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ANNEX C MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

Prior to the departure from Ulithi, four pilots and radiomen on the USS BISMARCK SEA had been specifically assigned to fly observation missions. They were specially briefed in all phases of the operation, and worked closely with observers while en-route to IWO JIMA. This trained pilot-observer team was of great value, and the observations of pilot and radiomen contributed materially to the observer's reports. No flights were provided for observers of this Division during the rehearsal at TINIAN.

(2) Activities During Combat

a. Naval Gunfire Spot - Air observers embarked on the four combatant ships commenced air spot for naval gunfire on 16 February, 1945, (Dog-minus-three day), and continued through 28 February, 1945, flying in OS2U's. Approximately 132 hours were flown in the execution of naval gunfire spot missions from OS2U aircraft, with highly satisfactory results. During subsequent phases of the operation, on several occasions, the tactical observers were employed to spot for naval gunfire.

b. Artillery Air Spot - From 20 February to 12 March, 1945, air spot for shore-based artillery was provided continuously by observers embarked aboard the USS WAKE ISLAND, flying in TBM aircraft. On 26 February, 1945, two OY-1's which had been embarked aboard the USS WAKE ISLAND, landed ashore at MOTOYAMA Airfield No. 1. Three OY-1's landed ashore from USS MAKIN ISLAND and USS SAGINAW BAY on 27 February; the remaining two of seven operational OY-1's landed ashore from LST #776 with two artillery observers on 28 February. Between 26 February and 4 March, four OY-1's were rendered unserviceable through enemy action in the shelling of the airfield; however, by 4 March, four OY-1's were again in operation. Artillery spot was continued with one TBM and generally with one OY-1 on station until the artillery was secured; however, two OY-1's were on station for two or three days from about 6 March, 1945. A total of about 470 hours were flown by artillery spotters on artillery missions which, combined with naval gunfire missions, totaled 602 hours.

From the observer's viewpoint, air spot was satisfactory. Base points and targets were easily located and registrations quickly made. Artillery observers airborne in TBM aircraft were greatly handicapped by the limited observation and difficulty of maneuvering.

c. Tactical Observation - Tactical observation commenced prior to How-hour on 19 February, 1945. Missions were flown in TBM aircraft from the USS BISMARCK SEA. Planes were armed only with defensive small-arms ammunition, no rockets being available.

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Two tactical air observers were to fly ashore from the USS BISMARCK SEA in OY-1 aircraft on Division order, leaving three tactical air observers aboard to continue observation in TBM's when carrier-based aircraft could operate ashore. The three tactical air observers aboard were to be shore-based, to continue observation in both OY-1's and TBM's. The night tactical air observer was to continue to operate from a carrier until ordered ashore. Supplementing the primary tactical air observers were the five officers who had received observation training and could be ordered to fly on order.

On the evening of Dog-plus-two, 21 February, 1945, the USS BISMARCK SEA was sunk by enemy action. The five tactical air observers aboard, and one OY-1 pilot were rescued later that evening, having been in the water up to three hours.

From 22-26 February, the Division was without its own tactical observation but immediately upon arrival of OY-1's ashore, tactical observation was commenced with secondary observers and one volunteer officer flying missions. Upon return of the regular tactical air observers, a definite schedule was maintained with tactical observation being furnished continually until the Division was secured. At that time, one OY-1 was operational and able to maintain observation flights. Only one tactical observation flight was flown in carrier-based aircraft from MOTOYAMA Airfield No. 1, a special mission for VAC.

One observer from Fourth Marine Division, one from Fifth Marine Division, and two from Third Marine Division were embarked aboard the USS SARATOGA for night tactical observation missions to commence D-day evening. It was hoped that day and night observation would be continuous. Five missions, totalling twenty-five hours, were flown by the night tactical observers through D- and D-plus-one evening; weather conditions and an air raid caused partially by faulty IFF, and an inadequate dissemination of the flight plan were factors hampering the success of this very much needed and new type of observation. On the early evening of D-plus-two, 21 February, the USS SARATOGA was subjected to an air attack and after sustaining heavy damage, was forced to retire from the theater of operations.

Several successive night, pre-dawn, and dusk-to-darkness flights were performed by tactical air observers in OY-1 aircraft. Ground troops report that enemy mortar and artillery fire was held to a minimum during darkness, when observation planes were kept on station. The presence of a plane overhead resulted in enemy forces being less willing to reveal their positions by firing.

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Heavy and accurate anti-aircraft and small-arms fire was received throughout the operation. Observation planes with Fourth Marine Division Observers were hit many times; one pilot being wounded and evacuated. The observer effectively piloted the aircraft from the rear seat after the pilot was hit, until just prior to the landing.

Although the enemy anti-aircraft fire was intense, all observers agree that our artillery, mortars, and naval gunfire constituted the chief hazard. To stay above the trajectory and get results was impossible, and there was no reliable way of tabulating when or where fire would be laid. With complete knowledge of trajectories at various ranges with various charges, angle of fall, and maximum ordinates for artillery, mortars, rockets, and naval gunfire, it was still usually impossible to judge which batteries were firing, and from what direction. It was therefore necessary most of the time to "feel one's way in", judging by nearby bursts, or by flying, when practicable, along the coastline of the island.

A total of about 260 hours was flown by tactical observers, of which 100 hours were in TBM aircraft and 160 hours in OY-1 aircraft.

d. Liaison on the Ground - Observers bivouaced with VMO-4 near the airfield, thus facilitating liaison. Continuous contact was maintained with Division Headquarters and the artillery regiment, and frequent visits were made to front line units. Communication with Division Headquarters was by radio and telephone.

e. Communications - The SAO net was used only for communications between SAC, Division Headquarters, RCT's, BLT's, and tactical air observers in TBM's. No difficulty was encountered on this net during the three days' operation by Division observers. To limit the traffic on the Fifth Division SAO net only Fourth Division Headquarters was permitted to transmit. The Reconnaissance Net, used with the OY-1's, included Division Headquarters, RCT's and BLT's. For a period of about two days, 4 and 5 March, sporadic enemy jamming was experienced and a frequency shift was made for one day only.

(3) Conclusions and Recommendations.

a. Consideration should be given to the advisability of organizing all tactical and gunnery air observers into a special section of Division Headquarters.

Observers with additional duties are not generally available for flying. At present, air observers are not

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included in the Tables of Organization for a Marine Division. All tactical and gunnery air observers authorized in Letter of Instruction #929, should be included in the Tables of Organization for a Marine Division.

b. Operation and Employment of OY-1's - It is recommended that all OY-1's be equipped and armed with six bazookas (rocket launcher 2.36" - M9A1) for purposes of accurately pin-pointing targets for support fires.

c. Operations in Carrier-Based Aircraft - It is strongly recommended that carrier-based observers fly in SNJ, SBD, or SB2C aircraft. The TBM is unsatisfactory for use as an observation plane. Its design restricts vision in the turret, to the port side; in the belly, to two small ports (approximately 18" x 12"); and in the greenhouse, by the wings, to directly ahead or astern. The TBM is not sufficiently maneuverable to keep a definite area under observation continuously, or for adequate evasive action. It is not suitable to fly at low altitudes over enemy installations for extended periods of time.

All observation planes should have dual controls to enable the observer to maintain the plane in flight and to land the plane in the event the pilot is hit.

Minimum allocation should provide eight tactical air observers with primary duties as follows: three night observers on night-operating carriers; three on one carrier for day tactical observation, and two observers as standbys aboard a third carrier in a separate carrier division.

A pilot-observer team for tactical observation should fly together in training and throughout the operation, moving ashore together.

During the operation, targets of opportunity discovered required immediate action and included active enemy artillery, rocket or mortar positions, and enemy troops concentrations. Inherent delays in the present system more frequently than not allowed the enemy to escape. The armament of observation planes, carrier-based, in the IWO operation did not permit taking these targets under fire even with permission of the Support Air Commander. On several occasions, air strikes went into targets located by air observers and were observed to miss completely. Had the observer led in the strike, better results might have been expected. It is recommended that observation planes be armed with half-explosive and half-colored smoke rockets to permit them to strike or mark targets. During the initial

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direct-support attack aircraft guarding the SAO net should operate with tactical observers to hit such targets of opportunity as are located, reported, and marked by observers.

(c) VMO-4 Operations

(1) Preparations.

a. In preparation for the IWO JIMA operation one officer, one enlisted man, and seven aircraft were sent to Guam in December, 1944. At Guam the planes had wings attached to the fuselages, engines checked, and were put aboard carriers for the coming operation.

b. On 31 December, 1944, twenty enlisted men embarked aboard the APA 207 at Kahului Harbor, Maui. On 4 January, 1945, seventeen enlisted men and one officer embarked aboard the APA 33. Fifteen men and one officer transferred from this ship to the LST #776 at Pearl Harbor. On 8 January, 1945, one Warrant Officer and two enlisted men, plus Squadron gear, embarked aboard the AKA 60 at Kahului Harbor, Maui, and sailed for Pearl Harbor. On 22 January, 1945, LST #776 sailed from Pearl Harbor; AKA 60 and APA 33 sailed from Pearl Harbor 28 January, 1945 - - all enroute to the objective.

c. On 22 January, 1945, six officers flew to Guam; here they were assigned aircraft. On 9 February, they flew their aircraft to Saipan and embarked aboard carriers on 11 February. Two officers and two planes went aboard the USS BISMARCK SEA; two officers and two planes went aboard the USS SAGINAW BAY; two officers and two planes went aboard the USS WAKE ISLAND; and one officer and one plane went aboard the USS MAKIN ISLAND.

