THE ARMY AIR FORCES
IN
AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS
IN WORLD WAR II

Prepared by the USAF
Historical Division,
Air University
1953
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USAF Historical Division
Air University
July 1953
FOREWORD

This study was written by Dr. Harry L. Coles, Ohio State University, for the USAF Historical Division, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Like other Historical Division studies, this history is subject to revision, and additional information or suggested corrections will be welcomed.
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It is the purpose of this study to examine the role of the air forces in the main amphibious landings in World War II. It is an operational study and deals only incidentally with administrative and logistical matters. The aim is to examine what the air forces actually did and to interpret the meaning of experiences in the various theaters of operations.

The subject naturally divides itself into two broad phases: the European and the Pacific. In the European theater landings were made preliminary to a protracted campaign on a large land mass. The land areas seized had strategic and political importance in and of themselves. There is a continuity in the European story which I have tried to develop. In the Pacific theater landings were of the island-hopping variety. Bases were seized not for their intrinsic importance but as stepping stones to further operations. Even in the Southwest Pacific, which in some respects resembled the European theater, the areas seized, though part of a land mass, were generally surrounded by impassable jungle which restricted the area of maneuver and made the occupying forces dependent upon long over-water lines of communication. Each of the Pacific theaters, it seems to me, had problems and patterns of operations peculiar to its locale. I have therefore tried to bring out the peculiarities and the lessons to be learned from each of the theaters.
Chapter 7
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"In dealing with foreign courts in cases involving the public..."
an amphibious invasion of great magnitude conducted with modern weapons was the British landing in Gallipoli during World War I.

It was Gallipoli that supposedly relegated amphibious landings to the ash heap of outmoded tactics. That ill-fated venture was conceived in 1915 by Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, as a scheme to drive Turkey out of the war. It was a "combined" operation in that both British and French troops were involved. About half a million men were landed in various assaults on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Largely because of inept and indecisive command, plus poor planning and preparation, the enterprise turned out to be a dismal failure with nearly 250,000 casualties. It was to a considerable extent the influence of this "horrible example" that caused military minds to regard amphibious landings as hazardous and visionary. But there were other reasons as well. The technological advances of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries seemed to favor the defender at the expense of the invader. With off-shore mines, torpedoes, the increased fire power of land based weapons, and above all the increased speed and offensive power of the airplane, such landings were regarded, in the words of Liddell Hart, as "almost impossible."

Apparently the skeptics failed to realize, as one historian has said, that "one man's poison may be another man's meat." They did not comprehend that weapons ordinarily thought of as primarily defensive might be turned to offensive use. They failed to realize that the submarine and the airplane, which presumably had doomed amphibious invasions to failure, could be massed under and over an invasion fleet to protect it from the enemy and to aid in the maneuver of ships and the advance of troops on the shore.
The making of amphibious operations was never easy. It is one of the more difficult of all forms of warfare, but it involves many elements that must be both completely skilled. Amphibious methods can be extremely complex and only after careful planning and preparation. But like other operations, the mode of execution is a high degree of specialization in certain areas; these are developed and synchronized; once these areas have been prepared they are not considered field. In fact, the degree of Western was to much of the degree of execution and in the field, the amphibious center of excellence, the forces abandoned more or less automatically after amphibious assault. The amphibious force, which follows the landing on the beach, is the one that virtually abandoned the operation because they knew they could not successfully land there. No higher tribute could have come to the amphibious forces of Western Europe.

American army was the result of a number of factors, including thorough training, careful planning, effective direction, and above all, the skill and valor of the men who hit the beaches. A factor of prime importance was the application of science, the application of science to the aid of the military. The role of the scientists in developing many of the most difficult problems, improvements in tanks, improvements in landing craft, and new weapons. The most important of the most difficult problems was the development of a tank that could successfully negotiate soft mud, sand, mud, and rocks. One of the most difficult problems in amphibious invasion is the rate at which the tanks progress. Advances in order that it is possible for them to find their way to exact points.
on distant shores at night and under all weather conditions. The
development of rockets and rocket launchers made it possible to deliver
a great volume of high explosives onto targets far inland or far from
airports. Stools and devices were developed for locating and
detonating underwater obstacles and demolition mines werepecially trained
in the techniques of removing such obstacles. Long-range flares, torches,
and mortars were invented to reduce pillboxes, strong points, and under-
ground fortifications.

Another factor that helps to explain the success of the United States
in the fact that in spite of general neglect the Marine Corps took expedi-
tious measures as its special province in the period following World War I.
Marines were a hard-bitten, battle-hardened fighting force in any conflict. In
any conflict, they would be the shock unit, and the key to defeat them would be
by an intense-reconnaissance against the Central
authority. This was an attitude that was inculcated in all Marine
officers. Marine divisions were self-contained forces capable of conduct-
ing their own operations. The Marine Shore Party Division was
unique in that it was a self-contained unit capable of
conducting coastal raids, surprise attacks, and other difficult
tasks. The Central

probably the greatest single contribution of the divisions, however,
was in the field of doctrine. In early 1920 the navy had prepared a
manual to instruct naval personnel in the conduct of shore operations.
Not only 7 out of 10 naval officers were devoted to exercises in naval

In a revision of the manual issued in 1927, the section on landing operations

Security Information
was covered in a mere five pages. That the Marines were not alone in their concern was brought out by the fact that in January 1933 the Joint Board of the Army and Navy, a forerunner of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a publication entitled, *Joint Overseas Expeditions*. This document, though incorporating many definitions and solutions that later became standard, was general and brief. It remained to work out the details. Using the Joint Board pamphlet as a point of departure the staff of the Marine Corps School at Quantico began in November 1933 the preparation of a manual on landing operations. The result was the publication in 1934 of the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*. This manual became the basis for all theoretical instruction in amphibious warfare in the Marine Corps Schools and served as a guide book for the landing exercises conducted annually by the Navy from 1935 through 1941. It was adopted with revisions by the Navy in 1936 under the title *Fleet Training Publication 167*.

Meanwhile the Army started work on a similar publication and in November 1940 the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth issued "landing Operations on Hostile Shores." This draft was issued as Field Manual 31-5 on 2 June 1941. FM 31-5 and FPM 167 followed the same general arrangement and used the same illustrations and sketches. Though there is no need here to make a detailed examination of these early publications, some of the basic principles set forth are of interest. In regard to command, FM 31-5 stated that "coordination of operations of Army and Navy forces is by mutual cooperation or by exercise of unity of command." Throughout the early documents there runs the assumption that air power is a mere adjunct of naval or land power. Although the
Influence of local air superiority is mentioned, counter air activities are listed as only one function along with observation, reconnaissance, and close support. There is nothing concerning the inclusion of the battlefield; no mention of the necessity of or methods to use aerial fire on opposing the battle area.

Tactically, instructions doctrine should be considered in conjunction with doctrines of air and ground forces for they are closely allied concepts. During a doctrine which began in early 1941, the war was set forth in "31-35 of April 1942," while there was one basic assumption, the subordination of aviation to the needs of the ground force commander. The doctrine that aviation units may be specifically allocated to the control of subordinate units of the army is that "final decision as to the quality of combat resides with the commander of the supported units." The trial during the early stages of World War II and the coming was the Fulfillment of a battle-tested doctrine of air-ground cooperation. The essence of this doctrine is that air power should not be cancelled out and frustrated away, nor a high degree of air supremacy in the theater of operations can be achieved and maintained, and that troops, airfields, and supplies should be introduced before reaching the center of operations. With the inclusion of the British and French forces in Africa on the assumption of air power as well as French air power in other theaters, they were gradually introduced in the North African theatre. The result was a revolution in the African doctrine of the employment of air power.
U. S. Air Force had long struggled for these principles but it was the Middle East and North African experiences that made the revolution a reality. On 21 July 1943 FM 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power was issued. This document set forth the basic principles that were henceforth to guide all air force operations in amphibious landings or otherwise.

The new regulation stated that land power and air power are co-equal and interdependent forces, neither of which is subordinate to the other. In order to exploit flexibility, air power's greatest asset, control must be centralized and command must be exercised through the air force commander in a theater of operations. Henceforth the missions of a tactical air force would be in the following order of priority: 1) to gain the necessary degree of air superiority; 2) to prevent the movement of hostile troops and supplies into the theater of operations or within the theater (isolation of the battlefield); and to participate in a combined effort of air and ground forces to gain objectives on the immediate front of the ground forces (direct support).

Strangely enough, all the landings down to the invasion of the Philippines had been carried out before these principles were formally engrafted into amphibious doctrine. The old manual of 2 June 1941 was not superseded until November 1944 when an entirely new version of Landing Operations on Hostile Shores was issued. The new manual stated that an amphibious operation was a joint undertaking in which the Army and Navy units act together as a single force, usually under a designated joint commander. This joint commander exercises his authority through three separate commanders of the ground, naval and air forces. He does not
command any force directly unless specifically authorized by higher
authority to do so. The principles of employment of air power were
essentially the same as those in FM 100-20.

So far as the role of the air forces in amphibious operations is
concerned it is obvious from this brief sketch that operations shaped
documentation rather than doctrine shaping operations. The lessons of the
war were hammered out on the anvil of experience.
Chapter II

NORTH AFRICA: THE GREAT CAESAR

The first large scale Allied amphibious operation in World War II was the invasion of North Africa. Besides being the "first" the North African operation has several other distinctions: it was the riskiest of all large scale Allied undertakings both from the point of view of military and political considerations; it was mounted in a spirit of haste and improvisation; and it was viewed with considerable skepticism and distrust by the American military commanders.

In the last respect the North African invasion was unique for on no other occasion did the Commander in Chief overrule his military advisers on a major issue of strategy. In their grand strategy the American Joint Chiefs of Staff held firmly two major premises. The first of these was that the combination of totalitarian states must be annihilated by striking the strong European front first and then dealing with the Pacific forces. The second major premise was that Germany could be most expeditiously eliminated by a direct blow—a cross-channel invasion. On the first major premise there was never any serious disagreement between the United States and Great Britain. On the second there was considerable disagreement. For many reasons the British favored a policy of encirclement as opposed to the direct blow. They did not want to see Russia in central Europe after the war; they did not wish to risk failure by a premature mounting of a cross-channel invasion; and they recoiled with horror at the thought of a prolonged blood-letting such as they witnessed during World War I.

It was the deterioration of the strategic situation in the spring of
The plans

Strategically speaking, the basic problem in the planning for 1943 was whether the landings should be concentrated to the east to take a rapid and eventual route into Tunisia, or spread out with a landing on the west coast of Africa to secure a Sale of the line of communications. In an directive given him on 13 March 1943 by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.S.) General Eisenhower was to establish "air or mutually supporting lodgments" in the Germa-Sicily-Southern France and in the Germa-Sicily area on the west coast. From these lodgments, control
try to be extended over much North Africa with the object of
attacking and by-passing the rear of the Axis forces in the western sector, prepara-
tions to invade Spanish Morocco were to be made to handle any hostile action
that developed by way of Spain.

The plans drawn up by General Eisenhower's staff suggested the elimi-
nation of the landing at Gela, and concentration on the north coast.

In place of a direct assault on Crete from the Atlantic, the invasion
area was situated at Gela, and so cut across French Morocco and took advantage
from the land side. General Eisenhower felt—and this is the British
view—the fact that German forces would avoid his forces too thinly. If
the main effort on Crete was not carried so far east, the Axis could get
into Tunisia and once there would build up a more effective line of supply
for their forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were unwilling to court this enemy. In
their view, the success of the landings on Crete would cost very little, and the
risk of losing the vital line of supply from Tunis out, they refused to
accept such a tactical risk and ordered the invasion restored.

It was to succeed. X Corps of the Eighth Air Force was activated
on 20 April 1943. In view of the short time available, it was necessary
to acquire the units to be used in the area, and get them into training.
It was expected that most of the units were available for the Eighth Air
Force. Consequently, it was decided to turn over most of the Eighth Air
Force to the area, except those to be used by the X Corps.
H. Doolittle, was to have its headquarters at Oran. The Eastern Air Command was to be responsible for fighter defense in the Algiers area while the Western Air Command, or Twelfth Air Force, was to furnish fighter defense in the Casablanca and Oran areas. The actual assaults were to be supported in the first instance by carrier based planes under orders of the naval task force commanders. After the capture of airfields, the Eastern Air Command, Twelfth Air Force (and its XII Air Support Command) were to relieve the naval aviation, as far as possible, and continue air support as directed by the respective task force commanders. The air plan contemplated coordination, not integration of the two air forces. The development of air units to achieve any particular strategic purpose after the initial phase of the operation would be determined by General Eisenhower as Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force.

The Twelfth Air Force was provided with a strength almost three times as large as the Eastern Air Command. It had over 1,200 aircraft with which Allied Force Headquarters (A HC) hoped to meet enemy air reaction on a strength basis of two to one. The air plan emphasized the vital need for maximum air strength at the outset in order to create among the French the impression of force majeure in the face of which they could honorably lay down their arms.

During the assault phase of TORCH, General Doolittle, Commander of the Twelfth Air Force, was to remain with General Eisenhower at the command post on Gibraltar while the air force units at Oran functioned under Colonel Lauris Norstad, A-3 of the Twelfth Air Force, and the XII Air Support Command operated at Casablanca under Brig. Gen. John K. Cannon. Both the subordinate commanders would be directly responsible to the ground commanders.
on the respective tasks. The overall picture, however, General Doolittle
will establish his headquarters at 
Cranston. The air forces, under the command of
11th Air Support Corps, will conduct air
operations to support the operations of the
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army.
The detailed plans for air force participation in the landings in the Oran area called for the dropping of parachutists by the 60th Troop Carrier Group at the two most important airbases in the vicinity, Tafraoui and La Senia. The paratroopers were to destroy enemy aircraft at La Senia and to hold the paved runway at Tafraoui until relieved by troops landing to the east and west of the city. After Tafraoui had been secured, Spitfires of the 31st Group (US), waiting at Gibraltar, were to fly in to furnish support against the French. Air force troops arriving on D-day and subsequent convoys had the mission of preparing for the reception of additional units flying in from England and Gibraltar.

**Casablanca**

Strategically speaking, the main object of the western landings was to make secure a line of communication to Allied troops in Tunisia. As defined by the TORCH outline plan the Western Task Force’s mission included the occupation of the port and airbases at Casablanca, the establishment and maintenance of communications with Oran, and the build up of land, air and striking forces for possible use against Spanish Morocco. The plans called for three surprise landings and the securing by the end of D-day of at least one airbase for land based aircraft. The Western Naval Task Force, or Task Force 34, under command of Rear Admiral Henry K. Hewitt, USN, included three battleships, seven cruisers, and many destroyers, oilers and minelayers. This fleet was to land 37,000 ground and air force troops under command of Maj. Gen. George S. Patton.

Under Maj. Gen. E. M. Harmon the sub-task force BLACKSTONE was to land at Safi, capture the port and operate against Casablanca from the south. The main assault was to be at Fedhala, and the sub-task force BRUSHWOOD, under Maj. Gen. Jonathan W. Anderson, who commanded about 20,000 men, was to press southward toward Casablanca.
The main object of the northern attack - which fell to be carried out by the 15th Army Group - was the capture of the city of Caen. The 3rd U.S. Armored Division, under Maj. Gen. H. M. Arnold, took the lead in this operation.

The armor along the coast was under control for the most part. The main drives were then made by Gen. de Lattre de Tassigny, who, with his I Corps, during the night of June 5th and 6th, advanced into Normandy from G wearsham to Faux, 56 miles from Carentan.

The armor near St. Lo, on the other hand, was under control for the most part. The main drives were then made by Gen. de Lattre de Tassigny, who, with his I Corps, during the night of June 5th and 6th, advanced into Normandy from G wearsham to Faux, 56 miles from Carentan.

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The President considered the situation.

After the meeting with the President, the President's chief of staff, Mr. John Smith, discussed the situation with the President. Mr. Smith explained that the situation was critical and required immediate action. The President agreed and directed Mr. Smith to take the necessary steps to address the situation.

The President instructed Mr. Smith to meet with the heads of the relevant departments and agencies to coordinate the response. Mr. Smith assured the President that the necessary actions would be taken to stabilize the situation.

The President also directed Mr. Smith to keep him informed of the developments. Mr. Smith assured the President that he would report back at regular intervals.

The President reminded Mr. Smith of the importance of maintaining the public's trust and confidence in the government.

Mr. Smith thanked the President for his support and the President wished him well.
The Allied landings at Algiers, carried out by the Western Task Force, were primarily decision in character, although the small proportion of the fleet consisted in the absence of the French commander, General Leclerc, who turned to give it an operational co-operation in the area of the French. On Climatic Task Force created no serious opposition the city surrendered at 1600 hours on 5th. In support for the Western Task Force was in charge of the 4th Navy led the 11th Air Force. It is clear that Oren, on the other hand, was not only supported, but with their Air Force played a significant role in this operation.

Situated about 200 miles south of Mers el-Kebir, the port of Oran enjoyed considerable natural protection. Unlike the semi-circular bay and its artificial harbor is bounded on three sides by cliffs. On its land side area is raised about 50 feet above sea level. Three miles to the east of Oran is the supplementary harbor of Cherchell, also artificial and almost the same size as Oran. Cretins well defended by coastal fortifications, particularly on the high ground between the ports of Oran and Cherchell. From the main Artillery Division was a mobile artillery battery in town, while Cherchell, 35 miles to the south, is the Headquarters of the French Foreign Legion. In addition to the two principal airfields at Oran and Mers el-Kebir, there were several other landing grounds that formed the Sixth Air Force bases. The Sixth Air Force bases consisted of about 55 aircraft and 600 to 700 planes, all out died. The local air force personnel were expected to be predominantly pro-Allied in their conduct.
The Japanese fleet consisted of British naval elements and American ships and the forces, to clear them thoroughly, took
scale, controlled the naval forces, which included 46 vessels. The navel
aircraft included 24 aircraft on 9 libyens on the curvy, 15 in addition on the 24 free. On, at, Lloyd, under
sail, 90, around the ground, and, which consisted of the first
Industry division, went to some of the first. The chief division, a
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all power, or, a service was claimed in the first. The first
Colonel Louis and 1. The health forces went to gain on the
headquarters ship as was in charge of all health forces operations
until the ship of naval health.

The mission of the under enemy forces was to occupy the ports and
airfields in the same area; to extend west and to let the enemy
forces to build up bases on the airfields. Forces in area the area should
protect from enemy zones; and to extend control to southern to
west to force control the ships. In northern divisions were to be
percolated by the parachute divisions at this new division to the
out the area of the ship. Present, and to the city to double
environment under cover of naval mines. As earthy cases, filled
with the earth, etc., under the order of the ship, I sent it
shipping and sent additional to occupy the new sections. Once it
battalion to be in control on a section of 500, the 50th section
under a group before, or the 31st at 20. 500, depending
on whether the weather caused hostile or peaceful conditions.

SECURITY INFORMATION
the protection of the convoys and support of ground troops lay with
the Fleet Air Army until airfields were secured and the air groups
could fly in from Gibraltar.

The Center Task Force left England on 25 October and passed through
the Straits of Gibraltar on 6 November. The military establishment at
Oran was alerted on the morning of the 7th by aerial reconnaissance, but
the alert was abandoned as the convoys passed eastward. The invasion
fleet was evidently mistaken for another attempt to provision Malta.
During the moonless night of the 7th, the Center Task Force slipped back
and took its position. F-hour was 0100.

In the center there was disaster. The plan to seize the harbor
installations of Oran by anti-sabotage troops was a complete failure.
The Walney and the Hartland were hit by fire from French ships in the
harbor and both vessels blew up. Most of the men were lost.

To the west of Oran, the 26th Regimental Combat Team landed unopposed
at Les Andalouses. The advance to Oran was delayed by enemy artillery,
but by mid-morning the western column of Combat Command B took the airfield
at Lourmel. On the eastern flank the landings were made at Arsen, and
that outpost fell to the First Infantry Division by 0745. The eastern
column of Combat Command B took Tafaraoui airfield by noon of D-day.

The Twelfth Air Force now received its cue to enter on the stage.
On being notified that the Tafaraoui field had been taken, General
Doolittle at Gibraltar ordered 24 Spitfires of the 31st Fighter Group to
take off. This contingent arrived over Tafaraoui at 1700 on 8 November
and had a brush with the not-so-friendly French air force. It had been
arranged that four Hurricanes from a carrier would cover the landing.

As the planes of the 31st came in for their landing four French Dewoitines
flying high over the field were mistaken for the friendly Hurricanes. As the pilots went in for their landing the Dewoitines attacked. One Spitfire was shot down. The remaining ones took off against the Dewoitines and brought down three.

Despite this initial encounter, the French air strength had been crippled by the time the land based planes arrived on the scene. The last peep out of French air force at Oran was heard on the morning of the 9th when a single bomber dropped a lone bomb on Tafaraoui. Before noon, the French planes at La Senia had departed from Morocco. On the same day the first contingent of the AAF ground personnel rolled into Tafaraoui. By means of improvisation and use of French ammunition and gas, they kept the Spitfires flying.

The aircraft of the 31st Group based at Tafaraoui lent important support to the American ground forces around Oran, which were encountering unexpectedly stubborn resistance. Shortly after dawn on 9 November, three Spits on reconnaissance patrol observed a large force moving northward against Tafaraoui. This column turned out to be a detachment from the famed French Foreign Legion moving up from Sidi-bel-Abbès. A continuing series of attacks, lasting four to five hours, was maintained against this target. The light French tanks were no match for the Spitfires with their 20-mm. cannon. At least five tanks were destroyed, numerous trucks were put out of commission, and troops were scattered by the determined efforts of the air forces. The battered French column at last turned back and was not molested further. At the time this action was taking place, Combat Command B was fully occupied in the assault on La Senia, and the action of the Spitfires probably prevented the recapture of Tafaraoui.
The land based aircraft rescued Tefaracui from a menace in another sector. About noon on 9 November, French artillery batteries began shelling the airfield with 75's from a hill two and a half miles away. Two flights of the 1st Group attacked and quickly silenced these guns.

During the afternoon of the 9th, General Doolittle arrived from Gibraltar in a 3-17 to take personal command. By this time radio communication with the headquarters ship, Lanza, had been established in order to carry out missions in support of the ground forces. The command ship assigned several missions. In one instance, the air forces were directed to attack an enemy column east of Le 'acta on Arzu Bay. By the time the message reached the air forces it read west of Le 'acta. The aircraft flew over a column to the west, which turned out to be American troops. No damage was done to the ground troops but two of the American planes were shot down. This mishap resulted in the establishment of a program of recognition training whereby the ground troops were given instruction in aircraft recognition and the pilots studied mechanized equipment of the Army.

There was another case of mistaken identity, occurring almost at the same time. The U.S. artillery requested the air forces to attack a column of tanks. In this case General Doolittle himself asked the artillery officer who had made the request if he were positive the tanks in question were French. Two planes went out and took one pass at the tanks, which proved to be a column of American M3's. Seventeen missions, totalling 45 sorties were flown against various French targets on 9 November, and close liaison was maintained with Combat Command 3.

Meanwhile the ground forces were making progress. On 9 November contact was made between the eastern and western arms of Combat Command 3.
Once a junction was effected the fate of Oran was sealed; the only resources left was street to street fighting within the city itself. The French
compounded the situation and started armistice negotiations around noon
on 19 November. After the fourth profitable targets presented themselves
to the flyers of the 1st Group but they continued to carry out missions
involving convey rescues, tactical reconnaissance, and ground support.

Most accounts of the North African invasion have overlooked or
neglected the contribution of land-based aircraft. One popular
account, for example, states that: "The Twelfth Air Force's contribution
to the taking of Oran was small and without weight." And yet, at the
time, air and ground commanders alike agreed that the fighters had done
a splendid job. General Doolittle, in a note given to summarization, said:
"I cannot speak too highly of the work done by these groups. They twice
stopped mechanized columns that were attacking the airport at Tafraouat.
From the north...and it has been for the prompt and efficient action of the
Beitinasr, Tafraouat and our air units would have been lost and the war
at Oran lengthened and made much more bloody." Maj. Gen. Terry Allen
praised the work of the 31st in a letter of commendation on behalf of the
1st Division. Aircraft losses during the three days battle were moderate.
Altogether seven planes were lost: one in combat; four to ground fire (two
of which were brought down by friendly fire), and two in taxiing. It
was no mean accomplishment: the beachhead had been secured and Algeria
was now open to aerial reinforcement for the campaign developing to the
west.

Although the air forces played a more prominent role than they have
generally been given credit for, it would probably be a mistake to attempt
to draw too many lessons from the amphibious phase of Torch. As opposed
to later landings, air force activity was certainly on a limited scale.

There was no preliminary bombing, there almost no counter air force activity, and the fighting did not last long enough to put close support to a real test. So far as the air forces were concerned the real lessons derived not so much from the amphibious phase as from the fighting that followed the landings. The Tunisian campaign brought out the inadequacies of American doctrine as set forth FM 31-35 of 9 April 1942 which provided that aviation units could be specifically allocated to subordinate units and that the final decision as to the priority of targets would rest with the commander of the supported unit. Apparently the planners of TORCH ignored the principles of the employment of air power that had been learned in the Western Desert. The essence of the doctrine that had been evolved by trial was that: "The Soldier commands the land forces, the Airman commands the air forces; both commanders work together and operate their respective forces in accordance with a combined Army-Air plan..."  

Since June 1942 when he arrived in the Middle East General Lewis H. Brereton, Commanding General of the Ninth Air Force, had been sending a steady stream of messages and reports on the system of air-ground cooperation as it existed in the Western Desert but apparently this information had not materially altered U. S. thinking at the time of the landings. Subsequent fighting in Tunisia, however, effected an alteration in U. S. doctrine. By February 1943 General Eisenhower had organized his forces so as to provide for army, navy and air commanders and the principles of the employment of air power developed in the Western Desert had been introduced.
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In connection with the essential directive formal directive, it was once mentioned that for the protection of the nation, a plan was being hatched. This plan was to involve a massive military action, specifically the invasion of Southern Europe. The primary consideration in choosing this region was the vulnerability of the northern part of the country. It was deemed to be the most strategic area to conquer, as it held the key to the Western European continent.

A military operation was planned, and the task was assigned to a unit under the command of General D. The operation was to cover a vast area, consisting of the northern and central regions. The operation was divided into two main forces, the 1st and the 2nd. The 1st force, under the command of General E, was to land in the north, while the 2nd force, under the command of General F, was to land in the center. The 1st force was to secure the northern coast and to control the western border. The 2nd force was to control the center and the eastern part, while the 1st force would control the southern part.

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The HUSKY Landings and Airborne Operations

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Although the establishment of special headquarters and planning staffs further complicated an already involved air organization, there was no fundamental change in the system of command set up on 18 February 1943 for the Mediterranean theater. At that time the Mediterranean Air Command (MAC) had been established. MAC was a small policy and planning staff made up of American and British officers headed by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder. On the command level directly under MAC were the Northwest African Air Forces (NAAF) commanded by Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, the Middle East Air Command under Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, and the Malta Air Command under Air Vice Marshal Sir Keith Park.

By far the largest of these commands was NAAF, which was organized into three main sub-commands. Northwest African Strategic Air Force (NASAF), under command of Maj. Gen. James H. Doolittle, was charged with the direction of all bombers and escort fighters for strategic operations. The main components of NASAF were the XII Bomber Command and the 330 and 331 Wings, RAF. The Northwest African Tactical Air Force (NATAF), under Air Vice Marshal Sir Arthur Cunningham, coordinated the efforts of the air force operating in support of ground troops. The Tactical Air Force consisted of the Desert Air Force, the XII Air Support Command, and the Tactical Bomber Force. The Northwest African Coastal Air Force, under Air Vice Marshal Sir Hugh P. Lloyd, had responsibility for the air defense and sea-air reconnaissance of Northwest Africa, as well as control over antisubmarine operations, shipping strikes, and air-to-air and air-to-ground recognition systems. NACAF consisted of 242 Group RAF and the XII Fighter Command. In addition to the above, NAAF included an air service command, a training command and a photographic wing.
The Ninth Air Force was the American component of the Middle East Air Command. By the time of the Sicilian campaign only two B-24 groups (93rd and 976th) were operating from their Cyrenaean bases under control of Maj. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton. The units of the IX Fighter Command were operating under MAAF as follows: the 57th and 79th Fighter Groups were under Desert Air Force and the 324th Fighter Group was attached to XII Air Support Command; the 12th and 340th Bomber Groups (!!) were under Tactical Bomber Force.

Pantelleria

A necessary preliminary to the invasion of Sicily was the reduction of Pantelleria, and the less important islands of Lampedusa, Linosa, and Lampedusa. Not only did these islands lie directly in the path of invasion but the powerful Freya radio direction-finder stations on Pantelleria and Lampedusa provided advanced listening posts from which the movement of aircraft over the central Mediterranean could be detected, while the ship watching stations could record the movement of shipping. In addition, the airfield on Pantelleria, believed to be capable of accommodating 80 single engine fighters, would help provide the close fighter support necessary during the initial stages of the forthcoming invasion. The plan was to launch an intense aerial attack against the island with the idea of so terrorizing and paralyzing its defenders that it could be seized without the use of ground troops, or to give such an assault every chance of success with the minimum of loss. As it turned out, intense air and naval bombardment made an assault by ground troops unnecessary but most of the essential elements of the Mediterranean-European pattern of amphibious landings were worked out in Operation CORNSCREW.
In the first place, a joint command, directly responsible to General Eisenhower was set up. Rear Admiral R. F. N. McGrigor of the Royal Navy, Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, commander of the Northwest African Air Forces, and Maj. Gen. W. E. Fluechtrick, the general officer of the 1st British Infantry Division, were placed in command of the naval, air and ground forces respectively. A combined headquarters was established at Sousse. From the time of embarkation this advance organization was to be aboard a headquarters ship from which it would direct all forces taking part in the operation. Should an assault be necessary, D-day would be 11 June. The air plan provided for two periods of preparatory bombardment. Up to and including 6 June steady and increasing pressure would be maintained. To avoid any indication that Pantelleria had been singled out for invasion other targets in Italy, Sicily and Sardinia would also be bombed. Beginning 7 June the island would be bombed around the clock. Since Pantelleria was being used as a sort of laboratory experiment of the ability of air power to neutralize strong defensive positions, targets were chosen with the greatest of caution and scientific estimates of the bombing effort necessary to knock out such targets were made. To carry out the bombing program NAAF had slightly over 1,000 planes against 900 enemy planes on or within range of Pantelleria.

Although Pantelleria had been hit intermittently during the closing days of the Tunisian campaign, the real offensive began on 18 May and increased in intensity until the island surrendered. Attention was focused at first on the harbor and airfields but as these targets were neutralized emphasis shifted to coastal batteries and gun emplacements. In attempting to neutralize some 20 gun positions it was recognized that direct hits
would be few. If, however, as many as one third of the guns in each battery could be knocked out it was believed that the remainder could be silenced by such secondary factors as damage to scientific instruments, disruption of communications, destruction of supplies, and demoralization of crews.

