THE DEVELOPMENT AND FUNCTIONS OF AAF OCS AND OTS

1942-1951

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FOREWORD

This monograph studies the history of administrative officer training in the AAF during the 10-year period, 1942-1951. The origin and development of the Officer Candidate School is presented in two sections: the wartime OCS and the activities of the school during the postwar years. Furthermore, the picture is completed by a study of the Officer Training School which functioned in conjunction with OCS during the wartime period.

This study was written by Dr. C. L. Grant, USAF Historical Division, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Like other Historical Division studies, this history is subject to revision, and additional information or suggested corrections will be welcomed.
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Chapter I
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE AAF OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL

The gradual transition of the Air Corps to wartime strength, which had begun in 1939, slowly disclosed one outstanding deficiency—no provision had been made for the training of nonflying officer personnel. In the small air arm which had existed before 1939, there had been no need for trained ground officers because pilots performed all administrative duties. Indeed, as late as 3 August 1940 it was thought that there was no reason for departing from this practice.\(^1\) By the following year the other branches of the service had taken cognizance of the growing need for officers, and a directive from the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, dated 26 April 1941, authorized the establishment of officer candidate schools. Quotas, locations, and opening dates for the various schools were designated. The Air Corps, however, was not among the branches of the service authorized to establish such schools; instead, a quota of 50 in the officer candidate schools of the other branches was allotted for the training of Air Corps officers.\(^2\) Then the Air Corps asked to have this quota increased to 400, the request was refused on the basis that "the present schools [photographic, communications, etc.\(^7\)] will turn out more officers than the Air Corps can absorb within the period of one year."**

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\(^{**}\)The practice of training Air Corps personnel in officer candidate schools of the other branches continued until May 1942. (lst ind. Ltr., Hq. I OTCG to GG A F attn.: RIT, 1 May 1942, Hq. A F to GG AGTG, 12 May 1942, in DFS, 352.9 Officer Candidate Schools.)
Despite this refusal, the increasing demand for administrative officers stimulated the Air Corps to begin action for the establishment of an officer candidate school primarily to satisfy its own needs; on 3 September 1941 Maj. Gen. George H. Brett, Chief of Air Corps, requested consideration of a proposal to establish a school for the training of Air Corps supply and engineering officers. This could be done under the provisions of the 26 April War Department directive, and, adequate facilities being available at the San Antonio Air Depot, Duncan Field, Texas, classes could begin about 1 January 1942. Classes of 60 students could be entered every 3 months until 400 officers had been graduated. Acting upon this proposal, the Maintenance Command issued a memorandum directing the establishment of the school. In addition to the details outlined by the Chief of Air Corps, it was specified that 1) students should be the "highest type available"—they should possess adequate educational backgrounds and have AGCT scores of 110 or higher; 2) only warrant officers and enlisted men who had completed five months of continuous service in the Air Corps immediately prior to entrance should be considered; 3) students should be citizens between 21 and 29 years of age; 4) students should agree to serve at least one year after successful completion of the course; and 5) graduates would be commissioned as second lieutenants, Air Corps (nonrated) in the Army of the United States or the Officers Reserve Corps—nongraduates would be returned at once to their units. Although the plan was apparently ready for implementation, after the maximum age was raised to 35 and the total number of graduates to 800, its inadequacy was recognized before it
could be approved. In a memorandum to the Chief of Air Corps, the Assistant Air Adjutant General, Lt. Col. John B. Cooley, pointed out that in addition to those officers then on duty, approximately 12,000 ground officers (mess, transportation, adjutants, etc.) would be required by the Air Corps. Although part of this requirement would be met by men commissioned directly from civil life, most of these would be too old for junior officer duty; therefore, it appeared necessary to establish officer candidate schools for the Air Corps immediately. Four schools, capable of graduating officers at a total annual rate of 8,000, should be established—two each for the training of adjutants, mess officers, transportation officers, and supply officers. Cooley suggested that initially candidates for these three-month courses could be selected from flying training eliminees.7

After a thorough study of the problem, the Training Division agreed with Cooley on the proposed source of students, the rate of graduates, and the subject matter to be covered. As there was no assurance that an officer trained in one of the four proposed specialties would be used in his specialty, the Training Division did not concur in the need for four schools; instead, one school offering a regular administrative course would more adequately meet Air Corps requirements. This course—which would be taken by students selected from eliminated aviation cadets and pursued in the grade of aviation cadet*—might consist of four weeks of

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*The reasons for selecting ex-cadets are given in chapter II.
general training and eight weeks of special administrative training. By means of a 12-week course with a new class entering each 4 weeks, which would allow the 2 upper classes to gain experience by handling the incoming men, 10 classes of 800 could be graduated the first year and 11 the following year. Since an undertaking of this size—maximum operation would be a student strength of 2,400—would overburden the regular establishment of either the Technical Training Command or the Flying Training Command, both of which were expanding their own facilities, it was recommended that a project officer or engineers under the FTC conduct the organization and operation of the school. Although the general requirements were not yet agreed upon, the Flying Training Command was directed to provide for the establishment of an officer candidate school. In turn the project was referred on 2 February 1942 to the commanding general of the Gulf Coast Air Corps Training Center (GC-ACTC) at Randolph Field, who was requested to survey his training center area to determine if the necessary facilities were available.* Since FTC received permission on 5 February from GC-ACTC to set up one school rather than the four previously recommended, GC-ACTC was informed that the establishment of the entire project at one institution was desired and that construction of new facilities was to be held to a minimum. Texas A&M, the University of Texas, Oklahoma A&M, and the University of Missouri were suggested as possible locations.11

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*Although consideration of Duncan Field as a site for the OCS was abandoned, some training of maintenance and supply officers was carried on at that station. (R&R, AF Combat Cmd., to G/OF, sub: Memorandum to AGO—Establishment of A.O. Officer Candidate School, 25 Sept., 1942, in ODD 352, O.C. School, Miami Beach, Fla.; Hist. San Antonio Air Service Cmd. [San Antonio Air Depot], Inception to 1 Feb. 1943, p. 97.)
Before action could be started by CCG CTC, the project was taken from FTC, and Brig. Gen. Walter B. Weaver, the new head of the AAF Technical Training Command, was directed on 17 February to "initiate action to create and operate an officer candidate school at such place as he may select" and to establish any other ground officer training schools he deemed necessary. In opening these schools full advantage was to be taken of all available sources of military experience, and to aid in the selection of candidates, tests were to be sent to all Air Corps installations. Any schools deemed necessary were to be set up at once even if only 10 or 20 candidates were available for the first class. As a possible general site for a new school, General Weaver, who had been impressed with the facilities for the year-round training of troops during a visit to southern Florida in the summer of 1941, suggested this location, and attention of the planners was shifted to the Miami Beach area. General Weaver contacted the business leaders of Miami Beach in regard to the establishment of a school, and three weeks later their report had been submitted to CCG. Using this report as a basis for discussion, a conference attended by General Weaver, Maj. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, O/AS, and Col. F. Trubee Davison, AC/AS-I decided on 17 February 1942 that the school should be located at Miami Beach and that existing facilities should be utilized. It was agreed that all efforts should be concentrated on the establishment of one central school for the training of officer candidates, its capacity to be 4,000 resident students.

*For reasons of security, approval for the establishment of the school in the Miami Beach area had to be obtained from the Navy. This had been done by General Weaver.*
Once this decision had been reached, the air Corps moved with surprising rapidity. Twenty-five Artillery officers, experienced as officer training instructors, were ordered to arrive at the school by 20 February to be available for six months, after which period they would be replaced by instructors selected from the first officer candidate class. To form the permanent party of the school, two school squadrons were ordered to report from Keesler Field, Mississippi. Arrangements were made for the necessary supplies, a curriculum was prepared, and final negotiations for the leasing of the required buildings were carried out within the next few days. With arrangements completed, 500 candidates, obtained from a list of enlisted men already classified as officer candidates, were ordered to report to Miami Beach not later than 22 February so that classes might begin the following day.\footnote{16} As a result of these preparations, six days after the decision was made to locate the school at Miami Beach, instruction of 376 officer candidates began (Class 1932-A eventually contained 549 candidates).

As might have been expected, the fact that the Officer Candidate School was created in such haste resulted in some shortcomings. By the leasing of many of the resort hotels for which Miami Beach was famous, sufficient housing facilities for candidates and administrative personnel were secured (the availability of these hotels was, of course, a potent factor in the selection of Miami Beach as the site of OCC);\footnote{17} however, space for classrooms was virtually nonexistent when the school opened. When weather permitted, classes were held on golf courses, and during unfavorable weather, hotel lobbies, night clubs, and store buildings
were utilized. This unsatisfactory crowding continued until August when 100 wooden classrooms, immediately dubbed by candidates as "chicken coops," were constructed on the North Municipal Golf Course. Training aids, such as manuals, charts, and maps, were also so inadequate that instruction in some courses was difficult. Despite these shortcomings, the school functioned with surprising smoothness from the beginning.

Although the speed and efficiency exhibited by the Air Corps in establishing the OCS was commended by most observers, some objection from the public was perhaps inevitable as a result of the decision to locate at Miami Beach. One correspondent requested "good reasons" for stationing earnest young soldiers in the middle of a "gay beach life" dominated by wine, women, and racing, as well as for leasing expensive resort facilities to house an Army camp. In reply, the Air Corps stated that conditions at Miami Beach would be improved by the presence of thousands of your American boys; furthermore, the economic welfare of the community and the nation would be aided by using idle property. More important, however, was the Air Corps' belief that time did not permit the construction of new facilities if the officer candidate program was to be carried out. Even though such criticism was not widespread, the Air Corps recognized the possibility of public reaction which might result from a bad press. The publication of some photographs depicting a life of luxury and ease for the officer candidates caused Headquarters AAF to caution that a "hostile press or a 'miscreaking' editor could publish these same photographs with captions referring to 'fighting men' and bring adverse and unwarranted criticism" which might jeopardize the entire program. Therefore, the AAF
Public Relations Office was directed to "initiate immediate action to build a public immunity against the publicity which is believed inevitable, particularly in the Miami Beach area." Criticism was not to be throttled. Headquarters emphasized, but it was desired that the entire project "be presented initially in a correct and favorable light." To do this, stress was to be placed on the availability of the facilities and the climatic advantages of the region.\textsuperscript{20} No fear need be entertained, Brig. Gen. Ralph H. Wooten, new commander of the area responded, if he was granted permission to present the facts and figures concerning the utilization of the resort facilities.\textsuperscript{21} Press releases thereafter stressed the rigorous training received by the candidates; and since further criticism of the location was seldom heard, the A&F was apparently successful in its publicity efforts.\textsuperscript{22}

Some local criticism was also occasionally heard in regard to the OCS policy toward colored officer candidates. As early as April 1942 T&G had directed that the need for Negro officers was urgent and that a proportionate share of each OCS quota was to be suballotted to colored units; commanders were instructed to "make every effort to secure qualified colored officer candidates from these sources."\textsuperscript{23} As a result, Negro candidates were included in most A&F OCS classes, and despite the location of the school in the South, few difficulties were encountered. Except for sleeping quarters, colored candidates were not segregated while on

\textsuperscript{20}One press release forecast a low hospitalization rate among the trainees because of the ideal climate, excellent living conditions, and abundant recreational facilities in the area. (Press release, 10 May 1942, in DRS 000.7 Press Release.)
the post—off the post it was necessary for them to abide by the local customs. Because of local customs, in June 1942 the Directorate of Individual Training received “several and emphatic Congressional representations” against further training of Negroes at the OGS.25 The Military Personnel Division pointed out, however, that this training was in accord with War Department policy that the race of the individual was immaterial when being considered for officer candidate training and declared that Negroes would continue to be sent to Miami Beach.26 To a suggestion that a separate officer candidate school for colored personnel be established, Maj. Gen. George L. Stratemeyer, Chief of Air Staff, was more emphatic. He replied: “I don’t want any colored school any place to be conducted as a segregated school. With reference to colored Officer Candidates at Miami Beach, I want them treated just like white Officer Candidates. They will go to the same classes, to the same drills, and eat in mess halls the same as the whites.”27 This attitude was to prevail throughout the existence of the OGS, and colored candidates continued to receive the same treatment and training as the white candidates.*

Meanwhile, the relationship of the new school with higher headquarters underwent some significant changes.† The original directive authorizing

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*By 1943 nondegregation was complete in that all candidates, regardless of color, were quartered together. (Interview with Capt. Fred H. Smith, Jr., Adjutant, Hq. Officer Military Schools (former Assistant Chief, Training, OGS), 2-4 Nov. 1953. (Hereinafter cited as Smith Interview).

†A recommendation by AAF/OS-I that an Army regulation be issued covering the establishment of AAF OGS was disapproved by the War Department. (Memo for C/AAF from OGS, sub.: Army Air Force Candidate School, 2 Mar. 1942, in RB, 352.9.0.C. School, Miami Beach, Fla.)
the school's establishment had put it under the control of O/AC and "under the supervision and jurisdiction" of the general commanding the Air Corps Technical Training Command (ACTTC), but gave it a status outside of TTC channels.\textsuperscript{28} For administration and supply, however, a more immediate supervisory unit was essential; hence, shortly after the opening of the OCS, the Air Forces Technical Training Command, Miami Beach, Florida, soon redesignated Miami Area, First District, ACTTC, came into existence commanded by General Wooten. As plans were made for the expansion of operations, all ACTTC activities in the area were combined for purposes of administration and supply into this subcommand.\textsuperscript{29} On 9 July 1942 this designation was changed to Miami Beach Schools, and on 20 August 1943, it became the Miami Beach Training Base. Finally, on 9 October 1943, the numerous activities in the Miami Beach area were combined into AAF Training Center No. 1.\textsuperscript{30}

Although the OCS thus became part of a vast training center, it retained its own identity during this period, but, as a separate unit, it encountered great difficulty in creating an efficient operating organization. General supervision of all personnel and activities was centralized in OCS headquarters under a commanding officer (commandant). To assist him in administrative functions, training, and policy-making, there was a staff of officers varying constantly in composition but usually including an executive, a director of training (supplemented for a time by a director of OCS), an adjutant, a material officer, a personnel officer, and a secretary.* Because no clear delineation between administrative and policy-

\*This was one of the most important positions and the secretarial staff at one time included 9 officers, 1/6 enlisted men and 36 civilians. The secretary and his staff handled not only all records pertaining to administration and training but performed such duties as supervising classrooms and maintaining the library. ([Hist. OCS, 19 Feb. 1942-24 July 1943, pp. 65-67.]
making authority existed during much of the period at Miami Beach, conflicts frequently arose between the officers assigned to the various functions. Furthermore, the confusion was aggravated by frequent losses of personnel through reassignment and because of many changes of duties within the school. *As a consequence* of no clear jurisdictional lines between the various positions, wrote the OCS historian, *the conflict between several dominant personalities both within and outside of OCS grew sharper until the situation became intolerable.*  

The actual training of the officer candidates was divided between a military and an academic department. The relationship of the academic and military instructors to OCS headquarters further emphasized the centralized nature of the school's organization; all instructors, including some civilians, were assigned to headquarters and functioned directly under it. As many training units as were required by the size of the officer candidate enrollment were provided in the form of wings, groups, and squadrons; these were merely skeletal organizations functioning as part of headquarters for housekeeping and training purposes. For the most part, officers and noncommissioned officers of these wings, groups, and squadrons were appointed from the officer candidate corps.  

By June 1943 several weaknesses had become apparent in this structure. Much time and effort was being lost because of the inaccessibility of the records retained at the school headquarters. Furthermore, the instructors, who often taught one subject exclusively and consequently had

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*During the first 16 months of the school's operation it had 6 commanding officers, 5 executive officers, 5 directors of training, and 4 adjutants. (Hist. OCS, 1 Mar.-1 July 1944, p. 27.)*
considerable idle time between classes, were not being utilized efficiently. Assigned to headquarters, the instructors rarely were able to become personally acquainted with the candidates and thereby often had little interest in or enthusiasm for instructing; and too many of them were specialists who were unable to present their subjects as a part of a unified program. When the announcement was made that the officer candidate course would be increased to 16 weeks effective with the class to enter on 28 June 1943, a reorganization of the entire administrative structure appeared to be essential.

This reorganization, which became effective 25 July 1943, decentralized many of the administrative activities in the interest of economy and more efficient use of personnel. Record keeping, such as payrolls and service records of the officer candidates, was delegated to the school squadrons, which became instructional units. The academic and military departments were consolidated into a single department under a director of training. In order to increase the amount of practical training received by the candidates, it was directed that a "constant effort will be made by all officers to eliminate the use of enlisted personnel in squadron duties and the substitution therefore of officer candidates, in rotation."

Perhaps most important, instructors were relieved of assignment to headquarters and were assigned to the school squadrons to learn all phases of administration. They would no longer specialize in one subject but would be rotated among teaching assignments, a practice expected to stimulate interest as well as to make them more valuable as officers.
Lastly, it was stressed that instructors should have more contact with the candidates; to promote such contact, schedules were arranged so that candidates would receive instruction (during the first part of the course) almost exclusively from officers of their own squadrons. Under this decentralized structure, responsibility for instruction was placed on the commanding officers of the school groups and squadrons, and any alterations or recommendations in respect to schedules or procedures were to be made by the group commanding officers through the commanding officers of the squadrons. To the latter were delegated the responsibilities of supervising instruction, assigning instructors (under the direction of the group commanding officers), receiving and recording grades, and counseling officer candidates. Assisting the squadron commanding officers were certain officers, designated senior instructors, who functioned in a supervisory capacity. At the risk of losing control over the functions of the school, therefore, OCS headquarters eradicated many of the administrative deficiencies by this reorganization. Not until the enrollment was too small to justify such loose control by headquarters was the former structure reinstated.*

In addition to an internal organization which tended to be faulty, largely because it was based on stereotyped military structure rather than on the needs of the school, the OCS was handicapped from the beginning by a shortage of personnel, particularly competent instructors. Graduates of the school replaced the original instructors from the

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*With an increase of enrollment in 1950, a compromise was reached by which administration of the school remained centralized while training was decentralized. (Smith Interview).
Field Artillery and many often proved better qualified for field work than instruction; furthermore, despite the use of civilians, a shortage developed when the number of instructors allowed to be returned by the school failed to keep pace with the increased enrollment. Consequently, at various times it became necessary to use as instructors officer candidates still in training who had previous experience in teaching or who were ranked highest in their classes. Candidates selected for this duty were given some special instruction, were frozen in their class standings, and were allowed to graduate with their classes.\textsuperscript{37}

Although this procedure was detrimental both to the training of the candidate-instructors and to the general level of instruction, no alternative was apparent and the practice was continued as long as the enrollment remained high. The OCS was also frequently handicapped by loss of competent personnel and by great difficulty in obtaining promotions for assigned officers and enlisted men. In March 1944 it was reported to Headquarters AAF that 469 officers had been transferred from the school since 1 January 1943, many without the consent of the OCS, and it often happened that outstanding officers lost in this manner were replaced with officers less well qualified for their duties.\textsuperscript{*} In the matter of promotions, 50 per cent of the officer strength was eligible, some having been in grade for two years. Much the same situation existed among the enlisted personnel assigned to the school, and the subsequent effect on the morale of all concerned was bound to be noticeable in the operations of the school.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{*This practice continued until the publication of AFR 36-64, 21 May 1952, which set up a three year tour of duty for Air Training Command instructors.
One important step which tended to improve the quality of instruction had been taken early in the existence of the OCS. When it was recognized that many of the instructors who had been selected from the graduating classes were better qualified for field duty than for teaching, a rotation plan was suggested which would allow the OCS to exchange for those unsatisfactory instructors members of future graduating classes who appeared to possess instructor qualifications. In addition to allowing the school to replace undesirable instructors, this plan would make possible the relieving of officers who were growing stale from teaching the same subjects too long. In order to institute this plan, it was recommended that the OCS be given authority to retain 20 graduates from each class in addition to its normal quota for replacing losses. The total output of the school would not be reduced by this plan, more experienced officers would be sent to the field, and it would serve to keep the OCS instructional staff on its toes.\textsuperscript{39} Headquarters \textit{Air} agreed with the proposed rotation plan and, in granting approval, gave the OCS permission to replace as many as 15 per cent of its instructors in this manner at the end of each class; this could result in a complete turnover of the instructional staff every seven months if the OCS desired.\textsuperscript{40}

Despite these handicaps and deficiencies, which were only partly relieved by the rotation plan, the output of newly commissioned officers by the school was unimpeached. On 11 May 1942, less than three months after the decision was made to locate the school at Miami Beach, 516 men of
Class 1942-A* received commissions as second lieutenants. Enrollment increased rapidly thereafter until on 30 September 1942 a peak load of 9,733 officer candidates was under instruction, including the largest class, 1942-F, which entered 4,128 candidates and graduated 3,694 (including 13 colored candidates). This large enrollment continued until the entrance of only 589 members of Class 1943-D on 6 March 1943 indicated that, although total enrollment was to remain over 2,000 until June 1944, the most pressing requirements for administrative officers had been met.

With the immediate demand for officers satisfied, suggestions for discontinuing the OCS or combining it with officer candidate schools of other branches were occasionally heard from the beginning of the summer of 1943. Some sentiment also existed in favor of combining all officer candidate schools into a single school at Fort Benning, Georgia, for all arms and services, but when the OCS commanding officer was asked for his opinion of such an undertaking by the TTO executive officer, he approved only if the integrity and identity of the AAF school were maintained. In his judgment the requirements for AAF officers were too dissimilar from those for officers of the other branches for effective training to be carried on in a joint course. The reply of the executive officer, "Don't get anyone upset about this—it is just an idea," made it apparent that nothing was to be done for the time being.

During August 1943 the AAF was informed that the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, was considering the standardization of the curricula

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*The commanding officer of OCS requested that classes be designated by the full year—this would avoid confusion with the other AAF schools which used the last two numbers of the year. (Ltr., Lt. Col. J. S. Stowell to O/AC, sub.: Flow of Officer Candidate Trainees, 25 Feb. 1942, in KCGC 352 Technical and Service Schools (Misc.), 1 Jan.-30 Mar. 1942.)
at the various officer candidate schools. In voicing its objections, the AAF pointed out that many differences existed between the type of training needed for AAF officers and that required by the other arms and services; the classification system and the AAF regulations were cited as proof of such a difference. Despite AAF objections, consideration of the officer candidate school merger continued, and on 29 November 1943 the assistant chief of staff announced a tentative reorganizational plan. A Branch Immaterial Officer Candidate School would be established at which all candidates regardless of arm or service would receive basic officer training for three months, upon conclusion of which they would undergo three months special training at the school of the arm or service for which selected. Although successful candidates would be returned to their original branch as far as possible, careful consideration in assignment would be given to "individual qualifications, existing needs and personal preferences." This plan did not necessarily call for the discontinuance of other officer candidate schools, yet those branches with relatively small quotas would be permitted to discontinue their schools and "assign graduates of the Branch Immaterial School directly to the basic officer course for technical training."46

In registering its objections to this plan, the AAF expressed satisfaction with the four months' course which it then had in operation; three months would not be sufficient. Furthermore, the course at Miami Beach offered adequate coverage of those subjects that were included in the proposed basic officer course and a change to the proposed plan would create a three months' period during which no officers would
be produced. The most important objection, however, concerned the type of officers required by the AAF. Many of the officer candidates in training at OCS were specialists chosen because of outstanding experience or qualifications such as those who, after eight weeks of training at OCS, were sent to a special school for statistical officers at Harvard University.* It was imperative that the AAF lose none of these specialists which might occur in the operation of the proposed combined officer candidate school. For these reasons, the AAF recommended that it be exempt from participation in the proposed reorganization. 17 Although rumors of the disbandment of the OCS were often heard, 18 continued separate operation of the school indicated that the AAF arguments were effective.

Despite the disappearance of this threat to the existence of the OCS, a reorganization in the spring of 1944 resulted in an almost complete loss of the school's identity. Training Command Memorandum 20-5, 1 April 1944, ordered the disbanding of all units not operation on a table of organization and authorized one AAF base unit for each AAF base or installation except "where operations are conducted by two (2) separate commands." As the OCS was not considered a separate command, on 30 April it became part of the 3504th Base Unit, AAF Training Center No. 1. Under this reorganization, the commanding officer of OCS became the director of officer candidate training and he and his staff became directly responsible to the commanding general of the training center, who was designated as OCS commandant. OCS headquarters protested

*See chap. IV.
immediately, pointing out that in effect the school ceased to exist and became merely a section of the training center under the new organization. As this reorganization disregarded the directives under which the school had been functioning, CSC recommended that the school be set up as a separate base unit. The Training Command disapproved this recommendation because CSC was considered an integral part of AAFTC No. 1, leaving the school as a subordinate unit of the training center.