(2) Flight Operations

a. In the evening of D-plus-2, the USS BISMARCK SEA (CVE 95) was sunk by enemy action. Of the two pilots VMO-4 had aboard this ship only one was rescued. Both of the Squadron's aircraft were lost.

b. On the morning of 25 February (D-plus-6), two officers and fifteen enlisted men came ashore and proceeded to MOTOYAMA Airfield No. 1. Signal equipment was immediately set up and radio contact was established with units of the Fourth Marine Division. The ground crew prepared to receive the first planes and to begin flight operations.

c. The following morning, 26 February (D-plus-7), two planes flew in from a carrier; the first American planes to

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land on IWO JIMA. Flight operations commenced on the same day. On 27 February (D-plus-8), the three remaining planes aboard the carriers flew ashore. This same day an attempt was made to fly one OY-1 from the Brodie Gear on LST #776. The hook failed and the plane went into the water; both pilot and passenger were recovered uninjured.

d. On the evening of 28 February (D-plus-9), a night mission was requested in order to locate, or hold down, enemy fire. Since it was experimental, only the pilot went on the mission. This was one of the first times that OY-1's had been used for night flying in combat. The flight proved to be of value to the division, and, therefore, more missions of this type were flown on following nights. The airstrip was not illuminated at night since the enemy still had observation of the field. A bad crosswind plus lack of proper instruments in the planes made night flying hazardous.

e. On 1 March, (D-plus-10), using an improvised releasing gear, the two remaining planes were flown off LST #776. The Squadron now had seven operating planes ashore.

f. Enemy artillery and mortar fire continued to fall on the airstrip while the Squadron was operating. Besides wounding one enlisted man, considerable damage was done to the aircraft. Two planes were damaged beyond repair and the remaining planes received damage necessitating immediate repair. On 2 March, (D-plus-11), one plane met with a mishap while landing. This accident put another plane out of operation, leaving only four operational planes in the Squadron.

g. On 5 March (D-plus-14), while flying a tactical mission, a plane was hit by enemy machine-gun fire and the pilot received wounds in the leg and arm. He was able to fly his plane back to the airstrip and made a safe landing. His wounds were such as to warrant evacuation and he was flown to Guam that day.

h. Bazookas, having been installed on one aircraft, were tested against KANGOKU Rock on 9 March (D-plus-18), using both antitank and white phosphorous rockets. Though performing satisfactorily, their use was never scheduled on IWO JIMA.

i. On 11 March (D-plus-20), the Fourth Marine Division Artillery was officially secured. Thereafter, the Squadron had no scheduled flights, but remained on call for tactical missions only. Flight operations were secured entirely on 17 March (D-plus-26).

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i. During the nineteen days of Squadron operations against the enemy on IWO JIMA, this unit flew a total of one hundred and ninety-four (194) missions, accumulating three hundred and sixty-six and four tenths (366.4) hours. All missions were flown over enemy territory at altitudes ranging from ground level to one thousand (1,000) feet. The scheduled length of a mission was two hours; the average, one and nine tenths (1.9) hours, the discrepancy being frequently due to engine trouble while in the air, necessitating the return of the craft prior to the completion of the mission. Flights where no difficulty was encountered averaged a duration of two and three tenths (2.3) hours, the longest mission being three and two tenths (3.2) hours. During fourteen of the nineteen operational days, two planes were on station at all times from dawn to dusk; one plane flying an artillery spotting mission, the other flying for tactical observation. This rotation of aircraft presented a definite hindrance to proper engine upkeep, and was a contributing factor, along with enemy action, to the early depletion of operative aircraft. Enemy fire was encountered frequently while in the air. Some of the planes that were hit needed major repairs while others needed only minor repairs. No airplane from this unit was lost to enemy fire while on a flight.

k. Combat experience in the IWO JIMA operation demonstrated that the mere presence of a plane over enemy territory helped considerably in holding down mortar and artillery fire. Flights for this purpose were most valuable at dawn and dusk; that is, before support aviation was on station, and after it had been secured. Also, enemy mortar and artillery flashes could be seen better during these periods.

(3) Brodie Gear

a. The Brodie System, as used by this Squadron, might well be termed a failure. The initial trial in December, 1944, was unsuccessful, and resulted in the loss of one aircraft from VMO-4 and one from VMO-5.

b. One aircraft was lost at Saipan, on 14 February, 1945. This plane was attempting to take off. Investigation revealed the cause to be a faulty hook of the launching gear which was unable to hold the suspended weight of the loaded OY-1.

c. On 1 March (D-plus-10), two aircraft were successfully launched from LST #776. This was made possible by suspending the plane on the launching gear by the main hook used in landing, thereby rendering the pilot-controlled release ineffective. Release from the cable was effected by an emergency trip which released the five-foot suspension cable as well as the plane. In one instance this cable crashed into the canopy of the plane.

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ripping out the plexi-glass. This was a radical method of launching and is not recommended, except under emergency conditions.

3. NAVAL GUNFIRE

(a) Training and Planning for Operation.

(1) NGF personnel of the Division functioned together on numerous occasions prior to the operation. CPX's were held, both in camp and in the field, for battalions, regiments and Division. In addition all teams performed normal functions on maneuvers in the MAALAEA BAY area and on TINIAN ISLAND. This training is felt to have been fully adequate with the one exception that the late assignment of several of the NLO's prevented them from personally taking part in the majority of these exercises and becoming familiar with their teams and supported units. Teams conducted simulated problems with fire support ships assigned in direct support for the operation from positions ashore on TINIAN ISLAND. Some of the DD's to be employed on the operation took part in simulated missions with teams in the MAALAEA BAY area and actually fired missions for spotters on KAHOO LAWE ISLAND. No opportunity was provided for conferences aboard fire support ships.

(2) This Division was the instigator of a series of conferences among unit commanders and staff officers as to the proper employment, problems and potentialities of all supporting arms. NGF was well represented and particularly stressed at each of these gatherings. Following several Division conferences which thoroughly covered all general aspects of the problem, individual units called on their own liaison officers to carry the principles along to individual members of their commands. All unit commanders appeared to be vitally interested in these conferences and it is felt that constructive steps were taken in bringing about a more thorough understanding of the proper employment of NGF throughout the chain of command. All NLO's kept their commanding officers and staffs well informed and abreast of the situation relative to NGF, day to day.

(3) The method of coordinating Artillery, NGF and Air support was accomplished in lower echelons of this command through the medium of conferences involving all three liaison officers and the operations officer or commander of the unit involved. On the Division level particularly close contact was maintained between the NGF officer and the operations officer of the 14th Marines. Through personal contact and telephonic communications NGF and Artillery kept well aware of each others activities. This usually took care of coordination with Corps Artillery also. The Coordination and cooperation of the 14th Marines with NGF was particularly

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helpful and gratifying throughout the operation. Personal contact was always present between Division NGF and Air officers. Each kept the other informed of his activities and coordination in the Division was good. However on several occasions NGF was not notified in sufficient time of air activities planned by higher echelons. This brought about several instances where ships were still firing when planes came in, simply because warnings had not had time to be sufficiently distributed.

(4) Division NGF was kept fully abreast of the situation throughout the operation by the D-3 section. Particularly close liaison was maintained between NGF and D-3 as they occupied adjacent sectors of the same dugout. All lower echelons reported that unit commanders kept them fully advised of all operation plans.

(5) It is felt that too much cannot be done in the furtherance of the coordination conferences between units and liaison officers of supporting arms. Excellent steps were taken prior to this operation but it is impossible to have too close an understanding between infantry units and supporting arms. This must go down as far as the individual riflemen. In the final phase of training for any operation SFCP teams must work closely with units which they will support. It is recommended that on future operations radio exercises with fire support ships at the advanced staging area be conducted with SFCP teams aboard their respective ships, thus incorporating the excellence of the exercise and precluding any chance of loss or damage to equipment at such a late date. If possible all fire support ships to be employed on an operation should take part in all preliminary operations and maneuvers. It is also highly recommended that in future operations conferences aboard direct support ships be arranged for all SFCP teams involved.

(b) Observations on Effect of Scheduled NGF.