According to plan, two opportunities were given the defenders to surrender, one on 8 June and another on 10 June. When the second invitation brought no response three convoys sailed from Sousse and Sfax. Before it became apparent that the defenders were trying to surrender on the 11th the assault craft were approaching the beaches and could not be recalled. The full air cover planned for the ground force was accordingly given until the first phase of the occupation was completed. With the exception of a small number of prearranged flights, all Tactical Air Force activities were controlled by the air force officer in the combined headquarters on board H.M.S. Largs. As precaution against possible sinking of the Largs, a stand-by headquarters was stationed on board H.M.S. Royal Ulsterman. Only small arms fire opposed the landing and as soon as the Governor of the island could be located he signed the terms of surrender. Following the example of Pantelleria, the Pelagie Islands, Lampedusa, Linosa, and Lampione, surrendered on 14 June.

The capture of Pantelleria not only cleared the way for Sicily but furnished many valuable lessons that were applied in later landings. Some of these lessons included the desirability of developing a better system of communications, the avoidance of premature crossings of the bomb line by invading troops, more comprehensive briefings, coordination of intelligence in the three arms of the combined force, and the importance of aerial photography in such an operation. The system of controlling the tactical
air forces from a headquarters ship was to be used and improved upon in subsequent operations. Probably the most important lesson had to do with bombing data. Some of the more enthusiastic advocates of air power hailed Pantelleria as proof positive that air power alone could induce heavily defended positions to surrender. More sober critics realized that the defenses and defenders of Pantelleria offered unusual opportunities for the exercise of air power, opportunities that were unlikely to present themselves with great frequency in the future. Furthermore, Pantelleria brought out certain limitations as well as potentialities of air power. It was found, for example, that even with the huge quantity of bombs dropped and even with little or no enemy interference it was extremely difficult to obtain direct hits on gun emplacements. Examination of the 80 guns that had been bombed revealed that only 2 had received direct hits. However, 43 were damaged and of these 10 were completely unsuitable. It was found that since the 1000-lb. bomb had an effective radius only about one and a half times that of the 500-lb. bomb, the latter should be used against small targets because of the greater number of bombs that could be employed. It was also found that bombs fused with a delay of .025 seconds gave better results than bombs instantaneously fused.

In other words the experience of Pantelleria pointed to the desirability of making a careful study of terrain and soil in the target area before deciding on the type of bombs and fusing to be used.

### Pre-Invasion Operations

The elimination of Pantelleria and Lampedusa cleared the way for concentration on bombing in direct preparation for Sicily. The Plan for the Employment of the Northwest African Air Forces and Attached Air Forces
issued in May 1943 reflected doctrines of the employment of air power that had been developed in the Western Desert and Tunisian campaigns. These doctrines, soon to become official U.S. doctrine, held that the air forces could make their greatest contribution to an amphibious operation, or any other war-winning operation, by establishing superiority over the enemy air force and preventing it from interfering with the invasion and by preventing troops and supplies from entering the assault area. These missions accomplished, the air forces could then lend effective direct support to the advance of the land forces. Accordingly, SAAF, assisted by the air forces in the Middle East and Malta, was to destroy or neutralize the enemy air forces within range of the invasion area, protect naval operations and assault convoys, attack enemy shipping and naval forces, and protect Northwest African and captured areas of Sicily against air attacks. It would also participate in the cover plan and in diversionary operations aimed at keeping the enemy air forces as widely dispersed as possible.

Four phases of operations were contemplated: a preparatory period, an assault period, aerial covering the attack on Catania, and a period covering the reduction of the remainder of the island. It was not intended to apply more than ordinary pressure until D minus 7, since many units needed rest and refitting and it was necessary to avoid heavy losses during this period. From D minus 7 to D minus 1, the air forces were to step up their offensive against the enemy air forces with the object of making them incapable of interfering with the landings. Forces would be the main enemy air bases in Sicily, Sardinia and southern Italy together with submarine bases, communications lines, and industrial plants. In concen-
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fleeting targets, since such attacks usually produced only ephemeral results at high cost. A 12-hour notice would in general be required before attacks by medium and heavy bombers could be executed.

The air plan dealt for the most part with broad policies to be followed in the application of air power, but it was not related in minute detail to the Army and Navy plans. This was deliberate. All commanders were agreed that the primary function of the air forces in all phases of the attack was the neutralization of the enemy air force, a target that could not be pin-pointed in advance. Furthermore, it was foreseen that one landing might go well, while in another area the ground situation might become extremely precarious, in which case it would be necessary to shift aircraft from one sector to another.

In accordance with the air plan, the primary targets during the preliminary phase were the main enemy airfields in Sicily, Sardinia, and southern Italy. The effect of the effort developed in June was the withdrawal of his bomber force from Sicily and Sardinia. Having driven the enemy back thus far, the Allied air forces continued with an attempt to force a similar withdrawal of the small bomber force still based in the heel of Italy. On 2 July, 91 Liberators of the Ninth Air Force attacked with good results the Grottaglie and San Pancrazio airdromes where GAF bombers were based, and also Lecce, a German fighter base. On 3 July bombers of NAAP attacked all the advance landing grounds in Sardinia. For the next three days, the combined air striking power was concentrated in an onslaught against the enemy's airfields in eastern Sicily, where the bulk of his fighter strength was now based. During the period, 4 to 9 July, NAAP flew nearly 3,000 heavy and 560 medium bomber sorties against Gerbini...
and its satellites, while the B-24's of the Ninth flew 79 sorties. Catania and Biscari also were glastered. The effect of this unprecedented blitz against enemy airfields as a prelude to invasion was to render many of the Sicilian airfields unserviceable and to drive upwards of one-half of the enemy air force either out of Sicily or to unknown landing grounds.

Sardinian airfields were practically neutralized after 3 July. Although no figures are available as to the exact number of aircraft destroyed on the ground during the pre-invasion period, one report states that up to 13 August approximately 1,100 aircraft, including those abandoned as well as destroyed, had been examined by Allied personnel on the island. As had been expected, also, the persistent bombing of airfields had the effect of forcing the enemy to come up and fight. During the week, 3 to 9 July, 159 enemy aircraft were destroyed in air combat as compared with 31 destroyed during the week of the invasion.

During the pre-invasion period 76 per cent of the total Allied bomber effort was devoted to airfield attacks and over 3,000 tons of bombs were dropped in more than 2,000 sorties. So successful was the effort to neutralize the enemy air force prior to the commencement of the land battle that it was possible after D-day to reduce the scale of attacks on airfields to 21 per cent of the total bomber effort.

The efforts to neutralize the enemy air force prior to the invasion of Sicily pointed to several lessons that would be of use in future operations. For one thing, it was learned that attacks, to achieve maximum results, must be well-timed and often-repeated. Spasmodic attacks, though capable of causing temporary damage, seldom produced decisive results. It was found desirable also to define clearly the aim of each attack, as the immedi-
ate aim varied from time to time. In some cases the airfield area was divided into definite sections which were assigned to certain formations. In attacking airfields over a wide area, one device adopted was to concentrate upon all airfields in a given section with the exception of one or two, with the purpose of causing aircraft still in the air to be diverted to those fields. A concentrated attack would then be made against the fields hitherto left unscathed. During the pre-invasion period about 50 per cent of the night effort of the Wellingtons operating under NAAF was employed in airfield attacks. Light and medium bombers of NATAF were also used on night missions during the moon period.

In order to achieve maximum dispersion the enemy resorted more and more to the use of satellite strips. To counter this move, mass strafing attacks by fighter-bombers (principally P-40's and P-38's) were employed with excellent results. It was found that the 20-lb. fragmentation bomb was particularly effective against grounded aircraft. During the last two days of the pre-invasion attack demolition bombs were used on a greater scale than fragmentation in order to make the fields unserviceable by cratering. The fusing was usually either instantaneous or short delay. Five-hundred pounds bombs with six-hour and 12-hour delay fuses were dropped in small numbers.

In addition to the operations against enemy airfields, the Allied air forces also carried out a bombing program against certain focal points to prevent the enemy from rushing in troops and supplies to meet the threatened area. These focal points included the Messina bottleneck, terminal ports on the Tyrrenian Sea—chiefly Naples, Palermo, and Trapani—railway marshalling yards at these ports and along the western coast of the Italian boot, and the small ports in southern and eastern Sicily. In an attempt to interrupt transportation down the boot, medium bombers attacked the
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In addition to guarding the life lines of the Allied armies, it was the mission of Coastal to dislocate and destroy those of the enemy. In the period between 24 June and 9 July the ship striking force damaged two large merchant vessels, and sank at least one 800-ton schooner, a 6,000-ton cargo vessel, and a 3,000-ton auxiliary craft.

On the eve of invasion the Allies enjoyed overwhelming air superiority. The German and Italian Air Forces were estimated to have a total of 1,500 to 1,600 aircraft based in Sardinia, Sicily, Italy, and Southern France, compared to an Allied force of some 4,000 aircraft. There were approximately 114 British and 146 American squadrons. Axis aircraft were believed to have an average 50 per cent serviceability, though probably in the battle area it was even less.

The Assault Period

From 3 July onward protection of the assault convoys represented a heavy commitment of the air forces. Off the coast of Algiers and Tunisia the convoys were protected by the MAGIC, assisted by the 33rd Fighter Group based on Pantelleria. Malta-based aircraft took over the protection of convoys as they came within 50 miles of the island. The enemy made no attempt to attack the convoys while en route. Admiral Hewitt stated that convoy protection was the most carefully planned and most successfully executed of all air force roles.

On the night of 9 July intensive and varied operations were carried out. Although it is not within the province of this study to consider the details of the airborne operations, mention should be made of their role in 

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The air forces of the Allied Air Forces were to capture and hold the drop zone for the supply troops. The Airborne Division of the 15th Air Force was to deliver drops to the drop zones. In the 150th Airborne Division, the 2nd Airborne Division was to deliver drops to the drop zones. The 507th Airborne Division was to deliver drops to the drop zones.

On the 15th Air Force, the mission was to involve dropping the 82nd Airborne Division to the drop zones.

On the 150th Airborne Division, the mission was to involve dropping the 507th Airborne Division to the drop zones.

On the 507th Airborne Division, the mission was to involve dropping the 506th Airborne Division to the drop zones.

In the 150th Airborne Division, the mission was to involve dropping the 508th Airborne Division to the drop zones.

The drop zones were to be defended by the 82nd Airborne Division.

The drop zones were to be defended by the 508th Airborne Division.

The drop zones were to be defended by the 507th Airborne Division.

The drop zones were to be defended by the 506th Airborne Division.

In the 150th Airborne Division, the mission was to involve dropping the 508th Airborne Division to the drop zones.

In the 150th Airborne Division, the mission was to involve dropping the 507th Airborne Division to the drop zones.

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In the 150th Airborne Division, the mission was to involve dropping the 82nd Airborne Division to the drop zones.

In the 150th Airborne Division, the mission was to involve dropping the 507th Airborne Division to the drop zones.

In the 150th Airborne Division, the mission was to involve dropping the 506th Airborne Division to the drop zones.

In the 150th Airborne Division, the mission was to involve dropping the 82nd Airborne Division to the drop zones.

In the 150th Airborne Division, the mission was to involve dropping the 508th Airborne Division to the drop zones.
In addition to the four large-scale airbase attacks there were a
group of small missions called CHESTNUT, designed to attack and harass enemy lines of communication.

Despite the errors made and the heavy losses incurred, the airborne operations made an important contribution to the success of HUSKY. General Patton, Commander of the Seventh Army, stated that at least 48 hours were saved by the action of the 82d Airborne Division in the western assault area; while General Montgomery, Commander of the British Eighth Army, estimated that the airborne assaults against the two bridges south of Syracuse and south of Cistania accelerated his advance by no less than a week.

These achievements were accomplished, however, only at a high cost in both men and material and it was evident that much remained to be learned about airborne operations. Immediately after the invasion steps were initiated to review the Sicilian experience in order that lessons learned might be put to good use in future operations. An important doctrine that emerged from these studies was that the use of airborne troops should be confined to missions suited to their role and the final decision should rest with the air force commander. Such a decision should be made in time to permit notification of all air, ground and naval forces. The use of airborne troops as reinforcements should be confined to serious emergencies. In spite of all the shortcomings and failures General Eisenhower thought that the outstanding tactical lesson of HUSKY was the potentialities of airborne operations.

But to return to the night of 9 July. In addition to protection of convoys and the dropping of real and dummy paratroops as well as gliders, NAHF carried out bombing attacks to soften resistance, to provide diversionary assistance to the airborne assaults, and to prevent the rush of enemy reserves.
to the threatened areas. Medium and light bombers carried out attacks against varied targets in the western area of Sicily while RAF Wellworths, Halifaxs, and Liberators bombed targets in southeastern area to weaken resistance to the initial assault.

H-hour was 0245 on 10 July. Planning and execution of the approach from the point of view of navigation and seamanship was, according to General Eisenhower, one of the highlights of the operation and "left nothing to be desired." Despite unfavorable weather conditions most of the assault waves made their landings not more than a few minutes behind schedule. The greatest delay occurred in the case of the 45th Division landings, where H-hour was postponed a full hour. A large degree of tactical surprise was achieved.

It was anticipated that the enemy air force would exert every effort to attack the shipping and beaches early on the morning of D-day. The number of Allied fighter aircraft available was not adequate to provide continuous cover over all beaches throughout the 16 hours of daylight. Sufficient fighter strength was present in the theater, but the limiting factors were:

(1) the operational capacity of the airfields on Malta and Pantelleria, (2) the long distance from the operating fields to the assault areas and the resulting short time of cover provided by each sortie, and (3) the large commitment of fighter escort for the bombing missions. In view of these circumstances it was agreed that continuous fighter cover should be provided over two of the beaches throughout daylight; that all landing areas should have continuous protection for the first two hours of daylight and for the last one and a half hours of daylight; and a reserve wing should be kept at a high degree of readiness to reinforce any area as the situation demanded.
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During the two hour time all lighter, including those over time, from 0000 to 0200 are ordered back to 0.5 or 0.3. (Note: provided forward direction 0.2 to 0.5 and 0.6 to 0.3 from 0.3.)

Additional note: In the O.G. phase, submarines to the Enemy or providing visual direction over 0.2 to 0.5 and 0.6 to 0.7. The point at which the action may commence.

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The action order is to 0.5, then 0.3 and 0.2 for control and 0.22 for support 0.2 and 0.21.
through XII Air Support Command (Rear), located on Cape Bon Peninsula. Requests that required light and medium bombardment aircraft were passed by XII Air Support Command to higher headquarters. Tactical reconnaissance was furnished by 111th Reconnaissance Squadron, which flew predetermined routes. Spot reconnaissance was also provided by diverting planes from fighter cover. Special reconnaissance missions were treated as air support requests. During the assault phase, 10-12 July, the 31st and 33d Fighter Groups were located on Gozo and Pantelleria, respectively, and the other units were located on the Cape Bon Peninsula.

It is typical, perhaps, of divergent service view that the Navy maintained that "close support by aircraft in amphibious operations, as understood by the Navy, did not exist in this theater," whereas NAAF maintained that the "cover proved successful." In support of its view the Navy pointed out that the average number of fighters over each of the areas CNT, DI'E, and J0SS was approximately 10 aircraft; that there were several "holidays" in the schedule when no cover existed; and that patrols were maintained at one level only. Even when requests for close support were granted, the time lag, according to the Navy, was excessive, sometimes as much as 12 hours.

In support of its view NAAF pointed out that on the day of the invasion the fighters flew over 1,000 sorties. Although the Navy was prepared for the loss of up to 300 ships during D minus 1 and D-day, the number lost from enemy air attacks to nightfall on 13 July was only 12. The majority of these losses occurred in the J0SS and DI'E areas, where the air attack was strongest and where the anchoring of ships as far out as six miles had the effect of over-stretching fighter patrols and permitting the enemy to get
through the screen. Furthermore, fighters on patrol were continuously fired upon by Allied ships, so that patrols ordered at 5,000 and 8,000 feet were forced up to 10,000 and 14,000 feet. At greater heights friendly fire was less hazardous but the danger of enemy aircraft breaking through was enhanced.

Further data presented in the report of the Western Naval Task Force itself would seem to warrant the conclusion that, although operating under extremely difficult conditions, the air forces performed a creditable job in protecting the invasion fleet. According to this report, during the period 10 to 12 July, approximately 200 enemy flights were plotted on the operations board. Of this number, over half were inland flights that did not reach the assault areas. There were 89 plotted enemy raids aimed at the assault areas, of which 26 were intercepted and driven off prior to entering the areas. The remaining 63 raids were, in most cases, engaged by the fighter cover. Not included in these 89 plotted raids were frequent low-level attacks that could not be picked up by radar. These raids achieved a good deal of surprise by coming in very low, flying down the valleys, and darting over the ridge of hills onto the beaches.

With little effective opposition from the low-grade Italian forces defending the beaches, Allied ground troops made excellent progress once they were ashore. By the end of D-day all beachheads in both the American and British sectors were secure. The Pachino landing field and the port of Syracuse fell during D-day. On the 11th the enemy launched his major effort to throw the invaders back into the sea. The main weight of the counterattack, which began early in the morning and lasted throughout the day, fell against the Americans near Gela. Enemy infantry, spearheaded by Mark IV tanks, at
and the.area became an island 2,000 miles of 2,000 miles long. In the 13th army.

The 5th army's left flank was anchored by the Alpine mountain range. The 47th division was cut off from the rest of the army and was forced to surrender. The 11th army's right flank was anchored by the River Arno. The 5th army's right flank was anchored by the River Po.

On the 12th of the 8th army's advance was stopped by the 47th division's left flank being forced to surrender. On the 13th of the 8th army's advance was stopped by the 47th division's right flank being forced to surrender. On the 14th of the 8th army's advance was stopped by the 47th division's center being forced to surrender. On the 15th of the 8th army's advance was stopped by the 47th division's right flank being forced to surrender.
In encounters with the enemy air force during the assault, Allied fighters were completely successful. Of the estimated 100 or more enemy fighters encountered on 10 July, the 9th Force lost 12, probably destroyed 3, and damaged 12 at the cost of 11 of their own number. The following day brought even greater exploits to the enemy. After 12 July, the enemy began to disintegrate in his day effort, and 13, 14, 15, and 16 July, the Allies increased the toll of his air planes. To protect the base area and help the night fighters, three ground control intercepts (GCIs) were installed in the base area in the ACT, 11th, and 12th zones. These stations 36 in operation during the fight of the night following 16 July, and enabled the air force to continue to hold the enemy. Since adequate radio equipment was not available for the fighter pilots and training was inadequate, the radio stations turned over their equipment for training.

In addition to the night and daylight combat effort which were to protect the invasion force, the whole weight of the Stutz in the air was brought to bear against the enemy during the assault period to counteract his air force and reassure the way for the Allied advance. From 9 to 14 July, the main efforts were on communications systems. Four weeks of 17's and five weeks of 24's from 16 March to 22 July, were in almost continuous service. In a few of the bombing efforts of the Eighth Air Force and B-24's, there was a reduction of air resistance. The 13th and 14th Divisions on either side of the enemy were able to put up an effective resistance in Sicily. The loss of his coastal motor sections and other vital installations on 9 and 10 July by the enemy in Sicily to destroy the effort seriously checked our efforts to destroy the enemy on Sicily. The loss of heavy fighter airplanes, but that too was effectively countered.

The essential rhythm of air force participation in large scale ambush operations was first established in the invasion of Sicily. The weight
characteristics of the air forces on which cooperation is essential for the achievement of our objectives: (1) reduction of heavy casualties by a use of the doctrine of maneuver, striking at vital centers by coordinated attacks; (2) concentration of the air effort in a limited area; (3) concentration of effort near vital centers of concentration to isolate the battle; (4) emphasis on destruction of life and equipment by direct bombing and strafing; (5) the advantage of air forces foreseen; (6) a concentrated effort; and (7) the most efficient results.

In all the critical situations, the role of the air forces was to control the battle at the critical points, to the extent that it was necessary, to prevent theIES and to achieve the objectives. The IES may be controlled by all available means, especially by air forces, but their role was to prevent the IES from using their forces to achieve their objectives. The air forces were involved in all aspects of the battle, including the control of the IES, and were required to do so in order to achieve their objectives.

The air forces were responsible for not giving up control or losing control, but to gain control. A basic difficulty that had to be overcome was to coordinate the efforts of the air forces and to gain control. The air forces were responsible for gaining control over the battle, and in order to do so, they had to take control over the air, which was achieved by local control of their forces. In some critical situations, the air forces were able to gain control and to achieve their objectives.
The troop carrier operations that spearheaded the assault were the least satisfactorily executed phase of HUSKY. The salient shortcoming was in night navigation. The dropping of a parachute brigade within Allied lines on the second night of operations purely as a reinforcement was unsound in principle. Failure to arrange a safe corridor for passage resulted in high casualties inflicted by friendly troops and ships. Dumb paratroops were used with success and this form of diversion was recommended for future operations. The experience in Sicily pointed clearly to the conclusion that the Air Commander in Chief should have the major share of control of airborne operations and his word should be final as to whether such operations should be undertaken.
Chapter IV

SOUTHERN ITALY: THE FIRST CHALLENGE

Definite plans for post-HUSKY operations had not been agreed upon when the TRIDENT conference was held in Washington in May 1943. This conference served to bring out again the basic differences between British and American strategy. At the first meeting the Prime Minister produced arguments for a continuation and enlargement of the war in the Mediterranean. Unimpressed, the President thought an Italian campaign might result in heavy attrition of Allied forces and might be a drain on resources, especially if Italy had to be occupied and supplied. The Prime Minister countered this by saying that it would be unnecessary to occupy all of Italy—it would suffice to hold such ports and air bases as were needed for operations against the Balkans and southern Europe. Finding themselves in disagreement the President and Prime Minister turned the matter over to the CCS. The upshot of TRIDENT was that General Eisenhower should plan such operations in exploitation of HUSKY as would be best calculated to eliminate Italy from the war and to contain the maximum number of German forces.

In accordance with this directive a number of plans were drawn at Allied Force Headquarters, but final decisions had to await the outcome of the Sicilian campaign. On 29 August 1943 General Eisenhower announced that he had decided upon two main operations: one coded MANTICOR (an amphibious assault against Leggio) and another coded AVALANCHE (an amphibious assault against Salerno). These operations were approved by the CCS at the QUADRANT conference held at Quebec. At the same time the Allied leaders formulated plans for other operations that gave first priority to OVERLORD (the cross-channel invasion of Europe.
in 1944) and POINTBLANK (the Combined Jomini Offensive). In other words, the same set of decisions that inaugurated the invasion of southern Italy also relegated that theater to a secondary role. The three-fold task of forcing the collapse of Italy, creating diversions of enemy forces, and destroying vital installations on the continent would have to be accomplished without top priority on men and supplies. Operations were to be in three phases: (1) Italy was to be eliminated as a belligerent, and air bases were to be established as far north as the Rome area; (2) Corsica and Sardinia were to be seized; and (3) constant pressure was to be maintained on German forces in northern Italy, and there was to be created a situation favorable for eventual entry of Allied forces—including the bulk of the re-equipped 1 French army and air forces—into southern France.

First of the two main amphibious assaults was BAYTOWN, to be carried out on 3 September 1943. It was to consist merely of moving two divisions across the narrow Strait of Messina and landing them in an area where Axis defenses were believed to be weak. One division of the British Eighth Army was to land at Gallico and Catona and another division was to land at Reggio. Both landings were to be covered by artillery from the Messina side of the Strait and by naval fire. Air cover was to be provided from near-by Sicily by the Desert Air Force, made up largely of British units. The immediate objectives of the Eighth Army were to seize Reggio and the airfields in the toe. The ultimate objective was to advance northward for a junction with the U. S. Fifth Army and eastward for a junction with other British forces that were to land near Taranto between D plus 2 and D plus 7 (Operation OCHSENN).

ANZACOCEL, an assault on the beaches south of Salerno, was to be launched on 9 September. Invasion forces were to consist of the American VI Corps and
the British 10 Corps and follow-up troops. The Allied forces in AVALANCHE would total about 125,000 troops against enemy forces estimated at 39,000 on D-day but capable of being increased to more than 100,000 by D plus 3. The objective of the Fifth Army was to seize Salerno and the airfield at Montecorvino and then, driving inland, to capture the port of Naples and secure the nearby airfields.

The Western Naval Task Force, composed of the Control Force, the Southern Task Force, the North Task Force and the Support Carrier Force, was to transport the assault troops to their points of debarkation off the beaches and to support them by naval gunfire and carrier-based aircraft until they were firmly established ashore. The Southern Task Force was to convey VI Corps to its beaches, while Northern Task Force was to transport 10 Corps. The Support Carrier Force, consisting of one carrier and four escort carriers, was to supply the maximum practicable fighter protection to the naval forces and to assist the Sicily-based fighters of the XII Air Support Command in controlling the air over the beaches. The Control Force included the flagship, USS Ancon, a Picket Group to screen the attack forces from hostile surface elements, and a Diversion Group, which was to make a feint against the beaches north-west of Naples to draw off enemy forces.

The Air Plans

The broad general tasks assigned to the air forces in both AVALANCHE and SALerno were as follows: (1) to neutralize the enemy air forces; (2) to prevent or effectively retard the movement of enemy forces into the assault area; (3) to provide air protection over the assault convoys, the assaults, and subsequent operations, and (4) to transport and drop paratroops in connection with AVALANCHE. In addition to these major tasks, NAAP had also a
number of disposable air-cushions, including the defense of territory already taken by the Allies, protection of infiltration convoys, strikes on local dumps or naval units, eliminating communications and airfields, stratified or localized, large-scale reconnaissance, air-sea rescue, and air bombardment.

Both of these, as well as the Allied air forces retained the same operational capability that they continued to maintain throughout the invasion and battle for the island. A summary of the enemy air forces was contained in the book of 1945. Credibility in the operation of the convoy by Allied forces in 1945 was thus based on the need to send the convoy from the British Isles without a convoy action could last 11 to 12 days, allowing the expected time to rendezvous over. On the other hand, or it could be expected for fighters until at a radius of 10 miles or beyond that point, to take over, as the destruction of bomber factories made it to employ two squadrons of F-22s in each of the 13 units and 20 bombers. One squadron of fighters to a small area in one end of the convoy area, 6 4 to 60 fighters, and 300 small reconnaissance planes. In the United Kingdom, the air cover was at least sufficient for the 15-000,000 pound cargo, and the 2400 miles of the north-south axis.
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of U.S. forces on the 13 submarines and 12 patrol boats in the vicinity of the
area, it was estimated that 20 submarines or the area, an average of 15 aircraft
could be maintained over the area at any time. With the same number
of aircraft available, and allowing for a cost of 24 to 27 aircraft could be
over the area and continuously 24 to 27 aircraft could

In addition, the submarines (there are 12 submarines in the area) would
be capable of providing a continuous work of 22
aircraft daily and 11 to 12 aircraft on plus 1. This will give a
work of 57 or 2/3 of the expected on all of the submarines during the working hours of
6-12. An order to counteract for the work area during the first hour
of each day. For the last hour of work, we propose to be additionally

One of the first major objectives of the ground forces for the East
coast, and the ground forces for the West
coast. A few of the special missions, but it should be noted, the special
missions will be accomplished on a day by day basis, but all aircraft would have
made progress in the combat, leading to the attack and strike. No other forces
would be able to maintain the necessary speed and accuracy, especially
in the combat, and to fulfill the mission.

After the completion of the mission, all aircraft would be

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better than at Leith, north of N., the crews already are destroyed or
engaged in both raids and extensive attacks were inflicted on buildings and
facilities. The Alberthorpe area was destroyed by the 23rd, only a few
damage were from
by 1,000 men on 1,000 men. The latter were from
the bomb. Only a few small ships were made on the harbors
of the North Sea coast, and that was in the middle of the
bombing, in the middle of the
10th, or 26th, respectively.

The absence of the heavy air force allowed 17 to concentrate its
major efforts on specific targets and lines of communication during the
period 18 August - 23rd, or 10th. For the greatest part of the period on
the north flank, the only targets included roads and rail-
ways, troop columns, bridges, and trains. There was no reason for
concentrating on the Italian railways, aside from a few minor targets, all the
northbound and the link to the Ortei through Luba, Lube, or Tubia. It followed
that fewer targets to the Italian air force could be inflicted by many
attacks on the road and train targets of these three battleships. Air
attacking targets at low altitude were to be avoided, but those at
Tirpitz, although visible, were still in full operation. The German battleship
at first attacked during the concentration period were those concentrated
on the north, and the south, and the German air and industrial areas
at the same time. On the 23rd, the destroyers were directed to a coordinated
attack on 72 destroyers and 71 planes. The 72 bombs of 4,000
lbu. were used, and the 71 planes dropped a bomb that inflicted serious damage
teams on the German battleship that had been under enemy attack.

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had been "most effective," and that actual damage had exceeded all previous estimates.

Other large-scale attacks were made against the Sulmona marshalling yards (at the junction of the Rome, Pescara and Termini lines), the Termini marshalling yards, northeast of Rome, and the Bologna marshalling yards on 27 and 28 August and 2 September. Small raids were carried out against yards at Aversa, Orte, Bari, and Taranto, and the vital supply line through the Brenner Pass. The last-mentioned raid, carried out 2 September, paid dividends far out of proportion to the investment. By hitting certain key bridges in the vicinity of the pass the U.S. Fortresses were able to halt temporarily all supplies coming into Italy via the Brenner, the shortest and most direct route between Germany and Italy. Most of the heavy bomber missions were carried out by the XII Bomber Command, but IX Bomber Command added its weight by attacking the railway station, air depot, and marshalling yards at Canerillo on 21 August. The IX Bomber Command also made other attacks on Pescara, Foggia, Taranto, and Bari.

The medium bombers concentrated their attacks against marshalling yards and industrial targets in southern Italy. One of the chief targets was Salerno against which 130 Wellington and 112 U.S. medium bomber sorties were flown. Between MUSIK and VALANTI the combined efforts of heavy and medium bombers of NAAF against communications totaled more than 4,500 sorties.

The results of attacks on rail communications were highly satisfactory. By the time the Allies were ready to make their first landing in Italy, the lines were blocked and all railway activity had ceased south of a line Naples-Foggia. Repairs were being made at Littoria (Rome) and Battipaglia, near Salerno. Large quantities of rolling stock had been wiped out. These constant
attacks forced the enemy to rely ever more on road transport. This placed a strain on fuel reserves and made the enemy's problem of supply difficult.

In the week preceding BAYTOWN air attacks were delivered against fortified positions, gun emplacements, and troop concentrations. These attacks, carried out by escorted light bombers and on occasion by B-25's, were not intended to saturate the landing areas. Rather, particular targets were pinpointed, such as gun positions at Reggio, fortifications at San Giovanni, and Axis Army Headquarters at Rosarno and Orti. These attacks were kept on a small scale for two reasons: a more concentrated attack would have disclosed the exact spot at which the landings would be made and it was known that the area within which the Eighth Army was to land was weakly defended. It seemed better to preserve the element of surprise than to knock out limited enemy defenses.

