The German Operation at Anzio

A STUDY OF THE
GERMAN OPERATIONS
AT ANZIO BEACHHEAD
FROM 22 JAN 44 TO 31 MAY 44

Produced at
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE  PAGE 1

INTRODUCTION  PAGES 2-9

DAILY ACCOUNTS OF THE BATTLE OF ANZIO  PAGE 10-119
22 JANUARY TO 31 MAY 1944

SUMMARY  PAGES 120-122

ANNEX I: ORDER OF BATTLE OF GERMAN, AND ALLIED DIVISIONS  PAGES 123-124

ANNEX II: GERMAN TACTICAL SYMBOLS  PAGES 125-126

ANNEX III: DESCRIPTION OF GERMAN UNITS  PAGE 127

ANNEX IV: DESCRIPTION OF GERMAN ARMOR  PAGE 128
Page 5, line 45 should read:
preparations. Detailed orders, determined which troops the armies and the

Page 15, line 25 should read:
command in the sector Cecina (south of Livorno)-Terracina. At this

Page 17, line 30 and 31 should read:
with the first Artillery Battalion and the reinforced 955th Infantry
Regiment. As the staff of the 4th Parachute Division

Page 18, line 2 should read:
LI Mountain Corps took over the coastal sector north of the

Page 21, line 20 should read:
defensive front from Isola Bella to bench mark 45 (3 km southeast) –

Page 25, line 9 should read:

Estimate of the Situation Sent by Fourteenth Army to the

Page 29, last line should read:
the enemy should be rolled up in a northerly direction.

Page 33, line 14 should read:
Therefore, our 85 batteries are opposed by 59 Allied batteries.

Page 35, line 21 and 22 should read:
battalion, Panzer Company "Schwelbach" (Tiger tanks) currently
with the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, and one Panzer company

Page 36, line 30 should read:
line along the road 1 km east of Cantoniera (F 880353). Divisionary
attempts

Page 36, line 33 should read:
In spite of heavy defensive fire by artillery and naval guns, the attack–

Page 37, line 2, 3, and 4 should read:
Army Reserves with the I Parachute Corps are: three battalions of the
4th Parachute Division; with the LXVI Panzer Corps are 2d Battalion
of the 194th Grenadier Regiment, and the

Page 38, line 25 should read:
The alleged mission of this unit is an attack against Littoria (G 0818).

Page 40, line 15 should read:
The I Parachute Corps was organized as follows:
Genzano (towns excluded). Raids by this division will be

An enemy attack on Aprilia was expected, and therefore, the

3 to 4 km northeast of Cle Buon Riposo (F 853310) has been reconfirmed.

The 65th Infantry Division and the 4th Parachute Division

Division and the 114th Jager Division. The initial objective

of Hill 67, 2 km west of Cle Buon Riposo (F 853310), was

A line, just north of Highway 82 (at F 875284) was reached

The 362d Division which has been transferred from the coast defense sector

end Le Ferricre (F 963242), is expected. Increased counterattacks,

the Gorge Campo di Carne (F 853300), the southwest edge

the 10th and 11th Parachute Regiments began an attack to

Division (US) was confirmed to be in the area of the Leschione

"Today's (29 February) successes did not meet our

the road crossing Campo di Carne (F 863286). Prisoners

antiaircraft regiment and Panzer regiment, were sent to the new

1st Infantry Division (Br)
Orvieto. The 103d Reconnaissance Battalion has been dispatched

The coastal defense sector north of Castiglione (west of Grosseto) up to Cecina was separated from the Fourteenth Army.

company; one Tiger Company; Regiment Staff 145th Grenadier Regiment

All guns except 6 Field Howitzers 15 cm of 671st Artillery Regiment 715th Infantry Division and the 3d Battalion Artillery Demonstration Regiment were lost,

4th Moroccan Mountain Division (FF)

infantry battalions, except that it has more mobility through
The following study of German operations against the Allied beachhead at Anzio, from 22 January to 31 May 1944, is based on the available journals and records of the German Tenth and Fourteenth Armies. It should be noted that the facts and opinions expressed in the text reflect the German point of view, all statements on Allied troop strength, are German estimates.

Records of the German Air Force were not available, therefore the details of air action against the beachhead has not been included.

The expressions, tanks, armored, (Panzer), light motorized infantry, (Jager), and armored infantry, (Panzer Grenadier), have been left in the German for purposes of clarification. German tactical symbols, for German units, have been used on all maps; a brief glossary of symbols will be found at the end of this publication.

The enclosed maps of the Anzio area are old editions, and do not include newly constructed habitations and roads. Grid coordinates in the text refer to Map of Italy, sheet 150 (Littoria), GSGS 4164 second edition, 1943, scale 1: 100,000.
Italy's capitulation on 9 September 1943, and the resulting surrender of the Italian Armed Forces gave rise to many problems for the German High Command. Chief among these was the question of how much territory the German High Command should strive to hold, i.e., at what point the Allied offensive would have to be halted. The surprise landings on the "toe" of Italy and at Salerno, coupled with rapid advances, led to the fall of the large airbases, such as Foggia. This left the High Command with the twofold task of securing the Po Basin with its great political, economic, and military significance, as well as the politically important region of Rome. A line of defense had to be established in the mountains of central Italy. How far to the south it could be established would depend upon the availability of troops. However, due to the number, condition, and distribution of German troops, at the time, an advantageous realization of this task was not possible.

In southern Italy, Marshal Kesselring, the Commander in Chief South, commanded eight divisions, mostly motorized or armored, which were fighting opposite seventeen Allied divisions. A portion of these German units had come from Africa and had not yet been brought back to full strength; the other part consisted of reactivated divisions from the eastern front. These forces had also been weakened during their retreat through southern Italy. Therefore, they could not be expected to establish a firm defense line, if the Allies should continue their concentrated offensive to the North.

Northern Italy was occupied by Army Group B under the command of Marshal Rommel. This Army Group comprised thirteen divisions, which had arrived in Italy shortly before or during the capitulation. These units were, for the most part, reorganized or reactivated divisions from the Eastern front. Due to the immobility of these units, and the lack of equipment, they were not suitable for combat duty in the south, as long as the front had not become stabilized.

The Commander in Chief South was directed to fight an initial delaying action with the forces available to him. Army Group B was left in northern Italy to secure the coast, and to devote itself to the fortification of the northern Apennines in case of a rapid loss of central Italy. In the beginning of October, the Commander in Chief South succeeded in establishing a thin line of resistance from Naples to Termoli. On 10 October 1943, the German High Command ordered the Commander in Chief South to continue these tactics up to the line, Gaeta to Ortona, and to make a stand in this advantageous mountain position (Bernhard or Gustav position). To bolster his forces, two infantry divisions of Army Group B were transferred to the Commander in Chief South. Simultaneously, he was charged with the task of securing the coast in the region of Rome. Army Group B was ordered to pacify its zone against partisan activities, especially the Istrian peninsula, and to set up strongpoints for coastal security. For these tasks, nine divisions were left at the disposal of Army Group B; two of its divisions having been transferred to the Commander in Chief South, and two to the Eastern Front. There were constant threats of an Allied invasion in central Italy, which would bring the front in southern Italy to a state of collapse. Therefore, Army Group B was ordered to consolidate its Apennine defensive line, south of Bologna, and to
ORDER OF BATTLE IN ITALY
AS OF 21 NOV 1943
make preparations for its occupation.

Until the end of November, the situation was further stabilized. On 21 November 1943, Marshal Kesselring acquired the title Commander in Chief Southwest, and took over command of the entire Italian theater. The Commander in Chief Southwest was responsible for all military action in Italy. The High Command of Army Group C, was activated to assume charge over all the Army units remaining in Italy, and constituted the staff for the Commander in Chief Southwest. It did not command the Navy and Air Force, but controlled units of the Air Force fighting on land, and was charged with administration in the zone of operations. Rommel and the High Command of Army Group B was shifted to France.

At the time of the appointment of the Commander in Chief Southwest, two armies were formed under Army Group C the Chief of Staff being Brigadier General Westphal. The distribution of these forces is shown in map number 1.

**Tenth Army**

- **Commander**: General von Vietinghoff
- **Chief of Staff**: Colonel Wentzell, GSC
- **Area**: Central Italy
- **Units**: 14th Armored Corps, 76th Armored Corps, Ten divisions

To the rear, the army boundary followed the line Piombino to Porto Civitanova. The area of Terracina-Rome-Orbetello, was not part of this zone; it was administered by the XI Air Force Corps which was directly under the Army Group.

**Fourteenth Army**

- **Commander**: General von Mackensen
- **Chief of Staff**: Colonel Hauser, GSC
- **Area**: Northern Italy
- **Units**: 87th Army Corps, 51st Mountain Corps, Nine divisions (only two qualified for combat)
- **Operational Zones**: Adriatic Coastal Region under Lieutenant General Kübler, Alpine Approaches under Lieutenant General Withhöft, who also commanded the sector, Ancona-Venice on the east coast

* Its staff had been formed in part, from Rommel's Army Group B headquarters.

The following is a translation of a teletype understanding reached between the Armed Forces High Command (OKH) and Marshal Graziani, showing Germany's relationship with the new Italian Republican Government:

1. It is essential that Italy will continue to make extensive contributions in the continuation of the war. For that, it is necessary that:

   a. the German occupied part of Italy shall not be treated as enemy territory, but as a friendly country;
b. and, the authority and independence of the Italian (Republican) government shall be established and maintained.

2. In this spirit, the zone of operations shall be confined to an area of 35 miles, behind the front in central Italy, and to the frontier regions in the North where the lines of communication to France and Germany must be protected.

The remainder of the country will be administered by the Italian Government. Zones of operations at the coast have been designated, but only at the time of an enemy landing will the German Armed Forces take over the administration from the Italians.

A Plenipotentiary Representative for the German Armed Forces in Italy (General of the Infantry Toussaint) is appointed for the territory administered by the Italian government. He is directly subordinate to the German Armed Forces High Command. His main tasks are:

a. to represent the interests of the German Armed Forces with the Italian government, and insure that their demands are carried through by the Italian government or its subordinate authorities;

b. and to lend support to the Italian government and its authorities, as far as necessary, in the execution of governmental measures and in their relations with the German troops.

3. The defense of the line Gaeta-Ortona has a decisive significance in the continuation of the common struggle. With the loss of Rome, Italy would cease to be a bellicerent country on the side of the Axis. Consequently, all auxiliary forces of the country have to be mobilized to protect the deep flanks and long shorelines, in order to free the German forces as much as possible for employment at the front. Units of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force are to utilize Italian volunteers without restrictions.

4. The reactivation of large Italian formations is to be carried out in Army Training Centers outside of Italy.

The outstanding consideration was the apparent small number of German troops in Italy, and the relative equality in strength between the Tenth and the Fourteenth Armies. Tactically, this was not to be expected, but there were several reasons for such distribution. Because of events in the East, and the necessity to prepare against an invasion in the West, the German High Command was in no position to substantially strengthen the forces in Italy. The uncertainty regarding new Allied landings, the political unrest, and the resistance movement in northern Italy, forced the High Command to leave a large number of available forces in northern Italy. Therefore, until the Allied invasion of Normandy, only two divisions were assigned to the Fourteenth Army. Its other components were made-up from divisions in rest or reactivated divisions, from training and replacement units, and numerous smaller formations, namely, fortress battalions, security battalions, etc. As soon as a division of the Fourteenth Army reached full combat strength, it was assigned to the Tenth Army and exchanged for a battle-weary division. This led to a constant exchange of units between the two armies, and enabled the Germans to continue the defense at the front with
relatively few divisions. On the other hand, this procedure put a heavy load on the communications system in Italy, which had been greatly incapacitated by Allied air attacks as well as slowing up the defense preparations along the coasts. Under these circumstances, the Fourteenth Army was forced to act as a reservoir of forces for the front. It also had to carry out its mission of fortifying the coast and pacifying the country with weak and untrained units.

Until the landing at Anzio, and even up to the time of the Normandy invasion, the preparations for the coastal defense of Italy had primary importance. By means of small and poorly equipped air reconnaissance units, and other intelligence sources, an estimate of the available Allied reserves and shipping could be made. Nevertheless, the German command was not informed as to the actual preparations and target areas for a landing. Landings were possible on a tactical scale in support of the existing Italian front, or on a strategical scale with the aim to cut-off the entire Army Group. Thus, the entire Italian coast was under constant threat. Five defense sectors, centered around Genoa, Livorno, Rome, Rimini-Ravenna, and Istria, were formed because various coastal sectors were suitable as possible landing points. These defense sectors were fortified and reinforced with the available forces. The shoreline between these sectors was guarded by small units and obstacles. In October, the Fourteenth Army began to consolidate, the Gothic Line, a land defense line across the Apennines between La Spezia and Pesaro, and the Voralpen Line, in the Alps from the Swiss frontier to Istria. In the case of a successful Allied landing, these lines would provide prepared defensive positions in the rear of the central Italian front.

The number of German troops in Italy was barely sufficient to hold the southern front, as well as to strengthen the rear areas. In the case of an enemy landing, reinforcements would have to be dispatched from adjacent theaters, and from Germany proper, in order to prevent a collapse of the Army Group. In preparation for this the German High Command, at the end of December 1943, issued orders to the Commander in Chief West (France and Lowlands), the Commander in Chief Southeast (Balkans), and the Commander of the Replacement Army, specifying the units that were to be transferred to Italy in the event of a landing. Thus, the prompt arrival of reinforcements was assured to the Commander in Chief Southwest. Until their arrival, the Commander in Chief Southwest was directed to throw his own forces into the struggle. The Army Group had made extensive preparations. Detailed orders, which troops the armies and the independent corps were to dispatch to the endangered defense sector, in the case of an Allied landing; in this regrouping, only the combat units and the essential service troops for these units were to be transferred. The rest would remain in situ and secure their sectors. For deceptive purposes, the various defense sectors used code designations. (See Map No. 2.) The Army Group assigned a timetable for alerting and redeploying specific units; it issued directives to alerted units, specifying the march and convoy routes, and the location of dumps for gasoline, munitions, and rations. It also assigned troops to road and bridge repair, and provided for communications during the march. Emergency units were formed by all rear area troops to combat possible airborne attacks.

Units were to be ready to march or load within eight to twelve hours after the alert had been received. With the alert the code name of the landing place was to be issued, so that each unit could
Army Group C was fully aware of the inadequate shore fortifications, and of the paucity of occupation forces at the coast. The Army Group considered it unlikely that it would be able to repulse a major enemy landing, since reinforcements would not immediately be available. This was also realized by the German High Command, and constant efforts were made to strengthen endangered coastal sectors; additional coastal artillery was set up, obstacles were constructed, and specific areas were mined and inundated.

The extent to which the coast was defended relied on the military situation on the Tenth Army front. If an Allied offensive caused an emergency on the southern front, new units were dispatched from northern Italy. They were replaced by a battle-weary unit, and this tended to weaken the coastal defenses. Since this played a decisive role in the success of the Anzio landing, a review of the situation at the Tenth Army front in the months preceding the landing follows.

November and December 1943, were characterized by extremely bitter defensive action by the Tenth Army. By tenacious defense and by repeated local counterattacks the front was held, and the retreat to the prepared Gaeta-Ortona position was delayed. Thus, valuable time was gained to consolidate this line (Bernhard or Gustav position), and later proved extremely advantageous.

Allied tactics along the front were partly responsible for the success of the relatively week Tenth Army. Since the attacks by the American Fifth Army alternated with the attacks by the British Eighth, the German Command was able to move divisions from the quiet sectors and commit them to the endangered sectors. Thus, a breakthrough was avoided. The Germans yielded territory to the British Eighth Army, so as to concentrate on the Fifth Army front. An American breakthrough would mean the loss of Rome, and a German withdrawal from central Italy. In these two months, serious emergencies developed whenever an offensive was started by one of the Allies, prior to the completion of the preceding attack by the other. German mobile operations achieved an initial success, so that at the end of 1943, the battle was still being waged in front of the line, Gaeta-Ortona. The motorized and armored divisions of the Tenth Army underwent terrific strain, since they were continually engaged in active sectors and had little time for rest and repair. During November and December, strong materiel and personnel reinforcements had to be injected to prevent disintegration of the Tenth Army. To keep the strength of the Army at its former level, it became necessary to increase the number of divisions. The serious situation in Russia did not permit a transfer of divisions to a secondary theater. Army Group C was forced to release some of its own troops for the front, and thereby weaken its forces in northern Italy.

The only three divisions of the Fourteenth Army fit for combat, the 44th Infantry Division, the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division, and the 352nd Infantry Division were transferred to the Tenth Army. To counteract this loss in the north, the battle-weary 56th Infantry Division was taken out of the front at Ortona, and assigned to northern Italy. In addition, the activation of the 278th Infantry Division, and the 15 SS Panzer Grenadier Division was ordered. The German High Command directed the Fourteenth Army to release the 371st Infantry Division for use in Russia, so that eight divisions were left with this Army. Since none of these divisions had full combat strength, the coastal defenses in
# 3

ORDER OF BATTLE IN ITALY
AS OF 15 JAN 1944
northern Italy were decidedly weakened.

The unfavorable results of continuous emergencies at the front were plainly revealed by the situation in the sector west of Rome. A landing in the rear of the Tenth Army in support of the offensive at the front, had always been considered a possibility. Therefore, the task of securing the coast near Rome had a special significance. The Fourteenth Army could not assume this additional assignment. A further weakening of northern Italy was not dared, inasmuch as the German High Command was uncertain about the intentions of the Allies, such as landings at Rome, Gulf of Genoa, and Istrra. As a result, troops from the Tenth Army were used to secure the coastal sector near Rome. This area was commanded by the 1st Parachute Corps operating directly under the Army Group.

Existing documents, of the Army Group and of the Tenth Army, revealed the constant conflict between the demands of the Army for reinforcements at the front and the necessity of maintaining a strong occupation force along the coast in the Rome sector.

Since no division, fit for combat, could be spared from the front, only battle-weakened units were employed in the Rome sector. At the beginning of November, with the aggravation of the situation at the front, merely one division could be released at a time. After a short rest period near Rome, the division would be sent back to the front. The continual flow of units that ensued, caused defensive preparations along the coast to be neglected, at the time of the Anzio landings.

