REDEPLOYMENT

AND

DEMOBILIZATION

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FOREWORD

This study was written by Dr. Chauncey E. Sanders of the USAF Historical Division, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Like other Historical Division studies, this history is subject to revision, and additional information or suggested corrections will be welcomed.
Redeployment is the "transfer of a unit, an individual or supplies deployed in an overseas theater to another theater, or to another location within the theater, or to the zone of interior for the purpose of further employment;" for the AAF in World War II it was, specifically, the transfer of units and material from the European and Mediterranean theaters to the Pacific theaters and China- Burma-India. Demobilization is "dissbanding military forces; changing over from a war footing to a peacetime footing." Thus the two are completely different things; but since they were always coupled together in the planning that was carried on during the war years, it seems best to treat them together in this chapter. Indeed, the story of the planning is almost all there is to tell about redeployment; for the plans were aborted by the sudden collapse of Japan. Almost as soon as it had begun, redeployment was turned into demobilization. Both terms involved much more than mere movement of men and equipment. Redeployment entails also procurement, supply, and maintenance; and demobilization embraces, in addition to the separation of personnel, the termination of contracts, the sale of surplus property, and the disposal of facilities not required in time of peace. It is with the personnel aspect only that this chapter is concerned.

Early Plans

The Department planning for redeployment and demobilization began early enough to have assured a highly successful operation, had circumstances...
of planning been the only requisite for success. * In June 1942 General Marshall recalled to active duty Brigadier General John McA. Palmer, whose name had been on the retired list for some fifteen years, so that he would be available "for consultation in the matter of Army organization as pertaining to the citizen forces . . . ." General Palmer pointed out in a memo for the Chief of Staff, dated 5 April 1943, that between the defeat of Germany and the surrender of Japan there would be a period of partial demobilization and that very careful planning would be required to coordinate the interim force of that period with the permanent peacetime military establishment. As if prompted by General Palmer's memo, though there may have been no connection between the two events, the Chief of Staff called upon the head of the Army Service Forces (ASF), Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, to "initiate preliminary studies exploring the fields of basic policy and broad planning for demobilization of our military organization after the cessation of hostilities." The result of General Marshall's directive was the establishment in the Army Service Forces of the Project Planning Division, headed by Brig. Gen. W. F. Tompkins, who had been serving as a member of the Munitions Assignment Board.

* Even earlier demobilization planning was carried on by the National Resources Planning Board, which had been charged by President Roosevelt, in a message to Congress of 14 January 1942, with "the preparation of long-range plans . . . for post-war full employment, security, and building America" (Maj. John G. Sparrow, History of Personal Demobilization in the United States Army, pp. 32-33). Chief results of this mandate were a conference, in the summer of 1942, at which were present, in addition to members of NRPE, representatives of Veterans Administration, War Manpower Commission, Department of Labor, Navy Department, War Department, and other federal agencies; and a report, Demobilization and Redeployment, submitted to the President on 30 June 1943 and made public on 31 July (Ibid., pp. 33-34). NRPE made no further contribution because Congress refused to provide funds for it in the FY 1944 budget. (Ibid., p. 38.)
On 2 April—even before the last events took place—General Arnold had written to the Chief of the AAF Special Projects Office expressing his desire that there be established in the Special Projects Office a committee of not more than eight officers, whose mission initially would be to carry out three major studies and to make recommendations on:

a. The detailed action to be taken the day the armistice is signed.

b. Plans for disposition of surplus personnel, materiel, and facilities immediately following cessation of hostilities.

c. Determination of the size, composition and disposition of the Post-War Air Force.

The directive pointed out that study on the subjects proposed was already in progress in the office of the AC/AS, Plans and in the Advisory Council; the proposed committee was directed to take advantage of all such studies. A most interesting stipulation of the directive is this: "It is desired that personnel should be so chosen as to make available a preponderance of original thought relatively free from the influence of precedents set by demobilization following World War I."

The Special Projects Office and the Project Planning Division

* In the reorganization of the Army that became effective 29 March 1943, Col. F. Trubee Davison, who had been A-1 since 12 January 1942, was replaced by Brig. Gen. J. M. Bevans, who was given the title AC/AS, Personnel (AAPS-10, "Organization of the Army Air Arm, 1935-1945," p. 174). Colonel Davison was made chief of a new special staff section, the Special Projects Office, with the rather vague mission of "Legislative planning" (Memo for General Arnold from Maj. Gen. George Stratemeyer, C/AS, 13 Mar. 1943, in AAG 521-C0). As it turned out, the SPO devoted itself to redeployment, demobilization, and postwar planning.
apparently worked independently of each other; but Colonel Davison
sought the cooperation of the British and the divisions of the Air
Staff.*

The Project Planning Division, on 18 June 1943, submitted to the
Chief of Staff through the Commanding General, Army Service Forces, a
Survey of Demobilization Planning; this was a broad outline, based on
four assumptions:

1. This Nation would emerge as the world's foremost military
power and would be prepared for action in many parts of the world.

2. The war in Europe would terminate before the Japanese
surrender.

3. The United States would furnish an important share of
large-scale occupation troops.

4. Public opinion would demand a rapid demobilization.

As specific problems emerged, they were to be solved by existing War
Department agencies or by ad hoc committees.

On 10 July General Somervell recommended to the Chief of Staff that
the "demobilization planning then being done by the Army Air Forces
be consolidated with the work of the Project Planning Division, . . ."* in
other words, that the Special Projects Office be taken over by the ASF.
General Somervell's recommendation was not accepted. Apparently General
Somervell did not know that three days before the date of his memo to the

--- * What may have been one result of such cooperation is "A Study
to Determine the Minimum Air Power the United States should have at the
Conclusion of the War in Europe," prepared by the Operational Plans
Division, Air Staff, April 1943, which includes an observation con-
cerning the post-armistice deployment of the AAF (p. 11). See also
Memo for the CG, AAF, by Col. J. H. McCormick, DAC/AS, Personnel,
30 June 1943, in AAG 370-01-A.
Chief of Staff, Secretary of War Stimson had written to Under Secretary Patterson and General Marshall directing them to make demobilization planning a War Department, rather than an ASF, responsibility. Consequently, on 22 July the Project Planning Division was abolished; and, in its stead, the Special Planning Division (SPD) was organized as part of the War Department Special Staff. General Tompkins and his ASF staff were transferred to the new division, and Colonel Davison became the AAF representative. The AAF had no formal representation but kept in close touch with SPD through the Control Division of the AAF G-1 Section. The Special Projects Office continued under the jurisdiction of the AAF.

The Secretary of War in his memo, which was, in effect a directive establishing the Special Planning Division, had said that the new organization was to be responsible to, and would report to, the Under Secretary of War, who would, of course, consult with the Chief of Staff on all military aspects of the division's activity. In the instrument that implemented the Secretary's memo, the decision as to jurisdiction is phrased with an apparently significant difference: "The Director, Special Planning Division, will report to the Secretary of War through the Under Secretary of War on policy matters relating to industrial demobilization and through the Chief of Staff on matters relative to military policy."

The mission of the SPD was a complex one. Its responsibilities in connection with industry and with the disposal of surplus facilities, installations, and other property are of no concern here; but even the things with which this chapter is concerned—the preparation of plans...
for redeployment, for determining "the organization, composition and
size of the post war military establishment," and for the eventual
demobilization of the Army—are by no means simple.

Great stress was laid on the necessity for keeping secret the
existence of the new division in order to avoid a public relaxation
in the war effort should it become known that we were deeply involved
in preparations for demobilization." This fear of a public reaction
was probably well founded. Many people would doubtless have felt that
the war should be won, or much more nearly won than it was in the
summer of 1943, before time and money were spent on postwar planning.
One AAF officer, when he read in a secret document that a group had
been organized to engage in demobilization planning, took a red pencil
and underlined the word "demobilization," adding a question mark in
the margin opposite. Then, below the question mark, he wrote "Already!"

Redeployment was the problem that needed to be solved first; indeed,
for the AAF there was to be no demobilization until redeployment had
been completed and Japan had surrendered. * There would be some

* This statement is contradicted in a memo of 13 September 1943, in
which the statement is made that after the defeat of Germany forty-three
groups could be returned from the European-African theater and demobilized
(Memo for Director, SPD, from Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy, AC/S, in AAG
370.01.). Eight days later, however, the author of that memo wrote: "One
hundred and twelve air groups will be released from the European-
African theater, but no air groups will be demobilized." (Memo for
Director, SPD, from Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy, AC/S, 21 September 1943,
in AAG 370.01.) It would seem that General Handy, during the interim
between memos, had been apprized of the fact that AAF leaders considered
it necessary to redeploy practically the whole ETO-MTO contingent of the
AAF—except the units selected for occupation duty—in order to bring
the Pacific War to an end as quickly as possible.
demobilization of the AGF and ASF almost from the moment of Germany's capitulation; it was thought that during "Period I"—the time from the defeat of Germany to the surrender of Japan—activities would be about one-fourth demobilization and three-fourths redeployment.

The first thinking about demobilization had to do with the procedure to be followed. On 30 June 1945 Colonel McCormick of A-1 wrote a memo to General Arnold setting forth the advantages of unit demobilization over individual discharges. From the military point of view there was, of course, no comparison. Unit demobilization is simple to administer, it ignores equity and other social considerations on the ground that they lie without the purview of the Army, and it keeps units not yet demobilized at war strength and fully operational. The other method makes it possible to reward those individuals who have served longest and sacrificed most by releasing them first; it also makes it possible to control, to some extent, the absorption into the civilian economy of the men to be released by keeping them in service until jobs are available. Colonel McCormick closed his memo by recommending that:

"a. The rate of demobilization be determined by military necessity for deployment and maintenance of the armed forces.  
  b. The absorption of discharged soldiers in the national economy be the responsibility of appropriate civilian agencies.  
  c. The standard operation procedure be unit demobilization."

The Director of the Special Planning Division apparently realized, however, that unit demobilization, however much it might be preferred by the military, would not be acceptable to the American people. He
expressed to General Marshall the belief that no one of the methods* discussed would be satisfactory by itself. He suggested that certain units be selected for inactivation and that enlisted personnel be screened and then transferred into those units in the sequence of dependency, age, and length of service.