In general the German fighter reaction was inconsistent, except in the Naples and Foggia areas where it was generally strong and aggressive. During the period 12 August - 3 September, MAFF destroyed over 260 enemy planes and probably destroyed 30 more. This constant attrition, plus the heavy attacks against airfields, forced the enemy to withdraw his bombers from southern Italy and to concentrate his fighters, his best pilots, and his heaviest anti-aircraft defenses in the Naples sector.

On the eve of BAYTOWN it was estimated that the Axis had about 1,500 operational aircraft of all types in Italy, Sardinia, Corsica, and southern France. Of these, about 900 were Italian, and 600 German. The Italian planes were out of date and their pilots were of low calibre in both experience and morale. As for the GAF, at least one-third of its 600 planes were unserviceable.
By D minus 1 the Allied air forces had successfully accomplished their preliminary tasks of neutralizing the Axis air arm, crippling lines of communication, isolating the battle area (for BAYCORN but not for AVALANCHE), and softening up Axis defenses. On the evening of 2 September, 300 landing craft were lying in wait at eastern Sicilian ports ready for the first assault on the European mainland.

BAYCORN

The movement of ships and men got under way in the early hours of 3 September. The Eighth Army crossed the Straits to the Calabrian shore against only dispirited resistance. There being no hindrance from mines or demolitions, the beachheads were soon made secure.

Air cover for the crossings and the assault was furnished by the Desert Air Force, which was primarily British in composition but contained the 57th and 79th U. S. Fighter Groups. Only a few enemy fighters appeared to contest the landings and two of these were shot down. The desultory efforts of the enemy air force enabled DAF by the middle of the day to shift to the offensive. Light bombers and fighter-bombers attacked gun positions, rail and road crossings, bridges, convoys, and troop concentrations in the lower part of Calabria. NAAFs P-25s and A-36s bombed the airfields at Comigliatello and Crotone, where increased fighter strength had been reported by reconnaissance aircraft. D-day closed with an armed reconnaissance mission that destroyed small groups of enemy vehicles. During the next two days the advance of the Eighth Army was held up only by demolitions. No contact was made with German forces. On 4 and 5 September, with the exception of a few enemy vehicles, few suitable targets presented themselves. On the 4th the enemy's first and only effort at
The leading scheme was broken on 3rd of its place and completed. With our active plan in control the ground for the continued to recovery. By a short but visible show was in the neighborhood of Oshawa. Will be noticed in the report the carrying out the operations in the court of the city. From the report the Berlin operations signifies important part of this and it can probably be under the

The situation by the material from the bundling on 8th to the execution of the task. For example only on 10 of 30 winners

From the report not the material from the bundling on 7th to the same bar in the report that the initial use made, the time was opened or 40 to 50

Very little was exceeded from all attempts. On the other hand headquarters

It should also be pointed with critical awareness. The best experiences

In a report to the city is considered absolutely. The lack of the

Depleted air strength for the new critical was taken.

Just before the winter the volume each place 6000 broke that

July and we will be unconditional surrender. This in our defeated all who are

does not, for the II. The report only when its moved in a

reasonable order.

On the holding

There is immediate observer of the situation of any,

thereby, and this is in all its display of concern and may be as

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from D minus 6 to D minus 1. The majority of ships of the Southern Task Force sailed from Oran and Algiers, while most of the Northern Attack Force sailed from Bizerte and Tripoli. All the ships of the great fleet met north of Palermo on D minus 1. By sundown of the same day the convoys were in position and had started their approaches at a point some 50 miles west of the beaches.

The convoys were not subjected to attack until late on D minus 2. During that night and the afternoon of D minus 1 they were attacked five times. The first attack, carried out by torpedo bombers apparently from southern France, caused no damage. The four other raids, which came on the afternoon of D minus 1, damaged an American LCT and sank a British LCT. Between 2000 and 2400 hours on D minus 1, the Northern Attack Force was subjected to repeated raids by small groups of torpedo bombers, while the Southern Force encountered two heavy and five light attacks. Only one LCT was hit. Good fighter cover, heavy antiaircraft fire, and poor performances by the attacking bombers prevented more extensive damages. Antiaircraft fire accounted for five enemy planes and Coastal Air Force night fighters claimed five probables.

After 2400 hours, when the ships began moving into their final positions and until 0330 hours (H-hour), when the last of the assault troops left for the beaches, there were no attacks by enemy planes. With the exception of a sector in the north where the British naval units were firing in preparation for the landing of 10 Corps, the whole front, from Salerno to Paestum, was quiet. Apparently the Germans planned it that way. As soon as the troops approached the beaches the Germans greeted them with the announcement: "Come on in and give up. We have you covered." Then came a great barrage of artillery, machine gun, and mortar fire. Although these tactics caused some
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The situation is dire and the outlook is bleak. The enemy is getting closer, and our forces are stretched thin. We must act quickly to secure our objectives.

In addition to the immediate threat on the western front, the enemy is also advancing through the eastern territories. Our forces there must regroup and reinforce their positions to hold off the enemy.

To the south, we have received reports of enemy activity along the border. This must be monitored closely, and any signs of infiltrations should be dealt with immediately.

Despite the challenges, our morale remains high. We will not allow the enemy to dictate our terms. The fight continues, and we will prevail.

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particularly of boats at the beaches. Beginning at approximately first
light regular and persistent bombing and strafing attacks effectively
interrupted unloading activities... The scale of these attacks has never
before and never since been equaled in this theater."

Beside this may be placed the Air Force statement that "very little
enemy action in the air was encountered the first day." Practically all
NAF's operational and intelligence summaries agree that the enemy's air
reaction to the landings was not severe. From an analysis of the various
conflicting reports, it would appear that the enemy flew enough small missions
over the beaches and shipping, and flew them regularly enough to keep the
Allied forces constantly on the alert and to hamper troops engaged in unloading
activities. However, the sum total of enemy operations was moderate, his
attacks were persistent but not very effective, and they caused only minor
damage. If the size and importance of the invasion be taken into account,
the damage suffered from enemy air action was small indeed. During the day
only one ship (an AT) was sunk and one LST was damaged. There is no means
of estimating casualties to personnel and damage to equipment on the shore,
but there is no evidence to suggest it was extensive.

The estimated 60 to 75 enemy sorties were met by the standing patrols
of USAF, RAF, and Navy fighters, in accordance with the Air Plan of keeping
around 36 planes over the assault area at all times. The enemy took advan-
tage of cloud cover and the mountains behind the beaches to strike quickly
at widely scattered points. Operating in small groups of from 1 to 6 planes
he would hit the northern and southern beaches simultaneously in order to
confuse and divide the Allied fighter defenses. In spite of these tactics
the Allied standing patrols were able to break up or turn back a large pro-
portion of the enemy raids. During D-day Allied fighters destroyed four planes and damaged one for the loss of two P-38's in combat and one Spitfire in noncombat.

The fighters performed creditably, but they were hampered in their actions by the unsatisfactory performance of the fighter control center on the Ancon. Several factors appeared to be responsible: the near-by hills caused echoes; the ship was not well equipped and was badly located; and the control center was not receiving enough information from the troops ashore.

The D-day activities of the Strategic Air Force were aimed at the isolation of the battlefield. The heavies and mediums hit roads, railway junctions, and bridges mainly in the Naples-Avellino area. Some attention was also given to the southwest area near Potenza and Sapri in order to hinder the enemy's movement into the Salerno sector. Sixty B-17's destroyed two road bridges and damaged the railway bridge over the Volturno River at Capua. The heavies further hampered communications above Naples by damaging the approaches to the Cancello bridges between Capua and the coast. Enemy air fields at Pozzallo and Scanzano (in the south) were beset with good results.

In all, the land based aircraft flew about 1,700 sorties in support of D-day operations. The air forces claimed 14 enemy planes destroyed, 3 damaged in combat, and 4 destroyed on the ground against the loss of 9 planes.

Extending the Salerno Beachhead, 10-11 September

In spite of stubborn opposition the Fifth Army retained the initiative for the next two days. Salerno and Montecorvino airfields were occupied during the morning of the 10th but Montecorvino was still within range of enemy artillery and could not be brought into use. Fighter cover would have to continue to be furnished largely on a long-range basis, with possibly some assistance from temporary fighter strips that were being readied inside the beachhead.
On the 10th and 11th the enemy increased both the quantity and quality of his air resistance; on both days about 100 planes bombed and strafed the beaches and shipping. Tactical Air Force met this increased activity with the same system of patrols used on D-day. On the 10th the day fighters broke up or turned away about 40 attacks, one-fourth of which contained formations of 10 or more planes. On the nights of 9/10 and 10/11 the Beaufighters were in action as usual and performed well. They might have performed even better had it not been that their radar coverage was interfered with by the high ground to the east and the Ancon could give only limited help.

On the 11th the CAF concentrated its efforts on Allied shipping with some success. The USS Savannah was hit by a radio-controlled bomb that exploded below deck. H.3 Flores was damaged by a near-miss, while the USS Philadelphia suffered damage from an enemy plane that crashed some 15 feet away. The attack on the Savannah came at a time when the fighter cover had been somewhat reduced, partly because the fighters had been diverted to the assault area against enemy transport and partly because of pilot fatigue. The diversion of fighters to the assault area had appeared feasible in view of the small enemy air reaction on D-day. After the Savannah was hit, normal cover was restored and continued throughout the day.

According to a Marine Corps observer, the air cover at Salerno during the first three days was excellent. The attack force in the northern area had maintained "about 98 per cent control of the air during all daylight hours and a possible 90 per cent control during the hours of darkness," so that "very few German planes broke through this cover."

Despite the good showing so far there were disturbing elements in the picture. Flying in cramped cockpits over long distances the pilots were
beginning to show signs of fatigue, and accidents were increasing rapidly. All the while the GAF was exerting itself to the utmost to inflict heavy damage on personnel and equipment.

In addition to their beach and shipping patrols, NAAF's planes continued their efforts to isolate the battlefield. On 9 September Mediterranean Air Command informed the Tactical Air Force that it would be responsible for destroying enemy personnel and equipment south of a line Battipaglia-Potenza-Bari, while Strategic would be responsible north of that line. Road communications used by the enemy to reinforce his battle lines were to be the main targets. Fighters on patrol over the beachhead did double duty. The planes were equipped with bombs, and the pilots, receiving their bombing instructions while in flight, would carry out their bombing and then proceed to patrol duties. This system, which was used principally over 10 Corps area, sometimes enabled the XII Air Support Command to furnish air support within 10 to 30 minutes after ground troops had sent in their requests. In general, however, air-ground cooperation was not satisfactory until Allied planes moved to bases in Italy. The land lines were unreliable, maps were poor, changes in bomb lines came in slowly, and, when requests from ground troops had to be sent to Sicily, the planes often did not arrive until four hours after the initiation of the request.

Tactical reconnaissance essential to close support, artillery fire, and intruder missions in the battle zone was furnished by P-51's of the III Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron and the British Spitfires of 225 Squadron. Until D plus 3, tactical reconnaissance was carried out on a pre-arranged basis with a set number of missions each day, but after 12 September the 111th operated with VI Corps and 225 with 10 Corps. Each squadron carried out about six missions a day.
The last phase of Allied advance was over by the afternoon of 11 September.

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According to the 1969,[1] [2] there was a significant amount of information related to the dropping of the atomic bomb. In addition to the bomb's destructive power, there were concerns about its potential for incineration and its impact on the environment. The bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, causing widespread devastation.

In 1969, the U.S. decided to declassify some of the information related to the bombing. This decision was made to ensure transparency and to prevent the repetition of past mistakes. The documents released included reports and intelligence analyses.

The declassification process was carried out in compliance with the guidelines set forth by the U.S. government. The information was carefully reviewed to ensure that it did not compromise national security.

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As the battle reached its critical stage, the entire resources of NAAF were shifted to direct aid of the Fifth Army. Fighter and fighter-bombers carried out more than 1,000 sorties on patrol over the beachhead and offshore shipping and in bombing and strafing attacks against targets of opportunity in the battle area. A-36's and P-38's dropped 160 tons of bombs on enemy vehicles, troops, gun positions, roads, bridges and marshalling yards. The medium and heavy bombers directed their efforts at the roads leading into the Salerno area and at concentrations of troops and supplies in the Battipaglia-Eboli area.

The fury of the air assault was not abated on the 15th. NAAF planes of all types flew about 1,400 sorties. To name all the localities hit would sound like a miniature Baedeker of the Salerno area," but special emphasis was laid on the Eboli, Battipaglia, Avellino, and Auletta areas. The staggering pressure of bombardment was kept up through the night of 15/16 September. By the 16th it was apparent that the enemy counterattack had spent itself. There were no great changes in positions, but the reinforced Fifth Army had consolidated its positions and was ready soon to go on the offensive.

During the critical period all the planes of NAAF, Strategic and well as Tactical, were employed in direct support of the land battle. Some of the planes of the Strategic Air Force bombed so close to the front lines that an error of a few hundred yards might have spelled disaster for the Allied troops. NAAF poured into the target area an average bomb density of 760 tons per square mile. How many enemy troops were killed by land based aircraft there is no way of knowing, but reports indicated that over 300 vehicles were destroyed and some 200 damaged by fighter-bombers alone. The Naples-Salerno
roads and railways were virtually closed to traffic as a result of heavy Allied attacks. "Never before," said Mediterranean Air Command, "have bombs been employed on a battlefield in such quantities or with such telling effect."

General Speatz felt that the Salerno experience had demonstrated "to a greater extent than ever before the importance of Air Force flexibility in organization and operations and the decisive effect which air power had in combined operations." General Clark, the ground commander, said that the air forces "contributed much" to the success of the operations and "all were most enthusiastic in their acclaim of the close and continuous support which had been given them by the Air Forces." General Sir Harold Alexander pointed out more specifically that:

The tremendous air attacks added greatly to the morale of the ground and naval forces and, in addition, have inflicted on the enemy heavy losses in men and equipment. They have seriously interfered with his movements, interrupted his communications, and prevented his concentration of the necessary forces to launch large scale attacks.

Although bare statistics can never convey the urgency of a desperate battle situation, the heroic efforts of over-worked pilots flying in cramped cockpits, or the quality of performance, they do convey some idea of the volume of activity. From 1 to 15 September NAAFs fighters and bombers flew approximately 17,500 sorties in furtherance of the BAYTOWN and AVALANCHE operations. They dropped some 10,000 tons of bombs and claimed the destruction of 220 planes in air combat for the loss of 90. During the four critical days NAAFs pilots flew over 6,000 sorties and dropped 3,500 tons of bombs. Three-fourths of these were flown by U.S. planes of the Twelfth Air Force. Planes of the Northwest African Photographic Reconnaissance Wing flew about 100 sorties and planes of the Coastal Air Force— which did not operate over the mainland—
flew about 400 sorties. It was an impressive record.

Putting to good use the lessons learned in Tunisia and Sicily the Allied forces were able to cope successfully with the first challenge of an Allied invasion by high grade German troops. The pattern of counter air force operations developed in previous campaigns was applied with minor modifications to prevent serious interference from the enemy air force. The efforts to isolate the battle area were successful for BAYCOPEN but not for AVALANCHE. Although the air forces attained considerable success in their attacks on marshalling yards and rolling stock, the Germans were able to mount a counter attack against the beachhead. The Allies had yet to learn how to isolate an invasion area where the enemy enjoyed better positions, had reserves for reinforcement, and possessed alternate means of communication. In a negative way Salerno taught another lesson: the utility of deceptive measures. There was no surprise in AVALANCHE; it is now definitely known that the Germans expected the main landings would be not in the Toe but in the Naples-Salerno area. They had several good reasons for believing this and the pattern of Allied attacks on radar sites, communications and airfields around Naples and Foggia lent credence to their suspicions. Henceforth all amphibious operations in the Mediterranean-European theaters would be preceded by deceptive bombing and other devices calculated to prevent disclosure of the point of invasion. The long distance of the Salerno beaches from airfields in Sicily and the failure to bring the Montecorvino airfield into operation underscored the importance of rapid airfield construction immediately behind the battle line.

Probably the most important lesson of the Salerno experience was the demonstrated ability of air cover to be shifted and massed to retrieve a desperate ground situation, a lesson that was to be brought out with even greater clarity at Anzio.
Chapter V

AUGIO: WE NEAR DISASTER

After weathering the critical stage of the Salerno landings the Fifth Army seized the offensive and pushed on to Naples. On the east coast the Eighth Army advanced and seized Foggia. With Naples the Allies had one of the best ports on the west coast of Italy, and the nearby airfields provided ample bases for tactical support in the push up the Italian peninsula. On the east coast they had the important port of Farii, and possession of the great complex of air fields around Foggia made possible a two way bombing of Germany.

At the Cairo Conference in November 1943 the basic differences in British-American strategy were aired again. The major objectives of the Italian campaign having been accomplished, the Americans recommended that no additional operations be mounted in the Mediterranean except as a direct supporting move to the cross-channel invasion. The British favored a continued and all-out prosecution of operations in the Mediterranean even, if necessary, at the expense of OVERLORD. The decision at Cairo was to continue the build-up for OVERLORD and to continue the redeployment of troops from the Mediterranean to England. The British made this concession apparently on the assurance that Rome soon would be in Allied hands.

A month of fighting did not produce the prize so dear to Churchill's heart. The Allied armies advanced to a line just north of the Volturno and Sangro Rivers and there they stopped. There was no lack of heroic effort on the part of Allied ground forces but they were faced with an almost impossible situation. The enemy was favored by difficult terrain, exceptionally bad
weather, and strong defense positions in the Winter and Gustav lines. When
the Allied chiefs met at Tunis on 25 December 1943 the advance had bogged
down but the Prime Minister again elaborated on the psychological importance
of taking Rome. In his opinion it would be folly to allow the campaign in
Italy to drag on and to face the cross-channel operation with a half-finished
and therefore dangerous situation in Italy. General Alexander proposed an
amphibious landing around the enemy's right flank to compel a withdrawal.
The Prime Minister supported this proposal strongly. Generals Eisenhower
and Clark, though approving the idea generally, doubted that the two partially
skeletonized divisions that Alexander proposed to use would be sufficient to
carry out the operations successfully. Another difficulty was the shortage
of landing craft. Furthermore General Eisenhower pointed out that the Anzio
attack might not compel a withdrawal from the front of the Fifth Army. The
enemy might choose to draw in reinforcements from outside Italy and fight
on both fronts. In this surprise General Eisenhower was correct, for the
immediate result of Anzio was a stalemate on two fronts instead of one.

The key with which the Allied leaders hoped to unlock the system of
German defenses around Rome was a high hill mass called Colli Laisiali, or
the Alban Hills. This promontory guards Routes 6 and 7, the two main high-
ways by which the Gustav Line was supplied. The object was to land at Anzio,
move inland to capture this point, and thus to control the enemy's communications
to the main front. It was hoped that this end run would do away with two
handicaps hitherto barring the Allied advance—weather and terrain.

The SHINGLE plans called for three amphibious landings around Anzio to
take place on 22 January. American and British troops, with follow-ups,
would total about 110,000. Just before the landing the Fifth Army was to make
a strong attack against the Gustav Line in the hope of breaking through the
Liri Valley and joining forces with the beachhead. Eighth Army was to make a demonstration in eastern Italy to prevent the enemy's drawing reinforcement from that sector.

The general tasks of the Allied air forces at Anzio were essentially the same as at Salerno, namely, the destruction of as much of the enemy's air force as possible; the disruption of enemy supply lines to the battle area by attacks on communications targets, this time in central and northern Italy; the provision of air protection for the assault convoys, the assault, and subsequent operations; and assistance to ground operations by air attacks.

Since AVALANCHE important changes had been made in the organization of the air forces in the Mediterranean. In order to supplement and strengthen the heavy bomber effort from England the Fifteenth Air Force had been created as of 1 November 1943. The creation of the Fifteenth as a Strategic Air Force meant that henceforth the Twelfth would in effect be a tactical air force, and the heavy bombers of the Twelfth served as a nucleus from which the Fifteenth was built. The Fifteenth was to be employed primarily against targets as directed by CCS, but in the event of a tactical emergency the theater commander was authorized to use any part of the Fifteenth for purposes other than its primary mission. On 10th December 1943, Mediterranean Air Command was consolidated with NAAF headquarters to form the Mediterranean Allied Air Forces. Under the new arrangement NAAF would direct operations through a single combined operational staff to assure real unity in planning and execution by the AAF and RAF elements.

The Allied bombing program for SHINGLE fell into three phases. During the preparatory phase (1 to 14 January), railway communications in central Italy were to be disrupted in order to limit the enemy's supply and reinforcement of the forward areas. Operations in support of a cover plan were to be
carried out also. These were to consist of attacks on northern Italian
targets to simulate a landing against a point north of Rome. During the
second phase (15 to 21 January), an all-out effort was to be made to isolate
the battlefield. In the third phase, which extended from D-day onward,
isolation of the battlefield was to be continued and close support was to be
furnished the ground troops.

The bombing in preparation for SHINGLE was inaugurated on 2 January with
a series of attacks that had as their primary aim the furtherance of the
cover plan. Seventy B-26's attacked railways and bridges east of Nice, while
fifty B-17's bombed transportation targets in the Turin area. A-36's of the
12th Air Support Command raked over the docks at Civitavecchia. In addition
to the air force activity, landing craft and troops were rather ostentatiously
gathered in the Sardinia and Corsica areas to foster the belief that an Allied
landing was imminent north of Rome, with Civitavecchia as the most likely
point of attack. During the next ten days of the first phase medium bombers
of the Tactical Bomber Force concentrated on the central Italian railway system.
Attacks against enemy airfields were on a limited scale. Operations were
hampered by weather, but there was no need for an all-out blitz, for estimates
of the enemy's air strength credited him with only about 550 operational aircraft
scattered from southern France to Crete. Altogether NAAP flew nearly
13,000 sorties in the first phase of SHINGLE.

During the second phase, the mission of the air forces was to cut the
supply lines to the battle area in order to prevent counter attacks. To
achieve destruction in depth a detailed plan was worked out by the Tactical
and Strategic air forces. Bombers of Strategic were to begin with targets
far to the north, while Tactical would operate as far north as Florence. As
D-day approached, both would move south, with Strategic concentrating in the Florence, Pisa, Leghorn and Arezzo areas and Tactical working north of Rome as far as Perugia. To prevent repairs night bombers would be used. In accordance with this plan, B-17's of the Fifteenth Air Force flew around 600 sorties and medium bombers of the Tactical Air Force flew over 800 sorties against transportation targets in the period 16 to 22 January. As a rule, the B-25's, equipped with the Norden bomb sight, concentrated on railway bridges, while B-25's were briefed to attack choke points and marshalling yards.

A high degree of success attended the efforts to isolate the battlefield. It should be pointed out, however, that in an area as large as Italy and as well controlled by a strong enemy force it would be unreasonable to expect a permanent and total isolation by air power alone. But on each of the four first priority railway lines leading into the Anzio area there was at least one point of interdiction. The air planners had set up nine points of primary importance in the Italian transportation system—five bridges and four marshalling yards. By D-day the air forces knocked out four of the bridges, had made one of the marshalling yards unserviceable, and had damaged the others. The beaches around Anzio were not isolated in the same sense that an oasis in the middle of the Sahara desert is isolated, but they lay open to an invader provided he got there quickly and with sufficient strength.

The Assault Period, 22 January - 14 February

The assault convoys began their journey from Naples before dawn on 21 January. Fighter protection was the responsibility of the Coastal Air Force until the convoys reached Ponziante Island. From that point to the landing area the XII Air Support Command took over. The convoys proceeded entirely unmolested by the OAF. The pre-invasion attacks on the enemy's long-
range reconnaissance base at Anzio and the breakdown of the German radar system deprived the enemy of any fore-knowledge of the invasion.

Dismemberment began at 0200 on the 22d. British troops, comprising an infantry division and supporting artillery and tanks landed north of Anzio, and an American Corps consisting of infantry, Rangers, artillery, tanks and other units put ashore to the southeast of Anzio. Complete tactical surprise was achieved, and only token resistance was encountered for several hours. Thus favored, troops and supplies poured ashore and by nightfall the ports of Anzio and Nettuno were in Allied hands.

Before the end of D-day, however, the RAF did what it could to hinder unloading. Enemy fighters made a tardy appearance about mid-morning and carried out about 50 sorties before the end of the day. But the RAF fighter patrol scheme prevented the Luftwaffe from seriously interfering with the landings. Patrons over the beachhead and convoy area consisted of four Spitfires at 20,000 to 25,000 feet, twelve Spitfires at 16,000 to 18,000 feet (eight over the beachhead and four over the convoy area), and sixteen P-40's at 8,000 feet (half over the beachhead and half over the convoy area). Arrangements of enemy aircraft were given to the patrolling fighters from a control ship. Interception was then carried out visually. During D-day XII Air Support Command's fighters intercepted six enemy fighter-bomber missions and destroyed seven planes and damaged seven others for the loss of three fighters. RAF Spitfires provided spotting of gun fire for the Navy, and U.S. P-51's spotted for Army artillery. As men and supplies were being unloaded, Allied medium bombers and fighter-bombers attacked road junctions behind the beachhead, while the heavies attacked road and railways in the Florence and Rome areas and in the Liri Valley. These operations were intended to support not only
the amphibious assault but also the offensive on the main Fifth Army front. In all, more than 1,200 sorties were flown by MAF in support of D-day operations.

On D plus 1 and 2 the same scheme of defensive patrols was used as on D-day. The high degree of air superiority made it possible to evolve a pattern of operations that made the fighters a triple threat. Each patrol flew to the beachhead a few minutes before its patrolling period began and dropped bombs on suitable targets under cover of the patrol it was relieving. After completing their patrol assignment the fighters would strafe enemy vehicles or other targets, depending on their supply of ammunition.

With no formidable opposition either on the ground or in the air, Allied ground troops occupied a beachhead seven miles deep and 15 miles long within three days. From this position they might have driven inland and seized their objective, the high ground around Colli Lanziali, but things were not going well on the main Fifth Army front. In ten days of bloody battle the Fifth Army had not been able to break through the Gustav Line, and there was little hope of an early junction with the forces put ashore at Anzio. Furthermore, the enemy was now bringing reinforcements to bear against the beachhead. Had the Anzio forces pushed far inland they might have been cut off from supplies and equipment. It seemed better to consolidate positions within the beachhead. By 2 February the enemy's forces in the assault area probably exceeded 10 divisions. Against such a force the outnumbered troops in the beachhead were unable to take the offensive.

During the early days of Anzio the enemy air forces made fairly regular though not highly successful attacks against shipping and troops in the beachhead with 50 or 60 planes. Then suddenly on 29 January 110 enemy planes
attacked. This was the heaviest enemy air attack since the landings in Sicily in July 1943. It was made possible by the transfer of two JU 88 groups from Crete and Crete and by the return of a number of bombers that had been moved out of Italy in December and early January. Air reconnaissance revealed about 170 enemy fighters and perhaps 200 long-range bombers in northeast Italy, most of them located on fields in the Udine area.

MAAF accordingly planned a series of counter measures. On 30 January, the day after the big enemy raid, the Fifteenth Air Force carried out an attack that showed real ingenuity. A force of 200 B-17's and B-24's took off and flew at normal altitudes so as to be plotted by enemy radar. After the bombers had left, 60 P-47's went out over the Adriatic and flew very low so as to escape being plotted on the radar screens. When they overtook the bombers, they climbed high and headed for the target area. Arriving 15 minutes ahead of the bombers they caught the enemy's fighters in the act taking off and assembling for combat. Having flushed their game, the P-47's moved in for the kill. Thirty-six enemy fighters were shot down and six were probably destroyed in the air. The bombers then came and almost without opposition dropped 29,000 fragmentation bombs on the airfields. Photos taken during and after the attack indicated 77 aircraft destroyed or damaged on the ground. The enemy aircraft shot down by the bombers and escorting P-38's brought the total destruction to about 140 enemy planes. More aircraft were destroyed and further damages were done in a follow-up raid on 31 January. In addition to the heavy attacks in the Udine area, Strategic Air Force also struck at enemy airfields at Lavrino and Aviano in Italy and Klagenfurt in western Austria.

Following these counter air force operations the enemy's air activity was on a reduced scale although small numbers of his planes continued to strike at
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The report was received dated 12th January 1940. We are informed that the probable date of the
arrival of the British Expeditionary Force will be between January 20th and February 1st. The
arrival is expected to take place in the vicinity of Boulogne, where it will be debarked and
transported by rail to such points as will be designated. The force is expected to consist of
approximately 100,000 men, divided into three divisions.

The 1st Division will arrive on January 20th and will be stationed near Amiens. The 2nd
Division will arrive on January 21st and will be stationed near Arras. The 3rd Division will
arrive on January 22nd and will be stationed near Lille.

The 1st Division will be under the command of Major-General Sir John Liddell, the 2nd
Division will be under the command of Major-General Sir Henry Smith, and the 3rd Division
will be under the command of Major-General Sir Arthur Wilson.

The 1st Division will be equipped with the latest British military equipment, including
machine guns, rifles, and artillery. The 2nd Division will be equipped with older models, but
equally effective. The 3rd Division will be equipped with a combination of both. All divisions
will be trained in battle tactics and will be ready to engage the enemy at a moment's notice.

The arrival of the British Expeditionary Force will significantly strengthen the British
position on the Western Front. It will provide additional manpower and expertise to
counter the German advance. The British will also provide artillery and air support to
augment the French forces.

The French government is aware of the situation and has prepared defenses to meet the
challenge. The arrival of the British forces will be a key factor in the outcome of the
conflict. It is imperative that the French government maintain close coordination with the
British to ensure a successful joint operation.

This information is CONFIDENTIAL and should not be shared with unauthorized personnel.

[End of report]
attack assembly areas, troop concentrations, and tanks. Heavy bombers, as
in the critical days at Salerno, were employed in all-out direct support. They
directed their efforts at the communications lines feeding the Rome area.

General Clark, who was highly critical of certain phases of air operations in
the Mediterranean, said that "reports from the beachhead showed that the men
had been vastly encouraged by ... that concentration of close support." At the
end of the first day the enemy had made only slight gains.

The Germans made a night attack on the 16th and then on the 17th unleashed
the full fury of their assault. By mid-morning the Allied troops were fighting
desperately to hold the last line, the original 9-day beachhead about seven
miles from the water. Commanders went among the front-line troops exhorting
them not to give an inch. Coming to the aid of the hard-pressed infantry the
air forces rained death and destruction on the enemy. Over 800 aircrafts of
all types dropped almost 1,000 tons of bombs on front line positions. This
represented the greatest concentration of air power in direct support of a
ground action in a single day up to that time. The heavies concentrated on
road junctions; the light and medium bombers hit command posts, dumps, gun
emplacements and assembly areas. Fighters flew the usual beachhead patrols.

Interrogation of enemy prisoners revealed that the close support operations had
a very adverse effect on the morale of enemy troops who had been led to believe
that they enjoyed air superiority. During the night the Wellingsons kept up
the attack on enemy-held towns and roads radiating from the bridgehead.