The offensive activities of the Allies slackened. At the beginning of the new year, the Tenth Army planned a regrouping, in order to rest exhausted divisions and to strengthen coastal defenses in its area. It was planned to retire the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" (HG) and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division from the Cassino front. The 29th Panzer Grenadier Division was to be assigned to the coastal sector at Rome, to replace the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division. The latter was to be transferred to the Adriatic sector on the left flank of the Tenth Army, where the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division was to be relieved for employment in the coastal sector, Pescara-Ancona, and the 26th Panzer Division as a reserve behind the front. The requirements of this scheme could not be met because new attacks by the Allies at Cassino and on the Adriatic coast tied-up the German forces, so that only the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" and the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division could be removed from their respective sectors. Consequently, a large part of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division remained in the region of Rome, pending relief by the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division.

At the beginning of January, a new tenseness arose, when various signs pointed to an impending Allied landing. Air and ground reconnaissance revealed troops and ships assembling in the region of Naples. Another indication was the fact that the offensive actions of the Allies against the Tenth Army changed to strong holding attacks. Since intelligence as to the date and place of an Allied landing was lacking, preparations for the defense of all the threatened coastal sectors, were speeded up. Consequently, the Army Group modified its plan for regrouping, but ordered the transfer of the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division from the east coast to the region of Rome. The transfer of this division was delayed by continued British Eighth Army attacks west of Ortona and by transportation difficulties in the mountains due to the weather. By 15 January, only half the division had arrived in the vicinity of Rome. Numerous difficulties were encountered in relieving the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division from
Cassino. The distribution of the German forces in Italy on 15 January 1943 is shown on Map No. 3.

At this critical stage, the preparations of the American Fifth Army for the offensive at the Garigliano River became manifest. Since 13 January, the Allies had been observed regrouping troops south of Cassino. At first, the intentions of these moves were not apparent. However, during the following days, up until 17 January, Allied air attacks at the Garigliano sector increased, and the registration fire of newly emplaced batteries was observed. The German command was now convinced that a major Allied attack at the Garigliano was imminent.

According to reconnaissance reports at Army Group, the Allies had enough forces at their disposal to simultaneously launch a landing and a new offensive. This assumption, coupled with the observation of increased naval activity in the region of Naples, excluded the advisability of removing reserves from the region of Rome, in order to oppose the coming offensive at the Garigliano. Therefore, the Army Group resolved to denude all sectors of the front not immediately threatened, especially the Adriatic sector, and hastily to transfer the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division to the south. The bulk of the Panzer Division "Hermann Goring" was still available as a reserve, and thus a weakening of the Rome sector could be avoided. Originally the German High Command had ordered the latter division to be transferred to France on 20 January. As its replacement, the 71st Division was on the way from Istria. This would further strengthen the southern flank of the Tenth Army, which until the arrival of all these units considered itself able to bridge the crisis by committing all available local reserves.

On 18 January 1944, the expected offensive of the American Fifth Army against the Garigliano started. The attacker gained initial successes by a surprise landing of strong forces west of the mouth of this river. In heavy fighting on February 10 and 19, the Allies crossed the lower Garigliano on a wide front. It appeared that the German front in the south would collapse. The bulk of the Panzer Division "Hermann Goring" and all local reserves had already been committed in action, and the arrival of the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division and 71st Infantry Division could not be expected before 22 January. New measures had to be taken in order to prevent an Allied breakthrough.

In spite of the threat of an Allied invasion in central or northern Italy, the Army Group now decided to deplete the coast west of Rome except for small security units. Thus, two divisions, the 29th and 90th Panzer Grenadier Divisions, were designated to conduct a counterattack at the Garigliano under the command of the 1st Parachute Corps. The Army Group foresaw a quick success in this action. This would release at the earliest possible moment the forces required to secure the coast near Rome. It was also estimated that a successful counterattack at the Garigliano might interrupt preparations and delay a possible Allied landing. However, an Allied breakthrough south of Cassino was regarded as dangerous as a successful landing near Anzio. The issue was to settle the immediate crisis first. For this purpose, the German High Command gave the go-ahead signal to launch the counterattack, thereby committing reserves of the Rome area.

In execution of this order, a redeployment of troops began on the evening of 19 January. Forty-eight hours later, on the eve of the landings at Anzio, the 29th and 90th Panzer Grenadier Divisions, under the command of the 1st Parachute Corps, were in position for...
a counterattack at the Garigliano. At this time, there were only
small contingents of the 29th and 90th Panzer Grenadier Divisions
left to secure the coast west of Rome, a sector nearly 100 miles
long, stretching from Terracina through Anzio to Civitavecchia.
A little further to the rear laid the newly activated 4th Parachute
Division, which had not been brought up to strength, and a few
tank and antitank companies. All these units were under the direct
control of the Army Group, after the 1st Parachute Corps had been
placed under the command of the Tenth Army.

The coastal sector west of Rome was greatly weakened and was
believed unable to effectively resist an amphibious operation.
According to estimates, an Allied landing in this sector would
bring the southern front to a state of collapse, since there were
no reserves available to oppose such an operation. However, since
the start of the Allied offensive at the Garigliano, no further in-
telligence about preparations for a landing had been obtained, and
the German Command believed that the crisis had been averted.
Allied landings at Anzio in the morning of 22 January came as a surprise to the German High Command, and confronted the German defense at its weakest point, in respect to time and place. Army Group C had believed in the possibility of an Allied landing because concentrations of troops, and ships had been reported between Naples and Sicily since 13 January. However, pending the outcome of the operations on the Garigliano river, the execution of an amphibious landing seemed improbable. This opinion was further supported by the belief that the German counterattack from the right flank of the Tenth Army would create a crisis. This would delay a planned landing. Heavy air raids on the railways and roads in central and northern Italy could not be interpreted as preparations for a landing, since it was also possible that these raids were intended to cut the Tenth Army supply lines.

In view of the threatening Allied breakthrough at the Garigliano river, Army Group C had withdrawn combat forces from the Rome area and transferred them to the south for the counterattack. The only units remaining in the Rome area were battle-fatigued and not prepared for offensive warfare. The strength of the troops remaining in the area west of Rome was so small that they could merely be employed for coastal observation in the Tarquinia-Terracina sector. Units were committed along the coast as follows:

**Sector Tarquinia - Mouth of the Tiber: 46 miles long.**

Two battalions of the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division were located on the coast, and one battalion in the rear, at Lake Bracciano. The following Italian coast artillery was available: two antiaircraft guns (7.6 cm), twelve light howitzers (10 cm), twelve heavy howitzers (15 cm), eight guns (7.5 cm), and six guns (10.5 cm).

**Sector South of the Tiber - Anzio - Mouth of the Astura: 41 miles long.**

The following units were located on the coast: two engineer companies of the 4th Parachute Division, one engineer company of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, and one Panzer Grenadier battalion, of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division. The following coast artillery was available: one howitzer (7.5 cm), seven howitzers (10 cm), eleven howitzers (15 cm), three guns (7.5 cm), eight guns (10 cm), two guns (10.5 cm), three guns (15.5 cm), and six guns (17 cm).

**Sector South of the Astura - Terracina: 32 miles long.**

The Reconnaissance Battalion of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division was employed for coastal observation. The following coast artillery was available: four antiaircraft guns (7.5 cm), five antiaircraft guns (9 cm), two howitzers (10 cm), two guns (7.6 cm), four guns (10.5 cm), two guns (12.2 cm), and two guns (15.2 cm).
GERMAN PREPARATIONS AGAINST ALLIED LANDINGS IN ITALY
DEC 1943
The Rome - Albanese Mountains area:

One Panzer company, one Italian assault gun company, one light antiaircraft battery, units of the 4th Parachute Division, and replacement units of the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring". Units of the 4th Parachute Division and the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" were neither completely up to strength nor trained.

As a result, Allied landing forces met practically no resistance in the morning of 22 January, and no German forces were available for an immediate counterattack. The situation was rendered more serious for the German Army, because the only headquarter in the Rome area was Army Group C Headquarters. No other staff was available to organize an emergency defense.

German air reconnaissance had failed. Neither the embarkation of invasion forces nor their approach was observed. At about 0500 Headquarters Army Group C received the first report of the landing. The basic German documents, of Army Group C and of Headquarters I Parachute Corps, outlining the course of the landing and subsequent battle are not available at present. Therefore, information about the events until the evening of 25 January, was limited to records of telephone calls between Army Group C and its armies. These notes gave the following situation until 25 January 1944, when the Fourteenth Army took over the command at the beachhead.

The critical situation at the southern flank of the Tenth Army had necessitated the commitment of all trained German reserves available in the Italian Theater. The absence of immediate German countermeasures, in the face of Allied landings south of Rome, could cut-off positions of the Tenth Army. This would lead to the collapse of the entire southern Italian front. Army Group C, recognizing this dangerous situation, intended to establish a defensive line on the beachhead as quickly as possible. At that time, it had to be assumed that the disembarking Allied forces might seize the Albanese Mountains, i.e. the key position in the area south of Rome, before sufficient German troops could be brought up for a defense. These considerations determined the necessity for a German counterattack. For this purpose, reinforcements were to be transferred to Italy from other theaters.

After the Allied landing was reported, Army Group C initiated the following measures. First, it alerted the 4th Parachute Division, which was being activated pursuant to the provisions of operation "Richard", and the replacement units of the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring", both in the Rome area. Their mission was to block all roads leading to Rome and all roads leading from the south to the Albanese Mountains. The Commandant of Rome, Brigadier General Schlemmor, was assigned to the tactical command in the landing area. Second, at 0600, Army Group C sent a report to the Armed Forces High Command that a landing took place, and requested that the task forces provided for in operation "Richard" be sent to Italy. The Armed Forces High Command ordered the following troops from other theaters to Italy. The 715th Motorized Infantry Division, the 99th Artillery Battalion (GHQ troops), the 1st Battalion, 4th Panzer Regiment, and the 301st Panzer Battalion, with remote controlled demolition vehicles, were to be transferred from the West. The Commander Southeast was to furnish the 114th Light Division (Jäger-Division), and two artillery battalions (GHQ troops). Because neither the Commander West nor the Commander Southeast could provide a second division as was planned in operation "Richard" because of the transfer of troops to Russia, the immediate active-
tion of the 92d Infantry Division, in Italy, was ordered. The following units, from the Replacement Army in Germany, were ordered to Italy: Headquarters LXXV Corps, the Infantry Demonstration Regiment, 1026th Grenadier Regiment, 1027th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, the Artillery Demonstration Regiment, the Rocket Demonstration Battalion, three battalions of security troops, two battalions of Russian volunteers, (Ost-Bataillone), six construction battalions, and the 506th Panzer Battalion with Tiger tanks. Third, at 0710, Headquarters Army Group ordered Headquarters Fourteenth Army to transfer, to the assault area, all forces provided for in operation "Richard." The Fourteenth Army ordered the 65th Infantry Division, from Genoa (less one regiment), 362d Infantry Division, from Rimini (less one regiment), and 16th SS Panzer Grenadier Division with two regiments (one from Livorno and one from Lubiana) to proceed immediately to the beachhead. These troops left for Rome on the evening of 22 January and during the course of 23 January. Fourth, at 0830, Army Group ordered Headquarters Tenth Army to transfer the Headquarters of I Parachute Corps and all combat troops that could be spared to the beachhead as quickly as possible. Units most suitable, for release by the Tenth Army, were the 71st Infantry Division and the bulk of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division. Only parts of these divisions were employed at the Tenth Army front, while the remainder was still on the march from the north. In addition, local reserves were also withdrawn from the southern front. Since tanks were landed at the very beginning of the Allied landing at Anzio, it was important to release antitank forces and artillery for employment at Anzio. The following troops of the Tenth Army were moved to the beachhead on 22 January and during the night of 23 January. From the area of Cassino came the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, (less one regiment, one artillery battalion, and one engineer company); the Staff, Reconnaissance Battalion, one artillery battalion, and one anti-aircraft artillery battalion of Panzer Division "Hermann Göring"; Reconnaissance Battalion of the 25th Panzer Division; Antitank Battalion (Panzerjäger) of the 71st Infantry Division; 525th Heavy Antitank Battalion (GHQ troops); 450th and 451st Light Artillery Battalions (GHQ troops); and 764th Heavy Artillery Battalion (GHQ troops). The Adriatic sector lost the 3d Battalion, 1st Regiment of the 1st Parachute Division; the Machine Gun Battalion of the 1st Parachute Division; one battalion of the tank regiment, 26th Panzer Division; and 500th Heavy Antitank Battalion (GHQ troops). Headquarters 71st Infantry Division and all elements of the 71st Infantry Division now enroute from the north to the Tenth Army were thrown into the Anzio positions. At 1700, Headquarters I Parachute Corps assumed command in the sector Tarquinia - Terracina and established a defensive line around the Allied beachhead with all available and arriving forces as they were allotted by Tenth Army.

Tenth Army units moved to the beachhead rapidly, despite enemy air raids. This was made possible by employing staff officers, available at Headquarters Army Group, Tenth Army, and Corps, to reroute the traffic. These officers had to divert troops, arriving from northern Italy and originally destined for the southern front of Tenth Army, in the direction of the beachhead. Units with no organic transportation were brought-up quickly, by the use of available supply columns. Available rear area troops were employed to clear the icy, snow-covered mountain passes.

The Allied advance on the beachhead on the first day of the landing did not conform to the German High Command’s expectations. Instead of moving northward with the first wave to seize the Albenese Mountains and north-westward with Mount Lepini as the target, the landing forces limited their objective. Their initial action was to occupy a small beachhead. This measure fully corresponded with the Allied landing plan, a copy of which had fallen into...
German hands at the beginning of the operation, but German defenses and troops were insufficient to prevent further advances, had they been made. Consequently, during 22 and 23 January, the German Command had time to reinforce the defenses, so that by 24 January the beachhead was encircled, and the Allied reconnaissance patrols met German resistance.

Initially, the only available forces for the construction of a defensive line were, except for the minor detachments alerted in the Rome area, the units allocated by Tenth Army. Under the command of the I Parachute Corps, three divisional sectors were set up. Reinforcements were assigned to these sectors as they arrived. The 4th Parachute Division was in command of the Eastern Sector. The six infantry and two artillery battalions in this sector were hastily assembled. Their mission was, in addition to the occupation of defensive positions, to protect the coast up to the Tiber river. The 3d Panzer Grenadier Division commanded the Center Sector. This sector was to be the center of resistance, since the first objective of an Allied attack was assumed to be the Albanese Mountains. Therefore, its front was less broad and more strongly manned. The Eastern Sector, considered unsuitable for an enemy attack, was under the command of Headquarters, Panzer Division "Hermann Göring", which had only incomplete units at its disposal. In addition, these units were responsible for the protection of the coast as far as Terracina.

The 71st Infantry Division was moved to the coastal sector above the line, Tiber – Tarquinia, because the German Command expected another Allied landing north of the Tiber. Previously, only three battalions of the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division were employed in this sector.

When it became clear on 22 January that the Allied landing at Anzio was a major operation, Headquarters Army Group C decided in the evening to discontinue the counterattack at the Garigliano river. Thus, additional troops would be made available for commitment against the beachhead. In the evening of 22 January, Army Group ordered the Tenth Army to send three Grenadier battalions and one artillery battalion from the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring", one Panzer Grenadier regiment and two artillery battalions from the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, one battalion from Regiment "Brandenburg", 60th Engineer Battalion (GHQ troops), and one anti-aircraft artillery battalion (GHQ troops), to the beachhead. In addition, the 26th Panzer Division, which was employed on the left flank of the Tenth Army, was relieved and transferred to Avezzano. This division was to participate in the intended counterattack at Anzio.

On 22 January, the situation on the beachhead had improved considerably for the Germans. From signal intelligence and prisoner of war statements, it was learned that the Allied landing forces were under the command of the VI Corps (US). The Allied forces identified on the beachhead were the 3d Infantry Division (US), 1st Infantry Division (Br), 751st Tank Battalion (US), and 504th Parachute Regiment (US). It was believed that the 45th Infantry Division (US) and the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion (US) would be landed as reinforcements, as the Allied forces made no preparations for a large-scale attack on the first day of the landings, the German Command estimated that the Allies would improve their positions, and bring up more troops during the following day. During this time, sufficient German troops would arrive to prevent an Allied breakthrough. The previously prepared plans, to move troops quickly to a threatened area, as well as preparations for designating specific units as reinforcements if landings were made, now benefited the German Command. While the transfer of troops from the Tenth Army had to be improvised, the disposition and departure of the detach-
ments from the Fourteenth Army, the West, the Southeast, and from the Replacement Army, proceeded according to plan without requiring special orders. At 1900 on 22 January, the troops of the Fourteenth Army began to leave their areas in northern Italy. On 23 and 24 January, the transportation of troops from France, Germany, and the Balkans began. These forces arrived in Italy by 31 January, despite constant enemy air attacks on roads and railways. By this time, the advanced detachments of these units were already employed at the beachhead.

No major actions occurred on the beachhead during 23 January. On the Tenth Army front, the enemy continued his attacks south of Cassino with undiminished ferocity. The crisis arising, from the combined attacks of the 34th and 36th Infantry Divisions (US), delayed the dispatch of reinforcements to Anzio. Telephone calls between Field Marshal Kesselring and the Commanding General, Tenth Army in the evening of 23 January, clearly indicated that the Army Group Commander believed that the danger of a large-scale expansion of the beachhead was no longer imminent.

On 22 and 23 January, the German Air Force repeatedly struck at the landing fleet and disembarkation points on the beachhead, and frequent reconnaissance missions were flown over the Ligurian and Adriatic Seas, as the German Command expected further Allied landings, because of the unusual lack of enemy activity. Allied preparations for a major attack were not observed on the beachhead. However, movements of troops and tanks north of Anzio, on the Aprilia road, were reported. Stronger enemy reconnaissance patrols were expected there during the next day.

