Chapter V
Japanese Aggression Against China
Sections I and II

Section I.
Invasion & Occupation of Manchuria
The China War and Its Phases

The war which Japan waged against China, and which the Japanese leaders falsely described as the "China Incident" or the "China Affair", began on the night of 18 September 1931 and ended with the surrender of Japan in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945. The first phase of this war consisted of the invasion, occupation and consolidation by Japan of that part of China known as Manchuria, and of the Province of Jehol. The second phase of this war began on 7 July 1937, when Japanese troops attacked the walled city of Wanping near Peiping following the "Marco Polo Bridge Incident", and consisted of successive advances, each followed by brief periods of consolidation in preparation for further advances into Chinese territory. Some of the Accused were active in this war form the very beginning, some participated as the war progressed. SHIRATORI stated during the course of his lecture, "The Trend of the Great War", which was published in the Diamond Magazine for June 1940, "It is not too much to say that the fuse of the European War was first attached by the China Incident".

Japan's Foothold in Manchuria
at the Beginning of the China War

The position of Japan in Manchuria as at 18 September 1931 is described by the Lytton Commission in terms with which the Tribunal entirely agrees:

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These treaties and other agreements gave to Japan an important and unusual position in Manchuria. She governed the leased territory with practically full rights of sovereignty. Through the South Manchurian Railway, she administered the railway areas, including several towns and large sections of such populous cities as Mukden and Changchun; and in these areas she controlled the police, taxation, education, and public utilities. She maintained armed forces in many parts of the country: the Kwantung Army in the Leased Territory, Railway Guards in the railway areas, and Consular Police throughout the various districts. This summary of the long list of Japan's rights in Manchuria shows clearly the exceptional character of the political, economic and legal relations created between that country and China in Manchuria. There is probably nowhere in the world an exact parallel to this situation, no example of a country enjoying in the territory of a neighboring State such extensive economic and administrative privileges. A situation of this kind could possible be maintained without leading to incessant complications and disputes if it were freely desired or accepted on both sides, and if it were the sign and embodiment of a well considered policy of close collaboration in the economic and in the political sphere. But, in the absence of these conditions, it could only lead to friction and conflict.

The situation was not "freely desired and accepted on both sides", and the friction inevitably followed. By the use of force or the threat of force, Japan had secured concessions from China in the days of her weakness; the resurgent nationalism of China

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resented the losses which the decadent Empire of China had been unable to avoid. A more powerful factor, and ultimately the decisive factor in producing the friction, began to emerge as Japan, non longer satisfied with the rights she had gained, south their enlargement on a scale which in the end involved the conquest of Manchuria. This policy on the part of Japan to seek enlargement of her rights and interests in China was first authoritatively announced in the time of the Tanaka Cabinet.

The Tanaka Cabinet and its "Positive Policy"

The political atmosphere had been tense in Japan before the formation of the Tanaka Cabinet, which came into power in 1927 advocating the so-called "Positive POlicy{ toward China. The military group attributed what they termed the weakened condition of Japan at that time to the liberal tendencies of the Government as evidenced by the "Friendship Policy" advocated by Foreign Minister Shidehara. The "Friendship Policy", which was thus displaced, had been in force since the Washington Conference of 1922. The "Positive Policy", advocated by Premier Tanaka, was to expand and develop the special rights and privileges, which Japan claimed to have acquired in Manchuria, through collaboration with Manchurian authorities, especially Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese North-Eastern Frontier Army and Chief of the Administration of Manchuria and Jehol. Premier Tanaka also declared that although Japan would respect the sovereignty of China over Manchuria and would do everything possible to enforce the "Open Door POlicy" in

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China, she was fully determined to see that no state of affairs arose in Manchuria which would disturb the local tranquility and put Japan's vital interests in jeopardy. The Tanaka Government placed great emphasis upon the necessity of regarding Manchuria as distinct from the rest of China and declared that, if disturbances spread to Manchuria and Mongolia from other parts of China, Japan would defend her interests in those districts by force. The policy thus involved an expressed intention to secure further rights in a foreign country and an implied claim of right to preserve internal peace and order in that foreign country.

Agitation in Support of the "Positive Policy"

Such organizations as the Kokurtukai (Black Dragon Society) and the Kokuhonsha (Foundation of the State Society) as well as such writers as Dr. Okawa (the former Accused) agitated strongly in Japan for the enforcement of Japan's special rights and privileges in China by force of arms if necessary.

The Black Dragon Society had been formed on 3 February 1901 at Kanda, Japan, to promote nationalism and anti-Russian and anti-Korean sympathies. It had advocated annexation of Korea, and in general supported the expansionist aspirations of Japan.

The Foundation of the State Society had been formed on 20 December 1920 to foster the spirit of nationalism and disseminate propaganda. It kept in close touch with the military and published a magazine to present its ideas to the public. HIRANUMA was President and KOISO and ARAKI were Members of the Society.

Dr. Okawa was a trusted employee of the South

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Manchurian Railway Company, and had been a Director of the East Asia Research Institute established by the Railway Company to study the economic situation in Manchuria. He had published several books before the formation of the Tanaka Cabinet. Sato Shinen's Ideal State, published by him in 1924, stated: that according to Sato, Japan being the first country in the world to be created. it was the foundation of all nations and therefore had the divine mission to rule all nations. The book advocated the occupation of Siberia to prevent the southward advance of Russia, and the occupation of the South Sea Islands to prevent the northward advance of Britain. He published Asia, Europe and Japan, in 1925. In that book, he maintained that the League of Nations was organized to maintain eternally the status quo and further domination of the World by the Anglo-Saxons. He predicted that a war between the East and the West was inevitable. Providence was trying to elect Japan as the champion of Asia, he asserted. Japan should endeavor to fulfill that sublime mission by developing a strong materialistic spirit, he advised. Dr. Okawa had been the organizer of many societies, including the Kochisha, one principle of which was the liberation of the colored races and the unification of the World. The political philosophy of Dr. Okawa had appealed to certain of the Military who had adopted him as their spokesman among the civilians and often invited him to deliver lectures at the Army General Staff meetings. Dr. Okawa became intimately acquainted with the Accused KOISO, ITAGAKI, DOHIHARA and other Army leaders.

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The Tsinan Incident

Marshal Chang Tso-lin, having declared Manchuria independent of the Central Government of China at the time of the Washington Conference, and made himself master of Manchuria, decided to extend his authority further into China proper and moved his headquarters to Peking. The policy of the Tanaka Cabinet, being based on the plan of collaboration with the Marshal, depended on the success of the Marshal in maintaining his leadership in Manchuria. Premier Tanaka repeatedly advised the Marshal to abandon his ambitions to extend his authority outside Manchuria; but the Marshal resented and refused this advice. Civil war between Chang Tso-lin and the Nationalist Government of China followed. In the spring of 1928, when the nationalist armies of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek were marching on Peking and Tientsin to drive out the army of Chang Tso-lin, and force it back into Manchuria, Premier Tanaka issued a declaration to the effect that Japan would maintain peace and order in Manchuria and was prepared to prevent a state of affairs which would endanger the interests of Japan in Manchuria. The Premier then sent a message to the Chinese generals, in effect telling them that the Japanese would oppose any invasion of Manchuria, including the definite statement that the Japanese would prevent defeated troops or those in pursuit from entering Manchuria. Even before the civil war spread to Manchuria, Japanese troops were sent to Tsinan in Shantung Province. A conflict ensued known as the Tsinan Incident, which aroused public opinion in Japan in favour of protection of Japanese rights in Manchuria. The Black Dragon Society held mass-meetings all over Japan in an effort to fan national resentment against China to the war pitch.

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Murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin

Marshal Chang Tso-lin had not only disregarded the advice of Premier Tanaka in attempting to extend his authority south of the Great Wall, but had shown increasing unwillingness to allow Japan to exploit China by the privileges she derived from various treaties and agreements. This attitude of the Marshal had caused a group of officers in the Kwantung Army to advocate that force should be used to promote the interests of Japan in Manchuria, and to maintain that nothing was to be gained by negotiating with the Marshal; however, Premier Tanaka continued to collaborate with the Marshal, relying upon the threat of force rather than its actual use to attain his objective. This resentment of the Marshal by certain officers of the Kwantung Army became so intense that a senior staff officer of that army, Colonel Kawamoto, planned to murder the Marshal. The purpose of the murder was to remove him as the obstacle to the creation of a new state in Manchuria, dominated by Japan, with the Marshals' son, Chang Hsueh-liang, as its nominal head.

In the latter part of April 1928, the Marshal was defeated by the nationalist armies of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. Premier Tanaka advised him to withdraw into Manchuria behind the Japanese lines before it was too late. The Marshal resented this advice, but was forced to follow it. The Kwantung Army, in accordance with Tanaka's declaration, that Japan would prevent defeated troops form entering Manchuria, was engaged in disarming Chinese troops retreating toward Mukden from Peking. The Japanese 20th Engineer Regiment, which had arrived at Mukden from Korea, mined the railroad with dynamite and a Japanese Captain placed his

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soldiers in position around the mine. On 4 June 1938, when the Marshal's train reached the mine, which was located at the point where the Peking-Mukden Railway passes underneath the South Manchurian Railway, there was an explosion. The Marshal's train was wrecked and Japanese soldiers began firing upon the Marshal's bodyguard. The Marshal was killed as planned. An attempt was made to obtain an order to muster the entire Kwantung Army into action and exploit the incident and attain its original purpose, but the effort was thwarted by a staff officer who apparently did not understand the real purpose of those desiring the issuance of the order.

The Tanaka Cabinet was taken by surprise and greatly embarrassed as it saw its program endangered by this murder of the Marshal. Premier Tanaka made a full report to the Emperor and obtained his permission to court-martial those responsible. Upon his return from the palace, he summoned the Minister of War and other members of his Cabinet and sated that he was determined to discipline the Army. Those present agreed, but when the Minister of War took the matter up with his Ministry, he suggested that strong opposition on the part of the General Staff should be encouraged. Thereafter, the Minister of War reported to the Premier that the opposition of the Army General Staff was based on the idea that to court-martial those responsible would force the Army to make public some of its military secrets. This was the first time, according to the testimony of former Navy Minister Okada, that the Army had projected itself into the formulation of government policy.

It was at this time that DOHIHARA appeared upon a scene in which he was to play an important part. He had

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spent approximately eighteen years in China prior to the murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin as aide to General Benzai, who had acted as advisor to various Chinese leaders. On 17 March 1928, DOHIHARA had requested and received permission from the Emperor to accept an appointment as aided to Matsui, Nanao, who was advisor to the Marshal. DOHIHARA reported for duty under the appointment and was present in Manchuria when the Marshal was killed.

Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, the Young Marshal

The Young Marshal, Chang Hsueh-liang, succeeded his father; but he proved to be a disappointment to the Kwantung Army. He joined the Koumintang Party in December 1928; and anti-Japanese movements began to be promoted on an organized scale and gained greatly in intensity. The movement for the recovery of Chinese national rights gained strength. There was a demand for the recovery of the South Manchurian Railway and, in general, for the limitation of the Japanese influence in Manchuria.

In July 1928, soon after the murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, Premier Tanaka had sent a personal representative to negotiate with the Young Marshal. The representative had been instructed to inform the Young Marshal that Japan regarded Manchuria as her outpost, and that the Japanese Government would like to cooperate with him "behind the scenes" and was prepared to spare no sacrifice under the Cabinet's "Positive Policy" to prevent an invasion of Manchuria by the Chinese Nationalist Armies. The Young Marshal's answer was to join the Koumintang as related.