Fighting continued desperately on 18 February. At several points a break-
through seemed imminent and in some cases there was hand to hand fighting.
The bitter struggle was fought out under an overcast sky that prevented a
repetition of air support on the scale of the previous day. Medium and heavy
bombers were prevented by weather from taking off, but light bombers and fighter-bombers flying 144 sorties gave effective support against enemy tanks and infantry. The full weight of the superior Allied artillery was brought to the aid of the infantry also. The heaviest onslaught came late in the day, but the best efforts of the enemy were not good enough. In the evening the fighting began to slacken.

During the temporary lull in the fighting, VI Corps troops reestablished a line of defense and restored communications between units. The enemy made one more strenuous effort on the 14th, but again the Allied line held. Bad weather again prevented the heavy bombers from making their presence felt in the beachhead, but nearly a hundred mediums dropped a heavy concentration of 20-15 fragmentation bombs on enemy troops and supply dumps. Light bombers and fighter-bombers maintained a continual attack against troops concentrations, tanks, vehicles, and strong points. By the evening of the 19th it had become apparent that VI Corps had broken the back of the attack Hitler ordered.

The attempt to crush the Anzio beachhead failed despite the fact that the German drive had started with many advantages in its favor. The Germans had nearly 10 divisions to the Allies' five; their troops were fresher and they held better positions. From the areas around the beachhead they were able to look down the throats of Allied troops and to subject them to merciless artillery fire. The congested beachhead presented an excellent target for enemy bombers. Yet with all these advantages the Germans could not win. The reasons were several: Allied superiority in artillery and supremacy in airpower, the inability of the enemy to employ his tanks in masses, the breakdown in enemy morale, and, most important of all, ground troops that refused to give up.

In the long run the Anzio operation paid off handsomely, but before results
could be achieved the force had to be built up to more than six divisions. In the short run no primary objectives were gained, and the Fifth Army was now faced with stalemate on two fronts instead of one. In addition to its commitment to a front extending from sea to sea across the Italian peninsula, HF was committed also to the defense of troops and supplies concentrated in a narrow, exposed beachhead.

In undertaking the Anzio landing with what was recognized as an inadequate force the Allied commanders relied heavily—too heavily—on air superiority to see them through. Apparently they did not comprehend—or chose to ignore—the limitations of air power. The fact that bad weather is capable of retarding or altogether stopping air operations was not taken into account sufficiently. Furthermore, air power was not always employed to its maximum advantage. General Arnold pointed out, for example, that the air forces did not always concentrate their available air power so as to hit selected areas with sustained mass attacks. Night operations, which are necessary for systematic and lasting isolation of the battlefield, should have been employed on a greater scale. This was one of the major lessons of Anzio. An effective isolation of the battle area cannot be achieved unless lines of communication and troops and supply movements are attacked around the clock. Also, any rupture in the enemy's defenses achieved by large scale air support must be followed up and exploited immediately by the ground forces. There is an old Army doctrine that a demolition to be effective must be defended. This would apply to demolitions by air forces as well as artillery.

On the positive side, it should be recognized that the landing at Anzio was possible only because the Allies possessed superiority in the air. The air forces made it possible for the Allies to land without serious interference.

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Chapter VI

THE CROSS-CHANNEL INVASION

Operation SHOVEL may be considered the last major commitment to the policy of encirclement. After the transfer of General Eisenhower to England and the establishment of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAPE) in January 1944, there could be no doubt that the American strategy of the approach direct held the upper hand: henceforth OVERLORD was to have unquestioned priority. Italy of course remained a heavy commitment and another large amphibious invasion was to be mounted from the Mediterranean. But the offensive to Rome and beyond was authorized mainly for the purpose of assuring the success of OVERLORD and the landing in Southern France was considered an important but subsidiary phase of the main landing in Normandy. With operation OVERLORD the Americans finally reached the strategic goal toward which they had been striving since the beginning of the war.

A necessary preliminary to the cross-channel invasion, as for all amphibious operations, was the establishment of air superiority. In a broad sense all the strategic bombing carried out by the RAF and AAF from bases in the United Kingdom may be considered as contributing to this end. Until 1944, however, the strategic bombing was carried out with the broad general objective of dislocating the German industrial system. It was not until 13 February 1944 that the CCS issued a directive that shifted the emphasis to the more specific objective of destroying the German Air Force by all means available.

Meanwhile, in November 1943, the Fifteenth Air Force had been created to carry out strategic bombardment from bases in Italy. To coordinate the operations of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces the U.S. Strategic Air Force...
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In the event of an emergency, the site will be protected by armed forces and personnel. The site is located in a secluded area, and access is restricted to authorized personnel only. The site contains highly classified information, and any unauthorized person found on site will be arrested and prosecuted.

The site is equipped with state-of-the-art security systems, including surveillance cameras and a closed-circuit television network. Access to the site is controlled by a central security system, and all personnel must present identification and clearance to gain access.

In the event of a natural disaster, the site will be evacuated immediately. All personnel will be moved to a secure location, and the site will be dismantled and stored in a secure location.

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proper employment of strategic air forces in preparation for OVERLORD. There was general agreement that there would be a program of bombing transportation targets to prevent the moving of reinforcements into the battle area and to isolate the battlefield. The disagreement came over the method to be employed. The program laid down by AEF and advocated by Leigh-Mallory and Air Chief Marshal Tedder, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, called for a long term program of attrition by attacks on rail centers in French and Belgian towns which would destroy marshalling yards, stations, repair shops, locomotives, rolling stock, etc. This plan was opposed by General Spaatz, Commanding General, USSTAF, and Air Chief Marshal Harris, of RAF Bomber Command, who advocated interdiction, that is, line cutting, strafing, bridge breaking, and the destruction of a few focal points. Such a program could be carried out immediately before the invasion and in the meantime the heavy bombers could be profitably employed against other than transportation targets. On 5 March Spaatz submitted to General Eisenhower a plan calling for attacks against the enemy's oil and rubber industries. Spaatz felt that the bombing of these two vital industries would weaken the whole German economy and would so disrupt troop movements that the enemy might give up altogether. The battle of interdiction vs. attrition raged through most of March. The divided counsels did not run along national lines but criss-crossed between them.

Time was growing short and a decision had to be made. The matter was finally brought to a head at a conference presided over by General Eisenhower on 25 March. Arguments on all sides of the question were aired. General Eisenhower drove to the heart of the matter by pointing out that the first five or six weeks of OVERLORD would be the most critical. "The greatest contribution that the air forces could make," he said, "was that they should hinder enemy
COMMAND AND CONTROL, OPERATIONS OVERLORD

SUPREME COMMANDER

AIR C IN C
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY
AIR FORCE

COMMANDER
U.S. STRATEGIC AIR FORCE
COMMANDER
RAF BOMBER COMMAND

COMMANDER
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EXPEDITIONARY AIR FORCE

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AIR COVER IN
SHIPPING LANES

AIR COVER
FOR BEACHES

21ST ARMY GROUP
OPERATIONS

AIR REPRESENTATIVE

AIR SUPPORT
PARTIES

FIGHTERS
ANSWERING CALLS
FOR IMMEDIATE
SUPPORT

SOURCE: AIR OPERATIONS BRIEFS, TACTICAL NOTES
COMPILED BY THE ARMY AIR FORCES BOARD,
30 NOV 1944
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Security Information

For info. All intel. This document contains military

I need to know everything that's going on.

I am so sorry, but I need to know everything.

I will do anything to protect this country.

I understand that this is for my own protection.

I promise to keep this information secret.

I will never reveal this information to anyone.

I will not discuss this information with anyone.

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the Prime Minister and the British cabinet never approved the bombing of railway centers but they did cease active opposition.

On 14 April General Eisenhower took over command of the strategic air forces in support of OVERLORD. The directive he issued three days later called for the destruction and disruption of the enemy's rail communications, "particularly those affecting the enemy's movements toward the OVERLORD lodgment area."

Main Features of the OVERLORD Air Plan

While the oil-transportation controversy was raging, the air plans for OVERLORD were being prepared. The overall air plan issued 23 April called in general for the attainment and maintenance of an air situation in which the GAF would be incapable of interfering with the Allied landings. In accordance with the familiar pattern developed in the Mediterranean theater the plan made provision for a preliminary phase, a preparatory phase, and an assault phase.

In the first phase, which extended from D minus 50 to D minus 20, counter-air force operations and reconnaissance were to receive the main emphasis. In the second phase a bombing program was to be carried out with the following priorities: (1) the GAF, (2) strategic railway centers, (3) selected coastal batteries, and (4) airfields within 130 mile radius of Caen. During the assault phase the missions of the air forces would consist of protection for the convoys, dropping of paratroops, protection of the beaches and support of ground troops.

In the post-assault phase the main tasks of the air forces were to delay the movement of enemy reinforcements into the invasion area, to support the ground forces, and to provide air transport.

After they had been furnished the overall air plan the various components of AAF worked out the details of their individual missions. Some of the
heaviest responsibilities in OVERLORD fell upon the U.S. Ninth Air Force which published its plan on 26 April. Some idea of the size and complexity of the whole operation may be gained from the fact that the battle plan of the largest tactical air force ever to operate as a unit contained 1,300 pages of legal size paper and included over 120 maps and charts.

During the preliminary phase, IX Bomber Command would devote its attention to training and to attacking railway centers, rocket-bomb installations, airfields and coastal batteries. These tasks would be continued through the preparatory phase and the additional mission of neutralizing airfields within 130 miles of Caen and selected radar stations would also be assumed. The IX Fighter Command had the task of providing escort for bombers, performing reconnaissance, and carrying out offensive sweeps over France. Continuous day-light control over the convoys was to be provided by six groups of P-39's, two from the Ninth and four from the Eighth Air Force. During the assault phase five groups of P-47's would fly high cover over the beaches. Two P-38 groups and four P-47 groups would bomb enemy gun batteries beginning about D-hour. Five fighter groups would be held in readiness as a reserve fighting striking force.

The heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force and RAF Bomber Command had important assignments in the plans for OVERLORD. After long debate it had been decided that the heavies could best contribute to the success of OVERLORD by extensive railroad bombardment program. RAF Bomber Command assumed a large share of the transportation campaign. Beginning D minus 4 the Eighth Air Force was to continue attacks against transportation and airfield targets in northern France and was to institute a series of blows against coastal defenses, concentrating on those in the Pas de Calais, in furtherance of the Cover plan.

..
to saturate landings in that area. Conservation of bomber strength for D-day was to be effected by the employment of only 50 per cent of the available strength each day.

A highly controversial feature of the OVERLAND air plans called for saturation bombing of the landing beaches. The air commanders doubted the efficacy of such an attack against casemated enemy batteries, strong points, and beach obstacles. The ground commanders, however, maintained that such an attack would have an adverse effect on enemy morale and would prevent the crews from manning their guns. Faced with these arguments the air forces agreed to carry out the attack. To avoid deep craters that would hinder the movement of troops and vehicles on the beaches demolition and fragmentation bombs were to be used except for strong points and areas where craters would not impede the movement of ground forces. To provide a comfortable margin of safety for ground troops, final plans provided that bombings cease five minutes before touchdown if visual conditions prevailed, and 10 minutes if skies were overcast. This would allow a safety zone of about 1,000 yards.

In addition to its beach saturation mission on D-day, the heavy bombers of the Eighth were to carry out three other missions directed at the severance of communications lines between the beachhead defenders and reserve elements with targets consisting largely of road chokepoints around Caen and several small Normandy towns. Leigh-Mallory ordered these missions to hinder German military movements toward the invasion area. Spaatz criticized the plan for D-day employment of the heavies on the ground that it was too inflexible. It absorbed all resources available and left nothing to provide for changing battle conditions. The bombing of French towns Spaatz criticized as being not only inhuman but unlikely to have any appreciable effect on the battle.
Allorey, threatening to resign as air commander in chief of OVERLORD, had his way; Generals Spaatz and Doolittle, however, were allowed to drop leaflets on all French towns near the coast warning them of impending bombings.

Prior to D-day aircraft of the VIII Fighter Command were to engage in normal escort operations. On D-day four P-38 groups were to fly high cover with the Ninth Air Force. P-47's and F-51's were assigned missions in support of bomber operations consisting of constant air patrols to the front and flanks of the beachhead area. Strafing missions were assigned on completion of patrols. Target priorities for these strafing missions were rail transportation, road transportation, ammunition dumps, troop concentrations, and airfields. Another D-day commitment of the VIII Fighter Command was to protect RAF bombers and IX Troop Carrier Command transports withdrawing from France.

All invasion plans rested on the assumption that the Allies enjoyed overwhelming air superiority. Although pre-invasion estimates underrated the Nazi air strength, this assumption was fundamentally sound. On the eve of the invasion the combined strength AAF and RAF in the United Kingdom was over 10,000 combat aircraft, exclusive of transport and troop carrier planes. Roughly, the breakdown was as follows: 3,500 heavy bombers, 1,500 medium, light, and torpedo bombers, and 5,000 fighters. Records discovered after the invasion indicated that the Germans had over 3,000 fighters and bombers available for combat.

Allied air forces allotted for direct participation in OVERLORD were under the operational command of the Air Commander-in-Chief, AEA, who coordinated strategic and tactical operations under the general direction of the Supreme Allied Commander. Control of the tactical air forces was exercised by Commander Advanced Allied Expeditionary Air Force through the Combined Operations Room and the Combined Control Center, located at Uxbridge, England. The Combined
Control Center controlled all fighter operations and issued instructions for fighter and bomber operations as directed by the Combined Operations Room. Advanced RAF dealt directly with the overall ground commander, Field Marshal Montgomery, whose 21st Army Group established at Uxbridge an element to relay ground force requests and to provide information helpful in the development of effective air-ground coordination.

Fighter cover in shipping lanes was controlled by three fighter direction tenders under the orders of the Combined Control Center. One tender operated in shipping lanes in conjunction with a shore station in England. The other two controlled beach air cover, one being in each task force area. This latter function passed to control centers on the continent once they were set up.

Air support parties were to land with each regimental combat team. By means of VHF and HF radio sets they transmitted their requests to Combined Control Center through the 21st Army Group Operations Room located at Uxbridge.

This system of control necessarily involved a highly complicated communications and signals set-up. The overall air plan provided for ship-to-shore, point to point, and ground to air signals. The derivative plans of lower headquarters contained signal annexes bulky with bewildering detail. An air representative was to be aboard each of the five headquarters ships scheduled to accompany the initial landing force to advise assault commanders and to direct Allied aircraft to targets in the Channel or on the beaches. Requests originating in the Task and Assault Force Flagships were given to the Air Representative embarked and were transmitted directly to Uxbridge; those originating in the Assault Force Flagships were monitored by the Task Force Flagship. All requests were filtered in the 21st Army Group Operations Room.
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The document contains a series of statements and instructions related to security and operational matters. It discusses the handling of sensitive information and the procedures to be followed in the event of certain scenarios. The text is technical in nature and pertains to security protocols and procedures.

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large numbers especially after the fighters began to drop belly tanks on
stalled trains and to set them afire by strafing.

In May also the air forces undertook what proved to be a brilliantly
successful campaign against bridges. In the beginning there was some doubt
concerning the feasibility of attacking bridges. These doubts were swept
aside by an experimental attack on 7 May. Using 1,000-lb. bombs eight P-47's
of the Ninth Air Force demolished a railway crossing over the Seine near Vernon.
An extensive interdiction program was then prepared which called for the cutting
of all bridges on the Seine to Monts and on the Loire to Blois and at critical
points in the so-called Paris-Orleans gap stretching between the two rivers.
Considerations of security made it necessary to reserve the Loire bridges
until D-Day. The bridges over the Seine led to the Pas-de-Calais as well as
Normandy.

The campaign against the Seine bridges opened on 26 May. It soon became
clear that in bridge breaking the B-26 was the choice weapon. The best com-
bination was something like this: B-26's dropping 2,000-lb. bombs, P-47's
diving with 500-lb. bombs, and Typhoons firing rocket projectiles. By
D-day a line of interdiction along the Seine had been effectively established.
To keep the bridges below Paris impassable Marauders, Thunderbolts, Lightnings,
and Typhoons bombed round-the-clock.

By D-Day the Allied air forces had dropped a total of 76,200 tons of bombs
on transportation targets: 71,000 on rail centers, 4,400 on bridges, and 800
on open lines. That the railway remained seriously interfered with the enemy's
ability to move in reinforcements there can be no doubt. Between 1 March and
6 June rail traffic declined 60 per cent. In the Region Nord, the area most
heavily bombed, three-fourths of the normal traffic was knocked off the rails.
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In general, those who had favored interdiction all glow ascribed the favorable results of the campaign to that form of bombing, while the advocates of attrition were certain that rail center attacks had accomplished the job. Interrogation of German commanders threw little light on the subject for they held opinions quite as varied as the Allied commanders. It is possible to maintain, of course, that since the object of the campaign was successfully achieved it makes no difference which method was the more effective. It should be borne in mind, however, that the Allies could afford the luxury of experimenting with both methods because they enjoyed overwhelming air superiority. In future operations such a wide margin of air strength may not be available and a choice of methods may have to be made. A careful weighing of the evidence seems to declare unequivocally in favor of interdiction for by that method more decisive results were achieved with greater economy of effort.

Neutralization of German Air Bases

The general weakening of German air power and the campaign to reduce the German fighter force had been carried out under the POINTBLANK and ARMENTN programs and had reached a climax early in the spring of 1944. The successful execution of these programs did not mean, of course, the total vanquishing of the GAP. A month or so before the invasion the Allies estimated that the Germans still had around 900 aircraft, including 450 bombers that might be used against the invaders. No target is more vulnerable to an air attack than a large amphibious force and even a depleted air force may be capable of inflicting heavy damage on such a target. Although the Germans had moved most of the aircraft from the 100 fields within a 350 mile radius of the landing beaches, these fields could be utilized on an emergency basis in an attempt to stop an amphibious assault. Furthermore, experience had shown that the
Germans would use their depleted air power in an entirely offensive role and their fighters were capable of operating from tattered fields and nearly-ruined
Force against vital German industries which prevented the Germans from shifting their airpower from the industrial heart of Germany to the invasion beaches.

**Attacks on Coastal Defenses**

One of the things that gave the Allied leaders most anxiety in the planning of OVERLORD was the much vaunted Atlantic Wall. As they were constructing the hideous maze of shore defenses the Germans developed the habit, as one writer has said, of "pouring a new rumor of immobility with each bucket of concrete." The Allied planners were not taken in by these rumors but the Atlantic Wall could not be discounted entirely and every precaution had to be taken to reduce its effectiveness.

Of particular concern to the Allies were the coastal batteries along the Atlantic Wall, each of which had two to six guns ranging in caliber from 105mm. to 406mm. The batteries were camouflaged, well-located, and encased, so it was believed, with steel and concrete. Nothing short of a direct hit could neutralize such a weapon. In view of these circumstances OVERLORD plans until April 1944 did not call for air force action until D-day at which time it was hoped that by bringing a continuous heavy volume of air and naval fire to bear the enemy defenses could be rendered ineffective during the critical stage of the assault. During the spring of 1944, however, both the Army and Navy began to bring pressure on the air forces to attempt to neutralize the coast batteries before D-day. The other services pointed out that bad weather might prevent or at least hinder the last minute saturation of gun positions. When, in April, it was discovered that 80% of the major coastal batteries in the invasion area had not been evacuated and their guns had not yet been fitted, the air forces agreed to try to knock them out.

In the counter-battery campaign, as in all other pre-invasion operations,
security was a major concern. In order not to show special interest in the
Normandy batteries, the targets outside the invasion area were chosen for every
one inside it.

The counter-battery campaign was opened on 13 April by medium bombers
(A-20's and B-26's) of the Ninth Air Force and Second Tactical Air Force.
During April the 8 uncompleted batteries inside plus 16 uncompleted ones out-
side the invasion area were attacked. In May the mediums were joined by the
heavies of TAF Bomber Command and the Eighth Air Force. Attacks were continued
with a crescendo up to D-day; on the day before the invasion 5,000 tons of bombs
and 495 sixty pound rocket projectiles were unloaded on coastal batteries in
the invasion area.

In addition to the pre-invasion bombing, the coastal batteries were sub-
jected to intense air and naval bombardment on and after D-day. It became
difficult therefore to separate for purposes of assessment the damage of pre-
invasion from the damage of the assault and follow-up periods. It appears,
however, that relatively few gun emplacements were destroyed by the pre-invasion
attacks. But not to be overlooked were the effects of unbalancing and dislocation
guns and the demoralization of crews. Here, as in all phases of the war, the
cumulative effects of air superiority must be kept in mind. The Atlantic Wall
was breached not only because of bombs aimed directly at it but also because
the fortification were far from complete on D-day. A shortage of materials,
due both to production and transportation difficulties, hampered all fortifi-
cation work. A shortage of cement, which began to appear during the winter,
was greatly aggravated by the transportation capability.

Another important pre-invasion task of the air forces was to neutralize
the very intricate and highly efficient system of enemy radar coverage. The
In the interest of national security, it is vital that the following information be kept confidential.

Information is highly sensitive and must be treated as such. Unauthorized disclosure could result in severe consequences for national security.

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commitments and with the exception of the famous low level attack on Fieschi in August 1943, were unable to launch an extensive campaign. It will be recalled that General Eisenhower’s decision on 25-26 March in favor of transportation did not entirely rule out an oil campaign, provided favorable opportunities presented themselves. A little imagination and latitudinarian interpretation of directives could easily provide such opportunities. General Eisenhower’s directive of 17 April to the Strategic Air Forces gave first priority to the destruction of the GAF. Did not the 8AF use oil products and would not attacks on oil targets force the GAF to come up and fight? General Spaatz contended all along they would. At any rate it was worth trying.

Besides the synthetic refineries presented a good target for they were grouped together in central Germany.

With General Eisenhower’s verbal consent the oil campaign was opened on 12 May when more than 300 heavies bombed synthetic oil plants at Wickau, Herzberg-Leuna, Brau, Hunsdorf and other cities. Severe damage was inflicted on the refineries and, as had been hoped, the GAF reacted vigorously. OVERLORD commitments prevented further attacks until 28 May when another series of attacks was made. Meanwhile the Fifteenth Air Force continued its efforts against the Fieschi refineries. These excursions deep into enemy territory discouraged the transfer of aircraft toward the invasion area and inflicted further attrition on the enemy air force. Entirely aside from its merits as a counter-air force measure, the oil campaign had immediate results on the fuel situation in Germany. Synthetic oil production for June was only half of the March output and by August all the German forces were hampered by shortages of fuel and lubricants. The pre-invasion oil attacks were only a beginning but they set in motion a campaign that, according to Reichsmiister Albert Speer, brought about the decision of the war.
Air Reconnaissance

An important task of the air forces in any amphibious invasion is to provide air reconnaissance. Probably in no operation in history did the air forces do a more thorough job in this respect than in OVERLORD. Air reconnaissance was of two types: tactical and photographic. The Ninth Air Force and Second Tactical Air Force carried out a broad pattern of tactical reconnaissance both as part of the deception plan and to gather information concerning troop movements, activity in repairing bridges and railroad tracks, and the like. A total of 400 visual reconnaissance sorties were flown by the Ninth Air Force between 15 May and D-day, in addition to 140 weather reconnaissance sorties.

Although they already had mosaics of the entire coast line of western Europe and photos of the Normandy and Pas-de-Calais beaches from 3,500 feet, the invasion planners required still more detailed information. Reconnaissance planes were therefore sent out to photograph the proposed assault beaches from various distances and at zero altitudes so that the unit commanders would know what their objectives looked like from several miles out, at 1500 yards, and from the shore line. The Ninth Air Force Photographic Group also made mosaics of the landing and drop zones for the IX Troop Carrier Command and the Airborne Division. A particularly hazardous mission was the photographing from low altitudes of the shallow water and beach obstacles so that the exact nature of such beach barriers might be known. The information thus obtained was of vital importance in showing the assault commanders which of the obstacles were wood, concrete, or steel, whether mines were attached, and where the belts were the thickest.

In all the preparatory air operations security had always to be provided
for. It is very remarkable that the transportation program, the bombing of air fields and beach defenses, and the pre-invasion reconnaissance operations were all carried out without indicating to the enemy the point of attack. The air forces had prepared the way and the assault forces were to achieve tactical surprise in the largest amphibious invasion in history.

Operations During the Assault Period

The original D-day was 5 June but owing to unfavorable weather it was postponed to 6 June. H-hour for the seaborne landings on the American beaches, UTAH and OMAHA, was 0600 while on the British beaches the time for touchdown varied from 0700 to 0730.

The first important D-day commitment of the air forces was in connection with the troop carrier operations. The 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions were dropped on the Cotentin Peninsula on the night of D minus 1. Reinforcements were flown in on D-day and on the morning of D plus 1. A second air force commitment involved the drenching of coastal batteries and shore defenses in the early morning preceding H-hour. The Eighth Air Force, which was to bomb targets chiefly on the OMAHA and British beaches and chokepoints in Caen, dispatched 1351 heavy bombers between 0155 and 0529 hours. Weather forecasts indicated that instrument bombing would have to be employed. A complicated pre-dawn assembly, which involved the forming of 225 flights of six aircraft each, was successfully executed by all flights except three which did not make contact with the E2X leader. On leaving the English coast the units adopted six-squadrons abreast formations. Of the 1,198 bombers dispatched against beach installations, 1,015 attacked the assigned targets. At Caen, 47 of the 163 aircraft dispatched carried out their attacks as planned. The principal reasons for failure of units to attack as planned were the inability
to locate F2X leaders, poor definition on the Pathfinder scope, and absence of assigned Pathfinder aircraft as in the case of the 3d Bomb Division units assigned to the Caen targets. On the whole the bombing runs were well executed and all attacks were well within the allotted period. A total of 2,944 tons of bombs were dropped with no interference from the GAF and with the loss of only one aircraft to enemy around defenses.

Medium bombers of IX Bomber Command, assigned targets in the UTAH area, took off between 0343 and 0500 hours. Flying in boxes of 18 planes, the 269 aircraft dropped about 550 tons. Owing to weather conditions the visual attacks on the seven defended localities in the UTAH area were made at unusual levels—between 3,500 and 7,000 feet. Fighter-bombers of the IX Fighter Command delivered their attacks between 0550 and 0638 hours. Coastal batteries at UTAH beach were hit by 33 aircraft dropping 47 tons while railway installations at Carentan were bombed by 129 planes dropping 83 tons.

Evaluation of the results of D-day bombing of coastal defenses was extremely difficult for several reasons. Because of cloud cover, strike photos were of limited value. Both naval and ground forces poured a tremendous amount of artillery fire into the assault on and after D-day. Later, cleaning-up operations further obscured the picture. Nevertheless, one or two generalizations can be made. In these pre-8 hour attacks the danger of shorts was great and in the interest of safety Pathfinder bombardiers were instructed to delay up to 30 seconds after the release point showed on their scopes before dropping. The safety precaution resulted in some cases in the main concentration of bombs falling too far inland. On UTAH beach only an estimated 43 per cent of the bombs fell within 300 feet of their targets. The beachlands from OMAHA east were left untouched. The heavy casualties suffered at OMAHA later caused severe criticism.
of the air forces but the necessity for taking precautions against short bombing is the obvious explanation. It is believed that no guns in emplacements were destroyed on D-day—a result predicted by air forces. The main contribution made by the last minute bombing of coastal defenses was the demoralization of enemy troops and the disruption of signal and transport communications, which hindered the deployment of immediate reserves.

While the early dawn attacks were being made the largest invasion fleet ever assembled—more than 4,000 ships, not counting small craft—was making its way to the assault beaches. Continuous cover was furnished exactly as planned. P-38's from the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces protected the troop-laden ships as they moved across the rough Channel. As the troops spilled ashore the RAF furnished low and the IX Fighter Command furnished high cover over the beaches. Enemy not a single enemy plane came within striking distance of the convoys. Three enemy planes (FW-190's) were sighted and driven off. In fact there was no enemy air action in the invasion area until nightfall when 22 enemy planes attacked shipping. This token effort caused no serious damage.

After the troops began pouring ashore, another task, direct support of the ground forces, was added to the duties of the air forces. As soon as the air support parties were functioning on the beaches requests began to be received at the combined control center at Uxbridge. Of thirteen requests received on D-day, five were refused because of unavailability of aircraft, weather, or the late hour but the remaining eight requests resulted in 11 missions. Three of these were armed reconnaissance along the roads leading from Caen to Carentan, St. Lö, and La Haye du Puits. Railway targets and a highway were bombed. An urgent request for divebombers on emplacements north of Isigny
resulted in claims of hits in the target area. Other batteries shelling the 
beaches from the vicinity were attacked. Scattered targets, including six 
gun positions, were reported hit between Isigny and Bayeux. A single day's 
experience with the control center at Troubridge showed that it was too compli-
cated and resulted in too long delays in fulfilling requests. The control plan 
was accordingly revised so that air alert squadrons were placed at the disposal 
of the air representative on board the Ancon, headquarters ship anchored off 
Omaha Beach. Targets were reported to the Senior Air Representative by the Air 
Support Party on shore, or determined by reconnaissance whose reports were 
intercepted by the Ancon.

Throughout the whole of D-Day both the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces were 
tactical and both joined in an all-out effort to get the ground troops ashore 
and keep them there. In addition to the airforce operations, convoy and beach 
patrol, last-minute softening-up operations, and direct support, the air forces 
continued and intensified the interdiction program. Heavies of the Eighth Air 
Force bombed chokepoints and bridges in the assault area while the mediums of 
the Ninth Air Force attacked coastal batteries on both flanks of the invasion 
area in addition to transomation targets. VIII Fighter Command executed its 
three missions, FULL HOUSE, STUD, and ROYAL FLUSH, substantially as planned. 
These operations were carried out in areas on the perimeter of the assault zone 
with the purpose of preventing or delaying enemy movements. Aside from weather 
flights, leaflet dropping, and reconnaissance, the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces 
dispatched 5,722 aircraft on D-Day. Considering the size and importance of 
the operation, losses were remarkably low—only 71 planes, mostly fighters, 
to air combat and flak.

D-day served to emphasize what was well known anyway—that the Luftwaffe
was a sadly depleted force. Though alerted to the Allied invasion, it could put up no more than 250 sorties and most of these planes were forced to jettison their bombs and fight before arrival in the battle area. Not a single daylight attack was made against Allied forces in the Channel or on the beaches. 44 

Close Support on the Beachheads

By the end of D-day the UTAH beachhead was reasonably secure. During its advance south to capture Carentan on the 12th and its push north to gain the ground on Quinerville ridge on the 14th, the VII Corps was supported by attacks on gun positions, roads, and near-by bridges. Heavy casualties were inflicted on fleeting targets and the commander of the German 77th Divisions was killed by rowing fighter-bombers while he struggled to direct the escape of his troops to the south. Attacks on road centers were devastating but of such little tactical importance that the enemy was led to wonder what their "deeper significance" might be. Considerable accuracy was achieved in attacks on defense installations but later examinations disclosed that not even 2,000 pound 45 bombs materially damaged heavy cement structures.