24 January was generally uneventful. As was anticipated, the Allied landing forces limited themselves to reconnaissance and patrolling towards the north, as well as adjusting their artillery fire on German positions. By this time, the German defenses had been strongly reinforced, and the German Command considered the danger of an Allied breakthrough to be removed. A telephone call made by Army Group indicates, that on 24 January, a total of 70 batteries, including antiaircraft, were available for German defenses. This estimate of the situation was supported by the belief that the enemy did not have sufficient troops available on the beachhead for a large-scale attack. It was learned that the 2d Armored Division (US) and a British tank brigade were newly employed on the beachhead. This would, at the most, give the enemy a total of three infantry divisions, one armored division, and two to three armored battalions or brigades. The strength of these troops was considered insufficient for an attack, on a strategic objective such as the Albanese Mountains, as such an operation would require effective flank protection. Therefore, it was expected, that for the next few days the enemy would only attempt to expand and consolidate his beachhead for a full-scale attack. Army Group C concluded that the enemy would make only local attacks. These raids would not begin before 26 January, since the enemy had just adjusted his artillery in the afternoon of 24 January.

With these assumptions in mind, Army Group C decided to launch a counterattack, to destroy the Allied landing forces, or drive them back into the sea. The time for such an attack depended on the arrival of reinforcements. Every effort was to be made to deliver this blow before the Allied forces had completed their initial consolidation. In preparation for a German assault, Army Group C ordered Headquarters Fourteenth Army, on 24 January, to take over the command at the beachhead. In addition, Fourteenth Army was ordered to hasten the consolidation of forces to be used in the counterattacks. The 26th Panzer Division and 56th Rocket Regiment (at Cassino) were ordered to the beachhead, and were designated as further rein-
forcement for the attack. The attack was not to be started before
28 January, as the initial regrouping could not be completed sooner.
However, in the event the Allies should start their assault, prior
to this date, the German counterattack was to begin immediately,
from defensive positions.

The first major action on the beachhead occurred on 25 Janu-
ary. After a raid on Aprilia (F 875333) before noon had been
repelled, the Allied troops succeeded in capturing the town at 1600,
after a desperate struggle. The Allies also gained some ground in
the northeast, but were thrown back at Borgo Piove (G 053203) by a
German counterattack. More Allied troops disembarked on the beach-
head during the day, while forces of the German Air Force in Italy
frequently raided troop transports and disembarkation points. The
movement of German reinforcements from the south, to the beachhead,
was facilitated as Allied attacks in the area of Cassino had slack-
ened, and bad weather limited Allied Air Force operations. Bad
weather was considered to be most favorable for the execution of a
German counterattack. Success or failure depended on the activity
of the Allied Air Forces, and on naval artillery support, as was
demonstrated at Salerno. Under bad weather conditions both factors
would be reduced to a minimum. However, destruction of railroads by
Allied air attacks, caused a delay in the arrival of ammunition
and reserves from the north.

At 1800, on 25 January, the Fourteenth Army took over the
command in the Cicina sector, south of Livorno - Terracina. At this
time the following German troops were employed in the area of Rome.

Sector north of the Tiber river - Tarquinia

Elements of the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division and the
71st Infantry Division.

Sector south of the Tiber river - Terracina

Headquarters I Parachute Corps; numerous GHQ troops;
and, elements of the 4th Parachute Division, 3d Panzer
Grenadier Division, Panzer Division "Hermann Göring",
15th SS Panzer Grenadier Division, 29th Panzer Gren-
adier Division, 26th Panzer Grenadier Division, 90th
Panzer Grenadier Division, 1st Parachute Division, and
356th Infantry Division, and 15th Panzer Grenadier Division.

All these units were employed in the defense line on the beachhead,
with the exception of elements of the 4th Parachute Division and the
29th Panzer Grenadier Division. These excepted units were employed
along the coast on both sides of the beachhead. Moving towards
Anzio were the following German Divisions: 26th Panzer Division,
from the left flank of Tenth Army; 55th Infantry Division, (less
one Grenadier regiment and one artillery battalion,) from Genoa;
114th Light Infantry Division (Jäger Division) from the Balkans;
two regiments of the 362d Infantry Division from the coastal sec-
tor Rimini, and 715th Infantry Division from southern France.

After 26 January 1944, the Journal of the Fourteenth Army gives
an account of the battle on the Anzio beachhead in chronological
order. The following daily reports, outlining these events, are
translations of this Journal.
II. 26 JANUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

On the right flank, a successful Allied raid was carried out by an assault detachment. An enemy counterattack, in company strength, was repulsed. The 29th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, supported by tanks, attacked Aprilia (F 875333), and pushed forward from the west to the center of the town. 58 prisoners were taken, 3 antitank guns destroyed, 4 Sherman tanks destroyed, and 3 put out of commission. In the evening our forces in Aprilia were withdrawn from the town.

In the sector of the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring", at Cisterna (G 0232), the enemy attacked in battalion strength, at 1545, but was repelled. At 1700, the attack was resumed with one to two battalions. The battle was still on at 2000, and during the night small penetrations were sealed-off.

Rest of this sector, an attack by two to three enemy infantry battalions with 20 tanks was broken up by effective artillery fire.

B. Intelligence Report

The 24th Grenadier Brigade (Br) is confirmed at Aprilia. The 1st Irish Guards, and 5th Grenadier Guards are stationed west of Aprilia. The 751st Armored Battalion (US) has been identified 8 km south of Cisterna. The 1st Battalion of the 504th Parachute Regiment (82d Airborne Division, US) is confirmed along the Mussolini Canal. At 1730, 100 vessels were observed at sea in the sector 8 km southwest of Anzio.

Estimate of enemy situation: Attacks are likely against our positions north of Aprilia, and reconnaissance raids are expected against Cisterna and Borgo Piave (G 053203).

C. Statistics

German losses: no reports

Allied losses: 90 prisoners, 7 tanks destroyed, 3 tanks put out of commission, and 4 antitank guns destroyed.

III. 27 JANUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

Sector of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division: Two combat patrols of the enemy were repulsed on right flank. No action at Aprilia (F 875333). In the morning, attacks by one to two companies were repelled east of Aprilia. In the afternoon, a heavy enemy attack inflicted casualties on our outposts, forcing them to withdraw about 1 km to the northeast.

Sector of the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring": An attack on the right flank was repulsed. In the center of the sector, the enemy attacked in regimental strength, supported by 10 tanks, and infiltrated south of Isola Bella (G 006294) and 2.5 km northwest of Borgo Podgora.
B. Intelligence Report

Captured documents confirm previous information that these units are on the beachhead: 1st Infantry Division (Br), composed of the 24th Guards Brigade, 2d and 3d Brigades, and the 504th Parachute Regiment (US). 21 enemy batteries have been observed in the area l'Americano (F 755315) to Spaceasassi (F 917330).

Air situation: active patrol activity.

Sea situation: Heavy disembarkations east of Anzio. Aerial photographs taken at 1100 showed the following vessels: 5 destroyers and escort vessels, 5 small auxiliary vessels, 39 LST; 59 LCT, 1 LCF, 1 LCG, 17 LCJ, 16 LCM, LCA, LCP, 9 freighters with 53,000 tons (Register), 1 special ship 3,000 tons (Register), and 1 auxiliary cruiser 3,500 tons (Register). At 1330, 1 light cruiser and 2 destroyers were shelled by our coast artillery northwest of Anzio.

C. Statistics

German losses: 29 killed, 49 wounded, and 41 missing.

Allied losses: 16 prisoners, 1 tank destroyed and 1 rendered immobile, 2 antitank guns destroyed, 3 planes shot down by antiaircraft, 1 mortar, 2 machine guns, and a number of small arms.

IV. 28 JANUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

A message from Berlin states, that according to reliable sources the enemy is planning an attack against Civitavecchia. Consequently, the motorized Combat Group "von Behr" (part of the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division) will be transferred from the coastal defense sector north of the Tiber, to a concentration area near Vetralla. The sector will be taken over by the staff of the 362d Infantry Division with the 1st Artillery Battalion and a reinforced Regiment of the 955th Infantry Division. As the staff of the 4th Parachute Division is still in the process of being activated, the staff of the 65th Infantry Division, commanded by Brigadier General Pfeiffer, will take over the sector of the 4th Parachute Division and the right flank of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, the sector of the 11th Parachute Infantry Regiment. This new command is named Battle Group "Pfeiffer". On the right flank of the sector, the enemy pushed closer to the Moletta creek (F 7531 to 8332).

An attack by motorized infantry, with 20 scout cars, 1.3 km northwest of Aprilia (F 875333) was repulsed, and 3 scout cars were put out of action.

In the sector, Isola Bella (G 006294), our front line was practically restored. Later, an enemy attack, in battalion strength,
3 km west of Isola Bella was repulsed after a two hour battle. Around noon, the enemy temporarily penetrated our front line, 2 km southwest of Isola Bella, during a new attack in battalion strength. At hill 32, 4 km southeast of Isola Bella, the former front line was regained.

In the morning, our artillery fired at 9 invasion barges at Anzio. Two enemy ammunition dumps exploded from direct hits by our artillery. Combat Group "Ens" (104 Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division), which has been on the left flank of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, west of Aprilia, was relieved during the night by the 71st Infantry Division (less the 211th and 191st Regiments).

B. Intelligence Report

2d Company 7th Middlesex Battalion (element of the 24th Guard Brigade) is located in area northeast of Aprilia. According to captured documents, the Reconnaissance Battalion of the 1st Infantry Division (Br) is in the vicinity of Canale S. Lorenzo (G 780300). The boundary between British and American troops runs along route Cas. Torre Spaccasassi (F 917330) Cas. Tre di Padiglione (F 921289).

Sea and Air situation: Continued heavy landings were made at Anzio; and air activity over the front line remained steady.

C. Statistics

German losses: 31 killed, 100 wounded, and 18 missing.

Allied losses: 1 prisoner from 1st Reconnaissance Battalion (Br), 2 prisoners from 3d Battalion, 504 Parachute Regiment (US), 6 heavy machine guns captured, and 4 planes, including 1 Mustang, shot down by antiaircraft.

V. 29 January 1944

A. Operations Report

51st Mountain Corps took over the coastal sector north of the mouth of the Tiber to the army border at Cecina.

There was less enemy activity than usual on the beachhead. An enemy attack, in battalion strength, on hill 61 (F 980297), 3 km west of Isola Bella was halted by artillery fire. Enemy reconnaissance, in company strength, partially with tanks and armored scout cars, was turned back. North of Aprilia (F 875333), a stalled tank was destroyed by a magnetic antitank charge, and other vehicles were destroyed by fire. The enemy was thrown back, west of Borgo Piove (G 053203), to Moscarello creek (G 0220). Thirteen prisoners were taken. One heavy machine gun and several bazookas were captured. In the evening a concentration of approximately 30 tanks and 70 to 80 trucks loaded with troops was observed in the vicinity of Aprilia.

Harassing artillery fire from the entire beachhead and the sea, was primarily directed on the right flank and on the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring". Two cruisers and several PT boats withdrew under coast artillery fire.
B. Intelligence Report

From prisoner of war interrogation it was learned that the 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Regiment is still at Borgo Pieve (G 053203); 1st Scots Guards at Macchia del Casale (F 8934); 5th Grenadier Guards at Cle Valleleata (F 863347). Disembarkation of troops continues at Anzio-Nettuno. In the evening a large convoy of approximately 100 ships was reported as approaching.

C. Statistics

German losses: 17 killed, 63 wounded, and 24 missing.

Allied losses: 20 prisoners (13 US and 7 British), 2 fighters shot down (1 US and 1 British), 1 tank, 1 machine gun carrier, and several vehicles destroyed.

D. The German Plan of Attack

The main mission of the Fourteenth Army is to annihilate the beachhead, which the enemy is reinforcing. The attack must be made as soon as possible; the date depends on the arrival of the necessary forces, which is being delayed, as the railroad system in Italy has been crippled by enemy air raids.

The attack will be launched from north to south along the Albano-Anzio road, with the main concentration on either side of Aprilia. The date of attack was to be 28 January, but in a meeting between Army and Army Group Commanders on 26 January, D-Day was postponed to 1 February, so that reinforcements would be available. These reinforcements were: 1027th and 1028th Infantry Regiments, the Special Artillery Demonstration Regiment, the Special Rocket Projector Demonstration Battalion, and the 1st Battalion of the 4th Panzer Regiment. These units left by train from Germany, and are expected to pass through the Brenner Pass on 26 and 27 January. The plan of attack as proposed by the 1st Parachute Corps follows.

**Combat Group "Pfeiffer"**

Consists of nine infantry battalions of the 65th Infantry Division and the 4th Parachute Division. Its objective in the attack was to penetrate towards the south and link up with the main group. In addition to the artillery assigned to coastal defense, the group will have 9 light field howitzers (10.5 cm).

**Combat Group "Grüßer"**

Located in the sector previously held by the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division. This group will be employed for the main effort. On the right flank of the main effort are the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division and the 26th Panzer Division, the latter supported by the 1st Battalion of the 4th Panzer Regiment. On the left flank will be the 715th Infantry Division, making a total of seventeen infantry battalions. This unit will have 11 long-range artillery guns (17 cm); assault artillery: 29 heavy field howitzers (15 cm), 34 light field howitzers (10.5 cm), 8 guns (10 cm), 36 rocket launchers (each with six 15 cm tubes), 18 rocket launchers (each with five 21 cm tubes), and 8 rocket launchers (each with ten 15 cm tubes).
Combat Group "Konrad"

This group is composed of elements of the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" and elements of the 114th Infantry Division, giving it a total of four infantry battalions. Its mission is to penetrate to the Astura creek from the area west of Cisterna (G 0232). It will be furnished with 32 heavy field howitzers (15 cm), 42 light field howitzers (10.5 cm), and 3 guns (10 cm).

Corps Reserve

Located in the region south of Albano. It will consist of elements of the 71st Infantry Division and the 16th SS Panzer Grenadier Division, with a total of six infantry battalions.

The following antiaircraft artillery is to be employed in ground action and air defense at the discretion of the divisional staffs.

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<th>Antiaircraft guns</th>
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<td>8.8 cm</td>
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<td>Combat Group &quot;Peiffer&quot;</td>
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<td>Combat Group &quot;Gräser&quot;</td>
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<td>Combat Group &quot;Konrad&quot;</td>
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Contrary to previous instructions, the attacks will begin simultaneously in the morning of D-Day after a coordinated ten minute artillery barrage. Only on the southern flank of the beachhead in the area of Borgo Piave (G 053203) a local diversionary attack will be executed on D minus 1.

VI. 30 JANUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

During the night, 29 to 30 January 1944, the enemy began the anticipated large-scale attack, on either side of the Anzio-Albano road. The attack was preceded by heavy artillery fire, which lasted for two hours. In the sector of the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring", the enemy made a penetration at dawn, on both sides of the Nettuno-Cisterna road (G 0232). Later, the attacks expanded to other sectors of the beachhead. By late afternoon, the enemy renewed his attacks after reserves were brought in. Heavy fighting occurred, with the positions changing hands frequently. The attacks were generally repulsed. Operation reports by units follow.

Combat Group "Pfeiffer": The right flank was infiltrated by Allied forces, which were eliminated, and 60 men captured. During early morning, an enemy attack, with tanks, against the center section was stopped. In the afternoon, a heavy tank formation, of at least 70 tanks attacked the left flank (at Vallelata Heights, 3 km northwest of Aprilia; F 875333). The main line of resistance, within the entire sector, generally remained in our hands, except for partial withdrawals at Vallelata Heights.
3d Panzer Grenadier Division: After heavy artillery fire, the enemy attacked, at about 0100, with two infantry battalions supported by armor. The attack made a negligible penetration, along both sides of the Aprilia-Albano road. In the afternoon, our own counterattack met a second enemy attack, which was halted. At 1700, a unit supported by armor, penetrated our defense line and by sunset had advanced to the railroad crossing about 6 km north of Aprilia. A new defensive line was established there. However, contact was not reestablished with Combat Group "Pfeiffer", and a 2 to 3 km gap between units remained.

71st Infantry Division: No unusual activity.

Panzer Division "Hermann Göring": In the early morning, enemy infantry, supported by tanks, attacked in the area Tba. di M Garibaldi (F 940313) – Canale Mussolini. The first attack force made several penetrations, which were repulsed by local counterattacks. Enemy units which advanced to Cisterna (G 0232) were destroyed. During the morning, the enemy began a new counterattack, with a strong infantry force, northeast of Tba. di M Garibaldi – Isola Bella (G 006294). Our forces counterattacked, and fought heavily until darkness. A defensive front from Isola Bella to bench mark 45, 3 km southeast along the Canale Mussolini to north of bench mark 31, 6 km southeast of Isola Bella, was restored.

An enemy breakthrough from the beachhead, had to be prevented and a closed main line of resistance, in the sector of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division had to be restored. In the sector of the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring", the 26th Panzer Division was to counterattack the 3d American Infantry Division, which had penetrated south of Cisterna. The 26th Panzer Division was concentrated in the area north of Cisterna, and units of the 114th Jäger Division, which have arrived in the region south of Velletri, were attached, as Regimental Group "Bergor" to the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring".

B. Intelligence Report

Prisoners of war stated that the 7th and 30th Regiment, of the 3d Infantry Division (US) are still on the line, the 601st American Tank Destroyer Battalion is attached to the 30th Regiment, and that the 1st Irish Guards were committed west of Aprilia.

C. Statistics

German losses: 94 men killed, 260 men wounded, and 231 men missing.

* These losses do not include those of the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring", which will be included in the statistics report of 31 January.

Allied losses: Enemy suffered heavy losses, especially in the area of the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring". 786 men, including 29 officers, were taken prisoner; 680 of them by Panzer Division "Hermann Göring". 3 enemy tanks were destroyed.

- 21 -
A. **Operations Report**

The enemy attacked, in battalion strength, supported by armor, at several points along the front. The attacks were repulsed despite heavy, continuous barrages of all calibers, including naval gunfire. Small penetrations were repulsed or cut off. Only west of Cisterna (G 0232) was a penetration achieved, but it stopped just south of the railroad line. In the evening, the Commander in Chief Southwest reported to the Armed Forces High Command, that the enemy began to attack, on 30 January, with about 3 divisions; the bulk of our own forces, including those which had been withheld for our planned offensive, were now committed in the defense of the front. Consequently, the offensive for the annihilation of the enemy had been postponed. Now our mission is to prevent an expansion of the beachhead, and to inflict heavy losses on the enemy. The enemy has suffered heavily, but our own losses have also been high. We are not certain whether the forces, at our disposal, will be sufficient to drive the enemy into the sea, if an extensive defensive battle has to be fought. Because of the difficult rail situation, we also doubt whether an ammunition issue can be assured for the Fourteenth Army, especially since the Tenth Army requires a great deal of ammunition at Cassino.

