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Operational Situation of the Japanese
Navy in the Philippines Invasion
Operations, Dec 1941

Seiguchi

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Memo 80

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PREFACE

Through Instruction No. 126 to Japanese Government, 12 Oct 45, entitled "Institution for War Records Investigation", steps were initiated to exploit military historical records and official reports of the Japanese War Ministry and the Japanese General Staff.* Upon the dissolution of the War Ministry and the General Staff, and the transfer of their former functions to the Demobilization Bureau, the general research job continued and resulted in the development of a series of historical monographs. Detailed instructions covering the preparation of these monographs were included in Memoranda 15 December 1945 and 21 November 1946, subject "Japanese Operational Histories".

The basic material contained in this operational record was developed by former officers, on duty in command and staff units within major units during the period of operations. It should be noted at once, that the enormous destruction by aerial bombardment and fire has practically wiped out the Tokyo records; much of this material was reconstructed from memory.

The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals, which are normally essential in the preparation of this type of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field operations or bombing raids rendered the task of compilation most difficult; particularly distressing has been the complete lack of official strength reports, normal in AG or G-3 records. However, while many of the important orders, plans and estimates have been reconstructed from memory and therefore are not textually identical with the originals, they are believed to be generally accurate and reliable. Further data as a result of continuing research and the occasional recovery of hitherto unavailable original documents will be covered in the subsequent publication of "supplements" by the Demobilization Bureau.

* The action under this memorandum and incidental detailed instructions, which followed, were initiated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, charged with responsibility for execution of the program under G.O. No. 9, SCAP, 2 October 1945.

In order to protect the interest of the United States, in the exploitation of Japanese Military Information, sub-paragraph 4 of G.O. No. 9 further provided for the screening of enemy documents and established inventories in Japanese Governmental Archives. Careful examination of the first records submitted by the Japanese Government in the summer of 1946 detected a misconception on the part of the Japanese as to what should be included in comparative histories; in a memorandum issued by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on 21 November 1946, the Imperial Japanese Government was directed to record the operations of the Japanese forces more extensively. The G-2 Section thereafter assumed coordination of the entire program, including the establishment of a small historical research section within the ATIS (Allied Translator and Interpreter Section.)

**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
Allied Translator and Interpreter Section**

NOTE: Translation Requested by G-2 Hist

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**Description of Contents: Full translation of account of Japanese
naval operations in the invasion of the
Philippines.**

Description of Japanese
Naval Operations in the Philippine
Invasion Operation

(Survey by Historical Research

Department, 15 May 46)

I. Gist of Operational Plan

A. General Plan

The invasion of the PHILIPPINES was one of the principal objectives in the first phase of the Japanese operations. ^{of the Pacific War.} In the Philippine invasion operations, JAPAN planned to crush the enemy in the PHILIPPINES and, at the same time, destroy the principal enemy bases.

In the fall of 1941, JAPAN estimated the enemy strength in the Philippine area at that time to be generally as follows:

The air strength was estimated at approximately 110 fighter planes, 40 ^{engine} four-engine bombers, 20 reconnaissance planes, 10 reconnaissance sea-planes, and 35 flying boats. The naval strength was estimated at two heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, 15 destroyers, 15 submarines, and ^{some} a number of auxiliary ^{vessels.} ~~vessels.~~

It was judged that if JAPAN should occupy the PHILIPPINES speedily, enemy reinforcements (principally in air strength), which may ^{be sent} ~~arrive~~ after the start of hostilities, would not be a great problem. The PHILIPPINES are located longitudinally with FORMOSA, which was JAPAN's foremost base of operations against the PHILIPPINES. In view of the fact that the greater part of American air strength was located in the southern part of LUZON, at least 500 nautical miles or more from FORMOSA, the speedy occupation of the PHILIPPINES by JAPAN depended upon how and whether JAPAN would be able to crush the American air strength in the Philippines in one blow.

The essentials of the Philippine invasion operational plan ^{conceived} ~~designed~~ by ^{the Japanese} JAPAN, in the face of this situation, was generally as follows:

On the first day of hostilities (^{X-Day} ~~Y-Day~~), in co-ordination with

the start of operations in the Hawaii and Malay areas, the main strength of the naval land-based air force would contact and destroy the main strength of American air power in Southern LUZON, while elements of carrier-based air power would attack the Mindanao area. With a third attack, at the most, the bulk of enemy air power ^{should} be rendered ineffective.

On ~~2 Day~~ ^{X+2 Day}, plus ~~two days~~ ^{and later}, Japanese Army and Naval advance ^{forces} ~~units~~ would occupy APARRI, VIGAN (~~addition that~~ LAOAG), and LEGASPI, and secure the airfields there. The Army and Naval air strength would then deploy and extend operations with these airfields as advanced bases.

On ~~2 Day~~ ^{X plus 14 Day}, the main strength of the Japanese Army invasion force would land at LINGAYEN Gulf. One element would land at LAMON Bay and advance to MANILA.

