

P

*Apr 44*

**[REDACTED]**  
**NL-9563-J**

# ANNEX MIKE

TO

FOURTH MARINE DIVISION  
OPERATIONS REPORT

## IWO JIMA

# 2nd ARMORED AMPHIBIAN BATTALION REPORT

RECEIVED  
NAVY  
MAY 15 1944  
PACIFIC OCEAN

REGRADED **UNCLASSIFIED**

BY AUTHORITY OF E.O. 10501

BY A. L. Adams

ON 15 Sep 89

**[REDACTED]**

*HR*  
30 May 45

PO Ref # 6882

# UNCLASSIFIED

## HEADQUARTERS SECOND ARMORED AMPHIBIAN BATTALION FMF, PACIFIC, IN THE FIELD

CONFIDENTIAL

### SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

#### PLANS AND REHEARSAL

The Second Armored Amphibian Battalion was divided into two equal parts for the support of the Fourth and Fifth Marine Divisions on the Iwo Jima Operation.

A and B Companies (17 LVTA's each) and det. H&S Company (1 LVTA) were attached to the Fourth Marine Division which further attached A Company to the 25th Marines, B Company to the 23rd Marines and the det. H&S Company to the Fourth Marine Division Support group.

C and D Companies (17 LVTA's each) and det. H&S Company (1 LVTA) were attached to the Fifth Marine Division as assigned.

Both divisions supplied adequate orders, maps, and plans in sufficient time to brief the battalion which was done prior to departure from Saipan because of the numerous ships this battalion was embarked upon. Main parts of paragraph 3 of the battalion orders to the two groups follows:

3. a. Company A at HOW-hour lands on beach BLUE I. Company A (less 1st platoon) will proceed inland past the first terrace, but not so far as to become endangered by our own N.G.F. and from defilade position will cover the debarkation of assault troops from LVT's and will support the attack until fire is masked by advancing assault troops.

The 1st Platoon after landing will cover the right (n) flank during debarkation of assault troops. After completion of initial mission, Company A will attach one platoon to BLT-3 on the right to support the attack in the seizure of beach BLUE II. Remainder of LVTA(4)'s remain in position prepared to support and/or deliver supporting fire as ordered by RCT Commander.

b. Company B at HOW-hour lands on YELLOW beaches, proceeds rapidly inland past the first terrace, but not go so far as to be endangered by our N.G.F., and from defilade positions

REGRADED

**UNCLASSIFIED**

-1-

BY AUTHORITY OF E.O. 10501

BY A.L. Adams

ON 15 Apr 89

**UNCLASSIFIED**

# UNCLASSIFIED

approach to the beach. When unmasked by LCI(G)'s and LCS's and when arriving within effective range, LVTA(4)'s will open fire with all available weapons. The left (s) flank platoon on beach GREEN I will ech approximately fifty yds to the left rear after passing through the line of LCS(L)'s in order to engage flank targets opposing the landing.

Three maneuvers were held by the battalion on the beaches of Saipan, the final one being in conjunction with the 5th Amph TracBn.

The battalion was ready to depart.

Each company carried two cargo LVT's, one for maintenance and one for a supply train. A radio jeep was preloaded in all except one maintenance LVT to establish rapid communications.

It was also planned by this battalion to carry one 6X6, one cargo jeep, and one arc welder per company and, in addition, 2 spare parts trailers, 2 water trailers and one 6X6 (wrecker) were to be carried for the battalion, but, when the ships arrived at Saipan no spaces were available on 5th Division ships and only space for one 6X6 and two cargo jeeps was available on the 4th Division ships.

The first wave troops of A and B Companies were placed on two Hospital LST's and the maintenance personnel of A and B Companies were placed on two Radar LST's. Thirteen men (B Company) were placed on an APA.

C and D Companies were placed on 9 LST's with only the platoons kept intact.

## MOVEMENT TO OBJECTIVE

On the 10th, 11th and 12th of February, 1945 this battalion embarked on 17 LST's and 5 APA's for a rehearsal and transportation to the target area.

