

ARMY TALKS



Two Years of War



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EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES ARMY

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ARMY TALKS



EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

TWO YEARS OF WAR

TWO years ago this month, Japanese bombers swept in over Diamond Head, circled American ships lying peacefully in the anchorage at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and launched the attack which thrust the United States into World War II.

In those two years our country has mobilized, equipped and trained a huge army. American troops have fought in many corners of the world. They are fighting there today. They have suffered serious reverses and they have gained glorious victories.

More victories and possibly more reverses are yet to come.

The most striking reverses were at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines; our outstanding victories have been on the home industrial front, in the Battle over Germany, in the Pacific and in the Mediterranean Theater.

On 30 June, 1943, Gen. George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, made his formal biennial report to the Secretary of War. It covered the period from 1 July, 1941, to the date of issue and forms the official record of what was done and why it was done, as our country went into the second war it has fought in a single generation.

He points out that, from the

American point of view, the war has divided itself into four phases, so far, and that his report of this summer covers the third and fourth phases of the conflict.

The first, as Gen. Marshall sees it, included the fall of France and the period of our national uncertainty as to the influence of the War on the United States.

The second phase began with the Battle of Britain and ended with the German declaration of war on Russia.

The third phase covered the period from the German attack on Russia to the Japanese blow at Pearl Harbor. The fourth phase covered complete mobilization of the United States and the co-ordination of our effort with those of our allies.

The fifth phase, in which we are now engaged, involved the launching of allied military power, after the end of a defensive period, in a series of constantly increasing blows against our enemies.

The early part of the Chief of Staff's report deals with the first three phases, as outlined in the preceding pages.

It is when he comes to the fourth phase that his report has the most interest for men here in the ETO.

This, in abstracted form, is what the Chief of Staff has to say about it:

This issue of ARMY TALKS is composed of extracts from the Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, July 1, 1941, to June 30, 1943, to the Secretary of War. Published by the Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., it was later reprinted in England by His Majesty's Stationery Office and is available to all service personnel and civilians.

PART I

**THE FOURTH PHASE:
WAR DECLARED**

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, galvanized the entire military organization of our nation into the immediate tasks of protecting the United States, against surprise attack and sabotage. It also precipitated the movement of additional men and material to guard our extended naval and air lines of communications from the United States to active and prospective theaters of operations, and to replace losses in Hawaii.

Troop Movements Made Urgent

Since the Japanese attacks on the Pacific Fleet in Hawaii had uncovered the entire west coast of North America, the reinforcement of garrisons along the West Coast, Panama, Hawaii, and in Alaska was given priority. The movement of air forces and anti-aircraft units was initiated immediately by flight and fast freight specials.

A first necessity was to make good the damage in Hawaii and to strengthen its defenses and those at Midway, to establish a succession of island bases to guard the Pacific lines of communication with Australia and New Zealand and to permit the transport of bombers and transport planes and the servicing of naval aircraft and shipping. Ships in the Pacific Coast harbors were immediately requisitioned, reloaded and sent westward with combat and service personnel, aircraft equipment and other material. Two fast convoys were organized, loaded and left San Francisco for Hawaii during the first ten days of the war. A convoy enroute to the Philippines was diverted to Australia.

Troops were sent to relieve the Marines and British Forces in Iceland, and, at the same time, the first echelon of troops was sent overseas to Northern

Ireland to assist in the protection of the British Isles and to pave the way for future American activities in Europe.

In February, 1942, Gen. Douglas MacArthur was instructed by the War Department to proceed to Australia to assume command of the newly designated Southwest Pacific Area. His directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff included the missions of holding Australia, checking the enemy's advance along the Melanesian Barrier, protecting land, sea and air communications with the Southwest Pacific and maintaining our position in the Philippines. Lieutenant-General Jonathan M. Wainwright, succeeding General MacArthur as commander of the forces in the Philippine Islands, continued the gallant defense which has become an epic in American history.

Japs Start Bataan Attack

On March 31 the Japanese initiated the anticipated general assault on the Bataan position, an attack relentlessly maintained during the next seven days. As our lines were finally penetrated and field hospitals were shelled by Japanese artillery, it became apparent that the courageous but exhausted defenders could no longer avoid disaster.

Despite Bataan's loss, Corregidor, Fort Drum and Fort Hughes (all island fortifications) continued to resist enemy attacks with counter-battery and anti-aircraft fire for nearly a month. On May 5, after a week of intensive bombardment which buried many of the shore defenses under landslides, the enemy made a landing on North Point of Corregidor. The shattered defenses were unable to dam the Japanese tide. The following day the exhausted and depleted forces

TWO YEARS OF WAR



were overwhelmed, and finally surrendered.

