MORALE IN THE AAF
IN WORLD WAR II

Prepared by the USAF
Historical Division,
Air University
1953

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June 1953
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THIS PAGE Declassified IAW EO12958
This study was written by Mr. Martin R. R. Goldman of the USAF Historical Division, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Like other Historical Division studies, this history is subject to revision, and additional information or suggested corrections will be welcomed.
The field of morale is a darkling plain, littered with dead
 cliches, swept by pronunciamentos, and only fitfully lit up by the
electrical play of insight. For more than forty centuries, since
human beings first banded together for the purpose of doing formal
violence to one another, military specialists have explored the field
in an attempt to isolate and master those elusive, volatile elements
in whose chemistry lies the key to forces that can fire or wet down the
spirits of men at arms. The incomplete success of these efforts is
indicated by the fact that there is still no commonly accepted definition
of morale, nor is there a definitive list of factors which affect morale;
and any discussion of the relative importance of various factors is
almost bound to generate, within minutes, hot words, high winds, and
little light. There are few men with souls so dead who never to others
have volunteered quick dicta on morale in particular and the Army
life in general. But while such opinions, grounded as they are in
steamy memories of Papua or gritty afterthoughts about Cyrenaica, may
glow with the heat of felt experience, they nevertheless do not fill
the need for some working definition which will at least serve present
purposes. In this chapter,¹ then, morale, that "most abused, most
misunderstood"² term, will be taken to denote an attitude of mind which
when favorable leads to the willing performance of duty under all conditions,
good or bad; and which when unfavorable leads to the unwilling performance,
or poor performance or non-performance of duty under the same good or bad conditions. * 

For assessing the actual morale of the Army Air Forces in World War II, however, such a definition is only a gateway to an obstacle course dotted with such hurdles as time, place, manpower, and evaluation, each of which tends to block sweeping generalizations. Any statement about morale in the Caribbean during the rearing activity of the 1942 submarine crisis, for example, would not apply to the final period of the war when the area had sunk back into tropical obscurity and the Sixth Air Force seemed as remote from violent conflict as the Spanish galleon that adorned its shoulder patch. The problem of place is illustrated by the radical contrast between the Eighth Air Force in Britain and the Thirteenth Air Force in the South Pacific Area. The two air forces lived different lives in different geographical areas.
with different levels of civilization; they fought different wars under different climatic conditions and different combat conditions; and they enjoyed, or suffered with, different priorities and differing degrees of independence, prestige, strength, and fame. Those and other distinctions arising in some measure from the accident of place exerted a variable influence on the morale of each organization. Another obstacle to a precise estimate of morale is the problem of measurement. Records of statistics on venereal disease, for example, cannot be pulled out of context and evaluated apart from such vital matters as the availability of women for intercourse, variations in the incidence of venereal disease among procurable females from area to area and country to country, the frequency of intercourse per man per month, the effectiveness of antivenereal disease revivals, the quantity, quality, and convenience of prophylactic equipment and facilities, and the level of soldierly enthusiasm for the healing powers of penicillin. The incidence of VD was, in fact, conditioned by so many factors that, in spite of tradition, it cannot reliably serve as an index of morale. But perhaps the most formidable obstacle to correctly gauging morale in the Army Air Forces is the evaluation of subjective evidence. There are few leading documents on morale, and these have limited usefulness. Most of the material crops up erratically, appears only in trace amounts, and assays low in quality. With distinguished exceptions, unit historians—whose work is perhaps the chief quantitative source of information on the subject—did their job perfunctorily as an unwelcome added chore for which they had had no preparation. Some ever-
looked morale completely, some gave it only a dull glance, and others handled it with a delicacy appropriate to NCO's and junior officers who write with one eye on the commanding officer through whose hands the record of the organization's achievements must pass before it ascends to a higher headquarters. There is reason to ponder, for instance, the balance and accuracy of reports which declare that "morale has pierced its highestebb"; reason to wonder if the acid content of other histories can perhaps be traced to an affliction of the spleen; and, in any case, good cause for handling most of the documentary evidence on morale with the care usually reserved for an armed bungle.

The inevitable question remains: Is it possible to move past the hazards, hurdles, and obscurities to a generalization about morale? The answer is a cautious and rather reluctant "yes." The available testimony, which of course can never add up to an arithmetically clean sum, appears to justify the following statement: Morale in the Army Air Forces during the Second World War hovered, on a rough average, between fair and good. It had a wide range, horizontally and vertically. It varied in some degree from man to man, unit to unit, air force to air force; it could soar above "good" to yrified heights, or tumble below "fair" into a black slough; and in all places in all times it reacted with the trembling sensitivity of a compass needle to every change, every shift in conditions. But extremes and fluctuations aside, morale more often than not seems to have clung to a middle or perhaps slightly higher level. When positive and negative morale influences tended toward equilibrium, certain basic constants made for a favorable balance.
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Most airmen never really forgot the fundamental fact that they were on the winning side in a terrible war, and the equally fundamental fact, which no amount of stereotyped grousing could obliterate, that concern for their well-being had generated a remarkable world-spanning welfare effort—civil and military, public and private—whose effects could be felt from the hill stations of India to the most implausible HF locations inside Germany. And, if all other thoughts failed then, airmen could always take comfort from the awareness that they were not in the infantry.

Any generalization about AAF morale, however, in applying to all men and all units, applies to no man and no unit. Behind its broad facade lie many conditioning factors which, functioning without pause, shaped and reshaped, raised up and pulled down morale. An examination of this constant interplay of factors and men throughout the course of the war offers perhaps the clearest path to an understanding of morale in the AAF, and promises not only to add substance to the spare frame of generalization but also to furnish the corrective qualifications that any full-blown statement about the ways of human beings must have. The major stress of this chapter will fall, therefore, on a consideration of morale in the making, or unmaking, first in the United States during the mobilization and training phase of the air man's military career, and then in the theaters of operations during the combat phase, with special emphasis given to the influence of specific factors in specific situations. If the discussion at times takes on a dark hue, that coloration will only reflect the concern of most of the documentary material with the problem side of morale, as well as the tendency of human beings in uniform to speak more of woe than of woe.
From the earliest days of the war period the AAF grappled energetically if not always successfully with the inevitable morale problems produced by the service's explosive expansion. Regulations, field manuals, directives, memoranda, and other forms of injunction, advice and exhortation provided subordinate commanders, chaplains, and junior officers with impressive prescriptions for safeguarding the morale of the hundreds of thousands of recruits then flooding into AAF basic training and classification centers. Among other things, the military leader was to know his men, take an interest in their concerns, earn their respect and their loyalty, eschew cursing them, promote their comfort and welfare, be patient, considerate, calm, firm and vigorous, keep the men informed, show enthusiasm, never assign pointless tasks, explain the reasons behind orders, preserve good health, make sure that uniforms fit, help solve family financial woes, check on laundry facilities, and bid a furloughed soldier a cheerful farewell. In such fashion the AAF provided ready-made paper solutions to all matters even tangentially related to morale. Reality, however, shied away from ideality with characteristic skittishness, and nowhere was this more true than in the hurly-burly of AAF basic training centers.

The obstacles to high recruit morale at AAF basic training centers were varied. Many of the men arrived from reception centers in a condition of bruised belligerent after sustaining the first shock of military life. If they sought peace and a refuge at such typical stations as Basic Training Center No. 7 at Atlantic City or Basic Training Center No. 9
at Miami, where in 1942 and 1943 violent growth, kaleidoscopic change, and frequently clashing gears seemed normal, they could only expect disappointment. Unit commanders or their representatives would greet trainees with inspirational orientation talks whose quality varied according to the interest and talent of the speaker. Whatever good such sermons may have achieved in replacing bewilderment with understanding of the aims and methods of basic training, and in creating unit spirit and confidence in the training commander, was often dissipated by experiences that followed. In practice, two-way communication between the separate worlds of recruits and training group officers was rare. Budding loyalties withered when officers whirled, revolving-door fashion, into and out of training unit commands every two to three weeks or—in one extreme case—six times in a month, and when the need to furnish cadres for new organizations set off a series of raids on the permanent party ranks of existing basic training groups. Jefferson Barracks alone, for example, turned out forty Technical School Squadrons cadres in 1942. Furthermore, instructor officers were in short supply, many had marginal qualifications, regarded their assignment “to the field” as a punishment for past sins and a bar to future grace, and, whatever their personal feelings may have been, wore too sorely beset by multiple duties to pay direct attention to trainees. Permanent party enlisted personnel—especially drill instructors, who as a group were closest to the recruits and played key roles in the basic training program—also failed to measure up to standards in quantity and quality; many of them had been picked helter-skelter, were understandably bemused by the starts,
stops and switches in training, suffered from contagiously low morale, or were simply incompetent. As time passed and pressures eased, it became possible to improve the permanent party situation, but this upturn came too late to help those thousands of trainees who, in 1942 and 1943, absorbed from their supervisors' little sense of mission or common purpose. Significantly, those unit commanders and instructors who did tackle the work of training with intelligence, consideration, and enthusiasm reaped a harvest of fine results and high morale in direct ratio to their efforts.\textsuperscript{13}

Job classification and assignment had perhaps a greater influence on trainee morale than any other step in the process of basic training. If necessary, most recruits would probably have been willing to shrug off various basic training center shortcomings as a price to be paid for the long-run benefits promised by proper classification and assignment. The woes of the drill field were fleeting; but the decisions of classification and assignment sections might, as far as wartime military careers were concerned, endure forever. Contemporary soundings of soldier opinion show that the AAF outstripped the Army Ground Forces and Army Service Forces in giving men the jobs they wanted and for which they felt best qualified. There was, nevertheless, widespread discontent on this score.\textsuperscript{14} In the case of aviation cadet applicants who had volunteered for induction with the expectation of receiving immediate college training but were instead subjected to psychological and medical tests that barred them from the air crew program, the trouble was rooted in the excessive zeal of AAF recruiters and, fundamentally, in the fang and claw competition between the services for manpower. The low morale
of these rejected applicants aroused concern in the Eastern Technical Training Command over improper recruiting methods. Another serious morale problem developed when quick shifts in AAF needs jarred and sometimes stalled the carefully crafted machinery of classification and assignment. Theoretically, civilian background, AGCT scores, results of aptitude tests and personal choice determined the classification of a recruit. But time and again the pressure to fill school quotas by hook or crook wiped out the good work of classification sections; thus, to the cheerless tune of "exigencies of war," qualified weather observer candidates set out for Radio School, and qualified draftsman candidates in turn went off to Auto Mechanics School. While such instances of misclassification and malassignment were in a minority, they cropped up too often for comfort and dealt a hard blow to the morale of the victims. Admittedly, the erratic appetite of war forced the AAF to reshuffle requirements frequently. Yet there was a strong feeling that better planning could have prevented much grief. Once the damage was done, repairs were difficult; as late as March 1945 the Eighth Air Force, for example, was still struggling to right the wrongs of malassignment.

