Midway Operations

May - Jun. 1942


Through Instruction No. 126 to Japanese Government, 12 Oct 45, entitled "Institution for War Records Investigation", steps were initiated to exploit military historical records and official reports of the Japanese War Ministry and the Japanese General staff.* Upon the dissolution of the Mar Ministry and the General staff, and the transfer of their former functions to the Demobilization Bureau, the general research job continued and resulted in the development of a series of historical monographs. Detailed instructions covering the preparation of these monographs were included in Memoranda 15 December 1945 and 21 November 1946, subject "Japanese Operational Histories.",

The basic material contained in this operational record was developed by former officers, on duty in command and staff units within major units during the period of operations. It should be noted at once, that the enormous destruction by aerial bombardment and fire has practically wiped out the Tokyo records; much of this material was reconstructed from memory.

The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals, which are normally essential in the preparation of this type of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field operations or bombing raids rendered the task of compilation most difficult; particularly distressing has been the complete lack of official strength reports, normal in AG or G-3 records, however, while many of the important orders, plans and estimates have been reconstructed from memory and therefore are not textually identical with the originals, they are believed to be generally accurate and reliable. Further data as a result of continuing research and the occasional recovery of hitherto unavailable original documents will be covered in the subsequent publication of "supplements" by the demobilization bureau.

* The action under this memorandum and incidental detailed instructions, which followed, were initiated by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, GHQ, charges with responsibility for execution of the program under G.O. No. 9, SCAP, 2 October 1945.

In order to protect the interest of the United states, in the exploitation of Japanese Military Information, sub-paragraph 4 of G.O. No. 9 further provided for the screening of enemy documents and established inventories in Japanese Governmental archives. Careful examination of the first records submitted by the Japanese Government in the summer of 1946 detected a misconception on the part of the Japanese as to what should be included in comparative histories; in a memorandum issued by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, on 21 November 1946, the Imperial Japanese Government was directed to record the operations of the Japanese forces more extensively. The G-2 Section thereafter assumed coordination of the entire program, including the establishment of a small historical research section within the ATIS (Allied Translator and Interpreter Section.)





Note: Translation Requested by G-2 Historical Section. Received ATIS: 30 Aug 47.

Description of Contents: Midway Operations.

(TN * indicates exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.)

Midway Operations Contents


General Situation.



Outline of Topographical Data on MIDWAY



Details of Operational Plan.



Operational Preparation of the Imperial General Headquarters.



Operational Preparations of the Combined Fleet.


A. Operational Plans far the East Front of the PACIFIC Ocean.


B. Main Points of the Operational Plans.


1. Estimate of Enemy Situation in Midway Area.


2. Object of Operation.


3. Principles of Operation.


4. Strength and Dispositions of Various Units.


5. Standards of Actions and Dispositions of Various Units Against the Enemy in the Mi and AL Operations.



Other Operational Preparations.



Outline of Progress.


A. General Progress.


B. Reconnaissance Prior to Action.


1. Aircraft Reconnaissance (2 K Operation).


2. Submarine Reconnaissance.


C. Task Forces.


D. Main Body (Including Screening Units).


B. Occupation Forces.


1. Main Body of Occupation Forces.


2. Escort Forces (Including Occupation Units).


3. Support Echelon (Including Midway Bombarding Unit).


F. Other Units.


1. Base Air Force.


2. Advance Troops.






1. Calendar of Midway Operations.


2. Organisation of Participating Units and Names of Leading Commanders.



I. General Situation.

From the beginning of the war, our operations in the various areas were carried out with great success. Within four months after the outbreak of the war, we had occupied strategic positions in the Southern Region and assured ourselves of areas rich in natural resources. From March 1942, our troops, the nucleus of which was our task force, extended operations to the INDIAN Ocean and had great success. Simultaneously, preparations for operations in the SOLOMONS and NEW GUINEA were underway.

During this period, the enemy assumed the defensive on every front. They carried out only two small task-force attacks, one against the MARSHALL Islands on 1 Feb 42 and the other against our homeland on 18 April. On 7 and 8 May 42, our occupation units, on their way to attack PORT MORESBY, NEW GUINEA, encountered an enemy task force in the CORAL Sea, and damaged the enemy fleet considerably; however, our strategic objective was not accomplished.

The first stage of our operation ended as mentioned above. After May 1942, we attempted to continue offensive operations and to insure our victory. At the time, enemy units on land and sea were assuming the defensive, that enemy submarines were active near the homeland, causing heavy damages to our ships in the early part of May. A total of nine ships (45,000 tons) was sunk, more than in amy other month. This was equal to almost our entire loss for March and April.

II. Outline of Topographical Data on MIDWAY.

The situation in the latter part of April 1942, was as follows: A. General Information: MIDWAY is an atoll six miles in diameter. The two islands, SAND and EASTERN, consist of calcareous sand and are generally flat and thinly covered with tropical plants.

1. Defense: Before the outbreak of the war, one battalion of Marines (approximately 750 men) was stationed on the island. It is recognised that some forces have seem added since the outbreak of


the war. The island probably is protected by many fortresses, antiaircraft batteries, and searchlights. Land-planes, seaplanes, submarine bases, wireless stations, etc., are established. It is assumed that these establishments and barrier reefs will be of considerable obstacle to our landing.

C. Strategical Value: The atoll not only can be an important base for patrol when the enemy task force attempts to approach our homeland, but it is also the only base for carrying out direct attacks with large aircraft on WAKE Island which is now occupied by us. In the future, when we assume the offensive against the eastern front in the PACIFIC Ocean, this island, together with the ALEUTIANS, will, by its location, greatly hamper the activities of our fleet.

III. Details of the Plans for This Operation.

The first stage of this operation progressed more favorably than we had expected. As a result, the enemy bases on the first time were forced to retreat. Therefore, the probability of a direct attack by the enemy on our homeland has been greatly decreased. Any enemy attack would probably follow a route from the East, similar to that which the enemy took when its task force raided our homeland on 18 Apr 42. After the outbreak of the war, patrol lines ware established approximately 600 miles off the homeland, and were composed of an observation unit assigned to the northern troops in order to prepare for enemy attack from the eastern front of the PACIFIC. This observation unit carried out its duties in co-operation with patrol flights of base Air Force aircraft. However, full reliance could not be placed on them because of weather conditions and the capacities of the patrol boats. With the complete situation in mind, the plan was drawn up for capturing MIDWAY sad the western ALEUTIANS in order to strengthen the patrol far maintaining the inviolability of our homeland by establishing our bases outside of the present patrol lines. At the time, the Solomons area, the New Caledonia area, and the Indian Ocean area, in addition to an eastern front in the PACIFIC, were being considered as sites for a main operation, but because of the unyielding opposition


of the headquarters of the combined fleet, it was decided to carry out an eastern front operation in the PACIFIC.

IV. Operational Guidance.

Issued by the Imperial General Headquarters.

A. Issuance of the Attacking Order: As mentioned in the preceding section, an eastern front operation la the PACIFIC was decided. Therefore, on 5 May 42, Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Department, Order No 18 to capture MIDWAY and strategic western points in the ALEUTIANS, in co-operation with the Army, was issued to Combined Fleet Commander YAMAMOTO. On the same day, the agreement of the Army and Navy regarding the AF (MIDWAY) and AO (ALEUTIANS) Operations was announced by Imperial General Headquarters Order No 94 as follows (summary):

5 May 42.

1. Object of the Operation: By means of the capture of MIDWAY (including KIYUA* Island), we will check enemy task force attacks against our homeland from the Hawaii area. At the same time, we will destroy the enemy fleet which will appear when our operation is underway.

2. Principles of the Operation: The capture of MIDWAY will be carried out through the co-operation of the Army and Navy. At the same time, the capture of KIYUA* will be carried out by the Navy unit alone.

3. Outline of the Operation:

a. The Army and Navy, in co-operation with each other, will capture MIDWAY and will speedily establish land and sea air bases. To facilitate the Midway Operation, the capture of KIYUA will have been carried out by the Navy unit on the previous say.

b. The Navy will support the occupation force with its main force. Before the landing, an attack on MIDWAY will be carried out by means of carrier-based airplanes with the main object of destroying the air


forces on the island.

4. Commander and Forces Employed:

a. Navy:

Commander: The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.

Forces: The greater part of the Combined Fleet.

b. Army:

Commander: Detachment Commander IKKI. [Kana characters not included in this document.]

Forces: A nucleus of one infantry regiment.

5. Beginning of Operation: The operation will be begun in the early part of June or the middle of June, almost simultaneously with the Aleutian Operation.

6. Assembly Area and Date: The assembly area for the occupation forces will be SAIPAN. The date will be about 25 May. The Navy will take charge of protecting the Army unit from the port of embarkation to the assembly area.

a. Following the completion of the assembly, the 2 Fleet Commander will assume the command of the Army unit in regard to the operation.

b. During the landing and landing battle, the Army unit and the Naval landing party will carry out operations at the same point, and the senior commander will assume the command of the operation.

8. Defense Duties After the Occupation: The Naval unit will take charge of the defense of MIDWAY. The Army unit will withdraw from the island one week after the completion of the capture.

9. Communications: Communications will be based on the Army and Navy agreement regarding communications in the AL, MI, and F Operations.



10. Transport and Supply: The Navy will take charge of supplying the Army and evacuating patients.

11.  Maps to be Used: Hydrographic charts.

12. Time to be Used: Central Standard Time (TN Central Pacific time).

13.  Name of the Operation: This operation will be called the Midway Operation.

b. Partial Reorganisation of the Combined Fleet.

1. To strengthen the operation for the capture of MIDWAY and to prepare for the advances which will be made after its occupation, on 1 May 42 a special combined landing party was organised to be attached to the Combined Fleet. On 1 April, the 26 Air Squadron was organised to become a part of the 11 Air Fleet.

2. On 30 Apr 42, the carrier, HAYATAKA, was placed in commission, and joined the 4 Air Squadron.

C. Operational Objectives Abandoned: In the battle on 4 Jun 42 all four carriers of the 1 and 2 Air Squadrons were lost, so the difficulty in continuing the operation was recognized. On 11 Jul 42, the mission of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet to capture MIDWAY, which had been based on Imperial General Headquarters Order No 18, was canceled.

V. Operational Preparations of the Combined Fleet.

After the Hawaii Operations was over, the headquarters of the Combined Fleet was aboard the flagship YAMATO, which was in anchorage off HASHIRAJIMA, an island in the western part of the ISLAND Sea, and it assumed charge of general guidance of operations. At the same time, the headquarters made preparations for future operations.

In April 1942, as soon as operations in the INDIAN Ocean were completed, the strength of the surface units of the Combined Fleet was concentrated in the western part of the INLAND Sea. At the same time, the greater part of the base air force was disposed on the


eastern front of the PACIFIC, and operational preparations were steadily furthered in co-operation with the Army.

A. Operational Plans for the Pacific Eastern Front.

The operational plans for the eastern front in the PACIFIC in May 1942 were as follows: Though the Pacific operation will be carried out in two directions, one towards MIDWAY and the other towards the ALEUTIANS, they will operate together in one body, keeping close contact with each other. The most important objective of the operation may be said to be the attacking of strategic positions, but it is also the objective of this operation to destroy the enemy fleet which is expected to take advantage of this opportunity to counter attack. Therefore, the plan has been drawn ap with considerations of various dispositions in order to face, with the Combined Fleet, any enemy concentration in the Midway and Aleutian areas. All units will participate in this plan with the exception of 5sf (TN Carrier division), 2Ss (TN Submarine squadron), both of which are under repair, and 8Ss which are engaged in India-Australia area operations.

1. Operations in the Midway Area:

a. Main participating strength (greater part of the Combined Fleet) under the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief of GF (TS Combined Fleet).

1S (TN Battleship Div or Cruiser Div), the greater part of 1S and 3Sd (TN Destroyer squadron), the HOSHO. Under the Command of 2F (TN 2 fleet) commander.

Midway Occupation Force, 1D/4S (TN 1 Division/4S), 5S, 7S, 1D/3S, 2Sd, 4Sd, 11Sf, ZUIHO, 2 Combined Special Landing Party.

1KdB (TN Task force): 1Sf, 2Sf, 10S, 8S, 2D/3S.

SaB (TN Submarine force): 3Ss (TN Subsquad), 5Ss.

FBG (TN Base Air force): 22Sf, 24Sf, 25Sf, 26Sf.


b. Essentials of Operation: Before the landing of the occupation force, air raids will be carried out by KdB on MIDWAY to destroy enemy forces and defense equipment on the island. Occupation forces will capture the island with one stroke. At the same time, the destruction of the enemy fleet, which will counterattack, will be carried out. SaB will be disposed between the HAWAIIAN Islands and MIDWAY to prepare for the counterattack of the powerful enemy units which will come from the vicinity of HAWAII. KdB and the main force will wait for the opportunity to attack the enemy at sea, north or northeast of MIDWAY, while the occupation forces will await the opportunity to attack the enemy at sea south or southwest of MIDWAY.

c. Actions of Various Units: The 2 Combined Special Landing Party (two battalions, approximately 2,800 men) and the Ikki Detachment of the Army (one battalion, approximately 3,000 men commanded by the regiment commander) will depart from SAIPAN on the evening of 28 May, guarded by 2Sd and 7S, and will carry out the landing on 7 June. 1KdB will leave the western part of the INLAND Sea in the early morning of 27 May. At 0130 hours on 5 June, it will attack MIDWAY from the air. 1D/4S, 2D/3A, 5S, 4Sd, and the ZUIHO will leave the western part of the INLAND Sea at 0500 hours on 29 May. En route to MIDWAY, they will protect the units which will sail from SAIPAN. On the day of landing, they will advance to the south or southwest of MIDWAY to protect the landing units directly. The seaplane unit will occupy KIYUA* on 6 June and establish an air base there.


