jobs. The Office of the Chief of the Air Corps was cautioned by the Air Adjutant General against requisitioning technicians from arms and services and then not using them in their specialties. Nevertheless, discrimination continued to exist in such things as allocation of personnel, equipment, and promotions. As the ASWAFF strength was reaching its peak in 1943, Brig. Gen. T. J. Hanley, Deputy
Chief of the Air Staff, directed that "Discriminatory differences
between Air Corps and AFWAAF personnel in the training program and
afterward, must be abolished."

During World War II the AAF was composed primarily of the Air Corps;
the remaining strength consisted of the various arms and services assigned
to the air forces. For example, when General Hanley issued his directive
in May 1943, the AFWAAF comprised about one fourth of the total enlisted
personnel of the air arm. The enlisted men in the arms and services
with the AAF came chiefly from the Engineer Corps, Chemical Warfare
Service, Finance Department, Medical Corps, Military Police Corps,
Ordnance Department, Quartermaster Corps, and Signal Corps. They wore
their own insignia and maintained sentimental attachments to their own
branches. The War Department order creating the Army Air Forces in
March 1942 had placed all units and personnel within that branch under
the complete jurisdiction of the commanding general thereof. It also
charged the Commanding General of the Services of Supply with the basic
and special training of arms and services personnel, and for their
initial allotments and subsequent adjustment of grades and strength.

The AC/AS, A-3 was willing to assume all responsibility for enlisted
men in the AFWAAF except procurement and individual training. He maintained
that the basic training centers were already taxed to the maximum and
the training of AFWAAF troops was specifically charged to the Services
of Supply. The complicating factor, however, was the inability of the
SOS--later ASF--to provide enough trained AFWAAF personnel to meet the
required AAF activation schedules. After a series of conferences exten-
tending over a period of about three months, a compromise was reached

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whereby the AAF would supply all basic training for ASWAFF personnel and the Services of Supply would supply specialist training as requested by the AAF. Effective 1 November 1942, all enlisted personnel for ASWAFF units were sent from reception centers directly to AAF basic training centers where they were to be carried as AAF unassigned (Medical, Finance, Signal, etc.), until actually assigned to units. At the AAF basic training centers the prospective ASWAFF's were classified; upon completion of four weeks of basic training, about 40 per cent were shipped to Services of Supply specialist schools where they were to continue training as AAF unassigned. The remaining 60 per cent were given a second month of basic training. Upon graduation from school or completion of this extra training period, ASWAFF personnel were assigned by Personnel, Headquarters AAF, to the appropriate units.38

ASWAFF unassigned recruits began to arrive at basic training centers late in 1942 and went through the classification process in the same manner as Air Corps unassigned, except that they were recommended for service schools of the Services of Supply rather than for AAF technical schools. Many of these men, however, could qualify for AAF technical training, and transfers were made between them and Air Corps recruits who were not qualified for technical school training. This was initially discouraged because it was felt that ASWAFF's would be drained of high quality men if basic training centers were given complete freedom to change branch assignments. However, the power of reclassification and reassignment to arms and services by basic training centers was shown to be necessary when reception centers misassigned large numbers of
ASWAAP personnel. For example, men with civilian experience in the fields of finance and banking were indiscriminately assigned to arms and services, and dental technicians were assigned to the Finance Department or other arms of services other than the Medical Corps.

Logical classification called for the assignment to jobs for which recruits were best fitted whether or not such assignment involved transfers among arms and services or between the Air Corps and ASWAAP. After the dust had settled on the pros and cons of ASWAAP transfers, the following plans were placed into effect by the spring of 1943: common classification procedures were adopted for the Air Corps and ASWAAP; transfers were permitted and simplified by executing them on service records instead of through the cumbersome process of special orders; and in the best interest of the service, consistent with proper classification, ASWAAP enlisted men could be sent to Air Corps schools and Air Corps recruits could attend ASWAAP schools. Thus school quotas could be filled with the most desirable men. 39

The power of branch transfers was sometimes misused by Air Corps commanders, who unnecessarily transferred ASWAAP personnel to the Air Corps, or used them for duties unrelated to their arm or service specialty. Some commanding officers paid little attention to ASWAAP personnel and discriminated against them in such things as job assignments, promotions, and school attendance. These bad practices were called to the attention of the Technical Training Command by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff. The Command promised to abolish any discriminatory practices, if they were found to exist; but it denied that any extensive transfers had been made except in instances where ASWAAP personnel were found to be better
qualified than available Air Corps men for technical school attendance. To support this denial, the Technical Training Command contended that the Air Corps unassigned recruits were usually found to be superior and more desirable students because of their higher general intelligence level, thus making extensive transfers from the ASWAAP unnecessary. For the period 1 November 1942 to July 1943, 45 per cent of ASWAAP personnel scored above 100 on the AGCT as compared with 62 per cent for the Air Corps. The ASWAAP percentage dropped to 42 per cent by October 1943—this decline made selection for specialist schools more difficult. The high elimination rate from Signal Corps schools reflected the poor quality of ASWAAP personnel.\footnote{40}

Nevertheless, flagrant disregard of reception center classification resulted in directives prohibiting basic training centers from changing branch assignments, except to correct obvious malassignments or to meet gunnery school quotas. The heavy demands of the combat-crew program established highest priorities for aircrew training, then gunnery training schools, and finally ASWAAP branch schools. However, personnel earmarked for the arms and services who were transferred to the Air Corps for gunnery training were to be replaced by Air Corps unassigned recruits.\footnote{41}

Effective with the flow of recruits in July 1943 an attempt was made by the Technical Training Command to improve the branch training/ASWAAP recruits. Instead of sending them to various basic training centers, all personnel of a certain branch were concentrated at one training center. For example, all ASWAAP personnel assigned to the Corps of Engineers were sent to Jefferson Barracks. It was hoped that this system would simplify the classification procedure, secure the beneficial results of specialization,
and obtain maximum use of the insufficient number of arms and services instructor personnel. Another change made in July was the inauguration of the regular AAF basic training course of two months for ASWAAF unless special requirements had been established by the arm or service concerned. If such requirements existed the second four-week period was devoted to specialized basic training as prescribed by the appropriate arm or service. 

Throughout the year 1943, barriers between the two categories of personnel, ASWAAF and Air Corps, were gradually penetrated. The AAF had already assumed basic training of ASWAAF; but in the summer of 1943 the War Department General Staff ordered the AAF to take over the ASWAAF specialist school training program, and to conduct all such training as soon as Training Command facilities became available. The AAF felt unprepared to inaugurate this training as early as 1 July 1943 and requested that either Army Service Forces school quotas for ASWAAF's be reduced only to the extent that the AAF was able to take over specialist training, or a plan be worked out for the transfer of arms and services specialists from the ground and service forces to the Air Forces. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, took a dim view of these proposals, especially after he had received reports of excessive demands for training of AAF personnel in specialist schools of the Army Service Forces, and reports of improper use of ASWAAF enlisted men in units. He did not consider transfer of specialists from the other forces as appropriate or in the best interests of the service. G-3 did make a concession in permitting the use of ASF schools for training ASWAAF personnel if the AAF could show that its needs could not be met in other ways.
The AAF favored integration of arms and services personnel, but the assumption of specialized training as early as July 1943 presented complicating problems in the securing of necessary equipment, training facilities, and instructors.

Nevertheless, the trend toward integration continued. On 6 November 1943, General Arnold announced to all personnel in the AAF that the War Department had authorized the elimination of arms and services branch distinctions. To bolster the morale of ASWAFF personnel, he assured those enlisted men that integration of arms and services into AAF functionalized organizations would be carried out gradually and carefully; that maximum use would be made of specialized skills; and that opportunities for service and advancement would be enhanced.

Three days later, the AAF Arm and Service Integration Committee was established under the chairmanship of the Chief, Management Control who was made directly responsible to the Chief of Air Staff. Its mission was to facilitate and expedite transfer and integration of ASWAFF personnel to functionalized AAF units in the United States and overseas. This entailed the drawing of plans for procurement, ratings, promotions, training, classification, reporting forms, and the preparation of functionalized tables of organization and distribution. Another difficult problem confronting the committee was the necessity of amending all War Department and AAF publications which would be in conflict with effective integration.

The mission of the committee reflected the recent observation that several categories of ASWAFF activities were functionally similar to those of the Air Corps; this fact led to a waste of manpower and
duplication of effort and equipment. Typical examples of this absurd situation were Ordnance men wheeling bombs to the planes and Air Corps Armament men loading them on the planes; Signal Corps men were primarily interested in ground equipment and Air Corps communications specialists with air equipment. In one bombardment group a savings of 25 per cent in personnel and 40 per cent in equipment was effected by the amalgamation and functionalization of ASWAAP and Air Corps personnel and units. The AAF also believed that integration would result in "Tighter Command control by all AAF echelons to ensure that all supply, all maintenance, all personnel, all intelligence, all training, all operations and planning matters are cohesively integrated at each echelon."

On 3 December 1943, the Deputy Chief of Staff restricted the integration process to tactical organizations which could accomplish a 20 per cent saving of personnel. Continental organizations and installations, and AAF medical and aviation engineering programs were exempted. Medical personnel and enlisted men in the Chaplain Corps were considered non-combatants by international law, and it was deemed advisable for them to keep their distinctive insignia. It appeared that the War Department was withholding approval of the transfer of ASWAAP enlisted men and the detail of ASWAAP officers to the Air Corps until it was shown manpower savings in tables of organization and equipment for integrated units. The restriction on Zone of Interior units was finally removed in April 1945, when an AAF regulation directed the transfer to the Air Corps of all enlisted men of any arm or service (except medical) assigned to duty with the Air Forces.
Elimination of ASWAOF personnel was to be carried out through a gradual and orderly conversion to Air Corps status; though there were still about 300,000 ASWAOF enlisted men out of a total AAF enlisted strength of approximately 1,800,000 by V-J Day, the process was slowly on the way to completion. As General E. E. Gates, Chairman of the AAF Arm and Service Integration Committee, noted at the first committee meeting, integration was "a real move toward the aim of a separate air force." General Arnold felt that the elimination of arms and services branch distinctions was a milestone in the building of a "more completely integrated, more efficiently functioning, harder hitting team—a team wherein the members have but one loyalty, one purpose, one distinguishing insignia." A separate Air Force not only depended on proof that air power had an independent role in modern warfare, but also upon a recognition of the importance of integrated supply, administration, maintenance, communications, transportation, and personnel aspects of logistics for the Air Force.

Although the integration of arms and services into the air forces was practically completed before the establishment of USAF, the problems relative to the optimum use of illiterates, non-English speaking, and negroes continue to be great concern to the armed forces.
Army tests were significant determining factors in a soldier's classification, duty assignment, and advancement. As the chart on the following page illustrates, enlisted men were subject to "measurement" from the time they reported for induction to their final separation from the service. Although The Adjutant General's Office was responsible for the testing programs at all levels, the AAF had been authorized to develop aptitude tests to select potential candidates for technical school training. The chart in Appendix 8 portrays the method for the development of such tests. Basic training centers became the administering agencies for tests designed by the Technical Training Command and The Adjutant General's Office. Almost all of the tests used were of a group nature—written tests administered to a large number of people at the same time—and of the objective type as distinguished from the essay or subjective type. The tests administered by the AAF were: Shop Mathematics, Surface Development, Mechanical Information, Radio Aptitude, Weather Aptitude, Link Trainer Aptitude, Clerical Aptitude, Cryptographic Aptitude, and Trade Information/General Technical; there were also oral trade tests for airplane mechanics, dope and fabric workers, and sheet metal workers. The Adjutant General's tests administered primarily at reception centers were: Army General Classification, Non-Language, Visual Classification, Clerical Aptitude, Mechanical Aptitude, Radio Telegraph Operator Aptitude,
LEVELS of testing IN THE ARMY

INDUCTION STATION
SCREENING OUT THE MENTALLY UNFIT
Qualification Test, Group Target Test, Individual Examination, Etc.

