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who was concealed in perfectly fortified positions. Resistance was characterized by extremely heavy small arms, knee mortar, and large mortar fire. The right of this RCT was unable to move forward regardless of repeated efforts to envelop and to even by-pass the resistance holding up its advance. At 1120 BLT 2/24 was directed to reconnoiter the area of BLT 3/25 with the probability of relieving that BLT that night. Upon consolidation at 1640 contact was made with RCT 23 and maintained with RCT 25. BLT 2/24 continued in Division Reserve.

(e) RCT 25, on the right, with BLT's 1/25, 2/25, and 3/25 in line from left to right, held its position and maintained contact with RCT 24 on its left. Elements of the RCT and the Division Reconnaissance Company continued mopping up operations in the rear areas and in the vicinity of TA 184 KL.

(f) 14th Marines. Other than the preparation fires for the attack, fires were executed on call from the RCT's. Eighteen (18) rounds of yellow smoke were fired to pin-point targets for support aircraft. There were no changes in assignments. VAC LANFOR Artillery reinforced fires on call. Air observation fired a total of nine (9) missions. No targets were reported by sound ranging during the period. The total number of missions fired was 303.

(g) 4th Tank Battalion. Tanks were able to render some support to the attack of RCT 23, even though their approach was restricted more or less to roads. A mine field was encountered in TA 201 NOT and three (3) tanks were destroyed. Further tank activity in this area was delayed until the minefield was cleared by the engineers. During a requested air strike in TA 185 KL, an auxiliary gas tank of Napalm, through error, was dropped in TA 201 N and fell directly to the rear of a friendly tank. The Napalm was splashed all over the tank. The outer surfaces of the tank caught fire but the crew successfully evacuated the tank and with a portable CO2 extinguisher put out the fire. The crew sustained no casualties and the tank was not put out of action. At the end of the period, thirty-two (32) tanks were operational.

(h) Aviation. CTF 52.2 continued to furnish air support. The Division requested two (2) strikes, one (1) of which was completed in TA 185 KL and the other of which was cancelled by the originator. The 7th Fighter Command, with eight (8) P-51's strafed the coastal area in the Division zone. VMO-4 flew seven (7) tactical observation missions and five (5) planes were operational at the end of the period. The 726th SAW Squadron reverted to VAC LANFOR control.

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(i) Naval Gunfire. Four (4) DD's from CTF 54 supported the attack. Call fires for the period were executed in TA's 185 and 202. A large amount of 40mm ammunition was employed in lieu of 5" as a safety precaution. One (1) naval gunfire spotter aboard a DD adjusted fires along the coastal area.

(j) 4th Engineer Battalion. There were no changes in assignments. This battalion continued to support the RCT's by executing demolitions on pillboxes, blockhouses, and the entrances and exits to caves and by mine removal and road work in the forward and rear areas.

(k) Combat Efficiency. The combat efficiency had been reduced by excessive casualties, particularly to key personnel, and battle fatigue, to an estimated 45%.

(l) Weather and Visibility. The weather was cloudy and cold, visibility was fair, and ceiling was overcast 10/10.

19. FROM 1800, 8 MAR 45 TO 1800, 9 MAR 45 (D PLUS 18)

(a) By 1800 enemy fires, consisting of rockets, mortars, grenades, rifle, and machine gun fire, were increasing in intensity, building up to a peak about 2000. Casualties were suffered in units all along the Division front and particularly in the area of TA 184 ABFG. Enemy movements indicated that either a counter-attack or a large scale infiltration would be attempted. Enemy units infiltrated in the zones of all RCT's but were most successful in the zone of RCT 23 where some elements reached the CP of BLT 2/23. At 1920 ten (10) to fifteen (15) Japanese were observed on a ridge in TA 202 QR. Artillery fire was requested on this area, and the enemy were either killed or dispersed. At 2300 there was considerable enemy activity along the front of BLT 3/24 and extending to the left in the zone of BLT 2/23 where infiltration attempts were reported. At 2330 the enemy attacked BLT 2/23 in force, and some elements succeeded in penetrating as far as the BLT CP where they were either killed or dispersed. It was apparent that this skirmish was not an all out "Banzai" attack but a well-planned and predetermined counter-attack in force. Captured information revealed that an assembly area had been designated at the crossroads in TA 201 N, from which the enemy moved up to CR 331 and south along the road to the CP of BLT 2/23, and that the forward elements were to be followed by a much larger force. The attack failed because of intense artillery fire and the disruption of the Japanese communications. A total of over 400 of the enemy were killed in the zone of BLT 2/23 during this counter-attack.

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(b) Throughout the night there was constant pressure along the front of RCT 24; numerous small units attempted to infiltrate, but all were repulsed and enemy dead in this zone totaled 150 for the night. Some infiltration was attempted through RCT 25 but no enemy were successful. Illumination fires were employed throughout the night. Contact throughout the night was maintained with a support ship of the 3d Marine Division which fired on possible rocket positions in TA's 185 and 202 and kept the east coast under observation. At 0415 Flash Red was reported; at 0505 Flash Blue, control Green, was received, and at 0512 Flash White was reported.

(c) Following a coordinated VAC LANFOR-Division Artillery preparation from King-hour to King-hour plus 10, with a limitation on ammunition expenditure to 1000 rounds 75mm, and 1000 rounds 105mm, the Division continued the attack at King-hour, 0700, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 16-45, to complete the mission assigned in the previous Operation Order. Formation and boundaries - no change; Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour.

(d) RCT 23, less BLT 1/23, resumed the attack in a column of battalions with BLT 2/23 in the assault. Considerable advance was made on the right and the right center against fairly light opposition, but the entire left was held up by intense enemy fire from the ridge in TA 202 BG. BLT 1/23 was released to RCT 23 at 1500, and BLT 3/23 reverted to VAC LANFOR Reserve at 1700 in TA 165 BC. Although ordered to consolidate at 1700, this RCT continued the attack to improve its positions and did not halt the attack until 1730. RCT 23 maintained contact with the 3d Division on the left and with RCT 24 on the right.

(e) RCT 24, less BLT 2/24, began the attack at King-hour with the main effort on the left in order to overrun a center of resistance along the boundary. This attack was not successful, and after a rapid reorganization the RCT launched a second attack at 0900, resulting in a breakthrough for a gain of about 300 yards on the left and left center. BLT 1/24, having suffered numerous casualties began a reorganization of its units into a consolidated BLT of two (2) companies under the command of the RCT Executive Officer. The BLT Commander was relieved just prior to this reorganization. By 1200 BLT 1/24 was able to advance its line on the left to a position opposite BLT 3/24. Extremely heavy resistance on the right held up the advance and little gain was made in that sector. Upon consolidation for the night at 1700, this RCT was in contact with elements on its right and left. BLT 2/24 was released to RCT 25 at 0500 to relieve BLT 3/25 on the extreme right of the Division zone. When released, BLT 3/25 was directed to assemble in TA's 182 O and 183 KL as Division Reserve. BLT 3/25 closed in the assembly

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area at 0730.

(f) RCT 25, less BLT 3/25, and plus BLT 2/24, maintained its positions and was unable to advance on the left because of the resistance holding up the right of BLT 1/24. A prominent reentrant resulted from the inability of these two BLT's to advance; however, plans were made to drive through this area on the morning of 10 March.

(g) 4th Provisional Battalion. A temporary Provisional Battalion, consisting of thirty-eight (38) officers and four hundred eighty-eight (488) enlisted was organized from the Support Group and assembled in TA 182 Y as Division Reserve for emergency use in the rear areas.

(h) 14th Marines. 1/14 was in direct support of RCT 25, 2/14 in direct support RCT 23, 3/14 in direct support RCT 24, 4/14 in general support, and VAC LANFOR Artillery reinforced fires on call. Air observers fired a total of seventeen (17) missions during the period. VAC LANFOR Artillery was fired on three (3) targets which required heavy artillery. Six (6) targets were reported and were fired upon during the period from information secured by sound ranging. The total number of missions fired was 343.

(i) 4th Tank Battalion. There were no changes in assignments. At the end of the period thirty-three (33) tanks were operational, eight (8) were damaged and thirteen (13) were destroyed. Company "B" towed a 7.2 rocket launcher in the zone of BLT 1/24 and fired twenty (20) rockets. Results were not successful.

(j) Aviation. CTG 52.2 and the 7th AAF continued to furnish air support. Of the eight (8) support missions requested, four (4) were completed. The remainder were cancelled because the front lines were too close to the target areas by the time these missions came in. RCT 23 reported that the P-51 mission with 500-pound delayed-action bombs was very effective. VMO-4 flew six (6) tactical observation missions. Successful tests were completed of smoke rockets fired from VMO-4 wing-mounted bazookas for target designation. One (1) VMO-4 plane, armed with six (6) smoke rockets, was available on call to designate targets for support aircraft.

(k) Naval Gunfire. Because of the increasing limitations upon fire possibilities, the Division Naval Gunfire Support was reduced to two (2) DD's. In supporting the Division attack, fires were placed in TA's 185, 186 and 202, with two (2) VOF planes furnishing air spot.

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(l) 4th Engineer Battalion. There were no changes in assignments or tasks of this battalion.

(m) 4th Pioneer Battalion. At 0800 the Division Shore Party was relieved by the Garrison Force. For the remainder of the period this battalion was disposed tactically for beach defense. It was directed to be prepared to assemble in Division Reserve on one (1) hour's notice.

(n) Combat Efficiency remained at an estimated 45%.

(o) Weather and Visibility. The weather was cool; visibility was unlimited. The ceiling was unlimited in the morning, decreasing to 1500 feet by the end of the period.

20. FROM 1800, 9 MAR 45 TO 1800, 10 MAR 45 (D PLUS 19)

(a) Enemy activity during the night was relatively quiet. The front lines received a small amount of light and medium mortar fire at infrequent intervals during the night. There were several unsuccessful attempts at infiltration. In order to insure the closing of the reentrant in TA 184 CH, and to shorten the lines across the Division front, Division decided to have RCT 25 relieve BLT 1/24, the right BLT of RCT 24, with BLT 3/25, which was in Division Reserve prior to 0630. BLT 3/25 was released to RCT 25 at 0300. RCT 23, on the left, was then ordered to assume control of BLT 3/24 in its present zone at 0630. When relieved by RCT's 23 and 25, RCT 24, less BLT's 2/24 and 3/24, was ordered to assemble in TA's 182 O and 183 KL as Division Reserve. Two (2) DD's provided illumination in the Division zone during the night.

