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BY *Lawrence F. Proctor Jr.*  
ON *9 August 1977*

# ANNEX GEORGE

TO

FOURTH MARINE DIVISION  
OPERATIONS REPORT

## IWO JIMA

# RCT 24 REPORT

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HEADQUARTERS, TWENTY-FOURTH MARINES,  
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,  
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

20 April, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.  
To: The Commanding General, 4th Marine Division.  
Subject: Final Report on IWO JIMA Operation.  
Reference: (a) Division SOP No. 1-45.  
Enclosure: (A) Final Report on IWO JIMA Operation, Regimental  
Combat Team 24.

1. The following report covering the activities of  
Combat Team Twenty-Four during the IWO JIMA Operation, from in-  
ception to conclusion, is herewith submitted, together with ob-  
servations and recommendations resulting therefrom.

*W. I. Jordan*  
W. I. JORDAN

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SECTION I

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

A. ORGANIZATION:

1. The 24th Regiment was formed into Regimental Combat Team 24 on 3 November, 1944 by attaching the following units:

Co B, 4th Tank Bn  
Co B, 4th Eng Bn  
Co B, 4th MT Bn  
Co B, 4th Med Bn  
2dPlat, 4th MP Co  
2dPlat, S&S Co, 4th Serv Bn  
Det, 1st JASCO  
2d Sec, 7th Mar War Dog Plat  
Det, 24th & 30th Repl Drafts  
Det, 3/14 (Arty Ln)  
442d Army Port Co (less 1st & 3d Plats)

2. Each BLT had one assault platoon consisting of 1 officer and 38 men, organized and trained to handle all flame throwers and demolitions necessary in assault work.

3. A Regimental Scout and Sniper Platoon consisting of 1 officer and 30 men, was organized to be used for CP security and scouting missions.

4. The only deviation from the Tables of Organization, within the Regiment, are those listed in paragraphs 2. and 3. above.

B. PLANNING:

1. For the purpose of training in planning amphibious operations, the problem of seizing and occupying the imaginary island "X" was set up by Division. Regimental and Battalion plans for the seizure of that island were drawn up commencing on 28 October, 1944. Completed plans were submitted to Division on 31 October, 1944.

2. On 18 November, 1944 another planning problem was received by RCT 24 for actual landings on "X" island (Maui). Ship to shore exercises were held on 27, 28, 29 and 30 November, 1944 in the MAALAEA Bay Area executing the planned problem.

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Planning and Preparation, Cont'd.

3. In early December, 1944 a third planning problem was begun which was very similar to island "X". Complete Regimental and Battalion orders were drawn up and they later proved to be almost identical to our final orders for the seizure of IWO JIMA.
4. The final planning phase covered a period from 27 December, 1944 to 19 January, 1945. The planning was based on a Tentative Operation Order received from Division. Plans were worked out in detail and a Tentative Operation Order was drawn up by Regiment and BLTs. Several Regimental OPX's were conducted to familiarize staff members and attached units with the scheme of maneuver and terrain of the objective as set forth in the Division Operation Order. When it was learned our objective would be IWO JIMA and the final Division Operation Order was received, few minor changes were necessary in our Tentative Operation Orders.

C. TRAINING AND REHEARSAL:

1. A training program, consisting of four phases, was instituted by Division for the reorganization and training of the Infantry Regiments. Phase I, a four week period (10 September to 7 October, 1944), was devoted to individual and basic training with proficiency in use of weapons and discipline the primary objectives. Phase II, a three week period (8 October to 28 October, 1944), was devoted to unit training with emphasis placed on the tactics of the squad, platoon, company and battalion in the offense and defense. Phase III, a five week period (29 October to 2 December, 1944), was devoted to Combined Arms Training with emphasis placed on the technique and tactics of:

- Infantry-Tank Team
- Infantry-Artillery Team
- Air-Ground Team
- Infantry-Tank-Artillery Team
- Air-NGF-Ground Team
- Battalion Landing Teams
- Regimental Combat Team

through actual operations in the field. Phase IV, a two week period (3 December, to 16 December, 1944), was devoted to special training as ordered by Division Commander. This period was very similar to Phase III with operations in the field using supporting units.

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Planning and Preparation, Cont'd.  
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2. During Phase III RCT 24 held its first rehearsal in MAALAEA Bay Area. Actual ship to shore exercises were held on 27, 28, 29 and 30 November, 1944. VAC conducted a rehearsal from 13 January to 18 January, 1945, inclusive, in the MAALAEA Bay Area. During landings and problems ashore RCT 24 was employed as Division Reserve. The final rehearsal was held at TINIAN on 13 February, 1945 when the RCT formed into landing groups and waves but did not go ashore.

## SECTION II

### MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE

Commenced loading (Kahului Harbor) on 1 January, 1945.  
Main body of RCT 24 embarked on 3 January.

BLT 1/24 aboard USS HENDRY (APA 118)  
BLT 2/24 aboard USS MELLETTE (APA 156)  
BLT 3/24 aboard USS SIBLEY (APA 206)  
Support Group aboard USS BAYFIELD (APA 33)  
RCT Cargo aboard USS SHOSHONE (AKA 65)  
RCT Cargo aboard USS ARTEMIS (AKA 21)  
Co B, 4th Tank Bn aboard LSMs 48, 49, 239 & 145  
4th Plat, R/W Co aboard LSM 238

Cleared Kahului Harbor morning of 4 January, arrived PEARL HARBOR afternoon of same day. Departed PEARL HARBOR for MAALAEA Bay on 6 January where landing exercises were held on 7 and 8 January, however landing craft were not beached. Returned to PEARL HARBOR on 9 January and liberty was granted to 50% of RCT daily. Departed from PEARL HARBOR on 12 January for MAALAEA Bay. Exercises in formation of boat groups and waves were conducted on 13 and 14 January. Troops were landed on MAUI, morning of 15 January as part of a tactical problem being conducted by VAC ashore. Commencing at daybreak 16 January, troops reembarked aboard transports. All troops disembarked into small boats on 17 January and simulated landing on KAHOO LAWE, reembarked aboard transports same day. Returned PEARL HARBOR on 18 January and began rehabilitation program that ended on 27 January. Immediately upon leaving Hawaiian Area intensive study and briefing of all hands on pending operation was begun. In addition to briefing on pending operation troops daily attended schooling.

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Movement to Objective, Cont'd.

drills and carried out normal shipboard routine. Arrived in ENIWETOK ATOLL on 6 February and departed on 8 February. Continued normal shipboard training consisting of briefing on pending operation, physical training and debarkation exercises. Arrived SAIPAN on 11 February and held landing exercise off TINIAN Island on 13 February. The landing was under Division control and was for the purpose of practicing control of units from transports to beaches. Troops were not landed and were reembarked aboard transports that same day.

Departed SAIPAN on 16 February for IWO JIMA. Continued schooling until arrival off target on 19 February, 1945.

### SECTION III

#### SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT

##### A. TACTICAL PLAN (Preferred)

1. RCT 24, as Division Reserve, was prepared to land on Beaches YELLOW or BLUE to support the attack. Two plans were adopted - called Plan 1 and Plan 2 and are quoted below:

###### a. Plan I

"RCT 24 will land in LCVP's on beaches BLUE or YELLOW with two BLTs abreast, BLT 1/24 on right, BLT 2/24 on left, BLT 3/24 in reserve. Each BLT will land two companies abreast with one in reserve."

###### b. Plan II

"RCT 24 will land in LCVP's on Beaches BLUE or YELLOW with BLTs in column, BLT 2/24 leading followed in order by BLT 1/24 and BLT 3/24 (RCT RES). Each BLT will land two companies abreast with one in reserve."

2. In accordance with the Division Replacement Plan, RCT 24 prepared two additional orders for landing in place of either RCT 23 or RCT 25. BLTs wrote orders and made plans for replacing BLTs of the assault RCTs as set forth in the Division Replacement Plan.

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Ship to Shore Movement, Cont'd.

B. TACTICAL PLAN (Alternate)

1. Under this plan RCT 24 (less one company) was still Division Reserve, prepared to land on Beaches PURPLE and BROWN. At H-50, "L" Co reinforced was to land on KANGOKU ROCK in LCVP's, with the following attachments:

1 Plat, Co A, 2d Arm'd Amph Bn  
1 Squad, Assault Demo Plat, BLT 3/24  
Rcn Sec 4/14  
1st Squad, 3d Plat, Co B, 4th Eng Bn  
Det, Com Plat, BLT 3/24.

The artillery reconnaissance party was to reconnoiter the ROCK as a site for artillery positions. Plan I and Plan II remained unchanged for the Alternate Plan as did most other details of landing.

2. The Replacement Plan used for the Preferred Plan was to be used for the Alternate Plan.

C. LANDING AND CONTROL PLAN:

1. Each BLT was boated in six separate waves. The first two waves consisted of the assault rifle companies. The third wave consisted of the reserve company. The fourth wave was battalion headquarters. The fifth wave was the assault demolition platoon and the mortar platoon. The sixth wave consisted of the 37mm platoon attached to the BLT.

2. The Support Group consisted of four call waves which could be controlled either separately or as a group. The waves were lettered Dog, Easy, Fox, and Xray. Call wave Dog consisted of the Regimental Scout and Sniper Platoon, Det, H&S Co and 2d Sec, 7th Mar War Dog Plat. Call wave Easy carried Co B, 4th Eng Bn. Call wave Fox was the Regimental Weapons Co Headquarters and the 75mm half-track platoon. Call wave Xray was a free wave and carried the Command Echelon. The majority of the Support Group sailed aboard the USS BAYFIELD (APA 33), however, elements of some waves were on other ships. In order to assemble these waves in their entirety, a message was sent to the APA on which separate units of the Support Group were embarked, ordering them to rendezvous at the APA 33 and join their respective waves.

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Ship to Shore Movement, Cont'd.

3. Within each BLT the first five waves were to land separately at five minute intervals. The sixth wave was to land when called. During rehearsals records were kept as to the length of time that it took major units to complete debarkation; the time that it took to travel from the rendezvous area to the LD, and the time from the LD to the beach.

4. With the units so organized, they could easily be controlled from the control vessel of the beach on which they were to land. Initially, the beach on which they were to land was not known since RCT 24 was the Division Reserve and its employment would depend on the decision of the Commanding General after the situation developed ashore. All units therefore remained aboard their respective transports, awaiting orders as to their employment. Upon receipt of orders designating the beach on which RCT 24 was to land, the RCT CO, essential members of his staff, and necessary communication equipment, preceded the BLTs to the control vessel in order to better control the units as they reported to the control vessel. At the control vessel, the CO could have his key officers come aboard for oral orders and last minute conferences.

5. When a unit received orders to report to the LD, debarkation was to begin immediately. When all waves were in the water, each wave was to be dispatched at one minute intervals and proceed to a rendezvous area seaward of the control vessel for the beach on which they were to land. The RCT Commanding Officer, on this control vessel could then have the waves dispatched for the beach by flag hoists, as desired.

D. DESCRIPTION OF LANDING:

1. RCT 24 remained aboard ship as the assault waves landed. A Command Post was set up in the ship's wardroom and the RCT was able to function tactically. A situation map was kept and the situation ashore was followed and studied. At 1405, BLT 1/24 and BLT 2/24 were ordered by Division to boat and rendezvous seaward of the LD off Beach BLUE 1 and YELLOW 1 respectively and await orders. At 1500 orders were received to have BLT 1/24 and BLT 2/24 land as soon as possible and upon landing become attached to RCT 25 and RCT 23 respectively. BLT 2/24 was ordered to land on Beach YELLOW 2 instead of Beach YELLOW 1. At 1515 orders were received to

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Ship to Shore Movement, Cont'd.

have the RCT (less BLT 1/24 and BLT 2/24) report to the LD off Beach BLUE 1 and await orders. The RCT Commanding Officer then left the USS BAYFIELD and proceeded to Beach BLUE 1 control vessel preparatory to land the RCT (less two BLTs). BLT 2/24 completed landing at 1650 at which time attachment to RCT 23 became effective. BLT 1/24 completed landing at 1656 and was released to RCT 25 at that time. By 1820 BLT 3/24 and the Support Group were boated and lying off the LD and waves were being dispatched at 5 minute intervals. Because darkness was approaching each wave commander as he crossed the LD was given the correct azimuth to Beach BLUE 1 by the control craft. The RCT Commanding Officer assigned assembly areas inland to BLT 3/24 and to the Support Group. By 2030, BLT 3/24 was ashore and in their correct assembly area. The RCT Support Group was also ashore and the RCT Command Post was established in TA 165 O.

2. Eight  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton 4x4 trucks, some with trailers, were boated, in the Support Group, but none of them were landed on D-day because of poor beach conditions, however, each BLT was able to land several essential jeeps. The 75mm half-track platoon and 3d platoon, Regimental Weapons Company were unable to land.

3. The 2d Sec, 7th Mar War Dog Platoon was not ordered ashore on D-day because the beach was too crowded and their employment was not contemplated.

4. Although darkness had settled prior to the completion of the landing of most units, all waves landed on the correct beaches, most of the boats were beached sufficiently well to permit the landing of all troops safely, and all personnel reached their designated assembly areas.

#### SECTION IV

#### NARRATIVE OF OPERATION

19 February, 1945.

As Division Reserve, RCT 24 received orders at 1405 to boat two BLTs, one to rendezvous in rear of LD off Beach BLUE 1 and await further orders, the other to rendezvous in rear of LD off Beach YELLOW 1 and await further orders.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

1430 BLT 1/24 was ordered to rendezvous in rear of LD off Beach BLUE 1 and BLT 2/24 was ordered to rendezvous off Beach YELLOW 1. At 1500 orders were received for BLT 1/24 to land as soon as possible on Beach BLUE 1 and be released to RCT 25 upon landing; BLT 2/24 was to land as soon as possible and be released to RCT 23 upon landing. RCT 24 received orders at 1515 to have BLT 3/24 boat immediately and proceed to the rendezvous area in rear of the LD off Beach BLUE 1 where it was to await further orders. BLT 2/24 was ordered to land on Beach YELLOW 2 instead of Beach YELLOW 1 as previously instructed. The Commanding Officer, RCT 24 left the USS BAYFIELD (APA 33) at 1550 for Blue Control Vessel, arriving there at 1620. The first wave of BLT 2/24 crossed the LD of Beach YELLOW 2 at 1620 and landed at 1635. Succeeding waves followed at 5 minute intervals and all of BLT 2/24 was landed by 1650. The first wave of BLT 1/24 crossed the LD of Beach BLUE 1 at 1620 and landed at 1632. Succeeding waves followed at 5 minute intervals and all of BLT 1/24 was landed by 1656. RCT 24 Support Group began debarkation at 1630 and by 1750 were in the rendezvous area in rear of LD off Beach BLUE 1. By 1820 the first 5 waves of BLT 3/24 had arrived at the LD of Beach BLUE 1 and the first wave was dispatched to Beach BLUE 1. Succeeding waves of BLT 3/24, with the exception of the 3d Plat, Regimental Weapons Company, and RCT 24 Support Group followed at 5 minute intervals. All units of BLT 3/24 with the exception of the 3d Plat, Regimental Weapons Company were in an assembly area in TA 166 F by 2030. RCT 24 Support Group with the exception of the 4th Plat, Regimental Weapons Company and the 2d Sec, 7th Mar War Dog Platoon was in an assembly area in the vicinity of TA 165 O by 2005. RCT 24 CP was located in TA 165 O. The order for the continuation of the attack was received at 2110. BLT 1/24 remained attached to RCT 25. BLT 2/24 remained attached to RCT 23. RCT 24 (less BLT 1/24 and BLT 2/24) remained in Division Reserve in the vicinity of TA 165 O, 166 F, G. King hour was to be 0830. The remaining elements of Regimental Weapons Company were ordered at 2142 to land on 20 February, 1945. Very little enemy fire was received by RCT 24 (less BLT 1/24 and BLT 2/24) prior to 2400, 19 February.

20 February, 1945

Moderate enemy heavy mortar and artillery fire were received from 0001 until dawn. Light casualties resulted. The 3d and 4th platoons of Regimental Weapons Company were

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

ordered not to land until beaches and beach exits were improved. A large enemy mine field was discovered running parallel to the beach, the mines were removed and a road taped through the field by Hq. Co B, 4th Eng Bn. Reconnaissance of routes forward was made and close liaison was maintained with RCT 23 and RCT 25. At 1623 orders were received to begin consolidation of positions at 1630 and plan to continue the attack at 0810, 21 February. RCT 24 (less BLT 1/24 and BLT 2/24) had remained in its assigned assembly area in TA 165 O, 166 F,G. Sporadic enemy mortar and rocket fire had been received throughout the day. BLT 3/24 received moderate casualties from the enemy fire. During the hours of darkness, prior to 2400, various types of enemy artillery, mortar and DP AA fire were received sporadically.

21 February, 1945

Light enemy artillery, mortar and DP AA fire were received from 0001 until dawn. The attack continued at 0810 with BLT 1/24 attached to RCT 25 and BLT 2/24 attached to RCT 23. RCT 24 (less BLT 1/24 and BLT 2/24) remained in Division Reserve in TA 165 O, 166 F,G. The 75mm half-track platoon of Regimental Weapons Company landed during the morning on Beach YELLOW 1. Further reconnaissance was made of routes forward in zones of action of RCT 23 and RCT 25. Co B, 4th Eng Bn (less 1st and 2d plats) continued removing mines from beach areas. Sporadic enemy mortar and artillery fire were received during the daylight hours and through the remainder of the period.

22 February, 1945

Enemy mortar and artillery fire were received from 0001 until dawn. An enemy plane dropped two 63 KG bombs in vicinity of RCT 24 CP at approximately 0230. One bomb was a dud but the other exploded causing one casualty. RCT 23 was relieved by RCT 21. At this time BLT 2/24 reverted to RCT 24 control and was ordered to move into an assembly area in the vicinity of TA 165 E, 166 A. BLT 1/24 remained attached to RCT 25. RCT 24 (less BLT 1/24) remained in Division Reserve. King hour was at 0830. The 3rd Platoon, Regimental Weapons Company and 2d Sec, 7th Mar War Dog Platoon landed at 0815 on Beach YELLOW 1. BLT 2/24 arrived in its assigned assembly area at 1230. At 1101 RCT 25 reported a possible enemy counterattack forming in the vicinity of TA 184 UV, 183 AB, and orders were received by RCT 24 to make disposition of its units so as to support RCT 25 if a counterattack

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Operation, Cont'd.

should develop. RCT 24 coordinated this support with RCT 25. All units of RCT 24 were alerted and prepared to support RCT 25 from defensive positions in the vicinity of their assembly areas. RCT 24 received a warning order at 1617 to be prepared to take over the zone of action of RCT 25 on short notice during the night. Orders to consolidate at 1800 were received and complied with. During the daylight hours and until 2400 very little enemy fire was received.

23 February, 1945

Division Operation Order No. 4-45 was received at 0315. RCT 24 was to relieve RCT 25 in its zone of action prior to 0600 and continue the attack to O-2 at King-hour (0730). BLT 2/25 and BLT 1/24 were to pass into the control of RCT 24 at 0600. BLT 2/24 relieved BLT 3/25 and 2/25, by 0800. Upon being relieved BLT 2/25 took up a position in TA 166 F,G as RCT 24 reserve. BLT 1/24 with Company A, 2d Arm'd AmphTrac Bn attached remained in position prepared to attack at King-hour. Regimental Weapons Company (less the three 37mm platoons which were each attached to a BLT), Company A (Reinf), 4th Tank Battalion and 1st Sec, 1st Prov Rocket Det operated under RCT 24 control. 3/14 was in direct support of RCT 24. The attack jumped off at 0730 preceded by a coordinated artillery and NGF preparation from 0654 until 0730. An air strike VICTOR went into effect along the Division front from 0745 to 0900. Very little progress was made initially because of heavy fire from enemy pillboxes along the taxi-way between Airfield No. 1 and No. 2. Five tanks of Company A, (Reinf), 4th Tank Bn were assigned to BLT 2/24 to assist in knocking out the pillboxes. By 0900 the entire front of RCT 24 was moving forward against heavy enemy opposition and through very rugged terrain. As the attack progressed a gap developed between BLT 2/24 and BLT 1/21. Company G, BLT 2/25 was attached to BLT 2/24 to fill this gap. Heavy enfilade fire was received from Airfield No. 2 by BLT 3/24. BLT 1/24 made very slow progress against stubborn enemy resistance. At 1700 positions were consolidated for the night generally along the line 182 S,O, 183 K,L,G,H, I,J,O, 184 T,P,U, 186 E,J. The greatest gains were made by BLT 1/24 and BLT 3/24 which each went about 400 yards. Two air strikes, artillery and NGF had supported the attack throughout the day. RCT 24 remained in contact with the enemy throughout the remainder of the period.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

24 February, 1945

Sporadic enemy fire from automatic weapons, rifles and mortars was received along the front lines from 0001 until dawn. The enemy attempted to infiltrate through the front lines in small groups but were repulsed. At 0545 orders were received by RCT 24 to continue the attack at King-Hour (0915) and seize O-1(A). The BLTs were ordered to continue the attack, pivoting on the right BLT (BLT 1/24). This was to straighten out the RCT line. Attachments remained the same and the LD was the front line at King-Hour. BLT 2/25 (less Company G) remained in RCT reserve. Division and Corps artillery fired a preparation for the attack from 0845 until 0915. An air strike was made from 0900 until 0915. The attack jumped off at 0915 with BLT 2/24 making the main effort. Good progress was made initially on the left but enemy resistance quickly stiffened and progress was slow throughout the day. Heavy enemy fire was received from the hill in the vicinity of TA 183 C,D and the vicinity of the southeastern strip of Airfield No. 2. BLT 2/24 reached the top of the hill in TA 183 C,D but received a terrific mortar barrage which forced it to withdraw to the foot of the hill. Orders were received to consolidate at 1700 on the most advantageous ground, and this was done. BLT 2/24 had 3 companies on line with Company G, BLT 2/25 in reserve. BLT 3/24 had 4 companies in line, one of which was Company E, BLT 2/25, which was committed to fill a gap in the lines. BLT 1/24 had all 3 of its companies in line. Company F, BLT 2/25 was attached as BLT 1/24 reserve. BLT 1/25 was attached to RCT 24 at approximately 1600 to be RCT 24 Reserve in the vicinity of TA 166 A. Company C, BLT 1/25 was attached to BLT 3/24 as its reserve, leaving BLT 1/25 (less Company C) and BLT 2/25 (less companies E, F and G) in RCT 24 reserve. During the day the left flank of RCT 24 advanced approximately 500 yards, the center approximately 50 yards and the extreme right flank about 100 yards, thus straightening the line in the RCT sector. Three air strikes were called during the day. Artillery and NGF had supported the attack throughout the day and provided defensive fires and illumination during the night. During the remainder of the period small arms fire, grenades and mortar fire were received along the front lines. The heaviest fire was received on the left in the zone of BLT 2/24.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

25 February, 1945

From 0001 until dawn enemy small arms and mortar fire were received along the front lines. Small groups of enemy attempted to infiltrate through the defensive position of the RCT but were unsuccessful. Orders were received during the night to continue the attack and seize O-2 with RCT 23 passing through BLT 2/24 at King-Hour (0930). RCT 24 was to continue the attack with two BLTs abreast. BLT 2/24 was ordered to move into an assembly area in TA 165 E, J upon being passed through by RCT 23. Company G, BLT 2/25 was to relieve Company C, BLT 1/25 as quickly as possible thus becoming BLT 3/24 reserve so that BLT 1/25 intact could revert to RCT 25. BLT 3/24 with Company E and Company G, BLT 2/25 attached was to attack in conjunction with RCT 23. BLT 1/24 with Company F, BLT 2/25 and Company A, 2d Arm'd Amoh Bn attached was to attack in conjunction with BLT 3/24. Other attachments remained normal and functioned under RCT 24 control. Division and Corps artillery fired a preparation for the attack from 0845 until 0930. The attack jumped off at 0935 but very little progress was made. BLT 2/24 was passed through by RCT 23 and moved into its assigned assembly area where it, in addition to BLT 2/24 (less companies E, F and G) became RCT Reserve. Company G, BLT 2/25 relieved Company C, BLT 1/25. BLT 1/25 reverted to RCT 25 at approximately 0930. Heavy mortar, automatic weapon, and small arms fire were received throughout the day causing heavy casualties and pinning down the attacking troops. Little progress forward was made even though all supporting weapons were used extensively throughout the day in an attempt to breach the enemy's positions. Two air strikes were requested during the day but no strikes were completed. At 1600 BLT 2/24 was ordered to relieve BLT 1/24 in its zone of action. Company F, BLT 2/25 was detached from BLT 1/24 and attached to BLT 2/24 to be its reserve. BLT 1/24 took up a position as RCT 24 Reserve in TA 166 A. At 1635 orders were received to consolidate at 1700. This was done with BLT 3/24 having 4 rifle companies in line including Company E, BLT 2/25 which it had been unable to extricate from the fire fight and BLT 2/24 using 3 rifle companies in the line. Progress for the days operation was very slight and RCT 24 suffered heavy casualties. Sporadic enemy small arms and mortar fire continued until the end of the period.

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Narrative of Operation Cont'd.

26 February, 1945

Light enemy fire and attempts to infiltrate through the front lines occurred from 0001 until dawn. One large group of approximately 20 enemy attempted to break through the line of BLT 3/24 but it was destroyed. Division Operation Order 7-45 was received during the night. RCT 25 with BLT 3/24 attached was to pass through RCT 24. RCT 24 (less BLT 3/24) was to revert to Division Reserve. BLT 3/24 and BLT 2/24 were passed through by 0800 and BLT 2/24 went into an assembly area in the vicinity of 165 E,J. Patrols from BLT 1/24 thoroughly searched all destroyed enemy vessels beached on Beach BLUE 1 and 2. RCT 24 (less BLT 3/24) spent the remainder of the day resting, reorganizing, cleaning weapons and equipment. Reconnaissance of routes forward into the sectors of RCT 23 and RCT 25 was made. Orders were received to consolidate at 1700 and RCT 24 (less BLT 3/24) remained in its assembly area 165 E,J, 165 A, 165 O as Division Reserve. No enemy fire was received in the RCT zone during the remainder of the period.

27 February, 1945

There was no enemy activity in the area of RCT 24 (less BLT 3/24) from 0001 until dawn. Orders were received from Division during the night. RCT 23 and RCT 25 with BLT 3/24 attached, were to continue the attack at King-Hour (0800) and seize O-2 in their respective zones of action. RCT 24 (less BLT 3/24) remained in Division Reserve in an assembly area in the vicinity of TA 165 E,J,O, 165 A. BLT 2/24 was ordered to reconnoiter the zone of RCT 23 and BLT 1/24 was ordered to reconnoiter the zone of RCT 25 for possible employment. All units of RCT 24 (less BLT 3/24) spent the day policing their respective areas, salvaging all equipment possible, resting, cleaning weapons and reorganizing. Routes forward were reconnoitered by BLT and RCT Staff Officers. At 1515 Company E, BLT 2/24 was alerted for possible employment with RCT 23. At 1530 Company E, was attached to BLT 2/23. Orders to consolidate at 1700 were received and all units remained in their assigned assembly areas. Approximately 10 enemy mortar shells fell 150 yards from the RCT CP during the remainder of the period. There was no other enemy activity in the RCT area.

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Narrative of Operations, Cont'd.

28 February, 1945

No enemy activity occurred in the assembly area of RCT 24 (less BLT 3/24 and Company E, BLT 2/24) from 0001 until dawn. RCT 23 with Company E, BLT 2/24 attached and RCT 25 with BLT 3/24 attached continued the attack at King-Hour (0815). RCT 24 (less BLT 3/24 and Company E) remained in its assembly area as Division Reserve. BLT 2/24 (less Company E) received enemy mortar fire at 0800 and suffered several casualties. Units spent the day policing the RCT area; salvaging equipment, cleaning weapons and resting. Reconnaissance of the Division zone by staff members and company commanders was continued. A new RCT CP location was reconnoitered in TA 182 S and at 1305 a group went forward to establish the installations. The remainder of the period was quiet.

1 March, 1945

Operation Order 10-45 was received from Division. RCT 24 (less BLT 3/24) was to pass through RCT 23 at King-Hour (0830), and seize O-2 prepared to continue the attack to O-3 on Division Order. BLT 3/23 was attached to RCT 24 until BLT 3/24 was released by RCT 25 at 0730. BLT 2/24 relieved BLT 1/23 and BLT 1/24 relieved 2/23. The reliefs were effected prior to 0630. BLT 2/24 while moving into position received an enemy heavy mortar shell which caused several casualties. Regimental Weapons Company (less 37mm platoons), Co B, 4th Tank Bn and 2d Sec, 1st Prov Rocket Det, operated under RCT control initially. 3/14 reinforced by 2/14 was in direct support of RCT 24. Air and Naval Gunfire support were available. The Division artillery fired an intense preparation beginning at 0820 which moved forward in successive concentrations after 0830. The attack jumped off on time with BLT 2/24 on the left and BLT 1/24 on the right. By 0930 BLT 2/24 had advanced approximately 100 yards against heavy enemy resistance. BLT 1/24 was slowly moving forward against very strong enemy opposition. By 0930 BLT 3/24 had returned to RCT 24 and become RCT Reserve. BLT 3/23 was released to RCT 23. At 1030 RCT 24 CP opened at TA 182 S. The attack continued throughout the day against strong enemy opposition and little progress was made. The left flank of BLT 2/24 advanced about 300 yards while the right flank of BLT 1/24 made practically no gain. RCT 21, on the left of RCT 24, was able to move forward at a walk. HILL 382 in the center of the RCT zone was very heavily defended and required extensive demolition work before any advance could be made. RCT 9 passed through RCT

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21 at 1600 and continued the attack. Contact between RCT 9 and BLT 2/24 became broken so two companies of BLT 3/24 were moved into line on the left of BLT 2/24 to regain contact. Company L, BLT 3/24 remained in RCT Reserve. The terrain was very poor for tank operations but several were used to support, by fire, the attack of the BLTs. Orders were received to consolidate at 1700. Two air strikes were completed in the RCT zone during the day. Artillery and NGF fired continuously in support of the attack and provided defensive fires and illumination for the night. RCT 24 remained in active contact with the enemy through the remainder of the period. Enemy mortar fire, rifle fire and hand grenades were received by the front lines.

2 March, 1945

Sporadic enemy fire was received along the front from 0001 until dawn. Orders were received from Division to continue the attack at King-hour (0800) with RCT 25 remaining on the right of RCT 24. RCT 24 changed the boundaries between BLTs in order to change the direction of attack to the south-east and thus attack down the corridors instead of across them. The RCT was to attack with BLT 3/24 (less Company L) with 4 tanks attached on the left, BLT 2/24 with 4 tanks and the 2d Sec, 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment attached, making the main effort in the center and BLT 1/24 on the right. BLT 1/24 would be pinched out as the others progressed and then moved to an assembly area. Company L, BLT 3/24 remained in RCT Reserve. 3/14 reinforced by 2/14 was in direct support of RCT 24. An artillery preparation preceded the attack. The attack jumped off at 0800 but little progress was made initially because of heavy enemy mortar, automatic weapons, and rifle fire. Small gains were made throughout the day all along the line except in the vicinity of HILL 382 where the bitter opposition continued. By 1700 when units were ordered to consolidate for the night the left flank of BLT 2/24 and the right flank of BLT 3/24 had advanced approximately 300 yards. One platoon of Company L was committed in the zone of BLT 3/24 to fill a gap in the line. There was a small enemy counterattack during the early part of the night in the zone of BLT 2/24. Approximately 30 enemy were killed and the remainder of the period was quiet.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd

3 March, 1945

Very little enemy activity occurred during the hours of darkness. Division Operation Order 12-45 was received and RCT 24 with RCT 23 on its right was ordered to continue the attack in the southeast direction at King-Hour minus 75 (0630). No artillery preparation would precede the attack. All attachments remained the same. The attack jumped off at 0630 with BLT 3/24 on the left, BLT 2/24 in the center, and BLT 1/24 on the right. Initial gains of 100 yards were made by the right of BLT 2/24 and the left of BLT 1/24. The remaining units of Company L, BLT 3/24 (RCT Reserve) were committed on the RCT left flank to relieve a company of RCT 9 which was supposedly in our sector. 22 casualties were received while effecting this relief. The attack continued throughout the day against heavy enemy resistance. By 1500 BLT 2/24 had pinched out Company A of BLT 1/24. Company A then became RCT Reserve. At 1700 the lines were consolidated for the night. Gains had been made along the entire RCT sector with the largest of approximately 350 yards being made by BLT 2/24. HILL 382 had been secured. Company A, BLT 1/24 (RCT RES) was moved into the zone of BLT 2/24 to give the BLT depth. Contact with RCT 9 on the left and RCT 23 on the right had been maintained throughout the day. Two air strikes had been made in support of the RCT attack. Artillery and NGF placed observed fire on enemy targets. Defensive fires and illumination were provided for the night. Sporadic enemy fire and activity continued along the front until the end of the period.

4 March, 1945

Small groups of enemy attempted unsuccessfully to infiltrate through the lines of BLT 3/24 and sporadic enemy mortar and small arms fire were received along the front from 0001 until dawn. The Division order was received and RCT 24 was ordered to continue the attack in its zone of action at 0730. RCT 24 was to attack with BLT 3/24 on the left, BLT 2/24 in the center and BLT 1/24 (Less Company A) on the right. Company A remained in rear of BLT 2/24 as RCT Reserve. All attachments remained the same. Division Artillery reinforced by NGF and Corps Artillery fired a preparation for the attack from 0715 until 0745. The attack jumped off on time but very little progress was made. The attack continued throughout the day against heavy enemy resistance. At 1500 a coordinated attack was made with RCT 23 but very little advance was made. When the lines were consolidated at 1750 the largest

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd

gain made in the RCT sector was only 100 yards. Heavy mortar, machine gun and small arms fire had been received throughout the day and RCT 24 had received heavy casualties. No air support was received during the day due to weather conditions. Artillery and NGF fired as much as possible with their limited ammunition. Flame thrower tanks were used to good advantage against caves and other enemy positions. Little enemy activity occurred during the remainder of the period.

5 March, 1945

Little enemy activity occurred along the front from 0001 until dawn. Orders were received from Division that no attack would be made during the day, instead, units would reorganize by 1200 and strengthen their reserves by thinning the front lines. Particular attention was to be paid the organization of the ground and supporting arms were to be registered as close to the front lines as possible. RCT 24 had Company I (less 1 platoon), Company A, and Company C in reserve behind the BLTs. At 0730 the BLT Commanders arrived at the RCT CP and were given the full details of the day's plan. Further orders for 6 March were to be received later in the day. All units of RCT 24 spent the day improving their positions, firing in mortars and artillery, and resting. Sporadic enemy mortar fire was received along the lines. Two air strikes, NGF and artillery were used throughout the day in an effort to neutralize the enemy mortars. At 2200 the plan of attack for 6 March, 1945 was given to the BLT Commanders by the Commanding Officer, RCT 24. RCT 23 was to pass through BLT 3/24 prior to 0600 and BLT 3/24 would go into Division Reserve. The attack would jump off at 0900 with RCT 23 on the left, RCT 24 in the center and RCT 25 on the right. RCT 24 (less BLT 3/24) would attack with BLT 2/24 with Company A, BLT 1/24 attached, on the left and BLT 1/24 (less Company A and Company C) on the right. Company C as RCT Reserve would remain in rear of Company B, where it would be readily available to fill any gap which might develop. Other attachments would remain the same.

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6 March, 1945

Very little enemy activity took place from 0001 until dawn. BLT 3/24 was relieved by RCT 23 at 0630 and closed in its assembly area as Division Reserve in TA 182 O, 183, K, L by 0800. The massed artillery of the Infantry Divisions and Corps artillery fired a preparation for the attack from 0845 until 0921. Most of the fire was placed in front of RCT 23. At 0900 the attack began and an initial gain of approximately 100 yards was made by the left and center of BLT 2/24. The right of BLT 2/24 and BLT 1/24 received heavy enemy mortar fire at the time of attack and were unable to move. Progress was slow along the entire front throughout the day. Two air strikes were made in the RCT zone of action. NGF and artillery fired in support of the attack. The lines were consolidated at 1700 with difficulty. Units of the reserve company of BLT 2/24 and of Company C, RCT Reserve, were committed to fill gaps and establish contact with flank units. The left flank of BLT 2/24 had made approximately 150 yards while BLT 1/24 on the extreme right had been able to make very little progress against strong enemy resistance. Sporadic enemy fire continued throughout the remainder of the period.

7 March, 1945

Sporadic enemy fire was received along the front from 0001 until dawn. Orders were received from Division to continue the attack at King-Hour (0730). RCT 24 would attack with BLT 2/24 with Company A attached, on the left and BLT 1/24 (less Company A and Company C) on the right. BLT 3/24 would remain in Division Reserve. BLT 2/24 would have 3 rifle companies abreast and BLT 1/24 would attack with one company in the line. Company C would revert to BLT 1/24 and pass through Company B which, when relieved, would become RCT Reserve from a position in rear of Company C. All other attachments remained normal. All units were ordered to push forward vigorously regardless of movement of units on flanks. The attack was preceded by Division Artillery and NGF firing neutralization and counterbattery fires on known targets from 0715 until 0745. Artillery ammunition was limited. The attack jumped off on time and both BLTs began moving forward slowly against heavy enemy opposition. At 1100 the RCT Commander was informed that BLT 3/24 would be released from Division Reserve prior to dawn, 8 March, 1945 to relieve BLT 2/24 which would then

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become Division Reserve. Another coordinated attack preceded by a five minute artillery preparation was made at 1245 in an attempt to break through the enemy's defenses. Both BLTs jumped off on time but very little gain resulted. At 1700 when the lines were consolidated for the night, a stubborn pocket existed between RCT 24 and RCT 23 which was not contained until about 1900. Total gains of approximately 100 yards had been made in the center of the RCT sector. Heavy enemy fire had been encountered throughout the day. Two air strikes, artillery and NGF had supported the attack. Sporadic enemy fire was received during the remainder of the period.

8 March, 1945

Very little enemy activity occurred from 0001 until dawn. Orders from Division to continue the attack at King-Hour minus 90 minutes (0620) and releasing BLT 3/24 to RCT 24 at 0300 were received. RCT 24 would continue the attack, with BLT 3/24 (less Company L) with Company A attached, relieving the two left companies of BLT 2/24. BLT 1/24 (less Company A) would relieve the right company of BLT 2/24. The boundary between BLTs was adjusted so that each BLT would attack with two companies abreast. Company A attached to BLT 3/24 was given the mission of reducing the pocket on the left flank of the RCT sector in conjunction with units of RCT 23. Company L was to be in RCT Reserve until Company A reduced the pocket. BLT 2/24 when relieved by BLT 1/24 and BLT 3/24 would be Division Reserve in TA 182.0, 183K,L. BLT 3/24 and BLT 1/24 each had one platoon of Co B, 4th Tank Bn. attached. Regimental Weapons Company (less 37mm platoons) and 2d section, 1st Provisional Rocket Detachment were to be under RCT control initially. Division Artillery reinforced by Corps Artillery and NGF fired successive concentrations along the front from 0620 until 0650. The attack jumped off on time with very little progress being made initially. At 1130 BLT 2/24 was notified to reconnoiter the zone of BLT 3/25 for possible employment there. By 1300, Company A had eliminated the pocket and was ordered to take up a position in rear of BLT 1/24 as RCT Reserve. Company L was released to BLT 3/24. Strong enemy resistance was encountered throughout the day. Heavy mortar, automatic weapons and small arms fire were received along the lines. The line was consolidated with difficulty at 1700. Company A, the RCT Reserve, was

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committed in the zone of BLT 1/24 to fill gaps which had been created. A total advance of approximately 75 yards had been made in the RCT sector. RCT 24 had no reserve since each BLT had 3 rifle companies in the line. Commencing at dark a heavy volume of all type enemy mortar fire commenced and increased in intensity all along the line. Enemy troop movements were felt especially on the extreme left flank of BLT 3/24. Enemy fire increased throughout the remainder of the period.

9 March, 1945

The enemy activity increased throughout the night. An attempt in some force to penetrate the lines was made in the sector of Company L, BLT 3/24 on the RCT left flank. Small groups attempted to break through at various other places in the RCT sector. All attempts to break through were repulsed and the majority of the attackers were killed. There were 253 enemy dead counted along the front lines in the RCT sector at daylight. Heavy mortar, machine gun and rifle fire continued until dawn. Orders were received from Division to continue the attack at King-Hour (0700). Both BLT 3/24 and BLT 1/24 were unable to jump off on time. BLT 3/24 had to mop up remnants of the enemy from the night attack that were in its immediate vicinity and BLT 1/24 had to reorganize. At 0730 BLT 3/24 jumped off after a five minute artillery preparation. The resistance met was considerably less than had been met previously. BLT 1/24 reorganized into 2 rifle companies and attacked at 1500, making small gains against strong enemy resistance. The advance, once started, continued slowly but steadily in the face of decreasing resistance, except on the right flank where the resistance was still strong. 4 air strikes, artillery and NGF supported the attack throughout the day. When the units consolidated at 1700 a gap of approximately 150 yards existed between BLT 3/24 and RCT 23. This gap was filled by RCT 23. The left flank of RCT 24 had advanced approximately 500 yards and the right flank had advanced about 200 yards. Very little enemy fire was received during the remainder of the period.

10 March, 1945

Little enemy activity occurred from 0001 until dawn. Orders were received from Division for BLT 3/24 to become attached to RCT 23. RCT 25 with BLT 2/24 attached was to

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relieve BLT 1/24 in its zone of action. RCT 24 (less BLT 2/24 and BLT 3/24) was to become Division Reserve in TA 182 O, 183K,L. BLT 1/24 was relieved and in its assembly area by 0800. At 1130 BLT 1/24 was released by Division to become Corps Reserve. RCT 24 (less BLTs 1/24, 2/24 and 3/24) remained in Division Reserve. The remainder of the day was spent in the assembly area. There was no enemy activity in the RCT area during the remainder of the period.

11 March, 1945

There was no enemy activity in the RCT assembly area from 0001 until dawn. Orders were received from Division for RCT 23 with BLT 3/24 attached and RCT 25 with BLT 2/24 attached to continue the attack at King-Hour minus 60 minutes (0730). BLT 1/24 was to remain in Corps Reserve. RCT 24 (less BLTs 1/24, 2/24, 3/24) remained in Division Reserve. The day was spent salvaging gear and equipment, cleaning weapons and resting. The RCT kept in constant touch with the tactical situation. Reconnaissance of the zone of action of RCT 23 and RCT 25 was made. At 1700 all units consolidated in their assigned positions. There was no enemy activity during the period.

12 March, 1945

There was no enemy activity within the RCT area from 0001 until dawn. Orders were received for RCT 23 with BLT 3/24 attached and RCT 25 with BLT 2/24 attached to mop up enemy resistance remaining in their zones. BLT 1/24 remained in Corps Reserve. RCT 24 (less BLTs 1/24, 2/24 and 3/24) remained in Division Reserve. Patrols were sent out to comb TA 182 thoroughly. No enemy were found in the area. Police work, and salvaging of gear and equipment were continuous throughout the day. Close liaison with the assault RCTs was maintained. There was no enemy activity within the RCT area during this period.

13 March, 1945

Orders were received to continue the mopping up operations, burying of enemy dead, collecting of own dead

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and policing of assigned areas. BLT 3/24 and BLT 2/24 remained attached to RCT 23 and RCT 25 respectively. BLT 1/24 remained in Corps Reserve until 0800 when it reverted to RCT 24. RCT 24 (less BLT 2/24 and BLT 3/24) remained in Division Reserve and continued to clean up TA 182. Patrols were sent throughout the area but found no enemy. Reconnaissance of forward areas was continued. No enemy activity occurred in the RCT area during the period.

14 March, 1945

Orders were received from Division to continue with the missions previously assigned on 12 March, 1945. BLT 3/24 and BLT 2/24 remained attached to RCT 23 and RCT 25 respectively. RCT 24 (less BLT 2/24 and BLT 3/24) remained in Division Reserve and continued to police its assigned area, salvage gear and equipment and patrol for enemy. Reconnaissance of forward areas continued. No enemy activity occurred in the RCT area during the period.

15 March, 1945

Orders were received from Division to continue the missions previously assigned on 12 March, 1945. BLT 3/24 and BLT 2/24 remained attached to RCT 23 and RCT 25 respectively. RCT 24 (less BLT 2/24 and BLT 3/24) remained in Division Reserve. Policing of area, salvaging of gear and equipment, patrolling of TA 182 and cleaning of weapons continued throughout the day. Close liaison was maintained with RCT 23 and RCT 25 relative to the results of the mopping up. There was no enemy activity within the RCT area during the period.

16 March, 1945

Orders were received from Division for RCT 24 to assume control of BLT 3/24 and relieve RCT 23 in its zone at 0800 and to thoroughly mop up and destroy the remaining enemy in the area. BLT 2/24 remained attached to RCT 25. RCT 24 (less BLT 2/24) relieved RCT 23 at 0800. BLT 1/24 was ordered to place one rifle company in position in TA 201 N, S, and the other company in position in TA 202 W, 185 C, H. BLT 3/24 remained in its position astride RJ 116 and tied in with Company A, BLT 1/24. The RCT zone was divided into 2 sectors and each BLT was assigned a sector. Each sector

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was to be thoroughly mopped up, policed, enemy dead buried, own dead collected, equipment salvaged and open caves closed. An overlay recording all of the above information was to be submitted to RCT 24 by 1600. The mopping up started at 0800 and continued throughout the day. By 1600, 25 enemy had been killed, 35 buried in caves and approximately 30 caves had been sealed. An overlay showing the positions of enemy killed, caves remaining open, routes of patrols and disposition of troops was sent to Division. Units went into designated positions for the night, placing outposts along the coast in TA 185 R and TA 185 E. There was little enemy activity during the remainder of the period.

17 March, 1945

Between 0001 and dawn, a small group of enemy attempted to cross the front of BLT 3/24. 11 were killed and it is thought those remaining returned to the zone of RCT 25. RCT 24 (less BLT 2/24) received orders to relieve RCT 25 in its zone at 0800. BLT 2/24 was to revert to parent control at that time. BLT 1/24 was ordered to comb again the area swept by both BLT 1/24 and BLT 3/24 the preceding day. The zone of RCT 25 was divided into two sectors, one of which along the coast was given to BLT 3/24 and the other inland to BLT 2/24. The BLTs were to begin from a position in the northeastern end of their sectors and systematically sweep the area going toward the southwest. The areas were to be thoroughly mopped up, policed, gear salvaged, dead enemy buried and own dead collected. The mopping up began at 0800 and continued throughout the day. By 1600 approximately 132 enemy dead had been buried, 58 caves sealed, 13 Marine bodies collected, and 4 enemy killed throughout the RCT sector. BLT 1/24 took up positions for the night in the general vicinity of TA 200 N, S, X, 183 E and BLT 2/24 took up position in TA 184 A, F, and 184 U, V. BLT 3/24 went into position in TA 182 T. There was no enemy activity during the remainder of the period.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

18 March, 1945

No enemy activity occurred from 0001 until dawn. RCT 24 was informed by Division that RCT 9 would relieve it at 0700, and RCT 24 would then complete reembarkation. RCT 9 relieved RCT 24 at 0808 and reembarkation began. All troops were embarked aboard their respective ships by 2000.

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SECTION 7

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. EQUIPMENT

1. The Army field shoe with the 2 buckle top proved to be excellent. It is recommended that the type shoe be made standard issue for troops in the field.
2. The lining of the 5 gallon expeditionary can gave a bad taste to the water. A new can has been developed with a different type lining, which does not taint the water. It is recommended that this new can be adopted.
3. The Carrier M29 operated very well in the terrain encountered, additional vehicles of this type would have been very valuable in the early stages of the operation. It is recommended that these vehicles be allotted to an infantry regiment as follows:

Each Battalion	1
Regt. Comm. Plat.	1
Regt. S&B Plat.	2
Regt. Wpns. Co.	3
Total	<u>9</u>

The vehicle itself should have hooks provided for its unloading. The present method of lowering it in a cargo net is very unsatisfactory. Its hood should be covered to make it more seaworthy.

4. Additional ambulances are needed for the evacuation of casualties. Each infantry regiment should have at least five (5)  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton 4x4 ambulances in addition to the ones now provided by the TBA and the medical companies.
5. Even though additional  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton trailers were assigned to the regiment by division, more were needed. It is recommended that every  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton 4x4 truck be provided with a  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton trailer.
6. Infantry battalions need a powerful telescope for their observation posts. It is recommended that each infantry battalion be provided with two (2) battery commander type scopes.

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Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.

7. The new blackout tents proved to be very satisfactory. Additional tents of a type similar to this with provisions for receiving stretchers should be provided for battalion and regimental sick bays.

8. A heavier wrecker is needed by Regimental Weapons Company. It is recommended that they be provided with a 2½ ton 6x6 wrecker in place of the 1 ton 4x4 wrecker they now have.

**B. WEAPONS**

1. A heavier mortar is needed to supplement the 81mm mortar and 60mm mortar now used by the infantry battalions. The heavier shell of either the 4.2 mortar or 155mm mortar would be of great benefit against enemy pillboxes or personnel.

2. The 7.2 rocket launcher mounted on a sled proved very unsatisfactory. It is recommended that the launcher be mounted on a tank as originally planned.

3. The 4.5 rocket launcher mounted on a 1 ton 4x4 truck was used very successfully. It is recommended that further work be done on the rocket and its launchers to decrease dispersion and to allow closer support of the infantry.

4. The tanks, M4A3, with Ronson flame throwers proved to be very good. It is recommended more tanks be provided with the flame thrower and that experimental work be done on the flame thrower to permit greater flexibility and allow the nozzle to be brought to the entrance of caves.

5. Additional .45 caliber automatic pistols are needed to fully equip medical personnel, stretcher bearers, flame thrower operators, bazooka and SCR-300 radio operators.

6. The Garret 60mm mortar should be adopted and six (6) allotted to each infantry battalion to supplement the 60mm mortar, M2. They would be valuable for flat trajectory fire into caves and especially useful during mopping up operations.

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Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.

C. AMMUNITIONS:

1. Both the 81mm mortar and the 60mm mortar were used extensively throughout the operation. Ammunition of various type for the mortars was always critical. It is recommended that the unit of fire for the mortars be changed as follows:

<u>Weapon</u>	<u>HE</u>	<u>ILL</u>	<u>WP</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
60mm mortar	90	30	10	130
81mm mortar	140 light 40 heavy		20	200

2. The shell, HE, M56 w/PDFM53 81mm mortar is not heavy enough for demolitions work against the enemy fortifications we have encountered. Since the M53 fuze has a delay action this shell cannot be used against personnel. It is recommended that a super-quick fuze (the M77) be made available for this shell.

3. The container for 60mm mortar shells is not watertight and many shells were unserviceable due to rusted tail assemblies.

4. The plastic nose on 60mm mortar shell was found to be unsatisfactory. The noses cracked or broke easily and resulted in a large number of duds.

5. An illuminating shell for the artillery should be perfected and adopted.

6. The WP Bazooka shell was found to be very effective for firing into caves. It is recommended that a greater amount of this type rocket be made available for training and combat.

7. It is recommended that three times the amount of Ground Signal (Green Star Clusters and Yellow Smoke) be carried on future operations.

D. MISCELLANEOUS:

1. Not enough personnel are available to serve as litter bearers. When casualties become heavy with:

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Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.

an infantry unit, it is impossible for them to evacuate all their casualties. Therefore it is recommended that the collection sections of the medical companies be enlarged so that each infantry battalion will receive approximately 25 men. The function of these men would be solely to evacuate casualties from the front lines to the rear. They should be given infantry training with the infantry battalions, especially in cover and concealment.

2. The maps of IWO JIMA were very poor. The aerial photograph coverage must be as complete as possible prior to making the maps. It is recommended that more time be spent on making the maps and, if subsequent photo coverage shows the map to be inaccurate, that a revised map be made and issued.

3. The printing of enemy installations on the operation map makes it very difficult to read the map. It is recommended that all enemy installations be left off the operation map except those which might be used as reference points for orienting the map.

4. The method of counting enemy dead is very inaccurate. Some system should be adopted whereby all enemy dead are tagged or otherwise marked, thus avoiding duplication in the reporting of bodies.

5. Pre-landing bombardments should be made with heavier armament when the enemy emplacements are so well constructed. More 2000 pound bombs or larger should have been used. The 8 inch naval shell was the smallest that could penetrate the enemy concrete fortifications.

6. Additional spare parts should be carried in Regimental Weapons Company to enable them to do 3d echelon maintenance in the field.

7. A regimental logistic net is needed during the ship-to-shore phase and until all ships assigned to the regiment are unloaded. This net should connect the regimental dump ashore, the regimental representative aboard the control vessel, and the regimental TQM aboard each ship. Either the 610 radio or the SCR 300 radio should be used for this net.

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Recommendations, Cont'd.

8. Replacements should be assigned to the infantry units as soon as possible, preferably while the unit is still in base camp. This would permit better organization and training of the replacements. They would be assigned to the battalions and companies they would augment in combat, and thus become an integral part of that unit. This would increase the combat proficiency of the replacements and of the unit to which they were assigned, in combat.

9. The telegraph set TG-5 and blinker lamps have never been used on an operation by this regiment. The trend is toward voice operation and there are adequate means much more dependable than the telegraph set and blinker lamps. It is recommended that the telegraph set TG-5 and blinker lamps be deleted from the TBA.

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ANNEX ABLE

ADMINISTRATION

1. REPLACEMENTS:

- a. See figures below for number of replacements received and date of joining. On joining, replacements were immediately assigned to the lower units, taking into consideration their SSN for this allocation as far as practicable. The majority of the men received, whose SSN wasn't 521 (basic), were men of specialist training that wasn't adaptable to infantry combat. Basic training in weapons, self-preservation, and squad tactics was negligible. The result produced not only many casualties among the replacements but also confused the seasoned troops and took much of their valuable time in training of the new men. The battle casualties for the replacements was sixty-one (61) per cent. The replacements with a SSN (521) were inexperienced in the care and functioning of weapons as well as the capabilities of these weapons given them to use, such as BAR's. Here both valuable fire-power and time was lost. The new men had to join their squads while on the front lines, hence the leaders didn't know their men by sight or ability.

(1) RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (a) It is recommended that replacements be men other than specialist and basic trained personnel. Trained rifle and weapons men should be the only replacements received with the exception of specialist requested from sources available. Replacements should be received, if possible, at times when units are at base camps, thus permitting squad leaders time to know their men.

(2) COMMENTS:

- (a) Replacements of a specialist branch, who were assigned that duty, and NCO's were as a whole very satisfactory.

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ANNEX A-BLE

(Continued)

2. MORALE:

- a. While in Pearl Harbor liberty and recreation was afforded all troops. Twenty-five (25) per cent liberty and twenty-five (25) per cent recreation was the general routine. This contributed a great deal to the morale of the troops prior to the operation.
- b. Mail service while in the staging areas was good. The first mail was received on D plus 9 and was dispatched immediately to all front line units. V-Mail was distributed to all troops and given every consideration for prompt delivery to the division post office. Many of the men took advantage of the "free air-mail" service inaugurated and supported by the Division Athletic and Morale Section and was appreciated by all due to the men's disadvantage in being unable to carry stamps. A package of air-mail stationery was given each man after the island was secured.
- c. While troops are in rear areas, 10 in 1 rations are acceptable by all as a relief from a continued diet of "C's" and "K's".

(1) RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (a) It is recommended that a "news-sheet" be delivered to all troops on the basis of one per squad.

(2) COMMENTS:

- (a) Morale was excellent due to the liberty prior to invasion, and to the mail service that accommodated the troops, although as the operation proceeded and the rate of casualties became increasingly higher, the morale of the troops became decidedly lower.

3. CASUALTY REPORTS:

- a. LANDING STRENGTH OF RCT-24 ON D-DAY - 12 FEBRUARY 1945

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ANNEX TABLE

(CONTINUED)

<u>UNITS</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
H&S Co.	*27	235	262
RWpns Co.	8	188	196
1st Bn.	37	856	893
2nd Bn.	38	861	899
3rd Bn.	36	819	915
Co "B", 4th Med Bn.		37	37
Co "B", 4th MT Bn.	4	77	81
Co "B", 4th Engr Bn.	6	169	175
Co "B", 4th Tk Bn.	7	166	173
2nd Plt, S&S Co.	1	78	79
2nd Plt, 4th MP Co.	1	22	23
2nd Band Sect.		27	27
2nd Sect, 7th War Dog Plt.		19	19
Det, 1st JASCO.	11	67	78
FO's, 14th Mar.	7	37	44
Co "E", 24th Repl Draft.	12	352	364
Co "E", 30th Repl Draft.	8	308	316
2nd Plt, Plt Hq, 442nd Port Co, TC.	2	65	67
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>205</b>	<b>4443</b>	<b>4648</b>

\*One ARC and one Off temp att'd.

b. D DAY TO 20 FEBRUARY, 1945.

