The "Jolle" Operation
This appendix was written in August 1944, before the "Jolle" operation had been completed and before any of the assumptions made could be confirmed. Information received later from non-radio intelligence sources has confirmed all important assumptions and has completed the picture. The identification of the individuals using cover names mentioned in this appendix have been verified, with the exception of Pizarro. Cobija and Valiente have been identified as Walter Burckhardt and Alfonso Chantrain, respectively, both having been arrested by the Argentine Federal Police on 20 August 1944.
According to the statements of Burckhardt and Chantrain the landing took place on 5 July. This conflicts with specific radio intelligence information giving the date as 1 July, but the veracity of the two spies may well be doubted, especially since they first claimed to have landed by a submarine. This was evidently a cooked-up story to throw investigators off the track, for all other evidence points to the use of a small sailing vessel.
What was probably the conclusion of the voyage was reported in an Associated Press dispatch from Vigo, Spain dated 24 September 1944. Three days before, eight Germans arrived at that port in a 300 ton sailing vessel claiming to have completed a 70 day voyage from Argentina.
This later non-radio intelligence information has been put in the preface and the original report left untouched on the theory that this method of presentation best illustrates the number and the validity of assumptions that may be drawn from radio intelligence information.
This appendix has a twofold purpose. First, it is an attempt to outline the progress of the successful attempt on the part of Germany to supply its agents in South America. Second, the whole history of the so-called "Jolle operation," insofar as it is known to OP-20-G, has been written in order to make
clearer the reasons for this operation, the methods used and the possibilities for future operations of the same nature.
The meaning of the term "Jolle" will be discussed later, but for the present it can be defined as a means of transportation devised by the central offices of the German espionage networks (the Abwehr and the SD) to transport men and material to and from their agencies in South America.
The precise nature of these organizations and the identity of their operatives is not completely known, but for the purposes of this report, the following information is sufficient.
Aside form the German Foreign Office, at least two other German agencies maintain espionage organizations in South America. The German High Command had its own spies, who are part of the Abwehr; and Himmler's Schutzstaffel had its agents, part of the Sicherheitsdienst (SD).1
The Chief of the South American ring is Sargo, who is believed to be Hans Siegfried Becker. He controls all agents working for the SD espionage net and exercises some degree of control over the agents of the Abwehr and those agents of the German Embassy who are still working. Under, or possibly coequal to, Sargo, is Luna, who is believed to be one Gustav Utzinger. Reports of all agents appear to be funnelled through Sargo's organization. This is certainly true as far as radio communication to Germany is concerned, for radio communication is one function of his agency. Luna is in charge of this technical function, and in this capacity handled most of the details of the Jolle operation.
In addition, the spies are in contact with several German owned or controlled business firms in South America, notably Siemens, Telefunken, Bayer and Banco Aleman Transatlantico.
Probably the two compelling reasons for the Jolle operation can be found in the need on the part of Sargo's organization for supplies and financing and for means of exchanging agents.
Many of the messages intercepted indicated that the agency in Argentina badly needed money as well as certain types of radio and cipher equipment. As a further means of obtaining money, part of the cargo was made up of items to be sold by the spies in South America.
The trip also gave the organization a chance to transfer agents or technicians whose knowledge or obviously German characteristics might endanger their whole group, and to send new agents to South America. As a matter of fact, two new agents were brought to Argentina by Jolle, and three returned with it.
However, the reason which seems first to have brought to light the possibility of these trips and which recently has been mentioned prominently was the threatened deterioration of the regular courier route.
At present, and probably since the beginning of the war, the main method used by the spies to forward their information is to send it via couriers on neutral merchant ships, particularly Spanish ships. As early as May 1943, the spies were worried about the possible loss of this route.2 Furthermore, the problems has grown in importance as an Allied victory becomes more evident to the Spanish and as the number of couriers arrested by the British increases.
Whether the Jolle system will be used in the future at least as an adjunct of the courier system, depends upon its chances of success and upon the type of conveyance used. To be of any use at all, frequent trips would have to be made. Further, the route would have to be reasonably safe; otherwise valuable information would be lost, and discovery might lead to the loss of Argentina as a safe base for Nazi espionage. The use of submarines would appear to be safer than surface vessels, but there is no evidence at present that a regular submarine route to Argentina is or will be contemplated.