(b) After a coordinated VAC LANFOR-Division Artillery preparation from King-hour minus 25 to King-hour minus 15, and from King-hour minus 10 to King-hour, and moving forward in successive concentrations of 100 yards every five (5) minutes from King-hour to King-hour plus 15, the Division resumed the attack with two (2) RCT's in assault at King-hour, 0800, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 17-45, to destroy the enemy and capture the remainder of the island within its zone of action. For formation and boundaries, see the map, Progress of Attack. Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour.

(c) RCT 23, on the left, less BLT 3/23, and with BLT 3/24 attached, continued the attack at King-hour with two (2) BLT's in assault, 2/23 on the left and 3/24 on the right, and with 1/23 in RCT Reserve, making its main effort on the right. Progress on the left was steady against light mortar and small arms fire coming from caves along the cliff line marking the Division front.

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the right the advance was slow against strong enemy resistance throughout the zone. After a steady advance resulting in considerable gains, the RCT took up a favorable defensive position along a line about 400 to 600 yards from the beach. Consolidation for the night was begun at 1700. Contact was maintained from right to left within the Division. At about 1500 patrols reached the coast line within the zone without encountering the enemy. At 1115 BLT 3/23, which was in VAC LANFOR Reserve, was released to RCT control. The RCT Reserve was employed in mopping up the rear areas throughout the day.

(d) RCT 25, on the right, with BLT 2/24 and the Reconnaissance Company attached, completed the relief of BLT 1/24 by BLT 3/25 at 0600 and assumed control of the zone as assigned in the attack order. See the map, Progress of Attack. At King-hour BLT's 3/25 and 1/25 jumped off in a coordinated attack supported by the fire of BLT's 2/25 and 2/24. Pivoting on the right of BLT 1/25, these two BLT's turned towards the southeast and were able to break through the reentrant and make a considerable gain during the day. During the day advance elements of BLT 1/25 were pinched out and were employed, together with units of BLT 2/25, to liquidate an area of resistance which developed in TA 184 N. At 1700, when consolidation was ordered, RCT 25 had reached the line shown on the map, Progress of Attack, and was occupying favorable ground for defense. The Division Reconnaissance Company was assigned the task of containing and destroying the enemy in TA 183 J in order to protect the rear areas from possible infiltration from caves in this vicinity. The advance of RCT 25 overran and annihilated the strong positions of the enemy and secured the commanding ground in the zone. The rear areas were mopped up as the advance was continued.

(e) RCT 24, less BLT's 2/24 and 3/24, reverted to Division Reserve in TA's 182 O and 183 KL at 0630. At 1115, VAC LANFOR directed that BLT 1/24 be assigned to VAC LANFOR Reserve and remain in position in above TA's.

(f) 4th Provisional Battalion, in Division Reserve, established defensive positions on the left of the Division zone in the rear areas. There was no activity reported during the night. During the daylight hours patrols from this battalion began mopping up operations in the Division rear areas.

(g) 14th Marines. 1/14 was in direct support of RCT 25, 2/14 in direct support of RCT 23, 3/14 in direct support of RCT 24 prior to 0630, after which time it reinforced the fires of 2/14; 4/14 was in general support, and VAC LANFOR Artillery reinforced fires on call. Air observers fired in fire mission during the

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period. The total number of missions fired was 329.

(h) 4th Tank Battalion. Company "C" was attached to RCT 23, Company "A" to RCT 25, and Company "B" was under Battalion control. At the end of the period thirty-five (35) tanks were operational, six (6) damaged, and thirteen (13) destroyed. One (1) platoon of Company "C" operated with RCT 9 during the day.

(i) Aviation. Two (2) missions were requested by the Division from the 7th Fighter Command, but both were cancelled because the front lines moved forward so rapidly that the strikes could not be employed. VMO-4 flew seven (7) tactical observation missions. Beginning at 0700 this period, and daily thereafter until they were secured, close air support groups were to be composed of eight (8) P-51 aircraft, each armed with two (2) 500 pound bombs and full ammunition. Flights were to be relieved on station at two (2) hour intervals, the first flight 0700, the last flight 1700.

(j) Naval Gunfire. One (1) DD with VOF air spot supported the Division during the day. Before all fire was lifted, because of the rapid advance of the Division front, one (1) mission was fired in caves in TA 185 J. The ship was held for emergency missions, and VOF air spot was employed in keeping the Division's front under observation throughout the day.

(k) 4th Engineer Battalion. No change in assignments or duties.

(l) 4th Pioneer Battalion, was prepared to assemble in TA 166 F on one (1) hour's notice as Division Reserve.

(m) Combat Efficiency of this Division was reduced by excessive casualties, particularly to key personnel, and battle fatigue to an estimated 40%.

(n) Weather and Visibility. The weather was cool and fair; visibility was unlimited; ceiling was overcast 1/10 to 2/10.

21. FROM 1800, 10 MAR 45 TO 1800, 11 MAR 45 (D PLUS 20)

(a) Enemy activity was relatively quiet along the entire front. Some infiltration attempts were made on the front of RCT 25. The area of resistance by-passed in 184 N was contained by elements of this RCT. It was quite apparent that the main enemy resistance had been broken but that the Japanese were continuing their passive defense from an intricate system of well concealed caves. These caves were hard to locate and were generally disclosed only when

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the enemy opened fire. Two (2) DD's provided illumination for the Division throughout the night.

(b) The Division continued the attack at King-hour minus 60, King-hour being 0830, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 18-45, without a preliminary artillery or naval gunfire preparation, to assist in the completion of the capture of IWO JIMA. Formation and boundaries - no change; Line of Departure - front lines at King-hour.

(c) RCT 23, with BLT's 2/23 and 3/24 abreast, continued the attack at King-hour minus 60 and rapidly overran the weak enemy resistance to its front by employing combat patrols to cover all of the beach areas. On the left of the RCT zone, the mopping up could not be completed because RCT 9 of the 3d Division was operating along the boundary and in the zone of action of RCT 23. On the right, BLT 3/24 encountered strong enemy resistance in the vicinity of TA 185 K. This resistance was reduced by the end of the period, and combat patrols had cleared out the remainder of this zone. BLT's 1/23 and 3/23, in RCT Reserve, were employed in mopping up the rear area. At 1530 BLT 1/23 relieved BLT 2/23 in its zone, completing the relief by 1700.

(d) RCT 25, with BLT's 3/25, 2/25, and 2/24 in line from left to right, continued the attack at 0745, fifteen (15) minutes late, to execute the mission assigned. BLT 1/25 neutralized the enemy resistance in TA 184 N by 1100. Shortly after the assault was initiated, the left of the line received intense fire from rockets, mortars, and small arms. The center of this fire area was located as being in the vicinity of TA 185 PQV, and it was at once apparent that this area was the final defensive position of the enemy in this zone. The terrain in this area was not normal in any respect; it could be classified only as a terrain freak of nature. However, it was well suited for the construction of cave positions, and the Japanese had utilized this advantage to the fullest extent. Their scheme of maneuver was to hold up the advance as long as it was possible, and to inflict as many casualties as they could before they were forced to adopt their usual suicidal tactics. By the end of the period this resistance in the above TA had not been liquidated. The Division Reconnaissance Company continued mopping up operations in the rear area.

(e) RCT 24, less three (3) BLT's, had no change. BLT 1/24 was in VAC LANFOR Reserve.

(f) 4th Provisional Battalion. One (1) platoon was attached to the Pioneer Battalion for the defense of Beach 1

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during the hours of darkness. The Battalion continued mopping up operations in the rear areas of the Division zone.

(g) 14th Marines. In accordance with VAC LANFOR Order, 2/14, 3/14 and 4/14 fired a thirty (30) minute preparation from King-hour minus 10 to King-hour plus 20 in the zone of the 5th Marine Division. 1/14 was in direct support of the Division until 1430, when it was directed to reinforce the 13th Marines. VMO-4 fired one (1) mission during the period and executed surveillance of fires in the Division zone. Artillery spot missions were secured at 1145. No targets were reported by sound ranging. The total number of missions fired in the 4th Division zone was eleven (11); the total in support of 5th Division was twenty-six (26).

(h) 4th Tank Battalion. At the end of the period, thirty-nine (39) tanks were operational, four (4) were damaged, and eleven (11) were destroyed. During the afternoon one (1) flame thrower tank with crew was loaned to the 3d Marine Division.

(i) Aviation. VMO-4 flew nine (9) tactical observation missions. One (1) plane was hit by enemy machine gun fire, and at the end of the period one (1) plane was operational.

(j) Naval Gunfire. No fires were placed in the Division zone during the day. One (1) DD was on call for possible emergency missions.

(k) 4th Engineer Battalion. Company "A" was attached to RCT 25, Company "B" to RCT 24, and Company "C" to RCT 23. All units continued the execution of demolitions and road work in the areas of these respective RCT's.

(l) 4th Pioneer Battalion. No change in assignment.

(m) Combat Efficiency was reduced to an estimated 38%.

(n) Weather and Visibility. The weather was fair, visibility unlimited, and ceiling overcast 2/10 to 8/10.

22. FROM 1800, 11 MAR 45 TO 1800, 12 MAR 45 (D PLUS 21)

(a) Activity for the night consisted of sporadic mortar and small arms fire coming from the center of resistance in the zone of RCT 25. The majority of this fire was aimless and apparently fired with no other purpose than to bolster the courage of the enemy. Some infiltration was attempted from this area, but all attempts were unsuccessful. One (1) DD illuminated the zone of

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action for the Division.

(b) Division Administrative Order No. 1-45, Warning Order for reembarkation, was issued at 0800. Reembarkation was to begin on or about 14 March.