<u>UNITS</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>SK&amp;E</u>	<u>WNE</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
H&S Co.	2	6				8
RWpns Co.	1	10			3	14
1st Bn.	4	27	2	3		36
2nd Bn.	1	13	2		7	23
3rd Bn.	3	6	3		3	15
<b>Total Regiment</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>96</b>

ATTACHED UNITS

Co "B", 4th Med Bn.						
Co "B", 4th Engr Bn.		1				1
Co "B", 4th MT Bn.						
Co "B", 4th Tk Bn.						
2nd Plt, S&S Co.						
2nd Plt, 4th MP Co.						
2nd Band Sect.						
2nd Sect, 7th War Dog Plt.						
Det, 1st JASCO.						
FO's, 14th Mar.						

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(CONTINUED)

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>SK&amp;E</u>	<u>WNE</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Co "E", 30th Repl Draft.						
Co "E", 24th Repl Draft.						
442nd Port Co, TC.						
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS.	—	<u>1</u>	—	—	—	<u>1</u>
GRAND TOTAL	11	63	7	3	13	97

NOTE #1: (One man restored to duty from MIA)

c. 20 FEBRUARY, 1945 TO 21 FEBRUARY, 1945.

<u>UNITS</u>						
H&S Co.		5				5
RWpns Co.		7				7
1st Bn.	11	29	3	4	2	49
2nd Bn.	12	53	5	7	13	90
3rd Bn.	7	20	2	4		33
Total Regiment	<u>30</u>	<u>114</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>184</u>

ATTACHED UNITS

Co "B", 4th Med Bn.						
Co "B", 4th MT Bn.						
Co "B", 4th Engr Bn.	1	6				7
Co "B", 4th Tk Bn.						
2nd Plt, S&S Co.		1				1
2nd Plt, 4th MP Co.						
2nd Band Sect.						
2nd Sect, 7th War Dog Plt.						
Det, 1st JASCO.						
FO's, 14th Mar.						
Co "E", 30th Repl Draft.						
Co "E", 24th Repl Draft.						
442nd Port Co, TC.						
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS	<u>1</u>	<u>7</u>	—	—	—	<u>8</u>
GRAND TOTAL	31	121	10	15	15	192

NOTE #1: (Six men restored to duty from WIA)

NOTE #2: (One man restored to duty from MIA)

d. 21 FEBRUARY, 1945 TO 22 FEBRUARY, 1945.

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ANNEX A

(CONTINUED)

<u>UNITS</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>SK&amp;E</u>	<u>WNE</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
H&SCo.	1	2		2		5
RWpnsCo.	1	1	2	2		6
1stBn.	3	29	3	4		39
2ndBn.		5				5
3rdBn.	<u>10</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>1</u>		<u>4</u>	<u>24</u>
Total Regiment	15	46	6	8	4	79

### ATTACHED UNITS

Co "B", 4thMedBn.						
Co "B", 4thMTBn.						
Co "B", 4thEngrBn.		7				7
Co "B", 4thTkBn.	1	7		2		10
2ndPlt, S&SCo.						
2ndPlt, 4thMP Co.						
2ndBandSect.						
2ndSect, 7thWarDogPlt.						
Det, 1stJASCO.		1				1
FO, 14thMar.						
Co "E", 30thReplDraft.						
Co "E", 24thReplDraft.						
442ndPortCo, TC.						
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS	<u>1</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>18</u>

GRAND TOTAL	16	61	6	10	4	97
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NOTE #1: (Two men restored to duty from SK&E)

NOTE #2: (One man restored to duty from MIA)

e. 22 FEBRUARY, 1945 TO 23 FEBRUARY, 1945.

<u>UNITS</u>						
H&SCo.			1			1
RWpnsCo.			2	1	1	4
1stBn.	2	11	10	4		27
2ndBn.	14	60	16	7		97
3rdBn.	<u>4</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>		<u>41</u>
Total Regiment	20	104	32	13	1	170

### ATTACHED UNITS

Co "B", 4thMedBn.						
Co "B", 4thMTBn.						
Co "B", 4thEngrBn.		8				8
Co "B", 4thTkBn.						

# UNCLASSIFIED

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(CONTINUED)

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>SK&amp;E</u>	<u>WNE</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2ndPlt, S&SCo.						
2ndPlt, 4thMP Co.						
2ndBandSect.		2		1		3
2ndSect, 7thWarDogPlt.						
Det, 1stJASCO.						
FO's, 14thMar.	3					3
Co "E", 30thReplDraft						
Co "E", 24thReplDraft						
442ndPortCo, TC.						
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS	<u>3</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>14</u>
GRAND TOTAL	23	114	32	14	1	184

NOTE #1: (One man restored to duty from SK&E)

NOTE #2: (One man restored to duty from MIA)

f. 23 FEBRUARY, 1945 TO 24 FEBRUARY, 1945.

<u>UNITS</u>						
H&SCo.		1				1
RWpnsCo.			2	1	1	4
1stBn.	9	32	2	1		44
2ndBn.	3	15	7			25
3rdBn.	<u>21</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>116</u>
Total Regiment	<u>33</u>	<u>107</u>	<u>45</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>190</u>

<u>ATTACHED UNITS</u>						
Co "B", 4thMedBn.		3	3			6
Co "B", 4thMTBn.						
Co "B", 4thEngrBn.		4				4
Co "B", 4thTkBn.						
2ndPlt, S&SCo.			1			1
2ndPlt, 4thMP Co.			1			1
2ndBandSect.	1	3	6		2	12
2ndSect, 7thWarDogPlt.						
Det, 1stJASCO.						
FO's, 14thMar.		2				2
Co "E", 30thReplDraft.						
Co "E", 24thReplDraft.						
442ndPortCo, TC.						
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS	<u>1</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>26</u>
GRAND TOTAL	34	119	56	3	4	216

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(CONTINUED).

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>SK&amp;E</u>	<u>WNE</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
<u>NOTE #1:</u>	(Nine men restored to duty from WIA)					
<u>NOTE #2:</u>	(Two men restored to duty from SK&E)					
<u>NOTE #3:</u>	(One man restored to duty from MIA)					
<u>NOTE #4:</u>	(Joined 40 men: Distribution as follows: 6 to 1stBn; 17 to 2ndBn; 17 to 3rdBn from 24thReplDraft)					

g. 24 FEBRUARY, 1945 TO 25 FEBRUARY, 1945.

<u>UNITS</u>						
H&SCo.		4	2			6
RWpnsCo.	1	1	1	1		4
1stBn.	3	85		1		89
2ndBn.	18	36	22	2	1	79
3rdBn.	18	66	15		3	102
Total Regiment	40	192	40	4	4	280

<u>ATTACHED UNITS</u>						
Co "B", 4thMedBn.	2					2
Co "B", 4thMTBn.						
Co "B", 4thEngrBn.	2	4				6
Co "B", 4thTkBn.						
2ndPlt, S&SCo.		3				3
2ndPlt, 4thMP Co.			1			1
2ndBandSect.		1				1
2ndSect, 7thWarDogPlt.						
Det, 1stJASCO.						
FO's, 14thMar.						
Co "E", 30thReplDraft.						
Co "E", 24thReplDraft.						
442ndPortCo, TC.						
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS	4	8	1			13

GRAND TOTAL	44	200	41	4	4	293
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NOTE #1: (Seven men restored to duty from WIA)  
NOTE #2: (Three men restored to duty from SK&E)

h. 25 FEBRUARY, 1945 TO 26 FEBRUARY, 1945.

<u>UNITS</u>						
H&SCo.	4	10	1	1		16
RWpnsCo.		1				

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ANNEX A

(CONTINUED)

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>SK&amp;E</u>	<u>WNE</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1stBn.	11			1		12
2ndBn.		3	14	1		18
3rdBn.	<u>1</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>1</u>		<u>50</u>
Total Regiment	16	44	33	4		97
<u>ATTACHED UNITS</u>						
Co "B", 4thMedBn.		1				1
Co "B", 4thMTBn.						
Co "B", 4thEngrBn.		1				1
Co "B", 4thTkBn.	1			1		2
2ndPlt, S&SCo.						
2ndPlt, 4thMPCo.						
2ndBandSect.	1		1	1		3
2ndSect, 7thWarDogPlt.						
Det, 1stJASCO.						
FO's, 14thMar.						
Co "E", 30thReplDraft.						
Co "E", 24thReplDraft.		2				2
442ndPortCo, TC.						
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>9</u>
GRAND TOTAL	18	48	34	6		106

NOTE #1: (Sixteen men restored to duty from WIA)

NOTE #2: (Four men restored to duty from SK&E)

NOTE #3: (Temporary attached five men from 1stJASCO to 3rdBn)

NOTE #4: (Joined twelve men from 24thReplDraft as litter bearers; five to 2ndBn; seven to 3rdBn)

1. 26 FEBRUARY, 1945 TO 27 FEBRUARY, 1945.

<u>UNITS</u>					
H&SCo.		3		5	8
RWpnsCo.		1	1		2
1stBn.		2	2	2	6
2ndBn.		2	5		7
3rdBn.	<u>2</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>22</u>
Total Regiment	2	22	9	12	45

ATTACHED UNITS

Co "B", 4thMedBn.		1			1
Co "B", 4thMTBn.					

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ANNEX ABLE

(CONTINUED).

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>SK&amp;E</u>	<u>WNE</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Co "B", 4th Engr Bn.		1				1
Co "B", 4th Tk Bn.						
2nd Plt, S&S Co.	Reverted to Parent Control this date.					
2nd Plt, 4th MP Co.						
2nd Band Sect.			1			1
2nd Sect, 7th War Dog Plt.						
Det, 1st JASCO.						
FO's, 14th Mar.						
Co "E", 30th Repl Draft.						
Co "E", 24th Repl Draft.						
442nd Port Co, TC.						
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS	—	1	2	—	—	3
GRAND TOTAL	2	23	11	12		48

NOTE #1: (Eleven men restored to duty from WIA)

NOTE #2: (Nine men restored to duty from SK&E)

NOTE #3: (Joined 478 men from 24th&30th Repl Drafts this date:  
Distribution as follows: 4 to H&S Co; 13 to RWpns Co;  
141 to 1st Bn; 159 to 2nd Bn; 168 to 3rd Bn)

j. 27 FEBRUARY, 1945 TO 28 FEBRUARY, 1945.

<u>UNITS</u>						
H&S Co.		1	2	3		6
RWpns Co.						
1st Bn.		1				1
2nd Bn.	6	12	6	2		26
3rd Bn.		14	8		3	25
Total Regiment	6	28	16	5	3	58

ATTACHED UNITS

Co "B", 4th Med Bn.						
Co "B", 4th MT Bn.	Reverted to Parent Control this date.					
Co "B", 4th Engr Bn.		1				1
Co "B", 4th Tk Bn.				5	1	6
2nd Plt, 4th MP Co.						
2nd Band Sect.						
2nd Sect, 7th War Dog Plt.						
Det, 1st JASCO.			2			2
FO's, 14th Mar.						

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OFFICIAL REPORT

ANNEX ABLE

(CONTINUED)

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>SK&amp;E</u>	<u>WNE</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Co "E", 30thReplDraft.						Reverted to Parent Control this date.
Co "E", 24thReplDraft.						Reverted to Parent Control this date.
442ndPortCo, TC.						
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS.	—	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>9</u>
GRAND TOTAL	6	29	18	10	4	67

- NOTE #1: (Thirteen men restored to duty from WIA)  
NOTE #2: (Seven men restored to duty from SK&E)  
NOTE #3: (Joined 50 men from 30thReplDraft this date: Distribution as follows: 20 to 2ndBn; 30 to 3rdBn)

k. 28 FEBRUARY, 1945 TO 1 MARCH, 1945.

UNITS

H&SCo.						
RWpns.						
1stBn.		3	1			4
2ndBn.		8		2		10
3rdBn.	<u>1</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>	—	<u>25</u>
Total Regiment	<u>1</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>4</u>	—	<u>39</u>

ATTACHED UNITS

Co "B", 4thMedBn.						
Co "B", 4thEngrBn.		1				1
Co "B", 4thTkBn.						
2ndPlt, 4thMP Co.						
2ndBandSect.						
2ndSect, 7thWarDogPlt.						
Det, 1stJASCO.						
442ndPortCo, TC.						
*FO's, 14thMar.	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS	—	<u>1</u>	—	—	—	<u>1</u>
GRAND TOTAL	1	25	10	4		40

- \*NOTE #1: (FO's, 14thMar remained with RCT-24 tactically but reverted to parent control administratively)  
NOTE #2: (Three men restored to duty from WIA)  
NOTE #3: (Two men restored to duty from SK&E)  
NOTE #4: (Seven men temporarily attached from 1stJASCO this date: Distribution as follows: 5 to 2ndBn; 2 to 3rdBn)

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ANNEX A/BLE

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
(CONTINUED)

1. 1 MARCH, 1945 TO 2 MARCH, 1945.

<u>UNITS</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>SK&amp;E</u>	<u>WNE</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
H&SCo.		2				2
RWpnsCo.	1	12		1		14
1stBn.	9	36	3	2		50
2ndBn.	13	40	15	4	4	76
3rdBn.	1	11	4			16
Total Regiment	24	101	22	7	4	158

ATTACHED UNITS

Co "B", 4thMedBn.		3				3
Co "B", 4thEngrBn.	1	6				7
Co "B", 4thTkBn.	Reverted to Parent Control this date.					
2ndPlt, 4thMP Co.						
2ndBandSect.						
2ndSect, 7thWarDogPlt.						
Det, 1stJASCO.						
442ndPortCo, TC.	Reverted to Parent Control this date.					
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS	1	9				10

GRAND TOTAL	25	110	22	7	4	168
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NOTE #1: (Three men restored to duty from WIA)

NOTE #2: (Four men restored to duty from SK&E)

NOTE #3: (One man restored to duty from MIA)

m. 2 MARCH, 1945 TO 3 MARCH, 1945.

<u>UNITS</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>SK&amp;E</u>	<u>WNE</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
H&SCo.						
RWpnsCo.					1	1
1stBn.	8	15		1		24
2ndBn.	14	44	5			63
3rdBn.	15	38	4	2		59
Total Regiment	37	97	9	3	1	147

ATTACHED UNITS

Co "B", 4thMedBn.		1				1
Co "B", 4thEngrBn.	1	3				4
2ndPlt, 4thMP Co.						
2ndBandSect.						
Det, 1stJASCO.						

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(CONTINUED).

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>SK&amp;E</u>	<u>WNE</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2ndSect, 7thWarDogPlt.						
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS	1	4				5
GRAND TOTAL	38	101	9	3	1	152

NOTE #1: (Twelve men restored to duty from WIA)

NOTE #2: (Ten men restored to duty from SK&E)

n. 3 MARCH, 1945 TO 4 MARCH, 1945.

<u>UNITS</u>						
H&SCO.						
RWpnsCo.	1			2		3
1stBn.	13	33	4	5		55
2ndBn.	9	40	14			63
3rdBn.	8	59	4			71
Total Regiment	31	132	22	7		192

<u>ATTACHED UNITS</u>						
Co "B", 4thMedBn.						
Co "B", 4thEngrBn.		1				1
2ndPlt, 4thMP Co.						
2ndBandSect.						
Det, 1stJASCO.		1				1
2ndSect, 7thWarDogPlt.						
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS		2				2
GRAND TOTAL	31	134	22	7		194

NOTE #1: (Six men restored to duty from WIA)

NOTE #2: (Seven men restored to duty from SK&E)

NOTE #3: (Joined 4 men from 24thReplDraft this date: Distribution as follows: 1 to H&SCO; 1 to 1stBn; 1 to 2ndBn; 1 to 3rdBn)

o. 4 MARCH, 1945 TO 5 MARCH, 1945.

<u>UNITS</u>						
H&SCO.						
RWpnsCo.		1				1
1stBn.	5	36				42

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(CONTINUED).

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>SK&amp;E</u>	<u>WNE</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2ndBn.	12	68	8	10		98
3rdBn.	<u>12</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>		<u>43</u>
Total Regiment	29	130	13	12		184
<u>ATTACHED UNITS</u>						
Co "B", 4thMedBn.		1	1			2
Co "B", 4thEngrBn.	2	2				4
2ndPlt, 4thMPCo.						
2ndBandSect.						
Det, 1stJASCO.		4				4
2ndSect, 7thWarDogPlt.						
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS	<u>2</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>1</u>			<u>10</u>
GRAND TOTAL	31	137	14	12		194

NOTE #1: (Two men restored to duty from WIA)

NOTE #2: (One man restored to duty from SK&E)

p. 5 MARCH, 1945 TO 6 MARCH, 1945.

<u>UNITS</u>						
H&SCo.						
RWpns.		2	1	1		4
1stBn.	5	7		4	1	17
2ndBn.	11	8		3		23
3rdBn.	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>8</u>		<u>7</u>
Total Regiment	17	23	2	8	1	51

<u>ATTACHED UNITS</u>						
Co "B", 4thMedBn.						
Co "B", 4thEngrBn.	1	1				2
2ndPlt, 4thMPCo.						
2ndBandSect.						
Det, 1stJASCO.						
2ndSect, 7thWarDogPlt.						
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>				<u>2</u>

NOTE #1: (Six men restored to duty from WIA)

NOTE #2: (Two men restored to duty from SK&E)

NOTE #3: (Joined one man to 2ndBn from 24thReplDraft. Joined one man to 3rdBn from 30thReplDraft. Joined one man to 3rdBn from 30thReplDraft --- total 3 men)

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(CONTINUED).

q. 6 MARCH, 1945 TO 7 MARCH, 1945.

UNITS	KIA	WIA	SK&E	WNE	MIA	TOTAL
H&SCo.			1			1
RWonsCo.		1		1		2
1stBn.	11	30	2	1		44
2ndBn.	14	36	6	7	4	67
3rdBn.	1	1				2
Total Regiment	26	68	9	9	4	116

ATTACHED UNITS

Co "B", 4thMedBn.						
Co "B", 4thEngrBn.						
2ndPlt, 4thMPCo.						
2ndBandSect.						
Det, 1stJASCO.						
2ndSect, 7thWarDogPlt.						
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS						

GRAND TOTAL	26	68	9	9	4	116
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NOTE #1: (Fifteen men restored to duty from WIA)

NOTE #2: (Three men restored to duty from SK&E)

NOTE #3: (Joined one man to H&SCo from 24thReplDraft. Joined one man to 1stBn from 30thReplDraft)

r. 7 MARCH, 1945 TO 8 MARCH, 1945.

UNITS	KIA	WIA	SK&E	WNE	MIA	TOTAL
H&SCo.						
RWonsCo.			1			1
1stBn.	7	23	2	2		34
2ndBn.	5	9	3			17
3rdBn.	4	21	5	1	1	32
Total Regiment	16	53	11	3	1	84

ATTACHED UNITS

Co "B", 4thMedBn.						
Co "B", 4thEngrBn.						
2ndPlt, 4thMPCo.						
2ndBandSect.						
Det, 1stJASCO.						
2ndSect, 7thWarDogPlt.						
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS						

GRAND TOTAL	16	53	11	3	1	84
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ANNEX A BLE

(CONTINUED)

s. 8 MARCH, 1945 TO 9 MARCH, 1945.

<u>UNITS</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>SK&amp;E</u>	<u>WNE</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
H&S Co.			1			1
RWpns Co.		1		1		2
1st Bn.	11	74	1	6		92
2nd Bn.		10	4	2	1	17
3rd Bn.	18	56	11	1		86
Total Regiment	29	141	17	10	1	198

ATTACHED UNITS

Co "B", 4th Med Bn.		2	1			3
Co "B", 4th Engr Bn.		1				1
2nd Plt, 4th MP Co.						
2nd Band Sect.		1				1
Det, 1st JASCO.						
2nd Sect, 7th War Dog Plt.						
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS		4	1			5

GRAND TOTAL	29	145	18	10	1	203
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NOTE #1: (Five men restored to duty from WIA)

NOTE #2: (One man restored to duty from SK&E)

t. 9 MARCH, 1945 TO 10 MARCH, 1945.

<u>UNITS</u>						
H&S Co.	1	1				2
RWpns Co.						
1st Bn.	11	19	1	1		32
2nd Bn.	2		2			4
3rd Bn.	3	6	1		1	11
Total Regiment	17	26	4	1	1	49

ATTACHED UNITS

Co "B", 4th Med Bn.						
Co "B", 4th Engr Bn.						
2nd Plt, 4th IP Co.						
2nd Band Sect.						
Det, 1st JASCO.						
2nd Sect, 7th War Dog Plt.						
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS						

GRAND TOTAL	17	26	4	1	1	49
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(CONTINUED)

NOTE #1: (Twenty men restored to duty from WIA)  
NOTE #2: (Two men restored to duty from SK&E)

u. 10. MARCH, 1945 TO 11 MARCH, 1945.

<u>UNITS</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>SK&amp;E</u>	<u>WNE</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
H&SCo.						
RWpnsCo.						
1stBn.		5	1	1		7
2ndBn.	1	3	1			5
3rdBn.	10	23	3			36
Total Regiment	11	31	5	1		48

ATTACHED UNITS

Co "B", 4thMedBn.		1				1
Co "B", 4thEngrBn.		3				3
2ndPlt, 4thMP Co.						
2ndBandSect.						
Det, 1stJASCO.						
2ndSect, 7thWarDogPlt.						
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS		4				4

GRAND TOTAL                      11              35              5              1              52

NOTE #1: (Four men restored to duty from WIA)  
NOTE #2: (One man restored to duty from SK&E)

v. 11 MARCH, 1945 TO 12 MARCH, 1945.

<u>UNITS</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>SK&amp;E</u>	<u>WNE</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
H&SCo.	1					1
RWpnsCo.						
1stBn.	5					5
2ndBn.	2	2	2	1		7
3rdBn.	8	7	3			18
Total Regiment	16	9	5	1		31

ATTACHED UNITS

Co "B", 4thMedBn.						
Co "B", 4thEngrBn.						
2ndPlt, 4thMP Co.						
2ndBandSect.						
Det, 1stJASCO.						

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(CONTINUED).

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>SK&amp;E</u>	<u>WNE</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
2ndSec, 7thWarDogPlt.	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS	—	—	—	—	—	—
GRAND TOTAL	16	9	5	1		31

NOTE #1: (Three men restored to duty from WIA)

NOTE #2: (Joined one man from 24thReplDraft. Assigned to H&SCo)

w. 12 MARCH, 1945 TO 13 MARCH, 1945.

UNITS

H&SCo.						
RWpnsCo.						
1stBn.		1				1
2ndBn.	2		1			3
3rdBn.		1	1			2
Total Regiment	2	2	2			6

ATTACHED UNITS

Co "B", 4thMedBn.						
Co "B", 4thEngrBn.		2				2
2ndPlt, 4thMP Co.						
2ndBandSect.						
Det, 1stJASCO.						
2ndSec, 7thWarDogPlt.	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS		2				2
GRAND TOTAL	2	4	2			8

NOTE #1: (Seventeen men restored to duty from WIA)

NOTE #2: (Seven men restored to duty from SK&E)

x. 13 MARCH, 1945 TO 14 MARCH, 1945.

UNITS

H&SCo.						
RWpnsCo.			2			2
1stBn.	1					1
2ndBn.	3	1				4
3rdBn.		6				6
Total Regiment	4	7	2			13

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ANNEX A/B/C

(CONTINUED).

<u>ATTACHED UNITS</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>SK&amp;E</u>	<u>WNE</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Co "B", 4th Med Bn.						
Co "B", 4th Engr Bn.						
2nd Plt, 4th MP Co.						
2nd Band Sect.						
1st JASCO.						
2nd Sect, 7th War Dog Plt. <u>Reverted to Parent Control this date.</u>						
<u>TOTAL ATT'D UNITS</u>						
<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>	4	7	2			13

NOTE #1: (Seventeen men restored to duty from WIA)  
NOTE #2: (Seven men restored to duty from SK&E)

y. 14 MARCH, 1945 TO 15 MARCH, 1945.

<u>UNITS</u>						
H&S Co.						
RWpns Co.				1		1
1st Bn.						
2nd Bn.	15	3	7			25
3rd Bn.	15		2	1		18
<u>Total Regiment</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>		<u>44</u>

<u>ATTACHED UNITS</u>						
Co "B", 4th Med Bn.						
Co "B", 4th Engr Bn.						
2nd Plt, 4th MP Co.						
2nd Band Sect.						
Det, 1st JASCO.						
<u>TOTAL ATT'D UNITS</u>						
<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>	30	3	9	2		44

NOTE #1: (Two men restored to duty from WIA)

z. 15 MARCH, 1945 TO 16 MARCH, 1945.

<u>UNITS</u>						
H&S Co.						
RWpns Co.		1				1
1st Bn.	3					3
2nd Bn.	2	11	3	1		17

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(CONTINUED)

	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>SK&amp;E</u>	<u>WNE</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
3rd Bn.		<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>			<u>3</u>
Total Regiment	<u>5</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>		<u>24</u>
<u>ATTACHED UNITS</u>						
Co "B", 4th Med Bn.	<u>1</u>					<u>1</u>
Co "B", 4th Engr Bn.						
2nd Plt, 4th MP Co.						
2nd Band Sect.						
Det, 1st JASCO						
TOTAL ATT'D UNITS	<u>1</u>					<u>1</u>
GRAND TOTAL	<u>6</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>		<u>25</u>

NOTE #1: (Four men restored to duty from WIA)  
NOTE #2: (Two men restored to duty from SK&E)

aa. D DAY TO 16 MARCH, 1945  
 (As reported above, daily)

Regiment	468	1579	345	136	55	2583
Attached Units	<u>18</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>143</u>
GRAND TOTAL RCT-24	<u>486</u>	<u>1672</u>	<u>364</u>	<u>146</u>	<u>*58</u>	<u>2726</u>

Grand Total Regiment --- 2583 (Daily Report)  
 Grand Total Regiment --- 2482 (Accumulated Report)  
 # 101

\*This figure represents entire number of personnel reported MIA during operation, however, at this date, this regiment carries 3 men as MIA on its rolls.

#This figure represents the change of status of casualties, for example, from MIA to restored to duty, a casualty erroneously reported yet carried in daily report, or from MIA to DOW.

bb. THE BELOW CASUALTIES OCCURED AFTER IWO JIMA WAS OFFICIALLY SECURED: (17 AND 18 MARCH, 1945).

17 & 18 March:	24	93	19	3	1	135
D Day to 16 March:	<u>486</u>	<u>1672</u>	<u>364</u>	<u>146</u>	<u>58</u>	<u>2726</u>
GRAND TOTAL	<u>510</u>	<u>1765</u>	<u>383</u>	<u>149</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>2861</u>

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(CONTINUED)

cc.

CASUALTIES BY PERCENTAGE

(Strength of attached units not included)

Replacement Officers: 28.57%  
Replacement Enlisted: 61.18%

Regiment with Replacement Enlisted: 65.8%  
Regiment without Replacement Enlisted: 66.2%

Officers with Replacement Officers: 56%  
Officers without Replacement Officers: 57%

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APPENDIX 1 TO SECTION IV  
 ° PROGRESS OF THE ATTACK °

- NOTE: 1. Days shown are days RCT 24 was committed as a unit.  
 2. Numbers on lines represent dates during period 17 Feb to 16 Mar.

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ANNEX BAKER

INTELLIGENCE

Reference: Division S.O.P. No. 1-45.

MAPS, PHOTOGRAPHS AND SUPPLEMENTARY INTELLIGENCE:

a. Maps:

The number and types of maps supplied to this unit during the planning phase of this operation were more than adequate. Twelve out of the twenty-eight items sent over from Corps for distribution would have been sufficient for familiarization and briefing purposes. These twelve items were: 1/20,000 map w/grid, 1/10,000 map w/grid, 1/10,000 situation map, 1/10,000 Beach map "A" w/o grid, G-2 Study, G-2 tactical study of terrain, 122-44 JICFOA Bul., Enemy defenses folder, Propaganda sets, surrender leaflets, Enlarged obliques of East Beaches, and Landing Information sheet. The other sixteen items duplicated in some way the twelve items or else were not necessary for an echelon as low as regiment. In addition, a great number of maps and studies serve more to confuse echelons lower than regiment rather than to aid in clearing up the picture.

The 1/10,000 special air and gunnery target map of Iwo Jima designated as the official operations map was received in sufficient quantity to satisfy all needs of this regiment. This map plus the revised 1/10,000 intelligence map received at Saipan were the two principal maps used during the operation. The 1/20,000 special air and gunnery target map was used to some extent but not as an operations map.

The operations map was generally accurate on horizontal control, but the twenty foot contour interval used gave a very deceptive map picture of the terrain to the North and East of airfield number two. The captured Japanese map could only be considered better in that it made no attempt to contour this area at all except along and just inland from the coast. It might have been well to use hachure contouring on such jumbled terrain.

Relief maps were very good for purposes of over-all briefing.

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ANNEX BAKER (Continued).

b. Photographs:

During the planning phase of the operation vertical photographs were adequate both as to quality and quantity. Oblique photographs were only fair. It is difficult to understand the lack of excellent low obliques on an operation which presented as difficult a landing problem as this one did. These photographs are a necessity for a study of the beaches and approaches inland. The best verticals can not take their place.

During the operation itself the aerial photographs supplied to this unit were completely inadequate. The verticals were foggy or cloud covered in most instances. Those taken by a PRO photographer from an Oy-1 airplane of VMO-4 were very helpful over a limited area.

If intelligence S.O.P. and the photographic plan outlined in appendix 12 to annex Dog of Fourth Marine Division operation order No. 49-44 had been carried out, good photographs should have resulted. Photographs at least as good as those used in the Tinian battle are very desirable for use by battalion and regimental commanders.

c. Hydrographic Information:

Hydrographic information was excellent. The G-2 section special study of the beaches was a very fine job for familiarization and briefing purposes. It would have been better if a supplement bringing it up to date had been issued.

The material presented in writing and verbally by the U.D.T. personnel brought aboard this unit's APA was excellent. It was an outstanding example of "on the spot intelligence" properly disseminated. It was exceptionally accurate.

d. Other Intelligence:

Both prior to and during the operation all intelligence material available appeared to be very ably disseminated to this unit by D-2.

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ANNEX BAKER (Continued).  
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The G-2 tactical study of the terrain was for the most part very good. It failed however to portray the true picture of the northern part of Iwo Jima. Once again the greatest difficulty here was the lack of good aerial photographs. It is impossible to produce an accurate terrain study of totally unfamiliar terrain without good to excellent aerial photo coverage.

The API reports of enemy installations to our front deriving from Corps-2 during the operation were most helpful in coordinating artillery fires and Naval gunfire.

The monitoring of the air reconnaissance net throughout the operation proved most helpful. This is a valuable source of intelligence and should be utilized to the utmost both day and night.

The enemy defenses target folder as adopted by this regiment was used by each company commander. They expressed the view that the folder would be of great help to them in a less static situation.

The SCR-300 division intelligence OP net did not operate as planned on D-Day. The only units manning it were this unit and RCT-25.

2. INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONING:

a. Collection of Information:

The collection of information on this operation was much more difficult than on previous operations that this unit has been on. Several factors were governing in this situation.

First and foremost was the Japanese attempt to destroy or burn all documents, radios and other papers or equipment which they felt would be of any intelligence value to our forces.

Second, few if any good OP sites were ever located in this regiment's zone of action. The personnel were well trained, but the terrain was most difficult for this type of work.

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ANNEX BAKER (Continued).

By D plus 2 evening the R-2 was the only officer remaining in the section. Enlisted personnel casualties had further reduced the efficiency of the section. A replacement officer was received in the section on D plus 6 but proved unsatisfactory due to lack of training in field intelligence.

b. Evaluation and Dissemination of Information:

The evaluation and dissemination of pertinent information was speedily carried out throughout this unit. Battalion reports were far better on this operation than ever before. Especially were they so in the timeliness of information reported. This regiment reported much more often to D-2 than in the past and in turn D-2 called regiment more often.

c. Communications:

Communications between the CP and the CP were normally very good. They were maintained by SCR-300. Other communications were excellent.

d. Liaison:

Liaison with D-2 was much improved over past operations. As between R-2's, however, much can be done. There seems to be a reluctance to disseminate information to adjacent units. This is true of battalions also.

e. Training and Use of Personnel:

As has been stated in previous reports, it is believed that personnel for intelligence sections should be carefully selected. This should be done by the R-2 and Bn-2's. The schooling for intelligence personnel should be intensive and carefully directed. There is no room on the field of battle for results of slipshod instructions.

As a whole the intelligence functioning of the regiment was much smoother than in past operations despite the difficulties outlined in paragraph (a) of this section. It is believed that this was mainly due to the selection of personnel and the school program used by this regiment while it was at base camp.

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ANNEX BAKER (Continued).

The basic schooling was a six weeks course conducted by the R-2 section and attended daily by all members of the Bn-2 sections including officers. At the conclusion of this school the R-2 and Bn-2 sections met from time to time for selected class and field work on a combined basis. This program served to unify to a high degree basic intelligence functioning throughout the regiment. It further served to let each section know what it could expect from others. It was suggested at the time that an intelligence CPX involving all intelligence personnel of the division should be had. Other work interfered and this was not taken up with D-2 at the time.

Japanese language personnel attached to this regiment at the time of landing consisted of two officers and two enlisted. The two officers were wounded and evacuated on D plus 1. On the night of D plus 1, one officer and one enlisted reported from D-2. One of the wounded and evacuated officers was returned on D plus 5. Throughout the operation these officers and men were most cooperative and helpful. The men went daily to Bn. CPs - whether the battalions were working with RCT-24 or not. The officers remained at the Regimental CP except when special search parties were organized. Considering the scarcity of documents and other material, plus a lack of prisoners, their work was excellent.

From a standpoint of working with this and lower echelons, the linguists should have an opportunity to become thoroughly acquainted with key personnel throughout these units. In addition, they should be schooled in the fundamentals of tactics and subjects such as map reading. This would give them a far better grasp of the daily situation while on an operation.

It is not imperative that linguists be permanently attached although their job is easier if they are. The most pressing need at present is for all language personnel to get additional training in school. In a period of more than a year the language personnel of this unit have had no opportunity to increase their conversational capacity and little opportunity for extensive work with documents, with the result that their efficiency from a linguistic standpoint has been decreased greatly.

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ANNEX BAKER (Continued).

Nisei were only employed by this regiment once. The opportunity was limited but the two men involved were most cooperative. Their conversational talent appeared far superior to that of the other linguists. It is believed that this talent must be developed to meet the needs of forthcoming operations.

3. PRISONERS:

RCT-24 captured four prisoners of war. Three were Army personnel; one was a cook from a Naval Aviation unit. Other prisoners captured by component BLT's while they were attached to either RCT-23 or RCT-25, were evacuated through those regiments. No civilians or Korean laborers were identified as being killed or captured in RCT-24's zone of action.

Prisoners were interrogated briefly at Battalion CPs and given first aid at that time if necessary. Enlisted language personnel handled this and merely tried to ascertain whether the prisoner had companions near his place of capture and his unit. The prisoner was then forwarded to the Regimental CP and interrogated briefly on matters relating to RCT-24's zone of action. This interrogation was always brief and the POW was then forwarded to the Division Stockade.

All POW's were very cooperative. But they were captured late in the operation. The information was either confirmatory of previous information or of a local nature involving his place of capture.

The enlisted Japanese language personnel assigned to RCT-24 proved thoroughly competent from a linguistic standpoint to interrogate prisoners on a battalion or regimental level. Their chief difficulty appeared to be a lack of knowledge as to what items were of importance. They require training in the tactical worth of enemy interrogation and enemy documents which do not appear important at first glance.

Selected line troops who were given an eight weeks course in the use of selected military phrases proved generally ineffective, in the dealing with the POW's

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ANNEX BAKER (Continued).

This was true due to several factors. These men were trained mainly to aid in the handling of large numbers of civilians. They were to be used on military personnel only to get them to surrender, not for interrogation. A number of these men were killed or wounded. Many of them forgot or garbled the phrases they had been taught.

4. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIEL:

During the training period at base camp the importance of collecting enemy documents and materiel was stressed during periods of instruction. As this regiment was landing in reserve, all units were instructed to glean the rear areas for any documents or materiel not picked up by the assault units. This proved most beneficial, for on D plus 1 morning, scouts from BLT 1-24's two section found a T/O of the Japanese Naval Forces on the island. This served to immediately revise the estimated enemy strength on the island upward by more than five thousand.

Throughout the operation, scouts and observers from the Bn-2 sections and R-2 section constantly scoured the areas just behind the front lines. They investigated many caves and gun positions. The number of documents turned in was not impressive yet the area was thoroughly covered. On several occasions, special search parties with either Nisei, Jap prisoners or additional language personnel were dispatched on special missions at the request of the battalions. All enemy guns, gun positions, mines, minefields and incidental materiel were reported directly to D-2. Whenever possible, samples were turned in to D-2. Varying types of enemy shell fragments were turned in to enable artillery to identify the weapons being used on our forces.

The cooperation of enlisted personnel in the front line units on the collection of documents and enemy gear is worthy of comment. These men made a conscious effort to turn in all letters, diaries and other papers found, as well as dog tags, and anything else that they thought might be of interest. All troops of this unit and attached units appear well indoctrinated in intelligence matters. There is also the element of personal

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ANNEX BAKER (Continued).

interest from a souvenir standpoint but the majority turn over gear and documents with just the idea of helping out. The presence of enlisted interpreters at Bn. CP's was a definite aid here.

Information of immediate use obtained from any source whatsoever was given rapid distribution to higher, lower and adjacent echelons.

As compared to past operations, documents, radio and radar gear and other specialized material which Jap forces knew would be of value to us were found in small quantities. Repeated evidence was found to bear out POW reports that special security measures were taken to prevent such materiel from falling into our hands. Radio and radar gear was smashed, documents burned and torn up, and other types of gear were either burned or smashed.

The items of greatest immediate tactical value were dog tags, letters, postcards and the Naval T/O previously mentioned. By use of these items it was possible for the language personnel to piece together an order of battle and to tell from day to day what enemy forces had been encountered. This served as an indicator of who was still in front of us. On two occasions, detailed diagrams of enemy positions directly to our front were found, translated, and sent directly to the Company commanders to whose front these positions were.

A few documents of value in assembling general and technical information about the enemy were found. Among them were aircraft and propeller logs, a few unit journals of small units, notebooks and publications containing technical data on rockets, mortars, aircraft and others, as well as the usual military handbooks. A few navigational instruction folders, some charts and topographical maps were turned in. Of particular interest were two books of complete military and geographic data on O Jima and Hachijo Jima.

5. PROPAGANDA:

RCT-24 did not request the use of propaganda leaflets over and above those used by higher echelon. No one of the four prisoners captured remembered seeing any of the leaflets. It is believed that propaganda on such

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ANNEX BAKER (Continued).  
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objective is next to useless. On larger objectives with a large civilian population, well written propaganda should be very valuable.

All attempts to induce surrender of Japanese by vocal attempts proved fruitless in RCT-24's zone of action. On four different occasions groups of Japanese holed up in caves were approached and spoken to at some length by interpreters. The only reply to pleas for surrender were explosions from the interior of the caves.

It is believed that the most effective means of inducing surrender is to use captured prisoners, who have been well treated, to return to caves or behind the lines and bring others back.

6. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE:

Counter intelligence was SOP. No special measures were employed or considered necessary. The orders expressed in the Division operation order were carried out to the letter. It is worthy to note that all personnel in this unit were acutely aware of the necessity for preventing maps from falling in the enemy's hands. On numerous occasions personnel exposed themselves to the enemy fire to insure this not happening. All compromising documents were quickly recovered from crashed planes whenever possible.

The enemy's counter intelligence measures were far superior to any yet encountered. He made a studied effort to prevent any compromising material from falling into our hands. He issued specific orders to cover the destruction of material which might be compromising in nature.

It is noted that very few casualties were suffered by friendly personnel relieving the lines under cover of darkness.

7. PUBLIC RELATIONS:

One of the two regimental combat correspondents was wounded and evacuated on D plus 5. Other correspondents from Division filled the gap from day to day.

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ANNEX BAKER (Continued).

It was noticed that civilian correspondents got closer to the front more often on this operation than on previous ones.

The two regimental photographers plus a movieman from Division were landed on D night and spent the next three days taking PRO pictures. In addition, throughout the operation, PRO photographers from Division were in evidence with front line units.

Generally speaking all went smoothly from a PRO standpoint. It was noticed that the collection of stories by Division PRO personnel slowed down after D plus 3, but this was easily remedied by use of message center.

8. THE ENEMY:

a. Organization:

The enemy forces on IWO JIMA were well organized and capably led up to almost the very end of the battle. The overall command of the island was Japanese Army. It was a far better defense than any as yet encountered by this unit. This was noticed from the first hour of landing until the last big infiltration in force on the night of D plus 17. Although certain units were destroyed almost in their entirety from time to time, they were destroyed as a unit fighting bitterly to the end with the aid of all supporting arms other than air and Naval gunfire. The above is especially true of Japanese Army forces encountered. The Naval Force was used mainly to man the coast defense and AA batteries. When these positions were overrun and destroyed, the personnel remaining alive either holed up in caves or was absorbed by the Army. The Naval units did not appear to have attained the high state of training of the Army units.

Complete order of battle information on Jap forces was obtained by various methods already discussed and will appear in higher echelon's report.

b. TACTICS:

The enemy's estimate of the situation so far as the possibility of an attack on IWO JIMA was concerned was very good. He apparently decided that our forces

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ANNEX BAKER (Continued).

would make successful landings on either the East or West Beaches. Captured maps indicate such to be the case. The cross island defense line was clearly defined on maps of a maneuver held late in January, according to POWs. The island commander apparently had a good idea as to the effect of our pre-landing bombardment, for he withdrew all troops from the beaches except those who were in large buried blockhouses or pillboxes.

Even though IWO JIMA lent itself to defense, the island commander did an excellent job of selecting his positions, and placing his troops. In a matter of two hours after initial blue landings, he skillfully brought to bear all available weapons on the beach areas. The results speak for themselves.

The enemy's use of automatic weapons to pin advancing infantry down and then pound them with big mortars was remarkably well coordinated. In most instances, the Jap forces had observation for this mortar fire. When they appeared to lack observation they had their own forward units fire air bursts with light mortars. These air bursts gave off a very heavy greenish-smoke. The big mortars would then register in on the air bursts. The air bursts were not particularly effective against personnel.

The anti-tank defenses of the island were exceptional, far superior to any as yet encountered. The use of planned minefields covered by supporting fire was well thought out. The mutually supporting anti-tank weapons found between airfields one and two and around Hill 382 were particularly effective.

The overall defensive set up running from the quarry to "Turkey Mob" Hill, thence around the "Amphitheatre" to Byobu Ame and thence north to Hill 382 was the hardest to crack of any ever faced by this unit. The use of underground tunnels to join positions was common. These tunnels were also used to conceal guns, mortars and rockets. They were used for every conceivable purpose from a stowage of aviation gasoline to the operating of a field hospital. A few of them were concrete inside, but the majority had only clay walls. Many of them were entered through pillboxes. When they were abandoned by Jap forces, they were invariably booby trapped.

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ANNEX BAKER (Continued).  
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Extensive use was made of anti-personnel mines and all types of grenades. The terra cotta mine with plastic fuse and the ceramic grenade as well as anti-tank conical hand mine have never been encountered by this regiment before. All types of prefabricated and home made booby traps were used.

On a number of occasions the enemy used smoke, apparently to conceal troop movements and displacement of weapons from our forces. Smoke also was used to conceal gun flashes.

The Jap forces made a practice of waiting in caves, tunnels, and dugouts until our artillery preparations were complete and then coming out to man positions to meet the attack. On one occasion we launched an early attack without artillery preparation, and apparently caught the enemy off balance. Good initial gains were scored.

In some instances small groups of enemy or individuals were killed wearing Marine Uniforms, helmets, and individual equipment or parts thereof. It is noted that some Japanese "G.I." dungarees are not unlike the Marine Corps issue in color.

The 150 MM mortar, 320 MM spigot mortar and eight inch rocket fire was the most devastating ever faced by this unit.

c. Equipment:

The enemy's individual equipment on IWO JIMA was standard. Ordnance equipment was far superior in quality and quantity to any as yet encountered by this regiment. It is believed that every type of Japanese weapon from 6.5 MM rifle to a 320 MM spigot mortar was on the island. Several types of grenade launchers were found. Many types of grenades were found and turned over to higher echelon. Every type mine and booby trap known by our forces to be used by the Japanese was found. Many standard and improvised devices were used for anti-tank measures. Several different types of rocket were encountered. Coastal defense and anti-aircraft weapons were located in great numbers. All ordnance equipment appeared to be new

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ANNEX BAKER (Continued).

and in excellent shape with the exception of field artillery. It was standard.

The enemy motor transport was not good and was quickly eliminated. Radio and telephone gear appeared in quantity. Although most of it was smashed, it appeared to be new.

From a standpoint of battle readiness, the enemy was in better shape than on any island yet invaded by this unit.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS:

Better prior planning as to the map needs of all operational echelons would save much paper and time. Closer liaison should answer this problem.

Every effort should be made to make the operations map as near perfect as possible. No time nor means should be spared to accomplish this end.

No effort should be spared to get good aerial photographs. The loss of a few planes may save thousands of Marines' lives. Better photographs than those taken before and during the past operation must be gotten.

An air observer should be up in the Division's zone of action twenty-four hours a day, during an operation.

More training from a liaison standpoint is indicated as between R-2's and as between R-2's and D-2's.

All intelligence personnel should be carefully selected.

Basic intelligence schooling should be carried on within regiments under the direction of R-2's.

D-2 should exercise supervisory control over R-2's training and should aid in this training by utilizing specially trained personnel as lecturers. In addition it is suggested that weekly conferences be held between D-2 and the various R-2's of the Division.

All language personnel should be sent to a school

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ANNEX BAKER (Continued).

in the states or else a school be set up for them here at which they can be given formal instruction in both written and spoken Japanese.

All Japanese language personnel should be taught a few fundamentals of military tactics and basic subjects necessary for them to perform their function in the field to a better degree.

At least three enlisted per battalion and two officers per regiment would be a proper number of linguists to have on hand for future operations.

Stress the importance of small scraps of information in training language personnel and in indoctrination of troops.

Needs for replacements have run about the same after each operation. It would be much better to have at least partially trained intelligence personnel with the other replacements rather than having to reorganize completely as is done now.

If radios and radio channels are available it would aid intelligence functioning greatly to have a Divisional intelligence net embracing all echelons in two work.

If future operations are planned for larger land masses, it is imperative that an intelligence and reconnaissance platoon T/O as used by Army regiments be adopted.

Some system of tagging enemy dead should be worked out. This would prevent over-estimation and dual-counting. It would give a much better picture of the exact number of dead and those remaining.

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ANNEX CHARTER

OPERATIONS

1. REHEARSAL:

a. The terrain selected by Division for rehearsals was similar to terrain anticipated on IWO JIMA. Boundaries, objectives, plan of attack, and area assigned units was relatively the same as those assigned on D-Day.

b. Camouflage discipline was strictly enforced and all vehicles were painted so as to blend with the terrain on IWO.

c. The Communication plan was the same as that used for the operation and personnel were able to become familiar with the various call signs and code names.

d. On one rehearsal BLT 1/24 was attached to RCT 25 and BLT 2/24 to RCT 23. This was considered as a possibility on D-Day and therefore units became accustomed to their likely employment on D-Day. On D-Day it turned out the attachments were employed as rehearsed.

e. Boat assignment tables were prepared by each BLT prior to the rehearsals and corrections were made to these tables after each rehearsal. Long before the final rehearsal each man knew what boat team he was in. Aboard ship, daily debarkation drills were held so that every man became thoroughly familiar with his debarkation station and the route to it.

f. Landing diagrams were prepared so that once debarked each boat team became thoroughly familiar with which wave they were in and what position they occupied within the wave.

2. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE:

a. Reconnaissance:

(1) In accordance with a Division SOP all BLT Commanding Officers, when in reserve, reconnoitered the lines of the battalions in attack which they were most likely to relieve. When RCT 24 was in reserve, the Commanding Officer, RCT 24 reconnoitered the zones of the assault RCTs.

(2) For the initial landing it was planned that if the assault RCTs needed additional strength, BLT 1/24 would be attached to RCT 25 and BLT 2/24 to RCT 23. With this

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Annex Charlie, Cont'd.

possibility in view, the Commanding Officer of BLT 1/24 was to reconnoiter the zone of RCT 25, and the Commanding Officer of BLT 2/24 was to reconnoiter the area occupied by RCT 23. The Commanding Officer of BLT 3/24 was to reconnoiter the beach areas in the Division zone.

b. Issuing of Orders: Operation orders were received every night from Division for the following day. RCT orders to the BLTs and supporting units were delivered in person by liaison officers to their units. Only on two occasions was it necessary for the RCT Commanding Officer to issue an operation order orally to the BLT Commanding Officers.

c. As soon as possible after the front lines consolidated for the night the artillery and NGF forward observers registered their night harassing and defensive fires. Overlays of these fires were then submitted by the BLTs to the RCT artillery and NGF liaison officers. These fires were then plotted on the RCT situation map. After they were plotted, the RCT Commanding Officer then had a picture of what areas were being covered and could call for additional fires where he thought they were needed.

3. ARTILLERY:

a. When possible, 7/14 was assigned to be in direct support of this RCT. They fired preparations for attacks, harassing fires (day and night), defensive fires, and targets of opportunity. Excellent cooperation and liaison was maintained with the artillery battalion through the liaison officer and by the artillery battalion commander's visits to the RCT CP.

b. Each rifle company had an artillery forward observer who in most cases, stayed right with the front lines enabling him to adjust close supporting fires. Most Japanese positions were so well constructed that artillery was only able to neutralize rather than destroy them.

4. NAVAL GUNFIRE:

a. As in the past naval gunfire, in deep support, proved very effective in neutralizing targets. Most firing was adjusted by air spot. Most targets were destroyed by naval gunfire employing air plane spot.

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Annex Charlie, Cont'd.

b. On this operation it was advantageous to employ LCI gun boats along the coast. They were particularly effective against observed enemy personnel and emplacements. They fired mortars, rockets and 40mm guns both in close and deep supporting missions.

c. Overlays of target areas for prearranged and harassing fires were turned into the Regimental NLO from the Battalion NLOs for coordination with air and artillery. Coordination was extremely good. Prearranged fires and night harassing as well as deep support fires were effective in neutralizing and pinning down the enemy. Night illumination was in most cases adequate.

5. AIR:

a. Air Support:

(1) Out of 36 air strikes requested by this RCT, 22 were completed. The average delay between the request for a strike and the strike was two hours. Nevertheless, in most cases the strikes were still effective.

(2) The Air Liaison Officer with the RCT coordinated the requests from the BLTs and submitted them nightly to the RCT Commanding Officer for approval. In this way thorough coverage for a preparation prior to an attack was always assured.

b. Air Observation:

(1) Air observation was available practically all of the time. Their observations were helpful and their presence over the enemy lines often caused the enemy to cease firing in order to avoid discovery.

(2) SAO - The SAO communications net was monitored at all times. Valuable information was obtained from their observations. 25 specific missions were flown for this RCT.

(3) OY-1 - This plane was often launched during the night and helped to locate the areas from which the enemy heavy weapons were firing. The observations received from the OY-1 observer were accurate both as the enemy and our own front lines. The plane was frequently used to observe areas within the RCT zone of action.

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6. TANKS:

a. Tank-Infantry Coordination:

(1) Company B, 4th Tank Battalion was attached to RCT 24 practically throughout the operation. In almost every Regimental Operation Order one platoon of tanks was attached to each assault BLT. Tank liaison officers reported to the BLT Command Posts and the BLT Commanding Officer was able, through the tank liaison officer, to have tanks report where and when they were needed. The tank company commander, or another tank officer, remained in the Regimental CP and in this manner the RCT Commanding Officer was able to control the use of tanks at all times.

(2) Tank-infantry coordination in the attack did not exist, because at no time would the terrain allow tanks to move forward with infantry. Usually two or three tanks supported each BLT by fire from the best positions available, as close to the front lines as possible.

(3) Tanks on many occasions drew heavy enemy mortar fire and at times the infantry preferred to operate without tanks for that reason.

b. Tank, M4A3: This tank was never able to maneuver in the zone of action of action of RCT 24. They were used whenever a route to the front could be found to support the attack by fire. On these occasions they could fire on caves and emplacements to the front.

c. Tank, M4A3: (Flame Thrower)

(1) Again it must first be mentioned that the terrain on IWO JIMA in almost all cases denied the use of tanks. On occasions it was possible to get a flame thrower tank to the front, but even then the tank usually could not get into a position from which flame could be thrown at the exact spot desired.

(2) The flame thrower tank was effective against caves when the above conditions could be overcome.

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7. ENGINEERS: The engineer company attached to this RCT successfully completed the missions assigned. One platoon was attached to each BLT. They were frequently called upon to remove mine fields and clear routes for tanks and other vehicles, which they always did rapidly and efficiently. They provided demolitions and personnel for the sealing of caves. Routes for tanks and evacuation and supply were opened by the armored bulldozer, often under enemy fire.
8. COLLECTING SECTION, COMPANY "B", 4TH MED BN: About ten (10) men from this section were attached to each BLT. They were used to evacuate the wounded, to supplement the aid station personnel and as casualty replacements for rifle company hospital corpsmen.
9. 1ST JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY: JASCo supplied this RCT with the officers, men and communication equipment necessary to control air strikes, air observation and naval gunfire. Each BLT was assigned a naval gunfire forward observer, naval gunfire liaison officer and an air liaison officer with communication equipment and enlisted personnel to man it. Supporting fire by ships and airplanes was called for through the JASCo personnel and the cooperation rendered was commendable.
10. WAR DOGS:
  - a. The 2d Sec, 7th Mar War Dog Platoon attached to RCT 24 was used as a part of the CP perimeter defense. Every evening dogs were sent to the BLT in time for them to take up positions along the front lines prior to dark. BLTs were also able to fill gaps between units by placing the dogs in strategic spots, and they were also a great morale factor for the troops.
  - b. The Regimental Intelligence Officer used dogs with his patrols in searching out caves. The dogs were to precede the men into the cave and alert the handler if the cave was occupied. In many cases the dogs refused to enter a cave. It is believed that this was because the dogs were never trained to enter dark enclosures and some hesitated because they were afraid.
  - c. Scout dogs were used with one company operating along the beach with on effective results because of the terrain

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11. LVT(A)4: BLT 1/24 proceeding northward on the eastern coast of IWO JIMA was the only unit which was able to use the LVT(A)4. The company commander of the company operating on the beach was unable to observe his front from the beach but was able to reconnoiter the area visually from the water in an LVT(A)4. They were not used on land or for fire support.

12. ROCKETS:

a. Barrage Rocket:

(1) Whenever the RCT was in the attack, a section of the rocket detachment was attached to it by Division. The section was either held under RCT control or attached to the BLT with the most difficult zone of operations. In either case any unit requiring the use of the platoon could request it through regiment.

(2) Although large troop concentrations were never observed within rocket range, many missions were fired by the rocket section. In any case where a unit met fierce and concentrated resistance the general location of the enemy positions became the target for a rocket barrage. A barrage falling forward of a unit almost always enabled that unit to make some advance. This can be attributed to the demoralizing effect of the rockets on the enemy and the helpful effect of the rockets on the morale of our own troops.

(3) The use of the barrage rocket was limited because of the shortage of rockets, as well as the difficulties in finding suitable firing positions.

b. 7.2 Rocket:

(1) Division carried a very limited supply of the 7.2 rockets.

(2) In the final stages of the operation the 7.2 rocket was used by this RCT as an experimental weapon.

(3) The launcher for this rocket is so heavy that it must be drawn by a tank and the range so limited that it must be fired from within the front lines. Since the tank must face in the same direction as the rockets are to be fired, the launcher has little maneuverability.

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This combined with the terrain on IWO JIMA made the selection of a suitable firing position very difficult.

(4) On two occasions the rockets were fired and although definite results of the rockets were not observed. It is believed that this rocket should be most effective against the heavy emplacements used by the enemy.

13. INFANTRY:

a. Organization: This RCT adhered to the Tables of Organization for an Infantry Regiment with the following two exceptions.