It was at OMAHA beach that air support was particularly important. In spite of strenuous efforts the V Corps had been able to penetrate only about a mile and a half by the end of D-day. To speed his advance Maj. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow called for continuous fighter-bomber support to search out and attack enemy artillery firing on the beaches. Maj. Gen. Elwood Quesada, Commanding General, IX Tactical Air Command, who was on the far shore, telephoned his group commanders to inform them of the urgency of the situation. Since the V Corps front was highly fluid, pinpoint attacks were not feasible. A bomb line was accordingly drawn on the Aure River and IX Tactical Air Command was directed to provide continuous armed reconnaissance of the area Aure River-Sayeux-Airel.
in squadron strength from 0500 until 2230 hours on 7 June. In the action which followed specific targets were generally selected by squadron leaders; in only two cases did the headquarters ship direct attacks on specific targets. Enemy batteries held a high priority but armor and trucks on roads as well as troop concentrations received attention. Close support was continued, weather permitting, and by 12 June the V Corps had driven inland 15 to 20 miles and had effected a junction with VII Corps. On the 13th, V Corps was ordered to limit its offensive action to aggressive patrolling while VII Corps continued its offensive.

Air support in the beachhead was greatly facilitated by the establishment of control facilities on the continent. Air support operations had originally been directed by the Ninth Air Force Advance Headquarters at Uxbridge, subject only to such modifications as might be effected by the controller on board the Ancon. On 10 June the 70th Fighter-Bomber Wing, based on the continent, took over the control functions hitherto performed on shipboard. Beginning 13 June IX Tactical Air Command Advance Headquarters assumed the major responsibility for the direction of air support from the continent. IX Tactical Air Command filtered ground requests for assistance, ordered missions as it saw fit, and transmitted to Uxbridge only such requests as it could not meet with its own resources. These developments were made possible by the efficient work of the Ninth Air Force signal units in establishing the necessary communications equipment on the continent.

Another development which greatly facilitated tactical operations was the construction of air fields in Normandy. As in the case of previous landings, aviation engineers had hit the beaches immediately behind the assault troops. One emergency landing field was ready by the end of D-day and other, more
extensive installations, followed rapidly. By 19 June fighter-bomber groups were operating from Normandy airfields. This made the application of air power more timely and economical and permitted more prompt dissemination of orders and information. A five-minute flight would now carry a plane from flight to target and aircraft could operate from continental bases when weather prevented operations from the continent.

The capture of Cherbourg was a vital part of the invasion plan, and it was to be effected with the least delay to provide the main port of supply for the invading forces. VII Corps planned a direct attack on the city from the south. On 21 June the battle for Cherbourg reached a critical stage and General Collins made a request for a vast air support project, the air pulverization of an area of some 20 miles. The air commanders entertained grave doubts concerning the effectiveness of such a program but agreed to carry it out when ground force commanders explained that the purpose was not so much the direct preparation for the ground advance as demoralization of the enemy troops and disruption of communications. A plan was accordingly worked out by AEF, Second Tactical Air Force, and Ninth Air Force Advance Headquarters whereby fighter-bombers and medium bombers were to neutralize the enemy defenses by bombing and strafing from H minus 2 to H-hour followed by pin-point bombing from H to H plus 1. A safety zone was established by withdrawing friendly troops 1,200 yards from the bomb line which was marked by white smoke laid on by artillery.

H-hour was 1400 hours, 22 June. Ten squadrons of fighter-bombers from Second Tactical Air Force attacked from 1200 to 1300 hours. Twelve groups of fighter-bombers from the Ninth Air Force attacked from 1302 to 1355 hours. Three groups of fighter-bombers and eight groups of mediums attacked from 1401.
to 1455 hours. In a total of 713 sorties 629 tons of general purpose bombs were dropped. On the following day 213 sorties were flown and 311 tons of general purpose and five tons of fragmentation bombs were dropped. Results, so far as immediate tactical developments were concerned, justified air force misgivings. Only a small fraction of the area drenched by bombs had been taken after two days of ground fighting. Poor results were obtained in the attacks against Fort du Hoc guarding the south approach to Cherbourg. Some of the outer walls and AA guns on top of the fort were destroyed but no damage was done to fixed gun positions. The ground forces generally agreed, however, that the main purposes of the saturation bombing before Cherbourg—disruption of enemy communications and morale—had been achieved. At any rate the air forces continued their close support and on 25 June units of VII Corps entered the city.

By 1 July American troops had cleared the Cotentin Peninsula and elsewhere the Allied beachheads had become a continuous strip of territory stretching along the Normandy coast to a firmly held position east of the River Orne. At one point, where the Allied spearhead had thrust out to Caumont, the beachhead was 20 miles deep. Besides Cherbourg and other towns in the Cotentin Peninsula, the Allies held Isigny, Carentan, and Bayeux. Caen was still in German hands. The first critical phase was now definitely over and the fighting assumed the nature of a conventional land campaign conducted on a wide front.

**Isolation of the Battlefield**

One of the most important contributions made by the air forces to the success of OVERLORD was the isolation of the battlefield. In the discussion above it was pointed out that the Allied plan for sealing off the battlefield called for the attack of all bridges, viaducts and other critical points up
the Seine to Saint-Lo, up the Maine to Lens, and in the Gap between the two rivers. Since the bridges over the Seine led to the Pas-de-Calais as well as Normandy they could be, and were, neutralized. By D-day all rail and highway bridges from the environs of Paris to the sea had been rendered impassable to rail traffic. Despite the fact that two bridges were re-established, no traffic crossed the Seine from the north into the tactical area during the entire campaign with the exception of one train which crossed the re-established bridge early in August.

Immediately after the landings, with security no longer a consideration, selected points on the Loire were subjected to systematic attack. The importance of the bridges to the Germans is indicated by the following extract from the telephone log of the German Seventh Army: "The Loire bridges must be protected under all circumstances, since these bridges are of vital importance..."

By 15 June over 2,650 tons of bombs had been dropped, almost entirely by heavies, causing the destruction of 8 of 10 bridges in the Loire section. Only 14 trains got across the Loire in the week ending 16 June. In the Gap Section between the Seine and the Loire 17 cuts were achieved. A total of 482 trains crossed the Gap during the first week in April whereas during the week ending 16 June only four trains crossed. No traffic whatever moved across the Gap during the following three weeks.

Other targets related to the objectives of interdiction were also attacked. Rail center attacks were continued. In fact targets within and without the interdiction line increased in number after D-day and attacks were scheduled daily on the basis of intelligence reports recording rail activity. A total of 50,000 tons was dropped from D-day through 20 August when the shift in the military situation eliminated the need for such attacks. Making allowance for
repair and recovery it was estimated the rail center bombings alone effected a 57 per cent reduction in German traffic. Rail cutting also received emphasis after the assault—cuts within the line of interdiction being designed to prevent movement inside the theater of operations, those beyond it to prevent movement into it. Despite the resourcefulness of the enemy in making repairs during bad flying weather, the cuts caused traffic jams which offered juicy targets to Allied planes, including armed reconnaissances. In addition to rail transportation, high bridges, troop concentrations, motor columns, and traffic centers were also attacked as part of the interdiction program. Ravensous fighter-bombers would even hunt down individual vehicles. German staff cars resorted to the use of spotters fore and aft, to give warnings of the approach of Allied planes. All parts of the interdiction program were interwoven and its effects were widespread and pervasive.

Did the interdiction program achieve its tactical object which was to prevent the enemy from rushing supplies and reinforcements into the battle area? The evidence on this point is extensive and overwhelming and can only be summarized very briefly here. The war diary of the German Seventh Army recorded on 2-day that the deep and rapid penetrations could be ascribed to the "great superiority in the air and on the sea." On the 11th the diary recorded that "troop movements and all supply traffic by rail to the army and within the army sector must be considered as completely cut off." Similar statements are found throughout the battle of the beachhead. On 8 July Field Marcial Rormel stated that "the losses through hostile artillery and air attacks are such that, even on comparatively quiet days, our combat strength and our already diminished transport capacity decreased farther. The superiority of the German infantryman will never come into play so long as the enemy air power
a constant flow of personnel, munitions and supplies into the beachhead. Ground forces were able to dispense with the time and labor-consuming camouflage procedures. Of major importance was the fact that the morale of Allied troops was never jeopardized by the nerve-shattering ordeal of large scale air attacks. The reduced scale of air opposition also made it possible for the tactical air forces to devote the major portion of their effort to offensive operations.

Prior to the invasion of the continent there were considerable doubts in the minds of some that the second phase of air force doctrine, the isolation of the battlefield, could be accomplished on a large scale. The experience in Italy, particularly, led many to question the soundness, or feasibility, of this doctrine. OperaFROD dispelled all doubts on this score and the evidence is overwhelming that this phase of operations was outstandingly successful.

In the third phase of operations, direct cooperation with the ground forces, all the weight of the vast air power that had been built up in the United Kingdom was brought directly to bear to insure the success of this operation.
Chapter VII
JOHN W. TOLLER; F. FREEMAN

The ambitious landings in Southern France on 15 August 1944 were the last in a long series of such operations in the Mediterranean. No basic changes in the employment of air power were introduced but refinements in technique were made and the many lessons learned in the Mediterranean and European theaters were applied to make this the most nearly perfect amphibious operation from the point of view of both planning and execution. In the account that follows no attempt is made at an exhaustive history of the operation. The aim rather is a brief analysis to show the essential features of amphibious operations as they were developed in the European-Mediterranean theater.

From the beginning, ANVIL (after August 1944, OVERLORD) was thought of as an operation to insure the success of OVERLORD. The directive issued to General Eisenhower in December 1943 stated that both operations would be carried out in May 1944. In February 1944, however, the CCS decided that the invasions could not be mounted simultaneously. There were a number of reasons for postponing ANVIL: the Allies had been unable to break the Italian stalemate during January and February; the Anzio landing, temporarily at least, had made matters worse instead of better; and there was the eternal shortage of landing craft. During the next few months there was a period of doubt and indecision during which the operation on a minuscule scale. In general it can be said that the Americans favored the operation. Basing their reasoning almost exclusively on military considerations, they felt firmly that ANVIL was the quickest way to insure the success of OVERLORD and to end the war. The
British, ever conscious of political considerations, had in mind post-
war events when they advocated an advance into the Balkans. During
the first six months of 1944 the matter was argued back and forth be-
tween the American and British Chiefs of Staff and when they found it impossible to
agree they tossed the question into the laps of the President and the Prime
Minister. The President backed up General Eisenhower who strongly favored
the operation and on 1 July the Prime Minister reluctantly gave his consent.
On 2 July the C S directed General Sir Henry "Wit" Milson, Supreme Allied
Commander Mediterranean (SACOM) to make every effort to meet a target date of
15 August. Thus the final decision on SNAIL came only one and a half months
before it was to be launched.

Fortunately, however, planning was already well advanced. In fact, a
rough outline plan had been issued by AEF on 25 June. The larger purposes
of the operation were to assist the Normandy attack by engaging German forces
that might otherwise be used in Northern France; to capture a major port
through which large-scale reinforcements could flow; to liberate France; and
to join up with the cross-channel invasion forces for a decisive battle with
the German armies of the West. The Seventh Army, which had made the assault
on Sicily, was made responsible for carrying out these tasks. The operation
was to be carried out in accordance with the principles of joint command. The
Army, Navy, and Air Forces were co-equal and operated under the direction of
the Theater Commander. The Naval Task Force Commander was to assume command
of the entire seaborne expedition from the time of sailing until the ground
force was firmly established ashore. The Ground Force Commander was to have
command of all ground forces participating in the operation while the Air
Corpsman in Chief was to serve as Air Task Force Commander whose responsibility
would be to provide full air support for the operation. The commanders of the forces involved were Col. Gen. Alexander M. Patch for the ground forces; Vice Admiral Henry K. Hewitt for the naval task force, and Airig. Gen. Jordan 2 P. Saville in charge of the air task force.

The Army Invasion Plan provided for a triple daylight assault by the 33, 36th, and 45th Infantry Divisions (reinforced) of VII Corps, supported by the 1st French Armored Division (Combat Command). The landings were to commence at 0600 hours on 15 August on beaches between San Cipriano and Arby. The area chosen for the landings could be covered by fighters based on Corsica, it afforded good beaches, proper exits, and terrain suitable for the construction of fighter strips. The landings were to be preceded by an airborne landing the object of which was to prevent the movement of enemy troops from the Ley sector into the assault area. 3

The Western Naval Task Force, consisting of over 200 ships and craft and over 1,200 ship borne landing craft, would carry the Seventh Army to the beaches, contribute to the silencing of the shore batteries and exploit port facilities to ensure troop maintenance. The Army's Aircraft Carrier Force, which had over 200 Seafires, Wildcats, and Hellcats, was to cooperate with the land-based aviation by providing fighter protection, scouts, and close support missions. While in the assault area the carrier-based planes would operate under control of VII Tactical Air Command. 4

In accordance with a pattern that had long since become standard, 5 AAF's Outline Air Plan issued 12 July outlined the basic tactics as neutralizing the enemy air forces, protection of convoys and beaches, interdiction of enemy movement into the battle area, and close support of the ground forces. To these familiar tasks another was added, cooperation with the navy. The various air forces under AAF had their specific tasks. AASAF was concerned
with a pre-invasion bombing program to be carried out in four phases.

Responsibility for the provision of air protection to shipping and beaches was divided between "ACEF and XII Tactical Air Command. Coastal was to provide protection, day and night, for all assault and follow-up convoys to a point within 40 miles of the coast of southern France; XII TAC would take over north of that line. ACEF was also charged with the protection of embarkation ports, intruder missions, shipping reconnaissance east and west of Toulon, shipyard strikes at Navy request, and defense of territory in the rear of the battle area.

Obviously the major burden for the invasion would fall upon the Tactical Air Force. Maj. Gen. John H. Cannon, besides planning for the assault operations, had to reorganize his entire air force and occupy new bases. General Cannon decided to leave the Desert Air Force to cooperate with the armies in Italy and to move XII TAC, an outfit consisting chiefly of fighters and fighter-bombers, to Corsica. Two medium bomber wings were to be held in readiness to assist either Desert Air Force or XII TAC as circumstances might require. XII TAC was to be responsible for day and night cover for the convoys and assault beaches, for air-sea rescue in the assault area, and for support of strategic Air Force between 0550 and 0730 hours on D-day, with attacks at maximum strength on active gun positions.

Plans for control of aircraft conformed in general to methods followed in the invasions of Sicily and Italy. Provision was made for a Headquarters Ship and Stand-by, for a Fighter-Director Ship and three Stand-bys, for an Air Sea Rescue Ship, and for floating GCI stations. The most significant improvement in control techniques was the employment of a separate Fighter Direction Ship to control defensive operations, instead of using the Headquarters Ship for this purpose. The need for a fighter direction ship was one of the major lessons learned at Anzio.
As in the case of the cross-channel invasion, elaborate measures were taken to achieve tactical surprise. Since it was manifestly impossible to conceal the build-up of forces and equipment, the objective was to mislead the Germans as to the point of attack. An effort was made to explain away the preparations by suggesting an amphibious attack on the Genoa area to out-flank the Pisa-Rimini line. In addition to planting the tale in enemy hands, the plan of deception called for considerable air effort in the Genoa area to lend verisimilitude to the fake landings.

Another pre-invasion task for NAF was to build up primitive, malaria-infested Corsica into a satisfactory springboard for air participation in the landings. Medical officers, engineers, and supply and supply troops performed this feat. By D-day VII TAC, under Brig. Gen. Gordon A. Seville, was effectively installed on 14 Corsican airfields with all the supplies needed to maintain about 40 U.S., British, and French squadrons, plus some 6 squadrons on loan from Strategic Air Force.

Pre-Invasion Operations

"TM's Bombing Plan, issued on 4 August, called for a program divided into four phases. In the first phase, covering the period to 9 August, counter air force operations, interdiction of communications, and attacks on subterranean bases were to be emphasized. The preliminary phase may be said to have begun on 20 April when a heavy daylight attack was made on the port of Toulon. In the period to 10 August NAF flew more than 6,000 sorties and dropped 12,500 tons of bombs on southern France. These attacks included normal antisubmarine operations, interdiction of supply lines into Italy, and the smashing of French marshalling yards. About one fourth of the effort was directly connected with the forthcoming landings; the remainder may be considered
as indirect support and assistance to the Normandy invasion.

So sadly depleted was the RAF that only a small amount of effort needed to be expended against airfields in the pre-invasion period. Beginning late in July and continuing through 10 August fighters and fighter-bombers hit airfields intermittently in the Po Valley and in southern France. But there was only one major attack during this period: on 9 August nearly a hundred medium bombers bombed Bergamo-Brugine, the enemy's most important air installation in northern Italy. Of the 12,500 tons dropped during the period 29 April through 10 August, only 972 tons fell on airfields and landing grounds. In like manner the submarine problem was so well in hand that an intensive campaign was unnecessary. Only a heavy attack, on 6 August, was made on the Toulon bases.

By far the heaviest proportion of the preliminary effort was against lines of communication in southern France. The results achieved were less effective. By 3-5, five of the six major railway bridges across the Rhone between Lyon and the coast were unserviceable. The Germans, by strenuous repair efforts were able to open restricted traffic over the sixth bridge at Avignon.

Beginning 10 August, D-minus 5, a second phase (Operation NEPTUNE) was inaugurated. The three tasks of phase I continued to be air force responsibilities but a new set of assignments as given priority. These called for the neutralization of the main coastal defense batteries in the assault area, neutralization of the main coastal radar stations, and concentrated bombing attacks aimed at lowering enemy morale. The air force commanders objected to the pre-7-day bombing of coastal battlites on the ground that such bombings, unless carried out all along the southern coast of France, would disclose the
place of attack. Also, such attacks would be made at the expense of the oil, communications, and counter-air operations. Army and navy commanders insisted, however, and the attack was carried out. To avoid blinding off the enemy as to the place of the amphibious assault, similar offensive action against identical targets in four coastal localities was to be taken as follows: Genoa area, assault area, Marseilles area, and 'ete area. By alternating and scattering the intense bombing effort among those four areas, it was hoped that the fiction of a landing near Genoa could be maintained. The scale of effort needed to neutralize each of the small targets was carefully studied and assignments were made accordingly.

Although weather interfered with the execution of 'NEBYO, virtually the entire program was completed by D-ey. Nearly 5,500 sorties were flown and 6,700 tons of bombs were dropped. Great damage was inflicted on enemy defenses and, as was intended, the enemy was confounded as to where the amphibious assault would come. But the enemy air remained weak is evident from the fact that during this period only five hostile aircraft were claimed as shot down or damaged.

The third phase of the bombing program was to last only about four and one half hours. Operation 'ORNQ was to begin at 0300 on 15 August and to last till 1-hour. This phase was designed to cause maximum destruction to enemy beach defenses. Its specific targets included any enemy artillery that could be brought to bear on shipping in the assault area, enemy guns, and other military installations which could bear directly on the ability of the ground troops to advance over the beaches. One half hour before the landings all bombings over the beaches were to cease. The bombing pattern extended to a depth of 400 yards inland and 75 yards to seaward. Twelve groups of escorted
heavies, two medium bomber wings, and the full striking power of XII MAC were utilized. All aircraft were assigned rigid lanes of approach to the assault area. Bomb loading for beach attacks were fragmentation and demolition, instantaneously fused, and not exceeding 260 pounds. For gun positions large demolition bombs with short delay fusing were used.

Weather difficulties on D-Day prevented TORNADO being carried out exactly as planned. A large percentage of the heavy and medium sorties were non-effective because of overcast conditions. The assault against gun positions was only partly successful but the final bombardment of all beaches was highly satisfactory. Underwater obstacles and beach defenses were beaten down, defending troops were disorganized, and a number of coastal guns, previously missed, were covered. General Patch, who personally witnessed the bombing of one beach, said that it was the best he had ever seen. General Laker, who examined the beaches soon after the assault, thought the bombing remarkable in view of the fact that it was done largely by Pathfinder technique.

The fact that the last minute bombings met no opposition again showed the weakness of the Luftwaffe. Pre-invasion estimates placed enemy strength in south and southwest France, at about 220 aircraft. Against this small force XII AF had not fewer than 5,000 aircraft, with more at call. The discrepancy between the ground forces on the eve of D-Day was hardly less extreme. Only seven weak divisions comprising the German Nineteenth Army were deployed around the invasion area. Against this the U. S. Seventh Army could throw in a force of 10 crack U. S. and French Divisions plus an assortment of paratroop, Commandos, and Special Service forces. A very considerable German navy would face, if it dared, 450 British, U. S., French, and Italian warships, including five battleships and 10 aircraft carriers.
firing on patrol. The mediums concentrated on strong points and road bridges between Nice and Hyères. The heavies attacked coastal defenses and then joined the mediums and fighters in operations designed to isolate the battlefield.

The Allies hit with such overwhelming strength that southeastern France was quickly overrun. By the end of the first week Toulon was surrounded, Marseilles was almost surrounded, and armored forces were rushing rapidly northward toward Lyon. During this time the air forces continued to protect the convoys and beaches, to cooperate with the ground forces, and to attack enemy lines of communication.

An important improvement in the technique of control of aircraft in amphibious landings was introduced in PUGOOG: defensive control was handled from a separate fighter control ship built exclusively for that purpose. Fighter Direction Tender (FDT) No. 12, a converted LST with a mixture of U.S. and British equipment, was made responsible for the control of defensive patrols over the beaches and for broadcasting warnings to the fleet and installations ashore. Daytime control was handled primarily by 64th Fighter Wing personnel. After D-Day fewer than 30 fighter aircraft on an average were kept over the assault area for the protection of the fleet and the beaches. This is in contrast to the 60 or 80 aircraft which were used to protect the landings at Salerno, an operation covering a smaller area. Night fighter activity was handled by British personnel, with one U.S. controller on duty to handle all other matters. There were four to six night fighters on patrol, and some of them were handed over to the various SCI stations whenever conditions permitted. An army antiaircraft liaison officer on FDT 413 maintained radio communication with his batteries ashore. Information on hostile raids and
friendly flights was passed by him to his shore batteries, which in turn
erave him any information they had. In a few cases where friendly night
fighters entered the Inner Artillery zone, they were fired upon. Except
at dusk, when identification was difficult, the control of antiaircraft fire
was good, and no friendly aircraft was shot down.

Offensive air warfare was scheduled and controlled from the USS Catoctin,
Amphibious Force flagship for the operation. The communications and air
control equipment on board this ship were enlarged into a Joint Operations
Room (JOR). Here the air and naval officers carried out their various functions
including: control of tactical reconnaissance and fighter-bomber missions;
furnishing information on movements and status of aircraft; air raid warning
and alerting the fleet; and stand-by for air drop direction. Fighter-bomber
missions were flown by F-47's and P-38's based on Corsica and by carrier-based
Hellcats and Wildcats. The 24 AB Combat Control Squadron (Amphibious), ac-
tivated as an amphibious fighter control squadron to serve aboard he amphibious
ships, handled air control for the Air Task Force commander. The fighter-
bombers reported in to the Catoctin giving names and attack mission numbers,
which were placed on the Fighter-Bomber Status Board. They were then told
to attack either their ordinary or their alternate targets, or to proceed on a
special mission. This system was necessary because the speed of the advance
sometimes placed the briefed targets inside the bomb line. On other occasions,
a special mission was given priority over regular missions because of particular
needs of the ground forces. The special missions were usually against enemy
transportation and were targets called in by Tactical Reconnaissance planes
or received by JOR via from the ground forces or other sources. Locations
of targets, which were released to airborne planes in the clear, were given
In short, the old industry must be preserved. If the new industry is to be brought in, then we must have the old one in full swing. If the new industry is to be the dominant one, then we must have the old one in full swing.

The old industry can be preserved by bringing back the old workers and by training the new ones. In this way, the new industry can be brought in and the old one can be preserved.

In conclusion, the old industry must be preserved. If the new industry is to be brought in, then we must have the old one in full swing. If the new industry is to be the dominant one, then we must have the old one in full swing.
which was much greater than the population of the cities, and therefore, the

society was in a state of war and armed conflict for the

next 100 years. During this period, there was a great increase in the number of

people who desired to live in the city and to protect their homes.

The residents of the city were divided into two main groups:

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2. Those who wished to leave the city and to seek a new life in the
The history of the Pacific war in the first six months after Pearl Harbor was a gloomy story of defeat and retreat. Japanese aggression reached full tide in the spring of 1942, and then there came the naval engagements at Coral Sea and Midway that marked a turning of the tide. The battle of Coral Sea occurred in the South Pacific early in May when a U.S. carrier task force met a Japanese carrier task force that was covering an enemy invasion fleet headed for Port Moresby. Although the enemy inflicted greater losses than he sustained, the principal purpose of his operation, the capture of Port Moresby, was thwarted by the American fleet.

Undeterred by this initial set-back, the enemy went ahead with other aspects of his plan, which included the taking over of the western Aleutians and the seizure of Midway Islands. The diversionary thrust at the Aleutians was checked and the main stab at Midway was parried by a decisive carrier victory at Midway in June 1942. At both Coral Sea and Midway, surface forces avoided contact and the outcome was decided entirely by air action. Japanese aggression having gone as far as it could, the stage was now set for an American offensive.

Responsibility for beginning the offensive in the Southeastern Solomons rested primarily with the Navy. Although the "beat Hitler first" strategy prevented an all-out effort in the Pacific until Germany was defeated, it did not preclude raids, attrition tactics by air forces and submarines, and limited, fixed offensives when opportunity offered. The question of what offensive should be undertaken and where was complicated by the fact that there was never a single commander for the Pacific. In April 1942 the Pacific had
Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, who as early as February 1942 had advocated a step by step advance through the New Hebrides, Solomons, and Bismarks, presented the Navy's views to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In view of the victories at Coral Sea and Midway General Marshall favored an offensive, but since Tulagi fell within CFA he felt that the operation should be carried out under command of General MacArthur. Admiral King on the other hand felt that the Navy should be in command and he presented formidable arguments to support his position: the only amphibiously trained troops available were Marines and the only troop lifts were Navy transports. The decision was in the nature of a compromise: the JCS agreed that the initial offensive would be under command of the Navy but all subsequent moves to Rabaul would be commanded by MacArthur. On 2 July 1942 the JCS issued a directive to the commanders in the Pacific outlining a three-fold plan whose ultimate objective was "the seizure and occupation of the New Britain, New Ireland and New Guinea areas." This was to be carried out by the performance of three tasks: Task 1, the occupation of the lower Solomons, was to be carried out by the South Pacific forces with the assistance of the Southwest Pacific forces; Task 2, the occupation of the upper Solomons and New Guinea, and Task 3, the reconquest of New Britain, were to be carried out by the responsibility of General MacArthur.

Guadalcanal

Acting under the terms of the JCS Directive of 2 July, Admiral Halsey ordered Commander South Pacific Force (COMSPAC), Vice Admiral Robert Ghormley, to seize Tulagi and Guadalcanal. The operation was given additional urgency by the discovery on 4 July that the Japanese had landed troops and laborers on Guadalcanal and had begun construction of an air field. If the enemy were
allowed to develop this base be held by an alliance of the United States
of America and Australia.

Throughout the Solomons campaign the U.S. units in the South Pacific
were under the operational control of the navy. During the Guadalcanal
operation the G-30/PM exercised this control through his air officer, Rear
Adm. John C. Stoll, Commander Airsea & South Pacific Force (G-30/PM-SPAC).
In matters relating to administration and supply the land-based air force
was under the U.S. Army Air Force in the South Pacific Area
(G-30/PM-SPAC). In operating under the Navy one of the chief concerns of the
air forces was to preserve the organizational integrity of the air force units
and to see that they wereclothed according to their capabilities. It was
therefore agreed that Admiral Solari would issue directions as to the types of
operations as expected from the various air components of his command, but
Gen. William B. Momy, G-30/PM-SPAC, would assume responsibility for training
they air units for these operations.

Although the Navy and Marines took the lion's share of responsibility
for basing, the "A" units had a part to play. On 20 July the 11th
Tientsen's Group (II) was designated as the "A" Force, Central Pacific, and
within a few days was on its way from Hawaii to the South Pacific. Plans
for the participation of land-based aviation called for sorties northwest of
Hon Garube by the 19 -25's of the 69th Bombardment Squadron and daily
searches of the southern Solomons and their western waters by the 27 7-17's of
the 11th Force. In addition, carrier force were to reconnoiter the western and northern
coasts of the Solomons and to bomb Rabaul. The whole operation was
named in such haste and was planned with such an insufficiency of troops,
supplies, and materials that its planners referred to it as "Operation Shoe-

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striker." In the light of that later happened, however, it is interesting to note that Admiral Ghormley and General Wheeler were perturbed that the main need was for additional land-based air. The two commanders joined in a request for a reinforcement of 6-day but 703 refused.

Beginning in July the 11th Commandant Group flew search and reconnaissaine missions over the Guadalcanal-Solomons area from 41st, a distance of 720 nautical miles. In preparation for the landings the 11th Group was designated a task force and was directed to strike the landing area with maximum strength from 31 July through 6 August. During this period the group flew 56 bombing sorties and 22 reconnaissance missions. On 7-8 August, under cover of carrier-based planes, the reinforced First Marine Division was put ashore. The landings at Guadalcanal and Tulagi were accomplished with little opposition at the beaches, but at the small island of Gavutu there was fierce fighting for a couple of days.

The contribution of land-based aviation to the first amphibious landing of World War II is somewhat difficult to assess. The commanding officer of the 11th Commandant Group was inclined to attribute the relative ease of the landings at Guadalcanal and Tulagi to the preparatory bombing and to explain the difficulties encountered at Gavutu to the absence of air preparation in that area. Probably the connection was more apparent than real. The preparatory bombing by the bombers was too light and sporadic to have affected the situation materially. After the troops went ashore they found that the runway on Guadalcanal was not badly damaged and there were large stores of supplies in the vicinity left unharmed by the air attacks. The minimal contribution of land-based aviation was the reconnaissance missions flown during the two month before the landing.
Although the air force role in Guadalcanal was a relatively minor one, the operation brought out several lessons that were of importance in future operations. In the first place, command relations were not satisfactory. Admiral Ghormley, who as CINCPAC, was in overall strategic command, chose to absent himself from the actual scene of hostilities and to delegate tactical command to Vice Admiral A. W. Fitch, who was Commander Expeditionary Force. As Commander of the Amphibious Force, General Turner was subordinate to Fletcher, but actually he had complete autonomy from the moment of landing. Maj. Gen. H. A. Vandegrift's Landing Force (First Marine Division Reinforced) was subordinate to Turner. In delegating his authority to Fletcher, Admiral Ghormley failed to make him responsible for all aspects of the operation. Failure to achieve unity of command at the implementing level brought the enterprise to the brink of disaster.

At the close of the second day of fighting (8 August) Admiral Fletcher, who commanded the carrier-based air forces, reported to Admiral Ghormley that his carrier strength had been reduced from 99 to 78 planes, that fuel for the carriers was running low, and because of the large number of new torpedoes and bombs in the vicinity, air support should be withdrawn. Withdrawal of the carrier force left the marines of the Amphibious Forces without air protection. Therefore on the morning of 9 August Admiral Turner informed General Vandegrift that he was withdrawing his force. This despite the fact that plans had been based on the assumption that the transports would remain off shore until D plus 4 (11 August) and that by the night of 9-10 August not more than half the supplies embarked by the First Division had been unloaded. The departure of the air support and amphibious forces left the Marines without air cover or naval support. The beachheads on Guadalcanal became virtually a besieged fortress.
It became apparent that additional airfields were necessary to support operations against New Georgia. Accordingly, the Russell Islands, 70 miles northwest of Guadalcanal, were occupied on 21 February. The landing was covered by fighters based on Guadalcanal but no opposition was encountered.