RECEPTION CENTER
BALANCING THE DISTRIBUTION OF TALENTS THROUGHOUT THE ARMY
General Classification Test, Mechanical Aptitude Test, Radiotelegraph Operator Aptitude Test

INITIAL TRAINING
REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS, UNIT TRAINING CENTERS, BASIC TRAINING CENTERS
Placing men in right military specialties, selecting potential officers and cadre, Clerical Aptitude Test, Officer Candidate Test, Trade Information Tests, selection tests for service schools, subject matter tests

SPECIALIST SCHOOL
Achievement Tests, selection of advanced specialists

OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL

ARMY SPECIALIZED TRAINING
Selection tests, subject matter achievement tests

FIELD UNITS
Retesting, selection tests for training, Officer Candidate Test, individual tests

SEPARATION PROCESSING

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and oral trade tests. Trainees who passed required tests and met
other qualifications became eligible to attend one of the
AAF technical schools for administrative clerks, technical and supply
clerks, aircraft armorer's, aircraft machinists, aircraft metal workers,
aircraft welders, airplane mechanics, Link trainer instructors, para-
chute riggers, photography, radio operators and mechanics, teletypers,
and weather observers.¹

Basic training centers were permitted to give retests of reception
center tests if there was reason to believe that they were administered
at reception centers under unfair or unfavorable circumstances. In
1942 the Headquarters of the Technical Training Command complained that
testing and interviewing procedures in reception centers were inadequate,
with the result that basic training centers had to give many retests to
secure dependable scores. Evidence was compiled by the AFTTC showing
cases of poor testing conditions, instances where AACT scores were re-
corded on Form 20's when the men did not take the test, failures to
record mechanical aptitude scores when men did take the test, and ex-
amples where extreme grade changes were made on the AACT when men were
retested. These charges were substantiated by The Inspector General after
an intensive study of the classification and assignment system throughout
the Army. TIG criticized the use of inexperienced interviewers and
classifiers and said that whenever the processing time at reception was
materially less than 72 hours then "classification tends to become
superficial and assignment tends to become little more than a substitution
process required to fill current requisitions."² The Technical Training
Command suggested that officers in charge of reception center classification should be qualified psychologists and also be familiar with classification procedures and problems at AAF basic training centers.

Validity studies were made by the Classification Division of the Technical Training Command to determine whether tests used at basic training centers isolated specialists and potential specialists, and whether they selected men who were likely to pass the various technical courses. One such study, made in the latter part of 1942 with coordination from The Adjutant General's Office, revealed that

The General Classification and Mechanical Aptitude Tests are the best predictors of success in a course. There is a definite relationship between scores made on these aptitude test and final course grades. A fairly good correlation also exists between the Mathematics Aptitude Test and Mechanical Movements Test and course grades.

Studies regarding the validity of various tests were carried on continuously and provided psychologists and statisticians with almost endless research problems. Coningencies of war, however, made many of the problems unsolvable at the time.

Meanwhile, the close cooperation between The Adjutant General's Office and the Air Corps, on such things as exchange of test data, led to duplication of testing operations between the reception and basic training centers. The Trade Test Division of the Air Corps Technical School and its successor, the Classification Division of the Air Corps Technical Training Command, had developed mechanical aptitude tests of two types--Surface Development and Mechanical Movements--for selecting student airplane mechanics. These tests had been in operation for over a year prior to American entry into war; items from those and other Air
Corps tests were incorporated into the new Army Mechanical Aptitude (MA) Test, developed by the Adjutant General's Office in 1941. According to the Technical Training Command:

... all of the items in the Surface Development section of the Mechanical Aptitude Test, Form MA-1, issued by the Adjutant General's Office, were taken directly from the Surface Development Tests, Forms 6-R-C and 6-R-D, published by these Headquarters. Several of the mathematics problems in the same form were taken from Shop Mathematics Examinations developed by the Classification Division, Air Corps Technical Training Command. Many items in the first section of Form MA-2 appeared previously in a Mechanical Information Test, Form M, prepared by this office.

Shortly after the United States entered the war, the War Department announced in January 1942 that the Mechanical Aptitude Test was mandatory for all men passing through reception centers. Immediately, the Air Corps Technical Training Command protested. It was of the opinion that this requirement would undermine the effectiveness of the current system of selecting technical trainees because prior administration of the test at reception centers to future Air Corps men would adversely affect scores made on subsequent administration of Air Corps tests at training centers.

The Air Corps proposed that its men be exempted from the Mechanical Aptitude Test, but TACO refused on the ground that the test was a necessary guide for reception center commanders in the assignment of men for the best needs of the service. The Adjutant General, however, promised to withdraw Form 1 of the MA Test from reception centers in an effort to limit the amount of duplication. Until that could be done, it was suggested that the Technical Training Command use part of the grades from the MA-1 to furnish information equivalent to Air Corps scores on the Shop Mathematics, Mechanical Movement, and Surface Development Tests. Nevertheless, some duplication in testing for mechanical aptitude continued throughout 1942.
Although the War Department directives establishing the Army classification system in the fall of 1940 had placed the responsibility for testing, classification, and assignment in The Adjutant General's Office, it frequently became necessary to restate his position. In April 1942 the War Department again proclaimed T&GO as its agency for the coordination of all research problems in those matters. Notwithstanding the decentralization of testing functions to the field, no tests for the selection or classification of military personnel could be used without the permission of The Adjutant General. Within a few months an exception was made in favor of The Air Surgeon's Office for aircrew selection tests.7

The AAF, because of its years of pioneering in selecting potential technicians, carried on its testing program more independently of T&GO than did the AGF or ASF. The Classification Division of the Technical Training Command was the operating agency for the development of tests appropriate for the Air Force. The results of its personnel research were disseminated to subordinate commands and basic training centers through Classification Division bulletins. Indeed, the AAF had become so independent in testing and classification matters that The Adjutant General found it again necessary to reassert his position. Early in February 1943, he reminded the Commanding General of the AAF, that although the major commands were the operating agencies for classification and assignment functions, the control of policies and major procedures remained with The Adjutant General, acting for the War Department. This control was necessary, he continued, to secure uniform personnel practice, to avoid duplication of research activities, and to use economically the few available competent research specialists. The construction of aptitude
and other classification tests remained a function of The Adjutant
General, and requests for research, test construction, and validation
were to be made to his office.  

This February memorandum was prompted by the AAF program of practical
performance aptitude testing introduced by the Technical Training Com-
mand early in 1943 to supplement the existing written aptitude tests.
These new tests were supposed to select men who were capable of absorbing
technical school training, but who, because of handicaps in language or
formal education, had failed on written tests. The AAF hoped that
practical testing would increase the number of eligibles for technical
schools, but The Adjutant General's Office viewed the change as a
substitution of fifty-odd performance aptitude tests of unknown validity
for a series of written tests of known validity.  

Maj. Gen. Walter R. Weaver, commanding the Technical Training Command,
was most influential in this short-lived testing revolution. Performance
aptitude testing was part of the practical approach to training that
General Weaver had been spurred into by criticisms of Headquarters AAF
and a board of officers appointed to review and reorient the technical
training program. General Arnold felt that the general concept of
technical training was still in the "stick and wire era" because of the
adherence to and expansion of the 1922 concept of technical training. The
board of officers found a tendency in technical schools to increase
theory at the expense of practical work. Lectures and textbook assignments
did increase when the supply of instructional equipment did not keep up
with the increased number of students and instructors—especially during
the rapid expansion of the AAF. Such educational methods brought
criticisms from the field that technical school graduates were not practical mechanics.\textsuperscript{10}

As the schools gradually acquired a sufficient amount of technical instructional equipment, General Weaver made his sharp break with past practices. In a directive issued on 16 October 1942, he criticized teaching and grading methods and ordered the discontinuance of lectures in all technical classes and the installation of workbenches in lecture rooms. Instruction was to be given in the use of tools, proper methods to be applied in assembly and disassembly operations, and other practical work. Daily grades based on actual practice were to replace written examinations. Student-instructor ratio was to be between 5 and 8 to 1. Experience, however, necessitated a number of modifications in this program.\textsuperscript{11}

It was a short step from the adoption of practical technical training to the establishment of a system for the selection of trainees who could absorb practical instruction. General Weaver and psychologists in the Classification Division and basic training centers of his command were in agreement that poor scores on written tests often reflected a lack of formal education, verbal facility, and test-wiseness rather than a lack of mechanical ability to perform useful service for the air forces. Accordingly, each basic training center was directed in December 1942 to devise practical performance aptitude tests in lieu of written ones. The recommended practical tests were to be sent to Headquarters of the Technical Training Command for study and for coordination with the research of its Classification Division. The Adjutant General's Office was informed at this time of the new testing experiments being devised for
the purpose of improving classification and assignment at basic training centers. A request was also made for a representative from TAGO to assist the Technical Training Command in the development of test procedures and methods of validation. The Adjutant General replied that he was responsible for all personnel research including the construction and implementation of tests. If the AAF Technical Training Command needed tests, he stated, the proper procedure was to make their needs known to his office which would either make available tests developed for other arms or services, or make changes in existing tests, or construct and validate new tests to meet stated requirements. "The detail of officers or professional personnel to the Army Air Forces," The Adjutant General concluded, "to operate under direction thereof for this purpose is not favorably considered."

The Adjutant General's decision was soon to be reversed. A series of conferences involving representatives from Headquarters AAF, Technical Training Command, and The Adjutant General's Office was inaugurated about two weeks later to thrash out problems relating to the AAF's testing program. One of the agreements reached provided that TAGO would furnish qualified technicians to the Technical Training Command for the purpose of conducting validation studies of practical performance and written aptitude tests in order to secure a battery of tests most effective for the selection of students for technical training as ground crew specialists.

Meanwhile, practical performance aptitude tests were developed in various elements of the Technical Training Command as part of the vast
project to convert from theoretical to practical operations. Training centers at Atlantic City and Keesler Field were the pioneers in such test construction. By 23 February 1943, a battery of 26 practical aptitude tests were approved—out of a multitude of tests submitted—for use throughout the Command. Blueprints for constructing the test were circulated among the various basic training centers. Among the practical tests to be used were: Hand and Tool Dexterity Test, Generator Assembly Test, Bolt and Sleeve Tests, U-Bolt Assembly, Precision Measurement Device, Disc Assembly Test, and others of an assembly nature. All written tests were abandoned except the more specialized ones, such as radio-code, mathematics, clerical, weather-observer, Link-trainer, and cryptographer tests. Although the project was launched with enthusiasm, the limitations of the new testing system became immediately apparent: equipment and methods of administering tests were not uniform among the basic training centers; testing conditions within each assembly set could not be kept constant when a wire became loose, when the threads of a bolt became stripped, or any other accident occurred which might make the performance on one assembly more difficult than on another; competent administrators were unavailable, since trained mechanics were at a premium and could not be spared for testing; and finally, the practical tests became primarily a measure of speed rather than quality of workmanship. It was also possible for a slow-learning recruit who had experience with tools and mechanical devices to do better on the tests than a man without experience but with an aptitude for rapidly learning technical operations. Practical testing became a demonstration of skill rather than an indication of ability to absorb technical training.
The most significant defect, however, was the failure to validate and standardize the tests before placing them into operation. Attempts were made by the Technical Training Command to prove the validity of practical tests, but such attempts were extremely incomplete. One basic training center reported that in actual practice the new tests by themselves could scarcely be used as a valid indicator of mechanical aptitude. The tests did no more than aid the classifier in a decision which was primarily based on the scores the enlisted men made in the written mechanical aptitude test they took at their reception center.