(1) Assault Platoon: Each BLT organized one assault platoon consisting of 38 men and 1 officer. This platoon was extremely effective throughout the operation. Whenever a rifle company requested flame throwers or demolitions or both, the assault platoon immediately sent the appropriate number of men with the necessary equipment to the company. Their work completed with the company, they could return to battalion, service their equipment and prepare new demolition charges. Since there were so many caves to be sealed on IWO the assault platoon was employed frequently and very successfully. The following Table of Organization was established for this platoon:

	Squad	Platoon
1 Commissioned		
2 Lieutenant (Plat Ldr)		1
3 TOTAL COMMISSIONED		1
4 Platoon Sergeant (c)		1
5 Sergeant	1	4
6 Squad Leader (c)	(1)	(3)
7 Service & Supply (c)		(1)
8 Corporal	1	3
9 Asst Squad Leader (c)	(1)	(3)
10 PFCs and Privates	2	30
11 Demolitions (p)	(3)	(3)
12 Flame Thrower Man (p)	(2)	(3)
13 Asst Flame Thrower (p)	(2)	(3)
14 Wire Team (p)	(2)	(3)
15 Service and Supply (c)		(3)
TOTAL ENLISTED	11	38

(c) - Armed with Carbine (p) Armed with Rifle

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(2) Scout Platoon: This platoon was used initially as security for the RCT CP. Early in the operation when BLT 3/24 suffered heavy casualties the scout platoon was attached to the BLT to supplement their reserves. The platoon remained so attached for two days and then the platoon returned to parent control it consisted of eleven men out of the original 30 men and 1 officer. These eleven men were used in the perimeter defense of the CP until towards the end of the operation when they were used to form a composite platoon. The following Table of Organization was established for the scout platoon:

	Hdq	Group	Squad	Total Plat.
1. Lieutenant	1			1
2. Plat. Comdr (c)	(1)			
3. TOTAL COMMISSIONED	1			1
4. Platoon Sergeant	1			1
5. Asst Pl Ldr (c)	(1)			
6. Sergeants	1		1	3
7. Guide (c)	(1)			
8. Squad Ldr			(1)	
9. Corporals		1	2	4
10. Group Ldr		(1)	(2)	
11. PFCs or Privates	6	4	8	22
12. Rifleman, Automatic		(1)	(2)	
13. Rifleman, automatic, Asst		(1)	(2)	
14. Riflemen	(4)	(1)	(2)	
15. Sniper (03)		(1)	(2)	
16. Communicator's (p)	(2)			
NAVY				
17. Corsmen	1			1
18. Corsman (c)	(1)			
TOTAL ENLISTED				31
TOTAL PERSONNEL				32

NOTE: c - Carbine 03 - M1903 Rifle (w/scope)  
p - M1916 Automatic

b. Composite Platoons:

(1) When the casualties became so high that front line BLTs often had an inadequate number of men in reserve, the RCT Commanding Officer organized two composite platoons consisting of the remainder of the scout and sniper platoon, and personnel that could be spared from H&S Company and Regimental Weapons Company.

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Annex Charlie, Cont'd.

(2) These platoons consisted of about 30 men each and although they were never tactically trained they were used to advantage by the BLTs to which they were attached. They were used to fill gaps in the front line night defensive positions, and as a holding unit when such was needed. Although they could not be expected to maneuver in the attack, they did perform a valuable service in the above capacity.

c. Weapons;

(1) The small arms normally carried by the infantry (M-1, carbine, BAR, etc) are not discussed in the following paragraphs as their use was no different on this operation than on any other.

(2) Bazooka: Since very few tanks were encountered by the RCT, the bazooka was not used as an anti-tank weapon. It was, however, put to good use firing into caves. In most cases where a cave was holding up a unit, the terrain did not allow the use of vehicle drawn weapons and limited the infantry to using demolitions, flame thrower, small arms and bazookas. Because small arms are ineffective against a cave, and as flame thrower and demolitions can only be used at a very close range, the bazooka was the only weapon which could fire a potent shell into the cave. The A.T. rocket proved effective in this capacity as did the W.P. rocket.

(3) Flame Thrower: The flame thrower proved to be an effective weapon against caves, however its short range limited its use. It is not necessary to have a flame thrower with the rifle company at all times. A rifle company is more efficient without the burden of refueling and maintaining the flame throwers. Also the flame thrower is too heavy to be carried every place that the rifle company goes. For these reasons the assault platoon under battalion control proved extremely effective. Companies called for the flame throwers when they were needed and after a mission was completed the flame thrower and operator returned to battalion.

(4) Demolitions:

(a) The 16 pound satchel charge of C2 was used to great advantage on IWO JIMA.

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Annex Charlie, Cont'd.

sealing of caves. The composition of the rock and ground was such that a well placed charge of CG was capable of sliding enough dirt and stone to close most small cave entrances encountered.

(b) Shaped charges were rarely used.

(c) TNT was used only as a booster for CG patchel charges.

(d) Bangalore torpedoes were not used.

(5) Hand Grenades:

(a) Fragmentation: With the enemy very often but "a stones throw" from the front lines it is obvious that the hand grenade was extremely useful. The grenade was also used to great advantage at night when it was necessary to combat vague targets. All companies desired extra grenades which were issued to the men for the night defense. Every morning the extra grenades were turned in to the company dumps. It should also be said that the fragmentation grenade was far superior to any grenade used by the Japanese.

(b) White Phosphorous: This grenade was effective against small caves and hasty defensive positions. It was mostly used with white smoke as a screening agency for withdrawing troops and casualties under enemy fire.

(c) Incendiary: Since practically everything on IWO was underground there were few instances when the incendiary grenade could be used effectively. There were occasions when it could be used to burn out a small cave but on the whole the absence of inflammable material limited the use of this grenade.

(d) Illumination: This grenade was extremely useful and was excellent in the front lines at night. It was the first time the men were able to provide their own illumination where and when they wanted it to clarify suspicious shadows or movements to their front. It can also be hooked up as a trip flare.

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(6) Trip Flares:

(a) M-48: All units used this flare to good advantage. Front line companies very often ran trip flares the entire width of their front with excellent results in that the troops were duly warned of anyone approaching their position by the flare being tripped. This flare was sometimes used as an illuminating hand grenade.

(b) M-49: Although much more elaborate than the M-48 flare, this flare was less effective. The parachute is shot so high that very often the spot at which the flare was tripped is not illuminated. Undoubtedly in open terrain where observation is more satisfactory this flare would be the better of the two.

(7) 60mm Mortar: This weapon proved to be the most effective close support weapon in the regiment. Its accuracy allowed units to fire as close as 30 yards from the front lines in cases of emergency.

(a) Illumination Shell: Where the illuminating grenade provided illumination for the individual, the 60mm illumination shell was used successfully to illuminate for the company. Some companies fire this shell at intervals throughout the night and some fire only when enemy activity to the front is suspected. The available supply of this shell was inadequate, however the naval gunfire star shell and the other means of illumination discussed previously helped provide successful illumination at the front.

(8) 81mm Mortar: Because of the shortage of 81mm ammunition this mortar did not attain its maximum efficiency. At times mortar platoons were able to supplement their supply of ammunition with captured Japanese 81mm ammunition. Although many mortar men felt that the 81mm mortar was not large enough to materially damage or destroy the enemy positions, it was used effectively to fill the gap between the 60mm mortar and the artillery. Since the exact location of the front lines was sometimes not certain, units which attempted to fire without observation fired dangerously close to adjacent front lines.

(9) 37mm Gun: The type of terrain encountered was not

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suitable for extensive use of this gun. Since this weapon requires long fields of fire and fairly good routes to a firing position, in most cases neither was available so the gun could not be used. On occasions the 57mm gun could be brought to bear on a cave and cannister was fired. Its most advantageous use was in the night defensive line, when it was possible to move the gun up by hand to cover likely enemy routes of approach.

(10) 75mm Half-track: The 75mm gun on the half-track was used on several occasions to fire into caves. On the whole, the terrain did not permit movement to the front, of the 75mm half-track, until late in the operation.

14. ENEMY TACTICS:

a. Anti-Tank Measures:

(1) Anti-tank ditches on IWO JIMA were so disturbed by the pre-invasion bombings that they became ineffective as a tank obstacle.

(2) The enemy laid an anti-tank mine field the entire length of the landing beaches about 150 yards inland from the waterline. Many tanks were lost as a result of these mines. Almost all roads were mined. In most cases where the enemy used barbed wire as an obstacle, the mines were laid in conjunction with the barbed wire. Roads became the only safe routes for vehicles because engineers were able to clear the roads of mines.

b. New Defensive Measures:

(1) Use of Smoke: On several occasions the enemy laid smoke in areas forward of our lines. It is believed that this was done in order to screen displacement of weapons and personnel to the rear.

(2) Uniforms: It was reported by several units that some enemy personnel were dressed in complete U. S. Marine uniforms. Numerous enemy dead were found wearing our camouflaged helmets. They were also found using our weapons which they undoubtedly recovered from our dead.

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(3) High Angle Weapons: Mortars of all sizes were much more effectively used by the enemy than in the past. Several high trajectory weapons used with deadly effect have been identified as rockets of various sizes, characteristics of which have not been studied as yet by this unit.

(4) Colored Shells: Certain of the enemy high angle weapons fired a shell that gave off a green smoke. It is believed that in several instances this shell was used for registering fires, in many cases they were fired as a barrage.

(5) Defensive Tactics:

(a) In general it can be stated that the enemy tactics differed from that encountered in the past in that the defense of the island was more cleverly planned. The exceptionally large number of caves and the very rugged and almost impassable terrain lent itself to the very determined resistance of the enemy.

(b) Counterattacks on a large scale were never encountered. Infiltrations were attempted very infrequently. On the night of D-17 all front line units received localized and small scale counterattacks. The following day the enemy resistance appeared broken, scattered and disorganized. For that reason it is believed that on the night of D-17 all enemy units had orders to counterattack from whatever position they held. This is further substantiated by the fact that at several points enemy officers were found dead but completely attired in dress uniform with sabers drawn, obviously killed in a futile banzai charge.

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ANNEX DOG.

SECTION I.

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION.

1. LOADING.

a. Planning Phase:

(1) Accurate loading plans were prepared and completed forty-eight hours prior to the time loading commenced. Some changes in vehicle priorities were necessary after the loading was completed due to changes in boat assignment tables by the 3-Section. The boat assignment tables determine the sequence of unloading of high priority vehicles.

RECOMMENDATION: That the 3-Section submit to the 4-Section, prior to the time that loading plans are drawn up, tentative boat assignment tables with debarkation stations to include all vehicles to be embarked with the assault and call waves.

b. Loading Phase:

(1) The loading of equipment and supplies was completed without difficulty within the time allotted. Ship's characteristics for the AK assigned this combat team were entirely inaccurate. It was necessary to make a complete set of new plans after the AK docked.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That Combat Team TQM's be sent to check the characteristics of respective ships they are going to load as soon as the ships come into the area.

2. UNLOADING.

a. Balanced LCVP loads of high priority supplies were assembled off the line of departure subject to call by the Control Officer. Conditions of the surf and beach made it impossible to land small boats during the assault phase. When balanced LCVP loads were landed the small quantities of some priority loads became lost in the general confusion during the early stages. Pre-loading of certain supplies on LST's on this operation such as "ten-in-one" rations caused LVT's to be tied up unloading supplies which could not be used on the beach but, when landed, had to be unloaded. Some Troop TQM's were forced by the ships' Captains to commence general unloading or to unload cargo which was not being called for in the early stages. The Troop TQM of the USS Hendry was forced to commence general unloading on D-Day with the result that all the USS Hendry's boats were tied up with cargo which could not be unloaded on the beaches until from forty-eight to seventy-two hours after.

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2. UNLOADING. (Cont'd).

Due to conditions of the surf and beach and unbalanced pre-loads on the LST'S, the supply situation on Blue beaches was very critical for the first few days.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) That on future operations, a definite understanding be reached between the Navy and those directing the unloading of Marine Corps supplies so that there will be no interference with the unloading plans and directives set forth until such time as general unloading commences.
- (2) That the officer representing the combat team on the control boat have two enlisted personnel as assistants to help him keep necessary records of unloading.
- (3) That the combat team be given the opportunity to make recommendations for pre-loaded supplies for their respective LST's.
- (4) That the mixed priority loads be loaded only on LVT's so that they can be sent directly to the assault troops.
- (5) That priority LCVP's be loaded with only one priority item or type of supply.

3. COMBAT SUPPLY.

a. Assault Phase:

(1) In the early stages of the operation the Shore Party Commander was swamped with requests for supplies from small units. It was impossible for the Shore Party Commander to handle all these requests.

RECOMMENDATION: That a representative of the Combat Team Quartermaster go ashore with the Shore Party Commander for the beach over which the combat team will operate and work in direct liaison with the Shore Party Commander. The combat team Quartermaster working directly with the Shore Party Commander can consolidate all requests and take over the issuing of all supplies from initial Shore Party Dumps. It will be necessary for the combat team Quartermaster to have at least four Quartermaster personnel checking supplies on the beach in direct communication with himself by means of SCR 536 radio. In addition the combat team Quartermaster should have direct communication with his representative on the control boat by means of SCR 300 or SCR 610 radio.

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b. Supply Inland:

(1) The Regimental Dump was established and functioning on D plus 4 Day. From that time on inland supply functioned smoothly. The levels of supply on Blue beaches were never adequate to support the Combat Team. It was necessary to employ LVT's to go to Yellow beaches for supplies. Due to the poor condition of the roads initially, it was necessary to employ LVT's to supply the units of this combat team until D plus 10 Day. Because of poor road conditions, much hand carrying was necessary to get supplies to front line troops in the early stages of the operation. By D plus 10 Day, roads became improved and the Division Quartermaster was delivering supplies to the Combat Team. From that time forward, inland supply functioned very smoothly.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Engineers attached to the Combat Team be supplied with at least two armored bulldozers to improve routes of supply during the early stages of an operation.

4. ADEQUACY OF SUPPLY.

a. There was an adequacy of all mounting out supplies with the following exceptions:

(1) Sandbags.

RECOMMENDATION: That on all future operations with similar soil conditions, the allowance of sandbags be doubled.

(2) Ammunition.

(a) There was a shortage of most types of high explosive ammunition and pyrotechnics. (Specific recommendations under ammunition).

5. TRANSPORTATION.

a. For the first time adequate transportation was embarked with the exception of Ambulances, 1/4-ton, 4x4. The present TO allowance of Ambulances, 1/4-ton, 4x4, for the Infantry Regiment is insufficient to properly handle casualties. The cargo carrier, M29C, proved invaluable due to the type of terrain encountered. The above vehicle is invaluable during the early stages of an operation when road conditions are poor. It can be used to great advantage to supplement organic jeep and trailer transportation but cannot replace it due to increased maintenance difficulties. The special allowance of trailers, 1/4-ton, 2 wheel, issued prior to embarkation made enough trailers available.

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RECOMMENDATION: That the following TO allowances for cargo carriers, M29C; trailers, 1/4-ton, 2 wheel, cargo; and Ambulances, 1/4-ton, 4x4, be established for the Infantry Regiment:

(a) Cargo Carrier, M29C.

3 per Regimental Weapons Company.  
2 per Regimental Service Platoon.  
1 per Regimental Communication Platoon.  
1 per Battalion Supply Section.  
Total: 9 per Infantry Regiment.

(b) Trailer, 1/4-ton, 2 wheel.

1 per truck, 1/4-ton, 4x4, cargo.  
Total: 36 per Infantry Regiment.

(c) Ambulance, 1/4-ton, 4x4.

2 per Infantry Battalion.  
4 per H&S Company, Infantry Regiment.  
Total: 10 per Infantry Regiment.

6. GENERAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Supply Communication:

(1) Heavy traffic on available networks made it impossible to get messages for priority supplies urgently needed on the beach through to individual ships. In some instances two or three hours were required for such messages.

(2) During the inland phase of supply, there was little need to use radio communication because of the short lines of communication throughout the operation, but it was readily apparent that on any future operation of a more extended nature, it will be imperative that a supply network be set up within the Division. It is very difficult to use a tactical net for supply communication.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That during the unloading phase, a logistical net be set up within the combat team using SCR 300 or SCR 610 radios to include the combat team Quartermaster on the beach, his representative on the control boat and the TQM's on each ship.

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Annex Dog. (Cont'd).

(2) That a supply network with its own frequency be set up within the Division.

b. Water.

(1) There was a sufficient supply of water in expeditionary cans, but much of the water was undrinkable due to the lining of the present expeditionary can used by the Marine Corps.

RECOMMENDATION: That either the Army expeditionary can with the large clamp type mouth be employed or some method found to improve the lining of the present can.

c. "B" Rations:

(1) "B" rations cannot be used by a combat team during an operation.

RECOMMENDATION: That only the following components be loaded in assault shipping:

(a) Fruit and fruit juices.

(b) Coffee, milk and sugar.

(c) Necessary components for making bread or doughnuts.

All other components should be block loaded on re-supply ships with a high priority and unloaded only when the situation permits their use.

d. Palletized Cargo:

(1) It is believed that the disadvantages of loading palletized cargo and handling such cargo during the assault phase of an operation outweigh the advantages.

RECOMMENDATION: That only cargo be palletized which is not needed in the early stages of an operation, and that most of the palletized cargo be loaded on the AK's to be landed after the assault phase is over.

e. Organizational Equipment:

(1) It is necessary for the combat team to carry much organizational equipment which, in many cases, cannot be used. Much of this equipment is lost or destroyed through needless handling.

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Annex Dog. (Cont'd).

RECOMMENDATION: That the following organizational equipment be carried by the Division Quartermaster to be block loaded on AK's and landed as the situation permits its use:

- (a) All camp equipment except tarpaulins.
- (b) All mess equipment except food vacuum containers, fire units and G.I. cans.

f. Clothing:

(1) Some Army type field shoes with the high top and two buckles were issued just prior to the operation. This type shoe was excellent in the field.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Marine Corps adopt the above type shoe.

g. Salvage:

(1) Salvage operations were carried on by all echelons beginning D plus 1 Day. Salvage materials moved back through the Regimental Dump to Division agencies. A salvage section from the Second Service and Supply Platoon was utilized to clean up the beaches in the regimental zone of action. The Regimental Service Platoon provided an organized salvage squad that functioned throughout the operation within the Regiment's zone of action. Salvage operations insofar as the Regiment was concerned were highly satisfactory.

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ANNEX DQG.

SECTION II.

ORDNANCE AND AMMUNITION.

1. Supply and re-supply from salvage of all weapons was adequate throughout the operation. Spare parts and accessories carried within the organization were adequate for the repair of ordinary malfunctions. All other repairs were made by the Division Ordnance Company. Due to the terrain encountered, it was possible to employ the 37mm Guns and Halftracks for only four days. The caliber .50 machine guns carried by the Weapons Company were not used at any time during the operation. All other weapons had twenty-six days of battle employment. Below are listed the number, type and caliber of weapons used and the total number of weapons lost.

a. Number, type and caliber used:

(1) Pistol, cal..45, M1911A1	82
(2) Carbine, cal..30, M1	1710
(3) Rifles, cal..30, M1	1361
(4) Rifles, cal..30, M1903, w/telescopic sight	21
(5) B.G, cal..30, M1917A1	54
(6) B.G, cal..30, M1919A4	65
(7) Mortar, 60mm, M2	39
(8) Mortar, 81mm, M1	12
(9) Launchers, Rocket, M1 and M9A1	27
(10) Rifles, Browning, automatic, M1918A2	243
(11) Shotguns, 12 Gauge	100
(12) Gun, 37mm, M3A1	12
(13) B.G, cal..50, M2, (HB)	10
(14) Flame Thrower, portable, M2-2	81

b. Weapons Lost:

(1) Pistol, cal..45, M1911A1	37
(2) Carbine, cal..30, M1	1010
(3) Rifles, cal..30, M1	669
(4) Rifles, cal..30, M1903, w/telescopic sight	14
(5) B.G, cal..30, M1917A1	14
(6) Mortar, 60mm, M2	7
(7) Launchers, Rocket, M1 and M9A1	25
(8) Rifles, Browning, automatic, M1918A2	156
(9) Shotguns, 12 Gauge	56
(10) Gun, 37mm, M3A1	1
(11) Flame Thrower, portable, M2-2	

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Annex Dog. (Cont'd).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- (1) That a heavier mortar be adopted for use by the Infantry Regiment.
- (2) That a luminous aiming stake be provided for night firing for all mortars.
- (3) That the .50 caliber machine guns in the Weapons Company be replaced by .30 caliber light machine guns.
- (4) That the following personnel be armed with the pistol, caliber .45, Model 1911A1:
  - (a) All medical officers and corpsmen.
  - (b) All flame thrower men.
  - (c) All bazooka men.
  - (d) All SCR 300 radio operators.

2. COMBAT VEHICLES.

a. Number, type and caliber used:

- (1) 75mm Gun, M1897A4, mounted on carriage, M3 - 5
- (2) Combat vehicles lost - 2

3. AMMUNITION.

Ammunition supply presented no difficulty except for the shortages of 81mm Mortar ammunition, 60mm Mortar-Illuminating ammunition and Green Star clusters. Several new types of ammunition were available but the unit had not been able to use any of the new ammunition during the training period. As a result very little of this ammunition was used. All ammunition in the Regimental Dump was stored in revetments. No loss of ammunition from enemy action occurred within the regiment. It was impossible to store ammunition on the beaches in revetments during the early stages and as a result a large quantity of ammunition was destroyed by enemy shelling on Blue Beach 2 on D plus 2 Day. Types and methods of packaging are adequate and suitable with the exception of the new container for the 60mm Mortar shells. This container is not waterproof. Much of the 60mm Mortar ammunition was rusted and corroded. Below is the list of ammunition expended during the operation:

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a. Ammunition Expended:

(1) Cart., carb., cal..30, M1 -	90,000 rds.
(2) Cart., AP, cal..30, 5 rd clips -	194,000 "
(3) Cart., AP, cal..30, 8rd clips -	197,200 "
(4) Cart., AP & T, cal..30, belted, (250rds) -	163,000 "
(5) Cart., ball, cal..45	9,500 "
(6) Shell, HE, M49A2, w/fuze, PD M52, for 60mm Mortar, M2 -	33,944 "
(7) Shell, illum., M83, w/fuze, time, M65, for 60mm Mortar, M2 -	4,314 "
(8) Shell, smoke (WP) T6, w/fuze, PD M52, for 60mm Mortar, M2 -	500 "
(9) Shell, HE, M43A1, w/fuze, PD, M52, for 3in. TM Mk I & 81mm Mortar, M1 -	5,578 "
(10) Shell, HE, M56, w/fuze, PD M53, for 3in. TM, M1 and 81mm Mortar, M1 -	5,217 "
(11) Shell, smoke (WP), M57, w/fuze, PD, M52, for 3in. TM, Mk I and 81mm Mortar, M1 -	650 "
(12) Canister, (fixed) M2, for 37mm Gun, M3, M5 and M6 -	520 "
(13) Shell (fixed) HE, M63, w/fuze, BD, M58, 37mm Gun, M3, M5 and M6 -	440 "
(14) Shot (fixed) APC, M51, w/tracer, for 37mm, M3, M5 and M6 -	320 "
(15) Shell (fixed) HE, M48 (N.C.) w/fuze, PD, M48, for 75mm Gun, M1897, all mod. & M2 & M3. -	100 "
(16) Shell (fixed) HE, M48 (NC) w/fuze, T&S.Q, M54, for 75mm Gun, M1897, all mod, M2 & M3 -	76 "
(17) Shot (fixed) APC, M61, w/fuze, B.D. M66A1, for 75mm Gun, M1897, all mod, M2 & M3 -	140 "
(18) Shell, smoke (WP) Mk II (unfuzed) for 75mm Gun, M1897 all mods, M2 & M3 -	147 "
(19) Grenades, hand, frag, Mk IIA1, w/fuze, igniting, M10A2 -	18,830 "
(20) Grenades, Hand, smoke (WP), M15, w/fuze, M6A1 -	2,275 "
(21) Grenades, hand, Inc., (Thermite), M14 -	525 "
(22) Grenades, hand, Inc., Frangible -	393 "
(23) Grenade, Projection, Adapter, M1 -	318 "
(24) Grenade, Hand, Illuminating, Mk I -	2,775 "
(25) Grenade, Rifle, AT, M9A1 -	150 "
(26) Rocket, HE, 2.36", M6 -	1,410 "
(27) Rocket, (WP) 2.36" -	276 "
(28) Flare, Trip, Parachute, M48 -	4 "

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Annex Dg. (Cont'd)

(29) Flare, Trip, M49 -	1,330	"
(30) Torpedoe, Bangalore, M1 -	30	"
(31) Explosive, shaped charge, 35 $\frac{1}{2}$ ", T3 -	23	"
(32) Caps, blasting, non-elec. -	1,020	
(33) Cord, Detonating, spools (100 ft) -	112	
(34) Fuse, time, spools (100 ft) -	12	
(35) Explosive, C-2, in satchels, 2/bx -	363	bx.
(36) Explosive, TNT, 1/2 $\frac{1}{2}$ Blks, 50 $\frac{1}{2}$ /bx -	45	bx.
(37) Lighters, fuze -	750	
(38) Explosive, Demolition Chain of 8 blocks, M1, w/carrying case -	34	bx.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That 60mm Mortar shells be packed in fibre containers within the metal container and that the lid be made waterproof.

(2) The following changes in the U/F are recommended:

<u>Weapons:</u>	<u>AP</u>	<u>HE</u>	<u>Tracer</u>	<u>Other Types</u>	<u>Total:</u>
Carbine cal..30				30-Ball	30
Rifle cal..30	64				64
BAR cal..30	260				260
Automatic or Re- volver cal..45				21-Ball	21
MG 50 cal.HB or AA (WC)	120		60	120-Inc.	300
37mm AT or Tk	20	60		20-Canister	100
60mm Mortar		90		30-Illuminating 10-W.P.	130
81mm Mortar		140Light 40Heavy		20-W.P.	200
75mm Gun, S.P. Tk or AmTrac.	30	60Super		10-W.P.	100

Changes in the U/F for Miscellaneous Munitions:

- (a) Grenades, Hand: One per individual.
- (b) Signals, Ground: Recommended that three times the amount of the following ground signals be carried on future operations as were carried on the past one:
  - (A) The Ground Signal (Green Star Cluster) used to denote friendly artillery falling short.
  - (B) The Ground Signal (Yellow Smoke) used as front line markers.

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Annex Dog. (Cont'd).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(2) (Cont'd).

(c) Grenades, Illuminating: The amount carried on future operations should be three times that carried on the past operation.

4. ENEMY MATERIEL.

a. Two (2) Japanese 81mm Mortars were captured and used by this organization. A total of sixty-seven (67) rounds of Japanese 81mm Mortar ammunition was fired. Some rounds were fired in our 81mm barrels, and some in Japanese barrels on our bipods and baseplates. The ammunition was fired with all increments at a range of approximately 2400 yards. Hits were not observed. Four mis-fires due to faulty primers occurred. Primers were well dented by the firing pin. Our barrels were not scarred or damaged by the ammunition.

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ANNEX DOG.

SECTION III.

MEDICAL REPORT.

1. PREPARATORY PHASE.

a. General: This phase covered the period from the end of rehabilitation until loading for this operation was completed.

b. Medical Training: Training in all its phases was seriously hampered by the late arrival of replacement corpsmen and medical officers. Training in professional subjects was carried on continuously and followed battalion and regimental schedules. Didactic instructions, demonstrations and examinations were employed in all subjects. The objective of this training was the acquisition of a high degree of professional skill by all hands. Emphasis was placed on the use of field expedients in all phases of instruction.

c. Unit Training: By simulating casualties, problems in treatment and evacuation were worked out during maneuvers with all echelons. The Collecting Section of the CT Medical Company worked in the field with the battalions of the regiment, thus becoming familiar with the problems encountered in combat, as well as learning to know the personnel with whom they were to work.

2. PRE-COMBAT PHASE.

a. General: This phase consisted of the period between the completion of loading out and D-Day. During this phase the Medical Sections of the regiment participated in all ship-to-shore maneuvers.

b. Training Aboard Ship: Training of all hands was continued aboard ship. Lectures and general briefing were conducted daily after leaving the Hawaiian Area.

c. Care of Embarked Troops: Sick call for Marines embarked was held twice daily by the Medical Department personnel of the Landing Force. Daily sanitary inspections of troop living and messing facilities were made. In general, the troop compartments and rations were far superior to those of other operations. Sickness aboard was minimal.

d. Regimental Dental Officer: Prior to the departure from the Hawaiian Area, the Regimental Dental Officer was evacuated to a Naval Hospital with atypical pneumonia. An officer replacement was obtained from the Division Rear Echelon.

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Annex Dg. (Cont'd).

3. COMBAT PHASE.

a. General:

- (1) This period consisted of the time between D-Day and the final securing of the target area.
- (2) All Medical Sections of the regiment landed on D-Day, with the exception of the Regimental Medical Property man, who remained aboard ship until all Medical Department gear had reached the beach. Company Aid-men landed with their platoons; battalion Aid-Station personnel and Collecting Section personnel landed with Battalion CP's, and the H&S Medical Section landed with the Regimental CP. Medical personnel and property were distributed throughout their respective waves in the interests of the principle of dispersion.
- (3) Throughout the operation, Aid Stations operated in the general vicinity of their respective CP's, thus taking advantage of the CP security measures.
- (4) Whenever necessary and practicable, covering fires and smoke were provided Company Aid-men and litter-bearers. Cooperation by line elements in this regard was far superior to that received on previous operations. The importance of this protective measure cannot be too strongly emphasized and constant training should be standard procedure for all Medical Department personnel attached to infantry units.

b. Evacuation:

- (1) On the whole, this operation may be considered exceptional from the point of view of the speed and efficiency of evacuation of wounded. After D-Day, with its attendant confusion on the beaches, casualties were dispatched from the front and reached definitive care in an incredibly short time.
- (2) Early, all casualties were transported by litter carrier only. Due to the relatively long carries involved, and the nature of the terrain, litter bearers became physically exhausted in short order and frequent reinforcements and replacements were required. Casualties were high among the litter squads. The Second Band Section was employed by battalions as litter bearers, but all elements of the regiment cooperated wholeheartedly in furnishing temporary reliefs. On about D plus 6 Day forty men from the 24th Replacement Draft were assigned for duty as litter bearers only.

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Annex Dog. (Cont'd).

(3) Later, as vehicles became available and the beachhead was enlarged, casualties were evacuated from Battalion Aid-Stations to the beaches, and finally to Division Hospital by jeep ambulance. Through the wholehearted cooperation of "B" Medical Company, it was possible to maintain three jeep ambulances at each Battalion Aid-Station. One ambulance was kept at Regimental Aid-Station. This vehicle was invaluable as a "free" ambulance which could be sent where needed in a very short time. The senior driver made periodic inspections of all vehicles, thus insuring proper maintenance. He superintended the necessary repair work. The "free" ambulance was used as a substitute for the vehicle undergoing repairs.

(4) A serious disruption of an otherwise smooth evacuation system occurred three days before this CT left the line for the embarkation point. The Division Hospital was closed and all Medical Battalion vehicles were withdrawn to be re-embarked. This necessitated evacuation of all casualties on the five organic ambulances from the front to the Corps Hospital. The condition of the roads, traffic congestion and other factors, made this a forty-five minute trip from a Battalion Aid-Station to the Hospital. As a result, the available transportation spent the greater part of the time on the road. Casualties piled up. Some relief was afforded by the arrival of two VAC ambulances late in the morning. Due to the increased evacuation distance and withdrawal of Medical Company jeeps, adequate provision for transportation should have been made. In view of the fact that the regiment was still in the line and sustaining casualties, such a move constituted a serious hazard to the proper functioning of the Medical Department.

c. Supply:

(1) Initially, supplies were carried ashore by corpsmen and litter bearers. Items for early re-supply were carried ashore in seabags by the Regimental Aid-Station personnel.

(2) At all stages of the operation, needed supplies and equipment were procurable at the beach from the Shore Party Evacuation Station and "B" Medical Company. Re-supply was adequate and prompt. Regimental Aid-Station re-supplied battalions with items unobtainable elsewhere, and acted as distribution point after the establishment of Division Medical dump ashore. The need for a larger supply of small battle dressings was demonstrated.

(3) Later, as vehicles became available and the beachhead was enlarged, casualties were evacuated from Battalion Aid-Stations to the beaches, and finally to Division Hospital by jeep ambulance. Through the wholehearted cooperation of "B" Medical Company, it was possible to maintain three jeep ambulances at each Battalion Aid-Station. One ambulance was kept at Regimental Aid-Station. This vehicle was invaluable as a "free" ambulance which could be sent where needed in a very short time. The senior driver made periodic inspections of all vehicles, thus insuring proper maintenance. He superintended the necessary repair work. The "free" ambulance was used as a substitute for the vehicle undergoing repairs.

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d. Personnel:

(1) Training of all hands was adequate to the needs of the operation. However, it is felt that a larger percentage of corpsmen should be trained to act as Company Aid-men in order to afford proper relief to men on the line. Regimental and Division pools of men so trained would be invaluable. These pools would help to prevent many evacuations for combat fatigue by means of a system of periodic replacements for the men under fire.

(2) The assignment of Marines for duty as litter bearers is most urgently recommended. The tactical and psychological training they receive enables them to operate more efficiently at this duty than Hospital corpsmen. A minimum of twenty men per battalion is recommended.

(3) The morale and efficiency of all Medical Department personnel was good.

(4) The Regimental Dental Officer was assigned additional duty as Regimental Burial Officer. In this capacity, he correlated the work of the battalion and the division sections. Location, tagging and collection of bodies was begun on D plus 1 Day. Due to the tactical situation, removal of our dead to the Division Cemetery was not begun until D plus 4 Day. By D plus 7 Day the area held by this regiment was maintained throughout the remainder of the operation. Due to shortage of transportation and the nature of the terrain, enemy dead were temporarily interred in the locality where found. Their graves were marked so that later removal for burial in a permanent cemetery could be effected.

The Regimental Dental Officer gave the following treatments:

- (a) Total number of patients requiring immediate treatment: twenty-six (26).
- (b) Temporary sedative fillings placed: twenty-three (23).
- (c) Extractions (under local anaesthesia): three (3).
- (d) No post operative treatments were necessary.
- (e) There was no marked incidence of gum conditions; gingivitis or Vincent's Angina.
- (f) Equipment taken ashore was adequate to cope with the emergency situations encountered during the operation.

e. Equipment:

(1) Medical equipment was found to be adequate.



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Annex Dog. (Cont'd).

(2) The addition of a trailer, 1/4-ton, for each battalion, would greatly aid in the movement of supplies and increase the mobility of the Aid-Station.

(3) The addition of five jeep ambulances to the present Tables of Organization would permit faster and more efficient evacuation of casualties.

4. MISCELLANEOUS:

a. General Condition of Troops:

(1) In spite of the long period of time spent aboard ship prior to landing, the troops were in good physical condition. Special attention to physical exercise aboard ship proved to be more than worthwhile.

(2) Health of the command has been excellent. Only a minimum of sickness, mainly mild upper respiratory infections, was encountered while en route to and on the target.

(3) No epidemics were encountered.

b. Rations:

(1) Throughout the entire operation, rations were plentifully supplied. The early use of "10-in-1" and the new type "C" rations provided a welcome change from the usual monotony of field rations.

c. Water:

(1) The supply of water was at all times adequate.

(2) Many of the five gallon expeditionary cans had not been properly cleaned before filling for this operation. As a result, much foul smelling, unpotable water was encountered initially. As soon as facilities for distillation of sea water became available, this condition was alleviated. Water brought ashore in fifteen gallon drums was almost universally good.

d. Sanitation:

(1) During the early phases of the operation, sanitation was at best haphazard, due to the frequent and heavy enemy bombardments. However, as the tactical situation improved, more care could be devoted to the establishment and policing of heads, di-  
refuse, etc. DDT spray was invaluable

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Annex Dog. (Cont'd).

d. Sanitation: (Cont'd).

was used locally at all CP's as well as being sprayed from planes. Individual rations were used throughout the operation by this regiment. Three small galleys were in operation by elements of the regiment during the last few days. They were carefully supervised and were found to be in good sanitary condition at all times.

(2) In summary, it may be said that field sanitation presented no serious problems during the operation.

d. Local Diseases:

(1) No local diseases of importance were encountered.

(2) POW's stated that Paratyphoid Fever had been endemic on Iwo Jima. No cases were discovered in troops of this regiment.

f. Location of Missing Personnel:

In this regiment a Chief Pharmacist's Mate was assigned the mission of locating personnel listed as missing, or missing in action. As additional duty, he assisted the Graves Registration Section. Prior to leaving base camp, this CPO received special instructions in the mechanics of the field record systems. By receiving all information concerning missing personnel immediately, this CPO was able to locate them before they were officially listed as missing or missing in action. Fifty-one (51) personnel were located by this agency alone after they had been declared to be in a missing status by lower echelon. The adequacy of this system is attested to by a comparison of the figures on missing in this regiment and any other regiment engaged in this operation. The success of the procedure was largely due to the following factors: (1) institution of an immediate search for the missing; (2) using a properly trained individual for this work; (3) making the location of missing personnel the chief duty of a specially trained individual.

g. Treatment of Chest Wounds:

After a series of tests made at base camp, this regiment adopted a simple and effective method of sealing off chest wounds, especially those of the "sucking" type.

Liquid rubber cement, such as is used in shoe repair trailers and issued by Marine Quartermaster departments was used as the adhesive agent. The cement is applied to the chest wall and the

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Annex Dog. (Cont'd).

g. Treatment of Chest Wounds: (Cont'd).

covered with rubber tissue, obtained by cutting rubber condoms to the required size. This combination provided a simple, easy to apply, and airtight dressing. The application of a gauze dressing immediately over the wound interfered in no way with the airtight dressing. The cement dries very quickly and will adhere to a greasy moist skin surface.

Reports from the Division Hospital indicate that chest casualties treated in this manner arrived at the hospital in better condition than those treated with a battle dressing or adhesive tape seal.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

The following recommendations are made by the Medical Department of this regiment as a result of experience gained on this and on previous operations:

- a. That Marine Corps personnel be assigned for duty as litter bearers. A minimum of twenty (20) men per battalion is recommended.
- b. That continued efforts be made to provide potable water during the early phases of an operation.
- c. That a larger percentage of corpsmen be trained for duty as Company Aid-men, thus allowing greater freedom in providing for replacements.
- d. That each regiment be provided with a pool of corpsmen trained in Company Aid and Battalion Aid-Station work; thus enabling the Regimental Surgeon to institute proper relief for men at the front, and in consequence of such reliefs, reduce the number of casualties due to fatigue, both mental and physical.
- e. That the number of jeep ambulances allotted to each regiment be increased to ten (10) with a trailer, 1/4-ton, provided for at least five (5) of the ambulances.
- f. That a lighter litter be provided for the medical activities attached to Marine units.
- g. That at least four (4) properly trained men be assigned by each regiment for the purpose of locating the missing and missing in action. Additional duty for these men should be correlated by the R-1.

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Annex Dog. (Cont'd).

## 7. STATISTICS.

a. Table Number 1: Recapitulation of Hospital Corps Strength Reports with casualties:\*

<u>Unit:</u>	<u>W&amp;E</u>	<u>KIA:</u>	<u>S&amp;E:</u>	<u>OB:</u>	<u>Total:</u>
H&S Co.	3	0	3	10	16
1st Bn.	11	5	1	21	38
2nd Bn.	12	5	8	15	40
3rd Bn.	<u>12</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>39</u>
Totals:	38	12	18	65	133

Personnel attached to organic units:

<u>Organic Unit:</u>	<u>Parent Organ:</u>	<u>W&amp;E:</u>	<u>KIA:</u>	<u>S&amp;E:</u>	<u>OB:</u>	<u>Total:</u>
1st Bn.	B Med Co.	2	1	2	5	10
	4th Tank Bn.	0	1	0	2	3
2nd Bn.	B Med Co.	6	1	2	4	13
	E Med Co.	4	0	4	1	9
	4th Tank Bn.	0	0	0	1	1
3rd Bn.	A Med Co.	1	0	0	4	5
	B Med Co.	6	1	2	6	15
	E Med Co.	<u>5</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>11</u>
	Total:	24	6	12	25	67
	Grand Totals:	62	18	30	90	200

\*All figures are cumulative, i.e., include replacements.

b. Table Number 2: Casualties treated, by types, not including KIA (these figures include personnel of other units treated in 24th Aid-Station):

<u>Unit:</u>	<u>GSW</u>	<u>W.Frag.</u>	<u>Blast</u>	<u>W.Mult.</u>	<u>ComFat.</u>	<u>Neuros</u>	<u>Misc.</u>	<u>Total:</u>
H&S Co.	3	35	6	0	7	6	29	86
1st Bn.	160	184	69	37	59	0	102	641
2nd Bn.	112	268	42	27	87	1	97	634
3rd Bn.	<u>204</u>	<u>226</u>	<u>28</u>	<u>172</u>	<u>113</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>320</u>	<u>1072</u>
Totals:	479	713	125	266	266	10	549	2433

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Annex Dog. (Cont'd).

c. Table Number 3: Wounds treated by anatomical location:

<u>Unit:</u>	<u>Legs:</u>	<u>Arms:</u>	<u>Torso:</u>	<u>Head:</u>
H&S Co.	11	7	11	5
1st Bn.	148	45	159	74
2nd Bn.	116	96	101	45
3rd Bn.	<u>84</u>	<u>109</u>	<u>142</u>	<u>59</u>
Totals:	359	257	413	133

d. Table Number 4: Recapitulation of disposition of casualties of the regiment, by class:

<u>Disposition:</u>	<u>H&amp;S</u>	<u>R/W</u>	<u>1stBn</u>	<u>2ndBn</u>	<u>3rdBn</u>	<u>Total:</u>
Wounded, not evac.	7	12	45	50	20	134
Wounded, evac.	35	38	479	486	520	1558
Sick, evac.	8	9	30	147	139	333

Returned to duty:	From W&E:	158
	From SK&E:	68
	From MIA:	<u>3</u>
	Total:	229

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ANNEX EASY

SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

1. NARRATIVE AND DISCUSSION:

a. TRAINING:

(1) After the arrival of the regiment at the base camp from SAIPAN and TINIAN and before the beginning of the regimental training program, a master training schedule was drawn up by the Regimental Communication Officer for all communication platoons in the regiment. This schedule was prepared with the cooperation and recommendations of the R-3 and the Battalion Communication Officers. It was further coordinated from week to week to fit the battalion training schedules and covered a period of twelve weeks. Thus each communication platoon conducted the same training under the direct supervision of the Battalion Communication Officer and under general supervision of the Regimental Communication Officer. Examinations, prepared by the Regimental Communication Officer, were given in all subjects at weekly intervals to each platoon, and a similar efficiency level was maintained by each unit. During the advanced training period and when applicable all platoons trained together. The master training schedule covered basic infantry subjects and all communication subjects both technical and practicable. Radio, wire, and message center sections trained separately during the basic communication phase.

(2) In summary the Regimental Communication Officer told all platoons what, when, and how concerning the training; he supervised the training and examined all platoons; the Assistant Regimental Communication Officer and the Battalion Communication Officers conducted the training. Competition was introduced among platoons, interest and spirit were built up, and all platoons found themselves cooperating with each other during the latter stages to better the entire regimental communications.

b. PLANNING:

(1) Communication plans were received from higher echelons in sufficient time to permit study, criticism, and make necessary changes. These included the Division SOP, SOI, and higher echelon communication annexes to operations orders. The Fourth Marine Division SOI was

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very thorough and covered all that was necessary in higher communication plans. It was kept up to date by changes being added from time to time. This precluded the necessity for long, bulky communication annexes to division and regimental operations orders. The SOI in itself was entirely adequate.

Communication personnel were thoroughly trained in the communication plan several weeks prior to embarkation.

(2) There were no shortages of major items of signal equipment and it was suitable as to design and quantity for the particular task to be performed with one possible exception. It is believed that a smaller and lighter switchboard could be designed for an infantry battalion. The present switchboard, BD-71, is unsuitable in its characteristic's for an amphibious operation.

All radios were calibrated and tested prior to embarkation. Crystals were issued by higher echelon where necessary for this purpose. This was the first time this unit had been issued such crystals and they greatly facilitated the operators to get on frequency.

Sufficient waterproof bags were available for all portable radios, switchboards, telephones, and batteries. Extra supplies and equipment were placed in chests, BC-5, and waterproofed. In addition to the waterproof bags, the telephone equipment was carried in Carts, MM-1, and these in turn were waterproofed. No equipment was lost or damaged as a result of water or spray.

c. EMBARKATION:

- (1) On the day prior to embarkation of troops on their designated ships, Marine unit communication officers contacted the communication officers of their respective ships in order to plan for the establishment of troop message centers and to become acquainted with ships' communication officers. During the same visit they conferred with ships' TQMs in regard to adequate and protected stowage for all radios and other communication gear which had to be available throughout the voyage for rehearsal use, testing, and necessary repairs. Arrangements were made to set up some troop radios on deck, for use during scheduled practice landings.

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In order to free BLT communication personnel of last minute responsibilities at the base camp, battalion switch-board and telephone facilities were discontinued on the afternoon before embarkation. At the same time, the regimental board was cut down to a minimum number of phones with one phone in each battalion office.

Accordingly, the battalion communication platoons and the bulk of the regimental platoon, were able to move to the docks and embark in one body. The regimental platoon left a skeleton wire crew at the camp until all units had departed. These men then spliced Division lines to previously designated rear echelon phones and entrucked for the ship.

(2) All communication equipment taken had been given high priority marking and was designated to be available during the voyage. A responsible NCO was put in charge of the equipment when it was ready for movement to the docks. His orders were to accompany this gear in its movement and to insure that it be handled and stowed aboard in accordance with its priority and importance. Radio jeeps were driven to the dock and their loading supervised by their driver-operators. All radio equipment was carried aboard by radio personnel and was properly stowed under the direct supervision of the troop unit communication officers.

d. REHEARSAL:

(1) The rehearsal provided an excellent means of testing all agencies of communication. This is particularly true of radio operation. During the rehearsal all radio nets were set up and every radio given a thorough work-out. Several minor deficiencies were found in some of the radios and these were immediately remedied. The effectiveness of waterproofing methods was given a good test during the ship to shore movement and they were found to be adequate.

Personnel became familiar with their debarkation stations and their specific duties prior to and after debarkation from the ship. In summary the rehearsal was very thorough and all communication personnel and equipment were adequately tested.

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e. MOVEMENT TO TARGET:

(1) Troop unit message centers operated in cooperation with ships' communication offices throughout the period that troops were embarked.

When required, troop radio operators stood watches in the ships' radio rooms.

(2) Intensive briefing of all personnel on all plans, orders and Signal Operation Instructions for the coming operation was conducted. The men were instructed, quizzed and instructed again until they were all thoroughly versed in all phases of the planned assault.

Duty assignment sheets were filled out and issued to each man showing his debarkation station, assigned equipment to be carried ashore and specific duty assignment.

Physical drill and weapons inspection were held daily.

Schools were conducted for staff and unit officers to instruct them thoroughly in unit call signs, voice radio procedure, shackle cipher and authenticator, and communication SOP.

(3) Signal equipment was inspected and batteries expended during rehearsals replaced. All waterproofing was checked.

At the staging area, OTC allowed some transmission on radio nets for a final check on radio equipment.

f. ASSAULT:

(1) OPERATIONS: RCT 24 was in division reserve initially and did not land until the late afternoon of D-Day. All normal radio nets were manned however early in the morning aboard ship, and in addition the voice command nets of the assault combat teams (RCT 23 and RCT 25) were manned for information purposes with reserve radio equipment. These latter nets proved to be of great value to the regimental staff and supplemented other agencies in gathering information concerning the situation ashore. The Support Air Observation net proved to be of great value for the same reason.

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When ordered to land, the Regimental Commander proceeded to the designated beach control vessel and boarded same. With him was the following radio equipment for use as indicated:

- 1 SCR-608 (Division Voice Command Net)
- 1 SCR-610 (Regimental Voice Command Net)
- 1 TBX (Division CW Command Net).
- 2 SCR-300 (1 for Regimental Voice Net - the other as a spare)

This equipment gave him the necessary communication with all higher and lower echelons and functioned in an excellent manner. There were no communication failures during the ship to shore movement. All radios except the SCR-608 were taken aboard the control vessel for the use of the Regimental Commander thereon. The boat with the SCR-608 remained alongside or in the near vicinity of the control vessel and traffic was passed by hand to and from the boat for this radio. Each battalion had similar equipment in the boat with the Battalion Commander and this equipment functioned in a like manner.

One important thing of note in the ship to shore movement was the fact that there was one (1) SCR-300 in one of the boats of each RCT call wave. These call waves included the RCT Command Group, the Engineer Company, the Regimental Weapons Company Headquarters, the Scout Platoon and the Dog Section. These radios were supplied from the RCT communication platoon.

While on the control vessel it was learned that radio jeeps could not be landed at the time because of beach conditions. This did not affect radio communications as there were other portable radios available to accomplish the same purpose.

Immediately upon landing personnel hastily reorganized and proceeded to the Command Post with all communications gear. Guides helped immeasurably in this respect.

Ashore and during the entire operation little difficulty was experienced with radio communications. Jamming occurred on two occasions but did not interfere with radio communications in either case. Normal operating difficulties and break-downs were experienced, however.

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quickly remedied by signal repairmen or new sets were drawn from Division Signal Supply. Some interference was experienced with friendly units on the SCR-536 radio used in the rifle companies due to the limited number of frequencies available. Other than this there were adequate frequencies. Due to the two pre-set channels on the SCR-610 (one on the Division Voice Net and one on the RCT Voice Command Net), battalions found this radio of no use when attached to other regiments unless it were used on the Division Voice Command Net. In the future each RCT headquarters should carry at least two SCR-610 radios pre-set on the channels of the other two RCTs for issue to battalions as necessary.

When attached to battalions, supporting arms such as tanks, armored amphibian tanks, and rocket detachments were afforded excellent communications by coming up on the battalion SCR-300 net. In addition tank companies maintained liaison officers with a SCR-510 (in direct communications with the tank) at the command post concerned. Direct support artillery battalions likewise maintained liaison officers with SCR-610 at regimental and battalion command posts.

Air observation was used to some extent by all units and the TCS radio worked well in the air nets at all times. This radio was remote controlled into the intelligence section for this purpose.

The TBX radio generator is too noisy and this fact is particularly noticed at night. A more silent generator should be issued with this radio.

Wire communication was excellent throughout the entire operation and telephone communication was maintained with all subordinate, attached, and adjacent units particularly one hundred per cent of the time. This is attributed to two main factors: (1) Lance poles were invaluable. Throughout the operation overheading on lance poles, careful and frequent wire-tagging, and the establishment of frequent test stations minimized wire troubles and expedited any necessary repairs. (2) Cooperation between wire sections was excellent and must be continued. With careful planning and knowledge of the wire situation, it was repeatedly possible to employ additional wire materials,

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to shorten long looped trunks and to keep the wire circuits at a high state of efficiency.

Throughout telephone communication was the most overloaded agency. In order to compensate for this fact, laterals were laid between adjacent and subordinate units and additional trunks laid to division and shore party. Part of this overloading was unjustified. Many conversations were entirely too long and some were unnecessary. Many calls were placed merely to find out the scuttlebutt or how their friends were getting along. These mistakes were corrected when reported, nevertheless they delayed many important calls.

Battalion to company wire communication was continuous (due to the slowness of the attack). At some times lines became long and over-extended, however the practice of using W-110 wire to companies whenever possible as well as careful laying of lines off roads and through broken terrain kept trouble to a minimum. Mortar wire communication to battalion and to mortar OPs, supplemented by the SCR-300, provided the 81mm platoon constant control and maximum use. At night sound powered phones were installed to rifle platoons on line for communication with the company command post. The 60mm mortar platoons used sound powered equipment constantly.

All units were generally careful in not damaging wire lines and this eliminated much trouble formerly due to carelessness.

"High-speed" W-130 wire was unsatisfactory. Its package is too heavy and bulky for efficient wire laying. It would be more desirable if wound in one-half mile coils.

DR-8 reels should be wound with one-half mile of wire, W-130, instead of one-fourth mile. This would conserve shipping space and greatly lessen the work of wiremen back at camp adding the additional one-fourth mile to each reel prior to an operation.

Message center operation was normal and there was very little or no delay in routing and clearing traffic.

Classified messages were cleared by using modified clear text and Navajo talkers. The Hagelin coding machine (CSP-1500) was never used and the Amphibious

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very few times. Modified clear and Navajo talkers are much faster and more accurate.

Runners from each subordinate unit were maintained at the message center and were used to great extent. Messenger dogs were not used mainly because they were not needed on this operation as such, and other means were more than adequate.

The telegraph set TG-5 and blinker lamps have never been used on an operation by this regiment and should be deleted from the TBA. The trend is toward voice operation and there are adequate means much more dependable and rapid than the former.

The shackle code authenticator system was used and it proved to be very effective. On the whole personnel were adequately trained in signal security. There were some violations on radio nets and particularly the Division Reconnaissance (VMO) Net. Schools for officers must continue to be conducted stressing security and radio procedure.

(2) PERSONNEL: The present allowance of communication personnel within an infantry regiment is believed adequate. There was fairly heavy casualties suffered in some of the battalions and twenty per cent (20%) for the entire regiment. Some replacements arrived however and the communication efficiency was not lowered materially.

(3) SUPPLY: The method employed by this regiment for resupply of signal equipment was to take as much ashore initially as possible, land remaining supplies under a high priority, and to request supplies from Division Signal Supply when needed. On D plus 3 radio batteries and wire became critical and were requested. In this connection Division Signal Supply did an excellent job as well as through the entire operation and supplies were adequately furnished. Replenishment rates were sufficient. Adequate spare and repair facilities were available. Due to the size of the island, transportation was adequate, however, one weasel is recommended for the regimental platoon for wire laying purposes and would be sorely needed on larger land masses.

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g. REEMBARKATION:

Reembarkation control was by radio. The Division Spare SCR-300 channel was assigned for logistic use to Ships TQMs, Control Officers, Shore Party and unit quartermasters. The Division Logistic Control Net was also available for this use. When troops units were ordered to the beach for reembarkation, control was maintained on SCR-300 and SCR-610 radios on regimental and battalion voice nets.

Troops unit TQMs embarked first with SCR-300 radio operators. Just before the troop reembarkation a regimental advance detail displaced with voice radios to the ship. Again the unit communication officer or his representative established liaison with ship's communication officer to make message center and stowage arrangements.

Once aboard, all signal equipment was mustered, cleaned, and stowed for the voyage.

2. RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTS:

a. TRAINING:

- (1) That the Regimental Communication Officer in cooperation with the R-3 specify what communication training is to be accomplished and that each platoon conduct this training simultaneously.
- (2) That platoons train separately in the early stages and together in the latter stages of the training program.
- (3) That both written and practicable examination be given weekly on all subjects to each platoon by the Regimental Communication Officer.

b. PLANNING:

- (1) The Fourth Marine Division SOI was kept up to date and covered the communication plan for the operation; it is recommended that this always be done and communication annexes cut to a minimum.
- (2) That a smaller and lighter switchboard be designed for an infantry battalion and that it have a minimum of nine drops.

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(3) That crystals always be issued lower units where necessary in order to facilitate and hasten operators to get on frequency.

c. EMBARKATION:

(1) That all portable radio equipment be loaded in troop space and made readily available during the voyage.

(2) That the Communication Officer or his representative supervise the loading of all signal equipment.

d. REHEARSAL:

(1) That every effort be made during rehearsals by all units to test radio communications.

(2) That in order to accomplish the foregoing, radios be substituted or changed on different nets.

e. MOVEMENT TO TARGET:

(1) That signal equipment be inspected during this phase paying particular attention to vehicular radio equipment and storage batteries.

f. ASSAULT:

(1) That one (1) SCR-300 be placed in one of the boats in each RCT call wave.

(2) That units be prepared to land and operated normally without vehicular radio equipment.

(3) That all radio operators repeat the Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, radio jamming school.

(4) That each regiment have different SCR-536 frequency channels for its companies.

(5) That each regiment carry two (2) SCR-610 radios pre-set on the channels of the other regiments for issue to battalions when detached.

(6) That a noiseless generator be issued with the TBX radio.

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- (7) That one tank in each platoon of a tank company be equipped with a SCR-300 for direct communication with rifle companies. This was done in this division and worked successfully.
- (8) That lance poles be carried by regiments and higher units on any operation and that wire lines be overheaded as soon as possible.
- (9) That laterals be laid between units when the distance involved is negligible.
- (10) That it would be impracticable to maintain three (3) trunks from regiment to division on larger land masses.
- (11) That "Hi-speed" coil wire W-130 is unsatisfactory in its present package.
- (12) That DR-8 reels be issued with one-half mile of wire W-130.
- (13) That Navajo talkers and modified clear continue to be used for classified messages rather than cryptographic aids.
- (14) That the telegraph set, TG-5, and signal lamps be deleted from the TBA for an infantry regiment.
- (15) That schools for officers continue to be conducted stressing security and voice procedure.
- (16) That one (1) weasel be added to the transportation of the regimental communication platoon for wire laying purposes.

g. REEMBARKATION:

- (1) See paragraph on reembarkation.

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HEADQUARTERS,  
FIRST BATTALION, TWENTY-FOURTH MARINES,  
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,  
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

20 April, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.  
To: The Commanding Officer, Twenty-Fourth Marines.  
Subject: Final Report on IWO JIMA Operation.  
Reference: (a) Division SOP No. 1-45.  
Enclosure: (A) Final Report on IWO JIMA Operation, Battalion  
Landing Team 1/24.

1. The following report covering the activities of  
Battalion Landing Team 1/24 during the IWO JIMA Operation, from  
inception to conclusion, is herewith submitted, together with  
observations and recommendations resulting therefrom.

*C. L. Banks*  
C. L. BANKS

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SECTION I.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION.

