United States Marines Land on Iwo Jima


The United States Strategic Bombing Survey was established by the Secretary of War on 3 November 1944, pursuant to a Directive from the late President Roosevelt. Its mission was to conduct an impartial and expert study of the effects of our aerial attack on Germany, to be used in connection with air attack on Japan and to establish a basis for evaluating the importance and potentialities of air power as an instrument of military strategy, for planning the future development of the United States armed forces, and for determining future economic policies with respect to the national defense. A summary report and some 200 supporting reports containing the findings of the Survey in Germany have been published.

On 15 August 1945, President Truman requested that the Survey conduct a similar study of the effects of all types of air attacks in the war against Japan, submitting reports in duplicate to the Secretary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy. The officers of the Survey during its Japanese phase were:

Franklin D'Olier, Chairman.
Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, Vice Chairmen.
Walter Wilds, Secretary.
Harry L. Bowman,
J.K. Galbraith,
Rensis Likert,
Frank A. McNamee,
Fred Searls, Jr.,
Monroe Spaght,
Dr. Louis R. Thompson,
Thoeodore P. Wright, Directors.

The Survey's complement provided for 300 civilians, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. The military segment of the organization was drawn from the Army to the extent of 60 percent, and from the Navy to the extent of 40 percent. Both the Army and the Navy gave the Survey all possible assistance in furnishing men, supplies, transport and information. The Survey operated from headquarters established in Tokyo early in September 1945, with subheadquarters in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and with mobile teams operating in other parts of Japan, the islands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland.

It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime Japanese military planning and execution engagement by engagement and campaign by campaign, and to secure reasonably accurate statistics on Japan's economy and war-production plant by plant, and industry by industry. In addition, studies were conducted on Japan's overall strategic plans and the background of her entry into the war, the internal discussions and negotiations leading to her acceptance of unconditional surrender, the course of health and morale among the civilian population, the effectiveness of the Japanese civilian defense organization, and the effects of the atomic bombs. Separate reports will be issued covering each phase of the study.

The Survey interrogated more than 700 Japanese military, government and industrial officials. It also recovered and translated many documents which have not only been useful to the Survey, but will also furnish data valuable for other studies. Arrangements are being made to turn over the Survey's files to a permanent Government agency where they will be available for further examination and distribution.


The studies of Campaigns of the Pacific War, presented in this volume, are an outgrowth of the investigations conducted in Japan in late 1945 by the members of the Naval Analysis Division of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. This Division, composed of officers whose combined experiences covered all major operations of the Pacific War, was constituted to assist the Survey when its directive for investigation of the war against Japan was broadened to include not merely the restricted subject of strategic bombing but the entire United States air effort.

The original purpose of the Campaign Studies was to provide supporting material for The Over-All Report, which has been presented to the Chairman of the Survey, and in which the conclusions of the Naval Analysis Division are embodied. However, since much of the material assembled here has not previously been available, it was felt that these studies, with the two companion volumes of interrogations, merited a wider circulation both within the services and among civilian students of military affairs. In line with this larger purpose, track charts, tabulations of various data, and translations of important documents have been compiled by the members of the Division and are appended to the narratives of the various campaigns.

It should be pointed out that in no sense are these Studies to be considered definitive. The work of the Naval Analysis Division was conducted under pressure of time, and was further complicated by the early detachment of several of its members to other duties. It is however felt that the Studies provide a useful summary picture of the Naval War against Japan and present, in convenient form, material essential to further study of the conflict.

To facilitate the investigations conducted in Japan, the war was arbitrarily divided into campaigns and these apportioned among the members of the Naval Analysis Division. This division of responsibility, which applies both to the interrogations and to the Campaign Studies was as follows:

Rear Admiral R.A. Ofstie, U.S.N.: Central Pacific Campaign, March-September 1944, including the Occupation of the Marianas.

Capt. T.J. Hedding, U.S.N.: Japanese Naval Planning, Iwo Jima Campaign, Okinawa Campaign, Final Naval Operations.

Capt. Steadman Teller, U.S.N.: Central Pacific Operations, June 1943-February 1944, including the Gilbert-Marshall islands Campaign, Campaign to Destroy Japanese Shipping.

Capt. J.S. Russell, U.S.N.: Aleutians Campaign.

Capt. Courtney Shands, U.S.N.: Coral Sea, Midway, Solomons Campaign.

Comdr. T.H. Moorer, U.S.N.: Pearl Harbor, The Japanese Invasions, New Guinea Campaign.

Lt. Comdr. J.A. Field, Jr., U.S.N.R.: Western Carolines Operation, the Philippines Campaign.

No attempt was made to impose a rigid outline for the treatment of the various campaigns, due to their varying nature and duration. Such uniformity as the studies possess is the result of the editorial efforts of Capt. F.M. Trapnell, U.S.N., Captain Russell, and Lieutenant Commander Field.

For the arduous work of supervising the assembly, technical preparation, and printing of the publications of the Naval Analysis Division, Lieut. (jg) H.C. Smither (SC), U.S.N.R., was chiefly responsible.

R..A. Ofstie,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Senior Naval Member,

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