Table of Contents

Foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor? No!” The Story of the U. S. Navy’s Efforts on JN-25B
Philip H. Jacobsen 193

Urkyptografen (“The Clock Cryptograph”)
Niels Faurholt 206

Cypher Machines - Maintenance and Restoration Spanning Sixty Years
Dorothy Clarkson 209

The Memoria Technica Cipher
Francine F. Abeles 217

Reviews and Things Cryptologic
Louis Kruh 230

The Sator Rebus: An Unsolved Cryptogram?
Rose Mary Sheldon 233

Instructions to Authors 288

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FOREKNOWLEDGE OF PEARL HARBOR? NO!:
The Story of the U. S. Navy's Efforts on JN-25B

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ABSTRACT: In their revisionist efforts to establish a "foreknowledge" of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor as a basis for suspicions that there was a deliberate failure by high U. S. officials to warn the military commanders in Hawaii, two modern day writers have misinterpreted numerous archival documents to come up with the speculation that the U. S. Navy cryptanalysts at Corregidor may have made a number of complete pre-war JN-25B decrypts of intelligence value. They then bootstrap this questionable camel's nose under the tent into a suggestion that these few highly speculative decrypts must somehow have become the equivalent of the selected 2,413 post-war translations from 25,581 decrypts of pre-war messages despite the vehement testimonies of key Corregidor personnel and official documentation to the contrary. A critical review of these claims and the pertinent documentation shows that essentially no JN-25B decrypts of intelligence value were achieved pre-war, much less any cryptanalytic information revealing any foreknowledge of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor.


I - REVISIONIST CLAIMS

A. Robert B. Stinnett.

In his book, Day of Deceit, Stinnett was the first revisionist to claim that President Roosevelt had foreknowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor through decrypted Japanese naval messages. He used the subterfuge of referring the two completely different versions of the Japanese main administrative naval code as only one "5-Num" code. Thus, he imputed the U. S. Navy's initial success with
the earlier and simpler one-part code and cipher, JN-25A (AN), which was implemented on 1 June 1939, to the much more complicated two-part code and cipher combination with a much larger dictionary of about 50,000 code values (by use of auxiliary tables) and a larger cipher additive book of JN-25B (AN-1) in effect at the time of Pearl Harbor.\(^1\) The fact that JN-25B (AN-1) replaced JN-25A (AN) on 1 December 1940 was skimmed over.

To show the extent of his revisionist bias, Stinnett also made the ridiculous assertions that an important Japanese message linked to the opening of war by the Japanese was sent in plain language and that an important geographical location was sent in the clear in the middle of an encrypted JN-25B message.\(^2\) He also alleged that the general order specifying the attack on Pearl Harbor was not only sent by radio, but was intercepted and decrypted by the U. S. Navy and implies such intercept and decrypt is being hidden to this day by the government. However, there are no radio message instructions in the example he gives or any record of its intercept and it is obviously just a very slightly different translation of Admiral Nagano’s General Navy Order No. 1. An experienced WWII translator’s noted that such Japanese naval general orders were never transmitted by radio.\(^3\)

Stinnett did record Captain Duane Whitlock’s vehement assertion that Corregidor did not produce any JN-25B decrypts of intelligence value before Pearl Harbor, but he basically ignored this impediment to his revisionist argument.\(^4\) However, Stinnett’s failure to note the Congressional testimony of Corregidor’s commander, Rudolph Fabian, that although they were exchanging code and cipher values with the British [at Singapore], they had not been able to read JN-25B prior to Pearl Harbor, is instructive. Fabian further testified that their message of 26 November reported all the carriers were in the Kure area and that was the last information they had on them before Pearl Harbor. He also testified that all of their intelligence information came from traffic analysis, not

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\(^2\) *Day of Deceit*, pp. 45-51, 219-24; Note that the Climb Mt. Niiitaka message displayed on p. 221 clearly shows that it was encrypted in JN-25B by 1945-47 translator RK; See author’s “A Cryptologic Veteran’s Analysis of Day of Deceit”, *Cryptologia*, 24 (2) April 2000 pp. 110-8.