(1) It is estimated that approximately ten percent (10%) of the beach defenses were knocked out and all enemy troops neutralized by scheduled bombardment in RCT 23 zone of action. Destruction was principally accomplished by heavy caliber shells. High velocity guns were not knocked out on the flanks and automatic weapons from emplacements along abutments of the airfield to the front were active. Mortars from the flanks and reverse slopes exacted heavy casualties on the beaches. Construction of emplacements, in conjunction with terrain, rendered area fires largely ineffective, although observation revealed it possible to close small caves with 5" projectiles. Directed fire from 5" batteries proved to have little effect upon the area surrounding the 11382. In RCT 25 zone of action large pillboxes on beach were knocked out

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by heavy caliber fire prior to the landings. Effect of 5", rocket and mortar fires on beaches was not visible due to the sandy nature of the beach. The rolling barrage screened initial waves sufficiently to enable them to organize on the beach but enemy riflemen had held their positions and were able to fire through the barrage from the right flank. Most emplacements observable from seaward were destroyed and the fire received came from reverse slopes and emplacements further inland.

(2) With the terrain and type defense employed by the enemy on this island, area coverage loses almost all value. All fire must be pin-pointed on targets if destruction is to be obtained. The pre-Dog day bombardment was far too brief to enable any ships to definitely locate many targets, let alone destroy them. Bad weather, coupled with brief time allotted, permitted ships to fire through areas only. In the operation two facts were obvious: (1) far more and heavier fires were needed on the flanks in depth, and (2) the rolling barrage was an excellent instrument in neutralizing areas but did little destruction. The reduction of enemy strong points and the total destruction of the bulwarks of defense must be accomplished in a carefully planned and more carefully executed pre-Dog day bombardment.

(c) Call Fire Phase.

(1) The present organization and doctrine for call fires is considered satisfactory.

(2) Every attempt was made throughout the operation to maintain coordination between adjacent units. Units communicated with one another and discussed their respective situations. No unit fired into another unit's zone of action without the specific permission of the commander of the unit involved. A close check was maintained at all times of front line positions of all units and the line of fire of each ship was kept under constant surveillance. Effectiveness of coordination in illumination was particularly stressed in the latter stages of the operation due to limitations on number of star shells available. Here one ship illuminated for as many as three units. Higher echelon coordination proved particularly effective. The 5th Marine Division proved themselves especially cooperative at all times in assisting our advance by promptly taking under fire any areas in their zone which were holding up our advance. Similar cooperation was obtained from the 3d Marine Division. All involved reacted promptly on all reports of starshell cases or short rounds and the number of instances of both were at a minimum.

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(3) Approximately 750 call fire missions were fired by units of the Division on the operation. Roughly 20-25% were fired by spotters, 50-60% by air spot, 5% direct fire and the remaining unobserved fires. Results obtained were generally good. In most instances neutralization only was obtained. Due to the nature of terrain over which the Division operated air spot was invaluable.

(4) Deep harassing fires were employed at night, mainly as counter-battery measures. Little destruction was obtained but almost invariably these fires would force enemy guns to cease firing. Some interdiction fire was also employed.

(5) On one occasion call fires were brought within 100 yards of friendly troops. In this instance a spotter was aboard the firing ship and communications with front line units were excellent. Fires were walked to within 200 yards of friendly troops on several occasions and as a rule NGF was employed as close as 400 yards. The 1200 fs ammunition was mainly responsible for these close supporting fires. Ships capable of efficiently employing this type ammunition proved excellent supporting units and it cannot be too strongly urged that 1200 fs ammunition be used during the major portion of all future shore fire bombardment exercises.

(6) Air burst was not extensively used due to the fact that the enemy was seldom caught in the open. When employed it was very effective. WP was used principally for marker salvos. Some units mixed it with HE and recommended its further use in such a manner. Rockets and mortars were especially adaptable for large area coverage in night harassing and interdiction fires. Forty and twenty millimeter fires were used mainly along the coast firing up draws and into caves. They were very satisfactory in this assignment. On several occasions spotters went aboard destroyers and fired forty millimeter along the coast.

(7) When air spot was employed the SFCP was on the same frequency with the plane but usually was unable to contact the plane by radio necessitating relaying of all messages through the firing ship. It was the consensus of opinion in the Division that due to the nature of the terrain air spot was indispensable. The continued employment of VOF spot planes is most strongly recommended with even larger numbers available for each operation if possible.

(d) Fire Support Ships.

(1) The relief and assignment of ships worked out excellently on the operation. The one difficulty encountered was the

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fact that on occasion ships were assigned later than desirable in the day. The principle of all reliefs being made prior to 1600 each day should be adhered to as much as possible. When additional ships were required higher echelons proved particularly cooperative in securing them if they were available. During the closing phases of the operation there were not enough ships made available to provide proper illumination.

(2) All ships proved cooperative and delivered prompt, effective fires. Some were rated as excellent and others as less so, but all were generally satisfactory. All appeared eager to do every thing possible for SFCP's. In several instances spotters were able to coach ships onto targets in order that they might employ direct fire methods.

(3) This Division continually employed one or more gunboats along the coast on the right flank. Their use proved very effective, particularly in the early stages of the campaign when a spotter from the right flank battalion spotted fires from the flag gunboat. It is believed that in future operations it would be well worth while for units operating along a coast line to so employ a spotter. This Division used a replacement spotter for this mission until casualties ashore forced his recall. The work of all types of gunboats was especially commendable throughout the operation.

(4) In the early stages of the operation a Division general support ship was assigned the Division and excellent use was made thereof. The ship was instructed to come up on the Division NGF Common net and was employed in deep support, emergency missions and with air spot on observed targets in the Division zone of action. Assigned to the Division for two days the USS SANTA FE proved extremely cooperative and continually functioned in a highly efficient and effective manner at the most trying stage of the operation. At one time this ship was in communication with a battalion spotter, a battalion liaison officer and the Division NGF officer and was simultaneously illuminating, firing cell missions and maintaining a harassing schedule in a most capable manner. It is recommended that plans for all future operations include a general support ship, preferably a cruiser, assigned to Division both day and night. The lack of such a ship was severely felt later in the operation.

(e) Scheduled Fires During Continuation of the Attack.

(1) The extreme difficulties of the terrain which were continually encountered in the Division zone of action rendered preparation fires less effective than is normally expected. However

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neutralization was obtained in almost every instance.

(2) Harassing and interdiction fires with NGF were held to a minimum whenever the areas could be covered by artillery. As fired they were reported as very effective. Mortar barrages were particularly adaptable for these fires.

(3) Due to the fact that the enemy took every possible advantage of the abundance of natural cover and concealment, and reinforced his positions with the strongest type of fortifications, counter-battery fires in our zone of action did not prove effective to the goal of destruction. Batteries were silenced through neutralization but it was impossible to knock many of them out since no direct line of fire could be obtained.

(4) In terrain of this type, fires must be placed on pin-point targets rather than in areas. Air spot is virtually the only successful means of observation. Destruction of targets, while still sought after, is not to be expected in too many instances unless a line of fire is available to allow the ship to employ direct fire.

(5) Star shell illumination was the only type employed by this Division. In the late stages of the campaign arrangements were made for searchlight illumination along coastal areas to the front, but such steps were never taken as the situation changed shortly thereafter. Coordination of illumination between Divisions consisted of passing on to Corps, and to each other, positions of ships and line of fire to be employed. On occasion when lack of illumination or point of illumination was detrimental to an adjacent unit, adjustments were quickly made. The Division attempted to hold the rate of fire for star shell illumination to one round every ten minutes except in cases of emergency. This rate is believed to be adequate, even though it was often exceeded due to the night infiltration tactics of the enemy. All units place star shell illumination above all other methods available and no casualties were reported in the Division from star shell cases.

(f) Effectiveness of SFCE Personnel.

(1) The number of personnel supplied to Division and regimental teams is the minimum number for manning necessary nets and radio sets. At least two more radio operators per team could be gainfully employed. These teams were enabled to function efficiently on this operation through two expediciencies; the use of radar beacon men as watchstanders on radio nets and the early cessation of the Division NGF Common net due to heavy losses in

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radio materiel suffered by regimental and battalion teams. The number of personnel furnished battalion teams is believed to be sufficient, particularly when it is borne in mind that these teams must be extremely mobile. It is felt, however, that a number of trained personnel should be held in reserve for these teams as replacements, since casualties must be expected to run high in assault battalion teams.

(2) Due to the fact that the majority of SFCP personnel of this command have operated together on several operations, the status of training could be called very adequate. Among some of the newer personnel there was a lack of sufficient training in radio materiel and infantry tactics. This can be mainly attributed to the late assignment of many of these men and officers to this unit prior to the operation and can be adequately dealt with before again moving into combat. It is felt that a communications officer of warrant or commissioned rank would prove extremely valuable as officer in charge of technical communications training of NGF personnel. During operations he would act as officer in charge of communications with the Division team.

(g) Equipment.

(1) Communication equipment furnished for the operation was sufficient and adequate. Facilities for replacement of equipment, parts, repairs, etc. were adequate, largely through the cooperation and efforts of the communications officers of the units to which SFCP teams were attached.

