

# ARMS, MEN AND GOVERNMENTS

THE WAR POLICIES OF CANADA

1939 – 1945

## Note

In the writing of this volume the author has been given full access to relevant official documents in possession of the Department of National Defence; but the inferences drawn and the opinions expressed are those of the author himself, and the Department is in no way responsible for his reading or presentation of the facts as stated.

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THE HON. J. E. MICHAUD  
Minister of Transport

The HON. C. D. HOWE  
Minister of Munitions and Supply

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Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada

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and Associate Minister of National Defence

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Minister of Finance

THE HON. T. A. CRERAR  
Minister of Mines and Resources

COL. THE HON. J. L. RALSTON  
Minister of National Defence

# ARMS, MEN AND GOVERNMENTS

THE WAR POLICIES OF CANADA

1939 - 1945

*By*

C. P. STACEY

S.M., O.B.E., C.D., A.M., Ph.D., D.Litt., LL.D., F.R.S.C.

Colonel (Retired), Canadian Army

Late Director Historical Section, General Staff

Professor of History, University of Toronto

Published by Authority of the Minister of National Defence

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and at the following Canadian Government bookshops:

HALIFAX  
*1735 Barrington Street*

MONTREAL  
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Price \$12.00      Catalogue No. D2-5569  
*Price subject to change without notice*  
The Queen's Printer for Canada  
Ottawa, 1970

## PREFACE

PRODUCING this book has been a long process. It was first planned as a fourth volume of the Canadian Army's official history of the Second World War, but in 1947 the then Minister of National Defence inquired whether it might not be possible to convert it into a volume dealing with military policies in the broadest sense, and covering all three armed services. My reply was that this was an excellent idea providing that access to the necessary Cabinet records (which we had not yet had) could be arranged. This was done, and preliminary work on the book proceeded thereafter so far as this was possible without interfering with the production of the Army history. The last volume of that history was published early in 1960. I had retired as Director of the Army Historical Section the previous year, but had been asked to continue writing the present volume as a part-time project. The task has been lengthened by new records becoming available as it proceeded; this has obliged me to re-write various sections already drafted.

Planning the volume has been complicated by the need for coordinating it with books already published. The Army and Navy histories contain much information on policy matters; this has not been repeated in detail here, but it has seemed desirable to summarize it. The fact that no official history of the Royal Canadian Air Force has as yet been published has obliged me to include detail on air matters which could otherwise have been omitted.

I have never been refused access to any document in the possession of the Government of Canada. I am grateful to many people, including some now dead, for allowing me to use private records. The late General A. G. L. McNaughton and the late General H. D. G. Crerar, two great military servants of Canada, gave me the freest access to their papers. I owe a special debt to the Literary Executors of the late W. L. Mackenzie King, the wartime Prime Minister, for permitting me to use Mr. King's papers and diary, without which this book would have possessed much less interest and authority. In this and other matters I am especially grateful to Dr. W. Kaye Lamb, the Dominion Archivist. I must offer particular thanks to Mrs. Stuart B. Ralston for giving me access to the papers of the late Colonel J. L. Ralston. Mrs. Ian A. Mackenzie was so good as to make for this official book an exception to the general temporary closing of Senator Mackenzie's papers. I am grateful to the Hon. J. W. Gardiner for access to "the papers of his father, the late Mr. James G. Gardiner; to the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park, N.Y., for access to the Roosevelt Papers, and to the Yale University Library for access to the diary of Colonel Henry L. Stimson. The late Senator C. G. Power and Queen's University kindly allowed me to use the Power Papers, and I am also grateful to Queen's for access to the surviving Norman Rogers Papers. Mr. James R. MacBrien generously allowed me to use the papers of his father, the late Sir James MacBrien. The late Mr. C. D. Howe's papers in the Public Archives of Canada were very valuable. Some use has been made of Viscount Bennett's papers, for which my thanks are due to the University of New Brunswick. I was unable to gain access to the papers of the late Mr. Angus L. Macdonald, the wartime Naval Minister.

Many other people have helped me in other ways. I have had much assistance from the Privy Council Office, particularly from Mr. W. E. D. Halliday, the former Registrar of the Cabinet, and from Mr. Gordon Hilborn and other officers of the Department of External Affairs. The Directorate of War Service Records, Department of Veterans Affairs, has been most generous in meeting my frequent requests

for statistical information; I am particularly grateful to Mr. H. Hrushowy and Miss J. Dignard. Successive Directors of the former Historical Sections of the three services in the Department of National Defence have been very patient and helpful, as has Mr. S. F. Wise, the present Director of History, Canadian Forces Headquarters. Many members of their staffs have assisted me at various stages of the work. I cannot name them all, but some special contributions are mentioned in footnotes to the text. I cannot fail to mention in particular Lt.-Col. D. J. Goodspeed, C.D., who worked with me for years and wrote the first drafts of various important portions of the book; my debt to him is very great. I also have special obligations to Lt.-Col. T. M. Hunter and Dr. J. Mackay Hitsman, and to Mr. E. H. Ellwand, who drew or adapted the maps. In the final stages I have been vastly indebted to Mrs. E. A. Sorby, M.B.E., and members of her staff, particularly Warrant Officers A. A. Azar, C.D., and P. R. Marshall, C.D.; without their help I could scarcely have produced the book as it is now presented. I also wish to thank the many typists who have worked on the book, and in particular Mrs. Gloria McKeigan, who typed the final drafts with great efficiency. Finally, I am grateful to the students in my seminar on "Canada in the Second World War" at the University of Toronto; their papers and discussions have often been helpful.

There is one more special debt to be acknowledged; that to the many eminent participants in the events recorded who have kindly read various portions of the book in draft and have assisted me with their comments.

.....

This volume is a conscientious attempt to tell, simply and directly, the story of the military policies of Canada during the Second World War in their main aspects. I have interpreted the word "military" loosely, and the book is designed to throw light on both the country's internal and external policies so far as they affected the conduct of the war. I hope it will be found to make a material contribution to the history of Canada's part in the greatest crisis of modern times. I do not claim to have exhausted the subject, and no doubt further research will elicit new facts from time to time; but over a period of two decades my helpers and I have examined a very wide range of sources of information, including many not drawn upon before; and I would like to think that the essentials of the story are here. It is complex and in many respects controversial, and in spite of all the help I have received from my many associates the responsibility for the interpretation of events is mine alone.

C. P. STACEY

University of Toronto

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## THE CANADIAN EFFORT 1939-1945

### A GENERAL SURVEY

#### 1. THE APPROACH TO WAR, 1933-1939

THE FIRST World War of 1914-18 was in many respects the most important event in Canadian history. In the course of it the Dominion made an unparalleled effort, an effort so great that in 1914 few people would have ventured to forecast its proportions.

Some 425,000 Canadians served overseas, and some 60,000 lost their lives. The record of the Canadian Corps in the bitter fighting on the Western Front was one of sustained distinction. There was a remarkable expansion of Canadian industrial production, and the country proved to have reserves of financial strength hitherto largely unsuspected. The ultimate result was a fundamental change in Canada's status within the British community which was evolving from Empire into Commonwealth. The Statute of Westminster of 1931 registered the transformation of the "self-governing colony" of 1914 into a nation which, in law at least, was co-equal with the United Kingdom.

In one respect, however, the hard experience of 1914-18 worked no change in Canada. The country's defence policy remained very much as it had been, founded upon an apparently deep-rooted reluctance to spend money on military preparation in time of peace. As in so many other nations, the years after 1918 witnessed in Canada a revulsion of feeling against war and "militarism". What we can now see as wishful thinking was the order of the day. Because Canadians wished and hoped for peace, they seemed to believe that peace would endure; and they showed no realization of the probable consequences if war did come and found their country unprepared.

This attitude became even more pronounced during the world economic depression which set in in 1929. Canada found herself grappling with ever-increasing problems of unemployment and relief. In spite of the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928 renouncing war (which Canada had signed), the international situation continued to be threatening; but public attention was focussed on the sombre aspect of affairs at home. In the four-year period beginning with the fiscal year 1928-29, the national revenue fell from \$460,000,000 to \$311,000,000. The government of Mr. R. B. Bennett (1930-35) attempted to deal with the situation in the first instance by a policy of drastic retrenchment; and it instituted a sharp reduction in the already small expenditure on national defence. In the fiscal year 1930-31 expenditure on militia, naval, air and associated services was \$23,732,000; in 1932-33 it fell to \$14,145,000. Even this figure included some provision for unemployment relief and public works construction.<sup>1</sup>

Canada drew out of the depression only slowly. Not until 1938 did the

national revenue, rising to \$516,000,000, exceed the figure for 1929. The population was growing; but the census of 1931 (the last before the Second World War) showed a total of only 10,376,786 persons, of whom fully 60 per cent lived in the provinces of Quebec and Ontario. The estimated population at 1 September 1939 is 11,295,000.<sup>2</sup>

While the state of the Canadian economy gradually improved, the international outlook grew darker. The clash of arms was heard in both the Far East and Africa. In 1931 Japanese aggression in Manchuria had provided the first major challenge to peace; four years later, when Italy made its unprovoked attack on Ethiopia, and the League of Nations failed to halt it, the League's shaky prestige collapsed.<sup>3</sup> It was, however, in Europe, and more particularly in Germany, that the greatest threat emerged. Adolf Hitler's assumption of power as Chancellor of the Third Reich on 30 January 1933 marked the beginning of another tragic period in German history. Under Hider's dictatorship the Germans rearmed rapidly, reoccupied the Rhineland ( 1936), established the Rome-Berlin Axis, and flouted world opinion by seizing Austria in March 1938 and the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia later the same year. As if these things were not enough, civil war had broken out in Spain in 1936, raising new problems of intervention by Communist and Fascist sympathizers. The horizon was ringed with conflagrations, and the democratically-minded nations had not yet learned the importance of strength and unity.

The reaction in Canada to these developments was, to put it mildly, cautious. In the general election of 1935, held in the midst of the Ethiopian war, the contending parties showed no disposition whatever to run risks on behalf of collective security or the League of Nations; and the incoming government of Mr. W. L. Mackenzie King, who now formed his third administration, adopted a policy of "no commitments" in advance of an actual serious crisis, using the formula that when the final moment came "Parliament would decide" the country's course, The paramount object was to maintain the unity of the nation. As late as 1936 Mr. King declared in Parliament, "Our country is being drawn into international situations to a degree that I myself think is alarming."<sup>4</sup>

The Canadian defence policy, or lack of one, received a degree of support from the nature of official opinion in the United Kingdom on the imminence of a major war and the need for an expeditionary force, Immediately following the First World War the British government adopted the so-called "Ten Years Rule" — an assumption that the Empire would not be involved in a large-scale conflict for at least ten years, and that defence policies could be planned accordingly. This rule was never formally adopted in Canada, but it became in effect the basis for the annual estimates of the Department of National Defence; and although it seems to have been abandoned in England as early as March 1932, the abandonment had no immediate effect in Canada.<sup>5</sup> The British example influenced Canadian political thinking in another important respect. For a long period British public and official opinion was loath to consider dispatching an expeditionary force to the Continent again in the event of another war; the comfortable view was taken that Britain would do her fighting at sea and in the air. It was not until the spring of 1938 that the British government authorized discussions with French representatives which envisaged the possibility of sending a body of troops to France and, even at this late stage, the result was no more than "a tentative plan for the despatch of two infantry divisions",<sup>6</sup> Only in the spring of 1939, after the German seizure of Czechoslovakia, did Britain begin to contemplate sending a larger force; and again this change of policy found for the moment no echo in Canada.

The impoverished state of Canadian defence in 1935 was revealed in a confidential memorandum prepared for the government by Major-General A. G. L. McNaughton, Chief of the General Staff.<sup>7</sup> He pointed out that there was "not a single modern anti-aircraft gun of any sort in Canada"; that available stocks of ammunition for field artillery represented only "90 minutes' fire at normal rates"; that coast defence armament was obsolescent, when not defective; and that there was not one service aircraft "of a type fit to employ in active operations", nor one service air bomb. Mr. King's government took steps to repair the gaps in the nation's defences, but its measures were very modest and its action deliberate. The estimates for the fiscal year 1936-37 totalled \$29,986,749; this figure was actually slightly less than the equivalent amount (\$30,112,589) for the previous year, but a reallocation of appropriations benefitted the services. The estimates for the Militia rose by \$1,367,926 to \$12,018,926; those for the naval service doubled, to reach \$4,853,000, and the appropriation for the air service (including, however, civil air operations) jumped by \$2,500,000 to reach \$6,809,215.<sup>8</sup>

During 1936 the government and its service advisers considered what was to be done. On 20 August of that year the Canadian Defence Committee, composed of the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Finance, Justice and National Defence, was set up to facilitate such consultation. Shortly afterwards the Joint Staff Committee, whose members were the military heads of the three services (it was redesignated the Chiefs of Staff Committee early in 1939) recommended a five-year programme to cost roughly \$200,000,000, with approximately \$99 million going to the Militia, \$26 million to the Navy, and \$75 million to the Air Force; the usual standing vote for militia services was not included, and would increase the average annual total by \$11 or \$12 million, that is to roughly \$51 or \$52 million, though the first year was calculated to cost considerably more. In the light of hindsight, these recommendations appear very modest. The government however did not care to face so large a commitment. When the programme was seriously launched, in 1937, the appropriations made for the Department of National Defence for the fiscal year 1937-38 totalled only \$36,194,839. Those for 1938-39 were within a few hundred thousand dollars of the same figure. Even this small measure of rearmament met strong opposition from the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in Parliament, and from Mr. King's own party colleagues in Cabinet and caucus.<sup>9</sup>

The policy of "no commitments", adopted to protect the unity of a potentially seriously divided country, was a limiting factor in defence planning which had to be accepted. It led to the programme being represented, to an unrealistic extent, as primarily if not exclusively a scheme of home defence. Thus the Joint Staff Committee, in its basic paper of 5 September 1936,<sup>10</sup> felt it necessary to define the tasks of the Canadian forces in these terms:

"(a) The direct defence of Canada is the major responsibility of its armed forces.

"(b) The indirect defence of Canada by co-operation with other Empire forces in a war overseas is a secondary responsibility of this country, though possibly one requiring much greater ultimate effort."

The last eight words, it is now evident, were the most important part of the definition. The same political factors resulted in much talk — highly theoretical it now appears — of the need for readiness to defend Canada's neutrality in case of a war between the United States and Japan, and in more attention being paid to the defences of the Pacific than to those of the Atlantic coast; though for the latter

measure there was the justification that the main strength of the British Fleet lay between Canada and potential aggressors in Europe.