The AAF Redistribution Center

The next step in the redeployment and demobilization program of the AAF was the activation, effective 15 August 1943, of the AAF Redistribution Center at Atlantic City, New Jersey. The mission of the Center was:

a. To receive all Army Air Forces personnel returning to the continental United States from overseas, except those returned for hospitalization or on specific assignment, and to receive such Army Air Forces personnel as may be transferred to the Redistribution Centers by continental commands and air forces, and after examination and re-evaluation assign them to appropriate stations, detail them to rest camps or effect their separation from the service.

b. To maintain and operate rest camps to which Army Air Forces personnel may be sent for necessary rest.

Simultaneously with the establishment of the Redistribution Center, there were activated Redistribution Stations No. 2 and No. 2 at Atlantic City and Miami Beach, Florida, respectively, and rest camps at Lake Lure, North Carolina, Castle Hot Springs, Arizona, and Camp Mystic, Texas.

The Redistribution Center, which became the Personnel Distribution Command (PDC) on 1 June 1944, later opened Redistribution Stations at Santa Monica and Santa Ana in California, at Camp Davis and Greensboro in North Carolina, and at San Antonio, Texas. The PDC also acquired during 1944 and 1945 more than a dozen convalescent

* Demobilization by skills, by length of service, by age, and by dependency are the methods mentioned in General Tompkins' letter.
hospitals (some of which also served as regional hospitals) and several overseas replacement depots.

Planning Assumptions

In order to carry on their studies of the problems involved in redeployment and demobilization and in the matter of the postwar air force, SPO and SFO found it necessary to make, or have made for them, certain "assumptions"—the military term for guesses. By August 1943 it had been decided that the Axis powers in Europe could not reasonably be expected to collapse before 1 September 1943; that date, which had been furnished to SPO by G-2, was therupon accepted, for planning purposes, as the date upon which it would be necessary to have redeployment and demobilization plans worked out in final form. *

Other basic assumptions, or ground rules, were that groups to be moved from the ETO-WTO to the CBI would go direct, the flight echelons with multi-engine aircraft by air, other flight echelons and all ground echelons by water. They would be preceded by such engineer, service, and depot troops as would be required to prepare the necessary airfields, gasoline storage, communications facilities, and airbase defenses. Flight echelons of groups going to the Southwest Pacific and the South and Central Pacific would fly to the United States, entering through Presque Isle or Miami, and then go to Australia via Hawaii. Ground echelons would go by boat through the Mediterranean and Red Seas or by way of the Panama Canal.

* This date was not universally accepted; it appears that OSS, JCS, and JFS were using 1 October 1944, and that the AAF also preferred the later date. (Memo for DC/S from Brig. Gen. W. F. Tompkins, Director, SPD, 5 Feb. 1944, in AAG 370.01-M.)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
Early Redeployment

Even before these plans were made, a more immediate redeployment was in prospect. In October 1943 General Giles, Chief of the Air Staff, wrote to General Chennault, in part: "Furthermore, if the Mediterranean show proceeds as now planned, two (2) P-51 groups (the 27th and 86th) will be transferred from the Twelfth to the Fourteenth Air Force next spring." In November longer range redeployment plans were revealed by General Giles to General Twining, commanding general of the Thirteenth Air Force, and to General Kenney, commanding general, Allied Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific and also of the Fifth Air Force. The plans for the Southwest Pacific Theater were superseded, however, by others set forth in a message from General Arnold on 29 January 1944. The new schedule called for the shipment to General Kenney's command, between October 1944 and June 1945, of seven very heavy bombardment groups, twenty-four heavy bombardment groups, eight medium and light groups, nineteen fighter and fighter-bomber groups, seven squadrons of night fighters, two reconnaissance groups plus two squadrons, seven troop carrier groups plus three squadrons, and five very long-range troop carrier groups. General Arnold's message also contained a request for General Kenney's comments on the proposed scheduling. General Kenney responded to the request by pointing out that he was hardly in a position to criticize the suggested order of shipments because he did not know the reasons behind Washington's planning. He did state emphatically, however, that all combat units except the very heavy bombers should be accompanied or preceded by fighter units to give protection during the establishment of new bases. He also said that there should be at least one troop carrier group for every four combat groups; hence he could not
have been pleased with the proposed ratio of about one to five—12-3/4
39
troop carrier groups to 60 groups plus 9 squadrons.

Some of the units which it was thus proposed to send to the Southwest
Pacific, as well as some of those to be sent to the South Pacific and the
CBI, would be troops fresh from training, going overseas for the first
time; but most of them would have to be redeployed from the ETO and MT0.
The reverses that were to be suffered in Europe late in 1944 put a stop to
planning for any such wholesale redeployment in the first half of 1945
as was here contemplated; but there was some redeployment from the MT0 in
the spring of 1944. The 33rd and 61st Fighter Groups were sent to China
by way of India in February and March; there they flew P-40's and P-47's
for the Fourteenth Air Force. \[40\] Later, in September, the 33rd was transferred
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to Burma, where it joined the Tenth Air Force. Another addition to the
Tenth Air Force was the 12th Bombardment Group (N), which left Italy in
42
the early spring of 1944. Originally a B-25 outfit, the group used
43
both B-25's and A-26's in Burma. There was also, in India, an instance
of what might be called temporary redeployment. The flying echelons of
the 64th Troop Carrier Group and the 14th Troop Carrier Squadron of the
62d Troop Carrier Group left Sicily early in April for detached service
in India; they rejoined the ground echelons, which had remained in Sicily,
in June. \[44\]

The "Tompkins Demobilization Plan," as revealed early in February,
assumed that there would be, on 1 September 1944, 124 groups in ETO-MT0.\[45\]

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* There were other movements of troops—such as the transfer of the five
groups comprising the 52d Troop Carrier Wing from the MT0 to England—which
are not here regarded as redeployment because, although the movement was from
one theater to another, it was not a movement from one war to the other.

\[45\] It may be of interest to note here that there actually were 119 groups
in ETO-MT0 on 31 August 1944 (Army Air Forces Statistical Digest, World
War II, p. 6). On the same date there were 56 groups in the Pacific, including
Alaska (Ibid., pp. 2-11).
It assumed, furthermore, that the defeat of Germany would release 112
groups for redeployment, leaving in Europe and Africa an occupation force of
42 groups. The AAF plan involved the transfer of more than 7,000
aircraft and approximately half a million men. The British at this
time were proposing a deployment to the Central and Southwest Pacific
of only 2,700 aircraft, and there was considerable speculation at AAF
headquarters as to the reason for what seemed to the American planners
such unrealistic thinking.

War Department Planning

Planning for demobilization, some of which seems to have been of an extremely practical nature, went on throughout 1944. On 20 March
there was activated at Fort Dix, New Jersey, a separation center, which

* The 2,700 presumably represents the British idea of the proper figure for the combined British-American deployment; such a total, however, seems at variance with the view of Prime Minister Churchill, as revealed by General Arnold in his book Global Mission (New York: Harper, 1949). In connection with the Quebec conference, September 1944, General Arnold wrote: “As the days passed, it became more and more apparent that the Prime Minister desired, for political reasons, to see Britain in on the final conquest of Japan. He wanted to be there with his main fleet; he wanted to be there with some 500 to 1,000 heavy bombers; and there was no doubt that the President would like very much to have it arranged along that line. The Prime Minister said that the British would not be able to hold up their heads if they were denied this opportunity to cooperate. Then he turned to me and said, ‘With all your wealth of air bases, you would not deny me the more pitance of a few for my heavy bombers, would you?’” (p. 526)
For the British to contribute 500 or 1,000 heavy bombers out of a total of 2,700 aircraft—even though they sent no other types—would still make the American contribution ridiculously small in view of the number of U.S. aircraft that would be available and the universal desire to get the war over with as quickly as possible.
was to serve as a pilot installation to provide experience in discharge procedures. Within the first week of its existence, the number of basic discharge forms was reduced from thirty-two to five, the number of copies required from fifty-seven to twenty-one, and the number of signatures from thirty to six.

Before the end of April the SPO, in response to a suggestion by General Giles, had prepared a list of "Actions to be Taken by AAF Commanding Generals in ETO and MTO Immediately Following the Defeat of Germany." The item on this list of chief interest here is the provision that personnel with longest overseas service be transferred, so far as such transfers could be effected without too seriously damaging the operating efficiency of the units concerned, from units scheduled for further combat into units to be sent back to the United States for strategic reserve. Even before this list was compiled, AAF Letter 55-3, dated 10 April 1944, subject: "Policies and Procedures for Redeployment of Army Air Forces" had been sent through channels to theater commanders. By midsummer the War Department had evolved a personnel plan and had it tested by the Caribbean Defense Command, and the AAF had followed with its "J" plan; all this planning resulted in War Department Readjustment Regulation 1-1, dated 30 August 1944.

RR 1-1, though modified by changes from time to time, remained to the end the basic plan for the demobilization of enlisted personnel. It provided that the War Department, as soon as a readjustment of the troop basis should become possible, would inform the commanding general of each theater or major command what his new mission was to be, and what would be the proposed troop basis. Suggestions from the field commanders would be
invited, and then the War Department would decide how many elements from each theater or command would be placed in each of the four categories: I, those to be retained for continued service in their current commands; II, those to be transferred from one theater to another or to the United States, or from the United States to a theater; III, those to be reorganized and then put in one or the other of the preceding categories; and IV, those to be inactivated. Each commanding general would then designate specific organizations to make up his quota in each category.*

By the terms of RR 1-1, any married female member of the Army, commissioned or enlisted, was to be separated upon application, regardless of any other consideration, if her husband had been separated. Other female personnel and enlisted men were to be separated according to a point system based on length of service since 16 September 1940, overseas service, combat service, and parenthood. The War Department would decide how much weight to give to each of the factors constituting the "Adjusted Service Rating Score" and then, after V-E Day, when partial demobilization would be in order, would set a "critical score" at such point that, by

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* By the spring of 1945 the categories had been changed: I, units scheduled for direct redeployment to another theater; II, units scheduled for redeployment through the United States; III, units to be assigned to the Occupation Air Force; and IV, surplus units and personnel scheduled for return to the United States for inactivation or separation.