It is more likely that, if attempted at all, small sailing vessels will be used. Although they would be slower, a regular route could be established. Also, they have a fair chance of passing unnoticed, for they would be harmless-looking and might well be mistaken for Portuguese, Spanish or South American fishing luggers, not uncommon in the South Atlantic. Note that the current Jolle has been at sea for about four months without discovery.
However, this is not likely to become a satisfactory means of communication. In 1943, at least 50 trips were made by Spanish couriers. To equal this, a sizable fleet of sailing vessels would be required, while at the same time the danger of compromise would be increased. At best, small sailing vessels would be used only to supplement the present means of communication.3
- What is "Jolle"?
"Jolle" means "yawl," a small, two-masted sailing vessel, and probably the SD authorities in Berlin always intended it to refer to a small sailing vessel of some type. There is no evidence that they ever used the word when referring to a submarine.
Nevertheless, Sargo's group seems, for a while at least, to have been under the impression that "Jolle" meant "submarine," possibly because that was the means of transportation first suggested by them. In September 1943, Sargo reported that a U.S. naval patrol had sighted a "Jolle" off Antofogasta but had lost it.4 Available collateral information sheds no light on this incident, but it is believed that this was probably a U-boat contact.
On 30 March 1944, Berlin informed Sargo and Luna that the vessel to be used was "not a Jolle but a cutter.5 Possibly Berlin had realized that Sargo was under the impression that a submarine was to be used and was attempting in this way to correct his error. It is equally likely, however, that Berlin was merely informing the agents that something other than a two-masted vessel would be used. At any rate, Sargo still seemed to be thinking of a U-boat, for on 13 April he stated that "the cutter must submerge because an aircraft base is quite nearby.6
Whatever the reason for this seeming confusion, it is clear that Jolle in the recent operation was a sailing vessel, and that since the meeting Sargo has used the term when referring to such a vessel.7
In the future it would appear that Jolle will be used as a cover name for a surface vessel of some sort, rather than a submarine. If past experience is to be relied upon, a small sailing vessel seems to be most appropriate. There have been recent indications, however, that the meaning may have been broadened to include any type of surface vessel. Thus, "Jolle operation" would cover the use of a neutral merchant ship to carry information to Europe.8
The first hint that such an extension may be intended was contained in a message from Berlin on 16 June 1944.9 In that message a new method of delivering information to Germany was suggested: via letters sent to certain specified American prisoners of war in German prison camps. These were to be sent via Jolle, the operation in general bearing the
cover word "Wolin." Jolle in this case must certainly refer to neutral - or even Allied - merchant ships.
The exact cargo carried by Jolle is not known, but the outline given below and the itemized list at the end of the appendix are thought to be reasonably accurate. The only supplies requested for the agency itself were cipher devices and radio equipment for Luna's technical staff. In addition, Luna asked that small gifts be sent for 42 of his collaborators.
Probably the bulk of the cargo consisted of items sent for resale. Siemens, Telefunken, Merck Chemical Co., and a medical company, probably Bayer, sent orders via Luna for radio and other electrical equipment as well as for chemical and medical supplies. In this way these companies were aided, and at the same time the money received from them contributed a great deal to the finances of the spy ring. The latter purpose was also served by the shipment of counterfeit English banknotes and of some sort of needle used in the weaving or mending of silk stockings, the latter to be resold by the agency.
Berlin also sent along plans for a device to make wood gas generators. An attempt was to made to sell a license for the manufacture of these generators.
An order, which may or may not have been filled, was put in for some transmitter tubes. These were to form the nucleus of the stock of a small business to be started by the agents with the help of Telefunken. It was intended that the company should sell radio equipment to the Argentine armed forces and thus in some measure achieve political as well as financial security.