The inherent defects in performance aptitude testing, together with the difficulties in establishing validity, reliability, and standardization of the tests, resulted in the abandonment of the project about seven months after its official establishment. Miss Gertrude N. Corkery, personnel technician in the Technical Training Command, thought that the Adjutant General's displeasure against the AAF's usurpation of his prerogatives in testing also may have had something to do with the discontinuance of practical testing. Doubtless all those factors contributed to the decision by The Adjutant General—with the approval of Headquarters AAF—to eliminate performance aptitude tests except for the Hand and Tool Dexterity and U-Bolt Assembly Tests. These seemed to have some value if used as supplements to other classification tools. Even those two tests, however, had to be given twice to secure an acceptable minimum reliability on duplicate sets of apparatus. It was also thought necessary to rewrite the directions for administering, scoring, and interpreting the two acceptable practical tests. Furthermore, scores for them were not to be entered on Form 20's because they were "meaningless for subsequent classification and reclassification in
Although AG/AS, Personnel supported The Adjutant General's decision, the Technical Training Command strongly opposed it and remained loyal to its performance testing project. That Command believed undue emphasis had been placed on the lack of standardization among basic training centers. It further claimed that the validation studies of the performance aptitude tests could not be completed until the students selected on the basis of those tests graduated from their technical courses. Until then, the Technical Training Command considered it premature to abolish § practical performance aptitude tests. 16

Practical performance and other technical tests used by the Air Forces were later checked for reliability and validity by The Adjutant General's Office at the request of Headquarters AAF. The Classification and Replacement Branch, TAGO, conducted the studies which were later designated Project PHS 6000. Its objective was to analyze, evaluate, prepare, and adopt tests for the more efficient and economical selection of men capable of absorbing technical school training. The Technical Training Command cooperated with the project by providing sets of performance aptitude tests and making technical school students available for experimental purposes. 17

As expected, research studies completed by The Adjutant General's Office in the summer of 1943 revealed certain written tests, as well as performance aptitude tests, to be poor predictors of success in technical schools. They were found to be unnecessary; for they correlated so highly with other tests that they yielded little additional information, or else they correlated so insignificantly with school success that they were useless. After a number of validity studies,
the AGCT and Mechanical Aptitude Test were found to predict success fairly well in all types of training. The AAF General Technical Test, consisting of technical reading, information and vocabulary, and the AAF Trade Information Test were also valuable predictors of success in technical training. The latter test covered seven fields: automotive maintenance, electrical work, hydraulics, machine and metal work, photography, radio, sheet metal work and welding. Special aptitude tests were additional aids for selecting individuals for particular jobs. In general, written tests were found better than practical performance aptitude tests for determining future success in technical schools.\textsuperscript{18}

After a meeting in New York City of representatives from TAGO, AC/AS, Personnel, and the Training Command, the Headquarters of AAFTC in September 1943 agreed to discontinue a number of written tests and all but two of the performance aptitude tests. Henceforth, enlisted men for various service and technical schools were to be selected on the basis of one or more of the following tests: AGCT, Army Mechanical-Aptitude Test, Signal Corps Code-Aptitude Test, Weather-Aptitude Test, and Cryptography-Aptitude Test. Those who were unable to demonstrate proficiency on written tests could take the two approved performance tests—Hand and Tool Dexterity or U-Bolt Assembly—and those who passed were considered qualified for technical school assignments if they met the other necessary requirements. The acceptance of those two tests showed that the practical performance testing program was not a complete failure, and their use salvaged thousands of mechanics who would otherwise have been classified through written tests as basics.
The better tests in the latter group, however, proved more valid for measuring mechanical aptitude than practical performance tests.\textsuperscript{19}

The interest shown by The Adjutant General's Office in the performance aptitude-testing program, together with its role in determining the battery of tests to be administered by AAF basic training centers, gave that Office a position in the AAF classification system which it had not had before. TACO, in collaboration with Headquarters AAF and the Training Command, prepared a manual in the fall of 1943 for guidance in administration and interpretation of tests and for standardizing classification procedure in AAF basic training centers. Decisions to eliminate previously used tests and to use others were based on results of research conducted by the AAF and TACO. The Training Command also agreed that TACO, rather than the AAF, would publish a number of AAF tests used by basic training centers. The Training Command also announced in the fall of 1943 that it did "not plan any personnel research in connection with selection of enlisted men for Technical Schools and The Adjutant General's Office will be requested to conduct such research as may be necessary."\textsuperscript{20}

The AAF, however, insisted that all inquiries concerning test interpretation and other classification matters, except requests for supplies, be routed through the office of the AC/AS, Personnel for coordination and control before going to TAC. The AAF also desired TAC to coordinate in writing any publications and instructions effecting AAF classification and duty assignment. Examples of lack of coordination were cited at a classification meeting conducted by TACO in December 1943. The Adjutant General was willing to assign liaison officers to the Training Command for purposes of coordination, but the AC/AS, Personnel
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He did not desire direct contact between TAG and the Training Command. The AC/AS, Personnel wanted to be consulted on any plans the TAGO had affecting the AAF; and then his office would supervise classification and assignment operations in the Training Command.

Nevertheless, from this time on TAG played a more active role in AAF classification proceedings but never as great as in the other two major branches of the Army. The AAF still attempted to maintain its semi-autonomous position and to some extent succeeded.21

At the time the testing program of the Technical Training Command was being checked by The Adjutant General's Office, tests developed by other air force commands also came under its review. Again asserting his responsibility for the development and approval of all classification tests, TAG requested the commands in the AAF to submit copies of all personnel tests originally developed by any unit except those used by The Air Surgeon. A survey by AC/AS, Personnel soon divulged three commands using tests other than those distributed by TAG or the Technical Training Command. The Third Air Force used the General Electrical Information Test, Form B, constructed by the Signal Corps, for which full information was already on file in the Office of TAG. The Second and Fourth Air Forces used performance, written, and oral trade and proficiency tests.22

Tests to measure proficiency of AAF-trained men, and trade knowledge tests to verify a man's specialty gained by experience, were part of elaborate classification systems set up in the Fourth Air Force Replacement Depot and the 18th Replacement Wing of the Second Air Force. These replacement organizations had been organized for the receipt, processing,
training, and distribution of men assigned to them from basic training centers, technical schools, arms and services schools, and overseas commands. These two training air forces found men arriving with a specialist classification but without the necessary qualifications for that specialty. Men who graduated from technical schools as specialists were found to have a wide range of knowledge and skills. To measure degrees of proficiency and the existence of skills, tests were developed by the replacement organizations just mentioned. Such tests became a vital part of classification processing which also included orientation lectures, interviews to correct any errors on Form 20's, aptitude and trade testing, and recommendations for technical school training. After processing, men were either reclassified, assigned to units, or sent to training schools of the Second or Fourth Air Forces. 23

The Director of Individual Training of Headquarters AAF was also concerned about the fact that many complaints were being made by field units to the effect that men were received from basic training centers classified as specialists--clerks, typists, truck drivers, etc.--but lacking the necessary qualifications. In reply to his query as to the feasibility of administering tests to determine whether a man had the qualifications claimed before he was assigned, the Technical Training Command stated that the reception centers were responsible for the administration of suitable trade tests. Individual performance trade tests at basic training centers--if processing at reception centers was inadequate--was not considered feasible because of the time, personnel, and equipment involved. Although the Technical Training Command did not want to accept primary responsibility for trade testing, it had
already developed such trade tests as those for airplane mechanics, metal workers, dope and fabric workers, welders, automobile mechanics, etc., for purposes of classification and assignment. The Command believed these tests to be superior to the current oral trade tests and promised to investigate the use of practical performance trade tests at basic training centers.\textsuperscript{24}

The Fourth and the Second Air Forces used existing tests but developed others deemed necessary for their operations. The latter organization believed that the validity of the results of a combination of practical, written, and oral trade tests was established by a direct correlation between test scores and job performance.\textsuperscript{25} The Adjutant General's Office, however, decided to conduct its own validation studies and to render technical assistance and advice. Representatives were sent to the replacement organizations in the Second and Fourth Air Forces.

Earle A. Cleveland, personnel technician, made a detailed study of the Fourth Air Force Replacement Depot. He felt performance proficiency tests to be of great value as an aid to proper classification of ground crew specialists and as an indicator of the type and amount of additional training needed, if any. The existing performance testing laboratory, however, could not cope with a test-development program of the desired scope because of the lack of space, equipment, and qualified personnel. In his report of August 1943, Cleveland recommended that the performance-testing laboratory revise existing tests and produce new ones in accordance with a long-range plan which should include the establishment by job analysis in the field of minimum standards of proficiency for
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The 18th Replacement Wing requested a qualified personnel technician from the Adjutant General's Office to collaborate in the item analysis and validity procedures for its independently developed testing program consisting of written, oral, and practical trade tests covering over 90 jobs required in Second Air Force units. A combination of these tests, with different assigned weights, was being used for each trade, and the final score was converted to indicate whether a man was disqualified, skilled, semi-skilled, or a potential specialist. Personnel technicians by TAGO were sent to assist in the trade-test improvement program and they helped in such things as item analysis, reliability studies, test administration, scoring, and preparation of a preliminary manual on trade testing. Since many tests were involved and the desired improvement and evaluation had not been attained, Lt. Carl J. Baldick, Director of the Trade Test Unit of the 18th Replacement Wing, was sent on temporary duty to the Adjutant General's Office for background and technical training necessary to continue the trade test-improvement program. Through ingenuity and diligent efforts by local personnel of that Unit, promising test devices were created and the Adjutant General's Office recommended the continuance of the trade-test evaluation and standardization project. It also wished to have reports on data collected, results found, and the tentative plans made for the future.