The Fourteenth Army is to start a counteroffensive, if, in the course of the defense, a good opportunity presents itself. Assault groups are to be held in readiness, in order that such a possibility can be exploited at any given time. The entire Army coast artillery south of the Tiber has been put under the I Parachute Corps, so as to achieve a greater concentration of forces. The artillery is to be emplaced near the coast, so that as many pieces as possible will be able to fire, from the flank, at enemy shipping at the beachhead. Since additional enemy landings appear likely, the Fourteenth Army ordered the thorough demolition of the harbor of Civitavecchia.

B. **Eyewitness Report**

An infantry battalion located near Campoleone (F 860406) repulsed, with machine gun and mortar fire, 10 light and medium tanks. This battalion did not possess any antitank weapons, since it had taken position only the preceding night. The fact that the enemy tanks retreated from the fire of infantry weapons, gave the men a feeling of confidence. However, they are impressed by the enemy's superiority in materiel, especially his artillery and planes. It is not understood why the enemy tanks halted their attacks, when they had advanced at several points, within 50 yards of our main line of resistance and were not subjected to any antitank fire. A breakthrough of tanks could not have been stopped, as neither antitank weapons nor suitable reserves were available.

C. **Intelligence Report**

3d American Infantry Division (US): 2 Ranger battalions (1st and 2d) in the area between the Mussolini canal and the road from Borgo Montello (F 976236) to Isola Bella (G 006299). With them are the 30th, the 7th, and the 15th Infantry Regiments of the Division. The 15th Infantry Regiment is in the region of Cle Carano (F 940309).
1st Infantry Division (Br): The division is in the bulge, north of Aprilia (F 875333). East of the highway is the 3d Brigade. On the west side is the 24th Guard Brigade, which according to a prisoner's report, will be removed. The 2d Brigade is in the rear of the 24th.

The deployment of enemy forces in the sector between the M1oletta valley and the coast (F 7631 to F 8332), is not clear. Our reconnaissance is trying to ascertain the enemy order of battle.

On the right flank of the 30th Infantry Regiment (US) is the 751st Tank Battalion. English prisoners report that American tanks of an unknown unit are attached to the 1st Infantry Division (Br).

The continuation of enemy attacks with the main effort on the bulge north of Aprilia is expected.

D. Statistics

German losses: 94 killed, 205 wounded, and 212 missing.

Allied losses: 4 tanks destroyed, one rendered immobile.

VIII. 1 FEBRUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

At dawn, the 71st Infantry Division and the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" counterattacked west of Cisterna (G 0232), where the enemy had made a penetration on 31 January. Despite stubborn resistance, the former main line of resistance was restored. In the course of the day, enemy attacks, in company to battalion strength, were made near Aprilia (F 875333), south of Cisterna, and at the Mussolini canal; they were repulsed.

It is intended to eliminate the bulge north of Aprilia on 3 February. Heavy fighting is expected, due to the presence of strong enemy infantry forces, and the constant reports of the movement of enemy armor. But a concentric attack against the flanks with coordinated artillery fire, should bring about the desired result.

Army Group C points out that at the present moment great stress is placed on intelligence since further enemy landings are expected. Army Group also states that the situation is so serious on the Tenth Army front, especially at Cassino, that new reserves will soon be required. These can only be drawn from units, which are now employed by the Fourteenth Army. It is exceptionally well equipped with artillery and antiaircraft; consequently it is to eliminate the beachhead.

The Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army indicates that although this numerical superiority in artillery doubtlessly exists, operations can be only conducted after thorough preparations. This is due to the weakness in number and training of the infantry troops. If this fails it will be impossible to repeat the undertaking, due to the lack of forces.
Order of the Fourteenth Army to subordinate units:

In the sectors where we are not able to attack for the time being, an intensive consolidation of positions must be started, such as the laying of mines, construction of trip wire entanglements, etc. Not a foot of soil will be given up. Enemy penetrations or breakthroughs must be prevented by a consolidation of the assigned main line of resistance and of the battle positions behind it. In addition, forces from the defensive sectors will be employed at the points of concentration in attacks. Foxholes will be converted into individual points of resistance and will be connected by trenches, and connecting wire entanglements will be set up. The next priority is the construction of a secondary connecting trench system along the artillery entrenchments. The battle position will consist of a system of mutually supporting points of resistance, machine gun nests, antitank gun and infantry howitzer positions, observation posts, artillery and mortar positions, shelters for reserves, distributing points, etc. They will all be consolidated as strong points, as soon as possible. The strong points assigned to the local reserves will be kept as near to the main line of resistance as the terrain and the missions will permit.

In front of the main line of resistance as many anti-tank and anti-personnel mines as possible will be laid. Natural and artificial tank obstacles and antitank weapons of all kinds are to be supplemented by barriers of anti-personnel mines.

Only a battle position, based on the system of strong points and supplemented by a system of tank defense is capable of breaking up a large-scale attack by the enemy. Penetrations cannot be avoided, but a breakthrough must be prevented.

These constructions must not lower the offensive spirit of the troops. Entrenchment is a means of maintaining power for the offensive. Positions must be consolidated, even though the commanding officer is aware that he will no more than start this construction. Whatever he can do will be profitable for the reserves which follow. It is the task of all commanders, especially company commanders, to fight against indifference, and to force the men to entrench themselves.

C. Intelligence Report

From the interrogation of prisoners of war the following units have been identified.

1st Infantry Division (Br):

Irish Guards, located near Cle Vallelata (F 863347)
5th Grenadier Guards on the left flank of the Irish Guards (5 km northwest of Aprilia).
C Company of the 2d Foresters (1 km south of Cap Dell'Osteriaccia - F 883390) was inserted between the 1st Irish and the 1st Scots Guards on 31 January.

3d Infantry Division (US):

Reconnaissance Company located north of Cle Carano (F 940309)
1st and 3d Ranger Battalions, east of highway at Borgo Montello (F 976236)
4th Ranger Battalion is behind the 1st and 3d Ranger Battalions.

45th Division (US):
On the beachhead;

36th Engineer Battalion:
On the beachhead, as indicated on a captured map.

33d Chemical Battalion:
On the beachhead, as indicated on a captured map.

6th Armored Infantry Regiment:
Part of the 1st Armored Division (US)
Located 2 km northwest of Aprilia.

D. Statistics

German losses: 38 killed, 107 wounded, and 49 missing. This does not include Combat Group "Gräser" and the 71st Infantry Division.

Allied losses: 39 prisoners, 11 Sherman tanks destroyed, 1 tank rendered immobile, and 6 vehicles destroyed.

IX. 2 FEBRUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

An enemy attack of more than two companies has been repulsed 4 km north of Aprilia. Our counterattack to straighten the line 4 km west of Cisterna (O C232) is stopped, because an American battalion with a few tanks, is putting up a stubborn defense in an olive grove. The right flank of the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" advanced about 1 km but was later forced to withdraw to the original line in a costly fight. The enemy advance against the main line of resistance 6 km east of Borgo Montello (F 976236) in company strength was repulsed.

The I Parachute Corps requested Army Headquarters to move back the main line of resistance of the 71st Infantry Division and of the right wing of the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring". These units, especially the 71st Infantry Division, have been greatly weakened, and, since pressure from the enemy has not abated, it is necessary to form reserves, which can be done only by shortening the front. The Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army replied that only under the most compelling circumstances could he permit withdrawal of the frontline on the beachhead. In this case the withdrawal is approved, in view of the critical situation of the 71st Infantry Division. The 1028th Panzer Grenadier Regiment is transferred to Velletri, in order to place reserves in the rear of the 71st Infantry Division. Strong activity by assault detachments is ordered during the night of 2 – 3 February, in order to reduce the enemy bulge into our lines as much as possible.
Counterbattery fire was effectively maintained by our artillery. It also fired at a concentration of tanks, which was sighted by air reconnaissance 1 km south of Aprilia (F 875333). Enemy area bombing in area of Combat Group "Gräser", destroyed the artillery communications net, and all fire direction charts for the action, planned to reduce the bulge north of Aprilia, were lost. This bombing of communications minimizes the supply of ammunition. The attack has been postponed for 24 hours as it needs the total support of artillery.

In the evening the Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army reported to the Commander in Chief Southwest and described his personal impressions gained in his tour of units fighting west of Cisterna. He observed that the partial failure of these units to push forward, viz, Panzer Division "Hermann Göring", was due to the magnitude of enemy artillery bombardments. They demoralize many young soldiers, and the older men often lose their courage. However, he believed that these men will regain their composure.

Army Group C declared that an invasion in the region of Civitavecchia was probable. An enemy air reconnaissance unit, which always has only been encountered where invasions occurred, has made its appearance there. The following countermeasures were taken: first, one battalion was made available for the Viterbo region; second, air reconnaissance was stepped up in the Civitavecchia region; third, our heavy airforce units were alerted; and fourth, an anti-aircraft battalion of the Tenth Army was made available for the region of the Tiber bridges.

Army Group C intends to transfer troops from the Fourteenth Army to the Tenth Army, which is having difficulties at Cassino. The machine gun battalion of the 1st Parachute Division is contemplated for this transfer. The Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army has noted, that this battalion is employed, in the sector of the Allied penetration, west of Cisterna, and can be removed only by placing reserves in its place. The staff of LXXVI Panzer Corps, formerly with Tenth Army opposite the British Eighth Army, is transferred to the Fourteenth Army. It assumes command of the former left sector of the I Parachute Corps. The following regrouping is ordered by Fourteenth Army.

LXXVI Panzer Corps at present will defend the main line of resistance. The command post of the LXXVI Panzer Corps, will open at 1200, 4 February in the region of Giulianello (8 km east of Velletri). Its chief mission will be to prevent an enemy breakthrough, where the heaviest attacks are made, i.e. north of Aprilia and southwest of Cisterna. Apart from the defense, it is the task of the Panzer Corps to make preparations for the decisive attack, which will annihilate the beachhead. It assumes command of Combat Group "Gräser" (3d Panzer Grenadier Division, 715th motorized infantry Division, Combat Group "Raapek" (reinforced 71st Infantry Division), and Combat Group "Konrad" (reinforced Panzer-Division "Hermann Goring", 26th Panzer Division).

I Parachute Corps, with command post at Grotta Ferrata, retains command of the 6th Parachute Division and the 65th Infantry Division. Group "Pfeiffer" is to be dissolved. The current mission of I Parachute Corps is to defend the main line of resistance between the sector of the LXXVI Panzer Corps (north of Aprilia) and the coast, and also the coastline up to the mouth of the Tiber. Apart from the defensive preparations, plans will be made for an early attack conforming to the mission given to the former Group "Pfeiffer". For this attack, the front of the 4th Parachute Division is to be extended to reduce the sector of the 65th Infantry Division, so that
this Division will be available for this attack. It is responsible for the construction of a rear defense line in the Campagna from the Tiber to Lake Albano. The Commandant of Rome is placed under the command of the I Parachute Corps, but will retain his present duties. The boundary between the I Parachute Corps and the "Coastal Defense Sector Casina - mouth of the Tiber", runs along the Tiber up to the junction of the Magliana, and then skirts the western and northern outskirts of Rome.

Army reserves consist of: 114th Jäger Division (less Regimental Group "Berger") in the region of Lago Albano, 1st Battalion of the 4th Panzer Regiment (Panther tanks) in the region of Torrenova - Torre Gaia southeast of Rome, 301st Panzer Battalion (remote control tanks) on the march from Peronne, France, and a Battery of Assault Howitzers on the march from St. Poelten, Austria.

Among the newly arrived units of the Fourteenth Army are the railroad battery "Erhardt" 8 km west of Lake Albano, and the antitank battalion of the 114th Jäger Division at Regimental Group "Berger". Parts of the 1027th Panzer Grenadier Regiment have arrived near Lake Albano. The 56th Projector Regiment, with Combat Group "Gräser" is ready for action.

B. Intelligence Report

Prisoners of war identified the Reconnaissance Battalion of the 1st Division (Br), 1 km southeast of Cle della Mandria (F 898365); the 2d Battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment (US), at F 994322; confirmed the 45th Infantry Division (US) on the beachhead, and located the 39th Engineer Battalion, attached to the VI Corps, at G 32250.

C. Statistics

German losses minus Combat Group "Gräser": 70 killed, 191 wounded, and 423 missing.

Allied losses: 35 prisoners, and 1 Sherman tank destroyed.

X. 3 FEBRUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

One of our assault detachments inflicted heavy losses on the enemy by attacking a bridge under construction 6.5 km northeast of Borgo Montello (F 976236). By counterattacks with superior forces, the enemy prevented the destruction of the bridge. Our forces had to withdraw.

In the enemy bulge north of Aprilia (F 875333) our assault detachments advanced their outpost positions. An enemy infantry attack, supported by 12 tanks and 2 assault detachments was repulsed. New enemy intentions in the area northwest of Aprilia are indicated by the extreme calm that prevails in that area, except for artillery adjustment fire.

The Commanding General of the I Parachute Corps reported to Fourteenth Army that preparations for the night of 3 to 4 February are adequate, and that a further delay because of enemy air attacks
is unlikely. Fourteenth Army ordered Combat Group "Graser" to attack without further orders, in case the expected enemy attack in the sector of the 71st Infantry Division occurred. General Graser was advised that a successful night attack should be exploited to the point, where a push past Aprilia towards the south would be feasible. The 3d Heavy Company of the 764th Artillery Regiment and the 1st Parachute Machine Gun Battalion were withdrawn from the beachhead, and transferred to the Tenth Army, for use at Cassino.

E. Estimate of the Situation Sent by Fourteenth Army to the Commander in Chief Southwest.

So far two enemy infantry divisions have appeared in the forward lines. In the west, opposite the northern flank of the 65th Infantry Division and opposite Group Graser is the 1st Infantry Division (Br); in the east, opposite the eastern flank of the 71st Infantry Division and the western flank and center of the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" lies the 3d Infantry Division (US). Each division is supported by a tank brigade. On the eastern flank the enemy has two to three ranger battalions and 1 parachute regiment of the 82d Airborne Division. On the western flank, opposite the southern flank of the 65th Infantry Division and the 4th Parachute Division, unknown enemy units are operating, but the 65th Infantry Division brought in a prisoner from the 1st Armored Division (US). In addition to units in the forward lines, we assume that the 1st Armored Division (US) and the 45th Infantry Division (US) are in the rear areas of the beachhead. The presence of the following units is questionable: units of the 2d Armored Division (US), one Corps Headquarters (Br), and another British division. The intense naval traffic indicates the arrival of reinforcements.

In the battle to enlarge the beachhead the enemy has suffered heavy losses in men and tanks, which was confirmed by prisoners. However, neither his will to attack nor his endurance to resist has been broken. The enemy strength is based in his accurate and strong artillery, which is abundantly supplied with ammunition, and on the supporting naval artillery, as well as his superior air force. The mental and physical strain is great on our fresh troops. Enemy movements and order of battle, indicate an attack with one assault group from the region northeast of Aprilia, and with another group, from the region west and southwest of Cisterna (G 0232), in the general direction of Velletri. Holding attacks in the other sectors are probable. The forces now in the rear of the beachhead will probably be committed at the center of the attack. The objective of the attack will be to occupy the heights near Velletri; to reach Valmontone, by advancing through the valley east of Velletri and, to break into the rear of the Tenth Army. An attack in the direction of Rome is not likely, unless it be executed in connection with a new landing north of the mouth of the Tiber.

Fourteenth Army intends to prevent the enlarging of the beachhead, and to prepare an attack to eliminate this area.

A number of army units are remnants from various organizations and are not able to mount an attack at this time; during the last days, they had to be used in the front lines to prevent an enemy breakthrough. With these forces a strong
assault group to conduct the attack on the beachhead cannot be organized. Therefore, Fourteenth Army has planned attacks with limited objectives, to suit various situations as they arise. Then the enemy is weakened by these attacks, an all-out counteroffensive will be launched.

The first attack will be launched during the night of 3 to 4 February, by one reinforced regiment, with tanks, in the bulge north of Aprilia. The I Parachute Corps will exploit the situation, by advancing south beyond the present objective, which is the line running 1.5 km northwest of Cle. Valletta (F 863347) to Cle. della Mandria (F 898365). If successful, the attack will be continued, during the night of 4 to 5 February, by the 65th Infantry Division and Combat Group "Gräser". The objective will be to recover ground on both sides of Aprilia.

As yet, no further attacks have been planned. However, similar attacks will have to be executed in rapid succession, in order to prevent effective countermeasures by the enemy. Due to the enemy's strong artillery, superior air support, and stubborn determination, substantial losses are to be expected. It appears doubtful whether the Fourteenth Army will eliminate the beachhead, with the forces available at this time. In order to accomplish its mission, the Army requested Army Group to attach additional troops. Should this deplete coastal defenses in other areas it should be considered as a calculated risk.

The Commanding General, Fourteenth Army, issued these orders to subordinate Corps Headquarters:

An attack is imperative. Under all circumstances constant blows against the enemy, at least with strong assault detachments, must be delivered along the entire front. This will give us intelligence of the enemy situation, and the enemy, expecting an attack, will be forced to disperse his troops. Partial blows in preparation for the decisive offensive aiming to wipe out the beachhead should be delivered, with all available forces, in order to weaken the enemy.

Therefore, I order: First, the elimination of the enemy in the penetrated sector north of Aprilia, as planned by the I Parachute Corps Headquarters for the night of 3 to 4 February 1944. Second, that the present main line of resistance be held in the sectors which are not in active combat at the moment. Assault detachments will attack the enemy continuously. Our forces will be shifted in accordance with enemy moves. Forces will be reduced rapidly in sectors where the enemy is inactive.