The initial Japanese successes were due to Allied lack of military means, especially in aircraft with supporting warning and maintenance services, to oppose an adversary whose preliminary strategic deployments permitted successive concentrations of overwhelming superiority in land, sea and

air forces on selected objectives.

The bombing of Japan by our planes commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel (now Major-General) James H. Doolittle was a heartening event in a generally sombre picture. Despite heavy losses in men and materials, the military balance was approaching an equilibrium. The initiative was no longer completely in enemy hands.

That Japan intended to exploit her victories to the limit was indicated by preparations for an offensive toward Australia. Between May 7 and 11, however, a heavy column of enemy naval vessels and transports moving southward in the Coral Sea was decisively defeated by Allied naval and air forces off the Louisiade Archipelago.

Coral Sea Fight Marked High Tide of Aggression

The Coral Sea action marked the high tide of Japanese conquest in the Southwest Pacific. The possibility that the enemy would shift his strength northward to attack Midway or Hawaii prompted a regrouping of our naval units and a further reinforcement of the air and ground units at Hawaii, Midway, and other island outposts. All available Navy carrier and land-based Army and Navy air forces were concentrated against the enemy. In the historic two-day battle which followed, heavy losses in ships and airplanes were inflicted on the Japanese, who retired at once.

The battles of the Coral Sea and Midway restored the balance of sea power in the Pacific to the United States and lessened a grave threat to our Pacific possessions. Midway climaxed our first half year of war and marked the opening of a new phase of Pacific operations. The enemy offensive had definitely been checked; the United Nations firmly held chains of island bases extending from the United States to Australia; our forces had begun to deliver staggering blows; and our commanders were now free to prepare for offensive operations.

The Fifth Phase Included Battles in the Solomons

The operation against Guadalcanal inaugurated a series of offensive moves in the Pacific which have con-

tinued to the present. The enemy occupation of the Solomon Islands permitted him the use of advance air and naval bases from which to attack our long Pacific supply line and the north coast of Australia. On 7 August, 1942, therefore, United States Navy and Marine forces seized beachheads on Guadalcanal and Florida and occupied Tulagi. The highly prized airfield on Guadalcanal was held by the Marines against a long series of heavy air, sea and ground assaults by the enemy. The resolute defense of these Marines under Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Alexander A. Vandegrift and the desperate gallantry of our naval task forces marked the turning point in the Pacific.

Enemy Showed Great Skill

While strongly contesting our offensive in the Solomons during the summer and fall of 1942, the enemy's determination to exploit his previous gains was indicated by persistent reports of activities in the Bismarcks, upper Solomons and New Guinea. These proved to be preparations for an overland push from Buna through the Owen Stanley Mountains with Port Moresby, our advance base on the south coast of New Guinea, as the immediate objective.

By September 12 the Japanese had forced Allied ground forces back to within 30 miles of Port Moresby in an advance which demonstrated great skill in jungle and mountain fighting; however, reinforcement of Allied ground troops coupled with effective air support finally turned back this threat.

Early in 1943 the northeast coast of New Guinea was finally cleared of the enemy by American and Australian troops under the command of Lieutenant-General Robert L. Eichelberger, as far north as

Buna, but only after he had been systematically rooted out of his fox-holes along the beaches and destroyed by the determined assaults of our men.

The United Nations in the Pacific theater now possessed more secure positions from which to counter Japanese offensive ventures; also, commanders and troops had secured valuable experience in battle. Unified command arrangements were welding sea, air and ground forces into efficient fighting teams. Our superiority was demonstrated by a loss ratio of four to one in our favor; and a more complete control of the sea was made possible by the "skip-bombing" tactics perfected in the Southwest Pacific by General Kenney's airmen.

SUMMARY

Early Japanese successes were largely the result of surprise and local superiorities. American troops were rushed to danger spots in the early days of the war. Naval cooperation turned the tide in the Pacific. "Skip-bombing" was developed in the Pacific Theater.

Q. What naval battle marked the high tide of Japanese aggression in the Pacific?

Q. What action followed the activities on the Bismarck and Solomon Islands?

Q. How do Japanese and American plane losses in the Pacific compare?

PART II

THE EUROPEAN THEATER

Prior to our entry into the war, the United States, through Lend-Lease operations, had supported British war economy and had included measures to insure safe delivery of these supplies and materials. When we were precipitated into active participation in the struggle, the necessity for the protection and control of the trans-Atlantic sea routes became both urgent and vital. Initial preparatory measures on our part therefore included the strengthening of both sea and air communication routes, and this in turn involved the further development of bases in Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom.

When we entered the war, Germany, although committed on the Eastern Front, had sufficient divisions in North-western Europe to threaten a cross-channel invasion or a possible thrust to seize Iceland on the flank of the sea lanes from the United States to the United Kingdom and Russia. American forces, in sufficient strength to discourage such a venture,

previously had been dispatched to augment the British garrison in Iceland. The latter was relieved in its entirety by the summer of 1942.