Considerable confusion resulted during the rehearsal as wave guide boats in the Fifth Division zone did not appear.

Routine maintenance and further briefing were carried on while enroute to the target.

# UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SHIP TO SHORE MOVEMENT

Debarking from LST's at 0730, 19 February, 1945, some of the LVTA's were met by Navy guide boats and led in column to the LD where the LVTA's executed a column right or left, followed by the correct flank movement required to bring the battalion on line facing the beach. The LVTA's without guide boats made their way to the LD without difficulty.

Off of the 4thMarDiv beaches one guide boat per beach took position forward of the LVTA wave and at 0927, upon signal from the control ship, led the formation to the line of LCI's and LCS's.

From the line of LCI's and LCS's in the 4thMarDiv zone, the LVTA's preceded the guide boats which continued to control the wave until it was 300 yds from the beach.

When the line of LCI's and LCS's was passed, the LVTA's spread to fill the gaps caused by circumventing the support vessels and 68 LVTA's commenced firing. The right and left platoons of the battalion formation echeloned to bring greater fire power on the flanks of the Corps beaches.

Inaccurate enemy mortar and high velocity shells were received as the first wave neared the beach. Although several LVTA's/suffered hits, only one was destroyed.

Firing neutralization fire on the beach approach, each LVTA had an average ammunition expenditure of 23 rounds of 75mm howitzer with M48 fuse, 128 rounds 50 caliber and 473 rounds of 30 caliber.

NARRATIVE OF OPERATION

A and B Companies attached to 4thMarDiv D-day - 19Feb45.

A Company on BLUE I, B Company on YELLOW I and II landed abreast at 0905 and, where possible, continued to fire neutral-

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ization fire on the high ground to the front and right (n) flank of the division beaches. The LVTA's ceased firing when they were masked by steep terraces and advancing infantry.

Only one LVTA of B Company and three LVTA's of A Company succeeded in surmounting the second terrace because of the slope and poor traction on the loose, volcanic ash beaches.

At 1030 the density of enemy mortar and high velocity shells (47 and 75mm) on the beach increased until 7 LVTA's were destroyed and one platoon of B Company was ordered into the water where it stood by about 300 yards from the beach.

One LVTA (B Company) delivered fire on the right (n) flank of airport no. I as ordered by 1/23 but the remaining LVTA's (B Company) were ineffective the rest of D-day.

One of the three LVTA's (A Company) which surmounted the second terrace advanced on the right flank about 400 yards in front of the front lines and, from the cover of a beached Jap LSM, supported the infantry by fire.

From H plus 60 until 1730, four, sometimes five, LVTA's (A Company) fired at enemy emplaced 6 inch, 37 and 47 mm guns on the high ground north of beach BLUE II.

Both A and B Companies established beach defense along Beaches YELLOW I, II, BLUE I and II D-day night. During the night heavy mortar and artillery fire fell on the beaches destroying 2 LVTA's.

## Casualties:

Personnel - 5 KIA  
35 WIA  
1 MIA

Material - 17 LVTA's operating  
18 LVTA's not operating

Ammo expended -

75mm HE all SQ and Delay	- 1603
.50 caliber	15,720
.30 caliber	45,650

## D plus 1

All LVTA's of A and B Companies which would operate in water left the beach early D plus 1 and four LVTA's (A Company) fired area fire in front of 1/24 from 0700 to 1030 with no ap-

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

parent effectiveness. The remaining LVTA's tried to refuel from Bowser boats and LST's but it was found that the Bowser boats were not satisfactory as they were not sufficient in number nor were they in their assigned positions. The LST's unloading cargo could not take LVTA's aboard for repairs and, in the attempt to obtain gasoline and needed repairs aboard maintenance LST's, 5 LVTA's sank. The remaining LVTA's returned to the beach and prepared beach defenses.