† Officers could be relieved from active duty under existing regulations, which made provision for the relief of officers over forty-five years of age "for whom no suitable assignments are available or in prospect" (Ltr to CG's, all Forces and Commands, by Maj. Gen. J. A. Ulio, TAG, 8 December 1944, in AG 210.25; the age was lowered to 38 in January 1944—see Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, 4 January 1944, p. 6) and of officers whose relief was "essential to national health, safety, or interest"—which phrase generally implied return to a key position in essential industry—or to prevent undue hardship (AGO Ltr. AG 210.83, 29 August and 24 November 1941, and WD Cir. #341, 19 Aug. 1944 and WD Cir. #485, 29 Dec. 1944).
the separation of all personnel having that score or a higher one, the
Army would be reduced to the size regarded as necessary to finish the
war against Japan.

The AAF approved the ASR plan for enlisted personnel, but strongly
objected to making the same policy applicable to officers. Colonel
Davison argued that, no matter how much emphasis might be given to the
principle that the ASR was secondary to military essentiality, the use
of a score for officers would inevitably lead to pressure for the separation
of high-score officers and would, at the same time, impede the separation
of officers of marginal efficiency who had low scores and wished to remain
in uniform. Colonel Davison pointed out that every officer had accepted
his commission voluntarily, and that the higher pay and other advantages
enjoyed by officers imposed on them the responsibility to remain in the
service as long as they were needed.\footnote{The AAF was overruled by the
General Staff, however; and when Readjustment Regulation 1-5,\footnote{\textit{Post}, 1-5, covering the separation of officers, warrant officers, and flight officers, was finally
approved, on 26 April 1945, it provided that the ASR score be taken
into consideration along with efficiency and the officer's preference for
retention or separation; but military essentiality was to be the controlling
factor. For officers, however, since the ASR score was a secondary
consideration, there was to be no critical score.}}

\textbf{Planning at Headquarters, AAF}

AAF leaders were greatly concerned over the possible result of the
first public announcement of their plans for Period I. They feared
that there might be a disastrous lowering of morale in the AAF when it

\textit{Post}, 1-2, covering the movements of personnel that would be required
after V-E Day; 1-3, prescribing an athletic and recreational program
for Period I; and 1-4, setting up an Army educational plan, were published
on 15 September 1944.
was revealed that, while there would be partial demobilization for the AGF and ASF, there would be nothing but redeployment for the AAF. General Arnold thought that any very serious morale problem could be averted by emphasizing the vital importance of the role that the AAF was to play in the Pacific and the necessity for throwing our entire air potential against the Japanese in order to minimize losses and hasten the end of the war. At the same time he recognized that AAF personnel, especially those who had long been engaged in service that was hazardous or arduous, or both, were in all fairness as much entitled to be returned to civilian life as were their opposite numbers in the AGF and ASF. Hence he proposed to discharge AAF personnel in the same proportion as the other forces by replacing those released with new inductees and with ground and service personnel whose units would be inactivated but who as individuals would not be eligible for discharge. He thought that a clear statement of this policy, and the promise that AAF personnel redeployed directly to the Pacific could expect early separation or at least rotation to the United States, would go far toward alleviating dissatisfaction.

Planning for the Postwar Air Force

Before going on to the implementation of the plans for redeployment and demobilization, it may be well to consider the other responsibility of the Special Projects Office. From the beginning of the planning for the postwar period, AAF leaders talked in terms of an air force of 105 groups. This, of course, was not as large an establishment as they would have liked to have; it represented rather the maximum force that they thought the American public would permit and support in times of peace.
Plans for the deployment of this force, as expressed in September 1943, called for twenty-one groups to be assigned to the Atlantic, including Europe and Africa (ten VHB, ten fighter and fighter-bomber, and one troop carrier); fifty-eight to the Pacific and Asia (twenty-five VHB, one heavy bombardment, twenty-five fighter and fighter-bomber, one reconnaissance, and six troop carrier); and twenty-six to the Zone of Interior, Alaska, and the Canal Zone (five VHB, one heavy bombardment, four medium and light bombardment, ten fighter and fighter-bomber, two reconnaissance, and four troop carrier). It was estimated that combat personnel for 105 groups would total more than half a million men; with the necessary training and transport troops and antiaircraft artillery the total personnel would be more than a million. At the estimated annual cost of more than $4,000 per man, a "self-contained, complete U.S. Post War Air Force" would require more than four-fifths of the amount that could realistically be expected to be made available for all the armed forces of the country. Little more than $300,000,000 would be available for the Navy, the ground forces, the service forces, ROTC, the Reserves, and Universal Military Training (UMT) if the Air Force were to get more than $4,500,000,000 out of a total of $5,000,000,000. UMT alone was expected to cost $1,500,000,000; and there was no doubt in the minds of the leaders of the armed forces that UMT was to be a feature of postwar American life.

*The directive of the Chief of Staff to the Acting Director, Special Planning Division, WDSS, 13 November 1944, contains a reference to the vastly increased power which will be given us by an annual program of universal military training—something we have never previously enjoyed." (Quoted in Memo, Acting Director, SPD to ADC/S, 15 Nov. 1944, in AAG 381-C.) See also Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, 21 August 1944, p. 6.
Obviously, the AAF planners during 1943 were failing or refusing to recognize that, once the war was won, the flood of money that Congress had cheerfully been appropriating could be expected, in the light of past experience, to diminish to a mere trickle. And yet, as late as February 1944 a postwar deployment was suggested—"for planning purposes"—that would have assigned 17 1/2 groups to the Atlantic area, 11 1/2 to the Asiatic-Pacific, and 21 to the United States, Alaska, and the Caribbean,—a total of 153 groups.

By mid-February 1944 the AAF was ready with its IFWAF (Initial Post War Air Force) Plan; this, as was to have been expected, called for an air force of 105 groups (thirty-one VHF, eleven heavy bombardment, four medium and light bombardment, forty-five fighter and fighter-bomber, three reconnaissance, and eleven troop carrier), plus thirty separate squadrons (night fighter, photo reconnaissance, tactical reconnaissance, and mapping). The personnel for such a combat force would total 525,000, and would have to be complemented by an equal or larger number of troops for administration, training, and other 21 activities.

Within the next few weeks or months—at all events by 7 July—the AAF planners seem to have become aware that plans for a postwar air force must take into consideration the world situation. An air force such as would be required in the event that the United States might have to stand alone against a powerful combination of aggressor nations would become an inexcusable drain on the public purse the moment that an effective organization of the nations of the world made aggression against the United States impossible or most unlikely. Hence the SPO, doubtless in conjunction with A0/AS, Plans, issued on 7 July 1944, IFWAF Plan No. 2, calling for an air force of 75 groups (three squadrons each, as compared with four squadrons...
each for the 105 groups), plus thirty separate squadrons. The 105-group Air Force would be required "after the defeat of Japan and prior to the establishment of an effective organization to maintain peace, . . ." Upon the establishment of such an organization, the Air Force would be reduced to the strength called for by PWA Plan No. 2.

On 13 November the Chief of Staff, apparently disturbed by the fact that the then current planning—even with PWA Plan No. 2 substituted for IPWA—would require an annual outlay for the armed forces of almost seven billion dollars, directed a re-survey of postwar military strength. This study was to be based on the assumption that the total annual expenditure for the military would be $5,000,000,000, of which the War Department share would be $2,800,000,000. Allowing $1,500,000,000 for UMT and $200,000,000 for the Reserves, National Guard, and ROTC, the amount left for the Regular Army would be $1,100,000,000.

The "Committee to Re-Survey Postwar Strength," on which the AAF representatives were General Kuter and Colonels Baker and Moffat, held an organization meeting on 16 November. At the second meeting, held on 27 November, certain decisions were reached. It was agreed that $1,100,000,000 would be sufficient for an Army of 275,000, of whom 25,000 would be officers. It was further decided that 55,000 of this personnel would go to the ASF, 100,000 to the AGF, and 120,000 to the AAF. The AAF could hardly quarrel with an allocation that gave it more than 43 per cent of

* Viewing the matter in the light of subsequent events, there is more than a bit of irony in the assumption that the international organization for the maintenance of peace would "be dominated by the four major powers: namely, United States, Britain, U. S. S. R., and China." See Memo for DC/S by Maj. Gen. W. F. Tompkins, 11 November 1944, in AAG 361-C.
the total; but a 120,000-man air force was a far cry, indeed, from one of 105 or even 75 groups. It was thought in the AAF that a proper distribution of the 120,000 would assign 30,000 to overhead and commands and 40,000 to the training establishment, leaving only 50,000 for the tactical components. That number of combat personnel would suffice for fewer than 20 groups.

At their third meeting, held on or before 1 December, the members of the committee considered the possibility of a postwar Army with 400,000 enlisted men. Such an Army would have made possible an air force of from 20 to 24 groups instead of 16.

All this planning culminated in the War Department Plan for the Post War Military Establishment, published in November 1945. This document gives no figures to show the number of enlisted men there were to be in the postwar air force; but since provision is made for an officers' corps of 25,000, it is safe to assume that a total personnel of 275,000 was what the planners had in mind. Thus there would have been a 16-group, 120,000-man air force.

The fortunes of the AAF-USAF did not sink quite that low. The nadir in groups was reached in June 1950, at which time the USAF could muster only forty-six groups, many, if not all, of which were below combat strength.

* Colonel Davison did point out that such an arbitrary division of strength among the three components—without consideration of the mission of each—did not seem wise. (Memo for the Advisory Council by Col. F. T. Davison, 13 Dec. 1944, in AAC 350.06-I. See also Memo for Director, SPD by Col. Davison, 22 Dec. 1944, in AAC 321-I.)

# It was proposed that there should be three VHB, four HB, one T/C, and eight fighter groups, plus one photo reconnaissance, 2 tactical reconnaissance, one mapping, and three night fighter squadrons—a total of sixteen groups and seven squadrons.
military personnel at this time totaled 111,277. The low water mark in personnel, however, was established in May 1947, at which time the total was only 303,614. But in June 1950 came Korea, and without ever having reached the minimum size once planned for it, the Air Force began again to expand.