Evidently Jolle carried little cargo on its return trip, outside of supplies. In March, Sargo reported that exchange difficulties made it impossible to send large sums of money to Germany, and that, therefore, he was remitting it by submarine; but there is no other evidence that this was done in the recent operation.10
Jolle itself asked only for a radio crystal, coffee and cigarettes, "night club blue serge," and food for relatives of the spies in Germany.11
Limitations of space restricted the number of persons Jolle could carry on its recent trip, and probably will continue to do so in the future. But there is good reason to believe that some agents will leave South America by this means whenever possible, and that more will be sent from Germany. Most of the returning passengers will probably be men who have been identified as spies by the Allies or have been active for so long that their continued presence might endanger the whole organization as well as themselves. There may also be some individuals who knew too much, and who may not possess the requisite degree of security.
Sargo himself was suggested as a passenger in March 1944, after Argentina broke off relations with Germany and arrested a few spies. This request was refused by Berlin.12
In September 1943, two technicians were named as passengers. They were Max Frankenberger, an electrician formerly employed by Telefunken, and Werner Lorenz, radio operator and engineer.
Another suggestion was made in October of the same year. Luna had two former ship's officers, both qualified radiomen, and one Filip Imhoff, all of whom were too "German" to be safe in case of trouble in Argentina. The first two have not been definitely identified, although one may have been Jurgen Sievers who later did make the trip; but Imhoff is known to have worked for Luna since July 1942. He was a radioman and at one time served in a clandestine station in Patagonia. His salary was paid by DEBEG (Deutsche Betriebsgesellschaft für drahtlose Telegrafie).
In the recent operation, it was not known until a week before the rendezvous whether Jolle could carry any passengers. Three were finally allowed, however, one being Imhoff and another, Jurgen Sievers, radioman and former ship's officer in the German African Steamship Line. The cover name of the third passenger was Jansen. This is believed to be an alias of Heinz Lange, reportedly the head of the espionage net in Western South America. It is known, at least, that Jansen operated in Chile until October 1943, when he went to Argentina.
Two replacements were sent to South America via Jolle: Cobija and Valiente. Although unidentified, it is apparent that these two men will be agents rather than merely radio
technicians. Cobija is believed to be an excellent radio operator and possibly handled the communications for Jolle. Both men slated to undergo a training period of 4 to 6 months in Argentina to learn the methods and functions of Sargo's organization. The Cobija will go to Chile and take over the espionage ring there. Valiente is slated to come to the United States, where he will collect information and pass it on to Sargo.13
Only one other passenger to Argentina has ever been mentioned. This was Pizarro, identified by Berlin as Waldemar Bottger, who was referred to in June 1943.14 Sargo once suggested that Pizarro be used to set up another technical organization separate from Luna's. Nothing more has been heard of this, and there is no evidence that he ever made the trip.
- Jolle operations not carried out.
The first indications that a new type of transportation to South America might be provided was received in May 1943. At that time, Sargo complained that the courier system threatened to collapse and requested consideration of contact by submarine. He stated that the organization had two seaworthy yachts to assist in the meeting. In June 1943, Berlin reported that Pizarro was to be sent over "by Jolle" in about August of that year. Exact particulars for the landing were requested, but for some reason there is no evidence that they were forthcoming until August 1943.
In August, the basic cargo orders for the current operation were given. Two-way radio contact on about 5,000 kcs, was suggested by South America, and Luna and requested that a few of his technicians be sent back to Germany on Jolle.
A landing point in a harbor near Mar del Plata seems to have been selected, and Luna requested that the cargo be stowed in about 12 water tight trunks. The plan to use sailing yachts at the rendezvous was dropped, probably for security reasons. The spies were to set up a base at an estancia near the coast, and the final transfer was to take place on a moonlight night or at dusk or twilight.
The operation planned for August was evidently abandoned, for although the traffic continued to mention plans, the next date mentioned for the operation was April 1944. It is probable that the Abwehr authorities in Berlin did not know
of the new proposal, which began to be discussed in September 1943, for they informed their agents that the submarine contact had been put off, inferring that it would not be taken up again until direct communication. In October, through a middleman, the spies leased and finally definitely purchased from a well-known Englishman, a sailing vessel capable of meeting Jolle at sea if necessary.
For some reason, Berlin disapproved the use of the sailing vessel, ordering instead that a small boat meet Jolle someplace as free from surf as possible. The rendezvous point was to be close enough to the estancia for easy access, and facilities for buying the cargo at once were to be provided.