The clear, direct influence of leadership, training procedures, classification and assignment on the morale of basic trainees is unquestionable. But the effect of other factors defies easy measurement. Floorless, stoveless tents pitched on marshy ground at Kessler Field, throttling dust at Shippard Field, rain and muck at Greensboro AAB, and extremes of heat and cold at Jefferson Barracks certainly offered
little cause for jubilation. But while such conditions could aggravate an already bad morale situation, it seems doubtful that they alone would ordinarily create one. Nothing in the record, furthermore, proves that recruits in an ungenial setting had a markedly lower morale than those who were in the Babylonian environs of Miami Beach. Army Emergency Relief, the American Red Cross, the United Service Organizations, base legal officers and chaplains, all in their several ways gave aid and comfort to trainees and thereby made a definite, if limited, contribution to morale. Similarly, post facilities for relaxation--service clubs, post exchanges, day rooms, gymnasiums, libraries, and theaters--played a useful role by offering diversion and amusement during leisure hours. Their importance, however, could be and was exaggerated. Secretary of War Stimson, never one to deny the worth of off-duty pleasures, bridled at the idea that "the morale of any army could be measured by the number of its recreation halls and canteens." This view, which Stimson spurned as a delusion, was held far more widely than he liked. There was a tendency to try to diagnose of morale by tucking it into a separate compartment of army life, where it could safely be left to the ministrations of "morale agencies." According to Stimson, morale depended finally on the training that a soldier received and on his confidence in his military leaders; but in the eyes of the AAF Training Command, among others, it seemed to hinge rather on the energy of the Special Services officer. Thus at Miami Beach, as one chaplain complained, morale was looked upon as the peculiar province of Special Services, whose efforts boiled down...
to little more than a series of extravaganzas at the Pine Tree Bandshell.\textsuperscript{19}

Recreational facilities were especially incapable of undoing the damage done to morale by dislocations such as often occurred at the end of basic training. By that time most recruits, for better or worse, had exhausted the possibilities of basic training centers. If, for example, they had fared well in classification, they could expect to gain little by marking time indefinitely on drill fields or in front of mess hall sinks; and if they had fared badly, a prolonged stay at the scene of disaster promised equally little. For these reasons and perhaps because of native restlessness, there was a general urge to move ahead to the next step in AAF training as quickly as possible. When trainees had high hopes of shipment to schools without protracted delay, their morale reflected that optimism. But when uncoordinated training periods and shifting quotas slowed down or dammed up the flow to schools, morale sank. The longer men stagnated in pools, the more dispirited they became. Pass and other restrictions which had hobbled them as raw recruits continued to harass them in their new role as casualties; and though advanced training programs were concocted to keep them profitably occupied, they still spent much of their time—when they were not on KP, guard and fatigue details—literally as well as figuratively going over ground that was familiar. One battle-eager youngster who went on an alcoholic stampede after six months of frustration at Atlantic City swore that he knew every brick in the road to the drill field and insisted that he had pushed a broom far enough
to cross the adjoining ocean. 20

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Pools of idle rampower were not peculiar to basic training centers. At one time or another they collected at almost every level of the Zone of Interior training program, and, on occasion, both before and after a particular phase of schooling. 21 And wherever or whenever pools appeared, the predictable consequences were administrative aches and morale pains. The aviation cadet program, to cite a notable case, was cursed with a pool problem, or a complex of pool problems, of cosmic dimensions from the outbreak of war until V-J Day. An ill-fated combination of all out recruitment, inadequate facilities for handling the non-recruited, and precipitate ups and downs in aircrew requirements led unerringly to the accumulation of masses of cadet applicants and cadets waiting, variously, to go on active duty, to enter the college training program, to get out of college training and into pro-flight schools, and to escape from post-pro-flight holding points into the promised land of flying schools, where, as many cadets later learned, more pools had formed. Each of these pools became, as might have been expected, a slough of despair. Morale may have hit its lowest mark, strangely enough, in the ranks of men who had not even donned uniforms--Air Corps Enlisted Reservists whom the AAF could more readily recruit than absorb. The AAF, pricked by barbs of criticism, argued in self-defense that the fast-changing nature of the war made pools inevitable. Undoubtedly the argument had much force. But there were indications that the pool problem might have been eased and morale stiffened through closer cooperation between Headquarters AAF and the Training Command, as well as through a quicker realization by planners that what they...
regarded as a passing migraine was actually a permanent question which called for a better answer than makeshifts or convulsions of policy.\textsuperscript{23}

That morale in the flying and technical training schools of the AAF often fell short of Himalayan heights should have surprised no one. A military academic machine which previously had existed only in miniature, and which in three and one-half years spewed forth 670,014 aircraft maintenance specialists, 128,877 armament specialists, 299,104 radio specialists, 297,318 aerial gunners, 74,400 single-engine pilots, and equally awesome numbers of other specialists,\textsuperscript{24} was almost inevitably destined to be troubled by problems arising from hasty construction and human frailty.

In October 1943 an emissary from Headquarters AAF made a five-day inspection of the cadet armament course at Yale and wrote a glowing report on the excellences of the school, the "really first rate" quality of the teaching, and the enthusiasm of the students. But elsewhere, at schools unbullied by ivied comforts and the ministrations of Mary’s conditions were less idyllic. Tent cities of the species that once graced Kelly Field, temporary structures which proved pathetically inadequate in winter at Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and in summer at southern bases where 120° F temperatures were frequent, and general overcrowding at many fields, did not nourish high morale.\textsuperscript{26} Nevertheless, though the radio students who trudged through the dead cold of a Wisconsin winter night at 0200 classes at Trux Field might not have appreciated the fact, the basic morale problems of AAF schools—like those of recruit training centers—probably did not spring from physical sources.

Nowhere was this more apparent than among those whose task it was to teach the students—the instructor personnel. Their pains were largely
of the spirit and the pocketbook. Complaints of injured morale arose
during the protracted delay and confusion that accompanied the commission-
ing of civilian instructors at preflight schools in 1942, and similar
protests resulted, once again from the efforts of over-zealous AAF
recruiters, who, hard-pressed to outbid the Navy and secondary rivals
in another phase of the scramble for manpower,* had oversold civilians
on the rank, promotions, and assignments they might expect upon entry
into service. The question of promotions appears to have been the chief
focus of discontent among instructors. Far from real war and its stimuli,
sometimes malassigned and keenly aware of their unfitness for their task,
and demoralized on occasion by lackluster leadership (always a major morale
factor, but one rarely discussed except in generalities) or by the sheer
boredom generated by a standardized teaching system which allowed little
room for individual initiative, many instructors often tended to lay
especially heavy stress on personal recom

To men in such a mood, promotions offered perhaps the handiest way
of measuring the ground gained in private campaigns for prestige, power,
and dollars. Motives aside, there was objectively good cause at times
for agitation over the promotion situation. The argument that there
never would or could be enough promotions to raise every man's cup run
over did not comfort those officer instructors whose chances for
advancement started to fade early in 1943. One legitimate reason
for shutting the doors was that too many men had become eligible
for promotion at the same time. But this fact was outweighed in the
minds of many instructors by the knowledge that officers in administrative

* See above, p.
and other favored categories were harvesting most of the available laurels. Morale and efficiency fell off when hard-working instructors had to plod along as second lieutenants for a year and a half to two years while their more happily situated peers dashed ahead of them in rank.

Enlisted instructors, for their part, felt no urge to shed tears over the fate of stymied junior officers who, after all, enjoyed the perquisites and immunities that went with a commission. Their own predicament was worse, and their morale that much more affected. Civilian instructors, for example, not only earned higher pay than enlisted men for equal work, but were free from many of the restrictions that hemmed in military personnel. At the Laredo Central School for Flexible Gunnery officer students were taught by privates who received their full measure of KP and like assignments, but no promotions. To the low-rated men on the faculties of other flexible gunnery schools, the dearth of promotions was injury enough; every graduation day, however, seeming insult was added when a new batch of freshly-striped sergeant or staff sergeant gunners rolled off the academic assembly line. These gunners who went on to armament school at Buckley and Lowry Fields had a catalytic effect on the faculties there, too. Many of them outranked their instructors and believed, furthermore, that after gunnery training they had nothing more to learn about armament. The result was a compound of disciplinary trouble and lowered
instructor morale. Some relief came with the adoption of a policy providing that in the future all armorers-gunners would receive armament training before going on to gunnery school and non-commissioned officer status. A more positive balm was the opportunity for instructors to qualify for the cadet armament course, which led to an armament officer's commission. The Training Command also made a number of attempts to raise morale and the quality of teaching by finding ways around table of organization restrictions and other obstacles to higher rank for instructors, but these efforts met with incomplete success. Administrative heads continued to echo over the problem at least until October 1963.20

A majority of the students who streamed into the ATC's school system approached military education with attitudes ranging from willingness to outright enthusiasm.31 The average airman was inclined at the least to welcome schooling as a forward step along the road to a military career which, if it did not lead to glory, might nevertheless have its satisfactions and rosy uses. Technical training and flying training also offered the immediate attractions of novelty, inherent interest and, for some, excitement. There were, of course, shortcomings in working conditions, in other areas of school life, but such departures from perfection were half-expected and usually accepted by men who had already sloughed off their more utopian illusions during the student process of basic training or enlistment classification. More positively, administrative efforts to care for and soothe irritants had a therapeutic effect on morale. Student protests, for example, over the cannot that had resulted from the killing of a nearly military instructor on top of a full program of technical training led by early 1963 to a sharp cutback in military activity at school.
To cite another case, the gradual elimination of night shifts—
long an object of mass repugnation—gave students more sleep and time
to recharge their energies, and served as a tonic to their spirits.\textsuperscript{32}
And the use of such incentives as promotions, competition, and enhanced
opportunity based on merit similarly helped to revive flagging morale.
So it was that most men went through the school phase of military existence,
sometimes cast down by adversity or the repellent drabness of their work,\textsuperscript{33}
perhaps more often buoyed by a different set of influences. This majority
group, like any group, undoubtedly had its morale problems, but they were
not usually of the virulent kind.\textsuperscript{34} The real trouble lay elsewhere.

The glider pilot program, whose rise and fall bore an unhappy resemblance
to the trajectory of a deflective multi-stage rocket, produced the most
spectacular case of mass low morale in the record of the Training Command.
Lack, ignorance of the nature and conduct of both glider training and
operations, uncertainty of purpose and lack of clear responsibility were
at the root of the troubles that developed when, in 1942, the AAF rushed
headlong into this new activity. Because the shortage of manpower had
made it difficult to round up enough glider pilot candidates during a
period in which the program's goals shot up more than seven-fold, extravagant
advancements—with its intense stress on money, rank and thrills—and
lowered physical standards became the order of the day. The result was
a glut of humanity that overwhelmed the glider schools. Lines of waiting men gathered, and morale receded. Then, as the entire program
suddenly dived into an earthward spin after the arrival of cutback directives,
morale dropped even lower to become "an extremely serious and almost
insurmountable . . . problem."\textsuperscript{35} Glider training reached its nadir in
the spring of 1943 when about three-fourths of the hapless trainees were
needed out and sent elsewhere. Of the survivors, many were dropped on physical grounds just before evacuation. It was not until that late hour that they underwent physical examinations.\textsuperscript{36}

The fevers and chills that shock the older program were confined, fortunately, to a small segment of the AIT school network. In such isolation occurred, or was possible, in the case of men who had been eliminated from the various aviation cadet programs. A high percentage of these rejections not only suffered from low morale themselves, but also constituted a menace of epidemic proportion to the morale of those with whom they came in contact after their discharge. At Kelly Field, crippled eligibles who had been chummed into real school served notice to mend their fortunes and behaved dourly enough to provoke a senior officer into denouncing them as sources of contagious rot.\textsuperscript{37} Similarly, the great majority of flying school eligibles in the cadet armor course at Lowry Field early in 1942 appear to have earned for themselves nothing more distinguished than the epithet, "defeater."\textsuperscript{38} Administrators were also hard-pressed to cope with the cadets who came to navigation or bombardment schools after benishment from pilot training. Here the curriculum devolved a good measure of the blame for the eliminations' bleak record, for until 1943 these reluctant navigators or bombardiers were forced to wind through the same preflight course they had already completed during their pilot training days. Morale rose when an overhaul of the flying-school system finally put an end to this pointless repetition. There were those who said, however, that the whole elimination problem might never have arisen if attempts had been made to quarantine rejections and minister to their morale before they went on to new assignments, whether or not the training...
Command had the time and personnel for a campaign of mass rehabilitation is questionable. But the success of at least one experiment in careful re-orientation in 1944 suggests that such an investment of effort might have yielded liberal dividends. 39

