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Central Pacific Operations
Record, Vol I
Dec '44 - Aug '45
This record has been compiled by Maj. MASATAKA IWANO, the former Imp. G.H.Q. staff officer, Col. NORITOME TADA, the former Chief of Staff of the 114th Div., Lt. Col. KEIZO ARITA, the former 52nd Div. staff officer and by many others.

The contents of this volume consists mainly of recorded memories of the above-mentioned persons and of some odd scattered information.

The operations of the SOUTH SEA (or NANKAI) Det. referred to in this book were recorded by the former Lt. Col. NORIKUNI TAJIMA in the War History Section of the Imp. G.H.Q. during the war time. He compiled it from the front reports and from other reference material gathered in the Imp. G.H.Q.
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I. Operation of the SOUTH SEA Det.


The plan of Imp. G.R.Q. had a following plan for operations in the PACIFIC ISLANDS Area, in order to check the enemy threatening the SOUTH SEA ISLANDS Area, the SOUTH SEA Det. (consisting of an Inf. Regt. under the command of the INFANTRY GROUP CO of the 55th Div. situated at SHIKOKU as a nucleus) and the 4th Fleet as a nucleus will first of all occupy GUAM ISLAND, and then proceed with occupation of the air bases in the BISMARCK ISLANDS. At the same time, part of the 4th Fleet (Marine Unit) will attack WAKE ISLAND again. After the SOUTH SEA Det. occupies GUAM ISLAND, the Marine Unit will take over the garrison duties on the island. Next, our Army in cooperation with the Navy will occupy RABAUL and secure the air base(s) there. The Marine Unit will as soon as possible replace the detachment troops in occupying the occupied areas. Accomplishing these operations, the detachment will move to the PALAU Area.

2. Outline of the Agreement Reached by the Army-Navy General Staff Concerning the GUAM and BISMARCK ISLANDS Operations:

a. Objective of the Operations.

By occupying the key points of GUAM ISLAND and the BISMARCK ISLANDS, the enemy threat to the SOUTH SEA ISLANDS Area will be removed.

b. General Plan of the Operations.

The Army in cooperation with the Navy will occupy GUAM ISLAND, and then attack RABAUL seeking to secure the air base(s) there.

c. Commencement of the Operations.

Attack on GUAM will commence immediately after our first air attack against AMERICA is confirmed to have been carried out.

3. Outline of the Operations:

a. At the very beginning of hostilities, the Navy
Air Force Unit advancing from SAIPAN ISLAND, to GUAM ISLAND will attack the enemy warships and defensive installations there.

b. The Navy will escort the Army transports to GUAM, and support the Army landing operation.

c. Upon landing on GUAM ISLAND, the main force of the Army will attack the strategic port of APRA while a part of the force will occupy AGANA, successively mopping up the remaining enemy on the island.

d. Upon the completion of the mopping up operation on GUAM ISLAND, the Army will be relieved of its garrison duty by the Navy, and will move to the TRUK ISLANDS where it will make preparations for the BISMARK ISLANDS Operation.

e. The Navy will carry out the aerial reconnaissance of the BISMARK ISLANDS Area, attacking it if necessary.

f. If sufficient Naval escort strength is available, and a good opportunity is afforded the Army in cooperation with the Navy, the Navy will attack RABAUL and occupy the air base there. If circumstances allow, the Navy will occupy the KAVIENG Airfield.

g. After the occupation of RABAUL, the Army will transfer the guard duties of the area to the Navy as soon as the situation warrants, and will under escort of the Navy units, assembled its force in the PALAU Area.

4. Concentration Points.

The troops assigned for the GUAM operation will be concentrated on the OGASAWARA ISLANDS for the BISMARK Operation. The troops will be assembled on the TRUK ISLANDS.

5. Strength to be Used:

A. The Army - the SOUTH SEA Det. (with three Inf. Bn.'s of the 55th Div. as a nucleus).

B. The Navy - a unit with the 4th Fleet as a nucleus.

B. Organization and Equipment of the GUAM Occupation Unit.

The organization of the SOUTH SEA Det. order was as follows.
144th Inf. Regt.
3rd Co. (less one part) of the 55th Cav. Regt. and 56th Cav. Gun Sect. of the same Regt.
1st Bn. of the 55th Mt. Arty. Regt.
1st Co. and a part of an Equipment Sect. of the 55th Eng. Regt.
A part of the 55th Div. Sig. Unit.
2nd Co. of the 55th Trans. Regt.
A part of the 55th Div. Med. Unit.
1st Fld. Hosp. of the 55th Div.
A part of the 55th Div. Steam-Horse Depot.
A part of the 55th Div. E.B. Water Supply and Pur. Unit.
One Co. of the 47th F.A.A. Gun Bn. ("B").

General equipment of the SOUTH SEA Det. was as follows:

Hq. of 55th Inf. Gp. Sig. Sqd. = Three signal apparatus, type "5". Several type "5" signal apparatus (TN. Sig). Several telegraph sets. An additional number of intendance and medical officers and N.C.O.'s will be attached.

144th Inf. Regt. (three Bn., Inf. Gun Co., Sig. Unit, and Ammunition Sect.).
The Bn. consisted of three Inf. Co., 1 M.G. Co. (equipped with four M.G.) and one Bn. Gun Sect. (equipped with two guns).
The Inf. Gun Co. was equipped with two Regt. Guns and two Anti-M. Rapid-Fire Guns.
The Inf. Co. was composed of three Pltn.'s (equipped with three L.M.G.'s and four captive balloons.) The Sig. Unit was equipped with signal apparatus type "5".

Cav. Co. (number of Pltn. unknown; equipped with two M.G. and one Rapid-Fire Gun).

Mt. Arty. Bn. (consists of three Co.'s equipped with 12 guns).

Eng. Co. (four Pltn.'s).

Trans. Co. (equipped with motor vehicles, number unknown).

C. Operation Leading to Capture of GUAM ISLAND.

1. The following facts concerning the enemy were known to us before the operation:

GUAM ISLAND is the Naval air base of the enemy. A Marine Unit consisting of 300 men is stationed on the island, in addition to about 1,500 native soldiers. It seems that artillery positions are being constructed at several points along the coast and inland of the island. Besides that, we had a general knowledge of the topography of the island from a military standpoint.

2. Preparations for the Invasion...
On 8 Nov., the SOUTH SEA Det. Commander received a cable from the JAO's G.O. ordering the preparations for capturing GUAM ISLAND.

On 14th and 15th of the same month, he conferred with the 4th Fleet Cdr. at IWAKUNI Air Naval Base on the details of coordinated preparation of Army and Navy. On 20th, he issued instructions to MARUGAME, SHIKOKU, ordering the detachment to secure AGANIA, the capital of the island. According to the order, the landing plan of the SOUTH SEA Det. was as follows:

Outline of SOUTH SEA Det. Landing Plan.

1. General Plan.
   a. The detachment will land the troops of the second wave just before dawn, with the landing of the second wave, the main body of the detachment will be landed, and then their strength will be reinforced, representing the main force of the detachment, which will be strengthened by succeeding landings. Before noon on the landing day, the detachment must be able to fight independently.
   b. Troops and materials not immediately required for the action will be unloaded at APRA HARBOR (or AGANIA according to the situation).

2. Execution of Landing Operation (Plan in details).
   a. The transports will enter into the anchorage. The arrival of transports and reaching the shore will be as follows:
      - First wave: at 0400. The 1st Landing operation will commence at 0500. The anchorage: 2 400.
      - Second wave: at 0530. The 2nd Landing operation will commence at 0600. The anchorage: 2 400.
   b. When the 1st Landing Cde. leave the transports, the transports will move about three nautical miles off the coast.
   c. If the time of the landing permits, efforts must be made to reach the coral reefs at one stroke, utilizing the high tide to get over the coral reefs at one landing, efforts must be made to reach the coral reefs taking full advantage of the high water.

3. Concentration at the Assembly Point. The detachment will embark on nine transports at
TABLE SHOWING THE LANDING OPERATION PLAN OF THE
FIRST LINE UNITS OF THE SOUTH SEA (OF HANKAI)
DETACHMENT.

( to be inserted here)
SAKAIDE, SHIKOKU, and towards the end of November will gradually assemble at the anchorage of OKI HARBOR on HAHA-JIMA.

Execution of the Invasion:

4. On 2 Dec., the Det. Cmdr. received at HAHA-JIMA, from the Imp. G.H.Q., an order concerning the capture of GUAM ISLAND. On the same day, he issued the following detachment order:

"Commence landings on 10 December and designate GUAM-Island on 10 Dec."

The convoy departed from HAHA-JIMA at 0900 on 4 Dec., and being escorted by the 4th Fleet (the Det. Cmdr. was on board the warship TSUGARU) proceeded towards GUAM ISLAND via the route east of the MARIANAS ISLANDS. Without contacting the enemy enroute the convoy reached ROTA ISLAND Area on the 8th and from there the advance was continued in scattered groups, each group heading for its respective anchorage. Carrier planes of the special aircraft carrier, SEIKAWA-MARU, and the 17th Air Unit attached to the 4th Naval Base Force (situated at TRUK) raided GUAM ISLAND since the 8th. It was reported that the OROTE PENINSULA Area was covered with thick black smoke and that the enemy minesweeper PENGUIN was sunk outside the harbor.

From 0001 to 0100 of the 10th, all convoys successively entering the anchorages immediately commenced launching the troops into boats while transports were still drifting.

At about 0230, the landing operation commenced at various points of the island. After landing, some contact was encountered in the area of the TSUKAMOTO Bn., which landed at AGANA BAY. The Bn. was confronted with some smoke and sound, but met no noticeable enemy opposition. The morning of the 10th, all the important points on GUAM ISLAND were captured and after mopping up the entire island during the 11th and 12th, the island was occupied.

It was planned that the San Francisco Unit (of about 400 men) would land at AGANA BAY, following the TSUKAMOTO Bn. However, finding the coast of that bay unsuitable for landing operations, the unit landed in the vicinity of the AGANA CITY at about the
same time as the first landing of the Army. Then defeating enemy resistance of some strength on its way, the unit at about 0430 occupied the Guam Government Office.

The South Sea Det. Hq. landed at Merizo immediately after the second landing of the Kusunoše Unit. But, discovering no road from Umatac to Agat, it returned to the beaches and moved further northward by boat. Landing on the northern coast of Pago Point, it began at 1400 to advance to Agat, entering the Agana City in the evening of the same day.

Outline of the progress of the fighting is shown on the attached map.

The detachment without resting mopped up the remaining enemy making at the same time the preparations for the next operation designed to capture the Bismarck Islands.

II. Operations in the Central Pacific Area from 1942 to the Beginning of 1944.

A. General Situation in 1942.

The South Sea Det. captured Guam Island during the beginning of the middle part of Dec. 1941. Then relieved of the garrison duties on the island by the Navy Unit, the detachment left the island in the middle of Jan. 1942, intending to capture the Bismarck Islands. In the meanwhile, the 4th Fleet of the Navy re-attacked Wake on 23 Dec., and occupied it. Originally, the Navy was responsible for the safety of islands in the Central Pacific Area. Immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities, the Navy therefore, deployed on the important islands necessary units which were charged mainly with the task of establishing and strengthening the Naval and air bases there. In course of their duties, they did not, however, construct any land defensive works.

In June 1942, the Midway Island operation took place, and the atmosphere of the Central Pacific Area reached a climax. After the failure to occupy Midway Island, the Central Pacific Area ceased to be the main operational theatre of Naval or aerial
warfare between JAPAN and AMERICA. Except the occasional appearance of a few enemy submarines, the whole year passed quietly.

B. General Situation in the SOUTHEASTERN PACIFIC Area at the end of 1942.

Since summer of 1942, the AMERICAN Forces began to counter-attack the SOLOMON ISLANDS and the NEW GUINEA Area in the SOUTHEASTERN PACIFIC. Towards the end of the year their attack gradually intensified. The enemy's plan for the future was estimated as follows:

"The enemy will advance northwards on both fronts of the BISMARCK ISLANDS and the NEW GUINEA Area, through DAMPIER STRAIT, and by attacking our SOUTHEASTERN Operation bases at RABAUL, will try to gain the security for its free activity in the SOUTH SEAS. Then he will move from his bases on the NEW GUINEA COAST in the northwest direction, having in view to recapture the PHILIPPINES, not neglecting at the same time the operations in the SOUTH SEAS, where enemy submarine activities and air bombings of our strategic throughout the whole southern sea area will aim to place our Empire into a difficult position."

Meanwhile, the situation of our forces in the SOUTHEASTERN Area was as follows:

Since August, our Naval strength, especially air forces and auxiliary warships, were greatly weakened due to continuous combat, which circumstances together with the steady increase of enemy air and sea strength, put our command of the SOUTHEASTERN Sea into great disadvantage. Reinforcement of troops and supply of war materials for GUADALCANAL and the EASTERN NEW GUINEA Area became so difficult, that since December even the minimum requirements could hardly be delivered by small warships that were sneaking through under the cover of darkness. Our troops in these areas therefore had no fight against heavy odds, without hope that their greatly reduced strength will be reinforced.

Taking this situation into consideration, and because
there were no means of continuing the recapturing operations, the Imp. G.H.Q. decided to withdraw our troops from GUADALCANAL ISLAND. The immediate execution of attack against PORT MORESBY was also given up.

C. Dispatching of Army Units for the Defense of the CENTRAL PACIFIC ISLANDS.

As the strategic situation in the SOUTHEASTERN Area became increasingly disadvantageous for us, the enemy attacks against the GILBERT, MARSHALL, WAKE and MARCUS ISLANDS in the CENTRAL PACIFIC Area was expected more than ever. The Imp. G.H.Q. therefore dispatched the following Army units (each garrison unit consists of one Inf. Bn. and one Arty. Co. as a nucleus) to the CENTRAL PACIFIC Area aiming to strengthen the local defenses and placing them under the command of each respective Navy Unit Cmrd.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>ISLANDS</th>
<th>NOTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st SOUTH SEA (or NANKAI) Garrison</td>
<td>GILBERT ISLANDS</td>
<td>The order was issued in April. 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd SOUTH SEA (or NANKAI) Garrison</td>
<td>MARCUS ISLAND</td>
<td>The order was issued in April.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd SOUTH SEA (or NANKAI) Garrison</td>
<td>WAKE ISLAND</td>
<td>The order was issued in June.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th SOUTH SEA (or NANKAI) Garrison</td>
<td>GILBERT ISLANDS</td>
<td>The order was issued in June.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The MARCUS ISLAND Unit was placed under the command of the YOKOSUKA Naval Dist. Commandant, while the other units were under command of the 4th Fleet Cmrd.

The 4th SOUTH SEA Garrison Unit was organized and dispatched because the 1st SOUTH SEA Garrison Unit met with disaster on the sea. On its way to GILBERT, the 4th SOUTH SEA Garrison Unit was transferred to the 8th Area Army (the 17th Army) and was sent to the SOUTHEASTERN Area (BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND and SHORTLAND ISLAND).

D. General Situation in the Summer of 1943.

Our troops in the CENTRAL and SOUTHERN PACIFIC Areas at a great sacrifice concentrated their efforts on securing the first line of our national defense, that ran through the MARSHALL
ISLANDS, the CENTRAL SOLOMON ISLANDS and the strategic areas around LAE and SALAMAU in EASTERN NEW GUINEA. As our troops stationed in the SOUTHEASTERN Area, with RABAUL as its center, became neutralized our defense of the GILBERT ISLANDS Area was decidedly weakened. As the enemy's Naval and air forces became more active in the eastern island areas of the CENTRAL PACIFIC, it was anticipated that the enemy will carry out in this area a general attack. Due to the marked superiority of the enemy in his general fighting strength, it gradually became impossible to secure the above-mentioned first line of our national defense. Consequently, the operations in the SOUTHEASTERN Area had to be changed from the offensive to the defensive operations.