At the same time that the CSC was being subordinated to the training center, it was becoming apparent that the existence of the school at Miami Beach was nearly at an end. Thus, early in March 1944, in line with a general policy of gradually removing all training activities from leased property as soon as they could be absorbed by regular military establishments, the commanding general of the Training Command requested the transfer of the school to the San Antonio Aviation Cadet Center. The CSC was to be activated at its new location on 1 April 1944 under the control of Commanding General, AAF and "under the immediate supervision and jurisdiction" of the Commanding General, AAFTC. In order to make the movement with a minimum of training interruption, the school at Miami Beach would not be discontinued until 1 July when all of the enrolled candidates would have been graduated. According to the Miami Beach press, the movement to San Antonio was carried out efficiently. "Sixty candidates and more than 200 other persons," departed from Miami Beach on 6 April to prepare the new CSC site for a class scheduled to enter on 17 April. Equipment was moved by long-distance moving vans.
rather than by the slower freight trains, and the OCS personnel who
loaded the vans in Miami Beach arrived at SAACC by train in time to
unload. As a result, instruction of Class 1944-H began at San Antonio
on schedule although the entire movement was not completed until 1 July--
the official date of transfer of the OCS headquarters to SAACC.

Upon arrival in Texas, the OCS found itself deprived of its former
independent status to an even greater extent than at Miami Beach, for
rather than operating "under the immediate supervision and jurisdiction
of the Commanding General, MAFC," it was to function through SAACC and
the Central Flying Training Command. In addition to the personnel which
had been lost at Miami Beach, the OCS mess detachment and the chaplain
were reassigned to SAACC and the rotation of instructors which had proved
so effective would henceforth be subject to approval by SAACC. In
the interest of administrative efficiency, therefore, the OCS had become
by mid-1944, merely a subordinate section of SAACC.

Shortly after the movement of OCS to Texas, the size of the incoming
officer candidate classes was reduced to 50, necessitating a complete
change in the internal structure of the school. As the decentralized
plan which had been instituted in July 1943 was no longer feasible with
such a small enrollment, control of all activities was returned to the
office of the director, and white officer candidates were placed in one
section* and the training staff in another. Several internal changes
were made also, particularly in the functions of the various supervisory

*Colored candidates were trained and messed with white candidates but
were quartered separately.
officers, so that the new arrangement operated more satisfactorily with the small staff which was required.

In May 1945 it was decided to transfer the OGS to Maxwell Field in order that SAOG might be converted to a redistribution station and convalescent center. The movement, under way by 31 May, continued until 14 June and again the transfer was carried out with a minimum of interruption in the training program—less than a week of instruction was lost. At Maxwell Field the OGS joined the Preflight School to form the Preflight Officer Candidate School Project but otherwise remained the same as at SAOG. "By the end of June," it was reported, "all phases of the training program were running smoothly, and the new organization had taken its place as an important part of the training at Maxwell Field."
Chapter II
SELECTING THE OFFICER CANDIDATE

The success of any course of instruction depends to a large extent on the quality of the students enrolled, as was particularly evident in the selection of prospective officers. Unless officer candidates were chosen with care, not only did the quality of the graduates suffer, but the percentage of students unable to complete the course tended to increase alarmingly. Although the selection of candidates for the AAF Officer Candidate School for the most part was never placed on a scientific basis, the AAF attempted to enroll only the best qualified men. As an aid in selecting the best candidates, a policy directive of 13 February 1942, prior to the opening of the school, indicated two sources of candidates: aviation cadets who had failed to reach the required standards in flying training, and warrant officers or enlisted men of the Air Corps who possessed certain qualifications.* It was anticipated that quotas could be filled from these groups without resorting to widespread recruiting of candidates.

Of these two groups of prospective officer candidates, the ex-cadets were given first priority in selection because they were partly trained and necessarily possessed the requisite amount of education and experience. Use of the flying training eliminees also would conserve manpower and give the former cadets a final opportunity to earn a commission. No

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*Candidates attended the OCS in the grades held at the time of selection with the exception that men in grades 6 or 7 were promoted to grade 5 (corporal) at least two days before departing for school. (Ltr., Hq AGTTC to all commanders AWTTC, subj.: Officer Candidate Schools, 30 Mar. 1942, in KCRC 352 Technical and Service Schools (Misc.), 1 Jan.-30 Mar. 1942.)
special qualifications were prescribed, but they had to be recommended by the commanding officers of the flying schools from which they had been eliminated. In order for a warrant officer or an enlisted man to qualify for officer candidate training, certain minimum standards were prescribed in this first policy directive. The candidate was required to have demonstrated high qualities of leadership and not to have been confined in a penitentiary or convicted either in a civil or military court for an offense denounced by the 92d, 93d, or 94th Article of War or recognized as a felony by federal law. If convicted of a less serious offense, positive proof of exemplary conduct since conviction had to be submitted. Only citizens of the United States who had passed their eighteenth birthday and who would not pass their thirty-sixth birthday on the date of the completion of the course were to be accepted. Further, candidates were required to have completed 3 months of continuous service or 6 months cumulative service during the 12 months preceding the date of enrollment and to meet the physical standards for a commission in the Army of the United States, except for height which would be the same as for selectees.* The candidate, lastly, must have attained a score of 1107 or more on the Army General Classification Test and "have such education or practical experience as will reasonably insure his satisfactory completion of the course of instruction." Great weight in the selection of candidates was to be given to educational and experience

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*Waivers for minor disqualifying physical defects might be requested by letter to the commanding general under whose jurisdiction the candidate was serving.

Despite this provision, AAF letters announcing quotas for the OSS stated 120 as the minimum AGT score. (Dr., Hq. AAFTTC to CG AAF Attm.: DRS 352.9 O.C. School, Miami Beach, Fla.)
backgrounds. With the exception of the maximum age limit, which was raised to 46 (no candidate would be accepted who would pass his forty-sixth birthday by the time of graduation), these entrance qualifications were included a week later in a War Department circular pertaining to all officer candidate schools.

In addition to standardizing entrance qualifications, this circular set forth a series of instructions for all officers charged with the selection of candidates. The widest possible publicity was to be given to the opportunities and procedures for qualifying as officer candidates, and the circular directed that officers were not to discourage any qualified applicants because of the importance of their work at the time. "Commanders will study their men," it was stressed, will "seek out those who are potential officer candidates, will give them additional responsibility and opportunity for further development in leadership, and will encourage them to apply." In order to realize the officer-procurement objective, it was essential that all of the schools be filled with the most highly qualified applicants. Of further aid to selecting officer candidates was a memorandum prepared by the Technical Training Command. According to this memorandum, all candidates who met the AGOT and length-of-service requirements were to be given an Officer Candidate Test (OC-3a) and would be required to complete a Biographical Inventory.

"The War Department had received reports that qualified applicants were either being ignored or hampered in their efforts to enter an officer candidate school by administrative procedure and by lack of cooperation on the part of company and other commanders." The Adjutant General had directed that this practice be discontinued and the above circular re-emphasized the policy. (Itr., TAG to C/S and all CG's, subj.: Selection of Candidates for Officer Candidate Schools, 27 Jan. 1942, in DRB 352.9 Officer Candidate Schools.)
(00-3). The officer candidate test, which purported to "measure certain basic abilities required to learn the course set up for the trainees," was composed of two sections designed to ascertain the candidate's mental alertness and administrative capacity. Only those who obtained a score of 90 or more on each section were to be considered. The Biographical Inventory, as its name implies, summarized on a single page the candidate's background and interests for use by selecting officers. With the completion of these preliminaries, all prospective candidates were to appear before a board of officers charged with the task of selecting the best candidates. To assist in rendering a decision, each officer was provided with a "Summary and Disposition Sheet" on which to record his impressions of the neatness, speech, poise, and attitude of the candidate. A personal interview with each candidate, the memorandum concluded,

will enable the Board to eliminate from candidacy any individuals who, in the judgment of the Board, are, with regard to personality or appearance, unfit to become officers. It will also, taken into consideration with the other qualifications summarized in test results and record of experience, enable the Board to make a selection of the best candidates from any group coming up for consideration.

Because of these high requirements, the AAF soon experienced difficulty in obtaining enough officer candidates to assure the filling of quotas. Therefore, the Director of Individual Training recommended that the requirement of three months service before the entrance of a candidate in OCS be lowered to one month to permit the AAF to fill any shortage in quotas with high-caliber men from the replacement training
centers. The three-month requirement had rendered enlisted men ineligible for OCS until they had completed basic training and had been assigned to units; and experience had shown that, once an enlisted man had been assigned to a permanent organization, his commanding officer was reluctant to release him for officer candidate training. This recommendation was not approved by A3/AS Personnel, but shortly thereafter the number of eligible men was increased when aviation cadets who had been eliminated for physical reasons at replacement or classification centers were accorded second priority in selection for officer candidate training, relegating warrant officers and enlisted men to third priority.

In April 1942 the base for selection was further broadened when the AAF noticed that the specifications of a new War Department circular (126), although making only minor changes in officer candidate requirements, differed in several important respects from the policy followed by the AAF in the selection of candidates for its OCS. The new circular stated that any warrant officer or enlisted man was eligible to attend any officer candidate school—AAF policy restricted applications to its OCS to AAF personnel. The maximum age for a candidate was 45 according to War Department policy, but the AAF was accepting only candidates under 36; furthermore, the AAF had announced on 18 April that the minimum AGCT score for consideration as a candidate was 120, while War Department policy called for a minimum score of 110. The new circular also specified that no administrative test was to be given to candidates; the AAF required the successful completion of its officer candidate test. In view of these conflicts, the Director of Personnel requested a clarification.
As the reply received stated emphatically that War Department Circular 126 applied in every respect to the AAF, it was necessary for the AAF to alter its policies accordingly.\footnote{12}

By changing its standards to comply with those of the War Department, the AAF in effect lowered entrance qualifications for its OCS, making its task in the filling of quotas less difficult but increasing the danger of a reduction in the quality of candidates. This danger was particularly acute if officer candidate selection boards were lax in applying minimum standards; that this frequently occurred was apparent as early as July 1942. After an observation of the officer candidates in the first four OCS classes, General Wooten reported that the quality of the members of the fourth class, which entered in July, was considerably below that of the members of classes 1942-A and 1942-B. The faculty board at OCS informed him that most of the eliminees had neither possessed the basic officer qualities nor the qualifications necessary to complete the course. "As the standard of graduates put out by this school will depend largely on the quality of the men who enter this training," General Wooten stated, it was necessary that more care be taken in the selection of candidates.\footnote{13} Upon receipt of General Wooten's complaint,\footnote{The Division of Military Personnel recommended that all commanders supplying OCS candidates be sent a strong letter pointing out the necessity for selecting only those men qualified for attendance at the training school.} the Division of Military Personnel recommended that all commanders supplying OCS candidates be sent a strong letter pointing out the necessity for selecting only those men qualified for attendance at the training school.

\begin{footnote}{
\textit{In a later letter General Wooten stated that four deficiencies had been noted in unfit candidates: AGCT scores under 110, disqualifying physical defects, insufficient education, and lack of military bearing. (Lt., Hq. Miami Beach Schools, First Dist., AAFTC to CG AAF, subj.: Unfit Officer Material Received at Officer Candidate School, AAFTC, Miami Beach, Florida, 14 Aug. 1942, in DRB 352.9 C Schools.)}
\end{footnote}
the school. Commanders were to be informed that the mere satisfying of formal requirements by candidates was not necessarily enough: "the presence in each individual of the qualities of leadership and character should be carefully determined before final selection to the end that the standards of the graduates of this school will in no way reflect on the commissioned personnel of the Army Air Forces." In disapproving the publication of this letter, AG/AS Personnel stated its belief that commanders who had sent unfit candidates to the school should be cautioned individually to discontinue the practice. Such a warning might be more effective than a general letter to all commanders and would avoid placing on the class then at OCS the kind of stigma that "might result from a published official statement that the student body was below average in quality." Following this suggestion, Headquarters AAF called for the names of all organizations which had sent unfit candidates to Class 1942-D.

This policy apparently was not too effective, for in October 1943 an AAF directive pointed out that many candidates who did not possess the basic qualifications for entrance were still being sent to OCS. Officers charged with selecting candidates were reminded that the OCS was operated to train officers, not to teach candidates to be basic soldiers; candidates without a knowledge of "the most rudimentary essentials of the military arts" had no place in the school. In this connection it was stated that 396 (more than 50 per cent) members of of Class 1944-A, which entered 20 September 1943, had completed less than seven weeks of basic training--20 had received no basic training at all.

*All candidates who applied for OCS subsequent to 1 May 1943 supposedly had completed eight weeks of basic training. (Daily Diary, Hq. AAFETTO, 27 Nov. 1943.)
In addition, 2 or 3 per cent of the candidates arriving at the OCS failed to meet even the physical requirements for retention in the service. Therefore, Headquarters AAF announced that "in the future, all selected applicants who do not meet the qualifications for Officer Candidate School will be returned immediately to their former stations." Although the OCS would be relieved of the disposition of unqualified candidates by this policy, the change did not remedy the trouble at its source.

It was apparent, the directive continued,

that many OCS boards have no comprehension of the mission of the school or the curriculum taught there. It is imperative that all commanders to whom quotas are allotted have their OCS boards familiarize themselves thoroughly with the curriculum of the school in order that they might properly instruct applicants in what will be expected of them when they become officer candidates.

In order to discover the boards which were lax so that remedial action might be taken, the OCS was directed in the future to report to Headquarters AAF the number of eliminees by commands of origin for investigation by the Air Inspector; furthermore, all OCS boards were to review periodically their accepted applications so that doubtful cases might be dropped. Proper selection of students was further emphasized in an AAF regulation published in December, which pointed out that the selection of students was a command responsibility. Station commanders should exercise particular care, therefore, in choosing students to make certain that all entrance qualifications were complied with. If all of these suggestions and directions were followed, the quality of officer candidates was certain to improve.

Despite the numerous directives on the requirements for entrance into officer candidate training, no rigid educational qualifications were ever
established. The original directive had stated that an applicant should have had enough education and experience to "insure his successful completion of the course for which application is made," thus leaving the final decision largely to the discretion of the selecting officers. As a guide for these officers, AR 625-5 of 26 November 1942 suggested that "successful completion of one year's college study leading to a degree" be considered a minimum for prospective administrative officers. Manifestly it became impossible to adhere to this minimum when the number of qualified applicants decreased, and many candidates without a high school education were entered in the course. Nevertheless, since nearly 50 per cent of the candidates who had not completed high school were eventually eliminated, the necessity for keeping educational standards as high as possible was apparent.\(^{19}\)

Physical standards for admission to the course existed; yet, because the OCS was not primarily concerned with the training of combat officers, they also were not rigid. The original directive announcing the entrance requirements stated that physical requirements would be the same as for a commission in the Army of the United States except for the height minimum, which would be the same as that for selectees; and, in the event of minor disqualifying defects, waivers might be obtained by the candidate.\(^{20}\) By November 1942 candidates were being accepted for officer training in two categories—general service and limited service\(^{21}\)—those in the latter category having minor physical defects which would not disqualify them for administrative duty but prohibited them from undergoing a rigorous physical and military program. The policy was clarified further in March 1943 by a War Department circular which stated
that any man should not be denied entrance for physical reasons into certain officer candidate schools, one of which was AAF OCS. Despite the leniency of this policy, candidates often arrived at the school who were unable to meet the physical requirements. In addition to the necessity for disposing of these men, usually by means of separation from the service, the OCS estimated that the physical status of about 10 per cent of all candidates had to be redesignated after their arrival for training.

War Department policy on physical qualifications was altered somewhat in July 1943 with the announcement that any man who could not meet the minimum standards for induction was to be discharged from the service; exceptions might be made at the discretion of the commander concerned if the man was considered physically able to perform his current duties. According to AAF interpretation of this policy, however, no man should be discharged whose services could be utilized in another unit or branch of the service. When this interpretation resulted in the sending of candidates to the OCS who did not meet the minimum physical requirements for induction, Headquarters AAF was asked for a clarification, and it answered that personnel in this category should not be sent to OCS.

Furthermore, Headquarters AAF announced that there were only two choices to be made when considering the physical classification of these candidates: they were to be classified either as physically qualified for limited service or as physically disqualified for all military service. The AAF could see no objections, however, to the granting of waivers for physical defects which were not disqualifying for administrative duties. Contrary
to the belief of the OCS, therefore, the limited service category still existed and physically unfit candidates could be expected to continue arriving at the school. The controversy was not resolved until the end of December 1943; then the OCS was informed that no candidates would be accepted for enrollment who did not meet the minimum physical standards for induction. If any candidates who did not meet these standards arrived at the school for enrollment, they were not to be discharged but were to be reported to the Commanding General, AAF for reassignment. The OCS was apparently to be relieved thereafter of the burden of disposing of any physically unfit candidates who might appear for training.

Although most disputed points were thus clarified, there still remained the question of candidates who might be found physically disqualified after enrollment in the school. According to a letter from The Adjutant General's office, these cases were to be reported to Headquarters AAF for review and the possible granting of waivers. In an endorsement to this letter, Headquarters AAF set forth the entire policy to be followed by the OCS in regard to physical qualification. In the future no officer candidates were to be physically re-examined upon arrival at OCS except where an injury or illness was obvious or a report was submitted that the candidates were unable to participate in the training program for physical reasons. If a candidate's physical condition was questionable for any of these reasons, he was to have a complete physical examination to determine whether he should be granted a waiver or separated from the service. Although this policy relieved OCS

*Exceptions to this policy were career enlisted men not physically qualified for officer training who might be returned to the enlisted ranks if they so desired.
of the necessity for examining each candidate, it once again placed
the decision of retention or discharge on the OCS staff; there it remained
for the rest of the period of hostilities.

Another problem which caused considerable controversy in connection
with the qualifications necessary for entrance into officer candidate
training was that of the maximum age at which candidates would be allowed
to apply for OCS. Although the original A.F. directive had established the
maximum age at 35 (no candidate should have reached his thirty-sixth
birthday by the date of graduation), the A.F. had been required to raise
the age to 45 to conform to War Department policy.* The OCS soon discovered
that the candidates over 38 were undesirable for a number of reasons.†
Because the average age of all candidates in training was under 30, the
older men lacked "common interests and a common viewpoint with the large
majority of their fellow officer candidates." Furthermore, men over 38
were over-age in grade as soon as they received their commissions as
second lieutenants and frequently remained so after one or more promotions.
Perhaps the most serious charge against the older men was that, even
though they took only a limited physical training program, eliminations
among them were more frequent than among the younger candidates—4.29
per cent for the younger group as compared with 12.33 per cent for the
men over 38 in classes 1943-A through 1944-B. Therefore, when the
desirability of relieving surplus officers over 38 from active duty was
expressed early in 1944, a recommendation was submitted for the lowering

*See above pp. 26-27.
†Although there was also some sentiment for raising the minimum age
to 21 because of the maturity and tact required of an administrative officer,
no action was taken. (Hist. OCS, 1 Mar.-1 July 1944, p. 61.)
of the maximum age of officer candidates to 38. By indorsement the Eastern Technical Training Command went further and recommended 38 as the maximum age for technical officer candidates but only 35 for administrative candidates. Despite these and later recommendations, the maximum age for enrollment remained 45 until after V-J Day.

Although these entrance requirements applied to officer candidates in general, it was necessary to set up special requirements for those enlisted technicians who enrolled in the OCS for the purpose of becoming technical officers. Furthermore, since some technicians feared that they might be reclassified as administrative officers, some assurance had to be given them that they would be used in their specialties after graduation. Therefore, the Director of Individual Training (AFRIT) recommended in September 1942 that standards be set up which would both encourage enlisted technicians to apply for training and assure them that they would not become administrative officers. Also AFRIT pointed out that the establishment of definite standards would provide selecting officers with a basis for disapproving applications from men who were good technicians but not officer material. After this recommendation had been approved, it was announced that as much as 50 per cent of the next class, 1943-B, could consist of technically qualified candidates who could meet certain requirements: 1) each should have been appointed to one of the first three grades (or warrant officer) by reason of merit prior to the submission of his application; 2) each had to be a graduate of an enlisted technical school with at least six months continuous service on the line or, if not a technical school graduate, have at least one year of continuous line service; and 3) each had to have a special
recommendation from his commanding officer that he was "technically qualified commissioned officer material." Those technicians who could meet these requirements were to be included in the regular OCS quotas and would be assigned upon graduation in line with their specialties.*35

Thereafter, beginning with Class 1943-B, a large percentage of each class was composed of enlisted technicians who were able to qualify as officer candidates.

Despite the efforts made to select well-qualified men for officer candidate training, the OCS reported that 18.7% per cent of Class 1944-A had been eliminated during the course of training. As this rate of failure was some 6% per cent higher than that of the previous class, Headquarters AAF expressed alarm, and at the request of AG/AS Personnel a thorough investigation of the entire OCS program was conducted between 21 and 28 January 1944 by Lt. Col. John E. Harris of the Air Inspector's office.36

Although primarily concerned with the curriculum and organization of the school, Colonel Harris' report contained some comments on the quality of entering students and was a severe indictment of the entire officer candidate program.37

Colonel Harris pointed out that only 3.7% per cent of all candidates who had reported for training had not finished high school while 38.3% per cent had been college graduates. The average AGT score of all candidates was 127.8, considerably higher than the minimum score of 110

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*AAF Memo 35-17, 24 Dec. 1942, announced these qualifications and set forth the procedure to be followed by a technician who desired to apply for OCS; the procedure differed little from that followed by regular administrative officer candidates.
necessary for qualification. Despite the plea of OCS that most of the eliminations had been the result of inferior candidates, Harris believed that, in view of these statistics, the candidates selected for training had been satisfactory—the fault lay in the type of training to which the candidates had been exposed. Following the submission of this report, a second investigation was conducted by Col. J. Henry Pool and Maj. E. B. Smith of the office of I.G./S Training.* For the most part, their report contradicted the findings of Harris—it agreed with the OCS that the primary reason for elimination was the acceptance of many candidates who either did not meet entrance requirements or who, despite satisfying formal requirements, were not officer material.†

It is probable that each of these reports contained a certain amount of truth, in addition to reflecting the prejudices of the investigators. Statistics included in the histories of the OCS reveal that many candidates were received who were not qualified for the course mentally or physically. The statement by Colonel Harris that "eliminations for academic and military deficiencies are due to inherent defects in the school rather than to the quality of the candidates chosen by Officer Candidate Boards" was, therefore, not entirely justified.‡ On the other hand, certain defects in the training program, such as a lack of uniformity in instruction, which were admitted in both reports, undoubtedly operated to cause the elimination of some candidates who were qualified for the training in accordance with the existing standards. Evidence tends to indicate that

*These reports will be discussed at length in Chapter III.

†See p. 71.
most of the candidates sent to the ODS were qualified for officer candidate training and that, in spite of handicaps brought about by the rapid expansion of the AF, the procurement system operated with noteworthy efficiency.

In addition to the necessity for obtaining the best men available for officer candidate training, two factors were important in procurement: the number to be procured and the source of the candidates. The number of candidates, of course, was determined by Headquarters AF and depended upon the needs of the service. Beginning with an entrance quota of 500 for the first class in February 1942, the number increased rapidly until over 4,000 candidates were enrolled in Class 1942-F.* By early 1943 the pressing need for graduates had been met, and beginning with Class 1943-D, which entered 6 March 1943, class strength was set at 300 administrative officer candidates.41 It was soon apparent, however, that this quota was too small; furthermore, the quota allotments as announced by Headquarters AF usually had no relation to the actual number of students who appeared at the beginning of each class. Class 1943-D, for example, actually began with 589 candidates. From March 1943 to June 1944 classes varied in size from 422 to 1,536 students,42 in each case in excess of the announced quota. The uncertainty caused by the variation in the size of the entering classes and the possibility of complications as to the chain of command were well illustrated by the commanding officer of ODS in June 1943 when he told an officer of Headquarters AF:

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*See p. 16.
Better send everything to me direct if you can. God Almighty! we got stuff lost. We don't know where this graduating class is going to go. It's the assignment letter lost in the mail some place. We just talked to Thompson up at Knollwood and he's going to call us back if he can find the copy of the letter and all that sort of thing. By the time it goes through Knollwood, Greensboro, Miami Area and gets here its ancient history. Christ! we'll have three classes on our hands if we're not careful.

Thus several factors in the procurement of candidates--fluctuations in enrollment, failure to receive communications, and the exceeding of announced entrance quotas--placed an added burden on the CCS, which often taxed the school administrators to the utmost in the matter of housing, equipment, and instructional personnel.43

Officer candidates were obtained from throughout the AF by a system whereby quotas were allotted to the major commands and were suballotted by the commands to smaller units; in each case quotas were based on the number of known accepted applicants.44 If a command was unable to fill its quota for any reason, the unfilled portion was allotted to another command. In addition, it was often necessary to establish special quotas for accommodating such groups as candidates who had returned from overseas assignment specifically to attend OCS.45 Despite occasional objection that quotas should have been based on command strength rather than the number of accepted applicants,46 this quota system was continued, except for a decision in February 1943 to allot quotas directly to the five technical training districts of the Technical Training Command rather than to the command headquarters.47

Regardless of the fluctuations in the entrance quotas for OCS classes, no restrictions were placed on the number of hopeful candidates who might apply and be accepted for training by the officer candidate boards.
As early as November 1942 applications had been approved by examining boards "all out of proportion with the number who will actually be given a chance to go to school." Often, prior to January 1943, accepted applicants were deleted from overseas shipments and allowed to wait for months before being assigned to school. The Division of Military Personnel, in recommending that a ceiling be placed on the number of applications which might be submitted by prospective candidates, believed that if the situation continues, considerable thousands of enlisted men will be involved, thereby depleting the numbers of men available for units, seriously affecting the morale of the men themselves who will not be given an opportunity to attend the school because of the lack of quotas or the removal of the technician from duties commensurate with his abilities for a long period of time pending assignment to an Administrative Officer Candidate School.