On the 7th, it will support the landing battle directly. The main unit will leave the western part of the INLAND Sea on 29 May. It will aid the various units on its way to MIDWAY. At the tine of the landing, it will advance to 60 c' (TN Presumably 600 miles) northwest of MIDWAY. FBG will carry out a comprehensive patrol flight to search for the enemy in conjunction with the action of the fleet. At the same time, the Pearl Harbor reconnaissance (K Operation) will be executed with ld x 2 (ld = large flying boat) from 31 May to 3 June. For one week after the landing, the ships, other than SsB, will operate in the vicinity of their stations awaiting the opportune moment, and will prepare to destroy the enemy float. After the equipment on land have been, for the most part, installed, the ships will return to the homeland to prepare for the next operation.

2. Defense after the Occupation of MIDWAY: The 2 Combined Special Landing Party (2,800 men) will remain. Ninety-four cannons of various types, 40 machine guns, six type A midget submarines, and five torpedo boats will be prepared. Preparations have been made to send four additional midget submarines, two quadruple torpedo tubes, and 12 20 cm guns in the middle of June and afterwards.

3. Operations in the Aleutian Area: The commander-in-chief of 5F will take charge of the direct command, but the commander-in-chief of GF will collaborate in this command in addition to having the command of the Midway area operations.

a. The Main Participating Strength: The main body, which will be directly commanded by the commander-in-chief of 5F: the NACHI.


2KbB: 4Sf, 2D/4S, and a few d's.

Attu Occupation Unit: half of 1Sd, Army north sea detachment.

Kiska Occupation Unit: 21S, a few d's.

SsB: 1Ss.

FEG: fd x 6.

Support Echelon: 2S, 9S and dg x 2 (TN Des Div) under the direct command of the commander-in-chief of 1F, which will act as GB.

b. Essentials of Operation: Same as in the Midway Operations.

c. Operations of the Various Units: The submarine force advanced beforehand. A part of it engaged in reconnaissance activities in the Seattle area on strategic points in the ALEUTIANS, while another part remained on the alert, as usual. It was planned that the 2 Mobile Unit start from OMINATO on 26 May, head for the south of DUTCH HARBOR, attack the port on 4 June, and attack KISKA and ADAK on 6 June.

Earlier, the Attu Invasion Force will have launched a sudden attack on strategic points on ADAK and KANAGA* on 28 May with Military units, sent from OMINATO, and Marine corps personnel aboard various ships in order to destroy enemy installations completely. On about the 8th, they will withdraw from the islands in order to capture ATTU.

The Kiska Invasion Force will leave from OMINATO on the 28th for PARAMUSHIRO where supplies will be picked up. The force will leave there on 3 June and land on KISKA on the 7th. For the most part, the main force will combine with the Kiska Invasion Units and advance to the waters south of ADAK and aid in the overall campaign --9--

The screening force will, in general, combine with 7 Squadron to attack from the western part of the INLAND Sea on 29 May. If the necessity arises. they will advance to a point about 500 miles south of KISKA to support the northern forces.

4. Operations after the Fall of KISKA and ATTU: Within a week after the attack, each unit will adopt suitable measures for its station, and KISKA will be supervised by the Navy and ATTU by the Army. The forces to be stationed on KISKA will consist of 300 special Marine troops, eight guns, and four machine guns soon after the conquest of the island, and four Type A midget submarine and one firing tube (four-chambered) will be dispatched on or after the 7th.

5. Enemy Intelligence: Within the Aleutian Zone, nothing can be seen of the enemy's fleet, aircraft, or major installations. Except in the Dutch Harbor area, their defenses are negligible as observed before. Enemy military strength in the Hawaiian area consists of the fleet, made up of two depot-ships as its main force. This was organized soon after the Coral Sea Battle and was removed to the east of the SOLOMONS, although they are supposedly remaining in the South Seas area. Our forces carried out submarine reconnaissance in the vicinity of strategic enemy locations, but the enemy was not sighted. Yesterday's cable reports that their Mobile units presumably arrived at a point south of the SOLOMONS. Towards the end of May, one or two of their planes attacked TULAGI. These two items indicate that some of their depot-ships are still in the South Sees area, but others may be back in HAWAII.

Fog is a greet nuisance in the Aleutian campaign. We are now in the midst of the year's most favorable


period for war activities, but the possibility of fog must be taken into consideration. The Midway area, on the other hand, it an area of favorable weather conditions. Due to bad weather, operations in the Aleutian area may be delayed somewhat, but the attacks in the Midway area will be carried out as planned.

6. Final Operations of the Campaign:

a. All units engaged in Midway Operation, except the main and submarine forces, will assemble in the Truk area, on or about 20 June, to prepare for the next campaign which will be carried out in early July. The main force will return to the homeland about 20 June, or may proceed to TRUK in order te support in the next campaign. The submarine force will continue its Hawaiian operation for the time being from the air base at MIDWAY.

b. The majority of the forces participating in the Aleutians Operation will return to OMINATO, and the screening force will return, either to OMINATO or to Tokyo Bay, in order to protect transportation units within the Midway and the Aleutians areas, and prepare for enemy activities in the waters east of the homeland during the next phase of the war. The submarine force will continue the Aleutians Operation.

B. Main Points of Progress in Midway Operations.

1. Estimation of Enemy Position in the Midway Area.

a. Enemy air strength:

Patrol seaplanes: two companies (about 24 planes)

Army bombers: one company (about 12 planes).

Air fighters: one company (about 20 planes).

The above are approximate numbers which may possibly be doubled.


b. Enemy air patrols in the western zone are carried out continually day and night at a distance of as much as 600 miles. Moreover, units consisting of two or three fighters are on constant patrol duty.

c. Several patrol seaplanes are active in nearby waters; and some submarines are probably active in the western area.

d. The aircraft carrier RANGER is said to be active in the ATLANTIC. Some PsW are of the opinion that the LEXINGTON has been sunk, but others say that she is now under repair on the west coast.

e. In the PACIFIC, the ENTERPRISE and the HORNET are still active, while the status of the WASP is not certain.

f. Special aircraft carriers which have already been completed are calculated to number about six, half of which are presumed to be active in the PACIFIC, area though their strength has been weakened. They are unfit for active duty.

g. Enemy air forces in HAWAII are able to provide rapid reinforcements to the Midway area. They are as follows:

Flying boats: About 60.

Bombers: about 100.

Fighters: about 200.

h. Enemy fleet units in the Hawaiian area are scheduled to advance if MIDWAY is attacked. The units are made up as follows:

Aircraft carriers: two or three.

Special carriers: two or three.

Battleships: two.

Heavy cruisers: four or five.

Light cruisers: three or four.


Light cruisers (TN Atlanta class): four.

Destroyers: about 30.

Submarines: 25.

1. Preparations for Defense in MIDWAY: Various cannons, dual-purpose guns, and machine guns are in great numbers, and Marine Corps troops (about 750) have been dispatched to aid in the defense.

2. Objective of Operation! The purpose of the operation in to capture MIDWAY, to advance our positions in order to check enemy activities from that direction, and to destroy the enemy fleet which might launch an attack otherwise.

3. The Main Points of the Operation.

a. The Main force.

(1) The main force will reach a point approximately 600 miles northwest of MIDWAY in order to support attacking units most conveniently.

(2) The security detachment will be separated from the main force by a special order, and will advance to a point about 500 miles south of KISKA to aid the northern units.

(3) The main force will execute an enveloping _attack when the enemy fleet advances.

b. Task force: The task force will advance to a point approximately 250 miles northwest of MIDWAY at daybreak, two days before the attack, and will support the attacking units by carrying out air raids against the island, destroying enemy air units, fleet, and base installations. Afterwords, they will engage in mopping up operations against the enemy fleet as opportunities arise. When an air base on MIDWAY is completed, fighters, now carrier-based, will be ordered to assemble there.

c. Invasion Units.


(1) The main force will reach a point approximately 400 miles west of MIDWAY at daybreak of the day preceding the attack. From then on, maintaining close liaison with the main force and mobile units, they will turn their attack toward the South Seas to bring about an enveloping attack on the enemy and support the operations of the other forces.

(2) Other units will co-operate with the aerial campaign of the mobile units in order to advance rapidly to KIYUA*, and, with a force consisting of seaplanes as its main factor, will have subjugated the island on the previous day to facilitate the movement of the seaplane units. They, successively, will occupy SAND and EASTERN Islands at daybreak of the appointed day with Marine forces, escorting parties, and their own strength in order to complete defense end base installations. d. Base Air Units.

(1) The main force will be deployed on the eastern front. While current operations are being continued, a portion of the forces will complete base installations on MIDWAY.

(2) After the fall of MIDWAY, one unit of fighters, land-based attack planes, and seaplanes will be dispatched immediately towards this area to engage in patrol operations against the enemy in the eastern sector over a wide area, and will aid in the defense of the island.

e. Advance Troops.

(1) Five days before the appointed day, one submarine squadron will advance along the coast of NORTH


AMERICA, or strategic points in the ALEUTIANS, and another, together with Submarine No 59, will advance to a point between HAWAII and MIDWAY to co-operate with both the attacking units and northern troops.

(2) Some of the submarines will engage in surprise attacks on the enemy fleet and in destructive operations against sea traffic in the areas of the INDIAN Ocean, South AFRICA, AUSTRALIA, and NEW ZEALAND.

f. Northern Troops.

Troops in the North will capture KISKA and ATTU on the appointed day, and capture the enemy fleet. 4. Disposition of Strength of Each Force.


a. Main force.





Battleship Mt.

Commander-in-chief of Combined Fleet.

1 Battleship Div.

2 Battleship Div.

1) Support the whole operation.

2) Exterminate enemy fleet.

Cruiser Div.

Commander of 9 Cruiser Div.

9 Cruiser Div.

Destroyer Sqn.

Commander of 3 Destroyer Sqn.

3 Destroyer Sqn.

One destroyer flotilla and a half of the 1 Destroyer Sqn.

Aircraft Carrier Unit

Captain of HOSHO.


Ono destroyer of the 1 Destroyer Sqn.

Special Duty Unit

Captain of CHIYODA.



1 Supply Unit

Captain of special duty ship, NARUTO.


TOEI Maru.


2 Supply Unit

Superintendent of the SANKUREMENTE* Maru


TA Maru.

One destroyer of the 1 Destroyer Sqn.


b. Screening Force (in case of maneuvering away from the main force).





Main unit

Commander-in-chief of 1 fleet.

2 Battleship Div.

1. Support northern Force.

2. Exterminate enemy fleet.

Screening unit

Commander of 9 Cruiser Div.

9 Cruiser Div.

24 Destroyer Flotilla (excluding one destroyer). 27 Destroyer Flotilla (excluding one destroyer). 20 Destroyer Flotilla.

Supply unit

Commanding Officer of SANKUREMENTE* Maru.


One destroyer of the 1 Destroyer Sqn.


c. Task Force.





Air attack force.

Commander-in-chief of 1 Air Fleet.

1 Air Fleet (excluding 4 and 5 Aircraft Carrier Divisions and 10 Cruiser Div).

Exterminate enemy fleet.

Support occupation force.

Support force.

Commander of 8 Cruiser Div.

8 Cruiser Div.

Two sections of the 3 Battleship Div.

Exterminate enemy fleet.

Protect air attack force.

Screening unit.

Commander of 10 Cruiser Div.

10 Cruiser Div (excluding the 7 Destroyer Flotilla).

4 Destroyer Flotilla.

Take precautions.

Exterminate enemy fleet.

Supply force

1 Supply Unit.

Captain of special duty ship, KYOKUTO Maru.




2 Supply Unit.

Under direct control of Commander-in-chief of 1 Air Fleet


2 KYOEI Maru



d. Occupation force.





Main unit

Commander-in-chief of 2 Fleet.

4 Cruiser Div, 3 Battleship Div (excluding the two SHOTAI), 4 Destroyer Sqn (excluding two destroyer flotillas), ZUIHO, MIKAZUKI, three transports.

Support the whole operation.

Escort unit

2 Destroyer Sqn.

2 Destroyer Sqn. (excluding one destroyer), one minesweeper flotilla, one subchaser div, one motor torpedo boat, one patrol boat, 16 transports.

1) Escort occupation unit.

2) Capture MIDWAY and assist arrangements for camping.

Occupation unit

Commander of 2 Combined SNLF (Special Naval Landing Force).

2 Combined SNLF, one construction battalion, one survey unit, one Army detachment.

1) Capture SAND and EASTERN Islands.

2) Make arrangements for camping at the base.

Support unit

Commander of 7 Cruiser Div.

7 Cruiser Div, 8 Destroyer flotilla, one transport.

Support escort unit.

Air group

Commander of 11 Aircraft Carrier Div.

11 Aircraft Carrier Div,


One destroyer of the 2 Destroyer Sqn.

35 Patrol Boat.

1) Capture KYUA* Island.

2) Co-operate with occupation unit in landing battles.

