

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
APO 442

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THE JAPANESE PLANS FOR THE DEFENSE OF KYUSHU


By the end of July 1945, sufficient information was available for the G-2 to make a preliminary estimate of the enemy strength in KYUSHU. In the Sixth Army G-2 estimate for the OLYMPIC operation, dated 1 August 1945, it was estimated that 421,000 Japanese troops were on KYUSHU, comprising nine divisions (or division-equivalents), plus a large number of base and service troops, and naval personnel. Subsequent information, obtained prior to the end of the war, including new identifications and estimated reinforcements, raised the estimated total to 680,000, including fourteen divisions (or equivalents). This figure was reached just prior to the end of the war.

Information secured since the occupation of JAPAN reveals that the overall total strength on KYUSHU of Japanese units of all services and types as of the final day of hostilities totaled approximately 735,000, including fourteen divisions and seven independent mixed brigades. However, this total includes units on the islands off-lying KYUSHU, which were not included in the Sixth Army estimate of the situation. Strength on these islands totaled approximately 25,000 and included three independent mixed brigades. Thus, the Sixth Army, 1 August, estimate was based on information procured in May, June, and July, and full allowance was made for large scale reinforcement, while the projected (but never published) revised estimate with complete information was 96% accurate. The discrepancy in 1 August estimate was largely caused by the underestimation of naval ground troops, whose number was greatly swelled by recruits undergoing boot training and by crews from ships which had been immobilized by allied attacks, and from troop units in transit.

The Japanese expected our invasion of the home islands, they expected it to be made during or after October 1945, they expected it to be made in southern KYUSHU, and that our landings would be made on the beaches of MIYAZAKI, ARIAKE-WAN and SATSUMA PENINSULA. Their available combat forces had been deployed according to these expectations, with reserves being strengthened when hostilities ceased.

Allied convoys approaching KYUSHU would have received mass suicide attacks by every available plane in the KYUSHU area. Transports would have been the main targets of these attacks, and the Japanese expected to destroy 10% in this manner. Offshore, the landing forces would have been hit by large numbers of small suicide craft and submarines, and the Japanese expected to destroy 60 transports by these means.

Once a landing or landings were made, a decisive stand would have been initiated. Placing much stress on artillery, and having three tank brigades, one independent tank company, one independent regiment, and four self-propelled gun battalions to support division troops in their operations, the Japanese forces planned to make a final stand near the beaches and units were instructed to remain in place until annihilated. Heavy counter-offensives in the beach areas were planned and little preparation was made for defense in depth.


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I. INFORMATION AS PREPARED BY MEMBERS OF THE STAFF OF THE JAPANESE SECOND GENERAL ARMY:

The following information on the defense of KYUSHU was obtained as the result of a directive sent to the Japanese Second Demobilization Headquarters (formerly the Japanese Second General Army). The Japanese Second Demobilization Headquarters was directed to submit accurate and complete information on the nature and extent of the Japanese preparations for the defense of KYUSHU at the time of the surrender, such information to be obtained exhaustively from all sources, including when necessary the memory of subordinate unit commanders and staff officers. Slight changes have been made in the grammar and wording of the Japanese answers in order to make a clearer text. No changes were made in content.

GENERAL:

1. Q. Were Allied landings on KYUSHU anticipated? If so, when, where and in what strength?

A. The landing of the Allied Forces on KYUSHU was anticipated. Allied strength was estimated at 300,000, and three areas in southern KYUSHU (namely the MIYAZAKI, ARIAKE BAY and SATSUMA PENINSULA areas, where landing would be enforced either simultaneously or in succession) were designated as points of landing, the time of which was predicted to be during Autumn (October) or later.

2. Q. What intelligence of Allied intents did the Japanese High Command possess? Specifically what was known and what was the source of this knowledge? Prisoners of war? Captured documents? Special operatives? Aerial reconnaissance and photography?

A. Various strategic information for judging Allied intents were controlled by the Imperial Headquarters, and from this information deductions were made and issued to armies under direct control. The Second General Army directed its efforts towards gaining intelligence of the military tactics involved in the minute details of the landing points, dates and strength of the Allied Forces based on the strategic deductions of the Imperial Headquarters. The methods for gaining this intelligence were: movement of controlled planes (reconnaissance and photography); observation of frequency and direction of U. S. bombing and reconnaissance within army area in the form of statistics; and study of movement of task forces and of the development of international affairs, especially that of American public opinion (through radio reception). The main points of issue in the handling of information were: The problem whether the Allied Forces would conduct operations on the CHINA coast prior to their landing on the home islands, or whether SAISHU-TO and southern KOREA would be used as intermediary battle points when the home islands were attacked directly. However, mainly due to the progress of the PHILLIPINE and OKINAWA campaigns, the conclusion as mentioned before, that the southern part of KYUSHU would be the first landing area, was reached.

3. Q. Was it supposed that the Allied landings on KYUSHU were to constitute the main effort against the Japanese homeland or to be preliminary to larger efforts elsewhere?

A. The Allied landings on KYUSHU were reasoned as preliminary tactics to the main operations against the KANTO area.

4. Q. Was it supposed that the Allied landings on KYUSHU would precede, follow, or occur simultaneously with landings on the CHINA coast?

A. The landings on KYUSHU were judged as taking place prior to the operations on the CHINA coast. Judging from the landing dates and reserve strength of the Allied Forces, it was thought impossible for the CHINA and Japanese HOME ISLAND operations to be conducted simultaneously, while the American strategic situation apparently lacked the need for conducting operations in CHINA, only resorting to

said tactics for political effects.

5. Q. At what time, if at all, was it anticipated that FORMOSA would be by-passed?

A. Operations against TAIWAN (FORMOSA) were thought very improbable after the OKINAWA operations.

6. Q. Did the operations of Admiral Halsey's Task Force at all disturb the belief of the High Command that KYUSHU would be the first homeland island to be attacked?

A. The operations of Admiral Halsey's Task Force did not in the least disturb the conviction that Southern KYUSHU would receive the first attack of the home islands group.

Japanese Troop Strength, Identity and Dispositions:

7. Q. What was the identity, history, strength and disposition of the KYUSHU garrisons prior to the arrival of reinforcements sent in because of the anticipated imminence of invasion?

A.

16 Army (area army)	Controlled all army units in KYUSHU from FUKUOKA.
56 Army (corps)	Controlled units in northern KYUSHU from IIZUKA.
145 Div	(17,685 persons) Organized summer 1944; in charge of defense in area between KOKURA and FUKUOKA.
57 Army (corps)	Directed units in southern KYUSHU from TAKARABE.
86 Div	(20,614 persons) Organized summer 1944; in charge of defense of entire ARIAKE BAY area.
156 Div	(17,429 persons) Organized summer 1944; in charge of defense of MIYAZAKI area.
98 IIB	(5,638 persons) Organized from engineering units of UCHIGAURA FORTIFICATION, ARIAKE BAY, and given to defense of OSUMI PENINSULA.
TANEGASHIMA GARRISON	Composed of three infantry battalions for defense of TANEGASHIMA ISLAND

(KURUME DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS

(KUMAMOTO DIVISIONAL HEADQUARTERS

Both organized about February, 1945, from remaining divisions at KURUME and KUMAMOTO. Units engaged mainly in instruction, training and recruitment.

IKI FORTIFICATION	} Each ordered to reorganize former fortification units into battle array.
TSUSHIMA FORTIFICATION	
SHIMONOSEKI FORTIFICATION	
HOYO FORTIFICATION	
NAGASAKI FORTIFICATION	

107 IIB Defense of GOTO, NAGASAKI PREFECTURE; headquarters at FUKUE-DHO.

WESTERN TAKATOKI GROUP (21, 425 persons) In charge of air raid defense of entire KYUSHU area; headquarters at KOKURA.

8. Q. What was the identity, history, strength and disposition of troop reinforcements brought into KYUSHU between 1 May 1945 and 12 August 1945?

