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
DECLASSIFIED  
DOD Dir. 5200.9, Sept. 27, 1958  
NMW by            date 7/18/66



*8*

# Tactical Mission REPORT

*General of the Army*  
**H. H. ARNOLD**



**MISSION NO. 40**  
**FLOWN 10 MARCH 1945**  
**COPY NO. 1**

**HEADQUARTERS**  
**XXI BOMBER COMMAND**  
**APO 234**

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NDD 760063  
By MR NARA Date 4/16/05

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*2-5239-111*

**S E C R E T****FOREWORD**

The incendiary night attack of 10 March 1945 on Tokyo, the report of which follows, embodied a complete change of tactics for the XXI Bomber Command.

Prior to this attack, all strikes had been planned as high-level, precision efforts. The desired results had not been obtained, however, since in a great many instances adverse weather conditions had prevented visual bombing. A study of radically different tactics was made, resulting in a plan for low-level, incendiary attacks. It was believed that the following advantages would result:


1. Better Weather Conditions: At lower altitudes, winds of 25 to 35 knots, as compared with 120 to 180 knots at 25,000 to 30,000 feet, would ordinarily be encountered, thus making it unnecessary to counteract excessive drift by limiting bombing approaches to east-west runs. Cloud conditions would also tend to be more favorable at lower altitudes.
2. Better Use of Radar Equipment: Scope definition would ordinarily be better at lower altitudes.
3. Greater Bomb Loads: Elimination of the climb to high levels plus the fact that formations would not be flown at night would result in decreased fuel consumption and therefore larger bomb loads. In addition, it was believed that night bombing would permit dispensing with all ammunition except that for the tail guns. The elimination of this weight would also increase the potential bomb load.
4. Simpler and Improved Maintenance: Low-level flying was expected to put less strain on the engines and to facilitate the problem of maintenance.
5. Greater Bombing Accuracy: Errors in bombing were expected to decrease as a result of the lowering of the bombing altitudes. Although low-altitude attacks would ordinarily increase the probability of losses as a result of enemy action, the missions would be planned to reach Japan at a time when its defenses were least effective. The fact that the enemy had not as yet developed an efficient night fighter was an important consideration.

Although night bombing would be new for a great many B-29 crews, all crews had had experience in night navigation on previous missions.

To take advantage of the surprise element in the planning, four separate targets were selected for attacks every second night in order to prevent, as far as possible, the enemy from setting up effective low-level defenses. Targets selected were the urban areas of Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka and Kobe. Nagoya was later made the target for a second attack, the fifth and last of this series.

The first mission against Tokyo was planned at an attack altitude of 5000 to 8000 feet so that maximum effect of enemy automatic weapons and barrage balloons could be avoided. Picked crews, designated as pathfinder crews, were to mark the aiming points. Bombing was to be by individual aircraft, with each plane using radar approaches and making visual corrections, if possible.

It is noteworthy that the object of these attacks was not to bomb indiscriminately civilian populations. The object was to destroy the industrial and strategic targets concentrated in the urban areas of these four major Japanese cities.

**S E C R E T**



**S E C R E T**

**HEADQUARTERS  
XXI BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 234**

**TACTICAL MISSION REPORT**

Field Order No. 43

Mission No. 40

Target: Urban Area of

TOKYO, JAPAN

10 March 1945

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Prepared By:

A-2 Section

**S E C R E T**

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By **AR** NARA Date **4/16/05**

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By auth. of the C. G.  
XXI Bomber Command  
15 April 45 JDE  
Date Initials

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Authority NND 760063  
By (6) NARA Date 10/1/91

HEADQUARTERS  
XXI BOMBER COMMAND  
APO 234

15 April 1945

SUBJECT: Report of Operations, 10 March 1945  
TO: Commanding General, Twentieth Air Force, Washington 25, D. C.

1. IDENTIFICATION OF MISSION:

a. Field Order No. 43, Headquarters XXI Bomber Command, dated 7 March 1945, directed the 73rd, 313th and 314th Bombardment Wings to take part in the Command's first incendiary attack on 9/10 March 1945.

b. Targets Specified:

(1) Primary Target: Urban area of Tokyo as outlined on attached XXI Bomber Command Target Chart No. 7.

(2) Because the type of mission planned extended over such a large urban area, no secondary or last resort targets were specified.