In these operations, the command relationship between the various Army and Naval commanders and the Naval air and surface unit commanders was to be based on the principle of "mutual co-operation." None of the commanders was to possess command authority over the others. ^{supported}

B. Gaining Aerial Supremacy

The Naval land-based air force, which was to be the main strength in the invasion operation, ^{belonged} ~~was attached~~ to the command of Vice-Admiral TSUKAHARA, Nishiso, commander of the 21 Air Fleet, and was ^{consisted of} ~~divided into~~ ^{Twenty-first and the Twenty-third} the 21 and 23 Air Flotillas. ^{Eleventh}

^{Twenty-first} The 21 Air Flotilla, which was under command of Rear Admiral TADA, Takeo, was composed of an element of the Kanoya Air ^{Group} Unit (30 Type-1 ^{medium} land-based bombers), the 1 Air ^{Group} Unit (54 Type-96 ^{medium} land-based bombers), and the TOKO (東港) Air ^{Group} Unit (24 Type-97 large flying boats).

^{Twenty-third} The 23 Air Flotilla, under command of Rear Admiral TAKENAKA, Ryuzo, consisted of the TAKAO Air ^{Group} Unit (62 Type 1 ^{medium} land-based bombers), TAIHAN Air ^{Group} Unit (55 ^{Zero fighters} Type-0 ~~carrier-borne fighter planes~~, six Type 96 carrier-borne fighters planes, and eight Type 98 land-based reconnaissance planes), ^{and the} The 3 Air ^{Group} Unit ^{Zero fighters} consisted of (55 Type 0 ~~carrier-borne fighter planes~~, seven Type 96 carrier-borne fighters planes, and seven Type 98 land-based reconnaissance planes).

Eleventh
In the initial plan of operation, formulated by the commander, ~~the~~ ^{the} Air Fleet, it was deemed extremely difficult to launch attacks on southern LUZON where the main strength of American Air Force was located, with its fighter strength in view of the fact that the enemy bases were 550 miles apart from TAIWAN and also considering the hindrance of meteorological and topographical conditions.

~~difficulties.~~ In order to achieve the aforementioned objective, the employment of carrier air strength was considered.

In the meantime, the technical capacity of the Zero type fighter plane units of the fleet had progressed notably from the beginning of the fall of 1941. As soon as it became ^{possible} established that these Zero type fighter units were capable of ^{manoeuvring} ~~making attacks~~ ^{the} over distances of 550 ~~miles~~ miles, the plan was revised to depend entirely upon these

Land based fighter units in order to accomplish the objective.

In regard to the ^{targets} ~~objects~~ of the attacks by these units and the time of the first attack, the following was considered: The main object of the attacks was destruction of the enemy air strength, especially large-type aircraft. For this purpose, NICHOLS and CLARK Fields, which were the operational bases of the enemy large-type aircraft, were to be crushed. At the same time, IBA, a strong fighter plane base, was to be neutralized *rendered powerless.*

In view of the fact that submarines of the opposing naval units could greatly hinder our landing operations, it was planned ^{initially} to attack the enemy submarine units situated in MANILA Bay. However, due to reports that the number of enemy submarines in the Manila area had decreased since December, the above plan to attack the submarines was cancelled.

Sunrise was selected for the time of the first air attack in order to enable ^{fighters to combat} ~~combat by fighter planes~~ and effective bombing by the land-based bombers. *to carry out*

The enemy air force, situated in the Mindanao area, beyond the attacking radius of the ^{Eleventh} ~~the~~ Air Fleet, based in FORMOSA, was to be attacked on 8-Day by the ^{Fourth Carrier Division} ~~Air Division~~ (HYUGO and SHIOKAZE), led by Rear Admiral KAKUDA, Kakuji.

The Army air force, which was to co-operate with the Naval air force,

was composed of approximately 36 reconnaissance planes, 36 fighters planes, 54 light bombers, and 18 heavy bombers, under the 5 Air ^{Group} ~~Brigade~~ Commander. These planes were based in FORMOSA, and, at the beginning of operations, they were to ^{gain} ~~secure~~ aerial supremacy over the Northern Luzon Area, and on X+2 Day,

~~After D-Day, plus two days,~~ when the air bases in Northern LUZON would have been secured, they were to engage in operations, with these airfields as advanced bases.

C. Securing Air Bases in Northern LUZON and LEGASPI Air Base.

Air bases scheduled to be occupied by ~~D-Day, plus two days,~~ ^{X+2 Day} in order to be utilized as advance bases by the Japanese Army and Naval air forces (principally the Army Air Force) were APARRI, VIGAN, BATAAN, and LEGASPI. The invasion of all of these airfields, with the exception ^{for} of BATAAN, was ~~the responsibility of~~ ^{assigned to} the Army.

The base for ^{Invasion} ~~operational~~ preparations of the units which would secure APARRI and VIGAN was MAKU. For the unit which would secure BATAAN, the base was TAKAO. The unit which would secure LEGASPI came from PALAU. ^{Third} The 3 Fleet, led by Vice-Admiral TAKANASHI, Ibo, was assigned the mission of escorting these invading forces.