The Occupational Air Force

As early as May 1945 plans had been made for the United States Occupational Air Force in Europe. It was decided that there should be 26-1/2 groups, plus 9 squadrons: 10 bombardment groups (H), 3 bombardment groups (N), 10 fighter groups, 2-1/2 troop carrier groups, 1 composite reconnaissance group, 2 air transport cargo groups, 4 night fighter squadrons, and 5 liaison squadrons.† The Ninth Air Force, which at the time contained most of the specified units (all except the troop carrier groups ‡), was designated the Occupational Air Force.

* These figures may be compared with the maximum figure for groups—269-1/4 in December 1943 (AAF Statistical Digest, World War II, p. 5)—and the maximum personnel figure of 2,411,894, reached in March 1944 (ibid., p. 16).

† A document dated two weeks later than the one containing this information (Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, 11 May 1945, p. 15) indicates a very slightly different deployment and reveals the types of aircraft involved; according to it, the OAF was to consist of 10 B-17 groups; 3 B-26 groups; 6 P-47 and 4 P-51 groups; 2-1/2 C-47 groups; 2 F-5 and 2 F-6 squadrons and 1 B-17/24 weather reconnaissance squadron, to form the composite reconnaissance group; 5 liaison squadrons; and 1 Mosquito and 2 P-61 squadrons. The later proposal thus called for only three, instead of four, night fighter squadrons (AG 322 TS (28 May 1945) OB-S-E-APOCR-W, for CO's ETO and MTO).

‡ The IX Troop Carrier Command had been transferred to the First Allied Airborne Army (Lt. Gen. SHAPE AG 322-1 (First Allied Airborne Army) GCP-AGM, 16 August 1945).
The Role of Headquarters, AAF, in Redeployment

Before taking up the redeployment experiences of the Zone of Interior and theater commands, of the numbered air forces, and of some more or less typical individual units, it may be best to finish the story of redeployment from the point of view of Headquarters, AAF. * AAF leaders in Washington must accept part, though by no means all, of the responsibility for the fact that the whole redeployment program was characterized by "utter confusion, pervading all echelons of command . . ." Part of the blame belongs to the War Department General Staff, part to the ASF, and part to the headquarters of almost every echelon from theaters and air forces on down.

The War Department issued directives, some of which were confusing

* In September 1944, overall responsibility for redeployment operations was vested in AC/AS Operations, Commitments, and Requirements (OC&R), and at the same time each AAF Headquarters staff office was called upon to appoint a redeployment officer to coordinate with AC/AS OC&R all matters pertaining to redeployment. Likewise each continental air force and command was to appoint in its headquarters a redeployment officer to see that the directives and other instructions of AC/AS OC&R were carried out in its organization (AAF Reg. 20-45, 13 September 1944). AC/AS OC&R immediately delegated his redeployment responsibility to the Theaters Branch of the Commitments Division (AAF HQ. Q1, 13 September 1944). It turned out later that, when a new agency was established, with the handling of redeployment as its primary mission (see below, p. ), considerable difficulty arose because of the apparent reluctance of AC/AS OC&R to surrender the authority thus given; or perhaps it would be fairer to say, because of the impossibility of arriving at a workable division of the functions of the two agencies.
or even contradictory; by the time requests for clarification or interpretation had been sent up through channels and the answers had come down, so that organizations in the field could know what was required of them, top level policy was likely to have changed, thus changing the requirement. For example, it was originally intended to redeploy organizations directly from the ETO-MTO to the Pacific. Military necessity required that the troops in ETO-MTO, which, aside from those already in the CBI and the Pacific, were the best trained troops we had, should be used to help finish the Japanese War.

As a strategic proposition the original redeployment scheme was simple and sound; it might have worked to perfection in a political and psychological vacuum. In practice, simplicity gave way to complexity, indecision, improvisation, confusion, and finally frustration. Without formal announcement, the policy was changed, probably late in 1944. From then on it was tacitly understood that organizations to be redeployed to the Pacific or CBI would be shipped via the United States. Personnel would be given opportunity to visit families or friends before being returned to combat.

It had also been the original intention of the AAF to send groups to their new assignment as nearly as possible intact, leaving behind only such personnel as were found to be not physically qualified for further combat duty and those for whom there were no longer places in the organization.* This policy was based on good sense. If carried out, it would give the AAF the benefits of the group's months, or years, of working together as a team; it would also preserve, perhaps even enhance, esprit de corps. But the policy was not carried out: there was

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*In the process of converting a group from HB to VHB—and of course many of the conversions were of that sort—some positions were abolished. Often, but not always, men thus rendered surplus could be retrained to fill positions in the new T/O.
too much pressure of public opinion against sending back into combat men who had already completed one tour of overseas duty, when there were thousands of others who had never been outside the Zone of Interior. Apparently yielding to this pressure, the AAF announced a change of policy early in January 1945. The new policy was to "replace to the maximum extent possible" personnel in units returning to the United States to be redeployed with personnel from the continental air forces and commands. This instruction was to be interpreted as meaning that commanders would replace at least 50 per cent of personnel, exclusive of combat crews, with more than one year's overseas service but retain in the unit cadre strength of experienced personnel. The new policy did not last long. On 22 June it was superseded by a 100 per cent policy, by the terms of which none of the returning members of the group would be redeployed with it except the commanding officer, the deputy commander, holders of certain critical MOS's, and any volunteer who would sign a waiver of his right to be separated under the terms of RR 1-1, i.e., when his ASR score equaled or exceeded the critical score. The new policy virtually destroyed the original identity of the group and, of course, almost completely discouraged volunteering.\#80

The reversal of position by the AAF was now complete. Military necessity had been forgotten in the desire to appease the public. Instead of redeploying to the Pacific, groups filled with men experienced in combat and doubly valuable because of that experience, the AAF would send groups filled with inexperienced men who were being sent for the

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* The critical score had been set on "R-Day" (12 May 1945) at 85 for men and 110 for women.

\# As one officer of the 449th Bombardment Group put it: "No one wants to be left in the Group with a bunch of 'fillers'" (*History of the Second Air Force for 1945," I, 66).
sole reason that they had not been in combat. As one writer put it, "The whole redeployment project, ... became something very much like activation with cadre." 21 Almost at once, however, Headquarters AAF retreated slightly from this position. On 18 June it was announced that individuals who had completed only partial tours of overseas duty might be recommitted to combat. For flying personnel, complete tours were defined in terms of specific numbers of missions or hours. For heavy bomber crews the figure was 18 missions or 110 hours; for medium and light bomber crews it was 35 missions or 150 hours; and for troop carrier crews 100 combat hours or 500 hours in the theater. All ground personnel who had left the United States on or after 1 December 1944 were considered to have completed only partial tours. This new standard of eligibility for recommitment made possible a change in the 100 per cent remaining policy. "As a guide, normally 20% of the officers (other than air crews) by grade should be retained in redeployed units." Likewise, "normally 20% of ground enlisted personnel should be retained." 23 It was thought that 10 per cent of the air crews would be combat experienced.

In brief, ... the air crews—originally not to be remanned at all—were to go out with proportionately fewer combat experienced men than the ground elements. Ten percent of the former and 20 percent of the latter were supposed to be redeployed individuals, although the units at the same time were supposed to be 100 percent remanned. And this reshuffling was to be done, and units made ready to fulfill their mission on arrival in the new theater, all within time limits set by the War Department on the premise of minimum remanning and training. 25

Having reached the height of inconsistency in its remanning policy, Headquarters AAF apparently resolved to do nothing more about it.

Suggestions for changes were made by lower echelons and by AC/AS, OCMR; but no change was made, or, at least, none was officially announced.
Redeployment in the 7/I Commands

Headquarters AAF had called upon its subordinate commands to be prepared to put into effect the AAF plans for redeployment and demobilization immediately upon the announcement of Germany's surrender. The Air Technical Service Command, to take a typical example, replied in an indorsement to the letter from Washington; this indorsement, which apparently was intended to be disseminated throughout the command, passed on to the subordinate components much of the information that had been received by the command from Headquarters AAF and designated certain tasks to be performed, at the proper time, by specific officers of the command.

The 7/I command that was chiefly concerned with redeployment, however, was the Continental Air Forces, which had been activated 12 December 1944 with complete supervision of redeployment as its chief mission.* Temporarily located, at first in the Pentagon and then at Bolling Field, Headquarters CAF, activated at cadre strength only, spent much of the first part of its existence in preparing for the move to what was intended to be its permanent quarters at Camp Springs, Maryland, renamed, on 7 February 1945, Andrews Field. In view of the way in which the whole redeployment program was conducted, it will doubtless surprise no one to learn that Headquarters CAF, when it went out of existence on 21 March 1946, was still at Bolling Field.

* Other missions were: air defense of the continental United States, joint air-ground training, and formation and command of the continental strategic reserve at the completion of redeployment (AAF Ltr (C) 20-9 for CG's all air forces and commands, by Lt. Gen. Barnay M. Giles, Dep. Comdr. AAF and C/S, 16 Dec. 1944, subject: Activation of Headquarters Continental Air Forces).
Briefly, the AAF plan for redeployment* was for each organization about to be redeployed to be screened to remove all personnel ineligible for redeployment; among such personnel would be those found to be physically unqualified for further combat duty and those who, by virtue of high ASR scores, would become eligible for separation before the organization could be redeployed or very soon after its arrival in the new theater. Vacancies caused by these transfers from the organization would be filled with low-score individuals from other organizations in the command, air force, or theater. Thus the group would leave for its new assignment completely manned with personnel eligible for redeployment.

The unit, upon arrival at a port of debarkation, would proceed at once to an Initial Processing Station (IPS), perhaps Bradley Field or Hunter Field. There personnel records would be processed, medical examinations conducted, and other necessary procedures carried out. Within 48 hours, the returnees would be on trains, headed for 30 days of "R&R" (recovery, rehabilitation, and recovery), at the end of which the members of the organization would reconvene at a Central Assembly Station (CAS). There replacements would be provided for any personnel who had, for one reason or another, become ineligible for redeployment; and the unit would then be turned over to the Training

*The basic authorization for all subsequent redeployment planning was a report prepared by the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC)—known before May 1943 as the Joint Staff Planners (JSP), an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This report appeared in April 1944 as a Top Secret document under the designation JCS 521/5. It was revised in May and was approved in June as JCS 521/6. There were also later revisions ("Redeployment: The Role of Headquarters Continental Air Forces," Hq. SAC, June 1946, I, 5).
Command for conversion or refresher training. Upon the completion of that training, the organization would be promptly sent to the Pacific.