2. STRATEGY AND PLAN OF OPERATIONS:

a. Selection of D-Day: The weather forecast presented to the Commanding General for 9 March predicted good bombing conditions at the target as well as good base and route conditions. Firm decision was then made to inaugurate the planned low altitude night offensive against targets on Honshu with this mission on Tokyo.

b. Importance of Target: Tokyo, one of the world's three largest cities with a population of 7,000,000 (1940 population figure), is the hub of Japanese industry and commerce. With the exception of heavy industry, the city has substantial portions of almost every Japanese business enterprise. Concentrations of such key war industries as machines and machine tools, electronics, precision instruments, petroleum, and aircraft and aircraft parts are within the city limits. Tokyo is also a vital transportation and communications center and the terminus of a majority of the main railroads on the island of Honshu. In addition, it is the administrative seat of government and of the great industrial concerns which comprise Japan's war machine.

c. Details of Planning - Operational:

(1) Selection of Aiming Points: The following four aiming points were selected:

Number 1 (354254N - 1394745E), near the center of one of the most inflammable parts of the zone, had virtually no fire-breaks.

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Numbers 2 and 3 (354205N - 1394830E) and 354054N - 1394832E) were east of the Sumida River and would insure an equal density bombs on the central three-quarters of the zone.

Number 4 (354057N - 1394653E) was bounded on the west by the Tokyo station; on the east by the Sumida River; by the Ginza (commercial) district on the south; and by the Imperial Palace on the north. Equal force assigned to each point to make certain that the average density of bombs would be greater than the minimum requirement of 60 tons of incendiaries per square mile for the entire zone. (Aiming points and assignment of forces are shown on XXI Bomber Command Radar Navigation Chart following the Tactical Narrative.)

(2) Bombing Plans:

(a) Bombardier's Planning:

1. Although this mission was directed against a large area, precision bombing was required in order to start conflagrations of a size that would overcome Tokyo fire defenses. Since predicted wind was from 280 degrees, the bombing sequence planned was from east to west to prevent smoke from obscuring aiming points previously bombed. Bombardiers were instructed to drop bombs on points adjacent to fires previously started.

(b) Determination of Bomb Load:

1. Selection of bombs and fuses for this mission was influenced by the availability of incendiary bombs and clusters and the suitability of munitions insofar as penetration, fire setting properties and stowage were concerned.

2. The first squadron of each wing was to carry AN-M47A2 bombs, multiple suspended six per 500-pound station with instantaneous nose fuzing for use as pathfinder munitions. This type of bomb would set up immediate appliance fires which would mark recommended aiming point for succeeding aircraft. Multiple suspension allowed maximum loads to be carried to insure placing the maximum amount of incendiary material on the target in minimum time. The M47 was chosen to assure good penetration and initial fire spread of sufficient size to tie up the enemy's fire fighting equipment and increase the potential effectiveness of smaller bombs to be dropped by later planes.

3. All other squadrons were to carry 500-pound clusters containing M-69 bombs. This type, chosen because of penetrating power and fire-raising abilities, coupled with the large number of expected hits, was considered superior to other available bombs. The 73rd Wing was to carry E-23 clusters fuzed to open 2000 feet above the target, while the 313th and 314th Wings were to be loaded with E-45 clusters fuzed to open at 2500 feet. The 2000 and 2500 feet fuzing altitudes were selected because density from individual plane patterns was expected to be greater than from higher openings and the striking velocity obtained would be sufficient for penetration of target. These opening altitudes also made possible the use of existing bombing tables.

4. Intervalometer settings planned were 100 feet for the M-47 bombs and 50 feet for the clusters. The M-47 setting was based on the fact 6 bombs were to be released on each station and the individual plane density would be sufficient to start appliance fires in an area approximately 3000 to 4000 feet in length. The M-69

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setting was planned so that an expected density from each plane would set appliance fires over an area 300 feet by 1500 to 2000 feet and would assure dropping a minimum of 25 tons of actual M69 bombs per square mile.

(3) Navigation Planning: All aircraft were to fly individually, requiring no assembly points.

<u>Route</u>	<u>Reason for Choice</u>
Base to	
25/00N - 143/00E	This route was planned to avoid Iwo Jima operations by 75 miles.
to	
27/15N - 140/53E	Nishino-Shima was used as a radar navigation aid. The route was close to Nanpo Shoto Islands to permit use of AN/APQ-13 as a navigational aid.
to	
34/50N - 140/00E	This point was chosen west of landfall to allow navigators to make proper orientation before making landfall in order to avoid the possibility of flying beyond Chosi Point.
to	
35/19N - 140/25E	Landfall point designated was distinguishable on the radar scope and made a common course with briefed axis of attack.
to	
35/36N - 140/08E (IP)	Chiba was used as the initial point because its location on Tokyo Bay provided good land-water contrast for both radar and visual identification.
to	
Target	Tokyo urban area.
to	
35/50N - 139/53E	This sharp right hand turn off the target was planned to avoid heavy Tokyo defenses.
to	
35/37N - 140/33E	To avoid flak areas on the return route, land's end was picked south of Chosi Point.
to	
Base	To allow navigators to utilize Bonins and Northern Marianas as radar and visual check points, route to base was to be as desired.