Japanese-Chinese Relations Strained

Japanese-Chinese relations in Manchuria became extremely aggravated. The Japanese claimed several violations

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of the "Trade Treaty" with China. The Chinese proposal to construct a railroad parallel to the South Manchurian Railroad, the claim that there was illegal taxation of Japanese in Manchuria, the claim of oppression of Koreans, and the denial of the right of Japanese subjects to lease land in Manchuria, were all "Manchurian Problems" according to the Japanese agitators. The Military advocated Japanese occupation of Manchuria. They maintained that diplomatic negotiations were useless and that armed force should be used to drive the Chinese from Manchuria and set up a new regime under Japanese control. ITAGAKI, who had been appointed a staff officer of the Kwantung Army in May 1929, was one of those who advocated the use of force. Dr. Okawa, who had visited Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and attempted to negotiate with him on behalf of the South Manchurian Railway, returned to Japan and engaged in a tour of over fifty prefectures in April 1929, giving lectures and showing pictures. The Army General Staff, of which MINAMI was Vice-Chief, began to cooperate with Dr. Okawa and to aid him in his propaganda program to instigate the people to take action against China. The Army General Staff also began to study plans for operations in Manchuria and to declare that Manchuria was the "lifeline" of Japan.

Resignation of the Tanaka Cabinet

The efforts of the Tanaka Cabinet to punish those responsible for the murder of Marshal Chang Tso-lin had alienated the Military. This group had joined with Dr. Okawa to create opposition among the civilians to the Cabinet, and had seized upon the signing of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Annex No. B-15), which they claimed violated the Japanese

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Constitution, as well as the terms approved by the Cabinet for the settlement of the Tsinan Incident, which they claimed were a disgrace to Japan, as opportunities to embarrass the Cabinet. The pressure became so great that on 1 July 1929, the Cabinet resigned.

The resignation of the Tanaka Government was a distinct victory for the Military and their civilian spokesman, Dr. Okawa. From this time on, the influence of this element on government policies was to become stronger, and their insistence that Japan should occupy Manchuria by force and establish a puppet government there was to bear fruit. Dr. Okawa became recognized as a political leader; and the South Manchurian Railway Company officials, realizing his value to them, divorced the East Asia Research Institute from the Company and created a Foundation in July 1929 to assist him in his work of investigating and molding public opinion in support of the Army's plan to occupy Manchuria.

Reinstatement of the "Friendship Policy"

The Hamaguchi Cabinet, which followed the Tanaka Cabinet, was formed on 2 July 1929; and Baron Shidehara, who continued to advocate the "Friendship Policy" toward China, was selected by Premier Hamaguchi as his Foreign Minister. The "Friendship Policy" rested upon good will and friendship as distinguished form the "Positive Policy" of the Tanaka Cabinet, which rested upon the threat of military force. As a result of the "Friendship Policy", Chinese boycotts of Japanese trade steadily decreased and normal peaceful relations might have prevailed but for violent agitation on the party of the Military.

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Hashimoto and the Cherry Society

In his book, The Road to the Reconstruction of the World, HASHIMOTO, in discussing his tour of duty of three years in Istanbul as Military Attaché discussed the political condition of other countries and said: "I was clearly conscious that Japan was the only country within the whirlpool of world movement that stood within the bounds of liberalism. I considered if Japan goes on under the present condition, she would drop from the ranks in the community of nations. At this time, fortunately, I was ordered to go back (to Japan). During my thirty days' voyage, I pondered on how to reform Japan and as a result, I succeeded in drawing a definite plan to a certain degree. On returning to the Army General Staff Office, my former haunt, I devised several

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schemes in order to put my ideas into execution." HASHIMOTO was attached to the Army General Staff on 30 January 1930.

Between 1-10 September 1930, a score or more of army captains who had recently graduated from the Army Staff College, met at the Army Club in Tokyo under the sponsorship of Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO and decided to organize a research organization to study Manchurian and Mongolian questions and the internal reorganization of the country. The Society's ultimate objective was later announced to be national reorganization, by armed force if necessary, in order to settle the so-called "Manchurian Problem" and other pending issues. The name Sakurakai (Cherry Society) was given to the organization; and its membership was limited to army officer on the active list with rank of Lt. Colonel or under, who were concerned about national reorganization.

Manchuria as Japan's "Lifeline"

Dr. Okawa, with the aid of the East Asia Research Foundation and the officers of the Army General Staff, had his propaganda campaign in full blast when HASHIMOTO returned to the General Staff Office. Propaganda was being disseminated through the newspapers and other media to establish the idea that Manchuria was Japan's "Lifeline", and that a stronger policy in connection therewith should be adopted. The military leaders issued instructions that all editorial writers, ultra-nationalistic speakers, etc., should unite to establish public opinion for more aggressive action in Manchuria. The MIlitary argued that Manchuria was Japan's

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"Lifeline", and that Japan must expand into Manchuria, develop it economically and industrially, set it up as a defence against Russia, and protect the rights of Japan and its nationals there as Japan was entitled to do under existing treaties. An appeal to emotion was made; it being said that Japanese blood had been shed in Manchuria in the Russo-Japanese War, and that by reason of that sacrifice, Japan was entitled to control Manchuria. The railroad question was still a burning issue; and Dr. Okawa insisted that Manchuria should be separated from Nanking and placed under Japanese control to create a land founded on the "Kingly Way".

HASHIMOTO in his book, The Inevitability of Renovation, has explained well the meaning of the term "Kingly Way". He said, "It is necessary to have politics, economics, culture, national defense, and everything else, all focused on one, the Emperor, and the whole force of the nation concentrated and displayed from a single point. Especially the political, economic and cultural lines which had been organized and conducted by liberalism and socialism in the past should be reorganized according to the principle of oneness in the Imperial Way, that is to say Kodo Ittai Shugi. This system is the strongest and the grandest of all. There are mony countries in the world, but there is absolutely no nation that can compare with our national blood solidarity which makes possible a unification like ours with the Emperor in the center".

It was Okawa's idea that after an independent Manchuria had been established on the "Kingly Way", with an incomparable relation between Manchuria and Japan, Japan could assume the leadership of the peoples of Asia.

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A General Investigation Section was created in the General Staff on 1 April 1930, as the Investigation Section of the Kwantung Army was considered insufficient to probe into the resources of Manchuria, the sentiments of the people and other kindred subjects of investigation.

Around the headquarters of the Kwantung Army at Port Arthur, the chief topic of conversation among the staff officers in those days was the "Manchurian Problem". ITAGAKI, who was one of those staff officers, had some definite ideas for solving the problem, which he expressed to a friend during the month of May 1930. ITAGAKI said that there were many 8unsolved problems between China and Japan, that they were so serious that they could not be solved by diplomatic means, and that there was no alternative but to use force. He expressed the opinion that Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang should be driven from Manchuria so that a new state might be established in accordance with the principles of the "Kingly Way".

Assassination of Premier Hamaguchi

On 4 November 1930, Premier Hamaguchi was on the platform of the Tokyo Railway Station when, in the words of Foreign Minister Shidehara, "He was shot by a silly young man". The Premier was not killed instantly; but his wound was such that it was necessary for Foreign Minister Shidehara to act as Prime Minister until the Hamaguchi Cabinet resigned on 13 April 1931. The Premier succumbed to his wounds and died on 26 August 1931. Acting Prime Minister Shidehara caused an investigation to be made and determined that the assassination of Premier Hamaguchi was caused by dissatisfaction with the Premier's

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Naval Disarmament Policy.

The London Naval Limitations Treaty had been signed on 22 April 1930. This treaty was in line with the policy of national economy and reduction of armaments which accompanied the Premier's "Friendship POlicy". Also in line with this policy was the reduction fo the Army from 21 divisions to 17 divisions. The signing of the London Treaty made the young navy officers indignant. The Black Dragon Society began to hold mass=meetings in protest. The Privy Council, of which HIRANUMA was Vice-President, was strongly against the Treaty and was taking the attitude that the Cabinet had usurped the powers and prerogatives of the Military in concluding the Treaty. It was in the midst of this violent political argument that the assassination had occurred.

The March Incident

A military coup d'etat was planned to occur on 20 March 1931. The affair came to be known as the "March Incident". The continual agitation and dissemination of propaganda by the Army General Staff had its effect; and as testified by Baron Okada, who was a member of the Supreme War Council at that time, it was generally understood that it was only a question of time until the Army would undertake the occupation of Manchuria. Before the Army could move into Manchuria, it was thought necessary to place in power a Government favorable to such action. At the time, the Hamaguchi Cabinet was in power; and due to the attempted assassination of the Premier, the chief exponent of the "Friendship Policy", namely Foreign Minister Shidehara, was acting as Premier.

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HASHIMOTO's plan, which was approved by his superior officers of the Army General Staff, including Ninomiya, who was Vice-Chief of the Staff, and Tatekawa, who was Chief of the Second Division of the Staff, was to start a demonstration as an expression of disapproval of the Diet. It was expected that a clash would occur with the Police during the demonstration, and that this clash could be expanded until the disorder would justify the Army in establishing martial law, dissolving the Diet and seizing the Government. KOISO, Ninomiya, Tatekawa and others called upon War Minister Ugaki at his Official Residence and discussed their plans with him, leaving with the impression that he was a ready tool for their scheme. Dr. Okawa was instructed to proceed with the mass demonstration; and HASHIMOTO delivered to him 300 practice bombs, which KOISO had secured for use on that occasion. They were to be used to spread alarm and confusion in the crowd and increase the appearance of riot. However, Dr. Okawa in his enthusiasm addressed a letter to War Minister Ugaki in which he stated that the time was just ahead for a great mission to descend upon Minister Ugaki; the War Minister now realized the full import of the plot. He immediately called in KOISO and HASHIMOTO and instructed them to stop all further plans to use the Army to carry out this revolution against the Government. The projected coup d'etat was averted. KIDO, who was then the Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, was fully informed of the plot beforehand by a friend, who suggested that the Imperial Household should be advised.

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The Watasuki Cabinet Continued the "Friendship Policy"

Although the "March Incident" hastened the fall of the Hamaguchi Cabinet, which was followed on 14 April 1931 by the formation of the Wakatsuki Cabinet, it did not succeed in displacing the "Friendship Policy" fostered by Baron Shidehara, for he was retained as Foreign Minister by Premier Wakatsuki. General MINAMI, who had been a War Councillor since his relief as Commander of the Korean Army, was selected as War Minister. He replaced General Ugaki, who was in disgrace with the Army for having reduced the size of the Army and for having refused to take part in the "March Incident". Ugaki resigned from the Army and went into retirement.

The Wanpaoshan Incident

The "Friendship Policy" was destined to be put to further tests, by two "Incidents", which had far-reaching effect upon opinion in Japan. The first of these "Incidents" occurred at Wanpaoshan, a small village located some 18 miles north of Changchun, in Manchuria. The village is located in a low marshy area alongside the Itung River. A group of Koreans leased a large tract of land near Wanpaoshan and prepared to irrigate the land by digging a ditch several miles long, extending from the Itung River across a tract of land, not included in their lease, and occupied by Chinese farmers. After a considerable length of the ditch had been constructed, the Chinese farmers arose en masse and protested to the Wanpaoshan authorities, who dispatched police and ordered the Koreans to cease construction at once and leave the area occupied by the Chinese. The Japanese Consul at Changchun also sent policy to protect the Koreans. On 1 July 1931, after

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negotiations had produced no results, the Chinese farmers took matters into their own hands and drove the Koreans from their lands and filled the ditch. During this operation, Japanese Consular Police opened fire on the Chinese farmers and drove them away, while the Koreans returned and completed their irrigation project under the protection of the Japanese police. No casualties resulted from this "Incident", but the sensational accounts of it printed in the Japanese and Korean Press caused a series of anti-Chinese riots in Korea in which Chinese were massacred and their property destroyed, which in turn caused a revival of the anti-Japanese boycott in China.

About this time, the War Ministry invited officials of the South Manchurian Railway Company to discuss "Manchurian Problems". At the discussions, MINAMI represented the Army and stated that he had long recognized the necessity of increasing the number of divisions in Korea.