U.S. Troops in United Kingdom

Upon our entry into the war it became urgently desirable to move United States troops into the United Kingdom as early as possible to bolster the defenses there which had been seriously weakened by the dispatch of troops to the Middle and the Far East, and for the psychological effect of the British people. At that moment, however, the threat to Australia was so serious that most of the shipping immediately available in the Atlantic in January had to be hurriedly employed for the movement of 25,000 troops to the Southwest Pacific.

Steps were immediately taken to build up in the United Kingdom a strong American air force, notably precision bombers. These units would afford additional protection to the British Isles against any invasion attempt.

In the latter part of January, 1942, the first convoy of our troops arrived in Northern Ireland. The complicated transportation, construction and administrative problems were solved with the close co-operation of all the British agencies concerned.

The United States Army Air Forces' assault on the continent of Europe was launched on July 4, 1942, when six American aircraft and crews participated in a Royal Air Force attack on targets in Holland. The combined American-British bomber offensive against the continent of Europe today gives promise of being a decisive factor in the ultimate destruction of the German Citadel.

Assault on Fortress of Europe

The British heavy bomber command was developed for the purpose of carrying out night missions, while the American Flying Fortresses and Liberators were developed for daylight operations. In the British planes, speed and armament were limited in favor of long range and heavy bomb loads. On the other hand the American bomber design tends toward a fast, very heavily armed and armored high altitude plane. The violence of the German fighter plane reaction to our daylight attacks is convincing evidence of precision bombing's deadly effect.

Experience over the European continent has demonstrated the soundness of our Air Force's tactical doctrines and the basic design of their aircraft. Notable early examples were raids against Vegesack and Wilhelmshaven during March, 1943, in which 180 of our heavy bombers destroyed over 80 German fighters with a loss of but five of our own planes. These raids effectively put out of action for a period of many months the Vegesack plant and administered crippling

damage to the naval installations at Wilhelmshaven.

On May 10, 1943, following the unfortunate accident which resulted in the death of Lieutenant-General Frank M. Andrews, command of the European Theater of Operations was assumed by Lieutenant-General Jacob L. Devers.


North African Theater

In January, 1942, when the Prime Minister and his Chiefs of Staff were in Washington, operations in northwest Africa, in Morocco and Algiers, were discussed in detail. The re-opening of the Mediterranean would facilitate Allied global operations, and the removal of the constant threat of German activities in Western Morocco and at Dakar would add immeasurably to the security of the Allied position. Furthermore, if our occupation of North Africa could be carried out without fatally embittering the French troops and authorities in that region it would provide a setting for the reconstruction of the French Army in preparation for its return in force to the homeland.

The adopted plans provided that task forces from both the United Kingdom and the United States should strike simultaneously at Algiers, Oran and Casablanca. It was urgently desired to make initial landings to the east of Algiers at Bone, Philippeville, and possibly Tunis, but the lack of shipping and of landing boats and aircraft carriers at the time made such procedure impracticable.

The success of the operation depended on the efficient handling of a mass of details as well as on the training and fighting qualities of the troops, and above all, upon the secrecy with which this vast undertaking had to be prepared.

General Eisenhower organized a combined staff in London and directed the planning. Three task forces were



formed: one entirely American sailed directly from the United States and carried out the landings along the west coast of Morocco, another of American troops escorted by the British Navy sailed from Great Britain and landed in the vicinity of Oran, the third, a combined British-American ground force escorted by the British Navy, sailed from the British Isles and landed at Algiers. There were naval covering forces, both British and American. The entire force totalled only 107,000 men.

Task Forces Assembled

Concurrently with the preparation in the United Kingdom of two task forces, one of Americans to land at Oran and the other a mixed force to land at Algiers, a third task force composed of the 3rd Infantry and 2nd Armored Division, the major part of the 9th Infantry Division, and reinforced with supporting arms and services, was organized in the United States under Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) George S. Patton, Jr. His headquarters were temporarily established in the Operations Division of the General Staff in Washington which became the coordinating medium between General Eisenhower and General Patton. Rear-Admiral (now Vice-Admiral) H. K. Hewitt, who commanded the expedition until its disembarkation in Africa, assembled the force at sea on October 24 and sailed for Casablanca. This task force was to effect a junction with the force under Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Lloyd Fredenhall which was to land in the vicinity of Oran.