The 73rd and 313th Wings were both instructed to dispatch 2 radio-homing aircraft to take off prior to the main force and to transmit homing signals for a period of 1 hour and 30 minutes to the later aircraft. The 4 aircraft were to fly between the following points: 35/02N - 140/00E and 34/50N - 140/00E.

(4) Flight Engineering Planning:

(a) Planes of the 73rd and 313th Wings were not to carry bomb bay tanks. Wing and center wing tanks were to be filled to capacity for a total fuel load of approximately 6800 gallons for each aircraft.



**I N D E X**

- A. Mission No 40 - Target: Urban Area, Tokyo
- B. Mission No 41 - Target: Urban Area, Nagoya
- C. Mission No 42 - Target: Urban Area, Osaka
- D. Mission No 43 - Target: Urban Area, Kobe
- E. Congratulatory Messages
- F. Participating Units
- G. Press Statements
- H. Extracts from Japanese Home Service Radio Intercepts
- I. Supplemental Statistical Summaries

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By **MR** NARA Date **4/16/05**

Mission No 40

Target: Urban Area, Tokyo

Contents:

1. Target Information
2. Field Order No 43 and amendments
3. Radar Scope Photos
4. Operational Summaries -  
No 63, 9 March 1945 (see par 2a)  
No 64, 10 March 1945 (see par 2a)  
No 66, 12 March 1945 (see par 3e and f)
5. Damage Assessment Report No 17
6. Consolidated Statistical Summary

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NOT TO BE TAKEN  
INTO THE AIR ON  
COMBAT MISSIONS

TARGET: Tokyo Urban Industrial  
Area  
Obj. Area: 90.17

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T A R G E T I N F O R M A T I O N S H E E T

---

TOKYO URBAN INDUSTRIAL AREA

Latitude - 35° 40' N  
Longitude - 139° 45' E  
Elevation - 0 - 120 feet

1. LOCATION & IDENTIFICATION: Tokyo is sprawled out for about 360 square miles along the north shore of Tokyo Bay. To the southward it merges into Kawasaki and Yokohama. It lies at the edge of an extensive almost featureless plain that is traversed by several rivers that flow down from the north and northwest. The largest of these is the Tone which heads in the uplands 100 miles to the northwest of the city and flows southeastward to the Pacific where it enters the sea at prominent Nagasaki Point 10 miles directly east of Tokyo. There are no appreciable hills eastward to the sea nor within 30 miles to the southeast and north and within 15 to 20 miles to the west. The terrain becomes very rugged farther west with mountains reaching upward to nearly 9000 feet. Volcanic Mt. Fuji, about 65 miles west-southwest of the Imperial Palace is the highest peak in the area - 12,388 feet.

Directly south of Mt. Fuji is Suruga Bay which is separated from Sagami Sea by a large prominent and rugged peninsula. About 30 miles southwest of Uraga Strait, which leads into Tokyo Bay, is O-Shima Island, the first and largest of the Izu Seven Island Group. O-Shima, and TO, Nii and Kozu islands plus several smaller ones form a chain 40 miles long that is lined up along a course leading directly to Tokyo.

The shoreline west of and to the south of Tokyo Bay is typically irregular and is characterized by its bays and peninsulas. The most prominent peninsula separates Suruga and Sagami Bays. A smaller one commands the entrance to Tokyo Bay. Much of the shoreline of Tokyo Bay is undoubtedly considerably affected by the tides. Extensive mudflats probably will be present at low tides. The shoreline to the south of the mouth of the Tone River is crescent-shaped and north of the mouth it is straight for about 40 miles. This Tone River cusped delta area provides the only extensive straight shoreline in southeastern Japan.

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All the streams in the area are permanent, and adjacent to most of them are extensive marsh lands. Numerous large lakes, notably Kasumiga and Imba, are present to the northeast of the city. Smaller ones occur throughout the rest of the surrounding area and there are two large reservoirs about 10 miles west-northwest of the city. Two rivers flow through the city. The winding Sumida is the westernmost and flows through the most densely built-up part, which is through the center of the target area. The Ara River flows along the eastern and northern limits of the congested areas. Numerous large lakes are present to the northeast of the city. Smaller ones occur throughout the rest of the surrounding area.