The "Munich Crisis" of September 1938, when Britain and France purchased a brief respite at the cost of sacrificing Czechoslovakia, administered a severe shock to Canadians generally and probably produced among them a more practical appreciation of the situation. At any rate, the defence appropriations provided before the outbreak of war for the fiscal year 1939-40 leaped up to \$64,666,874, an impressive figure by the low standards of the time and place.<sup>11</sup> At the same time there was a considerable change in the balance of proposed expenditure as between the three services.

The government had laid down, as early as 1936, certain priorities between the services and between tasks. As stated to the House of Commons in 1939, they were "fortification of Pacific coast prior to Atlantic coast"; "Development of the air force in priority to navy and, so far as possible, the navy in priority to the militia"; and, finally, "Reorganizing and re-equipping the militia as soon as our resources permit us to do so." There is some reason to believe that these priorities may have been suggested by the Prime Minister. They dictated the tendencies of the programme from 1937 to 1939; but it was only in the latter year that appropriations for the Royal Canadian Air Force actually moved ahead of those for the Militia, the pre-war round figures being \$29,733,000 and \$21,397,000 respectively; the Navy got only \$8,800,000.<sup>12</sup>

Surveying the individual services' progress towards rearmament in the years immediately before the outbreak of war,<sup>13</sup> we find that the Royal Canadian Navy, long the Cinderella of the nation's defence services, may be said to have remained so in spite of the official priority. Yet though its estimates were still small, they quadrupled during the five-year period beginning in 1934-35; and strength and efficiency grew accordingly, the more so as Canada was able to purchase ships on favourable terms from the British Admiralty. Increased financial provision, however, was in itself only a partial solution, since it was considered that five years were required to train personnel for new vessels.<sup>14</sup> Four modern destroyers were added to the force (which had already possessed two), and four new minesweepers were built in Canada. A Royal Canadian Fleet Reserve and a Fishermen's Reserve were organized, the latter to cope with special problems of the Pacific coast. Personnel strength grew steadily if modestly. On 31 March 1935 the total strength of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve and the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve was 212 officers and 1839 ratings, of whom 100 and 803 were in the R.C.N. Four years later the totals were 309 officers and 2967 ratings; of these 129 and 1456 were in the regular Navy.<sup>15</sup>

Because of the higher priorities given the other services, the Militia received proportionately less money than in previous years; in absolute terms, however, there was a considerable increase. Few changes were made in the structure of the regular force, the Permanent Active Militia, and its strength rose only slightly, from 3509 all ranks at 31 March 1935 to 4169 four years later. On the other hand the Non-Permanent Active Militia underwent a long-overdue reorganization in 1936. The number of cavalry regiments was reduced from 35 to 20, and 135 infantry and machine-gun battalions were cut to 91, with some provision for mechanization in each instance. Both the artillery and engineers were expanded. At the end of 1938 the actual strength of the N.P.A.M. was 51,418.<sup>16</sup> The situation as regards equipment was much less satisfactory (below, pages 100-04). Canada had almost no munition industry of her own, and the circumstances of the time made it difficult

to obtain equipment rapidly from her traditional source of supply, the United Kingdom. In 1939, in consequence, the Canadian Militia was still largely armed with the weapons of 1918.

A special aspect of Canadian rearmament was the coast-defence programme. As already mentioned, the Pacific coast had been given priority; but comprehensive plans were prepared in 1936-37 for both coasts. The estimated cost of the programme (not including armament for the works) was about \$4,000,000. The focal points were the naval bases of Halifax and Esquimalt. Unavoidable delays in supply from the United Kingdom compelled Canada to adopt an Interim Plan, whereby the available equipment was utilized to the best advantage. In the short time remaining before the outbreak of war, the Pacific defences were materially strengthened, although there were still many serious deficiencies. Following the Munich Crisis there was some shift of emphasis to the Atlantic coast, but very little progress had been made here when hostilities began.<sup>17</sup>

The Royal Canadian Air Force expanded rapidly in the pre-war years, in keeping with the official recognition of its increased importance. During the four years ending on 31 March 1939 the combined strength of the Permanent and Non-Permanent (after 1 December 1938 the Auxiliary) Active Air Force rose from 157 officers and 945 airmen (of whom 118 and 676 were in the Permanent force) to 360 officers and 2797 airmen; the Permanent strength at the end of the period being 261 and 1930.<sup>18</sup> Three Air Commands (Western, Training and Eastern) were organized; new air stations were established and old ones improved. When war came eight of the 11 Permanent and all of the 12 Auxiliary squadrons which represented the immediate goal of the Department of National Defence were fully or partially organized, but they were very far from being fully equipped. Until 1938, the Senior Air Officer was responsible to the Chief of the General Staff, though the former was always a member of the Joint Staff Committee. In that year the new status of the R.C.A.F. was suitably recognized by redesignating the Senior Air Officer's appointment "Chief of the Air Staff" and making him directly responsible to the Minister of National Defence.<sup>19</sup>

As Canada moved reluctantly towards her second major war of the century, public and political opinion were tortured by memories of the conscription controversy of 1917-18. There is no need to describe in detail here this disruptive legacy of the First World War. It is enough to recall the deep rift between French-speaking Canada and the rest of the country which resulted from the enforcement of the Military Service Act of 1917; in particular, the near-isolation of the province of Quebec after the general election in December of that year, and the post-war political consequences in Quebec for the party that was in power when the Military Service Act was passed. These things were enough to make any party leader regard the prospect of another such crisis with extreme alarm, and they certainly provide much of the background for the policy of "no commitments" and for the reluctance of the major parties to identify themselves with any line of action that might seem to involve assuming responsibilities abroad.

Nevertheless, as Hitler's aggression marched on from stage to stage, Canadian public opinion gradually began to show signs of hardening. It became more and more evident, particularly after Munich, that the democratic nations might be forced to fight to halt the advance, and that in that event Canada would not stand aside. In the spring of 1939, after the final German extinguishment of Czechoslovakia laid Mr. Neville Chamberlain's policy of "appeasement" in ruins and made war virtually inevitable, the Canadian political parties may be said to have found

a formula to meet this situation — a formula which it was clearly hoped might combine support of Canada's friends abroad with avoidance of the domestic perils of 1917. It was first enunciated by the leader of the Conservative Opposition, Dr. R. J. Manion, in a newspaper interview on 27 March. While recommending that Canada should stand beside Britain, he declared, "I do not believe that Canadian youth should be conscripted to fight outside the borders of Canada." Three days later, in the House of Commons, Mr. King gave a pledge against "conscription of men for service overseas".<sup>20</sup> These matters are dealt with in greater detail below (pages 397-8).

The Manion formula, as we may call it, was fateful. It doubtless helped to enable Canada to go to war as a united country. It also prepared the way, we shall see in due course, for the most bitter and prolonged Canadian controversy of the war period.

The Canadian defence programme of 1936-39 was effective as far as it went. It was, of course, utterly inadequate to the scale of the coming emergency. In 1939 the country was better prepared for war, on balance, than it had been in 1914; though that is not saying a great deal. Its domestic defences, while not strong, were in better condition than they had been, and a better basis existed for expansion of its forces. But it was in no condition to intervene abroad with any effect; and many months would pass before forces adequate to such intervention could be raised, trained and equipped. Such delay could have been obviated only by the expenditure before the war of sums far greater than the government and parliament of Canada were prepared to lay out, and by a defence programme undertaken long before 1937.

At the same time, it is evident that the political conditions of the time militated against a completely effective and practical programme. The emphasis on home defence rather than on expeditionary action; the emphasis on the defence of the Pacific rather than the Atlantic coast; the fact that (as will appear in its place) there was virtually no consultation or joint planning with those countries — notably the United Kingdom — with which Canada would be cooperating from the outbreak of war: all these were aspects or products of the no-commitments policy. Canadian service officers, as many of them have told the present writer, recognized these policies as unrealistic; it cannot be doubted that many politicians were privately of the same opinion. But strictly military interests were inevitably, and perhaps properly, subordinated to the political necessity for avoiding measures that might divide the country. The justification for Mr. King's policies — and it is a powerful justification — must be sought in the fact that, after all the uncertainty and debate of the pre-war years, Canada entered the conflict in September 1939 a united nation. Yet it should be said that military policies such as she pursued in those years were luxuries which could not have been afforded by any country which did not, like her, enjoy the double advantage of having both great physical obstacles and powerful friends between her and the potential enemy. During the early months of the war Great Britain and France held the front line. Secure behind their strength and the barrier of the Atlantic, Canada made the preparations which she ought to have made long before.

## 2. THE PERIOD OF MOBILIZATION, 1939-1940: THE REIGN OF THE DOLLAR

Canada entered the Second World War in a solemn and sombre mood very different from that of 1914. But the country, contrary to many expectations, was essentially united.

On 26 August 1939 Mackenzie King visited the Governor General (Lord Tweedsmuir) and recorded in his diary the report he made to him:

I told him I thought the King's visit had helped immensely re uniting Canada for this crisis, that last Sept. I wd. not have had a united Cabinet, that Lapointe Cardin & Power (I might have added Rinfret) wd. probably have resigned, & there wd. have been difficulty besides in fighting for Czecho-Slovakia. Today I had all united on our participation if there were an act of aggression which brought England & France into a war with Germany.

This report (which may have somewhat exaggerated the dangers of Cabinet disunity in 1938) reflected the decisions of a vitally important Cabinet meeting held two days before.

Mr. King himself, there is ample evidence, had never had any doubt as to the action Canada would have to take in a world crisis, though he carefully refrained from making any statement on this in public. Far back in 1923 he had told the Imperial Conference of that year — in the course of a statement which in general was a firm manifesto of Canadian autonomy in external affairs — that although American influences were a factor working against Canadian involvement in "lesser issues", "if a great and clear call of duty came, Canada will respond, whether or no the United States responds, as she did in 1914". King never seems to have changed this view, and in the crisis of 1938 he explained his own position very clearly to at least some of his colleagues. In his diary for 31 August of that year he wrote:

I made it clear to both Mackenzie and Power that I would stand for Canada doing all she possibly could do to destroy those Powers which are basing their action on *might* and not on *right*, and that I would not consider being neutral in this situation for a moment. They both agreed that this would be the Cabinet's view, Power saying that a coalition might be necessary, with some of the Quebec men leaving the party. I told him that the Cabinet Ministers should realize that it would be the end of Quebec if any attitude of that kind were adopted by the French Canadians in a world conflict such as this one would be. They, as members of the Government, ought to lead the Province in seeing its obligation to participate, and making clear the real issue and what it involves. Power thought Lapointe would become no [so] nervous and upset that he would be good for nothing,\* which I fear is only too true, though what he learns at the League and in France may cause him to feel differently ere his return.

Skelton,† who is for Canada keeping out of European conflicts as much as anyone, agrees that the Government could not, without suffering immediate defeat, adopt any such policy; that the country's sentiment would be strong for intervention and even for participation by a possible expeditionary force. . . .

Now, on 24 August 1939, with war evidently about to break out in Europe, King polled the Cabinet. It was advisable, he said, according to his diary, "while we were all still in a calm frame of mind", that policy should be decided; he had a clear idea in his own mind, but would like his colleagues to express their views before he stated it. He turned first to Ernest Lapointe, but the Minister of Justice also preferred to hear others' opinions. J. E. Michaud, the Minister of Fisheries, favoured no "participation outside of Canada". Rogers (Labour) recommended full support for Britain, and an immediate announcement of policy. Power (Pensions and National Health) said that Canada would have to go into the war, but the government should not state this before Parliament met. P. J. A. Cardin (Public Works) agreed with him. J. L. Ilsley (National Revenue) spoke for issuing a statement at once. Lapointe now broke in to oppose this idea. Mackenzie (National

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\*A premonition which the events of 1939 were far from bearing out.

†Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs: see below, p. 71.

Defence) supported Ilsley and made a specific remark on behalf of his department: "vulnerable points" should be guarded at once. Some English-speaking ministers (Norman McLarty, Postmaster General, and C. D. Howe, Transport) favoured participation, but no immediate statement. W. D. Euler (Trade and Commerce) was not far from Michaud's position, and against a statement. Finally, King took a position which he defined as between the extremes:

I got general agreement and unanimity on this position. In the event of war we had now decided that Canada would participate. We had further decided that we would summon Parliament at the moment war was declared, or that it appeared that efforts for peace were certain to fail. At the same time, we would announce our policy with respect to Canada being at war. . . . Parliament would decide details.

In fact, however, the government's decision to support Britain and France was announced in less firm terms than this statement indicated, and Parliament was allowed to go through the form of deciding, not just "details", but the main issue.

It will be observed that no minister advocated neutrality. The main disagreement was merely upon a point of timing. The "Quebec men" did not leave the party, though they tended to favour a cautious and limited participation in the coming war. The student of the history of this administration may see in the events of 24 August some vague prefiguring of future divisions.

On 1 September the guns opened fire in Poland; and the Canadian Cabinet, meeting at nine a.m., decided to summon Parliament for the 7th, a date which the superstitious Prime Minister confided to his diary he liked. It met that day, accordingly, to make the decision which the government had so often asserted would be left to it. Virtually everyone now knew what the decision would be. On the 9th it was made, in the form of approval of the Address in reply to the Speech from the Throne. There was not enough opposition to divide the House of Commons, though a French-speaking member from Quebec moved an adverse amendment. King's diary records that after a Cabinet discussion with the Speaker, Clerk and Deputy Clerk the words "On division" were written into Hansard; some ministers had heard them. Only four members, three of them Quebec nationalists, the other a convinced English-speaking pacifist, spoke against Canadian participation.<sup>21</sup> On 10 September, after a week of formal neutrality, Canada declared war on Germany.

This unity had been purchased, in some degree at least, by the prospect that Canada would be able to fight a war of limited liability. One French-speaking member (who however spoke in English on this occasion) said in the Commons, "I have consulted my conscience, and I know that in casting my vote in favour of co-operation, but against the sending of an expeditionary force and against conscription, in this critical hour, I am really and truly serving my compatriots."<sup>22</sup> The commitment against overseas conscription was itself of course a formidable prospective trammel on the war effort; but it seems certain that it was widely, and accurately, believed that the government envisaged a limited war effort in other respects as well, and certain too that this policy was acceptable in many areas of the country besides Quebec. It is true that warfare conducted on a "limited" basis is essentially a contradiction in terms; it is true that in the end "moderate" war proved a delusion; but it cannot be doubted that these ideas had much to do with the maintenance of national unity in Canada in the first phase of the Second World War.