A. ORGANIZATION:

1. Our battalion organization was similar to that called for by the Tables of Organization with one important exception, this exception being the formation of an assault platoon, which became a part of Headquarters Company. The rifle companies were somewhat under strength when planning and preparation for the IWO JIMA operation commenced. Headquarters Company, and the 81mm Mortar Platoon were up to strength at this time. The personnel for the assault platoon were taken from the rifle companies at the beginning of this period to enable them to have sufficient time for intensive training in assault problems prior to the operation. Replacements joining the battalion were sent to the rifle companies. At the time of embarkation each rifle company was approximately twenty (20) men under Tables of Organization strength.

2. Shortly before embarkation the organization of the battalion changed into a Battalion Landing Team Task Organization. This Task Organization for the operation consisted of the following:

- a. "B" Company.
- b. "C" Company.
- c. "A" Company.
- d. Support group.
  1. 81mm Mortar platoon.
  2. Assault platoon.
  3. 1st 37mm Platoon, Regt. Wpns Co.
  4. Det., Company "B", 4th Med Bn.
  5. Det., 2nd Band Section.
  6. Det., 3d Battalion, 14th Marines (F. O. Teams.)
  7. Det., 1st JASCo.

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Planning and Preparation, Cont'd.  
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B. PLANNING:

1. Operation orders for the rehearsal were received in sufficient time prior to embarkation for the proper preparation of this Landing Team operation orders and annexes thereto. Boat assignment tables were carefully prepared and several dry runs of landings were made with the Landing Team organized into boat groups and waves. By distribution of the operation orders to the Landing Team before embarkation, the landing team was able to conduct its own rehearsal problem in the field. During the latter part of October, the Battalion Landing Team planned a field problem based on an attack of Island X, which corresponded to IWO JIMA. Operation orders were prepared and all staff sections worked on appropriate parts of the order. The Landing Team spent three days in the field executing the problem. The problem consisted of a simulated landing (boat groups and waves were formed), movement to an assembly area, relief of a unit on line, and continuing the attack. This planning was exactly the same as that done for the actual operation, and the field problem turned out to be the same as the mission the Landing Team performed early in the actual operation.

C. TRAINING AND REHEARSAL:

1. Prior to leaving MAUI, the Landing Team conducted a three day field problem including aircraft, tanks, and artillery. This was the only offensive problem the battalion was able to carry out as a landing team before leaving MAUI. One defensive problem as a landing team was also carried out. Assault problems and assault tactics were stressed in this landing team's training once it was aware of the type of fighting it would encounter in the near future. The assault platoon was trained intensively and spent many days in a training area executing firing problems with flame throwers, demolitions, bazookas, and small arms. All platoons of the rifle companies worked on assault problems and had firing problems with assault squads of the assault platoon attached to the various rifle platoons. Other preparatory

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Planning and preparation, Cont'd.  
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training by this Landing Team stressed the use, movement, and tactics of the fire group, squad, and platoon.

2. This Landing Team sailed from KAHULUI Harbor aboard the U.S.S. HENDRY (APA-118) on 4 January, 1945. On 6 January, 1945, we arrived at MAALAEA Bay for ship and debarkation maneuvers. On 7 and 8 January, 1945, BLT 1/24 executed debarkation exercises, loading into small boats, forming into waves, and crossing the line of departure. Each wave hit the beach on schedule, the ramps were lowered and retracted, but no troops went ashore. On each day the Landing Team was dispatched from APA 118 on order of the Regimental Commander. The Landing Team reported to a control vessel and was dispatched to the beach upon order of the Regimental Commander. On 9 January, 1945, the landing team returned to PEARL HARBOR aboard the U.S.S. HENDRY (APA-118), remaining there in anchorage until the morning of 12 January, 1945. On 12 January, 1945 the U.S.S. HENDRY sailed from PEARL HARBOR for the operation rehearsal in MAALAEA Bay, MAUI, T. H. On 13 January, 1945 BLT 1/24 held debarkation exercises, formed into waves, crossed an imaginary line of departure, and then returned to the mother ship. On 14 January, 1945 the landing team repeated debarkation exercises, went to the line of departure, crossing it and going toward the beach as ordered by the Beach Control Officer. All waves turned several hundred yards from the shore and returned to the ship. On 15 January, 1945, upon Regimental order, the Landing Team commenced debarkation at 1000. The Landing Team reported to the control vessel off beach BLUE 1. The Landing Team was ordered to land on beach BLUE 1 and to be attached to RCT 25. BLT 1/24 landed at 1238, moved inland to a general assembly area, and awaited further orders. At 1700 the landing team was ordered to remain in a semi-circular MLR, 400 yards in from beach BLUE 1. Beginning at 1000, 16 January, 1945 BLT 1/24 re-embarked aboard landing craft on beach YELLOW 2, and returned to the U.S.S. HENDRY. On 17 January, 1945, BLT 1/24 debarked for naval gunfire exercises on KAHOO LAWE Island, but re-embarked almost immediately without going to the line of departure. The naval gunfire party of the landing team did land and executed naval gunfire missions. The following day APA 118 returned to PEARL HARBOR and a period of rehabilitation commenced.

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SECTION II.

MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE.

A. REHABILITATION:

1. This landing team remained at PEARL HARBOR until the morning of 27 January, 1945. During this period all troops were granted liberty daily. Each day supervised groups were taken to Richardson Center where many recreation facilities were available in addition to large quantities of beer and refreshments. During this period troops were given much time for their own use, such as letter writing and reading. On 27 January, 1945 the U.S.S. HENDRY sailed from PEARL HARBOR in a convoy bound for ENIWETOK ATOLL.

B. SHIPBOARD TRAINING:

1. All troops received training aboard ship from the time the Landing Team left PEARL HARBOR until the day before the landing on IWO JIMA. Each platoon was allotted space aboard ship and daily concentrated on the following:

- a. Briefing on the forthcoming operation.
- b. Inspection of weapons.
- c. Physical drill and conditioning.

For the briefing the relief map was constantly used, as were all other maps and data available. Other subjects covered in shipboard training were field sanitation in combat, first aid in combat, and review of chemical warfare. To break the monotony of intensive shipboard training, Happy Hours, produced by the combined Navy and Marine Corps talent aboard, were held frequently late in the afternoon.

C. FORWARD AREA REHEARSAL:

1. On 11 February, 1945 the U.S.S. HENDRY arrived at SAIPAN and anchored off GARAPAN. The maneuver scheduled for 12 February, 1945 was cancelled due to heavy seas. At daybreak of 13 February, 1945 APA 118 was stationed about 10 miles off TINIAN TOWN. At 1000 an order was received from the Regimental Commander stating the landing team was to report to the Yellow

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Movement to Objective, Cont'd.  
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Control Vessel. The landing team completed debarkation, but waves 3, 4, and 5 failed to arrive at the line of departure. This was due to distance involved, poor visibility, damaged boats, and poor control by the Boat Officers. Waves 1, 2, and Call Wave Able were dispatched by the control vessel and were ordered to land on Beach YELLOW 2. All boats returned to the U.S.S. HENDRY by 1600 that day. Following this rehearsal extensive schooling was held for the small boat officers of the U.S.S. HENDRY by officers of BLT 1/24. This schooling covered all essential information about the beaches and the landings to be made on IWO JIMA. 14 and 15 February, 1945, APA 118 remained at anchor off SAIPAN. On 16 February, 1945, the U.S.S. HENDRY departed from SAIPAN, bound for IWO JIMA. At this time the men were in excellent physical condition, were well indoctrinated, and morale was at its highest level. On 19 February, 1945, the landing team arrived at IWO JIMA and was prepared for the ship to shore movement.

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SECTION III.

SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT.

A. TACTICAL PLAN FOR LANDING:

1. Under all plans this landing team was to land two rifle companies abreast, and one in reserve. "B" Company was to land on the landing team right flank with "C" Company on the landing team left flank. "A" Company was in landing team reserve.
2. This landing team planned to land five waves plus one call wave. The first wave consisting of eight (8) boats containing four (4) rifle platoons, two (2) of the platoons being from "B" Company, two (2) of the platoons being from "C" Company. The second wave consisted of six (6) boats, three (3) boats containing the support platoon and company headquarters of "B" Company, and three (3) boats containing the support platoon and company headquarters of "C" Company. The third wave was made up of seven (7) boats holding the landing team reserve, "A" Company. The fourth wave contained headquarters company of the landing team, and consisted of six (6) boats. The fifth wave was made up of five (5) boats that contained the assault platoon and the 81mm mortar platoon. Call Wave Able contained the 1st 37mm A. T. Platoon, which was assigned to this landing team. Two free boats were assigned to the landing team commander for his command echelons.

B. CONTROL PLAN:

1. The battalion landing team was prepared to execute any of the Division's plans under control of the Regimental Combat Team Commander, Colonel JORDAN. Being part of Combat Team #24, we were to remain under their control until definite orders were received from Colonel JORDAN, attaching this landing team to another combat team.
2. All units of the task organization of BLT 1/24 were to remain under the control of the BLT Commander until orders to the contrary were received from him.

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Ship to Shore Movement, Cont'd.

C. DESCRIPTION OF LANDING:

1. For the landing on IWO JIMA on 19 February, 1945, Combat Team #24 was in division reserve. "H" hour was set at 0900. At 1448, that date, BLT 1/24 received orders to report to Beach BLUE 1 control vessel. Debarkation commenced at 1505. At 1545 the battalion landing team was embarked in boats and the waves were dispatched to Beach BLUE 1 control vessel at 1 minute intervals. The landing team arrived at the line of departure at 1612. Orders were received at the Control Vessel attaching this landing team to Combat Team #25 upon landing. The first wave was dispatched by Blue 1 control vessel at 1620 to land on Beach BLUE 1. This wave landed at 1632. The second wave was dispatched at 1625 and landed at 1636. Succeeding waves followed at 5 minute intervals and hit the beach 10 to 12 minutes after crossing the line of departure. The entire landing team was ashore by 1656. There were no losses suffered by this landing team during the ship to shore movement. All units of the task organization moved into an assembly area and the command post was established in 165 S.

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SECTION IV.

NARRATIVE OF OPERATION.

19 February, 1945.

1. This landing team was prepared for debarkation at "H" hour on 19 February, 1945. At 1448 we received orders from the combat team commander to report to the beach blue 1 control vessel. At 1505 the landing team commenced debarkation. At 1545 all troops were embarked in boats and waves were dispatched at 1 minute intervals to beach BLUE 1 line of departure. The landing team arrived at the line of departure at 1612. At the control vessel orders were received attaching BLT 1/24 to Combat Team 25. The first wave was dispatched by Blue 1 control vessel at 1620, and landed at 1632. Succeeding waves followed at 5 minute intervals and hit the beach 10-12 minutes after crossing the line of departure. At 1656 the entire landing team was ashore. There were no losses suffered by this landing team during the ship to shore movement. All units moved into an assembly area west of the landing beach and the landing team command post was established in 165 8.

2. Orders were received from Colonel LANIGAN, commanding officer of Combat Team 25, to attach one (1) company to BLT 3/25. "B" Company relieved "L" Company, Combat Team 25, and after dark moved into position on the high ground north of the quarry.

3. At 2030 a message was received from Division ordering this landing team to attach another company to BLT 3/25 immediately. "A" Company was assigned this mission and reported to Lieutenant Colonel CHAMBERS for assignment prior to 2100. "C" Company took up a defensive position to the rear of BLT 2/25. All companies received casualties that night.

20 February, 1945.

1. On this date BLT 1/24 relieved BLT 3/25 prior to 0730 and continued the attack at 0800. "A" Company conducted mopping up operations in the vicinity of beach BLUE 2. Their casualties were heavy having received 5 killed early in the mopping up process.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

2. "B" Company was on the high ground north of the quarry, and attempted to move forward several times. They were under enemy mortar fire and small arms fire throughout the day. Their casualties were heavy, some of which were caused by friendly fire. Friendly planes fired rockets into their positions and strafed them. Naval gunfire fired into their positions several times, and friendly artillery registered thereon.

3. "C" Company remained in landing team reserve 200 yards to the rear of "B" Company. The landing team command post displaced forward during the afternoon to 166 F. At 1700 "B" Company consolidated its positions in 183 W and X. "A" Company prepared its night defense in 183 X and 166 D and F. "C" Company remained in position behind "B" Company. During the night the landing team was under enemy mortar fire. "A" Company and "B" Company received enemy hand grenades during infiltration attempts.

21 February, 1945.

1. "A" and "B" companies continued the attack at 0810. "A" Company had one platoon of engineers attached to them and was constantly under fire as they moved along the beach as far as the terrain would permit. "A" Company destroyed several enemy caves and pillboxes. With the assistance of the engineers they removed 35 horned mines from the boat basin area. The company had 7 killed in action and 10 wounded and evacuated this date.

2. "B" Company was able to move forward slowly throughout the day although they were continuously under enemy mortar, light machine gun, and rifle fire. They maintained contact with BLT 2/25 on their left and a platoon of "C" Company, which was working over a cliff area, on their right. By 1000 "B" Company had advanced 200 yards. At this time they began to receive enemy knee mortar fire. Enemy troops were observed in well dug in caves along the ridge to their right front. About 1100 heavy enemy mortars began falling in the "B" Company area. At this time a pillbox was observed and still operative in 167 E.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.  
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"B" Company continued to move forward slowly in the afternoon. The enemy resistance did not decrease. "B" Company received many casualties during the afternoon and "C" Company was ordered to relieve "B" Company before 1600. "B" Company remained on the high ground north of the quarry and became the landing team reserve. Front line companies consolidated their positions at 1700, and commenced preparations for night defense. The landing team right flank was on the beach in 166 E, although the right flank company advanced forward of this position during the day. "C" Company located in 183 X was tied in with "A" Company on the right, and BLT 2/25 on the left. Throughout the night the companies were harassed by the enemy trying to get through our lines. On several occasions there was an exchange of hand grenades. Enemy mortar fire was received throughout the night. A total of 20 Japs were killed during the night.

22 February, 1945.

1. At 0900 "A" Company continued mopping up along the coastal area, north of beach BLUE 2. Many pillboxes and caves were destroyed and our casualties were light. Throughout the day "A" Company received enemy small arms fire and sporadic knee mortar fire. At the end of the days activity "A" Company was in the northern part of 166 J.

2. "C" Company moved out slowly in the attack while "B" Company remained in position as landing team reserve. "C" Company did not meet any heavy resistance, but did receive harassing small arms fire and knee mortar fire. Large amounts of enemy mines were discovered in the area "C" Company was advancing through. Our lines advanced about 200 yards this day, with "C" Company consolidating its positions for the night in the northern part of 183 X. All companies received mortar fire during the night. Several attempts at infiltration were made by the enemy, however, none were successful. Fourteen Japs were killed in the "C" Company area.

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Operation, Cont'd.

23 February, 1945.

1. At 0600 this date this landing team reverted to control of Combat Team 24. At 0900 "C" Company started to advance forward with 1 platoon of "B" Company attached. More mines were discovered and removed from the area. The mines were non-metallic, terra cotta, equipped with plastic fuses. During the morning enemy small arms fire was consistent, but its mortar fire was extremely light. This may have been due to the excellent artillery fires called for and directed by our forward observers. Naval gunfire was continuous some distance to our front. Troops in 183 U and F received some enemy mortar fire. Two demolitions squads were attached to "C" Company and were destroying caves and pillboxes along the bluff on the right flank of "C" Company. Several enemy troops and enemy activity were observed about 200 yards to our front. An enemy knee mortar appeared to be firing from that area. Heavy 60mm mortar and 81mm mortar concentrations were placed on the area, but light enemy mortars continued to fall within our lines and air bursts fell over them. "C" Company casualties were fairly high and "A" Company was ordered to relieve "C" Company at 1600. At 1700 our lines were consolidated for the night with "C" Company in landing team reserve. "B" Company was protecting an area to the right of "A" Company. "F" Company, 25th Marines was attached to this landing team and protected the area formerly occupied by "A" Company, which was the division right flank. During the day two 90mm mortars were captured, one being serviceable, the other not. Again during the night there were exchanges of hand grenades and some small arms fire. The Japs were armed with rifles and well supplied with hand grenades. They were identified as Naval personnel. During the night two rockets landed within the landing team area.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.  
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24 February, 1945.

1. At 1030 "A" and "B" Companies commenced the attack towards O1A. An engineer squad worked to the rear of the companies sealing up caves. Both companies ran into heavy enemy resistance. They were receiving small arms fire from point blank range and volleys of hand grenades. Throughout they were receiving enemy air bursts and knee mortar fire. Landing Team 2/24, on our left, was receiving the same type of fire and could not advance. We fired mortars and artillery almost continuously into the areas where enemy activity was observed. However, their point blank firing of small arms continued. Our casualties continued to increase while our advances were nil.

2. During the day "C" Company moved up into the low ground along the beach and with the assistance of one tank they continued mopping up in the vicinity of the boat basin. They were under enemy fire during the day. "F" Company, BLT 2/25, was in landing team reserve.

3. At 1700 our lines were consolidated and defenses prepared for the night. We had 3 companies abreast, "A" Company on the left, tied in with "L" Company, BLT 3/24, "B" Company in the center, and "C" Company on the right, tied in with the water. A platoon of LVTA's was attached to "C" Company and protected the beach to their rear.

4. The night was the quietest the companies had experienced thus far. Some hand grenades were thrown at the LVTA's during the night. The companies killed 11 Japs who again were found wandering about our lines at night.

25 February, 1945.

1. At 0930 "A", "B", and "C" Companies moved out in the attack. The objective was O2, 1600 yards to our front, with O1B as our intermediate base.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

Major ESTERLINE, commanding officer, "C" Company, was transferred to the BLT 3/24. Captain STOTT took command of the company. Heavy artillery and mortar concentrations preceded the attack by the companies. After slight advances, they received all types of enemy fire and casualties began to increase rapidly. Major STEWART, commanding officer, "A" Company, was hit by an enemy rifle bullet, and died shortly thereafter. First Lieutenant Roy I. WOODS took command of "A" Company. Lieutenant LOWNDS, Battalion Intelligence Officer, was wounded and evacuated and Sergeant HICKS took over his position.

2. Whenever the troops attempted to move forward they received intense machine gun and rifle fire, knee mortar fire, and air bursts. Over 30 Japs were killed during the fire fight. They were located just forward of our lines. At 1400 the enemy again concentrated all types of fire along our lines. The fire appeared to be coming from high ground about 100 yards to our front. However, some Japs were close enough to throw volleys of hand grenades.

3. Our casualties were heavy. "F" Company, BLT 2/25, landing team reserve, received extremely heavy casualties from enemy mortars, falling to the rear of our front line.

4. At 1800, BLT 2/24 relieved this landing team. "F" Company, BLT 2/25, was released to BLT 2/24. "A", "B", "C" Companies reorganized in assembly areas to the rear of the quarry in 166 A.

26 February, 1945.

1. The previous night was a quiet one, the landing team being in Combat Team reserve. At 0600 this date Combat Team 24 was relieved by Combat Team 25.

2. At 0900 the landing team moved to an assembly area in 165 E. Patrols were sent out to the beached LSM's and reported the ships clear of enemy snipers. The day and night was marked by inactivity.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.  
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27 February, 1945.

1. The landing team remained in the assembly area and the only activity was the sending out of patrols throughout the day. Late in the day a few heavy enemy mortars landed nearby.

28 February, 1945.

1. At 1800 this date the landing team was notified that it was in Corps reserve. At 2000 we were released from Corps reserve and received orders to relieve BLT 2/23, prior to 0600 the following day.

1 March, 1945.

1. Prior to 0600 this date, landing team 1/24 relieved BLT 2/23. Two companies were abreast; "A" Company on the left, "C" Company on the right with "B" Company in Landing Team Reserve. "A" Company was tied in with "G" Company, BLT 2/24, on its left. To the right of "C" Company was "A" Company, BLT 1/25.

2. The companies commenced the attack at 0830 following a heavy artillery preparation. "A" Company's position was along the right flank of hill 382. "A" Company was unable to move any great distance as hill 382 and the surrounding area was under heavy mortar fire. "C" Company was receiving intense rifle and machine gun fire from the woods and the slight rise to its front. Two tanks were attached to "C" Company which were coordinated in an attack that took "C" Company about 100 yards forward and into the edge of the woods. The company was able to move forward by fire and movement although heavy enemy fire was causing casualties continuously. Before noon the company commander, Captain STOTT was wounded and evacuated. At this time it was necessary to use smoke fired by artillery to evacuate wounded from the front lines. Captain SWOYER took command of "C" Company, reorganized, and an attack was coordinated for 1300. After a heavy artillery and mortar barrage the companies attempted to move forward.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.  
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Enemy small arms fire was still intense. At 1302 Captain SWOYER was hit by an enemy rifle bullet, and was evacuated. Captain KLOPFENSTINE took command of the company at 1345. The company advanced forward another 100 yards obtaining some of the high ground to the front. During the attack Lieutenant MANNING was wounded, his platoon sergeant and platoon guide being killed. A squad leader took command of the platoon. All of the casualties were being caused by rifle or machine gun fire. About 1600 a heavy mortar barrage fell in the vicinity of our front lines. Positions were consolidated at 1700 for night defense. "A" Company was at the right base of hill 382. "C" Company extended on the high ground overlooking MINAMI. BLT 1/25 was tied in on our right rear, and BLT 2/24 was tied in on our left flank extending across hill 382. Mortar and rocket fire fell throughout the area during the night causing some casualties. There were no attempts made at infiltration by the enemy. The landing team command post was located in 165 E.

2 March, 1945.

1. The attack started at 0800, following another heavy artillery preparation. Shortly after the preparation enemy mortars again began falling in the area. The Combat Team now had three landing teams abreast. The landing team front was comparatively narrow, and the plan called for our being squeezed out after advancing about 600 yards. "C" Company was able to move forward abreast of "A" Company, BLT 1/25. "A" Company, BLT 1/24, was partially squeezed out. "C" Company again took some of the high ground to its front. The unit on our left was receiving intense enemy fire, and was unable to advance. Again smoke shells had to be used to evacuate our casualties. A rocket mission was requested and granted for 1530 this date. The mission was performed, but the enemy fire did not decrease. A flamethrower tank was obtained and fire was brought to bear on a blockhouse to our right.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.  
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Additional fire was being received from a blockhouse to our right front. Losses were average during the day. Positions were consolidated at 1700 and all units occupied approximately the same positions as the previous night. Except for harassing mortar fire the night was comparatively quiet.

3 March, 1945.

1. The attack commenced at 0630 without any preliminary artillery preparations. "A" Company was still on the Landing Team left flank and "C" Company on the right. Shortly after moving out "A" Company began to receive enemy mortar fire. "C" Company continued to receive casualties and "B" Company was ordered to pass through "C" Company at 0930. The relief was effected in an area where an enemy was well entrenched and concealed. The zone of action was infested with spider traps and concealed machine guns. Fire was still being received from the blockhouse on our right, and tanks working with the adjacent unit were attempting to knock it out. Between 1100 and 1300 heavy mortars kept falling within our area. "A" Company advanced on the left flank and received grenade and knee mortar fire. "B" Company was attempting to move forward regardless of contact with units on its right or left. Japs were observed in a cave on the high ground to the left of "B" Company. This was neutralized by a friendly tank. Because of intense enemy fire "B" Company was unable to take all of the high ground to its front. They consolidated at 1700 and prepared their night defense. Their positions were about 125 yards forward of the previous night. At 1700 "A" Company was attached to BLT 2/24. Nothing eventful occurred during the night. "B" Company killed 8 of the enemy before dawn.

4 March, 1945.

1. "B" Company was in assault with "C" Company in landing team reserve. "A" Company was attached to BLT 2/24. BLT 2/24 was on our left, and Combat Team 23 on our right.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

2. "B" Company moved out at 0730. About an hour after a fire fight developed. Several men were killed and wounded and a number of the enemy were accounted for, some trying to flee from their positions. "B" Company was accounting for numerous enemy dead by 60mm mortar fire which has been firing continuously for 24 hours, the fire being brought to within 30 yards of its lines. As the 60mm mortar fire continued, the amount of enemy fire decreased.

3. Two tanks were working with "B" Company neutralizing enemy emplacements and pillboxes in the area. However, point blank rifle fire continued. Five of the enemy killed in this area were partially dressed in Marine uniforms. "B" Company's flanks were able to move slightly forward as the company's center was receiving most of the enemy fire. They killed many Japs in this area, but many still remained to be annihilated. The enemy were in too close for the use of any supporting weapons. Rifles and BAR's were used throughout the fire fight. Two platoon leaders were wounded and evacuated. Artillery was being called for and fired continuously to our front in an attempt to knock out enemy mortars which were still firing into this area.

4. "B" Company made slight gains and was tied in with "E" Company, 24th Marines on the left. The advance gave us about 75 yards and "B" Company again occupied much of the high ground. Whenever a marine exposed himself the enemy opened up with machine gun and rifle fire. It was deadly to stand up on any part of the high mounds. At 1700 "B" Company started to dig in here, just out of enemy hand grenade range. Heavy mortars fell during the night on the high ground forward of the company center and also to the rear of their lines. Rockets also fell to their rear. Five Japs were killed during the night.

5 March, 1945.

1. Orders were received from Combat Team 24 to the effect that our present lines would be held. "B" Company, consequently did not attack, but patrolled the nearby area and mopped up caves in its vicinity.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

Its 60mm mortars continued its heavy fire and effective close in fires. Their damage to the enemy was beginning to become more evident. "C" Company was in Regimental Reserve, and remained in position about 300 yards to the rear of "B" Company, in 183 C and D. Enemy mortar fire continued to fall throughout the day. Large dumps of ammunition and automatic weapons were discovered in many of the caves and pillboxes in the "B" Company area. "A" Company was split up among the companies of BLT 2/24. Nothing unusual happened during the night.

6 March, 1945.

1. "B" Company moved out in the attack at 0900. "C" Company was in Regimental Reserve and "A" Company was still attached to BLT 2/24. Shortly after moving out a barrage of friendly 81mm mortar fire fell within their lines, evidently fired by one of the adjacent units. Friendly mortars continued to fall just forward of our lines. "B" Company was advancing slowly. Two demolition squads were attached to the company and continued to destroy pillboxes and caves. "B" Company's right flank was on high ground just to the west of a large enemy blockhouse. The 25th Marines were now on their right and was awaiting our attack on an azimuth of 125° magnetic. The company's left flank was not able to advance as rapidly as the right flank and was receiving the bulk of the casualties. The advance straight to the front was impossible because of the terrain. The slight ground gains were proving costly, and the lack of leaders left with the companies began to show. "B" Company's last officer platoon leader was fatally wounded this day after leading his platoon in an enveloping movement. "B" Company organized its defense for the night slightly forward of the positions occupied on the previous night.

7 March, 1945.

1. Prior to 0630 "C" Company relieved "B" Company. While the relief was being effected, at about the break of dawn, a heavy enemy mortar barrage landed in the area. An acting platoon leader and three squad leaders of "C" Company were killed, among others, while receiving their orders for the attack.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

At 0800 "C" Company attempted to move out although partially disorganized by the enemy mortars, which continued to fall. "B" Company moved 300 yards to the rear, and became the Regimental reserve. "E" Company, BLT 2/24, was on our left with BLT 1/25 on our right. "A" Company relieved "G" Company, BLT 2/24, and remained attached to BLT 2/24.

2. By 0845 the left flank of "C" Company advanced over 50 yards. Captain KLOPFENSTINE was killed here by an enemy rifle bullet while leading the company in an attempt to take the high ground forward of the company's left flank. Lieutenant SALVAGGIO was immediately placed in command. The company was reorganized. Heavy artillery concentrations were requested and granted in an attempt to neutralize the heavy Jap mortars which were continuing to fall within our lines. The unit on our right continued to hold it up, as the direction of our attack might squeeze them out.

3. The left flank of "C" Company continued to inch its way forward through crevices and gullies, blowing up caves, and working under constant small arms fire. The right flank of "C" Company was unable to advance as several attempts to blow up a blockhouse to the front were beaten back by enemy fire. During the day two air strikes were requested and granted. Our air liaison officer established an OP on the front lines and was able to obtain close in air support missions. There was not any favorable terrain immediately to the front. At 1700 "C" Company occupied the best positions in its area and a defense for the night was established. All usual enemy fires occurred during the night.

8 March, 1945.

1. Prior to 0600 "B" Company relieved "E" Company, BLT 2/24. The battalion had two companies abreast, "B" on the left, "C" on the right. "A" Company was now working with BLT 3/24.

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narrative of operation, Cont'd.  
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"B" and "C" Companies moved out at 0600, prior to dawn. The commanding officer of "B" Company was unable to make a reconnaissance of the area forward of him during daylight, nor did he have visual knowledge of enemy strongpoints to his front. The companies moved about 50 yards forward. Their attack was slowed by the necessary demolition work on the numerous pillboxes and caves that were gradually being overrun. Before noon "C" Company occupied all of the high ground to its front, except that on the extreme right flank. "B" Company had one platoon on the high ground to its front. Many of the caves along the high ground contained telephone installations and appeared to be mortar CP's. Some of the caves were still occupied by the enemy. A gap developed on the right, but this was disregarded as "C" Company attempted to move further forward.

2. At 1200 "A" Company was released by Regiment from BLT 3/24 and occupied an assembly area in 183 C and D.

3. Every time an advance was attempted along the high ground, heavy enemy mortar fire landed within the lines of "B" Company and "C" Company. The climax occurred about 1615 when an extremely heavy barrage killed 15 men in the two companies including the last two remaining platoon leaders in "C" Company. The only officer left in "B" Company was Captain EDDY. "C" Company had one officer, Lieutenant SALVAGGIO, acting Company Commander. A count showed less than 40 men along "C" Company's lines. Both companies had to come off of the high ground about 1700 to consolidate for the night. Shortly thereafter an extremely heavy barrage fell on the area previously occupied. One platoon of "A" Company was attached to "C" Company, as was the Assault Platoon. This was necessary to occupy the ground and replace the heavy casualties received during the day. One platoon of "A" Company was attached to "B" Company, the last platoon remaining in Regimental Reserve.

4. During the night heavy attacks were made all along our front. 60mm and 81mm mortars helped to break up the enemy attacks. Over 60 Japs were killed here before dawn.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

9 March, 1945.

1. At 0700, the hour of attack, the assault companies were small and reorganization was evident. Major TREITEL, Landing Team Commander was transferred to Division Headquarters. At 0900, Lieutenant Colonel BRUNELLI took command of the Landing Team. The landing team organized into two companies, "C" Company being disbanded and split between "A" and "B" Companies. Assault platoon men, plus all other available men were given to the two companies. Major SCHECHTER, Battalion Operations Officer, took command of "A" Company, Major COXIN, assistant R-3, took command of "B" Company. Major WEBSTER became Bn-3. The strength of "A" Company was about 135 and "B" Company had about 120 effectives.

2. The companies completed their reorganization and 1300 was set as the hour of attack. "A" Company on the right, "B" on the left. The companies moved forward throughout the afternoon, advancing from cave to cave, and by fire and movement. A number of the enemy were killed during the attack. "B" Company advanced about 250 yards. "A" Company advanced about 200 yards on the left and 150 yards on the right. A large gap developed with the unit adjacent to our right, which did not advance. When the lines were consolidated for the night, the adjacent unit filled the gap. The night was comparatively quiet. The Command Post displaced forward to 183 H.

10 March, 1945.

Prior to 0630 this Landing Team was relieved by BLT 3/25. The two companies moved into an assembly area in 182 G. At 1130 this date BLT 1/24 was placed in Corps reserve.

11 March, 1945.

1. The battalion remained in Corps reserve. The previous night was quiet. During the days patrols were sent out and mopped up caves.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.  
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Patrols constantly came across one or two bypassed Japs. In one instance a wounded Jap was captured and sent to the Regimental C.P.

12 March, 1945.

1. The day was quiet except for additional patrols working over an area behind the front lines. The landing team remained under Corps control.

13 March, 1945.

1. On this date at 0800, BLT 1/24 was released to Combat Team, which was now in Division Reserve. The landing team continued to send patrols out through the area. Many enemy documents were found which were immediately sent to the Regimental Intelligence section.

14 March, 1945.

1. Activity this date was the same as the preceding one. The Company Commanders and Bn-3 made a reconnaissance of the lines of Combat Team 25 BLT 2/24, as there was mention of the fact that BLT 1/24 might mop up part of the area over which they were now fighting.

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Narrative of Operation

15 March, 1945.

1. On this date BLT 1/24 received orders to relieve BLT 1/23 and BLT 3/23. A reconnaissance was made of their lines. Company "A" was to relieve and occupy the lines of BLT 1/23, which had 3 companies abreast. Company "B" was to relieve BLT 3/23.

16 March, 1945.

1. The day was quiet except for additional patrols working over an area behind the front lines. The landing team remained under Corps control.  
1. Company "A" moved out of the assembly area at 0600 and relieved BLT 1/23 prior to 0700. Company "B" moved out at 0630, and relieved BLT 3/23 prior to 0700. One platoon of "A" Company was attached to BLT 3/24. The 81mm mortar platoon joined "A" Company as riflemen.

2. Company "A" set about mopping up the area it now occupied. Sixteen Japs were killed on the high ground to the rear while the company suffered 1 killed and 7

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2. Activity this date was the same as the preceding one. The Company Commanders and Bn-3 made a reconnaissance of the lines of Combat Team 25 BLT 2/24, as



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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.  
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wounded. The company right flank was tied in with BLT 3/24. There was no contact with a friendly unit on the left. At 1200 one platoon of "A" Company was released from BLT 3/24 and reverted to company control. During the day Company "B" mopped up the area it occupied and sent patrols out continually. Company "A" sealed numerous caves in 185 C. The night was comparatively quiet. "B" Company did not experience any infiltration attempts. Company "A" killed 4 Japs and 1 Marine was killed by a Jap grenade.

17 March, 1945.

1. Starting at 1200 both companies mopped up the area from 185 C and D to hill 382. Before dark they dug in for the night in the vicinity of hill 382. The landing team was relieved by RCT 9.

18 March, 1945.

1. Colonel BRUNELLI returned to Combat Team 24, as did Major COKIN. Major PARKS became C.O. of BLT 1/24, with Major WEBSTER as BLT Executive Officer. Major SCHECHTER returned as Bn-3. Three companies were again formed. Lieutenant WOOD commands "A" Company, Captain EDDY, "B" Company, and Lieutenant MC GILVRAY was placed in command of "C" Company. Lieutenant FOX was placed in command of Headquarters Company.

2. At 1430 this date BLT 1/24 moved out of its assembly area and proceeded to Beach BLUE 2, prepared for embarkation aboard the U.S.S. PICKAWAY (APA 222). At 1500 the BLT went aboard an LSM and at 1700 the LSM tied up along side the U.S.S. PICKAWAY. At 1800 all hands were aboard, awaiting their return to camp.

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## SECTION V.

### COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

#### A. 81MM MORTARS:

1. It is recommended that a large increase in the unit of fire of H.E. Light be made. On the past operation the present unit of fire did not prove satisfactory. A more accurate Heavy H.E. shell would be helpful.
2. An 81mm mortar platoon should not be allowed to fire in the zone of another battalion, or over the heads of the troops of another battalion, unless specifically requested or permitted to do so by the units concerned.
3. In regard to the above, guns should be displaced to conform with the movement of assault troops. This is stated regarding angle of guns to front lines. It was noted that on IWO JIMA, it was the angle to the front lines rather than distance to the lines which necessitated the displacement of the guns.
4. It is strongly recommended that a mortar of larger caliber should replace the 81mm mortar in the infantry battalion. This could be a 4.2 mortar or a 155mm mortar and should remain under battalion control, as the 81mm mortar is at present. The present mortar platoon could man the new weapon by increasing its personnel and providing it with sufficient vehicles. The 81mm mortar is not needed for an operation similar to IWO JIMA, but a heavier mortar is definitely required. The 60mm mortars are more capable of handling all firing needed of light mortars. The difference between the 60mm and 81mm mortars is not great enough to require both in an infantry battalion. It is suggested that the 81mm mortar be dropped from the infantry battalion.

#### B. ROCKETS:

1. The 7.2 rocket proved to be a most effective weapon.

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Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.

Although fired only twice in our zone of action, it proved that it was capable of destroying enemy installations and position in a manner that no previous weapon was capable of doing. This weapon gave us heavy close in support. It fired close to our lines and permitted an advance to be through an area that was previously under heavy enemy fire.

2. It is recommended that the range of the 7.2 rocket be increased. It will be impossible to always find a position along the front lines from which it may be fired, yet this is mandatory under its present range.

3. It is recommended that the rockets be loaded near-by its firing area. It takes a vehicle considerable time to move to a rear area, reload the rockets, and to proceed back to the front lines.

C. ASSAULT PLATOON:

1. It is recommended that the assault (flamethrower-demolition) platoon be maintained in the battalion as it now stands. Its organization and equipment were sufficient. At all times this battalion had 27 flamethrowers serviceable and available, even though they were in constant use.

2. The operation proved that the Assault Platoon was sufficiently trained for its work in combat.

D. BATTALION AID STATION:

1. It is recommended that the battalion have 20 men assigned to the rifle companies during the day as litter bearers. This would speed up evacuation and leave the corpsmen free to do the job that they are trained to perform.

2. The Battalion Medical Section should have at least one trailer attached to ambulance jeep for the transportation of bulky gear as the aid station displaces forward. This will be necessary when fighting on a larger land mass.

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Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.

3. After each operation the shortage of corpsmen should be made up immediately to enable the corpsmen to work with rifle companies.

4. More transportation should be available for transportation of casualties from the aid station to the field hospital. When casualties are heavy it requires two or three jeeps to evacuate wounded from the front lines to the aid station. This leaves the aid station without means of transportation, to evacuate casualties to the hospital which are in need of immediate surgery. The results to the wounded are obvious.

E. INFANTRY:

1. BAR and rifle squad. It is recommended that the number of BAR's in the rifle squad be reduced from three to two (six per platoon). It is suggested that a rifle squad contain a squad leader and three fire groups of four men each. Two of the fire groups to remain as they are now, each with a BAR. The third fire group to be a scout group, the leader being second in command of the squad. The other three men of the group should be trained as scouts and snipers, equipped with M-1 rifles or O3's with telescopic sights. Two BAR's furnish sufficient fire power for a rifle squad. With inevitable early combat casualties, it is rarely possible to man 3 BAR's with EXPERT BAR MEN. Few marines ever became expert in this weapon, and when this weapon is in the hands of inexperienced men, several malfunctions and jams occur unnecessarily. It is better to have two good BAR men per squad than many poor ones. The scout-sniper group would be a great asset in the attack. The increase of O3's with telescopic sights would aid this group. In training the scout group would get special training in scouting and sniping, demolitions and the bazooka. The BAR group would be trained with emphasis on complete mastery of the BAR and would work as a team in regular squad or group tactics.

2. More live ammunition should be allotted for training, both for range work and for training purposes.

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Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.  
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Too much training with live ammunition cannot be had.

3. Companies, battalions, and regiments should definitely operate AS A UNIT with assigned zones of action for maximum efficiency in combat. The reasons are obvious. On the past operation this battalion was often split up. On one occasion we had one company on line, another company on line, but attached to BLT 2/24, and the third company in Regimental Reserve. By moving the company attached to BLT 2/24 to our left flank, this battalion could have operated as such. As it worked out we had one company only under our control with a battalion staff about equal to the size of the company attempting to run it.

4. Dawn attacks. Units participating in a dawn attack should be in position the previous day. They will thus have enemy positions and strongpoints picked out and be able to plan the attack with knowledge of the terrain. It is extremely difficult for units to take positions on the front during darkness and carry out an organized attack at daylight against known enemy opposition.

5. Replacements. The plan used in the IWO JIMA campaign was an emergency measure and not satisfactory. A disorganized unit cannot fight with much efficiency and the new men have not absorbed the spirit of the outfit they join. Many of the replacements hardly knew who their platoon leader or squad leader was before being killed or wounded. The replacements were not adequately trained for the type of fighting experienced on IWO JIMA, nor were they trained in the use of all infantry weapons.

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ANNEX A  
ABLE

ADMINISTRATION

1. PERSONNEL:

a. On 19 February, 1945 this landing team landed on IWO JIMA, VOLCANO ISLANDS, with the following number of personnel: 34 Marine Officers, 816 Marine enlisted, 2 Navy Officers, and 37 Navy enlisted.

b. On 27 February, 1945, 149 enlisted Marine replacements were received from Combat Team 24. The state of efficiency of the replacements received was very poor, this was due to their lack of training even in the basic principles of the combat infantryman. Of 149 replacements received, 21 were killed in action, and 73 wounded and evacuated.

c. It is believed if it were possible for combat units in the field to receive trained replacements, the amount of casualties among the replacements could be substantially reduced.

2. CASUALTIES:

a. The total number of casualties for the operation amounted to 693, broken down as follows: 140 killed in action, 478 wounded and evacuated, 30 sick and evacuated, and 15 wounded and not evacuated.

3. MORALE:

a. Morale at the beginning of the operation was excellent, as the operation progressed morale decreased considerable. This no doubt being due to the extreme physical exertion required to successfully combat the enemy, and the great amount of enemy mortar, artillery, and rocket fire received by our troops.

4. CIVIL AFFAIRS:

a. No civilians were encountered in the battalion zone of action and civil affairs personnel were not present.

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Annex Able Administration, Cont'd.

5. RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES:

a. On two occasions Catholic and Protestant services were conducted for members of the landing team. On each occasion the landing team was in a rest area and all personnel were afforded the opportunity to attend.

6. POST EXCHANGE:

a. The post exchange ration box (containing cigarettes, candy, matches, gum, tooth powder, shaving cream, razors, razor blades, and tooth brushes) furnished were sufficient except there was a noticeable shortage of tooth brushes, razors, and razor blades.

7. POSTAL:

a. Mail was received four (4) times during the operation, upon the receipt of mail it was found that practically all of the mail belonging to personnel in the rear echelon was included in the mail sent to the field. This causes unnecessary work on the part of postal personnel in the field, and also a great delay in the delivery of mail to the rear echelon. It is suggested that in the future competent personnel be left in the rear echelon to remedy this situation.

b. V-Mail blanks, stationery, and stamps were furnished by higher echelons, and all personnel were afforded the opportunity of writing and mailing letters daily. The procurement of stamps and stationery was very much appreciated by troops in the battalion.

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ANNEX BAKER

INTELLIGENCE

1. MAPS, PHOTOGRAPHS, AND SUPPLEMENTARY INTELLIGENCE:

a. Adequacy and completeness of maps.

(1) Adequate 1:00,000 T. A. maps were available prior to the operation. The 1:10,000 map was the only one used to any great extent.

(2) In our zone of action the map was inaccurate in so far as contour lines were concerned, rendering the map useless, except for network of roads, which was fairly accurate.

(3) The relief map was very useful for schooling personnel, but did not show excessive ruggedness of terrain.

(4) Oblique photographs of the beaches were fair. The verticals were good for the network of roads and picking out prominent terrain features.

b. Adequacy and completeness of maps and photographs during the operation.

(1) Reproduced Japanese maps were of little value to this battalion.

(2) Photographs furnished during the operation were of little value to us, because of our having passed through the area before the photos reached us. Some obliques were good.

c. Timeliness, effectiveness, sufficiency of intelligence disseminated to us by D-2.

(1) Periodic reports were helpful for the completeness of reports in other Regimental zones of action, and confirmed reports received by us from other sources.

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Baker Intelligence, Cont'd.  
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2. INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONING:

a. Collection of information.

(1) Two men were assigned to each front line company while available. All information gathered was returned to the command post at the first opportunity. An observation post was established when terrain afforded an advantageous position. O. P. was equipped with regular field telephone. The O. P. functioned very well until lack of personnel and difficulty of terrain rendered an O. P. almost useless. Documents turned in by men assigned to assault companies were interpreted by an enlisted interpreter attached from R-2, evaluated and all important documents were sent to R-2. Impertinent information from documents was given to us by R-2, we in turn passed it onto all of our units.

(2) We monitored the air net, obtaining locations of installations and troop movements aiding us in keeping the latest information on hand for our Commanding Officer and Operation Officer.

(3) There were no commissioned interpreters attached to our unit.

(4) There were no additional personnel attached to our unit.

(5) When our O. P. team could not, because of terrain, set up an O. P. they acted as a roving patrol, collecting documents, and counting the enemy dead.

3. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL:

a. Procedure of gathering documents and material.

(1) Procedure of gathering documents and material was very effective. Assigned to each company on the lines were two men from our unit.

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Annex Baker Intelligence, Cont'd.

(2) The line company personnel were very helpful in turning in dogtags, and other captured material, especially when they realized that an effort was made to return the same to them.

4. ENEMY:

a. Organization.

(1) Enemy organization was very good. All of their actions seemed to indicate well pre-arranged defensive organization.

(2) Lack of important documents indicated special security measures.

(3) The units were well disciplined.

(4) Our battalion encountered organized rifle companies supported by heavy and light mortars.

b. Tactics.

(1) Enemy tactics employed were typical Japanese delaying action tactics, utilizing terrain prepared positions.

(2) The blockhouses and pillboxes covered avenues of approach with interlacing machine gun and rifle fire. Supported by light and heavy mortars.

c. Equipment.

(1) 782 equipment was collected and turned into R-2 as ordered.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Commissioned Interpreter attached to each landing team.

b. Special schooling for men in the line companies,

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Annex B Intelligence, Cont'd.

explaining why dogtags and documents are collected, instead of the bulletin board order method.

c. Recommend the G. I. watches be issued to Bn-2 personnel who need them in their work.

d. Recommend that more duro-seal transparent covering for maps be issued to the battalions for the next operation.

e. Recommend that some system of tagging or marking the enemy dead be used, it would prevent recounting.

f. Recommend that O. P. be given an SCR 300 radio for communication.

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ANNEX CHARLIE

OPERATIONS

1. AVIATION:

a. This landing team received better air support on this operation than on all previous operations. We were able to call for more missions, and to have more missions performed than heretofore. However, on D + 1 one company of this landing team suffered heavy casualties when a friendly air strike was carried out on our front lines. This unit did not call for this mission. Our Air Liaison Officer observed the strikes this landing team requested from an O. P. located with one of the forward rifle companies. He was able to contact the planes direct and in this manner we were able to receive close in air support. On some days he observed as many as 5 air strikes.

2. NAVAL GUNFIRE:

a. This landing team received excellent naval gunfire support throughout the operation. On several occasions we were able to knock out enemy installations forward of our lines by fire from gunboats located close to shore on this landing team's right flank. When this landing team occupied the position of the right flank, we sent an NCO out to a gunboat. He was able to direct fire on predesignated targets.

3. ARTILLERY:

a. Artillery gave us excellent support throughout the operation when ammunition was available. On several occasions the missions requested could not be granted because of the shortage of artillery ammunition. Forward observers with this landing team did an outstanding job observing and directing close in fires. In some instances they went forward of the front lines to observe their fire. Artillery smoke shells were extremely helpful several times when the rifle companies had to evacuate wounded from the front lines under enemy fire.

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Annex Charlie Operations, Cont'd.

4. TANKS:

a. On IWO JIMA this landing team was unable to use tanks as formerly used in other operations. There was little need for infantry tank coordination. Only in 3 instances was this landing team able to use tanks. In all of the instances tanks were used for close in direct fire into pillboxes, forward of our lines. In each instance the tanks drew enemy mortar fire and were dispatched to rear areas immediately. Psychologically, tanks had opposite effect on the riflemen than they had on previous operations. Due to the fact that they always drew heavy fire when on or near the front lines or when in our zone of action the men were not anxious to see tanks coming up to help. Tanks were unable to obtain good positions for firing or for the use of their flame-throwers. This was entirely due to the type of terrain this landing team operated in throughout the operation.

5. ROCKETS:

a. This landing team was able to use rockets throughout the campaign. The Rocket detachment did an excellent job whenever performing a mission. They registered rapidly on designated targets, fired their rockets, and cleared the area immediately. In two instances we were able to use the 7.2 rocket. This rocket proved to be extremely effective, gave us close in heavy support, and was partly responsible for this landing team making an advance through an area previously heavily defended by the enemy. The tank hauling the load of heavy rockets drew heavy enemy mortar fire shortly after firing it's mission.

6. WAR DOGS:

a. At least one war dog team reported to each assault rifle company each day before dark for use by that company in it's tactical night defense. The dogs themselves did not prove to be too successful.

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Annex Charlie Operations, Cont'd.

In some instances they went to sleep and had to be constantly awakened. However, they did help as a morale factor, as the men felt they had a little added security, and there were times when the companies were so small that the appearance of a war dog and its handlers seemed like heavy reinforcements.

7. INFANTRY:

a. During the rehearsal exercises the infantrymen were well indoctrinated with their part of the ship to shore movement. Upon leaving PEARL HARBOR all troops received indoctrination in details of the operation. This was done by platoon leaders and company commanders holding school daily for their troops. A thorough study was made of all maps and intelligence information available. The men were constantly examined and found to be well versed in all details.

8. WEAPONS:

a. Flame Thrower.

(1) The flame throwers used by the landing team proved successful throughout the operation. They did an excellent job in working over pillboxes and caves. At all times we had 27 flame throwers available and ready for use.

(2) The tank flame throwers did not appear to have the long range hoped for, and because of the terrain the tanks were not able to get into positions from which they could fire effectively.

b. Bazookas.

(1) The bazooka was found to be quite effective against fortified installations. The bazooka was used throughout against enemy pillboxes and blockhouses. It usually resulted in partially closing the structure before demolitions were placed thereon.

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Annex Charlie Operations Cont'd.

c. Demolitions.

(1) This landing team used a 16 pound satchel charge against fortified installations throughout the campaign, and found it to be most effective.

9. ENEMY TACTICS:

a. This landing team did not encounter any new enemy tactics. The enemy appeared to be using all tactics that we have previously run up against.

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ANNEX DOG

LOG SUPPLY CASE

1. PLANNING AND PREPARATION:

a. The planning and preparation for the IWO JIMA operation was characterized by no radical change. More emphasis was placed on the use of camouflage materials, and in this landing team the need for hot coffee as soon as possible after D-Day, possibly D + 1. This was anticipated by pre-loading our 1 ton 4X4 truck with a few G. I. cans, coffee, sugar, cream, etc.

2. MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE:

a. Waterproof rifle covers were issued after our last maneuver to insure their good condition.

b. Enroute our list of weapons was laid down in table form and all ammunition requests and Quotas were plotted according to the U/F with a few modifications. All men carried as much as possible without sacrificing maneuverability. The same table form was set up for rations, pyrotechnics, preloaded jeeps, and preloaded LCVP's so that each organization knew exactly what it was going to receive and how it was to be disposed of.

c. Both our preloaded LCVP's were attended by men of the QM department who rode to the beach with same to insure accurate and safe delivery. They were accompanied by representatives of the companies whose task it was to oversee their extra machine guns and flame throwers aboard.

3. TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER:

a. The time consumed to load and embark troops and cargo was twenty-seven hours.

b. Difficulties encountered in loading:

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Annex Dog Supply, Cont'd, 3rd  
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(1) Incorrect unit personnel and tonnage tables.

(a) Units added some items of cargo without notifying the TQM.

(b) Some units failed to change line numbers on gear carried over from previous operations when old U.P.&T. tables were used. This completely disrupted loading plans as cargo was carried on the U.P.&T. tables differently from what it was actually marked.

(c) Failure to mark like items of equipment with the same line number was prevalent throughout organizations embarked. This is especially true of bulky items such as chemical warfare equipment which was found to be marked under line nine by one unit, line five in another, and line four in still another.

(2) Incorrect ship characteristics. Our plans had been completed when we discovered that the ship had taken over some cargo space which had been shown on the ship plans as being available for troop cargo. This necessitated a complete change with only a short time to revise our loading plans. It also caused last minute changes down to each unit and lot of unnecessary confusion.

c. The methods to overcome these difficulties seem obvious, namely correct U.P.&T. tables, proper marking of gear, and a check on ship characteristics.

d. Improvements over previous operations.

(1) The saving of time, energy, and space throughout by leaving seabags in the rear echelon was obvious.

e. Total elapsed time for unloading was six and one-half days with the actual time spent in unloading approximately thirty hours.

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Annex Dog Supply, Cont'd. Cont'd.

f. Difficulties encountered in unloading.

(1) Lack of cooperation from ship (APA-118).

(a) On D / 1 ship loaded small boats with vehicles and other gear which was not to be unloaded until called for by unit commanders or until orders for general unloading were given. No such orders were given.

(b) The ship did the same on following days even when the control vessel radioed that they could not handle small boats on the beach.

(c) The ship received a message to load an LCT with priority gear. Paying no attention to the order the ship loaded such items as low priority vehicles, and lowest of all gear aboard, baggage, with no thought in mind but to complete unloading.

(d) Practically none of the messages were cleared through the troop TQM. He saw no message authorizing general unloading. He was not allowed to send a message over ships radio to check against ships unloading plans.

(e) The troop TQM registered protests, but the ship continued unloading, and piling a lot of low priority gear on the beach long before it should have arrived in there.

(2) Two types of cargo tickets.

(a) The Navy and the Fourth Marine Division shore party each had a different form which resulted in a duplication of work. One form is sufficient and accomplishes the same purpose.

4. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT:

a. Adequacy of mounting out supplies.

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Annex Dog Supply, - Contpa. C-111

(1) Material in all five classes was adequate with the below exceptions.

(a) 81MM H.E. light ammunition.

b. Adequacy of resupply.

(1) Material in all 5 classes was adequate with the below exceptions.

(a) 81MM mortar ammunition (all types).

(b) 60MM mortar illumination shells.

(c) Illuminating hand grenades.

(d) Sand bags.

(e) Gasoline.

c. No Wilson Drums were used by this organization.

5. ORDANANCE:

a. Weapons.

(1) The following shows the number, type, and caliber of weapons used:

Pistol .45 cal.	33
Carbine, M-1, .30 cal.	449
BAR, .30 cal.	81
M-1 Rifle, .30 cal.	391
M.G. .30 cal., 1917A1	18
M.G. .30 cal., 1919A4	18
60mm mortars	13
81mm mortars	4
12 Gauge shot gun, auto.	25
Bazooka	9

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Annex Dog Supply, Cont'd.

b. Combat Vehicles.

(1) Number and type of combat vehicles used.

$\frac{1}{2}$ Ton 4X4 cargo.	7
$\frac{1}{2}$ Ton 2 wheel trailers.	6
$\frac{1}{2}$ Ton 4X4 Ambulance.	1
$\frac{1}{2}$ Ton 4X4 TCS.	2
1 Ton 4X4 Truck.	1

(2) These vehicles were engaged in 28 days of combat.

(3) The following vehicle was damaged beyond repair:

1 -  $\frac{1}{2}$  Ton 4X4 Ambulance.

(4) In contrast to our other operations, the battalion had adequate transportation in the IWO JIMA operation.

(5) The cargo carriers M 29c (weasel) was observed to be very satisfactory.

c. Ammunition.

(1) Problems of supply. The greatest problem of ammunition supply was the shortage of 81mm mortar shells, all types, 60mm mortar illuminating shells, and lastly illuminating grenades.

(2) Shell holes and craters were effectively used to store and dispense the battalion supply of ammunition.

(3) Recommended changes in U/F.

(a) Raise Quota of 60mm mortar illuminating from 10 to 20.

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Annex Dog Supply Cont'd.

d.

(b) 81mm mortar U/F should be:

- 100 rounds H.E. light.
- 30 rounds H.E. Heavy (demolition).
- 10 rounds smoke.

(4) We are greatly in need of a concussion or offensive grenade. These can be used for small charges by taping a few blocks of TNT to them. We are told that these grenades are no longer in production.

d. Miscellaneous Ordnance Equipment.

(1) Type Used, total.

(a) Flame throwers 27

(2) These were used in 26 days combat.

(3) One (1) flame thrower was lost.

e. Enemy Material.

(1) Weapons salvaged.

3 7.7 LMG.  
2 6.5 LMG.  
10 .302 cal rifles.

(2) Vehicles. A Jap truck, 4 wheeled, with a long wooden bed, 6 cylinders. The performance was fair.

(3) Ammunition. Several rounds of Japanese 81mm mortar was captured. Seven (7) of these were fired, three (3) of them being mis-fires. The shells had been too long exposed to the elements.

6. SALVAGE:

a. Salvage was a continuous necessity during the operation. The companies collected all gear in

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Annex Dog Company, Cont'd. Cont.

their areas daily, and returned same to the battalion salvage dump. The battalion turned into salvage, and to Regiment approximately 30 jeep trailer loads of salvaged gear in the form of 782 gear, ammunition, weapons, etc. It must be noted however that much of this gear originally belonged to other outfits in the area.

b. Many times, our daily quota of H.E. ammunition was augmented by salvaging nearby small piles of abandoned material. This was particularly true of 60mm mortar ammunition and grenades.

7. MEDICAL:

a. Supplies.

(1) The supplies provided by the medical battalion were adequate throughout the operation. Resupplies were taken care of by ambulance and jeep drivers at the shore party early in the operation, and later from the Division Hospital. Extra supplies were provided by Combat Team 24.

b. Transportation and vehicles.