More than a dozen railroad lines lead into Tokyo. Most of these have double tracks. From the northwest the most distinctive is probably the double track line leading in from Takasaki 65 miles away. This line and those from Amori, Nagoya and Kobe, and Sendai converge in the Tabata-Nippori railroad yards. These yards are the largest in the city and are located just north of Ueno Park. The Shinagawa railroad yards are the second largest but are the most important in Tokyo. They are in the south end of the city adjacent to the west shore of the bay.

Airfields, power plants and race tracks are other landmarks around the city. There is a race track on either side of the mouth of Tama River at Kawasaki, and there are two more at Ichikawa - one south and the other southeast of town. In north Tokyo on the east bank of the Sumida River directly east of the Tabata-Nippori railroad yards is a steam power plant with four steel stacks 275 feet high. On the Kawasaki waterfront the six-stack Tokyo Electric Power Generating Station and the eight-stack Kawasaki Electric Power plant are unmistakable landmarks. There are numerous airfields in the area. The exact location of some of them is not known. One outstanding field is built on reclaimed ground between the mouths of the Sumida and Arakawa rivers. The city is extensively cut up by canals, small bodies of water, wide avenues and parks.

The TARGET AREA selected for attack (Map Reference: Zone 1 of Tokyo City Plan - "Japan - Incendiary Attack Data - October 1943", published by AC/AS, Intelligence, Washington, D. C.) is a highly congested rectangular area approximately 3 miles S-W and nearly 4 miles N-S. The Imperial Palace Grounds, almost completely surrounded by lakes, are most conspicuous among open spaces. They mark the southwest corner of the target area. Ueno Park, the largest in north Tokyo, is on the northwestern corner of the target. The Tokyo Railroad Station is the most important landmark on the western border. The railroad station is just east of the Imperial Palace. The northern boundary extends from Ueno Park following the Joban RR eastward to the Sumida River, then southeastward to a north-south line, the

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eastern boundary, which is halfway between Ara and Sumida Rivers. Southern boundary of the area extends from the "Y" shaped mouth of the Sumida River directly westward to Tokyo Station.

2. TARGET DESCRIPTION: Within this target area of approximately 10 square miles, the average population density is 103,000 people per square mile, an average probably not exceeded in any other modern industrial city in the world. In Asakusa Ward, the geographical center of this zone, the population runs as high as 135,000 per square mile.

Tokyo came out of the earthquake and fire of 1923 a relatively new city, especially in the better residential and business districts but this particular zone is less affected by these improvements and here the crowded conditions and more inflammable type buildings still exist. Flimsy residential areas are concentrated along both sides of the Sumida River. To the west of this is a commercial district, an area of large stores, shops and warehouses. The SE portion of the zone is largely industrial.

As late as 1931, 97% of Tokyo's buildings were of wood and though this percentage has undoubtedly decreased in the intervening period, Tokyo remains predominantly a city of wood, covered in many cases with plaster, tiles, tin, galvanized iron and other materials. Of the better-built structures concrete takes precedence over brick, for the latter is a difficult medium to use for earthquake-proof construction. While modern occidental fireproof concrete structures often reinforced with steel made their appearance following the 1923 earthquake, it was also necessary to erect great numbers of wooden barracks to meet the emergency and many of these have degenerated into permanent slum areas rather than being replaced as originally planned. Thus, some 65% of this central zone is covered by buildings and one has only to consider that roof coverage approximates only 40% in the most congested factory areas to realize the significance of this 65% figure.

In 1940 sample two-story buildings of the combination store/residence type were set afire in tests designed to determine the effectiveness of fire protection improvement measures. Two of the houses were built "complying with Tokyo regulations", with outer walls of steel net-reinforced mortar 3/4" thick, and with windows and doorways of fire resistant wooden shutters. The other two were "the usual kind, built in typical fashion" with outer walls of clapboard and windows and doors of exposed ordinary wood. The latter two burned to the ground in 12 minutes, and the other two lasted about twice as long, collapsing completely in 32 minutes. No figures were given as to what percent of Tokyo's buildings complied then or were expected to comply with the new regulations, though it was reported that the project was generally designed to be carried out in the two-story combination store/residence buildings, which would make up only a moderate percentage of the city's total number of buildings.