Apparently this recommendation was never adopted, nor, as was anticipated, did the quality of officer candidates improve appreciably by the opportunity for selection from a larger group of applicants. Since this surplus of approved applicants remained an unsolved AAF problem as late as 1945,* the OGS was never concerned greatly with the problem of the source of its students. The original policy directive contemplated that candidates would be obtained from washed-cut aviation cadets and the enlisted personnel of the Air Corps with the ex-cadets accorded first priority in selection. It was expected that 35 per cent of the entering students would be cadet eliminations. As officer candidate quotas increased, however, the proportion of candidates selected from enlisted

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*Candidates were accepted from the other branches of service for a short time in 1942. By November, when it became apparent that there were more accepted applicants from AAF personnel than could be accommodated, the practice was halted. (1st Ind./Ltr., Hq. V Service Cmd. to Director of Personnel, sub.: Quotas for AAF Officer Candidate School, 10 Nov. 1942, Hq. AAF to OG V Service Cmd., 17 Nov. 1942, in DRB 220,63 Officer Candidate Schools, Missouri.)
status necessarily became greater, and by the end of 1942 priorities had been dispensed with so as to give all prospective candidates an equal chance.

Because of the requirement that officer candidates should have completed three months continuous service prior to the date of enrollment in OSS, newly inducted enlisted men were not immediately eligible to apply. Exception to this requirement was made, however, in the case of volunteer officer candidates, men who would not normally have been inducted, usually because of dependents, but who volunteered for induction for the purpose of attending an officer candidate school. Men in this category were inducted in the usual way and sent to replacement training centers, where they were required to apply for officer training in the normal manner. After four months of service, if the volunteer had not been appointed to a specific class or, if appointed, had failed to complete the course, he was given the option of returning to civil life as a member of the Enlisted Reserve Corps or remaining in the service in an enlisted status.\textsuperscript{51} Members of reserve components who were deferred for dependency were allowed to apply for OSS and, if accepted, were sent directly to the school. If they failed to complete the course, they were returned to an inactive status.\textsuperscript{52} The Military Personnel Division, AAF Headquarters ruled in September 1942, however, that these directives did not pertain to the ordinary selective service registrants—they would not be accepted for voluntary induction for the purpose of competing for candidacy in the AAF OSS.\textsuperscript{53} Therefore, despite the latter restriction, well-qualified men, many of whom were
particularly badly needed as instructors and who might not have been in the service otherwise, were enabled by this means to obtain officer candidate training.*

According to AAF policy as modified by that of the War Department, therefore, any warrant officer or enlisted man who could qualify for officer candidate training was free to apply. Nevertheless, in practice, commanding officers were reluctant to lose trained personnel and, despite directives to the contrary, were often guilty of placing difficulties in the paths of prospective candidates. 54 Policy decisions by higher headquarters served to restrict further the number of possible applicants; for example, enlisted men awaiting appointment as aviation cadets and enlisted pilots were not eligible to apply in 1942. 55 Also, after January 1943 an applicant who had been accepted for training but whose selection for a specific officer candidate class within 60 days did not seem probable would not be withdrawn from an overseas shipment without a recommendation by his unit commander that he await assignment to OCS. 56 Furthermore, preference was usually given, all other considerations being equal, to candidates who had served overseas. 57 With these minor exceptions, AAF administrative officer training was possible for all who could meet the entrance qualifications.

Thus, the base for selection of administrative officer candidates was gradually broadened throughout the wartime operations of OCS. By adherence to the War Department directive dealing with qualifications

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*In 1942 an attempt to establish an abbreviated course at AAF OCS for the training of instructors was not approved. (R&R, comment 6, AFAAF to AFRIIT thru AFACI, subj.: Volunteer Officer Candidates, 8 Dec. 1942, in DRE 220.63 Officers Candidate School, Miami Beach, Fla.)
of officer candidates rather than to that published by AAF, the
minimum AGCT score was lowered from 120 to 110, the maximum age was
raised from 36 to 45, and the use of the officer candidate test was
discontinued. Furthermore, by the end of 1942 the system of entrance
priorities, which originally had favored AAF enlisted men and ex-
aviation cadets, was eliminated. No rigid educational qualifications
were ever imposed and, as noncombatant officers were being trained,
physical standards for entrance remained low. With less rigid entrance
requirements than many officer candidate schools and a surplus of
applicants, AAF OCS never suffered from a shortage of trainees.
Chapter III
TRAINING THE OFFICER CANDIDATE

The primary objective of the Army Air Forces Officer Candidate School was the training of candidates as officers rather than as soldiers, as was emphasized at various times after the establishment of the school; in order to realize this aim, it was obviously necessary to stress the development of leadership as well as the acquisition of the knowledge of administrative duties. How the OCS was to accomplish this, however, was never explained—no training directive was ever set up by higher headquarters for its guidance. As a result, great difficulty was experienced by the school administrators in devising a curriculum, and emphasis was often misplaced, to the detriment of the quality of the officers produced. Without a specific directive on which to build its training program, one report stated, "the OCS curriculum has been subject to the private whim, prejudice, or enthusiasm of almost any one at a higher headquarters who cared to assert himself." Under these circumstances, it was not surprising that the curriculum underwent frequent alterations and was the target of considerable adverse criticism.

The closest approach to a training directive received by the OCS appeared in the form of a training standard published in October 1943 by Headquarters AAF and stating certain minimum requirements for administrative officers, with major emphasis on military rather than administrative duties. In addition, it was directed that each officer
was to be trained in the duties of at least one specialty: adjutant and personnel, classification, guard squadron, intelligence, mess, supply, physical training, or drill and training. Although the minimum attainments expected in an OOS graduate were set up, no information was included concerning the method by which these attainments were to be reached.

The first program of instruction planned for the OOS was designed "to prepare the candidate for duty as a second lieutenant administrative officer in the Air Corps." For the efficient functioning of the school, classes were to enter on Wednesdays and graduate on Saturdays and all students were to receive a general course during 12 weeks of intensive instruction. Of the 528 hours of instruction outlined in the program, only 72 were devoted primarily to administration (problems of squadron administration) and approximately 230 hours to subjects which might be considered of an administrative nature. With the exception of four hours set aside for physical training, the remainder of the class hours were devoted to military instruction. Although the academic curriculum was divided into five subject areas—administration, mess, supply, transportation, and miscellaneous—the hours allotted to each were unequal. Eighteen hours each were devoted to mess and transportation, 24 to supply, and 72 to administration. The miscellaneous section of approximately 100 hours included subjects largely military in scope.

Regardless of the success of this course in producing a well-rounded officer, numerous complaints were soon received that considerable on-the-job training was required before the newly commissioned officer
could be of real service to his unit. Therefore, a revision of the academic program in January 1943 included a significant shift in emphasis. Regular officer training was to be confined to the first eight weeks of the course; the remaining four weeks would be devoted to one of seven types of specialized training. A total of 352 class periods of 45 minutes each, including 144 periods for the specialized training, was allotted to administrative subjects some of which might more correctly have been designated as military. Purely military subjects were assigned 146 periods and 67 periods were set aside for physical training. The 72 hours formerly taken up by the administration course were reduced to 18 periods and the remainder of the time was included in the specialized training phase. Several short courses, such as mathematics and training methods, were added to the curriculum and a 12-hour class in camouflage was discontinued. In all, some eight courses of a military nature were reduced in length. During the specialized period, which occupied the final four weeks of the course, all candidates except physical training instructors and those selected for instruction at the statistical school* were divided into six groups for training. Twenty-eight per cent undertook instruction as adjutants and personnel officers, 24 per cent as supply officers, 18 per cent as mess officers, and 10 per cent each as intelligence, training, or guard officers. The scope of the course in each specialty was limited to the knowledge required for the performance of group and squadron officer duties; and graduates would be reported

*See Chap. IV.
for assignment as having special qualifications in the specialty in which they were trained during this four-week period. It was hoped that this specialization would be sufficient to reduce the amount of training needed by the OCS graduates after they had reported to their new assignments.

It soon became apparent that this program entailed more training than could be absorbed adequately in 12 weeks; little time was available for practical instruction. Permission was therefore given to extend the course to 16 weeks beginning with Class 1943-H (entering 28 June 1943), an extension which necessitated complete revision of the program of instruction. The new curriculum called for 801 periods of instruction consisting of five phases. The classes in the first or basic phase, which was allotted 142 periods, stressed those attributes, largely military, that would be most useful to the candidates regardless of their future assignments. With the exception of several new courses, such as 26 periods allotted to marksmanship and range and the re-institution of the camouflage course, this section remained fundamentally the same as that of the 12-week course. In the second phase of 132 periods, basic administration was emphasized. Twenty periods were designated for each of four basic specialties: administration, mess, supply, and transportation—to which was added a 17-period class entitled "Air Base Problem." The third phase consisted of a 90-period field

*A film entitled "Sustineo Alas" (the motto of the OCS) depicting the operations of the school was prepared early in 1943 and, at General Arnold's direction, was shown throughout the United States as well as to President Roosevelt. (R&R, comment 1, Gen. George E. Stratemeyer to AG/AS Operations, ATTN: Photographic Section, subj.: OCS Movie, 5 April 1943; comment 2, AG/AS OCR, Movements and Operations Division, 7 April 1943, in DDB 062.2 Motion Pictures.)
service, and the fourth included the specialized training, now increased to 204 periods. It was intended that the candidates during this latter phase would be accorded a great many privileges, would be treated as officers rather than as officer candidates, and would be given as many responsibilities as possible to aid in their development as officers. Phase five which took place throughout the 16 weeks included 22 periods of orientation, 131 of drill and ceremonies, and 82 of physical training—a total of 235 periods. With minor exceptions, this program remained in effect until the OCS was well established at the San Antonio Aviation Cadet Center; then permission was given in August 1944 to eliminate the specialized training from the curriculum and revert to the generalized course to be pursued by all candidates.

The new curriculum, introduced with Class 1945-A, increased class periods to 50 minutes and reduced the total course to 731 periods. The time formerly allotted to the specialized training was divided among the classes in administration, mess, and supply, and such new classes as intelligence, testing, squadron activities, and training methods.

It was believed that this revision would be better adapted to the smaller classes then in attendance and would produce a better qualified administrative officer.

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**In July 1943 a proposal was made to increase the OCS course to six months and a program of instruction was drawn up accordingly. Since, however, the AAF objected, the plan was never adopted. (Ltr., CQ Leach to OC LFFTC, subj.: Proposed Six (6) Months' Course, Officer Candidate School, Army Air Forces, Technical Training Command, Miami Beach, Florida, 31 July 1943, in DRE 352.11 Officers Candidate School, Misc.)**
These frequent changes in the OGS curriculum might have been indicative of a desire on the part of the school personnel to employ the trial-and-error method in an effort to improve instruction, but apparently this was not the case. According to the OGS historian, the school administrators were reluctant to change either curriculum content or teaching methods; most of the changes evidently were made by higher authority. In fact, he recorded, "at times the staff seemed over-concerned with avoiding criticism," and no provision was made on the school staff for appraising policies or suggesting revisions of the course. Some improvement was noticeable, nevertheless, particularly from the standpoint of emphasis. From the first course of instruction, in which theory predominated, a more practical course was gradually developed in which stress was placed on academic training. After a revision in July 1943, the OGS could report that "in every subject the intention has been to permit the student to learn while doing" with emphasis on "practical application." As a result of the changes made and the shift of emphasis, the OGS personnel believed that the course as taught at the end of 1944 was superior to any previously presented to the candidates.

As the physical welfare of the officer candidate had to be considered along with his academic instruction, certain periods for physical training were included in each program of instruction. From only four hours in the first program, the allotted time was increased until 82 periods of physical training were scheduled in the 16-week program. In order to take full advantage of the time allotted, a Department of Physical Training, staffed with trained physical training instructors, was
established and four objectives were announced:

(1) to physically condition the officer candidate for the optimum accomplishment of military duties in theatres of operation; (2) to instill in him an appreciation of the values of physical conditioning, both as a soldier and citizen; (3) to improve his posture, coordination, agility, and general well-being; (4) if he is unable to do so, to teach him to swim and float and to protect himself in hazardous water situations.

During the first year of the school's operation, the physical training staff attempted to accomplish these objectives by mass exercises, games, and special instruction.

AAF Regulation 50-10, 28 April 1943, gave the department a definite training directive by prescribing a physical fitness test—consisting of three items, the sit-up, the pull-up (chinning), and a 300-yard run—to be given periodically to all AAF personnel. To be administered during the final two weeks of training,* the test was designed to measure both the physical status of the candidates and the effectiveness of the physical training program; for the remainder of the war period, it was the basis for the physical training activities at the OCS. In addition to the attainment of a satisfactory score (60) on the test, several other objectives were added to the proficiency standard for the officer candidates: it was expected that they would acquire the basic skills in tumbling, running (one mile in seven and one-half minutes and 300 yards in 45 seconds), hand-to-hand combat, team and individual games, and an appreciation of the need for physical fitness. Although the time allotted to physical training at OCS was not sufficient to produce officers in top physical condition, the program undoubtedly served to harden the candidates for the better performance of their future duties.

*It was also to be given during the first two weeks of the course if results of a previous test were not available.
Although academic and physical training were important segments of the officer candidate program, military training undoubtedly occupied the dominant role in the Officer Candidate School. A Department of Military Training designed to teach the candidate all phases of military activity was created soon after the school opened. In charge of the department was an officer who also served as the commanding officer of the Corps of Officer Candidates of which all candidates were automatically members. Under the director of military training was a varying number of officers, known as tactical officers, who supervised the military instruction of the candidates. According to the OCS historian, instruction by these tactical officers "was the most important single factor" in the training since they worked constantly with the candidates during the entire course.\textsuperscript{17} Their primary duty consisted of supervising a definite period (usually one hour) each day of close or extended order drill and ceremonies, in addition to the military subjects presented in the classrooms. As a result of this military training, the candidates were required to show proficiency in directing close order drill, performing guard duties and inspections, and using small arms. Each candidate was expected to become familiar with the customs and traditions of the AAF and to exhibit military leadership. Lastly, proficiency must have been demonstrated by every graduate in "military discipline evidenced by self control, ability to lead groups of individuals, and capability of imparting knowledge to others."\textsuperscript{18}
In general the program designed by OOS to achieve these objectives was based on that given at the United States Military Academy at West Point. With the entrance of Class 1942-B, 6 April 1942, the class system as used at West Point was introduced and thereafter formed an integral part of the officer candidate instruction for each class. Under this system, the upper class took over a considerable part of the military instruction of the newer candidates, always under the supervision of the tactical officers. Since after the entrance of 1942-B there were at least two classes in school at one time—four after the course was lengthened to 16 weeks—the system soon functioned smoothly. Not only did it partially relieve the instructor shortage, but it gave the upperclassmen experience in leading men and instilling discipline in the less experienced candidates.

Beginning with Class 1942-D, the practice of "bracing," or as it was usually called at Miami Beach "posturizing," was introduced as a part of the class system. Supposedly to aid in promoting discipline, lowerclassmen being posturized were required to stand in an exaggerated position of attention, often backed against a wall, for any length of time desired by the upperclassmen. At times the candidate being posturized was questioned and was expected to respond rapidly without moving from his position or faltering in the delivery of the memorized answer; incorrect answers or unnecessary movements resulted in demerits for the harassed "beavers." In 1943 a new term, "cerebralization," was added to describe the mental exercise resulting from the memorization
of the required responses. According to a pamphlet given to each new candidate, cerebrализation was designed to do the same thing for the mind that posturization did for the body; "make it alert, vigorous, and ready for the rigors that await the new Second Lieutenant." 20

Perhaps no other phase of officer candidate training aroused more criticism than posturization. Those in favor of its continuation believed it a necessary device for promoting discipline and for determining whether or not a candidate "could take it." In the report of his investigation of the OCS, on the other hand, Colonel Harris of the Air Inspector's office recommended that the practice be eliminated. He found that the benefits to be derived from an exposure to such strict disciplinary measures for only 30 days were doubtful; furthermore, he believed that this hazing was not applied uniformly throughout the school and often employed "as a vehicle to harass or good-natured candidates." 21 In voicing their disagreement with Harris' condemnation of posturization, Pool and Smith reported that "it was the consensus of opinion of the staff, eliminées, and candidates that the benefit derived from posturization justifies this practice." 22 Apparently the latter viewpoint prevailed, for despite repeated criticism, posturization was continued as an important part of the officer candidate training.

In order to develop leadership and give the candidates some experience as officers, most of the duties connected with the Corps of Officer Candidates were performed by candidates selected to act as officers. Group student officers and student noncommissioned officers
were chosen, on the basis of military bearing and class standing, from lists of upperclassmen submitted by the tactical officers; squadron student officers and student noncommissioned officers were selected directly by the tactical officers. All students selected to serve in officer capacities were entitled to the salute and other military courtesies from all candidates; otherwise they were accorded no special privileges. 23

During the first year of the existence of CCS, all candidates were rated militarily solely by their tactical officers, but beginning with Class 1943-D, these ratings were supplemented by ratings made by each candidate on all other members of his squadron. Designed primarily to introduce candidates to the technique of making efficiency ratings on officers and enlisted men serving under them, these officer candidate rating forms were completed at the end of the fourth, eighth, and twelfth weeks of training. Each candidate was instructed to rank his fellow classmen on a variety of qualities such as leadership, disposition, and enthusiasm; these ratings were delivered through the instructors to the squadron training officers. The latter compiled for each squadron a composite roster showing the relative position of each candidate according to his classmates' opinion of his military performance. 24 The results obtained were used in various ways for rating the candidates, particularly in the selection of honor graduates.*

At all times during the course, officer candidates were subject to a demerit system designed to supplement the military training program.

*See Chap. V.
Reports of any breach of conduct serious enough to warrant demerits could be submitted by officers or by any candidate against a candidate his junior, military rank not being considered. The number of demerits imposed for delinquencies varied with the severity of the offense, and each candidate had the right of appeal if he felt that an injustice had been done him. A total of four or more demerits for lowerclassmen and seven or more for upperclassmen acquired during a delinquency week ( reveille Thursday to reveille Thursday) was considered excessive and resulted in punishment tours of one hour for the first three excessive demerits and two hours for each additional demerit. Permanent student officers and student noncommissioned officers and members of the honor committee were confined to quarters for two hours instead of walking a one-hour punishment tour. Because the demerit system was intended to be an aid in the correction of discrepancies and in grading military conduct, candidates were requested to submit delinquency reports "readily and immediately." 25

Relatively few changes were made in this military training program during the wartime existence of the USS. Even though it appeared to function efficiently, the school historian pointed out that it failed in its primary objective—the development of leadership. He believed that it might have been assumed that candidates were good soldiers when selected for training; yet throughout the course, mechanical discipline was emphasized rather than creative leadership. Routine was apparent in all phases of the training, and few attempts were made
to test the initiative of the future officers. The OGS historian concluded that 26

the recent graduate as an enlisted man and again as a candidate has learned how to obey, but has had a minimum of training in the most essential quality for an officer, namely, how to lead men. He has learned how to march superbly, but it is questionable whether some of those hours could not have been spent more profitably.

Without a conscious effort on the part of the OGS instructors to install the qualities of leadership in candidates, it appears that the leadership possessed by graduates depended primarily on natural ability rather than on the instruction received at Miami Beach.

Beginning with Class 1943-B, training for all officer candidates was climaxed by a short maneuver called "Field Service," during which practical experience was gained by the students. General plans for this exercise were made by the officer personnel, who then entrusted the details to the officer candidates. Each candidate planned the functions of his specialty, and each was rotated through four or five administrative positions while in the field. At the bivouac area, the candidates were required to set up a camp site and carry on duty assignments similar to actual field service. During the maneuver period a practical problem of airfield defense was carried out, with the candidates divided into defense and attack forces, and, as far as possible, actual battle conditions were simulated. 27 When the value of this period of field activity was realized, it was gradually increased from the original two days until it occupied ten days of the final two weeks of the course.
By August 1943 objection to the scheduling of the field service so late in the course had developed because it had been found that candidates often "let down" with the termination of the academic program and were inclined to "exert as little effort as possible" during the period in the field. Since the candidates returned to the school area only a few days before the end of the course, little time remained for handling the many details relative to graduation. The late scheduling of the field service, moreover, left no time for the correction of any defects which may have appeared when the candidate was required to put to use the knowledge he had gained in the classroom. It was recommended, therefore, that the maneuver period be completed not later than the twelfth week of each class, and the recommendation having been approved, the maneuver was re-scheduled for the eleventh week of training.

During the first two years of the operation of AAF OCS, the training program remained comparatively free from adverse criticism. Periodic inspections revealed no major defects, and particularly after the innovation of the specialist training, favorable performance reports were received from the organizations to which graduates were assigned. The investigation conducted by Colonel Harris in January 1944, however, resulted in serious criticism of the school program. As stated by Harris, the purpose of the investigation was to ascertain the scope and render conclusions as to the effectiveness of the curriculum, and further to ascertain the reasons for the eliminations from the school in view of the fact that hundreds of qualified applicants ostensibly are available in all of the Air Forces and Commands for attendance at this school.
His conclusions, based on a week's inspection of the school, constituted a severe indictment of the entire OSS training program. According to Harris, the essential weakness of the school was to be found in its academic system. Although this weakness resulted partly from a lack of experienced instructors, the academic program was also hindered by the attempt to compress a maximum number of subjects into a minimum amount of time. Because of the intensive program "candidates universally suffer from a chronic state of physical fatigue" and "not infrequently carry smelling salts to academic classes to dispel drowsiness or resort to the use of 'No-Doze' tablets to remain awake at night for preparation of lessons." Furthermore, Harris reported, the subject matter was presented in such a way that memory was more important than knowledge, so that candidates were afforded "no lasting benefit" from a "superficial exposure to the curriculum." As the presentation of the subject matter was left largely to the individual instructors, there was little uniformity in the manner of presentation; this lack of uniformity was strongly reflected in the results from the departmentalized examinations. Instruction was hurried and superficial, little time was available for academic discussion, and much of the subject matter offered the candidates was out of date. These factors, Harris believed, produced a tempo rapid enough to induce "such a state of fatigue among the candidates as to militate against their academic success." In view of this situation, he recommended that the "curriculum be revamped to provide up-to-date
instruction in the minimum number of subjects necessary to meeting
the mission of the school and that more emphasis be placed on
specialization. More study time and more uniformity in method of
instruction were necessary, in his opinion, for the improvement of
the entire program. 32

Because Harris' report dealt primarily with the training received
at the OOS, it was submitted to AC/AS Training for necessary action. 33
Training immediately directed that a second investigation be made by
two members of its staff, Colonel Pool and Major Smith. Their report,
submitted only six days later, contradicted Harris on nearly every
point covered in the report of his investigation. 34 Pool and Smith
accused Harris of not conducting a thorough investigation and of making
recommendations for changes without personal contact with actual con-
ditions at the school. They did not find that the tempo of the training
program was too rapid and thus were not in favor of deceleration; more-
over, they believed that the courses were kept up-to-date and that
the curriculum was adequate for the purposes of the school. In regard
to the academic program, only Harris' recommendation for more uniformity
in instruction was fully concurred in by Pool and Smith. 35

The physical training program also was deficient, according to
Harris, and he recommended a modification to aid in the lessening of
pressure on the candidates. He discovered that most candidates inter-
viewed expressed a dislike for the physical training because of its
"rigorous and routine nature and the relatively limited opportunity
for mass athletics and games ...." He conceded, however, that the
candidates had expressed the belief that the program was not physically harmful except possibly to the candidates over 30.\textsuperscript{36} The second report again disagreed; the investigating officers believed that no modification of the program was necessary.\textsuperscript{37}

Although Harris was impressed with the military courtesy and marching ability of the officer candidates, he was displeased with the military training program. His remarks concerning posturization have been noted; he was also critical of the attempt to set up a "miniature West Point." It was impossible, he believed, to compress a four-year program into four months, as the OCS apparently was attempting to do. Included in this accelerated disciplinary program was the demerit system, the use of which Harris seriously questioned. There could be no doubt of its value in dealing with the younger men at West Point, he believed; but its use among more mature men was open to criticism. Lastly, Harris disagreed with the system by which each candidate rated his fellow squadron members by means of a prepared form. "Where these forms are conscientiously and honestly prepared," he acknowledged, "they may be of some value but it is obvious that they lend themselves to prejudicial and vicious use." Candidates whom he interviewed stated that "they had the sense that they were being spied upon and observed at all times, and from all angles, and that they were virtually the subjects of a 'Stasi' system under which a single misstep might lead to disaster." In view of these observations, he recommended the elimination of the demerit system since it resulted in punishment tours and the student rating system.\textsuperscript{38} Once again the
second investigators disagreed with him—they believed that the military training program, including the officer candidate ratings and the demerit system, was entirely adequate and recommended that no changes be made. 39

The period of field service which all candidates were required to undergo was similarly condemned by Harris, despite his admission that he had been unable to witness it in operation. He reported that "the instruction which candidates receive during this period may seriously be questioned in the light of the fact that the candidates themselves are required to perform all of the work, and that the candidates themselves are virtually in charge of the entire program under the limited supervision of 11 officers who are largely concerned with the performance of administrative duties." 40 These instructors were virtually without field experience; in Harris' opinion, "it takes a field soldier to train a field soldier." 41 In concurring with the Harris report, the chief of the Special Investigation Division, JAGD dismissed the field service with the remark that "the so-called 'bivouac' is notorious as a farce." 42 Far from agreeing with these remarks, Pool and Smith believed that the field training was "excellent, well conducted, well supervised," and that a great deal of benefit was derived from it; they recommended that the period of field training be increased to 15 days. 43

In addition to his criticisms of the academic and military programs, Harris expressed dissatisfaction with the commanding officer of the OCS, Lt. Col. Donald R. Storck, who had served in that capacity since 26 June
1943. Harris believed that Colonel Storck lacked the background and experience for such an assignment and recommended that he be superseded "by an officer of suitable rank, possessing a broad background of experience, combining both military and academic qualifications to the maximum degree." Pool and Smith, on the other hand, regarded Storck as "well qualified in every phase to operate the O.0.S." They reported that, despite many handicaps, Storck and his staff had discharged their duties very efficiently; indirectly they recommended a promotion for Storck as the only improvement necessary.