This plan was suddenly abandoned on 22 March because Luna believed that it had been discovered by the Allies. In January, Argentina broke relations with Germany and arrested a few of the spies. At about the same time Sargo and his superiors learned that one of the Spanish couriers had been arrested in Gibraltar with secret documents in his possession. Furthermore, the secret plan to send the Argentine Naval Reserve officer, Osmar Hellmuth, to Germany had been nipped in the bud by the British, who arrested Hellmuth in Trinidad.
Taking all this into consideration, Luna concluded that Jolle plan, too, had been compromised. He reported this to Berlin, and a new operation was at once started.
- The Jolle operation.
The voyage of Jolle - a small sailing vessel - probably began from France about the first of May 1944; but final planning commenced on 22 March, in the message reporting the compromise of the earlier proposal. At this time, Luna stated that the rendezvous could not take place later than the end of April. Such an early date was impossible, however, and Berlin reported that Jolle would leave at the end of April, arriving about the middle of July.
Although this office has no direct data on the departure of Jolle, it is likely that it left Europe around the first of May, certainly not much later than 9 May; a cargo request made on that date was refused: "Jolle has already been given permission to depart" [or: has already reported departure - 'da Jo bereits Scheidung eingericht']15
Jolle first came up on 21 June, informing Luna that a landing would be possible about 8 days later. On the 25th
June, 1 July, Thursday, was set as the date, but unfavorable winds caused Jolle to report a possible delay until 3 July. The meeting finally took place early on the first.
The actual position of the meeting was the subject of many messages and was changed several times. At first, it was evidently thought best to stay as close to Buenos Aires as possible. On 22 March, Luna suggested either Punta Indio or Mar de Ajo (probably Rio de Ajo was meant). Punta Indio was favored because of its secluded beach and smooth water. The proposed meeting place was 35°13'S - 57°09'W, just off shore.
For some reason, probably the proximity of Punta Indio to populated areas, Berlin vetoed these plans and proposed instead Necochea, Miramar and Mar del Plata, in order of preference. Although Berlin favored Necochea at all times, Luna, on 3 June, selected a spot about 4 miles south of Mar del Plata and refused to change. His selection was a small bay or cove protected by Punta Mogotes and about 1-1/2 miles southwest of Mogotes Light. The exact position of the rendezvous was given as 38°06'24"S - 57°34'12"W.
Probably this was the rendezvous point on 1 July, even though Berlin favored the Necochea area, and Jolle, on 21 June, requested Punta Indio. Jolle's request for a meeting at 38°15'S - 57°12'W was refused by Luna on the ground that it was by then too late to make adequate security preparations. Nevertheless, Luna agreed on a later contact in that area if the Mogotes plan failed. It is very unlikely that a change in the plan was necessary, for none was ever reported; and Luna's party, which requested two days notice in order to prepare, seems to have been ready at Mogotes on the 28th.
The basis of communication procedure, as specified by Luna from the earliest days, was direct, two-way radio contact between Jolle and the shore party. Actual contact was supposed to commence on 15 June, but the first messages intercepted were dated the 21st.16 Little is known of contact between Jolle and Berlin, but according to the latter a message from Jolle had been received on 18 May; presumably Berlin continued to send messages to Jolle was only a few days from the rendezvous, the fact that this was an estimate possibly indicating that they were no longer in contact.17 Certainly Jolle did not inform the SD authorities of the fate of the operation, for a message dated 4 July made it clear that Berlin did not know the outcome of the rendezvous.18
Special frequencies were allocated to this operation, taking into account the fact that the range of Luna's transmitters and receivers was limited to frequencies around 5000 kcs. Jolle and the shore group were provided with call signs, Q-signals, and schedules. Shortly before the meeting was to take place, Luna was to shift to a mobile transmitter and receiver which would be brought to Punta Mogotes. In this way, he was enabled to maintain radio contact at all times and still direct his own party on the spot. In short, the whole operation was thoroughly planned.19 From at least 21 June until the 28th, Luna contacted Jolle from his Miramar station. It is believed that the mobile station took over on the 30th, but no messages were intercepted after 28 June.