That was the plan. Theoretically it was perfect; in practice it was anything but perfect, as the experiences of the air forces concerned and the units that were to be redeployed will indicate.

Redeployment in the Overseas Commands

In the first place, the overseas theaters were slow in making known to lower echelons their redeployment plans. General Eisenhower said that planning in the ETO started in February 1945,* but the "Tentative European Theater of Operations Basic Plan for Redeployment and Readjustment" was not revealed until 21 April 1945—very shortly before V-E Day. This was approved by WDGS on 30 April and published as "European Theater of Operations Basic Plan" on 15 May 1945. The overseas commanders should not be judged too harshly, however; they were, after all, primarily concerned with winning one war, rather than with making plans for winning another.†

Nevertheless, the air forces were sorely handicapped by the failure of the theater to establish any firm plan before V-E Day and by the fact that plans once made were so often and, apparently, so arbitrarily

*Actually, a "Redeployment Planning Group" was established as a special staff section of Headquarters ETOUSA in November 1944 (GO 118, ETOUSA, 27 November 1944) and issued "Redeployment Planning Directive No. 1" on 6 January 1945 (Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization . . . , p. 221).

† The Theater Commander had directed that nothing was to interfere with combat operations; consequently the plan was not submitted to combat units below army group for comment. In some respects this decision was certainly unwise, for it "not only left many combat units with no knowledge of redeployment plans but deprived the planning committee of suggestions from combat commanders" (Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization . . . , p. 222).
changed. The historian of the Eighth Air Force complained bitterly of the difficulty encountered in meeting the commitments made for that air force by USSTAF and Headquarters AAF.

The situation in MTO was much the same. The Twelfth Air Force complained that redeployment schedules prepared between November 1944 and the following March were of little value because of the rapidity and frequency with which theater plans were changed. Not until two weeks after V-E Day was there a plan sufficiently firm to constitute a ground for action. "The actual forecast, on the basis of which most of the redeployment of this Air Force took place, was not received until 25 May 1945." 97

Lt. Col. A. W. Jensen, who was A-1 of the Twelfth Air Force, reveals graphically in a memo too long to be quoted here, the harassment to which he was subjected by higher echelons of command. In May, following instructions from higher headquarters—which seemed to him to be logical and to conform with current directives—he withdrew low score personnel from units being redeployed through the United States and replaced them with high score personnel. In view of the fact that almost 65 per cent of the personnel of the Twelfth Air Force had ASR scores above the critical score of 85, such a policy seemed imperative if there were to be low score personnel available for manning the units that were to be redeployed to the Pacific directly. But the higher echelons objected to the policy, and in June a directive was issued calling for the removal of all high score individuals—except volunteers—from units being redeployed either directly or indirectly. At this time the AC/3, A-1, AAF/MTO advised that units being redeployed through the United States...
might, if necessary, be shipped out of the theater at cadre strength. At about the same time, however, MTUSA directed that every unit being redeployed from the NTO must be up to full strength in personnel and must be able to perform its primary mission upon arrival in the new theater. Such units as had already been sent, far below strength, to staging areas were, before being shipped out, to be brought up to authorized strength by the transfer of personnel, either high score or low, in proper or related MOS. The new policy made it necessary to declare essential men who had already been transferred out of four groups scheduled for redeployment in July and to reassign them to their original organizations. Most of the men involved had been overseas for two and a half years and had ASR scores of more than 100; they were, understandably, not pleased at the prospect of continued combat duty; and some of them requested an investigation by an Inspector General. At a mass meeting held on 11 July, Colonel Jensen explained to the men why it had been necessary to declare them essential and keep them in groups destined for the Pacific; he promised that they would be the first to be rotated after arrival in the Pacific theater. During the closing minutes of the meeting, however, a telephone call from AAP/NTO revealed that enough low score men had been discovered in the Fifteenth Air Force to make the proposed reassignments unnecessary. Presumably, they had been there all the time.

Redeployment in the Z/I Air Forces

It was not the overseas air forces alone that suffered from what must have seemed the caprices and vagaries of the higher-ups. The 489th Bombardment Group (H) and the 369th Air Service Group were processed
at Bradley Field, Windsor Locks, Connecticut, in the latter part of December 1944.* The personnel of the groups scattered to their homes for 30 days on TDY for "Rehabilitation, Recuperation, and Recovery." They were to report to the Second Air Force on 22 January. Relatively minor personnel adjustments were contemplated: at least 50 per cent of the ground personnel with more than one year of overseas experience would be replaced, the bombardiers would be given transition training from the Sperry to the Norden bombsight, the navigators would get a refresher course in celestial navigation and instruction in the use of Loran equipment, and the other combat crew members would go to Davis-Monthan Field to receive such refresher training as might be required and to await the arrival of their "fly-away" B-24's. On 23 January Second Air Force was informed that plans had been changed: the 489th was to become a B-29 outfit and the 369th was to be trained for Very Heavy Bombardment support.

It is typical of the administrative fumbling which characterized the entire redeployment program that official word of the redesignation of the 489th as a Very Heavy Bombardment Group was not received by Headquarters, Second Air Force, until about 20 March 1945—two months after the decision had been taken. During all this time it was necessary to maintain two rosters of personnel—one for a Heavy Bombardment Group of four squadrons, the other for a Very Heavy Bombardment Group of three squadrons—and to report strength, overages, and shortages of personnel on the basis of two different Tables of Organization.180

The readiness dates, which had been 15 February for the 369th and the Ground Echelon of the 489th and 1 March for the Air and Flight Echelons

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* Some small units had been sent to the United States for redeployment even before this time. The 1st Air Combat Control Squadron, Amphibious, had arrived on 10 October, the 653d Signal Aircraft Warning Company on 7 November, and the 1st Composite Squadron on 15 November. All three were processed by the Third Air Force, the first at Hunter Field and the other two at Gulfport Army Air Field.
of the 439th, were changed to 1 June and 1 August.

It appears that the original intention was to have the Second Air Force redeploy 23 combat groups; as it actually turned out, the Second Air Force was to have been made responsible for the conversion and redeployment of four WB wings, each consisting of four WB groups and their associated service groups. Of these 32 groups, however, only one—the 369th Air Service Group—was redeployed; one other—the 439th Bombardment Group (WB)—was at a port of embarkation when the end of the war brought about the cancellation of the sailing. Eleven other bombardment groups and ten service groups belonging to the 47th, 20th, and 96th Bombardment Wings were partially manned; but none had completed training, and only one had been assigned any combat crews at war's end.

The groups of the remaining wing, the 13th, existed only on paper.

In addition to the 369th, only two groups were actually redeployed through the United States, both by the First Air Force. The Third and Fourth Air Forces and the First Troop Carrier Command did not complete the redeployment of any major units. Both the First and Third Air Forces operated Intermediate Processing Stations (IPS), the former at Bradley Field, Windsor Locks, Connecticut, and the latter at Hunter Field, Savannah, Georgia. Returnees were sent direct from ports of embarkation to an IPS; there they were quickly processed and then sent on to the place of their choice for 30 days' RR&R.

All four ZI air forces and the First Troop Carrier Command operated Central Assembly Stations (CAS). At these installations, according to the original plan, units would receive old members as they returned from their RR&R, screen out any who had become ineligible for redeployment, accept replacements to bring the organization up to authorized strength,
and then depart for the base at which they were to be trained for their new mission. In practice, the returnee, upon arrival at the CAS, was assigned to a squadron—frequently "X"—which was just a pool for replacements. If his old organization was one that was to be redeployed, he might or might not be reassigned to it. If he was aware that the reorganized group would have little in common with the group as he knew it, except the designation and a few key personnel, he might not much care whether he rejoined it or cast his lot with a different outfit.

The experiences of the first groups to be returned to the United States for redeployment to the Pacific graphically illustrate the best and the worst features of the program. The story of the 489th Bombardment Group and the 369th Air Service Group was told a few lines above. The next two major units to arrive for redeployment were the 319th Bombardment Group (M) and its associated group, the 514th Air Service Group. The members of these groups were processed at Bradley Field in January 1945 and had the same kind of pleasant treatment that had been so much enjoyed by personnel of the 489th Bombardment Group and the 369th Air Service Group some five weeks earlier. "Bradley was wonderful," one of them said. "I couldn't believe it was the Army—it was so efficient." 106

The task of converting the two organizations from B-25's* to A-26's was originally assigned to the Third Air Force; but on 1 February 1945 the groups were assigned to the First Air Force, and their conversion

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* The 319th Bombardment Group had been converted from B-26's to B-25's in the ETO.
Training was carried out at the First Air Force's Columbia AAB at Columbia, South Carolina.

If there had been doubt in the minds of members of the 319th and 514th about their being in the Army while they were at Bradley Field, that doubt was promptly dispelled when they reassembled, after R&R, at Columbia AAB. No one factor was responsible for the confusion, the chaos, that surrounded the two groups during the period of their assignment to the First Air Force. The groups' officer and enlisted personnel, Columbia AAB personnel, and the higher echelon headquarters involved—First Air Force, Continental Air Forces, and Army Air Forces—all contributed in various ways and in varying degrees to the mess that existed at Columbia in the late winter and early spring of 1945. The trouble started overseas, where the groups' administrative personnel had evidently "been more interested in watching operations . . . than in keeping up their paper work." Records were incomplete, incorrect, out-of-date, illegible, mutilated, poorly packed for shipment, and in some instances entirely missing. It was estimated that 75 percent of the records of the 319th and 65 percent of those of the 514th had to be completely remade at Columbia.