(2) It is recommended that the SCR 694 replace TBX and SCR 284 sets. If this is impossible arrangements should be made to provide a quieter generator for the foregoing sets. Each assault battalion should be provided with an SCR 300 channel. This is essential to early communications. All battalion teams should have crystals installed in SCR 536 sets on the same frequencies as fire support ships. These little sets, so equipped, proved life savers in the initial confusion and disorganization on the beach.

(3) The Radar Beacon was not used by SFCP units of this Division. Four beacons were taken ashore. One was lost on the beach from enemy action; another was being put in operation when it was knocked out by enemy fire; the other two were not used at all. The terrain did not lend itself to the use of this line-of-sight beacon, and when finally high ground was gained, firing was in limited areas. In exercises conducted prior to the operation the beacons were successfully employed, however, and their use is recommended in any terrain permitting proper line-of-sight.

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(4) Equipment other than communication proved adequate.

(h) Operational Features.

(1) The practice of SFCP-officers going aboard destroyers and actually spotting fires into enemy installations proved very valuable on this operation since in many instances the deep ravines in which installations were located opened to the sea and could be observed by the experienced eye from seaward.

(2) The time allotted for pre-Dog day fires was much too brief to allow sufficient accurate, destructive fires to be placed in vital areas. NGF on and after Dog day is rated as excellent, bearing in mind that the extreme difficulty of the terrain rendered destructive fires impossible in the majority of instances.

(i) General Recommendations.

(1) It is believed that the presence of at least one NGF spotter aboard a free gunboat is the solution to the problem of control during the unstable ship-to-shore period. Spotters so situated can control fires even more capably than personnel in free LVT's, as heretofore attempted, and in addition can furnish invaluable assistance from the seaward along the flanks after the SFCP has established itself ashore.

(2) The numerous changes in firing ships necessitated by changing situations between the time of conception of an operation plan and the time of landing lends to the general confusion of last minute corrections. It is therefor felt that the assignment of fire support ships by type rather than by name, would lend itself more readily to the planning of NGF. (Example: DD-1, DD-2 instead of LEUTZE, McCALL). An up-to-date list of ship assignments would have to be furnished units at regular intervals.

(3) In order to obtain the accurate, destructive fires necessary in the pre-Dog day bombardment it is felt that the presence of experienced SFCP officers aboard ships assigned to sectors in the Division zone of action is desirable. The Division recommends that Naval liaison officers and spotters of the initial Division reserve be placed aboard cruisers and battleships assigned to the Division zone of action in the pre-Dog Day bombardment. Arrangements could be made for the transfer of these officers to the Division control vessel the morning of Dog-day. It is further recommended that these officers be empowered to direct the fires of ships against enemy installations and areas which they are able to observe, or have spotted on maps and photos. A close coordination between these officers and ships' spotters is deemed very

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ANNEX CHARLIE TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

advisable, and complete cooperation with Landing Force gunnery plans necessary.

4. ARTILLERY

(a) Standard artillery tactics and doctrine were employed in the IWO JIMA operation and proved adequate and sound. Experience gained in this operation indicates that improvement in execution of existing doctrines and the adoption of new techniques must be a continuous process.

(b) According to the standard operating procedure for the Division, Division artillery landed as a unit and no attachment to infantry units was made. This scheme of landing again proved to be sound, particularly in view of the difficult beach conditions during the initial stages. Normal direct support assignments were followed throughout the operation.

(c) The reinforcement of Division artillery by the 155mm Howitzer Battalions of Corps Artillery was satisfactory, except that during critical periods additional corps artillery would have been highly desirable. It is considered that the minimum corps artillery in support of three Marine Divisions should consist of four 155mm Howitzer Battalions in order to provide one reinforcing battalion per division, permitting the remaining howitzer battalion to be used in general support. The nature of the terrain encountered on IWO JIMA made the high-angle features of the 155mm Howitzer Battalion highly desirable in reaching defiladed positions, and it is believed that 155mm guns, now constituting the corps artillery organization, would have been unsuitable for the mission of reinforcing division artillery. Attention is invited to the fact that the primary mission of corps artillery is to reinforce the fires of Division artillery, which, even in its present organization of three 105mm Howitzers Battalions and one 155mm Howitzer Battalion, represents minimum artillery requirements to support a marine division in an attack against light or average resistance. Normal concepts dictate that division artillery must be reinforced by several battalions of corps artillery howitzers in order for the division to accomplish its mission in operations against heavier than average resistance.

(d) High-angle fire was executed several times during the operation but experience proved that in terrain with limited visibility this type fire is harder to control and cannot be brought in as close to front line troops as normal low-angle fire.

(e) For detailed operations of 4th Marine Division artillery, see Annex Item, Division Artillery Report.

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5. TANKS

(a) Tank companies were attached to RCT's in the normal manner for landing, each company being embarked in three LSM's. This method of landing in LSM's, in view of the beach conditions, proved exceedingly satisfactory. Some difficulty was experienced in getting the information from tank reconnaissance parties back to RCT commanders and tank units prior to tanks landing. Additional training, reorganization of tank reconnaissance personnel, and the establishment of a standard procedure for tank reconnaissance is indicated.

(b) The rugged, jumbled terrain encountered in the Division zone of action precluded maximum use of tanks in support of infantry. Under similar conditions in the future and after intensive training in field artillery methods, tank units will be able to support the attack with indirect fire, augmenting the fire power of infantry weapons and artillery.

(c) Flame throwing tanks and bulldozer tanks were invaluable and additional tanks of these types should be included in the organization of a tank battalion.

(d) For detailed operations of the 4th Tank Battalion, see Annex Jig, 4th Tank Battalion Report.

6. ROCKETS

(a) Again the massed fire power of the 4.5 barrage rocket exerted a marked influence on the successful outcome of the IWO JIMA operation. This short-range weapon was repeatedly used by the infantry to neutralize centers of resistance and to thicken preparatory fires prior to an attack.

(b) Training of the 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment prior to the operation was seriously handicapped by the late receipt of ammunition and material and by the transfer of one-half of experienced personnel of the detachment to the 5th Marine Division late in the training period. Intensive rocket training was conducted for approximately one month prior to embarkation for IWO JIMA.

(c) The first section was attached to RCT 25 and the second section to RCT 23 for the operation. The Provisional Rocket Detachment headquarters was assigned to the support group. The sections landed generally as planned, although, in view of the congested beach conditions and the lack of access roads inland, it is considered that they were landed too early. Because of these

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ANNEX CHARLIE TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

conditions the first use of rockets did not occur until D plus 3.

(d) The rocket trucks drew enemy mortar, rocket, or artillery fire practically every time a rocket was fired, and many times while the trucks were being moved into position. Therefore, it was important that the vehicles maneuver rapidly into a position, fire the barrage, and move back to a rear area assembly point. When an intensive barrage was desired in a certain area, a section, consisting of six trucks, would fire one barrage, reload from ammunition carried in the trucks, and fire again. This double barrage took less than five minutes and consisted of 432 rounds.

(e) Much greater and closer support was fired by the rocket detachment on this operation than on the Saipan or Tinian operation. The sections were used frequently to fire preparatory barrages prior to an attack, then increase the range and fire barrages in support of the attack as the troops advanced. As a safety factor rocket barrages were normally fired at least 300 yards forward of the front lines. However, on this operation the infantry demanded closer support during critical stages and it is estimated that 12 to 15 barrages were fired less than 200 yards forward of the front lines.

(f) Effective conduct of fire was greatly impaired by the lack of a forward observer team with each section and by the inadequacy of communications. It was frequently necessary for infantry company commanders or personnel at Battalion OP's to adjust fire into the desired target area since the section leader, the only officer in the section, was required at the firing section position. As on Saipan and Tinian, it was found that a forward observer section of one officer and four enlisted for each firing section is absolutely essential for efficient conduct of fire.

(g) While the 4.5 barrage rocket has been used successfully by the Division in the past three operations, it is considered that the 5" spin stabilized rocket should be substituted therefor in order to obtain more flexibility in range, greater fire power, and considerably more accuracy.

7. WAR DOGS.

(a) The 7th Marine War Dog Platoon, consisting of three sections, was attached to the Division for the operation. In the task organization one section was attached to each RCT. The first section was landed by RCT 25 on D-day, while the second and third sections, attached to RCT 23 and RCT 24 respectively, were landed on D plus 2 day.

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(b) Throughout the operation the dogs were used primarily for security at night in the front lines, rear area security, and in mopping-up operations. The value of the dogs in front line security was attested to by the fact that on frequent occasions they alerted at approaching enemy infiltration parties, and gave front line troops an added sense of security due to their presence. Failure of the majority of the dogs to enter caves limited their value during mopping-up operations. On patrol the failure of the dogs to distinguish between hidden Japanese riflemen and Japanese dead limited their usefulness in this type of operation. Messenger dogs, when used, carried out their assignments in a highly satisfactory manner.