The Nakamura Incident

The killing of a Japanese Army captain by the name of Nakamura, Shintaro, on 27 June 1931 by soldiers under the command of Kuan Yuheng, Commander of the Third Regiment of the Chinese Reclamation Army in Manchuria, which killing did not become known to the Japanese until about 17 July 1931, gave rise to the second "Incident". Captain Nakamura, a regular Japanese Army officer, was on a mission under orders of the Japanese Army. According to the Chinese, he was armed and carried patent medicines, which included narcotic drugs for non-medical purposes. He was accompanied by three interpreters and

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assistants, and represented himself as an "Agricultural Expert". When he reached a point near Taonan, he and his assistants were captured and shot; and their bodies were cremated to conceal the evidence of the deed. This "Incident" greatly aggravated the resentment of the Japanese Military against the "Friendship Policy"; and the Japanese Press repeatedly declared that "solution of the Manchurian Problem ought to be by force!"

The Army Attitude Stiffened

The Army stiffened its attitude in regard to reduction of armaments and the plan of the Finance Department to economize, and threatened to appeal to the Throne. The Foreign Minster was bitterly assailed in the Press and by ultra-nationalists and the militarists for "Shidehara's weak-kneed foreign policy". The Cherry Society continued its agitation for the use of force. The Black Dragon Society held mass-meetings. Dr. Okawa stepped up the tempo of his propaganda. He was conducting a campaign of public speeches and publications to build up sentiment in support of the movement to occupy Manchuria. He made a speech along this line at the Naval Academy. The Army was completely out of control and could not be restrained. The Chiefs of Staff held a conference and decided that since one could not tell what Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang would do, he should be smashed firmly and without hesitation. Dr. Okawa confided in a friend that he and Colonel ITAGAKI and certain other Army officers would bring about an "Incident" in Mukden later on that would solve all "Manchurian Problems". KIDO admits that Baron Harada informed him of a

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plot to this end on the part of the military officers in Manchuria as early as 23 June 1931.

On 4 August 1931, MINAMI addressed a conference of Army Commanders and Commanding Generals. he said, "Some observers, without studying the conditions of neighboring foreign countries, hastily advocate limitation of armaments and engage in propaganda unfavourable to the nation and the Army. Manchuria and Mongolia are very closely related to our country from the viewpoint of our national defense as well as politics and economics, It is to be regretted that the recent situation in that part of China is following a trend unfavourable to our Empire. In view of the situation, I hope you will execute your duty in educating and training the troops with enthusiasm and sincerity so that you may serve the cause of His Majesty to perfection".

The Citizens' disarmament League took issue with MINAMI on this speech and addressed a letter to him in which they accused him of spreading propaganda in the Army in violation of the Military Criminal Code.

Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO and Lt. Colonel Shigeto, who was also a member of the Cherry Society, dined at the home of friend, Fujita, in Tokyo, during August 1931. During the course of the meal, the "Manchurian Problem" was discussed and the two Lt. Colonels agreed that positive action should be taken in Manchuria. A few days later, Lt. Colonel Shigeto appeared at the home of Fujita and deposited a large sum of money for safe-keeping. During the following days, this fund was drawn upon by SHigeto in varying amounts. After the "Mukden Incident", Fujita called at the home of Shigeto and exclaimed, "You have accomplished what you were contemplating

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in Manchuria!" Shigeto replied, "Yes!" and smiled; he then added, "We will expel Chang Hsueh-liang from Manchuria and bring Pu Yi to Manchuria and install him as Governor of the Far Eastern Provinces!" Upon questioning HASHIMOTO, Fujita received the reply, "Yes, things have come to pass where they should come!"

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Dohihara Investigated

Colonel DOHIHARA, who had been attached to the Army General Staff since his return from China in March 1929, was sent by the Chief of the General Staff to investigate the death of Captain Nakamura. Although his mission was ostensibly to investigate Captain Nokamura's death, his real mission appears to have been to determine the strength, state of training and condition of the Chinese armies and the efficiency of their communication system. He departed from Tokyo in July 1931, and traveled by way of Shanghai, Hankow, Peiping and Tientsin before reporting to Mukden. He admits that the investigation of the Nakamura Incident was only one of the missions that took him to China. Although the Headquarters of the Kwantung Army was in Port Arthur, the Headquarters of the Special Services Organization of that Army was in Mukden. DOHIHARA arrived at Mukden on 18 August 1931 and took command of the Special Service Organization.

Foreign Minister Shidehara Also Investigated

Foreign Minister Shidehara, anxious to enforce his "Friendship Policy" in Manchuria and give the Army no occasion to capitalize on the "Nakamura Incident", dispatched Consul-General Hayashi from Tokyo on 17 August 1931 with instructions to investigate and settle the affair. The Consul-General called upon the Chinese Governor of Liaoning Province, who appointed a commission to investigate and report upon the "Incident". This

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Commission reported on 3 September 1931; but its report was unsatisfactory to the Chinese authorities. On the 4th of September, Consul-General Hayashi was informed by General Yung Chen, the Chinese Chief of Staff, that the report of the Commission was indecisive and unsatisfactory and that it would be necessary to conduct a second enquiry. Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, who was sick in a hospital at Peping, was advised of the situation; and he immediately ordered a new Commission to be appointed and instructed to investigate the death of Captain Nakamura. At the same time, he sent Major Shibayama to Tokyo to confer with Foreign Minister Shidehara and make it clear that he desired to settle the case amicably. In the meantime, he had sent a high official to Tokyo to confer with Baron Shidehara and ascertain what common ground could be found for the settlement of various Sino-Japanese issues then outstanding.

Dohihara Reported to the Army General Staff

Colonel DOHIHARA returned to Tokyo early in September to report to the Army General Staff. After his return,the Press freely published references to the fact that it had been decided to use force to settle all pending issues in Manchuria as recommended by Colonel DOHIHARA. THe Press also stated that conferences were being held between the War Ministry and the Army General Staff to arrange definite instructions to be given to Colonel DOHIHARA. These publications may or may not be factually accurate. They were not officially denied.

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They fanned the rising flame of Japanese opinion in favoring the use of force against China. It is established that Colonel DOHIHARA disagreed with Consul-General Hayashi regarding settlement of the Nakamura Incident and continued to question the sincerity of the Chinese efforts to arrive at a satisfactory solution of the case. War Minister MINAMI later confided in a friend that at the time he had advocated decisive settlement of the "Manchurian Problem" in line with Army opinion. KIDO, as Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, noted in his diary on 10 September 1931 that he agreed with the theory that "self-defensive" action might be unavoidable in connection with Manchuria according to future developments.

Foreign Minister Shidehara Continued Efforts at Mediation

Rumors were current in Tokyo that the Army was planning an "Incident" in Mukden, and these rumors were heard by Foreign Minister Shidehara. In fact, Shidehara stated, "Shortly before the Manchurian Incident, as Foreign Minister, I received confidential reports and information that the Kwantung Army was engaged in amassing troops and bringing up ammunition and material for some military purpose, and knew from such reports that action of some kind was contemplated by the Military Clique".

It now appears from the evidence adduced before this Tribunal--though these facts were not known to Shidehara at the time--that Lieutenant, or Captain,

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Kawakami, who was stationed at Fushun in command of a detached company of the second battalion of the Independent Infantry Garrison, had received orders from the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army which involved the absence of himself and his company from Fushun. The remaining companies of this battalion were stationed at Mukden and took part in the attack on the Chinese Barracks at Mukden on the 18th of September. The full content of the orders which Kawakami had received form the Commander-in-Chief is not established, but they involved that Kawakami and his company should entrain and leave Fushun upon the occurrence of a certain emergency. Thereupon, Kawakami assembled the Japanese police, ex-servicemen, and civilians at Fushun and asked them what they would do if on 18th September 1931 an event occurred in Mukden which required him and his company to leave Fushun. He is said to have been anxious about defense at Fushun should he and his company leave that city. He also assembled the officials of the Railway at Fushun. He told them that some acute situation might arise after the 17th of September and that arrangements ought to be made about trains at Fushun. It appears that up till that time no arrangement had been made for having a night train standing by at Fushun to move troops in case of emergency, and Kawakami desired that such provision should be made.

The cased for the defence in regard to this most significant affair is that Kawakami had no orders which related specifically to the 18th of September; that his orders were general, to take certain action if and when an emergency occurred; that upon a review of the situation, Kawakami speculated that the emergency might occur about the 18th of September; and that this guess

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of his along accounts for his mention of that date, when speaking to the people at Fushun. Thus, according to the defence, Kawakami guessed the exact date on which the Chinese would deliver a surprise attack on the Japanese troops at Mukden. Upon a consideration of all the facts relating to the incident of 18th September, the Tribunal unhesitatingly rejects this explanation and hold that Kawakami had orders to take certain action in an emergency, which would occur on the night of the 18th of September, and was concerned since there was no provision for leaving a train available at Fushun at night.

Upon receiving the report from Hayashi, Shidehara called upon War Minister MINAMI and strongly protested against the report. In the meantime, SHIGEMITSU was holding conferences with Mr. T.V. Soong, who was Finance Minister of the Republic of China, and they had agreed to meet in Mukden on 20 September 1931, and confer with Marshal Chang Hseuh-liang and Count Uchida, who was President of the South Manchurian Railway Company, in an effort to settle all outstanding differences between Japan and the Marshal.

Night Maneuvers by the Kwantung Army

The Kwantung Army had begun carrying out night maneuvers on 14 September 1931 in the vicinity of the barracks of the 7th Chinese Brigade. These barracks were located near the tracks of the South Manchurian Railway, a short distance north of Mukden.

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The maneuvers involved vigorous rifle and machine-gun fire, and the 10,000 men of the 7th Brigade had been confined to barracks on orders of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang in order to avoid a clash between them and the Japanese. These maneuvers continued up to and including the night of 18 September 1931.

Mr. Morishima, a member of the staff of the Consulate who had been working with Hayashi in an attempt to settle the Nakamura Incident, learned that the Kwantung Army Units stationed at the important coal mining district of Fushun would execute a maneuver which contemplated the occupation of Mukden, leaving Fushun at about 11:30 p.m. on the night of 18 September 1931.

Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's Commission Returned to Mukden

Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's Commission, which had been investigating the Nakamura Incident, returned to Mukden on the morning of 16 September 1931. The Japanese Consul-General called upon General Yung Chen, the Chinese Chief of Staff, on the afternoon of 18 September 1931, and the latter stated that Commander Kuan Yuheng had been brought to Mukden on 16 September 1931, charged with the responsibility for the murder of Captain Nakamura and would be immediately tried by a court-martial. It appeared that the case would be settled. However, the conference between the Consul and General Yung was adjourned at about 8 p.m., because it was felt that since a member of the Military was involved, it would be necessary to confer with appropriate representatives of the Kwantung Army before any further representations could be made to the Chinese officials.

Mr. Morishima, of the Consulate, was detailed to arrange for the attendance of appropriate military representatives at a further conference, which was to be held later in the

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evening. He endeavored to contact Colonel DOHIHARA, and Major Hanaya; however, he was unable to locate either of them or any other office of the Special Service Office, although he sought them at their respective hotels, offices, billets and other places which they frequented. He reported this to the Consulate and retired to his quarters.

Minami's Emissary Went Astray

General Tatekawa of the Army General Staff arrived in Mukden via the Antung-Mukden Railway at 1:00 p.m. on 18 September 1931. He had been sent to Manchuria to make an inspection for the Army General Staff; and War Minister MINAMI, acting on Foreign Minister Shidehara's protest against the rumor that the army planned an "Incident" at Mukden for the 18th, had instructed Tatekawa to stop that plot. MINAMI's denial that he gave this order to Tatekawa is disproved by the subsequent statements of MINAMI and by other statements of Tatekawa. The Kwantung Army Commander Honjo, who had just completed an inspection of his troops and installations, was delivering an address to the 2nd Division at Liaoyang when he received a telegram from his Chief-of-Staff, Miyake, in Port Arthur, informing him of Tatekawa's visit and suggesting that Staff Officer ITAGAKI or Staff Officer Ishihara be detailed to meet Tatekawa and escort him on his inspection tour.