A.

(A) Reinforcements under 56 Army (corps) (Northern KYUSHU)

57 Div (20,429 persons)

Unit transferred from MANCHURIA primarily for defense of FUKUOKA area, later interchanging with 351 Div after the latter's formation, and concentrating as reserves for area army strategy.

351 Div (12,215 persons)

Newly organized in June 1945, interchanging defense duty with 57 Div (mentioned above). Headquarters at FUKUMA, FUKUOKA PREFECTURE.

312 Div (12,227 persons)

Organized simultaneously with 351 Div, and undertook defense of KARATSU, INARI area. Headquarters at AICHI-CHO, SAGA PREFECTURE.

4 ITB (3,103 persons)

Newly organized, and under direct army control. Headquarters at FUKUMA-CHO, FUKUOKA PREFECTURE.

6th ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS (119 persons)

Newly organized. Located at HARA-MACHI, MIIKE-GUN, FUKUOKA PREFECTURE.

(B) Reinforcements under 57 Army (corps). 57 Army formerly controlled the entire area of southern KYUSHU, but after the imminence of Allied invasion, the area east of OSUMI PENINSULA (inclusive) of southern KYUSHU was designated.

25 Div (25,804 persons)

Unit transferred from MANCHURIA, concentrated near KOBAYASHI, MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE, and trained as reserves for defense of southern KYUSHU.

154 Div (17,341 persons)

Newly organized unit, garrisoned north of 156 Div on coast of MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE. Headquarters at Tsuma-cho, MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE.

212 Div (21,351 persons)

Newly organized as an attacking force, and concentrated in northern plains area of MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE. Part of the unit was stationed north of 156 Div on the MIYAZAKI coastline. Headquarters at TONO-CHO, MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE.

109 IMB (6,888 persons)

Reorganized from TANEGASHIMA GARRISON. Reinforced to total one artillery and six infantry battalions.

5 ITB (3,108 persons)

6 ITB (3,784 persons)

Newly organized to meet decisive battle in southern KYUSHU. 5 ITB was located at HONJO-CHO, MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE. 6 ITB was located at KIRISHIMA, KAGOSHIMA PREFECTURE.

FIRST ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS (117 persons)

Newly organized, and located at TSOUMACHI, MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE.

THIRD ENGINEERING HEADQUARTERS (167 persons)

Newly organized, and located at TAKARABE-CHO, MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE.

(C) Reinforcements under 40 Army (corps)

The 40th Army headquarters was newly transferred from FORMOSA and given command of the western half of southern KYUSHU. Headquarters located at IJUIN-CHO, KAGOSHIMA PREFECTURE.

146 Div

Withdrew from 57th Army, retaining former status, and entered jurisdiction of 40 A.

77 Div (15,640 persons)

Newly transferred from HOKKAIDO, and first placed in the area between KUSHIKINO and IZUMI. Later interchanged garrisons with 303 Div, after the latter's formation, and concentrated near KAJIKI and KAGOSHIMA PREFECTURE as strategic reserves. Headquarters formerly at SENDAI.

206 Div (21,354 persons)

Newly organized at decisive battle corps, and entrenched for the main part on the western coast of SATSUMA PENINSULA. Headquarters at IZAKU-MACHI.

303 Div (12,213 persons)

Newly organized, and interchanged garrisons with 77 Div. Headquarters at SENDAI city.

125 IMB (6,826 persons)

Newly organized, and encamped on coast at entrance to KAGOSHIMA BAY, SATSUMA PENINSULA. Headquarters at IKEDA.

FOURTH ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS (117 persons)

Newly organized.

(D) THE CHIKUGO GROUP

Invested strategic office to the former KURUME DIVISION, and was placed in charge of entire NAGASAKI PREFECTURE and parts of SAGA, FUKUOKA and OITA PREFECTURES.

118 IMB (7,104 persons)

Reorganized from former HOYO FORTIFICATION, forming a mixed brigade.

122 IMB (6,884 persons)

Reorganized from former NAGASAKI FORTIFICATION, forming a mixed brigade.

(E) THE HIGO GROUP

Invested strategic office to the former KUMAMOTO DIVISION, and was

placed in charge of entire KUMAMOTO PREFECTURE and part of OITA PREFECTURE.

216 Div (21,736 persons)

Newly organized as decisive battle force. During training in vicinity of KUMAMOTO, held as reserves by area army. Headquarters at UDO-CHO.

126 IAB (6,213 persons)

Newly organized. Ordered to guard AMAKUSA ISLAND.

11th ENGINEERING HEADQUARTERS (103 persons)

Newly organized, and situated at NAGASU-CHO, KUMAMOTO PREFECTURE.

(F) 4 AA Div (21,415 persons)

Reorganized from former SEIBU ANTI-AIRCRAFT GROUP. Headquarters at TSUKUSHI, FUKUOKA PREFECTURE.

(G) THIRD COMMUNICATION HEADQUARTERS (2388 persons)

Newly organized under direct control of area army.

9. Q. What was the identity, history, strength and disposition of Japanese troops of all services on KYUSHU at the time of the surrender? In southern KYUSHU?

A. (See annex A, with attached map.)

10. Q. Had the reinforcement of KYUSHU troop strength been completed at the time of surrender, or was further reinforcement contemplated? Of southern KYUSHU troop strength?

A. At the time of surrender, scheduled plans for enlarging strength in the KYUSHU area were completed, especially in southern KYUSHU area, where it was quickly accomplished. After that, strengthening of reserves was being planned.

11. Q. Precisely what use would have been made of Home Defense Units and of Peoples' Volunteer Corps in the event of Allied landing? Would the Peoples' Volunteer Corps have been organized into Combat Corps?

A. (A) The Peoples' Volunteer Corps would have been appointed for traffic, communication, supply, transportation and other rear area duties. (At the time of Allied landing Home Defense Units did not exist.)

(B) When the Allied landing date became more imminent, the peoples' Volunteer Corps would have been organized into Combat Corps.

AIR DEFENSE:

12. Q. How many combat-type planes would have been committed to the attack on amphibious units of the Allied landing forces, how would these have been employed (that is, in kamikaze, high and low level bombing, dive-bombing, torpedo bombing, or baka-launching tactics), and what percent would have been held in reserve for use against later invasion forces?

A. The number of bombers which would have been employed to attack Allied landing units was about 800, of which most were special attack types (kamikaze). Storming planes, bombers and fighters would have been ultimately transformed into crash-landing planes. They would have been used for dive-bombing (blasting) from midair (altitude 1,000 to 2,000 meters), while bombing altitude would be lower than 200 meters. Reserves against later invasion forces were almost all units in KOREA and the KANTO area, about 70 percent against the above 800 planes.

13. Q. How much confidence did the High Command have in the ability of its air force to repel or thwart the Allied invasion? Was it expected that Allied troops in large force would succeed in getting ashore?

A. (A) We expected that the Air Force could render a 10 percent damage against the imminence and repulse of the Allied invasion.

(B) We expected that Allied troops in large numbers would succeed in getting ashore; so we planned a decisive battle on land near the seashore.

14. & 14a. Q. What was the capacity of the airfields and airfield facilities serving the KYUSHU area on 1 August? How many assault waves were contemplated, at what intervals of time, for what length of time, and how many planes could be maintained aloft per wave? What percentage of loss was expected?

Q. At what time would the main weight of the aerial attack have been brought to bear: when the Allied amphibious forces were still well off-shore, or when these were concentrated in landing areas?

A. The main point of our air attack was to defeat the Allied forces on the sea; therefore we laid stress on the amphibious troops at sea and on anchored positions. On the 1st of August, about twenty airfields were available in the KYUSHU area; the capacity could serve almost all of the 800 planes indicated in answer no. 12.

The first assault wave, it was planned, would attack from all areas at the same time if possible; intervals of time, number of planes and length of time, etc., of later attacks were under the command of attack commanders (flight group commandants). We expected that we would have from thirty to forty percent damage, but that half of the bombers would succeed. Efforts were directed to that effect.