Headquarters of the AAF desired to reduce needless testing, and when the intake for AAF enlisted men was reduced during 1944, it felt there was little need for trade tests. Performance on-the-job at the station where the enlisted man was assigned for duty was considered to be more valid than trade tests for determining proficiency in skills. However,
this judgment of greater validity could not easily be proved by objective methods because of the difficulty in holding training methods constant for control purposes.\textsuperscript{28}

The Adjutant General's Office was of the opinion that the tests developed by the Second Air Force could be of value elsewhere in the AAF and decided to complete the validation studies and consider their potential use. Doubtless, these studies were significant in the trade-screening test program initiated by The Adjutant General's Office in 1944. Meanwhile, Classification and Assignment Manual 35-1, April 1944, prohibited "...any research or experiments in Personnel Classification Tests or testing... within the Army Air Forces without specific authorization from Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel in accordance with War Department policy, except tests for which the Air Surgeon is responsible." The only authorized tests to be administered by basic training centers, in addition to the retests of the examinations given at reception centers, were: Weather-Aptitude, Cryptography, Nut-and-Bolt, Manual Dexterity, U-Bolt Assembly, Trade Information, General Technical, and Technical Trade Tests.\textsuperscript{29}

The real criterion for all military tests, however, is job-efficiency in combat. Validation studies to determine whether tests helped in the selection and preparation of men to perform successfully in combat were never made. The Committee on Classification of Military Personnel urged the War Department to make such studies in theaters of operation, but their recommendations were lost somewhere in the maze of higher echelons. It was not until the Korean war that psychologists were given the opportunity to work in the front lines gathering information which could be used to improve the classification system for selecting men best fitted to perform jobs in combat.\textsuperscript{30}
The classification methods and techniques developed in the continental United States were useless unless they enabled the classification system to operate successfully in theaters of operations. When a requisition was made for an airplane mechanic to replace a casualty, the replacement's qualifications, as well as his military occupational specialty number, had to be that of an airplane mechanic. There was little opportunity for reclassification, schooling, or on-the-job training in the front lines.

Realizing that the ultimate criterion for a successful classification system depended upon its operation in combat, the AAF tried to carry its continental program for correct classification and duty assignment, and its campaign to eliminate malassignments, to overseas theaters where a malassigned technician was not only a deterrent to combat operations but an unwarranted consumer of supplies difficult to transport. In addition, the approaching critical shortage of manpower for 1943 meant that each man had to perform at his highest level of ability. On 10 December 1942, The Adjutant General had cautioned all commands and theaters to "conserve manpower and material. . . . The strength of our overseas forces is limited to available shipping, and every expedient should be adopted which will increase the ratio of combat to service elements without a reduction in over-all combat effectiveness."

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Maj. Gen. Ira C. Eaker forwarded TAC's letter to his Eighth Air Force commanders and directed: "that the War Department's announced policy of economizing in personnel govern all agencies of this staff in organizational planning, and that every effort be made to reduce the number of officers and men to the absolute minimum to do the assigned task." 2

The crisis in manpower was imminent. In mid-April 1943, Arnold told Eaker to inaugurate immediately a study of Eighth Air Force requirements. Eaker was also informed at the same time that a committee headed by Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley, The Air Inspector, would arrive shortly in the United Kingdom to fashion the final plan for the personnel and material build-up of the air forces in the European Theater of Operations. 3

While the personnel phase of the Bradley program was being formulated, Headquarters AAF helped by instituting a program to secure maximum utilization of personnel. One method to overcome personnel shortages was to have each man operate at his highest level of capacity. On 14 August 1943, an AAF letter outlining simplified basic procedures for correct classification and duty assignment of enlisted men was sent to all numbered air forces overseas. An offer was also made to send an experienced classification officer from the States to work with overseas officers, if desired by the commanding generals of the air forces. The main instruments in the program related to Form 20's, informational rosters, distinctive sleeve patches, and periodic inspections. 4

The Eighth Air Force was the first to adopt the simplified classification and duty assignment program; it was followed by the Ninth, Twelfth, and Fifteenth Air Forces. The United States Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom (USAAFUK) was the first overseas air force

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**See above, p. 75 ff.**
organization to accept the offer from Headquarters AAF for assistance in inaugurating the program. Headquarters of the European Theater of Operations was also concerned with the classification problem about the same time. On 6 September 1943, it notified the Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force of the existence of a classification team of one officer and 10 enlisted men available, upon written request, to theater units for assistance in classification and assignment of personnel. However, the Air Force classification specialists were chosen by USAFUK.5

Colonel Clayton DuBosque from the Office of the AG/AG, Personnel, six additional officers, and 30 enlisted classification specialists comprised the mission dispatched to the United Kingdom. All air force commanders in that theater were enjoined to render full cooperation and support. They were also reminded that classification and duty assignment was a function of command exercisable in the AAF by the A-1's and S-1's.6

On 15 November 1943, a week after the classification mission arrived, a meeting was held in the United Kingdom of A-1's of all commands, together with the men designated to become classification officers. The purpose of the conference was to establish a comprehensive program of operation and to work out the mechanical details involved in establishing correct classification procedures. This meeting was followed by a meeting of statistical control officers for indoctrination in the preparation of informational rosters and AAF Forms 127 and 128. Subsequently, a week's course at two schools was conducted by the trained personnel from the States for instruction to classification teams. Sixty-one officers and 251 enlisted men were trained and then dispersed to
stations to conduct the campaign for correct classification and duty assignment. A special strength report of corrected military occupational specialties was rendered as of 6 December and transmitted by cable to Headquarters AAF. Thus, within a short period of time, a true inventory of men on hand, according to skills, was available for balancing further shipments to the United Kingdom, for redistributing overages, and for accurate requisitioning in shortages. Colonel DuBosque returned to Headquarters AAF with up-to-date Manning tables, proposed revisions for tables of organization, and complete specialty requirements for the build-up of USAAFUK.  

Three officers and all the enlisted classification specialists from the States were retained by USAAFUK for permanent duty in key positions to assist in continuance of the program. Lt. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, commanding USAAFUK, commended the work of the classification mission sent to the United Kingdom in a personal letter to Brig. Gen. James H. Bovans, AG/AS, Personnel:  

During the past five weeks, we have been working on the problem of correct classification and duty assignment of our personnel under the guidance of the group of officers, and with the assistance of the three classification teams, you made available to us for that purpose. . . . All of this work was definitely needed, and its accomplishment will be a great step forward toward the proper utilization and conservation of manpower, in which we are all interested.

The personal enthusiasm, the deep analysis of our problems, the active participation in establishing sound procedures and the untiring efforts of Colonel DuBosque and the other officers are deserving of the highest praise. I wish to thank you, and through you, each one of them individually, for his noteworthy contribution to our war effort.
The intensive program initiated by the teams from Headquarters AAF for the maximum utilization of manpower was vigorously continued by General Baker throughout USAAFUK. On 10 December 1943, he directed that classification boards be set up at all stations to provide for prompt reclassification of misclassified and malassigned men, and for executing the functions of the AAF classification system. During the following month when the USAAFUK was succeeded by the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe (USAFE, later USSTAF), classification audit teams were ready for operation. As the chart in Appendix 9 reveals, 74,785 enlisted men assigned to USSTAF from February 1944 through March 1945 were found improperly classified or assigned out of 196,372 men interviewed. Of the number misclassified or malassigned, 72 per cent had to appear before classification boards which reclassified 65 per cent of them. The causes given for such large numbers of improperly classified and assigned enlisted men in USSTAF were: a shortage of manpower necessitating the use of the available supply for whatever necessary jobs existed regardless of specialties; a relatively high percentage of men misclassified in the states; a shortage of trained classification personnel to operate efficiently the classification organizations at each echelon; a failure on the part of commanders to recognize the importance of supporting the classification program; and the failure to make tables of organization keep pace with actual requirements resulting from combat experience. In General Baker's own words: 10
During the period when practically no replacements were being received it became necessary to utilize existing personnel to the best advantage regardless of classification. For this reason, individuals—both officers and enlisted men—were assigned to duties other than those for which they were classified. A further cause for temporary malassignment developed as a result of the huge influx of casual personnel which necessitated assignments in bulk in order to keep replacement facilities.

Shortly after Eaker assumed command of AAF/ETO in January 1944, he requested Headquarters AAF to send classification and duty assignment teams on a mission similar to the one sent to USAFUK the previous fall. The General was again pleased with the results and informally notified the Office of GC/AS, Personnel:

The personnel classification audit, supervised by officers you sent over on temporary duty, has just been completed of AAF/ETO units. Although the audit had to be pressed through to an early completion, the results are very gratifying. Classification of personnel is now more accurate and a much more efficient job of reassignment for redeployment can be accomplished. We also had a much clearer picture of spots in which we can use limited assignment personnel. As in U.K., your boys have again done a very fine job, and I appreciate both their service and your cooperation in providing skilled officers and enlisted men to supervise this important work.

The reputation of the classification teams sent overseas to assist air force commanders operate efficient classification systems spread from Europe to the Far East. On 5 May 1944, Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney wrote a personal letter to General Bevans, GC/AS, Personnel, requesting trained classification teams to establish a classification system in his Fifth Air Force similar to the one inaugurated in the Eighth Air Force. He also desired these teams to conduct an inventory of the air force personnel in the Southwest Pacific Theater; and in addition, he requested authorization and assignment of classification officers and enlisted men to implement the program to be established by the teams from the
States. Lack of time and trained classification personnel, Kenney said, had retarded the operation of approved personnel methods.  

Kenney's remarks were confirmed by the Air Evaluation Board, Southwest Pacific Area, which reported that correct classification and duty assignment in that area had been ignored, and almost no records were kept of personnel activities. The changing requirements of a complex technical air force in combat placed unpredictable obstacles in the path of classification system operations, making it difficult to match occupational supply with demand. It therefore became necessary to train and retrain men for new jobs in the theater under the assumption that the American soldier was a versatile individual and capable of learning new duties. Despite scarcity of personnel and unpredictable problems, excellent results were often obtained. Such retrained men, however, were rarely reclassified into their new military occupational specialties; this failure to reclassify caused untold confusion in determining training needs, in securing an accurate picture of types of personnel in the theater, and in requisitioning needed specialists from the United States. In March 1943, Headquarters AAF had sent a qualified classification officer to the Fifth Air Force to advise on correct classification procedures. For some reason he was assigned to other duties. Classification and paper work in general were considered unimportant in the Fifth Air Force.  

Consequently, very little was done until the classification audit teams requested by General Kenney arrived in the Southwest Pacific Area in June 1944. Six teams, each one composed of an officer and five
enlisted men, were sent to the Fifth Air Force by Headquarters AAF for temporary duty; but it was for duty with the intention to assign them permanently in that theater after the completion of their mission. Additional officers and men, over and above the number originally scheduled, were authorized because of the Fifth's enthusiasm and need for such work.14

In August the classification teams were sent to the units to accomplish a classification inventory of officers and enlisted men; to indoctrinate personnel concerned with the correct classification and duty assignment program; to set up and maintain accurate records; and to develop standard operating procedures for audit teams and classification sections.15

By 11 March 1945 reports of classification audit teams within the Fifth Air Force were rendered on 189 units. Of the 38,071 enlisted men interviewed or whose records were reviewed, 2,051 were reassigned or recommended for reassignment, and 3,415 were reclassified or recommended for reclassification by board action. Total corrections on classification and assignment records amounted to 117,965; the vast majority of them related to classification in military specialties and record of current service. In addition, a more accurate picture of personnel status in organizations was reflected by the improvements instituted by the classification teams in the use of AAF Form 127.16

Meanwhile, the classification and audit program had been launched in the Thirteenth Air Force, and 28 percent of the personnel were reclassified from October through December 1943. In the Far East Air Service Command, 80 percent of all personnel had been interviewed by
1 January 1945 and approximately 8 per cent were recommended for re-assignment. Irregularities on Form 20's were reported to the Air Inspector, who checked for corrections during administrative inspections.

By the first quarter of 1945 the classification system in units of FEAF improved noticeably. FEAF Regulation 35-51, 24 July 1945, emphasized the importance of the efficient use of available manpower at the highest level. Classification audit teams were directed to visit all units periodically. The regulation also stressed the importance of continuing classification and maintenance of accurate records. A uniform standard, based heavily on AAF Manual 35-1, Military Personnel Classification and Duty Assignment, for carrying out classification and duty assignment most effectively, was prescribed by FEAF.