The great majority of combat veterans who flowed into the training mill fresh from overseas duty were afflicted, like cadet washouts, with infectiously poor morale. Again, as had been the case with the washouts, responsibility for this condition was mixed. For their part, the authorities charged with the classification and training of returnees generally tackled the job with the best theoretical intentions. Unfortunately, a gap of remarkable breadth separated theory from common practice. Good intentions did not interfere seriously with the workings of the law of military supply and demand. Thus when demand waxed for the use of combat veterans as instructors, returnees suddenly found themselves tagged as pedagogues—whether or not they yearned for the role or had the talent to play it. Returnees pilots, navigators, and bombardiers who voluntarily went to instructors school got along well. But those who looked upon their new career as a grievous form of involuntary servitude soon showed characteristic signs of maladjustment and poor morale. They clashed with permanent party men, failed courses with disturbing frequency, and aroused serious concern over their attitude. Nevertheless, as long as demands for their bodies and abilities held up, returnees were impressed into academic service; and the problems raised by their outlook and performance continued to resist solution. 40

 Virtually every technical or flying school carried on its rolls a number of men whose morale had allegedly been damaged by faulty classification
or maladjustment. True enough, the machinery of classification and assignment did function more than once with the fine discrimination of a bulldozer, but its behavior hardly accounts for all of the claimed injuries. In many instances students seemed to be suffering more from the frustration of personal plans and preferences than from actual mishandling. This was perhaps especially true after the crisis need of the first eleven months of the war had faded without being replaced, in the case of restless trainees, by some counter force like organizational pride or the pull of leadership that might have helped men through the process of subordinating individual desires to the demands of military necessity. Reports from technical schools speak of the problem of dealing with recalcitrant students who either objected to the kind of training they received or wanted no training at all. Their low spirits probably sank further under the added weight of a feeling of futility when it became known that in spite of orders from headquarters Air Force acquired specialist skills were frequently going to waste in operational units.\footnote{42} Flying schools had troubles of their own. Some small-sized pilots, for example, raised an outcry over their assignment to fighters, while others of all dimensions were just as outraged by assignment to bombers. Rescued training authorities tried to obviate the conflict of voluntary assignment, but there were times when an urgent need for men over--especially in the heavy bomber program--forced them to override personal choices. The resultant drop in morale had to be accepted as one of the costs of an emergency situation.\footnote{43}

As the many tributary streams of air are diverted, specialties flow from their sources in the training centers and spread to form units. New morale factors come into play and familiar ones took on new forms.
in a regularly constituted organization, men who had hitherto drifted through individual training like clumps of discrete atoms found themselves in a changed world. For the first time—in most cases—they actually belonged to a unit with a permanence, a meaning, and a clearly defined purpose that Training Command school squadrons (whose numerical designations quickly faded into a half-forbidden blur) had seemed to lack. There might be turmoil and confusion during the early weeks of an infant organization's life, but in good time a feeling of identification with the unit began to well up in men—and with that emotion came a lift in spirits. The speed with which esprit de corps developed varied with the rate of personnel turnover, the availability of equipment and facilities for a prompt start on training, and above all else—the quality of leadership shown by senior officers.

Though it would be hard to claim that physical conditions had no effect on morale at isolated bases like Elytw, in the California desert, where summer heat gave training a clear resemblance to the Bessemer process, other factors generally exerted a greater influence. The most dramatic of these was a fear of flying in certain aircraft. There was nothing new about the phenomenon. It had cropped up in World War I when the DH-4 won for early notoriety in the "Flying Coffin." Two decades later, the Spitfire—first of Britain's fighters—also encountered such whispering suspicion after the occurrence of several crashes marked by high collapse. In their turn at least a half-dozen American aircraft of World War II became objects of worry and controversy. The P-38 came in for its share of buffeting early in 1942 when a series of accidents involving this novel fighter set off a wave of applications for transfer to bomber units. The excitement died down and the wave of applications died as pilots gradually
masted the airplane's quirks. At about the same time the B-26 became the center of a greater furor whose echoes reverberated in General Arnold's office. Almost from the instant of its first delivery to AAF organizations, this medium bomber proved difficult to maintain and—such were its dangers for raw aircrews to fly. As disaster piled on top of disaster, a mood of panic spread like a pestilence from one B-26 base to the next and helped to add to the accident rate. The situation became so serious that when an opportunity for transfer arose, every eligible pilot in the 320th Bombardment Group (!), with the exception of the commanding officer and his executive, either formally or informally stated a desire to escape from B-26 training to a safer kind of flying activity. It took chance in design, combined with evangelistic lectures and a number of aerial demonstrations to convince crews that the B-26 would behave as well as any other airplane if handled properly.  

The Second Air Force, which concentrated on four-engined bomber crew training, had its share of grief—first and foremost with the B-24, and later with the B-29. At the bottom of the trouble with these aircraft—as with others that came before them or after them—were inadequate maintenance work, cockpit crew deficiencies, faulty supervision of the training program and the mechanics that ran the early record of almost every untrained aircrew. During 1942 and 1943 the B-24 had the sorry distinction of being the Second Air Force's "problem airplane." In 1943 alone, 150 Second Air Force combat crewmen lost their lives in B-24 accidents. The air of mystery that enveloped many of these disasters led to a truly chilling effect on the morale of untrained crews. Four lighting crashes in mid-air over near Alexandria, New Jersey, for example, led Gen. I. H. Forrest to report:

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"The people down there are scared to death of their airplanes and it is very bad,"47 Morale congealed almost as dangerously in the 34th Bombardment Group (H), which lost seven B-24's and forty-three crewmen during a six weeks' stay at Salinas, California.18 The B-24--like the P-38 and the B-26--ultimately went on to a notable record in combat, but not until many apprentice airmen had contributed heavily in lives and spirit to its trying out.

Overcrowding at airfields, lack of convenient recreational facilities and drastic shortages of housing for dependents49 were familiar but minor morale factors at this stage of the training program. Though they may have caused individual cases of discontent, most men in operational training units had by this time learned to shrug them off or accept them as the facts of Army life in wartime. But the issue of promotions was something rather new to the alumni of flying schools and technical schools who manned the organizations that were taking shape in the continental air forces. A majority of these men had spent most of their military lives in one form or another of individual training. As civilians they had moved about in a rigidly controlled economy where promotions either came automatically to all trainees in good standing at some point in the schooling process, or were not open to any of them. Now, in the more flexible world of the numbered air forces, officers and enlisted men alike scanned bulletin boards and followed the latest Table of Organization developments with an interest that fed on high hopes of personal gain. The general tendency to promote men to within one step of the maximum rank or grade allowed for their positions served as a spur to morale.50
The question of leaves and furloughs also began to loom larger on the horizon as airmen realized with mixed emotions that their time in the Zone of Interior was running out. For most of them there had been little or no chance to break away from military routine—except on passes—until they reached the end of training command schooling. Between that point and their date of departure from the United States, they could normally expect—as a matter of policy—a leave or furlough of up to fifteen days, plus travel time. This final opportunity for a visit home might come before, during, or after OTU or KU training—depending on schedules or unforeseen lulls in activity brought on by a dearth of aircrews. In the case of unassigned men who had not received unit training, it might not come short of arrival at overseas redeployment bases.

Early or late, these leaves and furloughs were a boon to morale. But whenever they were unfailingly delayed, cut short, or written off, a decline in morale followed. Such was the experience of units of the XIIth Air Force Service Command which had abandoned pre-departure furloughs in the rush to meet IOTB commitments in 1942; and such was also the experience of the Training Command and the Service Command after they had adopted similar emergency measures in the spring and summer of 1944 in order to fill their obligations to the XIIth Air Force in Europe and the P-51 project in the Pacific. At the Greensboro, North Carolina, OTU during this period, the recreation on furloughs in combination with aircrew-relief discipline helped to mend the court martial rate; whereas in Kansas a senior general officer unilaterally made a difficult situation worse by declaring during an inspection of the 78th Fighter Group (XI) that

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the crew's combat areas ought to have seven days of leave—a rarity which they could not get and did not get because of the urgent need to notify their B-29's and fly them away by a set date. But the crisis soon passed, after proving a new routine at one base, and by November the Second Air Force could report that over ninety-nine per cent of the men received for transfer overseas by the 31st Air Force had had leaves or furloughs at some time during the previous six months. 53

The approach of overseas movement usually acted as a signal for the appearance of an ailment that came to be known as "nemolalrotitis." Its symptoms ran the gamut from nervous tremors to Hall and desolation. It could crop up anywhere—at training fields, supply areas, overseas replacement centers, or ports of embarkation—and whether it would occur in mild or intense form was something no one could predict with any certainty. Generally speaking, severe seizures were most likely to develop when personal ties were weak or—as in the case of individual replacements who belonged to no unit—non-existent; when leaves or furloughs were denied; and when men had as much as seven weeks of idleness in which to consult their fears of the unknown beaches beyond the piers of San Francisco or the runways of Bari or Naples. But "nemolalrotitis" normally presented no grave problems. If the prospect of leave-taking aroused some qualms, it also generated a surge of excitement and high spirits that was powerful enough to overcome the drag of other factors. 54
During the journey over the likelihood of malaria diminishes toward the northern parts. The longer the journey, the greater the protection. Those who traveled by air right from one port to another had the lowest liability of such serious malady as French Line, Hariri to Face, New York, John Cline, Tidal, Illis, Actol, L and Hendel. But these reactions were not or less fleeting. Present by air usually offered the virtues of speed—speed along the North Atlantic route in winter, which at least provided the salvation of Iceland's Danish wines—speed variety. It made a little if the journey at a time in winter were watched; within twenty-four hours the complainants might be enjoying a real in a hotel at Nara, Brazil.

Similarly, if the flight of American steamers, it did so only for a day. Off in shing were less fortunate. Our crestine voyages resembled the 27th December Group's journey to the Philippines in December 1901 aboard the President Coolidge; the line was comfortable and unexpected, the diet—steam, eggs, choice of all birds—astonishing. After Pearl Harbor, these who traveled fastest along the shortest route from generally faced heat. During a quick run from New York to the Bight of Clyde on the Queen Mary, crowd quarters, steamed food, and other shortcomings ranked only as nauseating irritation. But in any lower voyage—especially through tropical seas—the heat, the overcrowding, the lack of ventilation, to primitive stoves, and other coals were even, to touch from grove to grove, the swarms of stowed bees. The conditions were not of any better.
consecutive days aboard ship could blend into a somewhat corrosive mixture. Many of the discomforts and deficiencies were unavoidable, but, as anger boiled up over such affronts as gross inequities in food and food service, this fact was often forgotten. 57

The chances of war brought American airmen into overseas settings that varied radically in nature and effect. Units could consider themselves thrice-blessed if their movement orders took them to stations in a temperate zone where climate was tolerable, danger was no grave menace (save to the careless and incontinent), and living quarters were reminiscent of what they had known in the United States. The worst that could be said of Eighth Air Force housing in Britain during 1942 and 1943 was that it did not equal the standards of permanent Zone of Interior installations.