In essential there seems to have been almost no difference between the actual landing at Mogotes and the earlier proposed landings.
When Punta Indio was considered, it was planned to establish headquarters at a house about 4 kilometers inland. Shortly before the meeting was to take place, the party would proceed by cars to a small beach pension on the pretext of a birthday party. On the 500 meter strip of isolated sand beach, they would place three directional lamps four meters above the ground, at an extreme distance of 400 meters.
From all angles, Mogotes appears to have been a good choice. There was a slight surf; but the beach was sandy, and 500 meters offshore there were 3 fathoms of water. The beach was very isolated, but an unused auto road allowed easy access and ran along a steep bank where cars could park and flash light signals. Luna was able to set up his transmitter at Miramar, only a short distance away, and from there keep in contact with Jolle and with his own party, which was stationed at an estancia 200 kilometers inland.
Jolle was to give three days notice, at which time Luna was to radio his group to proceed directly to the beach by automobile. At 0200 (presumably Argentine time) on a night fixed by Jolle, the agents were to be waiting in three cars parked 2-1/2 kilometers southwest of Mogotes. Starting at 0100, they planned to send light signals, three short flashes. Once visual contact was made, it is probable that on the spot instructions would be given.
Reports on the actual means of transfer are confusing. The plan to meet Jolle in a sailing vessel had been abandoned, but Luna also possessed a small tender and some collapsible
boats. Probably one or both of these means was used. According to one message, Jolle also carried 30 objects which may have been rubber boats, in which case could have been used.20
From the start it had been requested that the cargo be packed in water-tight packages with lines for carrying by hand. Boxes no larger than ordinary traveling trunks were also suggested. From all indications, the cargo was buried as soon as it had been brought ashore; probably so that it could be brought to Buenos Aires in small quantities less likely to be noticed. After the cargo had been unloaded, the exchange of the passengers would take place.
As mentioned earlier, Jolle completed its mission early on 1 July and began its return trip on the same day, carrying three passengers. News of the success was not passed to Berlin until 4 July.
Little is known of Jolle's radio contacts thereafter and nothing at all of the return trip. Between 8 and 10 July, Jolle and the Luna control station were heard attempting to make contact with each other, but no successful attempts were intercepted.21
- The Baarn-Koepff Expedition.
In conclusion, a brief comparison of the recent expedition with the trip made by William Marcus Baarn and Wilhelm Heinrich Koepff from France to Brazil in 1943 might be helpful in attempting to deduce more information on the recent Jolle voyage.
Baarn and Koepff left Arcachon, France, on 9 June 1943, in a two-masted sailing vessel of about 50 tons. They were landed on Gargahu Beach, near Sao Joao da Barra, Brazil, on the night of 9-10 August 1943. They thus spent 63 days at sea, but according to them about 21 of those days were spent becalmed.
The recent Jolle trip probably began about 1 May 1944, and a landing was made on 1 July, the trip thus taking about 61 days. (Although for some time Luna clearly intended "Jolle" to refer to a submarine, it is now certain that a sailing vessel was actually used.)
The sailing vessel used in 1943, known either as the Santa Barbara or the Ginette, is believed to have followed approximately the following course:
270° till well west of Portugal,
255° between the Canary and Madeira Islands,
240° passing east of the Cape Verde Islands,
West through the equator, altering course to avoid the doldrums,
180° after reaching a point 400 miles off Pernambuco.
The two spies appeared to believe that roughly the same course would be followed on the return trip if all went well.
The Baarn-Koepff operation was known as Mercator #2, Mercator # 1 had been a landing in Africa late in 1942, the same ship having been used. Mercator #3 was a planned trip to Canada, the Santa Barbara/Ginette to be used after its return from Brazil.
In view of the known success of the first two trips, it is believed that the Jolle used in 1944 was probably similar to the Santa Barbara/Ginette. The similarity of the lengths of the two South American cruises - taking into account the doldrums in the first and the longer distance in the latter - tends further to substantiate this theory. It is also quite possible that the same general course was followed.
If the assumptions above are correct, Jolle should not reach France before early September. Koepff appeared to believe that 100 miles per day was good coverage for the Santa Barbara/Ginette, and at such a speed, Jolle could hardly have reached a position farther north than Gibraltar by 20 August.