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The most effective protective measures have been fire alleys, previously reported and confirmed by photo reconnaissance. These total about 31 miles in length throughout the city and consist of adjacent city blocks cleared of all buildings. Work on the whole project is reported to be about 70% complete. The width of the alleys ranges from 45 to 110 yards, creating spaces serving the same fire-break function as the boulevards and canals do in other sections. Reservoirs are another protective measure, spaced 80 to 100 yards apart in the cleared fire alleys. These serve as a source of water for fire-fighting brigades. They are interspersed with tall structures to accommodate fire-watchers. Around several factory installations located in the more congested wards, similar areas about 50 yards wide have been cleared of all houses in an attempt to fend off sweeping fires.

The fire alleys run generally in an east-west direction, as the prevailing winds are north-south except in summer. An outstanding exception is a 110-yard fire alley running north-south between the Sumida and Naka Rivers, separating the densely populated Honjo Ward from the factory district to the east. (This line follows roughly the eastern boundary of the target area). The general pattern of these alleys is designed to supplement the natural fire-breaks formed by wide streets, canals, rivers and parks. Together they break the city into "unit fire areas" designed to be handled by the neighborhood fire-fighting organizations of which Tokyo is so proud. It is significant to note, however, that even with the natural and man-made fire-breaks, these "unit fire areas" still range in size from 900,000 to well over 3,000,000 sq. ft. This compares with 1000 - 5000 square feet in European cities where the individual building, because of its brick/stone/mortar construction, constitutes the "unit fire area".

3. IMPORTANCE: Tokyo is one of the world's three largest cities, having a population (1940) of some 7,000,000. Even excluding adjacent highly industrialized Kawasaki and Yokohama, Tokyo is Japan's leading manufacturing city. It contains with the possible exception of heavy industry very substantial portions of almost every Japanese business enterprise. This is particularly true of such key war industries as machines and machine tools, electronics, precision instruments, petroleum, and aircraft and aircraft parts. It is a vital transportation and communication center, the terminus of practically all the main railroads on the Island of Honshu, as well as the administrative seat of government and of the great industrial concerns comprising Japan's war machine.

Destruction of the target area would be more noticeable from the point of view of its relation to the Tokyo metropolitan area as a whole than from the physical loss of the individual installations within the target area itself. However numerous small factories, not profitable targets for precision bombing attack, would be damaged or destroyed. Employment at scores of

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war plants throughout Tokyo and environs would be directly affected by casualties, movement of workers out of the area, use of manpower in reconstruction, and probably lowered worker morale. Fire and probably damage would extend to the vital railway centers on the edge of this zone, such as the Joban, Ueno, and Central Tokyo Stations, termini of main roads from W and N Honshu, and to communications centers such as the Marunouchi Telephone Exchange, which houses 9000 lines of automatic telephone equipment, and 150 lines extending to all parts of the Empire. The Marunouchi (business), Ginza (commercial), and governmental districts bordering on the W and S of this zone would feel keenly the effects of a great conflagration here, even though buildings in this area are very modern and less crowded. This nearby area also houses Army and Navy administrative planning headquarters.

4. SUGGESTED AIMING POINTS: Primary purpose of this type of attack is to capitalize on the fact that many of Japan's industrial and transportation facilities lie within or immediately adjacent to known highly inflammable sections of her principal cities. Whatever has been said above describing the measures taken by Tokyo's inhabitants to meet or control fires, it should be kept in mind that all Japanese cities, including the Capital, present an opportunity for incendiary attack that cannot be judged by experience in the European Theater. Maximum destruction or dislocation of war-time industry through attacks of this kind can of course only be accomplished if fire-fighting facilities are overcome. Hence the importance of adherence by each squadron to its briefed aiming point and time of attack and coordination of latter with ground wind data.

Referring to XXI BOMCOM Litho Mosaic Number 90.17-Urban, the aiming points are:

055102  
066086  
067064  
041065

9 March 1945

Target Section, A-2  
XXI Bomber Command

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By MR NARA Date 4/16/05

S E C R E TS E C R E T

FROM: COM GEN XXI BOM COM  
 TO: COM GEN 73D BOM WING  
 COM GEN 313TH BOM WING  
 COM GEN 314TH BOM WING

By Auth of CG XXI BC

*CL* 10 Mar. 45  
 Initials Date

XXI BOMBER COMMAND  
 GUAM  
 0800 10 March 1945

ADMENDMENT NUMBER 3 FIELD ORDER 43 MEETINGHOUSE NUMBER 2

Add to paragraph 3 x.