Colonel ITAGAKI was detailed and proceeded form Liaoyang to Mukden; and upon his arrival, went to the Shinyokan Inn. DOHIHARA's assistant, Major Hanaya, of the Special Service Office in Mukden, met General Tatekawa and escorted him to join Colonel ITAGAKI at the Inn, where Colonel ITAGAKI and he dined that evening. According to ITAGAKI, General Tatekawa complained that he had not been able to rest on his trip and

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was not inclined to discuss business immediately, but did state that the superiors were worrying about the careless and unscrupulous conduct of the young officers. To this, ITAGAKI replied that there was no need to worry about that, and that he would hear the General at leisure the next day. After dinner, ITAGAKI took his leave of General Tatekawa and went to the Special Service Office, arriving there about 9 p.m. General Tatekawa later told a friend that he had no desire to interfere with any proposed "Incident" and had allowed himself to be decoyed to the Inn, where he was entertained by geisha girls while he listened to the sound of firing in the distance and later retired and slept soundly until called in the morning.

The Mukden Incident

At 9 o'clock in the evening of 18 September 1931, Officer Liu, at the barracks of the 7th Chinese Brigade, reported that a train composed of three or four coaches, but without the usual type of locomotive, had stopped on the South Manchurian Railway opposite the barracks. At 10 p.m., the sound of a loud explosion was heard, immediately followed by rifle fire. The Japanese account is that Lt. Kawamoto, of the Kwantung Army, with six men under his command, was on patrol duty, practising defence exercises along the track near the place where the explosion occurred, that he heard the explosion; that his patrol turned and ran back about 200 yards and found that a portion of one of the rails had been blown out; that while on the site of the explosion, the patrol was fired upon from the fields on the east side of the tracks; that at that moment, the regular southbound train, due in Mukden at 10:30 p.m., was heard approaching; and that the train

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passed over the damaged rail without mishap to arrive in Mukden on time. Captain Kawashima and his company arrived at 10:50 p.m. and the Battalion Commander Lieutenant Colonel Shimamoto commanding the Second Battalion of the Independent Infantry Garrison ordered two more companies to proceed to the spot. They arrived about midnight. Another company at Fushun, which was an hour-and-a-half away, was ordered to proceed to the spot also. This is the Company of Kawakami, who had long ago announced that he and his Company would have to leave Fushun on the night of the 18th. The barracks of the 7th Chinese Brigade were glittering with electric lights, but the Japanese attacked the barracks without hesitation at 11:30 p.m., employing artillery as well as rifles and machine-guns. Most of the Chinese soldiers escaped from the barracks and retreated to Erhtaitze, to the northeast; however, the Japanese claim they buried 320 Chinese soldiers and captured 20 wounded. The loss to the Japanese was two privates killed and 22 wounded. Colonel Hirata commanding the 29th Regiment received a telephone message at 10:40 p.m. from Lt. Colonel Shimamoto informing him of the explosion on the railroad and the plan to attack the barracks.

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Colonel Hirata immediately decided to attack the walled city of Mukden. His attack commenced at 11:30 p.m. No resistance was offered, the only fighting that occurred was with the police, of whom approximately 75 were killed. The 2nd Division and part of the 16th Regiment left Liaoyang at 3:30 a.m. of the 19th and arrived at Mukden at 5 a.m. The arsenal and aerodrome were captured at 7:30 a.m. Colonel ITAGAKI later admitted that heavy guns, which had been secretly installed in the Japanese Infantry Compound on the 10th, had proven useful in the bombardment of the airfield after the fighting got under way. After ITAGAKI took leave of General Tatakawa, he went to the Special Service Office. There, according to him, he was informed by Colonel Shimamoto of his decision to attack the barracks of the 7th Chinese Brigade and by Colonel Hirata of his

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decision to attack the walled city of Mukden. ITAGAKI says that he accepted their decisions and took steps to report to the Commander-in-Chief at Port Arthur.

Itagaki Refused to Negotiate

In the meantime, at 10:30 o'clock in the evening of 18 September 1931, Mr. Morishima of the Japanese Consulate, received a telephone call from the Army Special Service Office in Mukden advising him that an explosion had occurred on the South Manchurian Railway and that he should report to the Special Service Headquarters in Mukden. He arrived at 10:45 and found ITAGAKI and Major Kanaya and some others there. ITAGAKI stated that the Chinese had exploded the railroad, that Japan must take appropriate military action, and that orders had been issued to that effect. Mr. Morishima tried to persuade ITAGAKI that they should rely upon peaceful negotiations to adjust the matter. ITAGAKI then reprimanded him and wanted to know if the office of the Consul-General intended to interfere with the right of military command. Mr. Morishima insisted that he was certain the matter could be adjusted amicably through normal negotiations. At that point, Major Hanaya unsheathed his sword in an angry gesture and stated that if Morishima insisted, he should be prepared to suffer the consequences. Hanaya also stated that he would kill anyone who endeavored to interfere. That broke up the conference.

The Japanese Consulate received many requests during the night from the Supreme Advisor for Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang imploring the office of the Consul-General to persuade the Japanese Army to cease attacks. All these representations were communicated to the military, but to no avail, and the fighting continued. The Consul-General talked over the

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telephone a number of times during the night of the 18th and morning of the 19th with Colonel ITAGAKI in an effort to persuade him to cease the fighting, but Colonel ITAGAKI remained defiant and consistently informed the Consul-General that he should cease interference with the right of military command. Consul-General Hayashi on the morning of 19 September 1931 cabled Foreign Minister Shidehara, "In view of the fact that it was proposed several times from the Chinese side that this matter be settled in a peaceful way, I 'phoned to Staff Officer ITAGAKI and said that since Japan and China had not yet formally entered into a state of war and that, moreover, as China had declared that she would act upon the non-resistance principle absolutely, it was necessary for us at this time to endeavor to prevent the aggravation fo the 'Incident' unnecessarily, and I urged that the matter be handled through diplomatic channels, but the above mentioned Staff Officer answered that since this matter concerned the prestige of the State and the Army, it was the Army's intention to see it through thoroughly."

The Mukden Incident Was Planned

The evidence is abundant and convincing that the Mukden Incident" was carefully planned beforehand by officers of the Army General Staff, officers of the Kwantung Army, members of the Cherry Society, and others. Several of the Participators in the plan, including HASHIMOTO, have on various occasions admitted their part in the plot and have stated that the object of the "Incident" was to afford an excuse for the occupation of Manchuria by the Kwantung Army, and the establishment of a new State there based on the "Kingly Way" and subservient to Japan. In Japan,

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General Tatekawa of the Army General Staff was the leader. This was the same Tatekawa whom MINAMI, on Shidehara's complaint, sent to Mukden to stop the plot, the same Tatekawa who had no desire to interfere with any proposed incident. In Manchuria, ITAGAKI was the principal figure. The case which has been presented to the Tribunal as a general defence of the actions of the Japanese on the night of 18th September and as a particular defence of those who, like ITAGAKI, were in action on that night is this: it is said that previous to that night, Chinese troops in Manchuria had increased so that the Japanese troops in Manchuria, who numbered only some 10,000 men, then faced a hostile army which numbered some 200,000 men and was superior in equipment to the Japanese; it is said that the disposition of the Chinese troops had recently been changed so that the japanese troops, widely dispersed in groups along the railway line, faced concentrations which threatened their annihilation; it is said that the behaviour of the Chinese troops towards the Japanese troops was provocative and insulting; it is said that all indications pointed to an unprovoked attack by the Chinese troops upon the Japanese troops, in which the latter would be overwhelmed, unless decisive counter-action was promptly taken. Therefore, it is said, a plan was drawn up whereby, if the Chinese attacked, the Kwantung Army would concentrate its main forces in the vicinity of Mukden and deliver a heavy blow to the nucleus of the Chinese forces in the vicinity of Mukden, and thus by sealing the fate of the enemy, would settle the matter within a short period. It was a part of this plan that two heavy guns should be secretly set up in the Mukden Independent Garrison Barracks. Such is the testimony of ITAGAKI. When therefore, says ITAGAKI, he heard on the night of 18th September of

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the blowing up of the railway and the fighting outside the Chinese Barracks, it was apparent that this was a planned challenge on the part of the Chinese Regular Army against the Japanese Army and he approved of the decisions to attack the Chinese Barracks and the walled city of Mukden, because it was absolutely necessary and in line with the plan of operations of the Army drawn up in case of emergency.

The picture thus painted is that of a planned attack by the Chinese Army, overwhelmingly superior in numbers, upon some 1500 Japanese troops in the vicinity of Mukden; of a surprise attack upon an unanticipated occasion; and of a swift counter-attack by the Japanese troops at the nucleus of the superior forces, whereby they were routed. The picture is false save in the one particular, that Mukden was captured and the Chinese troops driven away.

The Chinese troops had no plan to attack the Japanese. They were caught unprepared. In the attack on the Barracks, where there were thousands of Chinese troops, the Japanese fired form the darkness upon the brightly lit Barracks and met with trifling resistance, mainly from some Chinese troops who were cut off in their attempt to escape. In their capture of the city of Mukden, they met only negligible resistance on the part of some police.

There is no question of the Japanese being surprised by the events of that night. For some time before 18 September 1931, rumors were current in Japan that the Army was planning an "Incident" in Mukden. Lieutenant Kawakami at Fushun had revealed that an "event" might occur in Mukden on 18 September 1931. Consul-General Hayashi had telegraphed to the Foreign Minister the news that the Company Commander of a Japanese Unit at Fushun had said that within a week a big "Incident" would break out. Morishima, a member of the staff of the Japanese Consulate at Mukden, had learned that

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Kwantung Army units stationed at Fushun would execute a manoeuvre which contemplated the occupation of Mukden, leaving Fushun about 11:30 on the night of 18 September 1931. The Foreign Minister attached so much credence to the information he had that he complained to the War Minister and persuaded the latter to dispatch General Tatekawa to Manchuria to "stop the plot", a General who, having non desire to interfere with any proposed :incident" failed to fulfill his mission. And when, as the Japanese allege, a patrol of a Lieutenant and six men was fired on in the dark of the night of 18 September 1931, all the Japanese forces in Manchuria were brought into action almost simultaneously on that night over the whole area of the South Manchuria Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur, a distance of approximately 400 miles. The Chinese troops at Antung, Yingkow, Liaoyang and other smaller towns were overcome and disarmed without resistance. The Japanese Railway Guards and gendarmerie remained in these places and the units of the 2nd Division at once concentrated at Mukden to take part in the more serious operations. ITAGAKI was at the Special Service Office at Mukden to approve the initial attacks by the Japanese, and to resist all efforts by the Japanese Consul-General Hayashi and the Japanese Consul Morishima to persuade him to stop the fighting, notwithstanding that the Consul-General informed him that China had declared that she would act on the principle of non-resistance. Even among the Japanese there were those who believed that the "Incident" was planned by the Japanese. A year after it happened, we find the Emperor inquiring if the "Incident" was the result of a Japanese plot, as rumored. The Tribunal rejects the Japanese contention and holds that the so-called "Incident" of 18 September 1931 was planned and executed by the Japanese.

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Preparation for war in China was not confined to the Kwantung Army. In Japan, an unusual shift of personnel occurred on 1 August 1931 as if in anticipation of coming events. Such trusted officers as OSHIMA, KOISO, MUTO, UMEZU, HATA and ARAKI, were included in this personnel shift. OSHIMA was appointed a Chief of Section in the army General Staff, a Member of the Military Technical Council, and Liaison Officer to the Navy General Staff; KOISO was appointed a Lt. General; MUTO was relieved as an instructor in Strategy at the Military Staff College and made available to the Army General Staff; UMEZU was made Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Army General Staff Office; HATA was promoted to Lt. General and assigned as Inspector of Artillery and Commander of the 14th Division; and ARAKI was appointed Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Office of the Inspector-General of Military Education.

General Honjo Assumed Command at Mukden

Colonel ITAGAKI, who, as senior staff officer on the spot, had been in active command at Mukden during the "Incident", was relieved by General Honjo, who arrived at Mukden at noon on 19 September 1931 and rapidly expanded the "Mukden Incident" into what came to be known as the "Manchurian Incident".