In view of the disintegration of the German position in France, however, it is possible that Jolle will put in at, or will scuttle near, some Spanish mainland or colonial port.
Inventory of cargo believed to have been carried by Jolle.
Note: This list contains those items requested by Sargo and Luna which were not definitely cancelled by Berlin. Items which Berlin specifically stated would be sent are indicated by an asterisk (*).
- Cargo sent to Sargo's organization.
- For Luna.
3 cipher devices, large or small.
2 trunk transmitters, about 80 watt. *
15 stabilizers, 280-40, with ferro-hydrogen resistances and sockets for tubes.
1 Wheatstone tape perforator.
2 complete small tape transmitters. *
50 ceramic rotary dial condensers HESCHO, about 75 picofarad.
10 millimeters, 200 MA small size.
4 sets of crystals, each with 6 pieces on same wave. Frequency when doubled: 8500 to 13000.
1 microphotographic installation. Photographic equipment.
- For resale by the agents.
- SWLN (?) needles for silk stockings, resale value: 25,000 pesos.
40,000 type "Komet" 15B 3650 G12 10,000 type "Komet" 15B 3650 G2 25,000 type "Autoexpress" 510B 4250 G75 25,000 type "Autoexpress" 510B 4250 G3 10,000 type "Stibbe" 58 10,000 type "Stibbe" 58-1/2
- Installation plans of patented process for making wood gas generators. *
- 100-200 100-watt transmitting tubes. Siemens type 291, 391, or 6640, or more modern types. To supply a small company of agents proposed to set up to sell to the Argentine armed forces.
- Counterfeit English bank notes. *
- Small gifts for 42 collaborators:
"SS" and Hitler Youth literature.
"SS" candlesticks and rings.
- Cargo sent to Telefunken worth 15,000 pesos or leass, to be paid to Sargo group.
100 meters tungsten wire 1.2mm, for "RS" 250, 255, etc. * 30 cathode ray tubes. Incandescent filaments for Osram search lights lamps: 20 #555909 55 volts, 5 kilowatts. 5 #555757D 1.5 kilowatts. 20 #555852 3 kilowatts. 5 #555751D 1.5 kilowatts. 20 #555907 26 volts, 4.5 kilowatts. Filaments preferably to have "complementary compression base"? 100 steel cutting pencils (Stahlscheidestift) EAZ 005-1.
- Cargo sent to Siemens worth 16,500 pesos, to be paid to Sargo group.
4 kilos CONSTANT wire 0.05 enameled 12,000 pesos 6 kilos CONSTANT wire 0.06 enameled 5 kilos CONSTANT wire 0.07 enameled 200 grams copper wire 0.03 enameled 5 kilos copper wire 0.05 enameled 12 kilos copper wire 0.06 enameled 5 kilos copper wire 0.07 enameled 3,000 10 (measuring type loop reflectors?):
Type 0.5 X 1; 1 X 1; 1 X 2
1,500 ------------ 16,500 pesos
- Cargo sent to Merck Chemical Co., value 88,570 (?) pesos, to be paid to Sargo group. *
(Number refers to preparation in NGR catalog for which the preparation is to be used)
10 grams at 10 Basico Crist (Alezado) for 893/15 200 grams Chlorhidratro de Carbaminhilcolona for 940 5 kilos Papaverina Basica para Suposit for 164 20 kilos Papaverina Chlorhidrato para Tabletas for 163 2 kilos Papaverina Basica para Ampollas for 884 2 kilos Papaverina Metarsulfonete for 884 (following numbers refer to catalog AH) 3 kilos Anerriza Substancia 1269 100 grams Digitolina Crist 23044 250 grams Arecolinat Bromhidrato 1495 250 -- ------ Puris 7305 1 kilo Atropina Sulfato 1575 200 grams Escopolamina Bromhidrato 7701 250 grams Homatropina Orpahidrato 4343 (above available at Merck, Darmstadt, Frankfurter St-250) 250 grams Digitann - ID S2726 5710/1 3 kilos Bitartrtode Dahddukop EWA 5070/1 (above available at Knoll Co., Ludwigshafen)
- Cargo sent to Bayer Co., value 175,000 pesos, to be paid to Sargo group.