D. Mine Laying.

In order to block access into the Philippine waters from the outer areas, plans were laid to have the ^{Seventeenth Squadron (ITSUKOSHIMA)} ~~37 Squadron (MITSUBISHI and YAMATO)~~, commanded by Rear Admiral KOBAYASHI, Tetsuri, lay mines in SAN BERNARDINO and SURIGAO Straits on ~~D-Day plus three days.~~ ^{X+3 Day.} The laying of mines in the mouth of MANILA Bay and BALABAC Strait by submarines was also planned.

E. Landing of Main Invasion Force

The invading force of the Japanese Army was commanded by Lt. Gen. HOMMA, Masaharu, commander of the ^{Fourteenth} ~~14th~~ Army. It was composed of the 16 Division, 48 Division, two tank regiments, 44 AA guns, and six battalions ^{Army} of artillery, ~~(attached directly to the army).~~

The main force of the ^{invading force} ~~invasion unit~~ was scheduled to depart from MAKU, TAKAO, and ^{KEELONG} ~~KIENH~~, escorted by the ^{Third} ~~3~~ Fleet, and was to land at LINGAYEN Gulf before dawn on ~~D+14~~ ^{X+14 Day.} The remaining elements were to depart from AMAMI-OSHIMA, in the ~~RYUKYU~~ ^{South-Western} Islands, and land at LAMON Bay

at a similar hour on ~~B~~ ^X 16 Day.

Direct aerial support in the above landing operations was assigned, in the LINGAYEN area, mainly to the Army, with Naval elements rendering *co-operating and in some support*, in the Lamon Bay area, the direct aerial support was assigned to the Navy.

F. Advance of Naval Land-Based Air Units *Forces.*

Schedules

Plans were made for the invasion of DAVAO, prior to the landings by the invasion force, on ~~B~~ ^{X+1/2 Day} 12 by a force consisting of a nucleus of Army elements to enable speedy deployment of Naval air strength in the said area. The Navy was assigned support of the landing operations.

Fighters Flight units of the ~~11~~ ^{Eleventh} Air Fleet were scheduled to proceed rapidly to the area as soon as the ~~bases~~ ^{enemy} were complete *and, together with, blocking the enemy route of withdrawal, make preparations for operations against the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES.* *(for the use of the Japanese the purposes of and making)*

Next, the invasion of JULO by Army and Naval units on ~~B~~ ^{X+1/7 day} 17 was planned.

II. Outline of Progress

A. *Domination of* Securing Aerial Supremacy

The first air attack against the American air force on LUNGH by the entire force of the ~~11~~ ^{Eleventh} Air Fleet was scheduled to take place around dawn on 8 December. However, due to the thick clouds and dense fog in the Southern Formosa Sector, the flight units were unable to ~~depart~~ *start on* *action* until around 0930 hours.

At that time, it was estimated that reports of the surprise attack by the Japanese task force against HAWAII had already been received by the American forces in the Philippines. Therefore, strong enemy resistance was expected against our first attack.

When the attacking *air groups* formation of Japanese planes *charged on* the CLARK and IBA bases *a little past* after 1330 hours on the same day, the attack apparently took the enemy by surprise, *because* for their interception was weak. The attack caught nearly the entire main enemy air strength, and achieved great results.

The ^{*medium*} 34 fighters and 54 land-based bombers, which attacked CLARK

Field, destroyed 25 planes in the air (of which two were unconfirmed), and burned or greatly damaged 49 planes on the ground. The 50 fighters and 54 land-based ^{medium} bombers, which attacked IBA, burned or decisively damaged 31 planes on the ground, and ~~materially~~ damaged 30 planes. Our losses amounted to not more than seven fighter ~~planes~~. Thus, supremacy, at least in the air, ^{over that area} was established conclusively.

The second attack, aimed at enemy air bases in the Manila area, was scheduled to take place on 9 December, the day following this attack. However, due to fog, which rolled in during the night, as on 8 December, it was impossible to carry out the second attack in full strength, and the ~~instead, an attack~~ ^{assault} was carried out before dawn on 9 December against CLARK Field, with a mere seven land-based ^{medium} bombers.

On the following day, 10 December, 18 fighter ~~planes~~ supported the VIGAN invasion, and the remainder of the force carried out the second attack against air bases and vessels in the Manila area and against the air base in the DEL CARMEN area.

At about 1345 hours on the same day, 34 fighters and 27 land-based ^{medium} bombers raided the NICHOLS, NIELSON and CAMP MURPHY bases; 18 fighter ^{charged on} ~~planes~~ ^{medium} ~~raided~~ the DEL CARMEN Base; 27 land-based ^{medium} bombers raided CAVITE, and 27 land-based ^{medium} ^{attached enemy} bombers ~~raided ships anchored at MANILA. Both bomb-~~ ^{In these operations, both bombing and strafing were employed. see operations} ing and strafing attacks were carried out.

The enemy losses amounted to 50 planes shot down (of which seven planes were unconfirmed), 53 planes greatly damaged or burned, and three merchant vessels burned. Our losses were merely three fighters, ~~planes.~~

The enemy's counterattacks amounted to nothing more than three or four scattered attacks, by several large type planes each time, against the VIGAN Anchorage, ^{and thus the enemy air activity was completely neutralized.} ~~The enemy was incapable of executing any direct active attack.~~

Although the weather in the Formosa area ⁱⁿ the morning of 10 December was unfavorable, a second attack was launched because a change to better weather was anticipated. The weather, however, ^{actually} not only did not turn for the better, but became very unfavorable toward evening, at about the time of our ^{onslaughting forces'} ~~attack~~ return. As a result, our attacking

units were forced to make scattered landings at various ^{bases} places, and the attack for 11 December, the following day, had to be postponed ~~in~~ ^{because of the necessity to accommodate} ~~order to shelter~~ the planes and ^{their crew} ~~flight personnel~~.