3) Anti-submarine screen, patrol and attack.


e. Base Air Force





Disposition of forces

2 Air Attack Force.

Commander of the 22 Air Wing Div.

22 Air Wing Div.

Truk Area: about half of the division.

TOKYO Bay Area: about half of the division.

1. Patrol each area and destroy enemy air strength

2. Contact and exterminate enemy task (occupation) force.

3. Assail and exterminate enemy fleet moving in the main operational area.

4. 4 and 6 Air Attack Forces cooperate with each other in the MIDWAY operation.

After the fell of MIDWAY, a greater part of the large flying boats of the 4 Air Attack Force, a greater part of the fighter planes of the 6 Air Attack Force, and a part of its lead attack

4 Air Attack Force.

Commander of the 24 Air Wing Div.

24 Air Wing Div.

Marshall Area: a greater part of the division.

Wake-Gilbert Area: a part of the division.

5 Air Attack Force

Commander of the

25 Air Wing Div.

25 Air Wing Div.

Rabaul Area: a greater part of the division.

Solomons Area: a part of the division.

6 Air Attack Force.

Commander of the 26 Air Wing Div.

26 Air Wing Div.

Kisarasu Area: a greater part of the division.

Minamitori Island Area: a part of the division.

34 Destroyer Flotilla

Commander of the 34 Destroyer Flotilla

34 Destroyer Flotilla

Disposed by another order.

1. Guard bases.

2. Escort ships.

3. Co-operate in transferring bases.

Transport and supply force.

Captain or superintendent of each warship or ship

19 transports

Disposed by another order.

Transport and supply.


(2) Midway Expeditionary Air Force.





3 Force.

Fighter plane force.

Commander of the 6 Air Group

36 fighter planes.

1. Exterminate attacking enemy planes.

2. Assailing and exterminating the enemy warships which come to the attack.

Medium attack plane force.

Commander of the medium attack plane unit dispatched by the Misawa Air Group.

Nine single-seat land attack planes.

1. Assail sad exterminate attacking enemy warships.

2. Patrol and search for the enemy.

Flying boat force.

Commander the flying boat unit dispatched by the 14 Air Group.

Six 10-place flying boats.

1. Patrol and search for the enemy.

2. Exterminate and reconnoiter military establishments and strength on OAHU Island.

3. Assail and exterminate attacking enemy warships.


f. Northern Force.





Main unit.

Commander-in-chief of the 5 fleet.

NACHI, 2 Sections of the 21 Destroyer flotilla.

Support the whole operation.

2 Task force.

Commander of the 4 Carrier Div..

4 Carrier Div.

2 Sections of the 4 Cruiser Div.

7 Destroyer flotilla.

One transport.

Make air raids on DUTCH HARBOR and other important areas.

Capture end exterminate the enemy fleet.

Attu Occupation Force.

Commander of the 1 Destroyer Sqn.

1 Destroyer Sqn. (excluding 3 destroyer flotillas).

Others omitted.

Capture ATTU.

Kiska Occupation Force.

Captain of the KISO

21 Div.

Others omitted.

Capture KISKA.

Submarine force.

Commander of the 1 Submarine Sqn.

1 Submarine Sqn.

Keep watch on important enemy areas.

Search for enemy fleet and attack it.

Seaplane force.

Captain of the KIMIKAWA Mara.

KIMIKAWA Maru. One destroyer

Co-operate in the landing operation.

Search for the enemy.

Base air force.

Commander of the TOKO Air Detachment.

Six flying boats, four transports.

Search for the enemy and attack it.

Patrol force.

Commander of the 22 Div.


Ogasawara Force.

Commander of the 7 Base Force


Attached force.

Under the direct control of the Commander-in-chief.



5. Standard operating procedure and disposition of each unit for the Midway and Aleutians operations (Selected from top secret order of battle No 14 of the Combined Fleet.)

a. The standard operating procedure for each unit for the Midway and Aleutians operations was prearranged as written in the appended chart. (Refer to appended chart.)

h. Disposition in readiness for the Midway and Aleutians operations: The disposition in readiness from the beginning of the campaign of occupation of strategic points to seven days after the appointed date was decided as follows:

(1) Disposition plan No 1: When any powerful enemy forces appear, advance and attack them.

If no special order is issued, this disposition will be followed.

(2) Disposition plan No 2: Lure powerful enemy forces to a familiar strategic point in an occupied area and annihilate them. (Deployment of forces.)



Main Force

1 Task force

2 Task force

Advance Units


Main unit

Security Detachment

Plan No 1.

Six hundred miles northwest of Air fleet.

Five hundred miles north of main malt.

Three hundred miles east of the main unit.

Three hundred miles east of the Security Detachment.

3 Submarine Squadron -deploy to A line.

Submarine Squadron -deploy to B line.

1 Submarine Squadron -deploy to D line.

Same as Plan No 1.

The C line may be used by special order.

Plan No. 2.

Each group will be located at a point 2000 miles west of the respective points indicated in plan No 1.


(1) Each group will operate within a range of 100 miles from the respective points designated.

(2) If it becomes important to observe the enemy's situation in the Seattle area, a part of 1 Submarine Squadron will continue this duty.

(3) The Commander of the Assault Group will decide the group's entire operation.


6. If powerful enemy forces appear and operate in the area west of 160 degrees, west longitude, apprehend and attack them according to the following operational instructions:

a. Tactics A (for attack on enemy fleet):

(1) The Task Forces and Submarine Squadrons will advance to search for the enemy. If necessary, the remaining units will assist these forces.

(2) If no special order is issued, these tactics will be employed.

b. Tactics B:

(1) Each unit deployed according to disposition plan No 1 or No 2 will await the enemy at its station. Submarine squadrons will carry out tracking tactic repeatedly against the enemy forces.

(2) The task forces will advance to search for and annihilate the enemy at the opportune time. The recoiling units will assist the task forces.

c. Tactics C:

(1) When a powerful concentration of enemy chips advances westward, all our forces will carry out a decisive battle against this enemy group as decided in the operational plan.

(2) The Commander of the 1 Task force will command both the 1 and 2 Task Forces. The commander of the advance unit will command the 1, 2, and 3 Submarine Squadrons.

(3) The 1 fleet, which operates in the northern area will join the main group.

Note: In carrying out A or B tactic, 40 degrees north latitude will be the boundary line which will separate the respective operational areas for the


1 Task Force (3 and 5 Submarine Squadrons) and the 2 Task force (1 Submarine Squadron). However, if the enemy should operate in the intermediate zone, both task forces shall co-operate in attacking the enemy.

VI. Other Operational Preparations.

A. Ship Radar Equipment.

At the outbreak of the war, the Navy did not have ship radar. As a result of earnest study and progress in preparations, the Navy finally completed the installation of radar equipment on the battleships, ISE and HYUGA, on 27 May, just prior to the beginning of this operation. The radar range was about 60 to 100 km at that time.

B. Basing Type 13 Experimental Carrier-borne Bombers on Our Carriers.

From the beginning of the war, reconnaissance planes for carriers were recognised as having great importance. Considering the importance of this operation, two Type 13 carrier-based bombers (water-cooled engines, twin cockpit), which had been under experimentation, were placed aboard the SORYU, a carrier attached to the 2 Air Squadron, as reconnaissance planes. (At that time, the Type 13 plane was superior in its characteristics to any of the enemy carrier-based planes in actual service and was able to carry out its duties satisfactorily.)

VII. Outline of operational progress.

A. General Progress.

The greater part of the Combined Fleet, which was to participate in this operation, had been engaged in maneuver in the INDIAN Ocean in March and April 1942, and the remaining part of the Combined Fleet had engaged the Battle of the Coral Sea in early May. Moreover, these ships had been ordered to attack the enemy task forces which bombed the homeland in an air raid on 18 Apr 42. For these reasons, these Naval forces could not return to the homeland to prepare for this operation before late April.


As a result of a series of major operations during the half year following the outbreak of the war, the Navy had been forced to carry out large-scale replenishments and replacements of crews, and to maintain its ships and planes, and was kept very busy. Therefore, our forces still could not assemble by mid-May. Such circumstances interfered extremely with the training of not only the fleet itself, but with the individual ships, and, especially, the plane unit of the task force.

Furthermore, units which were to participate in this operation did not have sufficient time for a thorough study of the operation. Finally, the task force was forced to set out for the operation with a mere briefing of the plans of the Combined Fleet.

In late May, when the Combined Fleet rehearsed the operation through use of a map, the various units suggested postponing the date on which to commence the operation and change the assembling point of the assault groups. However, the commander of the Combined Fleet decided to carry out the operation according to the scheduled plan.

The 1 Task force left the INLAND Sea on 27 May, and the main group and the assault group left the ISLAND Sea on 29 May. The convoy attached to the assault group, which had changed the originally-planned assembly point from TRUK to SAIPAN, deported from SAIPAN on 28 May. For information concerning the remaining units, refer to the daily report of the Midway Operations.

At the beginning of this operation, a number of enemy submarines appeared in the vicinity of the home islands. On 29 May, when our main group set out for the operation, two enemy submarines were sighted off Bungo Straits. On 30 May, a patrol plane from WAKE Island sighted two other enemy submarines in the area north of WAKE Island. According to the report on enemy submarine activities of 2 June, at least 16 enemy submarines were sighted after 29 May, including six in the vicinity of the homeland, four in the area northeast of WAKE Island, and four in the area around TRUK.

On 4 June, a day before the took force attacked MIDWAY, our convey was attacked by enemy patrol planes. Meanwhile, our K Operation,


which called far reconnaissance and attack on the Hawaiian Islands, was finally suspended because of the strict guard maintained by the enemy and because accurate information could not be obtained.

On 5 June, our task force, ea route, carried out an attack on MIDWAY Island. On the same day, a task force engaged with an enemy task force, and our carriers were heavily damaged. Therefore, the assault on MIDWAY Island had to be called off. On the other hand, the 7 Squadron, which was dispatched in order to bombard MIDWAY Island, had an accident which was followed by enemy attack and the MIKUMA (heavy cruiser) was lost and the MOGAMI (heavy cruiser) was severely damaged.

The details of the activities of each of our units will be discussed in the following.

1. Reconnaissance Prior to Operations.

1. Aerial Reconnaissance. (The second K Operation.) a. Outline: The second K Operational plan provided that Type 2 seaplanes from Wodje Base in the MARSHALL Islands would get fuel supply from our submarines stationed at FRENCH FRIGATE Atoll and reconnoiter PEARL HARBOR. Preparations were being made for this operation. However, since the submarines stationed at FRENCH FRIGATE Atoll reported that enemy seaplanes were keeping on close watch ever FRENCH FRIGATE Atoll, the operation was temporarily suspended. As the enemy continue to keep close observation, the Commander of the Base Air Unit ordered the operation dropped. As a result of this suspension, the only chance of reconnaissance against enemy task forces was lost.

b. Plans: following an order issued by the Combined Fleet to complete observation of the strength of the enemy sea force at PEARL HARBOR by late May or early June (by about 3 June), the Commander of the Base Air


Unit ordered the Commander of the 24 Air Squadron to send several Type 2 heavy seaplanes, together with some submarines, at an opportune time to carry out the above-mentioned mission. In compliance with the above order, arrangements between the headquarters aboard the KATORI, anchored at KWAJALEIN, on 19 May. The agreement regarding the second K Operation was as follows:

(1) The appointed date for reconnaissance: This will be carried out on "P Day" (31 May). If the attention in unfavorable, it will be postponed, and if it is impossible by 3 June, this operation will be suspended.

(2) Seaplanes and submarines to be employed:

(a) Two Type 2 seaplanes.

(b) Three submarines of the 13 Submarine Group and three submarines of the 3 Submarine Group.

(3) Operation of seaplanes: At 0000 hours on "P" Day leave Wodje Base. At 1430 hours, arrive at FRENCH FRIGATE (sunset time on this day is 1447 hours). The planes will receive approximately 10 tons of fuel from the submarines at 1600 hours and leave FRENCH FRIGATE. From 2045 hours to 2115 hours, carry out reconnaissance on PEARL HARBOR (attack the enemy if possible). At 0910 hours on "PH" Day, flying boats will return to Wodje Base.

(4) Duty and disposition of the submarines:

(a) Supply for seaplanes: Supply ships, "I" No. 121. "I" No. 123, and "I" No 122. (TN "I" indicates submarine.)


Supply points: A point 330 degress and 1.7 miles from the first PELOS Island. A point 170 degrees and 2.5 miles from the second PELOS Island. A point 260 degrees and 6.5 miles from the third PELOS Island.

(b) Radio guide beam: The submarine "I" No 71, deployed at appointed point "M" (19 degrees north, 174 degrees and 26 minutes west) will transmit a radio guide beam.

(c) Crash boats (to rescue crews of planes which have made forced landings): Submarine "I" No 74 will be positioned at appointed point N (200 degrees and 20 minutes off CAPS KEAHOLE in the Hawaiian Islands as an emergency boat.

(d) Observation of PEARL HARBOR (also reports on weather conditions in the vicinity of PEARL HARBOR): Submarine "I" No 75 (at a point 80 miles southwest of Oahu Island).

(5) Submarines Role in Operations.

(a) Radio guide beam: A radio beam will be transmitted, covering the designated area from 30 minutes before to 30 minutes after the seaplanes fly past appointed point M. (The seaplanes will pass point M at 0330 hours.)