In order to destroy the enemy near Aprilia this detailed plan will take effect: "Western Group" will push forward in an easterly direction from the area north and south of Hill 102 (F 858362). The "Eastern Group" will fight in a westerly direction toward the railroad from the area 1 km south of Cle. della Mandria (F 898365). Then, after establishing a defense line in the south, the enemy should be up in a northern direction.
"Western Group" will consist of a reinforced 145th Grenadier Regiment, of the 65th Infantry Division, three infantry battalions, two light artillery battalions, and two combat companies. It will be equipped with ten 88 mm self-propelled guns (Hornets), and three heavy antitank guns.

The "Eastern Group", will comprise a reinforced 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, two light artillery battalions, three infantry battalions, and two combat engineer companies. It will be equipped with 8 (Hornets) and 4 heavy antitank guns. There is a reserve of 12 assault guns, in addition to the detached "Artillery Group"; with three light artillery battalions, nine heavy artillery battalions, including mortars and 170 mm guns, and rocket projectors.

Should the outcome of this attack be favorable, strong assault detachments will push southward past the planned main line of resistance, to seize the enemy stronghold at the road junction (F 878354), 1.5 km north of Aprilia. Outposts will be established there.

The artillery, the antiaircraft artillery, and the combat engineers, assigned to support Combat Group "Graser", will be brought forward immediately, after the completion of the operation. This will enable us to follow up our attack, during the night of 4 to 5 February 1944, and to capture Aprilia. For the attack the 1st Battalion of the 6th Panzer Regiment, equipped with Panther tanks will be attached to the LXVI Panzer Corps. However, tanks and assault guns will attack with the infantry; they will not precede the infantry.

All officers are expected to understand the urgency of the situation. Our grand strategy demands that the beachhead be wiped out promptly.

After a telephone call with Field Marshal Kesselring the Commanding General of Fourteenth Army issued the following order:

Compared with other fronts, we have particularly strong artillery forces, and an adequate supply of ammunition. Enemy attacks must be repelled before they reach our main line of resistance. Artillery officers will be held responsible, if this task should fail, because of a lack of coordination between infantry and artillery, faulty liaison, or bad leadership. Continuous artillery fire will support the infantry. Single bursts of fire are not adequate for the support of infantry. A barrage will be placed in front of our lines. Long-range guns will engage enemy naval artillery, preventing it from interfering in our operations. Sectors of the main line of resistance, where no attack is planned, will be held and fortified by use of construction battalions. Tactical command posts will be moved from communication centers and villages, for protection against air raids, which might cause a delay.
in the attack, or the loss of staff personnel. As a countermeasure against possible further amphibious or airborne operations against Rome, the 1027th Panzer Grenadier Regiment is held as a motorized reserve. The 1027th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 450th Artillery Battalion, 3d Company of 525 Antitank Battalion, with 88 mm self propelled guns, and the 1st Company of 60th Combat Engineer Battalion (motorized), are available to counterattack the expected enemy landing in the area of Civitavecchia.

The Commander of Artillery Group 317 is placed under the command of Army. He will command the long-range artillery group of the unattached 619th Regiment, and the 56th Projector Regiment, reinforced by the Projector Demonstration Battalion. He will coordinate the artillery of both Corps, in order to assure effectiveness of the artillery, particularly along the Corps boundaries.

B. Intelligence Report

Prisoners of war have confirmed the 1st Duke of Wellington, of the 3d Brigade/1st Infantry Division (Br) at Hill 115 (F 869369). Units of the 1st Armored Division (US) are employed in area north of Aprilia.

C. Statistics

German losses: 87 killed, 259 wounded, and 194 missing.

Allied losses: 2 prisoners (American), 2 trucks destroyed, and 3 aircraft downed.

XI. 4 FEBRUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

Our attack north of Aprilia (F 875333) began at 2300 last night. Combat Group "Pfeiffer" (65th Infantry Division) reached the road 3.2km southwest of Cle. Vallelata (F 863347), and defended this newly won position with artillery fire. Combat Group "Grazer" penetrated the main line of resistance 2.5 km north of Aprilia and contacted Combat Group "Pfeiffer". After setting up a defensive front toward the south, the cut-off enemy groups were attacked. Individual strongpoints were heavily fought over, and enemy attempts to relieve their encircled forces from the south, by attacks in battalion strength with tank support, were repulsed. Our artillery supported our attack by firing on Allied reserves, brought toward Aprilia. An enemy battalion north of Aprilia was destroyed. Heavy enemy artillery fire, partly supported by naval gunfire, interfered with our attacks. The main forces of the 29th Grenadier Regiment (motorized), were placed on the new main line of resistance during the night of 4/5 February.

B. Eyewitness Report

The terrain of our attack was difficult, because of the many deep cuts, running in a northeast to southwesterly direction. Supporting tanks were handicapped by the heavy rains and mud. Any success
against the stubborn enemy was due to the efforts of our infantry. Our losses were light compared with those of the enemy. We captured 5 trucks, 2 armored reconnaissance cars, 1 Sherman tank, 3 ammunition carriers, and 2 motorcycles. With the exception of the 2 reconnaissance cars and 1 ammunition carrier damaged by artillery fire, all vehicles were intact. They were abandoned by their crews without attempting to destroy them.

C. Intelligence Report

The 1st Loyal Battalion of the 2d Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division (Br) is located 1.5 km northeast of Cle. Spaccasassi (F 917330), according to a British prisoner. He also said the 7th Infantry Regiment (US), with 3d Reconnaissance Battalion attached, was on the right of the 1st Loyal. This confirms our previous estimates of the boundary between the British and American forces. Captured papers confirmed previous information that the 1st Armored Division (US) was on the beachhead. The 6th Gordons Infantry Battalion (Br) was in the area 1.5 km south of Cle. della Mandria (F 898365), the 1st Duke of Wellington infantry Regiment (Br) is 4 km northeast of Aprilia, and the 1st King's Shropshire Light Infantry Regiment (Br) is south of Stazione Campoleone (F 877386).

D. Statistics

German losses: 74 killed, 161 wounded, and 498 missing (probably 80% killed).

Allied losses: 19 officers and about 900 enlisted men taken prisoner in pocket north of Aprilia, 12 tanks, 1 armored reconnaissance car destroyed, and 4 aircraft shot down.

XII. 5 FEBRUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

Only minor infantry activities took place during the day. The enemy artillery was active including naval guns. In the evening, the left flank of the 71st Infantry Division and the 26th Panzer Division attacked on Fourteenth Army orders with the objective to establish a new main line of resistance from Ponte Rotto (F 997314) to a crossing 3 km northeast of Cle. Carano (F 940309). Our armor crossed the railroad dam and penetrated the olive grove 1.6 km west of Ponte Rotto. An enemy attack, from the grove in battalion strength, was halted when it reached its own artillery impact area. Enemy losses were high. The Parachute Demonstration Battalion attacking the woods west of Ponte Rotto had to withdraw under enemy pressure. The left flank of the division reached its objective with armored support and occupied Ponte Rotto.

Our artillery fired on visual targets with good results. 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer 4 miles west of Anzio withdrew.

Army reserves included the 1st and 2d Battalions, 147th Grenadier Regiment (behind 1st Parachute Corps); two Battalions of 67th Panzer Grenadier Regiment; Panzer Grenadier Regiment 1028 (behind LXVII Corps); Panzer Grenadier Regiment 1027 (former Army reserve) assigned to 4th Parachute Division.
By order of the Army High Command the reinforced Panzer Grenadier Regiment 1027 was assigned to the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, and the reinforced Panzer Grenadier Regiment 1028 to the 26th Panzer Division. With the assignment of these regiments each of the two divisions now has three Panzer Grenadier Regiments.

Due to the possibility of new landings, particularly in the area between the Tiber river and Livorno, Fourteenth Army ordered the following units to be ready to move after a two hour warning: the 450th Artillery Battalion, 1st Company, 525th Antitank Battalion, 1st Company, 22d Engineer (Airforce), 1st Heavy Antiaircraft Battalion, 12th Regiment, and the newly arrived units of 114th Jager Division.

Artillery situation: A total of 39 enemy batteries has been located. An additional 20 batteries are believed to be in the area. Therefore, our 85 batteries are opposed by 50 enemy batteries. Not included in this figure, are enemy heavy caliber naval guns, which give considerable support to the land forces, and armored self-propelled artillery. Unlike our own, the enemy's artillery has at its disposal an almost unlimited supply of ammunition. Due to the absence of enemy counterbattery fire, it is believed that he has no exact picture of our artillery positions.

The ensuing table depicts the artillery available to our own units.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Number of Batteries</th>
<th>Number of Guns</th>
<th>Caliber</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Parachute Corps</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>22, over 10.5 cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LXXVI Panzer Corps</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>57, over 10.5 cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army coast artillery</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>19, over 10.5 cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56th Rocket Projector Regiment</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35 with 15 cm, 6 with 21 cm</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panzer Projector Battery &quot;Hermann Göring&quot;</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>None over 10.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad artillery</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15 cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>None over 10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>94.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>372</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A projector demonstration battalion is expected.

The chart below indicates the tanks, assault guns, heavy antitank guns available in our area, less those employed in coastal defense.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type tank</th>
<th>1 Feb 1944</th>
<th>4 Feb 1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panzer IV (Long)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panzer V (Panther)</td>
<td></td>
<td>59</td>
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<tr>
<td>Flame-throwing Tanks</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panzer VI (Tiger)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Tanks German</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command Tanks Italian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>30</strong></td>
<td><strong>95</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assault guns</th>
<th>1 Feb 1944</th>
<th>4 Feb 1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>48</strong></td>
<td><strong>47</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Heavy Antitank Guns        | 169        | 193        |

B. Intelligence Report

Captured documents indicate that the 1st Irish Guards is supported by the 39th Battalion of the Field Artillery Regiment. The
81st Reconnaissance Battalion of the 1st Armored Division (US) has been established 1 km southeast of Osteriaccia (F 789283). The 2d Battalion of the 36th Engineer Battalion (US) is about 4 km southwest of Le Ferriere (F 963242). According to 4 prisoners of war of F Company, the 30th Infantry Regiment of the 3d Infantry Division (US) is 1 km south of Padiglione (F 921289), and G Company 1 km east of that town. Most of the prisoners, taken in the pocket north of Aprilia (F 87533), are from the 6th Gordons and 1st Duke of Wellington Regiment. A prisoner of war says the 1st Battalion, 504 Parachute Regiment is near the bridge 1.5 km southwest Borgo Pieve (G.053203). An enemy patrol had the mission to capture prisoners for interrogation as the enemy is preparing an attack from the Littoria (G 0812) area. Rumors are spreading, that the 509th Parachute Regiment will arrive in Anzio soon.

As the enemy is not committing his reserves, it is assumed that he is preparing a new attack. It is possible, that apart from continuing his efforts to break out of the beachhead, in the direction of Aprilia, the enemy will attempt to breakthrough towards Cisterna (G 0232). Another possibility is an attack in the direction of Ardea (F 787350), in coordination with a landing west of Ardea.

**Enemy Strength on Anzio Beachhead as of 5 February 1944**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>At the front</th>
<th>Inf Bns</th>
<th>Anti-tank guns</th>
<th>arty pieces</th>
<th>AA guns</th>
<th>Armored scout cars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Infantry Division (Br)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46th Tank Battalion</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Infantry Division (US)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>751st Tank Battalion</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>601st Tank Destroyer Battalion</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tank Destroyers (Br)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Armored Division (US)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rangers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>504th Airborne Regiment</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps Artillery (US)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54 (13)</td>
<td>2/4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps Antiaircraft (US)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15th Infantry Division (US)</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reported by reliable sources

| 1 Infantry Division (Br)     | 1       | 64             | 72          | 48      | -                  |
| Elements of 2d Armored Division (US) | -    | 158 (L)       | -           | -       | -                  |
| 66th Armored Regiment        | -       | 232 (M)       | -           | -       | -                  |

Total 43 829 498 390 216 209

**C. Statistics**

German losses: 64 killed, 190 wounded, and 7 missing.

Allied losses: 63 prisoners and 102 dead.

Destroyed or captured: 3 howitzers (7.5 cm), 1 light gun, 4 bazookas, 4 light mortars, 1 machine gun, 2 antitank guns and numerous small arms, 7 planes shot down, and 34 vehicles destroyed.

- 34 -
A. Operations Report

With the exception of reconnaissance, artillery, and air activities by both sides, the day was quiet. During the night, an enemy attack, in company strength, against the right sector of the 26th Panzer Division was broken up, by concentrated fire of all weapons. Our artillery shelled enemy assembly areas, entrenchments, batteries, and ships at Nettuno and Anzio. Our antiaircraft guns (88 mm) shelled the airport 2.5 km southeast of Nettuno.

The 114th Jäger Division, less Combat Group "Berger", is assembling in the region of Frascati-Castel di Leva-Torre Chiesaccia. The 1st Battalion, 4th Panzer Regiment will be in the region 5 km west of Albano tonight. The 301st Panzer Battalion (remote controlled demolition vehicles), arrived in part in the region south of Stazione Agraria (5 km south of the outskirts of Rome).

By order of the Fourteenth Army the newly arrived staff of the 6th Panzer Regiment is attached to the LXXVI Panzer Corps. The staff and subordinate units will constitute Army reserves. They are: 1st Battalion, 4th Panzer Regiment (Panther tanks), 301st Panzer Battalion (remote controlled demolition vehicles), 1 assault howitzer battalion, Panzer Company "Schweibach" (Tiger tanks) and currently with the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, and First Panzer company (Ferdinand tanks). The units now in transit will assemble in the region south and southeast of Rome. All measures for a rapid drive to the south must be prepared.

The Army High Command has ordered the activation of the 92d Infantry Division, in the Civitavecchia area. The majority of the troops will be obtained from the reinforced 1026th Grenadier Regiment. It will consist of the 1059th Grenadier Regiment, 1060th Grenadier Regiment, and the 192d Artillery Battalion. Its activation will be completed by 1 I March 1944, and the division will be ready for action by 15 April 1944.

The Commanding General of Fourteenth Army issued an order, setting forth the following directives: First, the aim of the next attack by the Army will be the capture of Aprilia (F 875333). This attack will be made during the night of 7 to 8 February. The approximate main line of resistance after the attack will be the line along the southern edge of the ridge Tenuta Buonriposo (F 8332) to 1 km southwest Casale Carroceto (F 869330) to the crossroads southeast of Aprilia to the roadfork, 5 km northeast of Aprilia. Second, diversions will be carried out along the entire front. Strong elements of I Parachute Corps will attack from the west. The main attack group consisting of the LXXVI Panzer Corps, reinforced by available elements of the 71st Infantry Division, will attack from the east. Third, the ground liaison officer of the 2d Air Force will be requested to provide strong fighter escort over the area of Aprilia, as early as possible on 8 February, and to have planes alerted for missions requested by the LXXVI Panzer Corps.

B. Intelligence Report

An undated paper captured in the sector of the 7th Infantry Regiment (US) indicated that the 45th American Infantry Division, supported by a second brigade (probably the 1st Infantry Division (Br)) will attack Ardea (F 787350).
The interrogation of two prisoners, captured north of Aprilia on 5 February 1944, indicated that the 169th Brigade (Br) was an element of the 56th Infantry Division (Br). The Brigade is on the beachhead, as well as the entire division.

It is possible that an attack toward Ardea will be made by the 45th Infantry Division (US), reinforced by the 1st Armored Division (US) and possibly parts of the 1st Infantry Division (Br). This attack may be coordinated with a landing in the region south of Rome.

C. Statistics

German losses: 46 killed, 132 wounded, and 5 missing.

XIV. 7 FEBRUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

The hill 1.5 km northeast of Cle S. Lorenzo (F 780300), captured last night by an assault detachment, was later taken by the enemy, as a result of counterfire which caused many casualties. An enemy attack, in battalion strength, on the right flank of the 26th Panzer Division was repulsed. Two assault detachments wiped out two enemy strongholds. Two hills 2.5 km northeast of Aprilia (F 875333) were seized by reconnaissance, in force.

In the evening, the attack to recapture Aprilia began as planned. The 4th Parachute Division, which occupies the edge of the woods south of the Villotta Creek (F 7631 to F 8332), made numerous feints with reconnaissance patrols and assault detachments. At 2100, the 65th Infantry Division penetrated the enemy's main line of resistance, after combating enemy forces which stubbornly defended their positions. After destroying points of resistance in the Buonriposo Valley (F 8431), we succeeded in seizing a hill 2 km. southwest of Aprilia. At 2130, the LXXVI Panzer Corps attacked on the right flank (Combat Group "Grasser") and penetrated the enemy line along the road 1 km east of Cantoniera. Diversionary attempts were made by assault detachments of the 26th Panzer Division and the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring".

In spite of heavy defensive fire by naval guns, the attacking forces reached their designated objectives in all sectors. Our artillery supported the attack, with harassing and surprise fire on enemy troop concentrations and movements, shelters, and supply routes. In addition, the 280 mm railroad guns and 170 mm guns shelled enemy ships off Anzio and Nettuno. The attack on Aprilia is planned for 0600, 8 February.

After an air raid by the Luftwaffe on Nettuno, fires were observed.

After the completion of the attack on Aprilia, the Army Command has ordered the LXXVI Panzer Corps to reorganize its forces as follows: First, to withdraw the 26th Panzer Division, as soon as possible, to the vicinity of Cisterna (G 0233), where it is to act as a reserve. Second, to replace the 71st Infantry Division by the 71st (motorized) Infantry Division. Third, to prepare to place the 114th Jager Division, less Regimental Group "Berger", in the sector currently held by Combat Group "Grasser". Fourth, to withdraw the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division from the front. This reorganization
must be concluded no later than 14 February 1944.

Army Reserves are I Parachute Corps, with the 3d Battalion of the 4th Parachute Division as its components, and the LXXVI Panzer Corps, with the 2d Battalion of 194th Grenadier Regiment, and the 26th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion, as its subordinate units.

B. Intelligence Report

Prisoners confirm the position of the 1st London Scots (169th Brigade of 56th Infantry Division) to be north of Aprilia, and the 1st Irish Rifles to be west of Spaccasassi (F 917330).

C. Statistics

German losses: (minus I Parachute Corps) 23 dead, 99 wounded, and 9 missing.