Commanding officers were reminded that classification was a function of command; to help them operate efficiently in that sphere, trained classification personnel with primary duties of classification and assignment were to be assigned to each appropriate echelon.

The improved classification program in FEAF, however, did not solve all classification difficulties. The inauguration of the complexities of personnel reporting, statistical control, and classification in the midst of war accounted for some of the classification problems. The Air Evaluation Board in the Southwest Pacific Area reported some of the unsolved problems:

Without a doubt many replacements were found unsuited for theatre duty in their current MOS. Careless and inaccurate classification in the United States, followed by haphazard theatre reclassification, levied an almost unsurmountable barrier against lower echelons fulfilling their man-power shortages as reflected in the Form 127 for FEAF.

Boarding of well-qualified personnel by organizations within the United States and filling requisitions by reclassification of security information...
borderline personnel was partially responsible for this condition. Study of the Form 127 and other statistical
reports indicated the total absence of any concerted and continuous effort to adjust the shortages and surpluses
by redistribution of personnel within and between the various echelons of command. 

The classification and duty assignment procedures established by
Headquarters AAF for overseas commands were approved by the Classification
and Replacement Branch of TAGO. Personnel organizations in overseas
theaters were so inadequate that any attempts to improve the situation
were welcomed by TAGO. The lessons learned from AAF classification
activities overseas served to confirm the conclusions arrived at inde-
dependently by TAGO for the Army as a whole. 

If the full range of personnel activity with economical and
efficient use of manpower is to operate (either in the zone of
interior or in overseas theaters), qualified personnel (both
commissioned and enlisted) trained in the principles of clas-
sification and assignment must be provided in all echelons and
commands whether they are organized [sic] on a table of organization
or an allotment basis and they must be permitted to function. 

The Office of the AC/AS, Personnel continued its classification
interest in overseas personnel upon their return to the States. Early
in 1943 returnees were assigned directly to specific continental com-
mands and air forces, but it soon became apparent that this direct
method of distribution was very ineffective. For example, personnel
were sent to the Training Command on the bases of reports and records
when their backgrounds and temperaments better qualified them for the
Air Transport Command; or they were ordered to new jobs before they
were sufficiently rested or readjusted to military life in the continental
United States. Policies within the commands and air forces were not
uniform and no particular attention was paid to the peculiar problem
of men returning from overseas.
As the flow of officers and enlisted men from the war zones increased, the AAF realized that this old hit-or-miss assignment system would not be adequate to handle the increasing thousands of returnees. Consequently, a redistribution program was established in August 1943 under the operation of the AAF Redistribution Center, an exempted activity subject to the supervision of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel. The program was based on the premise that each returnee had to be handled as an individual, and it was administered through geographically spaced redistribution stations and rest camps. Its mission was to condition returnees mentally and physically for new duty assignments; to reevaluate the men and place the right ones in the right jobs; to maintain and operate rest camps; and to give guidance for civilian reemployment to men eligible for discharge.22

Wherever possible, the AAF used resort hotels as redistribution stations, thus enabling the returnee to enjoy a two-week vacation while undergoing leisurely processing. He could also bring his wife along at nominal expense. A survey, conducted toward the end of the war in Europe, indicated that 88 per cent of Air Force enlisted men who were questioned thought well of the redistribution stations in all ways; 81 per cent felt they received better treatment at those stations than in most other military installations, and 19 per cent felt it was about the same.23

This unique program of redistribution was without precedent in the military history of the United States and therefore came under careful scrutiny of the other major branches of the Army. The experiment to secure maximum use of returnees proved sufficiently successful to
stimulate the establishment by July 1944 of redistribution stations for the Army Ground and Service Forces. By that time, redistribution of personnel had reached such a stage of development and importance that the AAF placed it on an independent basis by creating the AAF Personnel Distribution Command. Its mission was expanded from control over the continental redistribution system to include also the responsibility for all overseas replacement depots, all Air Force convalescent hospitals, demobilization planning, and recruiting for the postwar air force.  

The redistribution stations remained the heart of a world-wide system whereby individual AAF returnees were gathered together, after furlough or convalescence, for complete medical examination, processing, evaluation and assignment. The chart in Appendix 10 portrays the various phases through which returnees, aircrew and ground crew personnel, had to pass before return to duty. Throughout the history of redistribution these phases remained relatively static, although their order was subject to experimentation and modification. One of the major problems in processing was the dearth of competent classification and assignment personnel in the various stations. It was early felt that combat-experienced personnel were necessary for interviewing, classifying, and assigning returnees. Rapprochement between interviewer and returnee, and confidence in the former's recommendations, would be more likely than if Stateside soldiers performed the jobs. However, qualified classification officers and enlisted men who had been overseas were difficult to find. In February 1944, Headquarters AAF permitted the AAF Redistribution Center to obtain from
continental commands and air forces specified numbers of combat-experienced officers and enlisted men to be trained as classification specialists for duty in the redistribution stations. The use of men from commands and air forces, rather than returnees, meant that a better job of classification could be accomplished for the reason that personnel familiar with the job specifications in the absorbing air forces and commands could do a better job of classification and assignment than could be accomplished by men fresh from overseas. When the such potential number of classification specialists permitted to be trained proved insufficient, the redistribution stations were allowed to select returnees, with the proper background and interest, for retraining as classification specialists.25

The Personnel Distribution Command considered the classification process as an art rather than a science or production line operation. The Commanding General, Hubert R. Harmon, wanted each returnee treated as an individual and with consideration given to his likes, dislikes, temperament, and capabilities. This view was part of the general policy of "leaning over backwards" in according the returnee all possible assistance, luxuries, and privileges as tokens of appreciation for past services. The announced AAF philosophy for the redistribution program was the granting of "full consideration for the individual consistent with the current and continuing requirements of the AAF mission. . . . The success of the entire redistribution system rests upon giving individual consideration to the personal factors of each returnee."26

This policy did not mean that because men had served overseas they could change their specialty and military assignment of their own volition.
A fundamental factor in assignment was to make full use of the returnee's overseas experience. Under ordinary circumstances, if a man was physically qualified and if there were demands for his specialty, as radio operator, for example, he would not be permitted to become an administrative clerk as he may have desired. The war was still on and expensive training and experience could not needlessly be dissipated. If a man could not continue in his specialty because of physical defects, misclassification, or little demand for his specialty as would be the case with an aerial gunner, he was recommended for another specialty by the redistribution stations. Such an individual would either be assigned on the basis of a secondary MOS or recommended for another specialty after careful consideration of his physical capacity, civilian and military background, testing results, needs of the service, and the individual's preference. These factors also determined whether a man was to be assigned to a unit for a specific job assignment, or on-the-job training, or to a school for further technical training. If reclassification downward was recommended, such action would have to be accomplished by a station classification board. Before he left the redistribution station, the individual's classification records were checked and brought up-to-date. It was often necessary to complete new Form 20's because they were unserviceable or missing.  

Assignment to continental air forces and commands was predicated upon current military necessity, established policies, priorities, quotas set by Headquarters AAF, recommendations of classification officers, and evaluation of the returnee's history. The returnee could have a
choice as to the place of assignment only if his wishes coincided with the AAF demands. Headquarters AAF determined the allotments to commands and air forces on the basis of need or opportunities for use of particular existing or potential qualifications. No guaranty could be given the returnee that he would be assigned by his new unit to duty in his MOS or recommended MOS, because of the impossibility of predicting the work-load requirements at duty stations. They were also supposed to have been warned that their new jobs would not be as glamorous as combat duty, and that they should not expect to replace experienced and key personnel immediately.

Additional tours of overseas duty were possible for those who volunteered, or if warranted by the military situation. Priorities for such assignments, however, generally were given to those who had no overseas service and those having the longest period of continental service since their previous overseas assignment. In any event, a re-turnee normally would not be sent back overseas until he had spent a minimum of three, and later six, months in the United States. A second overseas tour actually was the exception rather than the rule because of the large number of returnees physically unqualified for overseas duty, and because of the early ending of the war.

When a large percentage of returnee ground personnel were assigned to the Training Command, liaison units were sent to redistribution stations; thus it was possible for assignments to be made directly to specific training stations. Such units informed the Personnel Distribution Command of the available technical and gunnery training courses and their entrance requirements, and the permanent party jobs requiring
only on-the-job training. This procedure permitted more efficient classification based upon current M&F requirements and the capacity of units to absorb returnees. More adequate planning was made difficult by the lack of knowledge as to the rate, categories, and physical condition of men to be returned from overseas. Such information could not be made available because there was no one flow-control agency for movement from overseas to the United States. Flow depended upon rotational replacements made available to theater commanders, and the availability of shipping. In brief, all the contingencies of wartime operations could not be anticipated.\(^{30}\)

Notwithstanding the efforts of the Personnel Distribution Command, the over-all integration of returnees by the end of 1944 into Zone of Interior installations had not proved successful. To emphasize the importance of this returnee problem, commanding officers were informed by Generals Arnold and Cump that proper integration of returnees was a command responsibility and a reflection of true leadership. Brig. Gen. A. L. Sneed, commanding the Western Technical Training Command, threatened officers with reclassification proceedings if they failed to handle the problem efficiently.\(^{31}\)

Commanding officers, however, were not always responsible for the problem of absorbing and utilizing returnees—many of the difficulties encountered were inherent in the returnee program. For example, returnees possessing only combat skills could not easily be used in non-combat organizations; many also had high grades which only worsened the problem related to the existing surplus of high grades; enlisted returnees in the first three grades did not always possess recorded skills or specialties; and grounded
returnee flying personnel tended to have a bad effect upon flying personnel training for overseas duty. The situation was further complicated by some returnees who desired to change their duty assignment or pursue a particular technical course of study upon arriving at their new stations. The problem was frankly acknowledged later by Brig. Gen. H. H. McNaughton, Chief of Staff of the AAF Training Command, who wrote to Headquarters AAF:

To sum up this part of the problem, I think it can be said that the trouble lies in trying to fit the career gunner and the armorer gunner into jobs considered to be commensurate with their grade and ability due to: 1, their inability to perform specialized jobs, 2, their lack of interest in further training for specialized jobs, and 3, the overall policy of letting the man's preference wherever possible govern in the matter of his future training.

The AAF was especially concerned with the large numbers of returnees in high grades who were not performing commensurate duties. To avoid unfairly penalizing those individuals or arbitrarily reducing their grades, continental commands were directed to give them such training as would fit them to hold their ratings; however, those who, after suitable opportunities had been offered, did not demonstrate their ability to perform a job commensurate with their ranks could be reduced in grade by an enlisted reclassification board. Reduction in grade was not permitted, however, when a man's specialty justified his grade but there was no position vacancy or job assignment within his organization. Reassignment was the apparent solution for such cases; but there were not enough vacancies in the States to absorb the large number of high ranking returnees. The dilemma apparently was never
pletely solved. Reduction in grade became more difficult if consideration was given to public opinion which judged returnees as conquering heroes.  

It was not until the close of the war that the War Department authorized the assignment of returnees to positions calling for lower grades than those held by individuals concerned. However, unless so ordered by the unit or installation commander, returnees will not be assigned to duties subordinate to another individual whose grade is not at least equal to that of the returnee except when the individual is undergoing an assigned course of instruction at a school or on-the-job training under an instructor junior in grade.