In southeastern Australia, facilities at Tocumwal and Melbourne struck Laj. Gen. George C. Kenney as perhaps even too comfortable to be militarily useful. And in China, during the summer of 1942, Kunming offered to the startled men of the 23d Fighter Group a magnificent locale and accommodations that were as gratifying as they were unexpected. 53

But East Aria, New South Wales, and the valleys of Yunnan were not the world. Elsewhere, from Shemya to Bisk, from Youks-les-Yains to Espiritu Santo, airmen too often encountered conditions that subjected them to mood trials by fever and chill, dehydration and deluge, dust and sleugh, monsoon, khamain, and willimaw. There was nothing temperate about the heat of Darwin and the bock Australian bush country, the suffocating, clin-in-damp of the Papuan jungles, the blest cold of the Alaskan mainland, the interminable scyens of the Altaii chair, Irell's mixture of sun and strench, and the Libyan desert's winter blend of sand
storms and inundations. There was nothing reminiscent about the camp-
and-tin-can dugouts that dotted the landscape at forward fields in
Algeria, the washed-out tents at Harrum—"a hell hole if there ever
was one"—in Cyrenaica, and the intertwined, lice-infested, insect-
ridden, lizard-ridden, unshaded, and unscreened pyramidal tents that bases
in New Guinea. In all cases, there was no shelter of member, or at least, riser,
in the onslaught of afflictions like malaria, dengue fever, scrub typhus,
diarrhea and dysentery ("Kasai Grouch," "Delhi Belly"), cholera, dysentery,
bullous abscesses, tropical ulcers, fungus infections ("Guinea Crud," "Jungle Rot"), furunculosis, filariasis, and "sweats of unknown origin."

During the early stages of combat operations, however, morale held up
for better than might have been expected, in view of physical conditions
that ranged from poor to appalling. Disease, of course, could and did
have a depressant effect. Malaria, for example, helped to drain reserves
of strength and will in newly stricken organizations like the 11th
Lembergorch Group in the New Guinea and New Zealand, and the Fifth
Fighter Group in Burma. Chronic dysentery had a similar though less
extreme effect on personnel of the Indi-Ghrair Unit of the Air Transports
Corps. Perhaps equally depressant were the glaring contracts that
existed between the living standards of junior officers and their men
in India in 1943, or the disregard of their rear solutions on the
army at bases in the South and Central Pacific at any rate. But
there also fell for a sort of selling the whole story of morale in typical
manner. Given the hour of crisis, the call-up of responsibility,
the elemental pull of leadership, the feeling of pride in their unit, the excitement of participation in great undertakings, and the belief that all concerned were sharing in suffering alike, air crews and ground crews alike, in all theaters not only ensured survival but did what they had to do with a drive and a spirit that many of the would never again see or in later, physically easier, periods after the rear and fear of overseas life had taken its toll.mods in service with Air Force units were never higher than during the winter months in California and other forward bases in North Africa when conditions were at their worst. On the other side of the world, some, with enthusiasm, an absence of worry, carried every Eighth Air Force men through the hectic days and severe times of 1943 but there were only dictated by 1944, to be replaced by the "generalization on a grand scale" influence of delayed for instruction.

The challenge of physical hardship might serve as a short-term stimulus to fresh and eager crews, but there was no cover of uniform in illness as custom and timed in. "Poor food" ranked as one of the worst, frequently, most persistently voiced criticisms of crew in theaters of operations. The fact that available rations usually not nutritional requirements simplified criticism to overuse writers. Ques were still turned automatically to a sight of the army cooks of a Vienna sauce or cans. Orders of short rations could cover anything from unwill in the air to food being prepared in the kitchen. They could reflect the eternal hunger of General U.S. Army Quartermaster C., and be written in the ledger, or the absence of were in China. They could refer to food being the "soup," or to the greater Chinese diet and each.
confined to the front lines, every other day only for
they considered the situation to be of a very critical
need of respite, morale, or both. In any case, returned
and went straight into duty. The newly selected trouble, or lack
for our line of the channels, was for the credibility that morale
was suffering.

Though difficult circumstances were actually neither
made nor
serious, the quality of clothing at least was to be desired, but small
measures were taken to improve. Consequently, there was also,
and it was
the fact of army life—a condition that a cod was unlikely to
bear with a high degree but never achieve. Either there, which
merely failed to evoke a brittle reaction, was only a brief, or
was the same at all events in Great Britain as in France, or
could not be to the mind, from the eye of its view. On the
forth, aside from some stubbornness about coupling and the volume of
items, there were few complaints in the 2nd over all. It usually
contained a variety of Irish items. Even Irish Air Force black
their series of items and just across France in 1917, it is often
rectangular form at the time. But few many were fretted about this temporarily limited
for a period of instruction and movement. In London in 1914
and the Middle East, where transportation never kept pace with demand, and
supply lines had to reach for long and often in what: it all lieu
and the light "issue" in the months after the suspension in the west in
1920 and 1921, it is an issue of the men, according to the
conclusions of the time. In any area, what was...
in 1943, they received it first and most frequently. At less accessible
bases up front, where the arrival of a stray planeload of frozen meat
was a holiday event, men had to make do with what quickly became a dreary
diet of British rations and the usual array of canned American hashes,
stews, and luncheon meats. Fortunately, trading talents quickly came
into play, and more than one mattress cover ("sleep-sleep") 68 changed
hands in return for native chickens, eggs, and tangerines. Haphazard
barter had its limitations, however, and the food question showed signs
of developing into a disturbing morale problem just at the time that
Allied forces leaped over the Mediterranean barrier into Sicily, Italy,
and Sardinia. The move into Europe provided logistical salvation, for
there soon followed a remarkable improvement in troop menus as fresh
meats and dairy products poured into the refrigeration storage facilities
of ports like Naples, Bari, and Cagliari, and then flowed out to consuming
units with increasing regularity. As butter, steaks, milk chows, and
"the long 'Coney Island' hot-dog" made their welcome appearances, morale
rose and diet ceased to be an issue of real consequence in the Mediterranean. 70

Airmen were less fortunate east of Sues. In Asia and out across the
Pacific food rarely failed to be an issue of consequence from the beginning
of the war until its final stages. Except at rear area installations in
India, Australia, and Hawaii, or at forward bases in the Aleutians where
by 1942 chicken every Sunday had become a commonplace, dissatisfaction with
available fare developed into and remained a chronic complaint of the
overwhelming majority of air units. Conditions varied widely from Ling-wu
to Sancapor and Saigon, but at all of these bases a persistent un-
satisfying diet damaged morale. 71
In isolated China, which logistically speaking lay at the end of the known world, M1 organizations were dependent upon the Chinese Far Area Service Corps for the bulk of their food, and its preparation as well. The system aroused more regret than praise. Sentries of CMC hotels variously complained about the monotony of diet, objected to the dearth of vegetables, described water buffalo meat—which at times made up ninety per cent of the meat issue—as sickening, and reported that unsanitary kitchen conditions had caused numerous cases of dysentery. But in spite of the pressure of repeated warnings that morale had suffered as a result of these conditions, little could be done either to reform the hostel organization or to procure American fare. Eggs and rice remained life-sustaining staples for men who recognized of C rations. So such yearnings existed, however, on the other side of the fence in Hsian, where the lack of refrigeration facilities necessitated a diet of canned C foods. Here, the problem of coping suddenly with bush and the military version of cannibalism cut both the insularity of GI chefs and the morale of the clientele.

In the Pacific the combination of long, often unrelentingly rainy lines and grossly inadequate refrigeration facilities—both colored and white—created an almost insurmountable barrier to a satisfactory diet for army forces. Yet, nonetheless, the role of care in the way of retuning through, above, or around that barrier. They managed, with mixed success, to improve the preparation of the Australian and American canned rations and delegated various tasks that formed their basic menu. They reported to ex-patriots, letters of requests through channels, center with the Navy cus...
of Channels, snafus, gaffes, thievery, and frequent breakdowns in
Australia and Hawaii, the raising up of makeshift cool rooms, and the use
of everythings from 6-46's to P-38's for "fat-cat" shipments of extra
supplies to forward areas. But these expedients provided only sporadic
relief at best. The ultimate solution of the problem lay beyond the
control of air units, whose efforts to lay hands on salable foods
and the precious "recess" in which to store them were either informal
or illegal, depending on the observer's viewpoint. Official responsibil-
ity for refrigeration rested with the theater engineers, who were
harrassed both by shortages and the strait jacket of War Department
rules of Daulation. Jurisdiction over the procurement and shipment of rations
belonged to the Services of Supply, whose hotly-criticized operations
reflected only too faithfully the fact that--for army purposes, at least--
there were not enough refrigerated cargo vessels or transport aircraft to
accomplish the mission set. The situation remained serious until the winter of 1944-1945.
Dy then GI veterans of an endless succession of jungles and coral out-
croppings had had more than enough time to wonder, as they rooted at their
bully beef or concentrated peanut butter, why neighboring naval forces
never seemed to have to do without the refrigerators, while fresh foods,
and other material blessings that could make wartime existence in the
terrifying regions of the Pacific more tolerable.
A number of factors shaped the morale of AAF ground personnel as they went about their daily rounds. That the most dramatic factor of all—peril to life, limb, and mind from enemy air attack—exerted perhaps the least influence was a matter of the fortitude of war. American mechanics, clerks, and administrators were constitutionally no less vulnerable than their foes to the shattering effects of sustained aerial assault. But generally speaking, only those AAF units in the most advanced areas during the early phases of a campaign ever underwent a pounding. They could be badly hurt. The Japanese fragmentation bombs that rained down upon Port Mersey, the concentrated deus of bombing and strafing inflicted upon Twelfth Air Force men at Thelepte, the beating administered to Fifth Air Force Service Command truck drivers who worked round-the-clock on the Oran-Oay-Debedura supply run, and the punishment noted out to signalmen and other personnel at Sidi and Biskra, all strained morale and undermined endurance. Yet these cases were exceptional. Most air organizations either never came within striking distance of Axis aviation or were shielded just as effectively by local allied air superiority and the enemy's gradual descent into a defensive strategy. During the last half of the war enemy raidors intruded so infrequently upon the calm of many bases that one of their rare, ineffectual appearances was more likely to result in an upsurge rather than a sinking of spirits.72

A more serious threat than enemy bombs to the stamina and morale of non-combat personnel under certain conditions was ever work. In
New Guinea, the Loy Hebrides, the Solomons, and the Gilberts, shortages of personnel (especially in the skilled categories) and equipment put a heavy burden on the manpower available. Maintenance men who toiled long hours seven days a week under cruelly difficult conditions could hold up for a time, but not indefinitely. Then overwork sank from the exalted status of an all-out emergency effort to the level of routine, unrelied drudgery, the danger of a drop in strength, productivity, and morale developed.

Though the problems posed by exhaustion came to the fore most quickly in dismal settings like Guadalcanal and Tulagi, they were by no means confined to the torrid zone. In China, for example, the commander of the veteran 23d Fighter Group warned Headquarters Fourteenth Air Force in November 1943 that his understaffed, under-equipped organization could not stand the strain of overwork much longer "without a serious decline in efficiency and . . . morale."