Allied losses: 8 British prisoners, 28 American prisoners, 4 tanks destroyed or captured, 1 tank rendered immobile, 1 scout car destroyed, 3 motor vehicles destroyed, and 5 fighter bombers downed. Captured material: 8 automatic rifles, 7 light machine guns, 1 bazooka, 13 mines, 1 radio set (tank), 2 ammunition carriers, and 2 motorcycles.

XV. 8 FEBRUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

Due to strong enemy resistance and our heavy losses, the main attack on Aprilia (F 875333), which had been planned for 0600, 8 February 1944, had to be postponed. The attack will take place during the night of 8 to 9 February after the troops regroup in the dark, due to increased enemy activity. The attack will begin at 0000.

Continued tank supported counterattacks during the whole day were repulsed. Tank supported enemy attacks recaptured the cemetery in the Combat Group "Grasser" sector, northeast of Aprilia. On the right flank of the 26th Panzer Division an advanced company was cut off about noon, but was relieved at 2300 by our tank attack. In the morning, an enemy attack against Ponte Rotto (F 997314) was smashed by artillery fire. Four enemy tanks, that were feeling their way forward towards our outposts were forced to turn back by our infantry gun fire. Our artillery laid harassing fire on important enemy supply routes, and engaged enemy artillery with counterbattery fire with observed results. The harbor of Nettuno and the airport east of it were shelled by 17 cm cannons and railway guns.

The Commander in Chief Southwest has ordered the Fourteenth Army to exchange elements of the 71st Infantry Division and of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division for the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, currently with the Tenth Army. The marchorder for the transferred units follows. During the night of 8 to 9 February, at least two infantry battalions and one artillery battalion will move to their new position; during the night of 9 to 10 February, two infantry battalions and two artillery battalions; and the remainder of 71st Infantry Division and 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, will move in the night of 10 to 11 February.

The 114th Jager Division previously employed in the sector north of Spalato, Yugoslavia, will soon arrive in the sector south of Rome.
It will be attached to the 76th Panzer Corps as of 0000, 9 February 1944. Fourteenth Army will determine the employment of this division.

B. Eyewitness Report

The attacking troops were weakened not so much by enemy infantry defense as by heavy artillery fire, which, supported by naval artillery, has increased to barrage strength. An infantry battalion attacking Aprilia, from the north, suffered heavy losses in a mine field 1 km north of Aprilia. A captured enemy situation map gave the extent of the mine field, so that a large number of mines could be removed during the day, and a new attack be prepared. The mines, British contact mines, are comparatively easy to find. Most of them have been laid openly without camouflage. The supply of rations and ammunition, for the attacking unit, was brought up regularly in spite of heavy fire by enemy artillery and air attacks on the supply routes.

C. Intelligence Report

Information from captured documents indicates that the 1st Regiment of the 1st Special Service Force (US) is near 1' Osteriacia (F 789283). According to statements made by prisoners, the 3d Regiment and parts of the 2d Regiment of this unit are also on the beachhead. The remainder of the 2d Regiment is expected to arrive. The alleged mission of this unit is an attack Littoria (G 0818).

According to our air reconnaissance, outside Nettuno harbor lie 1 aircraft carrier, 5 tankers, 1 large transport, 40 large and numerous small ships.

D. Statistics

German losses: (1st Group Gräser and 65th Infantry Division) 29 killed, 98 wounded, and 26 missing.

Allied losses: 791 British prisoners. Most of the prisoners are from the 5th Grenadiers Guards, 3d Staffords and Irish Guards. None from the 1st Scots Guards have appeared.

XVI. 9 FEBRUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

At midnight, the left flank of the I Parachute Corps and the right flank of the LXXVI Panzer Corps resumed the attack, according to plan. During the night, the 725th Grenadier Regiment of Combat Group "Graser" advanced toward the northeast town limits of Aprilia (F 875333), after by-passing an enemy mine field north of the town. Before noon, the southern part of the town was taken in heavy fighting; and a defensive front to the south was established. Several enemy counterattacks, with heavy tank support (20 to 30 tanks) and some by single tanks, were repulsed by artillery, assault guns, and "Hornets".
The 65th Infantry Division attacked Cle. Carroceto (F 869330) at 1400 hours. After heavy fighting during the day, the Germans succeeded in occupying the railway line southwest of Cle. Carroceto and south of Hill 80 (F 865325). The Allies put up a stubborn defense, but numerous counterattacks were launched by the Allies, with tank support. For the first time, heavy units supported the ground forces. It was difficult to bring forward artillery, since the streets leading to Cle. Carroceto, from the west and northwest, were heavily mined and subject to shelling. It is planned to attack again and take Cle. Carroceto, during the night of 9 to 10 February, in order to establish contact with Combat Group "Gräser" in Aprilia.

Even though enemy artillery activity was relatively light, due to the scarcity of ammunition, it was compensated for, by heavy bomber and fighter activity.

For political reasons, elements of the Italian Parachute Regiment "Nembo" will be attached to the 4th Parachute Division and employed at the front. Upon arrival at the beachhead, the following troops will be attached to the units designated: Artillery Demonstration Regiment and 56th Projector Regiment is attached to the 65th Infantry Division; the Infantry Demonstration Regiment to the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division; and the Staff of the 59th Tank Regiment with the 216th, 301st, and 508th Tank Battalion; as well as, the 1st Battalion of the 4th Tank Regiment to the LXXVI Panzer Corps. The following units now employed with the Fourteenth Army will be transferred to the Tenth Army. During the night of 9 to 10 February, the Staff of the 194th Grenadier Regiment, 1st Battalion of the 194th Grenadier Regiment, and one artillery battalion, all of the 71st Infantry Division will be transferred; in the night, 10 to 11 February, the Fusilier Battalion of the 356th Infantry Division, and the 104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division. By 14 February, the 2d Battalion of the 71st Grenadier Regiment (motorized) of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division must be moved. Reserves of the LXXVI Panzer Corps include the 67th Panzer Grenadier Regiment (less the 1st Battalion) located in the sector 1 km south of Ariccia (near Lake Albano), and the 2d Battalion of the 194th Grenadier Regiment, in the woods 1 km northeast of Aprilia.

First order by the Fourteenth Army for the attack to wipe out the Nettuno beachhead (code name: "Fischfang").

During the last days the enemy has brought to and employed on the beachhead fresh reinforcements. The 56th Infantry Division (Sr), has just been identified. More reinforcements can be counted on. After the seizure of Aprilia, heavy enemy attacks against that sector are expected.

The Fourteenth Army will attack the enemy beachhead on X day, 15 February 1944 at Y hour, with its main effort between 1.5 km west of Aprilia-Nettuno highway and the Fosso di Spaccasassi (F 9129 to 9034). The front will be pierced and the attacking forces will push through to Nettuno and destroy enemy forces of the beachhead.

Orders to the Corps: I Parachute Corps (4th Parachute Division and 65th Infantry Division) will concentrate all available forces on its east flank. It will attack from the sector west of Cle. Carroceto (F 869330) in a southerly direction and will cover the west flank of the entire attack. The LXXVI Panzer Corps (3d Panzer Grenadier Division, Infantry Demonstration Regiment, the 114th Jäger Division and the 715th
motorized Infantry Division) will attack with the first wave. It will break through the enemy lines in the sector stretching from west of Aprilia-Nettuno highway to Fosso di Spaccasassi and will advance to Nettuno.

The 29th Panzer Grenadier Division and the 26th Panzer Division, including the 1st Battalion of the 4th Panzer Regiment and the 508th Tiger Battalion, will be held in readiness. They will be positioned so that they can be employed for a further thrust on Nettuno after a successful breakthrough or for mopping-up operations on the flanks. The sector east of Fosso di Spaccasassi will be held with a minimum of troops. Full use must be made of our strong artillery and armored forces. The date of the attack will be set later.

The I Parachute Corps will be organized as follows:

1. Large units
   a. 4th Parachute Division (only elements ready for action)
   b. 65th Infantry Division (less the 146th Grenadier Regiment, and the 4th Battalion of the 165th Artillery Regiment)
   c. Commander of Rome: 936th Security Battalion, Rome SS Police Battalion, 676th Regional Defense Battalion. Withdrawal of forces will be made only with Army approval.

2. Army troops
   a. 1027th Panzer Grenadier Regiment
   b. 590th Tank Destroyer Battalion
   c. One company of the 525th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Hornets)

3. Air Force troops
   a. Assault Gun Battalion, XI Air Force Corps
   b. 22d Air Corps Engineer Battalion

The Organization of the LXXVI Panzer Corps is listed below:

1. First Combat Wave
   a. Large Units
      (1) 3d Panzer Grenadier Division (less 103rd Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion)
      (2) 114th Jäger Division
      (3) 715th motorized Infantry Division
      (4) Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" (temporarily, less the bulk of the Panzer Regiment and the staff of Panzer Grenadier Regiment "Hermann Göring")
   b. Miscellaneous Units
      (1) 1st Parachute Division: 3d Battalion of the 1st Parachute Regiment.
      (2) 16th SS Panzer Grenadier Division: 2d Battalion of the 35th SS Grenadier Regiment and the reinforced 2d Battalion of the 36th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment.
      (3) 362d Füsillier Battalion.
c. Army Troops

(1) Infantry Demonstration Regiment (horse-drawn)
(2) 1028th Panzer Grenadier Regiment
(3) 216th Assault Panzer Battalion
(4) 301st Radio Controlled Demolition Tank Battalion
(5) 525th Tank Destroyer Battalion (less 1st Company)
(6) 60th Engineer Battalion (motorized)
(7) 811th Armored Engineer Company (Goliath tanks)
(8) Staff, 543d Engineer Regiment
(9) 813th Armored Engineer Company (Goliath tanks)
(10) 840th Heavy Armored Bridge Column

d. Air Force Troops

(1) Parachute Demonstration Battalion
(2) 7th Air Corps Field Battalion (unattached)

2. Second Combat Wave

a. Large Units

(1) 26th Armored Division
(2) 29th Panzer Grenadier Division

b. Army Troops

(1) Staff of 69th Panzer Regiment
(2) 1st Battalion of the 4th Panzer Regiment (Panther tanks)
(3) 508th Panzer Battalion (Tiger tanks)

Full support by Air Force and Navy is requested for the impending attack.

We must deceive the enemy as to the sector of our main effort. To accomplish this it is ordered that: First, the entire enemy front must be constantly raided, especially in the area of the Panzer Division "Hermann Goring" and the 4th Parachute Division. Second, the 26th Panzer Division will be assembled in the area Cisterna (G 0232) - Doganella (G 106306) - Casale delle Castelle (G 007352) after they are withdrawn from the front line. The 29th Panzer Grenadier Division will be assembled in the area Vollestri - Lanuvio - Genzano (owns excluded). Raids by this division will be made in the sector southwest of Cisterna. Third, the 26th Panzer Division and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division will conduct reconnaissance, wearing black Tank Corps uniforms to deceive the enemy that motorized forces are preparing attacks in this area. Fourth, motorized troops from assembly areas, in the rear, will be transferred only after the beginning of the attack, to positions of readiness, behind the point of main effort.

E. Intelligence Report

The 2d Battalion of the 157th Regiment, of the 45th Infantry Division (US) has been located for the first time 1.5 km east of Cle, S Lorenzo (F 780300). It has been confirmed, that the 2d Staffords
is employed in the area 1 km northwest of Cle. S Lorenzo. On their right flank is the 5th Grenadier Guards, and next to them to the northeast the remainder of the 1st Irish Guards. The American battalion under the command of the 24th Guard Brigade, is employed in the area south of Lorenzo. The 2d Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment of the 3d Infantry Division (US) is employed in the area, Isola Bella (G 006294); this was confirmed by prisoners of war. All three battalions of the 16th Brigade, 56th Infantry Division (Br) are employed in the Aprilia area and further east. The 3d Battalion of the 157th Infantry Regiment, and the 3d Battalion of the 504th Parachute Regiment are employed near Cle. S Lorenzo.

Prisoners of war indicate that the 1st London Irish Rifles and 10th Royal Berkshire are directly east of Cle. S Lorenzo. To the east thereof is the 1st London Scots.

1 Company 3d Battalion of the 179th Infantry Regiment, of the 45th Infantry Division (US) is 1 km south of l'Osteriaccia (F 789283). The regiment was employed on the southeastern flank one week ago. Another regiment of the division is said to have been committed in the western section of the beachhead.

C. Statistics

German losses: (less Combat Group "Gräser") 42 killed, 152 wounded, and 113 missing.

Allied losses:

Prisoners: 420 British, 1 American, 15 tanks destroyed, 3 tanks put out of commission, and 4 heavy antitank guns destroyed.

Captured: 10 antitank guns, 28 heavy mortars, 155 machine guns, 30 submachine guns, 22 motor vehicles, and 1 tank.

XVII. 10 FEBRUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

In the morning, the 65th Infantry Division succeeded in taking the railroad station at Carroceto (F 865330); and the enemy strongpoint on Hill 80 (F 865325). An enemy counterattack, supported by tanks, recaptured the hill, as well as the railroad station at Carroceto and inflicted heavy losses. The station, however, was retaken in the evening by Combat Group "Gräser".

Before dawn, the reinforced 26th Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion, occupied Cle Carroceto and destroyed the strongpoints north of it, which had held out since the morning of 9 February. At night, the 26th Panzer Division repelled an enemy attack in company strength.

The enemy attacked during the night, after heavy artillery preparations, with the strength of two companies, in the sector of the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring", and penetrated our main line of resistance at a point 1 km south of Borgo Podgora (G 045240). The enemy was repulsed by our counterattack. Another enemy attack southeast of Aprilia (F 875333), was broken up by our artillery.
During the entire day, enemy artillery was very active, especially in the area of Aprilia.

B. Intelligence Report

The location of 1st London Guards, 1st Irish Guards, elements of the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion (US), and 81st Tank Destroyer Battalion (Br), as well as 23d Engineer Company (Br) at Cle Carroceto, was confirmed.

According to information received from prisoners of war, the 1st Irish Rifles is between Cle Carroceto and Aprilia, and the 1st Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment is in the Ponte Rotto (F 997314) area.

The 88th Infantry Division (US) arrived a short time ago at the beachhead, according to information from three deserters from the 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment.

It is believed that the 1st Special Service Force is emplaced along the Moscarello (G 0113 to G 0219).

Commander 1st Battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment - Col. Sherman, is confirmed. Commander 2d Battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment - Lt. Col. Devall.

Because of the considerable losses inflicted, especially upon the 1st Infantry Division (Br), during the last few days, the enemy has been forced to concentrate further forces in the Aprilia area, to prevent our breaking through. Since he would naturally attempt to prevent this, it must be assumed that, in addition to a determined defense, the enemy will counterattack in order to try to recapture Aprilia.

C. Statistics

German losses: (less Combat Group "Gräser"): 13 dead, 61 wounded, and 16 missing.

Allied losses: 12 Americans captured (6 of them airmen) and 326 English captured.

Captured or destroyed: 20 tanks, 1 tank rendered immobile, 1 antitank gun, 3 prime movers, 1 machine gun, 12 submachine guns, 54 rifles, 2 heavy mortars with 500 rounds of ammunition, and 9 planes shot down.

Following are the total losses of the enemy, from 4 February 1944 to 10 February 1944, in the area of Aprilia: 2,563 prisoners, 53 tanks, 22 guns, 33 motor vehicles, 34 mortars, 168 machine guns, 42 submachine guns, 8 bazookas, and 20 planes.

XVIII. 11 FEBRUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

Since 0500, under cover of dense fog and artillery fire, the enemy attacked in strength, varying from one company to two battalions,
supported by tanks. He attacked our positions at Aprilia (F 875333) and Carroceto (F 869330) from the southwest, south, and southeast and, in the afternoon, also from east of Aprilia. By the combined firing of our artillery, and particularly the self-propelled guns of the 103d Panzer Battalion, all attacks were repulsed; some only after close combat, in which the enemy suffered heavy losses. Flanking fire inflicted severe losses on the infantry. The main line of resistance remained unchanged. Due to repeated enemy attacks, the infantry was confronted with a serious ammunition shortage. If the attacks were to recur, the heavy weapons would have to bear the burden of defense. Heavy losses of the infantry, during the day, necessitated reinforcements. For this purpose, a combat engineer platoon was brought up, during the night, to be used as infantry.

Army Reserves consist of the 1st Battalion, 4th Panzer Regiment (Panther tanks); 301st Panzer Battalion (radio-controlled demolition vehicles, still in transit); 1st Battalion of the 93d Panzer Artillery Regiment (26th Panzer Division), 2d Battalion of the 29th Motorized Artillery Regiment (29th Panzer Grenadier Division). The last two are units received from the Tenth Army on exchange.

B. Eyewitness Report

As an enemy attack on Aprilia was expected, and therefore, the antitank defense in this sector had been especially reinforced. Our infantry was in position on the southern edge of the village. Only 12 assault guns and several heavy antitank guns remained in Aprilia. Although Aprilia was heavily shelled, our losses were comparatively small, because the assault guns took cover behind the houses, and waited for enemy tanks to come within close range before firing on them. The assault guns were very successful; 11 enemy tanks were destroyed, and 1 put out of commission. The fact that, despite repeated enemy attacks, the main line of resistance remained firm, gives credit to the excellent registration of our artillery. The "Hornets" due of their thin armor plating remained in the rear, but were also very successful in the antitank defense. They destroyed enemy tanks at a distance of 2.5 km.

C. Intelligence Report

Units of the 46th Tank Battalion (Br GHQ troops), were employed at Stazione Carroceto (F 865330). Their strength is approximately 48 tanks, mostly Shermans.

From prisoner of war reports, it ascertained that company A 1st Battalion of the 179th Infantry Regiment, of the 45th Infantry Division (US) is located at the Cle Carroceto (F 869330). The 2d Battalion 15th Regiment of the 3d Infantry Division (US) is located south of Ponte Rotto (F 997314). It is presumed that the disposition of the 3d Infantry Division (US) was approximately as follows: from Fosso delle Iole (F 9731) to the East, the 2d Battalion, 1st Battalion, 3d Battalion of the 20th Infantry Regiment; and from Ponte Rotto to the East, the 2d Battalion 15th Infantry Regiment, with the 2d Battalion 7th Infantry Regiment probably relieved. The enemy probably intends to renew his attacks in area Aprilia. 5 naval vessels, 4 freighters and several small vessels were observed off the coast of Nettuno.