The high policies of the government are not well documented in the period before the War Committee of the Cabinet began to meet regularly and keep

minutes; but its general approach as war came on is indicated by a paper which Mr. King's most intimate adviser, Dr. O. D. Skelton, the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs (below, page 71) gave him on 24 August.<sup>23</sup> It is called "Canadian War Policy", and its most important passages should be quoted. It begins by remarking, "In all the discussion in Canada about the Polish war and Canadian participation in it, there has been little consideration of the forms and objectives of our participation once that participation has been decided." What form should the Canadian effort take? Skelton proceeds:

In framing any policy, it is assumed that there will be immediate consultation with the United Kingdom and France, and equally important, discreet consultation with Washington. . . .

*I. Military Action*

The defence of Canada should be put in the foreground. . . . It should be emphasized . . . that we cannot in this war ignore the Pacific as we did in the last. . . . There is a big job in defending our coasts. . . .

Within the measure of our capacity, we should consider the possibility of extending aid to Newfoundland and the West Indies. . . .

If any military action is to be taken overseas, it should, in the first instance, be in the air service rather than by military contingents. An announcement of an immediate and intensified programme of building planes and training men for air service in Canada and for a Canadian air force operating in France, would be effective from the standpoint both of military value and of consolidation of public opinion.

*II. Economic Effort*

While economic effort without military activity would not be a satisfying or satisfactory means of participation, it is in the economic field that we can give aid that will be most effective to our allies and most consistent with Canadian interests. . . . We should concentrate attention on the provision of munitions, raw materials and food-stuffs. . . .

*III. Closer touch with Washington.*

*IV. Statement of War Aims.\**

Mr. King wrote on this document, "Read to Council. Met with general approval. 24-8-39." Some of the Cabinet may have had mental reservations; yet Skelton's paper is the nearest thing we have to a general confidential statement of government war policy at the outset. It is interesting, and thoroughly typical of the King administration, that it originated not with the Chiefs of Staff but in the Department of External Affairs.

The general policy statement presented by the government's military advisers in fact had a rather less favourable reception. At the Cabinet's second meeting on 1 September, held shortly after four in the afternoon, King read the Chiefs of Staff paper "Canada's National Effort (Armed Forces) in the Early Stages of a Major War", dated 29 August, which outlined the forms Canadian effort "might take". Pointing out that there was now no doubt that Britain intended to send a major expeditionary force to France, the Chiefs had suggested the propriety of raising for overseas service a Canadian army corps of two divisions and ancillary troops.<sup>24</sup> King wrote in his diary, "Was surprised to find how much of it was devoted to a possible expeditionary force. Council were much against that idea." On the morning of 5 September the Cabinet Defence Committee, with the Prime Minister in the chair, discussed the paper with the Chiefs of Staff. The Committee made it very clear to them that the government's present policy was to take measures only for the defence of Canada, and that it was important that it should be

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\*Items III and IV are as printed here; no detail is given.

able to state to Parliament, when it met on 7 September, that nothing had yet been done beyond such measures. The Chiefs of Staff assured the ministers that this was indeed the case. The Prime Minister seems to have treated them rather severely, dwelling on the difference between the new paper and the Militia's Defence Scheme No. 3, under which a large force had already been mobilized. The Defence Scheme, while recognizing the possibility that this force could and might be used abroad, had laid politic emphasis on home defence.\* King now wrote in his diary, "It is clear that the Defence Department has been spending most of its time preparing for an expeditionary force, and that Mackenzie has either been conniving at this or not resisting it as he should, or knowing nothing about it." This was unfair; the Defence Department had merely been trying to lay the foundations for a military force. Such a force could be used wherever the government might decide.

Although it is thus evident that the government was determined to avoid giving any indication that any sort of commitment had been made in advance of the meeting of Parliament, it is equally clear, as we have already seen, that ministers had no doubt in their minds as to what Parliament would do. Every Canadian, indeed, knew that the week of neutrality from 3 to 10 September was a matter of form. This is reflected in the Cabinet's approving the secret order sent out on 3 September to the coastal commanders to take "all necessary defence measures which would be required in a state of war", and in the jovial assent of the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Mackenzie) to Colonel Pope's remark, "You are certainly trying to have it both ways."<sup>25</sup> It appears even more clearly in an incident of 25 August. On that day the British High Commissioner in Ottawa wrote to Skelton reporting an inquiry from the Commander-in-Chief of the America and West Indies Station (Vice Admiral Sir Sidney Meyrick) as to whether there was any objection to the use of Halifax by his ships. Mr. Mackenzie wrote later to Skelton, "This was discussed in Council on the 25th August and I wrote the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom on the same day advising him that the Canadian Government had no objection to basing HMS *Berwick* and HMS *York* at Halifax."<sup>26</sup>

With "political" history in the narrow sense this book is not concerned; but it is in order to mention two political events of these early months which throw light on the contemporary "climate of opinion". Immediately after the outbreak of war the provincial government of Quebec, headed by Mr. Maurice Duplessis, assailed the King ministry on the ground that its war measures infringed provincial rights, and called a provincial election. The national government met the challenge squarely; the Federal ministers from Quebec, led by Mr. Ernest Lapointe, the Minister of Justice, boldly took the field against Duplessis, declaring — contrary to the advice of Mr. King<sup>27</sup> — that they would resign if Duplessis was returned. At the same time they reiterated the pledge against overseas conscription. In the voting on 26 October Duplessis was defeated by a large margin, and Mr. Adélard Godbout took his place, at the head of a Liberal administration. No sooner was this crisis surmounted than Mr. King was menaced on the other flank, by the officially Liberal government of Ontario led by Mr. Mitchell Hepburn. On 18 January 1940 Hepburn pushed through the legislature a resolution condemning the Federal ministry for not prosecuting the war "in the vigorous manner the people of Canada desire to see". King met this attack by dissolving the Dominion Parliament and asking for a

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\*See Col. C. P. Stacey, *Six Years of War* (Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, vol. I), pp. 29-33.

vote of confidence from the electorate. On 26 March he got it, in the form of the largest majority that had ever been given a Canadian government.\* Even in Ontario, he obtained more than twice as many seats as his "National Government" (Conservative) opponents.<sup>28</sup> This victory placed Mr. King solidly in the saddle for the rest of the war against Germany. These events seem to leave no doubt that — in this period of "strange and unnatural calm" on the war fronts abroad which became known as the "phony" war — the "moderate" war programme of the King government was acceptable to the majority of Canadians. This programme we must now outline briefly.

Its very modest proportions are indicated by the smallness of the financial provision made for it. The short session of Parliament ending on 13 September 1939 appropriated \$100 million (including over \$16 million of emergency expenditure already authorized by Governor-General's Warrants) for the prosecution of the war to 31 March 1940. Less than \$13 million of the pre-war defence appropriation of over \$60 million had been spent at the end of August,<sup>29</sup> and the balance of this was available in addition. The total appropriation for the Department of National Defence for the whole fiscal year ending on 31 March 1940 was \$144, - 409,674; the actual expenditure was \$125,679,888, of which \$74,799,380 went to the Army.† Even within the limits of the appropriation, all concerned were enjoined to spend as little money as possible. On 21 September 1939 the new Minister of Finance (Colonel J. L. Ralston) wrote a strong letter to the Minister of National Defence (since the 19th, Mr. N. McL. Rogers) emphasizing that the authorized sums were "the limits within which expenditures can be made", and that every effort should be made to spend less, "consistent with the appropriate celerity and effectiveness"! It is clear that an attempt was being made to conduct the war under the same conditions of rigid economy and Treasury control which applied in peacetime. After a Cabinet meeting on 5 September, the Chiefs of Staff were given instructions beginning, "Estimates should be held down to very moderate level." It was probably mainly financial considerations which prompted the inclusion in these instructions of the sentence, "The Minister desires that there be no stimulation to recruiting at the present time as it is probable that more men are now available than can be conveniently handled."<sup>30</sup>

It is evident that the war effort of this period was tailored to fit within the limits of careful economic calculations made by the Department of Finance. When Mr. T. A. Crerar, the Minister of Mines and Resources, left for the United Kingdom for consultations with the British government on behalf of Canada in October 1939, he carried with him a "secret financial memorandum" furnished by that Department. This (as amended by cable after his departure) estimated Canada's national income for 1938 at \$3575 million. It was considered that this might increase by 15 per cent during the first year of the war; and that the maximum proportion of this income which all Canadian governments (including those of municipalities) could hope to take of this for all purposes was 42 per cent. Allowing for the military expenditures already budgeted for, this was reckoned to leave \$237 million available to cover financial assistance for British purchases in Canada and Canada's share of the first year's cost of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan

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\*As a matter of interest, the service vote may be recorded here. A total of 56,942 servicemen voted as such (others voted at civil polls). Of these, 28,385 cast votes for National Conservative candidates, 23,372 for Liberals, and 3032 for the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation.

†The figures in Appendix "B" below are smaller, because they cover the war period only and do not include certain items (e.g., Ministers' salaries) considered as "ordinary" rather than "war" expenditures.

(below, page 19), which had now arisen as a prospective new military commitment.<sup>31</sup> Such were the calculations that lay at the roots of Canadian war planning late in 1939.

The stages through which the military budget passed are not recorded with complete precision; but we have the programme which the Chiefs of Staff presented to the government on 17 September. For the first twelve months of the war, that is to 1 September 1940, its estimated cost was \$491,689,000, broken down into \$63 million for the Navy, \$292,689,000 for the Militia, and \$136 million for the Air Force. The King diary records that on 15 September a strong Cabinet sub-committee, of which Ralston (an ex-minister who had returned to the government to serve his country in the emergency) seems to have been chairman, had been appointed to work out a programme with the Minister of National Defence and the Chiefs of Staff.\* This sub-committee had come to the conclusion that the Chiefs' proposals involved "an expenditure the country could not begin to afford". On 18 September the full Cabinet grappled with the question most of the afternoon and again in the evening. Graham Towers, Governor of the Bank of Canada, and Clifford Clark, Deputy Minister of Finance, were brought in to advise. King wrote,

Towers made an excellent statement . . . making clear that what was being asked for by the Defence forces would take about a third of the national income, representing a point today which Germany has only geared up to after 7 years' intensive effort. He doubted if without materially affecting the credit of the country, we could contemplate an expenditure of over 250 millions of dollars. We might possibly go to 300 millions. . . .

King was pleasantly reminded of his Harvard days; it was "an immense relief getting back to sound economics". His record proceeds:

Cabinet agreed that we would tell the Chiefs of Staff that they could work out between themselves the division of their needs in terms of a total of 250 millions. It was clear that [Major-General T. V.] Anderson's idea of 3 divisions being raised at once was out of the question. One might be arranged for despatch overseas when required and trained in Canada meanwhile. A second in Canada to be kept available for home use or despatch later if required. Recruiting has already gone too far. It was decided to stop recruitment meanwhile, also to allow men to volunteer for overseas but not to make this compulsory. Those who have already enlisted to be re-attested. . . .

It was disappointing to find the Air Force "surprisingly behind what we had been told might be available". "All agreed that intensive [air] training on a large scale in Canada should be encouraged as much as possible."

The estimates for the Department of National Defence finally approved by the government for the twelve months totalled \$314,000,000; but subsequently one-tenth of this was ordered set aside as a reserve for unforeseen contingencies, thereby further reducing the already reduced figures put forward, under their instructions, by the Chiefs of Staff. The departmental accounts show that the unallotted reserve for the first seven months was \$12,183,000; this whole sum lapsed, unspent, when the fiscal year ended on 31 March 1940.<sup>32</sup>

A relatively large military force was mobilized on 1 September, the day on which hostilities began in Europe. Defence Scheme No. 3 provided for a mobile force of two divisions and ancillary troops, to be available either for home defence or for action abroad as circumstances might dictate. The General Staff had contemplated the possibility that the government might decide in a crisis to organize only part of this force; nevertheless, although the order in council passed on

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\*Mr. Pickersgill, in compiling *The Mackenzie King Record*, confused this sub-committee with the Emergency Council (later the War Committee).

1 September merely authorized vaguely "the organization forthwith of a Canadian Active Service Force", it was the entire Mobile Force that was ordered mobilized that day. In addition, many units were authorized for coast defence and similar purposes. However, within a few days the process began of postponing or suspending the mobilization of various miscellaneous units. (The \$292 million Army programme of 17 September was based on one division and ancillary troops overseas and a corps of two divisions plus numerous miscellaneous units at home; however, as we have seen, the government would have none of this.) At the end of September the actual strength of the Canadian Active Service Force was 61,497 all ranks; if all the units authorized at the beginning of the month had been fully recruited, it would have been close to 80,000. It is evident that these deferments were the result partly of equipment shortages, partly of the need for financial economy.<sup>33</sup>

The influence of this latter factor appeared very notably in one connection, as did that of the complete absence of pre-war military consultation with Britain. On 1 September the Prime Minister of Canada asked the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom for an indication of the sort of military cooperation which would be acceptable. The British reply of 6 September (see Appendix "C") asked for "a small Canadian unit which would take its place alongside the United Kingdom troops", and also made a request for technical units for attachment to United Kingdom formations. No provision for this latter need had been made in Canadian planning; and the units and the money required had to be found from within the force already mobilized and the appropriations already made. The story is told in detail in the Army history;<sup>34</sup> here we may simply recall that Canada offered to provide the units and be responsible for their pay, initial clothing, subsistence and transport at once to the United Kingdom, if the British government would equip them and maintain their clothing and equipment as long as they were not under Canadian higher command. The British authorities agreed, and the arrangement led later to a long controversy, in which Canada sought to insist on the letter of the agreement; this in spite of the facts that the list of units had been greatly altered, at Canadian suggestion, to make them suitable for ultimate inclusion in a Canadian higher formation, and that they never served in a British corps. This was one of the less edifying consequences of Canada's attempt, in the early part of the war, to run her military effort on a narrow budget.

The British communication pleased Mackenzie King, who wrote in his diary on 6 September that it would avert "the necessity of our thinking of an expeditionary force". He was "terribly shocked, however" by the news of Polish reverses; and the next day brought worries at home:

Found Council more favourable to an expeditionary force than I had imagined they would be, and growing feeling that it might become inevitable. I was also surprised to find considerable feeling for conscription or saying nothing against conscription. Lapointe said he would have to be outspoken on this point. I told Council I would have to be outspoken as well. I would say that there would be no conscription under the present Government, which means I would send the resignation of my colleagues and myself before allowing the measure of conscription of men for overseas to be introduced. It may conceivably come to conscription for our own defence; nothing has been said against that.