General Fredenhall's troops consisted of the 1st Infantry Division and one-half of the 1st Armored Division, reinforced by corps troops. In addition to seizing Oran and the adjacent airfields and making contact with

General Patton's force in the vicinity of Fez, this expedition was also charged with the mission of effecting a juncture with the Eastern Task Force which had the mission of capturing Algiers. The latter force, under Lieutenant-General K. A. N. Anderson of the British Army, consisted of British Commando and infantry units together with two United States regimental combat teams, one from the 9th and one from the 34th Infantry Divisions and a Ranger Battalion. The first landing was to be effected under the direction of Major-General Charles W. Ryder of the American Army. General Anderson took over command after the American troops had been established ashore.

November 8 was designated as D-day on which the three task forces were to strike simultaneously.

The Landings Are Carried Out

Despite the negotiations which had been carried on with a few French officials the amount of resistance which the landing forces would encounter remained problematical. General Eisenhower broadcast a proclamation of our friendly intentions towards French North Africa and instructed the French forces to display certain signals to indicate their non-resistance. However, each task force proceeded on the assumption that determined resistance must be expected. A code signal "Play Ball" was to be broadcast to the entire force at the first hostile act on the part of the French in any sector, as a warning to initiate vigorous offensive action.

At the moment the landings in Algeria began, at one o'clock on the morning of November 8, President Roosevelt assured the French people by short wave radio that the Allies sought no territory, and asked for French co-operation.

The landings were carried out in accordance with plans, and with a boldness and efficiency which secured the initial objectives, the major airfields and ports in North Africa, within a period of 48 hours.

Diplomacy Cleared the Way

These military operations were staged against a background of diplomatic negotiations through which speedy cessation of French resistance was sought. Both General Charles de Gaulle, leader of the Fighting French, and General Henri Giraud, who had escaped from Germany to France and then from France to Gibraltar, broadcast pleas for French co-operation when our operations started.

The North African government was reorientated and brought into close collaboration with the United Nations under a provisional government headed by Admiral Jean Darlan with General Giraud as Commander-in-Chief of the French ground and air units.

Race for Tunisia Begins

The rapid extension of the offensive eastward was facilitated by the expeditions landing at Algiers resulting from French co-operation. Our forces had suffered comparatively few casualties in this particular landing, and as quickly as logistical support could be prepared they were headed towards Tunisia.

It was apparent that a strategical surprise had been effected. Tunisia was lightly garrisoned by the French. Far to the east the German Afrika Korps and the accompanying Italian forces had been hurled back from the El Alamein position by General Sir Bernard Montgomery's Eighth Army a few days prior to the landings. Despite the manifest difficulties of supply, the immediate occupation of Tunisia appeared mandatory.

Immediately following the landings

in North Africa, Axis forces were rushed into Tunisia by sea and air. As early as November 16 our advancing troops encountered German patrols 60 miles west of Tunis. The leading units of the British First Army, with American reinforcement, reached Medjez-el-Bab, 30 miles southwest of Tunis, on November 25, and took possession of the airfield at Djedeida on November 28. Further to the south Allied units reached Pont du Fahs, and American parachute troops were operating in the Sbeitla-Gafsa area. Axis resistance steadily increased.

Our advance on the Station de Jefna, 32 miles southwest of Bizerta, was repulsed on November 30. Strong Axis counter-attacks with tanks forced Allied withdrawals from Tebourba, but similarly enemy aggressive action directed against Medjez-el-Bab was successfully resisted. Difficulties of supply became so serious that active operations were practically suspended in early December. Meanwhile the enemy rapidly reinforced his positions which assumed the character of a bridgehead protecting the Bizerta-Tunis area. Medjez-el-Bab remained the key-point of the Allied position.

In the midst of this campaign, the assassination of Admiral Darlan created a political crisis which was met by the action of the French North African governors in designating General Giraud as Darlan's successor.

Rommel Loses Tunisia

The new year opened with the opponents in Tunisia testing each other's strength along the partially stabilized line and matching each other's bids for air supremacy.

In Libya, Rommel's Afrika Korps with its complement of Italians abandoned a succession of defensive positions, withdrawing finally into Tripolitania. By February his troops

were established on the Mareth Line in southwest Tunisia.

Throughout the African operation up to this time, General Eisenhower had retained control of the United States Army forces in the British Isles, ground and air. Plans had been made before the launching of the African enterprise to effect a separation in February, and this was actually carried out on February 4, when General Andrews, a highly competent air and ground commander, who had gained in the Middle East recent experience in combat operations and in helpful contacts with our Allies, was appointed commander of the United States Forces in the European Theater of Operations with Headquarters in London.

Upon its arrival on the Mareth Line, the British Eighth Army came under the direction of General Eisenhower. General Sir Harold Alexander, of the British Army, was appointed his deputy and given direct command of the 18th Army Group, which consisted of the British First Army, the British Eighth Army, the United States II Corps, and the French units on the Tunisian front. North African Air units were organized into the Mediterranean Air Command under Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, with Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Carl Spaatz of the United States Army as Commander of the Northwest African Air Force. All heavy bombers, together with fighter support, were organized by General Spaatz into the Strategic Air Force under General Doolittle.