\(^3\) *Day of Deceit*, pp. 209, 211, 220, 293; Pearl Harbor Operations, http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/myths/jm-097.html p. 3; SRN-11548, RG457 Historic Cryptologic Collection (hereafter HCC) SRH-406, NA CP.

\(^4\) *Day of Deceit*, pp. 72, n. 18 p. 324, n. 27 p. 330, n. 13 p. 344.

Another Stinnett claim is that "Between September 24 and mid-November significant portions of the Japanese naval code system revealed much about the composition of the Japanese amphibious force being sent to the Central Pacific for the invasion of Wake and Guam." His claim implied that Station Hypo in Hawaii was decrypting JN-25B messages. However, a cursory review clearly shows that the Maizuru Special Landing Force's movement to the Mandates was tracked by associations of an originator with addressees in the headings of messages and not by cryptanalysis.\footnote{Day of Deceit, pp. 132-7; See n. 32 p. 348 where the decrypt and translation of SRN-117804 (RG457 HCC SRH-406 NA CP) was made in 1945-47 not in 1941 by Rochefort as Stinnett speculates; Just above that entry, Stinnett notes that there is no proof that the Japanese message text could be read in 1941.} Besides, it is well known that Hypo was not working on JN-25B prior to Pearl Harbor.

Stinnett first attributed the decryption of a message on 29 November 1941 by Station Cast on Corregidor advising that the CinC 2\textsuperscript{nd} Fleet was shifting communications zones from Kure to Sasebo and thence to Bako to a SM or Ship Movement Code.\footnote{Day of Deceit, p. 73.} More recently, he claims that in addition to that brief communications advice, the major part of the original Cast message that included this information showed a good capability to decrypt JN-25B.\footnote{Independent Institute (internet) http://www.independent.org/tii/news/030204 Stinnett.html.} However, Stinnett neglected to point out to his readers that the use of RI at the beginning of that message confirms that 95 percent of that information came from traffic analysis not cryptanalysis. More importantly, the one brief CI or cryptanalytic information provided at the end of that message was only a very partial decrypt as the translator stated, "Remainder of message not clear." Thus, instead of indicating any significant decryption capability of JN-25B, this message confirms that all Stinnett could come up with was one minor, partial decrypt just ten days before Pearl Harbor and that was probably not in JN-25B but quite likely from the SM (Ship Movement) code or a popular but simple communications code.\footnote{Day of Deceit, n. 18 p. 324; While technically a communications code, such popular changes of communication zone responsibilities were easily read if the encoded call signs included were identified.}
B. Timothy Wilford.

The most recent revisionist to enter the Pearl Harbor cryptologic fray is Timothy Wilford with his assertion that “Ultimately, our present understanding of USN intelligence reporting best supports the revisionist position: careful design prevented foreknowledge [of the Pearl Harbor attack] from becoming forewarning.”¹⁰ He claims that, “Cryptanalysis likely revealed the existence of the Strike Force and allowed numerical data such as ship schedules and positions to be read with relative ease.” However, he does not provide evidence of even a single pre-war decrypt regarding the Strike Force or such “numerical” data to back up such a claimed “likelihood.” In addition, Wilford omits much contrary information, exaggerates or misinterprets documents in advancing allegations supporting the revisionist position and discounts the great body of evidence that is favorable to the opposing traditional view. For example, he also omits Fabian’s Congressional testimony of no Corregidor JN-25B decrypts of intelligence value, etc. and even relegates Whitlock’s authoritative, personal observations regarding the lack of intelligence from JN-25B to a mere footnote as well as omitting statements in two official OP-20-G histories that JN-25B played no part in Pearl Harbor.¹¹

Instead, Wilford primarily relies on a misinterpretation of Lieutenant John M. Lietwiler’s letter of November 16, 1941 to advance the proposition that Corregidor was decrypting some JN-25B messages at that late date.¹² The letter starts out with Lietwiler’s obvious main point that they decided to discontinue using the mechanical device, JEEP IV to recover JN-25B cipher additive values as their manual system took less time. He notes that the JN-25B (AN-1) code book values OP-20-G produced in their current edition of R. I. P. 79 (AN-1 Code Book) were of no help and some were even wrong. This doesn’t square with the idea that the message was about significant decrypts of intelligence value being achieved. Lietwiler goes on to disapprove of the proposed method of using a microfilm system to getting raw intercepted messages to Washington faster and suggests air freight as an alternative to reduce the long delays being experienced. In the third paragraph of the letter, Lietwiler starts out with the advice that they have stopped all work on the prior cipher additive period 1 February to 31 July


¹¹Pearl Harbor Redefined, pp. 26, n. 27 p. 26, 42, 116; History of GYP-1, p. 26; General History of OP-20-3-GYP, RG38 CNSG Library, Box 116, 5750/1 2 of 3 p. 11, NA CP.