The AAF also tried to alleviate the difficult situation of excess grades and ratings by sending overseas all qualified personnel without combat experience as a means of creating vacancies; and by inaugurating a large-scale program of retraining and reclassification of enlisted returnees—especially among those who had held flying jobs. By November 1944, Army surveys revealed that two-fifths/no longer held flying positions; by June 1945 three-fourths were converted to ground jobs.  

In general, returnees disliked further training. They desired to settle down to a permanent-duty assignment and did not feel that trained and experienced veterans should go through basic training again like a raw recruit. They refused to recognize the need for further training (not basic training) for redeployment or conversion. They did recognize, however, that further training was sometimes used as a temporary solution for the lack of suitable jobs; and that suitable
assignments, even after retraining, could not be found because of the surplus of rank in the United States in relation to the tables of organization for continental units.\textsuperscript{36}

Morale was lowered further when training was conducted by lower ranking personnel. A poll conducted a month after V-E Day showed that 42 per cent of AAF returnees in the first three grades were dissatisfied with their jobs. Nevertheless, only a minority of returnees were sufficiently disgruntled or dissatisfied to wish that they had never come back to the United States. To prepare returnees with the realities of assignments in the States, General McNaughton recommended to AC/AS, Training, a month before V-E Day, that overseas commanders should indoctrinate returnees to the realities of continental service, namely:\textsuperscript{37}

that they will be required to perform jobs when they arrive in this country which may not be consistent with their training, their personal desires and their grade ... that they will have to take the jobs of the personnel in this country, whatever those jobs may be, so that replacement can continue for those remaining overseas. We just have to make these men understand that the job they will get on this side will be duller than hell compared with what they have been doing overseas, but that this fits into the overall strategy.

Men sent overseas to replace those returning from combat duty passed through overseas replacement depots, which were under the jurisdiction of the Personnel Distribution Command. A replacement was an individual ordered overseas to replace losses, fill shortages in authorized strength, or replace returning personnel. Although numbers were of importance, it was just as essential that qualified men be sent to fill vacancies. The ultimate test of good classification was to place the right man in the right job in combat. Then an Air Force
overseas requisitioned a radar mechanic for night fighters (650), it did not want to be supplied with an airplane electrical mechanic (685). The overseas replacement program for the AAF went into operation early in 1943 when overseas replacement training centers were activated at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, and Seymour Johnson Field, North Carolina. This operation, similar to handling of returnees, was a new one requiring the development of policies and procedures. The Training Command permitted each unit to set up their own program subject only to admonitions about training deficiencies, overseas indoctrination, and physical conditioning.38

Classification personnel at those stations were concerned with the large number of unqualified men arriving for overseas shipment. A number of men were downgraded or upgraded to fit particular military occupational specialty numbers specified in movement orders; some men had specialties which were not even in the appropriate family groups. In a few instances, qualified technicians who intensely desired to go overseas, were reclassified as basics in order to accommodate them for shipment. Inexperienced school graduates were detailed for overseas duty while good permanent-party personnel remained frozen in their jobs. Large numbers of Form 20's had incomplete entries. These discrepancies and deficiencies caused considerable confusion and delay in assembling and processing a shipment. At times personnel in MOS's required for a shipment had to be secured from distant stations. Jefferson Barracks attempted to alleviate the situation by interviewing each man destined for overseas duty to determine whether the specialty number entered on his Form 20 corresponded with the job he had been performing for at least three months.39
To process the increasing number of men being shipped overseas, the AAF in 1944 activated two overseas replacement depots at Greensboro, North Carolina, and Kearns, Utah, with the personnel from the two overseas replacement training centers. In July of that year the depots were transferred from the Training Command to the Personnel Distribution Command. The mission of the depots was to receive, prepare, equip, and organise personnel into provisional squadrons for shipment overseas.40

The new depots inherited the classification and other personnel problems of their predecessors. But more stringent measures had already been taken to prevent unqualified men from being shipped overseas. Classification officers had to certify to the correct specialty of each individual placed on shipping lists. The overseas replacement depots were ordered to return men to their units if they were unqualified for overseas shipment in their MOS, if their records were faulty, or if for any other reason they were unqualified for shipment; reports of such action were to be sent through channels to the air force or command having control of the unit for appropriate action. In unusual circumstances, however, and subject to the approval of Headquarters AAF, men could be placed on overseas shipment in an MOS which was in a field of skill related to their primary MOS.41

The above measures may have improved the quality of overseas replacements, but the following common types of misclassified men continued to arrive at the replacement depots: enlisted men given an MOS to fit tables of organization rather than their duties; men reclassified for disciplinary reasons and given specialties not commensurate with their ability for a specific job; men who were eliminated from technical schools and sent to replacement depots as basics instead of in the specialty they held.
prior to school attendance; and a large number of men, whose specialties were not authorized by AAF Manual 35-1, 3 April 1944, were arbitrarily given a new MOS for which they had not qualified.\textsuperscript{42}

The overseas replacement depots endeavored to correct any misclassification they could detect, but insufficient time and the necessity for meeting shipment quotas meant that unqualified personnel and borderline cases arrived in theaters of operation to hamper seriously the flow of replacements to combat units. In the Southwest Pacific Area, the Air Evaluation Board found that “Too high percentage of AAF ground personnel required reclassification on arrival in the theatre.”\textsuperscript{43} One reason for reclassification was that an MOS did not adequately describe a man’s qualifications; for example, if a man was an airplane maintenance technician (SEM 750) it was necessary to know the type of equipment, degree of skill, section in which work was performed, and any supervisory experience he may have had. Consequently, it was essential to interview each man to determine whether he was correctly assigned in the highest skilled specialty possible.\textsuperscript{44}

Thus a man in the States designated as a replacement went through classification check-ups at his unit, at the overseas replacement depots, and the replacement depots in theaters of operation. Such intensive efforts to secure correct classification and duty assignment was perhaps best justified by the Air Evaluation Board, Southwest Pacific Area, which reported:

The observations of the war further emphasized the fact that qualified replacements are essential to combat efficiency and that because of the highly trained specialists needed by the Air Forces it is necessary that replacements be correctly classified and trained before arriving in the combat area.\textsuperscript{45}
Complete and correct classification at the organization, however, could have avoided duplication and waste of manpower hours at replacement depots.
A complex problem never completely solved in the late war was that of manpower allocation and utilization. Manpower became a limiting factor and combat capabilities had to be developed within manpower ceilings. Perfect use of personnel for military purposes must remain an ideal; nevertheless, the ideal is one that should be constantly sought through the use of scientific knowledge and method and the full benefit of professionally competent experts. The military used the classification system as its instrument to make the most economic and effective use of individual skills, both real and potential. Testing played a vital role in the evaluation of an individual and the Army Air Arm, a highly technical organization, pioneered between world wars in the development and use of tests to measure "learnability" and aptitudes for the purpose of selecting large numbers of technical trainees.

Shortly after American entry into World War II, the Air Corps expressed the belief that it was receiving men below the standard necessary for entrance to technical schools. It requested preferential assignment treatment on the basis of its highly technical requirements. Consideration was also given to the facts that the initial military strategy called for the air forces to hold the enemy at bay while the Army was building and training its war machine, and that in all probability the Air Corps would be called upon to strike the first offensive blow.

* Inasmuch as the material contained in the summary and conclusions is discussed and documented in the body of the monograph, no footnotes are used in this chapter.
In February 1942, the War Department approved the request and established the policy whereby 75 per cent of enlisted men assigned to the Air Corps were to have a score of 100 or better on the Army General Classification Test. Two systems of assignment were thus created: one for the Air Corps based primarily upon mental ability; and the other for the remainder of the Army based upon civilian occupational skills. The adverse consequences of the new policy were widespread: the ground and service forces were deprived of their fair share of reception center intake of high grade men; the air forces lost necessary occupational specialists; and the service commands became hard pressed to meet the 75 per cent quotas at the same time they were trying to adhere to air force requirement and replacement rate tables for occupational specialists.

The commanding generals of the AGF and ASF, with the support of the Inspector General, G-1, and G-3, opposed the 75 per cent rule as "contrary to the best interests of the Army as a whole." Such opposition, together with the fact that an insufficient number of draftees were scoring 100 or better on the ACCT, resulted in the rescission of the 75 per cent rule in August 1942.

Headquarters AAF and its Technical Training Command immediately marshalled its evidence and statistics and secured the restoration of preferential assignment in September. This time the AAF was additionally favored by the stipulation that 75 per cent of the men assigned to the AAF were to have scores of 100 or better on the Mechanical Aptitude Test as well as on the ACCT. The AGF protested against this "appalling diversion of the national intelligence from leadership into technical and mechanical jobs." The AAF protested, but for another reason: it
was not receiving 75 per cent of its men with the required scores. In December the percentage was lowered to 55, but even this figure could not be satisfied with the then current flow of draftees. All percentage preferences for the AAF were discontinued on 1 June 1943, a month before they were due to expire. But the AAF continued to receive preferential treatment in less obvious ways. The indecision and vacillation of the War Department on the question of assignment priorities were partially caused by the fact that the information available on the composition of the national manpower, and on job and technical school requirements was exceedingly scanty.

During the controversy over preferential assignment, the WDCS, with the support of The Inspector General, charged the AAF with improper utilization of airmen, with the much desired score of 100 or above on the AGCT, in unskilled or semi-skilled tasks. This indictment proved embarrassing to the AAF in view of its efforts to secure preferential assignment of such men; and stern measures were immediately taken by Headquarters AAF to prevent misuse of high grade men.

Part of the AAF program to make proper use of men in AGCT grades I and II to their highest degree of capability, was the campaign to reduce malassignments. In a war of specialists, malassignments were not intentional; the AAF was a loath to make a company clerk out of an experienced airplane mechanic as it was to use a liaison plane for strategic bombing. The crying need for specialists was the best guarantee that malassignment would be the exception rather than the rule. But the exceptions reached such serious proportions that the WDCS had to take cognizance of the situation.
Although lack of planning and ineptitude may have caused many malassignments, the requirement that a war be fought simultaneously with a rapid build-up of the air forces must also be considered in any appraisal of classification breakdowns. Another factor complicating an assessment of malassignment was the question as to what constituted malassignment. During the initial development of classification and assignment procedures a static concept was established to the effect that a person was malassigned if he was assigned to any duty other than the specialty for which he was trained or recommended. Not until the fall of 1943 did the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Personnel advocate a more flexible rule recognizing that maximum use of man-hours was as important as having each man working at his job to the highest level of his ability. The fluidity of war and the recognition that the average American was capable of adapting himself to many different types of work made the new policy acceptable, and it also reduced the number of reported malassignments. Every effort was made to attain both maximum utilization of manpower and man-hours; where there was a conflict, the balance was to swing toward the objective most important for the war effort at the time.

Malassignments never could be completely abolished in wartime, especially when a relatively small number of human beings were trying to judge, evaluate, and assign millions of other human beings. But the AAF was determined to hold malassignments to a minimum by an aggressive prosecution of a program for correct classification and duty assignment. The program included creating AAF classification and assignment audit teams; adopting
Security Information

A simplified plan of basic procedures relative to Form 20's, distinctive sleeve patches, and informational rosters; systematizing and standardizing through the publication of AAF Manual 35-1 all regulations and directives pertaining to classification and duty assignment; and publishing a guide for classification and assignment at the squadron level.