Following this, the third and fourth attacks were carried out successively on 13 and 14 December, ^{respectively}.

In the third attack, carried out on 13 December at a little past 1130 hours, the main force of 63 land-based ^{medium} bombers attacked IBA, while an element attacked CLARK, and the burning of 10 planes on the ground was confirmed.

Another group, made up of 63 fighter ~~planes~~ and 52 land-based ^{medium} bombers, headed for MANILA, but due to the unfavorable weather in the Manila area, it changed its ^{targets} objective and attacked OLONGAPO. It destroyed 18 planes in the air, and burned or greatly damaged 24 planes.

The fourth attack, carried out on 14 December at about 1340 hours, with 52 land-based ^{medium} bombers, was directed against the Nichols Field base. In this attack, 11 planes were destroyed and, in addition, ground installations in the area were ~~bombed~~ ^{smashed}.

At about 1230 hours, another group, comprising ⁴ 36 fighter ~~planes~~ and 52 land-based ^{medium} bombers, attacked DEL CARMEN in the vicinity of MANILA, and shot down one plane and greatly damaged or burned 42 planes. Our losses in the third and fourth attacks were only one land-based ^{medium} bomber and two fighter ~~planes~~ ^{in all}.

On 15 December, one week after the start of operations, ^{the Headquarters of the Eleventh} ~~the operational command section of our 11th~~ Air Fleet estimated the situation as follows:

Losses dealt to the enemy by the fleet during this period totalled: Shot down - 70 planes, including 63 fighter ^s ~~planes~~, four large type aircraft, and three flying boats; completely destroyed on the ground - 131 planes, including 59 fighter ^s ~~planes~~, 25 medium type aircraft, 29 large type aircraft, nine flying boats, and eight training planes. In addition, approximately 80 other planes were damaged.

The American air force remaining in the Philippine area as of 15 December was estimated to consist of not more than approximately 10

bombers, some 10 flying boats, and about 20 fighter^s planes. It was further estimated that the greater part of these fighter planes were situated in a scattered ^{location} manner in the Central PHILIPPINES, while the rest were in the Southern PHILIPPINES.

The American surface fleet in the Manila area was ^{estimated} seen to consist of two or three destroyers, and two submarine-tender-like ships. Other than this no sign of the enemy was seen in Philippine waters north of 14° north latitude, and it was presumed that the enemy units had ~~with-~~^{evacuated} drawn to the south.

Material losses of the ^(Eleventh) 11 Air Fleet during this period, including losses sustained from causes other than direct combat, amounted to 10 land-based ^{medium} bombers, 23 Zero-type fighter planes, and one transport plane. Flight personnel losses totalled not more than four land-based ^{medium} bomber crews, 14 Zero-type fighter ^{pilots} personnel, and one transport plane crew.

^{Thus} ~~In this manner~~, in spite of the unfavorable condition presented by inclement weather, the greatest obstacle of the Philippines operation was cleared with greater success than had been anticipated by the ^{Eleventh} 11 Air Fleet alone during the period of only one week.

On the other hand, the ^{4th Carrier Division,} ~~4th Air Flotilla~~, which had been assigned the mission of attacking the enemy air force in the Mindanao area on the opening day of hostilities, 8 December, sent out attack units from carriers located approximately 100 nautical miles east of DAVAO on the morning of the same day, and attacked the Davao area. Details concerning the results are unavailable, but the attack was successful.

The 5 Army Air ^{Group} ~~Brigade~~, which supported the Naval air ^{force,} ~~units,~~ ^{on the heel of the Advance Unit invading VIGAN and APARRI, sent out} immediately after advance units had secured VIGAN and APARRI, advanced 15 fighters to VIGAN on 11 December, and 24 fighter ~~planes~~ to APARRI on 12 December. However, because of ^{the lack of their fighting strength,} ~~their weakness,~~ these units made no direct contribution to the ^{gaining} ~~establishing~~ of aerial supremacy over Southern LUZON.

B. Securing of Air Bases in Northern LUZON and Legaspi Air Base.

As roughly outlined in the foregoing, the securing of the Aparri,

Vigan, Batuan, and Legaspi air bases was scheduled ⁱⁿ for the first phase of the Philippine operations. The force (Army) invading APARRI departed MAKO on the evening of 7 December on six transport ~~vessels~~, with a naval escort, and headed for APARRI.

Navy surface force,
~~The vessels,~~ assigned ^{on} the escort mission ^{was} were under the command of Rear Admiral NARA, Kensaburo, ^{The Fifth} 5 Destroyer Squadron Commander, and consisted of the 22 Destroyer ^{Group} Division (FUMIZUKI, SATSUKI, HAGATSUKI, MINAZUKI), ^{1 Division} one ~~squadron~~ of the 5 Destroyer ^{Group} Division (HARUKAZE, HATAKAZE), three minesweepers, and six subchasers. This force anchored off APARRI at daybreak on 10 December without mishap ^{and} immediately ^{debarked the} upon arrival, ^{army troops.} the Army troops debarked. No resistance whatsoever was met on landing.