E. Dispatching of Army Units for the Reinforcement of the Islands in the CENTRAL PACIFIC Area.

1. At the end of Aug. 1943, taking the general situation in the CENTRAL and SOUTHEASTERN PACIFIC Area into consideration the Imp. G.H.Q. decided to move the first line of national defenses to the line that runs through the BANDA SEA Area, the CAROLINE ISLANDS and the area north of NEW GUINEA. To frustrate the enemy's further advance it was planned to strengthen these areas with defensive works, especially reinforcing the air forces, and establishing a strong base for our counter-attack.

2. Although the Navy had been endeavoring to strengthen the CENTRAL PACIFIC Area, it became evident that the Navy alone could not do the job and it was decided either to transfer Army units from other areas or to dispatch newly organized Army units for the reinforcement of these areas. Eventually the fortification group organized according to the plan shown on the supplementary sheet and commanded by Maj. Gen. AKIYAMA, Eng. Corps, was dispatched to these areas with a mission to inspect the fortification constructed by the Navy and also to make plans for future defensive works.
# Plan of Army Units Assigned to the Central Pacific Area (September 1943)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Planned Time of Advance</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marcus Island</td>
<td>2nd South Sea</td>
<td>Garrison Unit: One Inf. Bn., one Arty. Btry.</td>
<td>Already advanced</td>
<td>All these units are attached to the Eastern Dist. Army, and will be put under the command of the 4th Fleet Cdr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wake Island</td>
<td>3rd South Sea</td>
<td>Garrison Unit: One Inf. Bn., one Arty. Btry.</td>
<td>Already advanced</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaluit</td>
<td>1st South Sea</td>
<td>Det.: Two Inf. Bn., one Tk. Co.</td>
<td>September 1943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truk</td>
<td>Main force of</td>
<td>22nd Div.: Six Inf. Bn., one Tk. Co., two</td>
<td>January 1944</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mokilokk</td>
<td>4th South Sea</td>
<td>Det.: One Inf. Bn., one Tk. Co.</td>
<td>December 1943</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saipan, Tinian,</td>
<td>Main force of</td>
<td>13th Div.: Six Inf. Bn., one Tk. Co., two</td>
<td>July 1944</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5th South Seas</td>
<td>Det.: Two Inf. Bn., one Tk. Co.</td>
<td>August 1944</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Enemy Counter-attack against WAKE.

On 30 Aug. 1943, the enemy task force attacked WAKE, carrying out fierce bombings and shellings, and trying to land a part of its forces on the island. However, our units situated there fought desperately and defeated the enemy attempt.

4. As the enemy's intention to counter-attack the GILBERT and WAKE ISLANDS became clear at the end of August, the Imp. G.H.Q. transferred the 122nd Inf. Regt. from the PHILIPPINES to the MARSHALL ISLANDS. The KO Det. (consisting of three Inf. Bns., one Art. Bn. and one Eng. Co.) organized from the 52nd Div. which was activated in JAPAN Proper during the month of September, was dispatched to PONAPE ISLAND and placed under the command of the 4th Fleet Cdr. Both of these units were ordered to frustrate enemy attacks in each respective areas.

5. Preparations for Deployment of Main Force of Army Units.

In October, the Imp. G.H.Q. dispatched a part of the 52nd Div. to TRUK ISLAND, and a part of the 15th Div. to the MARIANAS ISLANDS instructing them to collect information and reference materials for the following operation and also to make preparations for Army units to be deployed in these areas. Simultaneously the main forces of these divisions, situated in CHINA and JAPAN Proper after making necessary changes in their organizations, carried out preparations and training for amphibious operations.

Note: Later, the dispatch of the 15th Div. was suspended because of a decision to use the No. 1 CHINA Operation. In place of the 15th Div., the 29th Div. was dispatched from MANCHURIA in February.

6. GILBERT Operation (Situation of the KO and 1st SOUTH SEAS Det.).

1. In Nov. 1943, in spite of the desperate counter-attack by our Navy units situated on these islands and by our air force of the 4th Fleet, the enemy landed on MAKIN and TARAWA.
ISLANDS of the GILBERT Group.

2. Situation of the 1st SOUTH SEAS Det.

The detachment arrived to the MARSHALL ISLANDS Area in the early part of September, and part of it occupied WOTJE, MALOLOAP and JALUIT, while the main force landed on KWAJALEIN ISLAND. Considering the critical situation of the GILBERT ISLANDS Area the detachment prepared to dispatch the main force to this area for reinforcement, but owing to the transport difficulty this move was suspended. On 30 Nov., the Det. Cmdr. was ordered to send the main force (Eq. and a Bn.) of the detachment, the 3rd Bn. of the 107th Inf. Regt., the 3rd Bn. (less the 1st Co.) of the 16th Mt. Arty. Regt., and the 2nd Co. (less a Pltn.) of the 52nd Eng. Regt., to MILI ISLAND for garrison duties.

3. Situation of the KO Det.

The KO Det. during Oct. 1943 assembled its entire strength on PONAPE ISLAND and was carrying out the garrison duties there. It was also kept in readiness to move to other areas at moment's notice. In November, one Inf. Bn., two Arty. Btrys. and one Eng. Co. of the detachment were moved to KWAJALEIN ISLAND, for participation in the GILBERT Area Operation. However, because of the change in the general situation, the participation of the detachment in the GILBERT Operation was suspended, and the above-mentioned units under the command of the 1st Det. Cmdr. were sent to MILI ISLAND. One Inf. Bn. and one Arty. Btry. were dispatched to KUSAIE ISLAND, and other units were disposed on PONAPE ISLAND for garrison duties in these islands.

G. Operation in the KWAJALEIN ISLAND Area.

1. General Situation before the Operation.

a. As enemy air bases in the GILBERT ISLANDS were gradually strengthened, the enemy air attacks in the MARSHALL Area were gradually increasing, until in Jan. 1944, he was able to use from 40 to 50 airplanes daily. Information was received that a considerable number of enemy warships in the later part of January departed from HAWAII moving westward.
b. In accordance with the reinforcement plan made by the Imp. G.H.Q. in Sept. 1945 for the purpose of strengthening the defenses of the CENTRAL PACIFIC Area, the reinforcement units gradually began to arrive to the MARSHALL and EASTERN CAROLINE ISLANDS as scheduled. In the latter part of January, the disposition of Army units in the MARSHALL ISLANDS were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ISLAND</th>
<th>UNITS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KWAJALEIN</td>
<td>2nd Eng. Bn. (less the 4th and 6th Cos.) of the 1st Amph. Mobile Unit; A part of the 1st SOUTH SEAS Det.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOTJE</td>
<td>4th Co. of the 1st Amph. Mobile Unit; 5th Co. of the 2nd M.G. Bn. of the 1st SOUTH SEAS Det.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALOLAP</td>
<td>6th Co. of the 1st Amph. Mobile Unit, 7th Co. of the 1st SOUTH SEAS Det.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIULI</td>
<td>1st SOUTH SEAS Det. (less the 2nd Bn.), 3rd Bn. of the 107th Inf. Regt., 3rd Bn. (less 2nd Co.) of the 16th Mt. Arty. Regt., 2nd Bn. (less a quarter) of the 52nd Eng. Regt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JALUIT</td>
<td>2nd Bn. (less 5th and 7th M.G. Co.) of the 1st SOUTH SEAS Det.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Disposition of troops of the 1st SOUTH SEAS Det. and the 10 Det. was completed from September to November. Some of the 1st Amph. Mobile Unit arrived in the latter part of January and were carrying out their deployment.

2. Outline of Progress of the Operation (from 30 Jan. to 6 Feb.).

a. From the early morning of 30 Jan., WOTO, KWAJALEIN, WOTJE and MALOLAP ISLANDS were fiercely attacked by enemy carrier airplanes. The total number of enemy airplanes was about 2,000. Our Navy Air Force and land units situated there confronted this attack daringly, and inflicted some losses upon the enemy ships and airplanes.

b. On 1 Jan., while the enemy task forces carried out air-raids, enemy units, transported by 45 transports and escorted by 12 warships, including battleships, began to land on KWAJALEIN ATOLL, WOTO and KWAJALEIN's main island.

Our garrison units on these islands, resisting the enemy fought desperately. But, in the WOTO Area, the enemy overwhelming our troops, occupied the island. The communication with WOTO was cut and since 3 Feb., the situation there was unknown.
In the KWAJALEIN Main Island, though our troops frustrated the first enemy landing, the enemy carrying on a fierce bombing and Naval shelling, persistently repeated his forceful attacks until on 6 Feb., he succeeded in occupying the island. Our operation bases smashed because our garrisons, not being supported by Navy and air force and being hindered by other various insurmountable obstacles were forced to resist the enemy single-handed.

H. Operation in the BROWN (EMIWETOK) and TRUK Areas.

1. General Situation before the Operation.

a. After landing on KWAJALEIN ISLAND, the enemy concentrated his efforts on the construction of the base there and at the same time using from 20 to 50 airplanes daily, continued to raid every island in the MARSHALL ISLANDS Area.

b. In the SOUTHEASTERN Area, the part of the enemy forces penetrated DAMPIER STRAIT, while another unit moved to BOUGAIMVILLE ISLAND. Both groups were expected to advance later, further in the northwestern direction. RABaul was bombed by 100 to 200 enemy airplanes daily.

c. The activity of enemy submarines in the CENTRAL PACIFIC Area somehow slacked in December, but since the latter part of January, simultaneously with the commencement of attacks on the MARSHALL Area, it was gradually intensified.

d. The disposition of Army troops in the EASTERN CAROLINE Area at the beginning of February was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OF ISLAND</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
<th>NOTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BROWN (EMIWETOK)</td>
<td>1st Amph. Mobile Brig. (less 2nd Eng. Bn.)</td>
<td>Arrived Jan. 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KUSATE</td>
<td>2nd SOUTH SEA Det.</td>
<td>Arrived Jan. 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FONAPE</td>
<td>3rd SOUTH SEA Det.</td>
<td>Arrived Jan. 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOROLOK</td>
<td>4th SOUTH SEA Det.</td>
<td>Arrived Jan. 1944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRUK</td>
<td>52nd Div. Hq.</td>
<td>Arrived at TORRES (TH?) ISLAND Dec. 1943</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Outline of the Progress of the Operation (from 17 to 24 Feb.).

a. Since 15 Feb., the enemy attack was expected in the very near future. As anticipated, on 17 Feb., four to six groups of enemy task forces (each group consisting of two to three aircraft carriers and two to four battleships or cruisers) advanced by sea 100 to 200 nautical miles east of TRUK ISLAND. At dawn of that day their carrier-based airplanes commenced to operate directing their attacks mainly against our ships at anchor and on our airfields. The attack continued without slackening until the afternoon of the 18th.

Our Army and Navy units stationed on the island immediately retaliated, employing our total force of airplanes and the entire strength of our anti-aircraft guns.

b. The 2nd Trans. Unit of the 52nd Div. under command of the 150th Inf. Regt. Cdr. was attacked by enemy airplanes and submarines on the OLOL ISLANDS Area. Although despite of our desperate defense, two transports were lost; the remainder succeeded in landing on 18 Feb. to land on TRUK ISLAND.

c. As soon as the enemy annihilated our air forces on TRUK ISLAND, he commenced to land on BROWN (ENIWETOK) ISLAND. The 1st Amph. Brig., which landed on the island only a short time before, having no time to construct any defensive installations, desperately resisted the enemy on this remote island for seven days. On 24 Feb., however, the communication with BROWN (ENIWETOK) ISLAND was cut off, and our troops there seemed to have been annihilated.
III. Creation of the 31st Army Command and Reinforcement of Strength.

A. General Situation at the Beginning of 1944.

1. In the NEW GUINEA Area, the enemy penetrating DAMPIER STRAIT, began in the early part of January to land in GUMBI POINT Area. The 16th Army was thus cut right at the center of its disposition. As the air strength of our Navy weakened, the enemy in this area moved very rapidly succeeding in covering long distances in a very short period. In the SOLOMON ISLAND Area, the enemy, establishing its base in the TOROKINA Area of BOUGAINVILLE ISLAND, carried out air-raids on RABAUL daily. (An average of 100 to 200 airplanes daily attacked and bombed RABAUL). In the early part of February the enemy landed on GREEN ISLAND, threatening thus the CAROLINE ISLANDS Area not only from the east, but also from the south.

In the NORTHERN PACIFIC Area, the enemy also became active since the end of 1943, intensifying its air-raids on NORTHERN KURILE ISLANDS.

Although the information available was not sufficient for predicting the enemy plan for its subsequent operations in the CENTRAL PACIFIC Area, it was considered however that its wedge-driving tactics into the MARSHALL ISLANDS Area and the air-raids on TRUK are pointing to his intentions to carry out some audacious operation as soon as he concentrates his superior sea and air forces.

Our situation at that time was critical although in accordance with the plan for strengthening the newly established national defense line that runs from the area north of FORMOSA to the CAROLINE ISLANDS, a part of the assigned units arrived at these areas. The entire disposition of forces, however, was not yet completed. The defensive installations were defective, and general preparations for defense were far from being satisfactory.

Our sea transportation became increasingly difficult. Our total losses of ships (including those sunk and damaged) in the entire operational theatres reached the figure about 30,000
tons in December, and about 430,000 tons in January. That was the
greatest loss since the outbreak of hostilities. In addition, our
air and Naval escorts were very weak. The emergency measures which
were taken to secure the sea transportation, to guard against enemy
submarines, to protect straits and islands along the important sea
routes, and the frantic efforts of our Army and Navy to implement
these measures were not expected to improve the situation for some
months to come.

2. Taking this situation into consideration, the Imp.
C.H.Q. picked out parts of troops from various areas, and organized
an Emergency Expeditionary Units under the command of the combined
fleet commanders (refer to the supplementary sheet No. 1). Twelve
fortress infantry units and one fortress artillery unit were put under
the command of the CHICHI-JIMA Fortress Cmdr. To supplement our
defenses in the CENTRAL PACIFIC Area the Imp. C.H.Q. on 25 Feb.,
organized the 31st Army (the strength of which is shown in the
supplementary sheet No. 2) which was placed under the command of
the Combined Fleet Cmdr. immediately.

SUPPLEMENTARY SHEET NO. 1
CHART OF THE EXPEDITIONARY UNITS URGENTLY ORGANIZED FOR THE
REINFORCEMENT OF FORCES IN THE CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Destination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Expeditionary Unit</td>
<td>4 Inf., 2 Arty.</td>
<td>HAIHAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Expeditionary Unit</td>
<td>2 Inf., 1 Arty.</td>
<td>MORTLOCK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Expeditionary Unit</td>
<td>3 Inf., 1 Arty.</td>
<td>FULLIWAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Expeditionary Unit</td>
<td>3 Inf., 1 Arty.</td>
<td>YAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Expeditionary Unit</td>
<td>2 Inf., 1 Arty.</td>
<td>PAGAN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Expeditionary Unit</td>
<td>6 Inf., 2 Arty.</td>
<td>GUAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Expeditionary Unit</td>
<td>6 Inf., 1 Arty.</td>
<td>WOLEAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th Expeditionary Unit</td>
<td>3 Inf., 1 Arty.</td>
<td>TRUK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

REMARKS: 1 - The Expeditionary Units will be organized from
the forces of Kwantung Army (except the 8th Expeditionary Unit which will be organized from the forces of KOREAN Army).
2 - Transportation will begin in March and must be
completed in the early part of April.