Honjo had returned to Port Arthur, after delivering his address to the 2nd Division, the Division which attacked Mukden, arriving at Port Arthur about 9 p.m. on 18 September 1931. Honjo had received the first news of the fighting at Mukden at about 11 p.m. from a newspaper agency. He immediately went to Kwantung Army Headquarters in Port Arthur, where he issued orders that action should follow the operational plans already established. It is

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stated in evidence that a few minutes after midnight on the 18th, a second telegram form the Special Service Office at Mukden was received at the Kwantung Army Headquarters reporting that the fighting had become more widespread and that the Chinese forces were bringing up reinforcements. if a telegram to this effect was received, there was no basis in fact for the statement that the Chinese forces were bringing up reinforcements. They were in full retreat from the Japanese attack. Honjo's staff advised that he should "mobilize the whole of the Japanese military might to seal the fate of the enemy in the shortest possible time". Honjo replied, "Yes, let it be done". Orders were immediately issued bringing into action all Japanese forces in Manchuria; the Japanese Garrison Army in Korea was asked to send reinforcements in accordance with the pre-arranged plan; and the Second Overseas Fleet was requested to sail for Yingkow. Under these orders, all the Japanese forces in Manchuria, and some of those in Korea, were brought into action almost simultaneously on the night of 18 September 1931 over the whole are of the South Manchurian Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur.

Upon arriving at Mukden, General Honjo set up a command post at the railway station and declared to the world his intention to wage a punitive war.

Minami Sanctioned the Kwantung Army Action

War Minister MINAMI sanctioned the action of the Kwantung Army and acted as a buffer between that Army and the Cabinet to prevent effective interference by the Government. He received information of the situation at Mukden in a telegram from the Special Service Office there at about 3 a.m. on 19 September 1931. Premier Wakatsuki first heard of the fighting when he received a telephone

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call from MINAMI sometime between 6 and 7 o'clock on the morning of 19 September 1931. The Premier called a meeting of the Cabinet for 10 a.m. MINAMI sent Lt. General KOISO, who was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, to act as Liaison Officer between the Army General Staff and the Cabinet. At the Cabinet meeting, MINAMI reported that the Chinese troops had fired on the Japanese troops at Mukden and that their fire had been returned. He characterized the action of the Japanese as "an act of righteous self-defense". The Cabinet expressed a desire that the affair be terminated at once. MINAMI stated that he would investigate and report to the Cabinet. The Cabinet then resolved upon a policy of non-expansion of the "Incident". THe Premier called upon the Emperor at 1:30 o'clock that afternoon and informed him of the situation and the decision of the Cabinet. The Emperor agreed that the Army should not try to enlarge the situation, but should stop further action as soon as it found itself in an advantageous position. MINAMI dispatched Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO and two other officers of the Army General Staff to Mukden for the announced purpose of communicating to the Kwantung Army Commander the decision of the Government to prevent the expansion of the "Incident".

The Army was not to be controlled; and the Premier cast about desperately, but without success, for assistance in enforcing this policy of non-expansion of the "Incident". In an effort to find a way to control the Army, the Premier held a meeting at 8:30 of the evening of 19 September 1931 at the official residence of the Minister of the Imperial Household; Senior Statesman Prince Saionji's Secretary, Baron Harada, Chief Secretary to the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal KIDO, the Grand Chamberlain, the Vice-Grand Chamberlain, and the Military

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Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty, among others, were present. The only suggestion came from KIDO, who proposed daily meetings of the Cabinet. This suggestion proved to be of no effect, since War Minister MINAMI reported at each of these meetings that for "strategic and tactical" considerations, it had been necessary for the Japanese forces to pursue the Chinese troops a certain distance further into Chinese territory, but that such action was only "protective" and would in no sense be expanded. However, at this very time, the Chinese had proposed through Minister T.V. Soong that a powerful commission be organized, consisting of both Japanese and Chinese, in an effort to prevent further expansion of the conflict. SHIGEMITSU, in reporting this proposal to Foreign Minister SHidehara suggested that it be accepted, if for no other reason than to strengthen the position of the Japanese in regard to the "Incident". Although Imperial Sanction was required under existing regulations for the Korean Army to commence operations outside Korea, the 39th Mixed Brigade of the 20th Division, consisting of 4,000 men and artillery, which had concentrated at Shingishu on the Korean frontier, crossed the Yalu River into Manchuria on 21 September 1931, and arrived at Mukden around midnight of the same day, without having received the Imperial Sanction; nevertheless, the Cabinet decided on 22 September 1931 that the expenses incurred in this move should be defrayed, and later the Imperial Sanction for this move

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was obtained. This had not been reported to the Cabinet by MINAMI. At the Cabinet meeting of 22 September 1931, MINAMI made further excuses for allowing the Army to continue its aggression. As Premier Wakatsuki says: "Day after day expansion continued; and I had various conference with War Minister MINAMI. I was shown maps daily on which MINAMI would show by a line a boundary which the Army would not go beyond, and almost daily this boundary was ignored and further expansion reported, but always with assurances that this was the final move".

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KIDO recorded in his diary, that during a discussion by a group at the residence of Baron Harada, it was mentioned that although the Emperor had approved the Cabinet's policy of non-expansion, the Army had been indignant that the Emperor had been induced by his personal attendants to form such an opinion. It was decided by this group that the Emperor had better say no more about the Cabinet's policy; and that Elder Statesman Prince Saionji had better remain out of Tokyo to avoid intensifying the antipathy held for him by the Military Clique. In this manner, MINAMI's effective cooperation with the Army General Staff, through his Liaison Officer KOISO, prevented the Government from enforcing its decision to halt further expansion of the "Mukden Incident". This is confirmed by an admission made by MINAMI after the surrender that he had been in favor of the action taken by the Kwantung Army.

Colonel Dohihara Returned to Mukden

Colonel DOHIHARA had completed his report to the Army General Staff, recommended the solution of all pending "Manchurian Questions" by the use of force as soon as possible, and was on his way back to his Special Service Office in Mukden to play the principal role in the organization of the new State in Manchuria based on the "Kingly Way", when the "Incident" occurred there. DOHIHARA's extensive knowledge of China and its people, gained over some eighteen years spent in active participation in local politics as a Military Aide under successive Chinese military leaders, qualified him more than any other Japanese Army officer to act as over-all advisor and coordinator in the planning, execution and exploitation of the "Mukden Incident".

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There can be no doubt that such was the part played by DOHIHARA. His reconnaissance trip through China, with a brief pause in Mukden before reporting to the Army General Staff, and his return to Mukden on the eve of the "Incident", together with his actions thereafter, leave us with no other conclusion.

Colonel Dohihara as Mayor of Mukden

The organization of a provincial government for Liaoning Province had proven to be a difficult one, because Mukden was the center of the Province, and during the fighting, most of the influential Chinese had fled to Chinchow where they were continuing to carry on the provincial administration. Chinese General Tsanh Shih-yi, who was Governor of the Province and had remained in Mukden, refused to cooperate with the Japanese in the organization of a new provincial government; for this, he was immediately arrested and confined in prison. Being thus hindered by lack of cooperation from the Chinese, the Japanese Army issued a proclamation on 21 September 1931 installing Colonel DOHIHARA as Mayor of Mukden; he proceeded to rule the city with the aid of a so-called "Emergency Committee" composed mostly of Japanese. By 23 September 1931, DOHIHARA had made himself complete master of the city and was found by visiting journalists in the Japanese Army Headquarters, where he was acting as political representative and spokesman for the Army. From this point on, the organization of provisional governments for the three Eastern Provinces made headway. On 23 September 1931, Lt. General Hsi Hsia was invited to form a provisional government for Kirin Province, and the next day, it

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was announced that a provisional government had been formed for Liaoning Province with Mr. Yuan Chin-hai as Chairman of the "Committee for the Maintenance of Peace and Order". THe Japanese Press hailed this as the first step in a separatist movement.

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Self-Government Guiding Board

The Self-Government GUiding Board was organized by the Japanese Army in Mukden during the last half of September 1931. The purpose of the Board was to start an independence movement and spread it throughout Manchuria. Colonel ITAGAKI was in charge of the Staff Section having supervision over the Board; and Colonel DOHIHARA, as head of the Special Service Office, supplied the Board with all necessary confidential information regarding the Chinese. Although the Chairman of the Board was Chinese, approximately 90 per cent of the personnel employed by the Board were Japanese residents in Manchuria.

General Hsi Hsia accepted the Japanese invitation, called a meeting of government organization and Japanese advisors, and on 30 September issued a proclamation establishing a provisional government for Kirin Province under protection of the Japanese Army.

General Chang Ching-hui, Administrator of the Special District, also called a conference in his office at Harbin on 27 September 1931 to discuss the organization of an "Emergency Committee of the Special District".

General Honjo took advantage of some minor disturbances in the town of Chientao, in Kirin Province, to announced that Japan would no longer recognize the government of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and would not cease operations until his power was completely broken.

Protests and Assurances

China lodged a protest with the League of Nations against the action of Japan in Manchuria. The protest was filed on 23 September 1931. The Council of the League was assured by the Japanese Government that Japan had started withdrawing her troops to the railroad zone and would

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continue the withdrawal; upon this assurance, the Council adjourned to meet again on 14 October 1931.

The United States of America also protested against the fighting in Manchuria, and on 24 September 1931 called the attention of both Japan and China to the provisions of the existing treaties. After a Cabinet meeting that day, the Japanese Ambassador in Washington delivered to the Secretary of State of the United States a Note in which it was stated among other things, "It may be superfluous to repeat that the Japanese Government harbors no territorial designs in Manchuria".

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The October Incident

These assurances given to the League and to the United States indicated that the Cabinet and the Army did not agree upon a common policy in Manchuria. It was this disagreement which caused the so-called "October Incident". This was an attempt on the part of certain officers of the Army General Staff and their sympathizers to organize a coup d'etat to overthrow the Government, destroy the political party system, and establish a new Government which would support the Army's plan for the occupation and exploitation of Manchuria. The plot centered around the Cherry Society; and the plan was to "cleanse the ideological and political atmosphere" by assassinating the government leaders. HASHIMOTO was the leader of the group and gave the necessary orders for the execution of the scheme. HASHIMOTO admitted that he originated the plot in early October 1931 to bring about a Government headed by ARAKI. KIDO was well informed of the proposed rebellion and his only concern seems to have been to find a way to limit the disorders to as to prevent widespread damage and sacrifices. However, a certain Lt. Colonel Nemoto informed the Police of the plot, and War Minister MINAMI ordered the leaders arrested, thereby breaking up the plot. SHIRATORI criticized MINAMI for opposing the coup and declared that it was necessary to take prompt acton so as to create a new regime in Manchuria; and that if MINAMI had given his tacit approval to the scheme, it would have facilitated a solution of the "Manchurian Problem".

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After the failure of the "October Incident", rumors were heard to the effect that if the Central Authorities in Tokyo did not support the Kwantung Army in the execution of its plan to occupy all Manchuria and establish a puppet State there, that Army would declared itself independent of Japan and proceed with the project. This threat appears to have been effective in producing a change in the Government and its attitude.

The War Ministry began censoring the news; and army officers called upon writers and editors, who wrote or published anything unsatisfactory to the War Ministry, and advised them that such writings were displeasing to the War Ministry. Violent organizations threatened editors and writers when they expressed views contrary to that of the War Ministry.

Decision to Enthrone Pu Yi

After this change of attitude by the Japanese Government, Colonel ITAGAKI and Colonel DOHIHARA decided to return Henry Pu Yi, the deposed Emperor of China, and enthrone him as emperor of Manchuria as an emergency measure to combat the influence of Marshal Chang Hseuh-liang, which was growing progressively stronger with the unity between the Young Marshal and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The new provisional government operating under the protection of the Japanese Army had succeeded in taking over all tax collection and finance institutions and had further strengthened its position by reorganization, but it was having considerably difficulty due to the Marshal's continued popularity. The Kwantung Army General Staff became fearful that the provisional government set up

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by them would conspire with the Marshal; therefore, it was decided by Colonels ITAGAKI and DOHIHARA to proceed at once with the organization of an independent State by uniting the Three Eastern Provinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin and Liaoning under the nominal leadership of Henry Pu Yi, the dethroned Emperor of China.