By the time of the Russell landings, the SCPOC had experienced considerable change in organization and personnel. On 20 September 1942 Admiral Nimitz had been succeeded by Rear Adm. Aubrey Fitch as CO, USATC/POC and on 16 October the colorful and aggressive Vice Adm. William F. Halsey had relieved Admiral Ghormley as CO, SCPOC. On 13 January 1943 General Harmon activated the Thirteenth Air Force and put Brig. Gen. Nathan F. Twining in command. Although the new air force possessed administrative autonomy, operational control remained as before with COUSATC.

In operations under Navy control General Harmon had insisted from the start that he retain direct responsibility for the control of all matters affecting administration, supply, movement, and training and that sound principles in the employment of air crews be observed. During the spring of 1943 he began to feel that these principles were not being adhered to by certain subordinate commanders and staff officers. The situation was brought to the attention of Admiral Halsey who directed General Harmon and Admiral Fitch to iron out their difficulties in a direct conference. Such a conference was held, and it was agreed that the highest degree of effectiveness would be achieved by vesting combat command of the various air forces in their respective services, that any disruption of normal command channels would be held to a minimum, and the air forces would be employed in roles for which they had been organized, trained, and equipped.

Meanwhile the Navy had attempted to get a clarification of joint command.
responsibilities on the JCS level. In September 1942 it had introduced a paper outlining its view to the Joint Planning Staff (JPS). But the Navy did not wish to bind itself to unity of command on the basis of a rigid rule. After sitting on the Joint proposal for some months the Navy finally agreed on 20 April. The principles embodied in the directive provided that in joint operations a single commander would be designated by JCS on the basis of the task to be performed. The joint force commander, who would not normally function in a dual capacity as commander of a component of his force, would be assisted by a joint staff. Participation by the joint commander in administrative matters would be held to a minimum and disciplinary matters would normally be handled through commanders of the services concerned. It was under these principles that the Thirteenth Air Force operated until it was relieved from the South Pacific command and assigned to the Far West Air Force on 15 June 1944.

After the Russell Islands the next step up the Solomons was Guadalcanal. Here the Japanese had constructed an airstrip which must be in Allied hands. Admiral Halsey did not deem the forces at his disposal sufficiently strong to justify a frontal assault, so it was decided that a Western Landing Force should capture Guadalcanal while an Eastern Landing Force would land at Vila Harbor, obtain victualling, and set up a supply point on southern New Georgia.

In preparation for the landings the Allied forces were to intensify their strikes against enemy bases on New Georgia and southern Bougainville. All forces were to destroy enemy shipping at every opportunity, and the photo-reconnaissance planes were directed to maintain a close watch on aircraft and shipping concentrations at Buna and around the southern end of Bougainville. The fighters were to provide cover for all forces in the Guadalcanal area, all
units in the New Georgia area, and shipping bound to and from these points.

General Stilwell, SWPA-1915C, planned to move from Cape Torube to Guadalcanal about five days before D-Day. He would retain direct responsibility for strategic operation of aircraft units on Guadalcanal, but for control in the forward area a new command was established from all elements

The New Georgia Force (CO: U.S. Army). This new forward unit was composed of a group of the 7th Brigade, 21st Marine Aircraft Wing. All aircraft assigned to this forward unit, including visibility of 10-30 miles could be used for take-off to this new establishment. Fighter control in the forward area would be exercised by the Fighter Director Group under CTF-16, Guadalcanal. Initially, Group No. 2 from the 7th Brigade would control from a destroyed unoccupied by Group No. 1, when it would then go ashore on Guadalcanal to establish itself as a standby fighter director group. The Santoa landings were to be coordinated with SFA, where further forces were to seize Trobriand and Norfolk on 16 June.

The landings on Guadalcanal, which began on 20 June, were covered by 22 Allied fighter aircraft at altitudes ranging from 1,000 to 20,000 feet. The enemy sent over three flights of from 30 to 50 missions on each of the following two days. The Allied patrol planes successfully fought off these attempts to disrupt the landings; only one ship was lost to enemy action. Embarked by excellent fighters over the ambitious forces also made their scheduled landings in the Aola Anchorage area, at Vina, and finally, after some delay, at the Anchorage. These flanking centers prepared the way for the main assault on Guadalcanal. On 3 July the leading elements of the 43d Infantry Division moved across the Blanche Channel to Aleana Island, approximately six miles east of Cape Torube, and stiff resistance the various forces converged...
Gentlemen:

I have been asked to provide confidential information regarding a recent incident involving the unauthorized access to classified data. The incident occurred last week, and I have been instructed to report it to you promptly.

The unauthorized access was detected through standard security protocols and was immediately addressed by our IT department. However, the individual responsible for the breach has not been identified yet.

I am attaching a copy of the incident report for your review. Please let me know if you have any questions or if there is anything else I can provide.

Sincerely,

[Your Name]
650 combat aircraft flown by a heterogeneous collection of squadrons drawn
from four different air services. Included were AF squadrons of bombers
and fighters, Marine TBF's, SBD's, F4F's, and F4U's, Navy Wildcats and Hell-
cats, F6F's, search planes of all types, and New Zealand P-40's and Hudsons.
As in the case of the advance on New Georgia, a new air echelon, Air Sea and
Northern Solomons (COMAIRSEASON) was created to control all aircraft entering
the Guadalcanal area. Control was to be exercised through two subordinate
Pilots command, one for New Georgia and another for Torokina.

A most important task of the Allied bombers was to beat down the enemy's
air forces. The protected landing area at Torokina was situated unreasonably
close to five enemy airstrips. The Bairoilieville field had been secured during
the New Hebrides Grouping, but in late October the air of attack was
stiffened up and continued through the critical phase of the battle. Although
the enemy failed desperately to restore damaged units to serviceability, he
was obliged under unwritten pressure to give way. Bombers met no interception
on the first air strikes in October and the final four - two, done dispensed with
all fighter escort. On the day before the assault the enemy, by working around
the clock, completed a new field at Torokina only to have it reduced inoperative
by an attack of 3-24's, 3-24's, 130's and 350's. Local air superiority was
attained by the Allied invasion was launched.

Preliminary landings on Treasury Island and at Yella on Choiseul Island
were carried out on 27 October. To cover the Treasury Island landings there
were 16 F-53's on station divided into two groups of eight each, one at 20,000
feet and one at 25,000 feet. There were also 16 P-40's, all at 10,000 feet,
and 12 P-39's at 10,000 feet. In addition to these there were eight P-39's
and eight F-40's orbiting in the general area 15 miles northeast of the Treasury
Islands. The enemy sent in his air power but was able to score only two hits.
on a destroyer and to force her to retire. An interesting feature of the
Treasury Island landings was the use of Landing Craft Infantry (LCI's)
in close support. An LCI-24 and an LCI-63 were armed with two 20-mm, three
40-mm, and five 50-caliber machine guns and were used for fire support close
to shore. The experiment was found to have possibilities and was improved
with yet more extensive in later operations. By 6 November 1943
operations on the Treasury Islands were complete. The landings on Choiseul
were unopposed.

The preliminary landings having palled the time had now come for the
main show—a landing on the narrow beaches at Esperance August Bay. On
1 November the transports of Task Force 31, carrying the Third Marine Division,
began unloading troops on 12 selected beaches. As expected, the enemy air
reaction was swift and overwhelming. Repeated attacks against both the convoys
and the beaches were made on D-day, but even on the few occasions when enemy
planes broke through the fighter屏幕 they were unable to inflict only slight
damage. In addition to air attack, the Bougainville landing was also subjected
to attack by a surface force. A Japanese task force left Rabaul on D-day and
headed for Bougainville. The enemy naval forces were attacked by Allied air-
craft but without decisive results. During the night of 1/2 November a force
of cruisers and destroyers under Rear Adm. Aaron C. Merrill attacked the Japanese
forces and turned them back.

The Japanese attached much importance to the defense of the Solomons
that they decided to send reinforcements into Rabaul from Truk. Some 250 or
300 aircraft from the carrier fleet at Truk were thrown against the Allied
air forces in November and the enemy carrier was hit by bombs from the Hiryu.
On 5 and
11 November U.S. carrier forces delivered attacks against Japanese shipping
at Rabaul. Carrier-based planes delivered the attack while shore-based
Fighters flew cover on Hawaiian bases and those of the Marine squadron provided most of the air support. Fighters and medium bombers of the Thirteenth Air Force normally operated against objectives remote from their area of ground fighter. As soon as the beachhead was secure, airfields at both Treasury Island and Torishima were begun. The Torishima fighter strip was ready by 10 December, but the Stirling Field did not become operational until early in January 1942.

By way of summary it may be pointed out that the first amphibious landing of the war, the seizure of Guadalcanal, taught several lessons that were of value in later operations. Failure to control the sea and air at Guadalcanal resulted in the premature withdrawal of naval support and supply ships, which in turn exposed the Marines to air and sea counter attacks. Although the primary aim of defending the island was to keep land-based aircraft, the Navy in planning the operation failed to provide the supplies and equipment necessary to bring the airfield speedily into use. The entire operation also suffered from lack of unity of command. In spite of these shortcomings, the seizure of Guadalcanal was the basis of the Navy, Marine, and Thirteenth Air Force plans at Henderson Field and extended their name to the Southern Solomons. Land-based air power was then able to bring Japanese bases and overwater supply lines under increasing pressure. Japanese air power was subjected to an attrition which made possible the series of amphibious landings on the ladder of the Solomons Islands. All these landings were successful because air superiority in the landing area had been established and because the land-based aircraft were able to create convoys and beachheads from serious congestion by the enemy air forces. Another factor of importance was the fact that from the beginning General Nimitz inscribed upon the principle of unity of
new and more advanced weapons, the British did not want to risk any more lives, so the order of battle was 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, 2nd Division.  

In the end, the lack of complete control over the entire operation, the great distance of the units, and the British's high level of coordination, allowed the German troops to advance without much difficulty.  

The 5th and 6th Divisions were able to break through the front line and push their way forward.  

In the end, the British were able to withdraw their forces and retreat to the safety of their homeland.  

In any case, the British did not want to risk any more lives, so the order of battle was 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, 2nd Division.
The mission of amphibious landings across the invasion chain, like the drive on the Solomons, was predicated by the efforts of the forces to
increase the capability of their equipment. On 3 June 1942 the Japanese expanded
the war to the south Pacific by striking Tulagi harbor with carrier-based planes.
The attack force, known as the 3rd Mobile Force, was composed of two air-
craft carriers (Ushio and Haruna), two heavy cruisers, and three destroyers.
The mission was discretionary to the early-invasion carrier strike against
the U.S. naval base at Tulagi Harbor in coordination with the attack on Midway.

A plan to support landings was included in the forces in the western Pacific. The initial
landing on Guadalcanal was launched on 7 August by two H.L. May 1200 boats,
consisting of a special naval landing force and a unit of native land-transport
craft. The operation continued on to the following day by the installation of Army
heavies.

The amphibious operations designed to effect the same in the Marianas
will be still affected by conditions peculiar to the South Pacific. These
conditions are a distance, heat, wind, weather, and so on.

The part of the Marianas chain between Saipan and Guam is
connected with the continuous line of States. It is probably
the same as the length of the Marianas chain from Saipan to Clarion, 1,000
leagues in distance. The distance from American material bases or
supply points is not significant to the point from New York to San Diego. It
is neither from the Aleutians in southeastern Alaska, to the mean of the Louisi-
Col. It is doubtful if any theater of the war offered more hazardous conditions than the Etilras. The chief characteristic was persistent snow condition. Forecasts were of limited value since snow was
...
Pre-invasion operations were made more effective by the use of fighter aircraft in fighter-bomber form. With the occupation of Sicily, the distance to the front dwindled from 350 miles to 25 miles, so that, while seven or eight fighter missions a day could be flown to Sicily, the P-51's primarily carried the 500-lb bombs. The P-61's carried one 500-lb. and six 20-lb. incendiary or equivalent incendiaries. Employing glide-bombing, the P-61's are able to drop through moderate altitudes and score direct hits against small armed buildings of U. c. m. r., etc., or personnel. In one operation of April were carried out with these tactics.

On 21 April 1943, the 2nd TCG did its operations over L’Aquila, which provided the overall aim for Operation L’Aquila. The novel attack force (Task Group 51) consisted of a 31-sいて, one carrier, the two carriers, and several submarines. The carrier group from included three "I" carriers while the aircraft carrier included the heavy cruiser. The submarines were to land about prior to the main assault.

In general, carrier-based planes were to be used primarily for cover and observation but were to be ready available for ground support if necessary. Air-based observation planes were to provide air spotting for naval gunfire. The shore-based Air Group under control of the Santa Maria Air Group, was divided into the Artillery Unit (Eleventh Air Force) and the Air Cover Unit (northern air force). The Eleventh Air Force was to provide naval air support for the landing operations, while the air cover was to carry out long-range air searches and act as close cover for the carriers. Coordination of air war operations was to be maintained by the Air Force in the U.S. Joint Staff, who was to be airborne at the scene.
of operations, the infantry division en route to be attached to the
Corps under limiting code and to each installation.

The air force of the United States Forces in the area considered the
assault zone to follow as an interdiction and by an extensive attack
and shelling, to bar and interdict any enemy movement, to destroy
any enemy installations, to interdict any enemy use of rail or road
for enemy transport, to interdict and neutralize the enemy's control of
railway nodes in the 24 hours after the initial assault. The 24-hour
period would coincide with flak.

Throughout the counter-battery phase and on initial and limiting, the
air force was unable, but no indications were reported. During
the initial ten days of the battle, only one 75-mm howitzer was
engaged, and that constitutes just a small part of the information con-
veyed in the reports on the 24-hour period of the first ten days of
the battle. In the battle, the counter-battery phase involved initial
positions on both the north and south sides, the bridges being, in
some cases, no more than

positions to the bridge and bridges etc. The invasion by US
forces was preceded by two days of heavy shelling and
bombing near the bridges, and the enemy forces were
being moved away from the bridges. The total move
was estimated to be between 7 and 10
The invasion of Iwo, the only concluded invasion carried out in the North Pacific Theater, was mounted by forces in the 7th Division and the 7th Infantry. This division was composed of units from the 7th Division and the 7th Infantry. The division, which had been formed in the 7th Division and the 7th Infantry, was composed of units from the 7th Division and the 7th Infantry. The division, which had been formed in the 7th Division and the 7th Infantry, was composed of units from the 7th Division and the 7th Infantry.

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out by 23 July. Both Japanese and American ships were used to remove
some 7,000 troops from the island.

From all points of view, conditions off the North Pacific remain
a certain handicap for the Fleet. But the most serious condition is
the inability to operate effectively in conditions of unfavorable
weather. This fact led one to conclude that carrier-based aircraft
reduced in numbers in that they can be moved to the immediate vicinity
of the scene of operations. The experience in the North Pacific throws
considerable doubt on this conclusion. During this period of
particularly bad weather, carrier-based aircraft were no more successful
than land-based aircraft in achieving the target. Furthermore, less
controlled from non-operational causes were to be seen carrier as land-based aircraft. If
airplanes sometimes collided in the vicinity, for so distant pillar. The
real situation of carrier-based aircraft derives not from their supposed
ability to overwhelm uncontrollable, but from the inherent
advantages, which everyone is familiar with. Instead, the
situation improved. In fact, it is apparent the introduction of land-based
aircraft, developed by the Fleet, has been of great assistance. From the air reconnaissance aircraft to
land, they were brought in, and through air reconnaissance, could largely
fill the vital need, at least by time and naval forces.
In the South Pacific it was the policy of General MacArthur to
consider his major forces as a composite team of land, naval, and air forces.
This arrangement allowed each force to operate as a separate entity and so
concentrate its efforts. In April 1942 General MacArthur's command consisted
of the Allied Naval Forces under Vice Admiral Lord J. Bayly; the Allied
Air Forces under Lt. Gen. George H. Brett; the Allied Land Forces
commanded by General Sir Thomas Blamey (an Australian); and the U.S. Army Forces
in Australia under Maj. Gen. John H. Hines. The first command change occurred on
23 July as the H. S. Services of Supply in the Southwest Pacific and
when Major Gen. Richard L. O'Reilly

The Allied Air Forces were composed of a command of the Southwest
Pacific Air Forces commanded by Maj. Gen. Doolittle; and the remnants of the
American Pacific Air Forces, formerly based in the Philippines.
In July 1942 General Brett was succeeded by Maj. Gen. George C. Kenney, then
the Fifth Air Force was officially constituted on 3 September 1942 General
Hines assumed command in addition to his position as commander, Allied Air
Forces. Maj. Gen. Louis A. Johnson was made deputy commander, Fifth Air
Forces, and in charge of forward areas.

Initially the broad aims of American strategy in the South and Southeast
Pacific were to knock out Rabaul and to prepare for land advances toward
the Philippines. The South Pacific forces, on the eastern flank of the
allies, were to follow the Solomon Islands chain toward Rabaul, while on the
western flank the South Pacific forces were to move in the northwest coast.
of the Japanese red into western Korea. The plans for the offensive
Arona and Kurihara called for the occupation of woodblock and Shindo Islands,
and the southeast tip of "New Guinea," one of them was to act as a base for the
seaborne forces. On 15 February 1943 the naval elements of
the advanced echelons continued to land until 17th of January 1944, and the
seaborne echelons about a week earlier to carry out the sea and subsequent
operations. The plans on both woodblock and Shindo were carried out on
30 June without perfection. The main forces were ashore on the 30th,
and there was some delay in concentrating detachments in the combat area.
By
The daily, however, became less critical for the land forces and the island
founded on their own forces and labs.

---- Summary ----

The above objectives of the land forces in the area
coastal zone and in Bali were covered in the land
operations in June. In the course of the month the
operations had to be carried out by the joint action of each of the echelons to the
final results. "Hence to the sound maritime support an extraordinary
degree of success in the land operations in I. I. The success was the
success due to a critical factor, and it was, in fact, a critical factor
that the Nagasaki Island, which was not occupied in the earlier
operations, was under the attack and the island was captured in the
summer of the year.
required to clear the site for an air force headquarters. In such circumstances it was essential to clear large areas quickly and to make it difficult to new locations. The operations were conducted over wide areas and concentration could not be maintained. To make this situation air back services were essential. Eventually there were the usual air force headquarters with the air district in section. The first of the air task forces was established in April 1943 at Oosterhout; the second was at Maastricht and in October 1943 a third was established at Aachen. The system of air task forces proved successful and was continued throughout the war.

The plan for the defence of Leuven involved a three-to-four landing 15 miles east of Leuven on the Senne. From which a drive in the direction of Leuven and on towards Vleickevoorde were to be initiated. Maastricht an unusual ferry used in Leuven, was to be held by airborne and airborne units. The convoy was to be protected by a 32-plane cover during daylight in addition to a combat force. The decision to provide a continuous air umbrella over the convoy raised the question of how the forces maintained on ground that could be committed with these participation in the attack. There were two main control centers on the north coast of the Scheldt, one at Oostende and the other at Blankenberge. The radar coverage of the area through which the convoy was to proceed were inadequate. One was at Zeebrugge or Zeebrugge could not be defended behind the relieved Leuven and the second, from The Hague, could not be protected. In either case the enemy could not be picked up until it was too late to provide sufficient warning. The solution was to establish two radar stations that would serve as a coastal radar station. The destroyers were to be in positions approximately 15 miles south of Vleickevoorde. On the destroyers there were two controllers and two
signal once enlisted men with radio and radar equipment.

The main base from which the enemy might be expected to interfere with
the landings was Guadalcanal. In order to allow a build-up on which the Fifth Air
Force deliberately held off for a while. Beginning on 17 August coordinated
attacks, both high and low level, were carried out with devastating effects.

With the destruction of 150 enemy air bases the threat of air attack from Guadalca
was removed. On the 21st immediately preceding the landings, the air force
continued heavy attacks on airfields, ships, and enemy lines in both New
Guinea and on Britain.

The bombers continued their strikes as the amphibious forces took up
their positions on 4 September. Shortly after 0500 the destroyer 
Falkland took
on its position off Manus as an aircraft warning lookout. The leading
section reached unmolested until 0705 then three twin engine bombers attacked. The
hostile bombers were shot down by the P-38's and the landings proceeded without
interference until afternoon. At 1200, as the convoy was requiring to
withdraw, the radar on the 
Falkland picked up a large number of bombers (unidentified
aircraft). Every fighter pilot carried a grid map in the cockpit of his plane
and was constantly tuned into the radio frequency of his fighter controller.

That by standing the grid reference of the bombers over the fighter frequencies
every minute to the fighter sectors at Rabaul and Masso Falls the 
Falkland could locate the course of the approaching enemy, and that information could
be plotted by each fighter pilot. Guided by information from the 
Falkland at
least 20 P-38's and 20 P-47's were able to intercept the Japanese attack and
to shoot down 20 of the enemy planes. The interception did not prevent the
enemy dive bombers from causing damage to shipping or from killing about 50
men. Later in the day the towing ship was again attacked by an unidentified
number of planes that fired on our position, some and killed two men and wounded others. Thus, though the insticians and beachhead sustained air attacks, the enemy did not succeed in seriously disrupting the operation. The land forces met such light resistance that there were no close support missions requested on the beachhead.

The capture of Solomons on 13 September of that year, days later made it possible to accelerate plans for amphibious operation against Trukichiban. Based on the plan called operation called the sea, Trukichiban was to be developed as a concentration point and starting base for further advances and as a forward base for aircraft and landing craft ships.

All transport vessels for the landings by motor attacks on Japanese installations, supply dumps, and reinforcement to Trukichiban. Oil planes to provide landing craft to be landed from land to sea and as they were landed with troop and equipment. In this operation, since the first of the transports was 25 miles or more of the convoy, it was decided that the central portion should be 25 miles or more than the central part of the convoy. This would mean maintaining 30 or 40 miles of seagoing, but a long journey, 100 miles or more, is of little value in the nighttime, and already on patrol.

The landing, which were carried out 29 September, were virtually unopposed. Shortly before noon the ship in the convoy and its anchor and started back to Gun. Less than an hour after ture the carrier controller on the ship took the Japanese coast with a large number of bombs. The landing, the Japanese shore at the end of an hour, from their point of view, three squadrons of fighter had been controlling the In-Trukichiban area for several hours and were about to be replaced by the other squadron. Thus five squadrons were on the alert for the operation. They drew near the Japanese.
attack and in the process shot down 10 or more bombs and 20 fighters.

The main objective of the 3rd look-ahead

Although in the center of Iwo Jima the Allied forces control of the western
of southeast coast of Iwo Jima, the Japanese developed an intricate system
of sea dumps from New Britain to Ustal Island to New Guinea. In order to
control the Danador and Vinian Straits it was necessary to control eastern
New Britain. Once control of the Straits would be established to control logistics
for large land and for use in future operations. As a preliminary to the
seizure of Cape Gloucester it was decided that Arrom on the southeastern
cost of New Britain, should also be taken. The object of this operation was
to obtain a suitable location for a base for light naval forces. Z-day for
Arrom was set for 15 December.

Out of the preliminary bombing for the south coast operation was directed
at Buna and points east in order to gain tactical surprise at Arrom. On
Z-1 the bombers switched to the invasion area. On Z-day bombardment operations
were limited to one strafing and to very light just before the landings. From
0700 to 0900 one squadron of B-25's was on air alert in the area. The squadrons
of B-25's flew on round alert throughout the day. Fighter cover was maintained
in the area throughout the day. Afternoon were sent out every two hours
ever the north and south coast in the direction of the main Japanese
air base. Although the Allied forces were subjected to two air raids made
on Z-day, the effectiveness of these raids was diminished by the friendly
fighter cover. From Z-day th have continued to feed parachute attacks
against Iwo Jima but with little success to the Allied forces and little to "inflict
and inflict damage. The Japanese called "Z-day" to avoid continuation with "D-day"
for the main battle at Gloucester.
On 13 December, the air assault on Cape Gloucester was stepped up, as the bomber effort reached its peak, every installation of importance in the area was hit. Some 1,205 soldiers were flown and nearly 4,000 tons of bombs were dropped in the air-invasion strikes. This was the first time in the Pacific war that saturation bombing had been possible and it paid handsome dividends. On D-Day the troops of the First Marine Division walked ashore "with their rifles on their shoulders" for air preparation practically eliminated resistance to the assault. "Gloucesteri" became the word for saturation bombing in the South Pacific.

It was not long after that another ambitious landing was carried out against Baker, on the New Guinea coast opposite Cape Gloucester. The intensive air operations that had preceded the Arna and Cape Gloucester landings served to a great degree as preparation for the Baker landings. Attacks on weak and increased fire and increased engagement on Baker and Woodlark during the latter part of December greatly reduced the possibility of enemy interference. On 9-11, B-24's and B-25's supported the landing beaches. On 2 January about 7,000 troops, mainly of the 32d Division, landed successfully except for one ineffective bombing attack. With the landing of Baker, the conquest of the Bismarck Peninsula was complete.

The invasion of western New Britain gave the Allies control over a large part of the Bismarck Archipelago. Conquest of the Bismarck Islands, constituting the northeastern group of the Bismarcks, was regarded as necessary to control that control, to isolate Rabaul and Ulawa, and to provide bases for further expansion of the Japanese empire.

The initial objective in the Bismarcks was the island of Las Navos upon which would be built an airfield to support operations both in the Southern Carolines and in the coast of New Guinea. The 46th Photographic
the 5th Bombardment Group of the Thirteenth Air Force had moved with its 15
B-24s to Yogyakarta

On 12 March 1944, the JCS sent a directive to MacArthur and Halsey
whereby an attack on Hollandia was to be launched on 15 April in order to
classify heavy bombardment groups there. At the suggestion of MacArthur the
target date was postponed from 15 to 22 April.

The Hollandia operation is of particular significance for several reasons:
the pre-invasion bombing brought about the defeat of the Japanese air force;
it was a realization of destruction; it was the largest combined operation in
the Pacific since the beginning of the war; and, it was the first major operation in the
Southwest Pacific carried by carrier-based planes.

Prior to the invasion the air force was charged with neutralizing the
neutrality of Dutch forces in the invasion area. Although attached
to the Ninth Air Force, its headquarters for the
Japanese 7th Air Army and the Dutch Air Force. It was also responsible for
bombing troops east and west across the projected Allied landing at Attu.

General Doolittle's action was not only to neutralize an air base but
to isolate supplies, bases, larvae, and personnel. The pre-invasion strike
of March, beginning on 11 March and continuing until the 27th, accomplished
a great dislocation of air. Over 2,000 tons of bombs were dropped in 1,500 sorties.

Concerning the obliteration of B-24s General Doolittle wrote: "On the 16th there
was no trend at all. The rains were full of clouds and wisps of cloud and
the F-4Fs turned back to their airfields. The air was in the vicinity looked like rain often..." So real was the
destruction that the Japanese war diarist "in their diary entries on 16 April..."
In order to avoid the usual reliance of the Fourth Air Force, a program was drawn up to strike the oil fields at Bollandia. The plan called for a daylight attack with unescorted bombers, hoping that the Americans did not dare to take a daylight attack with unescorted bombers. General Hapner would not permit any single attack unsupported by a naval force over the Bollandia oil fields. The program called for a low-level, surprise attack. Photographic coverage of the three airfields at Bollandia showed a strengthening of anti-aircraft and machine gun batteries. To break out these defenses General Hapner proposed that 80 B-26s carrying a normal load of ten 500-lb bombs be sent in three waves. These would shower the area with 20-lb. frags which would kill Japanese, break out machine guns, destroy airplanes, and cause general chaos. The remaining 16 B-26s could then concentrate on the airfields proper. Three all-out attacks were planned. The first day's attack would be aimed primarily at the airfields, striking the positions and fuel dumps; the second attack would concentrate on the airplanes themselves; and the third day would be devoted to a final clean-up. These attacks, carried out on 20 and 21 March and 3 April, established undoubted air superiority in the Bollandia area. Further attacks were carried out but they merely added to the destruction.

The cumulative effects of the Sixth-Fourth Air Force air attacks were catastrophic.
... the former to the latter. The Admiral's force was never to remain in the latter category. According to his plan, the Iwo To mission, or the two, would be the primary, or the main mission, of the carrier-based aircraft. In April 1944, the Iwo To mission had last been an offensive mission, not an offensive mission against Iwo To. But the mission, or the main mission, of the carrier-based aircraft was the invasion of Iwo To. The mission of the carrier-based aircraft was the invasion of Iwo To.

Allied to the Iwo To mission and to the invasion of Iwo To was the invasion of Okinawa, which was also the mission, or the main mission, of the carrier-based aircraft. The invasion of Okinawa, which was also the mission, or the main mission, of the carrier-based aircraft, was the invasion of Iwo To. The invasion of Okinawa, which was also the mission, or the main mission, of the carrier-based aircraft, was the invasion of Iwo To.

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air force, the 

forces could have been into Holland under the protection of the 

air forces, 4, 5,000 tons of bombs were dropped on the 

invasion of the Allied invasion. 

with the result of the invasion, it is 

rare advance in 1943 to be possible. In fact, none of his divisions to 

conduct such operations as this campaign. The plan envisions the assault on 

Holland, General Eisenhower proposed to advance as soon as the 

Dutch could be 

Place of the Allied Invasion

invasion would be preceded by a heavy air and naval bombardment 

advanced to the control of the British army and to protect its flanks, 

which is of considerable importance as the subject would 

be no 

forces could be involved from a neighboring force. More 

at least 

at least 

would be involved in the destruction of the enemy. 

would be involved in the destruction of the enemy, 

and on the other hand, and close support to the forces 

would be needed 

General Eisenhower instructed the 

and 

forces to be sent in. Although both plans had been developed before, 

the air forces were to be held to the invasion forces on 22 April. In addition 

Northern and Yugoslav airfields were also attacked. The NTF 50 task force 

was to land first at Leuven on the coast opposite Antwerp, 

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...
The defenders' success was due in large part to the terrain and weather. Limited coastal defense was in effect when Allied forces landed. It did have some effect but was not effective. The enemy was virtually unprepared when General Waller exclaimed, "It is not to be late to Corea."

Despite the lack of opposition at the beaches the Japanese began soon to put up a stout defense. The terrain of the island favored the defenders. Several narrow coastal plains were ridges and cliffs, surrounded with caves that provided a natural fortress for the defenders. For the first time in the 3.5L heavy bombers were used in close support. Thirty Liberators were sent against the airfields on Vella Lavella. Medium and light bombers were used also, both on call and by pre-arrangement. The last of the Japanese airfields on Vella Lavella in Allied hands by 20 June. The delay in retaking and retaking the airfields on Vella caused the Fifth Air Force to look about for alternate bases. Such bases were discovered in Guadalcanal, an uninhabited island some two miles south of Vella. Guadalcanal was to become an important heavy bomber base.