30 kilos Dolantin 10 kilos Fanodorm 20 kilos Salyrgan 40 kilos Naganol 1 kilo Atebrin injections 30 kilos Prontosil - Rubrum for solutions 10 kilos Vitamin B1 (above available at Leverkusen)
1 The espionage activities of the Abwehr were reported to have been subordinated to the SD in June 1944. The effect of this change on the activities of the agents in South America is not yet apparent, and for that reason it is not discussed here. 2 CG3-1986, Argentina to Berlin #614, 12 May 1943. "Contact through steamer couriers is threatened with complete break. Proven Spanish sailors refuse to take along any mail. Give consideration to possibility of contact by submarine . . ." 3 The Germans seem determined to experiment with this means. However, in June 1944, Berlin began to mention the possibilities of using Jollies for courier shipments from South America and possibly from the United States to Europe.
SD organization has also thought of a new means of shipment - mail via the Red Cross to specific internees in German prison camps - which may involve the use of Jolles. See CG4-5022, Berlin to Argentina #901-04, 16 June 1944; CG4-5179, Berlin to Argentina #946-48, 18 July 1944.
4 CG3-1955, Argentina to Berlin #382, 16 September 1943. 5 CG4-4014, Berlin to Argentina #913-14, 30 March 1944. 6 CG4-4223, Argentina to Berlin #306-07, 13 April 1944. 7 In July 1944, Sargo informed Berlin that Baarn and Koepff, who had been landed in Brazil by "Jolle" in August 1943, were under arrest. It is known that a two-masted sailing vessel was used in this operation. (See paragraph 9, below.) 8 See paragraph 3 above. 9 CG4-5022, Berlin to Argentina #901-04, 16 June 1944. "New courier-mail delivery is possible by way of Yanks interned in Germany, via Red Cross. From now on send continuously letters in Allied language from a fictitious sender to following internees . . . With Jolle there are new possibilities for courier shipments, which are underway in the framework of this action. They will be designated with the cover name "Wolin" . . ." 10 CG4-3946, Argentina to Berlin #302, 22 March 1944. This proposal is difficult to explain, in view of Sargo's and Luna's constantly reiterated complaints about their financial situation. Possibly this money was being sent by German nationals to their relatives in the homeland. 11 CG4-5051-A, Jolle to Argentinean, 23 June 1944. 12 CG4-3895, Argentina to Berlin #628, 22 March 1944; CG4-3992, Berlin to Argentina #904-06, 29 March 1944.
13 CG4-4880, Berlin to Argentina #905-53, 3 June 1944; CG4-5179, Berlin to Argentina #946-48, 18 July 1944. 14 CG3-1136, Berlin to Argentina #941-43, 11 June 1943. According to this message, Pizarro was to make the trip in an Argentine Jolle. It would appear that the meaning intended was that he should make the trip to Argentina by Jolle. 15 CG4-4623, Berlin to Argentina #912, 12 May 1944. 16 CG4-5006-A, Argentinean to Jolle, 21 June 1944; CG4-5007-A, Jolle to Argentina, 21 June 1944. 17 CG4-4997, Berlin to Argentina #911, 20 June 1944. 18 CG4-5131, Berlin to Argentina #922, 4 July 1944. 19 Not without hot words on both sides, however. Luna constantly berated his superiors in Berlin for lack of cooperation in matters of cargo and communication, and for changing plans too often. The SD control, on the other hand, several times castigated Luna and Argo for failing to answer important questions and for lack of security. Finally, Berlin told Luna to "save your criticism for yourselves when you do not know full details; it only indicates that through your cleaver conduct the originally contemplated landing has already been discovered." (CG4-4991, Berlin to Argentina #998, 15 June 1944.) 20 CG4-4880, Berlin to Argentina #950-53, 3 June 1943. A better guess as to the identity of these 30 objects might be rubber-covered trunks containing the cargo. The German word used was "praeservativen," literally, "protectors." 21 During these attempts, only "Q" signals were received; no text was intercepted.
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