In the scattered air attacks carried out by enemy bombers in the afternoon of the same day, Minesweeper No. 19 was greatly damaged by bombs which ^{caused detonation of her} detonated the depth-charges aboard ~~the vessel~~ and ^{she} ~~it was~~ ^{ran} aground. The occupation of the airfield by Army troops progressed as scheduled, and the airfield was occupied in the afternoon of the same day. On 12 December, two days later, 24 fighter ^{Group proceeded} ~~planes~~ of the 5 Air ~~Brigade~~ ^{Group} were advanced to this airfield.

The VIGAN invasion force
~~The unit invading VIGAN~~ departed MAKO in the evening of 7 December on six transport ~~vessels~~, with a naval escort commanded by Rear Admiral NISHIMURA, Shoji, ^{Fourth} 4 Destroyer Squadron Commander. The ^{naval escort} ~~invading unit~~ was composed of the following: NAKA, 1 Destroyer ^{Group} Division (MURASAME, SAMIDARE, HANUSAME, YUDACHI), 9 Destroyer ^{Group} Division (ASAGUMO, MINAGUMO, HATSUGUMO), six minesweepers, nine subchasers, and five fishing boats.

Contact with enemy planes was made twice from the time of departure from MAKO until arrival at VIGAN. However, the convey anchored safely at VIGAN ^{as} ~~on schedule~~ at a little past noon ~~on 10 December~~, and unloaded the invading force. *(midnight on 9)*

little resistance was met on land,
~~There was little resistance on land,~~ and the airfield was secured early in the morning. On the following day, 11 December, 15 fighters ^(10 December) ~~planes~~ of the 5 Air ^{Group} ~~Brigade~~ were already situated there.

From dawn on 10 December and throughout 11 and 12 December, more than 10 American fighters and bombers made several persistent counter-attacks. As a result, Mine Sweeper No. 10 was sunk, resulting in some casualties among ^{crew} ~~personnel~~ of the HAKA and MURASAME.

~~The Second Base Force,~~
~~The 2 Base Force,~~ commanded by Rear Admiral HIROSE, Susto, which had been assigned the invasion of RATAAN was composed of the YAMAGUMO, the 21 Motor Torpedo Boat ^{Group} ~~Division~~ ^{CHIDORI} ~~(CHISHIMA,~~ HATSUKARI, MANAZUMI, TOMOZUMI), two mine sweepers, two patrol crafts, nine converted sub-chasers, and three converted gunboats.

The main body of this unit departed from TAKAO and ^{BORYO} ~~MORTO~~ on the evening of 7 December, and at dawn on the following day, 8 December, reached the ^{anchorage} ~~anchoring point~~ off RATAAN. A naval landing force of approximately 490 men was landed, which occupied the airfield on the island.

Part of the force (3 Gunboat Division), operating separately, advanced to CAMIGUIN Island early in the morning of 10 December, mopped up the island, and speedily established a seaplane base there.

In order to cover these landing ~~operations~~, the ASHIGARA, MAYA, KUMA, ASAKAZE, MATSUKAZE, and the ^{SANOKIMARU} ~~SANGEMARU~~, under direct command of the commander of the ^{Third} ~~3~~ Fleet, Vice-Admiral TAKAHASHI, Ibo, left MAKO on 8 December, and reached a point approximately 200 ~~northwest~~ miles west of VIGAN on 10 December.

At this point and vicinity, the force was engaged by five enemy bombers, but suffered no damages. After that, the force proceeded to the northwest and, after anchoring temporarily in ^{BIAS} ~~BARANON~~ Bay, cruised north of PRATAS Island (TOSHATO), and returned to MAKO on 14 December.

The Army force assigned to invade LINGASPI boarded seven transports at PALAU, their base of departure. This force, under a naval escort ^{First Base Force} ~~2 Base Unit~~, commanded by the commander of the ~~2 Base Unit~~, Rear Admiral KURO, Kyuji, departed from PALAU on the morning of 8 December.

The naval force under command of Rear Admiral KURO included the HAGARA, the 24 Destroyer ^{Group} Division (UMIKAZE, KAWAKAZE, YAMAKAZE, SUZUKAZE), 1 ^{Division} Section of ^{The} 16 Destroyer ^{Group} Division (YUKIKAZE, TOKITSUKAZE), AOTAKA, two mine sweepers, two patrol crafts, and other small crafts. Accompanying this force were the CHITOSE, and ZUIHO of the ~~11th Air Flotilla~~, of which Rear Admiral FUJITA, Huitaro was commander. *(Eleventh Sea-plane Tender Division)*

This force, under the direct escort of the Fourth Carrier Division and the Eleventh Seaplane Tender Division the activity thereof will be mentioned later, arrived at the anchorage off LEGESPI early on the morning of 20 December.