It can well be understood that this situation did nothing to endear the newcomers to such CAAB personnel as had to work overtime to get the group records in shape. Nor did the superciliousness with which members of the groups looked upon permanent party personnel as stay-at-homes, do anything to improve relations between group and base personnel; it was particularly galling to those permanent party members who had had quite as much combat experience as any member of the 319th. The group's
pilots showed a callous disregard for flying regulations; this, too, became a sore point.\textsuperscript{111}

There were, however, two sides to the question; and much was said for the other side. The 319th had been activated on 26 June 1942; its active combat period extended from November 1942 to 31 December 1944. It was doubtless, at least in part, this long and honorable service that led to the selection of the group as one of the first to be redeployed. It had been known for some time that the selection had been made; and yet, when the time for departure came, the group had to move from its base in Corsica to the POE in Italy on three days' notice.\textsuperscript{112} Neither this inauspicious beginning nor the ensuing uncomfortable voyage on a crowded transport served to dampen the men's spirits. From Bradley Field they scattered to their homes, proud of their group and cheerfully determined to acquit themselves against the Japs as creditably as they had against the Germans.

When processing got underway at Columbia, and it became apparent that the groups that would go to the Pacific would be very different from those that had returned from the MTO, morale immediately collapsed. Colonel Holzapple, who had commanded the 319th since August 1943, had anticipated that 20 per cent of his personnel would have to be replaced. But when all those with more than one year's overseas service, those with dependent children, those over 42 years of age, and those made ineligible by reclassification or medical disqualification had been eliminated, the

\textsuperscript{*} The Headquarters AAF estimate was 50 per cent.
replacement figure for the two groups proved to be 76 per cent. *

The eliminating were to be promptly replaced by fillers from the First Air Force. The organizations that were to contribute personnel were under orders to provide capable, qualified replacements. But it is not in human nature for the commander of an organization with a mission to perform, voluntarily to transfer from his command his best personnel, knowing that he will receive in return individuals who, however willing and able, cannot, for some time at least, serve as well as those whom they have replaced. Some commanders, no doubt, unselfishly sacrificed key men whom they could ill afford to lose; a larger number apparently took advantage of the opportunity to rid themselves of misfits and incompetents. Hence, many of the men sent to the 319th and 514th proved to be in no wise qualified for the jobs they were expected to perform, and had themselves to be replaced.

An equally serious difficulty in connection with the remaining of the two groups arose from the fact that many of the men sent as replacements had not had the ten-day furlough required by POM. At first the officers of the groups, of Columbia AAB, and of Headquarters, First Air Force, thought that this would make no difference, that men could be sent overseas without furloughs on the ground of military necessity. But it was War Department policy that any man who had not had the

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This statement is seemingly at variance with one in the group history of the 319th: "Final tabulation showed that sixty-four per cent of the original officer personnel and thirty-four per cent of the enlisted personnel were retained." (History, 319th Bomb. Gr., 1 Jan.-1 Aug. 1945, p.2) It may be, however, that eliminations from the 514th were enough higher to make the average 76 per cent; that explanation seems likely in view of the fact that the 514th was brought up to authorized strength at the last minute before sailing from Italy by the assignment of a great many men from various aircraft-warning units, most of whom may have lacked the qualifications for membership in an air service group.
required furlough was to be left behind; and the Deputy Chief of Air
Staff ruled that that policy must be followed in the case of the 319th
and 514th. To have 353 men absent for ten days during the very
brief period allowed the two groups for their conversion training—17 days
for the ground echelons and five weeks for the air echelon—was, as
may be supposed, a severe handicap for trainers and trainees alike.

It had been intended to have processing and such basic training as
might be required all finished before the group training began. The
Base officials had expected to supervise the individual training rather
closely, and then to allow the groups a large measure of independence
in their operational training. Since many members of the groups had
applied for and received extensions of their RR&R, and since many First
Air Force units were slow in supplying fillers, the processing dragged
on and had not been completed when training began on 6 March. From
that time on training and processing were conflicting activities.
Personnel of the groups were interested in training; they were anxious to
learn to fly or to service their new aircraft. Processing they loathed
as a mere matter of sweating out more lines. To them it was just a lot
of unnecessary red tape. Even more they hated the basic training,
 inexorably required by training directives, of every man who could not
prove that he had previously completed it. Because of the condition
of the organizational records of the two groups, it was inevitable that
a great many individuals who had long since finished their basic training
had to go through it again. To be forced to submit to a routine designed
for raw recruits was, to the battle-seasoned veterans of the MTO, adding
insult to injury. Films such a "Flak" and "Target for Today" were shown,
as required by regulations, to men who not only had seen the films.
perhaps four or five times before, but had learned more from experience with flak and targets than a hundred films could teach them.

Even after the operational training got under way there were difficulties such as conflicts in training schedules and shortages of essential training equipment. Moreover, the Columbia AAB officials thought it necessary that they should take a larger part in the group training program than had originally been intended; and there was, for a while, some confusion as to the division of responsibility between officers of the Base and those of the groups. Nevertheless, training progressed well enough so that required standards were met by the time the postponed readiness dates rolled around—which is another way of saying that the dates had to be set back in order that training could be finished.

The two groups left Columbia for Seattle on 26 April and embarked for Okinawa on 7 May, arriving at their destination on 3 July.

Last it be thought that Columbia AAB was unique in having troubles, let the situation at Sioux Falls be considered. The SAC historian wrote, almost a year after the event: "If Sioux Falls wasn't the busiest army air field in the United States during redeployment it certainly was one of the most chaotic. "Organised confusion" was a term regularly and apparently aptly applied to the situation by the base personnel."

By the summer of 1945 the problem confronting the Central Assembly Stations was not to find fillers for remanning units being redeployed; it was to get rid of returnees for whom there were no facilities for training and entertaining, even, in some instances, for housing and feeding. It was found that almost three-fourths of the officers and more than one-fifth of the enlisted men reassembling at Sioux Falls were eligible for separation; but with the ASF separation centers
hopelessly bogged down, separation quotas and transportation to the centers were both lacking. Nor were those eligible for redeployment more fortunate; the overloaded Training Command could not or would not take them. Some found places in permanent party organizations; the rest just waited.

During the first ten days of July more than 6,000 individuals had assembled at Sioux Falls to be separated or redeployed. By the end of the month, more than 20,000 had been processed, and only 6,382 had been shipped out. In August, more than 30,000 additional returnees were received, and during September almost 6,000. In the three months a total of 48,738 were shipped out, leaving, at the end of September more than 10,000 awaiting, by that time, not redeployment, but separation. As Sioux Falls was the largest CAS, it represented the most colossal headache; but every other CAS had its troubles.

At Seymour Johnson AAB there was a large group of combat returnees, all of whom had become eligible for separation by 12 May. Yet in September, these men were still awaiting shipment to a separation center, practically all of them ignorant of the reason for the long delay. By heroic efforts on the part of the Air Inspector and the I&E Officer in tracing records and supplying deficiencies in them, this backlog was cleared up soon after the end of September.

In the Seymour Johnson case, the AAF was itself largely to blame for the fact that some of its personnel were not separated until months after they had become eligible; the trouble lay in sloppy handling of records in some AAF orderly room. Generally, however, it was the ASF separation centers that were responsible for the clogging of the channels
through which those eligible for separation were supposed to move rapidly from CAS to civilian life.*

The AAF in the Separation Business

After V-J Day, as redeployment ended and demobilization began in earnest, it became evident that the separation centers operated by the ASF were unable to accomplish separations at anything like the rate at which individuals were becoming eligible for separation. Even before that time, not long after V-E Day, fearing a serious decline in AAF morale if there should be too long a delay between the establishment of the individual's eligibility for separation and the actual separation, PDC had given consideration to the possibility of setting up AAF separation centers. The ASF, however, continued to monopolize the separation business through July and August. On 1 September, Headquarters AAF called upon CAF to submit a plan for separating AAF personnel at AAF installations. The plan was submitted on 3 September and won prompt approval by Headquarters AAF. War Department approval was quickly secured, and on 6 September, the Commanding General, CAF, was directed to undertake the separation of AAF personnel in the Zone of Interior as such personnel became eligible for separation under RR 1-l. This

* It was stated on 1 September 1945 that the 22 ASF stations had an estimated monthly capacity of 300,000. Beginning 1 October, 500,000 individuals were expected to return from overseas every month. Thus, unless measures were taken to speed up separations, the then current backlog of about 500,000 (of whom 120,000 were AAF personnel) might be expected to increase at the rate of 200,000 per month (History, 4th AF, 2 Sept. 1945-20 Mar. 1946, p. 15).

† PDC permanent party personnel and individuals being processed in PDC installations were to be separated by PDC, rather than CAF. This exception in favor of PDC was later countermanded; and, effective 19 October 1945, CAF was given complete responsibility for AAF separations (Daily Diary, Demobilization and Personnel Readjustment Branch, AC/AS-1, 12 Oct. 1945, in AFSHO files).
authority was to expire on 1 December 1945; but the time was later
extended "for whatever period is necessary to provide for prompt separation
of all eligible personnel in the Z/I, in excess of the capacity of WD
Separation Centers."

At the time when the AAF finally succeeded in gaining authority to
separate its own personnel, there was a backlog of 61,900 persons then
eligible for separation at AAF installations. By 17 September the total
had risen to 112,000. The CAF set up thirty-two separation bases,
putting them in locations chosen in accordance with the geographical
distribution of members of the AAF eligible for separation. By 20
September, twenty-three of the CAF separation bases had begun to function;
by 26 September all thirty-two were in operation. The daily rate of
separations rose during the first week of operations from 754 to 2,393,
and by 30 September had reached 3,948.