The Inspector General, after a comprehensive inspection of classification and assignment throughout the Army, reported in the summer of 1943 that

Units within the Army Air Forces are now ahead of most units within the other two major commands in matters pertaining to classification and assignment. Dynamic leadership and an effective liaison program within the past few months have produced notable results... reduction in malassignments during the past few months has been accomplished by rigid adherence to AAF directives which set forth correct classification and assignment procedures with emphasis upon the indoctrination of personnel at squadron level as well as control from command headquarters.

Such gratifying results partially resulted from the AAF's definite acceptance of classification as a command responsibility; A-1 sections rather than AG sections were responsible for the operation of classification functions. Although the Adjutant General was responsible for all personnel practices and research, the AAF was practically autonomous in such activities. Dr. Richardson stated that TAGO, busily engaged in all kinds of personnel problems, generally permitted the AAF to pursue its own course as long as War Department policy was not violated. In return, TAGO benefitted from the classification research and other activities of the AAF classification and assignment operations. The status of TAGO as the War Department operating agency for all classification matters
had to be clarified and reiterated periodically. His status was often confused by the dual role he played as Adjutant General of the ASF and The Adjutant General of the War Department. Field commanders often did not notice which hat he was wearing at a particular time.

Occasionally TAG had to intervene in the AAF classification system. He objected, for example, to the adoption by the Technical Training Command of the practical performance aptitude testing program; he believed such a program to be premature because its tests had not been standardized and their validity and reliability had not been established. TAG, with the consent of Headquarters AAF, eliminated the new testing program, except for the Hand and Tool Dexterity and U-Bolt Assembly Test. Thereafter, TAGO asserted a more active role in the AAF personnel research program.

Until 1944 physical classification and assignment did not approach the refinement nor receive as much time and research as were given to the elements of occupational skill and mental ability. Before that time men were classified as fit either for limited or for general physical service. As a result of combat experience and the great demand in 1943 and 1944 for ASF overseas replacements, the War Department recognized the need for accurately measuring the physical capacity of combat troops and established a physical profile system which also took into consideration, whenever possible, occupational skills and mental ability. However, such a system could not operate effectively without research to determine the physical demands made by each job. It is unfortunate that the published lessons of World War I, relative to the importance
The physical profile system was not the only concession granted to the AGP for meeting its high priority for quantitative and qualitative combat replacements in 1944. Extensive voluntary and involuntary transfers helped relieve the overseas shortages. The AGP was also able to return to the other major forces almost 30,000 aviation cadets who had not entered pre-flight school because air losses were actually less than the percentage anticipated and because air supremacy in theaters of operation was secured faster than the Army had dared hope.
if one considered the fact that the Army had less than 1,000
kinds of jobs into which workers in 8,000 civilian occupations had
to be fitted.

Greater publicity was of course given to the relatively few cases
of men who were not using their civilian experience or aptitude for
certain skills than to the vast majority of men who were properly
classified and assigned and satisfied in their positions. For example,
Radio operators trained as automobile mechanics and automobile mechanics
trained as radio operators were examples brought into the limelight by
their flagrancy. Although such cases were the exception rather than the
rule, instances of misclassification and malassignment were nevertheless
too numerous and too harmful to the critical manpower situation to be
rationalized as casualties of war rather than as a perhaps serious defect
in the classification and assignment system. A major difficulty was in
the quota system established topside for various classes of men. A re-
ception or basic training center might have to fill a particular day's
quota of 100 experienced or potential radio operators for air force
units. This quota might have to be filled with 20 skilled automobile
mechanics with an aptitude for radio but a desire for automobile mechanics.
A few days later a quota for 100 automobile mechanics might have to be
met in the same fashion. Specialists could not be held at reception
or basic training centers until requisitions for their individual specialties
were received because of the lack of housing and other facilities. More-
over, training schedules and unit activation dates, relatively inflexible,
were based upon a predetermined flow of personnel. The problem, never
solved during the war, was that of creating a plan for establishing a
flexible quota system by which specialists with civilian
skills could be held for a short period until called for by a unit needing their abilities. Perhaps a system making use of combination reception and basic training centers, in which all men would receive their orientation, shots, clothing, classification, and first month of basic training (common for soldiers of all branches), would have helped to solve the problem of quota flexibility. Moreover, efficiency and more accurate classification could have been accomplished under such a plan than under the one used in World War II in which a man was indoctrinated, physically examined, and classified during a hectic 72 hours of reception center operations.

Since the supply of manpower geared to a peacetime economy could not balance the needs of an Army geared to wartime needs, it was the responsibility of the War Department to determine which jobs and which qualities in a man were most important for the war effort. The W.D. classification system placed more emphasis on analyzing a man and recording all the information about him on a Form 20 than in analyzing each military job, to describe the duties and qualifications necessary for proper job performance, and for organizing job family groupings. The matching of the right man with the right job is the essence of classification, but this could not be accomplished without continuous job analysis and without a method for measuring the success of a soldier in combat to determine whether he was the right man. Not until the Korean war attempts made to gather data at the front lines which would help in the selection of men most likely to perform best under fire.

Inasmuch as the military could directly absorb only about one-eighth of the different civilian occupations, the others had to learn military
jobs and depend for advancement upon their ability to perform technical jobs successfully or upon leadership manifestations. No guide, however, was established for the testing of leadership or personality characteristics. The AGF recognized that intelligence did not necessarily make leaders, but in its objection to AAF preferential assignment of men scoring high in the AGOT it insisted that intelligence was essential in a leader. In the United States demonstrated leadership became the most reliable method of selecting leaders. In comparison, Germany, more than any other country in the world, had shown considerable interest in evaluating leadership and other personality traits. German military psychologists were interested in the total personality and used the characterological and subjective approach; whereas, the United States, in an age of specialization, sought individual abilities through aptitude tests. Despite a number of similarities, the German Air Force classification system was not as thorough or as well developed as that of the AAF.

Because of the technical nature of its equipment, the AAF clamored for high caliber men; but it was forced to accept its fair share of sub-marginal personnel—illiterates, non-English speaking people, and those of low mentality. The number of low grade selectees assigned to the AAF was sufficient to warrant special schooling, and in May 1943 basic training centers were instructed to establish special training units for the rehabilitation or discharge of low-caliber personnel. Several thousand men were thus salvaged from the manpower scrap pile and returned to duty with improved education and ability to hold responsible positions.

The plans for establishing special training units at basic training centers included a consideration of sufficient space for accommodating large...
numbers of colored personnel. The special and regular training of
colored troops was complicated by the race factor and by the fact that
most colored airmen—whether because of low mentality or because of
deficient education and an unfavorable environment—scored below average
on the AGCT. Between June 1941 and February 1942, 77.8 per cent of the
colored inductees scored in grades IV and V. The AAF, in compliance
with WD policy, attempted to give segregated but equal training and
assignment to colored troops. Judge William H. Hastie, colored civilian
aide to the Secretary of War, believed that the AAF practiced discrimination
in utilizing and assigning colored troops to jobs as common laborers and
resigned his position in indignant protest. Many negroes were assigned
as basics or general duty soldiers in aviation squadrons (separate) because
of their low AGCT scores, but low caliber white men were also assigned
to similar tasks fitting personnel in AGCT grades IV and V.

Whether or not the AGCT was defective because purely cultural and
socio-economic factors were not eliminated, if such a thing could be done,
it served throughout the war as one of the important determining instru-
ments for assignment to jobs and technical schools. It was not the
function of the Air Force to change the pattern of society, but to make
the most effective use of the manpower made available to it. Of course,
a number of colored individuals and units were of high caliber and performed
meritoriously. In classification and assignment affairs the AAF problem
was not one of negro inefficiency per se but one of military deficiency
caused by factors beyond the scope of the military establishment.

Charges of discrimination within the AAF were not confined to the
colored race. The arms and services with the AAF (ASWA AF) also felt

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discriminated against in such things as job assignments, promotions, and specialist school training. Such charges disappeared as the ASF/AAF were gradually integrated into the AAF. Integration was "a real move toward the aim of a separate air force."

Realizing that the ultimate criterion for a successful classification system depended upon its operation in combat areas, the AAF sent classification missions to Europe and the Far East to help air force commanders establish simplified classification and duty assignment procedures to reduce malassignments and secure maximum utilization of personnel. A malassigned technician overseas was a detriment to combat operations and an unwarranted consumer of supplies difficult to transport. Generals Eaker and Kenney highly commended the work of the classification missions for establishing sound operating procedures and programs for securing proper utilization and conservation of manpower.

Personnel returning from overseas duty were initially assigned to continental organizations under a hit-or-miss operation. This method of assignment proved utterly inadequate to process the increasing thousands of returnees; consequently, a redistribution program was inaugurated in August 1943 to condition and revalue returnees mentally and physically for new assignments. This unique program was without precedent in the military history of the United States and was carefully observed by the other major branches, both of which, as a result of their observation, soon established similar organizations. Nevertheless, the over-all integration of returnees into Zone of Interior installations had not proved completely successful. The absorption of the large number of high ranking returnees was one of the chief stumbling blocks in
the path of maximum utilization. Returnees should have been cushioned against the disappointments and dullness of continental service, as compared to overseas duty, through indoctrination by overseas commanders prior to embarkation. Many of the duty assignment problems of returnees were conditioned by the reluctance of continental commands to rotate their personnel to overseas theaters.

The operation of overseas replacement depots was also a new one requiring the development of policies and procedures. One of the major difficulties in preparing shipments of replacements overseas was the large numbers of improperly classified men sent by organizations to overseas replacement depots. Although the AAF took stringent measures to assure the shipment of qualified men, classification checks were conducted at continental and theater replacement depots. Such duplication and waste of manpower hours could have been avoided by complete and correct classification by the shipping organization.

Problems of manpower are of prime importance; it is manpower that operates and repairs the complex machinery and equipment upon which success in modern warfare depends. The development of an air personnel doctrine warrants as much consideration as the current concern in developing strategic air doctrine, tactical air doctrine, air intelligence doctrine, etc. In evolving an air personnel doctrine, the following factors relating to enlisted men, based upon past experiences, should be considered.

1. To place the right man in the right job it is necessary to have continuous job analysis for the establishment of requirements and
qualifications for a job and for keeping pace with changing concepts, organization, and materiel. Job analysis should consider physical requirements, and should be conducted, as far as possible, under combat conditions.

2. Evaluation of performance, by observation and testing, is necessary in deciding whether the right man has been selected. A prerequisite for such evaluation is the establishment of standards of performance by objective, standardized, and valid procedures for measurement.

3. A policy of maximum utilization of manpower should be accompanied by one of maximum utilization of man-hours.

4. Personnel research and planning should be centralized in a single agency of the Air Force and should be the responsibility of those charged with their execution.

5. Inductees should be given common basic training, and during that period complete classification should be accomplished by qualified professionals. During the war, basic training center classification duplicated reception center classification.

6. Plans should be developed for wartime use of low caliber and limited service personnel for duty in the United States and overseas.

7. A centralized control of all critically needed specialists should be maintained.

8. A USAF soldier's qualification or classification card should be developed with a workable coding system. Among other things, the types of equipment which a man is qualified to operate or repair, should be noted on the card.
9. Testing programs should include the development and improvement of tests for determining "learnability" or trainability, aptitudes, proficiency, fitness for promotion, and if possible, leadership.

10. Classification and assignment policies should be collected, published, and kept current in a single and simple manual.

11. Commanders and potential commanders should be indoctrinated in personnel doctrine and given an appreciation of the benefits from correct classification and duty assignment, the significance of test results, and the valuable information contained in the soldier's qualification or classification card.