The wide divergence in these reports is difficult, if not impossible, to explain, and each report apparently contained much justifiable criticism of the OGS training program. Moreover, receipt of the reports by Headquarters AAF resulted in further disagreement. AC/AS Training, undoubtedly satisfied with the report submitted by Pool and Smith, recommended that no further action be taken. The chief of the Special Investigation Division, JAGD believed otherwise: "this report confirms the present impression, spread throughout the service largely by the graduates themselves," he stated, "that the school is a cheap attempt to imitate the Military Academy by incompetent amateurs." Conditions at Miami had produced so much comment that he considered it "fortunate that this situation has never been the source of a Congressional inquiry" and he recommended "that speedy action be taken in order that we may, at least at this late date, be put in a proper position should...

*Colonel Storck was relieved as commanding officer of the OGS 24 June 1944 and was assigned to the office of AC/AS Training. (Daily Diary AC/AS Personnel Officers' Section, 24 June 1944.)
such an event unfortunately arise. Evidently those in immediate command of the OGS agreed with Training, for the latter recommendation did not produce "speedy action."

Such action as was initiated tended to confirm Harris' criticisms, as did a later report submitted by an OGS honor council. Following the investigations of Harris and of Pool and Smith, the Training Command announced that "every effort will be made to bring about the desired relaxation of the tempo of the school." Furthermore, a report drawn up by the Honor Council of OGS Class 1944-E seemed to substantiate the criticisms made by Harris when the council stated as a "widespread belief among the student body" that, rather than to develop officers, the basic objective of the training program seemed to be to discover them. The test of officer material appeared to be the ability of the candidates to undergo much unpleasantness, to work under pressure, to absorb a small amount of information on a variety of subjects, and to present a creditable appearance. "According to this doctrine," the report continued, "the crucial test is what a man can 'take' not what he can get or is given." Furthermore, the officer candidate training failed in its efforts to promote leadership and did not orient the candidates properly, particularly in regard to the overall aspects of the war. The council also agreed with Harris' belief that the accelerated nature of the course proved detrimental to the absorption of knowledge by the candidates, and, lastly, it concurred with Harris' condemnation of the demerit system: the system should be administered more uniformly and conducted so as not to produce discipline based on
In view of these remarks by the outstanding candidates of one OCS class, it appears that several aspects of the Harris report presented a reasonably accurate picture of the training program at Miami Beach. And it might be added that Harris would be more likely than the representatives of AC/AS Training to turn in an unbiased report on this part of the training establishment.

As a result of these inspections and the criticisms contained in the reports, a board of officers was appointed in March 1944 to conduct a survey of the OCS training activities. The members of the board, each of whom surveyed one aspect of the program, expressed universal satisfaction with the instruction presented by the school; most of their criticism was concerned with deficiencies not under the control of the OCS, such as the lack of a training directive. Nevertheless, in a summary of the survey prepared by the president of the board, many of the criticisms expressed in the Harris report were again justified. Among the changes recommended were: 1) the OCS should be provided with a definite training directive and the position of the school in the chain of command should be clarified; 2) posturization should be restricted to one hour each day, and more off-duty freedom should be allowed the candidates; 3) "proper teaching methods should be emphasized so that officer candidates would not merely learn the subject matter but would learn how to teach it"; but 4) contrary to Harris' suggestion, more emphasis should be placed on the basic phase of the course, and the hours devoted to specialization should be decreased in order to provide a better-rounded officer.
With such diverse opinions on record, it is perhaps not surprising that little action was taken to improve conditions at the school. Except for the effort to decrease the tension under which the candidates obviously labored, apparently nothing concrete was done to remedy the more valid criticisms presented by these various reports. Some of the deficiencies disappeared gradually as the size of the officer candidate classes decreased, e.g., the lack of instructors. Others, such as an overemphasis on posturizing and an insufficient amount of off-duty freedom, were corrected gradually. Nevertheless, the most fundamental defect in the OCS structure was not remedied; no training directive was set up for the guidance of the staff.

Improvement was made, however, in the academic curriculum as pointed out above. Because of complaints that graduates needed on-the-job training before they could perform their duties satisfactorily, the curriculum was changed in January 1943 to include 4 weeks of specialized training during the 12-week course; later, in June 1943, the course was lengthened to 16 weeks. Throughout the war years, the academic curriculum underwent considerable alteration apparently directed, for the most part, toward the training of a better-rounded officer; meanwhile, the physical and military training programs were changed little. Despite the defects in the training program, therefore, the primary objective of the OCS—the production of qualified administrative officers—appears to have been accomplished satisfactorily.
Chapter IV
ACTIVITIES OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE

Apart from the problems inherent in the curriculum, several aspects of the officer candidate training program required special consideration by the OCS staff. An accurate method of measuring student progress was essential, as well as an equitable system of eliminating unsatisfactory students from training. The maintenance of high morale among the candidates was a necessity, and the graduation of successful candidates and their proper assignment to units were of primary consideration if the objective of the school was to be realized. Lastly, the OCS was directly concerned with two phases of specialized training: its own physical training specialists course, and the statistical officer training course at Harvard University. At various times each of these problems taxed the efforts of the school authorities to the utmost.

Testing and Grading

Testing procedure varied considerably in the academic department during the wartime operation of the OCS, for no definite policy was prescribed at first, either for improving or for validating the examinations taken by the candidates. In the early period tests were prepared, administered, and graded largely by the individual instructors, resulting in much variation even among classes presenting the same subject matter. Because the tests were usually subjective, the work load
of the instructors, many of whom were inexperienced in conducting an examination program, was inordinately increased.* The rapid increase in the officer candidate enrollment in the summer of 1942 rendered this system unsatisfactory, and in order to conserve time and energy, a program to inaugurate an objective-type testing program was undertaken. 1

The grading system employed during the early months of the school's operation also proved inadequate. Seventy per cent had been designated as the passing grade for all courses regardless of length or importance; after obtaining the course grades, the clerical staff tried to weigh the grades according to the number of hours allotted to each course. With a larger enrollment and the introduction of new courses, this procedure soon proved too cumbersome and too prone to error; as a substitute, an "attainment point system" was announced in May 1942. Each course was allotted a number of points in accordance with its length and importance; points were also assigned to examinations and assignments. A total of 10,000 points was designated for the entire course, and the attainment of 70 per cent of the point total in any course or test was considered satisfactory. The point total for each candidate was then converted into a descriptive rating ranging from "Unsatisfactory" to "Superior." It was soon discovered that an arbitrary designation of 70 as the passing grade for examinations often resulted

*Absence from examinations because of military duties interfered so often with the testing program that a permanent department was set up to administer make-up tests. Make-up tests could be taken any day, three nights each week, or on Sunday mornings in the department office on the top floor of the Miami Beach Public Library. (Hist. OCS, 19 Feb. 1942-24 July 1943, p. 124).
in no failures or too many failures, depending upon the severity of
the particular examination; therefore, the 70 per cent figure was
abandoned, and students were rated according to their relative class
standing, with the lowest 5 to 10 per cent considered as unsatisfactory.
Candidates were told only if they had made a satisfactory or unsatisfactory
grade on each test, but they were also informed, at stated intervals
throughout the course, of their relative class standing based on their
point totals.\textsuperscript{2}

Whatever improvement was being made in the testing and grading
procedures came to a halt in the spring of 1943 when Headquarters AAFTC
directed that no examinations, "written, oral, or implied," were to be
given in any schools of the command. Instead, the "progress of a
student . . . will be determined by practical demonstration of the per-
formance of the actual duty for which he is being trained."\textsuperscript{3} Although
this directive was obviously intended primarily for technical schools,
as a part of the command the OCS was compelled to comply. Examinations
were discontinued, the point system was abandoned, and candidates were
thereafter graded daily by the instructor of each class on the basis of
individual performance. Despite later information that the directive was
not intended to prohibit tests in purely academic courses, the former
testing procedure was not reinstated at the OCS.\textsuperscript{4}

As a substitute for the objective tests and as an aid to the
instructors who were experiencing difficulty in grading 30 or 35 students
in each 45-minute class period, the use of graded problems was introduced.
These problems were prepared by the senior instructors, who were responsible
for the administering and grading of the problems, although the latter
functions were actually performed by the instructors. Instructors
were not permitted to conduct reviews in preparation for the problems
nor to aid the candidates in any way during the testing periods. Uniformity in the testing procedure was thereby attained; yet it was
considered necessary to caution the instructors against "teaching the examination." With the completion of a problem, the results were
arranged in a frequency distribution, and letter grades based on the
normal curve were obtained. These were posted for the information of
the candidates. The Plans and Problem Analysis Section then converted
these letter grades to the final descriptive grade of "Superior" down to
"Unsatisfactory"; candidates receiving a final grade of "Unsatisfactory" were,
of course, not commissioned.

Despite these many changes in the method of testing and grading,
the administration of examinations remained the same; a separate
examination was given, during the regular class period, in each subject.
In October 1944 a new system was introduced whereby two or three periods
were set aside each Monday for a single examination covering all subjects.
Each weekly test was composed of two sections; the first covered the
work of the previous week, and the second part was a comprehensive
review of all material in all subjects covered up to that time. These
examinations were graded with letter grades, which in turn were converted
to quality points on the basis of four for an "A" down to zero for an
"F," and the quality point total was then used to determine the relative
standing of the candidate. This method proved economical of time and
effort for the instructors and made regular study by the candidates
imperative. Realizing that a testing program may never be considered
adequate, however, the Plans and Problem Analysis Section continued
to make every effort to improve the CCS examination system.9

Honor System

In the original planning for the officer candidate course no effort
was made to include a provision for an honor system as a part of the
testing program, for it was believed that such a system had to be in-
spired by the students to be effective. School authorities merely
reminded the candidates of the "honorable standards of the profession of
arms" and allowed them to act accordingly. Apparently this reminder
was not sufficient, for two members of Class 1942-B were detected in
the act of cheating on an examination. When the instructors increased
their vigilance in an attempt to prevent a recurrence, the other members
of the class resented the constant surveillance and requested the in-
sauguration of an honor system.10

The honor system which resulted was patterned after that at West
Point* and was based on an honor code designed to "enable the members
of the Corps of Officer Candidates to set for themselves certain standards
of honor and conduct, to which each member thereof must adhere." Em-
phasizing that "the soldier's wealth is his honor," the code set forth
breaches of honor which would not be tolerated: cheating, rendering
false official statements, quibbling ("any attempt to impart a false
impression or to conceal a fact by using a technicality which, in itself,
may be a true statement"), and acquiescing in a breach of honor.11 To

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*Since its inception the honor code has changed but slightly in
operation and not at all in substance; major changes have been made in
the method of indoctrination of incoming candidates (Smith Interview).
supervise the functioning of the honor system, a council consisting of one member (elected during the fifth or sixth week of the course but taking office after he became a first classman) from each training squadron, was elected by the candidates. Not a disciplinary body, the council as a group was charged with the interpretation and administration of the honor code; individually, each member was to "undertake and be responsible for the instruction of and explanation to the members of his squadron of the principles of this Code and their rights, duties, and obligations hereunder, with the purpose of preventing any violations hereof." If a violation did occur, it was to be reported to a council member; he would pass the information on to the council's chairman. A preliminary investigation would be conducted, and if a council hearing appeared justified, preparations would be made for a rapid disposal of the case by a trial of the accused before a board of 12 members of the council. After the evidence was presented, the verdict—10 votes were required for a verdict of guilty—was rendered by secret ballot. If the accused was acquitted, the case was dismissed and all records destroyed; if he was found guilty, the case was turned over to the faculty with a recommendation that the accused be eliminated from the school with prejudice.

Even though the honor system had originated within the corps and though council members were elected by the squadrons, the council acquired a bad reputation during the latter part of 1942: it was accused at times of spying on the candidates and was referred to as "the Gestapo." However, the council of Class 1943-6, composed of extremely able candidates, was able to counteract this attitude somewhat by increasing the confidence in the council "as a friend and representative" of the
officer candidates. Later councils were instrumental in bringing about changes in the officer candidate program to the benefit of the candidates,* thereby creating respect for the council. ¹³ As a result, the honor system proved of great and lasting value in the training of future AAF officers.

Elimination

To insure the production of the best possible administrative officer, it was necessary for the OCS to adhere to certain standards of attainment, and only candidates who were able to meet these standards could be graduated from the course. Although throughout the wartime operation of the school the rate at which unsatisfactory candidates were eliminated from officer candidate training was never excessive, official concern was evidenced at times, and one investigation to ascertain the cause of student failure was instigated. Furthermore, because of the possible deleterious effect of elimination on student morale and on the maintenance of scholastic and military standards, an equitable system for the disposition of unsatisfactory candidates was a necessity.

The majority of officer candidate eliminations resulted either from academic failure or from a lack of the military qualities considered essential in an AAF officer. For the most part, student failure for these reasons could have been prevented by a more careful selection of candidates; in August 1942, for example, the OCS reported that candidates having AGGT scores as low as 90, insufficient education, or disqualifying

*Limitations were placed on posturing. Student orders were clarified, and punishment tours for upperclassmen were discontinued as a result of the efforts of various honor councils.

See p. 56 ff.
physical defects* had been received by the school. There was little
that the instructional staff could do toward making officers out of
these men. On the other hand, numerous candidates who met all of the
entrance qualifications proved unable or unwilling to show sufficient
progress to warrant retention in the course; elimination for this
reason was usually stated as "lack of military bearing," regardless of
the individual cause for failure. In addition to eliminations for these
causes, it was possible for candidates to resign or to be washed out
for violating the honor code, for exhibiting conduct unbecoming an
officer, or for acquiring an excessive number of demerits.15

In the opinion of the OCS authorities, eliminations for these reasons
were caused primarily by the acceptance of unqualified candidates rather
than any defects in the training program, and, as pointed out above, an
investigation was requested late in 1943. Colonel Harris, the in-
vestigating officer, reported that since superior candidates had been
sent to the school, the reason for eliminations was inherent in the
curriculum. A relaxation of pressure and an improvement in instruction,
he believed, would decrease the number of failures and save many "potentially
valuable officers" for service with the AAF. Harris also objected to
the use of the term "lack of military bearing" as "an omnibus term which
is used as a cloak to cover a large number of alleged deficiencies, all
of which enter into the production of the finished officer." Rather
than using such a "misleading" term as a reason for elimination, he

*The problem of the receipt of physically unqualified candidates has
been discussed above, p. 30 ff.
recommended that the specific cause be stated in every case. The later investigators, Pool and Smith, did not concur; they agreed with the school officials that inadequate selection was the primary cause of failure and that the criticized descriptive term "lack of military bearing" was an adequate means of expressing the reason for failure. 

Again it is apparent that each report contained an element of truth; certainly statistics could be produced to bolster each point of view. Nevertheless, as the rate of elimination in the OSS (approximately 11 per cent) compared favorably with those of other AAF schools, it seems that the problem was being adequately handled.

In order to provide an efficient system for the consideration of potential eliminees, a series of boards was gradually created in the OSS. At the top, and the only board possessing power to eliminate, was the Faculty Board which was "to determine all matters relative to standing, rating or classification, proficiency, or deficiency of all students" and was usually composed of the commanding officer, the director of training, the various departmental directors, a representative of the surgeon's office, and a secretary. During the early period of operations this was the only body, with the exception of the honor council, empowered to deal with unsatisfactory students; consequently, it was greatly overworked when the enrollment was increased. To alleviate the situation, two lower boards were established in the military department: a group board composed of three group commanders in each training wing, and an intermediate board made up of all group commanders. The group board interviewed delinquent students and was authorized to award demerits.
or punishment tours, to order confinement, or to recommend dismissal to the Faculty Board. 21 More serious cases were called before the intermediate board, which was also authorized to mete out minor punishments or to recommend dismissal to the higher board. Although these boards were concerned primarily with disciplinary problems or deficiency in military subjects, they helped to decrease the work of the Faculty Board to a large extent. 22

In any case involving academic deficiency, appearance before the Faculty Board was immediate and mandatory. While the percentage grading system was in use during the early classes, any student with a combined average of less than 70 per cent was ordered to appear before the board. Since most students were able to maintain a passing average, this resulted in few cases; hence it was decided to summon before the board any student failing in four or more courses. Again the solution was not satisfactory, for it was possible for a student to be failing in four minor classes and still to maintain a reasonably good average. Finally, when the grading system was altered so that it was based on relative class standings, the practice of calling before the board the lowest ranking members of the class, usually the bottom 5 or 10 per cent, was begun. 23

Three alternatives were available to the board in rendering its decision in any case brought before it. If the members decided that the student was not qualified to continue the course, their verdict would be elimination with or without prejudice, depending upon the cause of failure; academic failure usually resulted in elimination without prejudice. If the board decided that extenuating circumstances were
present, it might require the candidate to class or it could wash him back to a later class to repeat part of the course. Usually the number of eliminations was greater during periods when few students were washed back by the board.

It was always possible for a candidate to resign from the course if he considered himself unwilling; or unable to continue; rather than retain a dissatisfied candidate in school, his request was naturally granted. Personal affairs, misinformation about the content of the course, or loss of self-confidence were the reasons most often given by those seeking voluntary elimination. Late in 1942 a new problem arose in connection with self-elimination when a number of candidates who had been returned from overseas expressly for officer candidate training resigned. It was apparent that many of these had applied for OCS merely as a means of returning to the United States. To halt this practice, it was decided that in cases of this type the candidate would be relieved from training, reduced to the grade of private, and sent to the nearest port of embarkation for return to the overseas theater in which he had been serving. Regardless of such measures and various attempts by the school authorities to orient candidates properly, small numbers of resignations continued to be recorded.

For purposes of morale and the efficient use of personnel, it was essential that eliminations be correctly reassigned as soon as possible after the decision of the board. Upon elimination, candidates automatically

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*AGF or ASF personnel who were eliminated from AAF OCS were returned to their former branch if they so desired. Because of AGF objections, however, after November 1943 the AAF was permitted to retain only those eliminants who were qualified for aircrew training regardless of the preferences of the ex-candidates. (Weekly Activity Report, Enlisted Branch PNP AG/AS-1, 18 Dec. 1943).*
reverted to enlisted status, were reported to The Adjutant General for reassignment and, while awaiting orders, underwent a period of processing which included a classification interview and a physical examination.26 In spite of efforts by the OCS, this involved considerable delay in the disposition of the eliminenees.27 In order to avoid this delay, it was planned, approved in April 1942, to all unmarried eliminenees to replacement training centers "to be used as noncommissioned supervisory personnel for overseas movements." Married ex-candidates were to be returned to their home stations but were not to be reassigned to their original units.28 This procedure was altered slightly in September when permission was granted to allow unmarried ex-candidates to return to their home stations, also, if they desired.29 Although these directives should have alleviated the situation, assignment orders still had to come from TAG, and the OCS reported as late as February 1944 that 30 days often elapsed before an eliminated student actually left the school area.30 Because of this bottleneck, it was directed that, in order to disrupt the school program as little as possible, eliminenees awaiting orders should remain attached to their squadrons and carry on their usual duties except for attendance in class.31 The existence of such a situation at this late date indicates that the problem of quickly disposing of eliminenees remained largely unsolved during the wartime operation of the OCS.*

Morale

Inasmuch as the maintenance of morale among the officer candidates was the most intangible problem which would confront the OCS supervisory

*No regulation prohibited an eliminenee from applying a second time for officer candidate training; nevertheless, the abundant supply of prospective candidates usually meant that quotas could be filled with qualified applicants who had never been selected for the training before. (3d ind., 2tr., sender not given, to CG AAFWFGC, subj.: Officer Candidate School, n.d., Hq. AAF to CG AAFWFGC, 4 Feb. 1944, in DRB 352 Officers Candidate and Training School at Miami Beach, Fla.).
personnel, apprehension had been expressed when it was decided to locate the school in the midst of a lavish summer resort. Although the advantages of Miami Beach were obvious—climate, hotel facilities, and recreational opportunities—the effect of the surroundings on the candidates could only be surmised. However, despite some early criticism of the school's location, an inspector reported in May 1942 that "although there may be some undesirable features in retaining the school...at its present location, they are subordinate at this time to the disadvantages of moving it." During this early period of training at Miami Beach the school historian, who was much closer to the scene than any visiting inspector, had noticed no adverse effects of the locale, for candidates submerged themselves into the training program and "any sense of the lavish resort life reached them only sub-consciously."  

By 1944 the attitude of the school historian had changed; he now believed that, from the standpoint of morale, locating the school in a resort area had been a mistake. "Regardless of other advantages which Miami Beach possessed," he stated, "they may not have been sufficient to compensate for the harm done." Even though the presence of civilian observers had a stimulating effect on marching and singing, "the real damage was done in the destruction of ideals, the creation of bitter cynicism, and the kind of negative orientation" afforded by the surroundings. He reported that officer candidates naturally contrasted their regimented life with that of the tourist who all seemed to possess ostentatious automobiles with unlimited fuel, and vast quantities of money to lavish on the night clubs, horse races, and dog tracks. Men who had returned from overseas felt particularly embittered to see ample quantities of steak in civilian restaurants after having lived for weeks on Spam and having been told that other operational theaters (Miami Beach?) were receiving all the beef. ... An almost universal
feeling arose among the candidates that the landlords, and the retail merchants as well, were exploiting them.

Such conditions prompted one candidate to remark, "Now we know what we're not fighting for" and caused the historian to recommend that "future military planners should think twice before establishing an OCS in the heart of a community like Miami Beach unless they are prepared to take it over entirely."*34

Despite the location of the school, morale within the Corps of Officer Candidates apparently remained consistently high, possibly because the candidates were kept busy throughout each training day so that they had little time for reflection on their rigorous program. Although complaints were often heard from lowerclassmen regarding the posturizing to which they were subject, they were usually forgotten when the candidates were in a position to posturize others. Fear of elimination was ever-present, and, as in all military establishments, ominous rumors were always circulating among the students without causing, however, more than a temporary lowering of their morale.35 In the main, it appears that most of the candidates expected the program to be rigorous and, with a commission as their goal, were willing to undergo a great deal of unpleasantness for the satisfaction that successful completion of the course would bring.

In an effort to maintain morale among the officer candidates at a high level, several morale-building ideas were developed. Permission was granted in April 1942 for taking group pictures of the various OCS

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*One civilian's opinion of the effect of OCS on the community may be found in "The Town Crier," Miami Herald, 21 June 1942. He found that, although the military had taken over the places of entertainment and relaxation, they had done so in an orderly manner."
Beginning with Class 1942-D the compilation of a class book was begun, a copy of which was sold to each candidate as a permanent record of the activities of his class. In addition, a weekly OCS newspaper, "Wings Up," which proved invaluable as an orientation device as well as a morale-builder, began publication in November 1943. The paper was produced entirely by the officer candidates, with a minimum of supervision by the administrative personnel. Perhaps of more importance than these stimulants was the gradual institution of a liberal "open post" policy. Beginning with open post privileges of only a few hours for the first OCS classes, free time was increased until in 1945 first classmen were free each night until 2300 hours if they desired; second classmen were granted the same liberty three nights each week and third classmen on two nights. The lowest class had no open post privileges but were released from quarters once every two weeks. This policy was thought to have improved morale greatly without affecting discipline or academic progress.

As the war drew to a close, some fear was expressed that the reduction in enrollment and the uncertainty of the future would shatter the morale of the candidates then in training. Such did not prove to be the case, however, and most of the candidates appeared eager to continue the course to its conclusion. As was true during the entire existence of OCS, morale remained high and discipline good throughout the uncertain months between V-E Day and V-J Day.

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*This practice was halted after V-J Day but publication was resumed in 1949 (Smith Interview).

†The newspaper was later renamed "Candi-data."
Graduation and Assignment

At the conclusion of officer candidate training, graduation exercises, during which the successful candidates made the transition from enlisted to commissioned status, were held for each class. Formal ceremonies were held, in which graduates were administered the oath of office en masse, an address was given by a high ranking officer (General Arnold addressed the first graduating class), and, following the ceremony, the newly commissioned officers were presented discharges, dated the previous day, from the Army enlisted status. Commissions for the new officers were dated from the day of graduation, they went on active duty immediately, and after a short delay en route they reported to their new assignments.