Break Through Kasserine Pass

The junction of the veteran Afrika Korps with Von Kessler's command in Tunisia permitted the enemy to launch offensive strokes against the lightly held portions of the long Allied line.

On February 14, hostile armored units reinforced by artillery and infantry and supported by dive bombers struck westward from Faid and broke through the Kasserine Pass. By the afternoon of February 21 the Axis forces had advanced a three-pronged armored thrust 21 miles beyond the pass, threatening the Allied position in Central Tunisia. Of this operation General Eisenhower radioed :

"Our present tactical difficulties resulted from my attempt to do possibly too much, coupled with the deterioration of resistance in the central mountainous area which began about January 17. That deterioration has absorbed the bulk of the United States 1st and 34th Divisions, which formations had originally been pushed forward to provide general reserves and to permit us to attack from the line which we were then holding.

"You would have been impressed could you have seen the magnificent display everywhere by the American enlisted men. I assure you that the troops that come out of this campaign are going to be battle-wise and tactically efficient."

There were considerable tank losses on both sides. The enemy was able to maintain himself in his forward position for only two days before he recoiled under a concentrated attack by our ground forces, powerfully assisted by the entire Allied air forces in North Africa. The time had come for a co-ordinated Allied effort. The development of the plan is succinctly stated in General Eisenhower's radio on March 11th :

"Our own plans contemplate a rising scale of offensive operations and it will be the role of the II Corps to draw off all possible strength (enemy) from the south so as to help

General Montgomery's Eighth Army through the Mareth Gap. Once we have the Eighth Army through that bottleneck, this campaign is going to assume rapidly a very definite form with constant pressure and drive kept up against the enemy throughout the region."

The Last Phase Opens

The last phase of the Battle of Tunisia opened on the evening of March 20, when the Western Desert Air Force in rear of the British Eighth Army (including the 9th United States Air Force under General Bererton) launched an air offensive with continuous 24-hour bombing of the Axis positions and installations in the Mareth area, surpassing the intensity of any previous preparations since the capture of the El Alamein position. The Eighth Army attacked and secured a bridgehead through the minefields in the north, while the New Zealand Corps flanked the Mareth Line to the south. Co-ordinated pressure by the British First Army, the French, and the American II Corps under General Patton against the Axis bridgehead served to divert the enemy effort from the south. His position gradually crumpled and finally on April 7 patrols of the 9th Division, advancing southeast from Gafsa, made contact with units of the Eighth Army 20 miles inland from the coast.

Rommel's columns were unable to make a stand at Sousse. He therefore fell back to a prepared and final position through Enfidaville.

Enemy Air Power Shattered

The air attacks of this period provided a classic example of strategic and tactical use of air power. Allied air forces over a long period of time had studied every aspect of the enemy air transport activity across the Sicilian

Straits. They awaited the moment to catch a maximum concentration of transport aircraft on the Tunisian or Sicilian fields and to strike when the enemy was in greatest need of this air transport service. On April 5 the opportunity developed, and air attacks of consistent intensity were launched on the airdromes of Sicily and Tunisia, resulting in the destruction of over 150 enemy airplanes on the ground and 50 more shot down in the air; Axis ports and shipping were also heavily attacked. The suddenness of this complete and violent rupture of Axis communications with their Tunisian forces undoubtedly came as a surprise and precipitated the collapse of the German and Italian forces.

The advance of the British Eighth Army up the coast pinched out the II Corps, which was withdrawn and started on an extremely difficult movement across the rear of the British First Army to reappear on the left flank of the Allied forces. General Patton was withdrawn in order to go ahead with the plans for the expedition to Sicily, and Major-General (now Lieutenant-General) Omar N. Bradley, who had been his deputy, assumed command.

Armored Outfits Launch Attack

By April 20 the II Corps was attacking across the mountainous terrain north of Medjez-el-Bab, clearing the way for an armored thrust into the Tine River valley, which resulted in the fracture of the Axis position. On May 3 the 1st Armored Division broke through in a powerful thrust that carried it into Mateur, only 20 miles in an air line from Bizerta. The time was ripe for the final blow.

General Eisenhower, on May 5, reported:

"Tomorrow morning we start the big drive which we hope and

believe will see us in Tunisia in a day or so. I believe we can clear up the Bizerta angle very quickly, but the Bon Peninsula may be a difficult matter."

British armored units had concentrated between Medjez-el-Bab and Pont du Fahs in preparation for the drive down the Medjerda Corridor. After two days of bitter infantry fighting this armored force on May 7 struck through the gaps secured by the British infantry and artillery, and drove without check into the outskirts of Tunis. The II Corps exploited its initial gains, advancing north of Garaet-Achkeland Lac de Bizerte.