(9) D Day and Zero Hour: 091815K

Add to paragraph 4

(b) This is XXI Bomber Command Tactical Mission No. 40

*CL*  
 FOR MONTGOMERY  
 D/OPNS

LEMAY  
 COM GEN XXI BOM COM

DISTRIBUTION: 2 ea Wing

S E C R E T

-1-

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 By AR NARA Date 4/16/05



FROM: COM GEN XXI BOM COM  
TO : COM GEN 73RD BOMWING  
COM GEN 313TH BOMWING  
COM GEN 314TH BOMWING

SECRET

By Auth of CG XXI BC

GM 8 March 45  
Initials Date

XXI BOMBER COMMAND  
GUAM  
1630 8 March 1945

AMENDMENT NO. 2 FIELD ORDER NO. 43 MEETINGHOUSE NO. 2

Add to paragraph 3 x.

(a) During flight Altimeter setting will be set at 29.92.

LIEMAY  
COM GEN XXI BOM COM

*Style*  
FOR MONTGOMERY  
D/OPNS

DISTRIBUTION: 2 each Wing

- 1 -  
SECRET

- 2 -

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NDD 760063  
By MR NARA Date 4/16/05

FROM: COM GEN XXI BOM COM

S E C R E T

TO : COM GEN 73RD BOM WING  
COM GEN 313TH BOM WING  
COM GEN 314TH BOM WING

By Auth of CG XXI BC

CF      8 Mar 45  
Initials      Date

XXI BOMBER COMMAND  
GUAM  
1600 8 March 1945

AMENDMENT NO. 1 FIELD ORDER NO. 43 MEETINGHOUSE NO. 2

Change paragraph 3 x (3) to read:

- (3) Calibrated airspeed of 230 repeat 230 MPH will be flown by all aircraft. There is a violent vibration in some A/C when bomb bay doors are open when traveling at a speed of 240 MPH.

LEMAY  
COM GEN XXI BOM COM

*Copy*  
FOR MONTGOMERY  
D/OPNS

DISTRIBUTION: 2 each Wing

- 1 -

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority NDD T60063  
By MR NARA Date 4/16/05



FROM: COM GEN XXI BOM M  
 TO : COM GEN 73RD BOM WING  
 COM GEN 313TH BOM WING  
 COM GEN 314TH BOM WING

C R E T

By Auth of CG XXI BC

*RF* 8 Mar 45  
 Initials Date

XXI BOMBER COMMAND  
 GUAM  
 0800 8 March 1945

FIELD ORDER NUMBER 43. MEETINGHOUSE NUMBER 2.

1. Omitted.
2. The XXI Bomber Command will attack Urban Area of Meetinghouse with maximum effort on "D" Day. Location: 354IN - 13948E.
3. a. 73rd Wing:
  - (1) First A/C will take off at Zero Hour.
  - (2)
 

Offset A.P.	MPI	Course	Force
353830N - 13953E	354254N - 1394745E	312° True	2/3
Same	354205N - 1394830E	312° True	1/3
  - (3) Altitude of Attack: 7,000 to 7,800 feet.
  - (4) Bomb Load: One squadron - M-47 Incendiary Clusters (scheduled to be dropped first) fused instantaneous nose. Balance of squadrons - E-28 Incendiary Clusters fused to open 2,000 feet above target.
  - (5) Route:
 

Base  
 2500N - 14300E  
 2715N - 14053E  
 3450N - 14000E  
 3519N - 14025E  
 3532N - 1400430E (IP)  
 Target  
 3550N - 13953E  
 3537N - 14033E  
 Base
  - (6) Altitude enroute to target: 3,000 to 3,500 feet.
  - (7) The 73rd Wing will dispatch two radio-homing aircraft to take off prior to main force and fly between points 3502N - 14000E and 3450N - 14000E for 1 hour and 30 minutes for the purpose of transmitting homing signals to main force.

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FIELD ORDER NUMBER 43 MEETINGHOUSE NUMBER 2 CONTINUED

b. 313th Wing:

(1) First A/C will take off at Zero Hour.

<u>Offset A.P.</u>	<u>MPI</u>	<u>Course</u>	<u>Force</u>
353830N - 13953E	354205N - 1394830E	312° True	1/3
Same	354054N - 1394832E	302° True	2/3

(3) Altitude of Attack: 6,000 to 6,800 feet.

(4) Bomb Load: One squadron - M-47 Incendiary Clusters (scheduled to be dropped first) fused instantaneous nose fuse. Balance of squadrons - E-46 Incendiary Clusters fused to open 2,500 feet above the target.

(5) Route: Same as 73rd Wing.

(6) Altitude enroute to target: 4,000 to 4,500 feet.

(7) The 313th Wing will dispatch two radio-homing aircraft to take off prior to the main force and to fly between points 3502N - 14000E and 3450N - 14000E for 1 hour and 30 minutes for the purpose of transmitting homing signals to main force.

c. 314th Wing:

(1) First A/C will take off at Zero Hour minus 40 minutes.