D. Statistics
German losses (less Group "Gräser"): 40 killed, 115 wounded, and 15 missing.

Allied losses: 45 prisoners (22 British, 5 of them from the 46th Tank Battalion, and 23 Americans, one of them an aviator). 21 tanks destroyed, 2 tanks put out of commission, 1 antitank gun destroyed, and 2 ambulances captured.

XIX. 12 FEBRUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

Parts of the 65th Infantry Division and Combat Group "Gräser", which attacked at 0300, southwest of Cle Carroceto, (F 869330) were thrown back, after initial successes, by an enemy counterattack with armored forces. Numerous raids were executed by both sides during the night. In the forenoon, artillery and self propelled guns stopped an enemy attack from the southwest on Cle Carroceto and Aprilia (F 875330).

Fourteenth Army instructed the LXXVI Panzer Corps to prepare an attack on Isola Bella (G 006294), to deceive the enemy about the impending major attack along the Anzio and Aprilia road.

The German High Command commented on the planned attack as follows:

"The attack for 16 February is approved by Hitler. However, the final determination of D day depends upon favorable flying conditions. Mass employment of tanks cannot be afforded as it leads only to their loss. It is far better to keep tanks in reserve positions. Never commit tanks against concentrated antitank defenses, or pass through mine fields, antitank ditches, or swamps. If the infantry is properly concentrated, available forces will be sufficient for the mission."

The reinforced 956th Grenadier Regiment of the 362d Infantry Division, previously engaged in coastal defenses in the sector Cecina—mouth of Tiber, is allotted to the LXXVI Panzer Corps. Since the regiment is only suitable for defensive tasks, it will relieve elements of the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" and the 1st Parachute Division in the sector southwest of Cisterna (G 0232), in order to free these units for the attack.

The following new units have arrived in the Army sector: 811th and 813th Armored Engineer Companies (remote controlled demolition vehicles "Goliath"); 1st and 2d Battalions, 741st Jäger Regiment; the greater part of 3d Battalion, 661st Artillery Regiment; and the 114th Engineer Battalion (114th Jäger Division); two companies of the 29th motorized Engineer Battalion; and one light and one heavy battery of the 313th Antiaircraft Battalion from the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division. The 4th Parachute Division received two companies of the Italian Parachute Battalion "Nembo", and one company of the Antitank Battalion from the 4th Parachute Division.

The 735th Grenadier Regiment, 715th Motorized Infantry Division, will relieve the 29th Panzer Grenadier Regiment the night of 12 to 13 February, in order that the latter unit can withdraw for rest and recuperation.
The 2d Battalion, 725th Motorized Grenadier Regiment has insufficient combat strength, and will be dissolved. The remaining troops of this battalion will be assigned to other parts of the regiment.

The 216th Assault Howitzer Battalion, in the sector east of Rome; the 811th and 813th Armored Engineer Companies (radio-controlled vehicles "Goliath"), in sector Frascati; and the Panzer Company "Meyer" (Tiger tank), in sector east of Frascati comprise the Army Reserve.

B. Personnel Strength of Fourteenth Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army troops</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actual strength</td>
<td>2,556</td>
<td>59,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat strength</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>33,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear echelon troops</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>9,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply troops</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>2,159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force ground troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual strength</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>30,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat strength</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>23,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear echelon troops</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>4,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply troops</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>2,801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS troops</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual strength</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat strength</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear echelon troops</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total strength</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actual strength</td>
<td>3,408</td>
<td>91,837</td>
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<tr>
<td>Combat strength</td>
<td>1,577</td>
<td>58,189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear echelon troops</td>
<td>448</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supply troops</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>4,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Forces</td>
<td>181</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian Auxiliary Supply Units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Auxiliary Supply Units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Auxiliary Supply Units</td>
<td>887</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* less 111th Jäger Division and 71st Infantry Division. Including the 362d Infantry Division (12,403 men) which is employed in coastal defense.

C. Intelligence Report

Company B 2d Foresters of the 3d Brigade 1st Infantry Division (Br) is again in the sector southwest of Cie Carroceto (F 879330). The other companies of the Battalion are in the same sector. The 24th Brigade is on the right of the 2d Foresters. The 191st Tank Battalion (US GHQ Troops) has been established at Cie Carroceto pursuant to prisoner of war reports. Prisoners of war further report that the 1st Irish Guards and 1st Scots Guards of the 24th
Brigade are located in the Cle Carroceto sector. They reconfirm the employment of the 80th Medium Artillery Regiment 1st Infantry Division (Br) west of Cle Carroceto.

The following American units are known to be on the beachhead: 45th Infantry Division, 3d Infantry Division, 1st Armored Division, 82d Airborne Division (elements only), 1st Special Service Force Regiment, 1st Ranger Battalion, 3d Ranger Battalion, 4th Ranger Battalion, 191st Tank Battalion (GHQ troops), 751st Tank Battalion (GHQ troops), 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion (GHQ troops), and the 601st Tank Destroyer Battalion (GHQ troops). In addition, these British units are also present: 1st Infantry Division, 158th Brigade 56th Infantry Division, and the 46th Tank Battalion (GHQ troops). These forces are reinforced, particularly by GHQ Artillery Units. At this time, there is no confirmation of the employment of the 88th Infantry Division (Br).

8 warships, 3 transports, 5 small vessels, and 10 LST's were observed in the harbor of Anzio - Nettuno.

The enemy situation:

As the major enemy attack, of 30 January, with main emphasis at Aprilia and Cisterna has failed, the tactical initiative is now in our hands. Our main line of resistance of 30 January has been restored by our counterattacks. The enemy has taken up defensive positions and is endeavoring to hold the beachhead by fortifying his positions. He has attempted to recapture Aprilia. Continued attacks in the area of Aprilia and Cisterna must be expected. Enemy positions around Aprilia and Cisterna are fortified in depth with mines and obstacles. The enemy keeps his local reserves near the front lines presumably to launch immediate counterattacks. With the exception of the 1st Armored Division (US), he does not appear to have any reserves for immediate employment. Generally, the counterattacks have been supported by tanks. However, tank attacks are not probable, since the present situation does not favor such operations.

Enemy forces which landed on the beachhead, have not succeeded in reaching their first objectives; namely, Via Appia, near Albano, and Cisterna. The enemy is now awaiting our major attack. He has detected our troop concentrations partly by air reconnaissance. This and terrain conditions lead him to expect our main blow from Aprilia and Cisterna. Aware of the tactical and political significances, the enemy will attempt to hold the beachhead positions by all possible means. Stubborn infantry defense, extensive antitank gun positions, and superior artillery fire is expected. The bulk of the artillery is in the woods 5 to 10 km south of Aprilia. Our repeated attacks will accentuate the enemy's shortage of personnel and materiel. His supply situation is worse than ours, because it depends largely on the weather, and is affected by our artillery fire. A withdrawal by the enemy is not probable. However, in such a case our air force and artillery will make the evacuation very costly.

Part of the enemy forces, especially the 1st Division (Br) and 3d Division (US), have suffered heavy losses, but they defend their positions stubbornly, particularly the British. According to a prisoner, the combat strength of the 3d Division (US) has been reduced considerably, and it has been necessary to send rear echelon troops to the front. Our attacks, particularly at Aprilia, resulted in the enemy's confusion and disorganization.
D. Statistics

German losses: 17 killed, 66 wounded, and 2 missing.

Allied losses: 30 killed, 29 British prisoners (including 3 aviators), 15 Americans, 8 tanks destroyed, and 5 airplanes downed by antiaircraft.

XX. 13 FEBRUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

During the night of 12 to 13 February 1944, Combat Group "Graser" regained our former position at the railroad embankment and Hill 80 (F 863328), thus pushing forward the main line of resistance. This area, southwest of Carroceto (F 869330), was lost to the enemy the previous day.

Only active scouting and assault detachment activities on both sides occurred in the other sectors. An assault detachment of the 26th Panzer Division attacked Isola Bella (G 005294) and encountered strong enemy resistance. Two assault detachments of the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" and of the 4th Parachute Division silenced 3 machine gun positions and took prisoners. During the night, the Luftwaffe raided the harbor of Anzio-Nettuno.

By order of Army Group C, the 1st and 2d Companies of 763d Artillery Battalion (caliber 170 mm) are allotted to the Fourteenth Army for employment on the beachhead.

By order of the Fourteenth Army, the LXXVI Panzer Corps attaches one company of the 129th Assault Gun Battalion to the I Parachute Corps for the planned major attack. The Fusilier Battalion of the 362d Infantry Division is being placed under the command of the LXXVI Panzer Corps. The reinforced 954th Infantry Regiment, previously employed in the coastal defense of northeastern Italy, is being transferred to the area of Pescara as Army Group Reserve.

Other strong units of the 114th Jäger Division arrived in the area south of Rome. The 2d Battalion of the Infantry Demonstration Regiment (Garrison: Döberitz near Berlin) arrived to replace the 1st Battalion of the 145th Grenadier Regiment, 3d Panzer Grenadier Division. However, the remaining parts of the regiment are still on their way.

For the month of February the Fourteenth Army will receive the following replacements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3d Panzer Grenadier Division</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26th Panzer Division</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Panzer Grenadier Division</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65th Infantry Division</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Order Number 2, issued by the Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army, directing an attack against the Nettuno beachhead.
No essential changes have been made in enemy dispositions, as far as known. To a great extent, bad weather conditions have prevented the reinforcement of the beachhead forces. However, under more favorable weather conditions, we expect a great amount of fresh troops to be brought up.

The Fourteenth Army will attack on 16 February, concentrating mainly along the highway, leading from Aprilia to Nettuno, and eastward of this highway. In this sector, the Army will force its way through the main enemy defense area, and then push onward to Nettuno. The main assault will be launched on 16 February at daybreak (0630). The exact hour will be given later. On 16 February at 0400, strong assault detachments will push forward along the entire frontline of both Corps to cut the enemy defenses. Simultaneously with the main attack, the LXXVI Panzer Corps will mount an attack in the sector of the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring". Strong forces of this division will push forward in the direction of Borgo Montello (F 976236), with Isola Bella as the first target. By an increased use of artillery, in support of this attack, we intend to give the enemy the impression that a decisive battle is to be expected at this point.

The following points are of decisive importance: First, the main attack of the I Parachute Corps' east flank, and particularly the LXXVI Panzer Corps' west flank, must be supported effectively by coordinated and accurate artillery fire. Due to ammunition difficulties, the artillery will be unable to fire rolling barrages. Therefore, in supporting the infantry attack, it will be necessary for all artillery, including antiaircraft, to shift to observed fire, after a short preparatory fire on recognized points of resistance. Second, the armored units, to be employed in the attack, will be echeloned in depth. The first wave will consist mainly of infantry and the second of motorized units. Detached tanks of the "Tiger" type will be required to support the assault howitzers.

The enemy's air superiority when weather conditions are favorable, will prevent our transporting motorized units over long distances. Therefore, the first wave of the two motorized divisions and the attached tank units must be deployed close to the assaulting infantry.

The entire operation, especially date and time of attack, is to be considered as top secret. Telephone calls revealing our intentions are prohibited. Officers of the Army High Command who are here in advisory capacity will be forbidden to communicate with their headquarters by telephone.

The forward Army Command Post will be located 4 km west of Lake Nemi, effective 16 February at 0600 hours.

B. Intelligence Report

The location of S Company, 2d Foresters Regiment at the hill 3 to 4 km northeast of Cle. Buonripso (F 859910) has been reconfirmed.

A prisoner identified the unit, at the crossing of the Fosso della Ficoccia (F 886933), to be the 2d Battalion, 180th Infantry Regiment of the 45th Infantry Division (US). According to another prisoner of war interrogation the whole regiment was in this area.
The 39th Infantry Regiment was located near Ponte Rotto (F 875333) as confirmed by 2 wounded soldiers. Company C, 3rd Regiment of the 1st Special Service Force was 1.5 km southwest of Borgo Piave (G 053203). The 1st Special Service Force, consisting of 3 regiments (6 companies each) and a Headquarters Company with 2 platoons (25 men each), had been employed on the beachhead for ranger tasks since 2 February. The Command Post of the force was located immediately east of crossroad (G 004182). This information was from prisoners of war.

Although the enemy situation in general was unchanged, local attacks at Aprilia (F 875333) and an attack near Cisterna (G 0232) are possible. The enemy appeared reforming and regrouping his forces near Aprilia.

C. Statistics

German losses: 42 killed, 121 wounded, and 26 missing.

Allied losses: 14 prisoners (5 British, 9 American), 1 aircraft downed by antiaircraft, 2 tanks, 2 ammunition carriers, 1 heavy machine gun and 3 light machine guns, 5 vehicles, and 3 ammunitions dump shot afire.

XXI. 14 FEBRUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

Except for reconnaissance and raids by both sides, no particular activities took place during the day. The enemy was observed reinforcing his main line of resistance, opposite the sectors of the 4th Parachute Division, and Panzer Division "Hermann Göring".

Our long-range artillery forced 2 destroyers to leave the harbor of Anzio. The harbor and the airfield east of Nettuno were placed under artillery fire.

The 26th Panzer Division was withdrawn to the rear of the eastern flank of the LXXVI Panzer Corps. This division will constitute the corps reserve for the proposed attack. In addition to its own area, the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" took over the sector of the 26th Panzer Division. The greater part of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, previously employed with the Tenth Army has arrived, and will be placed under the command of the LXXVI Panzer Corps.

B. Intelligence Report

According to prisoner of war statements the organization of the 894th Tank Destroyer Battalion (GHQ troops) includes one reconnaissance battalion, equipped with 12 antitank guns (7.52 cm).

1st Duke of Wellington Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 1st British Infantry Division, has been filled up to Table of Organization strength. The 1st Scots Guard, 24th Brigade, received 360 men as replacements. Previously, the strength of its individual companies was only 40 men.
The fact that the enemy is entrenching, suggests that they plan further defenses. Increased traffic on the beachhead could be due to the movement of replacements and supply. Greater debarkation was observed. There were no indications of immediate large-scale attacks. However, local attacks, especially in the area south of Ardea (F 787350), at Aprilia (F 875333), and Cisterna (G 0232) were possible.

C. Statistics

German losses (less Combat Group "Gräser"): 18 killed, 82 wounded, and 24 missing.

Allied losses: 11 prisoners (British, Duke of Wellington), 1 aircraft downed by antiaircraft, and 2 light machineguns and 1 antitank gun (7.5 cm) captured.

XXII. 15 FEBRUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

With the exception of combat and reconnaissance patrols, there was no activity during the day. Around noon, our artillery fired on enemy tank concentrations and gun emplacements, south of Aprilia. The enemy fired a large quantity of smoke and phosphorous shells.

In the morning, Fourteenth Army Headquarters made the following additions and rescissions to the attack order dated 13 February 1944.

First it has to be assumed that the enemy expects our attack. His superior air force will enable him to ascertain our main points of effort. Special orders to assault detachments, as per order of 13 February, are hereby rescinded. Assault detachment activity during the night prior to the attack must be the same as usual. In order to achieve surprise, orders providing for the elimination of certain enemy combat outposts and advanced strongpoints are rescinded. Our attack must be sudden so as to be a surprise. H-hour will be given later.

Second, the commander of the air-ground support of the 2d Air Force will drown out the noise of the tanks, by the use of airplanes the night before the attack, between 2400 and 0400. As the sound made by the planes will be insufficient, it must be improved by artillery harassing fire. However, this fire must be the same as usual, in volume and type, in order not to alert the enemy.

H-hour for the main attack of 16 February is fixed at 0630 and will be announced to the subordinated units by Army.

The 71st Infantry Division withdrew from the beachhead front, and moved to the Tenth Army. The 116th Jäger Division (less 1st Artillery Battalion 114) arrived at the beachhead front. The 1st Battalion, 116th Artillery Regiment is south of Rome for refitting. The bulk of the 956th Grenadier Regiment of the 362d Infantry Division, previously assigned to coast defense, arrived at the LXXVI Panzer Corps and took over the sector of the 721st Infantry Regiment.
The reinforced 10th Parachute Regiment has, in addition to its own area, taken over the former sector of the 147th Grenadier Regiment of the 65th Infantry Division. The attachment of the 715th Motorized Infantry Division to Combat Group "Gräser" is rescinded. The 715th Infantry Division will assume command of the adjoining sector on the left of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division.

B. Intelligence Report

Pursuant to prisoners of war statements, C Company, 6th Gordons of the 2d Brigade of the 1st Infantry Division (Br) is deployed on the road 3 to 4 km south of Cle Carano (F 940309). Up to 2 days previously, which was dissolved to provide replacements for other heavily weakened companies of the battalion. The officers of C Company do not believe that a decisive operational success will result from the beachhead.

The continuous disembarkation and direct commitment of troops and materiel in the front emphasized the enemy's intention to reinforce his defense, as soon as possible. Until the present, there has been no confirmation that severely weakened units of the 1st Infantry Division (Br), in the Aprilia area, have been replaced by units of the 45th Infantry Division (US). Enemy entrenchments, naval activity, and his assignment of replacements indicate that he expects our attack with the main point of effort in the Aprilia area.

C. Statistics

German losses (less 3d Panzer Grenadier Division and 715th Infantry Division): 18 killed, 47 wounded, and 3 missing.

Allied losses: 3 prisoners (Br) of C Company 6th Gordons and 2 prisoners (US) of the 504th Parachute Regiment.

XXIII. 16 FEBRUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

Our attack with the purpose of eliminating the enemy beachhead began.

The Commander in Chief of the Fourteenth Army, with his Chief of Staff moved at 0615, to the forward command post, located in a house 2.5 km southwest of Genzano. During the night of 15 to 16 February, our assault detachments engaged the enemy along the entire army sector.

The left flank of the I Parachute Corps and the right flank of the LXXVI Panzer Corps began the attack at 0630, after a short concentration of artillery and rocket projector fire. The Panzer Division "Hermann Göring", having been detached at midnight from the LXXVI Panzer Corps and placed under the immediate command of the Army, joined in the attack.