(c) The Division continued the attack at King-hour plus 60, King-hour being 0700, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 19-45, to eliminate the pocket of resistance in TA 185 PQUV and to mop up thoroughly the zone, beginning at the coastline and working progressively back through the zone in order to destroy the remaining Japanese within the area. Boundaries and zones of action - no change.

(d) RCT 23, on the left, employed BLT 3/24 to assist RCT 25 in containing the enemy in the center of resistance in TA 185 PQUV. At King-hour this RCT, less BLT 3/24, began a systematic mopping up of its area from the beach toward the RCT rear area line. The evacuation of Marine dead and the burial of enemy dead as well as a general policing of the area occupied the remainder of the period.

(e) RCT 25, with BLT's 3/25, 2/25 and 2/24 in line, at 0900 began mopping up operations to destroy the organized resistance in its area. Because the area of this resistance was relatively small and was contained on three (3) sides (see the map, Progress of Attack), it was necessary to limit the weapons employed to small arms, mortars, and flame throwers. The character of the terrain prohibited the employment of tanks. The enemy were entrenched in ravines, caves and man-made pillboxes, and were extremely tenacious. In order to annihilate this resistance it was necessary to flush the enemy out of these emplacements one or two at a time. The Division Reconnaissance Company was employed in mopping up the rear areas. Detachments from RCT Headquarters were employed to evacuate Marine dead and to bury enemy dead.

(f) RCT 24, less three (3) BLT's, had no change. BLT 1/24 continued in VAC LANFOR Reserve.

(g) 4th Provisional Battalion. One (1) platoon was assigned to the Pioneer Battalion for the defense of Beach Blue 1 during the hours of darkness. At 1400 the battalion was disbanded and the elements thereof reverted to parent control.

(h) 14th Marines. Four (4) battalions fired preparation fires in the 5th Marine Division zone from 0903 to 0913. 3/14 fired harassing fires in the zone from 1900 to 0630 and from 0913 to 1045.

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The total number of missions fired was 84.

(i) 4th Tank Battalion. Two (2) flame thrower tanks, without crews, were loaned to the 5th Marine Division. At the end of the period, forty-one (41) tanks were operational, two (2) were damaged, and eleven (11) were destroyed.

(j) Aviation. VMO-4 flew four (4) tactical observation missions, and at the end of the period two (2) planes were operational.

(k) Naval Gunfire. One (1) DD maintained contact with the Division in case emergency fires were required.

(l) The 4th Engineer Battalion continued operations in support of the RCT's.

(m) 4th Pioneer Battalion. No change.

(n) Combat Efficiency was estimated to be 36%.

(o) Weather and Visibility. The weather was fair and cool, visibility was fair, overcast 8/10 to 10/10.

23. FROM 1800, 12 MAR 45 TO 1800, 13 MAR 45 (D PLUS 22)

(a) During the night sporadic and generally aimless mortar and machine gun fire was directed towards the Division rear areas. Attempted infiltration from the enemy compressed within the center of resistance was continuous throughout the night but was unsuccessful. One (1) DD furnished illumination during the night.

(b) The Division continued the attack at King-hour minus 30, King-hour being 0730, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 20-45, to complete the missions previously assigned. There was no change in boundaries or formations.

(c) RCT 23 continued mopping up operations, evacuation of own dead, and the burial of the enemy dead. BLT 1/23 operated in the forward part of the area, BLT 3/23 in the center part, and BLT 2/23 was in RCT Reserve.

(d) RCT 25 continued the attack at King-hour to eliminate the enemy resistance in its zone. The Division Reconnaissance Company and elements of RCT Headquarters continued mopping up operations, evacuation of own dead, and burial of the enemy dead. The center of resistance was contained by BLT 3/25 attached to RCT 23

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BLT's 3/25, 2/25, 1/25 and 2/24. Slow progress was made in the elimination of this area.

(e) RCT 24, less two (2) BLT's, continued in Division Reserve. At 0745 BLT 1/24 was released from VAC LANFOR Reserve to parent control. RCT 24 was employed in policing and mopping up the Division rear area.

(f) Division Administrative Order No. 2-45, directed that elements of the Division would begin reembarkation on 14 March.

(g) At 1350 a warning order was issued to RCT's 23, 24, and 25 to the effect that upon orders to withdraw all units, the assembly areas would be as follows: RCT 23 - TA's 165 BCD, 182 TWXY, 183 U; RCT 24 - TA's 182 JNOS, 183 AFKL; RCT 25 - TA's 183 MNRST, 184 UV, 167 B.

(h) 14th Marines. 2/14 and 3/14 fired harassing fires in the zone of the 5th Marine Division. All battalions were available to reinforce the 13th Marines on call until 1000. By 1130 all battalions had closed station and the forward observers and liaison officers of 3/14 returned to the battalion area at 1155. The total number of missions fired was 118.

(i) 4th Tank Battalion. Eight (8) tanks, including two (2) flame throwers, were loaned to the 5th Marine Division. Two (2) flame thrower tanks and two (2) combat tanks were employed along the road in TA 185 P. There was no change in the status of operational tanks.

(j) Aviation. VMO-4 flew four (4) tactical observation and three (3) photo missions. At the end of the period two (2) planes were operational.

(k) 4th Engineer Battalion. No change in assignments or duties.

(l) 4th Pioneer Battalion. No change.

(m) Combat Efficiency was reduced to an estimated 36%.

(n) Weather and Visibility. The weather was fair, visibility was good, and the ceiling was overcast 3/10 to 6/10.

(o) The operations for the period partially completed the mopping up of the Division zone and the continuance of the fighting to neutralize the enemy in the center of resistance then confined

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to TA 185 K.

24. FROM 1800, 13 MAR 45 TO 1800, 14 MAR 45 (D PLUS 23)

(a) The period of darkness covered by this report was relatively quiet except in the front of BLT 3/25. Continuous fighting in this area went on all during the night. One (1) DD illuminated the Division zone throughout the night.

(b) In accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 21-45, the Division continued its assigned mission at King-hour, 0630.

(c) RCT 23 continued mopping up operations and the burial of enemy dead. At 0810 elements of BLT 1/23 encountered a small group of Japanese in TA 185 B. This group had apparently been hiding in caves and had been by-passed unintentionally. Patrols from BLT's 1/23 and 3/24 surrounded the area and killed all the enemy. By the end of the period 95% of area had been policed and mopped up.

(d) RCT 25 continued the attack at King-hour to reduce the center of resistance in its zone. A slow, gradual advance, against desperate resistance was made throughout the period, and it was believed that the enemy remaining in this pocket had been considerably reduced. Mortars, hand grenades, demolitions, small arms, and flame throwers were employed against this area. Because BLT 2/25 had become so depleted in strength, BLT 2/24 was directed to relieve BLT 2/25 in time to continue the attack at King-hour on 15 March. A Provisional Company composed of personnel from the RCT Weapons Company, RCT H & S Company, and the 81mm Mortar Platoon of BLT 1/25 was organized and relieved BLT 2/24 on the right. The Reconnaissance Company continued mopping up operations.

(e) RCT 24, less two (2) BLT's, was in Division Reserve, and continued the police of the rear areas and made preparations for reembarkation.

(f) The 14th Marines began reembarkation at 0700. By 1600, 1/14 and 4/14 had completed reembarkation; 2/14, 3/14, and H&S Battery were continuing preparations for loading.

(g) 4th Tank Battalion. Eight (8) tanks (including two (2) flame throwers) were on loan to the 5th Marine Division. At the end of the period forty-three (43) tanks were operational and eleven (11) were destroyed.

(h) Aviation. VMO-4 flew one (1) tactical observation

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mission and at the end of the period two (2) planes were operational.

(i) Naval Gunfire. No naval gunfire was available nor could it be employed within the Division zone.

(j) 4th Engineer Battalion continued assigned duties blowing caves and executing general demolitions.

(k) Combat Efficiency was reduced to an estimated 35%.

(l) Weather and Visibility. The weather was fair, visibility was unlimited, and ceiling overcast 1/10 to 3/10.

25. FROM 1800, 14 MAR 45 TO 1800, 15 MAR 45 (D PLUS 24)

(a) Night activity in the Division zone was confined to the center of resistance in TA 185, where several unsuccessful infiltrations were attempted. There was considerable grenade activity, particularly on the front of BLT 3/24. BLT 2/24 relieved BLT 2/25 at 2200.

(b) The Division continued operations at King-hour minus 60, King-hour being 0730, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 22-45, to mop up thoroughly its zone of action.

(c) RCT 23 continued mopping up operations, burial of enemy dead, and the general police of its area. This RCT continued preparations for reembarkation and for the relief by RCT 24 at 0800, 16 March.

(d) RCT 25 resumed its operations to reduce the center of resistance in TA 185, to mop up the rear areas, to bury the enemy dead, and generally police its area. The order of units from left to right was BLT's 3/24, 2/24, 2/25, and 3/25. On the right of the center of resistance considerable advance was made, which reduced the size of the pocket approximately one-third.

The enemy continued to oppose the advance stubbornly. Numerous caves were demolished in this area after unsuccessful attempts to induce the occupants to surrender.

(e) RCT 24, less two (2) BLT's, was in Division Reserve. This RCT continued mopping up and policing of rear areas, and prepared to relieve RCT 23 in its present zone at 0800, 16 March.

(f) The 14th Marines continued reembarkation. The Regimental CP opened in the USS BOLLINGER at 1400.

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SECTION IV - NARRATIVE OF OPERATION.

(g) 4th Tank Battalion. Eight (8) tanks (including two (2) flame throwers) were still on loan to the 5th Marine Division. At the end of the period thirty-two (32) tanks were reembarked, three (3) remained attached to RCT 25, and eleven (11) were destroyed.

(h) Aviation. VMO-4 flew three (3) tactical observation missions, and at the end of the period two (2) planes were operational.

(i) 4th Engineer Battalion. No change.

(j) Combat Efficiency was reduced to an estimated 35%.

(k) Weather and Visibility. Weather was fair and visibility was good.