After, undoubtedly, considerable thought and discussion, of which no official record seems to exist, the government decided, and informed the Chiefs of Staff on 16 September, that while no "large expeditionary force" would be dispatched at present, one division would be sent overseas. It must be said that the Canadian

ministers interpreted the word "unit" in the British communication rather generously. The 1st Canadian Division, commanded by Major-General A. G. L. McNaughton, reached the United Kingdom in two convoys during December 1939.<sup>35</sup> At this stage it had only begun its training and was very incompletely equipped.

It is interesting that General McNaughton, at the time of his appointment to command the Division, made what seems to have been an attempt to make conditions. He had been for some years past seconded from the Army to serve as President of the National Research Council. On 4 October he had an interview with Mr. Rogers, in the course of which the latter spoke of a dispatch from the British government (possibly that of 6 September, above, page 13) which — as McNaughton remembered the conversation — indicated that Canadian land forces should not be large and not of such a size as to be a restriction on full development "in the air and in munitions supply". McNaughton apparently said that, while fully aware of the primary importance of supply, he knew too that "Canada should be represented by a fighting unit in the line of battle and that public opinion would be satisfied with nothing less". McNaughton recorded that he added, "and that any Government which did not satisfy this desire would have difficulty in remaining in office"; Rogers however did not remember McNaughton saying this. Rogers went on to speak of the limited amount of money available for the land forces, and said that the Minister of Finance (Ralston) had suggested "that the ancillary units of the Expeditionary Force might be borrowed from the British Army as had been the case in the last war when the Lahore Divisional Artillery had been loaned to the Canadian Corps". McNaughton dissented strongly:

I said that any such arrangement would be quite unacceptable, as under it there would be no adequate opportunity to develop the close cooperation between the combatant arms, which was, in fact, required if unnecessary casualties were to be avoided, . . . I said that without a fully organized Canadian Formation completely and properly equipped, I could not accept responsibility. I said that this was a very grave and serious matter indeed.

McNaughton later wrote a memorandum of the conversation and on 5 October sent it to Rogers with a covering letter which remarked,

It is my understanding that you agreed that the Canadian Expeditionary Force will be a self-contained Formation of Canadian Units completely and properly equipped and maintained in all respects and that this will be the policy of the Government of Canada.

The government clearly did not care to commit itself in this manner. Rogers recorded, "Owing to certain inaccuracies and apparent misunderstandings on the part of Gen. McNaughton with respect to certain features of our conversation, it was understood that this memorandum would be withdrawn and destroyed.\* The understanding was reached at a meeting in the Prime Minister's office at 11.30 a.m. on Friday, Oct. 6th, attended by the Prime Minister, Col. Ralston, Gen. McNaughton, and myself. The memorandum and covering letter submitted by Gen. McNaughton were replaced by an exchange of letters between Gen. McNaughton and myself on Friday, Oct. 6th."<sup>36</sup>

What happened at the interview in the Prime Minister's office does not seem to have been fully recorded, but King wrote in his diary that McNaughton stated that the major war effort should be "along the lines of production, and that every effort should be made to arm and equip the troops to spare human lives". King was much impressed by McNaughton, and doubtless made himself agreeable to the

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\*Before destroying his copies of the papers Mr. Rogers made detailed handwritten notes of them which he preserved.

general.<sup>37</sup> McNaughton's new letter to Rogers merely said briefly that he had "much honor in accepting the appointment".<sup>38</sup> The attempt to make conditions had failed, but it seems likely that McNaughton's views had had some impact on the ministers. The reader will have noted the part played by Ralston, and the likelihood that it increased the dislike of him which the general had long entertained.<sup>39</sup>

Army officers, with 1914-18 precedents in their minds, inevitably thought in terms of further expansion of the overseas force and the creation of a Canadian Corps; but the government was unwilling to make such commitments at this time. It is true that on 25 January 1940, during the one-day session of Parliament at which the dissolution was announced, the intention to send the 2nd Division overseas was made known; but the Cabinet War Committee was told on 12 February that this had been done merely to prevent the question from becoming a political issue during the coming election campaign. When General McNaughton explored the implications of the expected arrival of the 2nd Division with the British War Office, tentative arrangements were made to constitute the 1st Division and the Canadian ancillary units (those provided as a result of the British request for technical troops) as a self-contained formation under G.H.Q. British Expeditionary Force, pending the organization of a Canadian Corps. The government, doubtless with its eye on the 8000 additional ancillary troops that would be required for a Corps, disapproved this initiative; the 1st Division, it ruled, should be employed, on its arrival at the front, in the manner previously planned — as part of a British Corps. This was on 27 February 1940; five days earlier a message from Ottawa to the Canadian High Commissioner in London had emphasized the extent of Canadian war expenditures and remarked, "Obviously it would be nothing but a disservice to the task we have in mind and to our Allies for us to attempt something beyond our capacity." McNaughton and Mr. Vincent Massey, the High Commissioner, continued to urge the plan for a self-contained formation. On 17 March King assured them the matter would be taken up when the political campaign was over. After the election, the government accepted the plan.<sup>40</sup>

With respect to the Navy, the United Kingdom memorandum of 6 September asked for a considerable number of detailed measures, among them placing the naval bases at Halifax and Esquimalt in complete readiness, including anti-submarine booms, and making them available to the Royal Navy; and taking up and fitting out a total of 14 minesweeping vessels and three anti-submarine vessels at Sydney, N.S., and St. John's, Nfld. The Royal Canadian Navy worked along the lines suggested. Its share of the \$314 million allotted for the first year of war was \$35,888,000. By the last week of 1939 the personnel strength of the naval forces was up to 5042 all ranks and ratings. The strength in ships gradually increased, small vessels suitable for patrol duty being acquired from other government departments and private owners. After considerable discussion and negotiation the three coastal liners *Prince David*, *Prince Robert* and *Prince Henry* (the last was sailing in 1939 under the name *North Star*) were purchased in 1940 and converted into armed merchant cruisers.<sup>41</sup>

Like other aspects of the services' effort in this period, the Navy's shipbuilding plans encountered financial shoals. Its original relatively modest estimate submitted in September 1939 was for 104 vessels, ranging from two Tribal class destroyers down to 32 motor torpedo boats; of these, 24 (including the Tribals and 18 minesweepers) were proposed for immediate commencement, the rest to be undertaken when funds and shipyard facilities permitted.<sup>42</sup> The government's economy orders soon pruned this programme. In October the Chief of the Naval Staff is found

complaining that it had been "for financial reasons only, with absolutely no relationship to our strategical and tactical requirements . . . cut to 34 ships".<sup>43</sup> Shortly afterwards an attempt was made to cut it still further, to 21 ships; this stemmed from a ruling by the Minister of Finance that no more orders should be placed than could be paid for out of the authorized estimates.<sup>44</sup> The C.N.S. wrote, "To have these figures again reduced . . . is simply not facing our problem and is analogous to the ostrich burying its head in the sand."<sup>45</sup> In the end, a fairly large programme for building ships in Canada — 90 corvettes and *Bangor* minesweepers, for completion by the end of 1941 — was authorized by the Cabinet, though not until 7 February 1940. The anticipated cost was \$54,250,000.<sup>46</sup> Twelve of the new corvettes were commissioned before the end of the year (eight of them into the Royal Navy, though Canadian-manned,\* the others into the R.C.N.).<sup>47</sup>

While these measures of expansion were in hand, the existing force, working in close cooperation with the British Admiralty, had gone straight into the task which was to be Canadian sailors' main work of the war — the protection of Atlantic convoys. On 16 September 1939 the first convoy of a very long series sailed from Halifax, escorted by two British cruisers and two Canadian destroyers. The convoys were organized under the direction of a Canadian officer, the Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast; the Ocean escort forces were under an officer of the Royal Navy, the Rear Admiral Third Battle Squadron, who in turn was under the Royal Navy's Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies Station. It may be mentioned that under the policy of priority for the Pacific which we have noted, four of Canada's six destroyers were on the west coast at the outbreak of war. Two of them sailed for Halifax as early as 31 August 1939, and all of them were on duty in the Atlantic before the end of the year.<sup>48</sup> This distribution had been recommended by the Admiralty in the British memorandum of 6 September. The same document's bald request that the six Canadian destroyers "be placed under Admiralty orders" was not acceded to, but as will appear (below, page 309) Canadian naval forces were instructed to "cooperate to the fullest extent" with the Royal Navy and other Commonwealth naval forces<sup>49</sup> — which up to a point came to somewhat the same thing.

We have described the government's war programme but said nothing of the manner in which it was announced to the public. The final decisions on the programme, it will have been noted, were not taken until after the special session of Parliament in September 1939 had been prorogued; which from the government's point of view doubtless had the advantage that the programme, including the plan for an expeditionary force, did not have to run the gauntlet of parliamentary criticism.

The Cabinet sub-committee appointed on 15 September had the dual task of working out both policy and a statement concerning it. Even after the long Cabinet sessions of the 18th, we learn from the Prime Minister's diary, Ralston was still working with the Chiefs of Staff on these matters on the 19th, while King struggled with the question of a new Minister of National Defence, for he was strongly convinced of Mackenzie's inadequacy. Howe and Power were both considered (Ralston could have had the Defence portfolio, but preferred Finance); but the final choice fell on Rogers. Issuing the government's statement to the press late on 19 September was Mackenzie's last act as Defence Minister; he now moved to Pensions and National Health. The statement<sup>50</sup> reflected that studied "moderation"

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\*These vessels were re-commissioned into the Royal Canadian Navy during 1941.

which was the programme's keynote and which, we have said, seems to have been acceptable to the country. It described the programme as one "which endeavours to put first things first and to co-ordinate Canada's effort with that of the United Kingdom in the most effective way". The item which actually stood first on the list was "facilitating the purchase by the United Kingdom of essential supplies in this country", involving in the first instance "repatriation of Canadian securities held in London". The last item on the list was the intention "to organize and train a division to be available as an expeditionary force, if and when required", and to keep a second division "under arms as a further measure of preparedness". In connection with the navy, convoy and minesweeping operations were emphasized, and it was announced that "a large number of anti-submarine and minesweeping craft" would be built in Canada. The emphasis in connection with the air force was on training. "The Government has, today, authorized a plan of intensified air training in Canada so that there may be available a progressively increasing number of pilots and airmen for active service." There would be an immediate but limited "contribution of trained air personnel"; apart from this, nothing was said about an expeditionary air force. On the services generally, the statement said, "With regard to general enlistment, the policy is to avoid indiscriminate recruitment and to proceed along well-ordered lines, as circumstances render desirable." Here and elsewhere it reflected the memorandum received from the British government (below, Appendix "C" ).

One week after this statement was issued, the British government proposed to Canada a vastly expanded scheme of air training. Had this proposal been received ten days earlier, the government's war programme might have been rather different; it is possible, indeed, that no Canadian Army expeditionary force would have gone overseas in 1939.

### 3. THE INCEPTION OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AIR TRAINING PLAN

The story of the origins of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan must be told here in some detail. For this there are three reasons: the fact that the Plan was so important an element in the Canadian effort; the fact that the circumstances of its inception go far to reveal the springs of Canadian policy in 1939; and the fact that in the absence so far of an official history of the Royal Canadian Air Force the story has never been fully told.

The Royal Canadian Air Force was allotted in the first instance \$77,158,000 of the funds made available to the Department of National Defence for the first twelve months of the war. Its modest expansion in the autumn of 1939 paralleled the Navy's; by the end of the year its personnel strength was 8287 officers and airmen. Fourteen squadrons were then "operational", all in Canada and six of them on the east coast. Thanks to the pre-war measures, a few new aircraft of service type were available when war broke out; among them 19 Hurricane fighters, 10 Battle bombers and eight Stranraer flying boats. A fairly ambitious programme of construction in Canada of airframes of British type had been undertaken from 1937 onward. The immediate responsibility of the R.C.A.F. after the outbreak was cooperation with the navies to ensure the security of Canadian coasts and waters and the protection of convoys.<sup>51</sup> Almost at once, however, its energies began to be directed primarily into the training of aircrew personnel in Canada.

In the spring of 1939 a new training scheme intended to provide pilots who would hold short-service commissions had been introduced for the R.C.A.F. One feature of it, the result of long confidential negotiations with the United Kingdom, was that 50 pilots would be trained annually for the Royal Air Force (see below, page 82). Before the scheme got under way, war came; and the British government at once asked for what was in effect a large expansion of it. Their memorandum of 6 September (Appendix "C") indicated that trained personnel were the great need. It suggested that Canada concentrate first on the individual training of pilots, observers "and particularly" air gunners and wireless operators, rather than on forming and training complete units for dispatch overseas, "(Canadian expeditionary units excepted)". Rapid expansion of training facilities "with the aim of 2,000 pilots [*sic*] a year" was recommended; and one measure suggested as desirable at a later stage was the transfer of "at least 4" R.A.F. flying training schools to sites in Canada.

As early as 12 September 1939 the Canadian Prime Minister wrote to the British High Commissioner in Ottawa concerning arrangements for R.C.A.F. cooperation.<sup>52</sup> The expansion of R.C.A.F. training facilities, he said, was being put in hand immediately; a number of Canadian officer pilots (experienced only in the handling of civil aircraft), and some newly enlisted airmen of various trades, could be dispatched to Britain within six weeks for loan to the R.A.F. Mr. King added:

It is the desire of this Government that Canadian Air Force units be formed as soon as sufficient trained personnel are available overseas for this purpose, such squadrons to be manned by and maintained with Canadian personnel at the expense of the Canadian Government. Owing to the shortage of service equipment in Canada, Canadian squadrons overseas would require to be completely equipped by the United Kingdom authorities at Canada's expense.

The Prime Minister specified that personnel lent to the R.A.F. under the proposed arrangement would be available for transfer to R.C.A.F. units "if the Canadian Government should later decide upon the organization of distinctive Canadian air units for service overseas".

Mr. King emphasized that these suggestions were very tentative and might be superseded "after the situation becomes clearer". In fact, they were immediately "overtaken by events". It is possible, however, that some of the people concerned with R.C.A.F. policy may later have remembered them with a certain regret; for they had at least contained the possibility of an overseas air force which would be completely Canadian in personnel and maintained entirely at Canada's expense.