As long as the tempo of ground activity normally stayed below the danger line, hard work could serve as a powerful stimulus to unit morale and performance. This was especially true in the case of ground personnel who were able to see a close and direct connection between their labor and the prosecution of the war. In days of crisis, when that relationship stood out with naked clarity, non-combat men reacted magnificently to the challenge of the hour. Maintenance crews of fighter and bomber squadrons at Kossan, Adak, and Unnaq, during 1943, toiled up to 65 and 70 hours a stretch in zero weather, snowstorms, and one-hundred-mile-an-hour gales, en through the ordeal in good spirits. They had done something worthwhile, and they knew it. At Gauvouy, Tunisia, the ground men of the 79th Fighter
Group unexplainably labored sixteen hours a day during a vital period of operations against the Afrika Corps. Line crews and other ground section personnel at Eighth Air Force stations in England earned a glowing tribute for the superb way in which they met the crushing requirement of maximum aircraft availability that went into effect on 2 June 1944 and lasted until two weeks after the Normandy landings.\(^7\) When unit activities went forward at a less hectic pace, the virtues of work were still apparent to observers and tellers alike. A Seventh Air Force bombardment squadron characteristically reported from Guam in 1944, that "everybody is too busy to feel sorry for themselves."\(^7\) Eight months later, the squadron's parent organization—a group whose morale never wavered—echoed the refrain from Guadalcanal with the comment that the work load left "little time for contemplation" and thereby enabled the days to "pass more quickly."\(^7\)

For tactical units voiced similar sentiments. The quickly-functioning 3d Air Depot Group at Arnhem, for example, found that "very little less into the" attitude of morale by striving to shorten the long wait of an overseas tour of non-combat duty. Here, too, was an affirmation of faith in the principle that "the faster it flies, the sooner our return to the States."\(^10\)

There were limits, however, to the appeal of work. Ground personnel, when the need arose, could be expected with all of their strength into the execution of any military mission, but, with contrast, and climax upon chores that were temporarily worthless, almost projects had to be accelerated within mere conservatively than more motion. Almost every time had its cheer time or another of unelent tone of such occasions in the lore of American aviation, they were
even less palatable. This was particularly true in more-organized
like the Eighth Air Force Service Command, where the conception
of make-work schemes in 1945 kept men "crazy out except morale." 51 
Enlisted men harbored an even more intense animosity to work details that carried
the label of special comforts and privileges for officers. The commanding
officer of Headquarters Squadron, 10th AF, for example, protested against
the morale-breaking practice of detailing his men to construction work
on an office and club at a time when there was no day room for enlisted men
and a wise one already existed between officers and enlisted standards.
An engineering officer at a lower echelon level in the Central Pacific
was equally critical of the practice of repeatedly rushing aside work
that would improve living conditions for enlisted personnel in order to
proceed with the apparently unnecessary rehabilitation of high-ranking
officers' quarters. Enlisted general personnel, particularly in areas
where the sounds of combat were faint, had a bitterless call to
insurrection against what they took to be flagrant discrimination. Cases
like these were all that was needed to transform latent resentment against
officers into a rioting mood. 52

Despite all efforts to avoid anger in the rate of operations, almost all
units inevitably experienced spells of inactivity. And rather, shortages
of equipment, mangled shipping schedules, unpredictable tables of events,
and a number of other factors might be responsible for enforced inactivity.
For such the crew, the effect was likely to be unhealthy. Airmen, whose
devotion to each-time on the control, of course, earned a repute from
the wings depend on a series of strong, but they had no desire to
witness. Long days of useless time had little appeal for
deal of truth in the slogan, "the nearer the front, the higher the morale."86 Behind this cliché lay something more than a conviction that time raced at Okinawa, Leyte, and dragged in the Caribbean. Pride, self-respect, and a sensitivity to the opinions of others ("And what did you do in the war?") were also involved. On Okinawa morale flourished in bombardment units whose men "knew they were contributing a crucial share toward the winning of the war."87 In India, the feeling that they had "participated,"88 however vicariously, in successful combat missions helped to keep up the spirits of mechanics in a bombardment maintenance squadron. On Tinian and Okinawa, "justifiable pride" in "concrete accomplishment,"89 and the fact that all personnel—ground as well as combat—could measure the grief visited upon the enemy through their joint efforts, contributed heavily to a outlook of optimism.90 But in rear areas frustration often outweighed such compensations as a relatively high standard of living and immunity from sudden death. A special services officer pictured morale as "a tremendous problem"91 in the Aleutians after the withdrawal of the Japanese had reduced numbers of Eleventh Air Force men to a routine of sitting on their hands in a cold mist. Obsession with "a feeling of unimportance"92 was perhaps just as strong at air bases in India; this condition led one observer to urge a policy of sending depot personnel on temporary duty to combat units where they could see tangible evidence of the worth of their work. In the Mediterranean, men in AAC/AC units that were still stationed at African bases many months after the time of war had swept into Europe also found it difficult to believe that their

* The term was more figurative than real in air forces like the Eighth, where air depots were within flying distance of the nearest bomber airfields.
efforts had any military significance. This mood may well have been
most acute in the rear echelons of the Thirteenth Air Force Service Command,
where personnel could draw small comfort from the conviction that they were
stagnating in the middle of nowhere ("What was the name of that island again")
as members of a forgotten air force in a secondary theater of operations.
There were, however, of combating the negative mood that was so common
among service personnel. In the Ninth Air Force Service Command, for
example, intelligence officers carried on a steady and at least vaguely
successful campaign of educational therapy that was designed to show how
the precise labors of non-combat units had made the triumphs of the Ninth
Air Force possible. The war of attention also helped to keep men out of
the doldrums, as did the careful exploitation of the individual airman's
pride in his resourcefulness and skill.92

One fairly certain antidote for rear area depression and restlessness
was forward movement. Full of its steady right rear confusion and distraction,
exhausting effort in physical terms, but there lie in true over-
shadowed the minds of most men by the evidence of a close of scene
and the hope, more than ever, forward strike along the highways to Berlin
and Tokyo broached here, paradoxically enough, the closer. And for
accomplishment except at a rate so slow it promised to carry men nearer to
the combat zone. The experience of the 32d Service Group of the Ninth
Air Force in the Middle East was typical. For the 44th and 336th Troop-
ner Groups operated against actual enemy forces or to a rear active
sector, morale floundered in 1944, when the front lines moved to consider
with such solemnity of the enemy. For a time they, "every day as
in the dough.95 But under sounder the Group was able at least to teach that,
people could. The air crew, our pegged out, our raised...96 And

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May around the world, where a change of station could usually be made, and the air was cleaner, as a shift from a captured jungle site to an unrefurbished jungle site. Service units of the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces also reported notification to the arrival of personnel orders.

Some of the workaday factors that affected the morale of the non-combat personnel had a similar, perhaps even more decisive influence on combat crews. Every air raid on forward air bases taxed the nerves, energies, and spirits of air and ground personnel. "Machine Charlie" in the Solomons and his Luftwaffe cousin in Japavia were no respecters of persons. Nevertheless, as hard as it may have been for a bleary-eyed mechanic to drag himself through his daily routine after the cessation of air raids or heavy shelling and bombing, it was probably still harder for a pilot who had undergone the same testing stress to face up without results to the rigors of air combat. True enough, combat crews had the opportunity—denied their earth-bound comrades—to hit back at the enemy, but there were times when, in their overworked state, they were barely equipped to snatch at the opportunity. Similarly, though combat units might seem to be in a condition of deep-seated fatigue, reduced efficiency, and lowered morale, it could actually shatter combat personnel. A steady diet of nineteen-hour days or, as happens with more missions, from against area, without benefit of fighter escort or adequate air-sea rescue facilities. It was no accident that, at a time of critical manpower shortages, the much-brisk survivors of the early air battles in the Philippines fell in such a low state that they could with more
heavily worn out. The wrong man, service personnel may have
some place on deck. Understand the planes, all in for consonances of deck; but it is, to place something like the mount-
where in the 11th Air Force's newsubjects during the week-day order
of starts, there are, not necessarily had been needed to the planes
Air Force rear assault on Germany. The first X106 attack comes
and that echo. 46

Of those natural factors peculiar to our crews there is mention
none the heed I gave. In every manner, of course, one will note
the every expectation that there are and I, well to thought
be jolted with the first encountered that. Battle do or did not of themselves
automatically; rule for low cycle. Here after than now, very limited
only when. In cardiovascular, it is close to the reason all come along;
other experienced only fleeting minutes of repetition worse. In terms
of unit tasks, he imparted this trivial mention or reference it a curve,
but, you it occurred, in a level-pressed in rear, for example, the
least of an obscure reduction pilot, right into the effect of war on
node, until the planes are shut down turned out as our mission commander-
and was the core in the 32nd fighter squadron of the 11th Air Force—or
other by fire, the look could come as a terrible blow to the
entire unit. The mental consequences of cessation turned all upon the
role of operations. In benchmark move of the 11th Air force, were
the count of nations, ran into the barriers, looked up and some as a rule
part of the daily routine in some manner. In short, all any
improvement of morale. A different situation by, however, in the
result bit. Here in those in the 11th Air Force.
losses tended to stand out more dramatically than elsewhere: an
antiaircraft area that cost one B-25 crew throw "a cloud of gloom" over the 77th Bombardment Squadron.

In spite of dissenting opinions, there seems to be little doubt that heavy casualties exerted an intense command pressure on morale. The gray atmosphere they created in the 17th Bombardment Group in North Africa, and their "depressing effect" on bomber crews in the South Pacific during the spring months of 1944, were typical. When heavy losses occurred in concentrated form, the pressure on morale increased extremely. The attack of calamitous attrition in the Iwo Jima low-level mission of 1 August 1945, for example, hit the 30th Bombardment Group "like a thunderbolt."

Disaster at the hands of German fighters during the Vicenza raid of 23 December 1943 reduced the 37th Bombardment Squadron of the Fifteenth Air Force to a condition of stunned bewilderment over the "invisibility" of its loss and was a major factor behind the withering of the unit from combat two days later. Then the 37th went back on operational status, its worried new crew showed too much of a tendency, for a time, to discover mechanical troubles early in a mission or hook for home. In the Pacific, according to General Kenney, the casualties sustained by the Thirteenth Air Force in the Palawan strikes of 20 December and 3 October 1944 brought the morale of the surviving crews "close to the breaking point." Catastrophes that resulted from non-combat causes were recorded less.

desperately. The Fifth Air Force was badly shaken by the tragic loss on "Flak: Sunday" April 1945 of sixty-one fighters which he reported safely from a attack on the island area only to be pounded by fighters in the rear forces by a fatal barrier of elements. For the A-6's fleet China
Division also had reason to remember "the black days of January 9-10, 1945," when a burst of meteorological fury over the harbor destroyed nine transport airplanes.

Prompt replacement of killed, missing, wounded, and non-operational personnel to the preservation or restoration of front combat morale.