Colonel Dohihara Proceeds to Return Pu Yi

DOHIHARA was dispatched by ITAGAKI to Tientsin to return Pu Yi to Manchuria. ITAGAKI made all necessary arrangements and gave DOHIHARA definite instructions. The plan was to pretend that Pu Yi had returned to resume his throne in answer to a popular demand of the people of Manchuria, and that Japan had nothing to do with his return, but would do nothing to oppose the popular demand of the people. In order to carry out this plan, it was necessary to land Pu Yi at Yinkgow before that port became frozen; therefore, it was imperative that he arrive there before 16 November 1931.

Foreign Minister Shidehara had learned of the scheme to return Pu Yi to Manchuria and had instructed his Consul-General at Tientsin to oppose the plan. On the afternoon of 1 November 1931, the Consul-General contacted DOHIHARA as instructed and tried every means at his disposal to persuade him to abandon the plan, but DOHIHARA was determined and stated that if the Emperor was willing to risk his life by returning to Manchuria, it would be easy to make the whole affair appear to be instigated by the Chinese; he further stated that he would confer with the Emperor; and if

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the Emperor was willing, he would go through with the scheme; but if the Emperor was not willing, then he would leave with a parting remark that there would be no such opportunity in the future for the Emperor, and dispatch a telegram to the military authorities at Mukden to the effect that he would consider an alternative as the present plan was hopeless of success.

During the evening of 2 November 1931, DOHIHARA visited Pu Yi and informed him as follows: Conditions were favorable for Pu Yi's enthronement and the opportunity should not be missed. He should make an appearance in Manchuria by all means before 16 November 1931. If he did so appear, Japan would recognize him as Emperor of an independent State and conclude a secrete defensive and offensive alliance with the new State. If the Chinese Nationalist Armies should attack the new State, Japan's armies would crush them. Pu Yi appeared willing to follow DOHIHARA' advice upon being told that the Japanese Imperial Household favored his restoration to the Throne.

The Consul-General continued his efforts to dissuade DOHIHARA, but without results. On one occasion, DOHIHARA threatened that it would be outrageous for the Government to take the attitude of preventing Pb Yi's return; and that if this should occur, the Kwantung Army might separate from the Government and no one could say what action it might take.

Some difficulty was encountered by DOHIHARA in arranging the terms upon which Pu Yi was to return; and a Chinese newspaper in Shanghai, under a Tientsin date line fro 2 November 1931,

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published a complete account of the scheme and alleged that Pu Yi had refused DOHIHARA's offer. To hasten PU Yi's decision, DOHIHARA resorted to all kinds of schemes and intrigues. Pu Yi received a bomb concealed in a basket of fruit; he also received threatening letters from the "Headquarters of the Iron Blood Group", as well as form others. DOHIHARA finally caused a riot to occur in Tientsin on 8 November 1931 with the assistance of certain underworld characters, secret societies and rogues of the city, whom he supplied with arms furnished by ITAGAKI. The Japanese Consul-General, in a further attempt to carry out Shidehara's orders, warned the Chinese Police of the impending riot; being forewarned, they were able to prevent the riot from being a complete success; but it served th throw Tientsin into disorder.

This disorder continued, and during the riot on the night of 10 November 1931, DOHIHARA secretly removed Pu Yi from his residence to the pier in a motor car guarded by a party equipped with machine-guns, entered a small Japanese military launch with a few plain-clothes men and four or five armed Japanese soldiers and headed down the river to Tang-ku. At Tang-ku, the party boarded the ship Awaji Maru bound for Yingkow. Pu Yi arrived at Yingkow on 13 November 1931, and on the same day was taken to Tang-Kang-tzu, where he was held in protective custody in the Hotel Tai Sui Haku by the Japanese Army. An attempt was made to cause it to appear that Pu Yi had fled for his life as a result of threats and the riots in Tientsin. No doubt, these served to hasten Pu Yi's agreement with the terms offered by DOHIHARA.

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Enthronement of Pu Yi Delayed

In an effort to prevent further aggravation of Japan's position in the League and keep Japan's Representative in a favorable position before the Council during its deliberations, MINAMI advised the Kwantung Army to delay the enthronement of Pu Yi. On 15 November 1931, he sent a telegram to General Honjo in which he said: "Especially, to commit such hasty actions when we have just begun to see the signs of favorable results of our efforts to improve the atmosphere of the League of Nations is by no means a wise policy. Therefore, for the time being, we would like to have you lead the general public in such a way so as not have Pu Yi connected in any way, whether it be active or passive, with political problems. Naturally, in establishing a new regime, if our Empire takes the wrong attitude we must expect either an intervention by the United States based upon the Nine-Power Treaty or a council of the World Powers. Moreover, under the present conditions in Manchuria, it is an internationally recognized fact that an establishment of the new regime would not be possible without the understanding and support of the Imperial Army. Therefore, when Pu Yi unexpectedly enters into the picture of the establishment of the new regime, and even if it is ostensibly performed according to the wishes of the people, there would be fear of arousing world suspicion. it is essential that our Empire lead world situations so that we can at least and at any time conduct a legal argument against the Powers. I would like to have you keep this point in mind".

The Army moved Pu Yi on 20 November 1931 to Port Arthur and installed him in the Yamato Hotel with

--572--

explanation that he was receiving too many undesirable visitors at Tang-Kang-tzu. DOHIHARA and ITAGAKI arranged secretly for the Emperor's wife to join him at Port Arthur.

The Advance on Chinchow

An expedition to the Nonni River Bridge, which succeeded in defeating General Ma Chen-shen, the Military Governor of Heilungkian Province, and driving him toward the northeast upon Heilun during the first half of November 1931, had also resulted in the occupation of Taitsihar, and the elimination of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's authority from all of Manchuria, except for a fragment of Southeast Liaoning Province surrounding the city of Chinchow. The occupation of Chinchow was all that remained to make the subjugation of Manchuria complete.

The Chinese provincial Government, which had fled from Mukden, had established itself in Chinchow soon after the Mukden Incident, and Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang had moved his headquarters from Peiping to Chinchow in the early days of October 1931, so that the City had become the center of opposition to the Japanese occupation. Japanese observation planes made frequent flights over the city; and on 8 November 1931, six scouting and five bombing planes flew over the city and dropped some eighty bombs.

The disturbances and riots organized by Colonel DOHIHARA gave the staff officers of the Kwantung Army an excuse to send troops to tientsin to reinforce the Japanese Garrison and protect the Japanese Concession

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there. The first of these riots occurred on 8 November 1931 as heretofore related; but on 26 November 1931, a new series of disorders began. Colonel DOHIHARA had employed Chinese ruffians and Japanese plain-clothes men and formed them into operating gangs within the Japanese Concession in order to start trouble in the Chinese section of Tientsin. On the evening of the 26th, a terrific explosion was heard, immediately followed by firing of cannon, machine-guns and rifles. The electric lights in the Japanese Concession were put out, and plain-clothes men emerged from the Concession firing upon the police station in the vicinity.

The most practical route for reinforcements to take in moving from Manchuria to tientsin would have been by sea; but the route by land had distinct strategical advantages as it lay through the city of Chinchow; and any movement through Chinchow would afford an excuse for making an attack upon that city, eliminating the concentration of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang's Army there.

Neutral observers had expected an advance on Chinchow; and on 23 November 1931, during a conference on the subject, Foreign Minister Shidehara assured the American Ambassador in tokyo that he, the Premier, the Minister of War, MINAMI, and the Chief of the Army General Staff had agreed that there would be no hostile operations toward Chinchow. However, DOHIHARA's riot on the night of the 26th precipitated such an advance on the morning of 27 November 1931; and a troop train and several airplanes crossed the Liao River, ostensibly for the purpose of relieving the Japanese Garrison which was alleged to be beleaguered at Tientsin, but actually intending to drive Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang from Chinchow.

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The Japanese met little or no resistance as Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang had already begun withdrawal of his troops south of the Great Wall in order to remove all excuse for further advances by the Japanese. Nevertheless, the advance proceeded, and Japanese planes repeatedly bombed Chinchow. The American Secretary of State protested the violation of the assurance so recently given the American Ambassador that no hostile action would be taken toward Chinchow; and on 29 November 1931, this assurance was reluctantly and belatedly honored by the Chief of the Army General Staff ordering Honjo to recall his troops to a position in the vicinity of Hsinmin.

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The League Appointed a Commission of Inquiry

The Council of the League of Nations had been in session for approximately four weeks considering the dispute between Japan and China, when it resolved on 18 December 1931 to accept the suggestion of the Japanese Representative and send a Commission of Inquiry to Manchuria to make a study of the situation "on the spot". The Council's resolution provided that the Commission should consist of five members from neutral countries with the right of China and Japan to appoint one "Assessor" each to assist the Commission.

Paragraph 2 of the resolution was in these terms: "(2) Considering that events have assumed na even more serious aspect since the Council meeting of October 24th, notes that the two parties undertake to adopt all measures necessary to avoid any further aggravation of the situation and to refrain from any initiative which may lead to further fighting and loss of life."

Japan, in accepting the Resolution, made a reservation concerning paragraph (2), stating that she accepted it "On the understanding that this paragraph was not intended to preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action as might be rendered necessary to provide directly for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese subjects against the activities of bandits and lawless elements rampant in various parts of Manchuria."

China accepted the Resolution with the reservation that China's rights of sovereignty in Manchuria would not be impaired.

With regard to the undertaking and injunction contained in paragraph (2), quoted above, China stated "It must be clearly pointed out that this injunction should not be violated under the pretext of the existence of lawlessness caused by a state of affairs which it is the very purpose

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fo the resolution to do away with. It is to be observed that much of the lawlessness now prevalent in Manchuria is due to the interruption of normal life caused by the invasion of the Japanese forces. The only sure way of restoring the normal peaceful life is to hasten the withdrawal of the Japanese troops and allow the Chinese authorities to assume the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order. China cannot tolerate the invasion and occupation of her territory by the troops of any foreign country; far less can she permit these troops to usurp the police functions of the Chinese authorities."

Despite this counter-reservation of China, the Japanese maintained that their reservation gave Japan the right to maintain her troops in Manchuria and made her responsible for the suppression of banditry. Under the pretext of suppressing banditry, Japan proceeded to complete the conquest of Manchuria. In the words of the Lytton Commission, "The fact remains that, having made their reservation at Geneva, the Japanese continued to deal with the situation in Manchuria according to their plans".

The membership of the Commission was not completely made up until 14 January 1932. The Rt. Honorable, the Earl of Lytton (British) was elected Chairman of the Commission; and the Commission has come to be known as the Lytton Commission.

The Wakatsuki Cabinet Was Forced to Resign

The continued efforts of Premier Wakatsuki and his Foreign Minister Shidehara to enforce the "Friendship Policy" and the "Policy of Non-Expansion" generated so much opposition from the Military and their sympathizers that the Cabinet was forced to resign on 12 December 1931. Premier Wakatsuki testified as follows: "It is true that in spite of the fact that the Cabinet had decided on the policy of stopping the 'Manchurian Incident', it continued

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to spread and expand. Various methods were tried, and one of these was a coalition cabinet, which I hoped might be able to stop the action of the Kwantung Army. However, because of certain difficulties, this did not materialize, and that is why my Cabinet resigned."

The Inukai Cabinet

The Inukai Cabinet was formed on 13 December 1931, with ARAKI as Minister of War. The three Army Chiefs, that, is: the outgoing War Minister, MINAMI, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Inspector General of Military Education, whose duty it was under the Japanese Constitution to select the succeeding War Minister, had selected General Abe to be War Minister; but ARAKI was popular with the radical elements of the Army, and they approached Inukai and demanded his appointment. General ARAKI received the appointment. Although Premier Inukai announced to Elder Statesman Prince Saionji that he intended to carry out the Emperor's wish that Japanese politics should not be controlled solely by the Army, and although he adopted a policy to terminate the aggression of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, War Minister ARAKI was not in accord with this policy. ARAKI favored Commander Honjo's plan that the four Provinces formerly under Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang should be occupied and pacified. He admitted that this was so during an interrogation at Sugamo Prison after the surrender. His first act was to secure approval in the Cabinet and the privy Council of an appropriation to carry out this scheme.