(1) Two ambulance jeeps are furnished for the battalion, these afford space for landing most supplies. If a trailer was allotted to each battalion aid section, the problem of transporting gear would be simplified. For the first three days casualties were moved by hand carry; after that jeeps moved them from the lines to the hospital. There was often a delay in evacuation because of lack of transportation, a third jeep was used and at time even that was not enough. LVT's evacuated a small percentage of casualties the first three days.

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Annex Dog Supply, Cont'd.

8. BURIAL:

a. It was found that the S.O.P.'s on burial and identification of dead distributed by Division and Regiment prior to the operation worked very well if followed closely.

b. At no time was a shortage of transportation for the removal of bodies apparent. Division and Regimental Combat Team burial parties were well instructed in their duties, and very cooperative throughout the operation.

9. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Supply communication maintained by 300 radios and by wire was very efficient.

b. P.X. rations were sufficient, however there is never enough tooth brushes and razors in this ration. Tooth brushes should be brought in bulk, and issued for their natural purpose and for cleaning weapons. At times, men lose their packs in which they keep cleaning gear and toilet articles.

c. It is recommended that the policy of issuing pistols for use by radio men, bazooka men, and flame thrower men be continued.

d. It is recommended that a cargo carrier M29c (weasel) be issued to each battalion.

e. Our sufficiency of transportation was mainly due to our 1 ton 4X4 truck. This should be continued.

f. The policy of issuing blankets due to the weather was a very successful expedient.

g. The supply of 10 in 1 rations, fruit juices, and new "C" rations was an improvement and a great morale builder as was the supply of coffee, milk, and sugar.

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Annex Log Supply, Cont'd. 0 1 1.

h. This landing team being a part of the reserve Combat Team our floating dump LCVP's followed our boat waves into the beach on the afternoon of D-Day. Unfortunately, however, there being no beach set-up in the shore party at that time to unload the craft, the LCVP's had to pull out before a working party could be mustered.

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ANNEX EASY

COMMUNICATION

1. RADIO COMMUNICATIONS:

a. All necessary radio nets were manned early in the morning aboard ship on D-Day. When ordered to land, the Landing Team Commander proceeded to the designated control vessel. With him was the following radio equipment for use as indicated.

- 1 SCR-610 Regimental voice net.
- 1 MZ (TCS) Special purpose net.
- 2 SCR-300 (1 for the Regimental voice net and the other on the battalion command net).

b. All radio equipment functioned in an excellent manner and gave the Landing Team Commander necessary communications with all higher and lower echelons.

c. Upon landing, personnel quickly reorganized, and proceeded to the C.P. with all communication gear. We were not informed that vehicles could not land because of beach conditions. We landed with two (2) TCS radio jeeps, which received considerable damage on the beach. It was D + 6 before both radio jeeps were available within the C.P. During this time TBX's were employed and proved worthy.

d. The SCR 300 radios were manned by the Signal Corporals of the rifle companies. They did an excellent job throughout the entire operation. These men were trained at base camp to be radio operators. This increased the radio personnel needed within the battalion command post.

e. The SCR-610 provided excellent communication throughout the operation.

f. The SCR-536 was employed within rifle companies and proved to be very effective in controlling platoons within the company. Some interference was received on this set from friendly units. This interference was due to the limited number of frequencies available.

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Annex Easy Communication; Cont'd.  
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g. The Division Reconnaissance Net proved to be of great value to the Landing Team Commander and his staff. He was able to gather information, and also had direct contact with the plane. This net was remote controlled to the Landing Team Intelligence Section for information purposes.

h. During the entire operation very little difficulty was encountered with radios. Normal operation problems arose, but were quickly repaired by the signal repairmen or sent to the Combat Team or Division Signal Supply. These sets were either repaired or new ones were drawn. Jamming was noted on two occasions, but did not interfere with communications.

i. When attached to the landing team, supporting arms such as tanks, armored amphibian tanks, and rocket detachments were afforded excellent communication, by coming upon the landing team SCR-300 net.

2. WIRE COMMUNICATIONS:

a. Wire Communication was excellent throughout the entire operation, and telephone communication was maintained with all subordinate, attached and adjacent units continuously. This is partly due to the excellent cooperation between wire sections and this cooperation must be maintained.

b. Telephone Communication was a much overloaded agency and therefore required laying of laterals whenever possible. This overloading was unnecessary and many conversations were too long and unjustified.

c. Wire lines from the battalion to the companies were continuous (due to the slowness of the attack). They became long and over-extended at times; however, the practice of using W-110 wire to companies whenever possible as well as careful laying of lines off roads and through broken terrain kept trouble to a minimum.

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Annex Easy Communication, Cont'd.  
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Mortar Wire Communication to the Landing Team Mortar OP's, supplemented by the SCR-300, provided the 81MM Mortar Constant Control and maximum use. At night sound powered phones were installed to rifle platoons for communication with the Company C.P. The 60MM Mortar Platoon used sound powered equipment constantly.

d. The present switchboard is too heavy for an infantry battalion and does not accommodate the necessary wire lines. Many times we had two (2) switchboards within the C.P., and still had to party some lines. A lighter switchboard, with at least ten (10) drops would solve this problem.

e. "H1" speed W.-130 wire was used, and proved unsatisfactory, because of its bulky package. It would be more useful if wound in one-half mile coils.

f. W-130 wire on DR-8 proved worthy, but it is advisable that one-half mile be issued to the drum. This saves considerable time when in the field.

3. MESSAGE CENTER:

a. Message Center operation was normal and there was very little or no delay in clearing traffic. The shackle code authenticator system was used and proved effective. The personnel were adequately trained in signal security. There were very few violations on radio nets, but schools for officers and senior non-commissioned officers must continue stressing procedure and radio security.

4. SIGNAL SUPPLY:

a. This landing team took as much resupply of signal equipment ashore as possible, and remaining supplies were under a high priority. When supplies were needed we were able to draw from Regiment or Division Signal Supply. The most critical items were batteries and wire, and the resupply problem was excellent from the higher units.

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Annex Easy Communication, Cont'd.

When the wire jeep and trailer were ashore the supply problem was partially solved. We were then able to draw from our own supply dump throughout the entire operation.

5. TELEGRAPH:

a. The Telegraph Set, TG-5, was not used on this operation. There is a trend toward voice operation and other means, which are more convenient.

6. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO COMMUNICATIONS:

a. All units were very careful in not damaging wire lines, and this eliminated much trouble.

b. "Hi" speed W-130 wire is unsatisfactory in its present package. It would be more useful if wound in one-half coils.

c. A smaller and lighter switchboard should be designed for an infantry battalion. The present one is too large and does not have a sufficient number of drops. Would suggest that it should have at least ten (10) drops to insure sufficient number of wire lines needed.

d. Each regiment should have different SCR-4536 frequency channels for its companies.

e. DR-8 reels should be issued with one-half mile wire W-130. This would save much time that is required to service this wire in the field.

f. Recommend that Navajo talkers be sent to the battalion.

g. Lateral wire lines be laid between posts when the distances are not too great.

h. Schools must be held for the officers and senior non-commissioned officers stressing procedure, and radio security.

i. The allotment of personnel is adequate.

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75  
78

1 MARCH 5 MARCH  
2 MARCH 6 7 8 MARCH  
3 MARCH 9 MARCH  
4 MARCH 16 17 MARCH

22 FEB 23 FEB  
19 FEB 24 25 FEB  
20 FEB 21 FEB  
73  
80

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CO  
1<sup>ST</sup> BN 4<sup>TH</sup> MARINE B  
OVERLAY SHOWING POSITIONS  
OCCUPIED ON IWO JIMA  
SCALE 1:20,000  
10 APRIL 45

*I. Schechter*  
I. SCHECHTER  
MAJOR USMC S-3

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1975/RR-1mp

HEADQUARTERS,  
SECOND BATTALION, TWENTY-FOURTH MARINES,  
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,  
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

19 April, 1945.

**From:** The Commanding Officer.  
**To:** The Commanding Officer, Twenty-Fourth Marines.  
**Subject:** Final Report on IWO JIMA Operation, submission of.  
**Reference:** (a) Division SOP No. 1-45, dtd 8Feb45.  
**Enclosure:** (A) Final Report on IWO JIMA Operation, Battalion Landing Team 2/24.

1. The following report covering the activities of Battalion Landing Team 2/24 during the IWO JIMA Operation, is herewith submitted.

*R. Rothwell*  
R. ROTHWELL.

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SECTION I

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

A. TASK ORGANIZATION; BLT 2/24 --

Company "E", 24th Marines - Major R. E. Carey, USMC  
Company "F", 24th Marines - Captain W. J. Ridlon, Jr., USMCR  
Company "G", 24th Marines - Captain J. J. McCarthy, USMCR  
BLT 2/24 Support - Major C. C. Berkeley, Jr., USMCR  
81mm Mortar Platoon  
Bn Assault and Demolitions Platoon  
2d 37mm Platoon, R/Wpns  
Det, 1st JASCO  
F.O. Parties, 3/14  
Det, Co "B", 4th Med Bn  
Det, 2d Band Section

B. PLANNING:

Planning, training, and rehearsals for the operation were carried out concurrently.

C. TRAINING AND REHEARSAL:

1. OCTOBER

27th: Battalion Landing Team Commanders were briefed and received the RCT order on a problem known as "Island X". Only units of the Fourth Marine Division named; other organizations designated by letters "X" and "Y". The initial RCT order contained a Division Intelligence Annex. Map was an identical but abbreviated map of the Target, overprinted with enemy dispositions. No title on map except Island "X". Battalion Landing Team Orders, including Boat Assignment Table and Landing Diagram submitted.

30th: Now knowing the nature of terrain of the Target, i.e. open and devoid of cover, Division CPX was conducted including all unit headquarters down to and including the infantry battalion. The CPX was mainly an exercise of camouflage discipline for the various command posts and served to start immediate thought in that direction.

2. NOVEMBER

5th: Division CPX - all unit headquarters including infantry battalions participated. Map problem; held in offices. Used orders of Island "X" Problem.

9th: Corps CPX (Same as on 5th).

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Planning and Preparation, Cont'd.  
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10th: Regimental CPX in the field based on Island "X" problem. Battalion Headquarters participated.

15th: Battalion Field Maneuver, combined arms (air, artillery, tanks, half tracks, etc.), based on Island "X" problem. Battalion formed in boat teams, simulated a landing, went into an assembly area, simulated relief of a front line battalion, continuing the attack with combined arms. The exercise was carried out on terrain which was thought approximated that of Island "X".

28, 29 & 30th: Rehearsal landings on Island of Maui, T.H. First and second days, RCT Landing Exercises. Each BLT made one landing in LVT's and one landing in LCVP's. Third day a rehearsal landing and maneuver of Island "X" was conducted. Overlays of Island "X", including Airfield No. 1, overprinted on Maui Map. Control and conduct of landing craft in accordance with Island "X" Problem.

3. DECEMBER

10th: Battalion Landing Team Commanders received copy of First Tentative Draft of final Division Operation Plan for their information. Same as Island "X" Order, except island now called "W....."; certain annexes were added, and all participating units named.

27th: Received Regimental Order for Rehearsal based on First Tentative Draft of final Division Operation Plan. BLT orders for rehearsal written. Imaginary island of "M....." used for Rehearsal. Overlays of a portion of the the imaginary island of "W....." with airfields, overprinted on Maui Map. Airfield No. 1 and portion of "W....." Island staked out on ground.

28th: BLT Commanders received First Tentative Draft, Regimental Order based on Division Order, Tentative Draft.

4. JANUARY

3rd: Received complete set of Division and Regimental Orders, maps, overlays and latest photographs. Order identical to "W....." but with additional annexes. Iwo Jima named. BLT Commanders directed not to distribute information on same until leaving Hawaiian Area. Battalion order for attack on Iwo Jima drafted. Practically identical to previous orders.

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Planning and Preparation, Cont'd.  
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12th-17th: Participated in rehearsal landing and maneuvers ashore in accordance with Rehearsal Order which was identical to "W..... Order" and the Final Order. Maneuver ashore on the 15th involved 4th and 5th Divisions. On 17th, rehearsal fires of rocket 101's, mortars, naval gunfire and air support carried out. During latter exercise troops were embarked in landing craft but did not land. NGF liaison parties landed and conducted firing problems. Final Division Order studied by certain members of Battalion Staff during rehearsal period.

27th: After departing from Hawaiian Area, on 27 January, the operation plan naming Two Lima as the objective was issued to certain leaders together with air photographs of enemy dispositions up to the 9th of January. All ranks were now informed and briefed. Maps and intelligence summaries were issued to officers. Air photographs were circulated. Briefing was carried out by means of relief maps on which enemy dispositions had been marked. Very full beach reports and panoramas of beaches were exhibited in various parts of the ship. Boat officers were also briefed.

5. FEBRUARY

11th-13th: Final Rehearsal Landing at Tinian. A full dress rehearsal was carried out. Latest information of enemy dispositions and latest air photographs were received and issued. Special Landing Instructions were made out and issued to every man taking part in the operation.

SECTION II

MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE

A. REHABILITATION:

Our stay at Pearl Harbor was devoted entirely to liberty and recreational periods ashore as prescribed by Corps.

B. SHIP-BOARD TRAINING:

The ship board training was conducted in the same manner as on the previous operation - debarkation drills, physical exercises, weapons and equipment inspections, and upon departing from the Hawaiian Area, a thorough briefing of all officers and men. A maximum effort was devoted to provide movies and entertainment for the officers and men during non-working hours.

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Movement to Objective, Cont'd.  
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C. FORWARD AREA REHEARSAL:

A repetition of previous rehearsals held in the Hawaiian Area was conducted at Tinian. No apparent training value was believed to have been added to the troops of this unit by this repetition. This unit, however, was a BLT of the Division Reserve.

SECTION III

SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT

This Battalion Landing Team was a landing team of the Division Reserve, and consequently, landed on call. The method of its landing and control was accomplished in a similar manner as had been done with reserve units in previous operations.

SECTION IV

NARRATIVE OF OPERATION

19 February, 1945 -- D Day

1420 - Orders received to debark troops and proceed to Line of Departure.

1439 - First wave proceeded to debarkation stations.

1440 - Order issued to lower away all boats.

1505 - Troops began debarking from U.S.S. MELLETTE (APA-156).

1545 - Order received from C.O. 24th Marines to land on Beach Yellow 2 as soon as possible. Transmitted to company commanders.

1615 - Battalion Commander reported to Control Boat off Beach Yellow 2 for orders. BLT 2/24 was ordered to land on Beach Yellow 2, pass through and relieve BLT 2/23, gain contact left and right, dig in and consolidate front line positions for the night on the airfield.

1620 - First wave arrived at Line of Departure.

1630 - Fourth Wave dispatched from Line of Departure to Beach Yellow 2.

1635 - C.O. BLT 2/24 transmitted orders to all elements of BLT 2/24 via radio or voice prior to landing of waves on beach.

1650 - All waves of BLT 2/24 landed on Beach Yellow 2.

1710 - All company commanders and unit leaders of BLT contacted by Battalion Commander. Orders issued for the relief

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

of BLT 2/23 and the consolidation of front line positions for the night. BLT 2/24 attached to 23rd Regiment upon landing.

1800 - Passage of lines and relief of BLT 2/23 completed; contact gained with BLT 3/23 on the left and BLT 1/25 on the right. Order of companies left to right: Fox, George, with Easy in reserve. Front lines left to right 165 L (SU), G(SE) diagonally through H from (SW) to (NE) parallel to landing strip, beach side. Easy in reserve at 165L (C). C.P. at 165 L (SC).

Initial resistance, heavy enemy mortar, rocket, and artillery fire. Machine gun and rifle fire encountered along front line positions.

Reorganization of BLT 2/24 immediately after landing was complete and rapid. Movement from the beach to front line positions of the night, 700 yards inland, was speedily accomplished with a minimum of casualties.

NGF furnished (8) eight starr shells per hour for night illumination; adjustment point 182V. 600 rounds of (5") five inch NGF harassing fires were placed in 164 E, 165 A, and 182 V.

Direct support artillery not yet landed.

81mm mortars set up in 165 Q, with 265 rounds available at the guns.

No air missions called for due to darkness.

Both front lines and C.P. subjected to intermittent enemy mortar, artillery, machine gun, and rifle fire throughout the night.

CASUALTIES:						TOTAL	RET	FR	RET	FR	TOTAL	TOTAL
	KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NON	EFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF	EFF
OFF:	1					1						35
ENL:	2	13	3			18						843

REMARKS:

Waves were dispatched from Line of Departure by Naval Officer on Control Craft before BLT Commander returned from Control Boat with his orders. The hasty dispatch of this BLT from the Line of Departure by Naval Officer on Control Craft may have caused complications had the BLT Commander's radio communications failed even momentarily.

20 February, 1945 -- D/ 1 Day

Heavy intermittent enemy large caliber mortar, artillery, machine gun and rifle fire received throughout the night.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.  
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Orders received to continue the attack at 0800 in conjunction with BLT 1/25 on the right and 3/23 on the left. Boundaries same, objective, O-A. Remained attached to 23rd Regiment. Air and NGF support requested and provided for by Regiment. Tank support provided initially to 3/23; after adjustment of lines, one platoon of tanks passed to control of 2/24. Initially, the direction of attack swung from West to North.

Attack jumped off at 0800 with George on the right and Fox company on the left. Easy in reserve following Fox at 300 yards. Initially, the attack swung from West to North with Fox and George Companies moving rapidly across the NE-SW air strip against heavy enemy resistance from bunkers, pillboxes, and high velocity flat trajectory 47mm guns in covered emplacements. Tanks could not be used after the first hour due to the character of the terrain and mined approaches thereto.

Small advance patrols reached 182 V W (S) by 1600 and covered the consolidation of the front lines, which dug in for the night along a line through the central portion of 165 A B and C. Order of companies left to right - Fox and George; Easy in reserve along beach side of air strip. Front lines left to right from 165 A (SE) through B (C) to C (WC) through C to C (SE). In contact with 2/23 on left and 1/25 on right. C.P. 165 L (SC) O.P. 165 H (NC).

Assault squads employing demolitions and flame throwers, were used throughout the days fighting to assist the companies in the elimination of bunkers and pillboxes, a number of which were destroyed.

Progress was slow but steady against heavy enemy resistance, consisting of mortar, artillery and 47mm high velocity fire. Cross fires of machine guns from covered emplacements, coupled with intense and accurate rifle fire impeded the advance. Total advance 300 yards.

NGF furnished 8 star shells per hour for night illumination; adjustment point 182 R. 600 rounds of 5" fired on enemy artillery, rocket and mortar targets in 182 T, 183 Q, and 182 O; fire was ground adjusted. 500 rounds of 5" NGF night harassing fires were fired in 182 N, L, M.

Direct support artillery landed, and night defensive fires registered in 182 V, W, X (S), 165 A, B, C, (N).

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

81mm mortars adjusted at 0700 and fired 100 rounds preparation before jump off in 165 G, F, B and C. Registered night defensive fires at 1700 in 165 A, B, and C (N). No harassing fires laid down due to lack of ammunition - only 150 rounds at guns. One 81mm mortar knocked out by direct hit of enemy rocket.

Air missions asked for but none received other than those called by Regiment and Division.

CASUALTIES:						TOTAL	RET	FR	TOTAL	TOTAL
	KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NON EFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF
OFF:		2				2				35
ENL:	11	46	7			64				779

REMARKS:

Beaches and avenues of approach to front lines under mortar and artillery fire. Nontracked vehicles able to navigate through loose sand. Supply problem acute due to shortage and necessity for employing carrying parties for all supplies from beach to front lines. 37mm guns and half-tracks could not be used because of poor fields of fire and lack of routes of approach to firing positions. Had it not been possible to obtain a company from the reserve battalion of the 23rd Marines to act as carrying party for supplies, it would have been practically impossible to have supplied from line companies on this day.

21 February, 1945 -- D+2 Day

Heavy mortar, rocket, artillery, machine gun, and rifle fire received throughout the night. Hand grenade fights were reported all along the front lines.

King Hour changed to 0810. Artillery and NGF preparation from K-20 to K/20. Air strike plan Victor from K/20 to K/40. Present boundaries extended from 199 X to RJ 304 A in 199 E, exclusive, then to corner of airfield at 217 M. Boundaries between Regiments - extend present boundary to north 183 D along unimproved road through 201 U, V, W, and X, to 200 east of 201 O it crosses to 23rd Marines. Boundary between battalions - modify present boundary forward of O-1 and extend forward as follows; From O-1 at 199 Y (NE) along north edge of runway airfield #2 to RJ. Left boundary between 200 I and J it crosses to 2/24 then NE to RJ 330 A in 201 F it crosses to 2/24 and to O-2 at intersection with boundary between 201 A

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

and B. Objective O-2. 0630 Battalion Commander met company commanders at 165 B. Made reconnaissance on the ground, established an O.P. 165 B (SW), where orders were issued to the company commanders.

Tanks could not be used initially by either Fox or George Companies because of terrain and mined areas in 165 A, G, H, and 182 U, V, sufficiently to permit tanks to support Fox Company by fire shortly after jump off at 0810. Initially, the battalion, with Fox on the left, George on the right and Easy in reserve, jumped off at 0810 preceded by air, NGF, artillery, and a 180 round 81mm mortar preparation, the latter placed on suspected close-in enemy positions. The attack progressed slowly against extremely heavy machine gun cross fires from numerous pillboxes and bunkers. Enemy rifle fire was steady and accurate. The entire battalion front and reserve areas received heavy mortar, rocket, artillery, and high velocity flat trajectory fire. Assault teams employing demolitions and flame throwers were used steadily throughout the day's fighting. As the attack progressed, Easy Company was placed to the right rear of George Company to regain and maintain contact with 1/25. One 37mm gun was manhandled from below the airstrip, up over the embankment, across the airstrip, to the top of a revetment in 165 C, to aid George Company. Once in position, this gun was very effective in knocking out pill boxes in 165C and 182 W, but drew so much enemy artillery and 47mm fire on Easy Company troops in the vicinity, that it was ordered to cease firing as soon as its fire was masked by George Company's advance.

Battalion C.P. displaced to 165 G (NC) at 0820, and was under mortar and artillery fire intermittently throughout the day and night. From 1320 to 1515 the C.P. was under constant heavy artillery fire.

A gap of 75 yards developed between 3/23 and Fox Company's left flank. Enemy machine gun and rifle fire in this gap was of such accuracy and intensity, that three men attempting to crawl across it in daylight were killed. One platoon of Easy Company (battalion reserve) with a machine gun section attached, filled the gap under cover of darkness.

Front lines consolidated, contact gained on right initially, on left after dark, and dug in for night at 1800. Order

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

of companies left to right - 1 platoon of Easy Company with machine gun section attached, Fox and George. Easy in reserve to George Company's right rear. Front lines left to right - 182 U (SE) V (SW) TO V (EC) through W (C). C.P. at 165 G (NC). Days advance, 225 Yards.

No NGF, air, or 81mm mortar support on targets of opportunity except that controlled by Division or Corps.

NGF furnished 8 star shells per hour for night illumination; adjustment point, 182 M. 500 rounds of 5" NGF harassing fires in 199 L, M, N, R, S, T, and 200 A, B, F, G, H, E, R, S, T, W, X, and Y.

Direct support artillery registered in defensive fires in 182 V, W, X, N, O, R, S, (S). No record of harassing fires.

81mm mortars registered and fired 105 rounds harassing fires in 182 V, W.

CASUALTIES:						TOTAL	RET	FR	RET	FR	TOTAL	TOTAL
	KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NON	EFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF	EFF
OFF:	3	1	1			5		1		1		29
ENL:	14	54	8			76						703

REMARKS:

A high percentage of officers and experienced line NCO's are becoming casualties. Supply situation not improved. 81mm mortar ammunition critical. Carrying parties still necessary for transport of critical supplies to front lines. Evacuation of casualties very hazardous and difficult requiring large number of stretcher bearers. Casualties have to be carried from front lines to beach, a distance of approximately 1100 yards. Shortage of stretchers require the use of blankets and ponchos for removing wounded to beach.

22 February, 1945 -- D/3 Day

The enemy attempted infiltration at many points along the entire front lines, and in one instance a small group succeeded in penetrating the lines of an adjacent unit to the left of Fox Company. This group attacked Fox Company's rear elements but were driven off, suffering some casualties. The enemy was successful in putting a grenade launcher (knee mortar) into

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Relative Operation, Cont'd.

action in the rear of our front lines. This mortar was very effective, and caused some casualties before it was silenced.

Enemy mortar, rocket, artillery and machine gun fire harassed positions both of the front line and rear elements in the battalion zone of action, throughout the night, causing a number of casualties.

Hand grenade fights were numerous along the front lines.

Orders were received that the 2/24 would be passed through at dawn, by 2/21.

2/21 completed the passage of lines at 1200. BLT 2/24 was relieved and reverted to parent control, moving to an assembly area in 165 E, I and J. Companies were disposed in an area defense. C.P. at 165 I.

The entire passage of lines was hindered by harassing enemy 47mm, mortar and artillery fire, which caused a number of casualties.

An air mission was asked for and obtained in 201 I and O on suspected locations of enemy artillery and mortar positions. The mission came in quickly and effectively reduced the fire being received from that area.

Artillery F.O.'s laid down an almost continual barrage on suspected enemy artillery and mortar positions while the relief was being effected.

A warning order was received notifying 2/24 to the effect that it was anticipated 2/24 would relieve 1/25 in the line prior to 0600 the following day.

Companies were reorganized, supplies issued, and troops rested during the afternoon.

Routes of approach to, and the position of units on the front lines of 1/25 were reconnoitered and guides oriented. The Battalion Commander, and certain members of the staff, made a reconnaissance of the 1/25 zone of action. Unit leaders were oriented, and orders issued for relief.

CASUALTIES:		TOTAL		TOTAL				
KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	NON EFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF
OFF:	1			1				28
ENL:	1	18	7	26		1	1	678

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.  
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REMARKS:

Notwithstanding the heavy casualties incurred during the previous three days fighting, the spirit and morale of officers and men remains excellent. The spirit of cooperation between units is visibly improved, and superior to that noted in previous operations.

23 February, 1945 -- D / 4 Day

Occasionally long range machine gun fire and an occasional enemy mortar round fell into, or in the vicinity of, the assembly area during the night.

The battalion moved out of the assembly area in 165 E, I and J at 0400. Order of companies - forward echelon of C.P., George, Easy, and Fox. Relief of 1/25 effected under cover of darkness and completed by 0600.

Attack jumped off at 0730. Order of companies - George on left, Easy on right, Fox following the attack at 300 yards. The attack was preceded by a 20 minute artillery preparation and 175 rounds of 81mm mortar fire. Front lines at jump off - 182 S, T (S), adjusted just prior to jump off from 182 X, Y (N). C.P. displaced to 165 E (NC). Contact was gained with Able Company 1/21 on left, and Item Company 3/24 on right. Contact with Item Company was maintained throughout the attack but was constantly broken with Able Company 1/21 in order to advance.

Initial resistance to the direct front consisted of a strong defensive line of pill boxes and bunkers from which heavy machine gun cross fires impeded the advance. On the left flank of the battalion zone of action, the taxi-way between Airfield No. 1 and 2 running through 182 W, X, S, R, M, N, H, I, was flanked by bunkers and pill boxes. These bunkers and pill boxes enfiladed the assault companies by fire.

Tanks were employed to knock out pill boxes and bunkers, these being indicated to the tanks as targets by tracers fired by the infantry. Initially, the assault teams employed demolitions and flame throwers to knock out four bunkers to George Company's front, before the company could move the first thirty yards to permit the use of tanks.

The attack progressed slowly from one reinforced concrete pill box or sand and log covered bunker to the next, for 300 yards.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

Tanks encountered a large mine field by 1100 and were unable to move farther until a lane was cleared by engineers; this took until late afternoon. Lane cleared from RJ 184 to RJ 244 thence to CR 249.

Lines were consolidated at 1700 when 1/21 suddenly, and without notice, withdrew back and left, creating a 200 yard gap. It was necessary to commit Fox Company in the line to fill the gap. One platoon of George Company was ordered to maintain contact with Able Company 1/21 throughout the latter's withdrawal, remaining on the left flank. The Battalion Commander proceeded to the front lines and the battalion left flank, where he was able to supervise and expedite the contact and tying in of the lines. Companies in line left to right. One platoon George Company, Fox Company, George Company (less one platoon) and Easy Company. Front lines left to right - 182 R (NE) to (SW) below CR 263 to 182 N (SW) to (SE), 182 O (SW) to (EC), 183 K (WC) to (NE) I (NW) to (NE).

Days advance 300 yards. George Company, 25th Marines attached to 2/24 at 1610 to use as carrying party and stretcher bearers.

No NGF, or Air available for support of the attack. Direct Support Artillery and Corps Artillery for deep support missions very limited but available in insufficient quantity. 81mm mortar ammunition critical - only 300 rounds available at guns. NGF night illumination 8 star shells per hour; adjusting point 200 V. 500 rounds NGF night harassing fires. 250 rounds fired in 200 K, L, M, N, O; 250 rounds fired in 200 C, D, E, H, and I.

Intermittent heavy enemy rocket and mortar, and sporadic enemy artillery fire fell in front lines and battalion zone of action to the rear.

Artillery and 81mm mortar defensive fires registered in prior to dark. Artillery and NGF harassing fires arranged. Artillery ammunition so limited that it is believed that their harassing fires were not very effective.

CASUALTIES:				TOTAL	RET	FR	RET	FR	TOTAL	TOTAL
KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NON	EFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF
3	15	6			24				28	654

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

REMARKS:

Direct air support unavailable - could have been used to good effect. The limited amount of direct artillery support, due to lack of ammunition, resulted in unusually heavy enemy opposition, which had to be neutralized by infantry. Lack of deep support Corps Artillery, and NGF, permitted enemy rocket, mortar and artillery to fire more frequently and effectively, thus impeding the advance of attacking elements. One enemy plane flew over island. One man in C.P. injured by falling flak.

24 February, 1945 -- D / 5 Day

Long range machine gun fire from Airfield No. 2 harassed front line elements throughout the night. Intermittent enemy mortar and artillery fire fell in the battalion area causing no casualties. A number of the enemy attempted infiltration of Easy Company, and threw small anti-personnel mines and grenades toward the front lines, causing a few casualties, but made no penetrations.

Orders were received from Regiment for 2/24 to attack at King Hour (0915) in conjunction with 3/24 on right and 3/21 on the left and seize Division Ol-A in zone of action. One platoon of Baker Company, 4th Engineer Battalion attached to 2/24; other attachments normal. Regimental Weapons and Rockets remain under Regimental control.

A reconnaissance having been made, the Battalion Commander issued in substance, the following orders:-

"Fox Company (1 platoon George Attached) will move forward on the left at King Hour which is 0915 and proceed forward with 3/21 on their left until they uncover George Company on the right. Maintain contact with 3/21. George Company (less detachments) will then move forward on the right of Fox Company until Easy Company is passed. Easy Company will at that time revert to Battalion Reserve and take position in rear of George Company and remain in that position until further orders. Objective Ol-A. Attack will be preceded by naval gunfire, artillery preparation, and air strikes. An assault and demolition squad attached to each assault company (Fox and George) initially.

The attack, preceded by a rocket mission and a 150 round 81mm mortar preparation in addition to NGF, air and artillery,

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

Jumped off at 0915.

The attack progressed rapidly at first, particularly on the left flank. 3/21 moved out rapidly and in so doing shifted right, to its proper right boundary. This movement pinched out all of Fox Company except one squad and the attached platoon (1st) of George Company. Fox Company (less detachments) was then ordered to follow the attack on the left at 300 yards, in reserve, and be prepared to move back into any gap that might develop on the left. (Easy Company still in Battalion Reserve on the right.) The first platoon of George Company reverted to parent control and the one squad of Fox Company attached to George. As the attack progressed, George Company uncovered Easy Company, and then shifted right to contact Item Company of 3/24 on the right, creating a gap between George and the 3/21, which gap was filled by Fox Company; Easy Company was now alone in reserve in its position of the night before.

This readjusting of lines had been completed by 1120. Opposition up to this time had been medium to heavy machine gun and rifle fire, from the vicinity of Airfield No. 2, and Charlie-Dog Hill (183CD). Companies had progressed to within 100 yards of the base of Charlie-Dog Hill, (183 CD), 150 yards of the base of the NE-SW airstrip of Airfield No. 2. (183A, B, G, H). 3/21 shifted left, and lost contact with Fox Company. Fox Company sent out patrols to regain contact.

At 1125 the enemy on Charlie-Dog Hill (183CD) opened up from a number of strongly reinforced concrete emplacements. Troops received heavy machine gun, rifle, anti-tank, anti-aircraft airbursts, and artillery fire. All but artillery, AA, and some machine gun fire coming from Charlie-Dog Hill (183CD).

Air, NGF, and artillery support requested. Only meager artillery support received, and Air and NGF refused because front lines were less than 600 yards from target. 81mm mortar ammunition down to 400 rounds.

A preparation consisting of 175 rounds of 81mm mortar, 60mm mortar, and a five minute artillery barrage of about 100 rounds, was fired, during which preparation George Company was able to work four machine guns into a position where they could bring fire to bear on some of the live strong points on Charlie-Dog Hill (183CD).

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

From this point on, the companies had to work their way forward using no supporting fires, other than their machine guns and 60mm mortars, and one 37mm gun which was laboriously manhandled into a position where it had a very limited field of fire. 37mm knocked out 6 live emplacements.

Fox Company continued to advance to 183 A, B (S) where they were pinned down by heavy machine gun cross-fires from the airstrip in 183 A (NW) and (NC) and Charlie-Dog Hill 183 C(NW) and (NC). George Company had its left platoon, which was in contact with Fox Company, pinned down tight by these same fires.

Literally, yard by yard, George Company was able to work the assault squads, with flame throwers and demolitions, up to the base of Charlie-Dog Hill and one by one, isolate and knock out one strong point after another in the center of the south side of the hill and upward from its base to the top. Then, George Company worked from the top, back down, on right and left, to the base of the hill, eliminating live pill boxes and emplacements. One platoon of Easy Company was committed on the right of George Company, and, in contact with Item Company of 3/24, was able to advance to the top of the hill through this cleared passageway. This platoon aided George Company in mopping up resistance. By 1700, George, Item and one platoon of Easy Company troops were all over Charlie-Dog Hill, mopping up. Item Company had lost contact with its adjacent right company and a gap of over 200 yards had developed. Easy Company was committed on the right to allow Item to shift right and regain contact.

3/21 had shifted way to the left in order to by-pass the machine gun fire which had Fox Company pinned down, thus creating a gap of about 200 yards on the left. In the center of this gap the Fox Company contact patrol remained.

At 1815, the top and reverse slope of Charlie-Dog Hill was brought under intense enemy mortar and artillery fire. Casualties were heavy.

The Battalion Commander went to the front lines, and issued orders for readjusting the lines along the top and reverse slope of Charlie-Dog Hill, in an effort to both strengthen the lines and reduce the existing gap on the left. As a gap still remained after this readjustment of lines, he contacted the commander of 3/21 and made arrangements for 3/21 to put a company in the gap at dark.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

Fox Company was now able to move as the major portion of the fire which had been pinning them down, was knocked out. Day's gain - right flank, 300 yards; left flank, 500 yards; Charlie-Dog Hill (183CD) taken.

Order of companies in line, left to right, Fox, George, and Easy. In contact with 3/21 on left, and Item Company 3/24 on right. Front lines left to right - 183 B (NW across C (C) into D (C). O.P. at 182 Y (NE).

All companies being in line, a reserve company for tactical use was requested and obtained. George Company 2/24 (attached to 24th Marines) used heretofore as stretcher bearers and carrying parties was placed in a defensive position in 183L after dark as Battalion Reserve.

NGF fired 40 rounds at pillboxes in 183A; 20 rounds at caves in 200 I; 60 rounds at sugar refinery in 201 K, and 800 rounds of 40mm in cave and cliff area in 185 E and J. Eight (8) star shells per hour, adjusted in 200 K, were fired for night illumination. Night harassing fires, consisting of 220 rounds, fired in 184 D, T, Y and 167 E.

No air support was available. Corps Artillery deep support about 25 rounds per hour, for daylight hours. No record of other artillery support except that it was meager due to lack of ammunition. 200 rounds of 81mm mortar night harassing fires were fired in 200 V, W, and X.

CASUALTIES:

	KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	TOTAL NON EFF	RET W&E	FR SK&E	RET RET	TOTAL EFF
OFF:	1					1				27
ENL:	18	23	24			75	2		2	*588

\*7 Rp. Jd.

REMARKS:

Stretcher bearers and carrying parties for supplies were obtained from a company of the 25th Marines attached to the 24th Marines, to expedite resupply of ammunition, water, and rations to front line companies.

A number of officer and NCO platoon leaders and NCO squad leaders, were killed or wounded during the days fight. Leaders and experienced men are being lost at a very high rate.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

25 February, 1945 -- D / 6 Day

Heavy large caliber mortar, artillery, and machine gun fire received in front lines during the night. Some hand grenade fights between front line troops and by-passed enemy on Charlie-Dog Hill (183CD). Some casualties were incurred.

2/24 passed through by 3/23 at King Hour 0930.

All elements of 2/24 returned to an assembly area in 165 E, I, J. C.P. 165 I.

Remainder of morning and part of afternoon devoted to re-organization, resupply, and rest. At 1530, 2/24 was ordered to relieve 1/24 in line for the night.

Companies moved out, Easy, Fox and George in order. Relieved 1/24 in line by 1800.

Order of companies in line left to right; Easy, Fox, and George, with Fox Company 2/25 (attached) in reserve. Front lines left to right - 184 U (NC) through U and 167 A. Fox Company 3/25 - 183 Y, 184 U, along road. C.P. at 165 I. Advanced C.P. at 183 W (WC) for night.

NGF night illumination; Eight star shells per hour, adjusted 184 R. 350 rounds of 5" night harassing fires in 184 D, T, Y, and 185 F, K, and 167 E. 81mm mortars fired 150 rounds during relief of companies.

Artillery registered defensive fires, and fired two concentrations in 167 C, where enemy attempted to place mortar and rocket positions during the night.

LCE fired a number of 40mm missions into mortar and rocket positions in 167 B,C.

CASUALTIES:

	KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	TOTAL NON EFF	RET W&E	FR SK&E	TOTAL RET	TOTAL EFF
OFF:										27
ENL:	3		13			16		2	2	574

REMARKS:

The hasty relief of 1/24 was effected without casualties, and 2/24 spent a quiet night in this position.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

26 February, 1945 -- D / 7 Day.

No activity was noted in the front lines during the night, other than an observed attempt by the enemy to place mortars and rockets in position in 167 C, 400 yards to the front. Artillery, and 40mm from LCI, registered and discouraged the completion of this mission by the enemy.

Fox and George Companies passed through by 3/25 at 0900. Easy Company passed through by 2/25. Fox Company 2/25 reverted to parent control.

2/24 returned to assembly area in 165 E, I, and J.

Reconnoitered location of C.P.'s and routes of approach to battalions of the 23rd Marines.

CASUALTIES:	TOTAL		RET	FR	RET	FR	TOTAL	TOTAL
KIA W&E SK&E MIA DOW NONEFF	W&E	SK&E	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF		
OFF:						27		
ENL:	1	3	4	3	1	4	*634	
							*60 Rp. Jd.	

REMARKS:

Men very tired and listless.

27 February, 1945 -- D / 8 Day

No activity during night.

2/24 remained in assembly area 165 E, I and J, in Division Reserve.

Reconnoitered routes of approach and front line positions of 23rd Marines.

Rehabilitation and rest of troops continued.

Received orders to alert one company and have company commander report to Regimental Commander of 23rd Marines. Easy Company alerted, and C.O. of Easy Company reported to C.O. 23rd Marines. Easy Company passed to control of 23rd Marines at 1530.

Meeting of company commanders. No warning order received as yet but expected one. Discussion re routes of approach to front lines, terrain, and various phases of properly relieving front line unit.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

"If we move out, order will be; Battalion C.P. group, Fox Company, George Company, and if Easy Company is with us, Easy Company. If we go into the attack, Easy Company will be on the right, Fox Company on the left, George Company in reserve. If Easy Company is not with us, Fox Company on left, George Company on right, and Easy Company in reserve upon return. If we receive the order, the movement will begin at 0330."

2/24 rested, resupplied, reorganized, and ready to move on order.

CASUALTIES:					TOTAL	RET	FR	RET	FR	TOTAL	TOTAL
	KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NONEFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF	
OFF:											27
ENL:			3			3	4		3	7	*755
											*177 Rp. Jd.

28 February, 1945 -- D / 9 Day

Remained in assembly area 165 E, I, and J. Large mortar shell landed in C.P. at 0745. Twenty members of Assault and Demolitions Platoon killed or wounded.

Assault Platoon reorganized using engineers, and replacements. Replacements are being received and sent to companies.

Battalion Commander and staff made extensive reconnaissance of 23rd Marines' zone of action and front lines.

Received warning order. 2/24 to replace 1/23 on extreme left flank of 4th Marine Division, to operate in about 200N to 201 U (W).

2/24 reverted to Corps reserve (1½ hours), then reverted back to Regimental reserve.

Battalion Commander issued order for movement. Order of companies: forward echelon of C.P., Fox Company, George Company. Easy Company to join battalion at 183 B, remainder of C.P. to be moved on order. In attack: Fox on left; George on right; and Easy in reserve.

CASUALTIES:					TOTAL	RET	FR	RET	FR	TOTAL	TOTAL
	KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NONEFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF	
OFF:											27
ENL:	6	15	7		1	29	7		2	9	*755

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

1 March, 1945 -- Day / 10 Day

No enemy fire received in assembly area during night.

Battalion moved out from assembly area in 165 I and J at 0330. Order of march: Forward Echelon of C.P.; Fox Company; George Company. Rear echelon of C.P. remained in assembly area awaiting orders. Division Objective O-3; Regimental Objective Hill 382.

Passage of lines and relief of 1/23 effected at 0630. Fox Company received large enemy mortar round in lines while effecting relief.

At King Hour (0630) a 200 yard gap existed between 2/24 and 3/21 on the left. Fox Company was extended well into 3/21 zone of action to fill gap. O.P. established 183 C (EC). Forward echelon of C.P. established at 183 G (SW). Front lines left to right - 200T and Y (W).

Fox Company received enemy mortar and artillery fire, while George Company received machine gun and rifle fire initially. High velocity flat trajectory fire being received by both companies as they moved out at King Hour.

No supporting fires obtained until 0935 when air strike consisting of napalm bombs struck 201 N. At 1030 Corps Artillery obtained in 201 R, M, N and S.

At 1040 NGF obtained in 201 N. It took three hours to obtain deep support on enemy mortar and artillery positions that had been registered since 0700 on our front line companies, and the area to their immediate front. All supporting fires had to cease at 1054 because the unit on our left was reported in 201H.

Front lines have now moved forward approximately 150 yards to 200 O, T and Y (E).

Two imbedded tanks have been knocked out by George Company. Fox Company's lines have been extended well to the left, but a gap still exists. 3/24 committed between 3/21 and 2/24 at 1430.

Companies have moved steadily forward and at 1550, front lines left to right - 201 K (NC) south through P (NW) thence through 200 T from (NC) to (SE) through center of Hill 382 into 201 U (WC). Between 1600 and 1740, lines tied in on left with 3/24 and on right with 1/24. Lines adjusted from left to right as follows, 201 K (NE) diagonally to K (WC) into 201 N. Reconnaissance was made of Hill 382 and the flanks of the battalion and company commanders for tying in lines and continuing the attack the next day.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

Hill 382 honeycombed with caves with many open entrances. Many enemy personnel are still in the labyrinth like system of caves, network of small passageways, and miniature canyons. During the reconnaissance, and very late in the afternoon, hand grenade fights were in progress, and the assault squads were still blowing cave entrances and using flame throwers on points of resistance.

CASUALTIES:					TOTAL	RET	FR	RET	FR	TOTAL	TOTAL
KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NONEFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF	RET	EFF
OFF:											27
ENL:	13	35	13	1	62						639

REMARKS:

Hill 382 was particularly well organized for defense. The enemy had made full use of the caves, crevices, and broken up terrain to emplace light AA, machine guns, flat trajectory weapons, and embedded tanks, in perfect defilade with interlacing fields of fire.

The nature of the terrain provided maximum protection for the enemy from our own artillery and NGF.

It is estimated that at least 150 enemy troops were killed during the days fighting.

2 March, 1945 -- D / 11 Day

Front lines on Hill 382 active all night. Hand grenade fights and hand to hand fights with the enemy frequent. The enemy filtered out of recesses in the hill in front, into, and behind the Marines' positions. Two Marines received saber cuts in hand to hand fighting.

King Hour 0800. Artillery preparation from K - 20 to K Hour; F.O.'s to be guided by night defensive fires. Ten minute 81mm mortar preparation prior to King Hour, or, as company commanders desire to instruct forward observers. Easy Company will pass through George Company and go into assault on the right. Fox Company will attack on the left. George Company will revert to reserve and mop up in the battalion sector in rear of front lines. The battalion will attack due East. Tanks and rockets available for supporting fires. Division Objective O-3. Regimental Objective Hill 382.

Companies jumped off at King Hour, receiving machine gun, rifle, mortar and artillery fire. Companies moving slowly

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

against stiff opposition. Tanks employed but drew heavy enemy fire and were withdrawn. Own rockets fired three missions.

By 1100 the frontal attack of Hill 382 was slowed down by heavy enemy machine gun cross fires and unusually heavy enemy large caliber mortar fire. The Battalion Commander met the company commanders at George Company's command post. It was decided to send one platoon of Easy Company and two tanks around the right flank in order to outflank and destroy the enemy pill boxes holding up the advance. Orders for accomplishing this mission and continuing the attack were issued. A platoon from George Company, the Battalion reserve, was attached to Easy Company to replace in the line, the platoon of Easy Company chosen to make the flanking attack.

The Commanding Officer of Easy Company had been wounded and evacuated early in the day. While the Executive Officer, who had taken command of the company, was orienting his platoon leaders, and issuing orders for the flanking movement, and continuation of the attack, a large enemy mortar round fell into their midst in the C.P. The Executive Officer and a platoon leader were wounded and evacuated, one platoon leader was killed instantly and another later died of wounds from this shell burst.

The remaining platoon leader took over the company, issued orders for the flanking movement and continuation of the attack.

This company, minus five officers, continued the attack. Their mission was accomplished by 1530 and Hill 382 secured by the battalion. The remainder of the day was spent in mopping up the objective and consolidating the position. The tanks drew heavy mortar fire and were withdrawn.

Day's advance, 200 yards, Hill 382 secured in its entirety.

Order of companies left to right - Fox, Easy, and George in reserve. Front lines left to right - 201 L (SW) to P (NE) to P (SW) to U (NW) to U (SW).

Artillery, air, 81mm mortar, tanks, rockets and NGF used effectively during day's fighting.

CASUALTIES:					TOTAL	RET	FR	RET	FR	TOTAL	TOTAL
	KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NONEFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF	
OFF:	1	3				4					23
ENL:	20	40	9		3	76		3	3	*621	

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

REMARKS:

Today's fighting more intense than any day up until now. Enemy resistance very heavy. Many pill boxes and strong emplacements to the direct front. Many officers, NCO's and experienced personnel were casualties. Leadership now an acute problem. Enemy installations knocked out during the day's advance; 8 machine guns, 15 cave entrances, from which fire was being received, were sealed; one 47mm gun in bunker knocked out. No count of enemy dead, estimated to be over 100.

3 March, 1945 -- D / 12 Day

Enemy large caliber mortar fire received in front lines during night. Some hand grenade fights in reserve company area, on Hill 382. Some attempted infiltration, not successful.

Ordered to continue the attack at King Hour, (0630). 1/24 on our right, 3/24 on our left. Four tanks and 2nd section, rocket detachment attached to 2/24 in center. Boundaries, zone of action and direction of attack remain the same. 3/24 in direct support, 4/14 in general support. Corps Artillery available. Artillery will not fire preparation prior to King Hour, but will fire on predesignated targets from King Hour on, until call fires requested. Air & NGF under direction of Division and Corps, but available on call. Contact right to left. BLT reserve units may be committed for maintaining contact upon request of Regiment. Administrative details, no change.

"BLT 2/24 will continue the attack at 0630 with Fox on the left, Easy on the right, and George in reserve. Request supporting fires as needed. Objective O-3."

Companies jumped off at 0630. Initial resistance heavy; mortar, artillery, machine gun, and rifle fire. Pill boxes and reinforced concrete emplacements to the direct front. One emplacement containing a high velocity gun.

G.P. displaced to 200 Y (WC).

Tanks, rockets, artillery, 81mm mortars, air, NGF, and Corps Artillery used to the limit obtainable.

Progress rapid initially but slowed considerable when lines advanced to a point close enough to work on enemy emplacements with demolitions and flame throwers.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

Once this close-in fighting and assaulting of pill boxes began, the in-fighting was fierce, and general progress of the front lines very slow. The terrain consisted of numerous hill-ocks, mounds, and shallow cross-corridors with vertical sides. Covered reinforced concrete and sandcovered log machine gun and rifle emplacements with firing ports covering the front and both flanks, were in depth. Due to the character of the terrain, these positions were well protected from artillery fire. This defense line just north and east of Hill 382 was well over three hundred yards in depth. Tanks and flame thrower tanks could be gotten into position only with the greatest difficulty, and once in position, their fields of fire were limited and could fire effectively on only a few emplacements. Once these positions were reached by infantry, only 81mm mortar and 60mm mortars could be effectively used for the very close support needed. Artillery was effective for close support up to 100 yards, but the 60mm mortars and 81mm mortars were used to provide support within 50 yards of front line positions. 81mm mortars could not be used except periodically and when dire necessity made their close supporting fires mandatory, because of the limited availability of 81mm ammunition.

Consequently, infantry employing demolitions, portable flame throwers, and small arms together with bazookas, smoke and fragmentation hand grenades, had to maneuver into position with small groups and destroy the positions. This was a slow, prodigious, and tedious process, which required able leadership on the part of squad and group leaders, a number of whom were killed or wounded and evacuated while taking this exceedingly well fortified and hazardous ground.

George Company committed on left to prevent a small gap from being created between 2/24 and 3/24, during a readjustment of lines, in order to conform to assigned boundaries. George Company passing through Item Company, 2/24 in effecting this readjustment.

Attack ceased at 1910; lines consolidated after adjustments, tied in right and left. Order of companies; left to right -- George, Fox, Easy. Front lines left to right -- 201 R (NW) to C (SW) to V (SE).

Day's advance 200 yards.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

CASUALTIES:					TOTAL	RET FR	RET FR	TOTAL	TOTAL
KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NONEFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF
OFF:	1			1	2				21
ENL:	5	31	11	3	50	5	6	11	582

REMARKS:

Men very tired and listless, lack leaders. Close support by effective close support weapons, such as tanks and 37mm weapons not possible except in rare instances, due to terrain limiting fields of fire. Tank support is seldom sufficient to warrant the casualties resulting from the countermortar fire. A flame thrower tank was used effectively twice.

4 March, 1945 -- D / 13 Day

Hand grenade fights along entire front line, particularly heavy in Easy Company area on the right. Sporadic enemy mortar, rocket, and artillery fire fell in our lines during the night. This fire is especially well placed and it is suspected the enemy has an observer, in a covered position, very close to our front lines.

King Hour 0730. Attack preceeded by a 15 minute artillery barrage, and an air strike. Order of companies in line at jump off; left to right - George, Fox and Easy. Assault and Demolitions Squads attached to each company.

Tanks available but can not be used initially because of character of terrain. Rockets to be fired as close as possible initially.

Companies jumped off at King Hour, meeting strong initial resistance from many pill boxes, and well protected and substantial defensive machine gun and rifle emplacements, below and along the ridge line to the direct front. The enemy appears to have a strong secondary line of defense north of Hill 382. George Company has uncovered a number of caves and under ground passages, in which there are enemy troops. The area was booby trapped in certain places, and bangalore torpedoes were observed.

Air grounded due to weather; artillery and mortar ammunition very meager. Large numbers of enemy troops moving about, out of small arms fire range, and very little fire can be placed on them due to ammunition shortages. These enemy troops reported by air spot. Own rockets are being used to greatest possible extent.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

Companies are receiving accurately registered enemy mortar and artillery fire but are progressing slowly and knocking out enemy emplacements and machine guns.

At 1250 the companies have progressed 75 yards and have destroyed a number of enemy machine guns and emplacements.

Two medium and one flame thrower tanks are now able to work in limited zones and are very effective. One tank hit a land mine, and was put out of action.

By 1700 the center of the front lines had reached the ridge line, but the flanks were some 30 yards short of it.

Between 1730 and 1800 front lines were adjusted to form a strong defensive line for the night. Order of companies; left to right - George, Fox and Easy. Front lines left to right - 201 M (SE) through R from (NE) to (SW) through 201 Q (SE) to V (NE) thence to V (SE). Day's gain about 100 yards. Able Company, 1/24 attached, and put in position as Battalion reserve on Hill 382.

Enemy resistance on this day, while not the heaviest yet received in the operation was magnified due to lack of ammunition for supporting artillery and mortar fires. Casualties were increased because troops lacked supporting fires to neutralize active enemy artillery and mortar positions. Had 81mm mortar ammunition been available for close support, fewer casualties would have been incurred because these fires would have made it possible for infantry to work on a few isolated emplacements at a time, rather than receiving fire from both the front and flanks, while knocking out each emplacement encountered.

CASUALTIES:		TOTAL		RET	FR	RET	FR	TOTAL	TOTAL
KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NONEFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF
OFF:	1	2			3				*20 *2 Jd.
ENL:	12	59		1	79	1	6	7	*513 *3Rp. Jd.

REMARKS:

Leaders constantly becoming casualties. Very few leaders now left. Replacements inexperienced and require a lot of attention. Few experienced men left on the front lines. Troops are tired and lethargical because of being constantly in attack and from the ceaseless enemy mortar and artillery fire being received.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

5 March, 1945 -- D / 14 Day

Enemy mortar and artillery fire received on front line and in C.P. throughout the night. The artillery fire was very heavy and well directed, causing some casualties. Hand grenade fights in Easy Company area during the night.

Battalion Commander received orders from Regimental Commander to the effect that the 23rd Marines would spend the day re-adjusting their lines, and when the 23rd moved forward, 2/24 would maintain contact and move with them.

Front lines were readjusted forward approximately 50 yards and straightened out. During this adjustment enemy mortar and artillery fire continued to fall in front line positions. C.P. was moved to 183 G (sw) as enemy artillery had it definitely registered. Able Company 1/24 attached to 2/24 continued mopping up in 2/24 zone of action.

Supporting NGF and artillery fired on suspected enemy positions throughout the day. Corps Artillery, and air being used in 3rd Division zone of action, and requests for Air Support and Corps Artillery on enemy mortar and artillery positions granted when possible to incorporate with 3rd Division requests.

Front lines consolidated and well dug in. Order of companies left to right, George, Fox and Easy. Able in reserve on Hill 382. Front lines left to right - 200 R (NE) to R (SW) to W (NW) into F (SE). Contact maintained with 23rd Marines. Day's advance 50 yards.

CASUALTIES:		TOTAL		RET FR		RET FR		TOTAL		TOTAL	
	KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NONEFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF	
OFF:	1					1					*20
ENL:	6	22	1		2	31					** 490

\* 1 Jd.  
\*\* 8 Rp. Jd.

REMARKS:

Every effort was made to rehabilitate and reorganize troops on the line. Plenty of rations, water, and ammunition supplied to all hands. Blankets were sent up to supplement those already on the line. At 1900 the Battalion Commander reported to Regiment and received attack orders for the following day's attack.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

6 March, 1945 -- D / 15 Day

Companies received sporadic mortar fire during the night. Easy Company received one heavy mortar barrage.

Regimental order in part as follows:-

"King Hour 0900. 2/24 attacks at King Hour and maintains contact with 2/23. 1/24 will maintain contact with 2/24. Able Company 1/24 is attached to 2/24 and will be used as reserve. Corps Artillery may be requested after 0921. 3/14 and Division artillery available after 0921. Preparation fires for 2/24 will be fired between 0930 and 0900, by 3/14. Artillery F.O.'s may request artillery from 1/14 any time after King Hour. 2/14 should also be available for preparatory fires. Artillery F.O.'s should call fires as targets become available and in accordance with progress of troops. Rockets will be attached to 2/24. One Ronson flame thrower tank and 5 medium tanks will be attached to 2/24.

NGF support to be furnished by two ships with one plane available as air spot. NGF illuminating will cease at 0430, except in case of dire emergency. Air will be controlled by Corps until 0921, after which air has been requested by 2/24 in 185 A, B, C, G (primary mission) H, L, M, N (secondary mission). 500 pound bombs, 5" rockets and strafing has been requested.

Artillery ammunition for Division limited at 2500 rounds of 105mm and 1500 rounds of 75mm for next 24 hour period. Corps artillery fire precision fire on known enemy installations only.