NOTE: All the Expeditionary Force Units will be placed under
the commander in chief of the combined fleet.

SUPPLEMENTARY SHEET NO. 2
Strength of the 31st Army at the Time of its Organization
According to the Order of the Imp. C.H.Q.:

The Army Cmdr. - Maj. Gen. KIHIZO OBATA.
THUK Sector Groups.
32nd Div.
3rd SOUTH SEAS Det.
4th SOUTH SEAS Det.
5th SOUTH SEAS Det.
7th Indep. Eng. Regt.
2nd, 3rd, 7th and 8th Expeditionary Units, etc.

MARIANAS Sector Group.
29th Div.
25th A.A.A. Regt.
52nd Indep. A.A.A. Det.
1st, 5th and 6th Expeditionary Units, etc.

OGASAWARA Sector Group.
All the units of the CHICHI-JIMA Fortress.
Others.

PALAU Sector Group.
35th Div.
Others.

3. The Combined Fleet, which had its base in the CENTRAL PACIFIC at that time, was forced to withdraw its base to the rear area, detailing simultaneously with the organization of the 31st Army, a part of the Navy for the operations in the CENTRAL PACIFIC Area.

B. Organization of the 31st Army Command.

1. At 0001, on 10 Mar. 1944, the Army Cmdr. assumed at SAIPAN the command of the units of the CENTRAL PACIFIC islands, and ordered them to secure their respective sectors.

2. At the end of March, taking the operation situation in the NEW GUINEA Area into consideration, the Imp. G.H.Q. ordered the 35th Div., which was previously assigned to PALAU, to proceed to MANOKWARI, NIAX and MUNHOL Areas. This division was removed in April from the command of the 31st Army, its place being filled by the 14th Div., the 9th Expeditionary Unit (both were still in MAN-CHURIA) and by the 43rd Div. (at JAPAN Proper).

firmly their respective sectors.

C. Outline of the 51st Army Defense Plan.

(A) - General Plan.

1. The Army, expecting to meet the enemy attacks at any time, must rapidly deploy its troops, and make basic defensive preparations, priority being given to the OGASAWARA, MAHALANES and TRUK (west of PONAPE—including PONAPE-areas, then to east of WOLEAI—including WOLEAI-sector and finally to the PALAU—including the YAP area and ANGAUR) Sector.

2. While deploying the troops, the defensive constructions must be strengthened and general preparations for the annihilation of the enemy on the beaches must be completed, including the protection of our air bases. The field positions must be completed within one month after the arrival of troops and within three months the positions must be strengthened by constructing permanent fortifications in the most important points.

3. In making defensive preparations, the various projects already started by the Navy must be taken into consideration facilitating thus a cooperation between Army and Navy.

(B) - Deployment and Operation Preparations.

4. Transportation of the Army troops will be carried out in accordance with the Appended Table No. 1.

5. Disposition of the Army troops will be as shown in the Appended Table No. 2.

6. Units already occupying these areas must secure respective sectors and by speeding up defensive preparations, will facilitate the deployment of newly arrived groups.

7. Transportation of the expeditionary units as well as preparations for landing operation must be carried out in expectation to encounter the enemy at any time. Corresponding orders will be separately issued in case we have to make landing under the threat of enemy opposition.

8. In close cooperation with the Army and Navy units al-
ready occupying these islands, all personnel of newly arrived units, including officers, will work day and night to disperse the ships and to clear the landing points and in carrying out such air defensive measures as dispersion, covering and protection against enemy airplanes.

The highest ranking officer on each island will be responsible for protective measures, especially for air defenses.

9. Immediately upon their landing, troops will occupy positions at strategic points, and will make preparations to check the enemy on the beaches. If our strength will not be sufficient to defeat the enemy on the beaches, we will fall back on the strategic inland positions, which for this purpose must be fortified by retracement works. Even if we fail to check the landing of a part of the enemy force, our air bases will be firmly secured and we will be able by persistent opposition to deny him the use of these airfields. To facilitate the landing operation of our reinforcement troops the strong points must be well secured.

10. Works will be limited to the construction of positions, establishment of communication system, and storage of war materials. If occupation of houses already built will not interfere with military preparations they can be used as living quarters, but the erection of new living accommodations is not allowed.

In selecting the positions due regard must be given to thorough covering and protection of our troops and besides that due constructions must be strong enough to withstand the fierce enemy shellings and bombings. In storing war materials, due consideration must be given to the damaging influence of tropical climate on the quality of goods.

11. To be able to overcome many obstacles, a special training program designed to make troops familiar with respective terrain and new environment must be carried out. The leadership of all commanders must be improved, the troops must be instilled with the idea of solid unity and their morale must be elevated in every way.
Each sector group commander will immediately carry out the amphibious training with one Inf. Bn. Separate instructions for additional training will be issued later.

12. All operation preparations, must be carried out in close cooperation with the Navy. The first priority in labor and materials must be given to construction of strong air bases and every possible measure must be taken to use materials and labor.

13. The relation between the Army and the Navy will be governed by the agreement for the unified defensive operation of the fleet and the land forces (already reached between their respective central authorities) in the CENTRAL PACIFIC Area. (See Separate Sheet No. 1). Besides, both forces must always strive to achieve complete coordination of their operations not losing the sight of the whole aspects of the war situation.

(C) - Order for Subsequent Operations.

14. The fundamental purpose of the Army operations is to secure strategic areas, especially air bases, in the CENTRAL PACIFIC so that our air forces will be afforded an opportunity to annihilate the advancing enemy units at sea; or failing in that, they will be able to prevent the enemy from landing on the beaches and establishing his air bases on the islands.

15. In securing the air bases, we must firmly hold the islands where airfields are already constructed or planned, to be constructed and also those islands which are considered to be suitable for airfields. These islands must be held to the limit of our strength; if the worse comes to the worst all efforts must be made to prevent the enemy from using these islands.

16. If the enemy attacks these islands, all the fighting strength of the Army and Navy garrison units will be combined to annihilate the enemy on the beaches.

Every island, therefore, must be fortified with strong defensive works and amphibious operations must be carried out between all islands within the atolls and also sector groups. On the sea along the coast, a part of the strength will carry out
amphibious counter-attack to surprise the enemy during his prepara-
tional period in landing. Anti-aircraft artillery positions must be constructed beforehand and all the effective artillery fire must be concentrated against enemy airplanes.

17. The TRUK Sector Op. Cmdr. will secure the CAROLINE ISLANDS west of PONAPE (including PONAPE) and east of WOLEAI (includi

The operations will be carried out as follows:

a. TRUK ISLANDS.

The TRUK ISLAND being the main air base of the TRUK Sector will be resolutely defended to the very last. Even in the worst situation the enemy must be hindered from using the islands for their Naval bases. Therefore, it is essential to establish a close cooperation and mutual support between islands garrisons, securing the command of the sea within the atoll for the free amphibious operations of our troops. For this purpose the FOUR SEASONS ISLAND (or SHIKI-SHOTO including UOLA, TORRESG-TN., FEFAN, UMAN) must be strongly fortified.

b. MORTLOCK, FULUWAT.

In order to support the defense of TRUK, both MORTLOCK and FULUWAT ISLANDS being a sector of the airfields group must be strongly garrisoned. Preparations for amphibious operations of a part of our strength from TRUK ISLAND to both islands must be made.

c. PONAPE.

The present garrison strength without being reinforced will hold the strategic areas of the island which is an advanced operation base.

d. WOLEAI.

WOLEAI having a great value as a part of the TRUK Air Base Op., and also an important single air base, will be firmly secured. It is also important because it occupies the strategic position on our defensive line connecting the TRUK and
the PALAU ISLANDS. The best use of all types of weapons must be made in order to facilitate the mutual support between islands. The command of the sea within the atoll must be secured for our free amphibious operation.

18. The SOUTHERN MARIANAS Sector Cmdr. will secure the MARIANAS ISLANDS south of ROTA (including ROTA). This unit will be resolutely held to the very last because together with the NORTHERN MARIANAS and the OGASAWARA Sectors, it represents the final positions for the defense of JAPAN Proper. The operation will be carried out as follows:

a. GUAM ISLAND.

The island being an important air base must be strongly fortified. Some amphibious strength will be stationed on this island ready to support ROTA ISLAND Garrison.

b. ROTA ISLAND.

A powerful unit will hold this island as a part of the GUAM and TINIAN Air Base Op.

19. The NORTHERN MARIANAS Sector Cmdr. will secure the strategic area of the MARIANAS ISLANDS north of TINIAN (including TINIAN). This sector will be firmly held to the very last, because it is the final positions for the defense of JAPAN Proper. The operation will be carried out as follows:

a. TINIAN and SAIPAN.

Both islands forming an important air base group, must be strongly fortified affording facilities for mutual support and cooperation. Amphibious units will be stationed on both islands in order to help one another and also to support the BAGAN Area operation.

b. BAGAN ISLAND.

BAGAN being a part of the SAIPAN-TINIAN Air Base Op., and specially linking base for the OGASAWARA Sector Cmdr., must be strongly garrisoned and fortified.

20. The OGASAWARA Sector Cmdr. will secure the
OGASAWARA ISLANDS. The operation will be carried out as follows:
a. IWOL ISLAND.

IWOL ISLAND must be fortified and firmly held as an important air base in the OGASAWARA Sector.

b. CHICHJ JIMA.

Already constructed fortifications on this island will be strengthened to secure the island as an important air base next to IWOL ISLAND.

As many amphibious troops as available will be stationed on CHICHJ JIMA in preparations for the operations on other islands.

c. HAHA JIMA, MUKO JIMA.

For the present, only part of garrison will be stationed to prevent the enemy from using these islands.

21. The PALAU Sector Gp. Cmdr. will secure the PALAU ISLANDS (including ANGAUR) and the YAP ISLAND Area. The operation will be carried out as follows:

a. The PALAU ISLANDS.

The islands must be held to the very last as the final position barring the enemy from penetrating into PACIFIC.

PELELIU and ANGAUR must be fortified as an important air base.

A part of strength will be stationed on the PALAU Main Island to secure the strategic points, especially airfields, and also to prepare for the amphibious operations between PELELIU, ANGAUR and the YAP Area.

b. YAP Area.

Being a link in the PALAU Air Base Gp., and also a second line position for WOLEAI, YAP must be strongly garrisoned.

22. Each sector group commander will immediately investigate the position of those islands where no troops are stationed. To any island which is likely to be used by the enemy, especially as an airfield or as an intelligence base, a part of
the force must be dispatched for observation of enemy movements

25. The Army operation plan will be issued after the completion of all basic defensive preparations.

(B) - Fortifications.

24. First priority in construction will be given to improvised positions designed to frustrate enemy landings on the beaches (anti-aircraft positions must be added), and to temporary protective measures designed to minimize our losses in personnel and materials. Later, these constructions will be rapidly supplemented and strengthened by extending the positions in depth, converting actually the island into invulnerable fortress.

(B) - Air Defenses.

25. The highest Navy Cmdr. of each island will be responsible for the sounding of the air-defense alarms, which must be obeyed by all Army units. To expedite the transmission of air-defense signals, the Army units on each island must make arrangements with the Navy units.

As a general rule, the highest Navy Cmdr. will be responsible for the anti-air defense of civilians.

26. Although the Navy will take charge of the air defenses of the entire island, especially of air fields, the Army air-defense units, which are dispatched to some of the islands, will co-operate with the Navy air defense unit, protecting the island by the combined strength if possible under a single command.

27. Headquarters and important signal apparatus will be protected by strong parapets insuring their uninterrupted functions even under the fierce enemy bombings and shellings.

28. Air defense preparations will be classified as follows:

a. The First Stage of Preparadness.

When an enemy attack is quite certain, all guards will take up their positions, and complete preparations for repulsing the enemy.

b. The Second Stage of Preparadness.
When an enemy attack is expected, but is uncertain, the guards will be ready to take up their positions at a moment's notice, and the air defense units will complete their preparations.

c. The Third Stage of Preparedness.

When the situation is comparatively safe, the air defense units must be in readiness, leaving units (only a part) for guard. This is however only a general plan. Each sector group commander taking into consideration the present air defense regulations of the Navy units in each respective sector, will work out the details in accordance with the local situation.

The order for defensive preparations will be issued by the highest commander of all the Army and Navy units on each island (the area within an atoll including many small islands is considered as an island). He will be responsible for all defenses on island. As a rule, air defense preparations must be completely made one hour before dawn.

**SUPPLEMENTARY PAMPHLET:**

**THE OUTLINE OF FORTIFICATION AND INSTALLATION WORKS**


1. Coastal Defensive Positions.

   On those coastal fronts where the enemy could land without difficulty, independent strong points must be constructed along the coast at an interval of several hundred meters or as one kilometer. Each of these strong points must be manned by one Inf. Co. or a Pltn. Hy. Arty. located at these strong points will provide flank defense for the front area of the neighboring strong points covering at the same time the ground in intervals. L.M.G., Heavy grenade launchers and rifle fire will provide the intervals with final protective defense. If the enemy pressure be too strong, these small fire arms will give the final protective defense
by surrounding the strong points which will serve as a key position for our counter-attacks. Taking full advantage of local topography, the flank defense pill-boxes of the above-mentioned heavy artillery must be located at such places, as to provide them a self-protection against enemy planes and enemy naval guns. Considering also the constant changes in situation, several positions must be selected. To make stronger the key positions, the anti-tank trenches must be dug around these independent defense points.

b. If necessary, the posts for night observations and strong points for counter-attacks must be established in the intervals between the above-mentioned independent defense positions, not forgetting also the dummy pill-boxes designed to deceive the enemy and to divert his fire from our vital point.

c. In the rear of the coastal positions, taking advantage of the terrain, a second line must be constructed. These second lines will cover any partial collapse of the coastal positions, and will serve as a key position for the counter-attacks by the reserve units.

Organization of these second line positions will be constructed on the same principles as coastal positions, with many covers and strong gun (rifle) shelters. Heavy fire-arms must concentrate their rapid fire on the area between the coast and these second line positions. To facilitate our movements for the counter-attack, the roads must be repaired or newly constructed.

Many dummy positions and camouflage works must be put up in the area between the intervals and the second line positions in order to deceive the enemy and divert his fire power from our vital points.

d. On the coast front where enemy landings are restricted by cliffs and other obstacles, such as the state of the sea, etc., it is sufficient to place one platoon or even a squad, depending on a degree of landing difficulties and width of the sea front, to guard the beach. Depending on the situation, only observation personnel may be place on the coast, leaving the
main force in the rear where it can complete preparations for the advance to the shore in case of emergency. In this case many dummy positions must be constructed so as to mislead the enemy into thinking that this front is firmly guarded.

e. The artillery will concentrate its fire-power on the beach to destroy enemy boats and tanks. If a part of our coastal defense line collapses, the fire must be concentrated on this weak point. In order to check the advance of enemy ships and tanks, the guns must be placed mainly on the strategical points of the atoll on the coastal defense positions and in the second line positions. Taking advantage of the terrain, pill-boxes for flank defenses must be established at places which are completely protected from enemy Naval gun shellings and land attacks. Some fire-arms must be placed in the gun (rifle) shelters; in order to reduce our losses from enemy fire many positions must be established around gun shelters which could be easily reached by personnel in case of emergency. Also, dummy positions and false artillery emplacements must be constructed to mislead the enemy fire.