12. Supervision of classification and assignment activities in the field should be the function of audit teams working out of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

The execution of personnel policies and procedures, no matter how good, can be only as efficient and effective as the men who make it work.
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14. Misc. Papers on Pers. Qualifications for AAF . . ., in USAF HD Special File No. 2-3072, TD Memo No. 40-44; Physical Profile Plan, 18 May 1943, in AG 220.01 (24 Feb. 1944) (1). It is interesting to note that in Canada men were selected for military service on the basis of physical capacity. The purpose was not primarily for job assignment, but as "a safeguard against building up their pension rolls." Summary Sheet from AG/S, G-1 to G-3, & C/S, sub.: Physical Profile Plan, 18 May 1944, in AG 220.01 (24 Feb. 1944) (1).


   26 May 1944.


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   Special File No. 2-3072; AR 615-25, 3 Sept. 1940.
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32. Walter V. Bingham, "Personnel Classification Testing in the Army,"
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   XXXVIII (June 1941), 385.
34. Air Staff Post Hostility Intel. Requirements on Ger. Air Force, Sec.
   Ic, App. 18, p. 2. See also, pp. 1-4, and App. A.
35. Ibid., Sec. Ic, pp. 14, 45-47, App. 17.
36. Ibid., Sec. IX, p. 56.
37. Ibid., Sec. IX, pp. 51-52.
38. Ibid., Sec. IX, 105; Apps. 7 and 32.
39. Ibid., Sec. IX, 57.
40. Ibid., Sec. Ic, 117-119.

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4. Ibid., 289.


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16. Memo for 40/3 G-3 from MPD, sub.: Employment of Grade V Pers. in
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22. Paraphrased transcript of telephone conversation, in ltr., AAFIT
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23. Hist. OCS, in Hist. AAF Tng. Center No. 1, Miami Beach, Fla.,
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33. Unsigned memo to CC AAF, sub.: Negro Troops in the AAF, 10 June 1943, in AG 353 A, Negro Tng.

35. Memo for CG's all major forces from Director, Special Planning Div., sub.: Participation of Negro Troops in the Post-War Military Establishment, 23 May 1945; "Participation of Negroes in Post-War Military Establishment, with Tabs A thru D,"--both in USAF HD 143-04h.

36. Ltr., DC/AS to OGGTC, sub.: Tng. and Morale of ASWAAF, 20 May 1943, in AHS-49, Doc. 35. See also, RAR, AAG to G/AC, 14 Dec. 1941, in AAG 220.31 C-2, Asgmt. of EM.


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48. Arnold to All Pers. of the AAF, 6 Nov. 1943, in AAG 321, Integration of Arms and Services into AAF.
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8. Memo for CG AAF from TAC, sub.: Clas. within the AAF, 4 Feb. 1943, in AAG 201.6 Efficiency and Proficiency, Mental and Physical.


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of EM for Tech. Schools, 15 Sept. 1943, in Hist. 1st Dist.,
AAPTTC, 1 Jan. - 7 July 1943, V, incl. 120; Hist. AAPTTC, 8 July - 31

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AAPTTC to CG AAF, 10 Sept. 1943, and the basic letter, in AAG 220.01
Clas. and Reclas.; memo for Col. George R. Evans from Col. Clayton
Dubose, 28 Dec. 1943, in USAF HD 2-3072; incl. 1: Manual for
Use in Clas. of AAF Ground Crew Trainees, 15 Sept. 1943, in ltr.,
TAG to AC/AS, Pers., 22 Sept. 1943, in AAG 220.01 Misc.

1943; memo for Col. George R. Evans from Col. Clayton Dubose,

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Taylor, subj.: Detailed Report on Fld. Trip to 18th Repl. Wg. from
21 July to 11 Sept. 1943, 28 Sept. 1943, in AAG 220.01 Clas. and
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14. Ibid., p. 16; Diary, Plans and Liaison Div.

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of Returned Combat Pers., 25 Oct. 1944, and 1st ind. thereto, in 
Hist. Sheppard Flt., 1 Nov.-31 Dec. 1944, II, doc. 237; Keynote 
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VI, 498.

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Jan.-30 Apr. 1945, I, 52. See also, Ltr., WD Pers. Audit Team, 
Southern Area to TAG, sub.: Pers. Audit Report (Clas. and Asgt. 
Problems in AAF Installations), 1 Sept. 1944, in 4G 210-01 (1 Sept 
1944) (1); Hist. 3701 AAFBU and Amarillo Army Airfield, 1 Jan. 1943-
28 Feb. 1945, I, 89.

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(1 Sept. 1944) (1); Hist. AAFWUTC, Nov.-Dec. 1944, II, 320-321; 
Stouffer et al., The American Soldier, I, 295.

34. Ltr., TAG to CG's ACF, AAF, ASF, sub.: Excess Grades and Ratings, 

35. Stouffer et al., The American Soldier, II, 481.

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Jan. 1945-30 Apr. 1945, I, 52-53. See also, Stouffer, et al., The 
American Soldier, II, 486, 517.

38. Hist. AAFPDC, IV, 1204.

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42. Hist. ORD, Kearns, Utah, 1 July-30 Sept. 1944, I, 39.

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45. Ibid., p. 41.
APPENDIX I

DISTRIBUTION OF AGCT BY GRADE

PERCENT

NORMAL DISTRIBUTION

ALL MEN ENTERING THE ARMY UP TO JUNE, 1944

RESULTS FOR 774,383 MEN IN 209 AAF MOS'S

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Normal</th>
<th>All Men</th>
<th>Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
RECRUIT FLOW CHART, CLASSIFICATION DIVISIONS, BASIC TRAINING CENTERS, AAFITC

APPENDIX 2

GROUP I

SKILLED
SPECIALISTS

GROUP II

AGGT OVER 100
AND QUALIFIED FOR
TECHNICAL TRAINING

GROUP III

AGGT UNDER 100,
NON-SPECIALISTS,
AND UNQUALIFIED FOR
TECHNICAL TRAINING

CARDS SORTED

ORAL TESTS

SKILLED MEN

NOT SKILLED
AGGT 100

NOT SKILLED
FAILED AGGT

APITUDE TESTS

SCHOOLS

UNITS

FAILED
APITUDE TESTS

Source: Minutes of District Commanders' Conference,
AAFFTC, 5-6 Aug 1942, Krollwood Field, NC, p. 181
ENLISTED TECHNICAL TRAINING STUDENTS UNDER INSTRUCTION
QUARTERLY, DEC 1939 TO JUNE 1945

PEAK ENLISTED STRENGTH 2,111,140 IN NOVEMBER 1943

SOURCE: AAF STAT DIGEST, WWII

FIGURES ARE AS OF END OF MONTH.
APPENDIX 4

PERCENTAGE OF RECRUITS PROCESSED WEEKLY AT BASIC TRAINING CENTERS
WITH G CT STANDARD SCORES OF 100 OR MORE
JUNE 5 TO OCTOBER 29, 1942

PERCENT
100

WEK BEGINNING

PERCENTAGE OF RECRUITS PROCESSED WEEKLY AT BASIC TRAINING CENTERS
WITH MECHANICAL APITUDE (MA) STANDARD SCORES OF 100 OR MORE
JULY 31 TO OCTOBER 29, 1942

PERCENT
100

WEK BEGINNING

SOURCE

SECRET INFORMATION

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APPENDIX 5

ARMY AIR FORCES

DISTINCTIVE SLEEVE PATCHES FOR TECHNICAL SPECIALISTS
(Ref. AAF Reg. No. 35-12)

ARMAMENT

COMMUNICATIONS

ENGINEERING

PHOTOGRAPHY

WEATHER

RESTRICTED
BASIC RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE SCHEDULING OF PERSONNEL
REQUIREMENTS, PROCUREMENT, TRAINING AND ASSIGNMENT

APPENDIX 6

1. Preparation of a training program by the Office of Personnel and Training
   Required by: ASC / Operations, Personnel
   Transmittal to: ASC / Personnel

2. Preparation of a training program by the Office of Personnel and Training
   Required by: ASC / Operations, Personnel
   Transmittal to: ASC / Personnel

3. Preparation of a training program by the Office of Personnel and Training
   Required by: ASC / Operations, Personnel
   Transmittal to: ASC / Personnel

4. Preparation of a training program by the Office of Personnel and Training
   Required by: ASC / Operations, Personnel
   Transmittal to: ASC / Personnel

5. Preparation of a training program by the Office of Personnel and Training
   Required by: ASC / Operations, Personnel
   Transmittal to: ASC / Personnel

6. Preparation of a training program by the Office of Personnel and Training
   Required by: ASC / Operations, Personnel
   Transmittal to: ASC / Personnel

7. Preparation of a training program by the Office of Personnel and Training
   Required by: ASC / Operations, Personnel
   Transmittal to: ASC / Personnel

8. Preparation of a training program by the Office of Personnel and Training
   Required by: ASC / Operations, Personnel
   Transmittal to: ASC / Personnel

REVISIONS OF PROGRAM

STEP 1

The present program is based on the following assumptions:
1. The number of trained personnel is sufficient to meet current requirements.
2. The program is flexible and can be adapted to changing circumstances.
3. The program is cost-effective and provides a high return on investment.

STEP 2

The program is reviewed annually and any necessary changes are made to ensure its effectiveness.

SOURCE: AAF Reg. 35-7, June 1, 1943
APPENDIX B

DEVELOPMENT OF TESTS FOR SELECTION OF STUDENTS FOR TECHNICAL TRAINING

WORK IN CLASSIFICATION DIVISION AAF & TTC

DETERMINE TYPE & SCOPE OF TEST

TECHNICAL LITERATURE
OTHER TESTS
NEW QUESTIONS FURNISHED BY OUTSIDE EXPERTS OR WRITTEN IN DIVISION

WRITING OF TEST QUESTIONS & DIRECTIONS

EDITING & REVIEWING OF QUESTIONS

CONSTRUCTION OF TEST REQUESTED BY AAF & TTC

NEED FOR TEST TO MEET A SELECTION PROBLEM RECOGNIZED

TRY OUT OF TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT SELECTS SUITABLE MEN

STANDARDIZATION TRY OUT FINDING DISTRIBUTION OF SCORES MADE BY A TYPICAL ARMY POPULATION

USE OF TEST TO SELECT MEN FOR TECHNICAL TRAINING

CALCULATING OF SELECTIVE VALUE OF TESTS OR TEST ITEMS

WRITING AND EDITING OF TEST IN FINAL FORM

DETERMINING OF PASSING GRADES ON TEST

SOURCE - HISTORY KEETLER FIELD, W DCE '41 - 31 DEC '42, I, 140
Procedure at a Redistribution Station

Appendix 10

From Furlough

Orientation

(Explanation of the rotation program and the procedures to be followed in the return to duty)

Preliminary Phase

Personnel Records

(All papers brought up to date; back pay accomplished, earned medals and decorations presented, etc.)

1st Phase

Station Surgeon

(Complete medical examination to determine fitness for duty, dental, optical checkups, etc.)

2nd Phase

Classification

(Personal interviews to determine background, experience and training for further duty assignment)

3rd Phase

Station Assignment and Shipping Instructions

Indoctrination for Further Duty

Explanation of current status of all US Air Forces and Commands

Clearing and Movement

Duty

Source: Air Force, Oct 1944, p. 3

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