(b) If fuel supply is difficult to obtain from FRENCH FRIGATE as scheduled, due to enemy interference, the commander of the seaplanes will follow the following three plans, taking the amount of reserve fuel into consideration. The commander will inform of his emergency decision to the submarines concerned


The First Plan: After the attack on PEARL HARBOR, the seaplanes will stop at FRENCH FRIGATE for refueling and will return to Wodje Base.

The Second Plan: After the attack on PEARL HARBOR, the crash boats will collect the crews of crashed seaplanes.

The Third Plan: If, at FRENCH FRIGATE, it is difficult to obtain fuel supply due to enemy interference and if it seems impossible to reconnoiter PEARL HARBOR with the fuel on hand, request the submarine at point M, either the same night or the next morning, to transmit a radio guide beam and to pick up crew members.

(c) Weather reports: The day before "P" Day, each submarine will report to the 24 Carrier Division regarding weather conditions in its own area (point M, point N, "I" 123, FRENCH FRIGATE).

Time of transmission


The first time

The second time


1206 hours

1808 hours

Point M.

1236 hours

1818 hours

Point N.

1505 hours

1838 hours

(6) If it seems impossible to secure fuel supply at FRENCH FRIGATE because of strict enemy patrol, K Operation will be canceled.

(7) Any change in the date of "P" Day will be decided by the commander of the 24 Carrier Division. He will inform those concerned by 2100 hours on the day before the scheduled "P" Day.


(B) Refer to the instructions of the 6 Fleet regarding communications.

c. Outline of operational progress:

29 May: The commander of the 14 Air Unit advanced to WODJE Island in order to assume command of the second K Operation.

30 May: At 1540 hours, the following report was received from Submarine "I" No 123 (stationed at FRENCH FRIGATE Atoll): "Strictly watched by enemy. No possibility seen. Two enemy ships sighted at 1444 hours." The Commander of the 24 Air Squadron issued the following order: "'P' Day to be postponed one day because of strict enemy observance. 1630 hours."

31 May: The following two reports were transmitted from FRENCH FRIGATE at 1655 hours and 1656 hours, respectively. "One enemy seaplane sighted off French Frigate Bay. 1644 hours." "One enemy seaplane sighted. 1610 hours." Due to these reports, the Commanders of the 11 Air Fleet and the 24 Air Squadron jointly issued, at 2123 hours, an order to cancel K Operation.

2. Reconnaissance by submarine: Submarine No 168 conducted reconnaissance in the vicinity of MIDWAY Island from midnight, 1 June, to noon, 2 June, and made the following reports

a. During the whole day and night, patrol flights over the French frigate area, by at least 14 heavy and light enemy planes have already been observed.

b. What appeared to be a patrol boat was sighted in the area south of SAND Island.

c. A number of cranes were sighted on French Frigate atoll. It seems that the enemy is constructing war


equipment there. Furthermore, it seems as if the enemy air unit has been closely patrolling the area 600 miles southwest of MIDWAY Island.

c. Task Forces.

1. A task force left KATSURASHIMA (located in Hiroshima Bay in the INLAND Sea) at 0600 hour, on 27 May, and advanced to the water, northwest of MIDWAY via the first line. (See sketch map of action).

2. The task force sent a radio signal at 1030 hour, on 3 June. Supplies were assembled on 1 and 2 June, but the field of vision gradually diminished. From about 1000 hours on 2 June, a dense fog prevailed, so navigation was continued through the fog until about 2300 hours on 3 June. Daring this period, it was impossible to use visual signaling equipment. Consequently, the task force headed far MIDWAY at 1030 hours, 3 June, and was obliged to send a long-wave radio signal concerning its course. This took place at the change of course when the task force was to contact the enemy. (The circumstances at the time were such that if the task force were to advance along a predetermined course and wait for weather conditions to improve, it would have been late for N Operation.)

3. The Task Force was probably discovered by the enemy on the 4th.

a. The task force intercepted a radio signal (presumably that of an enemy patrol plane) at close range, at 1510 hours on the 4th. It was reported by TONE that about 10 enemy planes were recognised at a bearing of 260 degrees. Three planes from the AKAGI were dispatched immediately to attack the enemy, but they could not locate the planes, so it was assumed that the report was a mistake.


b. The AKAGI, on the 4th at about 2330 hours discovered an object believed to be a contact plane of the enemy, which was glimpsed twice through the clouds and which prompted the warship to prepare for immediate action. However, the enemy could not be sighted, so it was assumed that the AKAGI had been mistaken.

4. Evaluation of the situation as made by the commanding officer of the teak force before the air raid on MIDWAY.

a. Although the enemy appeared to lack fighting spirit, it would be prepared to make counterattacks against us when our offensive operation begins.

b. The activities of the enemy were concentrated mainly in the southern and western regions, and not so much in the northwest and northern regions.

e. We estimated the lookout range of the enemy to be approximately 500 nautical miles.

d. We assumed that the enemy did not know of our attempt, at least not until the early morning of the 5th. The enemy believed that they had not yet been discovered by us.

e. We did not presume an enemy aircraft carrier to be in the vicinity of our forces.

f. We assumed that after we had attacked MIDWAY, had damaged the air base, and had co-operated with the Army in the landing operations, it would be possible for us to win even if the enemy launched a counteroffensive against us.

g. It would be possible for us to repel counterattacks by enemy air-based aircraft with escort fighters, flying at high altitude, and with defensive gun fire.

5. Air raid against MIDWAY on the 5th.

At 0130 hours on the 5th, 36 ship-based fighters, 36 ship-


based bombers, and 36 ship-based torpedo-carrying assault planes were dispatched under the direct command of Capt TOMONAGA, the commanding officer of the Hiryu air unit, to attack MIDWAY. Shortly after, contact was made with enemy flying boats by our unit, and when the assault unit was within 30 nautical miles of its objective, the above mentioned flying boats dropped parachute flares to guide, it is presumed, enemy fighters escorting the flying boats in the upper altitudes. Thereafter, aerial combat became severe, from 0345 to 0410 hours, we shot down 50 fighters (this includes nine planes about which we are uncertain), two light bombers, one heavy bomber, and one reconnaissance plane. We did not see any more planes on the ground, so we concentrated on bombing military installations and destroyed a port of them by fire. After this, we returned home with two ship-based fighters, one ship-based bomber end three ship-based torpedo-carrying assault planes, at about 0600 hours.

Organisation of the Military Assault Unit


Commanding Officer

Military power


1 Group

3 Attacking Party

Commander of Hiryu Flying Corps

Leader of Soryu

f 18

fb x 36

One Hiryu ship-based torpedo carrying assault plane returned dam to engine trouble without completing mission.

4 Attacking Party

Direct Control

f 18

2 Group

11 Attacking Party

Leader of Akagi Squad

fb 18

fb x 36

12 Attacking Party

Leader of Kaga Squad

fb 18

3 Group

1 Air Command Party

Leader of Akagi Squad

fc 9

fc x 36

2 Air Command Party

Leader of Kaga Squad

fc 9

3 Air Command Party

Leader of Soryu Squad

fc 9

4 Air Command Party

Leader of Hiryu Squad

fc 9


Note: fo . . . Ship-based (or carrier-based) fighter.

fb . . . Ship-based bomber.

fc . . . Ship based torpedo-carrying assault plane.

6. Actual situation of enemy forces on MIDWAY on that day. It it presumed that the enemy anticipated our assault, for enemy torpedo-carrying assault planes and flying boats and about 50 fighter, (all of them GRUMMAN's) were sent against us. Before our first assault unit reached the target, our unit was attacked about 30 nautical miles from the objective. As soon as we assumed a serious counteroffensive, the enemy began to evade us. Thereafter, our carrier-based torpedo-carrying assault planes and bombers did not receive any damage through aerial combat, and a majority of the enemy air defense fighters were destroyed by our forces. Antiaircraft fire from the ground was so intense that we lost four planes. We dropped 12 No 80 land bombs (Note: bombs primarily used against land target) at two places on the airstrip, but they did little damage. The actions of the large land-planes became quite frequent later on.

(Annotation) Data concerning MIDWAY according to information from PsW:

a. Marine corps: About 5,000 Marines.

b. Airplanes: About 150 planes.

fighters (BUFFALO's as well as GRUMMAN's): 55.

Bombers (DOUGLAS B-17): 50.

Flying boats (CONSOLIDATED PBY): 30

e. Defensive batteries were located all around the island.

d. Five torpedo beats were in the harbor.

a. The Eastern Island airport was located at the northern end of the Island and was constructed in a triangular shape. The runway was 200 foot wide and 3,000 feet



f. Every morning, flying boats were sent out on patrol which lasted 14 hours and covered an area within 700 nautical-mile radius of the field.

7. Air reconnaissance in the south and east areas. During the time from 0130 to 0200 hours, one carrier-based torpedo-carrying assault plane each from the AKAGI and the KAGA, two Zero-type fleet reconnaissance planes each from the TONE and the CHIKUMA (range of advance, 300 nautical miles, and lateral distance, 40 nautical miles to port), and one type 95 float reconnaissance plane from the HARUNA (advance range 150 nautical miles, lateral range 40 nautical miles to port) were dispatched to search for the enemy to the south and east of the task force. However, the departure of the TONE, as well as the CHIKUMA was greatly delayed, and the sixth search plane returned at 0235 hours because of poor weather conditions.

8. Enemy flying boats contacted.

From about 0230 hours, two or three flying boats of the enemy came into contact with our task force.

9. Equipment of the 2 Assault unit converted.

After the 1 Assault Unit departed, the carrier-based torpedo-carrying assault planes ware equipped with torpedo armaments as a precautionary measure against the surface naval craft of the enemy. At 0415 hours, according to the commanding officer of the Midway assault unit, it was reported that it had been necessary to resume the second attack at 0400 hours. (At the time of the first attack, enemy planes had already departed from their base. Therefore, the attack was not as effective as it should have been.) It was decided to direct the second attack towards MIDWAY, and the torpedo armaments of the


carrier-based torpedo-carrying assault planes were ordered to be shifted to No 80 land bombers.

10. Repulsion of enemy assault planes.

From about 0400 hours to 0650 hours, we were raided by the enemy continuously and persistently, but the majority of the enemy planes were shot down by our defense fire and our fighters. By 0650 hours, all enemy planes were out of sight. We, in the meantime, had successfully evaded a torpedo and bomb attack by the enemy. The details of the enemy raid and of our counterattack are as follows:

a. Our reconnaissance planes discovers naval surface crafts of the enemy: At about 0500 hours, the first message in respect to the discovery of the enemy, dispatched by the Tone planes of the fourth search line, which was reported to be greatly delayed, was received: "Ten craft resembling the enemy's were sighted at 0428 hours at a compass point 10 degrees and 240 nautical miles off MIDWAY, on a compass course of 150 degrees, and proceeding at a speed of 20 knots." We received reports twice, at 0440 hours in respect to the weather and at 0455 hours regarding the compass course and speed of the enemy, but we did not receive any other information. Therefore, at 0500 hours, we requested information on the type of naval ship.

b. It was ascertained that enemy aircraft carriers had begun operation. At 0509 hours, the Tone plane reported that "the enemy power was composed of five cruisers and five destroyers." At 0530 hours, it was reported that the enemy was accompanied by something resembling an aircraft carrier end this was reported again at about 0540 hours. Two cruiserlike craft at a point 8 degrees and 250 nautical miles off MIDWAY, on a compass course of 150


degrees and cruising at a speed of 20 knots, were reported at 0530 hours, the following report was made by the commanding officer of the task force to the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet, when it was ascertained that the enemy aircraft carrier had commenced operations: "At 0500 hours, one aircraft carrier, five cruisers, end five destroyers were sighted at a point 10 degrees and 240 nautical miles off MIDWAY."

c. It was decided to launch an all-out attack on the enemy aircraft carriers after uniting with the Midway assault unit. It was impossible to dispatch the second force which was to make an attack on the enemy aircraft carriers as soon as they had been sighted because, according to the previous order transmitted at 0415 hours, the torpedo armaments of the carrier-based torpedo-carrying assault planes were being installed in No 80 land bombers, and, in addition, the carrier-based fighters were already in action, battling enemy planes which had come to raid us. There were only a few carrier-based bombing planes which were not attached to the air command group. We were determined to make an all-out attack on the enemy after uniting with the assault unit which had just returned from MIDWAY at that time. We transmitted the following order to the fleet at 0605 hours, "After the uniting operation has been completed, we will advance north for the time being and assault and destroy the enemy task force."

In accordance with this order, it was reported that the carrier-based torpedo-carrying assault planes of 1Sf (the 1 Air Squadron, equipped with torpedo armaments) would be able to set out at 0730


hours and the carrier-based torpedo-carrying assault planes of 2Sf (the 2 Air Squadron, equipped with torpedo armaments following its return from the first assault) would be able to set out between 0730 and 0800 hours.

d. Three Japanese aircraft carriers were damaged when enemy carrier-based bombers raided us. We completed our union with the Midway assault unit, and preparations were made for dispatching the assault unit, which was organised into four groups (AKAGI and KAGA, fc x 3, f x 27, respectively, and the HIRYU and SORYU, fc x 3, fb x 18, respectively), for the second assault.