Meanwhile, British forces poured through their initial gap, widening the split between the Axis forces defending the Cape Bon Peninsula and those trapped between Tunis and Bizerta. The latter force surrendered on May

9. Other hostile troops to the south had been withdrawn to the dangerous refuge of Cape Bon under heavy pressure from the British Eighth Army and the French XIX Corps under General Louis Marie Koeltz. Two British armored divisions brushed aside the remnants of Axis armor south of Tunis and drove directly against the base of the Cape Bon Peninsula on May 10, shattering the last resistance of the enemy.

Some 252,415 German and Italian troops and a large amount of equipment were surrendered. This completed the conquest of the African continent and placed the United Nations in

a position to launch more direct attacks on the southern face of the European Fortress. The Mediterranean was again open to Allied shipping, which, by shortening the turn-around of vessels, in effect meant an immediate increase of shipping equivalent to some 240 vessels.

French Troops Penetrate Line

A French Army had been reborn, celebrating its birthday by the capture of 48,719 prisoners following a deep penetration of the enemy's position. American troops had demonstrated their battle efficiency and had gained a wealth of experience which could be disseminated throughout the Army. Allied air forces had successfully demonstrated a technique involving effective co-ordination with ground forces and the strategic application of air power. Unity of

The Chief of Staff's report is an excellent medium for instilling in troops serving in this Theater:

- (a) Confidence in the command.
- (b) Pride in service and a sense of personal participation.
- (c) Knowledge of the causes and progress of the war.
- (d) A better understanding of our allies.
- (e) An interest in current events and their relation to the war and the establishment of the peace.

Allied effort, command and staff had been demonstrated to the world in a most convincing manner as evidence of the growing concentration of power which will sweep the enemy out of control of the European continent.

SUMMARY

First American convoy reached North Ireland in January, 1942. American Flying Fortresses joined the Battle over Europe. Plans for the North African invasion are completed. We landed November 8. Diplomats, Army and civilians, cleared the way. Tunis falls.

Von Kessler counter-attacks. Enemy's air power knocked out. The final drive and the surrender at Cape Bon.

Q. What is the basic difference between American and British heavy bombers?

Q. What were some of the American Divisions which took part in the first African landings. In the later fighting?

Q. What part was played by the British Army? The French Army of General de Gaulle?

PART III

GENERAL REVIEW

Reviewing briefly the military situation as we found it on July 1, 1943, it will be remembered that our entry into war was marked by a succession of serious reverses, at Pearl Harbor, in the Philippines and through the Malaysian Archipelago. With our Pacific Fleet crippled and the Philippines overwhelmed at the outset, we were forced to watch the enemy progressively engulf our resistance to his advances. One year before the German offensive in Russia was sweeping through the Donetz Basin, jeopardizing the whole of south Russia and the Caucasus, and ominously menacing the Allied positions in the Middle East, particularly the oil supply

at Abadan, on which the naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and Australia depended. Rommel's Afrika Korps with selected Italian troops had the British with their backs to Cairo, threatening the lifeline of the British Empire. Our successes in the Coral Sea and at Midway and the repulse of the Japanese forces in the Aleutians had not prevented the Japanese from carving out a vast empire from which they threatened

India, Australia and our position in the Pacific. Just a year before also the ability of the United States to transport its power in supplies, munitions and troops across the Atlantic was being challenged by submarines, which in a single month had sunk 700,000 gross tons of shipping.

July 1, 1943, found the United States Army and Navy united in purpose and in operation, a unity shared when the occasion demands by the British Commonwealth of Nations, the Chinese, Dutch, French and other fighting elements among our friends and supporters. Across the Atlantic the enemy had been driven from North Africa, and Europe had been encircled



THE THREE COMMANDS

by a constantly growing military power. The Russian Army, engaging two-thirds of the German ground forces and one-third of the German air fleet in deadly and exhausting combat, had dispelled the legend of the invincibility of the German Panzer divisions.

CONCLUSION

Organization

During the past two years the enlisted strength of the Army has been

increased by five million men; the officer corps has grown from 93,000 to 521,000. Included in these figures is the development of an air force of 182,000 officers and 1,906,000 men. Expansion as to time and numbers, having in mind the technical requirements of modern warfare, has been without precedent. For example, the expansion of the service units for the Army Air Forces has been approximately 12,000 percent, and that of the air forces proper about 3,500 percent. The Corps of Engineers has been increased by 4,000 percent.

This tremendous expansion required a fundamental reorientation of the conduct of the War Department and its methods of doing business.

Early in 1942, a committee headed by Major General (now Lieutenant General) Joseph T. McNarney completed the plan which established three great commands under the direct supervision of the Chief of Staff—the Army Air Forces, the Army Ground Forces and the Services of Supply (later designated as the Army Service Forces). The proposed reorganization was approved by the President and the Secretary of War and made effective March 9, 1942.