On 1 October the War Department made some changes in the rules governing
separation; these changes—one of which was the lowering of the critical
score from 80* to 70—made some 24,500 AAF enlisted men and women eligible

* The critical score had been reduced from 85 to 80 on 3 September
   (Army-Navy Register, 8 September 1945, p. 7). On 1 November it was
   lowered again; enlisted men with ASRS between 50 and 59, inclusive, and
two years of active service since 16 September 1943, and enlisted women
with ASRS between 29 and 33, inclusive, with a year of active service,
became eligible for separation (Daily Diary, Demobilization and Personnel
   Readjustment Branch, AC/AS-1, 31 October 1945, in AFSHD files). At the
   end of November an enlisted man who was the father of three or more children
   under 18 was entitled to be separated (Ibid., 29 November 1945). There
   were successive lowerings of the critical score, the idea being to have
   it by March 1946 at such point that by that time all enlisted men with
   two years of service would have the requisite number of points; the point
   system would then be abolished and two years of service would be the
criterion for eligibility for separation (Army-Navy Register, 13 October 1945,
p. 5).
for separation. Thus, despite the fact that more than 31,500 were
separated during the month of September, the backlog of AAF candidates
for separation was larger at the beginning of October than it had been
two weeks earlier. However, the AAF bases operated with efficiency
and dispatch; by 1 November 304,564 members of the AAF had been separated,
and there was no backlog. The number of AAF separations during November
was 208,245, and separation bases were being inactivated. By the
middle of December, CAF had secured AAF approval of its plan to operate,
beginning 1 January 1946, separation bases at nine installations, with a
daily capacity of 2,800. Having accomplished their mission, these
bases were closed between 9 and 18 February 1946. On 20 February CAF
announced that its separation program was concluded, with 734,715 officers
and enlisted men having been processed at AAF Separation Bases.

In the light of the record, the complacency of the following state-
ment is a bit surprising:

By mid-June it was apparent that the War Department Readjustment
Plan, so carefully prepared during the many months preceding, was
working well and was satisfying the three requisites which had been
the basis for the policy:

1. Military necessity - Redeployment was sending troops streaming
toward the Pacific Theater.

2. Partial demobilization - Those troops with the longest and
most arduous service, i.e., with the highest point scores, were
being 'selected out', sent home by all available means, and separated.

3. Morale - The great majority of individual soldiers considered
the Readjustment Plan fair and those selected for separation were being
separated in such a manner as to cause them to leave the Army with
a high regard for its efficiency.

Statement 1, though not strictly untrue, is highly exaggerated; the
"streaming" was more like trickling. As for the rest, the men at Seymour
Johnson Field who, by mid-June had been kept in the Army for a month after
for separation. Thus, despite the fact that more than 31,500 were separated during the month of September, the backlog of AAF candidates for separation was larger at the beginning of October than it had been two weeks earlier. However, the AAF bases operated with efficiency and dispatch; by 1 November 304,564 members of the AAF had been separated, and there was no backlog. The number of AAF separations during November was 205,945, and separation bases were being inactivated. By the middle of December, CAF had secured AAF approval of its plan to operate, beginning 1 January 1946, separation bases at nine installations, with a daily capacity of 2,800. Having accomplished their mission, these bases were closed between 9 and 18 February 1946. On 20 February CAF announced that its separation program was concluded, with 754,715 officers and enlisted men having been processed at AAF Separation Bases.

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they should have been separated and were to be kept there for more than three months longer, are not likely to have agreed that the "Readjustment Plan ... was working well ..."; and the returnees who had been assigned to permanent party detachments and who now saw troops fresh from overseas, with less service and fewer points than they themselves had, separated immediately upon arrival in this country, while they were kept in service weeks or months longer, are not likely to have left the Army "with a high regard for its efficiency."

**Project WONDERFUL**

Easily the most fantastic feature of AAF redeployment was Project WONDERFUL. Dreamed up at some time during the summer of 1945 by CAF or AAF Headquarters, or perhaps by WDGS or JCS, it was first made known to the Second Air Force on 11 August

and to the Fourth Air Force on the following day.

The first notice struck the two air forces like a bomb burst. It was a "Manning and Training Directive," to become effective upon the announcement of V-J Day, calling upon the two air forces to man and prepare for overseas movement with U.S. aircraft and crews (four squadrons - thirty-six aircraft and crews each per group) and ground personnel by MOS, the VHB tactical and service units scheduled for deployment through February 1946, as early as possible, and not later than 1 September 1945. The directive involved four groups belonging to the Fourth Air Force and fifty-two belonging to the Second. On 15 August CAF announced the surrender of Japan and called for action as directed; the deadline, however, was advanced three days, to 4 September. Compliance with the "Manning and Training Directive" was to take precedence over all
training, over the usual requirement that personnel be granted leaves
and furloughs prior to overseas movement, and 'over all other considera-
tions,' 

The immediate effect of Project WONDERFUL can easily be imagined.  

As the historian of the Second Air Force put it:

Through the immediate withdrawal which it necessitated of all
qualified personnel, both officer and enlisted, from permanent party
activities, it played havoc with the orderly functioning of the
Second Air Force, and it incurred the bitter resentment of affected
personnel, who could not themselves understand and to whom no effort
was made to explain the necessity for such hysterical haste . . . 

That the WONDERFUL project was impossible of achievement must have been
evident from the beginning to some of the masterminds. But one directive
followed hard upon the heels of another, rescinding, countermanding,
canceling, altering—and keeping the two air forces most concerned in a
constant state of flux.

Typical of what happened is the following: On 15 August CAF directed
the Statistical Control Office of the Fourth Air Force to submit a specified
report by 1200 EWT, 16 August. The required report covered 11-1/2 feet of
teleotype paper. Fourteen hours after it had been submitted, Headquarters
CAF wired that operations on said report were to be suspended until further
notice.

On 19 August CAF announced to the interested parties that

the original broad program would be continued but that the units
involved would be changed in accordance with three tabulations that were
enclosed:

Tab "A" superseded the original list of committed units;
Tab "B" listed units which would continue to be manned and
trained; and
Tab "C" enumerated those which had been committed, but whose
commitment would be rescinded. These could be used as a source
of personnel for units on "A" or "B."

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* One exception was made to this over-riding priority. On 21 August 1945 CAF had directed the transfer of more than 1,600 Fourth Air Force personnel to ASF for duty in separation centers. Before these people had been selected and shipped, the Fourth Air Force was directed to undertake the separation of AAF eligibles. Realizing that the individuals whom the ASF had requested according to MOS would be just the ones who would be desperately needed in their own separation bases, the Fourth Air Force tried to get out of making the shipment. But higher authority insisted that the requested individuals be sent "even at the expense of a temporary delay in completion of manning of Wonderful Project." (Hist. 4th AF, 2 Sept. 1945-20 Mar. 1946.)
Fifteen VHB groups and fourteen Air Service groups had been given 
1 September 1945 as their readiness date; on 31 August ten of the bombardment 
groups and nine of the service groups were given 1 October 1945 as their 
new readiness date. No readiness dates were set for the remaining five 
VHB groups and their associated service groups.

Six days later a completely revised Project WONDERFUL was announced. 
The new version called for six bombardment groups and six service groups 
to be prepared for overseas movement by 1 October. Five of the bombardment 
groups, with their associated service groups, were to be assigned to 
the 20th Bombardment Wing, destined for the European Theater of Operations; 
and one bombardment and one service group were to be sent to Alaska.

It was announced at the meeting of the General Council on 8 October 
that the readiness date for the five B-29 groups intended for the ETO 
Occupational Air Force (and presumably for the service groups that were 
to accompany them) had been moved up from 1 October to 1 December. It 
was explained that the original date could not be met because changes 
in War Department policy governing eligibility of personnel for overseas 
shipment had made necessary a partial remanning of the groups in question.

Nothing was said at the meeting about the Alaska-bound groups.

The net result of Project WONDERFUL may be summed up in one sentence: 
As of 15 June 1946—eight and one-half months after their commitment 
date—not one of the WONDERFUL groups had left the continental United 
States.

The WHITE and the GREEN Projects

The role of the AAF in redeployment and demobilization was not 
wholly one of frustration and failure; two AAF projects are universally
conceded to have been brilliantly successful. The "White Plan" called
for having all flyable B-17's and B-24's (except those required for the
ETO Occupational Air Force) flown from the MTO and ETO to the United States
by their own combat crews, each aircraft carrying passengers up to a
maximum of twenty. The operation began on 20 May with the departure
of eighty-five heavy bombers from ETO and six from MTO. The former headed
for the United States via the northern route, the latter via the southern.
The passengers who returned on these White Plan aircraft were all AAF
personnel, chiefly maintenance crews. Movement of troops under the
White Plan was to have been completed in two months; but when it was decided
to use aircraft other than B-17's and B-24's the time was extended to
31 August. By the time the project was completed, more than 5,400 air-
craft had been returned, carrying 73,642 persons. Of this personnel,
62 per cent, arriving via the northern route, were processed at Bradley
Field; the remainder, coming from the MTO via the southern route, landed
at Hunter Field. Of the White Plan aircraft, twenty-eight suffered
accidents, with more than forty-eight fatalities. The percentage loss
of aircraft was .0004—a record of which the AAF and American aircraft
manufacturers may both be proud.

* The program was later extended to include aircraft other than four-
engine bombers. Eventually, there were involved 1,629 B-17's, 2,121 B-24's,
375 B-25's, 111 B-26's, 200 C-47's, 604 C-46's, 58 C-53's, 67 A-26's,
9 CA-10's, and 3 FB's. (*Redeployment: The Role of Headquarters CHF," I, 63.)

The exact number is not known because of the absence of passenger
lists for three airplanes lost over the ocean.
The "Green Project" was a plan to have the Air Transport Command move troops from the ETO and MTO at the rate, eventually, of 50,000 per month. To achieve this peak load would involve 5,466 flying hours per day. The airplane miles are estimated to be 956,550 miles per day... or the equivalent of 38.2 flights around the world at the equator every 24 hours, or two round trips daily to the moon." The target for May was set at 16,000 and that for June at 27,500. Actually, 20,382 were brought back in May, 30,270 in June. The July target of 43,760 was exceeded by almost 15 per cent when 50,223 were returned. About 40 per cent of the passengers were flown via Casablanca to Miami over the Dakar-Natal route, and 40 per cent by the way of the Azores and the North Atlantic routes. Only 25 per cent of the passengers were AAF personnel; the AGF furnished about 40 per cent, the ASF about 25. The remaining 10 per cent included Navy, Red Cross, and civilian personnel. With the progress of the war in the Pacific and the improvement of the surface shipping position, the airlift was reduced first to 35,000, then to 10,000 per month. At the peak, the ATC was making a trip across the Atlantic every six minutes around-the-clock. Between 1 May and 31 July the ATC brought from ETO-MTO to the United States 100,896 persons without the loss of a single passenger life. The Green Project was terminated on 10 September.