15. Q. How seriously had Allied bombing curtailed the capacity of the airfield facilities serving the KYUSHU area, and what steps were taken to offset the damage to these fields and facilities in a pre-invasion step-up of aerial bombardment?

A. The capacity of the airfields in the KYUSHU area was not seriously set back by Allied aerial attack. We made it a principle measure against the aerial attacks to separate planes from airfields, and widely disperse them, as well as to keep them under complete cover. We made an effort to strengthen the capacity of anti-aircraft of airfields, utilizing all types of guns, including those mounted on planes; but this plan could not be accomplished to the expected extent due to various limitations.

16. Q. In the aerial attack on the Allied amphibious units, what types of craft would have had target priority?

A. The main point of our aerial attack against the Allied amphibious forces was directed towards transport ships.

17. Q. What percent of combat-type planes would have been reserved for use in support of Japanese ground forces?

A. We did not in the least expect the direct cooperation of our fighter planes with the Japanese ground forces.

18. Q. Would any use have been made of parachute troops or of crash-landing raids in the event of Allied landings on KYUSHU?

A. We did not plan to use parachute troops at the time of Allied landing, but we made crash-landing attacks of all planes the main tactics.

NAVAL DEFENSE:

19. Q. Which waters off KYUSHU were mined? How and to what extent?

Which waters off KYUSHU were earmarked for future mining?

A. The mined waters off KYUSHU are shown in the attached sheet, and these are all completed. (see ANNEX B). Future plans were to lay thousands of small mines along the coasts of KAGOSHIMA and MIYAZAKI against Allied amphibious forces.

20. Q. Were any Fleet units available for and intended for intervention in the Allied amphibious movement to KYUSHU? If so, what kind (carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines), how many, and how were they to be employed?

A. We had intended to interdict the Allied amphibious movement to KYUSHU, but no powerful fleet units were available. The tactics of our fleet for this purpose were as follows:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>How to be employed</u>
Destroyer	12	Carrying suicide torpedoes to attack transports off the landing coast.
Submarine	40	(a) Patrolling the waters east and south of KYUSHU by low speed submarines. (b) Attacking the convoys by high speed submarines. (c) Attacking the reinforcement at sea by large submarines.

21. Q. Were any small PT-type craft, assault demolition boats, midget submarines, or 1-man "human" torpedoes committed to the defense of KYUSHU? If so, where were the principal concentrations of these, how and with expectations of what kind of success were these to be used?

A. Small boats to be committed to the defense of KYUSHU were as follows:

<u>Type</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>How to be employed</u>
PT-type craft	none	
Assault demolition boat	1000	Attacking transports by concentrating in the several coast ^s of MIYAZAKI and KAGOSHIMA Prefectures.
Midget submarine	30	
Human torpedo	50	
Small submarine	100	Attacking transports by running out of BUNGO STRAIT.

The expectation of success was to sink about 60 transports.

22. Q. Were amphibious brigades available and intended for counter-landings? How many? Where and when were the counter-landings to be made.

A. We had neither counter-landing intentions nor amphibious brigades.

23. Q. Had any ramps or catapults been set up for launching jet-propelled suicide planes or aerial bombs against Allied amphibious units?

A. (a) We had been selecting 10 places for the catapults of jet-propelled suicide planes in the northern district of KYUSHU and YAMAGUCHI PREFECTURE, but the construction had not yet begun.

(b) We have no ramps or launching slopes.

(c) Aerial bombs were under experiment, and not yet actually in use.

GROUND DEFENSE:

24. Q. Anti-tank tactics: What anti-tank tactics were contemplated? Armor? Tank traps? Close combat assault? Raiding parties? Ground mines? Shoulder-pack mines? Lunge mines? Bazooka-type launchers?

A. Anti-tank tactics: The main anti-tank tactics were close combat assault with various types of portable explosives (torpedo), while anti-tank armor, gunfire, tank traps and bazooka type launchers, etc., were expected to render secondary effect.

25. Q. Armor: How many armored units were available in KYUSHU for commitment to its defenses? In southern KYUSHU? How many tanks, and of what types, were available? In which areas would the tanks have been committed? In coordinated attack or in piecemeal fashion?

A. Armor:

(A) Tank units for the KYUSHU operations consisted of three brigades (4ITB, 5ITB, 6ITB), one regiment (46th ITR), one independent company and four self-mobile gun battalions.

(B) There were 275 tanks in southern KYUSHU (standard number), and composed for the main part of average-sized tanks, while light tanks and self-mobile guns were included.

(C) The areas used by tanks in southern KYUSHU were scheduled mainly in the MIYAZAKI and ARIAKE BAY areas. Strategy lay in direct cooperation with the infantry.

26. Q. Chemicals: Was any type of chemical warfare projected? Why not? Was any type of chemical warfare expected from the Allies? What preventative measures were taken?

A. Chemical warfare:

(A) We did not anticipate active chemical warfare to any degree.

(B) The reason why we did not use chemical warfare was that world confidence would have been lost and the great disparity between the capacity of American and Japanese chemical industry put us in a situation in which we could not hope to contest.

(C) We did not expect Allied chemical warfare, but in the final stages of the war, that is in the case where Allied forces would have been defeated at their first landing in the KYUSHU area, we judged that the Allied forces might have resorted to chemical warfare tactics.

(D) The army was well equipped against gas attack by the Allies with masks, suits, antiseptics, etc. in quantities, while the civilian population as a whole was hardly provided for, with no means of counteracting any large-scale warfare.

27. Q. Artillery: What role would the use of artillery have played in the defense of KYUSHU? Would more emphasis have been placed on it than in previous operations? Would it have been used against Allied amphibious units at any points? Where?

A. Artillery:

(A) The principle object in defending KYUSHU was to defeat the Allied landing forces near the shorelines. Therefore, in order to accomplish this purpose, we put great stress on artillery. According to the military experience gained in fighting on islands of the Pacific, especially that on the PHILIPPINE and OKINAWA islands, the use of superior artillery was absolutely necessary in order to crush the establishment of beach heads.

(B) We did not plan to use general artillery against Allied amphibious units.

28. Q. Coastal Guns: Where were the greatest concentrations of coastal guns located? Would these have withheld their fire in the interest of concealing their positions until Allied units concentrated in landing areas or would they have fired on the first vessel to come within range? Had the guns of any dismantled ships been emplaced to assume a coastal defense role?

A. Coastal guns:

(A) Areas where the most guns were situated on seashores for shooting landing units, men-of-war, and ships were the coast of MIYAZAKI and the front of ARIAKE BAY.

(B) Coastal guns were directed towards concentrations of Allied landing forces and at ships coming within firing range, greater stress being laid on the former. These gun positions were disposed to provide maximum defilade from naval gunfire, while protection from aerial attack was gained by concealment. The main object was to provide flanking fire on the landing beaches.

(C) Guns from battleships were converted for coastal defense (none on ordinary ships).

29. Q. Anti-aircraft: What was the total number of AA actually emplaced on KYUSHU by 1 August? Was it planned that some of these were to be committed in a ground defense role?

A. Anti-aircraft guns:

(A) All anti-aircraft guns in KYUSHU up to 1 August numbered 410.

(B) The total number of Army anti-aircraft artillery was so little that there was no plan designed for utilization in land defense. However, should the AA entrenchment area turn into a battlefield, it would naturally participate in ground warfare. Moreover, quite a number of naval high-angle anti-aircraft guns were used for coastal defense purposes in KYUSHU.

30. Q. Mines: Where had ground mines already been laid? Which further areas had been earmarked for mining, and under what circumstances would these have been mined? What kinds of mines were used, and how were they to be controlled?

A. Mines:

Mines were not used either on great scale or systematically for ground defense for the reasons given below. However, each unit carried mines on a small local scale (mainly for killing and wounding men and horses and as anti-tank weapon). There are three types of mines.