The guns which are covering the front positions must fire in rapid successions of short duration, changing their positions frequently.

f. Naval guns on land will be used for flank defenses and also for the coastal defense. They must be protected from enemy naval guns which might fire from the distance well outside of our fire range. Flank defense positions therefore must be established on such a terrain, that will provide concealment from enemy observation and especially from enemy naval guns. Some naval guns will be allotted a task of annihilation of enemy transports. The shelter and camouflage against air and sea attack must also be completely prepared for frontal fire positions covering wide areas on some special fronts.
If artillery emplacements were already established and are vulnerable from enemy bombings and shellings, they must be gradually reshaped and improved in accordance with the above-mentioned ideas of concealment.

g. Small mines must be hastily laid in the water and under the ground. After the positions being roughly completed, various beach and underwater obstructions must be installed. Taking advantage of the terrain, the anti-personnel and anti-tank obstructions must also be established around and between the intervals of positions.


Anti-aircraft guns and anti-aircraft cannons must be collectively used for the air defense of airfields, harbors and other important positions. Important air defensive positions must be equipped with such fire-arms as to enable them to cover the air from high to low altitude. These positions must also be located at places from which the support can be given to both the sea and land defenses. Many positions must be prepared for mobile arms, which will frequently change their firing positions to avoid losses from enemy fire.

As H.M.G. and L.M.G., designed to be used mainly for ground operations, will also be used against enemy airplanes flying at low altitude, they must be protected by anti-aircraft shelters near their ground combat positions.

3. Positions in the Rear (Final Strong Points).

Even under the worst situation, each sector unit must firmly hold its strategic points in order to prevent the enemy from using airfields, and eventually to defeat him with the counter-attacks by the rear units. If time allows the rear positions therefore must be strongly built and also completely equipped for the counter-attack.

In order to minimize the losses in our fighting strength, the following steps must be taken immediately to completely protect our personnel, ordnance, ammunition and provisions from the enemy's violent bombings and shellings.

a. To protect personnel dugouts (partly covered) sufficient to accommodate all personnel must be constructed and in addition, the roads and places where great numbers of men are concentrated, must be provided with the adequate slit trenches.

b. To protect the coastal positions and other positions exposed to the enemy fire and to avoid unnecessary losses, slit trenches with shelters must be constructed, taking advantage of the terrain and installations in the respective areas. During enemy bombings and shellings, mobile fire-arms must be placed in these slit trenches. Facilities for observation and movements must be completed, provided so that if the enemy lands the troops may be able to take up their position immediately.

c. Firearms, vehicles, machines and tools must be dispersed and stored and concealed at places which are sheltered from the enemy fire.

d. Two-thirds of the ammunition, provisions, fuel, clothes and other war materials must be stored in the main defensive positions leaving the remainder in the rear positions. For the time being these materials must be dispersed at places sheltered from the enemy fire. Concealed trenches and shelters must be gradually constructed to provide a more dependable protective shelter.

e. Not more than ten cubic meters of material must be concentrated at any one place. The distance between concentrations must be over 100 m in cases of ammunition and fuel. In case of other materials, the distance must be over 50 meters.

f. As the wooden houses are very easily destroyed or burned, the use of them must be avoided as much as possible. Even if these houses are temporarily used immediately upon our
landing, hasty measures must be taken to protect materials from the rain and moisture by scattering and properly storing the materials.

\textit{g. In scattering and storing the materials, considerations must be given to damp-proof measures and proper ventilation.}

\textbf{B. Standard of Fortifications.}

1. To make our defenses more secure and bearing in mind that we have to resist the enemy attacks on every position of our successive defensive lines, efforts must be made to construct many positions which must be several times the number prescribed by the general standard regulations for each respective strength of units. Fire-arms, shelters and other fortifications for each position will also be several times more powerful than is required by the usual standard. In addition, many dummy positions and installations must be constructed to deceive the enemy.

2. Improvised positions for coastal defenses must be simple and light for the time being. Our losses and damages must be reduced by dispersion and concealment. However, important points of our positions, such as, shelterings for flank defense fire-arms, concealments of guns (rifles) and command posts, must be built as strongly as possible.

3. In order to economize materials and conserve labor and at the same time to make the positions invulnerable, the fortification works must be carried out in accordance with the Field Fortification Manual, taking advantage of caves, cliffs and steep slopes to the utmost.

4. When the materials for permanent fortifications are available, shelters for important fire-arms, dug-outs, command posts and communication posts must be gradually strengthened. When the terrain and the composition of the ground permits, explosives must be used to break the rocks in which many caves are shelters must be rapidly built. Other instructions concerning permanent fortifications will be issued.
C. Outline of Engineering Works.

1. Immediately upon landing, each sector garrison will commence the works in its respective sector. Within a week, defensive positions along the coast and constructions to minimize our losses will be roughly completed. Within a month, field positions will be completed. Within two months invulnerable field positions, fortified with especially strong pill boxes will be completely established. Henceforth, these positions will be gradually strengthened until they finally become a complete stronghold. In order to concentrate all the strength on the construction of positions, the troops during this period will bivouac on the spot. As a general rule, no new living quarters will be built.

2. During construction, fortification officers will be assigned to each sector to arrange the general fortification plan, and to supervise the allotment of materials and maintenance of tools and equipment.

3. The methods of construction and the speed must be always arranged so that the troops may be constantly ready to confront the enemy.

4. In carrying on engineering works, efforts must be made to conceal the works from enemy aerial and sea observations. No trees will be cut down unnecessarily, and the roads and accumulations of materials will be thoroughly sheltered and camouflaged.

D. Fortification Materials.

Although the materials obtained from local sources must be used for fortifications, the special materials will be supplied from the outside. Instructions for the distribution of the special fortification materials will be issued separately.

E. Results of the Fortification must be inspected from the air and from the sea.

SUPPLEMENTARY SHEET NO. 1

OUTLINE OF THE UNIFICATION OF THE LAND DEFENSE TO BE CARRIED OUT BY THE CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA FLEET.
1. The 31st Army Cmdr. will be responsible for the coordination of the plans and preparations for the land defenses by the Army and Navy units in the 31st Army operation area. (Air defenses and aerial operations excluded).

2. The Sector Gp. Cmdr. will be responsible for the coordination of the plans and preparations for the land defenses by the Army and Navy units in their respective sectors, i.e., in the MARIANAS ISLANDS, the EASTERN CAROLINE ISLANDS (islands west of WOLEAI and west of PONAPE), the WESTERN CAROLINE ISLANDS (including YAP and ANGAUR), and the Ogasawara Islands.

3. The senior Army or Navy Cmdrs. (excluding the air defense unit cmdrs.) in each respective island will be responsible for the coordination and for the state of the land defenses in each island. The area within an atoll including many small islands will be considered as an island.

4. "Land defense" means the preparations for land combat, short range battery emplacements and other accompanying activities (disposition of troops, fortifications, construction of obstructions, observation and communication) excluding air defenses and activities of the air forces.

TRANSPORT AND SUPPLIES

1. The Army will be responsible for the dispatching and transportation of the 31st Army (including war and other materials—sufficient to provide troops for three months—which will be carried together with the troops). The Navy will take charge of the subsequent transportations of the war materials and other supplies and replacements from the home, and the transportation of the wounded and sick back to homeland.

The Navy will be responsible for loading, unloading, and transportation of war materials, but the Army however must provide the necessary facilities to support the Navy. (The transport convoys of Army units will be accompanied by motor boats and
marine personnel. Anchorage Hq. will be established at important ports and bays).

The unloading operations will be carried out by the entire strength of Army and Navy Unloading Units.

The Navy will take charge of supply of the war materials and other requirements of the Army.

However, ordnance (except fuel), clothes and some other war materials for exclusive Army use will be maintained by the Army itself. The land transport for the 31st Army, and the supplies for the Ogasawara Sector Op. will be carried out by the Army.

However, on those islands where Army supply facilities are not available, the Navy will take charge of the land supplies.

2. Outline of the supply system of the 31st Army is shown in the appended table.

COMMUNICATIONS

1. Communication among the Army units, between the 31st Army Hq. and the Army Sect. of the Imp. C.H.Q. or with other neighboring Army units will be carried out not only by the Army communication system but also by that of the Navy. However, when communication installations are damaged, the Army and Navy will loan and borrow each others. They will also use the communication facilities of the SOUTH SEAS Government Office.

2. Signal regulations will be carried out according to the order of the Combined Fleet Cmdr. or the Area Fleet Cmdr.

3. Army units will exchange information with each other.

4. The Navy units will loan such facilities as signal apparatus and airplanes to Army units when the Army is in need of them for the transmission of orders and other messages.

5. The Army code will be used for the communication between Army units and within an Army unit.

For the communication between the Army and Navy, the Navy code will be used. The Army code will be used under direct instructions from the Army Sect. of the Imp. C.H.Q.
6. Military mail matters of the Army unit will be managed by the Navy military mail facilities.

BILLETING, FORTIFICATIONS AND MEDICAL SERVICE

1. The Navy units will provide the Army units with such facilities as living quarters, billet materials (which could not be supplied from JAPAN Proper), and fortification materials.

2. Whenever the Army medical facilities are insufficient or its hospitals overcrowded, the Army patients will be accommodated by the Navy medical institutions. In those cases, the Army units will dispatch necessary medical personnel for reinforcing the Navy personnel.

REQUISITIONING OF LOCAL RESOURCES

Labors and resources of each island will be controlled by the Army or Navy senior Omdr. or a man designated by him.

For the time being, requisitions must be made in accordance with the corresponding regulations and carried out by voluntary cooperation between Army officers and local inhabitants.
OUTLINE OF THE SUPPLY SYSTEM FOR THE ARMY UNITS IN THE CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA

**Corresponding Superintendent's Office (War Dept.)**

**Army Section of the I.A. G.H.Q., Inspector Gen. of Transportation**

War materials needed by Army

**Navy Dept.**

**Naval District (chiefly YOKOSUKA), Intendance Sect., Transport Sect., Hospital**

**CENTRAL PACIFIC**

Supply Facilities

**31st Army Hq.**

Army units under the command of the 31st Army

**The 4th Fleet**

Army units directly controlled by the Area Fleet

Army units under the command of the 4th Fleet

**REMINDERS:**

1. Plans for war materials, transportation will be made at the transportation conference provided by the Navy Transport Hq.
2. Requests for the GUASAWANA Sector supplies will be made directly to the Army Section of Imp. G.H.Q., by the 31st Army, which will be responsible for the handling and delivery.

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Requisition for supplies

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Transportation

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Appended Table No. 2 (Cont'd)
PLAN FOR THE DISPOSITION OF THE 51st ARMY TROOPS (APRIL 1944)
NOTE:
1. In addition to these units heavy artillery units will be dispatched to the MARIANAS and TRUK Sectors.
2. The Anchorage Hq. has dispatched the necessary strength to each island according to the order of each Sector Group Gmt.
3. The 51st Army permanent signal unit will be responsible for the communication between SAIPAN and the units under the direct command of the Army.
Chapter IV. Operations in the GENERAL PACIFIC Area from the Spring to the Summer of 1944.

A. Deployment of the Main Force of the 31st Army.

1. Capturing ENIWETOK (BROWN) ISLAND in the MARSHALL ISLANDS area in the end of February, and Occupying the ADMIRALTY Area.

The enemy in order to support his operations in the PHILIPPINES was expected to transfer his activities into the CENTRAL PACIFIC Area pushing from SOLOMON ISLANDS via northern coast of NEW GUINEA. There were also indications that these operations were aimed at TOKYO as the final enemy objective.

The general war situation in the CENTRAL PACIFIC at that time was growing tense through the following enemy actions.

a. At the end of March, an enemy task force with ten aircraft carriers and eight battleships as its main body raided the PALAU and MAREYON (WOLEAIL) ISLANDS in the PALAU area.

b. From 30 April to 1 May, an enemy task force consisting of several groups, with two to four aircraft carriers as its main body, heavily bombed our air base installations in this area.

c. Our operation base in the CENTRAL PACIFIC, TRUK ISLAND had been exposed to the daily enemy air raids from ENIWETOK (BROWN) and ADMIRALTY Areas. These actions indicated that the enemy was attempting to neutralise our bases.

2. Under the above-mentioned circumstance, all units under the command of the Army were ordered to speed up their deployment. During the period from March to May, the major portion of our line units sustaining some losses due to the enemy submarine warfare, arrived at their respective assigned islands, and roughly completed the deployment as planned.

3. The major portion of the units, under the command of the Army, was extracted from the forces stationed in MANCHURIA and KOREA. With the object to improve the command and to achieve better unity of the troops, the Army after the completion of the deployment reorganized into six independent mixed brigades (from the 47th to the 52nd Brig.) and into five independent mixed regiments (from the 9th to the 13th Regt.). To facilitate the defenses and supply of the MAREYON ISLAND (P.E.I) Unit this unit was on 4 May removed from the command of the TRUK Dist. Op. Cdr. and placed under the direct command of the Army.
B. Operations Around the SAIPAN ISLAND.

Refer to Sketch No. 1.

Note: Our records in relation to the battles in the MARIANAS Area, with the SAIPAN ISLAND as the center are incomplete, because up to the present we have no repatriated witnesses from that area.

1. General Situation Before the Operation.

The AMERICAN CENTRAL PACIFIC Area Force under the command of HINZIG appeared to have pushed their bases to the MAJURO, EWAJALEH, and KANWEKOK (BROWN) ISLANDS against little opposition from our Naval air forces. Since April the TRUK ISLAND in the SOUTH EASTERN Area was losing its value as our operation base, due to the daily enemy air raids which ensued since the completion of enemy air base in the ADMIRALTY ISLANDS. Moreover, judging by the facts that NIKAMITORI ISLAND on 20 and 21 May and on 24 May the GUAN ISLAND were the objects of enemy task force raids it was concluded that the commencement of enemy actions against the MARIANAS and PALAU Areas became a matter of days.

a. The Army had roughly completed the deployment of the front line unit, but the defense units in every sector were still devoting themselves to the construction of positions. In the MARIANAS Sector, due to its deficiency of transportation and landing facilities, the NORTHERN and SOUTHERN Sector Gp. units were in confusion with their deployment not yet achieved. Consequently, the construction of defense positions there was being delayed comparing with that in the CAROLINES Sector.

b. The outline of the strength of our armed forces in the SAIPAN Sector during that period was as follows:

The 31st Army Hq. (The Army Cmdr. and the senior staff officers in charge of operations and communication as well as the chiefs of all other sections, were, during the period from the end of May to the beginning of June, in PALAU ISLAND where they all were engaged in supervising the operation preparations in that area). The 43rd Div. (less one Bn.) actual strength due to the losses enroute was approximately equivalent to five Battalions.


The 1st Indep. Garrisons Transport and other units.
Total strength approx. 27,000 men.

2. Outline of the Operations.

a. Battles before the Enemy Landing (from 23 May to 15 June).

On 22 May 1944, about 10 large enemy airplanes raided the SAIPAN ISLAND for the first time and then raids continued on the 29th with nine airplanes and on the 30th with twelve airplanes, which bombed the airfields and harbor installations. Our losses were negligible.

On 11 June, a powerful enemy task force consisting of several groups (each group included two to three aircraft carriers and three to four battleships or cruisers as the main body) appeared in the offing, about 170 miles east of GUAM. This task force launched the following raids against the island:

From 1250 to 1550 of the same day, with about 190 carrier-based airplanes; on the 12th from 0400 to 1200, four times with approximately 500 airplanes in all; and on the 13th, from 0400 to 0600, twice with approximately 200 airplanes in all.

These attacks were directed mainly against our airfields, harbor installations, factories and positions. We suffered some losses in personnel, ordnance equipment, and armaments. However 70 to 80 enemy airplanes were brought down by our land units. Also on the 11th, 140 airplanes raided TINIAN ISLAND, and 130 airplanes raided GUAM.