The Vella Lavella was unique in that it was the only amphibious invasion in the advance along the New Guinea coast that precipitated a positive Japanese naval reaction. Realizing that the Allied advance meant a threat to the island, the staff of the Carlin directed on 20 May cut into effect their "Tokelau plan." The object of this operation was to send a steady stream of reinforcements into Vella Lavella Allied positions as opportunity offered. The first attempt at reinforcement was on 8 June. Six Japanese destroyers, three of which were laden with troops, were picked up by 10 P-47s. After the shot, one of the destroyers was sunk, one seriously damaged, and three other vessels. The Japanese convoy turned back.
The next section in the history of the conduct of the land battle, which we have described, begins with the establishment of the defenses, including the establishment of the defenses, in the opposition of the defenses, in the opposition of the defenses, in the opposition of the defenses.
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This section is classified and will not be translated.
The amphibious landing at the R.M.A. with the notable exception of those at Iwo Jima, were all under control of a U.S. Marine Admiral. The forces in

that area were organized according to the principle of unity of command, whereby the Army, navy, and air forces commanded under the Joint Chiefs of Staff

correctly. The control of all the amphibious landings in the Central Pacific,

Area Force, to Okinawa, were covered by a joint staff of the Army, Navy, and

airforces and under the unconditional control of the CINCPAC. The two forces

therefore present a coherent whole of coordination and control.

The Central Pacific

On 1st July 1942, until 14 July 1945 the United

Naval Forces in the Central Pacific were under the control of CINCPAC. In

March 1942, the United States Navy was divided into the United States Naval Forces,

Pacific Ocean, and the United States Naval Forces, Asiatic

Pacific Ocean, under the command of Adm. Halsey, CINCPAC. This command was

reorganized and reorganized as the United States Pacific Fleet, under the

command of Adm. Nimitz, CINCPAC. On 16 August 1943 these functions

were assumed by the Central Pacific Area Force, and

Area Force, to Okinawa, which was in

turn unified by the United States Army, CINCPAC, on 1 August 1942. Although the

latter was not the only national control exercised by CINCPAC, this control was exercised through

various intermediate commanders. In the early months of the war, until

the

1st July 1943, the United States

Pacific Command, under the direction of the

United States Fleet, and the

United States Navy, under the command of the

Admiral, were included

in the

command.
In Dec Force 57, commanded by Vice Admiral John H. Hoover. As operations continued across the Pacific theater, the Pacific units of the Seventh Air Force were assigned to various task force commanders.

The purpose of amphibious operations in the Central Pacific were essentially the same - to utilize the facilities to set up a naval and air base from which to evacuate further advances, to decoy certain missions in the rear, and to induce a desired hostile reaction. There were at least three main landing points: the initial amphibious assault, the Central Pacific air base, with associated wartime of the fighting, and the invasion of the beaches.

The war differences between Central Pacific and the United States and British forces within the Central Pacific made for both logistical and tactical difficulties. It took about 65 days between routine supplies requisitioning to the United States and delivery to forward units (by surface vessel). The tactical difficulties increased may be inferred from the fact that during the planning of Okinawa campaign, one of the landings there were separated by as much as 6,000 miles. Distance also for intelligence difficulties. Detailed physical reconnaissance may, such as was carried out before the cross-channel landings in France, was rarely possible. Aerial photographs were utilized only in conjunction with carrier strikes or long-range bomber attacks and the unit's flavor of the overall situation could not be ensured.

Most of the key decisions derived their importance from their strategic situation rather than fixed. In many cases, the nature of the objective made it inevitable for a carrier to do his damage within a radius of miles, so that the full effect of his force could be brought to bear against the enemy.

Coral reefs surrounding many of the shallow or coastal islands made.
never, it seemed, in the development of the amphibious tractor. This enabled assault troops and light equipment to be moved in, but the problem of moving heavy materiel—trucks, tankettes, bulldozers—remained. The Army succeeded in overcoming these difficulties by using heavy demolition barges that blasted channels through reefs and by pontoon bridges at bridging shoals surrounding them.

The bitter resistance encountered at the beaches brought into sharp focus the importance of supporting fires. Where there were prolonged and well-coordinated and well-directed fires the assault troops went ashore with a minimum of casualties; where such to elements were lacking, there were heavy losses.

The Gilbert Islands Campaign

Every bit of background to the operations that were carried out in the Central Pacific in November 1943 it should be pointed out that to defeat of the Japanese in this area in the Marshall Islands and that whatever air operation was conducted by the carrier-based air forces would be low in quality and quantity. The Navy had approximately 900 aircraft, about four times the number of combat aircraft possessed by the Navy in the Gilbert-Marshalls area.

The overall objectives listed for operations in the Central Pacific defined the purpose to win control of the Gilbert Islands and Marshalls Islands, to secure a base area for an attack on the Carolines, to invade the security of the line of communications, and to extend the rear area on the Japanese. The plan of operation for Operation GAUL followed this scenario. The main objective was the seizure of Tarawa and Tulagi on 20 November and Makin on 26 November 1943. The main objective on the Tarawa Atoll was the Island Betio, where the Japanese had built a
The pattern of amphibious operations in the Central Pacific was fairly well defined in these initial operations. The major combat forces were the Assault Force, the Carrier Force, and the shore-based ships. The Assault Force consisted of the ground troops who would be landed; escort carriers; shore bombardment, anti-aircraft, and gun batteries. The Carrier Force, which included the air force of two smaller aircraft carriers, was to provide air cover for the convoy to route and to air strike against the transport to the landing and beach operations and to support beachhead, anti-aircraft, and gun batteries. The shore-based ships, which included the air force of two smaller aircraft carriers, was to provide air cover for the convoy to route and to air strike against the transport to the landing and beach operations and to support beachhead, anti-aircraft, and gun batteries.

Later, the Gilberts (Part II) became the Seventh Air Force's objective. The island, which was the target for the invasion, was to be attacked by the ships of the Invasion Force, which consisted of the Seventh Air Force and the Carrier Force. The Carrier Force, which included the air force of two smaller aircraft carriers, was to provide air cover for the convoy to route and to air strike against the transport to the landing and beach operations and to support beachhead, anti-aircraft, and gun batteries.

Further, the Gilberts (Part II) were the objective of the Seventh Air Force's attack. The island, which was the target for the invasion, was to be attacked by the ships of the Invasion Force, which consisted of the Seventh Air Force and the Carrier Force. The Carrier Force, which included the air force of two smaller aircraft carriers, was to provide air cover for the convoy to route and to air strike against the transport to the landing and beach operations and to support beachhead, anti-aircraft, and gun batteries.
In addition, there is no indication that any ships were present for

the duration of the attack. In actuality, there were only two British
submarines in the area when the attack occurred, and they were

farther offshore. The German submarines (more than 20) and the

British aircraft were not in the area, and there was little chance

that they would have been able to locate the British ships in time

for them to be effective. The British, meanwhile, would have been

unable to locate the German ships in time.

Because of operational difficulties, the British submarines were

ordered to attack only a few ships in the area, by 10 a.m. on the 18th.
The 17 submarines and the 11 British aircraft did not attack any of

the ships, and only 10 ships were hit by the British. The

24 destroyers and one cruiser were sunk or damaged. In 72 hours of

British action, it is estimated that 7000 tons of oil and 15,000

bales of cargo were lost.

In light of the above, it seems important to consider the

impact of military history on our present ability to design and

execute offensive operations, as we did during the initial

operations of this war. Our initial experiences were in short supply. This

is also true for the early operations in the various theaters of war in

which German forces were involved. These initial experiences formed

to the extent that they have been formed. This is true in North Africa,

at Brest, and elsewhere. The initial experience of the British and

American forces in the early months of the war should give us

some idea of the importance of initial experience. In none of these initial

operations did the British or American forces play a decisive role, but since

these experiences

vividly affected a critical area, it is well to note briefly at least the

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The heavy casualties suffered at Okinawa invite comparison with Cape Gloucester. From the flat and exposed area the war only a few feet.

The Japanese had the advantage of dug-in positions that offered poor targets to naval fire and a wide flat trajectory. Cape Gloucester also was defended by dug-in positions, but the well-trained fire was delivered chiefly by land-based air and the massed naval forces were able to return, with little difficulty. What appeared to be a sea battle little front line the superiority of air bombardment was to be obvious. Another advantage of land-based bombardment was that it could be concentrated and sustained, at times, the interval between the firing of the final bombardment and the first wave of the assault was too short.

The U.S. 27th Division which was forced to Okinawa encountered determined resistance from 500 to 600 dug-in defenders but the island was under control by the following day with light casualties. Okinawa Island was ordered on 26 November with negligible resistance.

The Marshall Islands Campaign

The invasion of the Marshall Islands, Operation TF 43/43, was to be under command of Vice Adm. Shaver as who would assume tactical control only to the close of the flight over the island. The island-based air forces were ready to take over. The island-based air forces operated as before, no more of least force 37 value as seen of "aircraft power". Unlike the Gilberts, the land-based aircraft based the rear bases of operations. Carrying the mission was a mission but limited the carriers of the Pacific Fleet to off the task needed most, central, on refresher training, with the usual detachment of the Seventh Air Force on Guam.
Taking and securing the seizing necessary to the landings were begun. Heavy
battles at Vella, Tulagi, Tulagi, Guadalcanal, and Muru were constantly hit by
battleships, cruisers and destroyers of the Seventh. The weather concentrated on
Emmeline, greeting 200 tons of the stuff during the cyclone period. Just
before D-Day (beginning 31 January) the Fast Carrier Force (TF 52) under Rear
Admiral A. D. Strasser, massed in and pounded enemy bases in the Marshalls. By
D-Day, 31 January, the land and carrier based airstreams had established unquestioned
air superiority in the Marshalls; not a single enemy air plane appeared to
contest the landings.

Three initial objectives were set simultaneously by the amphibious
forces: Vella Island and Palm-Island Islands in the Emmeline Atoll and
Tuvalu Atoll, reaching 275 miles to the southwest. Three attack groups consisted
of 197 ships and carrying 63,000 troops were assigned to these objectives.

The forces were massed in the same basic patterns as for the Gilberts
Islands, with the addition of a "Neutralization Group" whose task was to main-
tain neutralization of the two enemy air Island at night and force or destroy
1/12th. After D-Day, the American forces were in possession of the Palm-Island Islands by 3 February, and by the 6th the occupation of Emmeline
Island was complete.

The landings in the Emmeline Atoll were taken with relative ease because
the Japs were barred in the Gilberts were not so easy to overcome. TH-145,
was an I transport over 6000 feet in height, momentous trace. In the first place
the enemy AOE had cleared, both air and surface, was heavy, prolonged, and
accurate. Although air attacks had been against evacuation control ships too
close to land, BAR Mrs. Richard L. Connolly, who led one of the amphibious
crews in the Triton in June, uncovered old battle ships to less than 2,000
...white paint to be used. Blue, white, and blue, and red, and white... 

Vermeil was a combination of forces in the Central Pacific The reason for this was to provide a base for the operations aboard the aircraft carriers. Frank was a key player in this operation, especially in the Battle of Midway. 

The operation continued throughout the war, involving many forces, including the carriers and the battleships. The Central Pacific area was the focus of this operation. 

As a result, the operation was successful in achieving its objectives. 

The operation was a significant achievement in the war.
subjected to bombardment because of the heavy casualties involved. There was no opportunity, either, of artillery support from ships within range, as had been the case at Anzio, Salerno, and Enistock.

On 22 June 22 F-47s of the Seventh Air Force were flown in to support the several troops. These F-47s were formed into by escort carrier and to the north and established from the island in a more ready contact of the landings in North Africa. From air strikes, later known as Easy Ride, the F-47s were employed against unoccupied targets, the strong points, all or.mined resistance on Okinawa ceased on 9 July, but mining and operations continued for another 25 days.

Guerin to the north route encountered on Okinawa, Easy Ride was continued until 21 July. As a result of this long range for coordinated air attacks and continued to both sides, carrier and land-based aircraft that were able to destroy the enemy all down as artillery positions. As a result, the 19,600 infantry and 57,000 vehicles employed in the assault were able to move southward only through two objectives. In the course noted Island Strong opposition developed but all remained resistance was overcome on 10 August.

In addition, the landing on Tanagura was made on 24 July. Tanagura, being separated from Okinawa by a channel less than three miles in width, was subjected to extremely heavy aerial, artillery, and naval bombardment. In the words of a service historian, "...the Tanagura operation must stand as an overgrown river crossing." Only light resistance was encountered and the island was declared secure on 1 August. With the assistance of another squadron of F-47s the landings at both Guam and Tanagura received direct support from land-based aircraft.

The versatile F-47s carried out a variety of operations: they could double as bombers, strike with 50-caliber machine gun, or launch 4.5-inch rockets.
was the most heavily defended small island in the Pacific outside of two
31.

There were several deficiencies in the Palau operation that made it
costly. For on their first venture into the full-scale intricate system
of natural caves and grottoes underneath that covered the island of
Welles. Intelligence failed to reveal the nature and extent of the enemy's
defense system. Three days preliminary naval bombardment
insufficient, and it is doubtful that even a longer operation by naval
forces with their first assault could have been effective against the enemy's
caves and underground positions. Finally, the failure to provide adequate
reserve troops for the Second Marine Division.

On the other islands in the Palau area formidable opposition was en-
countered. Storm was dealers on the 17th, 18th on the 23d, and 24th on
32.

The nature of operations conducted in the Central Pacific gave priority
of force to the Navy and Marines. Throughout the Central Pacific drive the
Seventh Air Force was under the operational control of the Army, until
the Marin's arrived, its role was essentially a supporting one. Whether
the purpose of the operation was to soften up an island for assault or to
maintain the neutralization of a by-passed island, the type of mission was
pretty much the same: long overflights and short raids at enemy bases on
small islands. This type of operation had its own peculiar hazards but it
involved relatively little contact with the enemy. Now the Central Pacific
Forces moved into the Marianas, the Seventh began to operate more directly
with the Army as the F-57's provided direct support for ground troops on
Guam, Saipan, and Tinian.
Official plan for the invasion of the Philippines called for the
assault of intermediate bases at Mindanao and Borneo and by Fleet forces and
at Tarakan by 1st forces. Even with these bases, General Short in July 1942
decided to plan not in harmony with air capabilities. He had observed that
the distances between theaters, control, for naval, and roads
were too much for actual support and had also ended the earlier form of
suggestion to be made to build on the bases every 20 to 30 days. On
16 October 1942, however, General Short wrote to General Short and
asked whether the American were "about through," or proposed operations should
be considered by returning island. Indicatively Admiral Short had come
to a similar conclusion after the initial attack carried out series of carrier
operations off of the Philippines in September 1944. Describing the Japanese
air forces as a "hard shell on a line on a land yards," he recommended
that Tarakan, Borneo, and New Guinea be bombarded, and a direct result of
these particular areas. Upon receiving these reports and recommendations, CNO sent
a directive to the fleet to return and destroy an enemy volume of
artillery intermediate bases would be cleared and all other units to move
by 30 October 1942.

This course of action took the Japanese out of the theater of operations
in the initial assault at Mindanao and Borneo but followed so successfully in 1942. Consequently,
Japanese air forces had been isolated from bases, and in each case was to provide
cover for the movement of all surface elements and the assistance of each
obligation, return to the walls. In one exception, Roll Call, the

roll call was held in order to complete a letter of appointment. In another, Roll Call was held in order to complete a letter of appointment.
SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

The U.S. is currently following a clearcut low oil stock position. If oil prices rise, the rest of the world may also face the same situation. At present, the world is in a state of turmoil, and the situation is further complicated by the fact that the oil is not available for use. In this situation, the U.S. must take measures to ensure the stability of the world oil market.

The U.S. is currently in a strong position due to its role as a global leader in oil production. The country has been able to maintain a steady flow of oil to its allies, and this has helped to stabilize the world market. However, there are concerns that the U.S. may not be able to maintain this position in the long term, due to the possibility of a decrease in oil production.

The U.S. government is currently working to develop alternative energy sources, such as nuclear power and renewable energy, in order to reduce its dependence on oil. The government is also working to increase the efficiency of oil production, in order to reduce the amount of oil that is wasted.

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Note: The text below contains classified information and should be treated as such.

The situation in the crisis area has developed in a manner unforeseen by the Allied Command and the United Nations. The crisis area has escalated significantly, with the possibility of a major confrontation. The United Nations has been extended in its mandate, and additional military forces have been deployed.

The situation in the crisis area is complex and requires careful consideration. The United Nations has been working closely with the Allies to coordinate a response. The situation is likely to escalate further, and a comprehensive strategy is needed to prevent a full-scale conflict.

Allied forces have been extended, and additional resources are being mobilized to support the United Nations. The crisis area is being closely monitored, and all relevant stakeholders are being informed.

The United Nations has been working closely with the Allies to ensure a coordinated response. The situation is complex and requires careful consideration. A comprehensive strategy is needed to prevent a full-scale conflict.

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Southern and Central Forces to demolish the Allied forces in the very last hour of the war cast. Thus it seems that the Central Forces carried out their mission in the face of Japanese resistance, and that they destroyed several units on 27 October in an attempt to capture the Japanese forces, thus leaving the Sea Barrier intact and undamaged. This was considered vital to the Japanese carriers and it was realized that to control the Sea Barrier while the enemy to the north was itself not much to be desired. While the Sea Barrier yielded to the Japanese Central Force and saved the Sea Barrier intact on the night of 24/25 October, the Central Force, already heavily engaged with the Southern Forces, faced the threat of a tremendousloss.

The heavy ships, all of which had been ordered for the Southern action, were lost or crippled, and only the few destroyers remaining to the Southern Force, the carrier and aircraft were then in dire straits, and, without further ado or action, had to commit themselves to the defense of the Sea Barrier. Unable to find adequate cover, they were forced to land on the exposed coast at midnight, only to crack up in the process, and to the difficulties of the weather. As organized in their landing, the Southern forces were in the middle of the night, the next morning, the morning, when the carrier ordered an assault. But this was not to be. The Japanese forces were now disappearing, and the carrier finally ordered an assault. But this was not to be. The carrier finally ordered an assault. But this was not to be. The carrier finally ordered an assault. But this was not to be. The carrier finally ordered an assault. But this was not to be.
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The loss of air superiority to the to the east of the enemy air base in the
area of the P-38s and P-51s could not be replaced and concentrated to
ment a serious situation.

Carrier force not broken down, and without additional naval bases
will be extended. On the other hand, the enemy's air superiority over the
carrier was seriously damaged and there would be no
counter-attack for us.

On 22 October 1943, the victory of the enemy and the
ne of the enemy's air superiority, our Carrier Fancy was not scheduled
to take over the defense of those until 5 November, but in view of the break-
down of carrier bases, 33 P-38s were flown in on 27 October, as
soon as the lack of air superiority could receive them. On 30 October all the carriers
were retained for the rest of the month.

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[Image 0x36 to 576x792]
The entry of the Chinese into the war raised the vital relationship of the time in the event of the unification of the unity, and ever present possibility of a regional conflict. The neutralization of the conflict in the event of an undeclared war is not expected to be immediately resolved. Therefore, it is necessary to maintain a strong naval presence in the Korean area to ensure that the security of the region is maintained.

The following are the key points of the security plan:

1. The neutralization of the conflict in the event of a regional war is not expected to be immediately resolved.
2. It is necessary to maintain a strong naval presence in the Korean area to ensure the security of the region.

In conclusion, the security of the region is dependent on maintaining a strong naval presence and ensuring the neutrality of the conflict.

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Forces to 'Indoro' presented severe problems. Since they had to pass through narrow
mountainous terrain with little room to maneuver, they were in need of numerous
airdrops. Flakners did their best to protect the skies by appearing
our continuous daylight cover the area and Flak control by all four
forces. Despite these precautions, one cruiser and one destroyer were damaged so
tightly that they had to be

The landing was reestablished on the 15th, considerably without opposition
except for the losses which occurred in the loss of two ships. In
for the appearance of 100 soldiers, however. The main defense effort to
destroy the destroyed or to just guard the vicinity in the form of a
attack by our four cruisers, one light cruiser, and two destroyers. Although
aircraft were conducted by an invisible force. As a matter of fact, these losses,
chicken (111 and 111) were checked and not. Furthermore, the attack was
around 1900 hours. Allied aircraft were now, with landings limited to
airfields. This action was now the usual routine of our destroyers and could be
repeated and conducted with success. Since our aircraft was over every
very vessel and directed, and two destroyers were sunk and one heavy cruiser and
one destroyer were damaged. 3rd Gen. 6 C. Smith, commander of the
 wasn't ever mentioned.

Our ships received a large amount of air strikes on that
night, but none on that night were more severe examples of what had already
assaulted our defenses in the night. In spite of continuous air raids
the ships built up the necessary reserve to continue their operations.

Dwight

The last major offensive landing in 39K was the invasion of Uppayan.
The object of this operation was the capture of the island and the seizure of the airfields in order to control the air. The Sixth Army was to employ the 7th and 17th Corps in the assault of the beachhead.

The initial phase would be similar to the breach and advance of the 4th Division, the Fourth Fleet Task Force to be supported by air and naval gunfire. The initial phase was expected to take about 3 weeks. The 3rd Division was to be landed in the objective area by 10th February.

The 4th Division was to be landed on 10th February. The 7th and 17th Corps were to be landed on 11th February. The 7th and 17th Corps were to be landed on 12th February. The 7th and 17th Corps were to be landed on 13th February.

On 7 January the 7th and 17th Corps were to be landed on 14th February. The 7th and 17th Corps were to be landed on 15th February. The 7th and 17th Corps were to be landed on 16th February.

On 7 January the 7th and 17th Corps were to be landed on 17th February. The 7th and 17th Corps were to be landed on 18th February. The 7th and 17th Corps were to be landed on 19th February.

On 7 January the 7th and 17th Corps were to be landed on 20th February. The 7th and 17th Corps were to be landed on 21st February. The 7th and 17th Corps were to be landed on 22nd February.

On 7 January the 7th and 17th Corps were to be landed on 23rd February. The 7th and 17th Corps were to be landed on 24th February. The 7th and 17th Corps were to be landed on 25th February.

On 7 January the 7th and 17th Corps were to be landed on 26th February. The 7th and 17th Corps were to be landed on 27th February. The 7th and 17th Corps were to be landed on 28th February.
In the air force, we were unable to apply to an intelligence circuit which was better or likely to collide without. Thus, the Allied forces enjoyed superiority in air and decided to prevent all chances from all disappeared aircrews or to strike in the enemy's direct attacks.

In addition to combating activities, the Allied forces also carried out operations against the destruction of fuel and communications. During the second phase, this role was taken by the North African Air Force which prevented the fuel and supply lines of the enemy from being effective.

This action, in particular, is critical in order to reduce the effectiveness of their ground forces. Also, the Allied forces involved in the action and destruction of fuel lines, a necessary weapon, to prevent the existence of the enemy's air force, the North African Air Force would be able to prevent the enemy's ability and to strike the enemy's fuel centers. On 9th October, as a result of the operation, 80 or so tank columns were destroyed, destroying enemy forces in the desert.

However, the enemy was able to continue their advance, thus, the North African Air Force continued their actions until the 15th of the month to prevent the enemy's advance. On the 15th of the month, the enemy was stopped in some areas, and the North African Air Force continued to support the ground forces in this battle, securing their success. On 16th of the month, it was observed that the enemy's movement in all sectors was stopped. On the 17th of the month, a total of 75 aircraft were...
The leading line of our attack would be to the west of the Channel, and we would aim to capture the ports of Calais, Boulogne, and Dunkirk. The next step would be to advance up the channel to the English coast, then directly inland to the north of Paris. During this advance, we would be supported by air power and naval gunfire.

The Immediate Objective

The immediate objective in the north will be the seizure of the harbor at Calais. This will be accomplished by a rapid advance across the open country, supported by air power and naval gunfire. The main objective will be the capture of Calais, followed by the advance into the heart of France. We will then proceed to the north of Paris, where we will be supported by the Rhine and the Meuse Rivers.

The Terminal Objective

The terminal objective will be the capture of Berlin. This will be accomplished by a rapid advance across the open country, supported by air power and naval gunfire. The main objective will be the capture of Berlin, followed by the advance into the heart of Germany. We will then proceed to the north of Berlin, where we will be supported by the Elbe River and the Oder River.

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were delivered 1 mile south of the roadside, near the base of the hill, to the rear of the beach; and here the first enemy casualties.

Overall control of the action 0400-0600 was exercised by Maj. General J. E. Joseph, Commanding 3d Marine Div. Sustained control was divided between Col. Col. J. V. Barry, Commanding 3d Marine Division, and Maj. Gen. R. L. Dikus, Commanding 3d Marine Division. Casualties on the front line, determined upon midnight, were estimated by Maj. Gen. J. V. Barry, 3d Mar. Div. The casualties of the 3d Marine Division were 1545 dead, 181 wounded, and 1728 missing, whereas the German losses were approximately 30 dead, 20 wounded, and 200 missing. In action of the 2d Marine Division the 3d Division made one assault. It was generally agreed that the German counterattack was a division of 2d Marine Div. which could have been driven off. The number of German casualties was estimated by the 3d Marine Division to be about 1545 dead and 181 wounded. ; (2) The 2d Marine Division would be driven off. The all 3d Marine Division. ; (2) The 2d Marine Division would be driven off. The all 3d Marine Division. ; (2) The 2d Marine Division would be driven off. The all 3d Marine Division. ; (2) The 2d Marine Division would be driven off. The all 3d Marine Division.

The number of the 2d Marine Division was estimated to be about 1000 casualties. The number of German casualties was estimated to be about 1000 casualties. The number of German casualties was estimated to be about 1000 casualties. The number of German casualties was estimated to be about 1000 casualties. The number of German casualties was estimated to be about 1000 casualties. The number of German casualties was estimated to be about 1000 casualties. The number of German casualties was estimated to be about 1000 casualties. The number of German casualties was estimated to be about 1000 casualties. The number of German casualties was estimated to be about 1000 casualties. The number of German casualties was estimated to be about 1000 casualties. The number of German casualties was estimated to be about 1000 casualties. The number of German casualties was estimated to be about 1000 casualties. The number of German casualties was estimated to be about 1000 casualties. The number of German casualties was estimated to be about 1000 casualties. The number of German casualties was estimated to be about 1000 casualties. The number of German casualties was estimated to be about 1000 casualties.
<redacted text>
15-35, Jan., 1941

This raid was

concerned, the Seventh Air Force was outstandingly successful; after
2 January the Japanese made no further attacks. Neutralization of the
enemy airfields on Iwo was, however, only partially accomplished. At no
time were all runways inoperational and no runway was inoperational for
an even a full day. The reasons are clear enough: airfields cannot be
effectively neutralized by a small force operating over long distances; to
be effective, such attacks must be in mass and sustained.

So far as softening defenses were concerned, results were even less
effective. Most of the defense installations were deeply dug in and cleverly
concealed. Shelter and gun positions were of such nature and construction
that it usually required a direct hit to cause any damage at all, and even
a direct hit by the type of bomb used (mostly 100- and 500-lb. 35) had very
little effect except concussion. The fragmentation effect of any explosive
was greatly reduced by Iwo’s loose soil, which was composed of cinder and
sand. Napalm was used in an effort to burn off cover from emplacements, but
due to the variety of reasons the experiment was not as successful as
2 The Marines
came to the conclusion that the only effect of air bombardment was to cause
the Japanese to construct more extensive underground positions.

If the pre-landing air bombardment was insufficient and ineffective,
so was the usual. The Marines estimated 10 days of preliminary fires as
necessary to prepare the island for assault. They got only three days
bombardment. A post-operational study concluded that with the force actually
employed — six old battleships and four heavy and one light cruiser — the
minimum time required to prepare the island as thoroughly as possible for
occupation was eight days. Why were the Marines obliged to go ashore with

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inadequate preliminary fire. The answer is to be found chiefly in a tight operational schedule. Hereby Iwo was sandwiched between two major invasions, Lingayen and Okinawa. The need of Iwo Jima had to be reconciled with these other major operations and of a carrier attack against Iwo Jima in mid-February by Halsey's Task Force 58. In the words of the marine historians, "the navy planned and delivered preliminary bombardment, not on a basis of accurately calculated requirements, but to conform with the strategic situation as the admirals estimated it at the time." There was a certain irony about the situation. Ammunition was allotted to Okinawa in vast amounts at the expense of Iwo. Yet the Japanese tactic of abandoning the beaches at Okinawa rendered much of the preliminary fire against that island useless.

At 0800 on 16 February the first wave of landing craft hit the beaches. A narrow beachhead was established on the first day, but the Marines soon encountered one of the most fiercely contested battles of the entire war. The Japanese on Iwo Jima put up a fanatical, well-planned, and ingenious defense. Lt. Gen. Tadamichi Kuribayashi, the Japanese commander, made few if any errors in planning and executing his mission of inflicting maximum attrition. The Japanese were able to take 5,500 American lives—a toll equal to their own dead. From 16-day until 16 March, when the island was declared secure, the Marines were forced to inch their way forward and to pay the enemy loose from well-entrenched positions.

From 19 through 22 February the fast carriers were on hand to assist the escort carriers in providing close support. Thereafter the burden had to be carried by 10 escort carriers, a force inadequate to the tasks at hand. During the early stages of the operation the Seventh Air Force B-24's hit other islands in the Maro Shoto and they, along with the carrier planes, were able to maintain
air superiority. The only serious air opposition came at dusk on 21 February when about a dozen enemy planes made a low level attack on a carrier unit. Although all intruders were shot down, they succeeded in sinking the Siskinek 12 Sea and damaging the Saratoga, Longza Point, and an LST.

The first F-51s of the 15th Group began to arrive on the on 6 March, with the withdrawal of all carriers on 11 March for rearmament and replenishment, the full burden of air defense and air support fell upon land-based aviation. The P-51’s 217 sorties, 175ering and strafing sorties against pillboxes, cave entrances, gun emplacements, slit trenches, troops, and stores. Though the pilots were inexperienced in close support operations they learned quickly from the Marine pilots and lent material assistance in the final reduction of the island. The 15th Group also furnished combat air patrol beginning 7 March and continuing practically to the end of the war. At night two P-61s generally flew patrol. With the arrival of other units the Nighters 13 also assumed the F-24’s burden of neutralizing Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima.

Okinawa

The landing on Okinawa was the result of the same decisions that had set up the Iwo Jima operation. On 2 October 1944 the JCS had decided to bypass Formosa and to seize Iwo, Iwo Jima, and the Ryukyus in succession. The directive received by Admiral Nimitz on 3 October ordered him to seize one or more positions in the Ryukyus by 1 March 1945. Okinawa was soon selected as the most suitable position but delays in the Iwo Jima campaign forced a postponement of 14 days to 1 April.

Okinawa was the last, and probably the most difficult, step in the great sweep across the Central Pacific. The purpose of the operation was to seize a base for the final assault against Japan. Okinawa is about 60 miles long.
and from 2 to 18 miles wide, with a total area of 485 square miles. Situated only about 350 miles from the home islands, it offered numerous airfield sites from which planes of almost any type could reach the industrial areas of southern Japan. It had excellent anchorages and it was of a size sufficient for the staging of assault troops for subsequent operations. Even if an assault on Japan proper proved unnecessary, possession of Okinawa would permit American naval and air power to control the East China Sea, which commands the approaches to Korea, Manchuria, Formosa and the North China coast, in addition to Japan proper.