Again on the night of D plus 1, heavy mortar, artillery and rocket fire was received on the division beaches but this battalion suffered no casualties in either personnel or material.

Casualties:

Personnel: 1 KIA  
4 WIA  
1 Sk&E

Material: 11 LVTA's operating  
24 LVTA's not operating

D plus 2

From the water 3 LVTA's (A Company) supported 1/24 by effective fire on scattered enemy personnel and caves in the boat basin until relieved at 1430. A Company was relieved from 3/25 and attached to 1/24. The night of D plus 2, A and B Companies established beach defense on YELLOW I, II, BLUE I, and II with 7 LVTA's.

Casualties:

Personnel: 2 KIA  
1 Sk&E

Material: 7 LVTA's Operating  
28 LVTA's not operating

D plus 3

In support of 1/24, from 1200-1300, 4 LVTA's (A Company) fired at caves and pillboxes on high ground on right (n) flank of RCT 24 from positions on BLUE II.

B Company was released from RCT 23 and attached to RCT 21.

Casualties:

Personnel: None

Material: 6 LVTA's operating  
29 LVTA's not operating

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

D plus 4

One LVTA (A Company) took the Commanding Officer of 1/24 on reconnaissance from 1100-1200 along shoreline to 300 yards north of Tachiina point.

At 1230 two LVTA's, positioned on the beach, fired at a Jap O.P. in TA 183-X&Y.

A Company maintenance crews landed, performed what maintenance that was possible and returned to their ship.

The usual beach defense mission was established by A and B Companies on night of D plus 4.

Casualties:

<u>Personnel</u>	2 Sk&E
<u>Material:</u>	6 LVTA's operating
	29 LVTA's not operating

D plus 5

Five LVTA's (A Company) were dispatched for fire support to 1/24. Three LVTA's went up coast road to TA 167-A and fired on targets designated by the infantry unit commanders while the remaining two LVTA's fired from the water on inland targets. One of the two water borne LVTA's went ashore at the small boat basin and destroyed 2 enemy machine gun nests while receiving heavy small arms and rifle grenade fire. This strong point was reported to the supported unit and was later neutralized by rockets and aerial strafing.

Casualties:

<u>Personnel</u>	None
<u>Material:</u>	9 LVTA's operating
	26 LVTA's not operating

D plus 6

On D plus 6, 25 February, 5 LVTA's (A Company) were dispatched at 0930 to support 3/25 with fire from sea but were released from their mission when it was found that the rough water made the fire ineffective.

Casualties:

<u>Personnel</u>	1 WIA
<u>Material:</u>	11 LVTA's operating
	24 LVTA's not operating

UNCLASSIFIED

D plus 7

No operation or activity.

Casualties:

Personnel 1 Sk&E

D plus 8

B Company relieved A Company at 0700, 27 February and 2 LVTA's (B Company) proceeded up north east coast at 0810 but rough water prevented accurate fire and they were released at 1800. B Company took up the beach defense vacated by A Company and placed 1 LVTA north of the East Boat Basin, 1 in East Boat Basin and 3 LVTA's south of beached LSM on BLUE II.

Casualties:

Personnel None

Material: 11 LVTA's operating  
24 LVTA's not operating

D plus 9

Three LVTA's (B Company) left the beach at 0840 to support right flank of 3/24. After working with K Company cleaning out cliff area, the LVTA's were recalled to the beach at 1030.

Beach defense placed 2 LVTA's north of East Boat Basin, one in the East Boat Basin and four on BLUE beaches which tied in with the defense of 5thAmphTracBn.

Casualties:

Personnel None

Material: 13 LVTA's operating  
22 LVTA's not operating

From D plus 10 until D plus 14 no operations except beach defense were undertaken. On D plus 12, B Company was detached from RCT 25 and attached to RCT 23.

D plus 14

B Company was released from RCT 23 and assigned to RCT 25. Three LVTA's (B Company) were used to fire from water in front of lines. These fired at targets of opportunity, furnished harassing fire, spotted effective fire on targets for artillery and returned at 1500.