At 0735 hours, approximately 30 enemy carrier-based bombers raided our force and the AKAGI, KAGA, and SORYU were damaged by fire. These ships were in the midst of preparations for getting underway and were forced to abandon stations. Only the HIRYU was left.

a. The flagship was changed to the NAGARA. All of the damaged ships were unable to communicate with each other, and, for the time being, the fire could not be extinguished. Consequently, the commanding officer of the task force was forced to conduct operations on hoard the NAGARA. At 0830 hours, he changed commands from the AKAGI to the NAGARA.

f. The desperate battle of the Hiryu unit:

(1) After the AKAGI, KAGA and the SORYU wore damaged, the commanding officer of 2Sf (the 2 Air Squadron) was determined to make an attack on the aircraft carrier which had been discovered by a plane from the TONE. At 0758 hours, he ordered six carrier-based fighting planes and 18 carrier-


based bombers of the Hiryu attacking party under the direct supervision of Capt KOBAYASHI, leader of the Hiryu squad, to attack the aircraft carrier, the attack group met with various obstacles, but overcame them, and managed to shoot down 10 enemy fighters (this number includes three planes which is not certain), and hit the aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE directly And badly damaged her. Three of our carrier-based fighting planes and 13 carrier-based bombers (including the lead plane) did not return. (Note: According to the official report of Admiral KING of the US forces, at 0907 hours, the YORKTOWN was hit by three bomb. (2) Before the battle, the experimental carrier-based bomber, Type 13, which set out from the SORYU at 0530 hours to contact the enemy aircraft carrier but which had been unable to communicate with our forces due to defects in radio equipment, reported after its return to the HIRYU that in addition to that which was discovered by the Tone plane, there was an enemy task force, consisting principally of the aircraft carriers ENTERPRISE and HORNET, moving in a northerly direction from the previously mentioned aircraft carrier. Accordingly, at 1030 hours, planes under the direct command of Capt TOMONAGA, the commander of the Hiryu squadron, set out to attack the force. About 1145 hours, the planes launched a desperate attack and shot down 13 enemy fighting planes (this includes five planes presumed to have been shot down), hit one Enterprise-type carrier with three


torpedoes and badly damaged it, and badly damaged one San Francisco-type heavy cruiser. In this attack, we lost three carrier-based fighters and fire carrier-based torpedo-carrying assault planes (including the lead plane) which exploded. (Note: According to the official report of Admiral KING of the US Navy, during the time from 1433 to 1445 hours, the YORKTOWN was hit by two torpedoes.

(3) The organisation of the group which attacked the enemy aircraft carrier:

(a) The first attack:




Notation group

14 Attack Group

Commanders of the Hiryu Squad.

fb x 18

Two planes of the Air Command group discovered an enemy torpedo plane on the way, drove it away, and did not enter into the battle.

4 Air Command Group


fc x 6

(b) The second attack:

4 Attack Group

Leader of Hiryu Air Squadron

f 9

f x 10

Akagi Attack Group

NISHIMORI (Air Sgt/Major)

f 1

4 Air Command Group

Leader of the Hiryu Squad

fc x 4

fc x 6

Kaga Fighter Squad

YAMAMOTO 1st Air Sgt

fc x 2

g. Actual condition of enemy aircraft carrier.

(1) The actual fact of the reconnaissance made by the Chikuma No 2 plane (which was assigned to contact the enemy) on the 5th.

(a) At 1413 hours, the contact plane spotted One Enterprise-type aircraft at a position 3015' North and 17650' West. The ship was stationary and listing, but it was


not on fire, and no deck damages were visible. Near the carrier, three cruisers and five destroyers were visible. At 1420 hours, leaving the aircraft carrier, the other craft advanced eastward on a compass course of 80 degrees at a speed of 20 knots.

(b) At 1510 hours, two enemy carriers (of the Yorktown and Hornet classes, respectively) were sighted at 3023' North and 17605' West. They were accompanied by escort ships consisting of two cruisers end four destroyers traveling while maintaining stations three nautical miles apart on a compass course of 270 degrees at a speed of 12 knots.

(c) Furthermore, at 1516 hours, two carriers (type not ascertained) were sighted. They were accompanied by five cruisers and six destroyers, and were about four nautical miles south of the carriers proceeding on a compass course of 260 degrees at a speed of 12 knots. According to reports, five aircraft carriers ware sighted by the CHIKUMA's No 2 plane. In addition, while the reconnaissance plane advanced south, on a compass course of 180 degrees, after 1500 hours, it sighted the carriers mentioned in paragraphs (b) and (c) at the bottom edge of a cloud bank while flying at an altitude of 300 m. Consequently, it is certain that a repetition of previous reconnaissance had not occurred.


(d) An aircraft carrier was badly damaged and seen burning as a result of five hits by enemy carrier-borne planes and one additional hit by enemy land-based plane in the initial attack undertaken by the carrier unit. Subsequent search failed to discover the carrier.

(e) It seemed that the aircraft carrier which had stopped and was listing due to three torpedo hits it had received during the second attack, drifted, badly damaged, until the next cay. On the 6th, it was sunk by a torpedo assault by our submarines. This carrier was discovered by the CHIKUMA's No 4 plane at 0352 hours on the 6th, and was sunk, deck undamaged, in an attack by our submarines. Because of this fact, we judged that it had been damaged by a torpedo during our second attack. (This is the YORKTOWN announced by the enemy.) After cataloguing and sifting the previously mentioned data, it would appear, if there was no error in the discoveries end reports made by the reconnaissance plane, that there were, in addition, one craft badly damaged by a bomb hit and one vessel damaged in the torpedo attack (this ship was sunk daring the submarine attack the next day). Moreover, it seemed that four enemy craft were active on this occasion, but, judging from the number of enemy planes which came to raid us, the action of the enemy after this and testimonies of the PsW, it seems


possible that an error may have been made regarding the type of ships involved in these actions.

(f) Statement of a PW (a Reserve ensign from the YORKTOWN):

4. Three aircraft carriers, YORKTOWN, ENTERPRISE, and HORNET, accompanied by six cruisers and 10 destroyers, took part in the action.

2. The YORKTOWN with two cruisers and three destroyers formed into one group and became a detached force.

3. The YORKTOWN carried 27 fighters, 18 bombers, 12 torpedo-carrying assault planes, and 18 reconnaissance planes.

h. The HIRYU attempts to make a fourth attack on the enemy: The HIRYU lost most of its attack planes during the three attacks. The HIRYU left, carrying six fighters, five bombers, and four torpedo-carrying assault planes, but it was decided to make an attack on the Hornet-type carrier by making use of the Soryu No 13 experimental carrier-based bombers, which joined the HIRYU after a reconnaissance flight, because the SORYU hod been damaged, and preparations were made for a night attack. During this time, the HIRYU exercised aerial precautions by using the combat planes of the various carriers.

1. The HIRYU was damaged during the second raid by 13 enemy planes. The contact plane (the experimental carrier-based bomber No 13 was about to take off whom the second enemy raid began.

j. The conduct of the operation after the task force commandant changed stations to the NAGARA:


(1) It was intended to harass the enemy with daylight attacks. After the commanding officer boarded the NAGARA, the CHIKUMA reported at 0828 hours that the enemy was located at 70 degrees and 90 nautical miles from the Japanese forces. Accordingly, with a view toward baffling the enemy with a daylight attack, the commanding officer ordered an assembly of forces at 0900 hours on a compass course of 60 degrees at a speed of 16 knots to carry out such an attack. At 0945 hours, the compass course was to be 0 degrees at a speed of 20 knots, and, at 1000 hours, at a speed of 24 knots. However, a Tone plane reported later that at 1230 hours the enemy was 110 nautical miles away and was proceeding on a compass course of 114 degrees, so it became apparent that the enemy ships were rapidly putting space between our force and theirs.

(2)  We attempt to harass the enemy with night attacks: If the enemy continued to attack us, providing the above-mentioned relative positions were maintained, any decisive battle against the enemy would be hopeless and we would be subject to the enemy's skillful tactics with no advantages on our side, resulting in serious damage to us. Consequently, the commandant wanted to turn back for the time being and to wait for darkness, so that the enemy might be harassed by night attacks. Preparations for carrying out night operations were begun, but, at about 1400 hours, the HIRYU was badly damaged in the enemy's second raid against us. All the aircraft carriers in our


command were damaged. in comparison, the enemy had at least one aircraft carrier which was not damaged. In addition, our forces were located within striking range of enemy air base which we could act attack at all. Consequently, the situation was unfavorable for us.

At 1433 hours, we were informed that the enemy fleet had commenced withdrawal towards the east on a course of 70 degrees sad at a speed of 20 knots. Although the chances of night operations seemed futile, the ship-based plane of the NAGARA (heavy cruiser) was ordered to prepare for night contact, and all ships were ordered to assemble.

In accordance with report received at 1530 hours from the CHIKUMA (cruiser), the strength of the enemy fleet was found contrary to expectations, to be very formidable. The report stated that our ship-based plane No 2 had sighted an enemy fleet consisting of four aircraft carriers, six cruisers, and 15 destroyers at a point 30 nautical miles east of the badly-damaged and burning enemy aircraft carrier. Since our planes could not establish contact by dusk, the situation of the enemy fleet was unknown and our night attack was not carried out. Realizing the difficulties of a daylight withdrawal, we employed a screen for the aircraft carrier, HIRYU, and withdrew towards the northwest.

k. Naval engagements after 6 June.

(1) On 6 June, our task force, which was proceeding towards the northwest in order to join the main force and which had not yet completed its concentration, was bombarded on three occasions by


enemy ship-based and land-based planes from 0500 to 1200 hours, fortunately, none of the ships was hit directly and only slight damage was sustained from near misses.

(2) On the 6th, a reconnaissance plane from the aircraft carrier HIRYU of the main fleet sighted the aircraft carrier HIRYU, burning and drifting. The commander of the Task Force dispatched the destroyer TANIKAZE and a ship-based plane (which departed from the cruiser NAGARA), and entrusted to them the responsibility for rescuing the HIRYU's crew. During the action, the TANIKAZE was attacked by a large group of enemy ship-based planes. Through skillful maneuvering, the TANIKAZE successfully evaded the attacking planes and continued on her mission. The destroyer, however, failed to locate the HIRYU.

(3) In the afternoon of the 6th, the task force succeeded in joining the main fleet and the attack unit. In compliance with the orders of the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet, all casualties from the task force were transferred to the battleships NAGATO and MUTSU.

(4) The chief of staff and his subordinates were dispatched to the YAMATO, the flagship of the Combined Fleet, to make a report on the situation at that time. Movements of the task force up to 10 June were co-ordinated with those of the main fleet. On the 10th, the NAGARA was ordered by the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet to return home alone.


Notes: Direct hits as sustained by each aircraft carrier.

Name of Ship


Number of Attack Planes

Hits/Bombs Dropped

Point of Impact



fb x 12




fb x 13




fb x 9




fb x 13


D. Main Force (including the Screening Units).

1. The main force under the command of the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet departed from Nashirajima anchorage at 0600 hours on 29 May, and followed the prearranged coerce. At 0300 hours on 29 hay, the 3 Destroyer Squadron, which had been engaged in clearing the frontal area of the main force, sighted an enemy submarine at a point 220 degrees and 40 nautical miles from OKINOSHIMA. They again detected an enemy submarine at the same point at 1300 hours.

2. On 4 June, the screening force was dispatched towards the north as prearranged. This was done to support the northern forces.

3. Outline of operational conduct after discovery of the enemy:

a. The following is a sequence of orders issued by each commanding officer.

(1) 0920 hours, 5 June: Commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet.

Combined Fleet Dispatch Operational Order No 155: Units will maneuver depending on the following orders sad will attack the enemy in the area north of MIDWAY.


(a) The position of the main body at 0900 hours vast "Fu To Mu" 15 (TN Japanese naval map reading): course - 120; speed - 20 knots per hour.

(b) for the present, a part of the Midway Occupation Unit will cover the retirement of the transport group going toward the northwest.

(e) The 2 Task Force will join the 1 Task force as soon as possible.

(d) The 3 and 5 Submarine Squadrons will deploy to line "III".

(2) 1010 hours, 5 June: Commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet.

Combined Fleet Dispatch Operational Order No 156

(a) The "C" method will be employed in attacking the enemy fleets.

(b) A part of the Attack Unit will attack the air base on MIDWAY tonight.

(e) The invasion of MIDWAY and the ALEUTIANS will be prolonged for the time being.

(3) 1120 hours, 5 June: Commander of the Task Forces.

1 Task Force Military Secret Telegram No 551:

The position of the 1 Task Force at 1100 hours on 5 June was "To E Fu" 33 (TN Japanese Naval map reading). It is our intention to proceed north and annihilate the enemy task force which is maneuvering to the east of our units. The 2 Task Force will join us as soon as possible.

(4) 1230 hours, 5 June: Commander of the 2 Task Force.

4 Air Fleet Military Secret Telegram No 884:


The 2 Task force will proceed south immediately after having assembled the Attack Units which are to attack DUTCH HARBOR. After receiving supplies at a point 4440'N-17620'W on the morning of the 7th, the 2 Task Force will endeavor to join the 1 Task Force. Our position at 1200 hours was 120 nautical miles southwest of DUTCH HARBOR.

(5) 1615 hours, 5 June: Commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet.

Combined Fleet Dispatch Operational Order No 158.

(a) The enemy's task forces have withdrawn to the east, and their aircraft carriers, for the most part, have been destroyed.

(b) It is the intention of the Combined Fleet to pursue and annihilate the enemy forces and, at the same time, occupy AF (TN Presumably place name unknown).