On 13 June, at 0930, the enemy force consisting of eight battleships, three cruisers, and 30 destroyers appeared in the offing, off the west coast of the SAIPAN ISLAND, and began to shell our Naval gun emplacements, anti-aircraft gun emplacements and main buildings; the bombardment continued until 1630.

As a result, the major portion of the city was burned down, though our losses in personnel and material were slight. The enemy continued occasional bombardments during the night, as well. Early in the morning, on 14 June, approximately 30 enemy ships, including battleships, intensified the bombardment while the enemy airplanes strafed our airfields and defensive installations. Besides, the enemy, dispatching a boat, attempted to reconnoitre the reef in front of OLMAI, preparing evidently for a landing operation.

b. Battles on the Beaches (from 15 to 17 June).

1). Situations of the Enemy Landing.

On 15 June at 0450, an enemy convoy consisting from 25 to 40
large transports appeared in the offing west of GARAPAE while the fleet continued uninterrupted shelling which started on the previous day.

At 0600, the enemy landing craft began the landing operation at a point about six and quarter miles off the coast by storming the OLEAI and CHARANKANO sectors in the following orders:

- The 1st Wave (0740) 120 Landing Barges (including ALLIGATORS).
- The 2nd Wave (0840) 36 Landing Barges.
- The 3rd Wave (0900) 25 " "
- The 4th Wave (1030) 15 " "

After effecting the above landings, the enemy gradually transported its troops from the reef to the shore.

2). Defense Against the Landing.

In the ensuing battle around the sea shore, our units in that sector set on fire many ALLIGATORS by shell fire and in close quarter combat. Our airplanes attacked the enemy ships and succeeded in sinking one battleship and destroyer, and setting fire to two destroyers. However, in the afternoon, the enemy finally secured a bridgehead two and half miles wide and one third of a mile deep in the sector between OLEAI and CHARANKANO. Its strength was estimated to be approximately two divisions.

Our units attempted to annihilate the bridgehead by attacking it from dusk with its entire strength, but being hindered by enemy tanks and Naval shell fire, did not succeed in their attempt.

3). Counter-attacks by the 43rd Div.

On 16 June, the enemy continued the shelling throughout the day and by intensifying its air raids, carried on the landing on the shore west of CHARANKANO under aerial protection. In the meantime, about ten more large transports arrived in the western offing of OLEAI.

From 1700, the 43rd Div. launched an all-out counter-attack against the enemy which had established a foothold at OLEAI. The main force of the division (two Inf. Bn. and one "8" Inf. Regt.) assaulted the enemy from the area east of OLEAI and one infantry battalion from the south of GARAPAE. On the 17th, they seemed to have broken through the enemy lines from the vicinity of the OLEAI South-western Radio Station, and being reinforced with one reserve infantry battalion, they appeared to have exploiting their initial success, pushed toward the SUSUFE POINT.
The information concerning their following actions, however, has not been yet received.

The counter-attack from the CARAPAN Sector by one battalion of the 36th Inf. Regt. was unsuccessful.

b. Reinforcements from the Other Islands.

On the night of the 16th, the Army ordered the 39th Div. on GUAM ISLAND, to dispatch by sea, approx. one battalion to the SAIPAN ISLAND. On 18 June, the Army also ordered, by telegram, the 52nd Div. on TUNIC ISLAND, to transfer about two battalions to SAIPAN ISLAND.

At 1730, of 21 June, two infantry companies of the 39th Div., under the command of Maj. YUKISHA (equipped with four M.G.'s, two Mt. Arty Guns, one A.T. Gun and six L.N.G.'s) left GUAM ISLAND for ROTA ISLAND in six boats and two small landing barges. They arrived at ROTA ISLAND at 0000 of the 22nd, but being intercepted by the enemy, were unable to land on SAIPAN ISLAND.

Reinforcements from the 52nd Div., due to the lack of transport facilities, did not arrive.

c. Particulars of the "AN" Operation.

At the beginning of May, the Imp. Eq. prepared an operation plan which was called the "AN" Operation Plan, which was based upon the supposition that the enemy in order to cut our communication line between the HOMELAND and the SOUTHERN Armies, will, challenging our fleet, endeavor to penetrate our defense lines and by launching two main coordinated offensives - one under command of NIMITZ and another under command of MAC ARTHUR - will strive to recapture the PHILIPPINES. That was that the Eq. considered the main purpose of the enemy's strategical and political warfaras.

It was further considered that the four main groups of island in the CAROLINE ISLANDS, especially PALAU and YAP ISLANDS, being the main obstacles in the path of enemy's advance in the CENTRAL PACIFIC, would be the chief objects of enemy's new operations. The invasion of the BONIN ISLANDS was thought less probable.

Based upon the above-mentioned suppositions and in order to retrieve the present fortunes of the war the Imp. Army and Navy, especially the latter, made up their minds to one-stroke to destroy the enemy's superior power against which each one of our groups separately could be easily overcome, one by one.
It was decided that the Navy must assemble its entire strength and, in one main counter-attack, deliver a telling blow to the enemy task force, frustrating thus the enemy's all-out push, and diverting his aggression to our other fronts.

In the end of May, therefore, the 1st Air Fleet base air unit which had just completed its requirement and the 1st Task Force (with air-craft
carriers as its main body) were ordered to push their preparations for a decisive engagement with the enemy task force in the seas around PALAU, PHILIPPINES, and DUTCH EAST INDIES north of AUSTRALIA.

In the middle of June, however, the enemy invasion troops backed by a powerful task force landed on SAIPAN ISLAND, rendering our "AN" Operation Plan unworkable. Although confronted with great difficulties in carrying out subsequent operations, especially that of the base air units it was considered, however, that leaving the SAIPAN Area to the enemy would further aggravate JAPAN's future operations and so, it was decided to launch a counter-attack against the enemy around SAIPAN ISLAND. This venture, however, ended in failure with a large number of casualties. The defense of SAIPAN ISLAND after that became hopeless.

d. Battles Around MOUNT TAPOTCHAU (from 18 to 27 June.)

1). Plan of the Army on 18 June.

In order to readjust the present front lines and to prepare for subsequent battles, the 43rd Div. must be assembled in the sector on the east side of MOUNT TAPOTCHAU, while the other units (two Bn.'s of the 135th Inf. Regt., one Mixed Bn. and Naval Units) in the sector on the east side of GARAPAN. By occupying the positions between the southern part of GARAPAN and RAURAU BAY via the southern foot of MOUNT TAPOTCHAU, the BANADHERU Airfield could be protected by our forces. As the ASHITO Airfield is outside of our gun fire range, a small unit secretly dispatched there will be sufficient to impede the use of airfield by the enemy.

2). Readjustment of the Battle Lines and the Attempt to Crush the Enemy Preparation for its Further Advance.

While dispatching small parties to hinder the forward movement of the enemy to prevent him from using the airfield, the Army by the 20th, re-assigned its units to our main positions between the southern edge of GARAPAN, WHITE CLIFF, the EAST 230 METERS HILL, the 288 METERS HILL and the beach, 10 5/8 KILOMETERS west of RAURAU. The enemy by that time had advanced within one third to one mile from our front lines.

Outline of our strength at that time was as follows:

a). Personnel.

The 43rd Div. - Approx. four and a half Inf. Bn's. and One Arty. Bn.
The 47th Mixed Brig. – Approx. one half of an Inf. Bn.
The others: One Inf. Bn., two Tk. Co., one A.A. Co.
b) Equipment.
12 field guns; six anti-aircraft guns; five machine cannons;
27 tanks; nine large landing barges; two small landing
barges and 20 folding boats.
c) Provisions (expressed in terms of 10,000 men days).
Staple food - 120, subsidiary food - 150, condiments - 130,
The Navy's provision 200.
d) Ammunition (expressed in terms of one engagement-
one division)
For rifles and machine guns - 0.1.
For mountain artillery, field arty. and anti-tank guns - 0.2.
For heavy grenade throwers - 0.2.
For infantry guns and mortars - 0.1.
Hand grenades - 0.1.

3) Status of the Enemy Preparations for the Coming Attacks.

On 19 June, the enemy had constructed 364 positions between
the 32.7 METERS HILL, five-eighths mile south of CARAPAN; a hill of 500 meters
elevation, west of the 230.5 METERS HILL; ridges five-eighths mile south of the
230.5 METERS HILL; and the 151 METERS HILL.

On the OLEMAI Airfield, three small airplanes were observed.

On 20 June, the enemy laid down heavy fire barrage against
MOUNT KAFUTAN and hills in the western region of TSUTSURAN. For a day or two,
owing to our actions, in accordance with "AH" Operation Plan, raids by the enemy
carrier based airplanes were comparatively light, but the severity of the Naval
shelling did not diminish in the least.

4) Our Defensive Battles.

From 21 June, the enemy resumed the advance and captured the
163 METERS HILL in the west side of TSUTSURAN.

Early in the morning on 22 June, approximately two enemy companies
advanced to the area west of the 235 METERS HILL, which lies at the southern foot
of MOUNT TAPOTCHAU, and four or five enemy tanks approached our positions in the
RAURAU BAY Area.

The enemy in the vicinity of the 230 METERS HILL attacked our
position at the east side of that hill, but was repulsed.

The enemy at the southern portion of the 233 METERS HILL,
accompanied by tanks, gradually infiltrated our positions through the gaps between our pill-boxes. During the night of that day, our positions in the hill east of the 230 METERS HILL, and in the 285 and 343 METERS HILLS, were assailed, each by approximately one company, but we repulsed the enemy.

On the same day, 21 GRUMMAN airplanes occupied the AMBITO Airfield. On 23 June, the battles in the vicinity of MOUNT TAPOTCHAU were gradually intensified. On 24 June, at the front of the 43rd Div., the enemy by infiltrating the gaps in our positions advanced to the south-eastern foot of MOUNT TAPOTCHAU and to the vicinity of CHAGHA. In the WESTERN BEACH Area, backed by heavy shell fire and bombing attacks, the enemy pushed their front to the line connecting the 300 METERS HILL, east of the southern edge of GARAFAN, and the 345 METERS HILL, five-eighths mile west of MOUNT TAPOTCHAU.

Meanwhile, our units in night attacks by small parties and in close-quarter combat were inflicting a heavy loss on the enemy. On 25 June, one or two enemy infantry companies accompanied by tanks penetrated our positions, reaching the line running through the 1,500 METERS HILL, west of MOUNT TAPOTCHAU and the 343 METERS HILL, and the highland of 700 meters elevation which stands north of the 269 METERS HILL. In the CHAGHA Area, the enemy force of about three hundred infantry supported by ten tanks pushed towards DONNII.

On 26 June, from early morning, about two enemy battalions supported by heavy shell fire, stormed our positions on MOUNT TAPOTCHAU. In a severe fight around the summit of that mountain, our unit of comparatively small strength, in spite of all efforts to defend that mountain, was overpowered in the evening of that day, and the mountain was occupied by the enemy.

On that night, our front line units tried to recapture the mountain, but failed.

6. Battles in the Vicinities of TANAPAG and TOROHOD (from 28 June to 5 July.)

1). Intention of the Army on 27 June.

The Army issued the order stressing the points that, our present front lines must hold out as long as possible inflicting on enemy the greatest loss possible and that the line connecting TANAPAG, the 221 METERS HILL and TOROHOD will be our last line of resistance.

2). War Situation on 26 June.

The enemy attacks supported by the air and sea forces were
increasingly intensified. Especially violent fighting took place in the vicinities of MOUNT TAPOTOPAU, the hills northwest of CHAGHA and the hill west of DONHI.

On 26 June, our units were fighting violently in the following positions:

The 118th Inf. Bngt. (approx. 50 men) on the eastern slope of the 545 METERS HILL.
One Co. of the 118th Inf. Bngt. (approx. 50 men) on the 368 METERS HILL.
Approx. 50 men of the 118th Inf. Bngt. on the hill north of 286 METERS HILL.
The main force of the 47th Indep. Mixed Brig. (approx. 200 men) and the 9th Tk. Bngt. (approx. 100 men) in the CHAGHA West-Plain.

From 26 June to 1 July, our units holding out the positions were so pressed for provisions that they even ate field grass and tree bark.

Due to the enemy Naval gun fire, and mortar shelling supplemented by the air raids, our losses in personnel increasingly grew so numerous that our positions in CARAPAN, MOUNT TAPOTOPAU, and in the western part of DONHI finally became untenable against the enemy's infiltration tactics.

3). Readjustment of Positions.

With the intention of making a last ditch stand on the line between TANAPAC, the northern area of MOUNT RADIO (T.17), and the northern district of TOROHORO, the Army on the night of 2 July evacuated the present front and during the next day, disposed its units on the position between the northern district of TANAPAC, the northern side of the 221 METERS HILL and the highland south-west of KARABERA. The enemy noticed our withdrawal rather slowly in our right sector, but in the central sector he advanced so swiftly that on the evening of the 3rd, approximately one hundred and fifty enemy troops advanced as far as the 221 METERS HILL.

On 4 June, in spite of our opposition in a confused close combat battle, the enemy infiltrated our positions in the area to the west side of the 221 METERS HILL.

f. The General Counter-attack.

On 5 July, the Army decided to launch an all-out final counterattack with its entire strength.

At 0330 on the 7th, the Supreme Commander led the attack against CHARANKEWA. With the failure of their suicidal counter-attack, our systematic defense on SAIPAN ISLAND seemed to have come to an end.

º Operations Around GUAM ISLAND.
APPENDED MAP NO. 1
COURSE OF SAIPAN OPERATIONS
15 JUNE TO BEGINNING OF JULY

(TO BE INSERTED HERE)
COURSE OF SAIPAN OPERATIONS
15 JUNE TO BEGINNING OF JULY

APPENDED MAP NO. 1

[Map of Saipan with various military units and locations marked, including KEY notes on the right side.]
(Refer to the Sketch No. 2).

Note: Because of the scarcity of sepatriates and the scarcity of data for the
battles in that area, the reliability of this report cannot be guaranteed.

1. General Situation before the Operation.

   a. After the first enemy air raid on GUAM ISLAND in the end of
      April 1944, the general situation in the CENTRAL PACIFIC became increasingly
      critical. On 11 June, GUAM and SAIPAN ISLANDS were each attacked by an enemy
      task forces.

      Since the capture of SAIPAN ISLAND, the enemy fleet remained in
      the MARIANAS SEA area launching daily air raids in cooperation with the
      Naval bombardments. The enemy appeared to be building up its strength.

   b. At that time, the Cdr. of the 31st Army and his two senior
      staff officers in charge of operations and communications, having failed to
      return to SAIPAN ISLAND, remained at GUAM ISLAND where our units under Army
      direct command, in anticipation of the impending enemy invasion, were doing their
      utmost to constructing defensive positions. The units at that time were:

      29th Div.; 48th Indep. Mixed Brig.; 10th Indep. Mixed Regt.; 52nd
      A.A.A. En.; 265th Motor Transp.

      The Navy: The 1st Air Fleet; the 56th Guard Unit.

2. Outline of Operations.

   a. Battles before the Enemy Landing.

   (from the end of June to 20 July).