<u>Offset A.P.</u>	<u>MPI</u>	<u>Course</u>	<u>Force</u>
353845N - 13948E	354057N - 1394653E	338° True	All squadrons

(3) Altitude of Attack: 5,000 to 5,800 feet.

(4) Bomb Load: One squadron - M-47 Incendiary Clusters (scheduled to be dropped first) used instantaneous nose fuse. Balance of squadrons - E-46 Incendiary Clusters fused to open 2,500 feet.

(5) Route:  
Base  
2500N - 14300E  
2715N - 14053E  
3502N - 14000E  
3525N - 1395430E  
Target  
3550N - 13953E  
3557N - 14033E  
Base

(6) Altitude enroute to target: 5,000 to 5,500 feet.

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## FIELD ORDER NUMBER 43 MEETINGHOUSE NUMBER 2 CONTINUED

- x. (1) Attacking by individual aircraft with minimum interval between aircraft. Plan of attack will be for radar bombing but visual bombing method will be used if possible. If visual bombing is done bombardiers should endeavor to place an even distribution of bombs over Incendiary Zone #1.
- (2) Intervalometer Setting:
- (a) M-47 Incendiary Clusters: 100 feet.
- (b) E-48 and E-28 Incendiary Clusters: 50 feet.
- (3) Calibrated airspeed of 240 M.P.H. will be flown by all aircraft on bombing run.
- (4) No ammunition will be carried.
- (5) If visual release is used the aiming point will be other than a conflagration previously started.
- (6) All A/C not equipped with bomb bay tank will salvo immediately after intervalometer has been actuated.
- (7) For this mission pins and car-o-seal wires may be removed from fuses prior to take off.
4. No Change.
5. Communications:
- a. (1) Radio silence will prevail enroute to target except in case of an aircraft in extreme emergency.
- (2) Four special radio-homing planes, two from the 73rd Wing and two from the 313th Wing will proceed to a presdesignated point and orbit for radio homing purposes. Designated radio planes will carry one (1) spare Liaison Transmitter and one (1) spare Liaison Dynamotor. All radio planes will begin transmitting homing signal 20 minutes prior to arrival of main force at designated points. (Reference Regulation 100-37 XXI BomCom) Radio homing planes will fly designated course for one hour and thirty minutes. The most capable radio operators available will be assigned to the special radio planes. The allocation of planes, altitude, frequency and identification signals will be as follows:

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Altitude</u>	<u>Frequency</u>	<u>Identification</u>
73rd	24,000	424 kcs	B
73rd	25,000	524 kcs	C
313th	26,000	230 kcs	N
313th	27,000	330 kcs	A

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## FIELD ORDER NUMBER 43 MEETINGHOUSE NUMBER 2 CONTINUED

- (3) Jamming tactics may be employed by enemy but one frequency of the four should remain open.
- (4) Wings will predesignate one plane per squadron as the only plane to transmit a strike report.
- (a) Special strike report will consist of time over target (GMT) target bombed, method of bombing, cloud coverage, results obtained, fighter opposition and flak opposition.


<u>Time</u>	-	Over Target (GMT)
<u>Target Bomed</u>	-	P - Primary
<u>Method of Bombing</u>	-	V - Visual
		R - Radar
		N - Navigation
<u>Cloud Coverage</u>	-	1 to 9 for tenths X for 10/10
<u>Bombing Results</u>	-	A - General Conflagration
		B - Several Large Fires
		C - Many Fires
		D - Few Scattered Fires
		E - Unobserved
<u>Fighter Opposition</u>	-	A - Heavy
		B - Moderate
		C - Meager
		D - None
<u>Flak Opposition</u>	-	A - Heavy
		B - Moderate
		C - Meager
		D - None

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
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# APPROACHES TO TOKYO

## ACTUAL SCOPE PHOTOS

LOW ALTITUDE (ABOUT 7000 FT.)