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED



Casualties:

Personnel

None

Material:

13 LVTA's operating

22 LVTA's not operating

D plus 15

From 1145 - 1500, B Company used 3 LVTA's in the water to fire harassing fire on flanks of the enemy opposing RCT 25.

Casualties:

Personnel

None

Material:

13 LVTA's operating

22 LVTA's not operating

D plus 16

Beginning at 0930, ending at 1040, three LVTA's (B Company) made a run along the north right flank firing harassing fire but observed no enemy action. At 1445, 6 LVTA's were sent to observe reported enemy activity in TA 185-D,E,&A and render harassing fire. The 6 LVTA's returned at 1545 having delivered fire but observed no enemy action.

Casualties:

Personnel

None

Material:

13 LVTA's operating

22 LVTA's not operating

D plus 17

No operation or activity, except for beach defense.

D plus 18

Three LVTA's (B Company) left the beach as ordered at 1045 to deliver fire at road and draws (TA 185-V&W and TA 168-A&B) and returned at 1215.

This date 30 men and 1 officer from 2dArmAmphBn were attached to a Provisional Infantry Battalion under Lt. Col. Krulewich.

Casualties:


Personnel

None

Material:

13 LVTA's operating

22 LVTA's not operating



[REDACTED]

# UNCLASSIFIED

## D plus 19

Harassing fire was delivered by 3 LVTA's at TA 185-V&W from 0745 to 1040.

Three LVTA's (A Company) were supplied B Company to place in beach defense north of East Boat Basin making a total of 9 LVTA's on beach defense.

### Casualties:

Personnel	none
<u>Material:</u>	13 LVTA's operating
	22 LVTA's not operating

## D plus 20

Three LVTA's (B Company) made a nonfiring reconnaissance up north east shore at 1115 for 2/24 and returned to beach at 1430.

### Casualties:

Personnel	None
<u>Material:</u>	13 LVTA's operating
	22 LVTA's not operating

## D plus 21

No operation or activity, except for beach defense.

## D plus 22

RCT 25 used 3 LVTA's opposite pocket (TA 185-V&W) from 0840 until 1030. Some machine gun and mortar fire was received but believed to be overs from friendly troops.

A and B Companies had no more activity except for beach defense until embarked aboard ship for return to base camp.

C and D Companies attached to 5thMarDiv D-day, 19Feb45:

At 0905 D Company (17 LVTA's) landed simultaneously with and on the left of C Company (17 LVTA's). Little fire was received by both companies on the approach to the beach but neither could surmount the terraces to the front as previously planned. Masked by the infantry and terraces shortly after landing, both companies left the beach and reorganized in the water. After reorganizing, C and D Companies moved to south of

# UNCLASSIFIED

the division beaches and kept Hot Rocks and targets of opportunity under fire until 1730. Both companies came in at 1730 but, as the congestion on the beach forbid more than 2 platoons, the remaining 4 platoons were ordered to ships. Unable to locate the LST's, the four platoons remained in the water all of D day night. Refuelling was done during the day from Bowser boats.

## Casualties:

Personnel: 6 WIA  
Material: 31 LVTA's operating  
4 LVTA's not operating

## D plus 1

At 0700, D Company was ordered from the beach by the beach commander and remained afloat all day. Two platoons landed at 1700 for beach defense.

At 0700, C Company was only partially resupplied with ammunition as there was a shortage of 75mm howitzer on the beach but completely resupplied with fuel. Hot Rocks was then kept under observation and fire from 0930 until 1400. One platoon remained on the beach for defense at night while the other two platoons (C Company) boarded LST's.

## Casualties:

Personnel: 1 WIA  
Material: 28 LVTA's operating  
7 LVTA's not operating

## D plus 2

Two platoons C Company remained on the beach for beach defense while all remaining LVTA's went aboard LST's that would accept them. One LVTA (D Company) at sea after being ordered to leave the LST by the LST commander.