(A) The use of mines on a large systematic scale would have been rendered powerless beforehand by the overwhelming superiority of battleship and aerial bombardment of the Allied forces.

(B) Due to lack of gun powder and iron it was more profitable to produce portable blasting powder instead of mines.

TACTICS:

31. Q. a. Which of the following beach areas were considered most vulnerable to attack and which were best defended: (1) MIYAZAKI, (2) ARIAKE, (3) MAKURAZAKI, (4) KAGOSHIMA and (5) KUSHIKINO?

A. The MIYAZAKI coast, the front of ARIAKE BAY and the coastal area between KUSHIKINO and MAKURAZAKI were given equal consideration as mutual points of operation. However, the degree of defense at the date of surrender, owing to the time element, showed the ARIAKE BAY front to be first and the MIYAZAKI coast second in degree of readiness. (In the first part of October, the three district areas were scheduled to be

fortified to an equal degree.

Q. b. Was Allied entrance into KAGOSHIMA-BAY considered possible? Probable?

A. The possibility of Allied invasion into KAGOSHIMA BAY were perceived.

Q. c. Would a strong defense have been made on the beaches? If so, in what strength, with what tactics, and supported by what kind of fixed installations?

A. Powerful defense was established directly near coastal areas. One third to one fifth of the whole coastal defense strength was stationed along the beaches. The beach defenses were uniformly strong; where natural terrain features were advantageous for defense less troops were stationed, but poor defensive terrain was defended with greater strength. The principal fighting method and object of coastal stationed units was to persistently destroy the establishment of beach heads (airfields), and to enforce continuous counter-attacks in wave formation to attain the same. For this purpose fighting units would take their stand even to utter annihilation. Camps were basically established underground or in caves. Weapons were set up for last-ditch defense against allied fire and bombardment.

Q. d. How would the defense in the plains areas of southern KYUSHU have been conducted? With what type of support from the rugged interiors? How and around what installations was the defense of these plains areas to be organized?

A. The defense of plains area in southern KYUSHU was primarily to resist airborne troops (parachuters). There were no systematic plans for large scale coordinated defense of the plains. Fortifications on coast lines were stressed while areas behind were given to attack-proof fortification necessary for the concentration, deployment and fighting of strategic reserve units. (These fortifications were to protect the units from aerial and naval bombardment, also having tunnels to facilitate counterattacks). At the time of surrender, part of these fortifications had been completed.

Q. e. Would large scale counterattacks have been launched to drive the Allies off the island, or would these attacks have been small scale harassing and raiding attacks?

A. Large scale counterattack and transition to the offensive against Allied landing were contemplated.

Q. f. Would the strategy on southern KYUSHU have been designed to achieve delay or annihilation?

A. The action in southern KYUSHU was for the purpose of thorough annihilation.

Q. g. What use would have been made of cave and tunnel warfare? Where? How conducted? What preparations for such warfare had been completed at the time of surrender?

A. Cave and tunnel establishments were apportioned to bases for counterattack and offensive against Allied gun fire and bombardment, and meant to exist indefinitely. Consequently these establishments were at all points where Allied troops were expected to land. At the time of surrender, granting difference in district areas, sixty to ninety percent of these establishments had been completed.

Q. h. Would any KYUSHU cities have been strongly held in house-to-house defense?

A. In KYUSHU, no cities were prepared for house-to-house warfare.

Q. i. Would the southern KYUSHU forces have been committed to

defend to the death, in place, or had arrangements been made for their possible retreat?

A. All units in southern KYUSHU were given orders to defend to the death and retreat was not recognized as a possibility.

Q. j. What were the locations and strength of the main tactical reserves for defense of southern KYUSHU? If called upon, how much time would have been required to commit them to action?

A. Strategic reserve strength for southern KYUSHU operations were as follows:

Primary: 216 D (vicinity of KUMAMOTO)
25 D (vicinity of KOBAYASHI, MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE)
77 D (vicinity of KAGOSHIMA)
212 D (plains of northern MIYAZAKI)

Secondary: 57 D (southern area of FUKUOKA PREFECTURE)
145 D (northern KYUSHU)

Third: 231 D (YAMAGUCHI CITY)
230 D (NEU, HINO-GUN, TOTTORI PREFECTURE)
225 D (TATSUND, HYOGO PREFECTURE)

According to developments, the following were held in reserve:

205 D (OKATOYO-MURA, NAGAOKA-GUN, KOCHI PREFECTURE)
11 D (KOCHI CITY)

(The reserve strategic strength immediately available amounted to the above 11 divisions, but the transfer of from three to five divisions from the KANTO area was expected according to the Imperial Headquarters reserve strategy). The participation in warfare of the above strategic reserve forces would be enforced from those units in southern KYUSHU approximately within a week; in ten days in central KYUSHU and within two weeks in northern KYUSHU. (Concentration and maneuvers would be obviously conducted by marching under enemy aerial bombardment). (See annex C).

32. Q. Communications: To what extent had Allied bombing impeded railroad and highway communications on KYUSHU by 1 August? Was it assumed that communications between northern and southern KYUSHU would be effectively cut off by Allied aerial bombardment prior to the Allied invasion? Had supplies been stored accordingly? Was the use of by-passes, secondary routes, or over-water communications contemplated? Could reserves have been brought down from the north to the south?

A. (A) Land transportation status in KYUSHU up to about 1 August was as follows:

Due to Allied aerial bombardment, railroads in southern KYUSHU were almost entirely blocked both day and night while road transportation was greatly reduced during the day. In central and northern KYUSHU, both road and railroad systems were only partly damaged from these raids.

(B) We were convinced that the transportation between northern and southern KYUSHU would be fully intercepted due to aerial bombardment prior to the Allied landings.

(C) The plans for and actual work on building new roads joining northern and southern KYUSHU, together with regulation of sea transportation, were in progress.

(D) It was anticipated that the shifting of northern KYUSHU reserves to the south was probable.

HOSPITALS AND SUPPLY:

33. Q. a. In considering an Allied invasion of southern KYUSHU, what in general was the supply situation of the Japanese troops in southern KYUSHU? All of KYUSHU?

A. (A) Supply situation in southern and entire KYUSHU:

(1) In KYUSHU various Army supply depots which had been established in peacetime (under the direct control of the Minister of War), were reinforced in July of this year for field operations, and organized under the Commander of the Western Army Area Headquarters. The said Commander not only placed branch depots and agencies at different requisite points, but divided sections of supply depots other than ordnance, forming temporary field freight depots in each army area for the purposes of troop and supply concentration.

(2) In southern KYUSHU, branch ordnance supply depots and field freight depots were established at TAKARABE (57th Army), and KAGOSHIMA (40th Army), besides agencies and stationary groups at requisite points. Field freight depots had been posted since peacetime in various areas, temporarily formed from controlled agencies of supply depots, and were not fully organized at the time of surrender. Agencies and stationary groups remained at their former posts and engaged in concentration and supply. The locations of these branch and freight depots, etc., are as follows:

Ordnance Depot	
Branch Depot	TAKARABE, KAGOSHIMA
Stationary Group	HITROYOSHI
Clothing Depot	
Agency	KAGOSHIMA
Provisions Depot	
Agency	KAGOSHIMA
Stationary Group	MIYAKONOJO
Munitions Depot	
Agency	KAGOSHIMA
Medical Supplies Depot	
Agency	MIYAKONOJO KAGOSHIMA HITROYOSHI
Field Freight Depot	TAKARABE, KAGOSHIMA

(B) Status of concentration of military supplies in entire KYUSHU:

(a) Ammunition:

The projected amount (i. e., planned amount) of ammunition was for 12 division battles, of which 8 were scheduled for shore operations and 4 for reserve (a division battle is considered as 30 days of normal operations. The supply of ammunition for a division battle would be that amount equivalent to approximately enough for 10 days continuous battle, or the equivalent of 10 units of fire). Should circumstances necessitate the expectation of other operations in KYUSHU, enough ammunition for 8 division battles was to be transferred from HONSHU. Ammunition for coastal operations had been distributed to each Army and stored near the shore lines. Reserves were placed for the main part in southern KYUSHU.