(c) The main force reached Fu Me Ri 32 (TN Japanese naval map reading) at 2400 hours, 5 June. It is proceeding at a speed of 20 knots per hour on a course of 90.

(d) The task forces, Attack Unit (excluding the 7 Squadron) and the advance units will locate and attack the enemy as quickly as possible.

(6) 1830 hours, 5 June: Commander of the Task Force. Task Force Military Secret Telegram No 560: An enemy force, consisting of five aircraft carriers, six cruisers, and 15 destroyers, is at present proceeding westward. Our present position is TOWASU 15 (TN Japanese naval map reading).


Escorting the HIRYU, we are withdrawing in a northwesterly direction at a speed of 18 knots per hour.

(7) 1950 hours, 5 June: Commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet.

The enemy still has four aircraft carriers (may include converted aircraft carriers) which, together with six cruisers and 15 destroyers, are proceeding westward. All our aircraft carriers are out of action. A reconnaissance to locate the enemy will be made tomorrow morning.

(8) 2040 hours, 5 June: Commander of the Attack Unit. 2 Fleet Military Secret telegram No 761. (a) The main body of the Attack Unit will reach To E Wa 12 (TN Japanese naval map reading) at 0000 hours on 6 June, and, thereafter, will conduct a reconnaissance of the eastern area. This unit will launch a night attack against the enemy which was mentioned in Task Force Military Secret Telegram No 560.

(b) The Task Force (excluding the HIRYU, AKAGI, and escorting strength) will reverse its course at once and participate in the night attack of the Attack Unit.

(Note) Prior to this, the task force had been placed under the command of the Attack Unit commander in accordance with a Combined Fleet dispatch order.

(9) 2115 hours, 5 June: Commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet.

Combined Fleet Military Secret Telegram No 303.

(a) The Attack Unit (excluding a part of its unit, nut including the 7 Squadron) and the Task Force (excluding the AKAGI, HIRYU,


and escorting strength) will join the main force.

(b) The position of the main force at 0600 hours tomorrow morning will be FURURI 31 (TN Japanese naval map reading). It is traveling at a speed of 20 knots per hour on a course of 90 degrees.

(10) 2355 hours, 5 June: Commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet.

Combined Fleet Dispatch Operational Order No 161.

(a) The attack on MIDWAY will be suspended.

(b) The main force, Attack Unit, and the 1 Task force (excluding the HIRYU end her escort vessel) will assemble, and receive supplies at a point 33N-170E on the morning of 7 June.

(c) The Screening Unit, the HIRYU and her escort vessel, and the NISSHIN will sail to that point.

(d) The Attack Unit will proceed westward, out of range of enemy planes based on MIDWAY.

(11) 0700 hours, 6 June: Commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet.

Combined Fleet Dispatch Operational Order No 162:

The 2 Task force will return to the northern force.

(12) 1200 hours, 7 June: Commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet.

Combined Fleet Military Secret Telegram No 331.

(a) The Combined Fleet intends to locate and annihilate the enemy task forces within the range of enemy planes based on WAKE Island.


(b) Commencing at 1230 hours from a point (coordinates: 3324'N-169E), the main force, task forces, and the 1 Division of the 3 Squadron will sail southward at a rate of 18 knots per hour on a course of 180 degrees.

(c) The Screening Unit will be responsible for supporting the northern force.

(d) The Base Air Forces will attack this enemy as much as possible.

(e) Omitted.

4. Although our aircraft carriers had been sank, we were still planning a night attack against the enemy fleet as mentioned above. This plan, however, was finally suspended when the enemy's situation could not be clarified. After that, we endeavored to assemble the 1 Task Force and the MOGAMI. Furthermore, we planned to direct a concentrated attack on WAKE Island and the enemy task force by utilising the attack planes of our Base Air Forces, but this plan also failed to materialize.

As a result of the Midway Operations, we can anticipate the enemy task force to advance in the direction of the ALEUTIANS. Powerful units were, therefore, sent to reinforce the Aleutians area, and a unit with the 5 Squadron as a nucleus had maneuvered so as to check the enemy's advance.

B. The Attack Unit.

After the Attack Unit was divided into three groups, each group maneuvered separately. The three groups were: the main force (including the air unit), the screening unit (including occupation forces), end the support unit.

1. Main force of the Attack Unit.

a. The main force of the Attack Unit left the Nashirajima anchorage in the INLAND Sea at 0500 hours on 29 May


and placed itself at the head of the main fleet's formation. Having left the main fleet on the morning of 31 May, it followed a prearranged course in an effort to join the screening unit.

b. On 3 June, a report from the screening unit stated that an enemy patrol plane had been sighted. The main force of the Attack Unit was sighted by an enemy patrol plane on 4 June.

c. On 5 June, it became apparent that our task force had suffered severe losses in the engagement with enemy task forces. In compliance with the Combined Fleet's Operational Order No 155, a part of our force covered the withdrawal of the convoy towards the northwest. The remainder of our force was rushed to the battle area.

d.  We ordered the 7 Squadron, which was the support unit, to attack the air bases on MIDWAY as stated in the Combined Fleet's Operational Order No 156.

e. Since the task force had been placed under our command as set forth in Operational Order No 160, we issued a telegram containing the outline of the night operation (2 fleet Military Secret Telegram No 761). We also ordered the task force, which had retreated towards the northwest, to reverse its course and participate in the night operation.

f. Observing one of our aircraft carriers burning in the distant, we advanced to the prearranged point for our night engagement at midnight on 5 June, but the enemy's situation could not be confirmed. We were ordered by the Combined Fleet to return (Operational Order No 161) and managed to rejoin the main fleet on the morning of 6 June.


g. On 7 June, after replenishing our supply, we sailed southward in order to contact the MOGAMI. We then escorted her to TRUK Island.

h. On our way to the homeland, we placed the 3 Squadron (excluding the 2 Division) and the ZUIHO (aircraft carrier) under the command of the northern force.

1. There were no enemy attacks on the main force during the course of the above action.

2. Escorting Unit (including the occupation force).

a. The strength of the Attack Unit was as follows:

2 Destroyer Squadron (excluding the 3 and 15 Destroyer Groups):

Flagship: JINTSU

15 Destroyer group (HAYASHIO, OYASHIO, KUROSHIO).


16 Minesweeper Group: Four auxiliary minesweepers.

Patrol Boat: Two.

Subchasers: Three.

Torpedo Boats: One

Transports: 16.

Tankers: One.

2 Special Naval Landing Fores:

Commanding Officer: Maj OTA OTA, Minoru


Strength: Approximately 2,000.

Ichinoki Detachment CO: Maj Gen ICHINOKI

Strength: Approximately 3,000.

h. Departure from the Homeland and the Concentration at SAIPAN: Following negotiations with the Combined Fleet Headquarters in the western INLAND Sea, during the middle part of May, our movements were as follows:


(1)  The 13 Destroyer Group departed from YOKOSUKA, escorting the Yokosuka 1 Special Naval Landing Force on 20 May.

(2) The 16 Destroyer Group departed from KURE escorting the Kure 2 Special Naval Landing Force on 19 May.

(3) Due to delay in repair works, the JINTSU and a destroyer under the 16 Destroyer Group departed from KURE on 21 May.

(4) Auxiliary patrol boats and patrol boats from TRUK and YARUTO*, and subchasers from the homeland were assembled.

(5) The concentration of escort squadron was completed with the arrival of the JINTSU at SAIPAN on 24 May.

c. Departure from SAIPAN.

(1)  Training and negotiations such as these mentioned below were carried on every day at SAIPAN: negotiations concerning operations of the Attack Unit, landing maneuvers for the landing Forces, operational negotiation with the Support Unit, and training in fueling for patrol boats.

On the evening of 28 May, the main body of the escorting squadron deported from SAIPAN under the direct command of the 2 Destroyer Squadron.

(2)  Because of their speed end cruising range, the subchasers and patrol boats were ordered to depart in advance, and, after receiving supplies at WAKE Island, were to rejoin the main force in the area southwest of MIDWAY on the day prior to our invasion of the Island. The above-mentioned ships left SAIPAN two days in advance of our main force.


d. Our Movements After Our Departure from SAIPAN:

(1) At that time, there were many enemy submarines in the vicinity of SAIPAN. We, therefore, departed during the evening and executed a flanking movement as a means of deception. Passing on both the west end south aides of TINIAN, we proceeded towards the area north of WAKE. Ships were refueled every third day.

(2) We deviated our course approximately 50 nautical miles north of the prearranged route after being informed through an intelligence report that enemy submarines were present in the waters northwest of WAKE.

(3)  We enforced strict lookout against enemy patrol planes after passing north of WAKE. The Escorting Squadron was sighted by a B-17 at a point 600 nautical miles southwest of MIDWAY at 0600 hours on 4 June. The plane was immediately fired upon by the minesweeper group.

(4) In the afternoon of 4 July, we were attacked by nine B-17's, but none of our vessels was destroyed. At midnight, we ware again attacked by an enemy torpedo bomber. One tanker was hit, but she managed to continue her voyage.

e. On 5 June (two days prior to the invasion), we had little knowledge of the situation of our task forces. We were, however, ordered to withdraw the convoy to the northwest under the protection of the 15 Destroyer Group. The subchasers and auxiliary ships, advancing from WAKE, were also ordered to accompany the withdrawal. The commanding officer of the 2 Destroyer Squadron rushed his unit, which had been strengthened by the addition of the JINTSU and the 16 Destroyer Group, to the battle area north of MIDWAY. However,


at midnight of the same day, this unit was ordered to retreat to the northwest.

f. On the morning of 6 June, we joined the main fleet and the main body of the Attack Unit. We then sailed south with the 4, 7, and 8 Squadrons in order to contact the cruiser MOGAMI. On the 7th, we escorted the MOGAMI and again retreated westward.

3. Supporting Forces (the Midway Attacking Force):

a. The supporting force was composed of the 7 Squadron (the KUMAMO, SUZUYA, MIKUMA, and MOGAMI), the 8 Destroyer Flotilla (the ASASHIO, MANCHO, OSHIO, and ASASHIO), and a tanker. On 21 May, the 7 Squadron left the western area of the INLAND Sea and advanced to GUAM. On 24 May, the 8 Destroyer Flotilla, escorting transports, advanced to SAIPAN.

b. During the anchorage at GUAM, the commander of the 7 Squadron proceeded to SAIPAN to arrange operations with the escort force.

c. In the afternoon of 28 May, the 7 Squadron left GUAM according to prearranged plan, and led the southern part of the invasion force. On the way, it combined with the 8 Destroyer Flotilla.

d. On 5 June, after the task force had opened fire, the 7 Squadron emerged onto the decisive sea frontier by order of the Combined Fleet. In the afternoon, the 7 Squadron was ordered by the commander of the invasion forces to attack midway, and it immediately headed toward MIDWAY.

e. Due to its distance, the 7 Squadron advanced at full speed to attack MIDWAY before dawn of 7 June. Therefore, the 8 Destroyer Flotilla was forced to withdraw.

While the 7 Squadron was advancing separately, an order from the Combined Fleet to suspend Midway


Operation was received, and, at 2330 hours on 5 June, the 7 Squadron reversed its course at a point about 90 nautical alios from MIDWAY. Immediately after this, the leading ship, the KUMANO sighted an enemy submarine. Therefore, the entire 7 Squadron executed a simultaneous 45-degree left oblique movement.

f. Since the signal for the movement was not clear, the third ship, MIKUMA, collided with the MOGAMI, the fourth ship. The MOGAMI was damaged in the bow from the first turret forward, and was difficult to navigate (the maximum speed was 12 knots an hear). The MIKUMA was damaged slightly, but could be navigated. Since the MOGAMI suffered heavily and was forced to halt, the three other ships kept strict guard. After confirming the condition of the MOGAMI, the commander of the 7 Squadron ordered the MIKUMA to stand watch over the MOGAMI, and also ordered the 8 Destroyer flotilla to combine with the 2 Division of the 7 Squadron. After that, he led the 1 Division of the 7 Squadron to the rendezvous designated by order of the Combined Fleet, and joined the main fleet on 7 June.

g.  The MIKUMA, together with the 8 Destroyer Flotilla, escorted the MOGAMI and withdrew towards the west. While withdrawing, enemy carrier-based planes attacked them on 6 June, but they suffered no damage.

h. On 7 June, a little after 0645 hours, the MIKUMA, the MOGAMI, and the 8 Destroyer Flotilla were attacked by enemy carrier planes about 500 miles west of MIDWAY. The MIKUMA suffered direct hits end was sunk. The MOGAMI suffered six hits and became difficult to navigate. Every ship of the 8 Destroyer Flotilla was hit, but they could be navigated in battle formation.


i. The MOGAMI suffered heavy damages, but escaped by taking proper emergency measures. On 8 June, at 0400 hours, the MOGAMI was covered by the main invasion force which rushed to the rescue. After that, the MOGAMI sailed to TRUK, escorted by the 8 Destroyer Flotilla, and returned to the mainland after repairs.

F. Other Units.

1. Base Air Force.

a. Distribution of troops: The disposition of strength of the Base Air Force in the second operation was as follows (Operational Order No 2 of the secret orders for the Base Air Force issued on 15 May):





Disposition (Standard)

Main Duty

Operational Movement

2 Air Attack Force

Commander of 11 Air Fleet

22 Carrier Division

22 Carrier Division

PT# area: half strength.



Tokyo area: half strength.



PX# area: bulk of strength.