Because the success of the school depended upon the proper assignment of its graduates, the classification of candidates, which began during the first month of training, constituted one of the most important functions of the COS administration. All candidates were interviewed and assigned temporary military occupational specialty numbers; these were used in determining the type of specialized training each candidate would pursue. Approximately six weeks before graduation, candidates were reinterviewed, and reports were submitted to AG.

Personnel giving the names of the probable graduates and their classification. In order to insure the proper placement of all graduating officers.

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8Complaints were occasionally heard concerning undue delays between the time of graduation and the arrival of the graduates at their new stations; the COS was instructed to take steps to prevent this. (Ltr., Hq. 2d AF to CG AAF, subj.: Travel Time, 7 Sept. 1942, in DRB 352.17 Miami, Fla., Graduates.)

9Through August 1945, 52,780 officers were graduated from COS. (Stat. Digest, table 56.)
officers, it was necessary for the classification section to exercise
great care in determining the correct classification of each candidate.

Despite the efforts of the CCS classification section,* officers
were often assigned without regard for their special qualifications.
The CCS called the attention of Headquarters AAF to this situation in
August 1942 and recommended that more consideration be given to the
qualifications of the graduating officers.2* In reply, Headquarters AAF
indicated that a report of the graduates by name would no longer be
necessary; henceforth, reports would include only the number of graduates
in each class, with the exception of those experienced in communications,
engineering, or armament—these were to be reported by speciality.

Using this information, the Military Personnel Division would assign
graduates to stations according to the number of officers they required,
and the station would reassign them according to their qualifications.

As an aid in this new procedure, Headquarters AAF/TG directed that the
required reports be rendered by CCS through that office three weeks
before graduation; on the other hand, all classification records were to
be sent directly to the stations to which the graduating officers were
assigned. 25

During the early period of the school's operation, organizations
desiring the assignment of newly commissioned officers were often
authorized to send representatives to CCS prior to graduation for the

purpose of interviewing and selecting from among the prospective graduates.

Other organizations frequently submitted requests for graduates directly

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*The CCS classification section was referred to as the "model Classification Office" in 1943 and was commanded by the school's commanding officer.

(Ltr., Lt. Col. Storck to all personnel, Classification Section, CCS, subj.: Commendation, 24 Oct. 1943, in Hist. CCS, 7 July 1943-1 Mar. 1944, app.)
Because of the increased enrollment and the widespread need for graduates, these practices had become unfeasible by September 1942; therefore, it was directed that all requests for officers were to be sent through channels to the Director of Personnel, Headquarters AAF, and interviews with prospective graduates were to be authorized only by him. Thereafter, upon receipt of the information concerning the number of graduates in a particular class, the different commands were allocated graduates by numbers in accordance with their expressed needs.

From time to time, problems arose in the assignment of newly commissioned officers, some of which were the responsibility of the school training program. It was reported in April 1943, for example, that the OCS graduates lacked experience in handling men and required a period of training after assignment before they could be used with maximum effectiveness; therefore, AAFTC requested permission to retain graduates for a two-month period during which they would act as training and administrative officers at basic training centers in the area under the supervision of the Officer Training School. Needed experience would be gained by this practice; hence, officers would be more valuable immediately upon assignment. Although AAFTC reported that this policy was to be instituted, apparently it was not followed too closely because of the pressing need for graduates. The Third District AAFTC partially solved this problem by establishing station training schools throughout the district to which all recent graduates of OCS and OIS were to be detailed to undergo a period of practical instruction before embarking on their new duties. Despite efforts of this nature, inexperience in the handling of men remained a basic deficiency among OCS graduates.
The graduation of former aviation cadets from the OCS also created a problem in the matter of assignments. Since the OCS course was shorter than most aviation cadet training courses, it was possible for a former cadet to receive a commission sooner than the members of the cadet class from which he had been eliminated. And because the attitude of the ex-cadets toward flying was ordinarily one of frustration, contact between the newly commissioned ex-cadets and their former classmates was often awkward and likely to lower the morale of the cadets still in training. In order to reduce the likelihood that this situation would arise, it was directed in November 1942 that no graduate of OCS who had been eliminated from flying training was to be assigned to duty within the Flying Training Command. The problem of eliminees diminished, however, as educational qualifications for aviation cadet training were lowered to such a point that many ex-cadets were unable to qualify for entrance into OCS.

In addition to those graduates who proceeded to new units, a small number of officers was detailed for further instruction at such other AAF schools as the Air Intelligence School, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and the Security Officers Course, Pawling, New York. Upon completion of these courses, they were assigned wherever a need existed for intelligence or security officers. Regardless of the ultimate destination of the graduates, the immediate need for officers with administrative training resulted in few problems for the OCS classification personnel. The success of the classification procedure employed is perhaps best revealed by a report of the OCS that over 90 per cent of the graduates were working in their primary specialties at their new stations of assignment.
Physical Training Specialist Course

Shortly after the opening of the OCS administrative officer course, a physical training specialist officer candidate course was established at Miami Beach to be conducted by the OCS physical training department. Except for administrative purposes, however, the department operated largely as a separate organization with two principal duties: training physical training specialists, and conducting the physical training of the administrative officer candidates. Both phases of the physical training activities thus could be conducted by the same instructor personnel, and candidates could be given practical training as a part of the OCS physical training program.

Open only to civilian physical training directors at first, the specialists course had higher entrance requirements than the administrative OCS. In addition to the qualifications prescribed for administrative officers candidates, physical training officer candidates must have served satisfactorily with troops for three months prior to admission to the course. Applicants were to be between the ages of 18 and 36, have an AGCT score of not less than 120, and possess a bachelor's degree in physical education from a recognized college or university or "an equivalent knowledge gained through experience in the field of physical training or recreation." Although experience in athletics was desirable, it was emphasized that this alone was not to be accepted as "equivalent knowledge." In August 1942 these requirements were relaxed.

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*A newly qualified director who had not served the required three months might be inducted or enlist in the service and serve 90 days as an enlisted man in order to qualify. (Ltr., TAG to C/AC, G/AAF, CG AF Combat Cmd, and CO's of interested Bases, Schools and stations, 27 Feb, 1942, in HD 145:96-109 (11-D) Training Directives, Programs and Orders, Book 1.)
somewhat so that an enlisted man without the required amount of service who was otherwise qualified might apply if, in the opinion of his commanding officer, he would be able to complete the course. 58 Despite this, the entrance requirements remained higher than for most officer candidate schools.

In addition to the regular basic officer training, physical training specialists took courses designed to increase their proficiency in the performance of their specialized duties. During the periods allotted to the administrative candidates for drill and physical training, the physical training specialists were given a 15-hour course consisting of such subjects as Anatomy and Physiology, Voice and Command, and Efficiency and Action. In February 1943 the course was enlarged by the addition of five classes, one of which included a period of demonstration and practice teaching; moreover, field days at which the candidates demonstrated their proficiency in various athletic events and mass exercises were held throughout the course. 59

For the most part, the physical training directors sent to OCS were returned to their original commands upon graduation. 60 While they were undergoing training, civilian directors were employed to replace them; these were, in turn, inducted and sent to OCS when qualified. It was hoped that the entire AAF physical training personnel would be converted to commissioned status in this manner without interfering with the operation of the physical training program. 61 As a further aid in the assignment of physical training graduates, it was suggested that candidates be designated as senior or junior directors,
depending upon their previous experience, and the plan was apparently adopted. Upon graduation, it would then be possible to assign the senior directors to more responsible positions, leaving the junior directors for the more routine daily activity programs. Because of the need for graduates, assignment never constituted a problem for the OCS administration, and though the number of physical training specialists in training was never great, the AAF need for commissioned physical training personnel was filled by OCS graduates.

**Statistical Officers School**

One important function of AAF administrative officers—the operation of the complex statistical control system used throughout the AAF—could not be taught at the OCS at Miami Beach; therefore, the AAF Statistical Control Officers School was opened on 8 June 1942 in the Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, for the training of statistical control commissioned personnel. Beginning with the second class (20 July), students for the six weeks' course were to be selected from officer candidates at AAF OCS who had completed at least six weeks of basic administrative officer training. Students selected for this training (the original quota was 165 per class) were to be chosen by the OCS commanding officer on the basis of demonstrated ability, "with priority consideration given to candidates possessing academic training or practical experience in accounting, business administration, banking, commerce, finance, and statistics." Successful candidates were to receive commissions at the same time as their fellow candidates at OCS; those who did not complete the course for academic reasons were returned to
CGS to complete the regular administrative course.*

At Harvard the candidates underwent an intensive 240-hour course designed to familiarize them with all aspects of the duties of statistical control officers. Courses were presented in AAF organization, statistical control methods and reports, and practical work in their use. For the most part, instruction was by the regular university faculty members and was presented in conference periods or by practical exercises based upon data obtained from the field of AAF operations, although some lectures, laboratory work, and training films were used. In addition, weekly assignment sheets containing work for each evening were distributed to the candidates, who were required to prepare the problems for discussion. Besides this rigorous academic program, the candidates were required to spend considerable time in the usual physical and military training activities.

Attendance at the statistical school was on a volunteer basis, and since most candidates at CGS appeared to know little about the purposes of the school and were reluctant to undertake the course, attempts were made to publicize the role of the statistical officer. When, despite these efforts, the number of volunteers still did not increase, the commanding officer of the CGS agreed to include one period of instruction in the statistical control system in the basic administrative officer course.

*A recommendation that a small number of colored candidates be sent to the school was not approved. (Ltr., AAFTC to CG 5th Dist. AAFTC, subj: Technical Training—Colored, 6 Jan. 1943, in DRB 353 A, Negro Training; TWX, CG AAFTC to CG 5th Dist. AAFTC, n.d., in DRB 353 A, Negro Training.)

†The course was increased to 250 hours when officer candidate training was extended to 16 weeks.
It was anticipated that this course would arouse enough interest to assure an adequate number of volunteers for statistical training. Nevertheless, when the decrease in CCS enrollment resulted in a further curtailment of eligible candidates for the statistical course, it was decided that the requisite number of students would have to be obtained from commissioned AAF personnel, and beginning with the class entering 11 July 1944, classes were composed of both officers and officer candidates. The number of officer candidates gradually decreased until by 30 April 1945 the school was composed almost entirely of student officers. In all, 2,072 officer candidates completed the course at Harvard and were commissioned as statistical control officers.
Chapter V

THE OFFICER TRAINING SCHOOL

The expansion of the military establishment of the United States during the years 1939-1941 was accompanied by a rapidly growing shortage of officer personnel. Many officers were required immediately, and time was not available for the various officer candidate schools to produce them. In order to meet this pressing need, all branches of the service, including the Air Corps, began granting direct commissions to qualified civilians on the basis of their education and experience. For the most part, these men were not eligible for induction into the service because of age, dependents, or the importance of their civilian occupations; yet the skills and knowledge which they possessed were needed by the armed forces. Although this method of securing officer personnel was not without defect, in the emergency no other course was apparent.

The Air Corps, further handicapped by its lack of an officer candidate school and its consequent dependence on the schools of the other branches for the training of its officer personnel, soon discovered, in common with the other branches of the service, that a serious weakness existed in the officers commissioned directly from civil life—they usually had no knowledge of the basic military essentials. Few of these newly commissioned officers possessed any understanding of military courtesy, drill and ceremonies, the wearing of the uniform, or the organization of the service in which they found themselves. Therefore, to avoid a lowering of military standards, it was necessary that the adjustment of these
civilians to military life be eased in every possible way so that, in addition to performing the technical or administrative duties to which they were assigned, they might become a credit to the uniform.

To assist the new officers in this adjustment, the Air Corps turned to the use of training schools at the various Air Corps stations throughout the country and in September 1941 directed that such schools be established "to orient the non-pilot class of officer and prepare him to assume his duties with the Air Corps." All nonpilot reserve, specialist reserve, and branch immaterial officers were to attend these schools (except those on duty prior to 1 March, who might be granted exemptions) while any other officers might attend if they so desired. Classes were to be held at least one hour each day, Mondays through Fridays, under instructors chosen from the assigned officers of the station. A syllabus of instruction was set forth which included courses in military customs and courtesy, military records and reports, military law, squadron officer duties, supply, and security. Each course was to continue until all phases of the curriculum had been adequately covered. Furthermore, it was decided on 17 February, at the same conference which resulted in the establishment of the Officer Candidate School, that, in addition to this method of affording the newly commissioned officers at least a rudimentary knowledge of military life, the technical school at Lowry Field should be used to give a short refresher course to newly commissioned officers awaiting assignment. Up to 500 of these officers were to be sent to Lowry Field as rapidly as possible.

Neither of these methods for training the newly commissioned officers proved entirely adequate. Lowry Field was not prepared to offer the
required courses, nor had it the facilities to accommodate the officers. Moreover, objection to the station training schools was expressed in March 1942 by Col. Ray A. Dunn, chief of the Air Service Command's overseas division, on the grounds that they were taking up the time of the regular officers who were serving as instructors and that the amount of instruction received by the new officers was too dependent on the time which those officer-instructors could spare. Dunn reported that he had seen "literally hundreds of officers who do not even know the ordinary customs of the service" and therefore recommended that a school system for newly commissioned officers be set up in which they could receive "three-weeks or a month's course of instruction prior to being placed on duty." He proposed that the curriculum include history, organization and functions of the Army and air forces, military courtesy, discipline, law, and enough drill and exercise "to improve their military bearing." He estimated that approximately 10,000 officers would have to be processed through such a school system. Headquarters AAF directed Dunn's memorandum to the commanding officer of the AAF OCS with a request for his views on the feasibility of instituting such a program at the Miami Beach school. The latter replied that such training could be undertaken by 18 April 1942 for a monthly entering quota of 250 officers; furthermore, he recommended that all officers commissioned directly from civil life be required to attend such a course in a 30-day temporary-duty status from their first station of assignment, to which they would return after completion of the course. Acting upon this information, the Technical Training Command was directed to prepare for the arrival of officers so that instruction might begin at Miami Beach on 18 April 1942. Facilities
for classes of 400 officers entering every two weeks would be required for a six-week course of instruction. Housing was to be provided by the officer-students, they were to be assigned to their new stations prior to reporting to the school, and no limit was placed on the eventual number of officer training classes to be entered. In complying with these instructions, ACTIB specified that, although the officers were to be responsible for their own living quarters, they would live under military rule at all times during the course. Also, authority was granted to the OCS to use its officer candidates as instructors in the OCS if necessary. Carrying out these instructions, the Officer Training School began operations on 20 April 1942 with a class of 354 new officers.

From the beginning of its operations, the permanence of the Officer Training School was uncertain, and during the first two months of its existence several suggestions were made for the removal of the school to another location. Likewise authorization for the school was apparently lacking, even though the correspondence relative to its establishment would suggest that it was intended as a part of the Officer Candidate School. Nevertheless, OCS administrative personnel attempted to function at first as a separate command, an attempt which caused considerable confusion until, two months after the opening of the school, an OCS

*Arrangements were made with two hotels still under civilian control to provide housing for the officers at special rates. (Press release, 19 April 1942, in DBB 100 Misc. Miami 39-42).

†When re instituted in 1951, this school was called USAF Officer Basic Military Course. See p. 136.

‡‡See below p. 100 ff.
general order assigned OTS as a unit to the OCS. Further difficulty developed in July 1942 when Headquarters First District, TTC reported that it could find no authority for the activation of an Officer Training School. Headquarters AAF was also unable to produce any definite information, although the Directorate of Individual Training (AFRIT) understood that it was never intended that the OTS should operate as a separate school but as a component of the OCS. In the absence of more concrete authorization, AFRIT suggested that the inclusion of an OTS in OGS be adopted as policy; to this suggestion the Directorate of Military Personnel agreed. Despite these opinions, no definite directive was deemed necessary, for the Directorate of Personnel (DOP) believed that the relationship between the schools had been sufficiently explained in an earlier directive, which stated that the OTS was instituted "in conjunction with the activities of" the OCS. Although this was not a stable basis for the operation of an AAF organization, it continued to be the only authority for the existence of the Officer Training School. *

According to the first program of instruction proposed for the Officer Training School, the purpose of the course was "the furtherance of the professional education of officers in order to increase their value to the service." The implication was that the officers undergoing instruction possessed a certain amount of previous training, but this was

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*Lack of a definite activation directive hampered the Officer Training School in obtaining supplies and training aids, for everything had to be acquired from the OGS. (R&R, comment 1, AFDMR to AFRIT, subj.: Construction of Miami Beach Area, 23 June 1942, in USAF HD 225.2-3 Miami Beach, Since July, 1942).
not ordinarily the case; most of the student-officers lacked even a basic knowledge of military training. Because of this deficiency and of the fact that supervisory personnel for the school were drawn largely from the OCS, it is not surprising that the curricula for the two schools were similar. Inasmuch as officers spent only six weeks in OTS, their courses were necessarily shorter than those in OCS; nevertheless, it appears that OTS attempted to give its graduates as nearly as possible the same subjects as were presented to the officer candidates. Another difference between the two schools is to be found in the fact that the greater age and poorer physical condition of the officers made necessary for them a less strenuous physical training program than for those in OCS.*

The scope of the program of instruction originally proposed for OTS included basic military indoctrination, fundamental professional education, and practical field exercises—an ambitious program to be accomplished in the three weeks contemplated for the course. Thirty hours were to be allotted to military training, 102 to academic subjects and field exercises, and 30 hours to physical training. Before the school opened, however, the course was lengthened to six weeks, with a corresponding increase in the time devoted to each phase of training: 253 hours of instruction were to be given in all; 39 in military training, 156 in academic subjects, and 58 in physical training. Later revisions of the program increased the hours of instruction to 265 in October and 277 in May 1943 without changing the fundamental structure of the course. Such

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*By August 1942 attendance at OTS was required of all officers commissioned direct from civil life except in "exceptional cases." (Ltr. AG to all commanders concerned, subj.: Waiver of Attendance at Officer Training School, 27 Aug. 1942, in USAF HD 145.96-110 (111-D) Training Directives, Programs and Orders Book II).
academic courses as administration, mess, supply, command and staff, and military law were allotted the greater number of class hours, and over one-third of the time devoted to military training was taken up by close order drill. In addition to this training which was received in the school area, the officer trainees conducted a maneuver known as "airdrome security"; it began with a 10-mile march for Class 1942-A and was expanded until it became a defense of a simulated air base. This problem continued to climax officer training until January 1943, when it was abandoned on orders from higher headquarters.\textsuperscript{21} Apparently the OCS training was as broad as was possible in the time allotted for the course.\textsuperscript{21}

Besides having a training program similar to that of the OCS, the Officer Training School experienced many of the same handicaps: fluctuation in enrollment, a dearth of classroom facilities, and difficulty in the procurement of competent instructors. Soon after the opening of the school it became apparent that the size of the enrollment was to be increased greatly; as time went on, entrance quotas for classes were usually exceeded without warning. This uncertainty placed an undue burden on the OCS administration, and in the absence of adequate classrooms all available facilities were utilized, including the municipal golf course on which classes were held when weather permitted.\textsuperscript{22} The instructional staff was inadequate from the standpoint of experience; moreover, even though qualified officer candidates were used as instructors, there were not enough instructors available.\textsuperscript{23} This situation was alleviated

\textsuperscript{21}The trend throughout the existence of the OCS was toward the use of practical problems rather than lectures and examinations. (Hist. OCS, 18 April 1942-36 June 1943, pp. 66-67.)
somewhat by the assignment of OIS graduates to the school as instructors; yet most of the staff, although having more military experience, was out-ranked by the students.\textsuperscript{24} Despite these difficulties, each class entered and graduated at the designated time, apparently with a minimum of difficulty.

Other problems which confronted the OIS administration were the result of the attempt to train officers in grade. Some of the officers did not report for training on time in the belief that the telegrams ordering them to active duty were not sufficient evidence of their appointments, while others either refused to report or reported late because of a delay in closing their personal affairs.\textsuperscript{25} An inspection in August 1942 revealed further problems: officers were making the trip from their homes to Miami Beach in uniform even though they had no knowledge of the proper wearing of the uniform; others were bringing their families and automobiles to the school, even though facilities were unavailable. The inspectors believed that the amount of paper work involved could be reduced if the officers could be placed on probation for six months to include the time at the OIS.\textsuperscript{26} Despite steps taken to alleviate these difficulties, they continued to vex the school officials throughout the life of the school.

More important than these problems was the acceptance for training of officers who soon proved unfit to hold the commissions which had been bestowed upon them. Although the OCS had anticipated this occurrence and had requested that a policy be formulated before the course began,\textsuperscript{27} apparently no procedure was planned for the elimination of unsatisfactory officer trainees. In May 1942 a representative of the Directorate of
Military Requirements (AFTRR) reported that the OTS was graduating all officers sent to it for training, without making an effort to eliminate the undesirable. If any officers were found to be weak, letters stating that the school did not consider them good officer material accompanied them to their permanent stations; it was then up to the station to take any action necessary. Concurring in his opinion that "the weeding-out process" should occur at OTS, AFTRR recommended that a directive be issued to that effect.28 As a result, AAFTC was directed to take immediate action to see that any unfit officers were relieved from training;29 hence a Faculty Board was set up at the Officer Training School which functioned in the same manner as the board at the OCS.30

The disposition of eliminated officers presented a somewhat different problem from that of returning officer candidates to enlisted status and reassigning them to other duties. Once an officer was judged deficient in any of the qualities considered necessary in an AAF officer, the procedure involved in returning him to inactive status was long and complicated.* Following the receipt of the directive of 2 June 1942 which authorized the OTS to eliminate unfit officers, the school began the practice of returning to the station of assignment, with a recommendation that reclassification procedures be instituted, those eliminated officers who had been on active duty more than 90 days. For an officer who did not complete a training course during his first 90 days of service, a report was sent to the office of the Air Adjutant General "with appropriate

*Postwar changes did little to make the procedure shorter or less complicated. See AFR 36-2, 3 October 1949 and AFR 36-24, 1 September 1950.
recommendation for his relief from duty with the Army Air Forces, and for the termination of his appointment as an officer of the Army of the United States." Any officer falling in this category was reassigned to Headquarters OGS/OTS to await action returning him to inactive status. Although this latter procedure often resulted in considerable delay in the disposition of the eliminate, no other action was possible as long as the OTS was without reclassification authority.

As with the problem of eliminations from the officer candidate course, failures in OTS could have been largely avoided by the application of better selection methods. The rapid expansion of the armed forces necessitated the procurement of a large number of officers for immediate duty; therefore, the responsibility for selection was entrusted to many boards scattered throughout the country. Much latitude was allowed the members of these boards, with the result that commissions were granted with little uniformity. Often field grade commissions were given solely on the basis of age and declared experience rather than on an indication that the men in question would be able to perform their military duties. Qualifications which induced one board to grant a captaincy to an applicant might, to another board, have appeared to justify only a commission as a first lieutenant. For the most part, the qualifications of the prospective officers to perform their duties in a military establishment were not accorded sufficient consideration by boards far removed from the military scene. The inevitable result was that some men were commissioned who soon proved not to be officer material.

In order to avoid the commissioning of unqualified men, many of the OTS administrative personnel believed that the school should have been
given control over the classification and assignment of the student-officers. All men commissioned directly from civil life, they averred, should have been granted a tentative appointment and sent for training without a designated grade; this would have enabled the OTS to return unfit officers to civilian life with little difficulty. Moreover, such a procedure, would have allowed the school administration to award, at the time of graduation, rank and assignment commensurate with the degree of competence shown during training. This system would have produced more uniformity in the granting of commissions and would have improved morale by placing all students on an equal basis during the training period.\textsuperscript{24} Even though this plan possessed considerable merit, it was never favorably considered, much to the detriment of the quality of officer personnel who received direct commissions.\textsuperscript{*}

The assignment of those officers who successfully completed the officer training course ordinarily presented no problem for the OTS administration.\textsuperscript{\textdagger} When the school opened, all trainees attended on temporary duty and proceeded to their station of assignment immediately following graduation. By May 1942 this method had proved unsatisfactory because requirements and priorities often changed during the six-week period of training, which meant that amendments to the assignment orders had to be made. In order to avoid extensive amendments, Headquarters AAF

\textsuperscript{*An attempt was made in March 1943 to simplify the reclassification procedure, but nothing was adopted before the closing of OTS. (Memo for AG/S C-1 from AG/AS A-1, subj.: Procedure for Reclassification of Commissioned Officers, 16 Mar. 1943, in DRB 352 AAF Schools Fla.).}

\textsuperscript{\textdagger}A small number of officers commissioned especially for intelligence work received the regular OTS training at Miami Beach before being sent to the Air Intelligence School at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. (R&R, APDIS to AFPM, 29 June 1942, in DRB 352.17 Miami, Fla. Graduates).
instituted a change in the assignment procedure; thereafter, most of
the officers sent for training would be assigned to OTS. Two weeks
before graduation, OTS would submit to the Director of Personnel a
report indicating the number and qualifications of the probable graduates;
and the graduating officers would then be distributed throughout the
AAF wherever they were needed.\textsuperscript{35} In any event, the entire assignment
function was not of direct concern to the OTS administrative personnel.