   Towards the end of June, simultaneous with the attacks on SAIPAN
   ISLAND, the enemy attacks against GUAM ISLAND from the air and sea were gradually
   intensified. On 26 June, approximately 150 shells from Naval guns were discharge
   to the island. The enemy bombing and shelling from 1 to 20 June were consider-
   ably increased as shown in the following diagram:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Bombers</th>
<th>Naval Shelling</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the beginning of June</td>
<td>ten airplanes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the middle and end of June</td>
<td>2,500 airplanes</td>
<td>2,800 shells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the beginning of July</td>
<td>900 airplanes</td>
<td>2,700 shells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the middle of July</td>
<td>1,280 airplanes</td>
<td>6,000 shells</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   The Naval shellings were directed mainly on owners positions in the
   vicinity of AKASHI BAY, while the airplanes strafed mainly, ours equipment on the
   beach and in the town.

   Since 14 July, the enemy carried out occasional reconnaissance with
   mine sweepers and small boats, approaching as close as five-eighths of a mile to the
Throughout the night of 10 July, the small enemy vessels fired with guns and machine guns on our positions in the AKASHI and SHOWA BAY Areas. During the day time of the 19th, the enemy fleet, under cover of smoke screen, concentrated its bombardments on the AKASHI and MHIARASHI HILL Districts, disclosing its intention to start landing operations in those areas.

By strengthening the fortifications in the face of incessant enemy Naval bombardments, all our garrison units had completed their preparations against any enemy attempts at any time.

b. Battles Around the Seashore. (from 21 to 24 July).

a). At 0530 of 21 July, an enemy force of 63 transports and 30 warships, including battleships, appeared in the offing of AKASHI BAY, and of SHOWA BAY. In the AKASHI BAY Area, at 0555, the enemy Naval force launched approximately 200 landing barges and 150 ALLIGATORS, in the offing seven and one half miles off shore facing area between ASANA and MIHARASHI POINT. At 0600, in the SHOWA BAY Area, the enemy launched more than 100 landing barges and also commenced a landing operation. Landings at both places were backed up by heavy bombing and shell fire. Although our units from beach positions resisted the enemy landings, the enemy by 1400, after repeated waves of landings, finally succeeded in advancing to the point half way to MOUNT ARITA in the SHOWA Area and from ASANA POINT to the northern side of MOUNT HONDA in the AKASHI Area.

By the evening of that day, the enemy landed approximately two divisions. That night, while the enemy was securing the bridgeheads, the main force of the 29th Div. unsuccessfully counter-attacked both landing points. We suffered great casualties especially in SHOWA Area where we have lost a regimental commander.

From 23 to 24 July, by employing close-quarter combat tactics by small parties in small parties in SHOBEACH, we again launched counter-attacks against the enemy bridgeheads in the AKASHI and SHOWA Area, but achieved very little change in the general situation.

c. Our Offensive (from 25 to 26 July).

Considering that by continuing the above mentioned holding out tactics he will not be accomplishing his mission, the Chief of the Army decided by the all-out counter-attack to solve the issue of the battle at a single stroke by an all-out COUNTERATTACK.

On the night of the 25th, the main force of the 30th Div., a tank unit, and the Naval land combat unit (approx. 1,000 men) commenced the counter-
attack against the bridgehead of the AMERICAN forces at the northern side of MOUNT HONDA. This venture, however, being met by the enemy's superior naval fire-power and fire from the bridgehead, ended in disaster, in which the major part of our officers above En. Omdr. rank (including the Omdr. of the 29th Div.) were killed. The naval land combat unit lost approximately 200 men, including its commanding officer.

d. Rearrangement of the Fighting Lines (from 27 to 29 July).

The remnant of the small number of troops, which did not participate in the counter-attack on the morning of the 28th, on the old positions. On the following morning, backed by heavy bombing and shelling, stormed with tanks in the vanguard our entire front, and forced our troops to abandon the high lands southwest and south of MOUNT HONDA. After that, the Omdr. of the Army ordered our entire force to evacuate the positions in the vicinity of MOUNT HONDA on the night of 28th, and reassembling all the remaining units in the vicinity of ORIDA decided to make another stand. The entire strength under the command of the Army on the ORDISH, was as follows:

- The Army, approx. 1,000 men.
- The Naval land combat unit, approx. 800 men.
- The Tank Unit of the 29th Div.
- The Arty. Unit of the of the 45th Indep. Mixed Brig. (six Art. guns).
- The others, approx. 2,300 men.

In the light of the general situation, the Imp. Hq. being unable to re-inforce the Army in the MARIANAS Area, immediately ordered the commander to hold out as long as possible.

e. Protracted Struggle in the NORTHERN Sector. (from 30 July to 10 Aug.)

1). Situation from 30 to 31 July.

On 30 July, the enemy concentrated the bombing and shelling in the vicinity of HIBARUSKA, repeatedly reconnoitering the adjacent forests from low flying airplanes. The Army reorganized its line concentrating its main force in the Mt. Saba area and and the Army C & O determined its main force in the Mt. Saba area and Mt. Saba as the site of the last stand. After the Army concentrated its main force in the vicinity of TANABARA, the Omdr. of the Army decided that MOUNT TANABARA went to the last.

Defensive left to the vicinity of IPAPAO for organizing the reassembly of the enemy's units for the subsequent operations. He himself went to IPAPAO to command the forces.

On 31 July, our tank unit destroyed about one company of enemy infantry in the vicinity of OLDEKUUT. Considering the general adverse situation, the command of the unit was quite satisfactory. By the daybreak on the 31st, the Right Sector Unit was deployed in the HIBARUSKA Vicinity, and the Left Sector...
Unit, in the south-western foot of MOUNT HABUTA.

2). Situation from 1 to 4 Aug.

On 1 Aug., the enemy front line unit supported by furious bombing and Naval gun fire in the vicinities of MOUNT HIRATSUKA and MATAGUAC advanced to the southern district of ODEBEUT (T.N.?; and to the vicinity of the airfield.

The enemy air force seeking out our units in the daylight hours in the forest, bombed and strafed even a single soldier. During the night, the enemy Naval units attempting to cut our communications were shelling our position from all points of the island, impeding thus our operation activities to a great extent.

During the period from 2 to 4 Aug., a ten tanks and approx. 500 infantry troops of the enemy attacked the HIRATSUKA and the SOLMICH (T.N.?; Area; another force of approx. 200 infantry troops, supported by five tanks, attacked the HABUTA Area. Both attacks were repulsed by our units' superior fighting.

3). Our defensive strength in the vicinity of MOUNT TAKAHARA towards 4 Aug., was as follows:

The Army 1,500 men.
The Navy 1,000 men.
The others 2,500 men.
Seven guns, 10 medium tanks and three light tanks.

4). Situations from 5 to 9 Aug.

Using guerrilla tactics, our forces fought the enemy by infiltrating his positions, whereas the enemy, with bombers and superior fire power at his disposal, was able to advance steadily.

On 7 Aug., with the MOUNT MATAKI position being overrun by an enemy force of approximately 200 men supported by tanks, with our positions in the vicinity of TAKAHARA being shelled by concentrated mortar fire, and our strength being considerably weakened, the entire battle-field presented a confused fighting on the broken front lines.

On the 10th, all our communication means were destroyed and our organized resistance on GUAM ISLAND was considered to have come to an end.

D. Operations on TINIAN ISLAND.

(Refer to the Sketch No. 3).

1. General Situation Before the Operation.
COURSE OF GUAM ISLAND OPERATION

(10 OCTOBER)

(INsert MAP)

See map on p. 52.
NOTE: Many imperfections in this translation have not been corrected by me. — T. Will

In June 1944, the enemy in the MARSHALL and CAROLINE Areas became more active. On 11 June, TINIAN ISLAND, as well as SAIPAN and GUAN ISLANDS were raided by an enemy task force.

In the end of June, the enemy which had landed on SAIPAN ISLAND commenced shelling the TINIAN Airfield with heavy artillery from POINT AGINGAN.

b. At that time, the Army unit at TINIAN ISLAND preparing for the eventual enemy landing waited by strengthening its defense fortifications.

Our strength on the island, then consisted of the main force of the 50th Inf. Regt. and one Bn. of the 43rd Div., both units under the command of the commanding officer of the 50th Inf. Regt.

2. Outline of the Operations.

a. Battles Before the Enemy Landing.

(from the end of June to 23 July).

The enemy bombings and Naval bombardments of TINIAN ISLAND, from the end of June till the middle of July, were furiously carried out simultaneously with the attacks on SAIPAN ISLAND as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Bombing</th>
<th>Naval Guns and Heavy Artillery Firing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In the end of June</td>
<td>by 2,000 airplanes</td>
<td>6,000 shells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the beginning of July</td>
<td>by 8,60 airplanes</td>
<td>2,600 shells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the middle of July</td>
<td>by 400 airplanes</td>
<td>800 shells</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Since 20 July after the beginning of the landing operation on GUAN ISLAND, the bombings and shelling of TINIAN were considerably intensified.

In the afternoon of 22 July, two large enemy landing barges approached the reefs in the TINIAN HARBOR area, and opening mommy and sweet silence, carried out a reconnaissance while firing.

During this period, in spite of the daily attacks from the sea and the air, we were able to achieve a fair results in dodging enemy airplanes.

b. Battles Around the Sea-Shore, Water's edge.

(from 23 to 24 July.)

From 0550 of 23 July, after bombarding our positions on the beach for several hours from four battleships, two cruisers, and seven destroyers, the enemy attempted a landing in the vicinity of TINIAN HARBOR from seven transports, but being met by heavy fire from our Naval batteries, turned back.

At 0445, 24 July, an enemy Naval force of one battleship, one cruiser, six destroyers, seven transports, and two large landing barges were preparing for the landing in the vicinity south-west of the TINIAN HARBOR. From 0540, the enemy bombings and bombardment were greatly intensified and the
western part of the island was covered with smoke screens.

At 0600, more than 100 enemy landing barge moved towards the
TINIAN HARBOR Area, but were repulsed.

At 0730, approx. 150 enemy landing barge attacked the 0-8 air
field in the west-northwest of the beach, but was again frustrated from landing there.

About 0830, approx. 1045, the enemy again attempted to move to land in the
TINIAN HARBOR Area, but was again repulsed in a heavy fight.

However, in the north-western sector at about 0800, the
enemy succeeded in landing a part of forces with tanks on the west beach of
WEST NAPOI (T.N.1), and invaded the 1st and 3rd Airfields. and landing operations
were commenced here.

Despite dauntless efforts of our men, the
enemy by 1600 had succeeded in disembarking approx. three battalions and ten tanks.

Our garrison fighting bravely since the morning of the 23rd, repeated
counter-attacks with its entire strength, the enemy bridgehead in the north-
western sector, but due to our inferiority, agreed to check the enemy.

c. Battles Around the Transmitting Station.
(from 25 to 28 July).

With the failure in obliterating the enemy landing and in
annihilating them immediately after their demonstration, the commander of the
50th Bngt. decided to check the enemy at concentrations between the Transmitting
Station and GURHAN POINT and redispersed his units accordingly.

Since the 25th, by reinforcing its strength with more barge
from the SAIPAN Area, the enemy enlarged 800 and at 27 July, with
numerous tanks in the vanguard stormed the Transmitting Station vicinity from
Our units in that district being superior in strength throughout almost to check
the enemy's advance, but on the 28th, the position was finally overrun by
the enemy.

d. Battles Around MOUNT CAROLINUS, (T.N.1)
(from 29 July to 3 Aug.).

On 30 July, the enemy was the front of our main positions, and
being supported by furious bombing and bombardment, gradually exerted such
a great pressure on our positions that our situation grew daily more hopeless.
APPENDED MAP NO. 3

COURSE OF TINIAN OPERATIONS

(TO BE INSERTED HERE)
On 3 August the regiment determined to assemble
his main forces and conduct a final attack. That might be accomplished
shortly for the time and they remained approximately 300 men
in force commanded by a regimental commander number about 300 men.
On 4 August the main forces were assembled in a forest and
and attacked in an early afternoon. All appeared to have died, and here
the main force continued in a forest until 1400 when the attack was sustained. It changed
organized combat on Tinian, came to an end.

F. Situation in the MARSHALL and CAROLINE Areas.

1. Our units stationed on WAKE, KUSAIE and MARSHALL ISLANDS, under the
command of the 4th Fleet Cdr., were assigned the tasks of strengthening the
local defenses and of suppressing the daily furious raids by the enemy airplanes.

2. Our units in the area between PONAPE ISLAND and PULUWAT were under
the command of the commanding officer of the TRUK Area Group. These units were
trying their utmost in strengthening the defenses, together with suppressing the
raids of the enemy airplanes.

3. ABRAHAM ISLAND [WOLEAI].

Our units on ABRAHAM ISLAND (WOLEAI) endeavoring to maintain the air-
base there and to strengthen the ground defense fortifications, defended the island
until the termination of the war despite enemy air-raids and having no supplies
whatever from the Homeland.

4. The PALAU Area.

a. On 19 July, the Army, in the light of the general situation,
was ordered to strengthen the defense of the main island of the PALAU ISLANDS.
The PALAU Group, therefore, redeployed a portion of its troops and took every
measure to speed up the construction of its defense fortification.

b. Battles Against the Enemy Task Force. (from 26 to 27 July).

The enemy seemed to have quickly concluded their MARIANAS Operation
by cutting off our air reinforcement route which ran from the PHILIPPINES to
the MARIANAS Area via PALAU and YAP.

On 26 July, an enemy task force consisting of two aircraft carriers,
two battleships, six cruisers, and ten destroyers appeared in the vicinity 105
nautical miles south of YAP ISLAND. From 1400 of the same day to 1455 of 27 July,
its airplanes persistently bombed and strafed our air bases on the PALAU and
YAP ISLANDS. Our ground units on these islands were able to knock down only
a few enemy airplanes.

V. Operations of the 31st Army after the Fall of the MARIANAS ISLAND and to the End of 1944.

A. On 1 July, in the light of the general situation, and particularly in the MARIANAS Area, the Imp. Hq. placed the BONIN Area Group under its direct command; and on 1 Aug., for the defense of the PHILIPPINE Area, the PALAU Area Group was reassigned to the SOUTHERN Army. Consequently both of the Area Groups were re-leased from the battle orders of the 31st Army.

B. In the beginning of August, the Cmdr. of the TRUE Area Group replaced the Cmndr. of the 31st Army, who was killed in the previous, and issued orders to all units of the 31st Army to continue their present duties.

With the fall of the MARIANAS ISLANDS, our organized defense of the CENTRAL PACIFIC ISLANDS as an operation unit could not be maintained any longer, and all islands as far as defense concerned were left in complete isolation. It was considered that if more islands are lost, it would increase the enemy threat on our Homeland. Consequently, the Army, utilizing the past war experiences,

...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Name of Island</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRUK Garrison</td>
<td>TRUK</td>
<td>Hq. of the 31st Army. The 52nd Div. (less its 107th Inf. Regt.)</td>
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<td>TRUK</td>
<td>The 51st Indep. Mixed Brig. (less one Inf. Bn. and F.A. Bn.)</td>
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<td>TRUK</td>
<td>The 9th Indep. Eng. Regt. (less one Co.)</td>
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<td>OTORI Garrison</td>
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D. All units of the 31st Army, since then despite constant enemy air raids, proceeded with determination to orient and train their men, as well as to complete its fortifications. Measures adopted for promoting the self-sufficiency schemes worked satisfactorily everywhere, except for the barren islands of Wake, Puluwat, and Peleliu (T. 3-4). All the personnel was confident of final victory.

In mid-October, the enemy landed on Peleliu Island in the Palau Islands.

(Refer to Volume No. II).

VI. Defensive Operation of Iwo Island.

A. General Enemy Situation before the Operation.

With the commencement of the Saipan Operation, the enemy intensified its air raids on the Bonin Islands, especially on Iwo Island, harassing our reinforcement route and hampering our air operations from our bases on the Bonin Islands. On 4 July, the number of the enemy raiding airplanes totalled 230. Since then, from August to the following February, daily air raids continued with an average of from 20 to 40 airplanes, in addition to the occasional shelling of the islands by the enemy task force.