¹²Letter from Lt. John M. Liewiler to Lt. L. W. Parke, 16 November 1941, RG38 CNSG Inactive Stations, Box 15, *NSRS Philippines, Operations Summaries*, 3200/1, NA CP.
as “we have all we can do to keep up with the current [cipher additive] period.”
Wilford boldly set out the next sentence to begin his Chapter on cryptanalysis,
but only quotes part of the sentence: “We are reading enough current traffic to
keep two translators busy . . .” to support his allegation that Cast was decrypting
some JN-25B messages. However, when you read the complete sentence,
together with the whole tenor of the entire letter, it is clear Lietwiler is talking
about “code recovery” efforts not final, complete decrypts much like his other
discussions about cipher additive recovery efforts. The complete sentence that
should have been quoted reads: “We are reading enough current traffic to keep
two translators very busy, i.e. with their code recovery efforts, etc. included”
(emphasis added). “Reading” in this case was referring to recoveries of code
values after the cipher additives had been stripped off, not finished decrypts and
translations suitable for intelligence reporting. Lietwiler goes on to discuss the
current cipher additive system again. Clearly, his focus was on recovering ci-
pher additives and not any success with completed decrypt of intelligence value.
Having known Lietwiler on a personal basis, if he had intended to convey the
information that Cast was now producing JN-25B decrypts of intelligence value
to their consumers, the letter would have started out with something like, “Eur-
eka! We are now able to provide valuable intelligence to the Commander, Far
East from our decrypts of JN-25B messages” or words to that effect. Instead,
he was merely bringing OP-20-G up to date on the JN-25B cipher additive and
basic code value recovery status. Also, it wasn’t until sometime around Novem-
ber 1941 before both Washington and Corregidor came up with a usable version
of the important “difference table” that greatly improved the recovery of cipher
additives. One OP-20-G history cogently sums up all of the U.S. Navy’s pre-war
cryptanalytic work against the Japanese Navy (which embraced the cryptana-
lytic efforts of Lietwiler’s group) with this observation, “It should be emphasized
that recoveries on Japanese naval systems before Pearl Harbor yielded cryptana-
lytic information rather than intelligence.”\(^\text{13}\) Wilford’s misinterpretation also
does not take into account Fabian and Whitlock’s testimony as well as the solid
documentation of OP-20-G records and the lack of evidence of any specific JN-
25B success in the various intelligence reports from Cast, Hypo in Hawaii or the
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in Washington.

With apparent approval, Wilford twice repeats Stinnett’s claim that Hypo
decrypted the Maizuru Special Landing Force movements to the Central Pacific
between September and November 1941 which was covered above. However,

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\(^{13}\) *History of GYP-I*, p. 25; General History of OP-20-3-GYP, pp. 3, 25.
he failed to recognize that all such information came from traffic analysis not cryptanalysis.\footnote{Pearl Harbor Redefined, pp. 26, 32.}

Wilford noted Stinnett’s original report of 29 November 1941 of a decrypt showing CinC 2\textsuperscript{nd} Fleet’s communication’s zone changes (covered above) and commented that it “suggested that Station Cast was reading the Ship Movement Code.” Later, Wilford again refers to the same message as if it was a separate decrypt, but now suggests that it might be a JN-25B message. He was apparently unaware that it was only a partial decrypt and that it could have also been from a routine but simple communications code that was also used to transmit these changes of communications zone responsibilities.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 26-7, 32.}

Next, a report of Japanese direction finder (DF) bearings is given an “example of Cast’s text-reading ability.” However, such DF information was generally encrypted in an intelligence or very transparent DF code not in JN-25B.\footnote{Ibid., p. 32.}