The war was still in its first days when it was reported that the air training suggestions made by the United Kingdom on 6 September would soon be supplanted by something still larger. On 15 September the Chief of the Air Staff, Air Vice-Marshal G. M. Croil, told the first meeting of the Emergency Council (the Cabinet's Committee on General Policy, which was later replaced by the War Committee) that he understood that the British request for 2000 pilots annually would shortly be increased to 8000. He presented in the meantime a tentative Canadian scheme under which, as a long-term objective, 12,000 men a year might be trained (8000 apparently being ground staff). This was evidently intended to meet the first British request and the R.C.A.F.'s own requirements as well. He estimated the cost at \$92 million for the first year, and the training staff required at 600 officers and 6500 men. With such an effort in prospect, he did not favour sending any R.C.A.F. personnel overseas in the near future. The scheme of 12 September was already a thing of the past.

The germ of the still larger conception which came to be called the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan\* is presumably to be found in the very modest pre-war scheme for training British pilots in Canada, and in the expanded plan proposed by the United Kingdom on 6 September. It seems evident that a large project for training in Canada was a basic part of the war plans of the British Air Ministry. There had also, however, been an initiative on the part of certain Dominion High Commissioners in London. On 13 September Mr. Vincent Massey discussed air training with Mr. Stanley Bruce, the Australian High Commissioner, and Canadian and Australian air force officers; and on 16 September Massey and Bruce suggested at a High Commissioners' meeting at the Dominions Office a scheme whereby Canadian, Australian and New Zealand airmen would be trained in Canada. It is important to note that the Dominions Office record states that after training the men should be "sent to the front as distinctive Canadian, Australian and New Zealand air forces".<sup>54</sup> No record of these discussions is to be found in the Department of External Affairs at Ottawa, and it seems evident that Mr. Massey took the considerable responsibility of sponsoring a plan which was likely to have a major effect upon the structure and balance of the Canadian war effort without telling his government what he was doing.

Mr. Eden, the Dominions Secretary, "undertook to look into" the High Commissioners' proposal. He apparently discussed it with the Air Minister, Sir Kingsley Wood. At any rate, on 26 September the British Prime Minister (Mr. Neville Chamberlain) sent communications to the Commonwealth governments proposing the Air Training Plan.

The British War Cabinet, he said, had lately sanctioned immediate measures designed to produce "a greatly enlarged air force". It was calculated that the maintenance of this force would require "not less than 20,000 pilots and 30,000 personnel of air crews annually". Such a feat of production required "more than twice the entire training capacity available in the United Kingdom, having regard to limited space, operational restrictions and vulnerability to air attack". Nor did Britain have the manpower required. The solution appeared to be to use the resources of the Dominions, and particularly those of Canada. Chamberlain put forward a detailed scheme for some fifty flying training schools overseas, with advanced training concentrated in Canada, and suggested a conference in Canada to discuss details.

The British Prime Minister called his message to Mr. King "a special personal appeal", and it evidently struck a responsive chord. On 28 September the Canadian government considered it at a meeting of the Emergency Council at which certain additional ministers and the Chiefs of Staff were present. It was pointed out that undertaking so large a project might involve considerable modification of the Canadian war programme so lately approved. The Chief of the General Staff (Major-General T. V. Anderson) expressed the view that the Canadian public would not be satisfied with a participation confined to air activity; they thought in terms of ground troops, and it was important that the army programme should not be interrupted. But the Ministers seem to have been impressed by the possibilities of the air plan; and on the same day Mr. King cabled back to Mr. Chamberlain,

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\*This designation was officially adopted by the R.C.A.F. in 1939, with "Joint Air Training Plan" as an alternative for use in certain official correspondence.<sup>53</sup> In Australia the usual term was "Empire Air Training Scheme".

I can say at once that our Government fully agree that Canadian cooperation in this field would be particularly appropriate and probably the most effective in the military sphere which Canada could furnish. We would therefore be prepared to accept the scheme in principle.<sup>55</sup>

The reader will remember the priority which the Canadian government's pre-war defence plan gave to the Royal Canadian Air Force; this received its strongest expression in the pre-war appropriations for 1939-40, when the R.C.A.F. got \$29,775,000, or very nearly half of the whole provision for the three services. In the light of the Skelton memorandum which the Cabinet had heard with approval on 24 August (above, page 9), it is more than a fair assumption that this pre-war emphasis reflects the King government's conception of the form which it was desirable the main Canadian effort should take if and when war came. The direction of political thinking had been clearly indicated on 30 March 1939 in the House of Commons, when the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition agreed that, in Mr. King's words, "the days of great expeditionary forces of infantry crossing the oceans are not likely to recur" (this, incidentally, was the very month in which the United Kingdom, forsaking its earlier hopeful limited-liability concept, promised France to prepare an army of 32 divisions and have it ready for service wherever needed before the end of the first year of war).<sup>56</sup> In the light of what we now know about Mr. King's thinking, as revealed in his diary, it is also pretty evident that one reason why an air effort had more political appeal than "great expeditionary forces of infantry" was the fact that it seemed to hold out the hope of smaller forces, fewer casualties, less pressure on manpower and a reduction of the danger of conscription. The Air Training Plan project was particularly attractive, presumably, in that it would be largely carried on within Canada and held out the prospect of a considerable portion of the R.C.A.F. being employed on training at home instead of in operations abroad. At the same time, no thinking person could possibly deny the vast importance of air power in this new war, and no one could doubt that the production of trained aircrew on a great scale would be a tremendous contribution to victory. And the project came with the very highest recommendations: an urgent appeal from the British Prime Minister. Mr. Chamberlain may not have realized it, but it is scarcely too much to say that in 1939 the Air Training Plan must have seemed the answer to any Canadian politician's prayer; and Mr. King embraced it accordingly.

The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs saw in the proposal the opportunity for seeking a share in the direction of the war. Its cost, he wrote to the Prime Minister, would "clearly be huge". "Now they [France and Britain] call on the Dominions to take the place of the United States in the last war and of Poland, Russia, Rumania, Greece, Turkey etc., etc., in the present war, by sharing in a colossal air attack. Should there not be consultation on objectives and policy, and not merely instructions as to how to help them in a policy they have formed?"<sup>57</sup> This suggestion found no echo in government policy. There is no indication whatever that the Canadian government made any attempt to use the Air Training Plan project in the manner which Dr. Skelton suggested.

The easy Canadian acceptance of the project did not mean, however, that when the missions from the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand arrived in Ottawa to work out details of the plan the negotiations were simple or easy. On the contrary, they lasted many weeks, and — particularly as between Canada and the United Kingdom — were full of difficulties. The United Kingdom Air Mission, headed by Lord Riverdale, a leading Sheffield businessman with long experience of

public affairs, arrived in Ottawa on 15 October. It was later joined by Captain Harold Balfour, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air in the Chamberlain ministry; while Sir Gerald Campbell, the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in Ottawa, played a prominent part in the negotiations. The senior R.A.F. officer was Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, with Air Marshal Sir Christopher Courtney acting for him until his arrival. The Australian mission was led by Mr. J. V. Fairbairn, the Minister for Air; it reached Ottawa on 1 November, followed on 3 November by the New Zealanders, headed jointly by Group Captain H. W. L. Saunders (an R.A.F. officer who was Chief of the New Zealand Air Staff) and Mr. T. A. Barrow, Air Secretary.<sup>58</sup> South Africa did not join in the project. On behalf of Canada the negotiations were carried on formally by a committee of the Cabinet consisting of the Prime Minister (who does not seem to have attended after the first meeting, but certainly watched the negotiation closely), Mr. Rogers, Mr. Ralston, Mr. C. D. Howe (Minister of Transport, and also responsible for the War Supply Board) and Mr. Ian Mackenzie (Minister of Pensions and National Health, and formerly Minister of National Defence).<sup>59</sup> Various officers and officials were called in from time to time, but the whole negotiation was political rather than military. The formal committee sessions were supplemented by more private discussions of various Ministers and officials with members of the visiting missions; and on five occasions members of the missions attended meetings of the Emergency Council or its successor the Cabinet War Committee.

It would seem that Lord Riverdale arrived without any detailed estimate of the cost of the scheme, and that he spent the fortnight after reaching Ottawa in attempting to draw an estimate with the assistance of the R.C.A.F. The formal discussions between the United Kingdom and Canada began on 31 October, on which day Riverdale and Balfour met both the Cabinet committee and the Emergency Council. The negotiations immediately ran hard aground on the rocks of finance. Chamberlain's original proposals had not dealt with this matter. Now Riverdale indicated that the total cost of the scheme over the proposed period of its duration, to 31 March 1943, might be \$888,500,000. The United Kingdom would make its contribution in kind, chiefly in the form of aircraft, to the extent of \$140 million of this in capital and \$51,500,000 in maintenance equipment. Of the balance of \$697, - 000,000, Riverdale seems to have suggested, half would be paid by Canada and the other half by Australia and New Zealand. He pointed out that the whole force created as a result of the scheme (some 100 new squadrons) would be maintained in the field by the United Kingdom, at an estimated cost of \$1,500,000,000 per year.<sup>60</sup>

It is clear that the scale of the proposed contribution by Canada took the Canadian ministers by surprise. The situation was not improved when the visitors indicated that they were not worrying about where the money which the United Kingdom would have to spend was coming from — finding it was up to the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The United Kingdom had abandoned "limited liability" (so far as finance was concerned) in the spring of 1939. Not so Canada. The Canadian Prime Minister indicated to the visitors that his government could not afford so cavalier an attitude: they would proceed under the advice of the Minister of Finance. The same calculations as to national income and national capacity which had been given to Mr. Crerar (above, page 11 ) were laid before Riverdale and his colleagues. Evidently the meetings of 31 October were a shock to both parties. The British were taken aback when told that Canada could not come "within shooting distance" of the figures that had been suggested, and the

day's sessions (Sir Gerald Campbell told Dr. Skelton) left them "blue and depressed". Later discussions of the exchanges suggest that Riverdale, making his presentation, had been thrown "off his base" by an interjection from Ralston expressing surprise at the size of his estimated costs; that this led Riverdale to refer to the British contribution in kind as "a free gift to you"; that this in turn nettled King, who said, "This is not our war" — meaning that it was a contribution not to Canada but to the common cause. The phrase nevertheless shocked the British, and Campbell was unwise enough to mention that it had been cabled to London — which led King, in one of his fits of childishness, to ask the Governor General, as the King's representative, to reprove the High Commissioner for allowing such a report to go through his office!<sup>61</sup> The negotiation had begun badly.

On 3 November the Canadian Cabinet considered the problem and approved the terms of a Prime-Minister-to-Prime-Minister cable to Mr. Chamberlain. The British proposal, it said, appeared to imply "that a United Kingdom project for reinforcing the Royal Air Force had become a Canadian plan, with corresponding assumption by Canada of the major provision of recruits and major proportion of the cost which detailed study now indicates would be of huge magnitude". The Canadian share proposed was quite beyond Canada's financial resources as reflected in the recent computation of national income. The cable went on to emphasize the relationship between the Canadian military programme and British purchases in Canada:

I may instance the fact that while the British Air Mission are pressing us in regard to their air training proposals which would involve a substantial increase in Canada's direct military expenditures, we on our part have for many weeks been pressing without satisfactory result for a decision in regard to wheat purchases which is the biggest single item in our whole economic program and the most far-reaching in its public consequences. In our opinion the questions of military and economic participation in the war effort are inextricably intertwined and cannot be dealt with separately. Until some understanding evolves from the discussions either here or in London, I frankly cannot see how a decision can be arrived at in regard to the proposals for the special air training program. . . .<sup>62</sup>

Chamberlain's reply, sent on 7 November, promised "urgent consideration" and was hopeful that further discussions with Mr. Crerar would make a useful contribution.<sup>63</sup>

Meanwhile, the air training discussions in Ottawa went on; and about 10 November it began to be evident that Australia and New Zealand also were not happy about the scheme as presented by Lord Riverdale. They too had financial scruples, and in particular they were short of Canadian dollars (though it may be noted that ultimately the United Kingdom promised to find the Canadian exchange they needed for the Air Training Plan if difficulties arose and they so requested).<sup>64</sup> Mr. Fairbairn said later that he was impressed by the discovery that the aircraft to be used in advanced training were either to come from Britain or were of a U.S. type which was being manufactured in Australia, whereas he had supposed the main reason for concentrating advanced training in Canada was that country's proximity to U.S. aircraft plants. At any rate, he proposed that Australia, in addition to undertaking all her own elementary training, should give advanced training to seven-ninths of her own aircrew at home, sending only two-ninths instead of all of them to Canada.<sup>65</sup> He also objected to the original British proposal under which Australia would produce 40 per cent of the Dominion aircrew required by the scheme, and Canada 48 per cent; Australia, he said, could produce men only in proportion to her population. New Zealand felt obliged to ask for changes in the same direction. On 22 November, after consulting the Australian Prime Minister

(Mr. Menzies) by telephone, Mr. Fairbairn put his final proposal before the Canadian Cabinet committee and the visiting missions; the only alternative, he said, was for Australia to "attempt the whole of its population proportion of the training in Australia".<sup>66</sup> This "ultimatum", as the Canadians called it, was perforce accepted. The change resulted in reducing the planned number of advanced schools in Canada from 55 to 36; on the other hand, Canada paid for 29 of these schools instead of 26 as originally planned, and the increase in expense to her over the whole initial duration of the Plan was estimated in August 1940 at \$34 or \$35 million.<sup>67</sup>

In the meantime, the discussions between Canada and the United Kingdom had proceeded, still turning mainly on financial questions. By 14 November they had advanced to the point where (the United Kingdom having agreed to undertake certain additional financial responsibilities relating to equipment, which raised its estimated contribution to \$220 million) the Canadian committee were prepared to recommend to their Cabinet colleagues an arrangement whereby Canada would pay 72 1/2 per cent of the balance, leaving 27 1/2 per cent for Australia and New Zealand. As a result of those two countries' amendments, the balance was now estimated at \$432,000,000 for the duration of the Plan. The committee also recommended two conditions: *first*, the British War Cabinet must be prepared to allow the Canadian government to state publicly that the air training scheme should have priority over other measures as being in the opinion of the War Cabinet the most important contribution that Canada could make to the war; and *secondly*, the agreement was contingent upon a reasonably and mutually satisfactory agreement being reached in the discussions on general financial and economic relations being carried on in London, where Mr. Crerar was now to be reinforced by Mr. Graham Towers, Governor of the Bank of Canada.\* These recommendations were approved by the Cabinet on 14 November, and were communicated to Riverdale and Balfour at a meeting of the Emergency Council the same afternoon.<sup>69</sup>

This was far from ending the negotiation. On 25 November Sir Gerald Campbell wrote Mr. King informing him of the British government's reply. The United Kingdom's representatives had been authorized to initial an air training agreement in the terms which had now been arrived at. But with respect to the two Canadian reservations London merely suggested that, at the time of initialling, letters should be sent to the Canadian government recognizing that the operation of the agreement was subject to further consideration and agreement between the two governments on these points.<sup>70</sup> The same day Campbell called on King and urged him to authorize the immediate initialling of an agreement; the Australian and New Zealand missions were ready to initial at once and were preparing to leave. King gave him a dusty answer. The Cabinet, he said, was united on the issues, and it was being openly said that a mistake had been made "in not going ahead with our own training scheme ourselves". If the British government wanted quick action, let it accept the Canadian reservations, "and we would then be in a position to set forth the terms of agreement on which we were ready to go ahead".<sup>71</sup>

Over the week-end the Cabinet committee completed its negotiations with the missions, and a four-party air training agreement was completed ready for signature.