26. FROM 1800, 15 MAR 45 TO 1800, 16 MAR 45 (D PLUS 25)

(a) Activity for the night was confined to the area in front of the troops containing the center of resistance in TA 185. Accurate rifle fire, hand grenades, and small mortar fire were delivered by the enemy. An attempt by a party of from fifty (50) to sixty (60) of the enemy to break out of the center of resistance was stopped when the advance party of the enemy was fired upon. Six (6) of the enemy were killed, and the remainder were driven back into the caves from which they had emerged.

(b) At 2250 1/14 had completed reembarkation in APA 172; 3/14 and 4/14 had completed reembarkation in APA 234.

(c) The Division continued operations at King-hour minus 105, King-hour being 0815, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 23-45, to eliminate the pocket of resistance in TA 185 and to mop up its zone of action thoroughly.

(d) RCT 23 was relieved at 0800 by RCT 24, less two (2) BLT's, and immediately began reembarkation. At 1700 the CP of this RCT was opened in the USS ROCKBRIDGE.

(e) RCT 24, less BLT 2/24, relieved RCT 23 and continued mopping up and the general police of the area assigned it. This RCT assumed control of BLT 3/24 at 0800. In a cave in TA 185 B, a patrol killed fourteen (14) Japanese and entombed eleven (11) additional when this cave was closed. At 1800 positions were taken for the defense of the area as shown on the map, Progress of Attack.

(f) RCT 25, with BLT 2/24 attached, continued the attack.

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SECTION IV - NARRATIVE OF OPERATION.

at King-hour minus 105, and at 1030 all organized resistance in this area had ceased. For the remainder of the period this RCT continued mopping up in its zone, the evacuation of own dead, the burial of the enemy dead, the removal of friendly mine field in TA's 167 D and 184 SX, and general police of the area. At 1700 dispositions for defense were as shown on the map, Progress of Attack. At 1600 the Division Reconnaissance Company reverted to Division control.

(g) At 1100 the entire Division Sector was reported secured.

(h) At 1800 the Commanding General VAC LANFOR announced that all organized resistance on IWO JIMA had ceased.

(i) 4th Tank Battalion continued reembarkation. Eight (8) tanks were still on loan to the 5th Division, and one (1) flame thrower tank to the 3d Division.

(j) Aviation. VMO-4 flew one (1) photographic mission and one (1) tactical observation mission, and at the end of the period one (1) airplane was operational.

(k) Combat Efficiency was reduced to an estimated 35%.

(l) Weather and Visibility. Weather fair, visibility good, and ceiling overcast 1/10 to 4/10.

27. FROM 1800, 16 MAR 45 TO 1800, 17 MAR 45 (D PLUS 26)

(a) RCT 23 completed reembarkation at 2300.

(b) During the hours of darkness eleven (11) Japanese, attempting to move about in the Division zone, were killed. Other than this, quiet prevailed over the entire Division front during the night.

(c) RCT 24 relieved RCT 25 in its zone at 0800. BLT 2/24 reverted to parent control at that time. RCT 24, in accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 24-45, continued thorough policing and mopping up the remaining enemy in the zones of action of RCT's 23 and 25. Throughout the day, active patrolling was conducted in both areas, in addition to the evacuation of own dead, the burial of enemy dead, the blowing of caves, and the general policing of the areas.

(d) RCT 25, when relieved, assembled in designated areas and commenced reembarkation. At 1345 troops of RCT 25 were embarked on APA's 178 and 172.

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SECTION IV - NARRATIVE OF OPERATION.

(e) As a result of the mopping up operations for this period, fifteen (15) of the enemy were killed, one hundred thirty-two (132) enemy dead were buried, fifty-eight (58) caves were closed, and thirteen (13) Marine dead were evacuated. General police improved the area in preparation for turning it over to the 3d Marine Division.

28. FROM 1800, 17 MAR 45 TO 1800, 18 MAR 45 (D PLUS 27)

(a) At 1900 RCT 25 CP opened in APA 172, reembarkation having been completed at that time.

(b) No enemy activity was reported during the night.

(c) In accordance with VAC LANFOR Order No. 25-45, the 3d Marine Division relieved RCT 24 with RCT 9 at 0808.

(d) When relieved by RCT 9, RCT 24 assembled in designated areas and prepared to commence reembarkation on order.

(e) At 1650 units of RCT 24 were embarking and proceeding to APA 222.

(f) At 1730 the Division Advance CP opened in APA 103.

(g) The remaining units continued reembarkation.

29. FROM 1800, 18 MAR 45 TO 1800, 19 MAR 45 (D PLUS 28)

(a) RCT 24 completed reembarkation at 2000 and opened its CP at 2100 in APA 222.

(b) The 4th Pioneer Battalion CP opened in APA 233 at 2300.

(c) The 4th Engineer Battalion CP opened in APA 222 at 0030.

(d) The Division CP was closed ashore at 0900 and opened at the same time in APA 103.

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Appendix 1

to

SECTION IV

P R O G R E S S O F A T T A C K

1:20,000 Target Area Map of Objective overprinted to show objectives assigned and daily front line positions.

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SECTION V

COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. General.

(a) In view of the varied and numerous suggestions pertaining to changes in current Tables of Organization and Basic Allowances, and in view of the possible adoption of an FMF PAC proposed Table of Organization, a coordinated study of the subject has been instituted by the Division and the results therefrom will be forwarded to FMF IAC in the form of specific recommendations.

(b) Without attempting to comment on all detailed recommendations outlined in staff section and subordinate unit reports, the comments and recommendations included herein and considered of immediate importance and general interest, are submitted.

2. Comments and Recommendations.

(a) Comment. The immense value of cooperation and understanding which results from constant association in a joint endeavor is reflected in smoother, more efficient teamwork which is the essence of success in the most complicated of battles - an amphibious operation. This Division has gained considerable experience in amphibious technique as the result of having participated in four (4) major engagements in the past fourteen (14) months, and it is felt that, if the Division had been working with the same TRANSDIVS, the same TRANSGROUP Staff, and the same control organization throughout this period, the resultant would have been an amphibious fighting team of unparalleled efficiency. Certainly the inevitable process of relearning the capabilities of personnel and retraining in basic principles and practices prior to each operation would be minimized.

The immediate reaction to this proposal will be to state that widespread Pacific operations make such a scheme impractical. The fact remains that maximum efficiency and unity of action between the agency responsible for placing troops ashore and the troops themselves will result only from the establishment of such a policy and, in view of more difficult operations in prospect where cooperation and understanding will be vital during the critical stages of landings, it is maintained that every effort should be directed toward achieving the desired end.

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SECTION V - COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

Recommendation. That the Navy establish a policy of maintaining TRANSDIV, TRANSGROUP staffs, and control organizations as permanent integral units, assigning them to work with the same troop units in each operation.

(b) Comment. Results indicate that high horizontal bombing by land based aircraft had little effect on the enemy's defensive system. In fact, one POW estimated that 40% of the bombs dropped by these aircraft prior to D-day missed the island entirely and this is considered a conservative figure. In order to permit more effective air strikes from low altitudes, which are essential if destruction of emplacements is to be accomplished, early destruction of enemy AA defenses must be effected. The efficiency of NGF spotting by VOS aircraft would also be enhanced by the reduction of the enemy's AA.

Recommendations. That in future assaults on heavily fortified objectives, initial effort be concentrated on destruction of AA defenses by carrier aircraft and that precise low-level bombing and use of rockets against located positions be initiated two (2) weeks prior to the target date.

(c) Comment. The Division's concept of NGF requirements for the IWO JIMA operation, which was submitted to VAC LANFOR early in the planning phase, emphasized the necessity for adequate preliminary bombardment of the objective and requested that a minimum of ten (10) days destructive fire be conducted prior to the landing. It was apparent that in order to insure success of the landing, weapon emplacements, pillboxes, and blockhouses, particularly those located on the right flank of the Division zone of action would have to be reduced prior to D-day by slow, deliberate, destructive fire from ships firing at close ranges. It is considered that the three (3) days allowed for the preliminary bombardment was insufficient.

Recommendation. That in future operations against highly fortified objectives a minimum of ten days preliminary bombardment to be scheduled, rotating BB or CA divisions if necessary.

(d) Comment. During the forward area rehearsal, the Division requested the use of "earthquake" bombs on the ridge in TA 183 CD, the "amphi-theater", and the high cliffs on the right flank of the Division zone of action, the objective being to cause a crumbling effect which would seal numerous weapons emplacements and caves contained in the cliff and ridge faces. This procedure had been found effective in the European Theater of Operations and

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SECTION V - COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

it is believed that similar results could have been obtained on IWO JIMA, particularly in view of the soft sand stone composition of the cliffs. The request was denied.

Recommendation. That provisions be made to employ "earthquake" bombs on future operations in an effort to crumble cliffs and seal caves, and also to use in large ravines for their concussive effect.

(e) Comment. The 19 LST's assigned the Division for the IWO JIMA operation were insufficient to properly embark four (4) assault BLT's and Division Artillery. In some cases tactical unity could not be completely preserved and the presence of additional radar, ponton barge and causeway personnel on seven (7) LST's further restricted troop space. LST requirements for the tactical loading of four (4) assault BLT's consist of sixteen (16) LST's, four (4) being assigned to each BLT. Division Artillery requires five (5) LST's, one (1) for each battalion and one (1) for regimental headquarters and additional ammunition, making a total of twenty-one (21) LST's needed to embark assault elements of the Division.

Recommendation. That a minimum of twenty-one (21) LST's, the entire troop capacity of which would be available for troop units, be assigned the Division in future operations of a similar character.

(f) Comment. On several occasions LST commanders refused to take aboard LVT's, causing the loss of LVT's from swamping when fuel was exhausted. (See par. 8(e), Annex NAN).

Recommendation. That all LST commanders be impressed with the responsibility they bear and the problems involved in operating with LVT units, and that new LST's be given training with LVT's sufficient to foster a spirit of cooperation and teamwork.

(g) Comment. Movement and operations of LST's and LSM's were handicapped because of the insistence of the TRANSRON Commander in personally controlling these craft. Consequently, the chain of command was considerably more involved and delays greater than if such authority had been vested in the TRANSRON Control Officer who was working in conjunction with the representative of the Commanding General.