Plans for the distribution of ammunition in KYUSHU is as of the attached list. (See Annex D).

(b) Fuel:

Projected amount of fuel for concentration was approximately 8,000 kilo-litres. The reserve amount was approximately 20,000 kilo-litres from Imperial Headquarters, to be retained in KYUSHU.

(c) Provisions:

One month's provisions for 2 million men and 80,000 horses were concentrated, while reserves for further operations in KYUSHU, namely, one month's provisions for 1 million men and 110,000 horses, were to be diverted from HONSHU.

(d) Medical supplies:

The projected amount was one month's supply for 6 million troops, of which enough for 4 million were supplied to each Army (corps) for coastal warfare, while supplies for 2 million were retained as reserves.

(e) Veterinary supplies:

The projected amount was one month's supply for 350,000 head, of which 200,000 were distributed to each Army (corps) for coastal warfare and 150,000 kept as reserves.

(c) Main ammunition concentrations in southern KYUSHU:

Concentration of ammunition in southern KYUSHU had priority from a strategic point of view, forming from 60 to 70 percent of the entire KYUSHU stock. Two-thirds of the munitions supply to each army (40th Army and 57th Army) were distributed to front line divisions and consequently dispersed among shore encampments, one-third being kept in reserve.

Operational reserve ammunition for the area army in southern KYUSHU was stored at HITOYOSHI and TAKARABE; enough for 2 division battles. Reserve supplies were to be used for offensive operations, while defense of landing areas would utilize the amount distributed to each division.

Q. b. What quantity of artillery, mortar, and small arms ammunition was available to the combat units charged with the defense of the landing beaches at (a) KUSHIKINO, (b) ARIAKE-WAN, (c) MIYAZAKI, and (d) SATSUMA PENINSULA? For how many days sustained combat?

A. (1) For the defensive battles at the landing coast, plans were to use ammunition concentrated along the coast besides that equipped for the unit (ammunition equipped for the unit means that ammunition which is a component part of the unit equipment). The quantity was as follows:

Ammunition equipped for units...for 0.2 battle

Concentrated ammunition

Vicinity of KUSHIKINO	0.5	division	battle.
Vicinity of ARIAKE-WAN	0.8	"	"
SATSUMA PENINSULA	0.9	"	"
Vicinity of MIYAZAKI	1.4	"	"

Each division was to have enough for 0.6 to 0.9 battles, including that equipped for the unit. The detailed quantity is unknown due to lack of records.

(2) The concentrated ammunition was supposedly the amount possible for the continuation of coastal defense battle for approxi-

mately one month; but through past experience, after taking into consideration the difficulty of supplement and the consumption of the concentrated ammunition in combat, it was decided that it was only enough for a battle duration of 2 weeks.

Q. c. There were the main ammunition dumps in southern KYUSHU? What method of transport was available to move the ammunition to the units engaged in battle?

A. (1) The principal ammunition concentration points in southern KYUSHU were the vicinities of TAKARABE, HONJO, TSUMA, MATSUYAMA, KAWABE, SENDAI, HITOYOSHI, and KOBAYASHI.

(2) The transportation of ammunition to the first line units was scheduled as follows:

a. To units engaged in combat, the principal means of transportation was by shoulder pack. Consequently, civilian combat corps and volunteer troops were to be used as supplying units.

b. To divisions supply points, transportation would have been carried out at night on animal backs and by shoulder packs.

c. It was judged that motor vehicle transportation was possible only in the rear zone and during the night.

Q. d. Were plans made to disperse supply dumps dug-in in the areas considered as possible battle fields? How much of this storage of supplies in the planned battle field areas had already been carried out by 15 August 1945?

A. All concentration of ordnance and ammunition in underground storage protected by fortifications from bombardment and battleship firing were 70 percent completed at the time of the ending of the war.

Q. e. Was it planned to bring additional supplies from northern KYUSHU, or possibly HONSHU, to the troops engaged in battle in southern KYUSHU, or were these troops to depend entirely on supplies previously stored in their battle areas?

A. All munitions necessary to carry out operations in southern KYUSHU were planned to be transferred from both northern KYUSHU and HONSHU. However, in KYUSHU a great portion of the Seibu Army (16th Area Army) munition allotments were distributed to southern KYUSHU with a view to minimizing the transfer of munitions after commencement of operations. The supplies to be transferred from HONSHU were mainly ammunition for 8 division battles and provisions for a strength of 1,000,000 men for one month.

Q. f. How long was it believed that the Japanese forces could continue effective resistance in KYUSHU from a supply standpoint?

A. The probable lengths of time for continued operation in KYUSHU viewed from the standpoint of replenishment of ordnance and ammunition were judged as follows:

(a) In event of possible replenishment from HONSHU
3 months.

(b) In the case of impossibility of replenishment from HONSHU2 months.

(c) The continuation of protracted warfare was judged possible by maintenance of northern KYUSHU mountain areas. For that reason a synthetic underground factory for ordnance and ammunition was under construction on the vicinity of HIDA.

Q. g. What was the main line or route of supply and evacuation for southern KYUSHU?

A. The main line or route of supply and evacuation for southern

KYUSHU is shown on the attached map. (See annex E).

Q. f. What was the capacity of hospital units for caring for wounded in southern KYUSHU? What was the plan for evacuation of wounded, and to what places?

A. The plans were that all military hospitals in KYUSHU, with a capacity of approximately 63,500 patients, were to receive the wounded soldiers of southern KYUSHU. All patients accommodated before commencement of operations were to be transferred to HONSHU. The arrangements were as follows:

Hospitals in southern KYUSHU and their accommodation capacity:

ARIAKE BAY DISTRICT	1,000 patients
MIYAZAKI DISTRICT	2,000 "
SATSUMA PENINSULA	1,000 "
HITOYOSHI, YOKOGAWA DISTRICT	4,000 "

In addition to the above:

1 Commissary Hospital in the MIYAZAKI district (accommodation capacity approximately 1,000 patients)

2 Commissary Hospitals (location in southern KYUSHU undecided) (accommodation capacity of approximately 1,000 patients)

Furthermore, the above accommodations being insufficient, it was planned for ordinary hospitals to be utilized as occasion demanded.

In view of the inevitable operations in JAPAN proper, the wounded were to receive field medical treatment in as far as possible except in those serious cases where evacuation was required. Strict caution was taken against decrease of strength in front lines.

Due to the above circumstances, and the regular transportation units being extremely limited, transfer of patients was to be entrusted to civilian combat corps and volunteer troops. Also thorough utility was planned for the return cars.

Accommodations for patients were located as follows:

Vicinity of the front lines:

ARIAKE BAY DISTRICT
MIYAZAKI DISTRICT
SATSUMA PENINSULA

KANOYA, MIYAKONOJO
NOJIRI, SUGIYASU, TORAKI
CHIKAKU, GUNZAN, KAWATO,
ISHIKI

Rear
~~Back line~~ area

KOBAYASHI, YOSHIMATSU,
YOKOGAWA, OGUCHI,
HITOYOSHI

II. NOTES FROM AN INTERVIEW BY V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS AND ALLIED OFFICERS OF THE COMMANDING GENERALS AND STAFF OFFICERS OF THE JAPANESE 40th AND 57th ARMIES:

40th Army:

The 40th Army was responsible for the ground defense of southeastern KYUSHU. The Japanese estimate of the situation was that enemy landings in force could be expected any time after 1 October 1945 in the areas of KUSHIKINO, ARIAKE WAN, and MIYAZAKI. It was also considered possible that landings might take place on the southern coast of the SATSUMA PENINSULA, particularly on the beaches immediately to the west of LAKE IKEDA. In view of this estimate, 40th Army located the 303rd, 206th and 146th Divisions on the coast, with general instructions to defeat the enemy in the beach-head area; and in view of the expected threat to the southern tip of the SATSUMA PENINSULA, the 125th Independent Mixed Brigade was located in this area, and it was placed under the command of the 146th Division.