1. To reconnoiter PX# area, and, according to the situation, the AA#, PY# areas.

1. Reconnoiter the sea east of PX#. If the situation requires reconnoiter the AA# and PY# areas, and prepare against enemy maneuvers and invasion.

2. To search and destroy the enemy task force (the occupation force).

2. If the enemy task force appears, destroy it with the whole force. (If necessary, co-operate with the 5 Attack Force and the 2 Attack Force.

4 Air Attack Force

3. To intercept and destroy the enemy fleet.

Commander of 24 Carrier Division

24 Carrier Division



4. To destroy AI military installations and enemy strength, and to feel out the enemy.

3. If attacked by enemy fleet, operate according to interceptive disposition.

Disperse part of strength according to the situation.

5. To co-operate with the Midway Operation.

4. At opportune time, carry out surprise attack against A2# with type 2 large flying boat in co-operation with submarines, and destroy military installations and strength. At the same


Commander of 11 Air Fleet

25 Carrier Division

25 Carrier Division

time, reconnoiter enemy situation.


The large flying boat after the capture.

5. Co-operate with the force to proceed with Midway operation and keep strict guard against the operation area.

Advance of half of strength.

6. Immediately after the occupation of AF#, let half of 14 Air Fleet strength advance as soon as possible. After arriving at the 14 Air Fleet base, receive instructions from commander of the 6 Air Attack Force and participate in the operation of AE# area.

RR# Area: bulk of strength.

5 Air Attack Force

R2T#, PX# areas: part of strength.


6 Air Attack Force

Commander of 26 Carrier Division

26 Carrier Division

Kisarazu area: balk of the strength.



South Torijima: part of strength according to the situation.

Advance the bulk of carrier fighters and part of long range capture of AF#.

(TN # indicates abbreviation of place name. Unknown.)


b. Progress: In the operation concerned, the Base Air Force was engaged in searching out the enemy and in convoy patrol for the surface force. At the same time, a part of its strength was divided among the various aircraft carriers of the task force. Immediately after the occupation of MIDWAY, preparations were to be made for an advance to that island. After the occupation operations had been suspended, the Base Air Force planned to pursue the enemy task force and to intercept it. The majority of land-based attack planes in this area was concentrated on WAKE.

An outline of the progress of each unit is as follows:

(1) The 4 Air Attack Unit (the 24 Air Force):

(a) K Operation (previously discussed).

(b)  Search for the enemy and convoy patrol. On 31 May at 0620 hours, land-based attack planes from the Chitose Air Base, which were stationed on WAKE Island sighted a CHIAROTTO* class submarine, 28 degrees and 425 nautical miles from WAKE. At 0750 hours, two more enemy submarines ware sighted, 48 degrees and 540 nautical miles from WAKE.

On 1 June, a Type 2 flying boat, which had taken off from WODJE, sighted an enemy flying boat about 500 nautical miles north-northeast of WODJE.

On 2 June, land-based attack planes on WAKE encountered an enemy flying boat and engaged in aerial combat, 73 degrees and 540 nautical miles from WAKE. At that time, another enemy plane was sighted in the same area.

On the same day, a land-based attack


plane patrolled HOWLAND Island and BAKER Island, but no changes were observed.

On and after 3 June, patrols continued day and night.

(e) Preparations for interception: Fifty-one land-based attackers and 18 fighters were concentrated on WAKE by 8 June. They carried out extensive search for the enemy and made preparations for interception. On 8 June, a reconnaissance plane sighted eight enemy submarines. Two of them were bombed and damaged considerably.

(2) The 6 Air Attack Force (The 26 Air fighting Unit):

(a) Search for enemy and patrol: The majority of the unit was disposed in KISARAZU and a part in south TORIJIMA. Both sections were on guard against the enemy. On 8 June, a load-based attacker stationed in south TORIJIMA sighted an enemy submarine.

(b)  The Air force dispatched to MIDWAY: In the latter part of May, the fighter units (the 6 Air Corps) of the dispatched Air force were loaded on the aircraft carrier of the task force in the western part of the INLAND Sea. Six planes were placed on the AKAGI, SORYU, KAGA, and HIRYU, respectively, and 12 on the JUNYO, a total of 36 planes. Planes, supplies, and a part of the personnel were lost when the carriers were sunk.

2. The advance forces.

The commander of the advance forces proceeded to KWAJALEIN in the MARSHALLS and assumed commend of the entire operation. He dispatched 15 submarines of the 3 and 5 Submarine


Squadrons and the 13 Submarine Division to MIDWAY, French Frigate Atoll, and the Hawaiian area to reconnoiter and to guard strategic points. At the same time, he co-operated with K Operation. The details of this operation are included in the account of submarine warfare. The date of our arrival at the scouting line was appointed by the Combined Fleet order as "N-1 Day," but it appeared that the enemy forces had passed through the line by the time our submarines assumed a scouting position between HAWAII and MIDWAY. In this operation, the "I" 168 (submarine) must be especially noted.

Outline of "I" 168 Activities:

1 June: Reconnoitered near midway (as mentioned previously).

5 June: Ordered to fire on MIDWAY. Bombarded the air base on EASTERN Island and was counterattacked under flare light.

7 June: At 1031 hours, sighted an aircraft carrier and several destroyers at a point 3056' North, 17720' West (150 miles north of MIDWAY). Attacked the ships from a distance of 1700 m and discharged four torpedoes which found their targets (explosions were heard five minutes after they ware released). We were attacked by a destroyer and sustained heavy damages from a near miss by a depth bomb (30 m). Farther submerged cruising became difficult, and we were pursued by two destroyers, barely managing to escape from the combat zone.

VIII. Operational Results.

A. Task Force and Submarine "I" 168.

1. Operational results:

a. Ships: We sank an Enterprise class carrier and inflicted heavy damage upon another aircraft carrier of


the same class. Also a heavy cruiser of the San Francisco class, (Note: Admiral KING reported officially that the aircraft carrier HORNET and the destroyer HAMAN* were sunk.) According to our records the two carriers sunk include the HORNET, which was seriously damaged by two planes. This ship, together with the destroyer HAMAN, which was standing by for rescue operations, was later sunk by one of our submarines.

h. Military installations: Burned military installation on SAND Island and EASTERN Island of the Midway Archipelago.


Classification of airplanes

Classification of attack

Fighter aircraft


Attack planes

Long range bombers

Recon-naissance seaplanes





Attack on MIDWAY






45 (9)

Enemy planes shot down by our suicide planes or by planes which failed to return are not included in this statistics.

Attack on aircraft carrier.

The 1st



7 (3)

The 2nd



8 (5)

Direct air escort.

The 1st






The 2nd



Defensive fire.

The 1st


6 (10 co-operated with fighter aircraft)


The 2nd



Sum total







178* (27)

(TN * are as on original document, although totals are incorrect.)


2. Damage.

a. Ships:

Sunk: Aircraft carriers AKAGI, KAGA, SORYU, and HIRYU.

Slightly damaged: The HARUNA and TANIKAZE (by a near miss).

b. Airplanes (only those which were lost in suicide missions or which failed to return):

Classification of airplanes

Classification of attack

Carrier fighter

Carrier bomber

Carrier attack plane







Aerial escort



Attack aircraft carriers

The first




The second









(TN * are as on original document; incorrect figures.) 1. Midway Bombarding Force.

1. Operational results:

Shot -

Destroyed by explosion -

2. Damaged: The MIKUMA was badly damaged; the MOGAMI suffered six hits, but returned to TRUK under its own power.

Slightly damaged: The ARASHIO and ASASHIO (both by hits).


Appendix No 1.

Daily History of the Midway Naval Battle



Main Orders

5 May 42

Order No 18 of the Naval Department of the Imperial General Headquarters: "Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO is to co-operate with the Army in the occupation of strategic points in MIDWAY and the ALEUTIANS."

Instructions No 94 of the Naval Department of the Imperial General Headquarters: "Army and Navy Joint Agreement on AF (MIDWAY) and AO (ALEUTIAN) operations."

6 May

Battle of the Coral Sea.

7 May

8 May

Base airplanes and submarines made every effort to reconnoiter the movement of the surviving enemy fleet in the area of the Coral Sea. However, until the 11th, the enemy fleet did not operate in the areas off TOWNSVILLE, BRISBANE, and NUMERA*.

9 May

10 May

11 May




Main Orders

15 May

At 0847 hours, the flying boat unit, attached to the Yokohama Air Base, sighted the enemy task force (two aircraft carriers, four cruisers, five destroyers) at 98 degrees and 445 miles off TULAGI.

17 May

At 0815 hours, a flying boat from the Yokohama Air Base sighted an enemy task force to the east of the SOLOMONS. According to reports from the flying boat, which kept in contact with the enemy task force until 1200 hours, the enemy was operating in the vicinity of the SOLOMONS. At 1200 hours, the enemy was located 94 degrees and 472 miles off TULAGI and was proceeding on a course of 130 degrees. According to the information received, our flying boat was able to determine the position of the enemy task force, at 1400 hours, to be south-southeast of TULAGI, but it was difficult to obtain




Main Orders

further information because of strict radio silence that the enemy maintained.

18 May

In the early morning, the base air force searched for the enemy between the GILBERTS and the SOLOMONS with flying boats from bases on TULAGI and MAKIN, but no information regarding the situation of the enemy was obtained. ICHIKI, the leader of the Army unit (commander of the campaign to occupy MIDWAY) called on the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet.

20 May

Orders issued by the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet states: Carry out second period of second phase of employment.

22 May

The first and second maneuvers of the Combined Fleet (the air force, the screening force, the occupation force, and the task force) were conducted off Bungo Channel.




Main Orders

24 May

The second K Operation (the reconnaissance and attack on the Hawaii area by airplanes) was to be executed within a week.

25 May

Air force maneuvers and plotting unit operations on charts were scheduled to be held from 0800 hours on the flagship YAMATO, anchored at HASHIRAJIMA. Arrangements for the second operation were to be made starting at 1500 hours.

27 May.

0600 hours.

An enemy task force appeared in the INLAND sea. Radar equipment was installed on the ISE and HYUGA (battleships).

28 May

Transport ships of the Attack Unit departed for SAIPAN.

29 May

The Attack Unit left HASHIRAJIMA at 0500 hours. The main force followed at 0600 hours. At 0200 hours, the 3 Destroyer Squadron, which had been clearing the front of the Combined Fleet, sighted five enemy submarines 220




Main Orders

degrees and 40 miles off OKINOSHIMA. Enemy submarines were observed in the same area at 1300 hours.

30 May

Since the enemy submarines sent a long emergency telegram to MIDWAY, we assumed that they were near the transport ships of our Attack Unit. Our air reconnaissance of PEARL HARBOR was postponed until after 1 June.

31 May

The Chitose land-based attack squadron on WAKE observed movements of enemy submarines as follows (enemy losses were undetermined):

1)  At 0620 hours, an American CHIAROTTO type ship was sighted 28 degrees and 425 miles off WAKE.

2) At 0730 hours, two submarines were sighted 48 degrees and 540 miles off WAKE.

1 June

Intelligence reports stated that!

1) At 1940 hours, a patrol plane was observed at a point 410 miles west-




Main Orders

southeast of MIDWAY.

2) At 1000 hours, a patrol plans was sighted at a point 330 alias south-west of MIDWAY.

3)  Out of approximately 180 enemy messages sent from HAWAII, 72 were of an urgent nature. The enemy seemed to anticipate our actions. It is assumed that their day and night reconnaissance to locate our positions covered a radius of 600 miles.

One of our submarines, the "I" 168 of the 3 Submarine Squadron reconnoitered MIDWAY from midnight of the 1st to noon of the 2nd.

A Type-2 seaplane from WODJE sighted an enemy seaplane 900 miles north-northeast of the island.

Owing to the battle situation in the vicinity of French Frigate Atoll, the commander of the 24 Air Wing suspended the second X Operation. (The Pearl Harbor Reconnaissance




Main Orders

2 June

General Situation of Enemy Submarines After 29 May.

Submarines present in Truk area-4, in the area north of WAKE-4, in the Japan area-6. The total can be estimated at a minimum of 14.

Report from Submarine "I" 168 which reconnoitered MIDWAY (from midnight of the 1st to noon of the 2nd).

1) An all-day reconnaissance of the MIDWAY area was made. Fourteen enemy submarines were sighted.

2) A patrol vessel was sighted west of SAND Island.

3) It can be assumed that enemy heavy bombers were active on MIDWAY. The enemy established close air patrol of the area southwest of MIDWAY, extending to approximately 600 miles.

Land attack planes starting from WAKE scouted the eastern sea area 540 miles from WAKE on a course of 73 degrees. During its patrol, this formation




Main Orders

encountered one enemy flying boat and sighted another.

A land attack plane reported that the airfields on BAKER and HOWLAND Islands did act appear to be in use.

At 0600 hours, our occupation forces (aboard 12 transport vessels) were discovered by an enemy patrol plane at a point 600 miles southwest of MIDWAY. The 16 Minesweeper Group immediately fired upon the plane. During the afternoon the occupation forces were again attacked by nine B-26's, but no losses were sustained.

At 2254 hours, the tanker AKEBONO was attacked by enemy planes. (Location of attack: Coordinates 2634'N, 17414'E.)

A direct hit by a torpedo caused the ship's magazine to explode, killing 11 men and wounding 13.




Main Orders

Five men were missing. Although its hull was badly damaged, the vessel managed to continue its voyage.