Recommendation. That TRANSRON commanders establish a general policy relative to movement and operations of LST's and LSM's and delegate authority for the detailed control to their TRANSRON control officers.

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SECTION V - COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

(h) Comment. The two replacement drafts were not received in sufficient time to thoroughly train them along with the Division units for which they would provide replacements. The status of training of the replacement drafts when received was such as to require intensive and realistic combat training prior to their reaching a satisfactory state of readiness for combat, and it is highly desirable that these drafts be available to the Division throughout the preparatory training period.

Recommendation. That battle replacement drafts be assigned the Division at least three (3) months prior to embarkation for an operation in order that integrated training with the Division may be accomplished.

(i) Comment. The need for timely oblique and vertical photographs of the battle area was keenly felt throughout the operation. The quality of most of the photographs furnished by higher authority after D-day was poor and the photographs were worthless for use by small unit commanders. During the latter stages of the operation, vitally needed photographic coverage of the enemy area under attack was finally obtained through the use of a VMO-4 plane and a Division photographer, a woefully inadequate system in comparison with the modern equipment available to higher echelon for this purpose.

Recommendation. That higher echelon automatically furnish the Division adequate photographic coverage of its zone of action throughout the operation, that more emphasis be placed on thorough briefing of pilots for photographic missions, and that higher standards in the technique of processing film be achieved.

(j) Comment. Experience gained in the IWO JIMA operation emphasized the need for a heavier and more powerful direct fire weapon than the Bazooka for use of assault teams against concrete emplacements and caves, employing a shell with concrete-piercing capabilities against the former and a fragmentation shell for attack of the latter.

Recommendation. That a short range rocket of 4.5" caliber, capable of being crew served by two (2) men of the assault team and firing concrete piercing and fragmentation ammunition, be adopted.

(k) Comment. The need for additional mortars in the Division, particularly a heavier type mortar than the 81mm, was

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SECTION V - COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

apparent in the operation. Heavier mortars should be employed to supplement the organic 81mm mortar platoons and provide the infantry commander with vitally needed additional fire support to bridge the gap between the 81mm and artillery.

Recommendation. That the 4.2 mortar be adopted by the Marine Corps and a mortar battalion of two (2) 4.2 companies and one (1) 155mm mortar company be assigned to each Division.

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A N N E X A B L E

TO

FOURTH

MARINE DIVISION

OPERATIONS REPORT

IWO JIMA

A D M I N I S T R A T I O N

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SECTION I - PLANNING AND PREPARATION

(a) Administrative.

Planning for the conduct of administration began on September 1, 1944, immediately after return from the Marianas Operation. Based on the experience gained in handling casualty reports on that operation, the casualty card inaugurated and used by this Division was revised, 100,000 copies being printed and distributed to subordinate units. These units filled out and kept up-to-date a set of these cards for each officer and man. Organizations ordered to duty with the Division during the operation were furnished copies of orders pertaining to administration and furnished blank casualty cards. Officers who were to handle casualty reporting attended a conference held at Headquarters, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific for the purpose of clarifying that Headquarters' desires in connection with such reporting.

Orders governing submission of embarkation rosters and submission of recommendation for award of medals and decorations were revamped and reissued.

Previous efforts to obtain an identification tag stamping machine for the use of this Division were continued with the result that such machines have now been authorized for all divisions. However, the machine was not delivered prior to the operation and identification tags had to be obtained by the Division Surgeon through the cooperation of nearby units having such machines. In addition a supply of 3,000 tin bound cardboard tags were obtained by the D-1 Section for use by the division medical units aboard each ship as emergency identification tags to replace those lost by officers and men enroute to the target.

The 24th and 30th Replacement Drafts of approximately 126 officers and 2600 enlisted were assigned to this Division during November, 1944. These drafts were assigned and ordered held intact, to be used as ships platoons and shore parties and later released to regiments. Due to the shortage of junior officers throughout the Division, replacement officers were released to the Division for assignment to combat teams, together with some medical personnel assigned to other units by higher authority. This reduced the officer personnel of the drafts to 63 Marine Corps and 3 Navy.

Each combat team was assigned a portion of the Replacement Drafts for training as a separate unit and for use as ships platoons during the operation.

Upon leaving the combat area following the Marianas Operation this Division had no information on the whereabouts of 555 officers and enlisted men. Some few of these were missing in action

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but the vast majority had been wounded and evacuated by ship and plane to hospitals located throughout the Pacific. By means of unremitting effort and utilizing the record resources of all hospitals, casual centers and Fleet Post Offices in the Pacific, all of the officers and men still alive were located at such widely separated points as Guadalcanal and Seattle. To avoid this state of affairs following the current operation, this Division decided to leave on each transport at the target a clerical noncommissioned officer whose sole duty would be to record data on all casualties brought aboard that ship for treatment. Once a casualty's presence aboard a particular ship is known, it is a comparatively easy task to trace his disposition thereafter. In order to obtain information on 4th Marine Division personnel who might be evacuated as casualties to vessels on which the 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions arrived at Iwo Jima, this Division requested that the Commanding General, V Amphibious Corps, issue orders that all units participating in the operation likewise leave a casualty reporting noncommissioned officer aboard each ship. Reports were submitted daily by these noncommissioned officers to Headquarters, V Amphibious Corps which disseminated the information to the various divisions. This information has already proven of great assistance.

An additional aid in locating wounded officers and men was developed where by means of a personal message from the Commanding General, and a cartoon bringing out the main points of that message, all officers and men were urged in case they were evacuated to write or have someone write for them, first to their next of kin and next to the Commanding General, or any other officer of the Division, by title, advising of their current address.

(b) Provost Marshal.

Planning and preparation of the Military Police Company consisted of final training for their duties in combat.

(c) Religious Activities.

Chaplains were so assigned to the various ships as to provide a Catholic and Protestant Chaplain for each vessel as far as practicable. Two additional chaplains were assigned, one of whom was assigned to the Rear Echelon and the other assigned to the Division Burial Section.

(d) Morale.

(1) Recreation - Prior to leaving the Division Base Camp, the commanding officer of troops aboard each ship assigned to the Division was allocated recreation funds approximating fifty cents per man for expenditure during organized recreation at Pearl Harbor

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after rehearsal and prior to sailing for the staging area. In addition, unit recreation officers were directed to take a supply of small games, cards and books to be used aboard ship.

(2) American Red Cross - Of the five American Red Cross representatives in this Division, four accompanied the Division. They procured and furnished commanding officers of troops on Division ships recreational supplies and comfort articles ranging from playing cards to razors, and including 6,000 ditty bags for use for the personal effects of our dead. In addition the ladies of the Red Cross Chapter on Maui made up and delivered through the Division American Red Cross Field Director a large contribution of battle dressings and wrappings.

(3) Other steps - Division Recreation and Morale funds were appropriated for the purchase from the Division Post Exchange of 20,000 folders of air mail stationery for distribution to troops at the target by the various unit mail orderlies. Magazines purchased by the Recreation Fund were intercepted at Pearl Harbor and distributed to commanding officers of troops aboard the various ships assigned to the Division. Books and magazines were assembled by the chaplains beginning two months prior to the operation and together with an additional supply obtained at Pearl Harbor, distributed to the ships on which the Division was embarked.

(e) Postal.

By November, plans for the operation had crystalized sufficiently to begin postal planning. At a conference of the Postal officers concerned, arrangements were made to secure plane priority for the mail of the combat troops involved, for working space at Pearl Harbor, Eniwetok and Saipan enroute to the target, for the establishment of an LST borne Fleet Post Office at the target and for the loading aboard that LST of supplies, equipment, V-Mail forms and other reserve postal supplies. The Division Postal Officer evolved a plan of sending fifteen postal clerks to Pearl Harbor to intercept all mail for the Division at that point and to break down this mail into 107 components comprising the Rear Echelon and troops aboard the 51 ships on which the Division was to be embarked. Postal supplies assembled and packed for the operation included a complete V-Mail sending station; \$15,000 in stamp stock including 55,000 air mail envelopes, in addition to a \$4,000 stock provided each of the four regiments.

(f) Civil Affairs.

The Corps Civil Affairs Unit, consisting of two Navy officers, Civil Affairs specialists; one Marine officer, a Japanese linguist and five enlisted men, reported to the Division immediately prior to the operation. The unit was outfitted with two trucks which

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were preloaded with the prescribed equipment of the unit.

SECTION II - MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE

(a) Administrative.

Embarkation rosters were secured from the various ships, verified and despatched to the Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific; the Division Rear Echelon and the various Division Postal Echelons immediately prior to departure from Pearl Harbor.

During the movement to the objective normal administrative work and final preparations for the tasks ashore were conducted.

(b) Provost Marshal.

The Provost Marshal utilized the military police under his control to augment Navy Shore Patrols during the weeks liberty granted members of the Division in Honolulu after rehearsal and prior to departure for the target.

(c) Religious Activities.

During the period spent aboard ship, chaplains conducted religious services, arranged for movies, organized amateur shows and assisted whenever possible in the conduct of ship's libraries and recreational facilities. During stop-overs, chaplains conducted services on ships having no chaplain of their denomination.

(d) Morale.

(1) Recreation - Upon arrival at Pearl Harbor, the recreation funds previously allocated to commanding officers of troops were pooled under the V Amphibious Corps, as were all available recreational facilities in the Pearl Harbor area. Each ship was allotted a quota and assigned a daily recreational area. Areas were rotated so that the preferred recreational facilities could be shared by the greatest possible number of men. Iced beer and Coca-Cola was purchased through the Navy and provided free to the men with sandwiches the men had brought from their respective ships.

(2) American Red Cross - Enroute to the target additional Red Cross recreational gear was supplied to the ships at Pearl Harbor.

(e) Postal.

This Division effected a completely successful delivery of mail to the Division scattered over 51 ships, and components of which were transferred from one ship to another over a period of 43 days

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consisting of 37 separate deliveries at Lahaina Roads, Maui; Pearl Harbor, T. H.; Eniwetok and Saipan. This delivery to ships was possible through the work of the fifteen man detail at Pearl Harbor which sorted all the mail of this Division and, employing rosters, sent to the Division's base camp the mail of the Rear Echelon and to each ship the mail for the troops embarked on it. Result was that all current mail (except 12 pouches) was delivered to the officers and men of the Division before leaving Saipan for the target. As a censorship matter from the time the Division left Pearl Harbor until D-Day, all outgoing mail was impounded and released when directed by the Commanding Officer, Expeditionary Troops.