The 77th Division was held in general reserve and located centrally at the head of KAGOSHIMA-WAN. If further reinforcement of the troops in southern KYUSHU was required during the course of the battle, it was possible that 16th Area Army would send the 216th Division from the KUMAMOTO area south to support either 40th or 57th Army. If the main battle developed in the MIYAZAKI and/ or ARIAKE-WAN area, 16th Area Army might transfer the 77th Division to the command of the 57th Army. However, if the 77th Division and the 206th Division were sent to support the 57th Army in the east, the Commanding General, 40th Army, considered that he would have insufficient troops with which to defeat the enemy at the water's edge. He therefore intended to fight only a delaying battle in the beachhead area, and then to retire to prepared positions in the hills.

For battle purposes, headquarters of major formations would be located as follows:

Hq 40th Army (Adv)	IJUIN
Hq 303rd Division	SENDAI
Hq 206th Division	BONO
Hq 146th Division	KAWANABE
Hq 125th IMB	IKEDA

The initial intention was to prevent the enemy from obtaining a proper footing ashore. This was to be done by the coastal divisions inflicting the maximum amount of damage on the enemy in the vicinity of the beaches themselves. After the initial assault had been held by the coastal divisions, the strongest possible counter-attack was to be delivered by reserve forces concentrated for the purpose.

It was intended to prevent enemy shipping from entering KAGOSHIMA-WAN. The Japanese considered that entrance to KAGOSHIMA-WAN might be attempted either by enemy ships forcing an entry through the minefield covering the entrance, or initially taking the LAKE IKEDA area by a landing from the south and then capturing the guns covering the straits.

303rd Division: Within the area assigned to it, this division was to hold the following three areas in strength: (1) KUSHIKINO, (2) mouth of SENDAI RIVER and (3) AKUNE. Three battalions of the division were to be ready to move south at short notice under orders of 40th Army as immediate reinforcements to 206th Division. The division's responsibilities in respect to KURANOSHATO STRAIT were to provide coast watchers for the approach of enemy shipping, and guns to cover the straits to ensure that enemy small craft did not get through. These responsibilities were shortly to be taken over by the Navy.

206th Division: Assigned the KAMINOKAWA-KAMINOYAMA beach front area, the division was to hold the enemy within the beach-head area until a strong counter-attack could be developed. Reference is also made to the possibility of transferring this division to the MIYAZAKI area if the main battle developed there. In the event of the 206th Division being

withdrawn, it was intended to divide its area between 303rd Division moving farther south and 146th Division moving north.

146th Division: This division was to be employed in a purely holding role, and particular emphasis was placed on defense of the KASEDA area and the south coast of SATSUMA PENINSULA. The 125th IMB was to obstruct the entry of the enemy into the mouth of KAGOSHIMA-WAN, and oppose any enemy forces landing in the KAIMONDAKI area.

77th Division: It was expected that this division would be employed in making a strong counter-attack in support of the 206th Division in the area of IZAKU. Prior to 1 October, they were to be employed in training and preparing defenses.

No general directive had been issued to the coastal divisions regarding the tactics to be employed in beach defense. However, the defense depended mainly on localities, prepared for all-around defense, sited in depth and mutually supporting, as far as ground would permit. The main localities were of approximately battalion strength; other localities of approximately company strength. In addition to these defended localities, the various battalions had forward elements in fox-holes and trenches at the back of the beach, to act as look-outs, to send information back to the main localities and to provide suicidal opposition to the initial landing. The majority of these forward positions were apparently sited on forward slopes with good fields of fire onto the assault beaches.

If available, land mines were to be employed in beach defenses, but there seemed little likelihood of supplies forthcoming. No plan existed for the employment of under-water obstacles on the beaches.

The main tank strength was to be concentrated in the area of LAKE IKEDA, and was to be employed in a non-mobile role, the tanks being dug-in and used purely as anti-tank artillery. The second regiment of the 6th Tank Brigade was under command of the 57th Army and was located at KIRISHIMA. The 13th ITB consisted of not more than 10 light tanks and was located to the north of LAKE IKEDA.

Artillery would be located in rear areas, covering the Japanese between defended localities and with ability to fire on the beaches. It was intended that 4th Artillery Headquarters would work in close cooperation with the 206th Division and would thereupon be located in the vicinity of IZAKU. The 9th Independent Field Artillery Regiment, equipped with 75-mm guns, was to be allotted to divisions as required. The 28th Field Medium Artillery Regiment, equipped with twenty-four 150-mm guns, was to be allotted half to the 206th Division (and located in the area of IZAKU) and half to the 146th Division (and located in the area of TSUZIKAZE). No allotment of the 20th Field Medium Artillery Regiment had been made, as the guns had not yet been received, but the regiment would probably have been allotted to the 206th Division. The 44th Independent Medium Artillery Regiment, consisting of four 150-mm guns, was under the command of the 125th IMB, and located in the area of IWAMOTO, to fire against ships entering KAGOSHIMA-WAN.

The 40th Army had under its direct control the 35th and 36th Suicide Boat Squadrons, which consisted of suicide craft of the shinyo type, manned by army personnel. The 35th Company was based on TANIYAMA and the 36th on ICHIKINO. From the latter base, it was intended to move the craft by road to the SENDAI RIVER and on down to KAGOSHIMA WAN. None of the boats allotted had as yet arrived, and no final decision had been reached as to how they would be employed. It was practically certain that they would be used only at night, and in attack against enemy transports.

Little information was gained of the various anti-aircraft units. The 21st Mortar Battalion was located in KAGOSHIMA to provide AA defense for the city. Other AA units located at BANSEI, CHIRAN, SENDAI, etc., were manned by naval and air force personnel and there appeared to be no overall anti-aircraft control or link-up of these various units.

Questions regarding the coordination of the three services for the defense of KYUSHU revealed the usual almost complete lack of knowledge of the organizations and plans of the other services. As far as the 57th Army was concerned, everything had to come through Hq 16th Area Army, and there appeared to be no coordination with the Navy or air force on the lower levels.

When the landings took place, civilians were to evacuate the forward areas and were to be organized for employment in company supplies, repairing roads, etc., in the rear areas.

57th Army:

At the time of invasion, it was intended that the major formations of the 57th Army should occupy the following general areas:

212 Division	Northern MIYAZAKI coast
154 Division	Central MIYAZAKI coast
156 Division	Southern MIYAZAKI coast
86 Division	Area of SHIBUSHI and coast line of ARIAKE-WAN
25 Division	Area of KOBAYASHI PLAIN
98 IMB	East coast area - KAGOSHIMA BAY
109 IMB	TANEKA-SHIMA
5 Tank Brigade	Area of central MIYAZAKI plain
1 Regt 6 Tank Brigade	KIRISHIMA (in support of 86 Div)

For the initial battle, it was intended that the head-quarters of the 57th Army and its units would be located as follows:

Hq 57th Army	AYAMACHI
Hq 212 Division	undecided
Hq 154 Division	TSUMA
Hq 156 Division	HONJO
Hq 25 Division	KOBAYASHI
Hq 86 Division	MATSUYAMA
Hq 98 IMB	OIRA
Hq 109 IMB	NOMA
Hq 5 Tank Brigade	MORINAGA

The Japanese plans for the defense of southern KYUSHU were based on the assumption that the American landings in strength would take place simultaneously in the areas of MIYASAKI, ARIAKE-WAN and KUSHIKINO. In addition, it appeared from the 40th Army plans, that considerable importance was attached to the possibility of a landing in the MAKURASAKI area. In the light of this overall plan, 57th Army had placed its main strength in the MIYAZAKI PLAIN area.