Of primary importance to the OTS administration was the effect of
attempting to train a large group of officers in conjunction with an
officer candidate school. Although the morale of the officers in training
remained consistently high, except for some disgruntlement resulting
from real or suspected discrepancies in the granting of rank, their
presence lowered the morale of those with whom they came in contact.
The young instructors, both at CGS and OTS, many of whom were CGS graduates,
and the officer candidates were frequently unable to understand why some
men without military experience and often with civilian backgrounds
similar to their\textsuperscript{2} were given direct commissions while they were required
to undergo officer candidate training. Further dissension among the
officer candidates was created by the presence of many limited service
officers who were not required to take full part in the military and
physical training programs. In view of OTS' unhealthy influence, the
Directorate of Personnel recommended that it either be moved to another
location or be abandoned in favor of on-the-job training and suggested
that no more limited service officers be sent to the school; since the
latter were appointed to fill limited service duties only, their selection
should be made in such a way that they were immediately capable of performing their "desk jobs." In commenting on these recommendations, AFRIT disagreed and urged that the OTS be continued at Miami Beach, pointing out that the existence of the school depended on several factors: 1) the indefiniteness as to the continuance of the school; 2) the uncertainty as to the number of future trainees; 3) the lack of supervisory personnel to conduct the school at any other location; and 4) the necessity of locating the school at a place with adequate housing facilities "without the necessity of constructing on an indefinite basis." All of these factors mitigated against removal of the school. Because this viewpoint was supported by the office of the Air Inspector, DOP concluded that the school would remain at Miami Beach; nothing further was said about the limited service officers.

Despite this decision, the future status of the Officer Training School remained uncertain, and it was difficult for the various agencies concerned in its operations to formulate plans for the future. In August 1942 AFRIT sought information on the probable length of time that the OTS would continue, so that arrangements could be made for housing the officers while in training. No definite answer was received from DOP except the information that a recommendation was being prepared which would call for the continuation of the school on a reduced basis (500 each month) and an increase in the length of the course to three months. On 9 September DOP announced that the procurement objective for administrative officers appointed from civil life would be exhausted with 600 officers commissioned for the 3 October class; therefore, the school would normally
close with the graduation of that class on 14 November. Instead of allowing the school to close, DOP recommended that it continue operations on a limited basis of 300 in each class, 150 of whom would be medical officers. In addition to these 300, any officer commissioned from the enlisted ranks "for whom such schooling is deemed beneficial" might be enrolled. Furthermore, DOP recommended that "officers commissioned direct from civil life and Reserve officers be sent to the School either on an unassigned basis or on a basis wherein they would be reassigned to the Command which had sent them." If the school was continued under this plan, it would serve to make the officers who attended more valuable to the service and afford the AAF an opportunity to get rid of unfit officers. Because the OCS was then meeting requirements for administrative officers, it would also be possible for stations to send to OTS those officers then on duty who had never received the training.\textsuperscript{42} Concurrence in these recommendations was forthcoming, and the decision was made to continue the school on a reduced basis. On 1 October it was announced that approximately 300 officers would be sent to OTS every two weeks beginning 17 October and that all officers commissioned directly from civil life into the Army of the United States would be required to attend. Quotas were set up for each air force activity but could be rearranged at the discretion of the Director of Personnel.\textsuperscript{43} Before this information was sent out, authorization for the attendance of officers at OCS in an unassigned status was challenged as contrary to existing regulations, and that part of the directive authorizing such procedure was revoked. Instead, it was directed that only officers who were initially appointed
in the AUS and who would have completed less than one year of service at the time of graduation from the school could be sent for training unassigned. All other officers were to be sent on temporary duty to return to their station of assignment upon completion of the course.44

As a result of these decisions, the Technical Training Command was informed in November of the conditions under which the OTS was to continue.* Classes of 400 (150 of whom were to be medical officers) rather than 300 students each were to enter training every two weeks, and four types of officers were eligible for training in accordance with quotas determined by Headquarters AAF: 1) any officer whose efficiency would be increased by the training was to be sent on temporary duty; 2) any officer considered misclassified could be sent for training with a view toward reclassification and reassignment, but only AUS officers commissioned directly from civil life with less than one year of service were to be sent in an unassigned status; 3) medical officers; and 4) recently commissioned high-ranking enlisted technicians who had not received basic officer training.45

Prior to this announcement medical officers (including dentists and members of the Sanitary Corps) had been sent to the OTS for basic officer training as a result of a request by the Flight Surgeon's office made as early as 21 August for an allotment of 150 newly commissioned officers per class.46 This request was finally granted, and the quota of 300 officers (later increased to 400) for each class beginning with the one entering 17 October was to include "150 to 200" medical officers.47

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*On 27 October 1942 AAFTC announced that the OTS would be transferred to Yale University about 1 January 1943 and would be increased to an eight-week course. As nothing further was heard on this change of station, the plan apparently never materialized. (Ltr. AAFTC to CG First Dist. subj.: Yale University, 27 Oct. 1942, in Hist. AAFTC and its Predecessors, 1 July 1939-7 July 1943, p. 3160).
These officers received approximately the same training as the regular administrative officers except for the substitution of courses peculiar to military medicine for much of the close order drill and similar activities which were given to the regular trainees. During the remainder of the school's existence medical officers continued to form an integral part of the enrollment.

A second group of officers was also under consideration for attendance at the OTS during this period. In November 1942 the Air Transport Command reported that about 1,200 ferry pilots had been commissioned, and many would be commissioned, most of whom had no previous military training. In order to give these officers at least a rudimentary knowledge of military training, ATC proposed that a three-week course be set up at the OTS to accommodate them in groups of 50 in each class. Although the OTS acknowledged that a course of this type would be possible, it would be impracticable because the essential knowledge could not be gained in less than six weeks. In case the three-week course was decided upon, however, a copy of the OTS curriculum was sent to ATC with a request that the courses to be eliminated be indicated. Higher headquarters agreed that the short course idea was not practicable and recommended that the ferry pilots be sent to the OTS for the full six-week course. In reply, ATC stated that no pilots could be spared at that time for a course of such length. During the last few classes, however, a large number of these officers were received by the OTS; although they were given the regular administrative officer training, they presented a peculiar problem because of their indifferent attitude. According to the commanding officer of OTS.
many of them have the impression that they are here because their Commanding Officer had to send them here and that regardless of their record in this school, their standing at their home station will not be impaired. Some are indifferent as to whether or not they are dismissed from the service since they reason they can obtain a job with a civilian Air Transport Company at substantially higher pay.

Officers with this attitude undoubtedly hindered the progress of other students and contributed to a general lowering of morale of the entire school. *

With the influx of these two groups of officers, no more suggestions for the closing of the OTS were heard until February 1943, at which time AC/AS A-1 gave three reasons for thinking that the usefulness of the school had almost ceased. First, quotas were not being filled by the various units to which they had been allotted, and no officers who had been judged unfit for further service had as yet been released from the service. Second, although at least 18 officers had been recommended for release, no action had been taken, and the officers, who had been assigned minor duties at Miami Beach during the interim, quickly became a demoralizing influence on the other trainees. As a result of this situation, no officers had been recommended for release in the later classes. Lastly, it appeared that no medical officers would be sent for training after the class which was to begin on 20 February 1943. Because of these circumstances, A-1 recommended that the school be closed with the graduation of the 20 February class. 54 The Directorate of

*According to the OTS historian, morale was lowered further by the influx of a group of "professors and teachers" who expected to receive only refresher academic training. "The shock of being confronted with general military training which is entirely foreign to their experience and expectations has lowered their morale" and consequently the morale of their fellow students. (Hist. OTS, 18 April 1942-26 June 1943, pp. 60-61)
Personnel did not concur, for it was estimated that enough officers still were without sufficient military training so that between 125 and 150 would be available for each of six classes after the class of 20 February; therefore, DOP recommended that the school remain in operation with a capacity of 300 students for each class through the class to enter 15 May.\(^{55}\) Although A-1 agreed, several provisions were announced under which the school would function. Quotas would no longer be used and officers would be sent for refresher training only; none would be sent for the purpose of reassignment or reclassification. Furthermore, if the number of officers commissioned directly from civil life fell appreciably below 150 every two weeks at any time before the completion of the six classes, the school would be discontinued immediately and arrangements would be made for the training of new officers within the individual commands and air forces.\(^{56}\) No additional reasons appeared for continuing the Officer Training School after the 15 May class, and the school accordingly ceased operations on 26 June 1943.*

With the closing of the Officer Training School, opinion varied regarding the worth of the course to the AAF. Although most observers agreed that the training had been of value, it was readily apparent that particularly six weeks had not been enough to produce a finished officer, older officers who, having been out of school for many years, found it very difficult

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*Because of the decision to close the OIS, a recommendation by AAFITC that the course be increased to 12 weeks was not favorably considered. (1st ind. /tels/, CG AAFITC to CG AAF, attn.: AG/AS Training, 15 April 1943/, Hq. AAF to CG AAFITC, 29 April 1943, in DDB 352.11 Officers Training School, Misc.).
to adjust themselves to study and classroom routine. Nevertheless, as a result of the training received at the OTS, some 13,000 officers were assigned or were returned to their organizations better equipped to carry on their duties. In view of the pressing need for officers during 1942 and 1943, it appeared that the OTS, as it functioned at Miami Beach, was the best possible vehicle for introducing newly commissioned AAF officers to military life.

Regardless of the closing of the Officer Training School at Miami Beach, some officer training was necessary to comply with regulations which stated that all officers appointed directly from civil life had to complete satisfactorily "an appropriate course of training." Therefore, all commands, air forces, and other AAF activities were directed to establish a training course for any newly commissioned officers who might be assigned to them, to be administered while the officers were fulfilling their regular duties. In addition to this training for newly commissioned officers, an Officer Training School was established in January 1944 at the San Antonio Aviation Cadet Center.* Although intended to operate on a much reduced scale, the three-week course was patterned after that of the OTS at Miami Beach. In all, some 144 hours of basic officer training was given to classes of newly commissioned officers or officers who had never received such training. Later known as the Officer Training and Command School, this school continued to train small numbers of officers throughout the war (except for a few months in the latter part of 1944), even though procurement of officers directly from civil life had all but ceased.59

*At an OTS operated at SAAAOC between 6 July 1942 and January 1943 some 1,000 officers had received basic officer training. (Hist. SAAAOC, 4 July 1942-1 March 1944, pp. 102-3.)
Chapter VI

THE OFFICER CANDIDATE SCHOOL SINCE V-J DAY

In the summer of 1945, with the end of World War II obviously not far away, considerable doubt prevailed within the AAF concerning the future of its Officer Candidate School. It was recognized that the school had been created as a wartime expedient, and it was feared that the OCS would be discontinued in the course of the demobilization which would undoubtedly follow the cessation of hostilities. In the event this occurred, the AAF would be forced to revert to its pre-World War II reliance on the officer candidate schools of the other branches of service for the training of its officers. In the summer of 1945, however, the War Department announced that officer candidate schools would be continued in all branches of the service which had maintained them previously. Thus, with the future of the officer candidate school apparently assured, it remained for AAF planners to decide how the peacetime school should operate.

Shortly before the official proclamation of V-J Day, the AAF outlined its recommendations for a postwar OCS in a memorandum to the Special Planning Division of the War Department. War Department policy had stated that officer candidate schools were "for young men who do not attend college or for those who attend colleges which do not maintain an ROTC unit." The AAF agreed that college attendance should not be a requisite for admission to the officer candidate schools "if the individual had achieved maturity approximating that attained by a college student.
with two years of college.\^ Formal education requirements might be
waived if the candidate possessed the proper character, attained an AGCT
score of 120 or better, and showed a capacity for leadership. In order
to produce the type of officer needed by the AAF, the officer candidate
school should be a full-time institution "providing an intensive three
to six months course of a general nature," including a curriculum
covering the 320 hours of the proposed two-year ROTC course, and "as
much of the advanced semi-specialized training as there may be time for."
During the postwar operations of the school, the AAF believed, officer
candidate training should be the responsibility of each major command,
with the War Department exercising only general supervision. Age limits
of the candidates should be 19 and 30, although graduates of the course
who were under 21 should not have their commissions confirmed until they
reached that age, and the pay of the candidates should be ample so that
no financial loss would be incurred by their attendance at the school.
In conclusion, the AAF emphasized that officer candidate training should
be restricted to the best qualified individuals. It pointed out that
"this is especially important, as future budgetary appropriations
probably will not allow emphasis on quantity. With a limited number of
candidates, a highly selective system must be employed in selecting
future officer material."\^ If these recommendations had been adopted,
many of the more serious defects of the wartime officer candidate school
would have been remedied.

Before any concrete plans could be formulated, the operations of the
AAF CCS, then located at Maxwell Field, were temporarily suspended shortly
after V-J Day. Although instruction of those then in training was continued, administrative personnel, instructors, and candidates rapidly decreased in numbers as a result of transfers and discharges, while those who remained on duty suffered from the uncertainty apparent during the unsettled summer months. Not until October was the anxiety eased with an announcement that a new class (1946-A) would be entered for training on 8 October 1945. Despite the recommendations of the AAF, no revisions were made in entrance requirements or curriculum; the only changes were to put the school on a five-day week and to require all candidates to sign a statement that they would remain in the service for at least one year after graduation.

In the midst of this postwar reorganization, the OCS was again moved; in January 1946, after only seven months at Maxwell Field, it was returned to San Antonio where, effective 1 February 1946, it became a part of the AAF Military Training Center. Class 1946-A was the last class to be graduated at Maxwell Field; those in training at the time of the transfer, Classes 1946-B and 1946-C, accompanied the school personnel to the new station. Contrary to the experience of previous movements, two weeks of academic training were lost during this change of station, one of which was made up by reverting temporarily to a six-day week. In a comparatively short time, however, the OCS was settled in its new home, and classes, though small, began to arrive at regular intervals.

*During the first quarter of 1946 classes ranged in size from no candidates in Class 1946-D to 32 candidates despite the fact that there was a quota for 50 trainees to enter each four weeks. (Itr, Hq. AAFTC to CG AAFTC, subj.: Officers Candidate School (Administrative), 28 Feb. 1946, in DRB 353 Training 18, Officer Candidate School, 1946.)
Shortly after the transfer to Texas had been completed, the AAF was informed of a prospective change in the Army officer candidate school program. Pointing out that the eight-week recruit training program then in effect was not providing a sufficient background to qualify personnel for officer candidate training, AG/6 G-3 recommended that the officer candidate courses be increased to six months. The six months of officer candidate training would be divided into two three-month periods; a basic course under the supervision of the Army Ground Forces and an advanced course under the direction of the major force concerned. The AAF, invited to take part in this program, declined and recommended instead that it be allowed to continue its own OCS. To support its stand, the AAF pointed out that the candidate load at the AAF school was small and the instructor staff would have to be maintained whether the course was three or six months in length; furthermore, the requirements of the AAF were sufficiently different from those of the other branches of the service to warrant the operation of a separate school. The recommendation that the course be increased to six months was approved, however, and the AAF proposed to adopt it "in the near future." Also under consideration as a future change was a recommendation that either quotas or class intervals be revised so that one or two classes would be under instruction each year rather than the four which then were entering annually.

In the meantime, two additional types of training were undertaken by the OCS. It was announced on 12 February that enlisted men holding the military specialty of flight engineer would be permitted to apply for the
AAF officer candidate school. Applications, accompanied by signed statements that the candidates would remain on duty at least one year after receiving commissions, were to be submitted in the usual manner. Candidates were to be informed that no facilities for providing flying time existed at the school and that they would receive aeronautical ratings when awarded their commissions upon graduation. Beginning 1 February a three-week course in administrative training for combat returnees, company-grade officers was also inaugurated as a part of the OGS; classes of 40 students each arrived at one-week intervals to pursue a 120-hour course composed largely of administrative and supply instruction. This course continued until 19 July when it was replaced by a new eight-week officer training course for company-grade officers; this called for entering classes of 34 students each every four weeks to undertake a general administrative officer course of 311 hours. Training of these two groups greatly increased the strain already apparent on the understaffed OGS administrative and instructional personnel, yet the training was completed on schedule throughout the period.

Despite the various recommendations proposed during the early months of the postwar period, only minor changes were made in the officer candidate entrance qualifications. In April 1946 it was announced that the maximum age for applicants had been lowered to 34 (no candidate should have passed his 35th birthday on completion of the course) and that a minimum of four month's continuous service immediately prior to the date of enrollment in OGS was necessary for qualification; other entrance requirements remained the same as they had been during wartime. In May the Special Planning Division of the War Department drafted a revision
of the recommended postwar policies, which, except for raising the minimum age to 19, also indicated no significant changes in the entrance qualifications for the AAF CCS.\(^6\) In spite of this recommendation, other changes were announced in August; the maximum age was lowered to 30 and the period for which a candidate was required to signify his intention of remaining in the service after graduation was increased to 18 months.* Furthermore, the amount of previous military service required before acceptance for training was reduced to eight weeks.\(^7\) Thus, despite the shorter period of previous service necessary for qualification, the number of possible applicants was narrowed further by the longer period of active duty required after graduation and the lower maximum age.

During the period in which these modifications were being made, considerable speculation existed concerning the probable future of the school, but since the OCS would be automatically abolished whenever Congress declared the emergency at an end, no definite plans could be made. In June 1946 it was pointed out that if the school were allowed to close, the only assured source of nonrated AAF officers would be the 42 per year coming from the United States Military Academy; no officers would be supplied by the Air Reserve Officers Training Corps program until June 1948. Since the nonrated officer requirement for the fiscal year 1947 would be 1,400, action was necessary. Because of the difficulties which would arise if the OCS closed, it was recommended that it continue operations at least for the remainder of the emergency plus six months; for the maintenance of a supply of officers after that undetermined date,  

\*The statement was invalidated if the candidate failed to complete the course.
legislation should be sought immediately which would authorize a
peace time AAF Officer Candidate School. To assure the fulfillment of
the officer procurement program until that time, it was recommended that
the annual quota of OCS trainees be raised to 1,400 and that steps be
taken to attract qualified applicants "by means of additional incentives
and publicity." 18 Although considerable agreement with these recommendations
was expressed in Headquarters AAF, no immediate decision was reached on
them. 19

The subject apparently lay dormant until September 1946; then it was
announced at an Air Staff meeting that Lt. Gen. John K. Cannon, commanding
general of the Air Training Command (ATRC) had recommended the elimination
of the AAF OCS because of a lack of operating personnel.* A request by
General Spaatz, AAF commander, for a study of the problem produced a
memorandum from AC/AS-3 similar to that outlined above. In addition
to the reasons presented in the June memorandum for the continuation
of the school, AC/AS-3 expressed the belief that the OCS was necessary
from a morale standpoint because, with no school of its own, the AAF
would be expected to participate in the Army officer candidate program
"which would lose for the AAF the esprit de corps and morale best obtained
in an AAF school." Therefore, the recommendations of AC/AS-3 were about
the same as those of the June memorandum, except for a proposed annual
quota of 1,500 candidates rather than the 1,400 previously suggested. 20

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*On 13 September Headquarters ATRC announced that the OCS would be transferred to a station of the AAFTC at "the earliest practicable date." Before this transfer could be made, however, the order was rescinded. (Ltr., Hq. ATRC to CG AAF, NEC, San Antonio, subj: Transfer of Courses, 13 Sept. 1946, in Hist. 354th AAF Base Unit (M.T.C.), San Antonio, 1 Sept.-30 Sept. 1946, App.; ltr. Hq. ATRC to CG AAFTC, subj: Transfer of Courses, n.d. in Hist. 354th AAF Base Unit /Indoctrination Division ATRC/, 1 Oct.-31 Dec. 1946, p. 150).
In October 1946 ATRO finally consolidated the various proposals for alterations in the OCS program and made new recommendations to Headquarters AAF. Because of the lessened demand for AAF nonrated officers, classes should be reduced to 50 candidates entering semi-annually. Moreover, ATRO believed, in common with the officer candidate schools of the other branches of the Army, that an increase in the length of the course to 24 weeks was desirable.\footnote{21} The Deputy Chief of Air Staff approved these changes, and the course was lengthened effective with Class 1947-D, the first to enter in 1947. However, a total of 50 candidates was not considered a sufficient input, and the quota for the first class was raised to 140, with a quota of 250 contemplated for subsequent ones.\footnote{22} The longer training period, which increased the hours of instruction to 960, rendered obsolete the new 640-hour curriculum of 15 July 1946, including most of the courses as they had existed during the wartime operation of the school. Most of this added time was allotted to the military and administrative training subjects; only 2 new classes were added, a 5-hour course in polar survival and 108 hours to be devoted to the practical application of the knowledge gained in the classroom. Because of these additional hours spent in the basic subjects, it was believed that the new program would increase the proficiency of the candidates by affording them more adequate indoctrination.\footnote{23}

Despite these variations in the length of the course and in the curriculum, the OCS academic grading system remained substantially as it had been since March 1944. In computing the standings of the officer candidates, daily grades (60 per cent), practical problem grades (20 to 40 per cent), and short-answer written examination grades (0 to 20 per cent)
were weighted "according to the nature of the instruction and the relative importance of each examination" and transposed into numerical grades ranging from 5 down to 1. A grade of 2.5 was considered passing, and this figure was used in determining the candidates who were to be washed back or eliminated. Up to 16 September 1946 students who received less than 2.5 in any phase of the course were automatically washed back to repeat the phase; if they again scored less than 2.5, they were eliminated. With the class which entered on 16 September (1947-A), a new policy was recommended by Headquarters OCC. Thereafter, failure to attain at least a grade of 2.5 would result in automatic elimination. Students who scored between 2.5 and 2.9 were to be washed back to repeat the phase and, if repetition did not produce a grade of 3 or better, elimination would be automatic; this procedure, it was anticipated, would reduce the time between failure of a phase and the rendering of a decision on washing back or elimination. 26 This plan was approved with the admonition that "extremely strict grading will be observed for all classes in training to insure that only the students meeting the high standards will be graduated." 27

High standards of achievement alone would not be a sufficient guarantee of the graduation of only the highest type of officers; selection methods could always be improved. As early as 1 April 1946, as a part of an Army-wide program, The Adjutant General directed that the various AAF agencies participate in activities designed to promote better selection. These activities consisted of a rather extensive program in which a specified number of enlisted men at each station would be tested and interviewed in an attempt to discover potential officer candidates. 28 Efforts of this nature notwithstanding, it was apparent that dissimilar methods of
selection were being employed by the OCS boards scattered throughout
the service, with the result that many unqualified candidates were
being sent to the school. Too many students were being graduated merely
by surviving the academic testing and avoiding infractions of discipline,
even though, the AAF believed, "they did not measure up to the expected
personality standards at officers." As the need for a better selection
system thus became apparent, an aviation psychological research and
examining unit (PREU) was designated in November to cooperate with the
OCS in a study of selection and elimination procedures and methods.
PREU began immediately to assemble data, to devise tests and projects
with means of interpretation, and to set up methods of evaluating OCS
training by performance after graduation. Work was continued through-
cut 1947 but without signal success because of a disagreement "between
the psychologists and school authorities as to methods of officer
evaluation." PREU did not consider the monthly ratings of officer
candidates by their fellow flight members or the observation reports
by the tactical officers reliable indications of a candidate's progress.
OCS officials not only disagreed but planned to place in operation a
much more detailed rating scale similar to that in use at the U.S.
Military Academy. Although PREU continued to experiment and was able
to prove the reliability of its rating scale, the OCS had discontinued
its use by the end of 1947 and was relying solely on the candidate
"buddy" ratings and observation reports. Because ATAG policy was "that
no subordinate commander will be told how to perform his assigned mission,"
the OCS commander was free to reject the advice of the PREU; therefore,
the year ended with a measure of discord in FRBU-OCS relations. 33

Meanwhile, further modifications in the entrance requirements were contemplated although none were made until late in 1946. As early as March 1946 the AAF had concurred in recommendations that 21 be set as the minimum age for the graduation of officers and that the length of prior service required for beginning the course be raised to six months. 34 No action was taken until November; at that time it was directed that attendance at OCS would be required of all candidates for a nonrated commission in the AAF and that, effective 1 February 1947, the minimum age would be 19 years. Rather than increasing the amount of service required, however, the minimum prior service was reduced to only six weeks. 35 Further changes were made in April: all candidates were to undergo training at least in the grade of staff sergeant, the minimum age for entrance was raised to 20 years and 6 months so that no officer would be graduated before he had reached his 21st birthday, and the maximum age for graduation was lowered to 28 years. Although this further reduced the number of men eligible for selection, the prior service requirement was dropped entirely in order to allow civilians to apply directly to the school. 36 Apparently it was believed that the six-month training period would compensate for a lack of military training on the part of candidates who entered school directly from civil life.

With the adoption of the 24-week course, some revision of the grading and elimination procedures was necessary; and, as an aid in improving the system in use at AAF OCS, three officers on the school staff visited the Army Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia, in February 1947. As a result of their observation it was decided to divide the
course into three eight-week phases and to measure accomplishment in the administrative subjects by departmentalized objective tests, weekly tests in each subject covered during the week, and review tests every four weeks to cover all previously presented material. Tactical courses would be tested by both written tests and instructor observation, while student progress in the practical application course would be determined by two or more officers from the school staff. New standards were also set up to aid in a more accurate evaluation of officer qualities. All students were to be kept under constant observation throughout the entire course, and records of personal observation were to be maintained by the tactical officers. An observation slip was to be made out on a candidate for an infraction of regulations, shown to the candidate concerned, and initialed by him; one or more unfavorable slips could result in an investigation by the faculty board. All academic, tactical, practical application, and personal observation scores were then to be averaged and converted into the 5 to 1 point scale. A minimum of 2.5 in any course and a minimum average of 2.7 in any one of the three phases (administrative and services, tactical, and practical application) were considered satisfactory; failure to maintain either would be considered cause for elimination.  