The army force and the Kure 1 Special Naval Landing Force were unloaded and later occupied the airfield there before noon, without meeting any resistance.

On the same day, 12 December, and on the morning of 14 December, several American planes made a counterattack. Although a few casualties resulted, no major interference was caused. On 14 December, approximately nine fighters ~~planes~~ of the 23 Air Flotilla advanced to this area.

The ~~this~~ invasion ~~at~~ LEGASPI was supported by a force formed chiefly for this purpose under command of the ^{Fifth Squadron} ~~5th Division~~ Commander, Rear Admiral TAKAGI, Takeo. The unit was composed of the ^{Fifth Squadron} ~~5th Division~~ (MYOKO, HAGURO, HACHI), ^{The Fourth Carrier Division} ~~4th Air Flotilla~~ (RYUJO, SHIOKAZE), and ^{Second} ~~2nd~~ Destroyer Squadron ^{Group} (JINTSU 15 Destroyer ^{Group} Division (MATSUSHIO, KUROSHIO, OYASHIO, HAYASHIO), AMATSUKAZE, HATSUKAZE).

This force ~~It~~ sortied from PALAN on the afternoon of 6 December and, upon reaching a point approximately 100 ~~nautical~~ miles east of DAVAO early on the morning of 8 December, it launched planes which raided the Davao area. Part of this unit, the destroyers KUROSHIO and MATSUSHIO, preceded into DAVAO Bay about the same time for the rescue of planes ^{would make} which made forced landings.

After the 8 December air raid on DAVAO, the force retired to the northeast and then joined the force invading LEGASPI, early on the morning of 9 December, and thenceforth ^{covered} ~~guarded~~ the invading force. ^{thereof} At about 1000 hours on 11 December, the JINTSU, the YANYAMA, and two ^{separated from} ~~destroyers left~~ the invading unit at a point approximately 120 ~~nautical~~ miles east of SAN BERNARDINO Strait in order to lay mines in SURIGAO Strait.

On the following day, 12 December, the ~~Fourth Carrier Division and the Fifth Sea-plane Tender Division~~ ^{Fourth Carrier Division and the} ~~Division~~ supported the LEGASPI invasion by launching their carrier planes from a point approximately 100 ~~nautical~~ miles east of LEGASPI. These aerial attacks were discontinued after 12 December, and the unit returned to PALAU.

C. Laying of Mines

The laying of mines in SAN BERNARDINO and SURIGAO Straits was set for the night of ~~2~~ ^X + 3rd Day.

On the morning of 8 December, the ~~17th Division~~ ^{Seventeenth Squadron} (ITSUKUSHIMA, YANYAMA), commanded by Rear Admiral KOBAYASHI, following the ~~unit invading LEGASPI~~ ^{invasion force}, sortied from PALAU. At about 1000 hours on 11 December, at a point approximately 120 ~~nautical~~ miles east of SAN BERNARDINO Strait, the ~~division broke formation~~ ^{Squadron dispersed its column}, and the ITSUKUSHIMA, supported by two destroyers, headed for SAN BERNARDINO Strait. The YANYAMA, supported by the JINTSU and two destroyers, headed for SURIGAO Strait. Both groups reached their destinations before noon of the same day. The ITSUKUSHIMA laid 300 mines and the YANYAMA 133 at their ~~different~~ ^{respective} destinations. Neither groups met ^{with} any counterattacks.

On 14 December, submarines I-124 and I-123 laid mines at the mouth of MANILA Bay and in BALABAC Strait, ^{with} respectively.

D. Landing of Main Invasion Force.

As described above, preparatory invasion operations were completed with clocklike precision, ~~without one single slip~~ ^{not a bit going wrong and the}. The landing of the main invasion force also proceeded smoothly, according to ~~plan~~ ^{the prearranged schedule}.

Preparations were completed at TAKAO for the landing at LINGAYEN of the first echelon, which ~~consisted of~~ ^{boarded} 27 transports. On the afternoon of 15 December, this force departed from TAKAO with an escort ^(navy) approximately equal in strength to the escort at the time of the Aparri landing. The escort was commanded by the 5 Destroyer Squadron Commander, Rear Admiral HARA.

On 19 December, ~~due to an unexpected typhoon, advancing northeastward in the vicinity of the PARACEL Islands, the course became rough, with~~ when the Convoy was proceeding in the vicinity of Paracel Is., it met with strong northeast monsoon ~~-13-~~ and the voyage was rather distressing with rough swell and the prevailing gale.

~~large waves caused by the strong northeasterly wind, making navigation difficult.~~ However, the force arrived at the anchorage point at about 0110 hours on 22 December, as scheduled.

At early dawn, it landed its first landing force, without any counterattacks ^{from the} on land. ~~And~~ ^{Besides the} counterattacks by two planes after dawn on the same day and by a four-engine ^{engine} plane early the next morning, 23 December, there was little resistance.

Continuous attacks were launched by enemy submarines at the mouth of LINGAYEN Bay after 22 December. Our patrol ships and small crafts conducted several depth charge attacks, ~~but we were unable to ascertain the results.~~ ^{but the confirmed report on the result of this attack has not been available.}

The second echelon, consisting of 26 transports and escorted by a force approximately equal in strength to the escort during the Vigan invasion departed from MAKU under command of the ^{Sixth} Destroyer Squadron commander, Rear Admiral NISHIMURA. Together with the first echelon, ^{the convoy} it entered the anchorage off LINGAYEN at midnight, 22 December, and unloaded its landing force.