On the same day, planes from our 2 Task force twice attacked DUTCH HARBOR.

5 June

While the Transport Convoy of our Attack Unit was steaming through the waters within air range of WAKE, it was sighted by on enemy flying boat. The commander of the convoy immediately sent up fighter planes to insure air protection for the convoy.

At 0300 hours, the 1 Task force reported that its position had been discovered by an enemy flying boat.

Planes from the 1 Task Force attacked MIDWAY at 0346 hours.

At 0500 hours, a patrol plane, reconnoitering the area east of the 1 Task Force, reported that a powerful enemy unit consisting of one aircraft carrier.




Main Orders

five cruisers, and five destroyers were proceeding 220 miles east of the task force. An attack unit left at 0600 hours to engage this enemy formation.

The 1 Task Force was attacked by enemy land and carrier-based planes. Although we inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, all our carriers were put out of action.

An intercepted enemy message contained a report of attacks on our task force and destroyers at 0900 hours and 1000 hours.

The commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet suspended Midway Operation.

After the MIDWAY attack, the 7 Battleship Division turned and withdrew. During the withdrawal, the MIKUMA collided with the MOGAMI.

The 1 Section of the

Order issued by the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet:

"The Attack on MIDWAY will be postponed.

"(a) The transport convoy will be strengthened with a portion of the units withdrawing to the northwest. A portion of the Attack Unit will attack the airfields on MIDWAY tonight.

"(c) The 2 Task Force will join the 1 Task Force as soon as possible.

"(c) The 5 and 3 Submarine Squadrons will be concentrated at the line of deployment in the waters north of the Hawaiian




Main Orders

7 Battleship Division was to maneuver separately.

The 1 Task force again attacked DUTCH HARBOR.


Order of the Combined Fleet (0700 hours):

"a) The 2nd task force will return to the northern forces."

Order of the Combined Fleet (2020 hours):

"a) After 8 June, two sections of the 3 Battleship Division, the 8 Battleship Division, one destroyer division of the 1 Destroyer Squadron, the ZUIHO, the KAMIKAWA Mara, and the 4 Destroyer Division will be added to the northern force.

"b) After 10 June, the 2 Submarine Squadron and the 13 Submarine Division will also be added to the northern force, the Midway Operation will be suspended."

The Advance Expeditionary Force reported that Submarine "I" 168 had succeeded in sinking the enemy ship, YORKTOWN, at a point 120 miles northwest of MIDWAY.

6 June

At 0200 hours, the 4 Destroyer Division sank the damaged AKAGI.

The 1 Task Force was attacked by enemy planes three times between 0500 and 1400 hours.

A carrier plane from the HOSHO sighted the HIRYU which had been damaged.

The TANIKAZE and the ship-based plane of the NAGARA were dispatched to sink the HIRYU. The TANIKAZE was attacked by enemy planes while an route.

The main force, the Attack Unit, and the task forces ware assembled. After sunset, all casualties of the task force were transferred to the NAGATO and MUTSU.

The MIKUMA, MOGAMI, and eight destroyers were




Main Orders

attacked by enemy planes, but no losses were sustained.

The Advanced Expeditionary Force reported that the 3 Submarine Squadron was then operating in the waters northeast of HAWAII. Attacks will be made on the YORKTOWN and other enemy units remaining in the area north of MIDWAY.

Order of the Combined Fleet:

"1) A unit, with the 5 Battleship Division as its nucleus, will be constituted as a diversion force.

This unit will co-operate for a week with the Base Air Force and the Submarine Force in a 300 mile area stretching east to south from OTORIJIMA and will endeavor to neutralize the enemy task forces.

"2) The Screening Unit with the 1 Fleet as its nucleus, plus the 1 Section of the 3 Battleship Division and the ZUIHO, will be transferred to the Northern Force.

"3) The main force, the Attack Unit, and the task forces will be directly commanded by the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet and will advance to the western part of the

7 June

After 0645 hours, the MOGAMI, MIKUMA and eight destroyers were attacked by enemy carrier planes. The MIKUMA was badly damaged at a paint 500 miles west of MIDWAY.

Submarine "I" 168, although hampered by enemy flying boats, managed to sink the YORKTOWN at a point 159 miles east of MIDWAY at 1040 hours.

The main force, task forces, and the Attack Unit were expected to concentrate and be supplied in the area 1000 miles west-northwest of MIDWAY.

8 June

At 0400 hours, the MOGAMI joined the 2 Fleet. It was difficult for the MOGAMI to travel faster than 12 knots per hour. Due to her damaged condition, she took in as much as 1500 tons of water during stormy weather.

The situations regarding enemy aircraft carriers and the MIKUMA




Main Orders

were still unknown. The MIKUMA was expected to under-go repairs at TRUK.

The Base Air force concentrated 41 land attack planes (the Chitose Air Unit) on WAKE for the purpose of long-range patrols. This unit was to be aided by land attack planes (the Kisarazu Air Unit) stationed on MINAMI TORISHIMA.

The land attack planes on WAKE sighted eight enemy submarines and inflicted considerable damage to one of them. The land attack planes on MINAMI TORISHIMA sighted one enemy submarine.

The main body of the Combined Fleet arrived at a point 600 miles north of WAKE.

The main body of the 2 Fleet moved into the area between the enemy and the 1 Battleship Division. The 1 Section of the 7 Battleship Division assembled in front of the 1 Battleship Division. Due to the situation of the 2 Section of the 7 Battleship

INLAND Sea. (This is expected to be completed on the 15th.)"

The plan to dispatch the 2 Section of the 3 Battleship Division and the 8 and 10 Battleship Divisions to the north was suspended.

The Screening Force arrived at a point 506 miles south-southwest of KISKA Island at 1800 hours on 9 June. It in expected to support the northern force.




Main Orders

Division, the 2 Fleet proceeded southward in an effort to annihilate the enemy task force within the air range of OTORIJIMA.

The airplanes of the 5 Battleship Division sighted two submarines 180 miles and 270 miles, respectively, east-southeast of the 2 Fleet.

Wireless intelligence reported four submarines and two unknown type ships which were sighted west of MIDWAY.

At 0550 hours, Submarine "I" 26 (4 Submarine Division of the 1 Submarine Squadron) attacked and sank an enemy transport (6000 tons) off SEATTLE. Activities near SEATTLE have been under observation since 2 June. Enemy precautions have not been as strict as expected.

9 June

There have been no reports on the enemy task force since the 7th. (It is assumed that it is either replenishing supplies or has reversed its course.)

A radio signal, presumably from a powerful enemy warship located 300




Main Orders

miles northeast of MIDWAY, was received tonight. It seems to be withdrawing.

The main strength of the 3 and 5 Submarine Squadrons is waiting in battle formation at a point 180 east longitude (140 miles west of MIDWAY).

A patrol plane from WAKE sighted two submarines surfacing 600 miles north of WAKE.

Enemy submarines were sighted 10,000 m west of OTORIJIMA at 1200 hours. Attack upon these submarines by our 65 Guard Unit, No 4 and No 5 Torpedo Boats, and subchaser unit was successful.

The Ichiki Detachment (Army), which had been responsible for the invasion of MIDWAY, under the command of the 2 Fleet, was expected to arrive at GUAM on the 13th or 14th, and was to be stationed there. This unit will be dropped from the command of the 2 Fleet upon its arrival at GUAM.




Main Orders

13 June

At 1450 hours, the 2 special Naval Landing Force and the Ichiki Detachment arrived at GUAM, escorted by two destroyers and four patrol ships.

The 11 and 12 Naval Construction Battalions, escorted by the 2 Destroyer Squadron (less too divisions) and a subchaser unit, arrived at TRUK at 1130 hours.

Combined Fleet Order issued at 1500 hours: "A force consisting of the 5 Carrier Division (less the SHOKAKU), one destroyer, and the 5 Battleship Division, which is at present employed as a diversion force in the area southeast of WAKE, will be transferred to the northern force."

15 June

Having been relieved of its duties with the Northern Force, the Screening Unit (2 Squadron as nucleus) will arrive at YOKOSUKA on the of afternoon of 17 June, and, after receiving supplies, is expected to proceed to HASHIRAJIMA.

The greater parts of the Screening Force, which operated in the Midway area, arrived at HASHIRAJIMA.

Enemy losses in the Midway Sea Battle:

Sunk (confirmed): One aircraft carrier and one submarine.




Main Orders

Sunk (unconfirmed): One heavy cruiser (San Francisco type).

Enemy planes shot down:

Large - 50; small - 100; total - 150.

Heavy damages were also inflicted on enemy hangars, fuel dumps, and base installations.

The Submarine Force, which operated in the Midway Operation, is expected to leave its operational bases today and return to KWAJALEIN or YOKOSUKA and SASEBO.

16 June

The offensive search force (submarine squadron, minus the NACHI, as its nucleus), which had been maneuvering in the waters east of WAKE, joined the supply unit on the 15th and proceeded northward. After replenishing supplies on the 17th, this force is expected to join the Northern Force at dawn on 20 June.

17 June

The Screening force (greater part of the 1 fleet) arrived at YOKOSUKA this afternoon.

The main body of the 7 Battleship Division and the 2 Destroyer B Squadron started for JAPAN.




Main Orders

The Combined Fleet excluding the Northern Force, is expected to return to the INLAND Sea about 21 June.

18 June

Repair work by the AKASHI and the 4 Repair Unit at TRUK on the MOGAMI, ASASHIO, and the ASASHIO, which were damaged in the Midway Operation, has been facilitated to insure a speedy return of these ships to the homeland. Estimated time of completion of repairs:

MOGAMI: Latter part of July.

ASASHIO: End of June.

ASASHIO: Beginning of July.

15 June

The ARASHIO (of the 8 Destroyer Division) has been temporarily repaired at TRUK. It is expected to arrive at SASEBO on 21 June.

17 June

Temporary repairs on the MOGAMI are expected to be completed on 22 June. She is expected to leave TRUK on 23 June and arrive at SASEBO on the 29th.

22 June

Temporary repairs on the MOGAMI have been completed.


Appendix No 2

Organisational Strength of Units Which Participated in the Midway Operation and Names of Important Commanders.

A. Organisation of the Forces which Participated in the Midway Operation.


Northern Force (5F) (ALEUTIAN GROUP)

21s - KISO and TAMA.

1sd - ABUKUMA and four destroyers.

Three destroyers and two destroyers.

2D/4S - TAKAO and MAT A.

4sf - KYUJO and SHOO

NACHI and two destroyers.

Attack Unit (2F) (Transport Convoy)

11sf - CHITOSE and ZUIHO.


The 2 Special Landing Unit.

Sixteen transports.

2sd - JINTSU and 12 destroyers.

4sd - NAKA and 16 destroyers.

3S - KONGO and HIEI.


Main Group (1F)

3sd - KAWACHI and 12 destroyers.




Carrier Group (IAF)

Supply Unit.

10S - NAGARA and 16 destroyers.



2sf - HIRYU and SORYU.

1sf - AKAGI and KAGA.



GF - Combined Fleet

AF - Air fleet

F - Fleet

sf - Carrier Division

S - Battleship or Cruiser Division

D - Unit

d - Bet trover

sd - Destroyer squadron

T - Transport

s - Submarine Unit

(Reference: Japanese Military Conventional Signs and Abbreviations. ATIS Publication, 4 Mar 43.)


B. Names of Ranking Commanders who participated in the Midway Operation.




Chief of Staff

Senior Staff

GF (1S)

Admiral YAMAMOTO, Isoruku

Rear Admiral UGAKI, Matoma

Captain KUROSHIMA, Kameto

Carrier Group

1AF (1sf)

Vice Admiral NAGUMO, Tadaichi

Rear Admiral KUSAKA, Ryunosuke

Commander OISHI, Tamotsu


Rear Admiral YAMAGUCHI, Tamon

Commander ITO, Seiroku


Rear Admiral HARA, Tadaichi

Commander DOI, Yeshiji


Rear Admiral OSUGI, Morichi

Commander ARAYA, Kiichi

Main Group


Placed under the direct command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet


Vice Admiral TAKASU, Shiro

Rear Admiral KOBAYASHI, Kongo

Captain ISHIZUKA, Chitoshi


Rear Admiral KISHI, Fukuji

Commander NITANDA, Saburo


Rear Admiral, NASHIMOTO, Shintaro

Commander YAMADA, Narishige

2F (4S)

Vice Admiral KONDO, Nobutake

Rear Admiral SHIRAISHI, Danryu

Captain YAGISAWA, Kuranosuke


Attack Unit (Transport Convoy)


Rear Admiral MIKAWA, Gunichi

Commander ARITA, Yuzo


Rear Admiral NISHIMURA, Shoji

Commander NAGAI, Sumitaka


Rear Admiral TANAKA, Raizo

Commander TOYAMA, Yasumi

2 Special Landing Unit

Captain OTA, Minoru

Lt Commander IMAI, Akijiro


Rear Admiral KURITA, Takeo

Commander SUZUKI, Masakane


Rear Admiral FUJITA, Ruitaro

Commander ASHIMA, Saburo

Northern Force (Aleutian Group)

5F (21s)

Vice Admiral HOSOGAYA, Boshiro

Captain NAKAZAWA, Yu

Commander MATSUMOTO, Michiyo


Rear Admiral TSUNODA, Kakuji

Commander ODAGIRI, Masanori


Rear Admiral OMORI, Sentaro

Commander ARICHIKA, Rokuji