8. CHEMICAL

(a) Personnel of the Division were equipped and fully indoctrinated in the use of all individual chemical protective equipment authorized in the Table of Basic Allowances, as well as in field identification of toxic agents, and first aid. Battalion decontamination squads were trained in the technique and procedure of decontamination. Chemical warfare officers and key non-commissioned officers were thoroughly conversant with the Division Chemical Warfare Standing Operating Procedure, and were prepared to carry out the procedure set forth therein had chemical warfare been initiated.

(b) Chemical warfare equipment was held loaded on ships in such a way as to render it immediately available for emergency use.

(c) Gas masks were carried ashore by all personnel. Some unit commanders had the gas masks turned in to easily accessible dumps when it was definitely ascertained that there were no enemy chemical agents on the island. This procedure, however, was only localized.

(d) Chemical warfare supplies and decontamination equipment were deposited in regimental dumps as soon as possible after they were landed.

(e) The enemy did not use toxic agents against our troops at any time. No previously unreported enemy materiel was captured. Enemy troops were equipped with gas masks, inferior to ours, which they carried with them at all times. Both the Division and enemy troops were prepared had chemical warfare been initiated.

(f) Gas masks collected during the operation were turned in to the Division salvage dump. 5,988 gas masks were turned in

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ANNEX CHARLIE TO 4TH MARINE DIVISION OPERATION REPORT, IWO JIMA.

for salvage. Of that number, 2,140 were serviceable and 3,848 were unserviceable. Those which were unserviceable were turned over to the Island Command, this Division having no facilities for repairing gas masks. 420 gas masks were re-issued from salvage during the operation.

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A N N E X D O G

TO

FOURTH

MARINE DIVISION

OPERATIONS REPORT

IWO JIMA

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HEADQUARTERS,
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

20 April, 1945.

Annex DCG to Operation Report - IWC JIMA

LOGISTICS

- A. Planning and Preparation
- B. Loading and Movement
- C. Rehearsal, Rehabilitation and Movement to Target
- D. Unloading
- E. Shore Party
- F. Supply Ashore
- G. Motor Transport
- H. Road Construction and Repair
- I. Traffic Circulation
- J. Salvage
- K. Medical Services and Evacuation
- L. Burial
- M. Reembarkation
- N. Recommendations

APPENDICES

- 1. Division Shore Party Report
- 2. Medical Report
- 3. Division Quartermaster Report
- 4. Ordnance Report
- 5. Motor Transport Report
- 6. Breakdown of Equipment and Supplies, 4th Marine Division, Reinforced.

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Annex 100 to Operation Report - IWC JIMA

A. Planning and Preparation:

Upon return of this Division to MAUI from the SAIPAN-TINIAN Operation, showdown inspections and inventories in all units revealed that considerable shortages in individual and organizational equipment existed within the Division. Prior to return from that operation, plans were formulated and, it was believed, arrangements made for the stocking at the Division's immediate supply source, the Second Service and Supply Battalion, of sufficient items of equipment and supply to meet the immediate needs of the Division upon its return to the Base Camp. However, the Second Service and Supply Battalion was unable to stock these items, and early replenishment of supplies and equipment within the Division was impossible.

Approximately one month following the Division's arrival at the Base Camp, requisitions covering all existing shortages were submitted. Here again, as after the RCI-NAMUR Operation, the delivery of supply shortages was excessively slow. Some of these shortages which continued to exist had an adverse effect upon the training schedule of the Division, and others seriously impaired the "readiness" of the Division.

While there is no desire on the part of this Division to be unduly critical of the Supply Service, it is believed worthy of comment that difficulties of initial supply for this operation were in all respects similar to the difficulties encountered in previous operations. The problems of the Division follow a clear-cut pattern in this respect. Upon return from an operation, the Division's immediate supply source is unable to provide in adequate quantities even the most essential items of supply and equipment; this is particularly objectionable with regard to clothing and individual equipment. Following this, supplies are delivered in an aggravatingly slow manner during the "middle days" of the Division's rehabilitation. Then, beginning sometime during the final four weeks immediately prior to commencement of loading, there is a sudden frenzy of activity on the part of supply services, and the Division and its immediate supply source are deluged with tons of "last-minute" deliveries. Undoubtedly some of these items of supply are not available at an earlier date, but obviously many of them are. These "last-minute" deliveries to the Division have a decidedly adverse effect on preparations for embarkation. The receiving, processing and servicing of these supplies and equipment places an additional burden on service personnel of the Division at a time when they should be employed largely in the marking and assembling of supplies for loading.

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ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (Cont'd).

In anticipation of the commencement of loading on 29 November, 1944, the clearing and preparation of stock piling areas in the vicinity of the docks, and the assembly in other areas of supplies for embarkation began in October. Segregation of the Division's ammunition supplies was begun at the ammunition dump of Second Service and Supply Battalion, but due to the proximity of this dump to the docks, and in order to avoid the assembly of this material in the exposed dock area, all Class V items remained in this dump and were moved therefrom directly to ships when loading commenced. Commissary and general supply items were segregated in warehouses and stock piles in the area of the Second Service and Supply Battalion located three quarters of a mile from the docks. These materials were so arranged that they could be moved in proper sequence by boxcar, flatcar and trucks from this area directly to the piers as loading progressed.

On 1 November, the cleaning of all water containers commenced. The method employed was that of steaming cans and rinsing them thoroughly, and in the case of 15 and 55-gallon drums, this procedure was entirely satisfactory. However, in the case of 5-gallon expeditionary cans, this method had little effect in removing the strong oily taste that persisted in these cans. The sterilization and filling of water cans was under the supervision of a Medical Officer, and was completed in early December.

In late November and early December, experiments were conducted by the Fourth Tank Battalion on the loading of the M4A3 tank in LCMs. It was found that LCMs so loaded had very little free-board generally and were dangerously low in the water at the bow. The results of these experiments were reported to V Amphibious Corps with the recommendation that LCTs be substituted.

Further tests were conducted by higher echelons confirming the Division's recommendation that LCMs should be replaced, and six LSMs were allocated to this Division for the loading of tanks. This decision was entirely satisfactory. However, the indecision which prevailed for some time as to the type craft to be used for tanks caused considerable concern and adversely affected the preparation of final loading plans.

In December a number of conferences were held with the TransRon and TransDiv Commanders and with loading representatives from the majority of ships upon which this Division was to embark. The Transport Squadron Commander came to the Base Camp at MAUI on 17 December, to examine preliminary loading plans. At his suggestion, several changes were made in these plans. The loading

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ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

representatives of the various ships were in camp for short periods of time, and conferred not only with Division representatives but also with the Regimental Combat Team and Battalion Landing Team Commanders concerned. All of these conferences were found to be extremely helpful to the Division in the preparation of its plans.

The final loading plan of the Division was submitted by the Division Transport Quartermaster to Commander Task Force 53 and the Transport Squadron Commander at PEARL HARBOR on 24 December, and, after certain minor changes were made, the plan was approved.

Throughout the period in which this Division was preparing for the IWC JIMA Operation, numerous conferences were held by Division representatives with representatives of V Amphibious Corps, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, and Supply Service, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, with the view to expediting the delivery of supplies to the Division. In every instance the cooperative spirit of these agencies and their representatives was clearly evident, but despite this, the delivery of supplies continued too slow to meet the urgent need of this Division.

Periodic conferences and informal discussions pertaining to method of supply and related subjects for the IWC JIMA Operation were held with Commanding Officers and "Fours" of Regimental Combat Teams and the Shore Party and other unit Commanders. A tentative Loading and Movement Order was issued 2 December, 1944, and a tentative draft of the Administrative Order to accompany the Operation Order was issued on 4 December, 1944. Following this, further conferences were held and certain suggestions and recommendations by unit commanders were incorporated in the final draft of these orders issued 20 December, 1944 and 24 December, 1944, respectively.

The Loading and Movement Order provided for the embarkation of items of supply and equipment considered essential to carry out the assigned mission. In general, supplies were loaded as follows:

Class I.

Rations - 30 days.
Water - 5 days (2gal/man/day).

Class II. - 30 days.

Class III. - 15-18 days.

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ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

Class IV. - 30 days.

Class V.

Artillery and mortar - 7 U/F
All other weapons - 5 U/F

In anticipation of a possible change of target involving an operation on a large land mass, an additional eighteen (18) 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo trucks were carried by this Division. Otherwise it was considered that the supplies and equipment embarked were adequate to support initial operations on a large land mass.

On the basis of experience gained on the SAIPAN-TINIAN Operation, where the ½-ton, 4x4 trucks, and ½-ton, trailers were insufficient to meet the needs of the Regimental Combat Teams, a reassignment of these vehicles was made. This reassignment involved temporary allocation of organic transportation from other units of the Division to the Regimental Combat Teams. As an example of this, fifty (50) ½-ton trailers which were to be left in the rear echelon (thirty-seven (37) by Fourteenth Marines, five (5) by Crinace Company and eight (8) in replacement stocks) were reallocated to the Regimental Combat Teams and other units for use on the operation.