At 0645 overlays distributed and orders to company commanders issued in part as follows: "Preparation fires will be defensive fires of last night. Rockets will be fired by 2/24 at 0900. Supply of 81mm mortar ammunition low - 60 rounds of HE heavy and 90 rounds of HE light will be fired by 2/24. The remaining 210 rounds of HE light and 70 rounds of HE heavy will be conserved for emergency missions. Order of companies in attack, left to right - George, Fox, Easy, Able Company 1/24 (Attached) in Battalion reserve. Able Company will regain and maintain contact with the 23rd Marines by patrols in the event contact by George Company is lost. One medium and one flame thrower tank to be used initially by Fox Company."

Companies preceded by small artillery preparation: jumped off at 0900.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

Resistance - small arms fire, medium to heavy mortar fire.

Initially 2/24 moved 75 yards before 2/23 or Baker Company, 1/24 began to move. By 1100 front lines had advanced 100 yards.

Rockets, NGF, artillery, air, and tanks used to best advantage.

Day's progress 175 yards. Order of companies in line, left to right - George, Fox, Easy, and Able 1/24 (attached), in reserve. Front lines left to right - 201 S (C) to S (SC) diagonally, through S (NW) into W (NE) to W (SC).

Air strike obtained in 185 H and M. Twelve 500 pound bombs, forty 100 pound bombs, and 112 five inch rockets.

NGF struck the following targets (plane spotted) - 185 L, two hits on blockhouse; 185 F blew up shack on cliff side; 185K two direct hits on blockhouses; 185A, F, covered area thoroughly; 185 B G one concrete cave destroyed another damaged; 185 C pill box underground, one hit, many near misses.

Six rocket missions fired in 201 X, T, and Y.

Defensive fires registered in for the night. Lines tied in, contact made right and left.

One thousand rounds of artillery available at 3/14 guns.

Corps Artillery for night in 185 G, H, L, M. Air Support requested at K / 15 in 185 G, H, I, and at K / 45 in 185 M, N.

No NGF for tonight.

CASUALTIES:	TOTAL				RET	FR	RET	FR	TOTAL	TOTAL
	KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NONEFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF
OFF:	1					1				*23 *4 Jd.
ENL:	7	29	4		1	41	1		1	450

7 March, 1945 -- D / 16 Day

In contact with the enemy throughout the night. Intermittent mortar and artillery fire received in front lines causing some casualties. Some enemy troops attempted to withdraw but were liquidated.

King Hour at 0800. Able Company replaced George Company in the lines before daylight. Order of companies in the line left to right, Able, Fox, and Easy. George reverted to Battalion reserve and will follow the attack at 300 yards.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

supporting fires from King minus 15 to King plus 15. Rocket mission fired at 0800.

Attack jumped off at 0800. Encountered stiff opposition, consisting of mortar, machine gun and rifle fire. A gap developed between Able Company and King Company of 3/23, because King Company did not move out initially. By 0815 a 50 yard gap had developed and Able Company committed their support platoon in the gap and echeloned it to the left rear. Companies held up by knee mortar, machine gun, and very accurate rifle fire. A small gap developed between Fox Company's right flank, and Easy Company's left flank. Easy moved up and regained contact. Medium tanks and Ronson Flame Thrower Tank used by Fox and Easy Company to help knock out resistance to front.

Artillery barrage called close in front of lines to aid advance; King Company 3/23 moved back and left, then by-passed resistance to their direct, and our left front, creating a dangerous pocket and gap of 100 yards on Able Company's left flank. At 1500 the front lines had advanced about 75 yards but are held up by resistance from the left front. The enemy began penetrating into the gap between Able Company 1/24 (attached) and King Company 3/23. In order to close the gap and contain the pocket, the Battalion Commander arranged for King Company's right platoon to be echeloned to the rear, where a platoon of George Company was placed in rear and encircling the pocket, in contact with King on the left and Able on the right. This pocket was similar in shape to a tear drop. Lines were adjusted all along, consolidated, and troops dug in on the most favorable defensive ground for the night.

Day's gain about 50 yards. Order of companies in the line, one platoon of George, (machine guns attached), Able, Fox and Easy. George Company (less one platoon, with machine guns attached) in reserve. Engineers and Assault and Demolitions Squad sent to George Company to bolster the reserve. Line well tied in but weak. Lines left to right, 201 S (NW) to S (C) then to S (SW) across S(NW) to W (SE).

NGF fired a number of effective missions on enemy installations in 185 K, I, N, C, K, L, A, F, and 202 G, B.

One excellent air mission in 185 A, B, G - 5 napalm bombs, 75 rockets and heavy straffing.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

Three rocket missions fired in 201 T, Y.

Defensive fires registered in for the night.

CASUALTIES:	KIA		W&E		SK&E		MIA		DOW		TOTAL		RET FR		TOTAL	
											NONEFF					EFF
OFF:																23
ENL:	6	18	4		1	29						5			5	*453 *27 Rp. Jd.

REMARKS:

Resistance notably reduced in the 2/24 zone of action, except in area of pocket on left flank. However, units on either flank apparently still receiving heavy opposition. The major portion of the enemy's secondary defensive line (in depth) north of Hill 382 apparently is neutralized. In the late afternoon, a number of enemy troops are beginning to desert their positions, and attempt escape. A few have made suicidal charges toward our lines.

8 March, 1945 -- D / 17 Day

Activity during the night negligible.

2/24 relieved by 3/24 at 0400. Able Company and the platoon of George Company remained in the line to reduce the pocket created the afternoon before, on the left flank. Companies moved to an assembly area in 183 K, L. George Company platoon reverted to 2/24 at 1200.

Day spent in reorganization and rehabilitation. Formed two companies (Fox and George) out of Easy, Fox and George; Easy Company being dissolved for all purposes except administrative.

Battalion Commander and certain staff members made a reconnaissance of the 3/25 area in anticipation of relieving that unit.

Received order to replace 3/25 at 0630 the following morning. Orders issued for movement starting at 0400 and relief of 3/24 to be effected by 0630.

CASUALTIES:	KIA		W&E		SK&E		MIA		DOW		TOTAL		RET FR		TOTAL	
											NONEFF					EFF
OFF:																23
ENL:		2	4			6										447

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

## REMARKS:

The reorganization of companies was made for the purpose of regrouping men, in so far as possible, under leaders they knew, and to have every tactical unit under the command of an officer or NCO, as appropriate. Equalizing the strength of the companies was secondary. The regrouping was such that Fox Company was about 50% stronger in number than George Company.

9 March, 1945 -- D / 18 Day

No enemy activity reported in the vicinity of the assembly area during the night.

Ordered to relieve 3/25 by 0630 and establish a strong defensive line in the sector now being held by 3/25.

The battalion moved out at 0400. Order of march:- Forward echelon of C.P., Fox, George, and Headquarters. Just as the first troops began to move out of the assembly area on to the road, a portion of the route (namely RJ 249) selected, was subjected to enemy knee mortar fire. Rifle fire, apparently from Marines was heard in the same vicinity. The plan for movement was changed, and the companies moved out by a different route at fifteen minute intervals. Fox, George and Headquarters Company in order. 2/24 passed to control of 25th Marines.

2/24 relieved 3/25 by 0630. Order of companies in the line left to right:- George and Fox. Front lines left to right - 184 S (SE) cuts corner of 184 T (SW) to (NW) corner of 184 Y to 184 Y (SC) and then from north to south in 167 E. Tied in on the left with George Company 2/25. C.P. displaced to 166 D (WC). O.P.'s established with front line companies. Forward C.P. initially in 167 B (C) then moved to 184 Y (NW).

Three 37mm guns in the line, with good fields of fire. The Engineer Platoon was designated as a mobile reserve, to be transported from C.P. to point of action by reconnaissance cars of 37mm weapons platoon. An additional 19 man reserve platoon, for emergency use, was organized from the Headquarters Company with an officer in charge. The 81mm mortar platoon was placed in reserve position, in 166 E, and was available for use as infantry in an emergency.

A reconnaissance party was sent out to locate and investigate all open caves and suspected enemy positions in the vicinity.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

zone of action; all such caves located were blown and entrances sealed.

Patrols were sent forward two hundred yards in front of the lines to investigate the area.

Baker Company of the 2nd Armored Amphibious Tractor Battalion was used to supplement beach defenses at night from 166E through 166 CD to 166 G.

Patrol of three armd amtracs were dispatched to work over the coast line 168 AB and 185 VW, with the further mission of examining the coastal areas from 167 A through 167 E from the seaward side.

A partially cleared mine field laid in front of 3/25's, now 2/24's, front lines was examined by our attached engineers, in an effort to locate and chart all mines. The best chart possible was made by the engineers attached to 2/24 in conjunction with infantry personnel from 3/25 who had helped to lay the mines initially.

Direct supporting artillery and mortar fires registered defensive concentrations.

CASUALTIES:		TOTAL		RET FR		TOTAL		TOTAL	
KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NONEFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF
									23
OFF:									446
ENL:		1			1				

REMARKS:

Troops resupplied, and subsidiary ammunition supply dumps established in company areas.

10 March, 1945 -- D / 19 Day

No enemy activity reported during the night.

Received orders to have the Beach Road, through 167 YT, cleared of mines, and to clear the mined area in front of the front lines for a distance of 100 yards on either side of the road. The engineers were assigned to clearing the mines. At 1100 the Battalion was ordered to furnish engineers to probe in front of tanks along the beach road in 167 TY and to furnish a platoon to cover the movement of the tanks and engineers.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

Fox Company furnished this platoon, and all mined areas concerned in the original order had been probed and mines removed at 1345. The tanks did not move out, receiving orders from Regiment to withdraw.

1700, lines tied in for the night in the same defensive positions of the night before. Reserve same as on D / 18.

1735 received orders to establish a beach defense with one platoon of Fox Company 2/25 (attached) in 167 ABC and D. This platoon with two heavy machine guns attached, established five strong points on the cliffs overlooking the waters edge in the areas indicated. In addition, a mobile reserve of three armored amphibious tractors were placed in 166 E at the Boat Basin to cover the east coastline. The tractors field of fire was due north parallel to the east coast line.

Front lines received mortar fire from 185 RQ at 1045. Otherwise no enemy activity in zone of action.

CASUALTIES:	TOTAL	RET	FR	RET	FR	TOTAL	TOTAL
KIA W&E SK&E MIA DOW NONEFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF			
OFF:						23	
ENL:						446	

REMARKS: Two men seriously wounded in mine clearing operations.

11 March, 1945 -- D / 20 Day

No enemy activity reported during the night.

Orders received to "move out when the unit (2/25) on our left moves, and to maintain contact. Support 2/25 on the left by fire as much as possible. A bulldozer and tanks under control of 2/25, will come up the Beach Road to work on caves in cliffs north of the road; cover their operations."

Orders were issued to the company commanders. An Assault and Demolitions squad was attached to each company. Supporting and preparatory fires were arranged for. Baker Company, 2d Armored amphibious Tractor Battalion was ordered to send four tractors, to cover Fox Company's advance. Fox Company led out East along the Beach Road in column until the mine field to their direct front was passed at which time they turned south and took up a position in front of the mine field. George

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

Company followed Fox Company and after clearing the mine field turned north and took up position in front of the mine field. Both companies were then facing east in the direction of the attack.

The unit on the left (George Company 2/25) moved out at 1030 and Fox and George pushed forward with them. By 1130 the Battalion right flank had moved out 200 yards and the left flank 150 yards. George Company directed tank fire into the cliff line north of Beach Road.

No enemy opposition encountered by Fox Company. George Company observed small enemy groups operating to their left front and received scattered small arms fire and an occasional round of mortar fire.

At 1630 the order to dig in and consolidate lines for the night was received. Reserve same as D / 18.

Two 37mm guns were placed in the line, contact gained on the left. Order of companies left to right; George and Fox. Front lines - 184 T (NE) cuts into 185 P (NW) to 185 P (SC) straight south through 185 U to 168 A (NC) to coast line.

Days advance 200 yards.

Defensive fires were registered in prior to dark.

CASUALTIES:					TOTAL	RET	FR	RET	FR	TOTAL	TOTAL
	KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOV	NONEFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF	EFF
OFF:	1					1					22
ENL:		5	1			6					440

REMARKS:

One half-track was used to fire three missions on enemy caves in cliff line. George Company's left flank platoon supported and aided the advance of George Company 2/25 on the left. Machine guns, bazookas, rifles, and hand grenades were fired into cave areas in front of George Company 2/25 by this left flank platoon of George Company 2/24.

12 March, 1945 -- D / 21 Day

No enemy activity reported by companies.

Orders received to move out at 0900; the movement to be a swinging movement, pivoting our left flank on the right flank

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.  
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of 2/25 and swinging the right flank in an arc northward until the entire line was parallel to, and just south, of the Beach Road, and facing North.

The order was issued and the pivoting movement began at 0845. No opposition. The objective reached at 0915.

Tanks were used to work over caves in cliff line North of Beach Road in 184 T and 185 P. Ronson Flame Thrower Tank also used effectively here.

Movement of 25th Marines apparently progressing satisfactorily and our front lines were now in line of the 2/25's fire. The Commanding Officer, 2/25 and 2/24 decided best to move 2/24 out of line of fire in order to allow 2/25 to proceed with mission. Contacted C.O. 25th Marines concerning situation and 2/24 was ordered to move back to original position of previous night. Movement completed at 1300.

At 1445 enemy fired large rocket from 185 P (C). Position observed by 2/25. An officer, who observed position, went in tank, with driver to direct fire on position. Reported back that he believes this one rocket position knocked out but there are others the tank can not reach. Position apparently not knocked out at this time, as rocket fired from same place later.

One flame thrower and two medium tanks employed during the day's operations.

Engineers remarked and retaped off boundary of mine field laid by 3/25, inasmuch as mine removal operations previously conducted not deemed to have made area completely safe. Mopping up operations continued in Battalion zone.

Front lines remained in the same position as previous night.

Reserve remained the same as on D / 18.

CASUALTIES:	TOTAL		RET	FR	RET	FR	TOTAL	TOTAL		
	KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NONEFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF
OFF:										22
ENL:	1	3	1			5				435

13 March, 1945 -- D / 22 Day.

No enemy activity reported during the night in Battalion sector.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

Ordered to remain in present position and hold right flank of 25th Marines' lines. Companies told to remain alert in case the 25th Marines' units on our left flank, who are attacking forward and perpendicular to our front lines, should drive any enemy into our area.

The morning was uneventful. At 1330, an enemy rocket was launched from 185 L (NW). A Fox Company platoon leader observed the launching spot and pointed it out on the ground. 25th Marines notified of position.

Tanks and a Ronson Flame Thrower Tank were sent to George Company together with an assault team to work over a cave entrance where George Company noted some enemy activity. Two enemy soldiers ran out of this cave, and riflemen shot them. The cave was well worked over by the tanks and flame throwers.

The LVT(A)'s were secured for the day. Lines remained in the same position as the previous night. George Company on the left, Fox Company on the right. Lines from left to right - 184 T (NE) cuts into 185 P (NW) to 185 P (SC) straight south through 185 W to 188 A (NC) thence to waters edge. Reserve remains the same as on D / 18.

CASUALTIES:				TOTAL		RET FR		TOTAL	
KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NONEFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF
OFF:									22
ENL:	2	1			3		1	1	433

14 March, 1945 -- D / 23 Day

No enemy activity reported during night.

Ordered to remain in position at present location. Mission the same as previous day.

Continued mopping up activities and the sealing of caves in the rear areas of the Battalion zone of action. The morning was uneventful.

At 1453 received orders from 25th Marines to withdraw from present position, move left, and pass through the right of 2/25, and attack at 1600. "You will be given orders later as to what companies of 2/25 you will pass through."

At 1455 orders were issued to Fox and George Companies to move out, that we were going into the attack. Order of companies: George leading, Fox following. Companies to move south

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

on the Beach Road to 184 Y (NC) opposite the O.P. where the Company Commanders would be met by the Battalion Commander of 2/24 and a guide from 2/25.

At 1515 the Battalion Commander requested information from Regiment as to just what companies of 2/25 we would relieve. The response was, George and Easy of 2/25. Head of George Company and Company Commanders arrived at meeting point 184 Y (NW) at 1530. The Company Commanders of 2/24 were given information as to what companies they would relieve, and the guide from 2/25 who arrived at 1521 was ordered to lead out.

Enroute to the attack position, order from Regiment for the passage of lines was changed to make passage of George and Fox of 2/25 rather than George and Easy of 2/25. Fox Company 2/24 was ordered to pass through Fox Company 2/25, and George Company 2/24 to pass through George Company 2/25.

It was now 1553 and the attack position was not yet reached. The C.O. 2/25 met the C.O. 2/24. At this time it was a surety that the attack could not jump off on time, because of the difficulties of movement in rear of certain portions of the line which was under enemy small arms and machine gun fire, and the inability of small unit leaders to make proper reconnaissance in time, of what was in front of them.

At 1558 George Company 2/24 began moving into position, Fox Company following behind. At this time, all leaders were totally occupied with the task at hand, that of effecting the passage of lines under fire. Regiment was notified to this effect and King Hour was changed to 1700.

The same difficulties of the movement still existed at 1645, at which time Regiment was notified. The attack was called off until 0630 the next morning, and at 1700 units were ordered to effect the relief and dig in on favorable terrain.

At 1652 George Company 2/24 reported they were in the line but not squared away. Fox Company reported one platoon only in the line. Fox Company 2/24 did not complete the relief of Fox Company 2/25 until after dark (see remarks) when the remainder of Fox Company 2/25 was able to leave their positions.

Lines consolidated, contact gained right and left, dug in for the night at 2000. Able Company 1/25 attached and assigned

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

as Battalion reserve. Order of companies in the line left to right - Fox and George; Able 1/25 (attached) in reserve. Front lines left to right - 185 K (NE) to (NW) 184 C (NE) south to 184 C (SC). Able Company 1/25 (attached) in reserve at 184 I (SC) to (SE).

CASUALTIES:	TOTAL		RET FR		TOTAL		TOTAL			
	KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NONEFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF
OFF:										22
ENL:	1	1	3			5	1	1	2	430

REMARKS:

A message was intercepted at 1730 from 2/25 to 25th Marines stating that, "Units had been relieved in the line."

This, however, was not the case as Fox Company 2/25 had one platoon still in the line that could not get out of their fox holes because of the extremely accurate enemy rifle and machine gun fire they were receiving, and consequently had to wait until darkness to move out. At darkness, this platoon of Fox Company 2/25 moved out and Fox Company 2/24 was able to get its last platoon into line and consolidate at 2000.

15 March, 1945 -- D / 24 Day

Enemy small arms and mortar fire received in front lines during the night.

Ordered to continue the attack at 0630 in conjunction with 2/25 and 3/25 on the right. Objective - Beach Road. No supporting fires other than 60mm mortars possible due to position of troops, character of terrain, and size of the pocket of enemy resistance.

The attack jumped off at 0630 with Fox Company on the left and George on the right.

Companies receiving very accurate enemy machine gun and rifle fire, and an occasional round of heavy enemy mortar fire. Machine gun and rifle fire also being received from Fox Company's left rear believed to be coming from 184 E and 185 A.

By 0930 the Battalion left flank had moved about 30 yards but the right flank was pinned down by deadly accurate machine gun and rifle fire.

At 0945 a conference was held by the Battalion Commander of 2/24, Battalion Commander of 2/25, and company commanders

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd

of George and Fox 2/24, and Able Company 1/25 (attached) attended. It was decided to continue the attack at 1130. The plan of attack was as follows: George Company 2/24 will hold in their present position and maintain pressure on the pocket of enemy resistance to their direct front. Fox Company with as much of their line as possible, will move forward 100 yards then face west behind (south) the pocket, which George Company is containing, and move westward to a predesignated junction with Able Company 1/25 (attached). Able Company will pass through Easy Company 2/25 which is on George Company's (2/24) right, and head east to make the junction with Fox Company 2/24 at the predesignated point south of the pocket. When the junction is made between Fox Company 2/24 and Able Company 1/25 (attached), both companies will face south and continue the attack. Objective - Beach Road. Easy Company 2/25 and BLT 3/25 will continue the attack south to the Beach Road from their present positions.

The use of another unit from 1/25 was requested so as to move it in to the south of the pocket that George Company was containing from the north, and thus complete the encirclement of this pocket. It was planned for this unit from 1/25 to move in from west to east, and go into position south of the pocket but just north of the junction made between Able Company 1/25 (attached) and Fox Company 2/24. No units available.

Sketches of maneuver given to all concerned.

The remainder of the day was spent in attempting to carry out this maneuver as planned.

Fox Company 2/24 arrived at its meeting point at 1445 but Able Company ran into a pocket of intense enemy resistance and could not make the meeting point by dark.

Fox Company was able to get a half-track into position to fire missions on an enemy rocket and mortar position to their front. The mortar position was observed to be destroyed.

A patrol consisting of Regimental Weapons personnel, 24th Marines (attached) together with a half-track engaged in a lively action with the enemy position in 184 E, and 185 A. Two machine guns and one knee mortar position were destroyed by this patrol and half-track.

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Narrative of Coeration, Cont'd.

Lines were consolidated for the night. Fox Company's right flank was readjusted to tie in with George Company's left flank. Able Company 1/25 (attached) tied in with Easy 2/25 on right and George 2/24 on the left. One platoon of Baker Company 1/25 (attached) tied in on Fox Company's left to fill a gap between Love Company 3/23 and Fox Company's left.

Order of companies in the line from left to right - one platoon of Baker Company 1/25 (attached), Fox Company, George Company, Able Company 1/25 (attached). Front lines left to right - 185 K (EC) across 185 K to K (WC) thence south from 184 O (EC) to 184 O (SE) into 184 T (NE) to T (EC) then east and north parallel to the Beach Road to 185 P (NW). Advance C.P. at 184 I.

Day's gain all along the line 50 yards. It was decided to continue the attack the following morning at 0630. The plan of today would be continued tomorrow, except that George Company instead of executing a holding attack, as was today's mission, was to aggressively move into the pocket and destroy the enemy therein.

Companies were ordered to put a maximum amount of supporting fires into the areas in front of them until the jump off.

The 81mm mortar platoon of 2/24 was used throughout the day as stretcher bearers and carrying parties for front line companies.

CASUALTIES:	TOTAL					RET FR	RET FR	TOTAL	TOTAL	
	KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NONEFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF
OFF:	1					1				21
ENL:	7	19	9	1	2	38				392

REMARKS:

Approximately 2500 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition expended during the night in harassing fires.

16 March, 1945 -- D / 25 Day

No enemy activity reported during the night.

The attack jumped off at 0730, with Fox and Able Companies making rapid progress toward the juncture point which juncture was made by 0906. Lines were consolidated and Fox Company 2/24 and Able Company 1/25 (attached) jumped off for the Beach Road

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

at 0915. George Company 2/24 moved into the pocket rapidly and by 0915 had swept through to the point of juncture between Fox and Able Companies. George Company did an about face and proceeded with mopping up operations through the pocket, while Fox and Able moved on to the Beach Road, reaching the objective at 0950. Fox and Able sent patrols to the water's edge. Able Company and Baker Company 1/25 reverted to parent control at 1100.

The 81mm mortar platoon was assigned to George Company, and engineer squads were attached to both Fox and George Companies.

Companies were assigned areas in the Battalion zone of action, and were ordered to mop up on their areas; blow all caves; bury all enemy dead; collect all salvagable gear; and carry all Marine dead to a collecting point, where they could be picked up by truck. This collecting point for Marine dead was at the CR in 184 I.

The remainder of the day was spent in carrying out these orders.

Enemy opposition consisted of a few isolated snipers. Many of the enemy were heard committing suicide with grenades.

2/24 released by the 25th Marines and reverted to parent control.

A perimeter defense was set up for the night in 184 I.

CASUALTIES:		TOTAL		RET FR	RET FR	TOTAL	TOTAL		
KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NONEFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF
OFF:									21
ENL:	4	1			5				387

REMARKS:

The Battalion completed its mission on this enemy pocket in 38 hours after going into the line, 14 hours of which time was spent in the actual attack. A six man patrol from Fox Company was sent to 185 A to investigate enemy resistance. Enemy resistance still located in cave areas in that sector. Two of the patrol were wounded and evacuated. This small pocket of resistance was in the 23rd Marines' sector. Patrol killed 5 of the enemy.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

17 March, 1945 -- D / 26 Day

No enemy activity reported during the night.

The battalion was assigned a zone of action in which to mop up. Orders were to blow all caves and seal if possible, remove all Marine dead to roads where they could be picked up and transported to the Marine Cemetery, salvage all gear and weapons which were to be placed in piles along the road side for further removal to a central area, and to report any enemy resistance not eliminated.

The zone of action for these operations, assigned this Battalion was as follows: From 185 K (NE) to 183 Y (NW) through 184 O, N, R, Q, P and 183 T, on the south; from 185 K (NE) to 201 W (SE) through 185 F, 184 E and 201 X on the east; from 183 Y (NW) to 183 M (C) through 183 S, M, on the west; from 183 M (C) to 201 W (C) through 183 I, E, 184 A, 201 V on the north.

Mopping up operations completed at 1600. George Company and Fox Company went into defensive areas for the night in 184 A, F, and 184 U, V, respectively. C.P. remained at 166 D (NC). Caves blown: - 32; enemy dead buried 90; all Marine dead that could be found were removed to the roads and taken to the cemetery by transportation provided for that purpose. No known points of enemy resistance remained in the mop-up area.

CASUALTIES:					TOTAL	RET FR	RET FR	TOTAL	TOTAL	
	KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NONEFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF
OFF:										21
ENL:	1		1		1	3		1	1	*381
										*4 Ret.

18 March, 1945 -- D / 27 Day.

One enemy soldier walking along road in Fox Company's area killed, otherwise the night was quiet.

Fox and George Companies moved to an assembly area in 166 C, D, and all hands prepared to embark on the USS BECKHAM (APA-133).

The Battalion moved from the assembly area in 166 C, D to Beach Yellow One and board LST 247 at 1500.

All units aboard the USS BECKHAM  
March, 1945.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

CASUALTIES:		TOTAL	RET FR	RET FR	TOTAL	TOTAL
	KIA W&E SK&E MIA DOW NONEFF		W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF
OFF:						21
ENL:			9	11	21	*383 *18Ret.

TOTAL CASUALTIES ON OPERATION FOR SECOND BATTALION, 24TH MARINES

					TOTAL	RET FR	RET FR	TOTAL	TOTAL	TOTAL	
	KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	DOW	NONEFF	W&E	SK&E	RET	EFF	RERREC.
OFF:	8	13	1		1	23	1		1	21	7
ENL:	133	437	151	2	15	774	38	38	76	383	243

OFF: W&NE - 7                      GRAND TOTAL ALL CASUALTIES - 850  
 ENL: W&NE - 46                    (Does not include Landing Team Attachments)

REMARKS:

Approximately 10,000 rounds of NGF expended during the course of the operation. Approximately 5,000 rounds for night harassing fires, 3000 rounds ground observed or plane spotted deep support in attack and 2,000 rounds against area targets 600 to 1,000 yards forward of front lines. Night NGF illumination averaged 8 star shells per hour of darkness except on one occasion when 15 star shells per hour were fire from 2300 to 0400

Approximately 7,600 rounds of 81mm mortar ammunition expended during the operation. 2,025 rounds of night harassing fires, 2,950 rounds fired in preparation prior to attacks at King Hour, and 2,625 rounds fired on targets of opportunity and other close support missions during the course of attacks.

Six air strikes received during the operation and approximately twenty requested. While there is no available record, it is believed that a number of the missions asked for, but not received individually, were combined with strikes called by Division and Corps.

A number of Corps Artillery missions were requested day and night. No record is available as to the number of missions received or number of rounds fired by Corps Artillery in response to these requests - believed to be meager.

Close support artillery fired every requested mission; although on a number of occasions, the number of rounds fired was less than requested.

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Narrative of Operation, Cont'd.

mission had to be reduced because of ammunition shortages. Co-operation by close support artillery superb.

Portable flame throwers and demolitions were used extensively throughout the operation and proved most effective in the destruction of the numerous reinforced concrete emplacements, log bunkers, and caves encountered in the Battalion zone of action.

Few good observation posts were found because of the nature of the terrain, and because practically all good O.P. positions were registered by enemy artillery and mortars.

#### SECTION V

#### COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- A. No new lessons learned. During the Saipan Operation we learned to expect anything and be prepared for any eventuality. This now has been implanted in our minds more than ever. Ingenuity, tenacity and common sense on the part of all leaders will overcome any problem.

1. 60mm MORTAR.

COMMENT: 60mm mortar ammunition packed in metal cases was often defective. Moisture, in many instances, rusted tail assemblies. This resulted in short rounds which is especially dangerous, inasmuch as this weapon is used sometimes for firing as close as 20 yards in front of our troops.

RECOMMENDATION: Improve construction of metal cases so that the ammunition will be completely waterproof. Institute a rigid inspection of all ammunition of this type just prior to going on next operation. Do not use any 60mm mortar ammunition packed thusly if possible, in next operation that was left over from any former operation.

COMMENT: There were an excessive number of 60mm mortar duds. This condition was noticeable for the first time when ammunition with the plastic nose was used.

RECOMMENDATION: Develop the present 60mm mortar shell so that this condition will be remedied.

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Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.

COMMENT: There was an inadequate supply of 60mm mortar illuminating ammunition. Constant rationing was in effect. A larger supply in the future operations is required.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the total supply of 60mm mortar illuminating ammunition be not figured, as before, on the unit of fire basis. There should be at least twelve rounds per hour of darkness provided for each 60mm mortar, plus a sufficient amount (about 100 extra rounds per company) in reserve for use in case of enemy counterattack.

COMMENT: 60mm mortar smoke rounds were found to be very useful. The smoke rounds were especially useful in adjusting fires.

RECOMMENDATION: Provide in future operations and provide adequate amount during our training period prior to the next operation.

## 2. ROCKET LAUNCHER:

COMMENT: The present number of bazookas in the rifle battalion is inadequate. In the field and during combat, bazookas are often damaged and replacement up to this time has been difficult. The battalion Command Post, the nerve center of a battalion in combat, is entirely without antitank protection in the present table of organization. Normally, in the present type of fighting, it is necessary that the Battalion Command Post be located very close to the front lines, and therefore, should have some organic antitank protection.

RECOMMENDATION: Provide three bazookas for Battalion Headquarters Company. A reserve supply of four bazookas should be kept with the Battalion Quartermaster for replacement. If the old type of bazooka is furnished, an adequate supply of batteries and bulbs should be carried with the Battalion Quartermaster.

COMMENT: Bazooka white phosphorous ammunition was very effective against the Japanese holed up in caves. The supply was inadequate.

RECOMMENDATION: In the next operation provide an ample supply of bazooka white phosphorous ammunition.

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Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.

COMMENT: Some adverse criticism was heard during the course of combat against the bazooka. Investigation has shown that in every case where criticism was heard, the bazooka was in the hands of untrained personnel or was used for missions for which not designated. The bazooka will not penetrate reinforced concrete but is very effective in the hands of trained operators firing at openings of caves and pill boxes.

RECOMMENDATION: Investigate thoroughly all adverse criticism of the bazooka. It is an excellent weapon for purposes for which designed.

3. ARTILLERY ILLUMINATION:

COMMENTS: It is believed that illumination by artillery would be useful.

RECOMMENDATION: Develop and acquire artillery illumination ammunition.

4. ASSAULT PERSONNEL:

COMMENT: Organized demolition personnel was inadequate. This Battalion organized an Assault and Demolition Platoon, the personnel of which were taken from the rifle companies. All Marines in the battalion were trained in primary demolitions. Despite this, demolition personnel was inadequate.

RECOMMENDATION: Provide in the table of organization two Demolition and Assault Platoons whose primary function will be the reduction of fortified positions. Each platoon would normally assist a rifle company in the attack. Each platoon should consist of approximately forty (40) men with an officer platoon leader. In addition to these two platoons a maintenance section of ten (10) men should be provided for. The function of the maintenance section would be to keep flame throwers filled and repaired, and maintain a steady supply of demolitions to the Assault and Demolitions Platoons with the front line companies. An increase of the present supply of flame throwers and demolitions equipment should be commensurate with the increase of personnel. It might be stated at this time that the twenty-seven (27) flame throwers, per infantry battalion, which at first seemed an excessive number, proved to be barely enough on this operation. The constant use of them and operational losses utilized our complete supply.

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Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.

5. 75MM GUN SELF-PROPELLED:

COMMENTS: When used, half-tracks operated under conditions that exposed operating personnel to enemy fire because of construction of half-track.

RECOMMENDATION: Replace all present half-tracks with a new type of tank destroyer. With this recommendation, it is suggested that the type of tank destroyer used should have interchangeable mechanical parts with the medium tank now being employed in the Marine Corps.

6. TANKS:

COMMENT: The tank bulldozer in present use did not seem to have sufficient power to push through sandstone rubble such as we encountered on Iwo Jima.

RECOMMENDATION: Improve present tank bulldozer so that power will be increased.

COMMENT: Ronson Flame Thrower Tanks were available on a ration basis. In no case was Regiment ever able to obtain more than two at a time. The usual number available was one. When that one expended its flame, it had to go to the rear and refuel, a time consuming process, and then return to finish its mission. This, at times, was very annoying.

RECOMMENDATION: Provide more Ronson Flame Thrower Tanks in the Regiment.

COMMENT: The tank drawn sled rocket contraption which was used on Iwo Jima was apparently in early stages of development. This weapon has great possibilities.

RECOMMENDATION: Immediate further development should be made on the tank drawn sled rockets. More range and accuracy is needed. Tanks operating in the type of terrain such as was found on Iwo Jima could not always get in the proper position on the front lines to fire on the desired target with safety to the troops. These same rockets should be developed for quick and accurate use by infantry.

7. MORTARS, 4.2 AND OTHERS:

COMMENT: The effectiveness of late mortar was time again brought to our attention by the

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Recommendations, Cont'd

**RECOMMENDATION:** The Marine Corps should develop and put into use at the earliest time, large caliber mortars. A 4.2 or larger caliber mortar platoon with each regiment would be a decided asset for fighting against an enemy holed up in deep draws and crevices such as was found on Iwo Jima. More thought should be given to the amount of mortar ammunition. This applies to the 60mm and 81mm mortar and any other higher caliber mortar that may be used in the future.

8. CANNON PLATOON:

Throughout the battle, tanks and artillery made little impression on some of the stronger fortifications. The use of NGF on these fortifications was not possible because of the close proximity of the front lines. This particular point was one of the most important factors in the costliness of our assault on the Japanese positions. The enemy held their fire from these strong points until we were practically on top of them. At this point, a large caliber mobile seige gun would have been most effective.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Division should have a cannon company consisting of self propelled seige gun type weapons such as the U. S. Army is now using in the European Theater. This company should also be equipped with mountain type howitzers that can be broken down and man-handled into positions that cannot be reached by tanks or self-propelled weapons, because of the terrain. These howitzers should be kept in reserve and bear a similar relation to the seige guns as the light machine gun is related to the heavy machine gun in the machine gun platoon of a rifle company.

9. ENGINEER PERSONNEL:

**COMMENT:** Much loss of time in getting tanks into position to fire missions was experienced because of the inadequacy of engineer personnel. In an operation as Iwo Jima, engineer personnel assigned to front line companies were constantly busy with demolition work. Many times tanks could not move into position because paths had to be probed and mines cleared and the engineer personnel available for same were busy with other missions.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Increase the size of engineer platoons to take care of the multitudinal tasks which they must ac-

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Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.

comply during an attack. If the table of organization of the Infantry Battalion could be increased to provide two Assault and Demolition Platoons as requested in paragraph 4, this increase in engineer personnel would be unnecessary.

## 10. SPOT PLANES:

COMMENT: Night spotting planes on the few occasions available, were found very useful in keeping down enemy mortar and artillery fires. They were especially useful for spotting enemy rocket positions at night.

RECOMMENDATION: Spotting planes should be available every night to the front line battalions.

## 11. FLAME THROWERS:

COMMENT: An idea is herewith presented for what it is worth:- On many occasions it appeared that a flexible hose extension on a reel from a large flame thrower apparatus would have been useful. This would enable infantrymen to work in close to fortifications that cannot be approached with safety by a man with the heavy portable flame thrower encumbering his movements or where the terrain prevents the use of a flame thrower tank. Such a situation occurred on several occasions during the battle of Iwo Jima.

RECOMMENDATION: This idea may be adapted to the flame thrower tank. It is requested that this idea be presented to the proper authorities for their judgment as to its merits.

## 12. BATTERY COMMANDER'S TELESCOPE:

COMMENT: Battalion O.P.'s often drew mortar, artillery, machine gun, and small arms fire, making observation at times impossible. A captured Japanese B.C. Scope proved on one occasion to be exceedingly valuable in maintaining an O.P. with minimum of exposure.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that two Battery Commander Telescopes be provided Battalions so that O.P.'s can be maintained with a minimum of exposure.

## 13. SHOES:

COMMENT: The high top field shoe was found to be conditionally comfortable and rugged.

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Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.

RECOMMENDATION: Issue these shoes so that each man will have one pair for combat. Make available these shoes so that each officer may purchase at least one pair.

14. REPLACEMENTS:

COMMENTS: During this operation, because of heavy casualties, there were many replacement officers. Each officer, after reporting for duty, takes several days to know the key personnel under him and their capabilities. This situation should be remedied in so far as practicable. If past operations are any indication of the future, it must be assumed that we will have heavy losses among officer personnel.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that one extra officer be assigned to a rifle company at the earliest practicable time. An appropriate officer could then be placed in charge of the weapons unit of the rifle company, namely, overseeing the machine gun platoon and mortar section. This officer could, in this position, ready himself for any job in the company and know the capabilities of all the key personnel. This would at least be one step, and it is believed, a very practical step, towards remedying the situation described in comment.

COMMENT: Replacements during combat are noticeably weak in fundamental training. They naturally do not know all their leaders and consequently, their efficiency is greatly hampered. This results in a large percentage of casualties among replacements. It is believed that this situation can be remedied.

RECOMMENDATION: Procure replacements early in the training phase. A definite program should be established to have certain groups of replacements trained with particular units during the training period. The resulting benefits from this is apparent. The plan must be carefully worked out and followed through so that the same group of replacements that worked with a particular outfit will rejoin that outfit on the battlefield. This applies to officers as well as the enlisted men. Replacements received at the base camp just prior to amphibious maneuvers, as has been the practice in the past, are practically in the same category from the training standpoint as those that joined on the battlefield without having basic training as above described.

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Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.

15. REPLACEMENT OF WEAPONS:

COMMENT: Many of our weapons (rifles, carbines, machine guns, mortars, etc.) have been used on previous operations, some in at least four operations, and it is believed, therefore, that there should be prompt replacement on such weapons, that may not perform efficiently through another operation. In the past, we have received some replacement machine guns and mortars a few days before we left on an operation and never had any time to fire them in training.

RECOMMENDATION: A prompt replacement of unserviceable weapons during the early part of the training period so that maximum training can be given with these weapons, especially crew served weapons.

16. AMMUNITION.

COMMENT: Prior to this operation, the following ammunition was not included in the training allowance and the use of same was never experienced by personnel prior to entering combat:- illuminating hand grenades, 60mm mortar white phosphorous ammunition, bazooka white phosphorous ammunition, new type pyrotechnics fired from the rifle grenade launcher, new type heavy barrage rocket, and anti-personnel mines.

RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended that the above ammunition be made available to the infantry battalions during the next training period. Any new type of ammunition, the use of which is being contemplated in the next operation, should be supplied in sufficient quantity for at least familiarity training purposes during the forthcoming training period.

17. RATIONS.

COMMENT: The new type "C" ration was rarely available to front line units but was very much appreciated when obtained.

RECOMMENDATION: In future operations replace all old type "C" rations with new type "C" rations.

18. TRANSPORTATION.

COMMENT: Two  $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks and trailers as provided in the T.O. for the 81mm mortar platoon, Headquarters Company, Infantry Battalion, is insufficient.

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Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.

RECOMMENDATION: Increase the number of  $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trucks in the T.O. for the 81mm mortar platoon from two (2) trucks to four (4); increase the number of  $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trailers from two (2) to four (4).

COMMENT: The present T.O. allows a total of five (5) trailers,  $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton, 2 wheel, cargo for the infantry battalion whereas the number of  $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trucks allowed is eight (8). No trailer is provided for the wire jeep. In supplying front line companies in the attack, the scant transportation in the battalion is taxed to the limit.

RECOMMENDATION: Change present T.O. to allow a  $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton trailer for each  $\frac{1}{4}$ -ton truck. A trailer for the wire jeep is a necessity. The communication handcart is an inadequate substitute.

COMMENT: The cargo carrier, M-29 (Weasel) would be invaluable for supply in certain types of terrain. During the first four days of combat, supplies were handled by carrying parties for considerable distances over sandy terrain. This terrain could not be traversed by wheeled vehicles even if same had been available from time of landing. This terrain could have been traversed by the "Weasel". The "Weasel" could, at times, be well used as an ambulance thus dispensing with the necessity of having aid stations located near transportation routes which are always good targets for enemy artillery and mortars.

RECOMMENDATION: Augment the present organic transportation of the Marine infantry battalion with four (4) carriers, M-29, one "Weasel" for each company in the battalion.

#### 19. CORPSMEN.

COMMENT: Replacement corpsmen from the medical companies were, in most instances, not suitably trained for duty as company aid men. Their knowledge of first aid was adequate, but they did not know how to properly take care of themselves on the front lines under fire.

RECOMMENDATION: All corpsmen in the Division who may be used as replacement company aid men in an infantry battalion during combat should receive training with an infantry unit.

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Comments and Recommendations, Cont'd.  
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21. CAMOUFLAGE.

COMMENT: Overhead telephone lines from Regiment to Battalion was very instrumental in maintaining excellent phone communications. However, on one occasion, when the Battalion Command Post was by necessity near the front lines, the C.P. soon came under mortar and artillery fire. The C.P. was well concealed within a rock formation and it was suspected that the tell-tale overhead telephone lines may have helped to draw the fire.

RECOMMENDATION: None. The comment is self-explanatory.

COMMENT: Frequent washing of camouflage helmet covers while in the rear area faded them to the point where the covers were conspicuous even if dirty.

RECOMMENDATION: There should be a reissue of camouflage covers from time to time and washing of same should not be one of the requirements of inspections.

22. GENERAL:

Further comments and recommendations will be found in other sections, annexes, and appendixes of this report. In general, all weapons and equipment that we have with the above mentioned exceptions, are excellent. The suggested improvements will help little if on the next operation, there is an insufficient pre-D Day naval bombardment or there are air strikes without a heavier type bomb than was used on Iwo Jima. It is believed that after meeting the resistance as we did in the central and northern part of the island, an additional five days naval bombardment should have been given in this operation, with a great portion of it concentrated on the north end of the island.

ANNEX A

ADMINISTRATION

A. Casualty Reports and Reports of KIA and WIA.

1. It is recommended that landing teams use copies of enclosure (A) for retaining information on casualties, rather than a file card. These sheets should be typed alphabetically prior to landing

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Anex Able, Cont'd.

regardless of rank and unit, along with one complete set of casualty cards, and sufficient blank cards. When a casualty occurs, the casualty card will be filled out and sent to regiment and the same information entered opposite the casualty's name on the sheet. This system, in addition to the File Card System, was followed by this unit throughout the operation and proved highly satisfactory. Each company first sergeant carried a small book of these sheets and recorded the information of casualties thereon. When possible, the first sergeant reported to the battalion command post, at intervals, to check his company's casualties with those reported to Regiment by Battalion. The casualty sheets combined to make the casualty book proved to be a much quicker way to check casualties, and also effective strength, than did the file card system. In addition another casualty book with names entered by companies alphabetically regardless of rank, was also kept. This proved invaluable in making a quick, accurate check of each company's effective strength which would not show in the other casualty book. Sufficient blank sheets were carried to enter the name, rank, and serial number, etc., of all replacements joined. In using only one set of casualty cards it would greatly reduce the size of the casualty card box and enable battalions to carry more blank cards with which to report personnel who were casualties on more than one occasion.

2. It is recommended that before battle replacements are sent to a battalion, such as were received on Iwo Jima, rosters or casualty cards showing name, rank, serial number, service and specification serial number, be forwarded to the battalion in sufficient time to allow for clerical work incidental to assignment to companies in accordance with the type of replacements most needed. This would eliminate the necessity for assembling replacements in a group to obtain this vital information thereby presenting a worthy target for enemy fire. On one occasion a 240mm Japanese mortar shell landed within thirty feet of where this necessary assemblage had been held, killing and wounding twenty men of a nearby unit.

3. It is recommended that Regiment send all replacements to Battalion via the Battalion Dump where they may dispose of all excess equipment and clothing prior to their arrival at the Battalion Command Post for assignment.

4. Due to the difficulty in obtaining information concerning the next of kin of replacements, it is recommended that a copy

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Annex Able, Cont'd.

of the embarkation roster on which all replacements appear be furnished the battalion prior to departure from the operation area. This procedure would enable commanding officers en route to base camp to write letters of condolence to the next of kin of deceased personnel among replacements assigned to them.

B. Morale of troops, methods used to maintain high morale throughout the operation.

1. Religious activities prior to and during the operation were excellent.

2. The postal service rendered after leaving camp was excellent and has been highly praised by all personnel. This unit has no adverse comment to make whatsoever. The Battalion Mail Orderly was set up in the Battalion Dump and worked the mail there, bringing up mail to the Battalion Command Post for effective personnel only. A roster was provided him and casualties were indicated thereon. At least once each day a list of the latest casualties was sent to him in order to keep his roster current. The only difficulty experienced was with mail for replacements, namely, corpsmen and ambulance drivers, who, in some cases, were changed daily. The air mail stationery and the free air mail postage provided troops was greatly appreciated by all hands and was conducive to more letter writing immediately after the island was secured. The foresight of the persons in charge of the Division Postal Service is highly commendable.

3. Ship's news sheets sent to the troops ashore were very much appreciated even though the number distributed was very small. Usually two copies per company were available and were passed along from man to man. In the future, a larger distribution would be beneficial to morale.

4. The splendid mail service received prior to and during the operation, and the fact that plenty of canned fruit and fruit juice was given front line troops was largely responsible for maintaining a good state of morale.

ANNEX BAKER

INTELLIGENCE

A. MAPS, PHOTOGRAPHS AND SUPPLEMENTARY INTELLIGENCE

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Types of Maps and Photos furnished before Operation. (See Appendix #1)

Adequacy and Completeness of Maps and Photos furnished.

1. The maps furnished were adequate in number and detail. The distribution within the battalion carried over to all platoon leaders, and a thorough and complete briefing resulted. The completeness of the maps tended to aid materially those responsible for the presentation of subject matter relative to the target area. The 1/5000 Air and Gunnery Target Maps were found to be very useful when placed in troop compartments and places of assembly.

2. No maps were furnished during the operation except a reproduction of a captured enemy map of Iwo Jima. The photos furnished were adequate in number, but because of the high altitude from which they were taken, many details of the terrain were eliminated. The enlarged beach obliques proved to furnish the most valuable information. It is extremely helpful to rifle company commanders if they are provided with photos, vertical and oblique, which are easily interpreted by personnel other than API personnel. The company commander's primary interest is the terrain which lies ahead of him and this is best given him by low angle obliques.

3. The photos furnished during the operation did not always cover the area as indicated in the photo mission request. All obliques were very useful for terrain study. More stress should be placed on photographic missions for small units and the service for such improved. Such service was not satisfactory during this operation as far as this unit was concerned.

4. Hydrographic information.

a. Hydrographic information furnished proved correct in all instances of importance to an infantry battalion.

5. Other Intelligence.

a. The G-2 Study, G-2 Tactical Study of Terrain, and JICPOA Bulletin #122-44 were sources of information presented in such form that easy reference could be made during detailed study of the objective. These sources of information were invaluable to the company commanders during the operation.

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orientation prior to D Day.

b. The intelligence disseminated to the battalion by D-2 during the battle was effective and sufficient, but the time of arrival of the reports was such that the period covered was too far back for full effectiveness to be gained.

**B. INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONING.**

**1. Collection of Information.**

a. Two scouts of the Intelligence section were assigned to each assault company within the battalion. Their primary mission was the collection of enemy documents and spotting by map reference enemy materiel. Two scouts were assigned to cover the area in rear of the assault companies, and their mission was the same as for the scouts working with the front line companies. Due to casualties within the section, this plan had to be changed early in the operation. A three man scout group was organized and worked laterally in rear of the front lines. The remaining personnel had to assume additional duties to insure the proper functioning of the section.

b. Front line companies furnished much information concerning enemy troop movements to their immediate front, types of fire received, and the number of enemy dead within their respective zones of action.

**2. Evaluation and Dissemination of Information.**

a. Initially, during the operation, all captured enemy documents were sent directly to R-2 for evaluation and dissemination. When Japanese Language Personnel were sent to the battalion each day, the captured documents were evaluated within the battalion command post, or, at a previously designated point in rear of the front lines, depending upon the tactical situation.

b. On one occasion, after the battalion had secured Hill 382 a Japanese Language Officer and a collecting detail were requested from R-2. This group, working with the Battalion Intelligence Section, established a collecting point in rear of the front lines and worked throughout one day in collecting and evaluating captured enemy documents taken from caves on and around Hill 382. All Japanese Language Personnel who worked with this detail were re-

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Annex Baker, Cont'd.

ceptionally well qualified, and efficient in their duties.

3. Communications.

a. Scouts assigned to companies:

(1) SCR 300 radio at company CP to battalion C.P. (available on request).

(2) Telephone (EE 8) at company C.P. to battalion C.P. (available on request).

(3) One scout acting as messenger.

b. Battalion Intelligence O.P.:

(1) Telephone (EE 8) to battalion C.P.

(2) One observer acting as messenger.

c. Bn-2 section within battalion C.P.:

(1) Telephone (EE 8) on battalion switchboard.

(b) All other normal battalion communications were made available to Bn-2 on request.

C. PRISONERS.

1. One prisoner was taken by this battalion during the operation. At the time of capture, this battalion was attached to the 25th Marines. The prisoner surrendered when he was fired on by a machine gun. The Regimental Intelligence Officer and two Japanese Language Personnel were at the scene of capture, and the prisoner was turned over to them immediately for handling and interrogation.

D. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIAL.

1. The procedure set up for the recovery of captured enemy documents and material was very effective considering the limited number of personnel within the battalion available for this type of work.

E. PROPAGANDA.

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1. There was no apparent effect from written propaganda dropped over the island before D Day.
2. There was no positive effect noted from vocal propaganda in this battalion's zone of action.

F. COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE.

1. All SOP's were followed.
2. Relief of a front line battalion was usually done before dawn. This action, primarily, was to lessen the number of casualties while effecting the relief, but it also served as a counter-intelligence measure.

G. PUBLIC RELATIONS.

1. Public Relations Personnel were observed at various periods within this battalion's zone of action. Men off the lines were interviewed.

H. RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. Photos furnished should be taken from lower altitudes, and greater emphasis should be placed upon low angle obliques for the small unit leaders.
2. It is believed that better results could be obtained if the battalion intelligence section was allowed additional personnel. If possible, the section's strength should be raised to eighteen (18) enlisted.
3. It is recommended that photo coverage, upon request during an operation, should follow as close as possible the area as requested, and the type of photos as requested.

I. GENERAL COMMENTS.

1. The greatest source of intelligence information within an infantry battalion originates in the rifle companies through the voluntary contribution of captured enemy documents. It is impossible for the intelligence scouts to cover completely a battalion's zone of action. All personnel within a battalion should be indoctrinated in the importance of intelligence functions. This section received outstanding cooperation from the rifle companies of this battalion during the past operation.

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Appendix #1 to Annex Baker, Cont'd.  
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APPENDIX #1

ANNEX BAKER

TYPES OF MAPS AND PHOTOS FURNISHED

<u>TITLE</u> (Maps)	<u>NUMBER FURNISHED</u>
1/20,000 - 2 sheets - - - - - W/Grid	30
1/20,000 2 sheets - - - - - W/O Grid	6
1/10,000 W/Grid - - - - -	50
1/5,000 4 sheets - - - - - W/Grid	10
1/5,000 4 sheets - - - - - W/O Grid	4
1/5,000 Assault Map - - - - -	50
1/10,00 Photo Map 4 sheets - - - - - W/Grid	30
1/20,000 Photo Map 4 sheets - - - - -	20
1/10,000 Situation - - - - - Map to 15 Oct.	6

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Appendix #1 to Annex Baker, Cont'd.

1/15,000 Situation	-----	1
Map W/Grid		
H.O. Chart 6101	-----	1
2" - 1 Naut. Mi. 2 Sheets w/Grd	-----	4
1/10,000 Beach Map "A" W/O Grid	-----	2
1/10,000 E. Beach Study	-----	1
Beach Diagram East	-----	1
Beach Diagram West	-----	1
Beach Profiles	-----	2
Water Level Profiles	-----	4
(Photos)		
1/7,000 Photo Mosaic 6 Sheets	-----	1
Verticals and Obliques		
1/5,000 - 1/20,000 in blocked and un- blocked areas	-----	300 (approx)

ANNEX CHARLIE

OPERATIONS

A. Operations and Training - Infantry.

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Annex Charlie, Cont'd.

1. Rehearsal exercises and methods used to indoctrinate troops in details of operation. Normal.
2. Methods used to guide tanks across reefs to beach - no comments.
3. Weapons (including ammunition and fuze settings) found most effective against fortified installations - No changes.
4. Efficiency and employment of flame throwers, portable and tank mounted - Efficient where use possible. Portable flame throwers used throughout operation. Terrain allowed only occasional use of flame thrower tank.
5. Special uses of tanks and LVT(A) (4's) (i.e., as supporting artillery, assault guns, etc.) - No Comments.
6. Infantry-tank coordination - Single tanks used. Terrain prevented normal infantry-tank tactics.
7. Enemy antitank measures - Enemy antitank measures were excellent. Mines strewn in most areas where tanks had to negotiate. Type of mines used were horned scullies, horned scullies in contact with aerial bombs, and yard stick mines. Horned scullies were very effective. Enemy 47mm guns and AT guns of larger caliber used against our tanks with much effectiveness.
8. Tactical use of War Dogs - During this operation, war dogs were of no use to this unit.
9. Employment of rockets, AT and BR - Use normally. Very effective.
10. New enemy tactics encountered - The enemy used the same tenacious fanatical defense as experienced in previous operations.

B. Air.

1. Adequacy and efficiency of defensive air cover, including antisubmarine patrol from time of mounting until completion of assault phase - No comments.

2. Effectiveness of preliminary heavy strikes against enemy installations - No sufficient. Whether desired degree of neutralization was attained - No.

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Annex Charlie, Cont'd.  
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3. Criticism, favorable or unfavorable, on air attacks on D Day, especially from H-60 to H-hour - No comment.

4. The manner in which air liaison parties performed their duties with respect to:

a. Advising unit commanders - Excellent.

b. Maintaining liaison with naval gunfire and artillery teams - Excellent.

c. Requesting close support missions - Excellent.

d. Directing air attacks - Satisfactory.

e. Maintaining radio communications with Air Support Control - Accomplished in normal manner and considered adequate.

5. Adequacy of communications equipment and nets between AGL teams and ASC, between ASC and support aircraft, air coordinator, and observers, and between support aircraft and AGL teams - Adequate.

6. Methods of marking targets from ground or from air. Methods of marking friendly front lines, and whether satisfactory to support aircraft. (Use of colored smoke or white phosphorous shells from artillery or mortars, panels, and use of smoke bombs by air-coordinator, etc.) - No comment.

7. a. Effectiveness and timing of air support missions and whether number of aircraft available was adequate. - No comment.

b. Whether interval between origination of request for air support missions and their execution was satisfactory to the originators, and average length of time - One out of six missions received within desired period of time.

8. Effectiveness of dummy attacks to cover an advance by our troops or in adjusting air attack on target prior to making actual live attacks - Policy should be continued.

9. Effectiveness of control of aircraft support rounds - No comment.

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Annex Charlie, Cont'd.

10. Any additional comments or recommendations - In future operations pre D-day and pre H-hour strikes, make more use of bombs weighing 1,000 pounds or more. During the operation, have 1,000 or 2,000 pound bombs available. These were not available to us on Iwo Jima.

C. Naval Gunfire.

1. The effectiveness of Shore Fire Control Personnel - Very efficient.

a. Adequacy of number - Sufficient.

b. State of Training - Excellent.

2. The effectiveness of Shore Fire Control equipment.

a. Communications equipment - Adequate.

b. Other equipment - Adequate.

3. The effectiveness of Gunfire.

a. Preparation fires against beach defenses - Adequate upon beaches on which the actual landing took place. The area overlooking and adjacent to the beach area apparently were not fully covered.

b. Fires on targets of opportunity - Air Spot excellent. Ground spotted targets not possible after D / 4, because the nature of the terrain provided no satisfactory ground observation.

c. Counterbattery fires - Satisfactory.

d. Night harassing fires - Sufficient when ammunition available.

e. Interdiction fires - Normal.

f. Fires against coastal targets, caves, etc. - No comments.

g. Fires with air spot - Satisfactory when air spot could be obtained.

h. Estimated number of call fires - Approximately fifty (50). (Preparatory and night harassing fires not included)

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Annex Charlie, Cont'd.  
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4. The effectiveness of coordination.
  - a. Between adjacent units firing HE or illumination - No comments.
  - b. Between Naval Gunfire and artillery, air support - No comments.
  - c. Effectiveness of chain of command between various echelons of Naval Gunfire control - No comments.
5. Outstanding or unusual features of the employment of Naval Gunfire - No comments.
6. Recommendations for future employment of Naval Gunfire - Recommend that on a target such as Iwo Jima, have a minimum of 3 times the amount of pre-bombardment as received. Rear areas where enemy artillery and mortar positions are likely to be placed and various areas adjacent to beaches should receive special attention for naval pre-bombardment gunfire.