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Honjo and Itagaki Moved to Execute Honjo's Plan

The formation of the Inukai Cabinet, with ARAKI as War Minister and favorable to the Honjo plan to occupy and pacify the four Provinces, was the signal to the Kwantung Army to execute the plan. ITAGAKI moved quickly to strengthen the provisional government of Liaoning Province; a concentration of troops west of Mukden, poised for a drive on Chinchow and Tientsin, was begun; and ITAGAKI prepared to visit Tokyo to assist ARAKI in making detailed arrangements for carrying out the plan.

General Tsang Shi-hi, who had been incarcerated in prison on 21 September 1931 because of his refusal to cooperate with the invading Japanese Army, was starved into submission and forced to agree to accept the appointment as Governor of the Provincial Government, ad interim, of Liaoning Province. He was released form prison on the night of 13 December 1931; and after an interview with ITAGAKI, he was duly inaugurated as Governor on 15 December 1931. He was in such a nervous, weakened condition as a result of having been starved in prison, that he fainted during his inauguration when a photographer exploded a flash bulb in making his picture. The inauguration of General tsang Shi-hi was in preparation for a conference of all the Manchurian Provincial Governors; and the Kwantung Army was hastening preparations for the meeting.

The concentration of troops for the advance on Chinchow had begun on the 10th; and by 15 December 1931, it was complete. However, the advance could not begin until approval of War Minister ARAKI had been obtained and funds provided.

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All preparations being complete, Commander Honjo dispatched ITAGAKI to Tokyo to convey to the Government his opinion that Manchuria should be made independent of China. War Minister ARAKI immediately supported Honjo's plan and said that complete independence was the only way in which the "Manchurian Incident" could be solved, but considerable opposition to the plan was found to exist, and he was not able to obtain approval of the plan without difficulty. The question was finally presented to the Throne at an Imperial Conference on 27 December 1q931, and ARAKI states: "We immediately decided to send the troops to Fengtien Province. The principal plan was made in the War Ministry's order to General Headquarters, and they took the procedure of sending troops for the operation." At least a part of ITAGAKI's mission had bene accomplished.

On the very day that this decision to advance against Chinchow was made, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs handed the American Ambassador in Tokyo a memorandum in which it was stated that Japan was determined to remain loyal to the Covenant of the League, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and other treaties, and would abide by the two resolutions adopted by the Council of the league regarding the Manchurian situation.

Manchuria Was Completely Occupied After the Capture of Chinchow

The Kwantung Army pointed to the reservation made at Geneva, as already referred to, and continued to deal with Manchuria according to plan. The Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, knowing that the attack on

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Chinchow was imminent, had made a last minute appeal to prevent further fighting by offering to remove all remaining Chinese troops south of the Great Wall, but nothing came of this appear; and the Kwantung Army actually began its movement on 23 December 1931. The Chinese Army was forced to give up its position. From that day, the advance continued with perfect regularity and hardly met any resistance at all as the Chinese General had ordered a retreat. Chinchow was occupied on the morning of 3 January 1932; and the Kwantung Army continued its advance right up to the Great Wall at Shanhaikwan.

Itagaki Completed His Mission and Returned to Mukden

KIDO records in his diary for 11 January 1932, that ITAGAKI had obtained approval of the plan to set up a puppet State in Manchuria; the entry is in part as follows: "At 10:30 o'clock this morning in the antechamber connected with the lecture hall of the Imperial Palace, I, together with persons close to the Emperor, heard from Colonel ITAGAKI the conditions in Manchuria and Mongolia. Colonel ITAGAKI first explained the situation concerning the progress of the campaign against soldier bandits in Manchuria and Mongolia as well as the progress in establishing a new State in Manchuria. Colonel ITAGAKI gave hint that Manchuria would be placed under a new ruler, and the Japanese Army would take charge of the national defense of the new Manchurian State. He further explained that Japanese people would participate in the management of the new State as high government officials." It will be noted that ITAGAKI followed the usual practice of referring to all Chinese soldiers as

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"bandits". The pretense of invoking the reservation made at Geneva was again employed.

On his way back to Mukden, Colonel ITAGAKI called upon the new ruler mentioned in his conversation with KIDO. During his visit with Pu Yi at Port Arthur, ITAGAKI stated to Pu Yi, "In order to get rid of Chinese Militarists and secure social welfare for the people of the Northeastern Provinces, we are willingly prepared to put up a new political regime in Manchuria." ITAGAKI proposed that Pu Yi should become the head of the new regime; but demanded, that a soon as the Manchurian Regime was set up, Japanese should be employed as advisers and officials.

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The Independence Movement Gained in Intensity

After the fall of Chinchow, the independence movement made progress, especially in North Manchuria, where DOHIHARA was on duty as Chief of the Special Services in Harbin. After the Japanese occupied Tsitsihar on 19 November 1931, and drove the forces of General Ma toward Hailum, a Self-Government Association of the usually type was established in Heilungkiang Province; and General Chang Ching-hui was inaugurated as Governor of the Province on 1 January 1932. General Chang Ching-hui, upon learning of the complete defeat and expulsion of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang from Chinchow, acceded to the requests of the Self-Government Guiding Board at Mukden and declared the independence of Heilungkiang Province. The declaration was issued on 7 January 1932. On the same day, the Self-Government Guiding Board issued a Proclamation, which it had prepared on 1 January, but had bene holding until an opportune time for publication. The Proclamation appealed to the people to overthrow Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and join the Self-Government Association. The Proclamation ended with these words: "Organizations of the Northeast, Unite!" Fifty thousand copies were distributed. Mr. Yu Chung-han, the Chief of the Board, and Governor Tsang Shih-yi, of Liaoning Province, were making plans for a new State to be established in February. This idea of independence from China had received no popular support in Manchuria before the "Mukden Incident" of 18 September 1931. It is apparent that it was conceived, organized and carried through by a group of Japanese civil and military officials, of whom Colonels

--583--

ITAGAKI and DOHIHARA were leaders. The presence of Japanese troops to enforce their authority, the control of the railways by the South Manchurian Railway, the presence of Japanese Consuls in all of the important urban centers, and the coordinating effect of the Japanese controlled Self-Government Guiding Board, afforded the group a means of exercising an irresistible pressure to bring about this so-called independence, and later to control the new puppet State. The independence movement and the Chinese collaborators were sustained by Japanese military might alone.

Additional Assurances by Japan

On 7 January 1932, the day that General Chang Ching-hui proclaimed the independence of Heilungkiang Province, the American Secretary of State instructed the American Ambassador in Tokyo to deliver a Note to the Japanese Government. The Secretary of State stated in that Note that the Government of the United States deemed it a duty to notify both Japan and China that it would not admit the legality of any de facto situation nor recognize any treaty or agreement entered into so as to impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China or violate the conventional policy of the "Open Door" in China, or impair the obligations of the Pact of Paris (Annex No. B-15).

This Note was not answered until 16 January 1932. The Japanese Note stated that Japan was aware that the United States could be relied upon to do everything to support Japan's efforts to secure full and complete fulfillment of the treaties of Washington and the Kellogg-Briand Pact (Annex No. B-15). This Japanese Note went on to say that in

--584--

so far as Japan could secure it, the policy of the "Open Door" in China would always be maintained. Having regard to the Japanese military action in Manchuria, which we have just described, this Japanese Note is a masterpiece of hypocrisy.

Hashimoto Objected to This Assurance

The next day, HASHIMOTO published an article in the Taiyo Dai Nippon, apparently in protest against this policy of observing treaties and maintaining the "Open Door" in China. The title of the article was, "The Reform of Parliamentary Systems." In the article, HASHIMOTO said; "Responsible government-Party Cabinet System-runs absolutely counter to the Constitution. It is the democratic government which ignores the 'Tenno' government, * * * which has been established firmly since the founding of our Empire, and which remains solemnly unshaken in the Constitution granted by the Emperor. When we consider their dangerous anti-national structure, political ideology and their aggressive evils we believe it most urgently necessary first of all to make a scapegoat of the existing political parties and destroy them for the sake of the construction of a cheerful new Japan."

Dohihara Negotiated With General Ma Chan-shan

After General Ma had been driven from Tsitsihar by the Japanese and had set up his capital at Hailun, from which he was attempting to govern Heilungkiang, Colonel DOHIHARA began carrying on negotiations with the General form his Special Service Office at Harbin. The General's position was somewhat ambiguous; although he continued negotiating with DOHIHARA, he continued to support General Ting Chao. General Ting Chao had never approved of the puppet

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government set up in Kirin Province by the Kwantung Army under the nominal leadership of General Hsi Hsia, and had organized an army to oppose General Hsi Hsia. Not only did General Ma continue to support General Ting Chao, but these two Generals maintained some contact with Marshal Chang Hseuh-liang and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who gave them assistance.

In an effort to force General Ma to terms, Colonel DOHIHARA requested General Hsi Hsia to advance on Harbin and drive in the direction of Hailun. General Hsi Hsia, at the beginning of January 1932, prepared an expedition to the North with a view to occupying Harbin. General Ting Chao was between him and Harbin. General Hsi Hsia advanced to Shuangchong on 25 January; but Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang instructed Generals Ma and ting Chao not to negotiate further; and fighting began on the morning of the 26th. DOHIHARA had failed in his attempt to intimidate Generals Ma and Ting Chao; and what was still worse, his ally, General Hsi Hsia, was meeting serious reverses at the hand of General Ting Chao. Thereupon, DOHIHARA was forced to call upon the Kwantung Army to assist General Hsi Hsia. To justify this, Colonel DOHIHARA created another of his "Incidents" in Harbin--an engineered riot--during which it is said that one Japanese and three Korean subjects of Japan were killed. Most of the Japanese troops had been withdrawn from Northern Manchuria in order to use them in the Chinchow drive; but the 2ne Division had returned to Mukden for a rest. Although the 2nd Division was ordered to go to the rescue of General Hsi Hsia, and entrained on 28 January, some delay was experienced because of transportation difficulties. This gave General Ting Chao time to seize the Municipal Administration

--586--

in Harbin and arrest General Chang Ching-hui, who had been acting as puppet Governor of Heilungkiang Province.

Minami Lectured

While the reinforcements were entraining to go to the aid of General Hsi Hsia, War Councillor MINAMI was delivering a lecture before the Japanese Emperor in Tokyo. His subject was, "The Latest Situation in Manchuria". KIDO was present and recorded the lecture. MINAMI's conclusions as expressed to the Emperor were: (10 Japan would take over the national defense of the new state to be created in Manchuria, complete the Kirin-Kwainei Railway, and make the Sea of Japan into a lake to facilitate Japan's advance into North Manchuria, thereby revolutionizing Japan's defense plans. (2) The joint management by Japan and the new State of the economy of the area would make Japan self-sufficient in the World forever. (3) This arrangement would solve Japan's population problem, provided she established a colonial trooping system to the new State. KIDO further recorded that he thought the three or four JAPanese organs in Manchuria should be untied under one head when the new State was formed. This idea was to be carried out later.