## Casualties:

Personnel: None  
Material: 21 LVTA's operating  
14 LVTA's not operating

## D plus 3

At 1400, D Company came ashore.

# UNCLASSIFIED

One platoon C Company maintained the defense of RED beach II.

Casualties:

Personnel None  
Material: 23 LVTA's operating  
12 LVTA's not operating

D plus 4

Two LVTA's assisted the Corps Reconnaissance Company in mopping up TA 147. All LVTA's (C and D Companies) except one went to PURPLE beach for beach defense. The one LVTA remained on beach RED II for defense of that beach.

Casualties:

Personnel None  
Material: 23 LVTA's operating  
12 LVTA's not operating

D plus 5

At 0730 D Company killed 10 Japs trying to come through their defense position on PURPLE beach.

Casualties:

Personnel 1 KIA  
2 WIA  
Material: 24 LVTA's Operating  
11 LVTA's not operating

D plus 6

No operation or activity, except for beach defense.

D plus 7

C and D Companies were given the mission of supporting 2/27 in TA 198 from water borne positions. C Company furnished 9, and D Company 11 LVTA's. D Company destroyed 3 enemy occupied caves with the 75mm howitzer, but as our own infantry was endangered by LVTA fire, orders were given to cease fire.

Casualties:

Personnel None  
Material: 24 LVTA's operating  
11 LVTA's not operating

No activity until D plus 21, 12 March, by either company except for the movement of all LVTA's on D plus 10 to TA 147-G&L

# UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

# UNCLASSIFIED

for defense positions on the beach.

Casualties:

Personnel None  
Material : 23 LVTA's operating  
12 LVTA's not operating

D plus 21 - 12 March

Transportation was furnished by 10 LVTA's to the Corps Reconnaissance Officers for the reconnaissance of KAMA and KANGOKU Rocks.

Casualties:

Personnel None  
Material : 23 LVTA's operating  
12 LVTA's not operating

D plus 22

Ten LVTA's ( C Company ) supported a landing of the Corps Reconnaissance Company on KAMA and KANGOKU Rocks with neutralization fire.

After D plus 22 neither company had any activity except for beach defense until released to battalion control for reembarkation.

## COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - SUPPLY

As all amphibious tracked vehicles are disembarked at approximately the same time, it is to be anticipated that all LVT's will need to refuel at the same time. The Bowser boats were not sufficient to handle the refueling problems when gasoline was needed by the LVTA's. Often the Bowser boats, after being approached, carried gasoline of incorrect octane rating. Bowser boats were not evenly distributed along the Corps beaches.

It is recommended by this battalion that Bowser boats carry a sign on which "100" or "80" is written to indicate the octane rating of gasoline carried.

Furthermore, it is recommended that cargo LVT's refuel from the LST's on which the cargo LVT's are loaded and that the "100" octane Bowser boats be used for the LVTA's, removing the necessity of the LVTA's returning to the LST area.

A more even distribution of Bowser boats off Corps beaches would have facilitated refueling.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

It is also recommended that the LST's be equipped with boat booms to expedite refueling as several LVTA's could be tied to the booms simultaneously.

#### AMMUNITION

A and B Companies were unable to obtain 75mm howitzer ammunition although it was requested through RCT's, control boats, and the division. As the result, A and B Companies drew 75mm howitzer ammunition from the artillery units which had little to spare.

#### COMMUNICATION

The SCR 508 radios (two receivers) were used in the battalion and company command LVTA's while SCR 528's (one receiver) were used in the remaining LVTA's. Because the high frequency sets are not used as widely as the low frequency sets, this battalion was able to use the number of different frequencies necessary for adequate communications.

The frequency crystals did not jar off frequency and very little drift was encountered. The waterproofed radio boxes were approximately 80% effective and the only waterproofing done by this battalion was the application of submarine cable waterproofing compound to the antenna mast bases. The SCR 300's which were used for liaison with infantry units did not perform well in a running LVTA as the noise of the engine made the reception inaudible.