The third echelon, consisting of 21 transports and escorted by a force approximately equal in strength to the escort at the time of the BATAAN invasion sortied from ^{KEELONG} ~~KEELONG~~ on 17 December, under command of the ^{Second} ~~2nd~~ ^{Force} Base Unit Commander, Rear Admiral HIRONE. It arrived at LINGAYEN early on the morning of 22 December.

Part of the escort force swept LINGAYEN Gulf and laid mines and an anti submarine net. However, at about 0900 hours on 22 December, the HAYO MANU, while ~~it was~~ preparing to lay mines five nautical miles west of the anchorage, was sunk by a torpedo ^{attack} from an enemy submarine.

On 19 December, the ASHIGARA, MAYA, KUMA, SANYO, and ^{MARU} ~~SANUKI~~ ^{SANUKI} MARU, under the direct command of the ^{Third} ~~3rd~~ ^{Cin C} Fleet Commander, Vice-Admiral TAKAHASHI, sortied from MAKU. After rendering support by maneuvering on the sea about 250 nautical miles west of LUZON on 22 December, they returned to MAKU on 23 December.

Air cover and support of the landing operations at the LINGAYEN anchorage were conducted by the army air units which had advanced to APARRI and VIGAN. The landings at LINGAYEN were concluded far more

because it smoothly than had been expected, despite the small escort strength, *(and with more success)* This had been achieved by taking advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness.

The force which was to land at LAMON Bay consisted of 24 transports, *(was making)* and made preparations at ANAMI OSHIMA. This convey, escorted by the HAGARA, the 24 *Destroyer Group* ~~Destroyer Division~~, and six mine sweepers, *(was)* ~~was~~ *(under the command)* of ~~the 2nd~~ *First Base Force* commander, Rear Admiral KURO. It had returned to the north after supporting the LINGASPI invasion and sortied from ANAMI OSHIMA *(escorting the LAMON BAY invasion force)* on 17 December.

Combining the 1 and 2 Subchaser Groups (comprising of 3 subchasers adding a number of first and second class subchasers (three of each respectively)), the YUKIKAZE, TOKITSUKAZE, AOTAKA, and minesweepers Nos. 5 and 9 to its *column* strength en route, the force entered LAMON Bay before dawn on 24 December, and debarked *(the invasion)* ~~the landing~~ force. Aside from scattered attacks by enemy planes on the same day, it met no resistance. The *MIZOHIO of the Eleventh Seaplane Tender Division joined the* ~~operation~~ *participated in this operation by maintain-* ing an aerial cover and aerial support.

In this *way*, the main strength of the force invading the PHILIPPINES completed landing operations as scheduled, and began to advance from LINGAYEN and LAMON to MANILA.

E. DAVAO, JOLO Invasions

The invasions of DAVAO and JOLO were *(scheduled)* ~~set by the main invasion force~~ for 20 and 25 December, respectively, prior to the landing on LUXON. The object of these invasions was to enable deployment of *(by main force)* naval land-based air units in the area, thereby cutting off the enemy's route of withdrawal, and to secure advanced bases ~~for the coming invasion of~~ the DUTCH EAST INDIES *(to be used in its)* which would follow.

The force which was to invade DAVAO consisted of 14 transports *(at notice)* and was ready at PALAU. This force was escorted by the JINTSU, 15 *Group* Destroyer Division (HATSUSHIO, OYASHIO, HAYASHIO, KUROSHIO), 2 *Division* Section of 16 *Group* Destroyer Division (AMATSUKAZE, HATSUKAZE) SHIRATAKA, and other *Combat vessels,* small ships, commanded by Rear Admiral TANAKA, Raizo, commander of the *Second* Destroyer Squadron.

Direct support in this invasion was to be *(executed)* ~~given~~ by the *Fifth Squadron* ~~5th~~ Division (MYOKO, HAGURO, NACHI), ~~1st Fleet~~ *(RYUJO, SHIOKAZE)*, *the Fourth Carrier Division* ~~11th Air Fleet~~ *the Eleventh Seaplane Tender Division*

(CHITOSE only) and two patrol crafts, commanded by Rear Admiral TAKAHASHI, Commander of the ~~32nd~~ ^{4th} Fifth Squadron.

This invading force left PALAU on 17 December, and with no counter-attacks en route, anchored off the north and south shores of DAVAO City between midnight on 20 December and dawn, and started landing operations. The landing progressed smoothly with little ^{on the following day,} enemy resistance.

Rear Admiral IRIFUNE, Naosaburo, commander of the ~~32nd~~ ^{30th} ~~Force~~ ^{Force}, ^{shifted} ~~located~~ his flag ^{to} DAVAO. Previously, on the afternoon of 19 December, the ^{Fourth Carrier Division} ~~4th~~ Air Fleet arrived at a point approximately 150 ~~nautical~~ miles east of DAVAO, and launched six carrier-borne planes, which flew a ^{attack} reconnaissance and attack mission over the DAVAO area.