D. General.

1. Artillery.
  - a. For all purposes intended, direct support artillery was outstanding when sufficient ammunition was available. At no time during this operation did we experience any short rounds or misdirected fires on our own troops.
2. Tanks.
  - a. Tanks were only effective when used individually or as a pair. Terrain was such that at no time were we able to use tanks as had been anticipated and as has been practiced in training. On rare occasions when tank support could be used, one or two tanks were the most that could be put into position. Their fields of fire, at these times, were exceedingly limited. Tanks used in the vicinity of front lines drew heavy mortar fire. On many occasions, because of this mortar fire, tanks had to be withdrawn for the safety of the troops in the vicinity. The use of flame thrower tanks was subject to the same limitations.
3. Rockets.

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Annex Charlie, Cont'd.

- a. The barrage rockets fired from reconnaissance trucks were used on numerous occasions for the purpose for which intended and proved very effective.
4. War Dogs.
  - a. War dogs were ineffective. They were used on two occasions as messenger dogs and on one occasion as scout dogs. It is believed, however, that this ineffectiveness was peculiar to this particular type of operation. This comment is not a fair appraisal of their future value.
5. Chemicals.
  - a. Gas masks were collected and put in the Battalion Dump on D + 4 Day.

ANNEX DOG

SUPPLY

- A. Adequacy of all types of mounting supplies.
  1. CLASS I
    - a. Rations: Adequate supply of rations.
    - b. Water: Adequate supply of water. Great deal of the water was foul tasting.
    - c. Extra component of "B" rations: Did not draw any of these until situation permitted.
  2. CLASS II.
    - a. No shortages; troops were fully equipped when landed.
  3. CLASS III.
    - a. The only item under this category that we supplied was flame throwing fuel, which was in sufficient quantities.
  4. CLASS IV.
    - a. Adequately supplies.

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Annex Dog, Cont'd.

5. CLASS V.

a. After landing team and attached units had received initial issue aboard ship, we had only three (3) cases of fragmentation grenades left. This was an inadequate supply, due to the fact the residue was not the required amount for the two LCVP's assigned this landing team for high priority supplies.

B. Adequacy of Resupply.

1. CLASS I.

a. Rations: An adequate supply of rations was received at all times, but it is recommended that more of the new type "C" ration be issued.

b. Water: Adequately supplied.

c. Extra component of "B" rations.

(1) Fruit Juices: A sufficient supply was received, but advocate more of a variety. It is further suggested that the use of #2 and #2½ cans be substituted for the #10. This would permit a more accurate distribution and waste would be reduced to a minimum.

(2) Fruits, canned: Received in sufficient quantities. No. 2 and No. 2½ cans should be substituted for the No. 10 for same reasons as (1) above.

(3) Coffee: This item, as well as sugar and cream, was adequately supplied.

(4) Doughnuts: These were received by the troops with highest appreciation and can be used by front lines at all times. Daily issues should be made and larger quantities be furnished.

2. CLASS II.

a. Under this class, all gear was sufficiently supplied.

3. CLASS III.

a. This too, was received in adequate quantities.

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Annex Dog, Cont'd.

4. CLASS IV:

- a. Sufficiently supplies.

5. CLASS V.

- a. Inadequate supply of 81mm mortar. Insufficient supply of 60mm mortar, illuminating, at all times. It is recommended that more illuminating hand grenades be carried on future operations.

C. Distribution of Supplies from Beach Dump.

1. Amphibious tractors were difficult to secure for transporting supplies from beach dumps. It is recommended that in addition to organic transportation now listed in T.P.A. for the infantry battalion, that one M-29 (Weasel) be added to each company; total - four (4) per infantry battalion.

D. Salvage and Salvage Collection.

1. All salvaged gear that was collected in battalion zone of action taken to Battalion Dump and thence to the Regimental Quartermaster.

E. Captured Material and Captured Material Collected.

1. A very small amount of any material of this nature was handled. Much captured material was in the form of immobile items, such as, heavy guns, mortars and rocket projectors.

F. Transportation.

1. Adequacy of wheeled and trailer transportation:

Jeeps and trailers were adequate for hauling supplies to front lines in this operation. However, hauls were short and there were no permanent losses of vehicles because of enemy action. In a fast moving operation covering great distances, the present amount of transportation as stated in the T.O. for the infantry battalion is inadequate. Each rifle company should be reinforced in transportation by one "Weasel". Two jeeps and two trailers for the 81mm mortar platoon in a situation where the platoon cannot function properly with this deficiency. A minimum of transportation

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Annex Dog, Cont'd.

required would be one  $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton truck and one  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton trailer per mortar squad; total - four (4)  $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trucks and four (4)  $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trailers. On previous operations our mortar platoon on many occasions could not function because of the lack of transportation for ammunition. At the times of functioning it was able to do so only through the use of captured Japanese transportation. On the last operation, the mortar ammunition transportation problem was not a difficult one, inasmuch as the movement was slow, displacement was infrequent and the amount of ammunition available was not of proportions to present any particular problem.

G. Efficiency of Supply Communication.

1. It is recommended that a SCR 300 be kept in the Battalion QM dump for emergency use. This proved very successful on this operation. Phones cannot be relied upon because of the frequent breakage of lines by tanks and vehicles between Battalion C.P. and dump location.

APPENDIX # 1

ANNEX DOG

A. Transport Quartermaster.

1. Time required to load and embark unit.

a. It took approximately twenty-four (24) hours to load cargo and embark troops.

b. Twenty (20) hours were required to load gear: - prior to the arrival of ship, all gear was on dock and was properly segregated according to its respective holds and priority for loading. The loading was delayed for approximately two (2) hours because no dunnage was available on the dock.

c. Four (4) hours were required to embark troops:- Troops arrived at the dock in two separate groups. This eliminated a great deal of confusion that would ordinarily exist and permitted the billeting officer to situate the men in a minimum of time.

2. Time required to unload individual ship

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Appendix #1 to Annex Dog, Cont'd.

- a. Six (6) days was the total amount of time required to unload ship.
3. Delays encountered:
  - a. Adverse weather and enemy shelling of the beach were the only major delays encountered.
4. Difficulties encountered in unloading ship in transport area and at beach.
  - a. Small crafts were broached on the beach, thus, interfering with the unloading of additional crafts. After "D plus 3", no small craft were permitted to be beached. This eliminated the use of all LCVP's and LCM's until conditions permitted. Palletized gear caused confusion as no orders were received as to whether it could be handled on the beach as it was broken down as loose cargo.
5. Type of Rigging and Slings used:
  - a. The ship had unloading facilities to handle all types of cargo, except palletized. Nets and slings were substituted. Regular cargo was used for general cargo and small slings were used on all light vehicles, including one ton trucks.

APPENDIX # 2

ANNEX DOG

A. ORDNANCE.

1. Weapons.

a. Number, type and caliber of weapons used.

474	--	Carbine, Cal. .30
6	--	Rifles, Cal. .30, 03
81	--	Rifle, Browning Automatic
424	--	Rifle, Cal. .30, M-1
31	--	Pistol, Cal. .45
9	--	Launchers, rocket
27	--	Throwers, flame, M-2-2
25	--	Gun, shot, 12 ga.
4	--	Mortar, 81mm
13	--	Mortar, 60mm

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Appendix #2 to Annex Dog, Cont'd.

18 - - - Gun, machine, heavy  
18 - - - Gun, machine, light

NOTE: On "D plus 18" we drew four (4) light machine guns from the Regimental Quartermaster to replace those of ours that had been lost or knocked out.

b. Number days battle employment: Twenty-six (26) days of battle employment.

c. Number, type and caliber weapons lost.

246 - - - Carbine, cal. .30.  
358 - - - Rifle, Cal. .30, M-1.  
6 - - - Rifle, Cal. .30, O3  
23 - - - Pistol, Cal. .45.  
76 - - - Rifle, Browning Automatic  
6 - - - Launcher, rocket  
9 - - - Thrower, flame, M2-2.  
22 - - - Gun, shot, 12 ga.  
1 - - - Mortar, 81mm  
7 - - - Mortar, 60mm  
7 - - - Gun, machine, heavy  
8 - - - Gun, machine, light

NOTE: An 81mm mortar was salvaged after being discarded by a tank unit; this replaced one of ours that had been destroyed by enemy shelling. It is estimated that 99% of weapons, under the category "LOST", and not totally destroyed, were either turned over to the Regimental Quartermaster or picked up by Divisional Salvage.

d. Adequacy of spare parts and accessories: An armorer was present at the dump throughout the operation with an adequate supply of spare parts and accessories to service all weapons.

## 2. Combat Vehicles.

a. Number and type of combat vehicles used:

7 -  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton trucks (4x4)  
2 -  $\frac{3}{4}$  ton trucks, T.C.S. (4x4)

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Appendix #2 to Annex Dog, Cont'd.

1. -- 1 ton truck (4x4)
  - 6 --  $\frac{1}{2}$  ton trailers
- b. Number days battle employment: Twenty-six (26) days of battle employment.
  - c. Number and type lost or damaged beyond repair: No vehicles were lost or damaged beyond repair during the operation.
  - d. Malfunctions: All maintenance of vehicles was handled by the Regimental Motor Transport Officer.
  - e. Recommendations as to modification of existing types and for new types.

(1) It is recommended that each infantry battalion be supplied with four (4) carriers, M-29 (Weasel) in addition to the organic wheeled vehicles.

### 3. Ammunition.

- a. Number of rounds by exact nomenclature expended:

No available data.

- b. Adequacy, type and packing.

There was an inadequate supply of all types of 81mm mortar ammunition and of 60mm illuminating ammunition. It was found that a small percentage of 60mm HE which was packed in metal containers, had rusted and was unuseable. It is recommended that a new process of waterproofing be employed for such containers.

- c. Recommended changes in U/F.

Supply of 60mm mortar illumination inadequate  
(See Sec V, paragraph 1)

### 4. Miscellaneous Ordnance Equipment (Flame throwers).

- a. Number and types used: A total of twenty-seven (27) portable flame throwers M2-2 were used.

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Appendix #2 to Annex Dog, Cont'd.  
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- b. Number of days battle employment: Twenty-four (24) days of battle employment.
- c. Malfunctions: None.
- d. Adequacy or spare parts and accessories: During the operation, two flame thrower men were designated to remain at the Battalion QM Dump for the purpose of maintenance and refueling of flame throwing equipment. Spare parts and accessories were sufficient for all repairs.

APPENDIX #3

ANNEX DOG

A. ABOARD SHIP.

1. Sanitation:

a. Water rationing was in effect during the entire voyage. The system of water rationing was poorly conducted from the standpoint of convenience to the troops. Water hours were changed frequently without prior notification. However, the difficulties here encountered were probably caused partly by inexperience inasmuch as the ship was on her first voyage with troops and partly by engineering defects of the ship.

b. Food excellent.

2. Sickness:

a. Sickness aboard ship was normal. An average of one case of upper respiratory infection was admitted each day. Minor foot troubles kept the podiatrist busy throughout the trip. There were about twenty cases of non-specific diarrheas which cleared up readily. One day six such cases were seen in the sick bay. There were six serious cases that were evacuated to shore installations before we reached Iwo Jima. Two were psychoneurotics, one idiopathic ruptured spleen, one renal stones, one pneumonia, and one vitreous hemorrhage.

B. DEBARKATION.

1. Personnel:

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Appendix #3 to Annex Dog, Cont'd.  
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a. There were two doctors, nine litter bearers, and forty-seven corpsmen who landed with the battalion on "D" day. Of these, five corpsmen landed with each of the three rifle companies. The remaining forty-three officers and men landed in four different LCVP's of the fourth wave with Battalion Headquarters. The landing was made about 1700 on "D" day, this outfit being an assault battalion of a reserve regiment. No personnel or equipment was lost en route to the beach. Dispersion of personnel and equipment was considered adequate.

2. Material:

a. Each company aid man carried either two unit No. 3's or his own modification of these units. The unit No. 3 is not satisfactory; it is clumsy to carry and difficult to use because it must be emptied in order to find most articles.

b. Corpsmen attached to the battalion aid station had carried fourteen litters, five seabags (packed with battle dressings; plasma, serum albumin, morphine, etc.) two unit five's (medications) and twelve plywood leg splints in addition to their individual units (unit number three).

c. The ambulance jeep packed with two cases of plasma, one case of brandy, one unit number eight (splints), twelve plywood leg splints, and one unit number nine (litters) came ashore with a corpsman and driver on "D plus one" day. Because the jeep could not negotiate the beach it had to be abandoned. The plasma, brandy, and splints were salvaged, and the next day the jeep was destroyed by a mortar shell.

d. It is believed that it is best to travel light going ashore. The use of serum albumin to the exclusion of plasma during the early phases when the supply lines are tenuous would be an improvement. Folding litters are too heavy and clumsy to use in the assault phase. The non-folding type is more satisfactory.

C. ASHORE.

1. The aid station:

a. The aid station was set up "D" night. One doctor and three corpsmen did not find the aid station that night and

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Appendix #3 to Annex Dog, Cont'd.

operated independently. Cover and concealment were afforded by bomb craters.

b. On "D plus one", the aid station received many near misses by enemy fire. On "D plus two", and "D plus three", while in a revetment of Airfield No. One, it received direct hits and several of our personnel were killed or wounded. Until "D plus fourteen", the aid station was always near enemy mortar fire. On several occasions forward aid stations were established near the front lines in order to hasten treatment and evacuation.

c. At no time was the aid station within the battalion command post as it has been in previous operations. Because of this telephones were used. There were frequent interruptions in the wire lines, which were cut by many tracked vehicles operating in the vicinity of the command post.

2. Hospitals:

a. No hospital facilities were available on the island until "D plus Nine". After that day casualties were taken directly to the hospital and the trip was a short one.

b. Several days before the fighting was over, the Division hospital left the island. Medical companies took back needed corpsmen where fighting was still going on in the lines, and our casualties coming in steadily. Casualties had to be taken to the Corps hospital which took twice as long as the Division hospital, to reach.

3. Evacuation:

a. Evacuation during the first three days was most satisfactory. The ambulance jeeps did not get past the beach barrier, and the numerous casualties had to be carried by litter bearers down to the beach.

b. The assigned litter bearers and corpsmen were exhausted shortly and platoons from the reserve company had to be used to carry litters.

c. Later in the operation, on "D plus five" the battalion received seventeen men from the Twenty-fourth Amphibious

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Appendix #3 to Annex Dog, Cont'd.

ment Draft. These men did an excellent job of carrying wounded from the front lines to the ambulances.

4. Casualties:

a. Six-hundred and seventy-two patients passed through the aid station. These were divided as follows:

Stretcher cases . . . . .	435
Ambulatory cases . . . . .	218
Died in the aid station . . . . .	<u>19</u>
Total . . . . .	672

b. Fifty-three (53) of the six hundred and seventy-two patients were evacuated for illnesses not the result of enemy action. Ninety-seven (97) were evacuated for combat fatigue.

c. Of the five hundred and twenty-two (522) patients evacuated for wounds received in action, forty-seven (47) had wounds of the head, one-hundred and sixty-four (164) had leg wounds, ninety-two (92) had arm wounds, fifty-nine (59) had chest wounds, and thirty-four (34) had abdominal wounds. The remaining one hundred and thirty-six (136) wounded were evacuated for multiple fragment wounds, wounds of the back, etc.

d. Many casualties with minor wounds were evacuated to ships. Many of these could have been returned to duty in a few days but were not. One corpsman who was sent out to a ship to get his aching tooth fixed during the first week of the battle was never returned to duty.

5. Sanitation.

a. Sanitation was satisfactory, considering the nature of the island.

6. Disposal of Dead:

a. It was about "D plus five" when serious efforts were begun to dispose of our dead. This was reasonable because of lack of transportation and because of heavy mortar fire. Japanese dead were covered on the spot.

7. Diseases:

a. There were twenty-five cases of mild diarrhea in the battalion during the last week of the operation. Previous to this, only one or two cases were reported.

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Appendix #3 to Annex Dog, Cont'd.

b. One case of bilateral pulmonary tuberculosis with involvement of the epididymis was diagnosed aboard ship after the operation. This man had not had a chest x-ray in two years. He may have been infected during part of this period.

8. Food and Water:

a. Food supply was excellent throughout the operation. Fruit and fruit juices were especially of value in preventing dehydration. There was an adequate supply of "K", "C" and "10-in-1" rations.

b. Water was supplied in adequate quantities. Until "D plus five", and even occasionally thereafter the water had an offensive taste and odor.

9. Medical Personnel:

a. Adequacy:

(1) In view of the fact that the main functions of the aid station are elementary first aid and evacuation, it is considered that one battalion surgeon per battalion is sufficient. However, one hospital corps officer would increase the efficiency of the aid station considerably by taking charge of corpsmen, records, supplies and equipment, and thus relieving the doctor of these responsibilities.

(2) It is felt that the collecting section corpsmen should be permanently assigned to the battalion. This would increase the number of corpsmen in each battalion from forty to fifty. The members of the collecting section should be assigned to the companies during the training period so that they will be prepared to replace company aid men during combat.

b. Employment of Personnel:

(1) Corpsmen attached to medical companies were used frequently to replace company aid men in the last two weeks of the operation.

c. Losses and Replacements:

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Appendix #3 to Annex Dog, Cont'd.

(1) There were forty-nine casualties among corpsmen during the operation. On "D" Day, the battalion had forty-seven corpsmen. During the operation the battalion received twenty-four replacements as follows:

"B" Medical Company . . . . .	4
"E" Medical Company . . . . .	11
30th Repl. Draft . . . . .	3
4th Motor Transport Bn. . . . .	1
H&S Co, 24th Marines. . . . .	5
Total . . . . .	<u>24</u>

(2) There were twelve casualties among litter bearers during the operation. On "D Day", the battalion had nine litter bearers. Seventeen litter bearers were received from the Twenty-Fourth Replacement Draft during the operation.

d. State of Training:

(1) Corpsmen from the medical companies were in some instances not fully trained for duty as company aid men. Their knowledge of first aid was adequate but they did not know how to take care of themselves properly on the front lines and under fire.

(2) It is strongly recommended that any corpsmen in the Division, who may be used as a replacement in the battalion during an operation, receive training with an infantry company as a company aid man.

10. Field Medical Equipment.

a. Adequacy:

(1) There was a shortage of litters on "D plus two". The fourteen litters carried in on "D Day" were not sufficient to evacuate some sixty casualties on "D plus two". At times an adequate resupply could not be obtained and casualties were evacuated on blankets and ponchos. Subsequently, the litter supply was adequate.

b. Suitability of Present Type:

(1) The folding litter is too heavy and clumsy and offers no advantage over the non-folding type. Litters



Appendix #3 to Annex Dog, Cont'd.

that are bright orange in color or have shiny handles are too easily seen by the enemy.

(2) Other equipment is suitable.

11. Supplies.

a. Amount:

(1) Amount carried in on "D Day":

- Unit 5 . . . . . 1
- Unit 5-A . . . . . 1
- Litters. . . . . 14

Five seabags containing the following items:

- Small battle dressings. . . . . 200
- Large battle dressings. . . . . 50
- 3 in. gauze bandage . . . . . 180
- 2 in. gauze bandage . . . . . 90
- 1 in. gauze bandage . . . . . 45
- 1 yard gauze squares. . . . . 36
- 250 cc plasma units . . . . . 12

(2) Amount brought in on 1/4-ton ambulances:

Battalion ambulance -

- 1 Unit 6 . . . . . Combat covers
- 1 Unit 7 . . . . . Combat dressings
- 1 Unit 8 . . . . . Thomas leg splints
- 1 Unit 9 . . . . . Litters
- 2 cases plasma . . . . . 500cc units
- 1 case brandy. . . . . 200 2-ounce bottles
- 1 Seabag . . . . . Miscellaneous gear

NOTE: This jeep was wrecked by a direct hit on "D plus one" on the beach. Only a part of this gear had been unloaded.

"B" Medical Company Ambulance -

- 2 Unit 7 . . . . . Combat dressings
- 3 seabags. . . . . Miscellaneous gear

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Appendix #3 to Annex Dog, Cont'd.  
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- 1 Case plasma . . . . . 250 cc units
- 12 plywood splints

NOTE: This jeep reached the aid station on "D plus three".

b. Adequacy:

(1) Supplies were adequate at all times.

c. Resupply:

(1) Resupply was adequate at all times.

d. Improvements:

(1) Serum albumin should be used more extensively. Results were excellent. However, gauge 19, 20 and 21 needles should be included in separate containers. The gauge 18 needle is too large for some veins.

(2) Condoms applied over penetrating chest wounds by means of rubber cement serve very satisfactorily.

(3) The small battle dressings are the only items used in the unit 7. The unit could well be eliminated if small battle dressings were included in greater numbers in other units.

(4) A small oxygen tank and mask could be carried on each ambulance jeep to be used in treatment of head and chest wounds requiring oxygen.

(5) The unit 14 is too large and heavy. Leg splints are not needed as unit 8 has adequate supply.

(6) Plywood splints were found to be satisfactory and should replace Thomas splints to a great extent.

13. Motor Vehicles.

a. Number and Type Carried:

(1) Two ambulance jeeps were carried. One vehicle was assigned to Battalion by Regiment and the other to the company.

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Appendix #3 to Annex Dog, Cont'd.

"B" Medical Company jeep ambulance. Additional jeep ambulances were obtained by the Regimental Surgeon from various organizations such as "E" Medical Company, Corps Evacuation Hospital, etc., and these were assigned to the aid station as needed.

(2) When the battalion was on line, on and after "D plus four", three jeep ambulances were available.

b. Losses:

(1) The battalion jeep ambulance landed on "D plus one", but could not proceed more than a few feet in the loose sand. Vital equipment and supplies were removed just before the vehicle received a direct hit and was demolished.

c. Adequacy:

(1) Before "D plus four", no jeep ambulances were available and evacuation to the beach on foot was an exhausting and time consuming job. Although all corpsmen and stretcher bearers were used to evacuate patients, they were not equal to the task and on "D plus two", several reserve platoons had to be used as litter bearers. On and after "D plus four", the three jeep ambulances assigned while the battalion was on the line and the one assigned while the battalion was in reserve were found to be entirely adequate.

d. How Utilized and Maintained:

(1) Jeep ambulances were used to carry as many as four litter cases and six walking wounded in one load. Maintenance was very efficient. There were very few vehicle failures.

e. Improvements:

(1) If "Weasels" could have reached the aid station before "D plus four", these vehicles would have been of inestimable use. Weasels converted for use as ambulances might eliminate the necessity for establishing the aid station near roads which are always good targets.

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Appendix #3 to Annex Dog, Cont'd.  
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(2) It was frequently necessary to evacuate four litter cases on one ambulance jeep. The extra two were placed on top of the framework and men stood on the sides holding them. For such emergencies, clamps or straps might be placed on the framework so that these litters on top could be properly secured.

14. Quartermaster Equipment and Supplies.

a. Clothing Resupply:

(1) There was an adequate resupply of some articles of clothing but not in required sizes. Size six underwear shorts and size thirty eight dungaree trousers, were, for example, abundant but sizes two and thirty-two were available in very small quantities. The same situation existed with regard to dungaree jackets, socks, and shoes. There was not an adequate resupply of the following:

- (a) Flannel shirts
- (b) Combat jackets
- (c) Ponchos

b. Suitability:

(1) An issue sweatshirt would be a useful item in combat to be worn between the flannel shirt and the combat jacket in cold weather.

15. Malaria and Epidemic Control.

a. Amount and Type of Equipment and Supplies Carried:

(1) The aid station was supplied with twenty-four gallons of insect repellent and with one hundred and sixty pounds of DDT powder.

(2) The DDT was sprinkled or sprayed on bodies, faces, and garbage; both in the command post and on the lines. The insect repellent was issued for individual application.

c. Suitability of Present Types.

(1) DDT gave excellent results, especially when sprayed from planes.

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Annex Easy, Cont'd.

ANNEX EASY

COMMUNICATIONS

A. The radios used on the Iwo Jima operation were for the main, the S.C.R. 300, and the S.C.R. 536. The former, though sometimes operated at distances and in terrain which greatly reduced its efficiency, was once again the backbone of radio communications used within the Battalion. The latter which was used exclusively in the front line companies, performed to the satisfaction of all concerned. The main complaint from the Company Commanders was not the function of the radio, but rather the number of radios on any one assigned frequencies assigned to the Division. The S.C.R. 610 was operated continuously throughout the operation, but there was very little traffic handled. The T.C.S. was used only when there was a plane operating on the Support Air Observation Frequency. The TBX was carried ashore initially, when the Regimental C.W. Net was ordered to secure, this radio was stored in the Battalion Dump for the remainder of the operation. The only other radio equipment used in the BLT was the radio receiver R.B.Z. It was used by the Battalion Intelligence Section to monitor the S.A.O. Net. However, the R.B.Z. was used very little as the T.C.S. was up on this frequency on all occasions and was available to the Bn-2. This section encountered enemy jamming on two different occasions during the operation. Both times the Division Signal Officer was notified so that steps might be taken to learn more information on the type of jamming which was encountered. On "D" Day, the Regimental Voice Command Net was blocked by transmissions in Japanese. Later on in the operation, "D plus twenty", the S.A.O. net was jammed. This time Regiment was notified and they ordered us to come up on another frequency.

B. Telephone communications, due to limited maneuvering of the BLT, were good. Regiment, at all times, had overhead lines to the Battalion with test stations which enabled this section to take over lines which were in our zone of action. The result was excellent for in this manner we were able to displace rapidly, and whenever trouble did cause these lines to go out, communications were restored in a minimum of time. Regiment also kept us well informed of any lines that it had laid so that we could, in emergency, use said lines for a minimum length of time. Wire forward of the Battalion Command Post was impaired mostly by the fire of heavy enemy mortars. At times we experienced breakage of lines by tracked vehicles, but this was secondary to the damage caused by enemy fire. However, the men of the wire section worked

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Annex Easy, Cont'd.

vigorously and maintained communications, twenty-four hours of the day. Their work was outstanding and carried out under the most hazardous conditions. It is desired to bring out the fact that the Regimental line was simplexed to give the artillery liaison team a direct line to the Regimental Artillery Liaison Officer. On several occasions this proved to be well worth the effort, for it enabled many problems on artillery to be settled quickly. The telegraph sets which were carried on this operation were not used at any time and it is recommended that the use of these be discontinued within the infantry regiment.

C. Message Center operated normally. This section, however, with its eight men was over strength for its normal function in the field. In the future, the men from this section will train as radio operators so that they may be used to relieve the strain on the radio section when casualties occur. In this manner we will be able to carry our own reserve.

D. Signal supply on the operation operated very well through our signal supply corporal. Never, at any time, were we in need of any signal equipment. A policy of keeping a two day supply on hand at the Battalion Dump was maintained throughout the operation. Signal repair operated on the following basis: "Radio for radio" replacement to any unit on the line. In this manner, we were able to obtain radios ready for instant use, i.e., S.C.R. 536, set up on frequency.

E. Air raid warnings came from higher units on all channels of communications. Conditions "Red" or "Blue" were satisfactory. Plenty of time was allowed for information to be passed on to units forward of the Battalion Command Post. The big fault with the air warning system was "Condition White". Fifty per cent of the time this unit never received the "all clear" signal after a Condition "Red" or "Blue" had been in effect. Steps should be taken to remedy this situation for future operations.

F. Report from the Naval Gunfire Team indicated that the equipment used by them was satisfactory and in sufficient quantities. Also, this unit stated that the present method of designating target areas is good. No report of any delays in communicating with the firing ship.

G. This unit never, at any time, had or requested any communications with the Island Commander.

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Annex Easy, Cont'd.  
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H. The circuits provided this unit by the Division were more than adequate for this operation. We never did have a chance to set up all that were allotted to us for the simple reason that, what we had, was sufficient. This, it is believed, was due to the excellent wire net maintained within the Regiment.

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ENCLOSURE (A) TO ANNEX A

EXPLANATION OF CASUALTY SHEETS

- (A) } Self-explanatory
- (B) }
- (C) }
- (D) }
- (E) }
- (F) Enter X if noneffective.
- (G) } Self-explanatory
- (H) }
- (I) }
- (J) }
- (K) }
- (L) }
- (M) }
- (N) }
- (O) }
- (P) Enter the Division Casualty Order No. if the man's name appears thereon.
- (Q) Enter date or dates Regiment was notified of casualty.
- (R) Enter date of burial regardless of whether in cemetery or at sea.
- (S) Enter Plot number
- (T) Enter Row number
- (U) Enter Grave number
- (V) If buried at sea enter Latitude and Longitude.  
If buried on land enter the name of cemetery in which buried.




ENCLOSURE (A)









2 INTELLIGENCE OP'S IN DIRECT COMMUNICATION WITH BATTALION OP'S WERE MAINTAINED DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS. THESE AND MANY BN OP'S ARE NOT SHOWN ON OVERLAY BECAUSE SUFFICIENT SPACE IS LACKING.



FRONT LINE  
OPERATION OVERLAY  
APPENDIX 1 TO SECTION II  
OF BATTALION OPERATION  
REPORT NO. 1-45



MASTER OVERLAY OF IWO JIMA  
AIR & GUNNERY TARGET MAP  
SCALE 1:20,000 28 MARCH 1945

C.C. BERKELEY JR,  
MAJOR USMCR  
BN-3

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HEADQUARTERS,  
THIRD BATTALION, TWENTY-FOURTH MARINES,  
FOURTH MARINE DIVISION, FLEET MARINE FORCE,  
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA.

20 April, 1945.

From: The Commanding Officer.  
To: The Commanding Officer, 24th Marines.  
Subject: Final Report on IWO JIMA Operation.  
Reference: (a) Division SOP No. 1-45.  
Enclosure: (A) Final Report on IWO JIMA Operation, Battalion  
Landing Team 3/24.

1. The following report covering the activities of Battalion Landing Team 3/24 during the IWO JIMA Operation, from inception to conclusion, is herewith submitted, together with observations and recommendations resulting therefrom.

*D. A. Stout*  
D. A. STOUT.

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SECTION I

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

A. ORGANIZATION:

1. Upon returning from Saipan, BLT 3/24 began the task of reorganizing the battalion. Promotions were made on a large scale to fill in the vacancies left by the heavy casualties of the previous operation. By 1 October, 1944, each rifle company had a nucleus consisting of experienced squad leaders and group leaders that was considered adequate for the proper training of the battalion as a whole when replacements arrived.

2. One important step that was to prove of very great value on IWO JIMA was the inception of an assault platoon consisting of three flame thrower and demolition squads, and a service and supply section. The total strength of this unit was planned to be 38 men; and since it was not authorized under current Tables of Organization, personnel were drawn from the rifle companies which were correspondingly reduced in size.

B. PLANNING:

1. In planning for the IWO JIMA operation, a study was made of the intelligence report on X-ISLAND. It was made at this time for preparations for thorough training in assault work on fortified positions.

C. TRAINING:

1. Training of BLT 3/24 was seriously handicapped by lack of replacements. During October and November, training consisted of small unit problems, infantry-tank and infantry-artillery problems. Numerous problems in assaulting pillboxes, using the newly formed assault platoon were held. Stress was placed on the responsibilities and duties of non-commissioned officers in all this work since riflemen and other privates were noticeable by their absence.

2. Tentative plans were drawn up for a two months intensive training of replacements when and if they should arrive. These plans were reduced to six weeks by the first of November, four weeks by the middle of the month, and when the battalion was finally filled out two days before regimental amphibious maneuvers began, a three week program was outlined.

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Planning and Preparation (Cont'd).  
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3. The first week of December was devoted to amphibious training, including special emphasis on battalions landing in reserve. The new men in BLT 3/24 did not profit too much by this because they did not understand what a squad was supposed to do when it landed, and it was found practically impossible to train them in the short time allotted.

4. Upon returning to camp from these maneuvers, BLT 3/24 instituted an intensive training program in an effort to ready the battalion for combat. Instruction was held on basic weapons, including some firing, and as much work on squad and platoon problems as possible. Lack of tanks was the most serious handicap. Three weeks was all the time available for the training of approximately three hundred men and this was very definitely proved inadequate in combat.

D. REHEARSAL:

1. BLT 3/24 commenced loading of equipment on 1 January, 1945, and personnel went aboard 3 January, 1945. Division amphibious maneuvers were of very little practical value to this unit because the landing team went ashore only on 15 January, 1945. Experience was gained in going down nets into small boats and lowering equipment by line but the two and three hour boat rides that this landing team undertook served only to tire the men. The general feeling was that BLT 3/24 could much better have utilized its' week of training on land in an effort to give a little more polish to green troops.

SECTION II

MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE

A. REHABILITATION:

1. Rehabilitation in Honolulu was of great value to the morale of BLT 3/24. Enlisted men had liberty every fourth day, and athletic games on nearby fields were held for men authorized to go ashore. Broken equipment and shortages were remedied, and the completion of the rehabilitation period found the battalion mentally and physically ready for the coming operation.

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Movement To Objective (Cont'd).  
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B. SHIP BOARD TRAINING:

1. Enroute to the forward staging area, intensive indoctrination was held on the coming operation. All men were briefed on the operation plan and the role of the battalion in the battle. Special emphasis was placed on the preparations for BLT 3/24 to land on any division beach using the relief map to instruct the men in locating themselves upon reaching shore. Time was sufficient for this briefing and it was felt that all personnel were thoroughly indoctrinated.

2. Physical exercise, weapons school, and tactical schools for small units were held every day except Sunday. Personnel maintained very good physical condition and new men became much more familiar with their company and with each other.

C. FORWARD AREA REHEARSAL:

1. The forward area rehearsal, like the previous amphibious maneuvers, were of little practical value to BLT 3/24. The battalion did not land, and riding around in small boats in order to give the Navy a chance to practice control of waves hardly seemed necessary. It was felt that empty boats could serve the same purpose.

SECTION III

SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT

A. TACTICAL PLAN FOR LANDING:

1. The tactical plan for the landing of BLT 3/24 envisaged the boating of the landing team in five waves. The first consisted of support platoons and headquarters of these units. The third wave held the reserve company and the fourth wave, battalion headquarters, headquarters company, and the 81mm mortar platoon. The assault platoon was in the fifth wave, along with two cargo boats, loaded with assorted ammunition, barbed wire, and water. One of these boats had a Weasel in it. There were two free boats each with a radio jeep, one containing the battalion commander and his command group, the other containing the naval gunfire officer and his party, less his forward observer.

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Ship To Shore Movement (Cont'd).

2. It was hoped that an assembly area would be designated before the landing team left its transport, since BLT 3/24 was the reserve battalion of the reserve regiment. Plans were made for an all around defense when this area was reached and the movement inland was to be made by companies.

B. CONTROL PLAN:

1. The control of boats and waves to the rendezvous area, line of departure, and beach, was entirely in the hands of the Navy. Landing plans called for waves to land at five minute intervals. This phase of the ship to shore movement was perfectly executed by boat group and wave commanders.

C. DESCRIPTION OF LANDING TO INCLUDE TIME MAJOR ELEMENTS COMPLETED LANDING:

1. BLT 3/24 received orders at 1600 on D-Day to debark and proceed to a rendezvous area behind the line of departure of BLUE Beaches. Personnel began debarking at 1610, and all boats were loaded and on their way to the rendezvous area by 1655.

2. The Free Boat containing the battalion commander proceeded independently to the BLUE control vessel and reported to the combat team commander. Orders were received there to land on Beach BLUE 2 and move to an assembly area in TS 166 F, G, K. Waves were to be dispatched as soon as the landing team arrived in the rendezvous area.

3. A message was sent to all companies notifying them as to the beach they were to land on and the assembly area to which they were to move. Each company had only one (1) radio and there was not sufficient time for company commanders to pass this message on to their subordinates.

4. The first wave was dispatched at 1810 and landed at 1835. The fifth wave landed at 1855. The landing was uneventful. No fire was falling on the beach at the time. Due to surf conditions, the battalion radio jeep was ordered not to land. The naval gunfire jeep did leave its' boat, but mired in the sand and was not brought to the assembly area until the next day. The boat with the Weasel in it broached and this vehicle was permanently lost.

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movement (Cont'd).

5. Movement to the assembly area was orderly once company commanders were able to notify their platoon leaders as to its' location. A few medium sized mortar shells, causing slight casualties, fell on the battalion enroute, but the low visibility of the evening probably hindered the enemy's observation of the movement.

SECTION IV

NARRATIVE OF OPERATION

19 FEBRUARY, 1945.

At 1600 BLT 3/24 received orders from RCT 24 to debark from APA 206 and proceed to a rendezvous area behind the line of departure of Beach BLUE. Debarkation was completed by 1655 and boats were dispatched to the rendezvous area. The commanding officer reported to RCT 24 commander aboard BLUE control vessel at 1730 and received orders to land on Beach BLUE 2 and move to an assembly area in TS 166 F, G, K, facing north.

At 1800 companies reached the rendezvous area and were notified as to their assembly area. The first wave was dispatched at 1810 before all units could be informed as to the new location. The first wave hit the beach at 1835, receiving no enemy fire, and all units of BLT 3/24 were ashore by 1855. One (1) LCVP with a Weasel aboard broached and sank in the surf. At 2030 BLT 3/24 reported to RCT 24 that all units were in their assembly areas.

"I" Company was on the left, "L" Company on the right, and "K" Company in reserve behind the two. "K" Company suffered a few casualties enroute and also found that its' area was in a partially cleared minefield.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF.	STRENGTH
	0-3	3-11	0-0	0-0	0-1	31	819
		1*				2*	38*

20 FEBRUARY, 1945.

Enemy mortar fire, varying in intensity from sporadic to heavy fell on BLT 3/24 during the night.

BLT 3/24 remained in reserve all day. Engineers completed the marking and neutralizing of the minefield in the "K" Com-

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Narrative Of Operation (Cont'd).

pany area. Intelligence personnel were sent out to determine the location of friendly front lines within the division zone of action in the morning.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	0-0	0-0	0-2	0-0	0-2	31 815
			1*			2* 37*

21 FEBRUARY, 1945.

Intermittent small and medium caliber enemy mortar fire fell on the assembly area all day causing a few casualties.

BLT 3/24 remained in reserve in the same area all day. At 1315 the commanding officer made a reconnaissance of the front lines of RCT 23, returning at 1500. Intermittent mortar fire fell on the battalion all day; and at 1835 numerous rockets were observed falling on BLUE beaches. The 81mm mortar platoon fired two (2) rounds of white phosphorous on the area from which the rockets seemed to be coming.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	0-7	0-9	0-2	0-3	0-0	31 797
		2*		1*		2* 35*

22 FEBRUARY, 1945.

Intermittent artillery and mortar fire was received from 0001 to dawn.

At 0830 BLT 3/24 received a warning order from RCT 24 to be prepared to relieve units of RCT 25 any time after 1200. The intelligence section set up an O.P. in TS 183 U which was functioning by 1055. At 1700 RCT 24 sent another warning order to BLT 3/24 telling it to be prepared to move on order to relieve BLT 2/25 and BLT 3/25.

Companies were alerted and RCT 25 was asked to arrange for guides to assist BLT 3/24 in relieving the line. No further word was received.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	0-10	0-10	0-2	0-1	0-1	31 774
						2* 35*

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Narrative Of Operation (Cont'd).

23 FEBRUARY, 1945.

At 0110 BLT 3/24 received orders from RCT 24 to relieve BLT 2/25 and BLT 3/25 prior to 0600 prepared to continue the attack at 0730 with BLT 1/24 on the right and BLT 2/24 on the left and seize the O-1A line. The commanding officer issued orders that "I" Company would relieve BLT 3/25, and "L" Company BLT 2/25. "K" Company was ordered to move into reserve in TS 183 U. One (1) assault squad and two (2) guides from the intelligence section were sent to each company. All units were ordered to be prepared to move out to RJ 69 at 0400 in the order "I", "L", "K", where arrangements were made with RCT 25 to have guides from the battalions being relieved to meet them.

At 0430 the command group and companies moved out and by 0500 the relief began. Great difficulty was experienced by "I" and "L" companies in this due to the infiltration of numerous enemy into the lines that night. In addition, although both companies put three (3) platoons in line, this was not sufficient to cover the front and at 0800 one (1) platoon of "K" Company was attached to "I" Company and placed on its' right to establish contact with "L" Company. By 0830 both companies reported that they were in position and ready to attack though greatly extended. The battalion lines generally now ran from TS 183 H to TS 183 T.

The C.P. was set up in TS 183 V, and at 0800 the commanding officer moved to an O.P. in TS 183 M. He ordered the companies to move out at 0900 with "K" Company following the attack by 200 yards, supporting by overhead machine gun fire wherever possible. From 0850 to 0900 a 100 round preparation was fired by the 81mm mortar platoon. A rocket barrage was fired to the front at 0900 and the companies began moving. Almost immediately "I" Company came under heavy machine gun and rifle fire from their left flank. Under cover of a smoke screen, one (1) platoon managed to reach the high ground to its' front but had to withdraw for lack of support. "L" Company was able to advance approximately 150 yards.

By 1200 no material progress had been made due to heavy fire from the left flank. Mortar and machine gun fire increased in intensity on "I" Company all afternoon and no further progress was made. At 1335 a friendly observation plane crashed about 300 yards in front of "L" Company. Both of the occupants were rescued. One man was dead when they reached the battalion aid station.

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Narrative Of Operation (Cont'd).

At 1400 one (1) 75mm halftrack, under control of BLT 3/24, fired about ten (10) rounds into a pinnacle in TS 183 J. It fired from a position just south of RJ 184.

At 1600 RCT 24 was notified that further attempts to advance would be very costly because of heavy small arms fire coming from the area to the left of the battalion sector. Companies tied in for the night from left to right, "I", one (1) platoon of "K", "L", in TS 183 P, K, L, M, S. At 2230 heavy enemy rocket fire fell on the O.P. causing numerous casualties.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	0-4	2-27	0-2	0-0	0-0	29 741
					1*	2* 34*

24 FEBRUARY, 1945.

Intermittent small arms fire continued throughout the night.

"I" and "L" companies reported that some enemy had been able to infiltrate their lines during the night but that most of them had been killed. At 0715 the order was received to continue the attack at 0915 to seize the O-1A line. Companies were ordered to attack at King-hour and seize the high ground immediately to their front. After an artillery preparation, 400 yards in front of the lines and a 200 round 81mm mortar barrage, "I" and "L" companies began moving out. Almost immediately "I" Company came under the same fire it had received the day before and was held up.

By 1200 BLT 2/24 had moved up almost abreast of "I" Company and had knocked out many of the emplacements which were firing on BLT 3/24. By 1400 "I" Company had succeeded in reaching the high ground in TS 183 H and held that position in spite of heavy mortar fire and a moderate sized enemy counter attack. "L" Company tied in with "E" Company, BLT 2/24 at 1900.

At 0900 an Engineer platoon reported to BLT 3/24 and was ordered to clear mines from the road in TS 183 L. This road was cleared by 1500. During the early part of the afternoon "L" Company moved to seize the high ground to the right of "I" Company. After advancing about 50 yards it came under heavy fire from its front and was unable to advance. The 81mm mortars at about 1500 fired 80 rounds of white phosphorous to cover the evacuation of wounded along the battalion front. At 1608 the O.P. was hit by a mortar barrage, killing three (3) men and wounding the battalion commander so that he had to be evacuated.

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Narrative Of Operation (Cont'd).  
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At 1430 one (1) 75mm halftrack, under control of BLT 3/24, fired about fifteen (15) rounds into a pinnacle in TS 183 J. It fired from a position just south of RJ 184.

At 1630 BLT 3/24 received orders from RCT 24 to dig in for the night along the most favorable ground. The remainder of "K" Company was moved in to the center and right of the line to fill in gaps caused by extension of the lines and heavy casualties. A gap still existed between "L" and "K" companies. RCT 24 attached "E" Company of RCT 25 to BLT 3/24. At 1700 "E" Company was moved in on the left of "K" Company and the lines were tied in for the night in TS 183 D, I, O, and TS 184 K, P. "C" Company of RCT 25 was moved in behind the front lines as a reserve.

At 1720 planes strafed and fired rockets in TS 183 E, C, M, A.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF.	STRENGTH
	0-21	3-55	0-31	1-0	0-1	26	836
		1*	3*			2*	30*

25 FEBRUARY, 1945.

The night was relatively quiet with a few attempts at infiltration and sporadic mortar fire along the front lines.

The 81mm mortars fired 200 rounds harrassing fire during the night.

At 0730 BLT 3/24 received orders to continue the attack at 0930, immediate objective the O-1B line, final objective the O-2 line. Five (5) tanks were attached to the battalion. Company commanders were ordered to report to the C.P. and the attack order was issued. "I" Company was ordered to hold its left flank on the high ground and support by fire the movement of "K", "E", and "L" companies to the high ground to their front. The attached Engineers were ordered to clear the road running East from RJ 244 to permit tanks to give direct support on the right. Artillery would fire a 15 minute concentration beginning at 0920 on the high ground to the front.

At 0930 planes bombed and strafed targets in TS 184 F, P, U. At the same time the 81mm mortars fired a ten minute preparation using 200 rounds.

At 0942 "K", "E", and "L" companies began moving out. Almost immediately they came under heavy small arms and mortar fire from the front. At 1000 "G" Company, BLT 2/25 relieved "C" Company, BLT 1/25 as BLT reserve. By 1027 five (5) tanks

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Narrative Of Operation (Cont'd).

moved up to support the attack on the right. Their use was impeded by rough terrain, and the enemy fire did not diminish. A rocket strike by aircraft at 1210 seemed to lessen the mortar fire and by 1350 the right companies were again able to move.

Within 30 minutes enemy fire again halted the advance and no further progress was made. Total gains for the day were approximately 100 yards. At 1630 orders were received to dig in for the night and attack at 0800 the following day. Companies tied in for the night left to right; "I", "E", "K", and "L" companies in TS 183 C, H, O, and TS 184 K.

It became increasingly evident that there was a very strong pocket of enemy resistance in the cliff line at TS 183 J and TS 184 F and K. Company commanders were ordered to report to the C.P. at 1800. Orders were issued for the attack in the morning. "E" and "L" companies were ordered to hold fast in their present position. "I" Company followed by "E" Company was ordered to move along the high ground in TS 183 D and E in an effort to outflank the enemy pocket. When they had succeeded in destroying the positions, "L" Company was to move forward and join them on the high ground. An air strike just in front of "L" Company would be coordinated with the movement of "I" and "K" companies.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	0-9	2-31	0-8	0-0	0-2	26 592
						2* 30*

26 FEBRUARY, 1945.

During the night a large enemy patrol infiltrated into the lines. At daylight it was found that twenty (20) of the enemy were killed including a Japanese Major, the leader of the patrol.

The 81mm mortars fired 300 rounds harrassing fire during the night.

At 0620 BLT 1/25 began relieving BLT 3/24. "I" Company had some difficulty in withdrawing due to the reluctance of the unit on their left to close the gap created by "I" Company's withdrawal. At 0914 all companies reached their bivouac area in TS 183 U, V, and the BLT was completely relieved at 0930 and became RCT 25 reserve.

At 1420 BLT 3/24 was informed of a B-24 air strike to hit TS 234 I, J, N, O, S, T, and 235 F, G, L, P, Q. This strike was cancelled later in the day.

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Narrative Of Operation (Cont'd).

At 1730 "L" Company was attached to BLT 1/25 and at 1745, "K" Company was attached to BLT 3/25 by order of RCT 25. At 1739 an intercepted enemy message reported a counter attack in TS 201 R, however, this counter attack did not materialize.

At 1840 "I" Company in RCT 24 reserve TS 183 U, V, "L" Company attached to BLT 1/25 in TS 183 J, O, and "K" Company attached to BLT 3/25 in TS 183 U, V.

At 1840 the location of the C.P.'s of BLT 1/25, 2/25, 3/25, and RCT 25 were received and noted on the situation map.

At about 2200 "L" Company, behind BLT 1/25 C.P., cleaned out a cave with demolitions and flame throwers, killing five (5) of the enemy.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF.	STRENGTH
	0-9	3-56	2-23	0-1	0-1	21	509
		2*	1*			2*	27*

27 FEBRUARY, 1945.

The night was quiet with a few attempts at infiltration. At 0700 "I" Company was attached to BLT 1/25 by order of RCT 25.

"L" Company relieved "C" Company BLT 1/25 at 0715. Its' mission was to hold its' ground until BLT 1/25 made contact with the unit on the right flank. "L" Company was then to clean up an enemy pocket to its' left front. This mission was not accomplished since BLT 1/25 could not move due to heavy enemy resistance.

"K" Company jumped off at 0800 and advanced 80 yards with BLT 3/25.

At 0900 the BLT was directed to salvage all empty water cans and to place guards over all ammunition and water supplies as those items were becoming critical to the enemy.

At 1000 2/14 reported two (2) enemy covered mortar positions at RJ 338 in TS 217. At 1255 the BLT was directed to take the following additional security measures due to enemy infiltration parties attempting to capture our water:

1. Destroy any enemy water encountered.
2. Leave no water unguarded.
3. Canteens will be emptied if necessary.
4. Water cans will not be left forward of company dumps at night.

At 1700 orders were received to consolidate our lines and be prepared to continue the attack at 0815, no change in formation, objectives, or boundaries.

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Narrative Of Operation (Cont'd).

At 1710 "K" Company moved back to the East Boat Basin to form a secondary line of defense in TS 184 U and 167 A. "I" Company in TS 183 N. "L" Company attached to BLT 1/25 in TS 183 J, O.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	0-2	0-13	0-1	1-4	0-0	20 696
		1*				2* 23*

28 FEBRUARY, 1945.

During the night several enemy infiltration parties came along an unprotected part of the beach and into our lines. By daylight the enemy had withdrawn the remnants of their parties due to our small arms fire and grenades.

At 0115 BLT 3/24 was informed that revised regimental and battalion boundaries would be effective for the continuation of the attack at 0815, 28 February, 1945. The immediate objective was the high ground 100 yards to our front and the final objective was the 0-2 line.

At 0815 all companies were moving out. At that time one (1) platoon of "K" Company was committed on the right flank of BLT 3/25 and one (1) platoon mopping up behind "K" Company, BLT 3/25. "L" Company was on line with BLT 1/25 in TS 183 J.

"I" Company at 1315 moved up behind "C" Company, BLT 1/25 with "B" Company, BLT 1/25 on its' right and by 1700 had succeeded in moving its' first platoon upon the high ground with "C" Company, BLT 1/25 on its' left and a 50 to 75 yard gap on its' right. At 1745 "I" Company attached 45 men to "A" Company, BLT 1/25 as reinforcements. At that time BLT 1/25 pulled off of the high ground and set up their lines for the night. The remainder of "I" Company became battalion reserve for BLT 1/25.

At 1750 "K" Company formed a secondary line of defense with its' right flank tied into the rear of "K" Company, BLT 3/25 and its' left flank had visual contact with the right flank of "L" Company, BLT 3/25. Physical contact could not be established due to an enemy machine gun behind BLT 3/25's line. "I" Company in TS 183 N, "K" Company in TS 167 D, "L" Company in TS 184 K, F.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	0-0	1-8	0-3	0-0	0-1	20 696
		2*				2* 23*

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Narrative Of Operation (Cont'd).

1 MARCH, 1945.

The night was uneventful with the exception of occasional bursts of fire from the enemy machine gun. This gun had a very limited field of fire.

At 0730 "K" Company was relieved and "I" Company was relieved at 0800. By 0830 both companies had set up in their bivouac area in TS 183 U and 166 B. At 1000 BLT 3/24 became regimental reserve for RCT 24. "L" Company was released by RCT 25 at 1245 and moved back to the bivouac area.

At 1430 "I" and "K" companies began moving out on RCT 24 order to fill a gap between BLT 2/24 on the right and RCT 21 on the left. Company guides were furnished by BLT 2/24. "L" Company became regimental reserve for RCT 24. At the same time the BLT 3/24 command group moved out for the new C.P.. By 1500 the command group arrived at the new C.P. at TS 183 C. At 1600 RCT 9 relieved RCT 21.

At 1655 the rear C.P. moved out with "L" Company following. They arrived at the new C.P. at 1715.

At 1700 "I" and "K" companies dug in for the night with "I" Company in TS 201 F, "K" Company in TS 201 G, H, and "L" Company in reserve in TS 200 X. "K" Company made contact with RCT 9 at 2200.

At 2100 companies were in position with "I" Company on the right and "K" Company on the left.

At 2400 orders from RCT 24 were to continue the attack at 0800. Our objective was to secure the ground to the left of Hill 382 in our battalion zone of action in conjunction with BLT 2/24 on our right.

Sniper fire during the day was quite accurate.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF.	STRENGTH
	0-1	0-13	0-9	0-2	0-0	20	683
						2*	23*

2 MARCH, 1945.

Sporadic mortar and machine gun fire was received throughout the night.

"I" and "K" companies moved out at 0800 supported by a 200 round preparation fired by the 81mm mortars. At 0905 heavy mortar fire was coming from TS 202 V. Initial resistance came from the BLT right flank in the form of heavy enemy machine gun fire after our line had moved approximately 35 yards.

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Narrative Of Operation (Cont'd).

By 1015 "C" Company of BLT 1/9 had moved 100 yards to our left front causing "K" Company to commit its' reserve platoon, plus the first platoon of "L" Company to fill the gap.

At 1330 planes fired rockets and dropped Napalm in TS 202 P, Q.

By 1500 "I" Company had advanced about 50 yards through heavy small arms fire but its' left flank was held up by "K" Company.

At 1530 "K" Company was able to move 35 to 40 yards to straighten out the line.

At 1555 BLT 3/24 requested night harrassing fires by Corps Artillery in TS 202 A, B, F, and by Naval Gunfire in TS 202 G, H, L, and M.

At 1700 RCT 24 granted permission to put one (1) platoon of "L" Company on the left of "K" Company to fill the gap with BLT 1/9 on our left.

At 1700 BLT 3/24 tied in for the night with "I" Company on the right in contact with "F" Company, BLT 2/24, "K" Company in the center and one (1) platoon of "L" Company on the left, tied in with BLT 1/9. "L" Company in TS 200 O, T, "I" Company and "K" Company in TS 200 H, M, Q, P.

At 2230 orders were received from RCT 24 to continue the attack at 0630, objectives and boundaries remain the same.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF.	STRENGTH
	0-1	0-10	0-4	0-0	0-0	22	622
		1*				2*	22*

3 MARCH, 1945.

Minor attempts at infiltration were made during the night; with this exception it was quiet.

The 81mm mortars fired 275 rounds harrassing fire during the night.

At King-hour the 81mm mortars fired a 10 minute preparation of 200 rounds.

BLT 3/24 did not begin moving until 0708 due to heavy small arms and mortar fire to the battalion front and right, plus confusion in the darkness in preparation for King-hour at 0630. By 0815 the reserve platoon of "L" Company was mopping up behind "K" Company. The battalion front had advanced 75 yards by 0830. The battalion command group displaced forward to the new C.P. in TS 201 K and was set up by 0850. The rear C.P. displaced forward at 1305 and arrived at the new C.P. at 1340.

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Narrative Of Operation (Cont'd).

The remaining two (2) platoons of "L" Company were committed on the BLT left flank and tied in with "A" Company, BLT 1/9 on their left at 1345. At 1530 "G" Company of BLT 2/24 began to relieve "I" Company on the BLT right flank. "I" Company furnished two (2) guides to "G" Company for this relief. This relief was completed at 1600. At 1615 "I" Company was in its bivouac area in TS 201 K just west of the battalion C.P. in battalion reserve.

At 1630 the lines were tied in for the night with "K" Company on the right tied in with "G" Company, BLT 2/24 and "L" Company on the left tied in with "A" Company, BLT 1/9. "K" and "L" companies in TS 201 I, H, M, O, V.

At 2100 orders from RCT 24 were to continue the attack at 0730, objectives and boundaries remaining the same.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF.	STRENGTH
	0-13	0-35	0-4	0-2	0-0	22	622
						2*	22*

4 MARCH, 1945.

Sporadic small arms fire continued throughout the night. The 81mm mortars fired 350 rounds harrassing fire throughout the night.

BLT 3/24 moved out at 0730 after a ten minute 81mm mortar preparation of 150 rounds, this fire was laid down between King minus ten and King-hour.

By 0800 two (2) tanks were in close support behind each company. Because of the rough terrain, approaches to the front line were limited and often only one (1) tank at a time could bring its fire to bear upon a target on a company front.

By 0900 the battalion front had moved 50 to 60 yards. The advance was held up by machine guns cross firing from well placed positions either just inside a cave entrance or immediately outside. These guns were difficult to pick out and could easily be moved inside the cave when brought under small arms and mortar fire.