The 65th Infantry Division and the 1st Parachute Division seized the ridge south of Cle Buon Riposo (F 859310) and the Carroceto valley (F 8732) against strong enemy resistance, including flanking fire, which prevented a further development of the attack.
In order to pin down the enemy and diffuse his artillery fire, increased scouting and raiding was continued. The attacking 3d Panzer Grenadier Division and 715th Motorized Infantry Division progressed rather slowly, due to strong enemy resistance and artillery fire, supported by naval guns. The tanks, assault howitzers, and Goliaths employed to support the attack, could only advance along the roads and paths, as the terrain was not sufficiently hardened by the night frost. Furthermore, the advance in this terrain was obstructed by ditches extending perpendicularly to the direction of the attack. As a result, the brunt of the attack was borne by the infantry supported by artillery. Advanced units suffered considerable losses from enemy artillery fire and snipers.

The Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" attacking under support of heavy artillery fire, gained 1 km of ground, but it was then forced to dig in because of effective enemy defensive fire, which caused heavy losses. Combat Training Units of the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" and the Parachute Demonstration Battalion were wiped out. The first unit had 80, the latter 110, casualties. Heavy, concentrated fire of enemy artillery and fighter bombers shelled and raided our points of attack, supply lines, artillery positions, and reserves. This action occurred mainly in the area of Aprilis (F 875333).

Toward evening, the Infantry Demonstration Regiment which had lost a large number of officers and noncommissioned officers, fell back about 500 m without permission. It was employed at the right flank of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division.

Throughout the night, the enemy maintained observation of our rear area, by dropping parachute flares, and bombed observed traffic. Although Army Group C has suggested commitment of the 26th Panzer Division and 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, until now held in reserve, the Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army, at 1825, claimed the time had not yet come to employ these vitally important forces. It was originally intended to weaken the enemy with the divisions now in combat, and to push forward with the mobile reserve divisions, when the enemy began to fall back. Not all forces of our engaged divisions were as yet in combat. The 3d Panzer Grenadier Division and the 715th Infantry Division each kept one regiment in reserve.

In the evening, Fourteenth Army issued the following additional combat orders to its subordinate units.

Enemy strongholds still maintain a main line of resistance. From reliable sources, we learned that in some sectors our attack brought the enemy considerable confusion, and that he frequently called for reinforcements. It is assumed that the enemy suffered heavy losses. No counterattacks have as yet been made due to the shortage of forces on the beachhead. Reserves have not been brought up and tank reserves not yet been committed. It is possible that the enemy resistance will weaken on 17 February. Today, the Fourteenth Army has thrown back the enemy combat outposts, and captured the advanced strongholds along the entire front of attack. The Army will continue the attack on the night of 16 to 17 February.

It is of decisive importance, during the night of 16 to 17 February, that the attack be continued along the entire eastern flank of the I Parachute Corps and in the sector of the LXXVI Panzer Corps. Where conditions permit, armored vehicles must support the attacking infantry along all roads.
and paths. The objective of the attack is to establish a line running from Fosso Michele (F 828315 to F 845308) via Carrocetello creek (2 km south of Aprilia) to the southern edge of the small wood, 2.5 km southeast of Aprilia. Bridgeheads across the Carrocetello creek should be extended as far as possible. The Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" will continue the attack on its west flank. Strong assault detachments must attack the enemy along the entire beachhead front, except at the center of main effort. The enemy must be engaged throughout the night. He must not be allowed to gain time, which would permit him to strengthen his defense.

The objective of the I Parachute Corps is Ridge, west of Riserva Nuova (F 8530). The main effort of the LXXVI Panzer Corps is to be along the border of the 715th Infantry Regiment and the 114th Jäger Division. The initial objective for the assault elements of the I Parachute Corps and the LXXVI Panzer Corps is Highway Number 82 S Lorenzo (F 780300) - Cle Torre di Padiglione (F 922290). The LXXVI Panzer Corps must have the 26th Panzer Division in readiness to exploit a point of penetration. This division will not be committed without permission of the Army Commander. The 29th Panzer Grenadier Division is to advance east of the 26th Panzer Division towards the Campoleone (F 877386) - Cisterna (G 0232) railroad. An advance over the railroad will only be extended on army orders.

Guns listed below were available on 16 February for the attack:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number each</th>
<th>Type of weapon</th>
<th>Caliber</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>howitzers</td>
<td>10.5 cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>howitzers</td>
<td>15 cm</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>guns</td>
<td>10 cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>guns</td>
<td>17 cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>howitzers</td>
<td>21 cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>railway guns</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>railway guns</td>
<td>24 cm</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>rocket launchers</td>
<td>15 cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>rocket launchers</td>
<td>21 cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>172</td>
<td>antiaircraft guns</td>
<td>8.8 cm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 452</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ammunition expenditure of long-range artillery on 16 February: 454 rounds caliber 17 cm and 50 rounds (railway guns) caliber 21 cm.

The Army Command believes that the unauthorized withdrawal of the Infantry Demonstration Regiment was due to unusually heavy artillery fire, which this regiment has encountered after having lost a great number of officers and noncommissioned officers. Although fifty per cent of the men in this regiment have already been in combat, they have not been in action for a long time. The regiment is expected to show an improved combat spirit, and to prove its courage in further actions. The Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army visited the regimental commander at his Command Post, during the afternoon of 16 February, and ordered an investigation of this incident.

Despite increased enemy air activities, such as the dropping of parachute flares throughout the night of 16 February, our troops
succeeded in reaching their initial positions without heavy losses. The reconnaissance activity and raids carried out in the sector of the 4th Parachute Division divided the enemy defense, and considerably relieved our attacking forces. Our heavy losses were due to insufficient training of troops, heavy enemy artillery fire, frequent fighter attacks, and enemy sniper activity. Because of tank losses, Fourteenth Army ordered that tanks are to operate only within our lines, and under no circumstances in front of them. Our artillery could not completely neutralize the enemy artillery due to lack of ammunition.

B. Intelligence Report

A, B, and X Companies of the 9th Royal Fusiliers and the 8th Royal Fusiliers, both of the 167th Brigade of the 56th Infantry Division (Br) were established in the area north of Cle Carano (F 939313). Both Battalions relieved American units two days ago. A company of the 9th Royal Fusiliers was brought up to strength by inexperienced troops which arrived from England via Naples.

The 3d Battalion, 179th Infantry Regiment of the 45th Infantry Division (US), was placed southeast of Aprilia, according to prisoners of war of Companies K and M. Through prisoner of war interrogation and captured documents, it was ascertained that B Company, 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry Regiment was 2 km eastwards of Isola Bella (G 006294), and that E Company, 2d Battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment was west of Ponte Rotto (F 997314).

As expected, enemy resistance was strong and determined. The enemy prevented a breakthrough, despite several crises which arose during the morning at Aprilia and southwest of Cisterna (G 0232). The enemy made no attempt to recapture his positions except southeast of Aprilia. Local reserves, and especially tanks, were observed only southeast of Aprilia. It is assumed that he will not commit his small local infantry reserves, until his former combat positions are threatened with a breakthrough. Although we may assume that the enemy has suffered losses, strong enemy resistance and counterattacks along the entire front during 17 February must be anticipated.

C. Statistics

German losses (less the 715th Infantry Division): 324 killed, 1207 wounded, and 146 missing.

Allied losses: 224 prisoners (141 British, 60 American, and 23 nationality not yet determined), and 7 tanks destroyed.

XXIV, 17 FEBRUARY 1944

A. Operations Report

Against stubborn enemy resistance on the ground and in the air, it was possible during night and day attacks, to penetrate the enemy main line of resistance, and to win initial positions for further attacks on 18 February.
Today the enemy's artillery fire and air bombardment was the heaviest since his landing on the beachhead. He made continuous raids in waves of 30 to 40 planes throughout the day, attacking troops, artillery positions, and rear areas. The estimated Allied ammunition expenditure is 22,000 rounds.

The 4th Parachute Division advanced to the Appolonia area, 1.5 km west of Cle Buon Riposo (F 859310), and in the evening, it took the wooded area around Hill 67, 2 km northeast Cle, La Cogna (F 815292) and the northwest part of the Fossi di Buon Riposo sector, 1.5 km north Cle, La Cogna.

The 65th Infantry Division overcame stubborn enemy resistance and tank supported counterattacks, especially against the right flank. It captured a part of the defense system of Cle, Buon Riposo. After previous unsuccessful attacks, the stubbornly defended strong point of Cle, Carrocetello, 2 km southwest of Aprilia (F 875333), was taken by a frontal attack, during the night of 17 to 18 February.

In the afternoon, continued attacks enabled the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division to push further south and to cross the Carrocetello creek (2.5 km south Aprilia).

The 725th Grenadier Regiment, 715th Infantry Division overcame strong enemy resistance and advanced to Piscina Tombola and to 2 km northeast Fta Campo di Carne (F 862284).

The 114th Jager Division took fortified Hill 61, 1.5 km southeast of Aprilia, by storm, and broke into the northern edge of the Macchia della Ficoccia Forest (2 km southeast of Aprilia); it held its gains against heavy, tank supported enemy counterattacks.

Our attack in the sector of Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" was stopped, after the road fork 250 m northeast of Colle del Pozzo (F 964312), was taken. The enemy put up a stubborn resistance from well fortified positions, supported by heavy weapons and tanks. There was increased sniper activity. Our antiaircraft defense was effective. Thirteen enemy planes were shot down. Enemy planes dropped bombs on Tiger tank dummies in the sector of the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring".

The morale of unseasoned troops was affected by the unusually heavy artillery fire. The initially poor fighting qualities of the Infantry Demonstration Regiment have improved.

The Commander in Chief Southwest issued the following order:

"On the first day of attack our artillery expended much ammunition. This large expenditure is not in proportion to our supply. The ammunition must be utilized to clear the way for our infantry by destroying enemy pockets of resistance. The infantry must make use of our artillery fire and the fire of its own heavy weapons in order to gain ground. It appears that fighting on the beachhead will last for several more days, and we cannot expend ammunition on secondary targets."

Orders of the Fourteenth Army for further attacks.

Although the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division and the 715th Infantry Division were able to penetrate deeply the enemy's battle positions, our attacks have not produced the anticipated results. Our task is to commit the second wave, whereby the initial penetration in the sector of the LXXVI Panzer Corps is to be expanded into a breakthrough, which will carry our forces
To Netuno. To accomplish this, the 26th Panzer Division and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division will be attached to the LXXVI Panzer Corps. During the night of 17 to 18 February the forces previously committed will continue the attack. All commanders are advised that the battle of the Netuno beachhead has reached its critical stage, that our troops must advance and pursue the enemy under all circumstances. Only a complete elimination of the beachhead ends our mission. During the night of 17 to 18 February, I Parachute Corps will insure the protection of the right flank of the LXXVI Panzer Corps, even if the Parachute Corps' right flank will have to be weakened for this purpose and will advance to Highway 82 (F 780300 to F 922290) during the night. The LXXVI Panzer Corps will continue the attack, with the divisions now committed, to gain as much ground as possible to the south, by the morning of 18 February. The Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" will pin down the enemy along its entire front.

The push to the south will be resumed by 0400; the east flank of the I Parachute Corps, the LXXVI Panzer Corps, and the west flank of the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring" participating. In the sector of the LXXVI Panzer Corps, the 26th Panzer Division and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division will be brought up during the night. The units will be ready to launch the breakthrough towards Netuno before dawn; they will move into the positions of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division and the 715th Infantry Division during the night. It is most important that the east flank of the Corps be protected from enemy tank supported counterattacks. The 1st Battalion, 4th Panzer Regiment (Panther tank) will remain in reserve. This battalion will be prepared for defense against a tank attack from the general direction of Torre di Padiglione (F 921289).

B. Eyewitness Report

The success of the past two days would have been much greater if the terrain conditions had permitted the employment of tanks as planned. But as the tanks had to keep to the roads, the burden of the fight fell on the infantry. The infantry overcame enemy strongholds and pockets of resistance, but sustained heavy losses. Enemy resistance weakened rapidly at points where tanks or assault guns could support the infantry. Enemy artillery fire was mainly responsible for the high casualties of our infantry. The strength of our infantry had already been weakened from continuous fighting. The combat strength of infantry battalions was approximately 120 to 150 men. Enemy aircraft did not excessively harass the infantry as their planes chose for their targets isolated houses or settlements, which were avoided by the infantry. However, enemy air action against our supply lines and artillery positions was very successful. For example, one well equipped antiaircraft unit, assigned to the 715th Infantry Division, was not able to participate fully in the attack, as enemy artillery and aircraft had inflicted heavy losses on troops and guns shortly after the start of the attack. The enemy fired a great number of white phosphorous shells, especially during the night. These shells did not produce actual damage, but they affected the morale of the troops. Once the man became accustomed to the phosphorous shells, they feared the high explosive shell more, as it caused higher casualties and inflicted more serious wounds.
C. **Intelligence Report**

The 9th Royal Fusiliers Regiment (Br) is in the sector north of Casale Vecchio, 1 km northwest of Cle La Cogna (F 815292). East of it is the 8th Royal Fusiliers. Adjacent to the south of Cle Buon Riposo (F 859310), is the 7th Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry Regiment. They relieved the 2d Foresters Regiment a few days ago.

The 157th Infantry Brigade, previously in the Garigliano sector, landed in Nettuno on 14 and 15 February, and was immediately put into action. The brigade is to be supported by elements of the 61st Tank Destroyer Battalion of the 1st Infantry Division (Br). This was learned from prisoners of war. The 2d Battalion, 157th Infantry Regiment of the 45th Infantry Division (US) is in the area southwest of the railroad station at Carroceto (F 865330). 2d Battalion, 179th Infantry Regiment is near the road junction, 1.6 km east of Cle Carroceto (F 869330). E Company, 2d Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment is in the area 800 meters west of Ponte Rotto (F 997314).

Flash ranging located six enemy batteries.

Active naval traffic and disembarkations in the harbor of Anzio have been observed. Two cruisers and three destroyers lie off the beachhead, and shelled Littoria (F 0818) around noon. 11 large and approximately 20 small naval units were outside Anzio harbor. A new landing point was observed 1 km northwest of Le Grottaccie (F 940150).

The heavy losses of the day are expected to have weakened the enemy. However, continued resistance can be expected along the entire front.

D. **Statistics**

German losses (less 29th Panzer Grenadier Division and 725th Infantry Division): 222 killed, 635 wounded, and 35 missing.

Allied losses: 571 prisoners (245 Americans, 326 British), 19 airplanes shot down (13 by antiaircraft and 6 by fighters), 17 tanks destroyed, and 4 heavy antitank guns destroyed. Several vehicles were set afire.

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**XXV. 18 FEBRUARY 1944**

A. **Operations Report**

Continuing our attack, the initial penetrations were enlarged in depth and width. However, no decisive breakthrough was achieved. Strong Allied counterattacks were halted by the I Parachute Corps, and the LXXVI Panzer Corps.

In the sector of the I Parachute Corps, the wooded area east of Hill 67, 2 km northwest of Cle Buon Riposo (F 853310), was cleared of the enemy. Along the 65th Infantry Division boundary, the enemy attacked supported by tanks, after an artillery and mortar barrage, and seized Hill 68, 1 km southwest of Cle Buon Riposo. A further attack was halted.
The 65th Infantry Division seized Hill 79, 1 km southwest of Cle Buon Riposo, and another Hill 79, 1.5 km southeast of Cle Buon Riposo.

In the area of the LXXVI Panzer Corps, both the 26th Panzer Division and the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division were committed for the first time. After 0100, they fought along with the 3rd Panzer Grenadier Division in the attack toward the south. A line, just north of Highway 82 (F 780300 - F 92229) was reached by the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division. Strong enemy resistance was overcome at Cle 1'0vile, 1 km east Cantoniera (F 864282), and at the foot of hills 73 and 69, 1200 meters northeast of Cle 1'0vile.

The 715th Infantry Division will be relieved from the area southeast of Aprilia (F 875333) and designated as Corps Reserve. By order of Fourteenth Army, this division is earmarked as reinforcement of the assault troops.

The 114th Jäger Division fought through the south edge of the Macchia delle Ficoccia wood (2 km southeast Aprilia). After overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, they established a bridgehead over the canal. This position was held against heavy counterattacks. The 1028th Panzer Grenadier Regiment seized the enemy strong point at Rosatelli (F 903320), but due to heavy artillery and mortar fire, the left assault group remained in the valley south of Spaccasassi (F 927330).

In the morning, Fourteenth Army reported to Army Group C that it required stronger fighter support to aid in the attack, and also increase the confidence of the troops. Our plans remain unchanged. New attacks towards the south are to reach the wooded area south of Aprilia. The 1st Battalion of the 4th Panzer Regiment (Panther tanks) will remain in Army reserve. One Battalion of the 362d Infantry Division employed as coastal defense, will be attached to the Panzer Division "Hermann Göring". This will enable the latter division to form assault units, and to attach them to the western flank. It is the intention of the Army to detach similar forces from the 362d Infantry Division for the same purpose. The 1027th Panzer Grenadier Regiment will be withdrawn from coastal defense, south of the mouth of the Tiber, and employed on the left flank of I Parachute Corps.

B. Intelligence Report

On 17 February, the following units were identified, on either side of the Aprilia-Anzio Highway: the 1st Battalion, 157th Infantry Regiment, 2d Battalion 157th Infantry Regiment, and the 2d Battalion 179th Infantry Regiment, (adjoining the 157th Infantry Regiment on the east). On 15 February the 2d Battalion 157th Infantry Regiment relieved elements of the 1st Infantry Division (Br). The antitank company of the 179th Infantry Regiment was observed on the highway, 1 km northeast of Pta Campo di Carne (F 862284). During the last few days colorful troops were engaged in bitter close combat at the Mussolini Canal.

We expect the enemy was to try to avoid a breakthrough on the highway to Nettuno by withdrawing all available forces from the less threatened sectors and by committing newly arrived troops. It is assumed that more tank supported counterattacks will be made. Positions still held north of the wooded area will be stubbornly defended in order to protect artillery emplacements. It may be assumed that enemy forces, echeloned in depth, are to be found particularly on highway 82, and between that highway and the northern edge.