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\*It is perhaps a commentary upon the degree of the sense of emergency entertained in Canadian official circles at this period that the Governor, undertaking this urgent wartime journey, was accompanied by his wife. The general public, needless to say, was at least equally unaware of the emergency. Many Canadian officers' wives went to England, in these early months, to be with their husbands. After the storm broke in North-West Europe on 10 May, such journeys were ended by order-in-council.<sup>68</sup>

On Monday 27 November the Emergency Council discussed the situation. A cable had now been received from Mr. Chamberlain, who said on the question of economic relations that he believed a satisfactory agreement could be reached after Mr. Towers joined Mr. Crerar in London. As to the question of the priority of the air training plan, the British government itself attached the highest priority to it, but had not wished to emphasize this "lest it should have embarrassing effects on our relations with the French who are pressing us strongly to increase our effort on land".<sup>72</sup> The Canadian ministers now decided to accept Chamberlain's statement on economic relations as satisfactory, and in effect dropped their reservation on this matter.\* But they stood firm on the issue of the statement on priority, and a cable sent to Chamberlain after a cabinet meeting on the 28th remarked unhelpfully, *a propos* of his reference to the French, "we had not intended to suggest that the United Kingdom should indicate in the statement the order of preference to be attached to its own war efforts".<sup>74</sup> By this time the Australians and New Zealanders had initialled the agreement and had left Ottawa or were about to leave; all the visiting missions had been present for the latter part of the Emergency Council meeting on 27 November, and an agreed public statement had been issued to the effect that the "missions and committees" representing the four governments had "worked out a basis of agreement which is now being referred to the respective Governments for decision".

On 1 December Chamberlain replied on the question of priority.<sup>75</sup> The British government, he said, had no objection to having its view of the importance of the scheme made public, "provided it is made clear at the same time that we, also attach very great importance both from a military and a psychological point of view to the presence of Canadian land forces in the theatre of war at the earliest possible moment". He suggested that the statement should read,

The United Kingdom Government have informed us that, considering present and future requirements, they feel that participation in the Air Training Scheme would provide for more effective assistance towards our ultimate victory than any other form of cooperation which Canada can give. At the same time they would wish it to be clearly understood that they would welcome no less heartily the presence of Canadian land forces in the theatre of war.

King committed his thoughts on this to paper, and they are revealing. He suggested to Skelton that Chamberlain's words "at the earliest possible moment" should be added at the end of the statement:

Apart from mention of military and psychological points of view, they clearly indicate the importance attached by both the British and French to a land force from Canada reaching the theatre of war at the earliest moment. Indeed early despatches indicated that men were seeking to enlist much too rapidly and that the sending of too many men overseas would be an embarrassment. Not to insert these words is to destroy altogether the significance of any statement as to priority in its relation to the air training scheme as providing the most effective assistance towards ultimate victory.

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\*It would certainly not have been practicable, on the terms desired by the Canadian government at moment, to persist with the idea suggested by their cable of 3 November, of making a satisfactory wheat-purchase agreement the condition of an air training agreement; for Mr. Crerar had been given the thankless task of attempting to sell wheat to the British government at 93 1/2 cents per bushel, F.O.B. Fort William at a time when the spot price at Winnipeg was 73 cents. He explained to the British government that 73 cents was not a price at which a Canadian farmer could make a living, and that 93 1/2 cents was calculated as the lowest price at which the Canadian producer could survive without being subsidized by the government. The substance of the British ministers' reply was that they appreciated the Canadians' difficulties, but could not afford to alleviate them at the cost of accepting a wheat price which would add three halfpence to the price of the heavily-taxed Englishman's loaf of bread. It is not surprising that "a good deal of feeling was aroused in Whitehall" by this rather extraordinary Canadian suggestion.<sup>73</sup>

What King intended that the statement should convey, it is clear, is that it was more important that land forces should reach the theatre soon than that they should reach it in strength. The passage serves to document King's deep-seated persistent desire that the Canadian effort should centre on the air force rather than in "great expeditionary forces of infantry". Chamberlain accepted the proposed addition, and it was in this form that the statement appeared in King's broadcast of 17 December announcing the inauguration of the Air Training Plan.<sup>76</sup>

The "priority" question had now been settled to the Canadian government's satisfaction. Another basic issue that might have given infinite trouble was disposed of relatively easily. This was the question of the system of command and administration for the Plan. It was discussed in detail between Rogers and Balfour; and when the latter left for England on 28 November he carried with him a letter from Rogers making proposals. The first and basic proposition was, "The air training plan in Canada will be administered through the organization of the R.C.A.F. and the executive command shall be in the hands of the R.C.A.F." The general supervision of the Plan should be entrusted to a Supervisory Board with the Canadian Minister of National Defence as Chairman and the other participating countries represented upon it. Those countries might appoint liaison officers who might visit stations or units involved in the Plan at any time, might offer criticisms or suggestions to the Board, and would be free to report on progress to their own governments. In due course the British government accepted these proposals as written.<sup>77</sup>

One problem remained, and it caused more asperity between the Canadian and British negotiators than any other except perhaps finance. From the beginning the Canadians had emphasized that Canadian public sentiment would demand some provision for the maintenance of R.C.A.F. units on the fighting fronts. On 8 December the question was raised specifically in a letter from Rogers to Riverdale. By this time, it will be recalled, a draft agreement had been drawn up and had been initialled by the Australians and New Zealanders before their departure. Article 15 of this agreement ran as follows:

The United Kingdom Government undertakes that pupils of Canada, Australia and New Zealand shall, after training is completed, be identified with their respective Dominions, either by the method of organizing Dominion units and formations or in some other way, such methods to be agreed upon with the respective Dominion Governments concerned. The United Kingdom Government will initiate inter-governmental discussions to this end.

Referring to a conversation on 7 December, Rogers now wrote to Riverdale, "I understand that you accept as the proper interpretation of this paragraph that Canadian personnel from the training plan will, on request from the Canadian Government, be organized in Royal Canadian Air Force units and formations in the field." He asked Riverdale to confirm this. Riverdale replied on the same day, but his letter contained an important qualification: he accepted the implication that Canadian pupils would be incorporated in R.C.A.F. units, adding however, "in all circumstances in which it is feasible".<sup>78</sup> Mr. King agreed with Rogers that this was unsatisfactory; he felt that "a clear and unequivocal statement" was necessary. Over the week-end, 9-10 December, there were discussions with Riverdale and Campbell; the latter suggested that the phrase "on request from the Canadian Government" raised a difficulty, for the United Kingdom was doubtful of the results of giving such an undertaking to Canada unless it extended also to Australia and New Zealand. Since the United Kingdom had yielded so much ground to Canada, on other issues, could not this one be left for subsequent discussion between the governments under the terms of Article 15? King, when again consulted, was

emphatic that it could not: "This matter was regarded by the whole Cabinet as absolutely essential and was a prerequisite to signature by the Canadian government." Campbell said he would cable again to his government.<sup>79</sup>

It is interesting that at this point Dr. Skelton, the Prime Minister's adviser, began to have doubts about the government's policy in connection with an aspect to which the Ministers seem to have paid little attention. The arguments used by some of the proponents of this policy, he wrote, "would lead logically to our undertaking to organize and maintain at the front all Canadian trainees. In any case there will be real difficulty in insisting on the one hand on our right to organize trainees in Royal Canadian Air Force units and on the other on the United Kingdom meeting the costs of the maintenance. . . . I do feel . . . that there is some danger of sliding into a position where we would have no answer either to the British Government or to some vociferous elements in the Canadian public if it were suggested that if we call the tune we should pay the Piper." Paying the piper, he calculated, might come to as much as \$750 million annually.<sup>80</sup> The time was to come when Canada would pay, in full and gladly; but in 1939 Skelton's memorandum had no effect. On 14 December the Canadian Cabinet considered a formula which had been drafted in an attempt to meet the problem of Canadian squadrons, and rejected it. Later that day Riverdale, Brooke-Popham and Campbell attended a meeting of the Cabinet War Committee to discuss the issue. The discussion turned largely on the question of "ground crew" personnel. The Air Training Plan was intended to provide aircrew; it made no provision for servicing personnel, thus Canada would in due course have great numbers of pilots, air gunners, etc., but no ground crew to support them. The United Kingdom representatives pointed out that if the United Kingdom provided ground crews for R.C.A.F. squadrons, four-fifths of the personnel of such squadrons would be British and only one-fifth Canadian. There were three ways, they said, of organizing Canadians graduating from the Plan in the field: in R.C.A.F. squadrons consisting of Canadian air and ground personnel; in "R.A.F. — Canada" squadrons with Canadian air and British ground personnel; and in regular R.A.F. squadrons pending posting to units in one of the other categories. The Canadians argued for and indeed insisted on a fourth way — R.C.A.F. squadrons with ground crews provided by the R.A.F. Lord Riverdale undertook to cable to London yet once more.

The thinking in London is illuminated by the record of a meeting which Mr. Towers and Mr. L. B. Pearson (Official Secretary at the Canadian High Commissioner's Office) had with British officials on the 13th. It was explained that the British government did not favour any arrangement by which "R.C.A.F." squadrons would be maintained by the British taxpayer. An attempt had therefore been made "to arrange a compromise by which the Canadian contribution to the Air Training Programme should be set off against the formation, equipping and maintenance of R.C.A.F. squadrons in the field. This would probably result in approximately 15 Canadian squadrons, although no exact figures could yet be determined." Unfortunately, Towers and Pearson were not in touch with the negotiations in Ottawa, the High Commissioner had no reason to believe the matter was urgent, and the British officials merely suggested that Towers might explain their views when he returned to Ottawa. The result was that the memorandum of the conversation, which might have helped to ease the situation in Ottawa, was not cabled but sent by mail,<sup>81</sup> while the British "compromise" solution arrived in Ottawa on 15 December. Mr. King, in contrast with his earlier attitude, was now very anxious to get an agreement signed as soon as possible; for that morning the Prime Minister of Australia had

made a premature announcement of the Air Training Plan which a Canadian request had been too late to stop.<sup>82</sup> King had two interviews with Lord Riverdale during the day and a form for a letter from Riverdale to Rogers was apparently agreed upon between them. But Riverdale checked again with London, and it was now that the "compromise" proposal was heard of. He spoke to the Air Minister, Sir Kingsley Wood, and as a result wrote King a letter offering to accept the idea of Canadian trainees being formed into R.C.A.F. units in the field, but concluding with this paragraph:

It would be a condition that the factor governing the numbers of such pupils to be so incorporated at any one time should be the financial contribution which the Canadian Government have already declared themselves ready to make towards the cost of the training scheme.

This baldly phrased formula made King very angry. After further conversation with Riverdale the Prime Minister wrote him a letter rejecting his proposal with the remark that it introduced a quite new factor: "This factor is that the organization of R.C.A.F. units is to be measured by the cold consideration of financial contribution, disregarding entirely Canada's heavy contribution of fighting men in the way of pilots, observers and gunners." He then sent off to Mr. Chamberlain an enormously long telegram describing the recent events in detail, quoting the documents, expressing the opinion that Lord Riverdale accepted the Canadian viewpoint, and suggesting that the British government should "support the head of their Mission".<sup>83</sup> But Chamberlain was on a visit to France, and this telegram did not affect the final settlement.

During 16 December King continued to press the British representatives. An additional reason for haste, in his eyes, was the fact that the first flight of the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division was now approaching the shores of Britain and it seemed to him desirable that a couple of days should intervene between the Air Training Plan announcement and that of the landing of the troops. Riverdale, it must be assumed, was again in touch with London. When nothing had happened by evening, King took extreme action. He aroused the Governor General (Lord Tweedsmuir), who was in bed unwell — he died in the following February — and enlisted his aid in exerting further pressure. King had formed, rightly or wrongly, the idea that "Brooke-Popham and the technical men" were responsible for the difficulties. Brooke-Popham was called urgently to Government House for an interview with the Governor General, but whether this had any effect on the result seems doubtful. King himself returned to his office and Riverdale met him there. King made a small verbal concession, which according to him Brooke-Popham had considered important — the deletion of the word "the" in the phrase "*the* Canadian pupils, when passing out from the training scheme, will be incorporated in or organized as units and formations of the Royal Canadian Air Force", thus reducing the likelihood of its being interpreted as an obligation to incorporate *all* pupils.<sup>84</sup> The offending paragraph concerning financial contribution was dropped, and Lord Riverdale signed a letter to Rogers which was much the same as that agreed upon with King before the conversation with Wood, except that the first 24 words were a significant addition, taken from Riverdale's draft suggested after that conversation:

On the understanding that the numbers to be incorporated or organized at any time will be the subject of discussion between the two governments, the United Kingdom Government accepts in principle, as being consonant with the intention of Paragraph 15 of the Memorandum of Agreement that the United Kingdom Government, on the request of the Canadian

Government, would arrange that Canadian pupils, when passing out from the training scheme, will be incorporated in or organized as units and formations of the Royal Canadian Air Force in the field. The detailed methods by which this can be done would be arranged by an intergovernmental committee for this purpose under Paragraph 15.<sup>85</sup>

The last of many problems had now- been settled, and five minutes after mid-night, that is on 17 December 1939, King and Riverdale began signing the copies of the memorandum of agreement. Brooke-Popham arrived from Government House only during the signing. Sir Gerald Campbell later complained that he had been unable to get through to Riverdale by telephone while the latter was with King, but it would seem that this did not affect the issue ("the message which he had to communicate was a telegram from his government, which was most cooperative").<sup>86</sup> Riverdale, under King's strong pressure, may have carried out the final act without waiting for the last word from his government. Later in the day the Prime Minister received a cable from the Secretary of State for the Dominions (Mr. Anthony Eden) who was at Liverpool for the landing of General McNaughton and his troops:

It is indeed a happy coincidence that these two significant events should have taken place on your birthday and I send you my greetings and hearty congratulations.<sup>87</sup>

King's pleasure in the happy coincidence was somewhat marred. The publicity plans to which he had attached so much importance were disrupted by the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Churchill), who in the words of the *London Times* "torpedoed without warning" the arrangements so carefully agreed upon for releasing on 20 December the news of the troops' safe arrival. He broke it himself in a broadcast on the evening of the 18th,\* when Canada was still holding back the story.<sup>89</sup>

The four-party air training agreement is printed in Appendix "D" and need not be described at length here. It envisaged an organization which would ultimately produce every four weeks 520 pilots with elementary flying training (all Canadians), 544 pilots with service (advanced) flying training, 340 observers and 580 wireless operator-air gunners. Of greatest interest are the provisions concerning the graduates of the Plan. It will be noted that (except for R.C.A.F. aircrew retained for home defence squadrons) pupils who had completed their training were to be placed at the "disposal" of the British government. During their time in Canada all the pupils from other countries were "attached" to the R.C.A.F. and paid at R.C.A.F. rates; upon embarkation for the United Kingdom all became charges upon the British government at R.A.F. rates of pay, except that the Dominion governments could supplement these rates of pay if they so desired. Canada did in fact pay the difference between R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. rates for all Canadian graduates of the Plan. As for the results of Article 15, and the interpretation of it so painfully arrived at between Canada and the United Kingdom, much more would be heard of these things in due course.