First Invasion of Shanghai

After MINAMI had finished his lecture on the afternoon of 28 January 1932, fighting broke out in a new place in China. At 11:00 p.m., fighting commenced in the first invasion of Shanghai. The commencement of the "Incident" is typical. The anti-Chinese riots in Korea following the "Wanpaoshan Incident" led to a Chinese boycott of Japanese goods in Shanghai, which had been

--587--

intensified after the "Mukden Incident" and increased in intensity as that "Incident" grew into the "Manchurian Incident". Tension increased so that serious clashes occurred between Chinese and Japanese. Japanese residents of SHanghai requested the dispatch of Japanese troops for their protection. The Japanese Consul-General presented five demands to the Chinese Mayor of Shanghai; and the Admiral in command of Japanese naval forces at Shanghai announced that unless the Mayor's reply was satisfactory, he would take action. On 24 January 1932, Japanese naval reinforcements arrived. The Chinese reinforced their garrison in Chapei, which is the native section of Shanghai. On 28 January, the Municipal Council of the International Settlement met and declared a state of emergency as of 4:00 p.m.; at that hour, the Japanese Consul-General informed the Consular Body that a satisfactory reply had been received from the Chinese Mayor; and that no action would be taken. At 11:00 p.m. on the same day, the Japanese Admiral announced that the Japanese Navy was anxious as to the situation in Chapei where numerous Japanese nationals resided, and had decided to send troops to that sector and occupy the Shanghai-Woosung Railway Station, and that he hoped the Chinese would speedily withdraw to the west of the railway. These Japanese troops sent to the Chapei sector came into contact with Chinese troops which would not have had time to withdraw even had they wished to do so. This was the beginning of the battle of Shanghai.

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China Made Another Appeal to the League

The next morning, 29 January 1932, the alarming situation caused China to submit a further appeal to the League of Nations under Articles 10, 11 and 15 of the Covenant. The Council of the League was in session when the fighting started at Shanghai and it received the new appeal from China the next day.

General Ma Bargained With Dohihara

In Manchuria, Colonel DOHIHARA was continuing his negotiations in an effort to obtain the support of General Ma in the formation of a new State in Manchuria. Colonel ITAGAKI had recognized General Ma as "a man of real worth possessing his own troops", and had attempted to arrange a truce with him after the battle of Tsitsihar. General Ma continued to cooperate with General Ting Chao until the latter's defeat by the combined forces of General Hsi Hsia and the Japanese on 5 February 1932. After General Ting Chao's defeat, General Ma resumed negotiations with Colonel DOHIHARA, while his army escaped through Russian territory into China. With his army safe in China proper,k General Ma, it is said, accepted the one million dollars in gold offered by DOHIHARA. In any event, he now agreed on 14 February 1932 to become Governor of Heilungkiang Province and cooperate with the Japanese.

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Supreme Administrative Council

According to ARAKI, General Honjo conceived the idea of having the Governors of the Provinces organize a "Supreme Administrative Council" to make recommendations for the organization of the new State in Manchuria. He forwarded his plan to ARAKI and requested permission to set up a new State for the government of Manchuria with Henry Pu Yi as its head. During his interrogation at Sugamo Prison, ARAKI admitted that since he had no better suggestion and thought the General's plan would solve the "Manchurian Problem", he had approved the plan. ARAKI then sent additional experts into Manchuria to assist the Self-Government Guiding Board in carrying out General Honjo's plan.

General Ma having reached an agreement with DOHIHARA, the Self-Government Guiding Board called a meeting of the Governors of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Special District to meet at Mukden on 16 February 1932, for the announced purpose of "laying the foundation" for the new State. The meeting was attended in person by General Ma, as Governor of Heilungkiang; General Chang Ching-hui as Governor of the Special District; General Hsi Hsia, as Governor of Kirin; and general Tsang Shihui, as Governor of Liaoning; but General Tang Ju-lin, the Governor of Jehol, was not present. The legal advisor for the meeting was Dr. Chao Hsin-po, the Tokyo University trained Doctor of Laws, who had relieved Colonel DOHIHARA as Mayor of Mukden.

These five men decided that a new State should be established, that a North-Eastern Supreme Administrative Council should be organized which would exercise temporarily

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the supreme authority over the Provinces and the Special District, and that this Supreme Council should, without delay, make all necessary preparations for the founding of the new State.

On the second day of the Conference, the Supreme Administrative Council was duly organized, to consist of seven members, namely: the Governors of Heilungkiang, Kirin, Liaoning, Jehol and the Special District, and the two Mongol chiefs who had joined the Conference on the morning of the second day. The new Supreme Council immediately proceeded to business, and decided: (1) to adopt the Republican system for the new State; (2) to respect the autonomy of the constituting provinces; (3) to give the tile of "Regent" to the Chief Executive; and (4) to issue a Declaration of Independence. That night, General Honjo gave an official dinner in honor of the "heads of the New State". He congratulated them on their success and assured them of his assistance in case of need.

Declaration of Independence

The next morning after General Honjo's dinner party, that is to say on 18 February 1932, the Declaration of Independence of Manchuria was published by the Supreme Administrative Council. Dr. Okawa in his book, 2600 Years of Japanese History, published in 1939, in commenting on this declaration has this to say: "The Chang Hseuh-liang regime was swept completely away from Manchuria in one swoop through the quick and daring action of the Japanese troops." The Tribunal finds upon the evidence that there was no popular

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movement in Manchuria for the establishment of any independent government. This movement was sponsored and inspired by the Kwantung Army and its creature, the Self-Government Guiding Board, with its Japanese Advisors.

Organization of the New State

The Declaration of Independence having been issued, Governors Ma and Hsi Hsia returned to their Provincial Capitals, but they designated representatives to meet with Governor Tsang Shih-yi, Governor Chang Ching-hui and Mayor Chao Hsin-Po for the purpose of working out the details of the plan for the new State. On 19 February 1932, this group decided that the form of the new government should be that of a Republic with a constitution drawn on the principle of the separation of powers. The group then agreed upon Changchun as the Capital of the new State, fixed the design of the new national flag, and agreed that Pu Yi should be asked to act as "Regent" of the new State.

The Self-Government Guiding Board immediately began holding mass-meetings and demonstrations in the Provinces, at which the Kwantung Army paraded its might and fired artillery salutes to impress the Manchurians with the power of Japan. After the proper foundation had been laid by these demonstrations, the Board took the lead in convening an All-Manchurian Convention, which was held in Mukden on 29 February 1932. At this Convention, speeches were delivered; a declaration denouncing the previous regime of General Chang Hsueh-liang was unanimously adopted; and resolutions welcoming

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the new State with Pu Yi as its Chief Executive were approved.

The Supreme Administrative Council met immediately in urgent session and elected six delegates to proceed to Port Arthur to convey their invitation to Pu Yi to head the new government. Pu Yi did not respond to the first invitation from the Supreme Administrative Council, so a second delegation was appointed on 4 March 1932 to induce Pu Yi to accept. Upon the advice of Colonel ITAGAKI, Pu Yi accepted the second invitation. After an audience with the Delegate on 5 March, Pu Yi left Port Arthur on the 6th for Tangkang-tze, and after two days, began, on the 8th, to receive homage as the "Regent of Manchukuo". Inauguration ceremonies were held at the new capital, Changchun, on 9 March 1932. Pu Yi declared the policy of the new State to be founded upon morality, benevolence and love. the next day he appointed the list of principle officials suggested by the Japanese.

Prior to the arrival of Pu Yi, a number of laws and regulations, on which Dr. Chao Hsin-Po had been working for some time, had been made ready for adoption and promulgation. they came into effect on 9 March 1932, simultaneously with the law regulating the organization of the Government of Manchukuo.

Public announcement of the new State of Manchukuo was made on 12 March 1932 in a telegram to the foreign Powers, requesting that they recognize the new State. Dr. Okawa stated that Manchukuo was a result of the plan of the Kwantung Army approved by the Japanese Government, and the establishment of the State progressed smoothly, because it had been well planned and prepared

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beforehand. Pu Yi says that Manchukuo was under the complete domination of Japan from the beginning.

Japanese Cabinet Approved Fait Accompli

ARAKI was right when he said that the Honjo plan was approved by the Cabinet; but it was not so approved until 12 March 1932, after the plan had been executed and after the new State of Manchukuo had come into existence. it was on 12 March 1932, the day that the telegram announcing the formation of Manchukuo to the foreign Powers was sent out, that the Cabinet met and decided upon an "Outline for the Disposition of Foreign Relations Accompanying the Establishment of the New States of Manchukuo". It was decided to render "all sorts of aid" to the new State, short of recognition under international law, and "lead her to fulfill the substantial conditions for an independent state step by step" in the hope that the Powers would ultimately recognize her independence. To avoid intervention of the Signatory Powers of the Nine-Power Pact (Annex No. B-10), it was thought best to have Manchukuo declare a policy consistent with the policy of the "Open Door" and in harmony with the principle of equal opportunity guaranteed by the Treaty. The Cabinet also decided that Manchukuo should seize the custom houses and salt-tax collecting organs; but that this should be done in such a way as not to "bring about troubles in foreign relations". One method agreed upon for doing this was to bribe the customs officials and replace them with Japanese. It was planned to seize military power in Manchukuo under the guise of subjugating banditry, in line with the reservation made

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at Geneva. In short, the Cabinet fully realized that the occupation of Manchuria and the establishment of an independent State there by Japan was a direct violation of existing treaty obligations; and it was trying to evolve a plan whereby the reality of the breach could be concealed by an appearance of compliance with the obligations.

The Lytton Commission Arrived in Tokyo

On the day that the All-Manchurian Convention was being held in Mukden, that is to say on 29 February 1932, the Lytton Commission arrived in Tokyo, where they were received by the Emperor and commenced a series of daily conferences with the Government, including Premier Inukai, War Minister ARAKI, and others. Although these daily conferences continued for eight days, none of these government officials informed the Commission that Japan was forming a new State in Manchuria; and the Commission first learned of this after it had left Tokyo and arrived at Kyoto on its way to China.

On the day that the Commission arrived in Tokyo, KOISO was elevated by ARAKI from Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry to the high position of Vice-Minister of War.

Araki Dispatched Reinforcements to Shanghai

The battle which had started at Shanghai on 28 January 1932 had developed to such an extent that the Navy Minister was forced to call upon War Minister ARAKI for reinforcements. The Chinese 19th Route Army was

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giving a good account of its fighting ability. Large numbers of Japanese destroyers were anchored in the Hwangpu, and Japanese airplanes were bombing Chapei. The Japanese Marines were using their permanent garrison in Hungkow as a base of operations; and barricades erected between this garrison and Chapei served as the front lines between the ground forces. The Japanese destroyers, firing point blank, bombarded the forts at Wu-sung; this fire was not returned by the forts, for they had no guns capable of answering. The Japanese Marines had invaded areas adjacent to the International Settlement, disarmed the police and paralysed all city functions; a veritable reign of terror was in full swing when the Navy Minister requested these reinforcements. ARAKI states that he conferred with the Cabinet and it was decided to send supporting forces quickly; 10,000 men were dispatched the following day aboard fast destroyers. These reinforcements landed in the International Settlement fully equipped with tanks and artillery. The Navy drew up heavy ships and began shelling the city. However, this attack which began on 20 February 1932 brought no marked success despite the fact that it continued for several days. Following this attack, ARAKI, claiming that General Ueda had suffered such great losses that it was necessary to send further reinforcements, sent the 11th and 14th Divisions to oppose the Chinese Army which had been defending the city.

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The League Took Action

The League of Nations was aroused to action. The members of the Council, other than China and Japan, addressed an urgent appeal to the Japanese Government on 19 February 1932 calling attention to Article 10 of the Covenant (Annex No. B-6); and the Assembly was convened to meet on 3 March 1932.

The American Secretary of State advised the American COnsul-General at Shanghai that the Secretary's letter to senator Corsh on the China situation was being released to the Press. In this letter, the Secretary stated that the Nine-Power Treaty (Annex No. B-10) formed the legal basis upon which the "Open Door POlicy" rested. he set forth a long history of the Treaty. He commented that the Treaty represented a carefully matured international policy designed to assure to all parties their rights in China and to assure the Chinese the fullest opportunity to develop their independence and sovereignty. He recalled that Lord Balfour, Chairman of the British Delegation, had stated that he understood that there was no representative present at the signing of the Treaty, who thought that spheres of interest were advocated or would be tolerated. The Pact of Paris (Annex No. B-15) was intended to reinforce the Nine-power Treaty. The two Treaties were interdependent, he said, and were intended to align world conscie