The following day, 20 December, which was the landing day, this ^{air} force supported the landing and, thenceforth, until 22 December, gave aerial cover over the anchorage. The ^{Fifth Division maneuvered in the} ~~5th~~ ^{in the} ~~same manner~~ ^{in concert} with the Fourth Carrier Division. ^{operated according to the movements of the 4th Air Fleet.}

The ~~31st~~ ^{11th} Air Fleet (CHITOSE only) advanced westward, generally ⁱⁿ ~~to~~ the north of the invading force, and, on 20 December, supported the landing ^{side} operations with reconnaissance seaplanes. On 20 December, as soon as the landing at DAVAO was successfully completed, the force rapidly advanced that evening into TALOMO Bay, south of DAVAO, and established a seaplane base there. Thereafter, ^{with} ~~this locality as~~ ^{its base,} it carried out air patrol, reconnaissance, and attack missions over MINDANAO.

On 21 and 22 December a part of the fleet was assigned to ^{rescue Japanese residents who had been interned around DAVAO Bay districts.} ~~evacuate Japanese residents from various localities.~~

In the afternoon of 23 December, 12 fighters and two land-based reconnaissance planes ^{belonged to the Eleventh} ~~from the 11th Air Fleet~~ proceeded to the Davao base and took over from the ~~4th Air Fleet~~ ^{Fourth Carrier Division} the mission of providing aerial cover. On the preceding day, 21 December, 12 flying boats from the ^{Group} ~~Toko Air Unit~~ proceeded to DAVAO seaplane base.

The invasion of ^{TOLO} ~~30th~~ was carried out on 22 December by the force ^{aboard} ~~of~~ nine transports, which ^{had} landed north of DAVAO City. That evening, nine American heavy bombers ^{appeared} ~~attacked~~ and bombed the anchorage, but

caused no damage. This invasion force proceeded under aerial cover from the ~~11 Air Flotilla~~ and was escorted by the ~~9 Division~~ ^{Fifth Squadron} and the JINTSU.

^{Fourth Carrier Division}

Early on the morning of 23 October, two enemy heavy bombers attacked ~~the~~ ^{the}

without any major interference, and, at midnight on 24 December, the ^{invading} force approached JOLO. Before dawn, an army force and the ~~Marine~~ ^{1st Kure} Special Naval Landing Force was ^{unloaded} landed. Some resistance was encountered, but the town of JOLO was completely occupied during the morning.

^{Fourth Carrier Division}

The ~~11 Air Flotilla~~, which supported this invasion, was assigned

to render aerial cover until 24 December, and later proceeded to PALAU.

The CHITOSE of the ~~11 Air Flotilla~~ ^{Eleventh Seaplane Tender Division} gave escort support by generally

^{Manoeuvring}

moving with the convoy, and continued to guard ^{in the} the air after the landing until ~~fighter planes from the 11 Air Flotilla~~ ^{land based fighters of the Eleventh Air Fleet} proceeded to the JOLO

base on 26 December.

^{Fifth Squadron}

On 25 December, the ~~9 Division~~ advanced to a point approximately 100 nautical miles southeast of JOLO, and later proceeded to PALAU.

F. Advance of Naval Land-Based Air Force

^{Eleventh}

The ~~11 Air Fleet~~, which had generally completed the ^{domination} arresting of air supremacy in the Philippine area during the first week after the operations began, advanced southward as air bases were secured in the Legaspi and Davao areas, and extended its sphere of control. On 14 and 18 December, nine and four fighter planes were advanced to LEGASPI, and operations were extended to even the Mindanao and Central Philippine areas.

As soon as DAVAO was occupied, from 22 December to 29 December, further deployment was effected rapidly by advancing the ~~22 Air Flotilla~~ ^{Twenty-first} Headquarters, the entire strength of the ~~3 Air Group~~ ^{Group} (approximately 50 fighter planes), approximately 10 land-based ^{medium} bombers, and 20 flying boats.

^{of the Fleet air strength}

Deployment to JOLO was started on 26 December, and by 20 Jan 42, the entire Tainan Air ~~Base~~ ^{Group} (approximately 50 fighter planes) was ^{advanced} ~~placed~~ and the air supremacy in the Philippine area was secured completely.

On 22 December, 18 fighter planes from another naval force proceeded to MILLI, BOHENO, and blocked the western route of withdrawal.

^{Enemy}

*stationed**Eleventh*

Many enemy cargo vessels were reported to be stationed in the Manila Bay and the Eleventh Air Fleet ~~directed~~ ^{began} attacks against them with ~~the~~ ^{its} entire force of land-based medium bombers (approximately 60 planes), which were at notice at Formosan bases on and after 24 December. The greater part of the enemy vessels was sunk or rendered inoperative but those which attempted escape from the harbor prior to 24 December successfully ran away.

In the meantime, the army forces continued to advance rapidly to Manila sweeping ~~every thing~~ ^{everything} on ~~its~~ ^{their} ways and reached the Capital on 2 January 1942. This triumphal entry actually put period to the naval phase of ~~the~~ operations in the invasion of the PHILIPPINES.