Wilford misinterprets Captain J. S. Holtwick’s reference in SRH-355 of about 2,000 JN-25 code values recovered by 4 January 1941 (just a month or so after JN-25B was introduced) by declaring such reference “would have likely concerned JN-25B.”\footnote{Ibid., pp. 28-9; SRH-355, Naval Security Group History to World War II, Part I, RG457 HCC, Box 108, p. 398 NA CP.} One has to ask the question, “Why did Wilford compare Holtwick’s 4 January 1941 estimate of about 2,000 JN-25 code values recovered with April to December 1941 GY records of JN-25B values recovered instead of comparing that January 1941 estimate with the record for 1 January 1941 of 1,400 JN-25A code values contained in the same document?” Since he subsequently raised the issue of a “conflict” between the two official documents, the answer seems to be an effort to throw doubt on the above official GY figures for JN-25B. However, with the 1 January 1941 record at hand, it is crystal clear that Holtwick was referring to JN-25A and not JN-25B as Wilford erroneously concluded. Since the GY report for 1 January 1941 does not mention any JN-25B (AN-1) code recoveries at all, a figure of zero can be assumed further confirming that Holtwick was referring to JN-25A.\footnote{OP-20-GY, RG38 CNSG Library, Box 115, 5750/198, pp. 20-1, NA CP.} Also, it is quite obvious that 2,000 code groups would not have been recovered in the mere 35 days that the new code JN-25B had been in effect especially when one considers the mail delays involved. Furthermore, Holtwick mentions a possible total of 33,000 code group with that 2,000 code
value figure. Since 33,000 was the limit for JN-25A and JN-25B contained some 50,000 code groups, this is additional evidence that Holtwick was speaking of JN-25A. There are other reasons that also support JN-25A as the code Holtwick was referring to.\textsuperscript{19} Thus, it is clear that Wilford’s attempted “conflict” failed and the GYP-1 records for JN-25B are accurate.

The History of OP-20-GYP-1 claims that OP-20-G discovered of the existence of the number-date table and found the scheme by which the enemy generated code groups for numbers and dates for JN-25B. It suggested that the above discovery “placed the reading of the Baker code on a current basis” but did not specify when it was accomplished. Wilford assumed it was achieved before Pearl Harbor and he again raised the possibility of “conflicting interpretations” with another history that specified no JN-25B messages were read in 1941. However, it is well known that it was Station Hypo who first unraveled the separate $12 \times 31$ substitution cipher table for the date-time group within JN-25B. This was done in May 1942, just in time to fix the date of the planned Japanese attack on Midway Island as 4 June 1942.\textsuperscript{20} One should keep in mind the early Hypo-OP-20-G feud over the Battle of Midway and latter’s habit of taking credit for Hypo’s achievements in that regard. It is far more likely that it was the great 1942 success by Hypo of recovering that cipher table and not the mere discovery of such an undecipherable feature (whenever such discovery occurred) that really placed the reading of JN-25B “on a current basis.” Therefore, there does not appear to be any real conflict on this issue between The History of GYP-1 and Activities and Accomplishments of GY-1 During 1941, 1942 and 1943 as Wilford suggests.\textsuperscript{21}

Unfortunately, Wilford once more seizes on an obscure phrase. This time, he misinterprets the otherwise solid position of a respected writer that JN-25B was not being decrypted before Pearl Harbor. Wilford claims that Frederick D. Parker alluded “to the Navy’s ability to read JN-25B7 in late 1941” by referring to Parker’s statement that a 5 December 1941 message was the only message “found after 0000 4 December 1941 in the old cipher which could have been read before 8 December.” It is clear that Parker was only saying that if, in fact, JN-25B7 could have been read in December 1941, this was the last message sent in that old cipher system that was changed on 4 December 1941. If Wilford

\textsuperscript{19} JN-25B was assigned to Cast (instead of Hypo) in March, 1941; The British also recovered a relatively similar number of JN-25B code values (500) by March, 1941.