Initially the Division was scheduled to commence loading on the 29th of November, but on 23 November, 1944, an order was received from Commander Amphibious Forces, Pacific Fleet, delaying this until 13 December, 1944. On 10 December, 1944, a further delay of fourteen (14) days was announced, and the final date for commencement of loading of the Division was set for 27 December, 1944. These delays were a distinct advantage to the Division in that they allowed additional time for receiving, processing, distributing and servicing, prior to commencement of loading, the vast quantities of supplies and equipment received during the month of December.

During the latter part of December and early days of January, urgently needed tractors, cranes, DUKWs and distillation plants were delivered to the Division, and units were afforded only the minimum time required for inspection and servicing of this equipment prior to loading. It is understood that this material was not available in the area in time for earlier deliveries.

However, the delivery of 50% of the Division's ration requirements and the arrival of a shipment of gasoline and lubricants approximately 70% in excess of Division requirements during

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ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

the month of December, at a time when dock and storage facilities were already taxed, is inexplicable. This is especially true in view of the fact that 60% of the Division's Class III requirements were already available at the Second Service and Supply Battalion, and the Supply Service had been so notified. The handling of these surplus supplies caused unnecessary work and confusion at a time when storage space and personnel were at a premium.

Considerable ammunition was delivered to MAUI during December, and one (1) ammunition ship discharged cargo for this Division during the time that actual loading was being accomplished. Other items of ammunition were flown in to MAUI after some units had completed loading and cleared the port, and it was necessary to load these items during the Rehearsal at MAALAEA BAY.

Undoubtedly some of the delay in receiving supplies was unavoidable, but it is believed that much of this material could have been provided earlier. It is feared that the Supply Service does not fully appreciate the problem presented to a Division by "last minute" deliveries. The fact that equipment is finally loaded in assault shipping and reaches the target is no criterion for believing that the situation is satisfactory; "issues at the gangway" are possible, but they are in no measure desirable.

If the two delays in loading dates had not been made, those critical items which were secured in December would, in large part, have been embarked at PEARL HARBOR during the rehabilitation period there following the Rehearsal. This would have been an unsatisfactory solution as it would have involved top-loading these items on cargo already in the ships, thus violating the principles of combat loading.

However, as a result of the delays, coupled with the splendid cooperation of Second Service and Supply Battalion and the untiring efforts of the service personnel of this Division, supplies and equipment were received and processed to such an extent during December that when loading of the Division began on 27 December the status of supply within this organization was generally satisfactory.

A further factor which interfered with preparations for embarkation, and for a time, even threatened to delay the actual loading of the Division, was the locking at Pier #1 on 22 December of the SS MANULANI and the SS MAHMAHI, both of which carried non-critical stores and supplies for civilian concerns on MAUI. The MANULANI was completely unloaded onto the pier, and departed at 0810, 23 December. As the MAHMAHI, a very large ship which was

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ANNEX TO SPECIAL REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

loaded to capacity, continued to discharge cargo, the dock became increasingly congested as these stores and supplies were not removed from the dock as fast as they were unloaded.

Despite frequent assurances of the local Director of Cargo and Passenger Control that docks would be cleared by the morning of the 26th, the date when the movement to the docks of organizational gear was scheduled to begin, it became apparent early on 24 December that this deadline could not be met. At that time Pier #1, representing more than half of the available dock space at KAHULUI, was completely blocked by stores packed to the overhead and spread in a solid mass throughout the pier. Higher echelons were notified of this situation, and were advised that, if the dock could not be cleared, loading of the Division would necessarily be delayed.

Despite frequent requests from Division to local port authorities that the unloading of this ship be discontinued and that she be dispatched from the port, the discharging of cargo was suspended only when there was no further space available on the dock.

Civilian employees of the Kahului Railroad (the stevedoring agency in the harbor) failed to report for work on 24 and 25 December, and the Director of Cargo and Passenger Control, in a memorandum written at Division's request and delivered at 0900 on the morning of the 25th, admitted the situation was beyond his capabilities to correct, and requested the Division to clear the docks, using such Marine Corps personnel and equipment as required. In anticipation of this, working parties totaling four hundred fifty (450) men plus twenty (20) 2½-ton trucks and sixty (60) drivers and supervisory personnel were alerted to work on a "round-the-clock" basis until the docks were cleared. At 0900, Christmas Day, the first working party of one hundred fifty (150) Marines, which was assembled at the docks awaiting receipt of orders, commenced clearing the pier and moving cargo to the warehouse.

As cargo was removed and space became available on the docks, the MAHMAHI continued discharging stores and supplies until in the late afternoon of the 25th she was finally ordered out of the port with five hundred (500) tons of cargo still aboard.

It is believed that the Office of Cargo and Passenger Control at HONOLULU made a serious error in judgment in dispatching such a heavily laden ship to KAHULUI immediately prior to the scheduled departure of this Division. It is further believed that the Director of Cargo and Passenger Control at KAHULUI, being familiar with the local situation, lacked foresight in allowing

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ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (Cont'd).

this undesirable condition to develop and grow progressively worse on the locks. Furthermore, during the time the Division was making strenuous efforts to remedy a situation which had arisen due in considerable part to his apparent indifference, this individual's cooperation left much to be desired.

Realizing the gravity of the situation, all Marine Corps personnel employed in relieving the congestion at the lock, worked willingly, diligently and with great speed. Due entirely to their untiring efforts, the locks were cleared by early morning of 26 December, thus enabling this Division to commence loading operations as scheduled.

B. Loading and Movement:

1. General.

Loading of the Division began 27 December, 1944, at KAHULUI HARBOR and MAALAEA BAY, in ships of Transport Squadron 15, plus LSTs and LSMs attached. Shipping was allocated as follows:

<u>SHIP</u>	<u>BASIC ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>LOADING DATES</u>
<u>Transdiv 44 RCT 25</u>		
APA 120 HINSDALE (F)	Support Group	Dec 27-28
APA 190 PICKENS	BLT 2	Dec 27-28
APA 193 SANBORN	BLT 3	Dec 27-28
APA 157 NAPA	BLT 1	Dec 27-28
AKA 66 SOUTHAMPTON	Cargo	Jan 5-8
7 - LSTs	(Amphibian Tractors, (Assault Infantry Companies	*Jan 10-Feb 10
3 - LSMs	Co "A" Tanks	Jan 18
2 - LSMs	Shore Party	Jan 1-3

* Assault troops embarked at MAUI beginning 10 January and amphibian tractors embarked at SAIPAN beginning 9 February.

Transdiv 45 RCT 23

APA 196 LOGAN (F)	Support Group	Dec 30-31
APA 158 NEWBERRY	BLT 1	Dec 30-31
APA 207 MIFFLIN	BLT 2	Dec 30-31
APA 154 LOWNDES	BLT 3	Dec 30-31
AKA 60 LEO	Cargo	Jan 5-8

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REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

Transdiv 45 RCT 23 (Cont'd).

7 LSTs	(Amphibian Tractors,	Jan 8-10
	(Assault Infantry Companies	
3 LSMs	Co "C" Tanks	Jan 18
2 LSMs	Shore Party	Jan 1-3

Transdiv 43 RCT 24

APA 33 BAYFIELD (SF)	Support Group	Jan 2-3
APA 156 MELLETTE	BLT 2	Jan 2-3
APA 118 HENDRY	BLT 1	Jan 2-3
APA 206 SIBLEY	BLT 3	Jan 2-3
AKA 65 SHC SHONE	Cargo	Jan 5-8
AKA 21 ARTEMIS	Cargo	Jan 5-8
5 LSTs	14th Marines	Jan 7-10
4 LSMs	Co "B" Tanks	Jan 4-6
1 LSM	Reg Weapons Company	Jan 4-6
1 LSM	4thSigCo	Jan 1-3

Elements of the Division Support Group were distributed throughout the Transport Squadron for transportation. Division Headquarters, less Assistant Division Commander's Group, was embarked aboard BAYFIELD, APA-33. The Assistant Division Commander's group was embarked aboard MELLETTE, APA-156.

2. Transports.

Heavy rains on 26-27 December made initial movement of ammunition from the dump to the lock area difficult; however the time schedule for the first group of four ships was met. Thereafter good weather prevailed, and the loading of transports progressed smoothly and on schedule. No deviation was made from approved loading plans except in the case of SHC SHONE, AKA-65. Upon arrival, it was discovered that three platforms, which had been shown in ship's characteristics to be available for troop cargo, were actually used for crew and troop berthing. This necessitated the complete revision of loading plans of this ship prior to commencement of loading, and resulted in several undesirable changes in vehicle debarkation priority.