It is recommended that the radios be mounted in the cargo compartments of each LVTA to afford better protection from salt water, and that this battalion be supplied with SCR 510's for liaison.

#### MATERIAL MODIFICATIONS MADE

#### ARMOR

As learned by experience the LVTA with one fourth inch armor base offers insufficient protection from small arms fire. This battalion equipped all LVTA's with the auxiliary armor plate kit for LVT's which consisted of a 1/2 inch bow plate and four 1/4 inch pontoon plates. In the majority of cases the added armor stopped shell fragments and in no instance did small arms fire penetrate the added protection.

Small arms fire and shell fragments did penetrate the 1/4 inch armor not protected by the additional armor.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

The increase in weight caused by the addition of the extra armor did not effect the seaworthiness or land operation adversely.

Most LVTA's with 100 operating hours were in fair condition when the operation ceased.

## MATERIAL

The .50 caliber skymount was modified in that the complete cradle was discarded and the tripod head M2 on 12 inch extensions was substituted. A 18"X24"X1/2" armor shield was placed in front of the LVTA commander.

The .50 caliber as modified was easier to handle and therefore more efficient but the .50 caliber operation was still cumbersome.

The Red and Green guide lights placed on the instrument panel and operated by the LVTA commander with a toggle switch should be placed in all LVTA's to insure a method of directing the drivers when other means of communication fail.

The bulkhead behind the driver and his assistant was removed for ventilation and in some vehicles electric blowers brought in cool air for the drivers.

In order to facilitate the towing of vehicles, towing cables were equipped with hooks in place of clevises which were slower and prone to jamming.

## RECOMMENDED MODIFICATIONS

### GYRO-STABILIZER AND POWER TRAVERSE

As has been recommended, the installation of a gyro-stabilizer would improve the water borne gunnery.

### BILGE PUMP

If an auxiliary means (separated from the engine) of pumping water could be provided, LVTA's with inoperative engines could be pumped and would not sink because of slow leaks.

UNCLASSIFIED

 UNCLASSIFIED

LOADING

It is recommended that each company be loaded on one LST with all its maintenance and supply gear.

Furthermore the company LST should carry only gear for the company.


ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT

Foul weather gear is necessary for at least the driver and assistant driver as water pours through the vision slits and hatches in an ordinary sea.

If LVTA's are to be used as a support weapon in the role of artillery as is directed by higher echelon, it is recommended that at least 2 bull dozers (T-18) for the purpose of digging in ammunition and weapons be added to the TBA.

*R. M. Fawell, Jr.*

R. M. FAWELL, JR.  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve,  
Commanding.



UNCLASSIFIED

○ ○



UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX ABLE TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

ADMINISTRATION

RECAPITULATION OF CASUALTIES - PERSONNEL

KILLED		WOUNDED (EV)		SICK (EV)		WOUNDED (NON EV)		MISSING	
O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E	O	E
1	11	4	41	0	9	0	9	0	1

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that regardless of the divisions to which attached that all Reports and Administration be handled through one centralized unit. It is further recommended that a copy of the Standing Operation Procedure for embarkation rosters, reports, and other administrative details required by higher echelons be furnished this organization by the unit to which it is attached. In the past operation this battalion did receive administrative matter pertaining to the above subjects, but only to the extent of reference to orders published and distributed before this battalion was attached to the divisions, therefore the battalion did not have copies of these references.

*R M Fawell Jr*  
 R. M. FAWELL, JR.,  
 Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve,  
 Commanding.

UNCLASSIFIED

ANNEX BAKER TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN - MEDICAL

The Medical Section of the Second Armored Amphibian Battalion consisted of the Battalion Surgeon, Battalion Dental Officer, and thirteen enlisted hospital corpsman. The personnel was further subdivided in order that the two flank companies were assigned three corpsmen each and the two other line companies two each for the initial assault wave. The Headquarters section comprising the Battalion Surgeon, Battalion Dental Officer, and three corpsman formed the Battalion Aid Station group. This group embarked at Saipan with their respective companies. The journey from Saipan to the target area was of short duration and no sickness of personnel was encountered. Sanitation was satisfactory.