Decentralization of authority was an imperative requirement for the tremendous war expansion, which could not otherwise have been achieved without confusion, inefficiency and the delays inherent in the transformation from a small peacetime army to the present vast organization.

Logistics a Matter of Supply


The Army Service Forces are charged primarily with logistical matters which include the supply, equipping and movement of troops at home and overseas; food, clothing, equipment, ammunition, medical service, motor, rail and ship transportation; records of

personnel, and mail service. Under the present War Department organization many matters pertaining to morale, such as movies, educational programs, and newspapers, are also included within the supervision of the service command. Global war has introduced lines of communications encircling the earth (a rough check indicates that present protected supply lines extend over 56,000 miles). It has made necessary harbor improvements with depots and railroad management, as in the Persian Gulf for the transportation of supplies to Russia, and in the region of the Suez Canal and the Red Sea. It has required construction of bases in Australia and throughout the Pacific and bases at Karachi and Calcutta on the west and east coasts of India; pipelines and pumping plants to facilitate movement of gasoline, and a multiplicity of requirements to support our fighting forces and permit them to devote their undivided attention to the enemy. All these matters are involved in the logistical problem for the Army in this war.

The requirements of logistics are seldom understood. The burdens they impose on the responsible military authorities are rarely appreciated. The conflicting demands of our theater commanders, of Allied sovereign powers and of the home front, pose difficulties never before approximated in war. The necessity for a high degree of efficiency in management is evident and it has been found in the co-ordination of all the various supplies and administrative departments of the Army, under the command and leadership of Lieutenant General Brehon Somervell.

The vital importance of adequate training in the technical warfare of today is evident. Such training involves not only the basic elements of military science, but their co-ordination

ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY



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into teamwork involving the platoon, company, battalion, and regiment, and later, combined training of the various arms into divisions and army corps capable of a sustained and co-ordinated effort on the battlefield. The organization of training centers, expansion of our school system, the activation of new units, the development of training doctrines, and the conduct of maneuvers, have been the primary responsibility of the Army Ground Forces which, under the command of Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, has achieved remarkable results that today are paying heavy dividends on the battlefield.

Another factor is now operating to our advantage. We are reaching the end of the expansion; already it has been possible to reduce many training installations to a purely maintenance basis to furnish replacements for the present strength of the Army. It also has been practicable, and it is highly desirable, to lengthen the basic training period for soldiers and to extend the period of training for officer candidates; and most important of all, it is no longer necessary to drain units of their best officers and men to furnish trained cadres for new organizations or students for the officer candidate and technical schools.

Air Forces

The problems and accomplishments of the Army Air Forces during this emergency are so colossal in scope that the story can be properly told by their Chief, General H. H. Arnold. The outstanding feature to date of America's war effort has been the manner in which our air forces have carried the war, in its most devastating form, to the enemy. Limited by appropriations prior to the emergency, we have, in a remarkably short time, been able to produce combat airplanes

which have matched or surpassed those of other nations. The high degree of technical proficiency necessary to operate military airplanes in combat has been secured by a complex but remarkably efficient training program.

The Army Air Forces are now attacking the enemy on 10 different fronts throughout the world. Their victories wherever they come in contact with the enemy testify to the gallantry and skill of pilots and crews, to the mechanical efficiency of planes, and to the leadership of General Arnold and the fighting commanders of the air forces in the field, Kenney in New Guinea, Twining in the Solomons, Hale in Hawaii, Spaatz, Brereton and Doolittle in Africa, Eaker in England, Butler in Alaska, Bissell in India, and Chennault with his unique contribution in China.

The development of the powerful war army of today could not have been approximated without the determined leadership of the Constitutional Commander-in-Chief, and the wisdom and firm integrity of purpose of the Secretary of War. It has been dependent upon vast appropriations and the strong support of the Congress, and the co-operation of numerous government agencies. Individuals, civilian organizations—patriotic and commercial—all have given strong support to the Army program. Outstanding has been the courageous acceptance of sacrifice by the families of those men who have already fallen in the struggle.

The end is not yet clearly in sight but victory is certain. In every emergency the courage, initiative, and spirit of our soldiers and their young leaders and of our pilots and their crews have been an inspiration at the moment, and a complete assurance of the final victory to come.

Preparation

THERE has been an increasing demand in recent weeks from discussion leaders to have ARMY TALKS supply them with facts, and more facts. "You give us the facts and we will take care of the rest" is an almost exact quotation of the opinion expressed. It is with this thought that the present issue of ARMY TALKS is presented, coupled with the reflection that nowhere will we find a more authoritative statement of America's share in the war than in General Marshall's report. It is a careful and liberal gathering of the facts.