These attempts to improve officer candidate selection and grading methods notwithstanding, the nongraduating rate for the year 1947 was an astonishingly high 38 per cent (149 eliminees out of 392 entering candidates). Although a majority of the nongraduates either were disqualified physically or were eliminated for academic failure, the number of resignations was so high (45 in the first six weeks of the July class) that those resigning were interviewed in an effort to ascertain the reasons. It was discovered
that, although the cause given for the record usually was personal
difficulties, the basic reason could be found in careless selection of
candidates; some had no real interest in the training, some were not
prepared to undergo six months of rigorous training, and others, who
were former flying enlisted men or flight officers, had expected to
retain their flying status while in training. Because each resignation
had deprived a more worthy man of an opportunity to become a candidate,
as well as costing the AAF in time and expense, efforts were made to
remedy the situation at its source—in the selection boards—but without
success. Finally it was decided that each candidate would be required to
sign a statement signifying his desire to attend officer candidate school.
Although no penalties were attached if a candidate resigned after
signing the statement, it was hoped that the act of signing would be
a deterrent to those who were insincere in making their applications
for the training.

In addition to the changes brought about in the OCS grading methods,
some innovations in the school curriculum were made in 1947. In April
Air Training Command headquarters directed the addition to the academic
program of an orientation course on atomic energy which would introduce
the candidates to the subject of the atom bomb as a weapon of war;
therefore, the revision of the curriculum which became effective with
the July class contained a 20-hour course in that subject. Also added
to the revised program of instruction was a 14-hour course in review
English, introduced because of a deficiency in the fundamentals of good
grammar noted among the candidates. Minor changes were also made in the
time allotted to some of the other courses—additional time was given
to mess management and training methods while 36 hours were taken from
open time and 24 hours from practical application—so that the total number of hours in the program remained 960. Further alterations were made in another revision of the curriculum which was adopted at the end of the year for the January 1946 class. The review English course was expanded to include public speaking and was increased to 87 hours, the military leadership course was increased from 15 to 50 hours, while courses in chemical warfare, camouflage, transportation, and a 15-hour period of open time designated "Forum and Study" were deleted from the program. The atomic energy course was reduced to 12 hours and the time for drill and ceremonies, practical application, and special activities were all reduced approximately 20 per cent. From these changes it appears that the trend of OCS emphasis was away from military and practical training in favor of the development of a well-rounded leader of men.

The year 1947 did not close without another another attempt to discontinue the AAF OCS; this time the recommendation originated in Headquarters ATRC. In September ATRC recommended that a ground training course for aviation cadets be substituted for the administrative course because of: 1) discrepancies in educational qualifications in the OCS and aviation cadet programs; 2) differences in pay and allowances between students in the two programs (pay and allowances of the officer candidates being higher); and 3) dissatisfaction with the selection agencies of the OCS. This recommendation was withdrawn, however, when USAF explained that, after January 1948, final selection of officer candidates would

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*With the reorganization of the military establishment effective 26 July 1947, the AAF assumed the status of a separate service and became the United States Air Force (USAF). The change in status in no way affected the Officer Candidate School.
be made at Headquarters USAF, the change should remedy the selection procedures. Furthermore, nothing could be done to reconcile the differences between officer candidate-aviation cadet pay and allowances without congressional legislation. Once again, therefore, the CCS had weathered the storm without losing its status as a separate training institution.

A significant change in the personnel and operations of USAF CCS took place in June 1948 when a decision was reached to offer officer candidate training to qualified Women in the Air Force (WAF) personnel on the same basis as that given to the male candidates. Recognizing that some allowances in the curriculum would be necessary, it was nevertheless contemplated that essentially the same program would be taken by both men and women. As finally worked out, the curriculum to be used beginning with the January 1949 class (the first to include women) called for the WAF’s to take the prescribed courses with the men except for small arms training, some sections of the military sanitation and first aid course, and physical training; furthermore, during drills and ceremonies the WAF’s would march separately. WAF’s were divided among the academic sections and were eligible for positions of leadership on the same basis as the male candidates, not in proportion to the number of WAF’s. Although proportionately the number of WAF candidates was never great, they formed thereafter an integral part of the officer

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While male candidates were taking small arms training, WAF’s were given a course entitled "WAF Specialized Training," which included instruction in grooming and poise, WAF history and traditions, and WAF regulations. It was necessary to use male instructors for this course until suitable women were available. (Smith Interview).
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A program of postgraduate training for OCS graduates was also placed in operation during 1948. Before being reassigned to USAF units, all graduates, with the exception of those specialists destined for further training at another base, would be assigned to the training wings at Lackland Field to aid in the basic training program. This would serve a dual purpose: the newly commissioned officers would receive practical training while the personnel shortage in the training wings would be relieved.\(^{46}\) In addition to these advantages, PREU would be able to study a group of graduates "under controlled homogeneous conditions" from which it hoped that better methods of evaluating OCS graduates might be developed.\(^{47}\) Of perhaps more significance, however, was the announcement that, for the first time since V-J Day, it would be necessary to increase the output of OCS. For the time being class quotas would not be increased; expansion would take place gradually beginning the following January by having enough additional candidates enrolled in each class to compensate for eliminations.\(^{48}\)

With the exception of the modifications necessitated by the inclusion of WAF officer candidates, few curriculum changes were made during 1948 or 1949. The field service was reduced to only 7 hours, beginning

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\(^ {46}\) In connection with a proposed extension course to be taken by prospective officers who had not had the benefit of ROTC, OCS, or USMA training, a suggestion was made that the extension course be required as a prerequisite for OCS training. The suggestion was discarded, however, on the grounds that it would make candidates more difficult to obtain. (Lttr. and indorsements thereto, ATAG to CG Indoctrination Division ATAG, subj.: Air Force Extension Program for Pre-Commission Training, 6 Aug. 1948, in Hist. 3543d AF Base Unit / The Indoctrination Division ATAG, 1 July-31 Dec. 1948, app. A, doc. III 5.)

\(^ {47}\) A survey of graduates of Class 1948-A was completed by the OCS administration in December 1948 with discouraging results; only 87 out of 190 questionnaires were returned by the graduates and little information of historical value was received. (For a complete account see Hist. 3700th Basic Training Wing, 1 Oct.-31 Dec. 1948, pp. 42-55).
with the January 1949 class, with the 25 hours thus saved allotted to special activities; also a 12-hour course in character guidance replaced the 11-hour personnel management course. In June further minor readjustments were made; the review English, intelligence, and practical application courses were reduced slightly, physical training was reduced from 120 to 72 hours, and the time formerly earmarked for these classes was assigned to special activities. This continued the trend of allotting more time in the curriculum to special activities such as pay, processing, and testing, which formerly were performed whenever convenient, often at the expense of classroom time.

Air Force regulations governing the entrance qualifications of officer candidates also were amended in September 1948 and March 1949. The maximum age of entering candidates had been reduced so that no application would be accepted from any man or woman over 26 years and 6 months of age; now no candidate would be accepted for training who had reached his 27th birthday nor would waivers for age be granted. Moreover, candidates who had entered training from enlisted status and who failed to complete the course would be returned to their former stations in the grade held at the time of entrance and would be required to serve only the unexpired portion of their term of enlistment. The September directive also reiterated the other requirements necessary for enrollment. Applicants were not required to have prior military service but were required to complete basic training between the time of application and enrollment at the school and were required to take an officer candidate test battery, which included a biographical information blank, an interview test, and an evaluation report; candidates with less than two years of college had to pass the aviation cadet educational examination.
A further change in eligibility requirements was discussed at some length later in 1949 when Headquarters USAF considered raising the minimum educational background to two years of formal college training instead of allowing high school graduates to qualify by means of the aviation cadet examination. Although it was recognized that this more rigid requirement might lower enlisted morale, it was believed that this would be compensated for by the raising of the educational level among Air Force officers. In commenting on this recommendation, Headquarters, Indoctrination Division went further and expressed the opinion that four years of college or a validating equivalent examination would be more desirable than two years. It was admitted that this might give preference to civilians over enlisted men, yet it was believed that a cut-off point on the examination could be established so that all vacancies would not be filled by civilians or that a quota for enlisted men could be established. As justification for this increase in educational requirements, the dubious argument was advanced that an individual who does not complete college may not possess either the ability nor the fortitude to complete any task worthwhile whereas, an individual who has completed college has evidenced the ability and fortitude and possibly formed a habit of completing what he or she undertakes.

Regardless of the possible benefits to the USAF from the raising of educational standards by this means, no action was taken upon the recommendation.

In October two proposals for additions to the officer candidate program were made by the OCC: the establishment of preparatory OCC training and the placing of postgraduate training on a permanent basis.
Interviews had been conducted with officer candidates who had undergone no military service prior to enrollment, and over 75 per cent had stated that they believed some previous training would have been beneficial to them; therefore, it was recommended that an officer candidate preparatory school, prepared to offer a minimum of one month of training, be established in conjunction with the OCS. During this course the candidates would be confined to the base, would not be able to resign, and would be checked carefully to determine their fitness for commissions. The month of training would be spent in learning or reviewing the fundamentals of basic military information, so that candidates could begin officer candidate training on a more nearly equal basis. Completion of the proposed course, which consisted of 177 hours of instruction, would permit a more concentrated academic program during the regular OCS course.\footnote{54}

In outlining this proposed preparatory training, the OCS pointed out that the personnel used for conducting the course would be available for other activities when no preparatory class was in session.\footnote{55}

As some graduates of the OCS had disregarded "the standards of officers in the conduct of their financial and personal affairs" in the past, the OCS recommended that the postgraduate course be made a permanent part of OCS training. The proposed training would consist of semiweekly two-hour classes during the six-month period of student officer training following graduation. The time allotted to this training would be utilized in problem solving, discussion groups, and reading assignments; and the recent graduates would be observed and guided in their new status as USAF commissioned officers. Headquarters OCS believed that such a
course could be conducted with no increase in existing facilities and that the officers could be used as instructors while undergoing the training. Although both of these proposals contained considerable merit, no action was taken on them by ATC headquarters.

Action was taken before the end of 1949, however, on a recommendation of the Indoctrination Division's commander that the semianual entrance of OCS classes be abandoned in favor of four classes each year. This change was to be inaugurated with Class 1950-A (to enter 9 January 1950) and the quota for each class was set at 145 male and 15 female candidates. Because two classes would be in training simultaneously under this plan, it was decided to reinstitute the class system and, in order to improve upon the wartime operation of the system, representatives of the school visited the Aviation Cadet School at Randolph Field for study and observation. As a result, considerable modification was made in the directives which governed officer candidate training; the restoration of the distinction between upper and lower classes would make still further changes in life at OCS for future candidates.

The most significant curriculum revision of the postwar period, which was also to take effect with Class 1950-A, was announced late in 1949. In an attempt to discover what qualities were most essential in an officer, Dr. John C. Flanagan of the American Research Institute of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, had interviewed or queried by means of a questionnaire thousands of combat returnees. A compilation of these data resulted in the selection of 54 (later condensed to 36) specific behavior areas which related to officer effectiveness. OCS graduates in the field were then rated according to these behavior areas to ascertain what
qualities should be stressed in the training of officers. Also, the results of the research were incorporated in a new officer rating form, Officer Effectiveness Report (Form 77). When all of the data were combined and correlated, an OCS staff study was conducted to determine if the curriculum placed proper stress on the development of these qualities. The findings of this staff study were reflected in the new curriculum.

One deficiency brought out by this extensive research was the inability of many OCS graduates to express themselves orally or in writing. Therefore, the review English course was replaced by courses in effective expression, which emphasized public speaking and written expression, effective reading, effective study, effective teaching methods, and "How to Think and Solve Problems." These additions were allotted 123 hours. The hours allotted to practical application were increased to 152, and the atomic energy course was replaced by a more practical one entitled "Radiological Defense." To provide hours for these additions, the polar survival course and the field service were dropped entirely, and several administrative courses were reduced in length. An attempt was made in a March 1950 revision of the curriculum to correct another deficiency, a lack of geographic knowledge among the recent graduates, with the introduction of a 23-hour course in military geography. In addition to acquainting the candidate with the effect of geography on military operations, the course was designed to give him an over-all knowledge of the world political and economic picture and the place of the USAF in that picture. Further changes were made in July 1951 when the OCS returned to a six-day week; this increased the total hours of instruction to 1,152 and necessitated further revision of the curriculum.
Fifty-two hours of new courses, largely concerned with the activities and composition of the various Air Force commands and the other branches of the service but including an eight-hour/service,* were added to the program. The remaining 140 hours of new instructional time was divided among nine courses and miscellaneous activities. With the addition of these hours to the training program, it was possible for the OCS to replace the time which had been taken from the basic officer courses and, at the same time, to continue stressing courses designed to produce a more effective USAF officer.

The grading system and the rate of officer candidate failure also came under surveillance during 1950, with the result that significant improvements were made in both phases of OCS administration. The point scale which had been in use since 1944 was dispensed with and a grade point system was introduced—grade points being the percentile score received on an examination multiplied by the number of class hours covered by the examination. A total of 473 grade points was possible of attainment in the academic subjects. At the end of the eighth week of training, the lowest 15 per cent of the candidate corps and at the end of the sixteenth week the lowest 10 per cent would be called upon to appear before a group of officers, known as the Academic Board, representing each department. These candidates would be tested by the board by means of a written and an oral examination, which in some cases served candidates who had trouble with objective type examinations.7

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*The principal objective of the field service now is to give the candidates "a basic knowledge of chemical warfare and the defense measures employed against such attack." ("Candi-data," p. 54)†

†Much research in the field of item analysis and content analysis produced more valid objective tests in 1951 and 1952 (Smith Interview).
and the board would then decide whether or not the student should be recommended to appear before the faculty board for possible elimination from the course. 63

By 18 May 1950, 24 members of Class 1950-B who had entered training on 20 March had resigned, and Headquarters ATAG requested a report on the circumstances. 64 The OCS explained that each candidate who expressed a desire to be relieved from training had been interviewed in an attempt to determine the reasons for dissatisfaction and that several significant factors had been uncovered: 1) some candidates had applied for OCS in an attempt to alleviate an unsatisfactory civilian economic status and desired to be relieved from training when offered civilian employment; 2) others had been misinformed by the recruiting personnel regarding conditions at the school; 3) some had been disappointed at the quality of instruction offered at the school; 4) some had resigned upon discovering that they were not physically qualified for a regular USAF commission; and 5) a recent reduction in USAF reserve officer strength had made others dubious about the security offered by an Air Force career. The OCS pointed out that, although resignations submitted by qualified officer candidates would continue to be discouraged, it would be inconsistent with the mission of the school to retain candidates who had expressed a desire to be relieved from training. 65 With these factors in mind, ATAG recommended by endorsement to Headquarters USAF that action be taken to improve the quality of instruction and to assure a more satisfactory orientation of prospective candidates with regard to the nature of OCS training. The former improvement could best be accomplished, it was
believed, by stabilizing the instructional staff with minimum grants to instructors of three-year tours of duty. Headquarters USAF replied that it was anticipated that a future publication would counteract the misinformation to which candidates had formerly been exposed. Furthermore, it was USAF policy that officers with less than three years of active duty would have the lowest priority in any future reductions so that the newly commissioned officers would be retained on active duty for at least three years after graduation. Headquarters USAF believed that this information should aid in restoring confidence among the candidates concerning the Air Force as a career; however, critical shortages of personnel made it impossible to set up a minimum tour of three years for instructors at the school. Although these efforts would not guarantee an improvement in the elimination problem, they might prove beneficial, and Headquarters AMC assured the CGS that everything possible would be done to improve the quality of instruction.

During the latter part of 1950 there was considerable evidence that the CGS could expect an increase in the size of its enrollment as a part of the armed forces buildup following the United Nations' action in Korea in June. A survey of the existing facilities at the CGS revealed that 500 male and 80 female candidates could be accommodated with the existing

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†In May 1952 the normal tour of duty for Air Force instructors was established as three years (AFR 36-64, 21 May 1952).
living and messing quarters; however, classrooms were not available for more than 500 candidates. It was recommended, therefore, that classes be limited to 210 male and 40 female candidates which would mean a total of 500 candidates in the school at one time. Even this modest increase would require the addition of 12 officers and 25 enlisted men to the administrative staff. If these changes were made and a continuous flow of 250 candidates in each class was maintained, no additional construction would be required. 

Despite this survey, Headquarters USAF proposed an increase in enrollment to 320 candidates in each class, making a total of 640 candidates under instruction simultaneously. Even though this would entail considerable conversion of classrooms and barracks, as well as an additional 19 officers, 34 enlisted men, and 4 civilians as permanent personnel, the expense involved was believed justified; and it was urged by CCS that, beginning with Class 1951-B, the enrollment be increased to the figure proposed by Headquarters USAF.

Beginning in October 1949 it became possible for a small number of the highest ranking graduates of the CCS to receive regular commissions in the USAF, and the instructions issued for determining the outstanding members of Class 1949-E typified the method used in making these selections. Academic and military standings were to be compiled to determine the upper one-third of the class, and these candidates were then to be arranged on an "Order of Merit" list on the basis of 55 per cent for leadership, 30 per cent for academic grades, and 15 per cent for lack of demerits (beginning with Class 1949-C this was changed so that a distinguished graduate had to be in the upper fifth of his class
militarily and in the upper third academically). From this list candidates would be selected as "Distinguished Air Force Officer Candidates" and any of these who were physically qualified and under the maximum age could apply for a regular commission." When the OCS class was graduates, those candidates who had submitted their applications for the regular commissions would be commissioned in the reserve along with their fellow graduates. During the first six months after graduation they would be checked closely, according to the behavior areas developed by the Planagan research, and officer effectiveness reports would be prepared on them at the end of each 60-day period of active duty. At the end of six months, all data concerning these graduates would be submitted to Headquarters USAF where the final selection would be made. Finally, these graduates appeared before a regular officer screening board; this highly selective system should have produced only outstanding officers.72

In the selection of distinguished graduates in classes 1950-A and 1950-B, it was discovered that little correlation existed between the military aptitude ratings submitted by the instructors, those made by the candidates on their fellow candidates, and those by the tactical officers. Since the instructors had little contact with the candidates outside of the classroom and were prone to judge military aptitude by academic proficiency, the OCS believed that instructors should not be required to rate the candidates militarily.73 Even without military

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*The maximum age was 27 for all applicants for regular commissions, except for those who had served in the armed forces prior to 2 September 1945; for them the maximum age was 30.*
aptitude ratings by the instructors, further difficulties were encountered in rating members of Class 1950-C. A study of the ratings submitted at the end of the sixteenth week of training revealed that candidates had rated their fellow students much higher than did the tactical officers; therefore, in order to validate the ratings it was recommended that military ratings for that particular class be dependent on the reports of the tactical officers. When this recommendation was approved, the military ratings employed in the selection of distinguished candidates of Class 1950-C became solely the responsibility of the tactical officers. As a result of this situation, steps were taken by the OGS staff to ensure better indoctrination of new candidates in the use of ratings and a repetition of this type of rating invalidation has not occurred.

In the fall of 1950 changes in the elimination procedure resulted in a great increase in the amount of work entailed in handling candidates who for various reasons did not complete the OGS course. Prior to this time, only cases of academic or military deficiency were required to appear before the Faculty Board; however, Headquarters AT&TC directed in October that the Faculty Board be required to meet all candidates who failed to complete the course, regardless of the cause of failure. Furthermore, Headquarters AT&TC directed that OGS no longer prohibit resignations during the first month of training; candidates were to be allowed to resign at any time. Upon receipt of this information, the OGS pointed out that the innovation of this policy would greatly increase the amount of work performed by the board and would undoubtedly interfere with the successful carrying out of
the mission of the school. Despite this very valid objection the Faculty Board was required to assume the additional burden which, according to the prediction of Headquarters OCS, would more than double the number of cases handled by it.

During the month of July 1951, in addition to the curriculum modifications noted above, AFR 53-2, the directive which governed the operations of the USAF OCS, was revised with regard to the personnel eligible to apply for officer candidate training. After 16 July application would be limited to three groups: 1) enlisted men or women and warrant officers on duty with the USAF, 2) members of Air National Guard or organized Air Force Reserve units, and 3) female civilians. Age and educational requirements remained the same except that personnel on duty with the USAF who did not meet the minimum requirement of two years of college would be required to take the general educational development test (college level), whereas members of the Air National Guard or the organized reserve who were high school graduates might qualify by taking the aviation cadet examination. Under the provisions of this regulation, therefore, male civilians no longer were qualified for officer candidate training; quotas would thereafter be filled from active duty or reserve personnel.

As a result of the increase in the USAF following the Korean action of June 1950, procurement of officers directly from civilian life was again undertaken in the summer of 1951. In order to prepare these newly commissioned officers for the better performance of their military duties,
an officer training school, designated the Officer Basic Military School, was established in conjunction with the OCS. The eight-week course, consisting of 352 hours of instruction, was designed to familiarize the officers with the knowledge considered essential for USAF officers; stress was placed on administration, supply, and military training, with such auxiliary courses as Strategic Air War and Air Defense included in the course of instruction. Essentially the same course framework was employed that had proved successful in the Officer Training School at Miami Beach during 1942 and 1943. Furthermore, evaluation and elimination procedures for the new course were very similar to those formerly used in OCS and to those then in use in the OCS. The first class of newly commissioned officers, consisting of 10 male and 46 female students, entered OBM on 17 September 1951, with larger classes expected at regular intervals during the following year.

At the close of 1951 the USAF OCS was on the threshold of further expansion and a greater role in the production of USAF administrative officers. Although the school continued to experience great difficulty in the procurement of an adequate supply of instructors, some improvement in the quality of those obtained was noticeable. The curriculum had been improved considerably and had been expanded both in scope and in the number of hours of instruction to candidates. Testing and grading methods had been validated and elimination procedure perfected so that

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8Late in 1951 witnessed the beginning of further research on the military aptitude rating system, the results of which appeared in Ernest C. Tuples, Walter R. Dong, and M/Sgt. Gabriel Friedman, "A Factor Analysis of the OCS Paired-Comparison Evaluation System," ARDC, Human Resources Research Center (Technical Report 53-10, June 1953). Based upon this report, significant improvements have been made in the "buddy rating" system which it is hoped has removed many major defects (Smith Interview).
the mission of the school—"to prepare selected candidates for their
duties and responsibilities in commissioned rank and to insure a high
quality of junior officers by commissioning only those individuals who
display the attributes required of an officer in the United States Air
Force"—was being carried out efficiently and well.
Chapter VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

When the Secretary of War authorized the establishment of officer candidate schools on 26 April 1941, the Air Corps was not accorded a school; instead, a small quota was set up for the training of Air Corps personnel at the other candidate schools. Since this procedure was patently inadequate, Air Corps planners began considering the organization of a separate school devoted to producing Air Corps administrative officers. In September 1941 a proposal was made to set up at the San Antonio Air Depot, Duncan Field, Texas, an officer candidate school capable of producing 60 officers every 3 months until 400 officers were graduated. A memorandum based on this proposal was written setting forth the entrance requirements; each candidate should have an AGCT score of 110 or higher, have completed 5 months continuous service in the Air Corps prior to entrance, be between 21 and 29 years of age, and agree to serve 1 year after graduation. Each successful candidate would be commissioned as a second lieutenant upon graduation. Even though the maximum age was raised to 35 and the graduation quota was increased to 800, the inadequacy of the plan was recognized; and when it was announced that 12,000 ground officers would be needed, thoughts were turned to a school capable of graduating 8,000 officers annually. With such a large school in prospect, the project was assigned to General Weaver, head of the AAFTC, who was directed to create an officer candidate school at such a place as he might select. At a conference held on
17 February 1942, the decision was reached to locate the school at Miami Beach which had been suggested as a site by General Weaver. Once the location had been selected, the AAF moved with surprising speed and all arrangements were completed in the next 6 days; on 23 February 1942, 378 members of the first class began officer candidate training.

Soon after the opening of the school, several defects became apparent, most of which were not the fault of the OCS itself. Some criticism was voiced concerning the placing of a school in the midst of a tourist resort; however, in the interest of speed and economy the decision was a sound one. Early classes were handicapped considerably by an inadequate supply of training aids and classrooms, but these defects were gradually remedied. Administrative and instructional personnel were never adequate, either in quality or quantity, and the school was often compelled to rely on officer candidates as instructors. Furthermore, the relationship between the school and higher headquarters was never clarified; and, from a comparatively independent organization in 1942, the OCS gradually became subordinate to the immediately higher headquarters. Lastly, the school experienced great difficulty in its own organizational structure: lines of authority were not clearly drawn, and the centralized system of administration and instruction in operation during the first 18 months of the school's history proved uneconomical of time and effort. On 25 July 1943 a reorganization decentralized all functions and produced a more efficient organization, which continued to operate until enrollment decreased to the point that a re-institution of centralization was necessary. Despite these handicaps, classes entered and were graduated on schedule; by V-J Day some 52,780 officers had been
Regardless of the success of the school in filling the AAF need for administrative officers, suggestions for closing or combining the OCS with other officer candidate schools were heard as early as July 1943. Some of these suggestions had considerable merit; yet the AAF was able to continue the operation of its own OCS, although the school was moved twice during the remainder of the period of hostilities. Between 1 April and 1 July 1944, the school was transferred to SAACG where it remained until May 1945 when it was moved to Maxwell Field.