Movement of cargo to the lock area began one (1) day prior to arrival of each group of four (4) ships. All Division supplies, except ammunition, were moved by rail, while ammunition and organizational equipment were moved by truck. Advanced parties boarded ships immediately upon arrival, and loading began as soon as hatches were opened and booms topped. The average time

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ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

of loading of APAs was twenty-four (24) hours and of AKAs, seventy-two (72) hours. The average tonnage of APAs and AKAs (except ARTEMIS, nine hundred (900) tons) was five hundred and nine (509) tons and twenty two hundred (2200) tons, respectively (see Appendix 6). Personnel, moving by motor serial to lock area, were embarked following completion of loading of cargo.

3. LSTs and LSMs.

Six (6) LSTs assigned to RCT 23 were loaded with LVTs and infantry personnel at MAALAEA BAY 8-10 January, and three (3) LSTs assigned to RCT 25 were loaded with infantry personnel only on the same dates. As the Fifth Marine Division was to use, during Rehearsal, three (3) LSTs assigned to RCT 25, these could not be loaded until 19 January, at which time they embarked personnel only at KAHULUI HARBOR. Upon arrival at SAIPAN on 10 February, one (1) LST assigned to RCT 25 and one (1) assigned to RCT 23 embarked LVT(A)4s, and the remaining LSTs assigned to RCT 25 embarked LVTs.

Each of twelve (12) Infantry LSTs loaded three (3) days rations, two (2) U/F (Infantry Company) and two (2) gallons of water per man at the time personnel embarked. These supplies were to be used as initial landing supplies. In addition to the above, V Amphibious Corps preloaded in each of ten (10) of these LSTs, prior to their arrival at MAUI, the following: approximately two (2) U/F (Infantry Battalion), two thousand (2,000) "C" and "K" rations, twelve hundred (1,200) "D" rations, four thousand (4,000) gallons of water, fifty (50) rolls of concertina, and twenty-two hundred (2,200) gallons of gasoline plus corresponding lubricants. Five (5) LSTs assigned to the Fourteenth Marines, embarked artillery pieces (preloaded in DUKWs), personnel, and three (3) U/F 75mm PH, plus landing ammunition (small arms), water and rations at KAHULUI HARBOR 7-10 January.

All LSMs were loaded in KAHULUI HARBOR during the period 1-18 January. The LST pier could not be used because of its deteriorated condition and the prevailing heavy swells, and some difficulty was experienced in loading Shore Party equipment (cranes, beach matting and beach sleds, in particular) from the beach in the outer harbor. One mishap occurred during beaching which necessitated the substitution of one LSM following Rehearsal. A quay with a concrete cap was hastily constructed by the 39th Naval Construction Battalion at the shore end of Pier #2, which could accommodate three (3) LSMs or two (2) LSTs providing there was no ship alongside the pier. All LSTs were loaded at KAHULUI, and several LSMs were loaded at this point. LSM 238, assigned to Regimental Weapons Company, RCT 24, was given a one layer understorey of ninety (90) pallets of "K" ration. This was lunnaged

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REPORT - IWC JIMA (Cont'd).

and vehicles mounted thereon. Similarly, LSM 260, assigned to the Fourth Signal Company, was given an understow of ninety-eight (98) pallets of fruit juices. This cargo arrived at the target in excellent condition, not so much as a can of fruit juice having been breached by the weight of the vehicles. This understow had no effect on the stability of the vessels or of the vehicles resting upon it.

4. Miscellaneous.

Due to the two successive postponements in target date, this Division had ample time for proper preparation and approval of loading plans prior to commencement of loading. However, had these delays not occurred, an almost impossible situation would have resulted due to delay in arrival of vital supplies and equipment. Even with these delays, it was found necessary to load such items as clothing (2000 cuft), three (3) portable operating rooms, etc., during the rehabilitation period at PEARL HARBOR following Rehearsal, thereby nullifying to some extent the combat load of ships on which these items were placed.

C. Rehearsal, Rehabilitation and Movement to Target:

As TransDivs, less AKAs, completed loading they moved to PEARL HARBOR and HONOLULU to await arrival of remaining ships of the TransRon. In view of the fact that the great majority of the ships assigned had been recently commissioned and had had only a minimum amount of training, on 6 January all ships present of the TransRon sortied from PEARL HARBOR and HONOLULU, and conducted exercises in preparation for the Rehearsal scheduled during the period 12-18 January. Troops embarked did not participate in these preliminary exercises. On 9 January TransRon 15 returned to ports at CAHU where it remained until 12 January when it sortied to conduct scheduled Rehearsal operations of the Fourth and Fifth Marine Divisions (Reinforced) and V Amphibious Corps Troops in the MAUI - KAHUOLAWE area.

Initially, Rehearsal operations consisted of boating troops without equipment in order to conduct exercises in the formation of boat groups and waves. No landings were made.

On 14 January, troops landed with nothing heavier than hand carts and portable equipment. Skeleton Shore Party installations were established. Troops conducted limited maneuvers ashore and completed reembarkation by 1400 on 14 January.

On 15 January, troops landed with nothing heavier than

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ANNEX DUG TO OPERATIONAL REPORT - IWO JIMA (Cont'd).

1-ton, 4x4, trucks and 37mm guns with prime movers. Artillery was landed in DUKWs. Only such signal equipment as was required to establish communications was landed. Complete Shore Party installations were established, and the beach was organized to accept rations and water to be used by troops ashore. Landing of other supplies was simulated.

Upon completion of exercises ashore, reembarkation of all units commenced at daybreak on 16 January.

The Fourth Marine Division was charged with the responsibility of refueling LVTs and DUKWs of the V Amphibious Corps ashore during these Rehearsal exercises. Accordingly, gasoline dumps were established by the Tenth Amphibian Tractor Battalion prior to the Rehearsal, and refueling of all vehicles proceeded satisfactorily and was accomplished without untoward incident.

The remainder of the Rehearsal period was devoted to Naval Gunfire exercises off KAHUCLAVE, and TransRon 15 reentered CAHU ports on 18 January.

No equipment of the Fourth Marine Division (Reinforced) was lost or destroyed during the Rehearsal. The few LVTs which became inoperative during the exercises were training vehicles which were used in lieu of LVTs of the Fifth Amphibian Tractor Battalion which did not participate in the Rehearsal. These inoperative LVTs were not scheduled to be used in the IWO JIMA Operation, and their loss had no effect upon the status of the equipment to be used in combat.

During the rehabilitation period in HAWAIIAN ports certain small items of equipment were delivered to Division and some exchanges were effected on ordnance items, the serviceability of which was questionable. In addition to the above, three (3) portable operating rooms and two thousand (2,000) cubic feet of clothing, which was not previously available, were loaded by this Division.

As a result of engine trouble sustained by LST 1031 and a damaged bottom suffered by LSM 202 when she ran aground in KAHULUI HARBOR, LST 648 was substituted for LST 1031 and LSM 201 was substituted for LSM 202. Transfer of cargo and personnel of these vessels was accomplished in CAHU ports.

During the rehabilitation period at CAHU and during the Navy logistical stop-overs at ENIWETCK and SAIPAN, conferences were held with Naval Commanders, Regimental Combat Team Commanders

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and their "Fours", the Division Quartermaster and Shore Party Commanders. As a result of these conferences, a complete understanding of plans for unloading and for supply ashore was reached.

While at SAIPAN, personnel and equipment of the Fifth Amphibian Tractor Battalion were embarked in LSTs assigned. On 15 and 16 February, Tractor Group Baker and TransRon 15, respectively, departed for IWC JIMA.

D. Unloading:

1. Narrative of Events.

(a) D-Day (19 February).

Two (2) LCVPs from each APA and AKA were designated to receive balanced loads of ammunition, water, rations and medical supplies. Upon arrival of ships in the transport area, these boats were lowered and loaded, and were dispatched to their respective beach control vessels immediately following the dispatch of assault waves. They were then held as a floating dump at the control vessel until calls for supplies were received from the beach.

Upon landing of assault waves, LVTs returned to the LSTs from which originally discharged, and immediately began to take aboard #1 preloads. Initial LVT loads were balanced loads of ammunition, water, rations and medical supplies. LVTs were on call and did not report directly to control vessels, but were controlled by radio teams of LVT representatives on beach control vessels and on the beach.

Bowser boats for the refueling of LVTs and DUKWs were available at the Line of Departure from about noon of D-Day. In addition, a small, and it developed, inadequate amount of gasoline was included in the #1 preload aboard each of ten (10) LSTs.