A word of comment on the negotiations may be in order. On the Canadian side they were obviously dominated by financial considerations, and by the fact that the project bore (as at least two Canadian ministers remarked during the Ottawa discussions) the appearance of being a recruiting scheme for the R.A.F. The Canadians looked at the figures of what they would pay to create and maintain

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\*"To my intense surprise, The First Lord of the Admiralty, in wireless talk now going on, has announced arrival of First Division" (High Commissioner in London to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 18 December 1939).

the training organization in Canada, and thought them staggering. They were not impressed by the much larger sums which Britain would have to lay out to maintain the trainees when formed into squadrons in the field; the remark was made that "she would have to do so no matter where they came from".<sup>90</sup> There were in fact strong arguments on both sides. The British "compromise" scheme was hastily and tactlessly presented at a moment of pressure; but although it was so ill received by Mr. King the idea of relating the number of Canadian squadrons in the field to the amount spent by Canada on the training organization was not without merit. It was not very different in effect from the arrangement finally adopted in 1941, although the number of squadrons then agreed on as an initial figure was 25, whereas the British in 1939 were very tentatively thinking of something like 15.

A post-war commentator in Canada described this agreement as in some ways "a colonial document". The description is apt, not least with respect to the payment of Canadian graduates of the Plan serving with the R.A.F. The system by which Canada paid merely the difference between their R.A.F. pay and Canadian rates was precisely that followed with the Canadian contingents in the South African War of 1899-1902. The explanation, of course, is to be found largely in the determined regard for economy which dominated Canadian war policy at this early period. The British government came forward with an imaginative plan on a war-winning scale; but that scale was disproportioned to the Canadian government's financial thinking in 1939. The result was permanent damage to the R.C.A.F.'s status in the field. Had Mr. King and his colleagues felt equal in 1939 to producing Canadian ground crews as well as aircrew, and to paying the full cost, or a large part of the cost, of Canadian squadrons overseas, in addition to the large training expenditure, the force's status would have been assured. We have seen that they were thinking in such terms during the short period after the outbreak of war before the Air Training Plan was proposed (above, page 18); though doubtless they had in mind a relatively small force. Because they thought such action impracticable on the scale indicated by the Air Training Plan, the R.C.A.F. over a period of years had to fight its way slowly back from a position of dispersion and subordination; and it never fully achieved an overseas status parallel to that of the Canadian Army.

As already noted, the Air Training Plan would certainly absorb to the full the limited resources in trained personnel and equipment which the R.C.A.F. had available in 1939, and its adoption effectively scotched any possibility of sending a considerable Canadian air expeditionary force abroad in the immediate future. Nevertheless, one complete R.C.A.F. squadron did go overseas during this period. This development seems to have been largely a by-product of the dispatch of the 1st Canadian Division. General McNaughton, the Division's G.O.C., was very anxious to ensure efficient air support — and Canadian air support — for his formation, and indeed he looked forward to a time when Canadian ground forces overseas would be supported by Canadian fighters and bombers. He discussed the matter with the Chief of the Air Staff before the Division left Canada.<sup>91</sup> While its first flight was on the ocean, a telegram went to London informing the Canadian High Commissioner that No. 110 (City of Toronto) (Army Cooperation) Squadron was being manned and trained for dispatch overseas, and remarking, "Canadian Government would like this squadron employed in same corps as First Canadian Division, if possible." It would take no equipment other than personal clothing and accoutrements.<sup>92</sup> The squadron, augmented by personnel of No. 2 (Army Cooperation) Squadron, landed in England late in February 1940. A

second R.C.A.F. Army Cooperation Squadron, No. 112 (City of Winnipeg), went overseas in May and June.<sup>93</sup> These squadrons, like those of the Home War Establishment in Canada, were completely Canadian, both as to aircrew and ground crews; and their personnel was fully paid by Canada. Their status was different from that of the R.C.A.F. personnel and units subsequently produced as a result of the Air Training Plan.

Meanwhile, the Canadian war effort on the industrial front developed slowly. The spirit of limited liability, and the small appropriations for the armed forces, which we have noted, were not favourable to rapid growth. The Canadian supply organization moved into a new phase; the War Supply Board succeeded the Defence Purchasing Board (15 September 1939) and was itself succeeded by the Department of Munitions and Supply (9 April 1940). The manufacture of clothing and similar personal requirements for the forces went forward with praiseworthy rapidity.<sup>94</sup> But equipment and weapons were necessarily a different matter. As we have seen, large orders for naval vessels were placed early in 1940 (above, page 16); considerable orders for airframes were authorized at the same period; but very few weapons were ordered, and the first really big order for motor transport (\$4,440,294) was placed with General Motors of Canada only on 20 March 1940.<sup>95</sup> It is a rather remarkable fact that large orders for weapons for the Canadian land forces were not placed until concurrent orders for the British forces became available in the following summer.

Mr. King confided to his diary on 3 June that at the War Committee that day he had advocated a great increase in the Canadian production effort; he had apparently recommended that this be done even if British orders were not forthcoming. He recalled that "Howe and Ralston" had opposed him earlier when he asked for larger war production, and that he had held a special meeting of the Committee on the subject.<sup>96</sup> This was apparently the meeting of 8 December 1939 — the first the War Committee held under that name — during which reference was made to reports that the Deputy Minister of Finance was putting barriers in the way of the War Supply Board's desire to provide for supplies beyond the current fiscal year (see above, page 16), and the possibility that the Board's Chairman might resign was mentioned. The Committee was told that the Minister of Finance had made it clear in a letter that his department would permit commitments for future years so far as the Navy and Air Force were concerned. The Minister (Mr. Ralston) reported that he took full responsibility for what had been done, and his Deputy should not be blamed; and further, that he felt that he would be derelict in his duty as Minister of Finance if he failed to keep the matter of cost constantly in mind. King's diary shows that he had returned to the subject of manufacturing arms "for our own armies" in Cabinet on 29 January, urging that there should be no waiting for British orders.

Canadians, expecting a flood of war orders from the United Kingdom to make use of their idle industrial capacity, were disappointed when these did not come. Mr. Howe reported to the Cabinet War Committee at the meeting on 8 December 1939 that, apart from an order for Lysander aircraft, British orders so far amounted only to \$5,000,000. A certain number of others had of course been placed before the outbreak. A British Purchasing Mission reached Ottawa in September 1939, and in November a British Purchasing Commission, headed by the Scots-Canadian Arthur B. Purvis, was set up in New York to coordinate purchases in Canada and the United States.<sup>97</sup> It must be remembered that there were special and powerful

reasons operating to limit British orders. One was the factor of time. Canada had developed virtually no military industrial capacity in peacetime, and developing it would be the work of years rather than months. In the words of a British official writer, "Requisitions from Canada were confined in the main therefore to such minor projects as could be expected to bear fruit within the first year or so of war." At the same time, the barrier of dollar exchange was an extremely serious one for the United Kingdom, the more so as that country would have to buy vast quantities of foodstuffs and other raw materials from Canada. Canadians were over-captious in their complaints against British purchasing policy. Express instructions from London gave Canada precedence over the United States as a source of supply. "In all, the value of Ministry of Supply orders placed or pending in Canada at the end of April 1940, excluding orders for machinery or raw materials, was approximately \$81 million; the corresponding figure for the United States was only \$33 million."<sup>98</sup> Though the figures were beginning to be respectable, the surface was hardly scratched yet. The whole aspect of affairs, however, was shortly to be altered by cataclysmic events in Europe.

#### 4. THE EXPANSION OF THE EFFORT, 1940: THE DOLLAR DETHRONED

The "phony war" which had lasted since the Germans overran Poland in September 1939 ended suddenly when they invaded Denmark and Norway on 9 April 1940. The humiliating defeat of the Allies in the brief Norwegian campaign that followed brought down the Chamberlain government in Britain. Winston Churchill became Prime Minister on 10 May, the actual day on which the German offensive against France, Belgium and the Netherlands initiated a new series of disasters. By 4 June the Allied armies had been split in two and the British Expeditionary Force and a large number of French soldiers had been evacuated through Dunkirk. The next day the Germans struck the surviving French forces holding the line of the Somme and Aisne; and by 17 June those forces had been hopelessly routed, the French government had fallen and the new Prime Minister, Marshal Petain, had asked the enemy for an armistice. In this phase a few thousand Canadian troops had reached France, as part of the attempt to build up a new B.E.F. and keep France in the war; fortunately they were withdrawn almost without loss.<sup>99</sup> On 10 June Benito Mussolini's Italy, hastening to join what now seemed clearly the winning side, announced its entrance into the war as an ally of Germany.

Against these powerful and triumphant enemies the British Commonwealth now "stood alone", and its peoples, shaken out of the easy confidence of the opening months, suddenly found themselves confronting the possibility of defeat. In Canada as in Britain, the response was an outburst of effort and energy greater than anything that had preceded it. A magazine writer described the national capital as he saw it about the time of Dunkirk.<sup>100</sup>

To tell that Ottawa, as this is written, is in the midst of a crisis is to put it mildly. The "quietest war capital in Christendom" has become a cauldron of excitement; disillusioned, shocked from its complacency. Day by day, as the shadow of the Swastika lengthens across the English Channel, old shibboleths, old comfortable delusions, go overboard. Where once reigned smugness, self-satisfaction, there is now a wholesome fear; with it, fortunately, more of war stir and vigor.

The new situation was reflected in the activity of the government. The Cabinet War Committee had held only six meetings during the four months following its incep-

tion on 5 December 1939. The Norwegian crisis produced no meetings. But from the moment the *Blitzkrieg* was loosed in the West on 10 May it met frequently; there were eight meetings, beginning on that date, before the end of the month. The meeting on 10 May decided to offer to accelerate the dispatch of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Division to the United Kingdom, and to invite the British government to make suggestions concerning additional measures which Canada might usefully take. On 17 May the Committee heard the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Rogers, who had just returned from overseas, report on Britain's inadequate preparation for mechanized warfare, and on what he called the incompetence and lack of imagination of some British officials. This meeting decided both to form a Canadian Corps overseas and to mobilize a 3rd Division. It anticipated by only a day a message from the British government suggesting the formation of a Corps with the necessary Corps, Army and G.H.Q. troops, and of a third division, which "would prove of great military assistance and encouragement in prosecuting our common task".

The official record indicates that these large measures were taken without any anxiety whatever being expressed over their cost; though the King diary for 24 and 27 May still speaks of difficulty with Ralston over his financial scruples. Of King himself it records on 17 May, "I insisted strongly, so long as we could make a useful contribution at all, of [on] not considering the expenditure." The atmosphere had changed remarkably since the discussions with the British Air Mission in the early winter and those in February concerning the possibility of forming a Corps. The fact is that the dollar sign had suddenly come off the Canadian war effort. Financially speaking, at least, the days of limited liability were over. The actual appropriations for the Department of National Defence for the fiscal year ending 30 March 1941, the first complete year of war, were \$681,438,416, as compared with the \$125,679,888 of the previous year.<sup>101</sup>

Such immediate help as unprepared Canada could offer was being rushed across the Atlantic in answer to British calls. On 22 May the Cabinet War Committee heard with satisfaction that the R.C.A.F.'s one fully-equipped fighter squadron was to go to Britain. The same day it approved providing a brigade to garrison Iceland. The next it authorized the dispatch overseas of four destroyers — the country's whole disposable naval force at that moment. The 2nd Division had already been offered and accepted, and a Canadian battalion was preparing to sail for Bermuda and Jamaica.

Bad news — appalling news — continued to arrive. On 26 May Ottawa received a highly secret telegram from London reporting the decision to withdraw the British Expeditionary Force to the United Kingdom and mentioning the possibility, which would have seemed inconceivable a few months earlier, that the French "are not going to carry on". The next day brought another telegram informing the Canadian government of the results of "preliminary consideration" of this possibility by the British War Cabinet: namely, that in such a case there could be no question of Britain giving up the contest.<sup>102</sup> By 13 June it was evident that, so far as France was concerned, the worst was likely. That day the Canadian War Committee met with Opposition leaders and all agreed that Canada must continue the fight for freedom as long as Britain and France together, or Britain alone, remained in it.<sup>103</sup> On 14 June Paris fell to the enemy; on the 17th came Petain's request for an armistice; and on the 18th Mr. Churchill, in words that rang around the world, announced the British intention to fight on.