\textsuperscript{21} Pearl Harbor Redefined, pp. 29-30.
had looked elsewhere in the very same document, he would have seen Parker’s clear evaluation of this issue, “The actual reading of current Japanese [naval] messages before Pearl Harbor was not to be.22 Thus, Wilford’s interpretation of Parker’s reference about a post war decrypt is without merit. Interestingly, that message was addressed to naval attaches in foreign jurisdictions. Therefore, it would seem logical that the message was encrypted in a JNA cipher and not JN-25B as Parker stated.

In the next four pages, Wilford lists various letters by Lietwiler and Lt. L. W. Parke (OP-20-GY), which primarily discussed their work on recovering portions of the 100,000 cipher book values of JN-25B, and concludes that “Meanwhile, Cast successfully decrypted JN-25B throughout 1941” (emphasis added), but provides no evidence of such extensive decrypts.23 On the contrary, Wilford omits a key Fabian letter of 30 August 1941 (about three months before Pearl Harbor) where Lieutenant J. R. Dennis [a future head of the Navy’s cryptologic agency] adds a personal note before his transfer and states, “As you know, during my entire tour out here information from cryptanalysis was at an almost absolute zero. This forced the recourse to traffic analysis for fleet information, and this source has become quite fruitful and fairly dependable” (emphasis added).24 This letter destroys Wilford’s allegation of extensive JN-25B decrypts throughout 1941 and is further confirmation of Fabian and Whitlock’s evaluation of no JN-25B decrypts of intelligence value.

Next, Wilford covers some of the translations pertinent to Pearl Harbor out of 2,413 full translations from 26,581 decrypts accomplished in 1945-47. He speculates that they were also decrypted and translated by Corregidor and thus provided this group and the U. S. Navy with a forewarning of the Pearl Harbor attack. In so doing, he compares the work of a small number of cryptanalysts and translators at Station Cast during a month or two before Pearl Harbor to the work of OP-20-G’s huge complement of heavily experienced wartime JN-25 cryptanalysts and translators over a two year period from August 1945 to August 1947 to finally arrive at the translations pertaining specifically to the events of 7 December 1941. Thus, it is ridiculous to claim that Cast’s relatively tiny force could even have begun to duplicate OP-20-G’s post war effort in this short period of time. In describing the 1945-47 decrypted and translated messages,

22Ibid., pp. 30-1; Frederick D. Parker, Pearl Harbor Revisited, Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 1994 pp. 20, 66.

23Pearl Harbor Redefined, p. 34.

24Letter by Lt. J. R. Dennis attached to letter from Lt. Rudolph Fabian to Cdr. Safford, 30 August 1941, RG38 CNSG Inactive Stations, Box 16, Assignments and Distributions, 1300/1 NA CP.
Wilford claims they revealed that a Strike Force had been formed, Corregidor could probably have read that buried address, and the USN likely had foreknowledge of the Strike Force’s existence. However, the code groups for that term and area designators had not been identified until the experiences of Pearl Harbor attack and the carrier raids of early 1942, so any emphasis on those specific terms in a pre-war context is inappropriate.25 Examples of other 1945-47 decrypts and translations are given to show exercise activity using torpedoes, but even there the 20/20 hindsight of the post-war translator is evident. For example, the questioned adjective “near surface (?)” for torpedoes and the phrase in parenthesis “(a special attachment for torpedoes probably bow or stern planes)” both indicate an impact of the translator’s historical knowledge of the actual Pearl Harbor attack. As the saying goes, “One cannot unring the bell.”26 The reference to Hitokappu Bay, Ominato and Russian ships would have been more likely to show an interest in Russian Siberia than Pearl Harbor.27 Only the Tanker Shiriya’s intended position north of Wake Island showed any North Pacific Ocean interest. Here, Wilford claims the Shiriya supported the Strike Force when in fact this tanker only refueled the separate operation of two destroyers (also from Yokosuka) of the Midway Neutralization Force that shelled Midway Island after the Pearl Harbor attack and not the Kido Butai.28 It is clear the massive two year post-war effort to decrypt 26,581 intercepts and produce some 2,413 full translations would have foretold that Japan was going to war but where and against whom? When one considers that even the diplomatic “bomb-plot” decrypts that pointed to Pearl Harbor did not attract the attention of intelligence analysts who had their eyes focused on Southeast Asia, why would they do any different with the above translations absent the 20/20 hindsight of the translators and 1942 code recoveries? Even with his erroneous view of Corregidor’s ability to decrypt JN-25B, Wilford was forced to admit, “No doubt, selecting and decrypting the most relevant messages amongst many thousands [26,581] of intercepts would have been an arduous task.”29 Furthermore, about 90 percent of those post-war decrypts cited (and all messages covered by Wilford) were not intercepted by Station Cast. Instead, they were copied by Station H in Hawaii.