10 MILE SWEEP  
OVER TOKYO  
URBAN AREA




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PALACE

ARA RIVER  
(AND BRIDGES)

SUMIDA RIVER  
(MOUTH)

TOKYO

20 MILE SWEEP



KAWASAKI

TOKYO BAY

YOKOHAMA

20 MILE SWEEP



YOKOSUKA

SAGAMI BAY

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SAGAMI BAY

A-2 SECTION

XXI BOMBER COMMAND

MARCH 1945

PREPARED AND REPRODUCED BY 949TH ENGR AVN TOPO CO

HEADQUARTERS XXI BOMBER COMMAND  
 APO 234, c/o Postmaster  
 San Francisco, California

SECRET  
 AUTH: CG XXI BC  
 Inits: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Date: 10 March 45

9 March 1945

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OPERATIONAL SUMMARY NO. 63

1. STATISTICS:

	<u>Missions</u>	<u>Effective</u>				<u>Losses</u>				
		<u>Airborne</u>	<u>Sorties</u>	<u>Tonnage</u>	<u>Claims</u>	<u>E/A</u>	<u>AA</u>	<u>DIT</u>	<u>OT</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Major Strikes:</u>										
a. Current:	1	322	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
b. Final Rpts:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<u>Weather Strikes:</u>										
a. Current:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b. Final Rpts:										
(255-266)	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<u>Weather Recon:</u>										
a. Current:	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b. Final Rpts:	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<u>Photo Recon:</u>										
a. Current:										
(3 PRM 73-74)	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b. Final Rpts:										
(3 PRM 69-70-71-72)	4	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<u>Radar Photo:</u>										
a. Current:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
b. Final Rpts:	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL CURRENT:	4	325	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL FINAL:	7	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

2. SUMMARY:

a. Major Strikes as of 2400K, 9 March 1945:

(1) Mission No. 40: Target Tokyo Urban Area.

- (a) 73rd Wing: 150 A/C were airborne. First A/C was airborne at 091815K and the last at 091929K. No further reports at time of this report.
- (b) 313th Wing: 110 A/C were airborne. First A/C airborne at 091815 and last at 092018K. No further reports at time of this report.
- (c) 314th Wing: 54 A/C were airborne. First A/C airborne at 091736K and last at 091830K. No further reports at time of this report.

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## Operational Summary No. 63 (cont'd)

b. Weather Strike Missions as of 2400K, 9 March 1945: None scheduled.

c. Weather Reconnaissance Missions as of 2400K, 9 March 1945:

(1) WRM 5: Weather reconnaissance of scheduled area made. No E/A observed. No AA. Pictures taken of Farallon De Medinilla Island NE of Saipan. Returned base Guam at 091500K.

d. Photo Reconnaissance Missions as of 2400K, 9 March 1945:

(1) 3 PRM 73: Objective Tokyo; Airborne 090217K. Photographs taken. This A/C landed at Iwo Jima due to mechanical trouble and will remain until repairs completed.

(2) 3 PRM 74: Target Shimonosaki Straits. Airborne 090022K. Photographs taken. Landed base Guam at 091430K.

e. Radar Scope Missions as of 2400K, 9 March 1945: None scheduled.

f. Air Sea Rescue: Negative.

3. FINAL RESULTS:

a. Major Strikes: None.

b. Weather Strike Missions:

(1) WSM 265: Target Kyushu Area. Airborne 080608K. No bombs carried. 2/10 cloud over area. No enemy opposition. Landed base Guam 082000K.

(2) WSM 266: Target Kobe-Tsuruta-Kyoto Areas. No bombs carried. 5 - 7/10 clouds over area. Wind 280 deg., 230 knots. Landed base Guam at 082050K.

c. 655th Weather Reconnaissance Missions:

(1) WRM 5: Weather reconnaissance of scheduled area flown. Airborne 090558K. No enemy opposition. Pictures taken of Farallon De Medinilla Island NE of Saipan. Landed base Guam 091500K.

d. Photo Reconnaissance Missions:

(1) 3 PRM 69: Objective Tokyo. Photos of good quality obtained. No enemy opposition. 1/10 clouds at 15,000 ft. Observations: 4 reflectors E of Fuji (3540 N - 13940 E) Landed base at 081805K.

(2) 3 PRM 70: Objective Nagoya Area. Photos of excellent quality obtained. No enemy opposition. 9/10 to 10/10 clouds at 33,000 ft. Observations: Several reflectors SW of Nagoya. Landed base 081810K.

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## Operational Summary No. 63 (cont'd)

- (3) 3 PRM 71: Objective Tamashimo. Good quality photos obtained. No enemy opposition. 6/10 clouds at 32,000 ft. Observations: Reflectors S of Wakayama. Landed base 081810K.
- (4) 3 PRM 72: Objective Tokyo. Excellent photos taken. No enemy opposition. Observations: 2 reflectors W of Chosi. Landed base 081815K.
- e. Radar Scope Missions: None.

*W. H. Blanchard*  
*Colonel*

For: W. H. BLANCHARD,  
Colonel, G.S.C.,  
AC of S, A-3.

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Regular distribution  
for this report.

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