One of the most important problems which faced the OCS was the selection of officer candidates; the type of officer turned out depended to a great extent on the quality of the entering candidate. When the school opened, candidates were restricted to eliminated aviation cadets and enlisted men or warrant officers of the Air Corps. No special qualifications were prescribed for the ex-cadets, but the Air Corps personnel were required to meet certain minimum standards: 1) a demonstration of high qualities of leadership, 2) citizenship between the ages of 18 and 45, 3) three month's continuous or six month's cumulative service prior to enrollment, and 4) an AGCT score of 110 or better. No rigid educational requirement was set up, and since the school was not concerned with the production of combat officers, the physical standards were low. Furthermore, commanding officers were directed to seek out and encourage qualified men to apply for the training. Despite the clarity of these minimum requirements, many unqualified candidates were received by the school throughout the war, new directives to selection boards notwithstanding.
Several attempts were made to alter the entrance requirements in the interest of obtaining better qualified candidates. Limited service candidates had been selected for training, and waivers had been granted for minor physical defects. Late in 1943, however, it was directed that only two choices were possible in determining a candidate's physical status; either he met the minimum physical requirements for induction and was thus qualified for OCS training, or he did not meet the requirements and was to be discharged. Changes were proposed in the age limits also when it was seen that the elimination rate among the candidates over 38 was much higher than among the younger men. Despite considerable sentiment for reducing the maximum age to 38, nothing was done until after V-J Day.

The number of candidates accepted for officer candidate training was, of course, determined by the requirements for administrative officers; therefore, the size of the classes varied considerably. Candidates were obtained by a system of quotas allotted to the major commands who in turn suballotted quotas to the smaller units. Despite the relatively small number of officers to be trained, no restrictions were placed on the number of men who might apply and be accepted by local selection boards; consequently, by late 1942 a surplus of prospective candidates had developed. Although recommendations were made that would have reduced this surplus, none was adopted and many candidates remained accepted for training who were never sent to school.

When the candidate reported to the OCS, he underwent a rigorous 12-week training program. Although the school was never given a training directive to serve as a guide, a curriculum was developed which was designed
to prepare a well-rounded administrative officer. Stress was placed initially on an academic program consisting of administration, supply, mess, and transportation courses, and a military program. When complaints were received that graduates were unable to take on the responsibilities of their new assignments without on-the-job training, the academic program was reorganized. A period of specialization, during which candidates would undergo training in one of six specialties—adjutant and personnel, supply, mess, intelligence, training, or guard—was set up to occupy the last four weeks of the course.* It was soon apparent that this was more instruction than the candidates could absorb in 12 weeks; therefore, the course was extended to 16 weeks (beginning with Class 1943-H) and continued at that length for the remainder of the war period.

In addition to the academic training, the candidates underwent some physical training and were constantly subjected to military training. Candidates underwent physical training throughout the course under the direction of a physical training department which also trained physical training specialists as officer candidates. Military training undoubtedly occupied the dominant role in the curriculum and, in general, was patterned after that of the U.S. Military Academy; the class system and bracing or "posturization" were parts of officer candidate life. Officer candidates performed many officer and noncommissioned officer duties, rated their fellow squadron members militarily, and were subject at

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* This did not include those candidates who were enrolled in the physical training officers course at Mound Beach or who were earmarked for the statistical officers course at Harvard University.
all times to a demerit system. Furthermore, the course was climaxed by a short maneuver, called a field service, during which the candidates put into practice what had been learned in the classroom. In spite of the strenuous military program and partially as a result of improper selection of candidates, the OCS was unable to fulfill completely one of its primary missions: the development of leadership among the prospective officers.

During the early years of the school's operations at Miami Beach, periodic inspections revealed no serious defects in the OCS training program. In January 1944, however, Colonel Harris of the Air Inspector's office submitted his report of an investigation of the school. It was a severe indictment of the entire program. Among the criticisms reported by Harris were: The academic system was weak because of the attempt to crowd too many subjects into a few weeks, the candidates were forced to work under too much pressure, the physical training program was too strenuous, particularly for the men over 30, and the attempt to set up a "miniature West Point" was a failure. This report was submitted to AG/AS Training; that office immediately sent two of its staff, Colonel Pool and Major Smith, to conduct another investigation. Their report, completed six days later, contradicted Harris on nearly every point. Although it is impossible to explain the wide divergence between these reports (that of Harris seemed to have been borne out by later reports), each apparently contained much valuable criticism of the school which should have been seriously considered by later AAF planners.

Several administrative problems, which were never adequately solved,
confronted the OCS throughout its wartime existence. Much time and
effort were devoted to the validation of testing and grading methods
with only nominal success. Even though the elimination rate was never
excessive, the problem was serious enough to warrant one investigation,
that by Colonel Harris. Despite the opinion of Harris that the elimina-
tions were caused by the OCS program and the belief expressed by Pool
and Smith that they resulted from the admission of unqualified candidates,
evidence indicates that the attrition rate among the officer candidates
compared favorably with those of other AAF schools and that most elimi-
nations resulted from normal causes such as academic deficiency, lack
of military aptitude, or physical defects. Because of the environment,
the morale of the candidates also presented a problem; morale was affected
adversely by the presence of an officer training school and by the location
of the school in the midst of a winter resort. Although conditions in
1942 had necessitated the use of all available facilities by the AAF,
by 1944 observers were convinced that from the standpoint of morale,
locating the school at Miami Beach had been a mistake. These problems
notwithstanding, OCS classes were graduated on schedule, and the newly
commissioned officers were assigned wherever a need for them existed.

Before the OCS had been able to produce officer personnel in
sufficient quantities to meet the demand, the Air Corps, in common
with the other branches of the service, had begun to grant commissions
directly to civilians who possessed the qualifications required by the
service. No other method of fulfilling immediate requirements was apparent,
yet a serious weakness was soon evident; most of the new officers
had little or no knowledge of military essentials. In order to remedy
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this deficiency, officer training schools were set up at the various Air Corps stations late in 1941. When this plan proved inadequate, it was decided to open an Officer Training School of six weeks' duration to be conducted at Miami Beach in conjunction with the OCS. Approval was obtained, and the OTS began instruction on 20 April 1942.

Despite a lack of authority for operation; a dearth of adequate administrative and teaching personnel, and an unpredictable fluctuation in enrollment, the OTS functioned until 26 June 1943. During this period about 13,000 officers were given at least a rudimentary knowledge of military laws and customs and, as a result, were better able to assume their new duties. The officers attended the course on temporary duty from their units, underwent some 253 (later 277) hours of instruction similar to that given to officer candidates, and were returned to their units. Although the six weeks of instruction were undoubtedly of some benefit to the newly commissioned officers, there is no doubt that a longer course and a method of weeding out the unfit would have assured the AAF more competent officer personnel.

During the months following V-J Day the status of the OCS was constantly in doubt; not until 8 October 1945 was a new class entered for training. Despite AAF recommendations for changes in the school, which would have eliminated most of the wartime defects, none were made, except that in January 1946 the school was returned to SMCC and quotas were reduced to 50 candidates in each of 4 annual classes. Shortly after the return to Texas the OCS again survived a threat to its existence; this time the proposal was for a combined school for all branches of the Army.
Since that time important changes have been made in entrance requirements and curriculum content. In April 1946 the maximum age for graduating candidates was lowered to 35; in August to 30; and in September 1948 to 27. Effective with Class 1947-D, the length of the course was increased to 24 weeks with classes entering semianually. Only two classes were trained each year thereafter until 9 January 1950; then the decision was made to return to the schedule of four entering classes each year. Several other changes were made in April 1947: the minimum entering age was raised to 20 years and 6 months, prior service requirements were eliminated, and henceforth candidates were to undergo training in the grade of staff sergeant. Perhaps most significant, however, was the decision, effective in January 1949, to train WAF's along with male officer candidates.

Curriculum changes during the immediate postwar years seem to have been directed at no particular goal. A new program for the first class in 1947 added time to the basic subjects while revisions later in 1947 and 1948 showed a trend away from military and practical training and toward a more varied program. In addition to these alterations, unsuccessful attempts were made in 1949 to introduce both preparatory and postgraduate OCS training. More successful was a proposal for improvement of the grading system, in which no major change had been made since 1941. In 1950 the point scale was abandoned in favor of a grade point system; eliminations under the new system were to be made on the basis of relative class standings after the determination of each candidate's grade point total. Although most of these changes tended to improve the quality of instruction and training offered to officer
candidates, some defects, which had their origins in the early years of the school, remained.

As a result of the UN action in Korea, the OCS was faced with the necessity for another expansion program after June 1950; once again there was an urgent need for officer personnel. In order to satisfy this need, the OCS slowly increased its output and appeared to be on the verge of larger operations at the end of 1951.
NOTES

Chapter I


2. Ltr., TAG to all CG's, sub.: Officer Candidate Schools, 26 Apr. 1941, in DRB 352.9 Officer Candidate Schools.

3. R&R, C/AS to OCS/AS, sub.: Increase in Officer Candidate School Program, 23 Oct. 1941, in DRB 352.9 Officer Candidate Schools.

4. R&R, C/AC to C/AS, sub.: Officer Candidate Schools for the Air Corps (non-rated), 12 Sept. 1941, in DRB 352.9 Officer Candidate Schools.

5. R&R, C/AC to C/AS, sub.: Memorandum to AGO - Establishment of A.G. Officer Candidate School, 12 Sept. 1941, in DRB 352.9 C. O. School, Miami Beach, Fla.

6. R&R, Mat. Div. to CG/AC, sub.: Memorandum to AGO - Establishment of A.G. Officer Candidate School, 21 Oct. 1941, in DRB 352.9 C. O. School, Miami Beach, Fla.


9. 1st ind. (ltr., Hq. ACG to C/AC thru C/AS, sub.: Officers' Candidate School, 3 Feb. 1942), C/AC to C/AAF, 5 Feb. 1942, in DRB 352.9 Officer Candidate Schools.

10. Some consideration had been given previously to the construction of an officer candidate school in Pennsylvania at a cost of $24,000,000 (Hist. OCS, 19 Feb. 1942-21 July 1943, p. 2).

11. Ltr., CG ACG to CG CGACTG, sub.: Officers Candidate School, 2 Feb. 1942, in DRB 352.9 Officer Candidate Schools.

13. Ibid.


15. Memo for C/AAF from C/AS, sub.: Officer Candidate School, 17 Feb. 1942, in IRE 352.9 O.C. School, Miami Beach, Fla.


17. Fifty-four hotels were used by the Officer Candidate School at one time or another during its stay at Miami Beach (Hist. OCS, 1 Mar.–1 July 1944, pp. 40–41).


23. Ltr., TAG to all CG's, sub.: Officer Candidate Schools (Colored Candidates), 19 Apr. 1942, in IRE 352.9 B Schools.


25. R&R, AFRT to AFMP, sub.: Negro Officer Candidates, 28 June 1942, in DBR Officer Candidate School.

26. R&R, comment 2, AFMP to AFRT, 3 July 1942, in DBR Officer Candidate School.


32. OCS GO 8, 1 Apr. 1942, in Hist. OCS, 1 Mar. – 1 July 1944, app.


34. Ltr., OC/AC to CG ACTTC, 22 May 1943, in Hist. OCS, 7 July 1943–1 Mar. 1944, app.


38. Memo for Maj. Davis, DWP, Hq. AAF from Hq. OCS, 1 Mar. 1944, in DRB 352 Officers Candidate and Training School at Miami Beach, Fla.

39. Ltr., Hq. OCS to CG AAF, sub.: Rotation of Instructors, 28 June 1942, in DRB 210 Misc. Miami Beach, Misc.

40. Ltr ind. (ltr., Hq. OCS to CG AAF, sub.: Rotation of Instructors, 28 June 1942), Hq. AAF to CG ACTTC, 11 July 1942, in DRB 210 Misc. Miami Beach, Misc.

41. AAF Stat. Digest 1946, table 55. Discrepancies were found between the statistics included in the History of OCS and those in the Statistical Digest; whenever possible the latter (which is considered by USAF to be authentic) has been used in this study.


45. Memo for CG's AGF, AAF, ASF from AG/3, 29 Nov. 1943, in DRB 352 Officers Candidate and Training Schools, Miami Beach, Fla.

46. Ibid.

47. Memo for G/3, G-1 Diva, from G/AS, sub.: Officer Candidate Schools, 17 Dec. 1943, in DRB 352 Officers Candidate and Training School, Miami Beach, Fla.

48. R&R, Sec. AS to AC/AS Tng., sub.: Officer Candidate School, 6 Dec. 1943, in DRB 352 Officers Candidate and Training Schools other than Miami Beach.

49. Ltr., Lt. Col. D.R. Storck to CG AAFTC #1, Miami Beach, sub.: Army Air Forces Officer Candidate School, 12 May 1944, in Hist. OCS, 1 Mar.-1 July 1944, app.

50. 2d ind. (ltr., Storck to CG AAFTC #1, Miami Beach, sub.: Army Air Forces Officer Candidate School, 12 May 1944), Eq. AAFTC to CG AAFTC, 15 May 1944, in Hist. OCS, 1 Mar.-1 July 1944, app.

51. 3d ind. (ltr., Storck to CG AAFTC #1, Miami Beach, sub.: Army Air Forces Officer Candidate School, 12 May 1944), Eq. AAFTC to AAFTC, 23 May 1944, in Hist. OCS, 1 Mar.-1 July 1944, app.

52. R&R, AC/AS Tng. to AC/AS OC&R Attn.: Troop Basis Division, sub.: Disbandment of Officer's Candidate School at Miami Beach and Establishment at San Antonio, 11 Mar. 1944, in KGR 352X Army Service and Technical Schools, Staff Colleges and Troop Schools.


54. AAFTCP 80 35, 1 Apr. 1944.

55. The [Miami] Beach Post, 9 and 16 Apr. 1944.


58. Hist. 78th Flying Tng. Wg. and SAACC, 1 July-31 Aug. 1944, pp. 102-3.

60. For a description of the preflight officer candidate school project, see Hist. 2132d AAF Base Unit and Maxwell Fld., 1 May-30 June 1945, pp. 14-17.

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Chapter II

1. Ltr., Hq. AAF to C/AC, sub.: Policy on Obtaining Candidates for the Air Corps Officer Candidate School, 13 Feb. 1942, in KORC 352d Technical and Service Schools (Misc.), 1 Jan.-30 Mar. 1942.

2. Ibid.

3. WD Cir. 48, 19 Feb. 1942.

4. Ibid.

5. Memo for classification officers in charge of testing candidates for officer training and boards of officers appointed to pass upon fitness of candidates for such training, from Hq. AACTG, 11 Apr. 1942, in DDB Officer Candidate School.

6. Ibid.

7. R&R, AFRIT-3 to AFRON, sub.: Reduction in Requirement for Officer Candidate School from 3 Months to 1 Month, 6 Apr. 1942, in DDB 220.632 Miami, Fl., Detail as Students.

8. R&R, comment 2, AFAQP-1 to AFRIT, sub.: Reduction in Requirement for Officer Candidate School from 3 Months to 1 Month, 16 Apr. 1942, in DDB 220.632 Miami, Fl., Detail as Students.

9. Ltr., Hq. AAF to all Commanders concerned, sub.: Quotas for Air Forces Officer Candidate School, 1942-C, 18 Apr. 1942, in KORC 352 Technical and Service Schools (Misc.), 1 Apr.-7 May 1942.

10. Ibid.

11. R&R, AFDOP to AFAAP, sub.: Policy for Air Forces Officer Candidate School, 5 May 1942, in DDB 352.9 0.C. School, Miami Beach, Fl.

12. R&R, comment 2, AFAQP to AFDOP, sub.: Policy for Air Forces Officer Candidate School, 12 May 1942, in DDB 352.9 0.C. School, Miami Beach, Fl.

14. R&R, ATMP to ARMG thru AFRFT, sub.: Quality of Personnel entering Officer Candidate School, 7 Aug. 1942, in DRB 352.50 Schools.

15. R&R, comment 5, AAF to AFTOP thru AFRFT, sub.: Quality of Personnel entering Officer Candidate School, 14 Aug. 1942, in DRB 352.50 Schools.

16. 3d ind. (ltr., Hq. Miami Area, First Dist. AAFTC to CG AAFTC thru CG First Dist. AAFTC, sub.: Quality of Personnel Entering Officer Candidate School, 9 July 1942), Hq. AAF to CG AAFTC, 17 Aug. 1942, in DRB 352.50 Schools.

17. AAF Ltr. 35-11, sub.: Selection of Applicants for AAF Officer Candidate School, 15 Oct. 1943, in DRB 220.63 Officers Candidate School, Miami Beach, Fla.


21. AR 625-5, 26 Nov. 1942.

22. WD Cir. 64, 2 Mar. 1943.


24. WD Cir. 161, 14 July 1943.

25. Telg., CG AAFTC to CG AAF, 15 Oct. 1943, in DRB 220.63 Officers Candidate School, Miami Beach, Fla.


27. 3d ind. (telg., CG AAFTC to CG AAF, 18 Oct. 1943), CG AAF to CG AAFTC, 30 Nov. 1943, in DRB 220.63 Officers Candidate School, Miami Beach, Fla.

28. Ltr., TAG to Comdt. OCS, sub.: Physical Standards for Appointment of Officer Candidates, 30 Dec. 1943, in DRB 333.5 12 June 1944.
29. Ltr., TAG to Comdt. OCS thru CG AAF, sub.: Physical Standards for Appointment of Officer Candidates, 8 May 1944, in KCRC 352 Special Officers Candidate School and Pre-Technical School.

30. 1st ind. (ltr., TAG to Comdt. OCS thru CG AAF, sub.: Physical Standards for Appointment of Officer Candidates, 8 May 1944), Hq. AAF to CG AAFTEC, 16 May 1944, in KCRC 352 Special Officers Candidate School and Pre-Technical School.

31. Ltr., AAF Tng. Gen. #1, Miami Beach to CG AAFTEC, sub.: Lowering of Maximum Age for Enrollment in AAF Officer Candidate School, Administrative, 15 Feb. 1944, in DRB 220,63 Officers Candidate School, Miami Beach, Fla.

32. 1st ind. (ltr., AAF Tng. Gen. #1, Miami Beach to CG AAFTEC, sub.: Lowering of Maximum Age for Enrollment in AAF Officer Candidate School, Administrative, 15 Feb. 1944), Hq. AAFTEC to CG AAF, 15 Mar. 1944, in DRB 220,63 Officers Candidate School, Miami Beach, Fla.


34. Ltr., AFRIT to AAFTEC, sub.: Qualifications for Entrance to Course at Officer Candidate School Leading to Classification as Technical Officer, 23 Sept. 1942, in USAF HD 225.2-3, v. 31, Qualification and Selection of Students.

35. Ltr., TAG to all commanders concerned, sub.: Quotas for AAF Administrative OCS, Class 1943-B, 10 Nov. 1942, in KCRC 352 Technical and Service Schools (Misc.), 1 Oct. - 15 Nov. 1942.


37. Rpt. to TAI from Col. Harris, subj.: Investigation of Curriculum and Conditions Existing at Officer Candidate School, Miami Beach, with Particular Reference to Qualifications of Candidates and Reasons for Elimination, 5 Feb. 1944 (hereinafter cited Harris Rpt.), in DRB 333.5, 12 June 1944.

38. Ibid.

40. Resume of Harris Rpt.


42. Hist. OCS, 1 Mar.-1 July 1944, p. 30.


44. Ltr., Hq. 44th Corps Area to all commanding officers, sub.: Officer Candidate Schools, 2 June 1942, in KRC 352 Technical and Service Schools (Misc.), 26 May-30 June 1942.

45. R&R, AFRMP to AC/AS A-1, sub.: Special Army Air Forces Officer Candidate School Quota for Overseas Applicants, 18 Mar. 1943, in DRB 220.65 Officers Candidate School, Miami Beach, Fla.


47. 1st ind. (ltr., Hq. AAFTC to TAG thru CG AAF, sub.: Quotas for Officer Candidate Schools, 24 Jan. 1943), Hq. AAF to TAG, 2 Feb. 1943, in DRB 220.65 Officer Candidate Schools, Misc.

48. R&R, AFRMP-2 to AFRMP amnt. Col. Wetzel, sub.: Enlisted Men Qualified for Officer Candidate School, 7 Nov. 1942, in DRB 220.63 Officer Candidate School, Misc.

49. Ltr., Asst. AAG to C/AC, sub.: Officer Candidate School Quotas, 18 Feb. 1942, in DRB 220.63E Detail as Students and Instructors.

50. Memo for C/AFMP from Avn. Cadet Sec., sub.: Attached Memorandum to Aviation Cadet Section, 16 Feb. 1943, in DRB Officer Candidate School.

51. Ltr., TAG to all CG's and CG's, sub.: Attendance at Officer Candidate Schools of Selective Service Registrants Deferred for Dependency Only, 24 Mar. 1942, in KRC 352 Technical and Service Schools (Misc.), 1 Jan.-30 Mar. 1942.

52. Ltr., TAG to CG's SOS, AGF, and AAF, sub.: Attendance at Officer Candidate Schools of Members of Reserve Components Deferred for Dependency Only, 11 Apr. 1942, in USAF HD 145.96-109 (111-D) Training Directives, Programs and Orders Book I.


54. Ltr., TAG to CG's, sub.: Selection of Candidates for Officer Candidate Schools, 27 Jan. 1942, in DRB 352.9 Officer Candidate Schools.
55. 2d ind. (ltr., Col. D. T. Spivey to CO SEAAFTC, sub.: Personnel Eligible for Officer Candidate School, 1 Sept. 1942), Eq. AAFEC to SEAAFTC, 3 Oct. 1942, in KCRC 352 Technical and Service School Training (Misc.).

56. AAF Ltr. 210-31, sub.: Assignment of OSS Candidates to Units or Casual Shipments Destined for Overseas, 29 Oct. 1942, in DRB 220.63 Officer Candidate Schools, Misc.

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Chapter III


2. Survey of the Officer Candidate School, 21 Mar. 1944, in Hist. OCS, 1 Mar.-1 July 1944, app.

3. AAF Tng. Std. so-131, sub.; Administrative Officer (OCS), 11 Oct. 1943.


6. Program of Instruction, AAF OCS, Miami Beach, 26 Jan. 1943, in USAF HD 229,56-100 v. 10.

7. Ltr., AAFTC to CG Fifth Dist. AAFTC, sub.; Directive in Specialist Training for Administrative Officers at Candidate School, 23 Jan. 1943, in KERC 352 Special Officers Candidate School and Pre-Technical School.

8. Ltr., Hq. OCS to CG 5th Dist. AAFTC, sub.; Program of Instruction, AAF OCS, 19 June 1943, in USAF HD 229,56-200.


10. 4th ind. (Ltr., OCS to CG ATBC thru CG 75th Flying Tng. Wg. and SAACC and CG AAFC/TC in turn, sub.; Revised Program of Instruction for AAF Officer Candidate School (no day given) Aug. 1944), Hq. AAF to CG AAFTC, 19 Sept. 1944, in DRB 353 Training 16, Officer Candidate School, 1944.


13. Ltr., Hq. OCS/TS, AAFTC, Miami Beach to CG 5th Dist. AAFTC, sub.; Program of Instruction, AAF OCS, 19 June 1943, in USAF HD 229,56-200.

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15. Hist. OCS, 7 July 1943 - 1 Mar. 1944, p. 43.

16. Ltr. Hq. AAFTC to CO AAFCS, sub.: Proposed Physical Training Program for Officer Candidates, 11 Jan. 1945, in OCS 352 Special Officers Candidate School and Pre-Technical School.


27. OCS Tng. Memo 50-44, 1 July 1944, in Hist. 78th Flying Wing, WG, and SAACC, 1 July - 31 Aug. 1944, app.


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   IGO AAFETTC to CG AAFETTC thru CG OCS AAFETTC Miami Beach and CG
   AAFETTC Tng. Cen. #1, Miami Beach, sub.: Report of Training
   Inspection of OCS, AAFETTC, Miami Beach, 16 Oct. 1943, in Hist.
   OCS, 7 July 1943-1 Mar. 1944, app.

31. Harris Rpt.

32. Ibid.

33. RSR, AC/AS Pers. to DC/AS, sub.: Investigation of Curriculum and
   Conditions Existing at Officer Candidate School, Miami Beach, 1
   Mar. 1944, in DRE 333-5, 12 June 1944.

34. Pool Rpt.

35. Ibid.


38. Harris Rpt.


40. Harris Rpt.

   in DRE 333-5, 12 June 1944.

   Div., 10 Feb. 1944, in DRE 333-5, 12 June 1944.

43. Pool Rpt.

44. Harris Rpt.

45. Pool Rpt.

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