In the case of units whose attrition rates were reoccurring, a steady supply of new pilots or crews acted more as a preventive of trouble than anything else. But for some units and groups that had been marked by disaster, an immediate influx of reinforcements had the life-saving quality of a blood transfusion. It counteracted tendencies towards disintegration, helped to bring the organization out of a condition of shock, and started the healing process. Though mishaps often were a painful reminder of de-tele, their occurrence as a reassuring sign of renewal and continuity, are an aid to the sickly sentiment induced by the sight of empty crew quarters or blocks of empty combat at rest in fields. But their losses are losses or relatively light, until marked in the course of the movement that follows to beam with pride upon the scar of 1942-1943 and sturdy faith or its or even as little distinction to realize the traditional role of rear area, sliding rearward of enemy, into the sight of light, into, or even hostile not easily, without need of cutting or clearing the uninvolved units, the snow the sick in endured until the moment registered.
...convinced that the mission was worth the cost, air forces... coal a source to the hazards we have for our air...research on the battlefronts. A belief of utmost importance during the...the risk is high. The weight of evidence from the actions of others...air force's ability to sustain BLt,45,120 air force morale during the...daylight air battles over Germany in the winter of 1945, and for both...Air Force morale during the...other Allied nations, substantiated by...in the East. The Allied nations, including the United States, British, and...voiced feelings that the risks and sacrifices were uniform in the very high...for the results gained against the enemy...now as a direct result;...cloud-busting in the eastern or western sectors of the...British, the U.S. and France; the...offensive on the enemy's morale and...clearly from their disappearance: lack of flying on combat...series of neutralizing service centers, naval bases, communications, and...other personnel correspondents on the west surface of the Central Pacific...hills...a normal mood of easy flying in the two miniature Pacific air...forces to a large extent the invaluable result of the role they had...in Italy, in North Africa it seems to have been caused by...coordination between...intelligence agencies and...would...the requirement for that they had...had made it...over the objections and a role of time, personnel and...success or failure in combat had...an overriding influence on...the critical and vital role of personnel in any other single factor. Because...and...It is an absolute necessity to recognize the role of...behavior...and...and...
of the 365th Bomb Group. Aerial reconnaissance of the area revealed that the enemy had reinforced the airfield with heavy earthworks and concrete. In addition, the airfield was protected by a large number of enemy aircraft, which were concentrated in two main areas: one near the center of the airfield and another near the western perimeter. Despite these defenses, the 365th Bomb Group was able to make a successful attack on the airfield, resulting in the destruction of many aircraft. The success of the attack was attributed to the use of "secret weapon," a bomb that was rumored to be superior in effectiveness to other bombs. The operation was a significant blow to the enemy and was a major victory for the 365th Bomb Group.
the occasion of their one hundredth successful bridge-busting attack. In the Mediterranean, the same kind of contrast in mood could be seen in the 17th Bombardment Group, which, much to the "disgrace" of its fliers, was pulled out of action in October 1943 because of bombing inefficiency, went through re-training, and in a matter of a few months was able to boast about its record of "almost unbelievable" bombing accuracy.

Fighter pilots who were troubled by misgivings about the worth of escort work had only to head for the nearest bomber field to learn that their big brothers looked upon them as knights-errant whose very presence sent spirits up, and losses down. The veteran of the Eighth Air Force's 305th Bombardment Group who described Spitfires on P-47's as looking "pretty sweet" when they shepherded limping B-17's safely home unmasked the feelings of bomber men. To corvet crews few sights were lovelier than the welcome of friendly fighters around bomber formations during the quiet stretches of a mission, or more breathtaking than their sudden appearance—fire on machina-fashion—at an instant of ultimate extremity. Bomber crews who had ever stared straight at an approaching J-160 for long seconds before catching a glimpse of a P-47 on its tail would not soon forget the emotions of that moment. There may have been some uncertainty concerning the extent to which full fighter protection could cut bomber attrition (predictions ran as high as seventy-five percent), but all parties agreed that the cut would be substantial at the credit to morale increase. Unfortunately, unanimous agreement on the merits of escort fighters an the crying need for them did not solve the painful problem of man-power extension, production, and allocation; and until those problems were solved, virtually all bomber forces had to make do with only part-time fighter cover or no cover at all. P-38's and P-51's did not reach the forth
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Air Force, for example, before the latter part of 1943. In the Central
Pacific, Seventh Air Force bombers rarely received any assistance before
the last weeks of the war. The Fifth Air Force, after a hard beginning,
served better than the Seventh, but its early B-25's were handed by
priorities favoring the B-17 and B-24. And it was not until the fall of
1944, that Liberators crews of the Thirteenth Air Force began to
relieve of the particular kind of logistics they feel that as only fighters they
are even flyers, also in Europe are the Mediterranean, desert con-
verted, not that difficulties during the early days of every kind, on
American bombers generally concentrated on anti-ship targets were the
primary mission. The cover furnished by Eights of limited range
in this period of shallow penetrations meant a role at 1-27 on areas,
according to General Spaatz, gave a healthy life to combat, but in 1943,
when direct threats into heavy bombers became more and more serious
for beyond the radius of fighters, bombers did very little, or a crisis
of serious proportions. The fighter did not exist until even in
1944, on 25th Air Force, 1945, on 25th Air Force, the Eighth
Air Force was out of action, and, in 1945, Fifth Air Force, 1945.

But even now the problem has not been completely eliminated. The
problems in terms of results. In July 1942, a reduction in fighters was
very much a cause for concern, but in 1944 the force loss or error.122

General was in the Central Pacific in an area of operational and
physical threats which neither had never been before. The general
situation was for the first time in a true sense that was truly serious,
but they were not as much as much, but ...
to the ordeal of battle. In reverent silence, as they rose, the thin, sick-smelling atmosphere four miles above Tokyo, the turbulent uncertainties of the Pacific and the Bay of Bengal, or the "nightmare of searchlights, warships, rockets, and . . . smoke" over Tokyo—they entered that new dimension of strain. All offers to mitigate the tension, fear, and fates that were part of air operations, and to give airmen every possible assistance should they come to grief, contributed in some degree to the maintenance or maintenance of some morale. The projection that new-feathered body armor, for example, gave to bomber crews of the Eighth Air Force in December 1942 yielded benefits that were real as well as material and led to wholesale adoption of air equipment. There was no hiding place in a B-17 and any cadet or crew that learned a constant feeling of extreme vulnerability to all visions and learned to have a constant secret. Similarly, something as minor as the improvisation of an extra safety belt that would keep runners from being sucked out of a compassed B-17 if a blister were to go also heightened morale. On a larger scale are in an entirely different sphere, such brilliantly successful undertakings as Operation Fortitude—the mass aerial evacuation of more than 200,000 civilians unarmed American pilots from North to Italy in 1944—improved the morale of thousands of Allied troops by offering them abundant proof that if they were not alone and survived they could not be forgotten. Airmen were not considered to have even greater been to morale. Many liebested sacrifices in the history are worthily never made any YF order (not personal, but the L-9 crew "just felt better knowing they were there"). Elsewhere, many hundreds of fighter pilots and bomber crews received immediate recognition for their activities of an astonishing sort of
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In recognition of the contribution of the 88th Bombardment Wing for their feats of heroism during the Berlin Airlift, the Air Force has decided to honor them with a special recognition. This is a recognition of theirmore than 1,000 sorties flown during the operation. The 88th Bombardment Wing, based at Molesworth Air Force Base in England, played a vital role in providing crucial supplies to Berlin during the Cold War crisis.

The recognition was held at an awards ceremony at the base, where General Harry H. W. Clark, Commander of the 8th Air Force, presented the medals to the distinguished group of aviators. The ceremony was attended by many high-ranking officials, including Secretary of the Air Force, who congratulated the heroes for their efforts.

The men of the 88th Bombardment Wing were a true example of the spirit in which they served. Their contributions were not just a matter of numbers but a demonstration of their dedication and courage.

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This page has been declassified IAW EO12958.
'big league' Air Force" betrays the Seventh Air Force's sensitivity over its neglected state. E-24 men of the thirteenth Air Force—very much of toiling in the shadow of the Fifth Air Force—were equally uneasy and complained bitterly that their missions had been slighted or ignored. Combat awards and decorations served as a valuable complement to, or if need be—substitute for, the kind of morale-building headlines that the XIII Bomber Command craved. But the need that awards and decorations could do depended on some extent upon the speed with which they were recommended, processed, and formally presented. The universal stress on the need for quick action bespeaks a conviction that delay robbed decorations of part of their worth. Minor morale crises developed in units of the twelfth and seventh Air Forces when approval of recommendations for the air medal took as long as six months to be granted. It was only natural for men who knew that they were near insurmountable risks to yet to receive their honors while they were still hot and alive. The official effects of awards and decorations could also be believed were not least quickly or wrongly—that they were being discriminated against.

In 1AF, for example, fighter pilots claimed that their lower returns had harvested a disproportionately large share of the available honors; junior officers and junior officers often took a dubious view of awards that they were imposed upon senior officers; and when under a reviewing commission or tightened, officers were among not the recipients of the awards but the protected until they were being awarded. Shorter were in circumstances from air force to air force as a result of each on such a base. And the discipline of war was severe in the expectation of varying combat conditions. There was a feeling, not of...
Air Medal. Fifteenth Air Force men moaningly suggested that it might be a good idea to stamp their conservatively-awarded B-40's with the number 15 in order to distinguish them from Eighth Air Force B-40's. But the Fifteenth, too, was not above suspicion of inflationary activity. Between August 1942 and 29 December 1944, one of its heavy bombardment groups distributed a total of 15,577 Air Medals on 1,920 bomb clusters. 129

The recognition that ground personnel received for their services fell far short of that accorded to officers. This was natural, moral, and traditional. It was just as natural, moral, and traditional for a number of non-contact non-officers in service units—to wear their stripes or insignia: to feel that they deserved for conspicuous in action or for meritorious service medals. Yet the serviceuestion was: who

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The institution of the Home Station, established in 1911, was corner-stone for the creation of the British Commonwealth. The new organization was at first hailed as "a means of securing the future for the men who have been doing, but it gradually did not come into existence because of various events. In service units, battle positions, an action promptly became a better basis than evacuation. Service personnel in all countries are employed and the extent of their work is sometimes that of making them safe, if not the, a little more than has been expected. Ground military of her or it, from the other side, to a tank that is preparing, at the moment, as in the past, in all of those places. It became an achievement of her or was something such as intense in 1915 the service personnel of her, to her army, but the little service with the discovery of military. All concerned, am on the move to prepare for life, in time, armed to secure a portion of service units everywhere in our little army. The little army has received a new volume on the course of these.

Operation, like little storms, is a two-fold value. At the same time, they are a part of the same solace for recreation and allowed his time for leisure. Whether all concerned cherish the idea that our service men are better armed now or ready may be hard to say. Most of them are content to leave analysis of their role to those who are concentrators in their own pursuit of better things for mankind. In an atmosphere, therefore, a little storm is made and the entire area is whirled in whirl of air.
The document is not legible due to the blurring and distortion of the text. It appears to be a page from a confidential report or document, possibly discussing military or strategic matters, given the context and the style of writing.

The text seems to be discussing a plan or strategy, possibly involving military operations or intelligence gathering. The content is difficult to interpret due to the lack of clarity.

The page is marked as confidential, indicating that the information contained within should be treated with strict confidentiality and not disclosed to unauthorized individuals.
of course, was wasted time and motion until the War Department provided a remedy in September 1942 by granting to the Eleventh authority over its own promotions. The India-China line of AOC suffered from the same kind of headache during the period when it had to route promotion recommendations through Headquarters AOC in Washington. But even after Maj. Gen. Harold L. George, Commandant General of AOC, had voluntarily abandoned his authority to the theater in an effort to hasten action, conditions did not improve. The India-China line had simply jumped from the frying pan of red tape into the world-wide fire of I/O restrictions.\textsuperscript{137}

That a hue and cry inevitably arose in all theaters over the baneful effect of I/O restrictions was not surprising. Tables of Organization were by their very nature finite; the ambitions which they checked were not. Feelings on the subject faithfully reflected locale. In July 1943, Maj. Gen. George S. Stratemeyer, while still Chief of the Air Staff in Washington, took a calm view of what he described as budgetary and War Department policy restraints on promotions. Writing to Maj. Gen. Ira C. Eaker in England, he noted that the promotion question was under study and that action would duly follow.\textsuperscript{138} Two months later, after General Stratemeyer had assumed command of the India-Burma Sector, China-Burma-India, his tone a bit cut took a charred radically. In a letter to his successor on 4 September, he sensed a plea for extra grades and ratings with the exhortation, "For God's sake, give us some help." "All I am trying to do," he added, "is build up morale and the least that can be done back there is to support me when I ... only want to spend a few more of Uncle Sam's dollars."\textsuperscript{139} The predicament in which General
Stratemeyer found himself was already quite familiar to Air commanders overseas. There were either not enough promotions to go around under existing T/O's, especially in units that operated at above-normal strengths; or, in the case of provisional organizations, there was no T/O at all.