The original report, available to anyone interested, was compressed into its present form with an eye on the interests of the soldier in the European Theater. At best, historical accounts are not the easiest material with which to stimulate discussion, but they are the best means of getting at the evidence, of giving the material on which to build discussion.

Wherever we are located and whatever we are doing it is difficult to keep an accurate and a constant over-all view of the whole war effort. It is as hard for the soldier stationed in New York and in Tunisia as it is for the soldier stationed in England. Possibly the main value, as it is the main purpose of this issue, aside from an accounting of the stages of various operations, is to let us all glimpse the over-view and relate the incidents into a close-knit whole. Such a picture demands much of the discussion leader. Since the incidents described are finished and much of the history is closed, the discussion leader must bring the episodes back to life to the best of his ability.

1. Secure a black board, if possible, and if not a large piece of cardboard.
2. Write an outline of the topics to be considered in such a way as to be easily visible to the group, as follows:—

I. War Declared.

- A. Attack on Pearl Harbor, Dec. 7, 1941.
 1. Strengthening Hawaiian defences.
 2. Organization of convoy routes to Hawaii.
- B. General MacArthur took up command in Australia of Southwest Pacific Area, Feb., 1942.
- C. Losses of Bataan, April 9, 1942; and Corregidor, May 6, 1942.
 1. Causes of Japan's initial successes.
 2. Effects of American bombing of Japan.
- D. Battles of Coral Sea, May 7-11, 1942; and Midway, June 4, 1942.

II. The Solomons.

- A. Operations against Guadalcanal.
- B. Clearing of Northeast coast of New Guinea, 1943.

III. The European Theater.

- A. Strengthening of air and sea communications.
- B. Development of bases in Newfoundland, Greenland, Iceland and United Kingdom.
 1. American garrisons completely relieved British in Iceland, Summer, 1942.
 2. Shipping needed for European troop movements diverted to Pacific; 25,000 troops sent to Australia.
- C. Jan., 1942, first convoy of American troops sent to Northern Ireland.
- D. Strong American air force established in U.K.
- E. European Theater of Operations established June, 1942, and American air force assault on continent began July 4, 1942.

IV. North African Theater

- A. Three task forces under command of General Eisenhower carried out attack on North Africa at Morocco, Oran and Algiers, the entire force consisting of 107,000 men.
1. Landings made Nov. 8, 1942.
 2. Ports and airfields under control within 48 hours.
- B. Military Cooperation with French facilitated operations in North Africa, combined with diplomatic negotiations between General de Gaulle, General Giraud, and American and British authorities.
1. Political crisis created by assassination of Admiral Darlan.
 2. General Giraud made Darlan's successor.
- C. With great air support the final stages of Battle of Tunisia began in March, 1943.
1. Combined operations of British Eighth Army, our U.S. II Corps, the R.A.F. and American Northwest African Air Force forced final decision and capitulation at Cape Bon Peninsula, May 10, 1943.
 2. 252,415 German and Italian prisoners and much equipment taken.
- D. Outcome:
1. Mediterranean opened.
 2. United Nations placed in position to attack Europe.
 3. Fighting French Army re-created.

3. If possible get the complete report of the Chief of Staff in which are a number of maps and charts that could be used and worked in with the outline. Three especially good ones are: Solomon Islands Area, French Northwest Africa, and Final Break Through to Tunis and Bizerta. Special Service will be glad to provide the report in limited numbers.

QUESTIONS FOR THE DISCUSSION

Pacific Theater

Q. Why was Japanese aggression in the Pacific so frequently termed suicidal by Americans? Was it carried out without careful deliberation, or was it the result of a carefully laid plan? Has it proved so far beneficial or suicidal to the Japanese? Who have proved the losers in this vast battle area to date? pp. 4-7. What force has distinguished itself in the bitter fighting at Bataan, Corregidor, and Midway?

European Theater

Q. What were the original motives in bringing American troops to the European theater? Have they been followed? Were American precision bombers built for this theater to co-operate with R.A.F. night bombers? Has the European force yet moved in to the action for which it is intended? To what extent? How successfully?

African Theater

Q. Could the African campaign have been conducted without a European Theater? Of what importance to us is the African campaign? Why was it fought before an attack on Continental Europe? Could not the Continent have been invaded separately and before an African campaign? Without an African campaign? pp. 8-12. Of what advantage to us as soldiers can the fighting experience of the U.S. II Corps prove? Some? None? Much? pp. 13-14.

As the history outlined in this issue of ARMY TALKS comes alive in your mind, what connection can you make between the efforts and gallantry and losses described and the five points listed on page 14?

The Topic for the next issue of ARMY TALKS will be U.S. Foreign Policy. For extra copies of ARMY TALKS, see your Special Service Officer.