LSTs carrying tanks of assault Regimental Combat Teams were landed on Yellow and Blue beaches at 0945 and 1020 respectively. Because of the loose volcanic ash of which the beach was composed, the steepness of the beach and lack of exits, tanks had difficulty in moving off the beach. All beaches were under heavy mortar and artillery fire by this time. At 1155, an LSM carrying shore party equipment was beached on Yellow, and unloaded an armored bulldozer to clear a beach exit for tanks of Regimental Combat Team 23. Two (2) tank retrievers were landed on Yellow Beach at 1230 to assist in movement of tanks from beach. Tanks of the reserve Regimental Combat Team (RCT 24) were landed at 1400, and

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ANNEX DCG TO OPERATION REPORT - IWO JIMA (Cont'd).

were divided and attached to each assault Regimental Combat Team. The First Battalion, Fourteenth Marines, completed landing on Blue and the Second Battalion, Fourteenth Marines, on Yellow at approximately 1700 and 2000 respectively. By 1800, an LSM load of shore party equipment consisting of five (5) dozers, three (3) cranes, one (1) utility tractor and five (5) trucks had been landed on Yellow. Due to constant interdiction of beaches by mortar and artillery fire, little could be accomplished in the organization of beaches by the shore party. Due to the heavy surf, only a limited number of LCVPs could be beached. However, supplies were being landed by LVTs from LSTs. Transports and LSTs withdrew during the hours of darkness, leaving only Hospital, Maintenance and two (2) Artillery LSTs, and a small number of previously designated transports in the area. Throughout the night, LVTs continued to unload preloaded #1 from Maintenance LSTs, while DUKVs unloaded artillery ammunition from Artillery LSTs. The shortage of ammunition on both beaches was reported as critical.

(b) D plus 1 (20 February)

During the night, many items of shore party equipment were rendered inoperative by artillery, mortar fire and mines. All preloaded supplies on two (2) Maintenance LSTs had been unloaded by morning. As other LSTs came into the area, unloading of the remaining eight (8) carrying preloaded #1 was immediately begun. Beach-matting and an additional dozer were landed during the morning to be employed in preparation of beach exits. As a result of continuous artillery and mortar fire, coupled with heavy surf conditions, all beaches were virtually blocked by damaged and beached landing craft, and this situation was termed critical. Immediately after breaching, these landing craft quickly filled with sand and water, and settled somewhat in the loose volcanic ash, with sandbars building up around them. As a result of this, the small salvage boats available were inadequate to pull the beached boats and hulks from the beaches. Some improvement was made in preparation of beach exits, however the only means of supplying troops inland was by LVTs and DUKVs. As on D-Day, LCVPs and LCMs were used to a limited extent in the landing of supplies due to heavy surf conditions. An ammunition dump of Regimental Combat Team 25 on Blue Beach was almost completely destroyed by enemy fire at approximately 0400. By 1500, one hundred sixty (160) LVT and thirty (30) LCVP loads of supplies had been landed. Unloading of artillery ammunition from LSTs by DUKVs continued. The Third and Fourth Battalions, Fourteenth Marines, were landed on Yellow Beaches and went into position. LSMs, which had discharged cargo on D-Day, were utilized for the unloading of transports. The first of these (loaded with rations and ammunition) landed on Yellow Beaches during the afternoon.

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(c) D plus 2 (21 February).

The landing of RCT 21 of the Third Marine Division on Yellow Beaches during the morning, interfered somewhat with the unloading of supplies. Amphibian trailers were towed to the beach by LVTs, but broached and bogged down in the volcanic ash on the beach. In the majority of cases, the supplies carried therein were salvaged. These broached trailers further congested the beaches on which broached boats and hulks of LVTs already had created a serious problem. Services of the Underwater Demolitions Teams were utilized during the day to clear some of these hulks with explosives. LCVPs were unable to land because of heavy surf. Another hit on an ammunition dump on Blue Beach completely destroyed all remaining 81mm mortar ammunition of Regimental Combat Team 25.. As all 81mm mortar ammunition from ships of this Regimental Combat Team had been landed, this loss was extremely serious. Supplies continued to be unloaded on call only, except that certain designated snips were being completely discharged into LSMs in order that they might clear the area. Mortar and artillery fire on the beaches continued heavy. Work was begun on beach lateral roads but was not completed because of artillery positions in close proximity to beach. Three (3) passable roads to Airfield #1 were completed. By nightfall, all preloaded supplies from five (5) Infantry LSTs and approximately 50% from remaining five (5) had been landed. Transports were 20% unloaded, overall, although some items, such as 81mm mortar ammunition, were 75% unloaded. At approximately 2200, a direct hit on a napalm dump on Blue Beach started another fire which was not brought under control for several hours. Shore Party reverted to Division Control at 2045.

(1) D plus 3 (22 February)

Constant calls for 81mm mortar ammunition were being received from both beaches. At 0945, a request for additional ammunition of this type was sent to V Amphibious Corps. Situation on the beaches was improved by clearance of wrecked landing craft, and LCTs and LSMs were unloaded during the day. A lateral beach road was completed during the period. A number of vehicles were landed and were employed in moving supplies to front line units from dumps. Sporadic enemy fire on the beaches continued, but unloading progressed to the point that critical items were reduced to 81mm mortar ammunition only. At 1945, ComTransDiv 32, which carried RCT 21, was directed to land two thousand five hundred (2,500) rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition on Blue and Yellow Beaches. By using all available LCMs within that TransDiv, this ammunition was landed prior to daybreak.

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OPERATIONAL REPORT TWO JIMA (Cont'd)

(e) D plus 4 (23 February)

Unloading proceeded steadily, although LCVPs still could not be handled on the beaches. 81mm mortar ammunition continued critical, as no further supply was available. All artillery ammunition had been unloaded from LSTs, and calls began to come in for that remaining on AKAs. The Division Command Post was established ashore at 0930. Exit roads were completed; three (3) from Yellow Beaches to airfield #1 and two (2) from Blue Beaches into main road net. Sporadic artillery and mortar fire continued to impede unloading on beaches.

(f) D plus 5 (24 February)

Priority of unloading was given to 105mm howitzer ammunition, which had become critical. Water distillation units were landed on both beaches. Division dumps began operation during period. Corps Shore Party Commander assumed control of beaches at 1700. Shore Party was able to handle supplies as rapidly as they could be unloaded from ships. Surf conditions still precluded the use of LCVPs for unloading of cargo. Four (4) APAs of TransRon 15 had been completely unloaded into LSTs and LSMs, and had departed from the area. Because of shortage of suitable landing craft, AKAs began unloading 105mm howitzer and 75mm pack howitzer ammunition directly into DUKVs. Enemy fire on beaches had slackened, and only two (2) interruptions in unloading from this cause occurred during the day.

(g) D plus 6 (25 February)

An ammunition resupply ship (COLUMBIA VICTORY) arrived, and unloading thereof began at daybreak, using DUKVs and LCTs. Unloading progressed favorably during the day, although 105mm howitzer ammunition was being fired as fast as it could be landed, and the supply remaining aboard AKAs was running dangerously low. The south portion of Yellow Beach One plus the northern portion of Red Beach Two were redesignated as Black Beach and assigned to the Third Marine Division at 1400. Two (2) enemy shells landed on Blue Beach, and Yellow Beach was sprayed with 20mm and 40mm fire with no resultant damage. Improvement of beach exits and laterals continued.

(h) D plus 7 (26 February)

Surf conditions still would not allow the use of LCVPs for unloading. Shore Parties were able to handle cargo as rapidly as it arrived on the beach. Intense mortar fire was laid on the beach at 1000 and again at 2200, causing some casualties to personnel and material. This, however, did not cause a serious

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disruption in unloading. At 1500, ComTransRon 15 gave directions that general unloading was to begin immediately, and that remaining cargo to be discharged was to be landed at maximum rate. At the end of the period, nine (9) APAs had been completely discharged of all cargo, the remaining three (3) APAs were approximately 60% unloaded, and the three (3) large AKAs approximately 45% unloaded. Unloading of the ammunition resupply ship continued, with priority of unloading being given to 81mm mortar, 105mm howitzer and 60mm mortar illuminating ammunition.

(i) D plus 8 (27 February)

Unloading proceeded at a rapid rate despite sporadic fire on beaches. Garrison elements began landing equipment and supplies over Blue Beaches. Unloading of ammunition resupply ships continued. One (1) large AKA completed unloading during period.

(j) D plus 9 (28 February)

Two (2) APAs completed the discharge of cargo during period, leaving only one (1) APA and two (2) large AKAs to complete unloading. At 1200, GroPac assumed control aboard control vessels in preparation for landing garrison forces, and Control Officers of TransRon 15 were relieved.

(k) D plus 10 (1 March)

Unloading of all ships of TransRon 15 was completed this date. As the cargo remaining aboard the ARTEMIS (AKA-21), consisting of "B" rations, fuel and clothing, was not needed ashore, this ship was dispatched to SAIPAN for unloading. As sufficient transportation was ashore to support this Division, eighteen (18) 2½-ton, 6x6, cargo trucks were not unloaded but were returned to SAIPAN. At 1600, the beaches were again brought under fire causing some casualties. Unloading of the ammunition resupply ship continued.

2. Comments.

There were many factors which contributed to the length of time required to unload the equipment and supplies of this Division at the target. The intense enemy artillery and mortar fire on the beaches caused heavy casualties to Beach and Shore Party personnel and equipment in the early phases and restricted the amounts of material which could be landed. Furthermore, as long as the beachhead was small and heavy fire was more or less continuous, it was considered unprofitable and undesirable to subject additional equipment and supplies to the hazards of the beach.

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