SECTION III - NARRATIVE

(a) Administrative.

Periodic reports were prepared throughout the operation and beginning on D-Day casualty information in the form of cumulative figures on killed in action; wounded and evacuated (from the reporting organization); missing; wounded but not evacuated; sick and evacuated and total casualties, each divided between officers and enlisted men were furnished D-3 for inclusion in the Division daily despatch report. On D plus 3 a representative of the D-1 Section landed with the Division Advance Message Center to obtain and provide these figures and to compile the periodic report. After Headquarters, V Amphibious Corps came ashore C-1 of that organization was furnished by telephone each day the same casualty figures as were included in the daily despatch report to that Headquarters.

The main body of the D-1 Section landed on D plus 5. The first administrative casualty report by name was prepared on 28 February, 1945, and before leaving Iwo Jima, 14 administrative casualty reports, containing a total of 6527 names of officers and men had been prepared and despatched. An additional administrative casualty report containing 124 names of officers killed in action and died of wounds was radioed from Guam. Casualty reports were submitted in mailbrief form although during the last few days of its stay ashore this Division was permitted to report daily the names of twelve killed in action by radio.

The 24th and 30th Replacement Drafts accompanied this Division on the Iwo Jima operation. During the first phase of the operation these drafts functioned as ship platoons and shore parties until ships were unloaded when they were assigned to combat teams, they having been released to the Division early in the operation to be used as replacements.

The 24th Replacement Draft consisted of 30 Marine officers, 1267 Marine enlisted, and 7 Navy corpsmen. The 30th Replacement Draft consisted of 29 Marine officers, 3 Navy medical officers, 1214 Marine enlisted and 36 Navy corpsmen, and a total of 62

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officers and 2524 enlisted. At the completion of the operation all of these replacements had been assigned to other units except 4 Marine officers, 57 Marine enlisted, 3 Navy medical officers and 15 Navy enlisted (corpsmen), of which 11 enlisted Marines were missing in action.

A rear echelon at base camp from these two drafts consists of 4 Marine officers and 38 Marine enlisted.

The assignment of personnel of these Replacement Drafts was by specification number as far as possible, in accordance with existing instructions.

On 9 March, 1945 by Division Special Order #12-45, a temporary Provisional Battalion consisting of 38 officers and 488 enlisted was organized from the Support Group and assembled as a Division Reserve for emergency use in rear areas. These troops were used in rear area patrolling for two days, at which time forward elements had been returned to that area and the temporary battalion was no longer necessary. Officers and men rejoined their units.

Following are cumulative casualty totals as of 1800 on each date shown:

1945	KILLED			WOUNDED EVACUATED			SICK EVACUATED			MISSING IN ACTION			TOTAL KIA EVAC & MIA		
	Off	Enl	To-	Off	Enl	To-	Off	Enl	To-	Off	Enl	To-	Off	Enl	To-
			tal			tal			tal			tal			tal
2/19															
2/20															
2/21	33	347	380	96	1655	1751	1	51	52	2	332	334	132	2385	2517
2/22	36	391	427	92	1720	1812	1	99	100	1	354	355	140	2564	2704
2/23	39	417	456	101	1959	2060	4	138	172	-	300	300	144	2844	2988
2/24	46	520	566	122	2318	2440	6	339	345	1	340	341	175	3517	3692
2/25	45	543	588	120	2379	2499	7	347	354	2	304	306	174	3573	3747
2/26	48	620	668	144	2557	2701	11	432	443	2	316	318	205	3925	4130
2/27	56	705	761	161	3063	3224	14	572	586	2	338	340	233	4678	4911
2/28	57	728	785	159	3149	3308	12	633	645	1	347	348	229	4857	5086
3/1	58	769	827	176	3365	3541	13	712	725	1	352	353	248	5108	5446
3/2	64	816	880	183	3573	3756	14	761	775	1	286	287	262	5433	5698
3/3	65	927	992	187	3799	3986	14	847	861	1	276	277	267	5849	6116
3/4	66	1025	1091	193	3993	4186	15	909	924	1	228	229	275	6155	6430
3/5	67	1102	1169	201	4171	4372	15	955	970	1	191	192	284	6419	6703
3/6	69	1148	1217	205	4293	4498	14	967	984	1	174	175	289	6582	6871
3/7	73	1224	1297	210	4461	4671	19	1008	1027	2	162	164	304	6855	7159
3/8	77	1265	1342	215	4663	4878	15	1043	1058	2	136	138	309	7107	7416
3/9	77	1271	1348	214	4751	4965	16	1059	1075	2	132	134	309	7213	7522
3/10	79	1315	1394	217	4793	5010	17	1115	1132	1	111	112	315	7558	7873

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1945	KILLED			WOUNDED EVACUATED			SICK EVACUATED			MISSING IN ACTION			TOTAL KIA, EVAC & MIA		
	Off	Enl	To-tal	Off	Enl	To-tal	Off	Enl	To-tal	Off	Enl	To-tal	Off	Enl	To-tal
3/11	82	1366	1448	222	4913	5135	16	1122	1138	1	112	113	321	7513	7834
3/12	83	1429	1512	223	5006	5229	17	1143	1160	1	89	90	324	7667	7991
3/13	84	1481	1565	223	5087	5310	18	1167	1185	1	95	96	326	7850	8156
3/14	84	1513	1597	222	5158	5380	18	1180	1198	1	88	89	325	7937	8264
3/15	88	1606	1694	221	5155	5376	21	1200	1221	1	78	79	331	8039	8370
3/16	90	1622	1712	220	5196	5416	22	1211	1233	1	74	75	333	8103	8436
3/17	91	1640	1731	219	5209	5428	22	1213	1235	1	74	75	333	8136	8469

WOUNDED BUT GRAND
1945 NOT EVACUATED TOTAL CASUALTIES

	Off	Enl	To-tal	Off	Enl	To-tal	#
2/19						491	#
2/20				93	1918	2011	
2/21	None Reported			132	2385	2517	
2/22	14	144	158	144	2708	2852	
2/23	17	158	175	161	3002	3163	
2/24	18	220	238	193	3737	3930	
2/25	24	238	262	198	3811	4009	
2/26	27	310	337	232	4235	4467	
2/27	33	335	368	246	5013	5259	
2/28	35	377	410	262	5234	5496	
3/1	37	397	434	285	5595	5880	
3/2	36	435	471	298	5871	6169	
3/3	39	436	475	306	6285	6591	
3/4	41	462	503	316	6617	6933	
3/5	41	471	512	325	6890	7215	
3/6	41	485	526	330	7067	7397	
3/7	38	498	536	342	7343	7685	
3/8	43	520	563	349	7627	7976	
3/9	45	527	572	354	7740	8094	
3/10	44	532	576	359	7869	8228	
3/11	47	543	590	368	8056	8424	
3/12	48	556	604	372	8223	8595	
3/13	49	560	609	375	8390	8765	
3/14	50	565	615	375	8504	8879	
3/15	50	572	622	381	8611	8992	
3/16	50	575	625	383	8678	9061	
3/17	51	578	629	384	8706	9090	

Includes estimate of 470 from RCT 23. No reports received from RCT 24 and RCT 25.

(b) Provost Marshal.

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The Military Police Company strength of 7 officers and 133 men was sub-divided into 5 platoons and company headquarters on this operation. Three platoons, each consisting of 1 officer and 23 men, were attached to the regimental combat teams with whom they performed military police duties for the duration of the operation. The two remaining platoons provided Division Command Post security as well as traffic control and straggler patrol initially on the beach and later along established straggler lines. 219 stragglers were apprehended and returned to parent organizations. A prisoner of war stockade was established and maintained for 22 days.

(c) Religious Activities.

On arrival at Iwo Jima, all chaplains landed with the organizations to which detailed. Later it was necessary to assign them for alternating tasks of a divisional nature such as the continual presence of one chaplain at the beach casualty evacuation station, and the nightly vigil at the Division Hospital of one Protestant and one Catholic chaplain. In addition unit chaplains visited the wounded of their units at the hospital. The chaplain on continuous duty at the Division Cemetery conducted a committal service when each officer and man was interred. On 15 March, 1945, the 4th Marine Division Cemetery was dedicated, after which the chaplains conducted Jewish, Catholic and Protestant memorial services.

(d) Morale.

(2) American Red Cross - Red Cross personnel assisted in caring for the wounded, both aboard ship and after landing ashore. After establishment of the Division Hospital ashore they furnished most of the health and comfort items to the patients.

(3) Other Steps - The air mail stationery provided by the Division Morale and Recreation Fund was distributed to the Division in the same postal pouches in which incoming mail was sent to the units. Because in combat men cannot be expected to have preserved air mail stamps and may be prevented either by lack of funds or other circumstances from obtaining such stamps, initially \$115.00, an amount later increased by \$100.00, of morale funds was turned over to the Postal Officer so that every letter leaving the Division Post Office would have an air mail stamp affixed to it. Men were encouraged to write home to allay their next of kin's fears for their safety. By appropriating to the Division Morale and Recreation Fund money realized from the sale of Division Post Exchange supplies placed aboard such vessels as did not have ship's service stores, sufficient funds were realized to give each commanding officer of troops 22.6¢ per man to be expended for the health

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and comfort of the enlisted men on the trip from Iwo Jima to the Division's base camp.

(e) Postal.

Division Post Office personnel landed on Iwo Jima on D plus 6 and the Division Post Office was in operation the following day. No conclusive arrangements to receive incoming or to despatch outgoing mail by air having been made, this Division recommended to higher authority that mail be dropped with the result that mail was dropped by parachute on 1 and 2 March. On 3 March an airfield was in operation, after which all division mail was received and despatched by air. A portable V-Mail station of this Division was put into operation by the Division Postal Officer in a shell pocked water reservoir on D plus 7 and the first outgoing V-Mail despatched via press plane the following day. This V-Mail station was the only such station operating on Iwo Jima and served all Marine, Navy, Army and Coast Guard personnel on the island as well as on ships anchored there.