Efforts to secure wholesale reforms usually foundered on the rocks of War Department resistance. Air force commanders had better luck at winning piecemeal concessions, which, if they did not cure morale ills, at least eased them. The Sixth Air Force, for example, gained permission early in 1943 to create fifty second lieutenants in spite of 1/0 barriers; the Twelfth Air Force twice succeeded in getting extra allowances of space; and in the Southwest Pacific, the Fifth Air Force received some special dispensations. During 1943 and 1944 the War Department made further concessions on a general basis by liberalizing promotion requirements for second lieutenants and privates. The largest promotion problem of all, however, was only slowly solved—during the last year of the war—slowly because the War Department's policy of furnishing replacements in the armed forces could not keep pace with the demands for thousands of overseas veterans at the end of the war—demands which, to morale, Officers and enlisted men who had served hard and waited long for the opportunity to fill 1/0 vacancies that called for higher grades and rank, were received bitterly as replacements of inferior quality who were fired in order to wind straight into more capable hands. The chorus of protest against "diluting replacements"—the tactical replacements—was loud and was aired. The War Department nevertheless held to its policy rather than accept the alternatives of cutting selection of the only personnel available for overseas theaters, or the assignment of 1/0 personnel not until the end of 1944, and the war ended with overseas theaters had officer and enlisted 1/0
During leisure hours, when there was time to take off the blinders of routine and look away from a world circumscribed by pistons, flak, and third carbons, the thoughts of thousands of airmen turned first and foremost toward home. Therein lay the importance of mail to morale. Letters (with the usual snapshots enclosed), personal parcels, and periodicals not only linked men overseas with the people and places they had left behind, but served also as tangible symbols of that idealized, promised land of America for which airmen longed with an aching desire that at times bordered on the obsessive. Mail from home was not, however, an unmixed blessing. Letters bearing news of feminine faithlessness and other calamities like family illness and death hit the men who received them hard. But the anger, concern, and grief that came of such bad tidings were essentially private and touched only isolated individuals.\textsuperscript{141} The general run of mail, on the other hand, had an altogether healthy influence on morale. Letters and parcels contributed notably to the high spirits that prevailed when activities were going smoothly, and provided a measure of cheer in situations that were otherwise quite cheerless. Airmen asked one thing above all of the Army Postal Service—a steady flow of mail. Given that, they were volubly grateful. It was not unusual for a unit to single out reliable mail service as “the biggest morale booster,”\textsuperscript{142} especially if that service happened to coincide with the Christmas season. But as soon as mail deliveries slowed down or stopped, reports of a sag in morale followed with automatic regularity. The sag was likely to become more pronounced if, after a five months' delay, holiday packages
finally arrived with their contents scrambled into a wilder hash. 143

Complaints of poor mail service cropped up most frequently in 1942 and the first half of 1943. In this early period, cargo space on air transports was at a premium and had to be fought for—not always with success; shipments of second class matter bound for such end-of-the-line points as India and China had to run a gauntlet of thieves on route—again not always with success; and, on a number of occasions, the postal system was simply inadequate to meet the mounting demands that were made upon it. Probably the most serious complaint came in November 1942 from a representative of Headquarters AAF who, after returning from a tour of the Eleventh Air Force, charged the Army with neglect of overseas mail delivery. In time, however, service improved immensely, though up to the end of the war there were still sporadic lags and delays—particularly when units were in the throes of movement, when ships with mail aboard were diverted from their original destinations because of operational necessity, and when communications with outlying areas broke down. But these lapses could not obscure the fact that over the long pull the Army Postal Service performed a task of unprecedented difficulty and complexity with a skill, ingenuity, and reliability that benefitted morale greatly. 144

However pleasurable mail may have been, it alone could scarcely exercise the twin appetites of boredom and breeding which threatened the morale of airmen during off-duty hours. Few men had either the desire or mental energy to devote all of their spare time to the ritual of reading and re-reading letters and writing replies. Other diversions were needed.
The least complicated of those, in material terms, were GI bull sessions and games of chance. The former, which required only people and a willingness to range back and forth over the eternal subjects of women, war, home, food, and the merits and demerits of various makes of American automobiles, won a high place—though often by default—on the list of leisure-time activities. The latter, hardly more complicated, called only for the same people plus a deck of cards or a pair of dice, and thousands of airmen everywhere found some escape in long sessions of bridge, poker, pinochle, and crap games. 145

But virtually all other recreational pursuits, even one so essentially simple and private as reading, reflected in varying degree the influence of the factors of time, place, and logistics. In the European and Mediterranean theaters, which benefitted from relatively short lines of communications and abundant local resources, recreation presented no serious problems except during the North African phase of operations, when forward units lacked either the facilities or the equipment for most leisure-time activities, and later during periods of movement on the continent of Europe, when some organizations temporarily spurted beyond the effective reach of the American Red Cross, Army Special Services, and other agencies. 146 Generally, however, airmen in the two theaters had ample opportunity for off-duty diversion. Many availed themselves of the hospitality of their allies and co-belligerents; and all, according to their tastes, found some form of pleasure in the cities and towns of Britain, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, and North Africa, where cultural and historical monuments could be seen at almost every step, where entertainment was to be had in innumerable opera houses, bistros, and music halls, where beer, wine, brandy, and gin
answered the need for recreation and relaxation, and where the company of women of differing social stations could be enjoyed for differing social purposes. 147

The program of officially-sponsored recreational activities got off to a fast if uneven start in both theaters and before long expanded to quantitatively awesome dimensions. Special Services offered movie showings (easily the most consistently popular form of diversion in all theaters, and the one credited with doing the most good for morale), supplied athletic gear and equipment, ran hobby shops, distributed scarce radios, phonographs, and P.A. systems, sponsored USO show tours of AAF bases, organized dozens of all-soldier shows like "Skirts," which played 212 times in Britain before 260,000 spectators—including Queen Mother Mary, became involved in radio broadcasting in Italy, produced a rodeo at Foggia, superintended a "Tec Bowl" football game in England and a "Spaghetti Bowl" game in Italy, had a hand in track and field meets, organized fifty dance orchestras in the Fifteenth Air Force and over 500 basketball teams in the Eighth Air Force, initiated a series of symphonic concerts and operatic performances in Naples, and fostered an interest in art in Britain. 148

Information and Education Sections were scarcely less active at their somewhat more staid tasks of setting up and conducting off-duty schools, supplying and running unit libraries, establishing newspapers, distributing news maps, copies of Stars and Stripes, Yank, and other publications, arranging for courses at Oxford, Cambridge, and other institutions, and both encouraging and facilitating enrollments in USAF and university extension courses. 149 Working alongside Special Services and I and E,

147 I and II had operated as a part of Special Services until the latter part of 1944.
the American Red Cross also made a major contribution to the program of leisure-time relaxation. Its activities included the management of hundreds of off-base service clubs ranging from modest centers in provincial towns to huge and elaborate establishments in cities like London and Naples. Aero Clubs (complete with American hostesses) at airfields, wandering clubmobiles, rest houses, beach clubhouses, and outdoor pavilions. Its offerings were equally diverse, running the gamut from the inevitable doughnuts and coffee to books, radios, phonographs, musical instruments, ping-pong tables, sports events, educational tours, sightseeing tours, dances, forums, and sleeping facilities. There seems to have been general agreement that, despite occasional lapses and shortcomings, Special Services, I and E, and the Red Cross, aided and abetted by indefatigable chaplains and the USO, not only provided airmen with a steady measure of amusement, diversion, and edification, but also helped substantially to keep AWOL, courts-martial, and VD rates down.

In Asia and the Pacific, most airmen quickly learned not to expect too much in the way of recreational opportunities or facilities. Only units in rear areas or at fields in China could enjoy the benefits of being based at or near centers of civilization. The rest, for at least the greater part of the war, had to adjust themselves to an existence almost devoid of women, normally potable beverages, and other amenities that were commonplace elsewhere. Informal and organized off-duty activities alike suffered from crippling handicaps imposed by shortages of equipment and transportation, low priorities and the length of lines of communication. Reports from the CBI and the several Pacific theaters
during the first two years of the war were filled with complaints about enervating monotony and the dearth of movie equipment, "live" entertainment, athletic gear, books, periodicals, newspapers, club buildings and the like. There was no choice, however, but to make shift with what was available or could be bought, borrowed, bartered, or stolen.\textsuperscript{151} Men therefore sat in the rain watching movies and waited patiently when projectors broke.

They hailed Joe E. Brown with delight during his pioneering tour of the Southwest Pacific and welcomed the USO troops that preceded and followed him—especially those with girls in the cast. They depended on the helpful Japanese for radio entertainment until Army stations were established in 1944. And they played softball, volleyball, and basketball when and where they could.\textsuperscript{152}

Special Services, I and E, the Red Cross, and other agencies all had to grapple with the problem of carrying out their regular tasks under irregular conditions. They did surprisingly well and earned widespread praise for their contributions to the maintenance of good morale.

Special Services distributed its meager allotment of supplies and hunted for more, promoted the usual sports events and shows, tried to keep the flow of films moving, and established and ran not only day rooms and clubs but also a gold mining camp and a ski lodge.\textsuperscript{154} I and E sections gave out news, published newspapers, set up war rooms, organized quizzes, and played a leading role in the founding of off-duty schools like Fox HOLE Military Academy, Angaur Prep, Suriuchi College, and Fifth Air Force University.\textsuperscript{155}

The Red Cross, though it came under criticism at times in the Southwest Pacific and CBI, generally functioned as well as circumstances permitted. It staffed rest camps in Australia, operated from tents in the Central
Pacific, had charge of full-scale establishments in the Philippines, mass-produced doughnuts in the Admiralties, specialized in hot coffee on Tarawa, and won legendary fame for the hamburgers served at its canteen in Gaya, India.\[^{156}\]

The need to supplement the ordinary off-duty recreational activities with periodic intra-theater leaves for both combat and non-flying personnel was recognized in all operational air forces. Commanders and flight surgeons alike accepted the proposition that short spells of relief from the drab and wearing routine of overseas military life were essential to maintenance of efficiency, health, and good morale. In Europe and the Mediterranean, where rest facilities and transportation were generally available, the leave program got under way early and went forward without serious interruption. Airmen on masse swarmed through Britain on holiday trips, thronged into Paris to sample its delights, and enjoyed the attractions of such superb rest centers as Cannes and Capri.\[^{157}\] In the CBI conditions were less satisfactory. Nevertheless, personnel in India managed to relax at hill station rest camps like Darjeeling and Shillong during the hot season, and in Calcutta, Lucknow, and other cities when cool weather came on; while airmen in China made use of the limited facilities at Camp Schiell, Tuyen Yang, and Kunming.\[^{158}\]

In the Pacific, vast distances, frequent shortages of accommodations in rear areas, and a chronic lack of transportation conspired to make the leave program as much a source of raging frustration as a builder of morale. No amount of pleading, warning, and cajoling could conjure up enough aircraft to carry all of the men who needed rest to havens in Australia, New Zealand, and the Hawaiian Islands. Combat personnel understandably had first call.
on aircraft space then and if it was available. Ground men could only wait in disgust until their names climbed to the top of long leave lists. The Fifth Air Force tried to follow a policy of giving noncombat men a week in Australia for every six months endured in New Guinea. Few, however, received their leaves on time. Most waited at least ten months, some as long as eighteen. Air Force Service Command Negro troops, whose poor morale reflected such familiar phenomena as low status and discriminatory treatment, had even greater cause for disgust. According to an intelligence report, "the lack of a rest area and rest leaves for colored personnel" had a serious and inflammatory effect on Negro units. The leave situation in the Pacific deteriorated, if anything, as the war entered its last year. PEARF's movement to the northwest made it increasingly difficult to fly men to Australia and resulted in the gradual elimination of leaves to that area. In the Central Pacific, air units were similarly moving beyond the reach of their rest areas. The situation led Maj. Gen. Curtis LeMay to propose, as a temporary substitute for trips to Hawaii, that two luxury liners be brought to the Marianas and used as floating rest camps for his B-29 crews. Lack of shipping, however, blocked the realization of the idea.