Demobilization

After he became Chief of Staff of the USAF, General Spaatz wrote:

On V-J Day there were 216 effective combat groups. By the end of 1945 rapid activation had reduced their number to 160.

The halving of the V-J Day air force in a four-month period meant far more than a halving of its strength. During the confusion of the rapid disintegration of the Air Force no accurate reports.
of operational efficiency were rendered, but it is certain that few of the 109 groups could have been effective. A year later the Air Force had been reduced to 55 groups, and operational efficiency reports were disturbing; only 2 groups were effective.

General Arnold's foresight and wisdom never appeared more clearly than when he called for "a preponderance of original thought relatively free from the influence of precedents set by demobilization following World War I." He and his colleagues did their best to preserve for the country an air force that would be worthy of its traditions. But foresight and wisdom could not prevail against the thoughtless populace and their subservient politicians. Had it not been for Korea, the air force would have been a long time recovering from demobilization.

* Elsewhere General Spaatz wrote: "such drastic reductions had been accomplished that overseas commanders had insufficient personnel to carry out the responsibilities assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff." (Report of the Chief of Staff to the Secretary of the Air Force, 30 June 1948, p. 7.)
1. DA SR 320-5-1, August 1950.
2. WD TM 20-205, 18 January 1944.
3. Maj. John C. Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army (Washington, D. C.: Office, Chief of Military History, 1951), p. 41. Other examples of early demobilization planning are: a study by the Historical Section of the Army War College, prepared for the AG/S, G-1 in August 1942; an "Outline of Proposed Demobilization Plan," prepared in January 1943 by the Services of Supply (known after 29 March 1943 as the Army Service Forces); a study in February 1943 for the Director, Military Personnel Division, and "Demobilization as a Current Problem," presented to the CG, ASF on 9 April, both by the Historical Section, Army War College; and a study begun in March 1943 by the Army Ground Forces (Ibid., pp. 41-43).
5. Memo for CG, ASF from C/S, 5 April 1943, attached to memo for CG, AAF from Maj. Gen. I. H. Edwards, AG/S, G-3, 14 April 1943, in AAG 361-A. There is some question about the date of General Marshall's directive; it may have been 14 April. See the memo referred to in n. 6, below, and Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization . . ., p. 408, n. 29.
7. Ltr., General Arnold to Special Projects Officer, 2 April 1943, in AAG 361-A.


10. Sparrow, History of Personnel Demobilization, p. 46.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 47.


17. See above, n. 13.


19. Ibid.

20. JCS 451, 30 July 1943.


27. "History of the Personnel Distribution Command," I, 22. The camp at Camp Mystic, Texas, proved to be unsuited to the intended purpose and was never operated by the Redistribution Center.

28. Ibid., p. 62.
29. Ibid., II, 179 ff.
30. Ibid., pp. 637 ff.
31. Ibid., pp. 706 ff.
32. Ibid., pp. 508 ff.
33. Ibid., pp. 747 ff.
36. Ltr., Maj. Gen. B. M. Giles, C/AS to Maj. Gen. Claire Chennault, CG 11th AF, 14 Oct. 1943. General Giles may have made a mistake, since the 27th and 36th were not P-51 but fighter-bomber groups; or there may have been a plan, later abandoned, to convert the two groups to P-51's.
41. Hist. 33rd Fighter Gp., September and October 1944.
   January -
44. Hist. 614th TC Gp., April-July 1944, and Hist. 4th TC Sq., April-June 1944.
47. Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, 27 March 1944, p. 12.
50. Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, 19 July 1944, p. 16.
51. SPO, "Demobilization Planning Report for Year 1944," in AAG 370.01.
52. Memo for Director, SPD, WDSS, from Col. F. T. Davison, 8 Dec. 1944, in AAG 003.
56. Ltr., Arnold to Baker, 21 June 1944.
   Gen. E. L. Eubank, AAF Board, 8 Nov. 1943) appears to deny that
   planning had reached this stage. General Craig wrote that "No effort
   has yet been made to deploy the 105 groups, either in the Western
   Hemisphere or overseas." It seems likely, however, that what General
   Craig meant was that no attempt had been made to assign specific
   groups to specific bases.


60. Minutes of the Meeting of the Committee to Re-Survey the Postwar
   Strength, 27 Dec. 1944, in AAG 381-C.

61. Ibid.

62. Comment No. 4 (AC/AS, Plans to Chief, SPO, 10 Feb. 1944) to R&R,

63. Deployment Chart, in AAG "Initial Post War Air Force," Tab "E",
   15 Feb. 1944.

64. Memo for C/AS from Col. F. T. Davison, 23 Oct. 1944, in AAG 381-C.

65. Ibid.

66. Memo for the Advisory Council from Col. F. T. Davison, 13 Dec. 1944,
   in AAG 350.06-I.

67. Minutes of Meeting of Committee to Re-Survey Postwar Strength,
   27 Nov. 1944, in AAG 381-C.

68. Memo for Members of Committee to Re-Survey Postwar Strength from
   Col. R. C. Moffat, 30 Nov. 1944, in AAG 381-C.

69. Memo for Members of Committee to Re-Survey Postwar Strength from
   Col. G. E. Textor, Chairman, 1 Dec. 1944, in AAG 381-C.

72. History of the Strategic Air Command, Jan–June 1950, Vol. IV, Tab 34;

73. USAF Statistical Digest, January 1942–June 1950, p. 27.

74. USAF Statistical Digest, 1947, p. 16.

75. Hist. 2d AF, 1945, I, 55–56.


77. "Redeployment: The Role of Headquarters Continental Air Forces"
    (Hq. SAC, June 1946), I, 106.

78. AAF Ltr. 151–3, 3 Jan. 1945, subj: Redeployment Manning Policy.

79. Ibid.


81. See n. 77.

82. AAF Ltr. 35–416, 16 June 1945, subj: Policies Pertaining to
    Recommitment of Personnel Completing Only Partial Overseas Tours.

83. Ibid.

84. AAF Ltr. 150–7, 25 Apr. 1945, subj: Re-orientation of the AAF.

85. "Redeployment: The Role of Headquarters Continental Air Forces"
    (Hq. SAC, June 1946), I, 113.

86. Ibid., p. 114.

87. By letters to the various commands, such as that addressed to ATSC:
    Ltr, Hq. AAF to Hq. ATSC, 30 Mar. 1945, in AAG 370.01.

88. 1st Ind. (ltr., Hq. AAF to Hq. ATSC, 30 Mar. 1945) Hq. ATSC to
    Hq. AAF, 9 Apr. 1945, in AAG 370.01.


91. "Redeployment: The Role of Headquarters Continental Air Forces" (HQ. SAC, June 1945), I, 26, in AFHQ files.

92. Ibid., p. 106.


95. Ibid., p. 223.

96. "Narrative History," HQ. 8th AF, 8 May to 16 July 1945, pp. 7-13.


99. Ibid.


101. Ibid., p. 63.

102. Ibid., pp. 86-87.

103. Hist. 1st AF, Pt. III (June 1945), I, 50, and Hist. 3d AF, 1 Jan.-31 Mar. 1945, pp. 140 ff.


106. 1st AF, Monograph I (May 1945), "First Redeployment, January to May 1945," p. 16.

108. "Redeployment: The Role of Headquarters Continental Air Forces" (June 1946), I, 43.

109. Ibid.

110. 1st AF, Monograph I (May 1945), "First Redeployment, January to May 1945," pp. 83, 89.

111. Ibid., p. 105.


113. Ibid., p. 36.

114. Ibid.


116. Ibid., I, 45.

117. Ibid.

118. 1st AF, Monograph I (May 1945), "First Redeployment, January to May 1945," p. 40.

119. "Redeployment: The Role of Headquarters Continental Air Forces" (June 1946), I, 44.

120. 1st AF, Monograph I (May 1945), "First Redeployment, January to May 1945," p. 105.


122. 1st AF, Monograph I (May 1945), "First Redeployment, January to May 1945," pp. 30-31, 89-90; and "Redeployment: The Role of Headquarters Continental Air Forces" (June 1946), p. 47.

123. 1st AF, Monograph I (May 1945), "First Redeployment, January to May 1945," p. 90.

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124. Ibid., p. 89.

125. "Redeployment: The Role of Headquarters Continental Air Forces" (June 1946), I, 47.

126. Ibid.


129. Ibid., pp. 92, 123-24, 127.

130. Ibid., p. 96.


132. Ibid., p. 6.


137. Daily Diary, Demobilization and Personnel Readjustment Branch, AC/AS-1, 10 Oct. 1945, in AFSHO files.

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139. Of these, 26 were opened on 17 September and 6 on 24 September; 2
more were opened on 15 October. In addition, 19 auxiliary bases
were activated between 5 and 17 October. The PED opened its 8
bases on 10 September; after 19 October these last did not operate
(Daily Diary, Demobilization and Personnel Readjustment Branch,

140. Memo for CG, AAF from Brig. Gen. Charles F. Born, 10 Oct. 1945, in
AAG 210.8.

141. Ibid.

142. Ibid.

143. Daily Diary, Demobilization and Personnel Readjustment Branch,
AC/AS-1, 1 Nov. 1945, in AFSHO files.

144. Ibid., 4 Dec. 1945.

145. Ibid., 30 Nov. 1945.

146. Ibid., 19 Dec. 1945.

1946.

148. Military Personnel Division, ASF, "The Separation of Military
Personnel, 1 Sep 39 - 1 Sep 45," I, 148-49.

149. Hist. 2d AF, 1945, I, 83.


151. Ibid., p. 8.

152. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

153. Hist. 2d AF, 1945, I, 89.

154. Ibid., p. 92.

156. Ibid., p. 11.
158. Ibid., pp. 93-94.
159. Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, 8 Oct. 1945, p. 15.
160. Hist. 2d AF, 1945, p. 95.
161. Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, 4 June 1945, p. 11.
163. Ibid., p. 58.
164. Ibid., p. 62.
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid., p. 63.
167. Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, 30 Apr. 1945, p. 16.
171. Minutes, Meeting of the General Council, 26 June 1945, p. 16.
175. See above, pp. 3.