25 *Pearl Harbor Redefined*, pp. 37-42; *And I Was There*, pp. 282, 411; SRN’s 115367, 115377, RG457 HCC, SRH-406, NA CP.

26 *Pearl Harbor Redefined*, p. 39; SRN-117301 RG457 HCC, SRH-406, NA CP.

27 *Pearl Harbor Redefined*, p. 41.

28 Ibid., p. 42; SRN-115398, RG457 HCC, SRH-406, NA CP.

29 *Pearl Harbor Redefined*, p. 43.
Station Cast had about half of the intercept positions devoted to circuits where the Pearl Harbor messages were obtained from than Station H due to Cast’s unique diplomatic and local China responsibilities. So, a large number of those 1945-47 decrypted messages that Parker and Wilford claim would have foretold of the attack on Pearl Harbor were probably not even intercepted by Corregidor.

II - THE U. S. NAVY’S JN-25B

A. OP-20-G Histories.

As mentioned above, various OP-20-G histories provide narratives on the U. S. Navy’s efforts against JN-25A (AN), the differences between JN-25A and JN-25B and cover the attack on JN-25B at length with detailed statistics. These histories had various but consistent conclusions such as no JN-25B messages were read in 1941, that JN-25 played no part in the Pearl Harbor and its code and cipher recoveries yielded cryptanalytic information rather than intelligence.\(^\text{30}\) At this point, it is appropriate to acknowledge the excellent accomplishments of Stephen Budiansky in making the details of the U. S. Navy’s limited work on JN-25B available to the public. For more complete details on just what was and was not achieved in these cryptanalytic efforts, one should review his extensive writings on this subject.\(^\text{31}\) Briefly, the number of JN-25B code values (out of a total dictionary of about 50,000 code values) that were recovered by the combined efforts of Corregidor, the British at Singapore (except for 500 for March and 500 plus for April 1941 which were held up due to mail delays) and Washington were: 300, 400, 1,100, 1,100, 2,000, 2,000, 2,400, 3,000 (600 new values) and 3,800 (800 new values) for the first of each month from April to December 1941. This is about eight per cent of the total number of JN-25B code values as of December 1941. Equally important was the 2,500 cipher additives recovered out of a total of 100,000 or five percent.\(^\text{32}\) Combining these statistics, less than one percent of JN-25B messages could be read on average. Of course, simple pattern messages or those with many numbers and other factors would increase this figure considerably. However, this overall small percentage of read

\(^{30}\text{History of GYP-1; General History of OP-20-3-GYP; Activities and Accomplishments of GY-1 During 1941, 1942 and 1943, RG38 CNSG Library, Box 115, 5750/197 NA CP.}\)


\(^{32}\text{OP-20-GY, pp. 7-20.}\)
further confirms the personal testimony of Corregidor officials and conclusions in OP-20-G histories of no significant JN-25B decrypts of intelligence value before 7 December 1941.

B. List of JN-25B Decrypts in Date Order.

A little known listing catalogs the first 100 or so of JN-25B decrypts from all sources in date/time order of translation. Number 1 appears to have been decrypted by Station Hypo on 8 January 1942. The second decrypt had an intercept date of 5 December 1940 and a translation date of 16 January 1942 by OP-20-GZ. Number 3 was sent by message from the British at Colombo with a date/time group of 2 February 1942. The next 22 are translations by OP-20-GZ in March 1942 from intercepts by Station S, Bainbridge Island, Washington and Station M, Cheltenham, Maryland. Except for the first translation of 16 January 1942, the above 25 decrypts were very short messages or partial decrypts of marginal intelligence value. Other sources state that Corregidor really only began to issue JN-25B decrypts of significant intelligence value around March 1942. Of the estimated 40 percentage of intercepted messages that were being decrypted during the Midway operations in May 1942, with three greatly expanded cryptanalytic centers operating on a wartime basis, only some 10 to 15 percent of a typical message text was readable. Therefore, it is inconceivable that Corregidor’s relatively small pre-war force could have began to approach anything like the complete 1945-47 decrypts by WWII experienced cryptanalysts in the very short period before Pearl Harbor as Wilford speculates.