For the overwhelming majority of airmen, overseas leaves were only temporary medicine—essential, but no cure whatsoever for a fierce, growing desire to get back home. The longing for rotation implied no lack of patriotism. It was instead simply the elemental reaction of ordinary human beings to the excursions of war and prolonged separation from the people, places, and things they valued most. Under these circumstances, the twists and turns, ups and downs, of rotation policy...
were bound to have a major effect on morale. Rotation policy was conditioned above all by three factors: the availability of replacements, the intensity of operations, and estimates of the ability of men to stand up to various kinds of strain. These factors explain why combat men were ultimately rotated in large numbers and ground men were not, and why within the combat crew relief program there were marked fluctuations in the rotation rate.

The early realization that after a certain number of missions or combat hours—varying according to the nature, intensity, and locale of operations—a hypothetical average flier would decline in efficiency and, if not relieved in time, "burn out" led to the development of a decentralized system of aircrew rotation. Battle weary veterans were to be transferred to the Zone of Interior, where, it was felt, they could best recover from their experiences before going on to another combat tour or other activities. The aircrew rotation system never functioned, however, in a vacuum. Senior air force commanders were expected to carry out their missions—General Arnold was emphatic on that point—in spite of the fact that the flow of replacements up to the last year of the war rarely if ever seemed adequate to cover attrition, allow for relief, and still leave enough men to meet mounting operational commitments. An impossible situation soon arose. Combat men eventually went home, but some air forces had to hold back rotation, and others—like the Eighth—were forced to scrap the rotation program they had established. Headquarters AAF was deluged by a torrent of anguish-laden pleas for more replacements, reports of impending or actual combat crew exhaustion, and warnings that the involuntary policy of slow rotation or no rotation that had been forced on the overseas air forces
was doing grave damage to flier morale. Headquarters AAC, for its part, replied with assurances that replacements were being trained and rushed to the theaters as fast as was humanly possible and expressed the hope that by some future date—1944 was usually given—a peak surplus of replacements combined with a drop in attrition would make possible the establishment or restoration of a consistent and steady process of rotation. The long-expected day of personnel plenty did finally come in the summer of 1944, and thereafter combat crew rotation was at most a minor issue. 167

Ground personnel bore the war with few illusions about rotation. The lack of manpower reserves made normal replacement of non-combat men a virtual impossibility. Nothing could change that harsh fact. Nevertheless, as time passed, commanders and flight surgeons in the Pacific and CBI pointed out with increasing urgency the debilitating effect of climate and working and living conditions on the energy and morale of the men in their charge. They also insisted again and again that it was absolutely essential to give those men some goal to aim for, some hope of escape in the "short of the end of the war or collapse." An already bad morale situation became perhaps worse whenever hopes for an effectual program of relief were periodically raised, then dashed. A scheme calling for the rotation of five per cent of AAC ground personnel per month was abandoned in March 1943 before it ever got under way and constituted "the most crushing blow to morale experienced during the period." 170 A War Department plan for rotation at the tonné rate of one-half of one per cent per month actually went into effect in 1943 but in the long run probably cost more misunderstanding and bitterness than good. No sooner was the program launched than eligibility standards were raised. Later changes created
further restrictions. But even then, with all but the most grizzled veterans eliminated from eligibility, the program still ran far behind schedule. Coming on the heels of the aborted rotation plan was a project for granting thirty days (late forty-five) of temporary duty in the Zone of Interior to qualified personnel who agreed to return to the theater for another year. The 

Though leadership received far less attention than rotation as a morale factor, it nevertheless exerted a strong influence, perhaps stronger than that of any other single factor. There was widespread agreement that unit morale acted as "a complete barometer and gauge of the fighting spirit, capacity for leadership, and general all-around ability of the..."

commander." What constituted effective leadership varied according to the circumstances and the personality of the officer in command. But certain fundamental traits appear to have been essential: leadership. These included vigor, aggressiveness, fairness, firmness without arbitrary harshness, a lively interest in the welfare of all personnel, and, perhaps most important of all, the ability to inspire confidence by demonstrating both a grasp of the work at hand and a capacity for doing it. That many officers, especially those with the least experience, lacked one or more of these qualities is beyond question and not too surprising. Each shortcoming was usually reflected in lessened efficiency and lowered morale, whether the unit involved was large or small. Despite a number
of somewhat strident complaints about poor leadership, the AF—a very human organization working in an imperfect world—appears to have done a creditable job in the selection of its leaders. The record of senior officers, like that of their juniors, was mixed. Conspicuous failures occurred, but they stood out as exceptions. Senior commanders by and large knew their work and did it, understood their responsibilities and fulfilled them, placed a high valuation on the well-being of their men and fought for it. They led, they took care of their own. In so doing, they contributed richly to the maintenance of good morale from the beginning of the war to the end.
NOTES

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2. See, for example, p. 703, above, "Military Interstate"

3. See, for example, p. 8, 16th A, ev. 1977, p. 37.

In some of his letters, and it is indeed true material from
civilian and military for the same article, but criticism on
merit. For example, his: [blank], Greensboro, N.C.,
1 July-9 Sept. 1971, 2, vi-vii.

For more information, other a few of his letters reporting
the work of people, see 10th AE, retroactive to 1971 for iso.
17th, ev. 11, 16th AE, retroactive to 1971; and also 11th AE, retro-
active to ev. 9, 1970, to ev. 3-4, 1971, July 1971, and to or-

6. See, for example, p. 18., 36th AE, retroactive, July 1971, p. 12.

7. Ref. 10, 11, 1970, ev. 12; Ref. 11, retroactive Service, etc.,
   and Education (ev. 1970, 197), p. 12; "Art Is Sacred?" in University-
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The page contains redacted information and is marked "CONFIDENTIAL."


23. Air Historical Study No. 21, Aviation Cadet Ground Duty Program: Policy, Procurement, and Assignment, pp. 54-55; AAFHS-15, p. 76-77; Hist. AAFTC, II, 300-301, 400; III, 428-44. A more lurid but less typical illustration of the tie between pools and poor morale was the glider pilot program.
23. Cont'd
   See Air Historical Study, No. 1, The Glider Pilot Training
   Program, 1942-1943; and Hist. MAFTC, VI.

24. Hist. MAFTC, III, 607, 620; IV, 845; V, 942, 935; VII, 1406; VIII,
   1514.

25. Air Historical Study, No. 8, Bombsight Maintenance Training in the
    AAF, p. 64.


27. Occasional visits by instructors to tactical units, where they could
    watch the alumni of technical schools at work, not only provided an
    escape from tedium and lifted morale, but raised the quality of in-
    struction as well. See Hist. MAFTC, VII, 1376.

28. Air Historical Study, No. 48, Preflight Training in the AAF, 1939-1944,
    pp. 31, 35-36, 41, and Tab 10, pp. 3-4, 6-7; Hist. MAFTC, II, 207,
    272; III, 476; IV, 479.

29. Hist. MAFTC, V, 1082; VII, 1377; Air Historical Study, No. 31,
    Flexible Gunnery Training in the AAF, p. 22.

30. Air Historical Study No. 60, Individual Training in Aircraft Armament
    by the AAF, 1939-1945, p. 58; MAFTC-31, p. 22; Hist. MAFTC, II, 273;
    IV, 792; V, 1013-14; VII, 1377-79.

31. Preflight students who had been classified as pilots were in the "cager"
    category. See MAFTC-48, p. 43.

32. Hist. MAFTC, VII, 1362-63; Air Historical Study, No. 20, Individual
    Training in Aircraft Maintenance in the AAF, p. 150.
33. As far as many reluctant trainees were concerned, armament training and clerical training fitted into the drab category. See AAFHS-60, pp. 94-96; and Hist. MAFTC, VIII, 1631-32.

34. A typically non-virulent no-false problem was that created by delays in giving cadets back pay and reimbursement for travel. See Monograph on Classification Centers (Aircrew), 1 Jan. 1939-31 Dec. 1944, p. 110.

35. AAFHS-1, p. 57; R&R, AFHAS to AFPHS, 3 Oct. 1942.

36. AAFHS-1, pp. 9, 12, 15, 18, 29, 39, 45, 49, 61; Hist. MAFTC, VI, 113, 115, 117.


38. AAFHS-60, p. 76.


41. Hist. MAFTC, III, 570.

42. Hist. MAFTC, VIII, 1328, 1358; R&R, AFHAS to AFPHS, 13 July 1942; Air Historical Study No. 26, Individual Training In Aircraft Maintenance in the AAF, 1943, pp. 151, 159; Survey of Soldier Opinion, USAFIES, 4-18 May 1942, Part II, p. 1.


57. Cont'd Report, 22/4th Medical Dispensary Aviation, 1913-1918, pp. 8-9; Hist.
14th Bomb. Gp., 1 Apr.-2 Sept. 1918, I, 150; Hist. 426th Bomb. Gp.,
June 1918, p. 4; Hist. 73d Bomb. Jr. 17 July-30 Nov. 1918, pp. 12-27;

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62. Hist., p. 130. See also Hist. 17th Bomb. Gr., Jan. 1914-Sept. 1914,
p. 15; Problems of Air Service Germany in the Western Pacific, p. 6; Hist.

63. Hist. 47th, 16 Jan. 1912-July 1914, pp. 6; Hist. 67th 1st B.G., July 1912,
p. 1; Hist. 76th, Hist. 77th, June 1912, p. 138, 1/1; Hist. 117th,
Nicole Mont., 17 Oct. 1912-17 Oct. 1913, p. 8-10; Hist. 320th Ftr. Gr.,
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Local Activity in Aug., p. 3-4; L. Gen. 38, 1, The Army
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65. Ltr.-Col., 63d Bomb. Gr., to N. 1039, 15 May 1942; Hist. of Ltr.-Col., June-

9, 1942, p. 3; 1039, 15 May 1942; ltr., Hamilton to Arnold, 13 Aug. 1942;

1942, p. 138; ltr., Hamilton to Arnold, 13 Aug. 1942;

68. Robert J. Leuen, Jr., Report to Air Bureau, 28 Apr. 1942, sub: Permanent Personnel, 30 May 1942, Harvard, Boston, MA, to


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66. 1945, p. 26; Hist. XII A, 1 Jan.-


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67. Hist. XII A, 1 Jan.-

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69. Hist. XII A, 1 Jan.-

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69. Hist. XII A, 1 Jan.-

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70. Administrative History, 12th AF, Part II; VI, Annex 26, 58, 63;
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166. Ltr., Arnold to Brig. Gen. Ralph H. Wooten, 16 Feb. 1944. Similar letters were sent to other overseas air force commanders.


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171. Hist. 12th AF A-1 Sec., through end of 1943, p. 12; ibid., 2d quarter
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