Of the three divisions located on the coast line of MIYAZAKI, it was intended that the 154th and 156th Divisions should remain in position, wherever the landing was made, and should maintain a purely static defense. The 212th Division in the north was, if necessary, to be employed in a mobile role and was to be used to move initially to support the 154th and 156th Divisions. In addition, it might possibly be employed even further south if the main battle developed in the area of ARIAKE-WAN. It was anticipated that the 212th Division would be able to counter-attack in support of the 154th and 156th Divisions within 48 hours of the landing.

Farther back, in the KOBAYASHI area, the 25th Division was held centrally in general mobile reserve, prepared to move to any area where the resistance required strengthening. It was anticipated, however, that it would probably be committed to the defense of the MIYAZAKI plain and in such circumstances, it would have under its command the 5th Tank Brigade. It was apparently not intended to commit the tank brigade piecemeal, but to employ it at maximum strength in a strong counter-attack in conjunction with the 25th Division. It was expected that this strong counter-attack would probably be delivered within 4-7 days of the landing. At the conclusion of this counter-attack, the 5th Tank Brigade would revert to the control of the 57th Army.

The 5th Tank Brigade was to consist of a headquarters and two regiments, each of approximately 50 tanks and self-propelled guns. The total for the whole regiment was estimated as follows:

Medium tanks	56
Light tanks	26
S. P. guns (150-mm)	6
S. P. guns (75-mm)	24
	<u>112</u>

57th Army had not received any allotments of heavy tanks mounting 75-mm guns, and the Commanding General considered that no such tanks were located anywhere in KYUSHU. Tactically, it was intended to use the medium and light tanks, as far as possible, as mobile units in a tank-versus-tank role. The self-propelled guns were to be used mainly in previously selected and prepared positions as anti-tank weapons, although the 150-mm guns might also be used as normal supporting artillery.

In addition to the reserve provided by the 25th Division and 5th Tank Brigade, the 77th Division, initially under the command of the 40th Army, might also be switched to the command of the 57th Army if conditions required it. The Commanding General, 57th Army, further explained that the tactic of quick and weighty counter-attack was being insisted on in the light of the experience gained during the LEYTE Campaign, where the Japanese reserve had not come up quickly enough to the counter-attack.

Divisions allotted to coastal defense were committed to a policy of annihilation of the invader within the beach-head area. No general directives as to how such a defense should be conducted had been issued either by the 57th Army or by any higher command. This statement that no detailed tactics for beach defense had been laid down by higher authority agreed with the information obtained from the 40th Army. The only instructions given to divisions were that the coastline was to be held by a defense at the water's edge and that there was to be no retreat under any circumstances.

The tactical disposition of the 156th Division is a good example of a typical coastline division disposed tactically for the defense of its area. The system of defense is almost identical with that employed by the divisions of the 40th Army on the west coast. The 156th Division consisted of four regiments, and of these, the 453rd, 454th and 455th were to be located on the coast itself, while the 456th was to be held in the rear, immediately behind the 453rd. Within each regimental area on the coast, the first line of resistance which the invaders would meet would be a thin screen of infantry dug-in among the dunes at the back of the beach in foxholes and tunnels. It was hoped that a percentage of these troops would survive the preliminary bombardment and offer a certain amount of suicide resistance to the first wave of invading forces, and also send back some information to the defended localities behind. Behind the line of dunes, positions were prepared for all-around defense, from which considerable resistance could be offered. The kernel of the defense, however, was still farther back in completely prepared positions, almost invariably selected on high ground. Such positions were to be occupied by the equivalent of a battalion group strength and were to be defended to the very end.

The following were quoted as comprising a typical battalion locality:

- Infantry Battalion (approximately 1000 rifles)
- Two 70-mm battalion guns
- Twelve HMG
- Thirty-one IIG
- Two 75-mm guns (allotted by regiment)
- Four anti-tank guns (37-mm)
- A proportionate number of mortars

The Commanding General considered that the 57th Army was definitely deficient in artillery, which was allotted in small numbers to divisions and regiments. Artillery was so placed that it could range on the

beaches and provide supporting fire to the infantry within the gaps left by the defended localities. It appeared that the Japanese had no method of centralizing control of artillery fire with sufficient flexibility to mass the fire of all artillery on a specific target. They were unable to shift all the fire from one target to another on a wide front.

No land mines had been laid in the area, although it was intended to use them to the maximum if supplies were forthcoming. There appeared to be no intention of erecting under-water obstacles on the beaches. No preparations had been made for blowing bridges.

It was intended that all forward troops should hold three months' food; artillery—500 rounds per gun dumped at the gun position; small arms ammunition—"enough for one major engagement". The re-supply situation was very vague.

The employment of airborne troops by the Americans was also regarded as possible, and to meet this threat, the 1st Special (Adv) Tank Unit was located in the area of MIYAKONOJO. The unit was equipped with 27 light tanks and was intended to move rapidly to any area in the vicinity where airborne troops were dropped. In addition, poles were to be erected and plane-traps (10 meters wide, 6 deep and 40 long) were to be dug in MIYAKONOJO PLAIN to prevent plane and glider landings.

The 31st and 32nd Suicide Boat Units, each consisting of 150 craft of the shinyo type, manned by army personnel, and located at ABURATSU and ONESHIRE respectively, were under the direct orders of the 57th Army. These army craft were apparently quite separate from the navy, and were intended to be employed close inshore, whereas the navy was to attack farther out to sea. The 57th Army claimed to be aware to a large extent of the naval plan and that a degree of coordination between the two services had been achieved. It was intended to employ the army boat units only at night, and that attack would be delivered by companies of 33 or so craft, and not in complete units. The main objects of attack would be the transports and the LST's.

The degree of coordination achieved with the Air Force was practically non-existent. In order for close air support of the ground forces, the demand would have to be submitted through army channels to the 16th Area Army, who would pass it to the 6th Air Army Headquarters, who would pass the order all the way down the chain of air command.

III. MAP ILLUSTRATION:

A sketch prepared by the A. C. of S., G-2, V Amphibious Corps gives a good illustration of the Japanese plan for the defense of KYUSHU (see ANNEX F).



ANNEX A

STATUS OF KYUSHU UNITS AT TIME OF SURRENDER

Area	Units	Strength	Location
NORTHERN KYUSHU	* 16th Area Army Hq	* 888*	* YANAGA, TSUKUSHI-GUN, * FUKUOKA PREFECTURE
	* * 56th Army	* 349*	* KATSURAGAMA, KAKO-GUN, * FUKUOKA PREFECTURE
	* 5 * 57th Div	* 20,429*	* SASAGURI-CHO, KASUYA- * GUN, FUKUOKA PREFECTURE
	* 6 * 145th Div	* 17,685*	* AKABA-CHO, MUNEKATA-GUN, * FUKUOKA PREFECTURE
	* t * 312 th. Div	* 12,227*	* OCHI-MACHI, HIGASHI- * MATSUURA-GUN, SAGA * PREFECTURE
	* h * 351st Div	* 12,215*	* FUKUMA-CHO, MUNEKATA- * GUN, FUKUOKA PREFECTURE
	* A * 4th Ind Tank	* 3,103*	* FUKUMA-CHO, MUNEKATA-GUN, * FUKUOKA PREFECTURE
	* r * Brigade	* 9,209*	* MUSHOZU-MACHI, IKI-GUN, * NAGASAKI PREFECTURE
	* y * IKI FORTIFICATION	* 2,059*	* KOKURA CITY, FUKUOKA * PREFECTURE
	* * SHIMONOSEKI	* 119*	* HARU-MACHI, KASUYA-GUN, * FUKUOKA PREFECTURE
	* * FORTIFICATION	* 379*	* IJUIN, KAGOSHIMA * PREFECTURE
	* * 6th Artillery Hq	* 15,640*	* KAJIKI-MURA, KAGOSHIMA * PREFECTURE
	* * 40th Army Hq	* 17,429*	* KAWANABE-MACHI, KAGOSHIMA * PREFECTURE
	SOUTHERN KYUSHU	* 4 * 77th Div	* 21,354*
* t * 146th Div		* 12,213*	* SENDAI CITY, KAGOSHIMA * PREFECTURE
* h * 206th Div		* 7,313*	* IKEDA, IBUSUKI-GUN, * KAGOSHIMA PREFECTURE
* A * 303rd Div		* 117*	* IJUIN-MACHI, KAGOSHIMA * PREFECTURE
* r * 125th Ind Mix		* 25,804*	* KOBAYASHI-MURA, NISHIMORO- * GUN, MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE
* y * Brigade		* 20,614*	* MATSUYAMA-CHO, SOO-GUN, * KAGOSHIMA PREFECTURE
* * 4th Artillery Hq		* 17,341*	* TSUMA-MACHI, MIYAZAKI * PREFECTURE
* * 57th Army		* 25,804*	* KOBAYASHI-MURA, NISHIMORO- * GUN, MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE
* * 25th Div <i>From Manchuria</i>		* 20,614*	* MATSUYAMA-CHO, SOO-GUN, * KAGOSHIMA PREFECTURE
* * 86th Div		* 17,341*	* TSUMA-MACHI, MIYAZAKI * PREFECTURE
* * 154th Div <i>New</i>			