In planning the operation (coined TAIPI), air superiority was a consideration of prime importance. The enemy could be expected to resist to the full extent of his remaining strength. He could—in fact did—utilize what remained of his naval forces, but they were too weak to offer serious challenge. Tattered though his air forces were, Leyte had proven that by concentrating on the assault forces and by use of kamikaze tactics they could constitute a formidable menace. Okinawa was within reach of numerous Japanese airfields. It would be necessary therefore to neutralize air power not only in the objective area but also in the numerous staging areas, including the home islands, Formosa, the China coast, and the Ryukyus.

Okinawa was the largest amphibious invasion of the Pacific war. The total troops committed numbered over half a million, over 1,200 ships were used, and over 500 carrier-based aircraft participated. The Army-Navy task force, designated the Central Pacific Task Force, was commanded by Admiral Raymond A. Spruance. The principal naval units were the Covering Forces and Special Groups (Task Force 50), commanded by Spruance personally and a Joint Expeditionary Force (Task Force 51), commanded by Vice Admiral Richmond K. Turner. The
Expeditionary Troops (Task Force 50) were under control of Lt. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, commander of the newly activated Tenth Army. When Admiral Spruance decided that the amphibious phase of the operation had been successfully completed, General Buckner was to assume command ashore.

Original plan for operation ICW-3 contemplated three phases of operations: the seizure of nearby Furima Retto and Nago Shima Islands about a week before the main landings and occupation of southern part of Okinawa; capture of Ie Shima and occupation of the northern part of Okinawa; occupation of the remaining positions in the Kansalcho. Subsequent events made necessary changes in this schedule.

All air forces in the Pacific had a part, directly or indirectly, in the attempt to isolate Okinawa. The Strategic Air Forces, FOA, was to neutralize enemy air bases in the Carolines and Bonina, to strike Okinawa and Japan when practicable, and to provide fighter cover for the Twentieth Air Force missions against Japan. The Commander, Forward Areas Central Pacific, was to use his naval air strength to provide anti-submarine coverage, neutralize bypassed enemy bases, and provide logistic support. Forces outside FOA had important supporting roles. Planes from USAF were to engage in searches and in continuous strikes against Formosa as soon as the situation on Luzon permitted. For the first time, B-29's could have an important role in an amphibious operation. Originally, the China-based XX Bomber Command was to carry out search and bombing operations against Formosa while the XXI Bomber Command from Marianas bases concentrated on Okinawa, Kyushu, and other points in the Home Islands. The decision in January to withdraw XX Bomber Command from Chinese bases canceled its part in the war except in regard to photo reconnaissance. According to the original JCS directive governing employment of very heavy bombers, Admiral
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limits, as theater commander could divert the XII Bomber Command from its primary strategic bombardment mission by declaring a tactical or strategic emergency—an arrangement similar to that governing the employment of the Fifteenth Air Force in 1944. However, General Arnold, on the day before the invasion was launched, informed limits that XII Bomber Command was to be used to ensure the success of Allied forces, minimizing cost of time and casualties. The Superforts were to be employed whenever and wherever they could have a decisive effect, regardless of whether an emergency existed.

Air support at the target area was to be provided by the fast carriers of Task Force 56 and by the escort carriers of Task Force 52. For the first time the fast carriers were to be available at the target area for a prolonged time to furnish support and combat air patrols. The fast carriers were to cover mine-sweeping operations, hit targets on Okinawa that could not be reached by gunfire, destroy enemy defenses and air installations, and strafe the landing beaches. The escort carriers were to provide aircraft for direct support missions, anti-submarine patrols, naval and artillery gunfire spotting, air supply, and photo missions.

The preliminary bombardment of Okinawa and supporting bases began months in advance of the landing. The first fast carrier attack had been made as early as October and subsequent attacks were made in January. On 13 and 19 March Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's Task Force 56 raided airfields on Kyushu and Formosa and shipping in the Inland Sea. During February and March, land-based aircraft from the Marianas or 3RAF made almost daily attacks over the Ryukyus and adjacent waters. Search and patrol bombers helped to isolate Okinawa by destroying cargo vessels, barges, and other craft.

On 26 and 27 March the 77th Division made its preliminary landings in the
Corazone Islands and Ie Shima. Although neither of these positions afforded airfield sites or base facilities, they were considered necessary for the fleet anchorages they offered. An unexpected windfall from the Corazone Islands operations was the capture of some 350 suicide boats that the Japanese intended using against the invasion convoys. On Ie Shima the Tenth Army mounted two battalions of 55-mm. guns to support the attack on Okinawa.

On the 27th, 165 B-29s of VIII Bomber Command flew their first scheduled mission against airfields and defense installations in Kyushu. That night the very heavy bombers began setting aerial mines in the Shimokuri Straits in an effort to bottle up shipping in the Inland Sea during the assault.

In preparation for the main landings on 1 April the Navy carried out a seven-day bombardment, and carrier planes raked over the island. It is impossible to estimate the effectiveness of the preparatory operations because the defenders chose to offer only token resistance at the beaches. Maj. Gen. Hitosuru Ushijima, Japanese commander at Okinawa, had instructed his troops: "We must make it our basic principle to allow the enemy to land in full."

Ushijima had withdrawn his garrison into well-prepared defenses, especially in the south on part of the island and had dispersed his forces in great depth. The Japanese on Okinawa, as on Iwo Jima, took every advantage of rugged terrain and inflicted maximum attrition on the Americans. There were over 100,000 enemy troops and they were able to prolong the campaign for 22 days and to inflict 49,000 casualties, of which about 12,500 were killed or missing.

The assault troops had expected the Japanese to put up a fanatical defense, but they had not anticipated a virtual abandonment of the beaches. Marine and Army infantrymen began storming ashore at 0630 on 1 April. By nightfall, 50,000 troops were ashore and held a beachhead along the Hagushi
beaches. During the first days the troops pushed rapidly inland and fanned out to the north and south, well ahead of schedule. By 4 April the Tenth Army held an area 15 miles long and from 3 to 10 miles wide. This beachhead included two airfields, Kadena and Yontan. Air, as well as ground resistance, was light during the first days, but kamikaze planes managed to score hits on the escort vessels, two transports, and an LST.

As the Army and Marine troops prepared to probe the main defenses in the southern and northern regions of the island, the enemy began his air and sea counterattacks. On 6 April the Japanese unleashed a ferocious attack by over 350 kamikaze and almost as many conventional planes. Intercepting such attack, the anti-aircraft and carrier planes destroyed around 300 enemy planes, but not before two destroyers, a minesweeper, two ammunition ships and an LST had been sunk and numerous other vessels damaged. That night the enemy fleet appeared to contest the landings in what was virtually a suicide engagement. Planes from T-58 sank the Yonago, the Yoko, and four destroyers and inflicted serious damage on one destroyer. The last sortie of the Imperial Fleet was thus broken up by air power. But the menace of kamikaze attacks continued.

Meanwhile, from 6 April to 22 June, about 1,900 suicide sorties were flown. For this effort the Japanese were able to sink 25 ships and to score 150 hits and nearly 100 near misses.

In addition to the 5-27 effort, the Fifth Air Force pounded the suicide bases on Okinawa throughout April. The 78 fighters of the 78 Fighter Command also made a direct contribution to the success of the Okinawa campaign. On 16, 19, and 22 April the P-51s worked over the airfields on Kyushu and Shofsuka throughout the rest of the campaign the P-51's made periodic sweeps over airfields in southern Japan. They claimed 64 enemy planes destroyed and 130
downed on the ground, in addition to 10 shot down in combat. To achieve these results the VII Fighter Command lost 11 planes in combat and 7 from other causes. Unfavorable weather and the enemy’s habit of shifting planes from field to field prevented the hoped-for widespread destruction. During the first week of the Okinawa campaign all direct air support was carrier-based. The first two groups of fighter planes to operate out of Yontan and Nakna Fields were Marine aircraft and throughout the operation the Marine pilots were in the majority. By the end of May a total of 270 Corsairs and 20 Army Thunderbolts were operating out of the Yontan, Nakna, and Ie Shima airstrips.

With the liberation of the Philippines and the seizure of Iwo Jima and Okinawa the preliminaries to the final knock-out blow had been accomplished. All the numerous landings in both the Central and Southwest Pacific areas had been aimed toward the final goal—invasion of the home islands. Yet these preliminary operations had in fact accomplished the defeat of the enemy. Severance of surface communications, strategic bombardment, and finally the atomic bomb made the final great amphibious operation in the Pacific unnecessary.
"The lesson of Aisne, with her adherence, it's broken her
influence upon our counsels and it's difficult to see it now, as
of course you know, the one could not break the forward and the other was
impatient of an equal, so that between the pride of one and the intolerance
of the other it was not easily circumvented." This accrued the more that Sellaert
on one hand, had until Carson's expedition against Orsini in 1942, Sellaert
held the concept of one of the great factors well in the successful and
successful operations, where and the no discord. The importance of world war II showed
nothing clearer than the need for unity of command.

The joint operation, unity of command was not there yet it will be one
concept to conduct the joint and balanced forces for the air, ground, naval
forces. The concept it was the best utilization of the capabilities
of the various services and keep it a distance to "division of discord."
So of the future of air power its flexibility, which makes it
possible to employ the whole weight of available air power against selected
targets in turn. Its this flexibility is so employed to the full, control
must be centralized and sound directed through the force commander.
The result is that the air power is individual and systematic. Although the air forces played a near-principal
role than they have been generally given credit for, the full weight of air
power was not brought to bear at critical areas. This situation was corrected
in the Sicilian invasion, and unity of command reestablished in the European
The concept of this doctrine was well illus-

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The critical situation developed in mid-February 1944. By concentrating the full weight of air power in the area under heavy attack, the situation was saved.

In this study an attempt was made to bring out the different types of command arrangements that prevailed in the Pacific. In the Southwest Pacific the principle of unity of command prevailed, and it is believed that in general the best results from the air point of view were achieved there.

The air forces were employed in accordance with their capabilities, coordination between the various forces was of high order, and morale was generally good. In the North, Central, and Southwest Pacific areas where the air forces operated under heavy control, air power was not always employed in accordance with its best capabilities, discord and wrangling between the services arose, and morale, at times at least, was unsatisfactory. The experience in the Pacific showed that if air power is extremely sensitive to any misdirection.

The importance of unity of command was easily demonstrated at Leyte. General Stilwell ordered series of amphibious landings preparatory to his return to the Philippines. He advanced without serious let or hindrance until he moved out of range of his land-based air power. In the landing at Leyte, not only the land-based aircraft but the sound principle of unity of command was left behind. At Leyte General MacArthur, though responsible for the success of the operation, did not have control of the Third Fleet. The withdrawal of the Third Fleet at a critical time in the battle produced a near-disaster, which in all probability could have been avoided had unity of command prevailed.

Looking forward a bit, it might be pointed out that unity of command was
As the Allied Forces approached the end of World War II, the invasion of Japan brought about the end of the war in the Pacific. The problem of coordinating, linking, subordinating, and controlling the forces under common command was then under consideration for air, ground, and naval forces. However, the problems of reconciling, linking, subordinating, and controlling the forces in the Pacific as a single theater of action were not brought about by the coordinated invasion of Japan. After returning to the problems of coordination for months, JCS on 3 April 1945 designated General MacArthur as Commander in Chief in the Pacific with control of all military resources in the Pacific theater, with the exception of those in the Southeast Pacific and in the Jackson Command. By the same order, Admiral Nimitz was given control of all naval resources in the Pacific, less those in the Southeast Pacific. JCS would retain control of the Bantirah air force and normally would charge liaison with land campaigns and Nimitz with sea campaigns. Thus, as before, unity of command was not achieved short of the JCS in Washington.

The World War II experience showed that probably the most important role of air power was in the pre-invasion period. The primary object of the pre-invasion operations is to establish air superiority. The term should be understood to imply a continual, rather than a battle, which does not achieve finality until the enemy air force is vanquished. Air superiority may be local or temporary, as in the early stages of the Pacific war, or widespread and sustained, as in the final phases of the war in Europe. Pre-invasion may be local, or by any means; for that matter, can be used if it is necessary to arrive at a situation in which the enemy air opposition can be dealt with effectively. Air superiority was achieved
in a variety of ways and by the use of all types of aircraft. Times of counter-air operations included air combat, fighter sweeps, and attacks on airfields, installations, supplies (especially fuel), repair bases, and aircraft factories.

The North African operation was unique in that it was preceded by no preparatory bombings. The invasion of Sicily was the first of the large European landings and a carefully planned program of pre-invasion bombardment was carried out. The chief effort was concentrated on airfields. It was learned that attacks to be effective must be well timed and adequate. It was found also that although airfield attacks could not of themselves be expected to defeat the enemy's air forces, such attacks, when properly co-ordinated with the air attacks, would substantially weaken and paralyze the enemy's air forces.

In preparation for D-DAY the Air Force air superiority was wrested over a broad area of the coast of France. This had established air superiority on the coast of their assigned area prior to D-DAY, and that superiority had been gradually extended by the P-47's and P-38's over the coastal area. As the Allied air forces approached the shores of Europe, our air forces, our squadrons of African, and finally into the interior. The largest invasion in history was launched, the attack on the enemy's air force. The invasion of London and since the air invasion was even more helpful.

In Europe, the battle for air superiority in the Atlantic began at the encircling and the naval invasions. By October 1943 the decrease in Allied air power in the Pacific was virtually defeated by American land-and
air superiority and planes tried rally over Trinil. Superiority over the Japanese air force was essentially accomplished by about April 1944, with the air series of 'sweep' operations in the Southwest Pacific that brought the Japanese campaign to a successful conclusion and a 3-5 drive across the Central Pacific extended through the Gilberts to Wall Island. The degree of air superiority was, however, over-estimated in the decision to land in the Philippines without land-based air support.

The use of submarines by the Japanese introduced a new factor in the equation of air superiority. It was demonstrated that even a detected, ill-trained, and poorly equipped air force is capable of causing widespread damage to a concentrated fleet of ships, troop, and supplies. The answer to the problem, attack the submarines in their forward block and in the air before they could do it.

In addition to the inherent danger of air superiority, which then can be countered, an important point of pre-invasion control is the effective coordination of land, air, and sea forces. Submarines can be neutralized, the landing of troop defenses played no important role in the lands in Sicily and Italy. The islands were not heavily defended and air surveillance seems to have been placed in naval vessels and early artillery. An air force effort was directed not at the beaches, which could be neutralized with relative ease, but on communications leading to the assault areas.

In the over-thrown invasion it was a very different story. The whole court of invasion was shielded with many batteries, strong points, and beach obstacles. Experience has shown that costs defense guns, in bocce or
amounts, could only be controlled and made safe by direct hits. Either
air or naval bombardment had much effect on such objectives as anti-air-
craft batteries, time, machine guns, and ordnance concentrations. In view of these
facts, the forces provided primarily air to hold off fire until ev-
ery man had a continuous fire volume of fire. If we had 2,000 defenses
we could use [illegible] during the critical hours of the assault. To
the first of the Army, plans were made to include a long pre-invasion
control point cross defense. So far as can be determined from evidence
from troops that were unscathed, but where unbalanced and dislocated stances were
undamaged, such as from reports to those parts of the air forces took place
before the landing, the [illegible] troops in the [illegible] were shot down.
By all accounts the beach defenses in the landing areas were beaten down and
the defending troops were disorganized by fire as the Allied troops hit the
to shores.

The importance of fixed-based air in softening up operations was brought
into sharp focus in the Pacific theater. In the South and Southwest Pacific
the landing areas were prepared months before the assault and gradually the
areas were made safe with light casualties. The classic example of the saturation
shelling of a landing area was the [illegible] Base, where the defense was
flattened before the troops went in. In the Central Pacific the pattern
was different. In fixed-based air power was used to protect bases already held,
to neutralize lightly-armed bases, and to soften the base to be seized. Generally,
however, the bases to be seized were beyond the effective range of anything
but heavy bombardment, and these were not available in large numbers until late
in the war. The intermittent efforts of the air forces were generally supple-
mented by carrier support. The result was that with the exception of Tinian

[Signature]
(within range of all kinds of aircraft), Buna, and China, the bases were not subjected to sustained heavy bombardment. The heavy casualties at Tarawa, Faiselieh, and Iwo Jima are a matter of history. The striking differences between the relative ease and the extreme difficulty of landing operations in the Southwest Pacific and the Central Pacific cannot be explained by land-based vs. carrier-based air power alone. There were differences in latitude, distance, quality of enemy resistance, and logistical problems that helped to make the Central Pacific landings more costly in lives and equipment. But the greater effectiveness of land-based bombardment should not be obscured or explained away by these other factors.

In the North Pacific, land-based air power was operating under conditions of minimum advantage from the point of view of weather and terrain. The Navy did not think carrier-based aircraft could overcome those disadvantages by their ability to move to the island to score on operations. The record did not prove out this claim. Despite times of particularly bad weather, carrier-based aircraft were no more successful than land-based aircraft in reaching the target. Losses sustained from non-operational causes were as high among carrier as land-based aircraft. The real advantage of carrier-based aircraft derived not from their supposed ability to overcome unfavorable weather but from the increase of firepower that they provided.

In the pre-invasion period of amphibious operations the air forces also played an important role in the carrying-out of deceptive measures. The need for surprise varied with the theater. In the Central Pacific, landings were so or so far apart there was little need for deception. In continental landings where there was a choice of landing areas, tactical surprise was highly desirable. The pre-invasion bombing in the Palau Islands area was conducted to lead the Japanese to expect an invasion at Peleliu and
The cross-channel and Southern France invasions were most evident of the invasion. The pattern of the invasion was not clear until the invasion in the first place. A flak through the armor was made and then the bullets carried around night and. In Southern France fronts were made at both ends and the ball was carried through armor.

The second priority of air force objectives in offensive landings, the isolation of the battlefield, was carried out with varying degrees of success. Isolation of the battlefield involved preventing the movement of troops or supplies to the battle area and within the battle area. This isolation, like the first, began to the assault and continued throughout the operation. Italy was effectively cut off from reinforcements by attacks on the trans-Italian railroads, railroad, and roads along the western coast of the Italian boot, and the small ports in Southern and Eastern Sicily. On the continent of Europe railways assumed particular importance. Although the air force was able to attain considerable success in their attacks on marshaling yards and rolling stock, the effort to isolate the battlefield was the German socalled a success for the new idea that the air was able to assemble troops and to deploy them at different battle fronts. Although air attacks on railroads failed to achieve the objective of isolating the battlefield, they were successful and the experience of these campaigns brought the need for night operations for systematic and lasting isolation of the battlefield. The air war must be attacked around the clock. The air war in Italy led me to question the ability of air power to isolate the battlefield. All such doubts were dispelled by the experience of the cross-channel invasion.

In the Pacific, isolation of the battlefield similarly meant attacks on shipping for land-based objectives are far more distant. In the
Central Pacific the seventh air force was not consistently successful in its anti-shipping strikes, at least during the early stages of the war. Distances were too long generally for the use of medium bombers and the number of heavy bombers was too few for high level hits to be obtained. In the Southwest Pacific area early anti-shipping strikes off Mandalay and Formosa were not too successful. Later, however, the fifth and thirteenth air forces developed a high degree of skill in anti-shipping strikes. When heavy bombers became available in large numbers, standard bomb patterns could be laid down, and results were improved by bombing from lower altitudes than had been used earlier. The B-24 radar-equipped "sneakers" which were introduced in limited numbers beginning in August 1943, proved themselves an effective means of attack. The medium and light bombers, using tactics ingeniously devised in the South and Southwest Pacific areas proved, however, to be the next effective weapons against shipping.

In the assault period of landing operations, the main functions of the air forces were convoy cover, protection of the beachhead, and close support of the ground forces. Convoy cover both by land and carrier-based planes was successful and although ships were damaged and sunk, no convoy was obliged to turn back because of air or sea attack. A beachhead with its concentration of shipping and crowded men and supplies offers a particularly tempting target to enemy aircraft. Aside from Salerno and Anzio the beachheads established in the European war were not subjected to heavy air attacks. In the Pacific the same was true until Iwo Jima, which was subjected to repeated and heavy attacks before land based air power was effectively established. Iwo Jima demonstrated that carrier-based planes can be relied upon to cover a beachhead only for limited periods and that the most advantage of land-based support is its stability cover.
In most of the missions, the air forces are better suited for the direct support of land troops and do not play an essential role. However, air forces are essential for the air superiority mission, which is important for the direct support of land troops. In most cases, air forces are better suited for indirect support missions, which are not as essential for direct support. In the future, it is expected that air forces will play a more significant role in direct support missions.

In addition to direct support missions, air forces are also essential for nuclear deterrence. The nuclear arsenal plays a crucial role in maintaining a balance of power and ensuring peace. The development and deployment of nuclear weapons are essential for maintaining nuclear deterrence. The use of nuclear weapons is a last resort, and only in the event of a direct attack or nuclear threat would nuclear weapons be used.

In conclusion, air forces are essential for both direct and indirect support missions. The development and deployment of nuclear weapons are crucial for maintaining nuclear deterrence. The air forces play a significant role in maintaining air superiority and ensuring peace.

The development of nuclear weapons is a complex and challenging task. It requires significant investment in research and development. The use of nuclear weapons is a last resort, and only in the event of a direct attack or nuclear threat would nuclear weapons be used.
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A word to the wise is sufficient to convey. But it need not be repeated. It is, in fact, better not to do so.

As for the recent events in the Middle East, the situation is complex and difficult. The reasons for these events are multifaceted and rooted in history and other factors. The future remains uncertain, but the past can provide some guidance.

Although it is not within the province of this letter to consider the use of nuclear weapons in possible scenarios, it is useful to note the potential consequences of such an action. Careful consideration should be given to the implications of reversible nuclear threats.

In this context, it is important to note the need for a comprehensive approach to the situation. One thing to consider is the potential for technological, social, and political solutions to the broader issues presented.

The lessons of history provide a valuable foundation for understanding the complexities of contemporary issues.
Chapter III


3. After 1972, the records are not complete. For a list of records, please refer to the following:

4. The records are located in the following locations:


6. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

7. The following are the locations of the records:


9. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

10. The following are the locations of the records:


12. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

13. The following are the locations of the records:


15. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

16. The following are the locations of the records:


18. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

19. The following are the locations of the records:


21. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

22. The following are the locations of the records:


24. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

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27. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

28. The following are the locations of the records:


30. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

31. The following are the locations of the records:


33. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

34. The following are the locations of the records:


36. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

37. The following are the locations of the records:


39. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

40. The following are the locations of the records:


42. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

43. The following are the locations of the records:


45. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

46. The following are the locations of the records:


48. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

49. The following are the locations of the records:


51. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

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54. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

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57. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

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60. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

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63. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

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66. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

67. The following are the locations of the records:


69. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

70. The following are the locations of the records:


72. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

73. The following are the locations of the records:


75. Request received, 1972-1977, IAW:

76. The following are the locations of the records:

32. 12th AT Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 25, 10-16 July 1943.

33. tent. of 12; tent. of 152.

40. USMC's Participation in the Sicilian Campaign from 15 June through 24 July.
NOTES

Chapter II

1. K.S. In 11, 12, 13, 421-423; Air Force History No. 15, Air Task of the 16th Bomber Command to 1 January 1944, pp. 1-42.


3. 


5. Ibid., p. 61-63.

6. Ibid., p. 67; Air Plan for 1944, p. 67 (1945).

7. Ibid., p. 62.

8. Ibid., pp. 63-65.

9. Ibid., p. 62.

10. Ibid., p. 62.

11. Ibid., p. 62.

12. Ibid., p. 62.

13. Ibid., p. 62.


15. Ibid., p. 62.

16. Ibid., p. 62.

17. Ibid., p. 62.

18. Ibid., p. 62.

19. Ibid., p. 62.

20. Ibid., p. 62.


22. Ibid., p. 62.

23. Ibid., p. 62.

24. Ibid., p. 62.
38. "Ibid.," pp. 139-140.
40. "Ibid.," pp. 143-144.
43. "Ibid.," pp. 149-150.
44. "Ibid.," pp. 151-152.
70. "Ibid.," pp. 203-204.
78. "Ibid.," pp. 219-220.
Chapter 7


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36. Ibid.; Leigh-Mallory's Scrapbook, paragraphs 137-152.


39. WM-73, Effectiveness of Third Phase Tactical Operations, p. 61.


41. See note above.

42. WM-73, Effectiveness of Third Phase Tactical Operations, p. 61; Ninth Air Force Invasion Activities, p. 53.

43. Draft WM-70, p. 33; 11th EPMD, XII, 194.

44. WM-36, p. 51.

45. WM-73, Effectiveness of Third Phase Tactical Operations, p. 61.


47. 11th EPMD, Hist., 70th Fighter-Bomber Wing, June 1944.


49. WM-73, Effectiveness of Third Phase Tactical Operations, pp. 75-76.

50. Ibid.


52. WM-73, Effectiveness of Air Attack Against Rail Transportation, pp. 27, 86.

53. Ibid., p. 29.
Security Information

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Chapter XIII


9. USMC, The Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against Japan, p. 3.


11. Ibid., IV, 36.


13. "Roosevelt, after a study of the ship's logs, concludes that there was no fuel crisis. The Struggle for Guadalcanal (Boston, 1950), pp. 27-29.


15. Ibid., p. 67.

16. As quoted in Miller, Guadalcanal, p. 85.


18. Ibid., pp. 6-8.


213
Chapter 1

1. "In 7th, 4th, 6th, 9th, 35th.


4. Seco. 3rd Part of I. Mitchell Interception by Col. M. E. Hlavac,


6. CSV, Col. Treby's, for Mitchells 3rd. Part.

7. CSV, Sec. 3rd Part of Mitchell Interception by Col. M. E. Hlavac,

8. CSV, Sec. 3rd Part of Mitchell Interception by Col. M. E. Hlavac,

9. CSV, Sec. 3rd Part of Mitchell Interception by Col. M. E. Hlavac,

10. CSV, Sec. 3rd Part of Mitchell Interception by Col. M. E. Hlavac,

11. CSV, Sec. 3rd Part of Mitchell Interception by Col. M. E. Hlavac,

12. CSV, Sec. 3rd Part of Mitchell Interception by Col. M. E. Hlavac,

13. CSV, Sec. 3rd Part of Mitchell Interception by Col. M. E. Hlavac,

14. CSV, Sec. 3rd Part of Mitchell Interception by Col. M. E. Hlavac,

15. CSV, Sec. 3rd Part of Mitchell Interception by Col. M. E. Hlavac,

16. CSV, Sec. 3rd Part of Mitchell Interception by Col. M. E. Hlavac,

17. CSV, Sec. 3rd Part of Mitchell Interception by Col. M. E. Hlavac,

18. CSV, Sec. 3rd Part of Mitchell Interception by Col. M. E. Hlavac,

19. CSV, Sec. 3rd Part of Mitchell Interception by Col. M. E. Hlavac,

20. CSV, Sec. 3rd Part of Mitchell Interception by Col. M. E. Hlavac,

21. CSV, Sec. 3rd Part of Mitchell Interception by Col. M. E. Hlavac,


26. 8-3 Hist. 11th W; 11th W Combat Activities; C.I = 030, Work to Con trol, 120, 15 July 1943.


30. See note above.


32. 11th W Statistical Summary; Hist. 11th W, p. 277.


Chapter X

11. "IF in IV, IV, 221.
15. "IF in IV, IV, 559, 563.
1. 7 in... (M.4, 1952), p. 30-335; Hist. Air Force Hist., I, 29-335; 3-355. The

7th in... Air Force in the... 1942, p. 1. 15.

Historical Review concludes that "... of the movement whereby the 7th Base Unit was under the control of the U.S. forces in the South Pacific, it is not known... in the Central Pacific... given to certain personalities." 

Schulman, Gilberts, and... 1942-44 (Boston, 1961), p. 177.

2. Lecture by Gen. C. S. Sheppard, Jr. (1950), At Armed Forces


3. "... Air Command of the Pacific War," p. 25-35.

4. Richard... Johnson, Fuller, "The Story of the Second Marine Division


The Battlefront," p. 192.

5. USSS, Air Command of the Pacific War, p. 25.


7. During the... Division attack the 11th and 13th Air Groups were based

at Panatula, Adak, and Kiska, 12th in... 25, p. 25.

8. "... Historical Study... Operational History of the... Air Force, 6 Nov. 1943 to 31 July 1944," p. 1-124; Johnson, Fuller's


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16. in, 11, 16, 32.
24. USMC T. J. T. J. Ambushes 0-0-8-9s in the Marshall Islands, Jan. - Feb. 1944, op. 1-22 to 1-26; 0-0-8-9s, op. 1-10.
25. USMC T. J. T. J. Ambushes 0-0-8-9s in the Marshall Islands, Jan. - Feb. 1944, op. 1-22 to 1-26; 0-0-8-9s, op. 1-10.
27. USMC T. J. T. J. Ambushes 0-0-8-9s in the Marshall Islands, Jan. - Feb. 1944, op. 1-22 to 1-26; 0-0-8-9s, op. 1-10.
29. USMC T. J. T. J. Ambushes 0-0-8-9s in the Marshall Islands, Jan. - Feb. 1944, op. 1-22 to 1-26; 0-0-8-9s, op. 1-10.
30. USMC T. J. T. J. Ambushes 0-0-8-9s in the Marshall Islands, Jan. - Feb. 1944, op. 1-22 to 1-26; 0-0-8-9s, op. 1-10.
31. USMC T. J. T. J. Ambushes 0-0-8-9s in the Marshall Islands, Jan. - Feb. 1944, op. 1-22 to 1-26; 0-0-8-9s, op. 1-10.
32. USMC T. J. T. J. Ambushes 0-0-8-9s in the Marshall Islands, Jan. - Feb. 1944, op. 1-22 to 1-26; 0-0-8-9s, op. 1-10.
33. USMC T. J. T. J. Ambushes 0-0-8-9s in the Marshall Islands, Jan. - Feb. 1944, op. 1-22 to 1-26; 0-0-8-9s, op. 1-10.
34. USMC T. J. T. J. Ambushes 0-0-8-9s in the Marshall Islands, Jan. - Feb. 1944, op. 1-22 to 1-26; 0-0-8-9s, op. 1-10.

The new mission would be related to existing operations in the area. It would involve the establishment of a new base, which would serve as a hub for various activities including intelligence gathering, combat support, and logistics. The base would be located near the current site and would be equipped with modern facilities to support the mission.

In addition to the primary mission, there would be a focus on improving relations with local communities. This would involve establishing partnerships with local organizations and implementing programs to support local development.

The new mission would require a significant investment in personnel and equipment. It would also require coordination with other agencies and organizations to ensure smooth operations.

The mission would be led by a team of experienced officers, with a focus on ensuring the safety and security of the operation. The team would be supported by a robust logistics and support network to ensure that all necessary resources are available.

Overall, the new mission represents a significant opportunity to expand our presence in the area and to support the long-term stability of the region.