After the capture of the Marianas, the enemy swiftly fortifying those islands, and also gradually advancing its task force to the Ulithi Area, established its sea and air supremacy in the Pacific, being able thus to gradually develop and increase since December its air raids by the B-29's against our points in the Homeland. In the beginning of February, when the operations in the Philippines, especially on Luzon, were in full swing, the enemy was using in raids as many as 180 of B-29's based on the Marianas Islands.

A summary of the enemy attacks on Iwo Island by the enemy task forces and airplanes were shown in the accompanying diagram No. 1.

B. Organization, Tasks, and Disposition of the Bonin Group.

1. Reinforcement of the Strength.

Because the islands in the central Pacific became, from the fall of 1944, very important as the front lines of our Imp. Nat. Def., the positions in the Bonin Area were strengthened under the command of the Cdr. of the Chichi Island Fortress, who was subordinate directly to the Eastern District Army command.

In the end of Feb. 1944, the Imp. Hq. assigned several fortress infantry and fortress artillery units to this area, placing it under the battle order of the 31st Army. In addition, on 19 June, during the Saipan Operation, the 145th
Inf. Regt., and on 4 July, the 17th Mixed Regt. were also assigned to the BONIN Area. Besides, with the fall of the MARIANAS Area, and with the BONIN Group being placed under the direct command of the Imp. Hq., the 109th Div. on 29-32 Sept. organized from the CHICHI ISLAND fortress infantry and fortress artillery units was also assigned for the strengthening of the defenses of the BONIN Area.

2. Outline of the Battle Order of the BONIN Group at the End of Sept. 1944.

Cmdr. of the BONIN Group, Lt. Gen. TAKAMICHI KURIBAYASHI.

The 109th Div. (Details of its organization are shown in the accompanying list).

The 145th Inf. Regt.
The 12th Indep. Mixed Regt.
The 17th Indep. Mixed Regt.
The 274th, 275, and 278th Indep. Inf. Bns.
The 28th Tk. Regt.
The 1st and 2nd Indep. M.G. Bns.
The 8th, 9th, 11th, and 12th Indep. A.T. Gun Bns.
The 20th, 21st, 43rd, 44th, 45th, and 46th Specially Established Machine Cannon Units.
The 2nd, and 3rd Medium Trench Mortar Bns.
The 1st Indep. Trench Mortar Co.
The 20th Indep. Arty. Mortar Bn.
The 17th Shipping Eng. Regt.
The 21st Field Well Const. Co.
The 5th Fortress Const. Duty Co.

The accompanying list:

Organization of the 109th Div.
The 1st Mixed Brig.
The 306th Indep. Inf. Bn.
The 307th " " "
The 308th " " "

The Hq. of the 109th Div.
The 303rd Indep. Inf. Bn.
The 304th " 2 "
The 305th " "
The Arty Unit of the 1st Mixed Brig.
The Eng. Unit of the 1st Mixed Brig.
The 2nd Mixed Brig.
The Arty. Unit of the 2nd Indep. Mixed Brig.
The Eng. Unit of the
The Med. Hosp. of the
The A.A.A. Unit of the 109th Div.
The Radar Unit
The OICHIJIMA Military Hospital.
The Signal Unit of the 109th Div.

3. Duties.

The duties of the Group were to defend the BONIN ISLAND and to protect our air bases in that area.

In case of any enemy landing operation, the units must endeavor to annihilate the enemy and if failed to do that they must apply delaying action tactics in order to prevent the enemy from using our airfields.

4. General Situation of the Units (Details are unknown).

The BONIN Group deployed its main force on IWO ISLAND, one reinforced brigade on OICHIJIMA, a unit with approximately three infantry battalions as the nucleus on HAHA ISLAND and one reinforced battalion each on MUKO and ANI ISLANDS respectively.

Summary of the strength of the IWO ISLAND Garrison immediately before the enemy landing:

The main force of the 109th Div. Hq. The 2nd Mixed Brig.
The 20th, 21st, and 44th Machine Cannon Units. The 8th and 12th Indep. A.T. Gun Bns.
The 1st Indep. Trench Mortar Co. The 2nd and 3rd Medium Trench Mortar Bns.
The A.A.A. Unit of the 19th Div. The Eng. Unit of the 1st Mixed Brig.
The Radar Unit
The Signal Unit
The total approximately 14,000 men.
Note: 1. Besides, there were about 6,000 men in the machine cannon units of the Naval batteries.

2. As for the guns, we had approximately 244 guns of caliber larger than the anti-tank gun.

3. There were 23 tanks in all.

C. Defensive Disposition on IWO ISLAND.

Positions of the units of the 109th Div. (fan units) and organization of the positions on IWO ISLAND were as shown in the accompanying Doc. No. 2 and No. 3. Some characteristics of the positions were as follows:

1. The topographical features of the island can be summarized as being plains in the vicinity of the CHIDORI Airfield, and most of the rest area, north of the airfield, hilly land, reminding of the sea ripples.

2. As indicated by the name of this island, its terrestrial heat was so high, that the construction of the fortifications deep into the ground was impractical, especially in the plains.

3. In spite of the said topographical and geological feature, our defense installations, having been carried on vehemently, were in general fairly strong. Each of the key positions was supported with several cave facilities.

4. Because of the deficiency and even of material, our obstacles constructed to hamper the enemy, were not expected to be very effective.

5. Due to the geological characteristic of the island, our weakest point was the difficulty in the acquisition of fresh water.

D. Outline of Our Defensive Operations on IWO ISLAND (Refer to the accompanying Doc. No. 4).

1. Situation before the Enemy Landing (from 12 to 18 Feb.).

On 12 Feb., there were indications that the enemy task force was going to sail from ULITHI, and its invasion troops from the MARIANAS. On the 13th, from 70 to 100 enemy ships were observed on the course north-north-west in the offing about 70 nautical miles south-west of SAIPAN ISLAND. Accordingly, the BONIN Group command issued special battle orders to take battle positions for the defense.

At 0650 of 16 Feb., 21 GRUMMANS raided IWO ISLAND. Soon after, the island was encircled by enemy ships which were in the offing three to ten miles
off shore. Our airfield and MOUNT PIGE were bombarded. The enemy seemed to be preparing for the landing at the following areas:

North-north-east of IWO ISLAND:
1 battleship, 2 cruisers, 6 destroyers and 1 L.S.T.

South-east of the island:
1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers, and 10 destroyers.

South-south-west of the island:
1 battleship, 5 cruisers, 17 destroyers, and 1 L.S.T.

West-south-west of the island 13 to 19 L.S.T.'s.

West-north-west of the island:
1 cruisers, 3 destroyers, 5 transports and 10 L.S.T.'s.

On 17 Feb., backed up by bombing and Naval bombardments, the enemy reconnaissance units attempted a landing on FUTATSUNE BEACH at 1031 and on KAMIYAMA BEACH at 1041, but in both cases was repulsed.

At 1330, eight airplanes of the Army special attack unit attacked the enemy ships in the offing north of the island.

On 18 Feb., approximately 350 enemy carrier borne planes raided SHIGI ISLAND.

From 0600 of the same day, two battleships and four or five cruisers fired on the EASTERN Sector; and two battleships and four or five cruisers shelled the shore positions in the SOUTHERN Sector, FUNAMI HILL, and Mt. PIGE; and four or five cruisers fired on the shore positions in the WESTERN Sector with the result that six of our pillboxes and eight Naval batteries were damaged.

At 1500, a convoy of approximately 130 ships, consisting of five aircraft carriers, three battleships, nine cruisers, 20 destroyers, nine transports, 60 L.S.T.'s, and more than 20 other ships appeared in the offing south of IWO ISLAND.

2. Battles Around the Seashores. (From 19 to 22 Feb.).

At 0800 on 19 Feb., supported by a Naval Bombardment and bombing attacks (at that period, 50 enemy airplanes were always hovering overhead) the first wave of the enemy troops consisting of 100 landing barges (a strength of approx. 1000 men and 100 tanks) landed on the area between the SOUTH Debarcation Point and TAKASAGO HILL, followed by the second and third waves consisting of approximately
100 landing barges each.

Toward 1400, the enemy strength was roughly estimated at 5,000
men and 189 tanks. Their main attack appeared to be aimed at the CHINESSU
PLAIN Area, with part directed toward MOUNT PIPE.

By about 2100, the enemy landed more than 10,000 men and 200 tanks,
and while this force advanced to the highland north of the MINAMI PIER,
another enemy force attempted a landing on the KAMAYAMA BEACH.

As the result of the enemy bombing and shelling on this particular
day, 24 of our pill boxes were destroyed and our gun positions were reduced by
one half. The enemy landing troops were presumed to be the 4th and 5th Marine
Div.

130 enemy airplanes consisting of GRUMMANS and B-24's, in order
to intercept our reinforcement forces, raided CHIGI ISLAND. Toward 0800, 20 Feb.,
the enemy was still carrying on the landing operation in the vicinity of MINAMI PIER.

Although the enemy attempted to land in the KAMAYAMA Vicinity, the landing
was frustrated, and the attack on our main position north of MINAMI PIER was
checked. He was able, owing to the isolation of our Southern and Northern
Sectors, to occupy the CHIDORI Airfield.

Severe attacks by the enemy ground forces, and his Naval bombard-
ments reduced the strength of our units in MOUNT PIPE by one half in a single day.

From 0700 to 1800, 21 Feb., our front line was extended between the
MINAMI PIER, the MINAMI VILLAGE, the KANZ HIll located at the southern side of
the FUNAMI HILL, and the CHIDORI VILLAGE. The heavy and medium tanks of the enem y
concentrated their attacks upon the MINAMI VILLAGE district, where we engaged
him in violent battles.

On the sea front, besides one battleship, 13 cruisers, 42 destroyers,
80 transports, 100 large landing barges, and 250 small landing barges which were
observed previously, approximately 30 more large transports newly arrived (with
presumably 3rd Marine Div. on board) and commenced landing operations immediately.

On this same day, approximately 30 of our Naval carrier attack
airplanes and bombers attacked the enemy ships in the vicinity of the island
succeeding in sinking five large ships and setting on fire about 20 other ships.
This attack by our own air forces had the psychological effect of stiffening the
morale of our garrison troops.
On 22 Feb., under aerial cover and backed up with superior Naval gun fire, the enemy undertook a push towards the MOUNT ETOSU and MOUNT TAMAH Area, invading our main positions between the MOUNT ETOSU vicinity and the northern side of the NUKAMI HILL. The MOUNT ETOSU, however, was recovered by our furious counter-attacks.

In the evening, the enemy front lines were in the positions between the NUKAMI PIER, the northern part of the NUKAMI VILLAGE, the southern area of the NOKOYA Airfield, and UKEJIROKU at the KIBORI VILLAGE. Part of our units, however, was still occupying the positions, in the NUKAMI PIER Area and in the vicinity of the crater. These two positions were holding out through marauding tactics of our troops.

In the MOUNT PIES Area, as the result of violent fighting, which continued throughout the day, our army and Naval strengths were reduced by one half.

During this same day, the raiding airplanes of the enemy were estimated to be about 60, and the number of shells fired by the Naval guns, which were concentrated upon the KIYA and NIKI VILLAGES, was estimated to be as many as 30,000. As a result, both of these villages were completely demolished.

3. Direction of the IWO ISLAND Defensive Operation by the Imp. Hq.

Our PHILIPPINES Operations from the end of 1944 to the beginning of 1945, did not progress according to the plan. In February, the enemy succeeded in cutting off our communication between the SOUTH SEAS and JAPAN Proper. The enemy was, at that time, expected to attempt to tighten its encirclement of JAPAN Proper, by attacking the HONIN ISLAND Area.

The strategical value of the HONIN ISLANDS from the view point of the defense the Homeland, was in their geographical position. The loss of this area therefore, would facilitate the enemy air raids on JAPAN Proper, raising a havoc in the organization of our war strength.

Although the opportunity of dealing a telling blow to the enemy ships and ground forces, which were converging around the tiny islands, was very great, our forces however, were unable to do so because JAPAN already had lost a major portion of her sea strength in the past engagements. Moreover, our first line Army and Naval air forces had been exhausted in the recent PHILIPPINES Operation. The anticipation to restore our air forces, bringing their combined number to about 5,000 machines, could materialize only by March or April and even...
then, mainly because the types of airplanes and their performance proved to be impracticable for operations extending beyond 550 miles radius, we could not use them for operation in the BONIN ISLANDS area. Accordingly, these planes were expected to be used in the near future in the SHINAN ISLANDS and FORMOSA Areas where ground bases were available within short distances.

The transportation of our reinforcements by sea was out of question, because the enemy had gained the mastery on the sea and in the air.

In the light of the above situation, seeing that it was impossible to expect that our air, sea and ground operations on the IWO ISLAND would be favorable for us, it was decided that in order to gain the time necessary for the preparations of the Homeland defense, our forces should rely solely upon the established defensive equipment in that area, checking the enemy by delaying tactics.

Even the suicidal attacks by small groups of our Army and Navy airplanes, the surprise attacks by our submarines, and the actions of parachute units, although effective, could be regarded only as a mere strategical use on our part. It was the most depressing thought that we had available means left for the exploitation of the strategical opportunities which might from time to time occur in the course of these operations.

4. Battles Around Our Main Positions.

a. The war situation from 23 to 25 Feb.

At 0930 of the 23rd, the enemy in the front of the WESTERN Sector, being supported by a fierce bombardment, resumed the attack. Our units, however, checking the enemy on the first line of defense in the WESTERN Sector and on the second line in the SOUTHERN Sector, repulsed the enemy by counter-attacking from the ASO HILL district.

At 2100, our first line being a total wreck, our garrison unit in the MOUNT PIPE Area, under the command of Col. ATSUJI, leaving a part of force to destroy ammunition, joined our unit in the vicinity of the CHIDORI Airfield by breaking through the enemy lines.

From 0900 to 1600 of the 24th, a powerful enemy force, consisting of two infantry battalions and at least 40 tanks, launched an onslaught upon our
positions in MOUNT NOTO and MOUNT BYOBU. The violent struggles for those positions ended, however, in a draw.

Approximately 200 enemy airplanes were always overhead throughout the day. On the 26th, the enemy directed its bombing and shelling on our rear, and commenced the attack on the entire front. Its vanguard eventually succeeded in advancing to the CHIBETSU PLAIN, TANK ROCK, and the ASO HILL.

b. The Progress of the Battle on 26 Feb.

In the morning, after bombing and shelling the entire island, since the previous night, the enemy resumed its general attack succeeding in advancing to the vicinity of the HIDORI Airfield. The whole front was pushed forward to the line running from MOUNT SHIRO, to the northern side of MINAMI PINE, through the area where the MOTOTAMA Runway was converging, right up to the southern side of MOUNT BYOBU.

At MINAMI ROCK, our garrison through superior fighting, drove the enemy back. At 1300, however, another enemy force consisting of three infantry battalions and ten tanks, assaulted our positions on TAMARA SLOPE, and in the area west of MOUNT SHIRO, succeeding finally in infiltrating our main position there.

A "see-saw" warfare in the vicinities of the MOTOTAMA Artillery positions and on MOUNT BYOBU continued throughout the whole day.

c. Summary of our losses and gains.