C. Intelligence Reports.

Except for one partial decrypt a week or so before Pearl Harbor, that might not be from JN-25B and was related to the southern operation, revisionists have not found any JN-25B decrypts of intelligence value in the various intelligence reports or messages by Station’s Cast and Hypo or from ONI in Washington. These reporting entities included each other in their various intelligence reports. A review of these reports and summaries confirms that they had no information of the Japanese Strike Force and had their carriers located in home waters.

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33 Untitled list of numbered (#1 up) JN-25B decrypts in date order, RG38 CNSG Library, Box 22, 3222/82, NA CP.


35 Combined Fleet Decoded, p. 315.
is additional evidence that Cast did not have any information whatsoever on the Japanese Strike Force whether from cryptanalysis or traffic analysis despite Wilford’s supposition that they did. Fabian testified that Corregidor’s message 261331Z of November reporting the carriers to be in the Kure area was the last information they had on the carriers until 7 December 1941. Fabian also testified as to the 29 November (he recalled 1 December) message reporting the communications zone change of CinC 2nd Fleet that was previously mentioned. With the exception of the latter (which quite likely was not encrypted in JN-25B) and some DF bearings encrypted in another minor code, all the information reported came from traffic analysis and not cryptanalysis.

III - CONCLUSION

The above revisionists have thrown out a whole bevy of suspicions and allegations in an effort to arrive at the “possibility” that the U. S. Navy had decrypted a substantial number of key JN-25B messages out of a total of 26,581 decrypts made in 1945-47 that gave a questionable forewarning of the planned attack on Pearl Harbor. Then, they go from there with additional claims or speculations about the possibility that such “foreknowledge” was intentionally withheld to get the U. S. into the war in Europe. The purpose of this writing was to critically review each of these revisionist suspicions and allegations that were advanced to show some unspecified Corregidor ability to provide JN-25B decrypts of significant intelligence value in the few short months or weeks before Pearl Harbor one by one. By this exercise, each revisionist suspicion or allegation has been exposed as being of little substance or clearly erroneous. When all the revisionist chaff is separated out, there is no credible evidence that Corregidor produced JN-25B decrypts of intelligence value, much less any cryptanalytic intelligence on the Kido Butai, prior to 7 December 1941. This complete lack of contradictory evidence confirms the personal testimonies of Fabian, Whitlock and Dennis (who were current analysts on Corregidor) and three official OP-20-G histories and records which declare that no JN-25B decrypts of intelligence value were made before 7 December 1941, that JN-25B played no part in Pearl Harbor, and only cryptanalytic, not intelligence, information was wrung from JN-25B in 1941. The revisionists have taken their best shot and it is wide of the mark.

It is abundantly clear that revisionist allegations that pre-war Corregidor decrypts of JN-25B messages provided a forewarning of the Japanese attack are completely and utterly unfounded. Without such foreknowledge, their further
claims or suspicions that this “forewarning” was withheld for political purposes fails for lack of a proper foundation. It is sad that revisionists do not seem to consider the implications of allegations of foreknowledge of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor necessarily have on the reputations of dead intelligence personnel who are unable to defend themselves. These unfounded allegations of foreknowledge of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor should be laid to rest once and for all together with any implication that naval personnel had such knowledge and, as a result, were possibly involved in some form of improper action.

**BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH**

Lieutenant Commander Jacobsen served 27 years as a cryptologist in the U. S. Naval Security Group and its predecessor organizations. During WWII, he performed various duties involved with the collection, and analysis of Japanese naval communications at various stations in the Pacific area. He is a researcher, indexer and columnist for the *Cryptolog*, the journal for the U. S. Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association.