Orders from RCT 24 at 1300 were to resume the attack at 1500. A 150 round 81mm mortar preparation was fired at this time. At 1700 one (1) platoon of "I" Company filled in the gap between "L" Company and "A" Company, BLT 1/9 on the left. All companies moved out on time following the 81mm mortar barrage.

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Narrative Of Operation (Cont'd).

Companies were tied in for the night at 1825 with "K" Company on the right tied in with "G" Company, BLT 2/24, "L" Company in the center, and one (1) platoon of "I" Company tied in on the left with "A" Company, BLT 1/9. "L" and "K" companies in TS 201 D, I, M, R. "I" Company, less one (1) platoon in TS 201 K.

At 1900 the battalion C.P. received a heavy concentration of mortar fire.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	0-7	0-62	0-4	0-0	0-1	22 560
	1*					2* 21*

5 MARCH, 1945.

There was sporadic machine gun and mortar fire throughout the night.

Received orders from RCT 24 at 0730 to hold present positions for the day. At 0740 the battalion commander attended a conference at RCT 24 C.P.. At 0920 a large mortar landed in the JASCO section of the battalion C.P. killing one (1) man and injuring seven (7) men. Throughout the day large enemy mortars continually landed in and around the battalion C.P..

At 1130 planes dropped bombs and fired rockets in TS 202 P, L.

At 1800 "I" Company, less one (1) platoon on left of "L" Company, in TS 201 K, "L" Company and "K" Company in TS 201 D, I, N.

At 1825 the battalion commander and the battalion operations officer attended a conference at RCT 24 C.P.. A large rocket hit the battalion C.P. at 1915.

At 2200 company commanders were notified that BLT 2/23 would begin relieving BLT 3/24 at 0500. King-hour 0900.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	0-6	1-28	0-5	0-1	0-0	21 521
		2*				2* 19*

6 MARCH, 1945.

Enemy mortar and small arms fire was persistent throughout the night.

The 81mm mortars fired 300 rounds harrassing fire during the night.

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Narrative Of Operation (Cont'd).

At 0445 one (1) officer and one (1) man from each company were furnished as guides for the relief.

At 0500 BLT 2/23 began relieving BLT 3/24. This relief was completed at 0615. The BLT arrived in its' bivouac area in TS 182 S at 0815.

The day was spent in policing of personnel and equipment. New clothing and 10 in 1 rations were issued. The BLT was in reserve all day.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	0-0	0-3	0-1	0-0	0-0	21 521
						2* 19*

7 MARCH, 1945.

RCT 24 continued the attack at 1245. At 1400 a meeting of all company commanders was held at the battalion C.P.. They were informed that BLT 3/24 would begin relief of BLT 2/24 at 0400. At the same time 26 replacements arrived from RCT 24. Three (3) privates first class went to "I" Company, four (4) corporals, nine (9) privates first class, one (1) field music first class and one (1) private to "K" Company, and one (1) sergeant and eight (8) privates to "L" Company.

The battalion was in reserve all day in TS 182 S.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	0-0	0-1	0-1	0-0	0-0	22 547
						2* 19*

8 MARCH, 1945.

The night was uneventful. At 0400 "I", "K", and "L" companies moved out to relieve BLT 2/24. One (1) officer and two (2) enlisted men acted as guides for "K" Company.

The "I" Company commander, having sufficiently reconnoitered the area on the previous afternoon, did not require a guide.

At 0530 complete relief was effected and the command group displaced forward.

BLT 3/24 moved out in the attack at 0620 with "I" Company on the left tied in with "A" Company, BLT 1/24, which became attached to BLT 3/24 at that time. In turn, "A" Company was tied in on the left with BLT 2/23. "K" Company was on the right flank of "I" Company tied in with "B" Company, BLT 1/24. "L" Company was in RCT 24 reserve. Boundaries and objectives remained the same.

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Operation; (Cont'd).

At 0630 the forward C.P. was set up in TS 200 W. By this time "K" Company had advanced 60 to 70 yards and "I" Company had advanced 40 to 50 yards.

At about 0800 enemy resistance in the form of knee mortars and machine gun fire held up the advance. At 0900 a rocket barrage was laid down in front of the battalion but, because of its' great range, it did not materially decrease the resistance to our immediate front.

At 1415 "L" Company was committed to a gap between "I" Company and BLT 2/23 on its' left.

The attack continued at 1500. At this time the 81mm mortars fired a preparation lasting ten minutes and using 275 rounds. A second rocket barrage was fired at 1600 and by 1700 the battalion front had advanced 75 yards.

At 1700 lines tied in for the night with "K" Company on the right in contact with BLT 1/24, "I" Company in the center, and "L" Company on the left. A gap existed at this time between "L" Company and "F" Company, BLT 2/23. This gap was finally filled at 1800 by "E" Company, BLT 2/23. "L", "I", and "K", companies on line in TS 201 S, X.

At 2200 orders from RCT 24 were to continue the attack at 0730. Boundaries and objectives remained the same.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	0-4	0-21	0-4	0-1	0-2	22 438
						2* 19*

9 MARCH, 1945.

"I" Company reported that during the night three (3) of the enemy had infiltrated their lines. There were several other attempts at infiltration throughout the night.

The 81mm mortars fired 400 rounds harrassing fire during the night.

At 0600 BLT 2/23 withdrew their "F" Company recreating the gap between "L" Company and "E" Company, BLT 2/23.

At 0730 BLT 3/24 continued the atteck after the 81mm mortars fired a ten minute preparation using 200 rounds.

The battalion front moved 50 to 75 yards but BLT 1/24 remained in position on our right. This created a gap which was filled by "K" Company, BLT 3/24. Again, knee mortars and heavy small arms fire retarded our initial advance. Almost all enemy positions were in caves.

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Narrative Of Operation (Cont'd).

At 1200 "A" Company, BLT 1/24 plus two (2) platoons of "G" Company, BLT 2/24 had completed mopping up the pocket of resistance behind our left flank and reverted to parent control.

At 1315 the command group moved forward and arrived at the new C.P. in TS 201 Q at 1335.

At 1400 a rocket barrage was fired in front of the battalion and at 1430 "I" Company used a 75mm halftrack to knock out enemy positions in a cliff directly to their front.

At 1700 the companies were tied in for the night. "K" Company on the right was tied in with "B" Company, BLT 1/24, "I" Company in the center and "L" Company on the left, companies in TS 202 U, 201 Y, and 184 D. The gap between BLT 3/24's left and BLT 2/23's right flank, created by our advance, existed until 2000 when "L" Company, BLT 3/23 filled in.

At 1715 the command group returned to TS 200 W.

At 2100 BLT 3/24 received orders from RCT 23 to continue the attack at 0800. We are to be attached to RCT 23 tomorrow. Boundaries remain the same. The objective is that part of the beach road in our battalion zone of action in TS 185 H, M, L.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH	
	0-16	0-57	0-11	0-1	0-0	22	438
						2*	19*

10 MARCH, 1945.

During the night there was considerable activity behind our lines due to the 200 yard lateral gap on our left remaining open until 2000. The 81mm mortars fired 400 rounds harrassing fire during the night.

BLT 3/24 reverted to control of RCT 23 at 0630. At 0800 the battalion moved out with "K" Company, BLT 3/25 on the right and "I" Company, BLT 3/23 on the left, closely following a rocket barrage.

At 0830 the command group moved forward and set up a new C.P. in TS 201 Q at 0850. At 0900 BLT 3/24's O.P. was in TS 184 D.

By 0950 the battalion left flank moved 110 yards, the center and right flank moved 80 yards. At 1000 companies requested air observation in TS 185 Q, R, M, N. At 1020 "K" Company requested an air strike in TS 184 O; this mission was later cancelled. By 1050 "L" Company had moved 200 yards since King-hour and was rapidly opening its' flanks. The battalion commander ordered "L" Company to continue their attack.

At 1310 the rear C.P. moved out and arrived at the new C.P. at 1330.

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Narrative of Operation (Cont'd).

Due to "L" Company's substantial gain with practically no opposition, gaps were created on both of its' flanks. "L" Company's gain amounted to 600 yards. At this point a patrol from "L" Company was sent to within 100 yards of the beach. On its' return the patrol reported finding no enemy and had suffered no casualties.

At 1400 "K" Company, BLT 3/23 became attached to BLT 3/24 and was committed on the right flank of our "K" Company. By 1600 "I" and "K" companies had succeeded in moving to their front and left to make contact with "L" Company. Two (2) platoons of "A" Company, BLT 1/23 tied in with "L" Company's right flank. An 80 yard gap existed between "I" Company, BLT 3/24 and "A" Company, BLT 1/23. The gap on "L" Company, BLT 3/24's left flank was closed by BLT 2/23 at 2200. "I" Company tied in with "K" Company on its' right, and "K" Company had an 80 yard gap between its' right flank and "K" Company, BLT 3/25. "L" Company is in TS 185 H, L. "I" and "K" companies are in TS 185 F and 184 J, O.

At 2200 orders from RCT 23 were to continue the attack at 0730. The beach was the final objective.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	0-1	0-8	0-1	0-0	0-1	22 407
						2* 19*

11 MARCH, 1945.

There was some enemy activity well behind the front lines during the night. This again was due in a large part to the gaps created in the lines during the day and failure in filling these gaps until a late hour.

At dawn, "A" Company withdrew from our zone of action. At 0830 "L" Company reported on patrols sent to the beach in TS 185 S. They found a beach road heavily mined with horned mines. They killed four (4) of the enemy fleeing north. Our objective had been reached at this time.

At 0900 "I" and "K" companies were moving out. Both companies met initial resistance from covered positions directly to their front in the form of heavy small arms and knee mortar fire.

A subsequent King-hour was set at 1545. By 1600 "I" Company had moved forward and tied in with "L" Company's right flank at RJ 116.

At 1630 "L" Company was on the battalion left flank tied in with "A" Company, BLT 1/23 on the left and "I" Company on

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Narrative Of Operation (Cont'd).

the right. "K" Company was tied in with "I" Company on its left. A 70 yard gap existed between "K" Company's right flank and "K" Company, BLT 3/23.

At 1700 the regimental commander of RCT 23 declared the regimental zone of action secured.

At 1730 three (3) 37mm guns were in position in the front lines. At 1815 a strong point was set up forward of "I" and "L" Company's positions. "L", "I", and "K" companies were in TS 185 H, M, L.

Orders from RCT 23 at 2130 directed BLT 3/24 to conduct thorough mopping up operations in present positions. King-hour at 0800.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	1-9	0-22	0-3	0-0	0-1	21 391
						2* 19*

12 MARCH, 1945.

The night was uneventful.

King-hour at 0900, delayed one (1) hour by RCT 23 to attempt to let enemy forces in the RCT zone of action to surrender. At 0900 the battalion commander ordered all companies to police their areas and bury all enemy dead.

By 1200 "I", "K", and "L" companies, working with Engineers, had cleaned out all areas to their front down to and including the beach within the BLT zone of action.

At 1500 this date the BLT had buried a total of 351 of the enemy.

At 1800 one (1) platoon of "L" Company, BLT 3/23 and one (1) platoon from "F" Company, BLT 2/25 were ordered to fill a gap between "K" Company, BLT 3/23 and "F" Company, BLT 2/25.

At 2100 the lines were consolidated for the night. "L" Company was tied in with "A" Company, BLT 1/23 on the left, "I" Company in the center, and "K" Company on the right tied in with one (1) platoon of "K" Company, BLT 3/23 which in turn was tied in with "K" Company, BLT 3/25 on the right. A small gap still existed between that flank and BLT 2/25 on the right. "L", "I", and "K" companies in TS 185 H, M, L, K.

Orders from RCT 23 at 2140 were to continue present mission. King-hour at 0730.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	0-8	0-8	1-2	0-0	0-1	20 375
						2* 19*

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Narrative Of Operation (Cont'd).

13 MARCH, 1945.

The night was uneventful.

At 0900 details were sent out from Headquarters Company to bury enemy dead. Sixty-nine (69) enemy dead were buried.

At 1000 a bulldozer began cutting a road from the road junction in TS 185 B to a point about 100 yards east to enable a flame thrower tank to work on a large cave. This road was cleared at about 1100 at which time the flame thrower tank was able to proceed to the cave and effectively burn it out. This tank was under the control of "I" Company at that time.

At 1025 the RCT 24 commander visited the battalion C.P.. At 1035 the Assistant Division commander visited the battalion C.P..

At 1900 "L" Company, BLT 3/23 became attached to BLT 3/24. At the same time it relieved "K" Company, BLT 3/23 which reverted to parent control.

At 1930 the companies were tied in for the night. "L", "I", and "K" companies in TS 185 H, M, L, K.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	0-0	0-1	0-1	0-0	0-0	21 387
						2* 19*

14 MARCH, 1945.

The night was uneventful.

King-hour at 0630, BLT 3/24 to continue mopping up operations in battalion zone of action.

At 0830 a strong patrol was sent into TS 185 G to clean out snipers in the vicinity of Higashi. By 1300 one (1) 75mm halftrack and one (1) 37mm gun, in conjunction with patrols, cleaned out snipers in the Higashi area.

At 1700 the lines were tied in from left to right. "A" Company, BLT 1/23, "L", "I", and "K" companies, and "L" Company, BLT 3/23 on the right. "L", "I", and "K" companies in TS 185 H, M, L, K.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	0-0	0-6	0-0	0-0	0-0	21 373
						2* 19*

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Narrative Of Operation (Cont'd).

15 MARCH, 1945.

The night was uneventful.

At 0600 BLT 2/24 relieved BLT 2/25.

King-hour at 0630. Our mission remains the same. Patrols from each company under the direction of "I" Company worked with Engineers behind the lines of the right of the battalion zone of action cleaning out caves on a ridge line with the use of demolitions and 60mm mortars. This work was completed at 1700.

At 1700 due to advance of BLT 2/24 on our right, "L" Company, BLT 3/23 was squeezed out of the lines. They set up a secondary line of defense behind our "K" Company.

At 2200 the 37mm gun attached to "I" Company killed five (5) enemy as they walked north along the beach road toward RJ 116 in front of "I" Company's lines.

Lines remain the same. "L", "I", and "K" companies in TS 185 H, M, L, K.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	0-2	1-5	1-1	0-0	0-0	19 366
						2* 19*

16 MARCH, 1945.

The night was uneventful.

King-hour at 0630. Our mission remains the same. At daylight "L" Company, BLT 3/25 reverted to parent control. At 0800 BLT 3/24 reverted to parent control; RCT 24 relieved RCT 23; BLT 1/24 in line on left flank of BLT 3/24; BLT 2/24 on right of BLT 3/24.

By 1000 the left flank of BLT 2/24 had reached the beach road and gained contact with our right flank. At 1700 "L", "I", and "K" companies tied in for the night in TS 185 H, M, L.

At 2130 BLT 3/24 received a warning order to be prepared to move back to an assembly area sometime the following afternoon.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	0-0	0-1	0-2	0-0	0-0	19 366
						2* 19*

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History of Operation (Cont'd).  
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17 MARCH, 1945.

The night was uneventful.  
At 0800 three (3) combat patrols of twenty (20) men each, one (1) patrol per company, moved south along the beach road extending 300 yards on either side of the road to continue mopping up operations in that area. Attached to each patrol were five (5) Engineer and two (2) Intelligence personnel. Lt. Gershen was in charge of all three (3) patrols. These patrols proceeded south from the right boundary of the battalion zone of action to TS 184 P, U, and 167 A. They returned over the same area. Twenty (20) caves were sealed by demolitions and two (2) dead Marines were placed near the beach road to aid the Division Burial detail. There was no contact with the enemy and there were no casualties. This mission was completed at 1045.  
At 1215 BLT 3/24 moved back to its' assembly area. The BLT arrived in the assembly area in TS 182 T at 1315.

Casualties:	KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
	0-0	0-2	0-0	0-0	0-0	19 374
						2* 19*

Total Casualties from 19 February, 1945 to 17 March, 1945, inclusive.

KIA	W&E	SK&E	W&NE	MIA	EFF. STRENGTH
1-160	16-496	4-130	2-17	0-2	20 374
2*	13*	5*	1*		2* 19*

\* Navy Personnel.

SECTION IV

PROGRESS OF ATTACK

- Appendix I(a)-Overlay of Daily Front Line Positions, RF-1:20,000.
- Appendix I(b)-Overlay of Objectives, C.P.'s, O.P.'s, and Zone of Responsibility, RF-1:20,000.

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Comments And Recommendations (Cont'd).

SECTION V

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that casualty replacements furnished during battle should come to the organization as a unit, trained as such, with non-commissioned officers having had a greater length of service. It is also recommended that replacements, when possible, be trained with companies and battalions before leaving the training area. This would alleviate the necessity of having to train the men in brief rest periods and having to acquaint them with their fire group and squad leaders. Our greatest shortage was definitely in experienced non-commissioned officers.

2. It is recommended that more complete and detailed aerial photographs be furnished to battalions after the assault phase. It is also recommended that assault battalions be furnished low oblique photographs of their battalion zone of action, to be photographed in the direction of the attack. Either the pilot or aerial photographer should be sent to the battalion C.P. in order that he may be closely briefed on the desired mission prior to taking the photographs. This briefing would include direction of flight, exact area or areas to be covered, altitude of plane, number of copies required, etc.

It is recommended that situation maps not be overprinted with enemy installations. This tends to confuse certain terrain features. Special maps with enemy installations shown were sufficient.

3. It is recommended that a heavier mortar be adopted. The need was plainly felt by all hands for a 4.2 inch mortar or a 155mm mortar. These mortars would supplement the 81mm mortar platoon and would operate in the same manner.

It is recommended that the Tank Battalion be provided with more flame thrower tanks. This recommendation is made especially in regard to the large flame thrower mounted in the barrel of the 75mm gun.

It is recommended that regimental training programs include more anti-tank training plus sufficient amounts of material for field training. It has been found in previous training that

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Comments And Recommendations (Cont'd).  
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the number of anti-tank weapons and the number or rounds of ammunition, particularly ammunition, have been inadequate.

It is recommended that more rocket jeeps be made available for use by battalions. Because of their small size and comparative ease of mobility through rough terrain, they seem to be more ideally suited for work with front line companies than do the one (1) ton trucks.

4. It is recommended that ten (10) jeeps and three (3) weasels or thirteen (13) jeeps comprise the organic transportation for a Battalion Landing Team. The following distribution is suggested: two (2) jeeps or one (1) weasel and one (1) jeep per rifle company, two (2) jeeps for the 81mm mortar platoon, one (1) quartermaster jeep, four (4) jeeps for battalion headquarters.

5. It is recommended that more litter bearers be furnished the Battalion Landing Team. These men should be furnished in ample time for training as litter bearers. On several previous occasions litter bearers have become casualties because of the lack of proper and sufficient training in the basic principles of cover and concealment, and movement under fire.


It is recommended that the Battalion Aid Station be furnished with four (4) ambulance jeeps.

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APPENDIX I(b) TO SECTION IV TO OPN. REPORT NO. I-45  
PROGRESS OF THE ATTACK  
 BN, OBJECTIVES, CP, OP, AND, ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY  
 MAP: SPECIAL AIR B. GUNNERY TARGET, IWO JIMA  
 R F 1/20,000

BY COMMAND OF MAJ. D. A. STOUT  
 A. ARSENAULT  
 MAJ. USMC  
 EXECUTIVE OFFICER

DISTRIBUTION:  
 OFFICIAL:  
*W.C. Esterline*  
 W.C. ESTERLINE  
 MAJ. USMC  
 BN-3

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ANNEX A

ADMINISTRATION

1. INITIAL PREPARATIONS AND PLANNING:

a. Preparation of casualty cards, as prescribed by Division General Order #29-1944, dated 8 October, 1944, was initiated the first part of November, 1944. Casualty cards were completed by mid November and distributed according to Division Order. For a more accurate check of casualties in the battalion, each mans' name, rank and serial number was entered in three (3) record books, carried and maintained by three (3) men. (See Appendix #1 for sample page).

b. When casualties were reported to the battalion, it was planned to enter the information in the record books as well as preparing the casualty cards. All company officers and the first sergeants of the battalion were acquainted with the system in use, to enable them to give as much cooperation as possible in reporting casualties. Arrangements were made with the Battalion Aid Station to report daily, casualties clearing the Battalion Aid Station. Prior to embarkation and while enroute to the combat area a daily inspection of personnel was held to insure that each man possessed identification tags, and was wearing only his own clothing which was to be marked according to regulations.

2. CASUALTIES:

a. See Appendix #2.

3. MORALE:

a. Enroute to the combat area an entertainment program was instituted. Smokers were held every afternoon from 1600 until darken ship. During this time boxing and wrestling bouts were held and a band played between bouts. Mail was picked up enroute to the combat area. Mail from home plus the reading material and games distributed by the Red Cross were the greatest factors in maintaining morale aboard ship. During the battle, mail and newspapers from the ships were distributed to the front line companies.

b. Rehabilitation on the Island of Oahu proved to be excellent to bolster the morale of the battalion. Liberty was granted

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Administration (Cont'd).

every fourth day and those not authorized to go ashore were taken to nearby recreation fields so that they could participate in athletics. Morale throughout the whole operation was excellent.

4. POSTAL:

a. Mail, when received in the battalion, was sorted into company lots and sent to the companies with the evening supplies. Casualties' mail was bundled, properly marked, and returned to the regimental postal clerk. V-mail forms were distributed to companies. Out going mail was censored in the battalion and dispatched as quickly as possible.

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Appendix #2.

ORGANIZATION: Hq, 3rd Bn, 24th Mar, 4th Mar Div, FME, C/O FPO, San Francisco, Calif. PERIOD COVERED FROM 12:00 TO: 12:00 34 834 2\* 39\*

UNIT	KILLED		WOUNDED (EV)		SICK (EV)		CASUALTIES		MISSING		TOTAL CAS.		EFFECTIVE STRENGTH	
	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E
D Day														
D1	3		3	11*	2	1*			1		3	15*	31	819
D2	7		9	2*	2		3	1*			21	21	31	815
D3	10		10		2		1		1		24	24	31	774
D4	4		27		2				1*		33	33	29	741
D5	21		55	1*	3*		1		1		108	108	26	636
D6	9		31		8				2		50	50	26	592
D7	9		56		23		1		1		90	90	21	509
D8	2		13	1*	1		4				20	20	21	506
D9			8	2*	1				1		12	12	20	696
D10	1		13		9		2				25	25	20	683
D11	1		10	1*	4						15	15	22	672
D12	13		35		4		2				58	58	22	622
D13	7		62		4		1				74	74	22	560
D13	1*								1		1*	1*	2*	21*

\* Navy Personnel

(OVER)

D/6 Joined: 2 Officers -- 4 Enlisted men  
Returned: 2 Enlisted men

D/7 Joined: 22 Enlisted men  
Returned: 2 Enlisted men

D/8 Joined: 37 Enlisted men  
Returned: 13 Enlisted men

D/9 Joined: 201 Enlisted men

D/10 Returned: 7 Enlisted men

D/11 Joined: 1 Officer  
Returned: 1 Officer

D/13 Returned: 6 Enlisted men

Appendix #2.

ORGANIZATION:

Hq, 3rd Bn, 24th Mar, 4th Mar Div, FMAF, C/O FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

PERIOD COVERED FROM

12:00

TO:

12:00

	KILLED		WOUNDED (EV)		SICK (EV)		WOUNDED (NON EV)		MISSING		TOTAL CAS.		EFFECTIVE STRENGTH			
	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E		
A/14		6		1		28*		5				1		40*	21*	521*
D/15						3		1						4	21	518
D/16						1		1						2	22	547
D/17		4				21		4				2		32	22	521
D/18		16				57		11				1		85	22	438
D/19		1				8		1				1		11	22	407
D/20		1				22		3				1		35	21	391
D/21		8				8		2				1		18	20	375
22						1		1						2	21	387
D/23						6								6	21	373
D/24		2				5		1				2		8	19	367
D/25						1		2						3	19	366
D/26						2								2	19	374
GRAND TOTAL	1	160	2*	16	496	13*	4	130	5*	2	17	1*	2	23	805	374

\* Navy Personnel

ENEMY PRISONERS CAPTURED

(OVER)

3

Disposition of: Turned over to R-2 after brief questioning



D/14 Transferred: 7 Enlisted men  
D/15 Joined: 1 Enlisted man  
Returned: 1 Enlisted man  
D/16 Joined: 1 Officer - 5 Enlisted men  
D/17 Returned: 5 Enlisted men  
D/18 Returned: 1 Enlisted man  
D/21 Returned: 2 Enlisted men  
D/22 Returned: 14 Enlisted men  
D/25 Returned: 2 Enlisted men  
D/26 Returned: 1 Officer - 10 Enlisted men

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ANNEX BAKER

INTELLIGENCE

1. MAPS, PHOTOGRAPHS AND SUPPLEMENTARY INTELLIGENCE:

a. Prior to the Iwo Jima operation the following types of maps and photographs were furnished to this battalion: Maps: 1/20,000 2 sheets w/grid, 1/20,000 2 sheets w/o grid, 1/10,000 w/grid, 1/5,000 4 sheets w/grid, 1/5,000 Assault Map, 1/10,000 Situation Map to 15 October, 1944, H.O. Chart 6101, 1/10,000 Beach Map "A" w/o grid, 1/10,000 East Beach Study, 1/10,000 West Beach Study; Photos: 1/10,000 Photo Map 4 sheets w/grid, and Enl. Obliq. of East Beaches. During the operation no new maps were furnished, however, aerial photographs of T.A. 201, 185 and 202 were disseminated to this organization. Both the maps and photographs furnished before and during the operation had the following faults: they in no way depicted the ruggedness of the terrain we were to operate over, the maps did not bring up to date changes in the key terrain features (the extension of Airfields number 1 and 2), and the situation map was too cluttered up with enemy installations. To further explain this last criticism, it was the opinion of the battalion commander and members of the staff that the situation map should not include enemy installations. Another map was issued showing all enemy installations, and this is considered sufficient.

2. HYDROGRAPHIC INFORMATION:

a. Adequate hydrographic reports were furnished this battalion. Appendix 2 to Annex Baker, Division Operation Order No. 49-44 and CINCPAC-CINCPHA Information Bulletin No. 122-44, dated 10 October, 1944, gave a detailed summary of hydrographic conditions that accurately depicted the type of surf, beach gradient, etc., that this battalion experienced on landing D-day.

3. OTHER INTELLIGENCE:

a. Prior to the operation the intelligence available to this battalion was generally good. However, the D-2 tactical study of the terrain failed to portray the true picture of the northern part of Iwo Jima. Here again, the greatest difficulty was the lack of good aerial photographs.

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Intelligence (Cont'd).

4. INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONING:

a. Intelligence of the enemy situation was gotten in this battalion by the use of O.P.'s and Intelligence Teams. A battalion O.P. was established whenever the battalion was in the line or when we knew we would be committed in a certain sector. The battalion O.P. had wire to the C.P., and often an SCR 300 was used for additional communication. The Intelligence Teams had the function of collecting all materiel and documents of intelligence value, and also keeping abreast with the tactical situation.

b. All observations of the O.P. were reported to the battalion C.P. and the R-2 as quickly as possible. Also, the Intelligence Teams continually sent in documents and materiel to the C.P., where they were evaluated by an enlisted Japanese language specialist and then disseminated to the interested units.

c. The liaison between this Bn-2 Section and other echelons was considered adequate except in the instance of adjacent units. The Bn-2 Section of this battalion tried to instigate a system of closer liaison between battalions of the regiment before the operation, but nothing actually materialized.

d. The training of the personnel of the Bn-2 Section of this battalion for the Iwo Jima operation started in the second week of September, 1944. The first six (6) weeks training was under the direction of the R-2 and included a thorough introduction to map reading, aerial photography, S.O.P. for intelligence, scouting and patrolling, compass drills, and terrain appreciation. After this training period this Bn-2 Section trained separately putting particular emphasis on radio transmitting including voice procedure, shackle codes, division call signs, and setting up the set; C.P. procedure; Division S.O.P.'s; and intelligence publications dealing with recent operations. At the middle of November, 1944, this battalion began going out on field problems, first separately, and then in conjunction with regiment. We also had several CPX's with regiment, division, and corps.

During the operation an enlisted Japanese language specialist was assigned to this battalion. He was particularly valuable in the evaluation of documents and materiel. For a discussion of the relative merits of Japanese language personnel for interrogation of prisoners see 5 below.

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Intelligence (Cont'd).

5. PRISONERS:

a. This battalion captured three (3) prisoners. Two (2) of them were captured 10 March, 1945, while we were attached to the 23rd Marines, and one (1) 15 March, 1945, while under parent control. The R-2 of the 23rd Marines dispatched a language officer to our C.P., when we reported having captured these prisoners. This officer was able to quickly interrogate the prisoners concerning enemy units to our front before sending the prisoners to the rear. When we captured a prisoner while under parent control the R-2 had us employ an enlisted Japanese language specialist who was attached to our battalion. He had greater difficulty interrogating the prisoner than the more experienced language officers of the 23rd Marines. This, however, was due to this man's lack of experience in interrogating under combat conditions. After the experience of this campaign he should make an excellent interrogator.

6. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIEL:

a. The following procedure was set up for the recovery of captured enemy documents and materiel: Intelligence Teams were assigned to each company to collect documents and materiel, paying particular attention to newly captured areas and installations and taking special pains to check enemy dead who had tried to infiltrate our positions during the night. This method, in conjunction with a close liaison between the Bn-2 Section and the company commanders, produced excellent results. This procedure had to be somewhat modified after the section received five (5) casualties D/5, but the general pattern was followed throughout the operation.

7. PROPAGANDA:

a. When it was reported that Lieutenant General Takamichi Kuriyabashi, commanding officer of the 109th Division might be in the pocket that formed the last Japanese bastion, a warning order came down to this battalion that an LCI would lie off shore and try to induce General Kuriyabashi and members of his party to come into our lines and surrender. This attempt proved fruitless. This was the only time oral propaganda could be practicably attempted in our sector. There was no indication in this battalion's sector that the written propaganda showered on Iwo Jima was of any worth.

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Intelligence (Cont'd).

8. ENEMY TACTICS:

a. There were several distinctive enemy tactics noted in this battalion's zone of action. On 4 March, 1945, this battalion jumped off without an artillery barrage and in less than thirty (30) minutes advanced 100 yards over territory that our unit and others had fought to take for several days. Later intelligence explained this by the procedure of the Japanese to go in their caves during our artillery barrage and then to automatically fire on our front lines when the barrage was lifted. On 20 February, 1945, our C.P. sighted what was believed to be a Japanese war dog in TS 164 E. Later reports confirmed that the Japanese were using war dogs on Iwo Jima. On 26 February, 1945, a joint D-2, R-2, and Bn-2 team searched a cave in our C.P. area in TS 183 W. In it we found at least eighty (80) partially cremated Japanese and ashes that may have represented several hundred other Japanese that were cremated.

9. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

- a. Every possible expedient should be made to procure more accurate maps and aerial photographs.
- b. The situation map should not be cluttered up with enemy installations.
- c. A system of adequate liaison be instigated between battalions. Division should instigate this system so it is applicable when a battalion is assigned to another regiment.
- d. The excellent system of joint R-2, Bn-2 training should be continued.

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ANNEX CHARLIE

OPERATIONS

1. REHEARSAL EXERCISES:

a. During the latter part of November and the first week of December regimental amphibious maneuvers were held. Division maneuvers were held in mid-January.

b. From the time we left Pearl Harbor until we landed on Iwo Jima continuous squad, platoon, and company school was held on all phases of the operation. Particular emphasis was placed on the mission of this battalion and all pertinent intelligence data, making use of all orders and plans, intelligence summaries, maps, photographs, etc.

c. This battalion is of the opinion that information furnished for this operation was the most complete and comprehensive information as yet furnished.

2. WEAPONS FOUND MOST EFFECTIVE AGAINST FORTIFIED POSITIONS:

- a. The most effective weapons were:
- (a) 155mm shells
  - (b) 105mm shells
  - (c) 75mm shells
  - (d) Flame thrower tanks

3. EFFICIENCY AND EMPLOYMENT OF PORTABLE AND TANK MOUNTED FLAME THROWERS:

a. The use of both type flame throwers was extensive due to the particular type of enemy defenses.

b. The portable flame throwers, attached to front line companies, when the need arose, were used extensively on caves and pillboxes with good results. Re-supply presented a problem in that there were times when sufficient servicing and supply personnel were lacking in order that the flame throwers could be kept in action continually for several hours at a time.

c. The flame thrower tank proved to be highly satisfactory when it could be used. In many cases these tanks were not available when requested because of other missions. They could only be used where the terrain permitted them to move to the

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Operations (Cont'd).

target area or where a road could be bulldozed in sufficient time.

4. INFANTRY-TANK COORDINATION:

a. The lack of suitable tank terrain made coordination with infantry almost impossible. There were only two or three instances when tanks could move with the attack and in each case the movement was not over 50 to 75 yards. In most cases they were employed singly or in pairs.

5. ENEMY ANTI-TANK MEASURES:

a. The enemy made extensive use of land mines and 47mm guns with excellent results. In many instances one (1) land mine or one (1) 47mm shell completely disabled the tank.

6. TACTICAL USE OF WAR DOGS:

a. The battalion used a messenger dog only once and its performance was satisfactory. On two (2) occasions war dogs were sent to companies in the line for security during the night. They proved to be of no value on both occasions.

7. EMPLOYMENT OF ROCKETS, AT AND BR:

a. Both anti-tank and barrage rockets were used effectively for the purposes intended. Anti-tank rockets were effectively used against caves and strong points.

8. NEW ENEMY TACTICS ENCOUNTERED:

a. There were no new enemy tactics encountered.

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ANNEX DOG

SECTION I

1. SUPPLY AND EQUIPMENT:

a. Adequacy of All Types of Mounting Out Supplies.

(1) Class I - Rations. The variety and amount of rations of all types were very satisfactory. However, it is recommended that more new type "C" and "10 in one" rations be carried in lieu of the old type "C" and certain components of the "B" ration. If need be, the "10 in one" ration can easily be used as a combat ration, thus, your allowance for the cut down of certain components of the "B", the old "C" in total and a percentage of the "K" rations.

Water as a whole was good and of a better quality than that of the Marshalls or Marianas Operations. It is recommended that the larger mouthed five (5) gallon expeditionary can be used and that some remedy be effected to control the inevitable bad taste of the new can. The fifteen (15) gallon drum is excellent and the quantity carried should be increased.

Extra components of the "B" ration worked out very satisfactorily, however, there was a predominant supply of pineapple juice.

(2) Class II - It was quite satisfactory as carried on this operation.

(3) Class III - Fuel Products. It was quite satisfactory as carried on this operation. It is recommended that more flame thrower fuel be mixed and put into five (5) gallon containers. The fifty five (55) gallon drum is a bit awkward to handle at times.

(4) Class IV - An infantry battalion could use the cargo carriers, M29C (Weasel), to great advantage. A bulldozer, armored if possible, at the disposal of the Bn-4, would be a time saver for the performance of the following duties:

(a) Building roads into the company C.P.'s. If an armored bulldozer were on call instead of on priority ratings, company supply would be faster and the possible advance of the unit pushing the enemy would be speeded.

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Supply and Equipment (Cont'd).

(b) Revetting of battalion supplies in the dump.

(c) An armored bulldozer is good for clearing mines and building roads over which a tank would not be wary to operate and thereby more readily support the attack. Also ambulance jeeps could get closer to the company C.P., thus speeding evacuation of wounded from company to battalion.

(5) Class V - Ammunition. There was a notable shortage of 81mm light and fragmentation hand grenades. Two hundred and fifty eight (258) rounds of 81mm light and seventy six (76) cases of fragmentation hand grenades are hardly enough for a Battalion Landing Team to have at its' disposal on a D-day landing.

b. Adequacy of Resupply.

(1) Resupply of all classes of material was excellent in so far as the method was concerned of the items available. It was widely known that an acute shortage of certain types of ammunition existed such as 60mm illumination, 81mm light, heavy and smoke, and illuminating hand grenades.

c. Shore Party Distribution of Supplies From Beach Dumps.

(1) It is the impression of this section that amphibian tractors were to be used in the transport of supplies from the Shore Party dumps to the battalion dumps via the regimental dumps if existent. This section found it extremely difficult in finding and persuading amphibian tractor personnel to comply with such requests. If the wrong impression is in evidence there should be some provision made to overcome that difficulty, i.e., Transporting supplies from the beach to BLT dumps or certain understanding and control should be placed upon tractor operating personnel. This condition exists only when the organic transportation of a unit has not been landed; in this instance the first eight (8) days of the operation.

d. Salvage and Salvage Collection.

(1) Salvage in this battalion worked as follows. The company jeeps and trailers on their return trip from the company area would bring back from that particular company

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Supply And Equipment (Cont'd).

all salvage which had been previously collected and placed in the company dump. The salvage from the four (4) companies was placed in a special section of the battalion dump and therefrom transported back to the Regimental Quartermaster Dump. Daily collection of salvage from the Battalion Aid Station also was in effect. Salvage as a whole was excellent in this battalion.

e. Captured Material and Collection.

(1) Captured material and collection was handled in the same manner, if not requested by the Intelligence Section to follow that channel.

f. Efficiency of Cargo Carrier M29C (Weasel).

(1) The weasel proved to be a very valuable piece of equipment on this operation. Each infantry battalion could use three (3) of them very effectively.

g. Efficiency of Supply Communication.

(1) This battalion had telephonic communication most of the time and 610 radio communication with the battalion C.P. from the battalion dump. An SCR-300 radio in the battalion dump with the privilege of checking in on the regimental net thereby directly contacting the regimental dump would be more effective and save time for all concerned.

2. ORDNANCE:

a. Weapons.

(1) Number, type and caliber of weapons used:

Carbine, cal. .30, M1.	474
Rifles, M1903 (w/telescopic sight)	6
Rifles, cal. .30, M1.	424
B.A.R.'s, cal. .30.	81
Shotguns, riot, 12 gauge	25
Pistols, cal. .45.	31
Mortars, 60mm.	13
Mortars, 81mm.	4
Launcher, rocket, A.T.	9
Flame Thrower, portable.	27

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Supply And Equipment (Cont'd).

- (2) Twenty four (24) days officially.
- (3) Carbine, cal. .30, M1. 176
- Rifles, M1903 (w/telescopic sight) 2
- Rifles, cal. .30, M1. 353
- B.A.R.'s, cal. .30. 64
- Shotguns, riot, 12-guage. 19
- Pistols, cal. .45. 14
- Mortars, 60mm. 4
- Mortars, 81mm. 0
- Launcher, rocket, A.T. 9
- Flame Thrower, portable. 12
- Light Machine Guns 4
- Heavy Machine Guns 12

In connection with the above list of weapons, it is to be taken into consideration that practically all of these weapons totaled under "Lost" were turned in as salvage, repaired or cleaned by the Ordnance Company, and turned over to the Division Quartermaster. Thus, the term "Lost" can be applied only to the battalion supply.

b. Ammunition.

- (1) Answer to this question will be included in the R-4 report.
- (2) Jeeps and trailers within battalion.
- (3) Shell craters, revetments when possible.
- (4) 60mm Illuminating, 81mm all types, Illuminating grenades inadequate, 60mm Smoke HC not very effective.
- (5) Higher percentage of Illumination 60mm to the U/F of 60mm mortar ammunition.
- (6) A new type of 60mm HC Smoke Shell that does not give away mortar position on instantaneous firing of a round.

c. Enemy Weapons and Ammunition.

- (1) Weapons.
  - (a) One (1) Japanese 81mm mortar complete, i.e., (tube

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Supply And Equipment (Cont'd).

bipod and baseplate). Tube was used with U.S. bipod, baseplate and sight. Japanese ammunition was used and the performance was most satisfactory at long ranges.

(2) Ammunition.

(a) Twenty (20) cases of Japanese 81mm mortar ammunition complete were captured. This ammunition comes completely disassembled and quite some time is involved in the assembling of the shell for firing. This ammunition when fired gives a terrific muzzle blast and a very loud report accompanied with much smoke. The burning powder train of the time fuze leaves a noticeable trail. A few accidental airbursts occurred. Due to the fact that only long range fire was used, the bursts were unobserved. Permission to bring this Japanese mortar and ammunition back to the rest camp was obtained from the R-4. The purpose of this action is to fire the Japanese mortar and Japanese ammunition and observe all fires so as to effectively work up adequate range cards for the ammunition in case such a situation should occur in the future.

3. COMMENTS:

a. This battalion, in the first eight (8) days of combat, sent back to the Regimental Quartermaster and thereon to the Ordnance Company some four hundred (400) weapons. This large number of weapons was sent back because there was no personnel to take possession of them, or to clean and recheck them. Since no ordnance personnel were available at the battalion dump this was the only disposition possible. Yet on an occasion a few days later men who had been evacuated were returned to this organization who through no fault of their own had no weapons.

b. Carbines and M1's were required to arm them and it took the same sum total of four (4) hours of waiting and searching with the Ordnance Company to procure and sign for five (5) carbines badly needed to men going up to front line companies. Some arrangement should be made in the future between the Ordnance Company and Regimental Munitions Officers to remedy this situation.

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Supply and Equipment (Cont'd).

c. It is recommended that an ordnance man with a specialty in small arms be assigned to stay at the battalion dump under control of the Bn-4. This would assure the battalion of extra weapons in combat condition on ready call instead of the inevitable delay.

## SECTION II

### 1. TRANSPORT QUARTERMASTER:

#### a. Loading.

(1) APA 206 was loaded with a four hundred twenty (420) ton combat cargo in twenty one (21) hours. No particular difficulty was experienced, but the loading could have been considerably speeded had the rail switches in Kahaluuhi been in a workable condition. It is suggested that this condition be remedied so that it would be possible to move empty cars out without interfering with the loading of the other ship at the pier.

#### b. Unloading.

(1) Unloading of troops and cargo was begun at approximately 1600, 19 February, 1945, and completed at 1400, 27 February, 1945, or a total elapsed time of 190 hours. This could not be considered unloading time since as hereafter noted on several days little or no cargo was unloaded. Each night also at about 1800, the ship put out to sea, returning to the transport area about 0730. On 20, 22 and 23 February, 1945, little cargo was unloaded because beach conditions prevented the landing of LCVP's. Only one (1) LCM was available for unloading on 22 and 23 February, 1945. On 25 February, 1945, because of rough seas no cargo whatsoever was unloaded. On 21 February, 1945, LSM 206, on 26 February, 1945, LCT 688, and on 27 February, 1945, LSM 207 took off the bulk of the cargo. Vehicles were sent in LCM's with the exception of the four (4) trucks, 1 ton cargo and four (4) guns, 37mm, sent in on 21 February, 1945, aboard LSM 206.

#### c. Difficulties Encountered.

(1) In general, aside from 19 February, 1945, LCVP's were

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Transport Quartermaster (Cont'd).

unloading were:

- (a) Rough seas and poor beach conditions.
- (b) Insufficient numbers of LCM's and larger craft capable of landing in heavy surf and discharging cargo.
- (c) Lack of coordination between control vessels and shore party.
- (d) Inexperienced winch operators and probably coxswains.

### SECTION III

#### 1. MEDICAL:

##### a. Embarkation.

(1) Embarked aboard ship on 4 January, 1945, with two (2) Medical Officers and thirty nine (39) corpsmen. The attached units consisted of nine (9) corpsmen from "B" Medical Company and nine (9) bandsmen from Headquarters and Service Company, 24th Marines.

##### b. Aboard Ship.

(1) Sickness aboard ship consisted of numerous cases of Cat Fever plus several cases of Cellulitis. There was one (1) appendectomy done and one (1) patient transferred for possible Appendicitis. Two (2) patients were on the sick list and unable to leave the ship for the landing. The sanitary conditions were excellent at all times. The cooks and messmen were examined immediately after embarking and were examined periodically thereafter. An inspection was made every day by one of the Battalion Medical Officers. The food was adequate at all times and well prepared and served in a sanitary manner.

##### c. Debarkation.

(1) There were five (5) corpsmen boated with each Infantry Company; two (2) boated with the 81mm mortar platoon; one (1) with the assault platoon, and one (1) in the Free Boat.

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Medical (Cont'd).

The Battalion Aid Corpsmen and Bandsmen were boated in the fourth wave and the "B" Medical Company Corpsmen boated in the fifth wave. We landed at 1800, 19 February, 1945, on Blue Beach 1.

(2) Medical supplies were carried by having each corpsman carry two (2) units (#3) plus one (1) unit of Plasma. The bandsmen carried litters and splints. We were able to get ashore adequate essential supplies including twenty (20) 500 c.c. units of plasma plus thirty (30) 100 c.c. units of Serum-Albumin. One company aid corpsman was slightly injured and evacuated. We lost two (2) small carts on the beach; otherwise, there was no further loss of personnel or material on landing.

d. Ashore Assault Phase.

(1) Medical Installations.

(a) A temporary aid station was established at the battalion C.P. where casualties were treated and evacuated by hand carry to the beach. At all times the Battalion Aid Station was situated near a road.

(b) With the exception of the days we spent on the beach, the Aid Station had adequate cover and received very little fire. Dispersion was possible at all times after we moved from our position on the beach. In general, the Aid Station was in a position which was easily located by walking wounded. We were able to utilize caves and dugouts to a good advantage. Security was maintained by a joint guard posted by the battalion C.P. and the corpsmen. Black out precautions were put into effect at all times; we were able to treat patients inside a cave which enabled us to use a flashlight without breaking black out regulations. Our Aid Station was usually located at the base of a cliff which affords very good protection.

(2) Unable to comment on hospitalization.

(3) Evacuation.

(a) While we were on the beach, the casualties were carried from the companies to the Aid Station by the

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Medical (Cont'd).

bandsmen and battalion aid corpsmen and carried to the beach by the corpsmen from "B" Medical Company.

(b) After leaving the beach, the casualties were usually carried by litter bearers from the front lines to a collecting point 300 to 400 yards behind the lines where they were picked up by the Jeep Ambulances, and brought to the Aid Station. From the Aid Station, the casualties were transported to evacuation points by Jeep Ambulances. On several occasions, trucks were utilized to evacuate walking wounded. Usually we had two (2) Jeep Ambulances running from the front lines to the Aid Station and two (2) Jeep Ambulances from the Aid Station to the beach. This seemed to be adequate on most occasions due to the short evacuation lines; however, until roads were made available to the front line companies, the problem of getting casualties from the front lines was extremely difficult due to inadequate litter bearers and the difficult terrain. After we received additional men for litter bearers, the situation was relieved considerably. Until we had received corpsmen and new personnel, men from Headquarters Company had to be used.

(4) Casualties Treated.

(a) Wounded and evacuated - 691

(b) Sick and evacuated - 154

(c) All types of wounds were encountered. There were numerous chest wounds with an occasional sucking type wound. Many abdominal wounds both from small arms and shell fragments. It was noticeable that there were numerous extensive soft tissue injuries complicated with compound fractures. Many of the head wounds proved fatal.

(d) There were approximately ninety (90) cases of Combat Fatigue; most of these cases were among men who had been exposed to combat before and were unable to adjust themselves to the stress of additional combat conditions.

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Medical (cont 67)

(5) Sanitation.

(a) All companies used 1-2-3 trenches which were completely covered when the area was vacated. All areas were policed frequently. During the last several days of the operation, DDT in diesel oil was used around company areas with excellent results in controlling the flies. Food and water was issued by the Quartermaster and no food or water from the island was consumed. In general, the food was adequate plus the fact that there were adequate fruit juices. On several occasions, the water had a repulsive taste.

(6) Disposal of the Dead.

(a) The enemy dead were immediately covered when possible and when the situation made it practical, all the enemy dead were buried.

(b) Our dead were gathered from the front lines as soon as practical and carried to points along the road where they were picked up by working parties and evacuated.

(c) No enemy dead were handled by hand. The men who handled our dead were furnished with an antiseptic solution for their hands.

(7) Epidemics or Unusual Diseases in Troops.

(a) There were approximately forty (40) cases of Diarrhea encountered; about 80% subsided with treatment of Peregoric and Bismuth and the remainder subsided on Sulfadiazine. None of these cases clinically resembled Bacillary or Amoebic Dysentery.

(8) Dental Service.

(a) Emergency dental service was available at all times at Regimental Headquarters. We had approximately three (3) cases.

(9) Care of Civilians.

(a) No civilians cared for.

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Medical (Cont'd).

(10) Prisoners of War, Care of.

(a) None treated.

(11) Medical Organization.

(a) The battalion organization seems to function well under the conditions encountered. Unable to comment on other organizations.

(12) Medical Personnel.

(a) The present compliment is adequate but there is a definite need for the training of additional company aid men. When a company aid man is lost, there is no one who is either acquainted with the company or the duties of company aid corpsmen. The sending of inexperienced men into the front lines greatly increases the casualty rate among corpsmen.

(b) The Medical Companies should also have a period of training for corpsmen for front line duty. Replacements came from "B", "D", and "E" Medical Companies and Headquarters and Service Company, 24th Marines.

(13) Field Medical Equipment.

(a) The present equipment is adequate for the treatment of casualties in the battalion and the units can be revised according to individual likes and dislikes after they are received. Re-supply was adequate; we had two (2) combat loaded Jeep Ambulances plus the supplies received from the Regimental Surgeon. We encountered no noticeable losses.

(14) Motor Vehicles and Rolling Stock.

(a) Two (2) Ambulance Jeeps were assigned to the Battalion Aid Station. Neither of these landed in running order, but were put into running order within 24 hours after landing. Two (2) additional Ambulance Jeeps were made available by the Regimental Surgeon after we landed. These vehicles were inspected periodically by Regiment. A trailer would definitely improve transportation and a Weasel could be used for both litter and walking cases.

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(15) Quartermaster Equipment and Supplies.

(a) Adequate at all times.

e. Recommendations.

(1) There should be provisions made for adequate permanent litter bearers; nine (9) bandsmen are definitely inadequate for an infantry battalion especially when casualties must be carried over long distances. These litter bearers should receive special training in the proper way to go to and from the front lines in order to reduce the number of casualties among litter bearers.

(2) More corpsmen should be trained with the line companies to assure efficient replacements of company aid men. This should be done also in the Medical Companies if those corpsmen are to be used as replacements.

(3) Medical Jeeps should not be removed from use until provisions are made for continued evacuation of casualties.

(4) The sealing of chest wounds with rubber cement and condrums proved very efficient and speedy.

(5) Serum-Albumin is a very nice unit due to its' clinical effects and also due to the fact that it is small and can be carried easily.

(6) Brandy proved to be a great morale factor in the front line even though a small amount had to be distributed among many men. We could have used more.

(7) DDT spray proved very beneficial in controlling flies. I suggest earlier availability to front lines.

Total Casualties from 19 February, 1945 to 17 March, 1945, inclusive.

KIA	W&E	SK&E	MIA	W&NE	EFF.	STRENGTH
1-160	16-496	4-130	0-2	2-17	20	374
2*	13*	5*		1*	2*	19*

\* Navy Personnel.

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Burial

SECTION IV

1. BURIAL:

a. Formation.

(1) The battalion burial team was formed in accordance with Regimental S.O.P. for Burial and Graves Registration, dated 2 May, 1944. It consisted of a Battalion Burial Officer, a Graves Registration Officer, a Burial Non-commissioned Officer, and a detail of four (4) men.

b. Procedure.

(1) Although the burial detail had too few men to accomplish much work alone, it was supplemented with runners and any other men that could be spared from their regular duties. The burial detail tagged the bodies with emergency tags and removed the bodies to a battalion collection point. The Division Burial Team was contacted immediately and the bodies were taken to the Division Cemetery.

(2) The burial of enemy dead was limited because of the size of the burial detail. However, enemy dead were buried in the various locations of the Battalion Command Post. During the mopping up phase all companies were instructed to bury enemy dead. The total number of enemy dead buried by this battalion in its' zone of action was 448.

c. Recommendations.

(1) It is suggested that in future operations a Regimental Burial Team be organized to aid the Battalion Burial Teams in collecting dead. Some mode of transportation should be available to these teams to aid them in transporting bodies over long distances.

(2) Rubber gloves, or gloves, of any kind, were not available to members of the burial team. It is suggested that provisions be made on the next operation for gloves to be made available to members of the burial teams.

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ANNEX EASY

COMMUNICATIONS

1. TRAINING:

a. Training of communication personnel began soon after the return from Saipan. Weekly training schedules drawn up through joint cooperation of battalion and regimental communication officers, initially resulted in separate training of each section of the battalion communication platoon, i.e., message center, wire, and radio.

b. From the latter part of August to the first of November, 1944, radio personnel received one (1) week's training in Jamming, including receiving through both a CW note and natural interference, three (3) hours per week of radio procedure as well as instruction in CP security, camouflage, CP displacement, and general operation of radio sets. Little time was spent on the technical aspect of radio, but rather on capabilities, limitations, and tuning of the individual sets.

c. The wire section had the dual responsibility of maintaining communications within the battalion area in camp and training. In the period before November, 1944, technical familiarization and servicing of telephone gear was emphasized.

d. Message center personnel were trained in procedure by the message center chief following FM 24-5 closely as a guide. Training in the use of cryptographic devices was limited to the Hagelin machine, the DAME code, and later the DEAL code. Training with the Hagelin was generally considered to be insufficient. Continuous schooling was held on the SOI and SOP for all sections.

e. November and December, 1944, brought platoon field problems and coordination with increasingly larger infantry units in more extensive problems. Previous training which had been largely a review for old personnel was found to be entirely adequate in these problems.

2. PRE-EMBARKATION:

a. In the pre-embarkation period final arrangements were made for the personal responsibility of each man for each piece of communication gear assigned to him. Gear not to be used on the initial assault was packed so that the loss of any box would not cause the loss of the entire supply of any item. Although the third battalion was the senior unit aboard its' APA no

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Communications (cont'd).

advance message center was established aboard ship. Portable radios were stored in the troop compartment and were checked daily by their operators. Batteries were stored in the hold so as to be readily accessible.

3. MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE:

a. Activity during the voyage, after leaving Pearl Harbor, included one (1) hour per day briefing from intelligence data, minor servicing of telephonic and radio gear, and schooling on the SOI. Radios were completely checked two (2) days before the Saipan rehearsal and on D-2. The radio section held a four (4) hour review on message writing.

b. Three (3) operators volunteered to copy FOX broadcasts on a Navy circuit. Message center held special schooling on the code name roster and recognition of officers.

4. DEBARKATION:

a. Debarkation of communication personnel was effected in one (1) echelon with the exception of the vehicle drivers and two (2) radio operators on the TCS Regimental Special Purpose net. Signal supply from regiment began before our initial three (3) day supply was exhausted. This was of great importance to us as unloading of signal gear was fouled up and was not fully recovered until D/12. However, fairly adequate supply from our own dump began on D/5. Vehicles were landed at this time. Supply and repair was much better than in previous operations largely because of the small distances involved.

5. INITIAL INSTALLATION OF WIRE COMMUNICATIONS:

a. No difficulty was experienced in the initial installations of wire communications on the beach. Tracked vehicles necessitated continuous trouble shooting. This was aided by the short distances between units.

6. MESSAGE CENTER PROCEDURE:

a. Activity of the message center was limited to the handling of 225-300 messages during the entire operation excluding the preparation and distribution of shackle codes. Approximately two thirds of the messages handled were administration, the remaining one third, tactical.

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Communications (Cont'd).

7. WIRE CONTACT WITH LOWER ECHELONS:

a. Continuous wire contact with lower echelons was restricted by tracked vehicles, enemy shell fire and enemy line cutters at night. Tanks were generally careful of wire if seen, but with closed hatches observation was often too restricted to see overhead wire. It was found that W-130 stayed in much better than W-110-B when run over by tanks. Wire buried eighteen (18) inches below a road surface often failed to stay in. Some difficulty was experienced with operation of EE-8B's. In most cases, the trouble was remedied by a thorough cleaning. The RL-31 was never used.

8. FREQUENCY INTERFERENCES ENCOUNTERED:

a. Some interferences on radio circuits were experienced on D-day. Japanese traffic unintentionally jammed SCR 610, however our transmissions could be received with difficulty. Music and a CW note occasionally jammed SCR-536 on 4080 KC. A steady CW note was noted on the 25th Regimental Special Purpose net on D/8 and D/9. Receiving was difficult. Although the Regimental Special Purpose (3505 KC) and Regimental CW Command (3615 KC) were secured early in the operation, remaining radio nets were adequate due to better procedure and fewer messages. The Division Recon. Net (2754 KC) was used only once for transmission. Bn-2 kept a listening watch during the latter half of the operation on this net and found it very helpful.

9. SPECIAL EQUIPMENT AND DEFECTS:

a. MZ equipment was used only once; one (1) transmission on 2745 KC. Replacement of defective sets was immediate either by Regiment or Division. TBX and SCR 610 transmitters were defective once. Difficulty with loose connections in SCR-300's was often found. Defective hand and head sets gave the most trouble. SCR-536's could have been used more if companies would have volunteered to ask for battery replacements immediately as needed.

b. Some difficulty was experienced with companies abandoning signal equipment on the lines. These items include SCR-536 and particularly AP-50's.

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