In the assault phase the company corpsmen went ashore as crew members in LVTA's. The Battalion Aid Station group remained aboard Hospital APA 120 on call. Each LVTA was equipped with a complete First Aid Kit, while auxiliary supplies for each company viz: sick call supplies, sanitation equipment with prefabricated heads, DDT sprayets were preloaded aboard maintenance tractors. The corpsmen landed in the initial wave and remained with their companies handling any of their casualties or those of other units on hand. The supplies preloaded in maintenance tractors were for the most part lost when these vehicles were sunk.

In the meantime the Headquarters section functioned aboard the Hospital APA 120 in collaboration with a medical company. On D plus 1 when the Medical Company was ordered ashore contrary to plans, the Headquarters section took over the function mobilizing all available non-medical personnel to assist in handling and treating all casualties.

The Battalion Aid Station was ordered ashore when the Battalion CP was established. Equipment in a preloaded ambulance jeep was brought ashore and a Battalion Aid Station set up in a large cistern in the vicinity of MOTOYAMA Airfield #1. In as much as two companies were located on the BLUE beaches and two on PURPLE beaches, this represented an approximate mid-point. It was in close proximity to evacuation points as well as to Division Hospitals. There were no losses on medical personnel.

Daily visits were made to the company bivouac areas. The prefabricated heads were set up and area as well as foxholes

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

[REDACTED]

dusted with DDT powder. Because of a lack of proper equipment for cooking and sterilization of mess gear, canned rations were used exclusively and the use of mess gear not permitted. Sanitation was satisfactory. There was no incidence of infectious diseases and only one case of possible dysentery and three cases of mild disorders reported. In every instance the individual admittedly used mess gear contrary to orders.

Medical supplies were adequate although the loss of medical supplies aboard the cargo tractors resulted in a temporary shortage in the companies.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS


It has been observed that wearing of clothing impregnated with dimethylphthalate results in a chemical dermatitis of sensitive parts ie, the scrotal area. Apparently, prolonged wearing especially when clothes have been wet causes this dermatitis. It is recommended that impregnated clothing, in the case of LVTA personnel, not be worn while in tanks and subjected to immersion in water but be worn once a bivouac area is established on the beach.

*R. M. Fawell, Jr.*  
R. M. FAWELL, JR.  
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve,  
Commanding.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED


## APPENDIX 1 TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN



X indicates LVT(A)(4).

# UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED



R. M. FAWELL, JR.  
 Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve,  
 Commanding.

# UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX 2 TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN  
RECAPITULATION OF CASUALTIES & MATERIAL

LVTA's

Destroyed by enemy fire (mortars and high velocity)	6
Sunk because of mechanical failures	8
Sunk because of leaks caused by enemy fire	7
Sunk due to insufficient fuel	8
Operating at conclusion of operation	<u>41</u>
Total	70

LVT's

Sunk because of mechanical failure	2
Operating at conclusion of operation	<u>7</u>
TOTAL	9

One LVTA ceased to operate because of the failure of low gear needle bearings and could not be repaired because of lack of parts. One LVTA had the controlled differential to fail but this assembly was replaced in one day.

*R. M. Fawell, Jr.*  
R. M. FAWELL, JR.,  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve,  
Commanding.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

APPENDIX 3 TO SPECIAL ACTION REPORT, IWO JIMA CAMPAIGN

ARMORMENT

Each LVTA carried a 75mm howitzer, one 50 caliber machine gun, mounted in the turret ring, one 30 caliber machine gun in front of the assistant driver and one 30 caliber machine gun mounted in front of the howitzer loader.

*R. M. Fawell, Jr.*  
R. M. FAWELL, JR.  
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve,  
Commanding.

-1-

UNCLASSIFIED