Following is a tabulation of mail handled by the 4th Marine Division Post Office during the 22 days it was in operation on Iwo Jima:

OFFICIAL V-MAIL-OUTGOING

Rolls - Documents - Division		
17	105	3rd
14	89	4th

REGULAR V-MAIL OUTGOING

Rolls	Letters
117	161,777

INCOMING AIR MAIL
MAR 1 - MAR 19TH INCLUSIVE

4th MarDiv:	For Other Organizations:
364 pouches	420 pouches

OUTGOING AIR MAIL
FEB 28 - MAR 19 INCLUSIVE

264 pouches

(f) Civil Affairs.

No civil population was encountered in the 4th Marine Division zone of action on Iwo Jima.

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RECOMMENDATIONS

(a) Administrative.

It is recommended:

(1) That in the future, as on this operation, casualty noncommissioned officers be left on board each vessel during the operation. The sole duty of these men would be to record and report casualties brought on board their ship. This system worked very well and it is highly desirable that it be continued.

(2) That higher echelons of command make a definite study, determine and announce at least two months prior to embarkation for an operation, the exact information relative to personnel, which will be required during the operation from divisions and positive time these reports are to be made. Further, that once this is done no changes be made during the operation. The information desired should only be of such vital nature and such that front line troops will be able to furnish it with the least amount of diversion from the job at hand.

(3) That Division Commanders be given a quota of meritorious field promotions for noncommissioned officers, allotted by pay grades, for use on the field of battle. This will enable a Division Commander to make just awards for outstanding work in the face of the enemy and at the same time fill vacancies resulting from the battle.

(4) That personnel replacements be furnished as excess per regiment and be assigned for training and use of the regiment. If this is done the personnel will become acquainted with the leaders in their units and feel they are a part of the regiment. This excess will provide sufficient personnel for ships platoons and Regimental Shore Parties. When these men are put into combat they will be a reserve being sent forward to their own unit. When held out as separate replacement drafts as done in the last operation, men were committed with units utterly strange to them, which did not lend to the utmost efficiency.

(b) Provost Marshal.

It is recommended:

That the present strength of the Military Police Company in this Division, 7 officers and 133 enlisted, which provides 5 platoons and a headquarters section be included in the Table of Organization. Recent reduction in Table of Organization strength to three platoons, one platoon being assigned to each of the three

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regimental combat teams, makes no provision for Division Command Post security; for Division prisoner of war compound; for traffic control on the beaches or for rear straggler lines, tasks which could not very well be delegated to Military Police of another unit such as Corps Military Police.

(d) Morale.

(3) Other Steps

It is recommended that:

(a) Money allotted to troops for recreational purposes at Pearl Harbor or any other intermediate stop between the base and target be delivered to each man by the commanding officer of troops on his ship to be spent by the man at the recreation center assigned as he sees fit. That beer, Coca-Cola, cigarettes, and such other articles as may be furnished, be provided by the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, at those recreation centers for sale to the liberty parties. This insures each man receiving his apportioned share and he alone is responsible that he obtains the articles. This requires coordinated effort between Divisions and higher echelons.

(e) Postal.

It is recommended that:

(1) A postal detail be left at each intermediate mail stop between the base and the target for the purpose of expediting mail and for the purpose of holding out and delivering where possible mail of men evacuated. This was done at Pearl Harbor on this operation with the result that men evacuated to that area received immediate mail service, as their mail did not go beyond that station.

(2) That members of this Division when enroute to an operation be permitted to write letters under the same censorship rules which obtain during rehearsals, i.e. no mention being made of the rehearsal or an impending operation and no mention being made that the writer is aboard ship, and that such letters be placed in the postal system immediately upon the arrival of the Division at each way-point enroute to the target. It is believed this would do much to relieve the anxiety of the next of kin, improve the morale of officers and men, and let thousands less civilians know that an operation impends than does the present system of suddenly stopping all despatch of personal mail to the mainland of the United States.

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A N N E X B A K E R

TO

FOURTH

MARINE DIVISION

OPERATIONS REPORT

IWO JIMA

I N T E L L I G E N C E

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ANNEX BAKER

INTELLIGENCE

1. MAPS, PHOTOGRAPHS AND SUPPLEMENTARY INTELLIGENCE.

(a) Maps.

Prior to embarkation the following maps were furnished this Division:

- (1) Special Air and Gunnery Target Maps, scales 1:5,000, 1:10,000 and 1:20,000, with Target Area grid.
- (2) Special Terrain Maps, scales 1:5,000, 1:20,000, without Target Area grid.
- (3) Special Air and Gunnery Target Maps, scale 2 inches equal 1 nautical mile.
- (4) G-2 Situation Maps, Nos. 1 and 2, scale 1:10,000 gridded.
- (5) Special Aerial Mosaics, scale 1:10,000, with Target Area grid, and 1:20,000 without Target Area grid.
- (6) H.O. Chart No. 6101.

In addition, Division prepared an East Beach Assault Map, scale 1:5,000.

The Special Air and Gunnery Target Map, scale 1:10,000, with Target Area grid was designated the "Official Map" upon which all reports were to be based.

Division was given the opportunity to request the quantity of maps desired. Quantities supplied were ample and permitted wide and thorough distribution.

Considering the fact that these maps were made from aerial photographs, without ground control, they were in general reasonably accurate. It would have required the most meticulous ground survey to have portrayed accurately the areas of rough terrain. In these areas, such as Target Areas 184, 185 and portions of 200, 201 and 202, the 20-foot contour interval in no way depicted the deep crevices running generally seaward on the rocky volcanic serrations and outcroppings which were so effectively hidden by vegetation in the preliminary aerial photographic coverage.

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ANNEX BAKER TO FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT IWO JIMA

All units reported that overprinting enemy positions on the Special Air and Gunnery Target Map proved detrimental rather than helpful.

The quantity of enemy positions shown obscured contours and made reading lettered squares most difficult and as these positions were plotted from early photographic coverage they were out-dated by the final Situation Map printed and issued at GUAM.

The improved type and quality of paper employed for map reproduction was noteworthy. The effects of handling and rain were minimized.

Maps of scale 1:5,000 and those ungridded were occasionally used and proved helpful in isolated instances.

The half tone aerial mosaic map, due to its cloud cover, was of little use. There was also little use for the Eastern Beach Assault Map printed by Division.

While the Enemy Situation Map prepared by VACLF was the basic situation map, others were received in lesser quantity prepared by JICPOA, FMF PAC, and PHIBSPAC. As each situation map reflected the interpretation of the issuing unit, they were at variance. Inasmuch as preliminary naval gun fire and air attacks are largely prepared from these maps this variance is confusing. A single situation map depicting the combined photographic interpretation is strongly recommended. The Joint Situation Map, scale 1:10,000, made at GUAM from last minute aerial coverage and issued at SAIPAN, was excellent and of considerable value.

The Enemy Place Name Map, issued at IWO JIMA, proved of material assistance. The captured contoured map which was reproduced by VACLF and issued at IWO was of considerable value, but the limited quantity printed restricted its use.

Relief Maps received from VACLF and augmented by those made by the Division Relief Mapping Section were of sufficient quantity to place one on every APA, and most of the LST's, LSM's and LSD's.

(b) Photographs.

Preliminary aerial photographic coverage was excellent and the quantity received of each sortie permitted suitable distribution.

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ANNEX EARLY TO FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT TWO JIMA

The plan to send an advance API officer from the Division Intelligence Section to Interpron 2 at GUAM to assist in the preparation of the final situation map and to select and arrange the distribution details of the D-minus-15 aerial photographs, met with outstanding success. The wholehearted cooperation of Interpron 2, VD5 and Photographic Squadron 28 was all that could be desired.

Commencing with the assault on Hill 382 and continuing throughout the operation, good oblique and vertical aerial photographs were vitaly needed. Preliminary coverage of this area depicted little ground detail due to heavy vegetation and gave no idea of the innate ruggedness of the terrain. By the time this area was under our direct assault, the whole surface of the area was altered by bombardment. Green vegetation was a tangled mass of dead and torn trees. Buildings were destroyed and even the trace of some roads was obscured.

As the map and preliminary photographs were virtually useless, except for general area orientation, repeated requests were initiated for aerial photographs. The few photographs furnished were hopeless. Considering the height at which they were taken and the focal length the resultant scale was unsuitable for Division use. Oblique photographs were taken at odd angles and generally not in the direction of our attack and apparently taken by pilots unfamiliar with our zone of action or plan or direction of attack. Processing was equally poor. Few of the aerial photographs taken after D-day were ever used. The title strip giving all the needed data, long adopted and in use by both Navy and Army in combat areas all over the world, was completely omitted.

The only aerial photographs of real use to the Division were those taken from Division VMO-4 observation planes by Public Relations personnel. The pilot and photographer were thoroughly briefed and understood their mission. Employing a K-20 camera, excellent obliques were taken at altitudes as low as 500 feet. The photographs were processed, enlarged and annotated by G-2 and turned out to be the only true terrain guide available.

During combat, the ideal situation envisions a few selected obliques and vertical aerial photographs complete with title data, annotated for orientation, obliques to be taken in the direction of our attack, verticals in strips parallel to our front and both furnished in sufficient quantity for distribution to companies and observers, and in time for use; likewise a few annotated photographic mosaics with grid for regimental and Division use.

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ANNEX BAKER TO FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT IWO JIMA

While front line panels are SOP, the suggestion has been offered to use some similar type of panel immediately behind the front line to identify boundaries. This scheme would be a great aid to pilots and observers and would materially assist API personnel in annotating aerial photographs for general use.

The enlarged beach photographs, in some cases annotated, were excellent. The quantity received permitted distribution down to companies.

(c) Hydrographic Information.

In general, preliminary hydrographic information furnished Division proved accurate.