ANNEX A (continued)

* * 156th Div	* 17,429*	HONJO-MACHI, MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE
* * 212th Div <i>New</i>	* 21,351*	TSUNC-CHO, MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE
* * 98th Ind Mix Brigade	* 5,638*	TAKASAKI SHINDEN, KAGOSHIMA PREFECTURE
* 5 * 7 * t * h * A * r * m * y * * 109th Ind Mix Brigade	* 6,888*	TANEGASHIMA, KAGOSHIMA
* * 5th Ind Tank Brigade <i>New</i>	* 3,108*	MORINAGA, HONJO-CHO, HIGASHI MOROKATA-GUN, MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE
* * 6th Ind Tank <i>New</i> Brigade	* 3,784*	KIRISHIMA-MURA, HARA-GUN, KAGOSHIMA
* * 1st Artillery Hq	* 117*	TSUO-CHO, HIGASHI MOROKATA- GUN, MIYAZAKI PREFECTURE
* * 3rd Engineer Hq	* 167*	TAKARABE, SOO-GUN, KAGOSHIMA
* * Kurume Div	* ---*	KURUME
* i G* 118th Ind Mix * k r* Brigade	* 7,104*	SAGANOSEKI-CHO, KITA- HAMAPE-GUN, OITA PREFECTURE
* u o* * g u* * o p* * * 122nd Ind Mix * * Brigade	* 6,884*	NAGASAKI CITY
OTHERS * * Kumamoto Div	* ---*	KUMAMOTO
* H * 216th Div	* 21,736*	UTO-CHO, UDO-GUN, KUMAMOTO PREFECTURE
* i G* * g r* * o o* 126th Ind Mix * u * Brigade	* 6,213*	HONDO-CHO, AMAKUSA-GUN, KUMAMOTO
* p* * * 11th Engineer Hq	* 103*	NAGASU-MACHI, TAMANA-GUN, KUMAMOTO PREFECTURE
* 4th Anti-aircraft Div	* 21,425*	TSUKUSHIMURA, TSUKUSHI- GUN, FUKUOKA PREFECTURE
* 107th Ind Mix Brigade	* 6,565*	FUKUE-CHO, MATSUURA-GUN, NAGASAKI
* Tsushima Fortification	* 7,069*	KECHI, SHIMO KATA-GUN, NAGASAKI PREFECTURE
* 3rd Communication Hq	* 2,388*	TASHIRO-CHO, MIYAKI-GUN SAGA PREFECTURE



OUTLINE MAP
KYUSHU, JAPAN

10 8 6 4 2 0 10 20 MI.

Prepared By
A.C. of S., G-2
Hq. Sixth Army

For use by War and Navy Department Agencies only
Not for sale or distribution



**JAPAN (SOUTH)
SPECIAL STRATEGIC MAP**

0 20 40 60 80 100 Miles
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 Kilometers

Lambert Conical Orthographic Projection
Standard Parallels 31° 30' and 36° 30'

HEIGHTS IN METERS

LEGEND

Towns of First Importance	Primary Roads
Second	Secondary Roads
Third	Railroads: Double Track, Single Track
Fourth	3'6" Gauge

Prepared under the direction of the Chief of Engineers, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.
Compiled by the Army Map Service, War Department, from the following sources:
Japan 1:250,000 (one sheet) for information; Culture Institute, 1:500,000
Map of 1934, No. 10, 1:500,000; No. 53, 1931, No. 54, 1931, No. 55, 1931
Directorate of Land, Army, 1932 and 1933; No. 1, 3, 1937, No. 54, 1937
Military of Korea 1:100,000 (one sheet); No. 1, 3, 1937, No. 54, 1937
AMS 5207
First Edition AMS 1, 1943.



SKETCH MAP
 WESTERN JAPAN

STRATEGIC JAPANESE RESERVE
 FOR CONTINGENT OPERATIONS

PREPARED BY
 A. C. of S., G-2
 HQ. SIXTH ARMY

ANNEX D (continued)

12-cm Trench Mortar Ammunition	90,000	40,000	27,000	6,000	17,000
10-cm Howitzer Ammunition	56,000	12,000	25,000	-	19,000
15-cm Howitzer Ammunition	64,000	17,000	23,000	14,000	10,000

NOTE:


1. This list is the outline of the main ammunition concentration plan according to the memory of the Staff Officer in charge.
At the time of surrender about 80 percent of the concentrations were completed.
2. The quantity supplied each army included an amount for 8 Division Battles in coastal operations, besides a reserve amount.

ANNEX D

PLAN OF MAIN AMMUNITION CONCENTRATIONS IN KYUSHU

Variety	Division	Concentration Amount	Direct Control By 16th A	Supply to each army			
				57th A	40th A	56th A	56th A
Rifle Ammunition		54,000,000	16,000,000	19,000,000	6,000,000	13,000,000	
MG Ammunition		37,000,000	7,000,000	13,000,000	8,000,000	9,000,000	
Heavy Grenade Ammunition		1,000,000	200,000	350,000	200,000	250,000	
37-mm Anti-tank Mounted Gun Ammunition		140,000	30,000	45,000	25,000	40,000	
47-mm Anti-tank Mounted Gun Ammunition		97,000	38,000	25,000	18,000	16,000	
92 Type Infantry Gun Ammunition		250,000	40,000	80,000	60,000	70,000	
41 Type Mountain Gun Ammunition		150,000	50,000	45,000	30,000	25,000	
94 Type Mountain Gun Ammunition		100,000	45,000	25,000	15,000	17,000	


(continued on following page)



GLOSSARY


Japanese	English
-gata	lagoon, inlet
-gawa	river
-jima	island
-kakyō	strait
-kawa	river
-ko	lake
-misaki	point, cape
-nade	sea, open bay
-numa	lagoon
-saki	point, cape
-san	mountain
-shima	island
-ura	lagoon
-wan	bay
-zaki	point, cape
-zan	mountain, cape

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY
 APO 442
 OFFICE OF THE
 A.C.O.F.S., G-2



JAPANESE PLAN OF DEFENSE
KYUSHU ISLAND

ADAPTED FROM SKETCH
PREPARED BY
A.C. OF S., G-2




NORTH
PACIFIC
OCEAN

EAST
CHINA
SEA

KYUSHU

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH ARMY
APO 442
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2

NR 12785

JAPANESE PLANS
FOR THE
DEFENSE OF KYUSHU

Instructors Reading this Document

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Name CH Barnes Date 13 Feb

Morgan
Barnes 9 sec 46 Feb



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