Casualties sustained by our front line units were approximately 50% of their strength, but in some units the casualties in personnel amounted to 75% of their strength. Most of our field pieces were damaged, but those salvaged were roughly as follows:

11 field cannons with 4,000 shells.
5 mountain guns with 2,500 shells.
9 ten c.m. howitzers with 350 shells.
13 medium trench mortars with 500 shells.
39 light trench mortars with 7,000 shells.
4 mortar artillery pieces with 141 shells.
14 rocket guns with 200 shells.
12 anti-aircraft artillery guns with 9,400 shells.

The enemy losses up to this day were presumed to be as follows:

Casualties - approx. 15,000.
Tanks damaged or set on fire - approx. 210.
Airplanes downed or damaged - 60.
Ships sunk, two battleships or cruiser, four cruisers, nine transports, and three L.S.T.'s.
Ships set on fire - 31 L.S.T.'s and other types.

d. The progress of the battle on 27 and 28 Feb.
In view of the general war situation, the IVth Div. Omr. decided to continue the delaying warfare by using MOUNT TAMANA, -the KITA VILLAGE in the MOUNT HIGASHI Sector, and the HYOTSUBOKE vicinity as independent key positions. On the night of the 27th, the 3rd Bn. of the 147th Regt. was transferred from the MOROYAMA Artillery vicinity to MOUNT TAMANA, and two battalions of the 2nd Mixed Brg. were ordered to the EASTERN sector.

On the same day, part of enemy force penetrated into MOUNT TAMANA, but was driven back.

On the 28th, the enemy front lines were advanced to KEGANE ROCK, IWO HILL, AND NIDAN ROCK, but despite especially violent attacks from the NIDAN ROCK Sector, our garrison was able to hold its position.

From 1200 to 1400, our positions in the MOUNT HIGASHI Sector were attacked by an enemy infantry battalion, and part of enemy force advanced to MOUNT OSAKA.

That night, our garrison counter attacked, and recaptured and secured the KEGANE ROCK and NIDAN ROCK.

The enemy seemed to have rearranged its disposition. Its deployment in depth on that day was roughly as follows:

- The 21st Regt.
- The 23rd Regt.
- The 2nd Bn., 3rd Marine Div.
- The 5th Marine Div. (CHIDORI Airfield)
- The 9th Regt.
- The 4th Marine Div.

On 1 March, our units confronting the AMERICAN Forces were deployed at MOUNT OSAKA, KEGANE ROCK and at NIDAN ROCK. An element of the AMERICAN Force, however, by infiltrating through gaps between our positions attacked our units from the rear at MOUNT FURO, ASOU, MOUNT TEREZAN, SANGENYA, and at MOUNT OSAKA.

During this day, 241 enemy planes bombed our position, in which 124 Naval guns in addition raised 6800 shells.

On 2 March, despite furious enemy onslaughts, our units were still holding out in the vicinities of MOUNT OSAKA, KEGANE ROCK and NIDAN ROCK. By occasional small sorties our forces were endeavoring to maintain their present lines.
On 3 March, approximately 50 of our infantry men were defending the MOUNT OSAKA position, while our forces at MOUNT TAMANA were struggling against an enemy force consisting of 800 infantry troops and ten tanks, with the KITA VILLAGE opposing about 600 enemy infantry troops.

The vicinity of the hot springs at NISHI VILLAGE fell to the enemy.

5. Battles around our last defensive position.
(from 4 to 16 March).

In the battles on 2 and 3 March, the major part of our tanks and guns were damaged, as well as eight anti-aircraft artillery pieces, and approximately two-thirds of our officers of all ranks were injured. As a result, it became impossible for the group to continue its organised resistance as a unit. Our units, in each independent key point, therefore, were forced to make a last ditch stand separately, by using their key points as their last defensive position.

Our garrison's strength toward 4 March was as general as follows:

The MOUNT TAMANA position:
The Army = 1,000 men.
The Navy = 1,000 men.
The EASTERN Sector position: 500 men.
The NORTHERN Sector position: 500 men.
The HYOTSUBUKO position: 300 men.

a. The progress of the battles from 4 to 7 March.

On 4 March, the enemy resumed its full scale attack from the entire front, with the major blows aimed at the KITA VILLAGE and the HYOTSUBUKO vicinities. The enemy assaulting the HYOTSUBUKO position, being reinforced with 1,000 fresh infantry troops and ten or more tanks, at about 1100 overran our SANGENTYA positions, at about 1100 hours.

On 5 March, with the view to strengthen the NORTHERN Sector, the Div. Cmdr. transferred the main force of the EASTERN Sector Garrison to the NORTHERN Sector, placing the remaining troops under the command of the MOUNT TAMANA Garrison Cmdr. It was observed that the CHIDORI Airfield was busy with vigorous activity of the fighter planes, and that in the morning, one B-17 and one B-24 were landed there.

In the morning 6 March, the main force of the enemy resumed the offensive, directed towards the KITA Airfield vicinity. Our KITA Key Position Garrison desperately held out on the front which extended from the liaison post.
at the southern edge of TAMANAGI BEACH, to GINMEISUI FOND, through the junction of the SHINAN ROAD, and to MOUNT TENZAN.

On 7 March, the battles in each sector continued fiercely throughout the day, with enemy bombings and naval shelling being concentrated on the NORTHERN Sector.

An enemy element, which infiltrated into our MOUNT TENZAN position during the day time, was driven back by a small scale counter attack, undertaken during that night.

b. The progress of the battles from 8 to 16 March.

On 8 March, the fighting spirit of our units in each key point, in spite of considerable losses suffered in the struggles of preceding days, was still high.

Nine medium transport planes, 16 P-38s and 12 other airplanes were observed on the GHIDORI Airfield.

On 9 and 10 March, the enemy who had infiltrated into the MOUNT TENZAN Sector was repulsed. In the MOUNT HIGASHI Sector, some 700 survived men of our Army and Navy forces were endeavoring to maintain their positions.

The MOUNT TAMANA Garrison Unit, which was assumed to have been annihilated during its all out sortie on 8 March, was still fighting securing the eastern half of that sector with surviving personnel.

On 12 March, the MOUNT TAMANA and MOUNT TENZAN Sectors were the theaters of bitter fighting throughout the day. The enemy commenced tunnel attack tactics, intensifying at the same time its attacks with aerial torpedo bombs.

On 13 March, the MOUNT TENZAN position finally fell to the enemy, and the remaining personnel continued their resistance by utilizing marauding tactics. The MOUNT TAMANA Sector was almost overrun.

On 14 March, as part of enemy force entered the KITA VILLAGE, against a stiff opposition of the garrison of 900 men who, after burning the regimental standards, were forced to abandon their positions.

On 16 March, with only about 500 men scattered in the NORTHERN Sector, and about 300 in the EASTERN Sector, it was evident that the collapse of our defensive positions could be expected in the very near future.
6. The Decision for an All-out Counter-Attack by the Division.

Looking back on the history of the battles fought under the command of the 109th Div. Cdr., it can be said that he had directed his forces through a succession of bitter battles for nearly a month on a tiny island, in extremity of adverse circumstances. The enemy force being equipped with a far superior number of tanks and artillery and supported by bombardments from the encircling Naval unit, consisting of more than 50 ships, and by constant bombings of about 500 air planes, had a strength equivalent to several times the number of our troops.

With no reinforcements to be expected and without any means for changing the war situation in his favor, he was forced to lose both ground and personnel day by day. Finding himself in this painful position, he often had thoughts of evading his responsibilities and affection, by making a suicidal all-out counter-attack against superior forces, but evidently, had come to the conclusion that a premature "BANZAI" charge would have no favorable bearing on JAPAN's general operation, especially on the preparations for the defense of the Homeland, and so by continuing his delaying actions, he decided to take the maximum toll of the enemy. Besides, he did not disclose anything in his reports to the Imp. Eq. pertaining to his difficulties and wants in carrying out the defensive operations.

On the contrary, his reports were always filled with words expressing his anxieties about the preparations for the Homeland defense. No suitable or sufficient words could be found to express our respect and admiration for him.

The division fought with an excellent morale and in perfect unity during these thirty days, inflicting on the enemy heavy casualties which was estimated at approximately thirty thousand. Our forces, however, were decimated and reduced to a small number still hanging to totally destroyed positions. Only when the war situation became hopeless beyond the slightest doubt, the commander decided to launch on the 17th a final all-out counter-attack intending to die a glorious death.

7. The Course of the General Counter-Attacks.

From the midnight of the 17th, the garrison unit launched an all-out attack with its entire surviving personnel.

From the 18th to the 20th, there were no reports, and the fate of the division was unknown.
ATTACHED MAP NO. 3

ORGANIZATION OF POSITIONS ON IWO JIMA

(TO BE INSERTED HERE)
ATTACHED MAP NO. 4

COURSE OF IWO JIMA OPERATIONS

(TO BE INSERTED HERE)
APPENDED MAP NO. 2

DISPOSITION OF TAN UNIT ON IWO JIMA
(BEFORE ENEMY LANDING)

(TO BE INSERTED HERE)
ATTACHED SHEET NO. 1

ENEMY AIR-RAIDS AND TASK FORCE ASSAULTS ON

IWOF JIMA

FROM: 3 JULY 44

TO: 31 MAR. 45

(TO BE INSERTED HERE)
1. Vice Adm. NARC HITSCHER, Cmdr. of Task Force 58, was relieved of Task Force 58 command during the middle of October and had been back in the UNITED STATES.

2. Lt. Gen. HOLLAND SMITH, former Cmdr. of the 5th Amphib. Unit, is apparently at GUAM in the capacity of Marine Cmdr. of the PACIFIC Fleet.

3. Maj. Gen. HARRY SCHMIDT, Cmdr. of the 5th Amphib. Unit, was formerly Cmdr. of the 4th Marine Div.

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**PACIFIC Fleet**

**Adm. of the Fleet**

**5th Fleet**

**Adm. S普RAN**

---

**Amphib. Operations Unit**

**Vice Adm. RICHARD TUNBER**

**Landing Unit**

(5th Amphibious Unit)

**2nd Adm. HARRY SCHMIDT**

---

**5th Marine Div.**

Maj. Gen. JAMES F. ADDISON

**4th Marine Div.**

Maj. Gen. DALTON B. GATES

**5th Marine Div.**

Maj. Gen. CARY Z. STAFFORD

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**Force Approx.**

Marine Div. Approx. 16,000

Battleships

NEW YORK

TEXAS

NEVADA

IDAHO

TENNESSEE

ARKANSAS

6 Aircraft

Carriers

10-13 Cruisers

Approx. 50 Destroyers

---

**Transports**

More than 80

**LCI**

More than 40

**LCT**

More than 100

In addition 250 small boat
On the 31st, according to a Navy report, about 400 of our personnel, including the division commander and the commander of the 45th Regt., were still fighting fiercely in the KITA VILLAGE vicinity.

On the 22nd, the last report from the division was received via CHIGI ISLAND, stating that the enemy troops, failing in their attempt to overrun our position, are forced to only attack with tanks and heavy weapons, but the division, by maintaining a perfect unity, is determined to forcibly wedge themselves into the CHIGI ISLAND Airfield district, from the HETOYUBOKU vicinity.

With subsequent communications from the island being suspended, the IWO ISLAND Operations came to an end.

The total enemy losses were presumed to be as follows:

Personnel - approx. 35,000
Tanks - approx. 270

8. The chain of command of the AMERICAN IWO ISLAND Invasion Force was assumed to be as shown in the accompanying paper No. 5.

E. Situations of the BONIN ISLANDS after the Conclusion of the IWO ISLAND Operation:

1. On 25 March, the Isp. Hq. ordered the Cmdr. of the 1st Mixed Brig., Lt. Gen. TACHIKAWA, to reorganize on CHIGI ISLAND the Hq. of the 109th Div., by incorporating it into the CHIGI ISLAND Detachment headquarters, and appointed him to be a Cmdr. of the remaining units in the BONIN Group Area.

2. In the beginning of April, after examining the problems concerning the subsequent defense, the Gq. Cmdr. found it necessary to redeploy to CHIGI ISLAND the MUKO ISLAND Garrison, which was transported by the powered sailing vessels.

3. In the end of June, according to our aerial photographic reconnaissance, there were approximately 285 airplanes on the airfields at IWO ISLAND.

4. After the termination of war, the group was still putting up resistance with ground weapons against the sporadic enemy air raids undertaken from IWO ISLAND.

VII. Situations on CENTRAL PACIFIC ISLANDS in 1945.

A. Operations of the 31st Army.

With the collapse of defenses in SAIPAN, TINIAN and GUAM ISLANDS, which were the focal points in the CENTRAL PACIFIC ISLANDS guarding the front line of our Nat. Def., the enemy by establishing its air and Naval bases on these islands, since the end of 1944, gradually began to intensify the air raids on our Homeland.
After occupying, in February, practically all of the PHILIPPINES and, in March, IWO ISLAND, the enemy was able to establish at full supremacy of his command at sea and in the air, supremacy.

The JAPANESE EMPIRE, therefore, was forced to concentrate all her efforts on preparations for the all-out HOMELAND defense, planning by assembling and maneuvering large forces to meet the enemy in a final decisive engagement with combined ground, air and sea strength.

This strategy was not applied in the previous operations, because of the lack of sea transport facilities, and remoteness of the war theaters.

In view of the above general war situation, the 31st Army confirmed its chain of orders, and strengthened the defenses of each island, preparing thus, to inflict the maximum casualties on the enemy in case of his attack on our positions. Furthermore, in preparation for the impending homeland engagement, they were ordered to employ all means and facilities to obtain accurate information on the movements of the enemy fleets and air units in the CENTRAL PACIFIC.

In June 1945, an enemy task force, with two aircraft carriers, four cruisers, and four destroyers as the nucleus, bombèd and shelled TRUK and WAKE ISLANDS, but was repulsed without causing much damage.

B. General Situation at the Termination of the War.

1. The 31st Army, praying for the final victory of JAPAN, was engaged in the operation preparations with the main stress on the training, the strengthening of the defenses, and self-sufficiency schemes when the order of the suspension of the hostilities was received. Hereupon, the entire operations of the Army came to an end.

2. Strength of the Army at the Termination of the War.

a. There was approximately 30,500 men deployed at the following Points.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>PERSONNEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MARSHALL AREA (INCLUDING WAKE ISLAND)</td>
<td>2,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAST CAROLINE AREA (INCLUDING KUSAIE ISLAND)</td>
<td>24,278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOLFE</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILITARY AREA (C.H.F.1)</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUNGA AREA</td>
<td>947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAGAN AREA</td>
<td>947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>30,863</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b. Weapons.

Weapons on all islands were roughly as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSIFICATION</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>AMMUNITION</th>
<th>NOTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>37,981</td>
<td>18,674,910 rounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy and light M.G.</td>
<td>3,310</td>
<td>12,056,274 rounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of Grenade dischargers</td>
<td>3,310</td>
<td>276,335 rounds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Artillery</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td>616,778 rounds</td>
<td>calibers less than 10 c.m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heavy Artillery</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2,616 rounds</td>
<td>calibers more than 10 c.m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of land mine</td>
<td>17,973</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>62</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A N M O B I L E S</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tractors</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks</td>
<td>147</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>others</td>
<td>27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>183</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Beats 14


1) Every man was equipped generally with two sets of wearing apparel.

2) Provisions.

There still remained enough emergency rations to provide all troops for a month. The entire personnel on each island had existed on the foods locally produced, except the units deployed at WAKE, PULUWAT, and MELEITON ISLAND (T.N.T.), where owing to the barren nature of the islands the men greatly suffered from the lack of food.

3. Casualties in our personnel from Aug. 1943 to Aug. 1945 were as follows:

| Killed-in-action and died from wounds. | 51,923 |
| Died from illness                    | 5,212  |
| TOTAL                                 | 57,135 |