The carefully laid plans for the attachment of personnel from the 4th Reconnaissance Company to accompany the Underwater Demolition Teams on their reconnaissance preliminary to D-day, and their consequent assignments to report to assault battalions, regiments and Division, were partially upset in the final phase, due to damage suffered by the ships on which these personnel were embarked.

Dispatch reports, while brief, were of considerable value. In the instances where Underwater Demolition Team and Division Reconnaissance personnel succeeded in reporting in person, they proved of great assistance. The personnel reporting aboard the Division Command Ship gave an excellent report and many points of interest were developed in a round table interrogation.

Information of particular importance obtained from the UDT's included the following: (1) the lack of underwater obstacles, permitting landing craft up to LST's to use the beaches; (2) the nature of the beaches and location of terraces inland from the beaches; (3) routes inland from the beaches; (4) the extremely high gradient of the slope up to Airfield No. 1; (5) the presence of unidentified positions in the base of the embankment of the Airfield; and (6) the presence of heavy defensive concentrations in the vicinity of MT. SURIBACHI and the wooded area north of the Quarry.

The only misleading item of information was the statement that the beach sand or volcanic ash would support the movement of jeeps and other small trucks. Until roads were bulldozed, passage of wheeled vehicles proved impossible.

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ANNEX BAKER TO FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT IWO JIMA

(d) Other Intelligence.

On the whole, the intelligence furnished by higher echelon for the IWO JIMA Operation prior to D-day was more timely, complete and usable than on any previous operation.

Early preliminary information, while not complete, was adequate for initial planning phases.

The preparation of a single comprehensive JICPOA bulletin to treat every aspect of the target and the use of this bulletin as the basis for all other intelligence proved highly satisfactory. With maps, charts and photographs, the printed bulletin was in a form to be readily digested and was furnished in sufficient quantities to be distributed to all echelons. It rendered unnecessary the preparation of the usual mimeographed study of the theater of operations.

The G-2 Study prepared by VAC, containing a situation map, lists of defensive installations by target area squares, and studies, diagrams and drawings of each of the beaches, was extensively used to good purpose, particularly in the briefing stage.

The voluminous C-2 Study of the Enemy Situation proved an excellent vehicle for collecting and issuing all undissemated enemy information acquired prior to leaving the HAWAIIAN Area. Sufficient quantities were provided for wide distribution, though some of the enclosures - e.g. the lists of enemy officers - did not need such wide distribution. Order of Battle information, as it turned out, was not complete, but all possible methods of making it complete must have been used.

Various beach diagrams and profiles and water level profiles supplemented the principal studies and proved of some assistance.

Use was made of the G-2 Tactical Study of the Terrain, especially in planning phases. The report of the submarine reconnaissance provided important verifications of early estimates.

Aerial photographic interpretations made by VACLF, JICPOA and Interpron 2 differed considerably. As emphasized in section 1 (a) of this Annex (Maps), it is strongly recommended that the interpretations not be duplicated but be prepared and issued by one agency.

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After D-day close contact was maintained with VACLF by telephone, teletype, dispatch and liaison. VACLF made every effort to keep Division well informed. C-2 Periodic Reports were received in sufficient quantities to be distributed to regiments, which gave them a better over-all picture than had been heretofore provided.

The preliminary order of battle analysis, issued on D-plus-10, was useful and accurate, but it is believed that the production of similar studies at an earlier stage of the operation, even though they could not be so comprehensive or accurate in detail, would have given better direction to Division.

The coordination with higher echelons on intelligence matters reached an all-time high. Every request by Division was approved at once with the single exception of requests for aerial photographic coverage in the later phase of the operation.

2. INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONING.

(a) Collection of Information.

Collection of information from lower echelons followed standard practice and procedure. Reports and single items of information from one echelon were correlated by the next echelon and forwarded until they reached Division. Division was in constant communication with regiments by phone and by liaison.

Establishment of Division OP's from which the Division zone of action could be scrutinized was most difficult due to the terrain. Initially, the Division OP team, using 20-power captured Jap glasses, operated on the top of MT SURIBACHI. In the later phase, after the capture of Hill 382 and its environs, it was necessary to displace for closer observation. Due to the fact that no single point permitted observation of even one whole battalion sector in its entirety, it was necessary to establish several roving two-man OP's, which moved as frequently as required to keep their zone under observation. As distances involved were short, reports were collected by runner and brought to a central collection point, where they were correlated and transmitted to G-2. As the OP runners were in constant contact with company and battalion CP's, a valuable flow of additional intelligence was possible.

The difficulties of observation, lack of late aerial photographs and the failure of the map to portray the whole picture accurately, constituted a serious problem. As a result the G-2 made

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ANNEX BAKH TO FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT IWO JIMA

almost daily tours to all battalion CP's and as many battalion and company OP's as were necessary to complete the full picture. Likewise, enemy-held terrain was studied from the air and from close-in reconnaissance on an LCI(G). This constant study of all angles of the terrain not under our control, coupled with an intimate contact with operations and all intelligence echelons, assisted in making the Division Intelligence effort more valuable than it had ever been while in combat.

Due to the closer contact maintained with the enemy throughout the operation there was little opportunity or occasion for patrols to the front of our lines. Listening posts were maintained at night and anti-sniper patrols covered rear areas. In both of these tasks the war dogs proved to be invaluable. It was reported that the German shepherds appeared to be the superior breed for scouting of fortified positions and caves.

Collection of documents and material is discussed in Section 4 of this Annex. Systematically organized search patrols covered rear areas attempting to find documents, and front line units either turned in documents or reported location of observed caches as found.

Division Language personnel received valuable experience in monitoring Japanese radio transmission. It is believed from this experiment with a minimum of equipment that the effort is thoroughly worth while and should be highly developed for any future operation.

A Ground Study Team was organized from G-2 and JICPOA personnel. Its composition included photographers, draftsman and language personnel and was augmented when necessary by specialists such as experts on bombs, weapons, planes, etc. The team was commanded by the Officer-in-Charge of JICPOA Team No. 23, whose past experience enabled this group: (1) to make accurate daily reports; (2) to compile a complete record of the enemy's organization of the ground; (3) to obtain photographs, drawings and sketches of installations and terrain; and finally (4) to arrange for the collection of all weapons of particular intelligence value.

Intelligence collected by artillery was notably improved. The S-2 made full and proper use of the wealth of sources at his disposal including artillery forward observers, air observers, observation posts and flash ranging. Resultant reports were extremely valuable to Division.

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ANNEX BAKER TO FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT IWO JIMA

(b) Evaluation and Dissemination of Information.

Subsequent to the issuance of the Division Intelligence Annex and while enroute to the target, the Division Intelligence Section prepared and distributed a study of the Western Beaches and two appendices to the Intelligence Annex to the Division Operation Order in which an effort was made to analyze and present the latest intelligence garnered from aerial photographs and other sources in a clear and concise form.

Benefiting by past experience, the initial dissemination of intelligence material for the operation was effected direct to all major units in sealed packages for further distribution after departure from the HAWAIIAN Area. Intelligence received after embarkation at PEARL HARBOR and at SAIPAN was distributed direct to all ships for further distribution aboard. The plan was the most successful one used to date.

At the target, even though there was less intelligence material with which to work than on SAIPAN, the Division Intelligence Section did a far sounder job of evaluation than before. Information was received from battalions and regiments in more accurate form than heretofore. Regimental intelligence reports were also better organized and gave a clearer picture than formerly.

At Division CP, prior to dissemination, all intelligence received was carefully but rapidly evaluated. Compilation and evaluation of Order of Battle information was made a Language Section function. On D-plus-6, three days after Division CP was established ashore, a detailed Order of Battle was published and given wide distribution. On D-plus-9, a special report entitled "Analysis of Original Enemy Dispositions and Subsequent Movements", was given similar dissemination. This report was an attempt to present a graphic picture of enemy units defending in this Division's zone of action on D-day, and to give a running story of how enemy units disintegrated or retreated, and what enemy units were believed remaining to oppose us. It was felt that only through such a summary could troops and commanders alike visualize the nature of the enemy in contact. A special collection of captured orders and overlays in connection with the enemy counterattack on the night of D-plus-18 (9 March), was also prepared, together with an analysis of enemy operations during the attack.

Division intelligence and periodic reports were sound and accurate and remain as tangible evidence of their worth.

Continuous telephonic contact with all units and daily liaison with higher, lower and adjacent units made dissemination rapid and efficient.

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ANNEX BAKER TO FOURTH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT IWO JIMA

(c) Communications.

Initially each regimental S-2 was provided with an SCR 300 radio, for contact with Division using the Division OP channel. Heavy initial losses of radio equipment necessitated the appropriation of the regimental sets allocated for intelligence sections. These radios could not be replaced during the operation. The speed and value of the information obtained from this temporary net while it was in operation confirmed opinions of its extreme value.

Messages from the regiments reaching G-2 through regular radio channels were supplemented by the radio dispatch summaries called for in Division Intelligence Memorandum No 5-44 and presented an adequate and clear picture, even though delivery of regimental periodic reports was delayed. Radio communication with VACLF was satisfactory and G-2 periodic reports were delivered each morning by officer messenger.

When telephonic connections were established, the field telephone became the standard means of communication with regiments and VACLF. A separate phone for the Language Section permitted both it and the Operations Section of G-2 to function more efficiently. Proximity of regimental CP's to Division permitted prompt delivery of all written reports and generally facilitated rapid communication.

Communication with the Division OP throughout the operation was by SCR 300 radio over the Division OP channel.

(d) Liaison.

On the day that Division CP was set up ashore, G-2 instituted the practice of sending an experienced officer daily to make a round of the regimental CP's, G-2, VACLF, and the G-2's of the 3rd and 5th Marine Divisions. By employment of this system the G-2 liaison officer could collect as well as disseminate intelligence. Experience with the procedure confirmed the belief that it is a sounder plan than to attach an officer from the G-2 Section to each regimental intelligence section for an operation, where he becomes merely an assistant to the S-2, taking over the task of dissemination which the section is capable of performing.

Daily liaison with the other Divisions and VACLF permitted observation and comparison of procedure and methods of functioning of their various departments such as API, language, etc, resulting in a reciprocal exchange of good ideas.

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