Under the impulsion of the new circumstances, Canadian public opinion was ready for measures which it would not have tolerated earlier; indeed, it was

demanding such measures. At the meeting of the Cabinet War Committee on 14 June it was stated that there was a growing feeling throughout the country that provision should be made for every able-bodied man to be used in some phase of the war effort; and at the next meeting, on 17 June, there was general agreement that compulsory military service for the domestic defence of Canada was desirable. (It is relevant that two leaders of the Opposition had called on Mr. King that morning and demanded, among other things, that the government take authority to mobilize all manpower and material resources for aid to Britain and the defence of Canada.)<sup>104</sup> The Secretary was directed to draft a bill in consultation with Mr. Ernest Lapointe and Mr. C. G. Power (who incidentally were the senior French-speaking and English-speaking representatives of the Province of Quebec in the Cabinet). The result was the National Resources Mobilization Act.<sup>105</sup> Though not passed quite as expeditiously as the Prime Minister had hoped (he had suggested that, like the United Kingdom's very similar Emergency Powers Act, 1940, it might be put through all its stages in a single day), it became law on 21 June after three days' discussion in the House of Commons. It was short and general, authorizing the Governor in Council to make orders or regulations "requiring persons to place themselves, their services and their property at the disposal of His Majesty in the right of Canada, as may be deemed necessary or expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of Canada, the maintenance of public order, or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies or services essential to the life of the community". There was one reservation; these powers might not be exercised "for the purpose of requiring persons to serve in the military, naval or air forces outside of Canada and the territorial waters thereof". The government's repeated pledges were thus duly honoured. Conscription for overseas service was impossible so long as this section of the act remained on the statute book.

To administer the act, a new department of government, that of National War Services, was set up by statute; its first Minister was Mr. J. G. Gardiner.\* The act was implemented by regulations setting up a scheme of compulsory military training under which the first trainees reported in October 1940. At first only thirty days' training was given; but this was shortly extended to four months, and in April 1941 the decision was made to keep men trained under the National Resources Mobilization Act on duty indefinitely for home defence. At the end of 1941 over 16,000 N.R.M.A. soldiers were on such duty or in training; and the number rose steadily thereafter. The dualism thus created in the Army, between the men freely enlisted for general service and the men called up for compulsory service in Canada, was to pose a continuing and increasing problem as time passed. It should be noted, however, that the N.R.M.A. provided an important by-product: large numbers of general service recruits. Many men called up for home defence preferred to volunteer for general service; there were 18,274 such volunteers in the peak year, 1942, and the total for the whole period was 58,434.<sup>106</sup>

Through the feverish summer of 1940, while Britain prepared against what seemed the imminent threat of German invasion, the Canadian forces expanded steadily. The most important units of a 4th Division — its nine rifle battalions — were authorized late in May, and many miscellaneous units were formed as the weeks passed. On 22 July Major-General H. D. G. Crerar, lately Senior Officer at Canadian Military Headquarters, London, succeeded General Anderson as Chief

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\*The administration of the N.R.M.A. was transferred to the Department of Labour late in 1942. See below, page 413.

of the General Staff. He proceeded to draw up an army programme for 1941 based upon the creation overseas of a Canadian Corps of three divisions plus an armoured brigade. The armoured brigade was formed in Canada that autumn. While Crerar refrained from sketching specifically a long-term programme for the Army, his memoranda foreshadowed an overseas force of six or seven divisions, two of them armoured, plus two divisions for home defence in Canada mainly composed of N.R.M.A. soldiers.<sup>107</sup> By the end of the calendar year 1940, the authorized expansion and the manner in which the young manhood of Canada pressed forward to volunteer during that tremendous summer had increased the general-service strength of the Canadian Army to 177,810 all ranks.\*

The summer crisis of 1940 appeared to throw the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan into the melting-pot. The immediate need was air defence for Britain; the Cabinet War Committee was told on 24 May that she could not now undertake to send to Canada the aircraft she had promised. For a moment the future of the Plan seemed to hang in the balance; but the R.C.A.F. stepped into the breach with substitute proposals,<sup>108</sup> and in the event the Plan went forward fully and rapidly, with Canadian-built airframes and American engines taking the place of the British-built aircraft originally intended. † The first school under the Plan, No. 1 Initial Training School at Toronto, had opened in April, and others began work as the summer advanced. The first overseas draft of B.C.A.T.P. trainees, 37 strong, landed in the United Kingdom on 24 November (below, page 257). In the meantime, however, No. 1 Fighter Squadron, R.C.A.F. (above, page 32) had reached England on 20 June. Ready for operations by mid-August, it helped to win the famous victory over the *Luftwaffe* in the Battle of Britain.<sup>109</sup>

The crisis had served to introduce a new and important element into the air training situation in Canada. It will be remembered (above, page 18) that in September 1939 the British government had forecast that in due course it might wish to move "at least 4" R.A.F. flying schools to the Dominion. Now, on 13 July, a cable arrived proposing, in view of the new circumstances, to transfer four existing Service Flying Training Schools *en bloc* from the United Kingdom and asking whether facilities could be made available. Five days later the request was expanded; the United Kingdom now desired to move to Canada as many as 14 schools of various types. The Canadian government made no difficulties. The fact that construction for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan had been pushed with great energy and efficiency, and was now actually in advance of the organization of schools, enabled Canada to make facilities available for the R.A.F. units without delay. In all, 26 transferred British schools operated in Canada during the war; one of these trained pilots for the Fleet Air Arm.<sup>110</sup>

The proposal to transfer R.A.F. schools raised the question of control. The Supervisory Board of the Air Training Plan, considering with Mr. Power in the chair the initial request to move four schools, expressed the view that it would be appropriate for these to be controlled and operated by the R.A.F., the intention being, evidently, that they would be considered as "serving together" with the R.C.A.F. under the Visiting Forces Act (below, page 211). But when the larger request arrived a different attitude was taken; Mr. Power told Sir Gerald Campbell

\*Several unfortunate typographical errors occurred in Appendix "A" of *Six Years of War* in the early printings. In three columns opposite the date 29 Dec (1940) the figure 117,302 should read 177,302 and the figure 117,810 should read 177,810. In the Remarks column the date on which the CA(A) reached its peak strength should be 22 Mar 44, not 22 Mar 45.

†The Anson aircraft was redesigned to take the Jacobs engine and American instruments and accessories.

that in these circumstances, with R.A.F. schools scattered all across the country and some of them close to schools established under the B.C.A.T.P., it would be desirable that they should be treated as "in combination" under the Act, and come under the R.C.A.F.'s Air Officers Commanding the areas in which they might be located. The United Kingdom authorities at once accepted this in principle.<sup>111</sup>

The Royal Canadian Navy continued to expand, in ships and in personnel, and it now extended its activities across the Atlantic and took its share of the naval encounters and losses which accompanied the German offensives in the West. No enemy submarines, had yet appeared in North American waters (on 23 February 1940 Hitler had negated a proposal of Admiral Raeder for operations by two submarines off Halifax; though they might well have had a field-day, the Fuhrer wisely decided that it was more important to avoid alarming the United States).<sup>112</sup> But on 23 May, as we have noted on page 32, an urgent request from the British government led the Cabinet War Committee to order the four available Canadian destroyers to England at once.\* (The War Committee agreed that the United States should be informed of the action taken, and the reasons for it; and Mr. H. L. Keenleyside of the Department of External Affairs was accordingly sent to Washington with a personal message from Mr. King to President Roosevelt.)† One of the destroyers (H.M.C.S. *Fraser*) was lost by collision on 25 June off St. Jean de Luz, during the last stages of the evacuation of France. She was replaced by another taken over from the Royal Navy under the name *Margaree*, who unluckily was herself sunk in a collision while on convoy escort duty on 22 October. But when fifty over-age destroyers were transferred from the U.S. Navy to the Royal Navy late in the year, the R.C.N. got seven of them.<sup>113</sup> There were plenty of Canadians willing to man them, though trained men were few and training took time. By 31 March 1941 the Royal Canadian Navy had 2080 officers and 17,036 ratings on war duty.<sup>114</sup>

It is evident that during 1940 the Canadian war effort intensified and ramified in many directions. The disasters in Europe produced a much closer relationship with the United States, expressed in the formation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (below, Part VI). While everything possible was done, by dispatching men and material, to strengthen the military position of the British Isles, Canada also found herself involved in the defence of other areas. We have seen that a Canadian battalion went to the West Indies and an infantry brigade to Iceland. (In this connection the opinion was expressed in the War Committee on 22 May that Canada should do her best to meet all requests of the United Kingdom for help in the Atlantic and American areas, as being particularly appropriate contributions by a North American nation.) In June Canadian forces were sent to Newfoundland (which of course was not then a part of Canada), and in August an agreement was made under which Canada took wide responsibilities for Newfoundland defence and Newfoundland's forces were placed under Canadian command.<sup>115</sup>

Such material help as a country so ill-prepared as Canada could give was sent to Britain as soon as the desperate nature of the crisis began to be apparent; 75,000 Ross rifles and 60 million rounds of small arms ammunition were dispatched before the beginning of June. When Britain, and France, then made further requests, they had to be told that the Canadian cupboard was bare. At the same moment, however, the situation with respect to Canadian war industry was being transformed.

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\*The R.C.N. now had seven destroyers, having acquired one from the Royal Navy in the autumn of 1939; but two were under repair and a third (also by British request) was serving in the West Indies.

†See also below, pages 328-32.

The Minister of Munitions and Supply reported to the War Committee on 5 June that he had been informed that the British government proposed to place in Canada orders for the equipment for 10 divisions; and in fact during the last seven months of 1940 the United Kingdom placed, or had under negotiation, new contracts in Canada for 300 tanks, 1000 universal carriers, 72,434 vehicles, 3450 artillery equipments and naval guns and 100,000 rifles; while its pre-war order for Bren light machine-guns had been increased from 5000 to 42,600. British orders for ships and aircraft had likewise greatly increased. Britain, under the stress of the crisis, had defied the dollar exchange problem and the considerations of time that had deterred her from placing such orders earlier (above, page 31). The great influx of orders from the United Kingdom encouraged the Department of Munitions and Supply to contract in Canada for equipment for Canada's own expanding forces, and large concurrent orders were placed in these months.<sup>116</sup> But since the manufacture of weapons was an almost completely new activity in Canada, the fact had to be faced that much time would elapse before the material now ordered actually became available.

The Canadian forces had expanded greatly during 1940. It seems clear also that there had been some change in the balance of emphasis between them. The government's previously evident policy of concentration upon the air, and particularly upon the Air Training Plan, had undergone a degree of alteration as the result of the summer crisis. The French Army — the one really large land force on the Allied side — had suddenly vanished from the chessboard of the war; the British government's desire for a considerable Canadian army effort, obvious in the discussions on the priority of the Air Training Plan, had been made apparent again; the danger to the United Kingdom, and the British requests for help in specific areas, underlined the need for large disposable forces; and in the shadow of the emergency the War Committee, apparently without any doubt or hesitation, authorized a succession of major increases in the army. The Prime Minister himself, usually the chief opponent of a large army, refrained from opposing these measures.<sup>117</sup> Indeed, if one can take his diary literally, he momentarily took the lead in them. He wrote on 17 May concerning that day's War Committee meeting,

I . . . discussed with my colleagues at length the situation from our point of view. Got their agreement to send a 3rd division; establish a Canadian Corps of Ancillary troops [sic] in England; advance the time of the departure of the 2nd division; and arrange for a reserve division in Canada.

The Air Training Plan continued to be of fundamental importance in the eyes of the government; but, while there had been no specific discussion of or decision on the point, it clearly no longer enjoyed quite the overriding priority indicated in the discussions of November and December 1939.

The expansion of the forces necessitated changes in the machinery for controlling them. A single Minister, a single Department, had been adequate for the tiny services of peacetime; now something more was needed. Accordingly in May 1940 new legislation provided for a Minister of National Defence for Air, and in July for a Minister of National Defence for Naval Services. Mr. C. G. Power (formerly Postmaster General), who also became Associate Minister of National Defence, and Mr. Angus L. Macdonald (formerly Premier of Nova Scotia) were respectively appointed to these portfolios. Although in law separate departments were not set up, in practice this is what took place. These changes are dealt with in greater detail below (pages 120-22). On 10 June 1940 Mr. Norman Rogers, who

had been a competent if colourless\* Minister of National Defence since September 1939, was killed in an air crash. After a short interregnum, the Minister of Finance, Colonel J. L. Ralston, a Nova Scotian who had been a famous battalion commander in the Canadian Corps of 1915-18, was transferred to National Defence (a portfolio he had already held in 1926-30) on 5 July; he was to hold it now for fifty-two eventful months. Ralston, we have seen, had so far been chiefly notable as the watchdog of the Treasury who constantly emphasized the need for economy during the "phony" or "twilight" war; he now moved to the great spending department and was to preside over the expenditure of sums that would have appalled him and his advisers in 1939-40.† The new Minister of Finance was another rugged Nova Scotian, J. L. Ilsley, who was promoted from the Department of National Revenue; though never liked by the Prime Minister, he was to be a pillar of the state through the years of war, and to be remembered as the man who taxed Canadians as they had never been taxed before, and almost made them like it.

The summer crisis of 1940 changed many things and many men. The Canadian Prime Minister had always claimed to be a staunch Commonwealth man, yet the note struck in his diary for 24 May, as he commented grimly on the decision the day before to throw Canada's little naval force into the European battle, was strange for him:

One wonders if Canadian destroyers will come back. We may find our own coasts left bare in giving our last possible aid to the Mother country. That, however, to my mind, is right. We owe to her such freedom as we have. It is right we should strike with her the last blow for the preservation of freedom.

On the same date he recorded a stage in what may be called the education of O. D. Skelton:

It amuses me a little to see how completely some men swing to opposite extremes. No one could have been more strongly for everything being done for Canada, as against Britain, than Skelton was up to a very short time ago. Yesterday, in our discussion, he naturally [? actually] did not want me to suggest any help for Canada, but rather the need for Britain. He now sees that the real place to defend our land is from across the seas. He did not want the Americans to undertake the protection of our coasts, lest they might not do as much for Britain.

For perhaps the first time in his career, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs was in full agreement with the Chiefs of Staff.

## 5. THE EFFORT MOVES TOWARDS ITS PEAK, 1941-1943

The strategic situation at the beginning of 1941 was painful. The Commonwealth, supported only by the exile governments of the countries which Hitler had overrun, and living under the constant threat of an attack by Japan, still confronted Germany and Italy alone. Canada, her war effort now steadily expanding on a wide front, was for the moment the United Kingdom's most powerful ally, and her growing military force in Britain had been an important factor in British defensive calculations when invasion seemed imminently threatened in the autumn.

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\*Mackenzie King recorded in his diary on 19 September 1939 that the Governor General, Lord Tweedsmuir, referred to Rogers' lack of colour. King says, "I said I thought that was perhaps all to the good at this time."

†Unfortunately the Ralston papers preserved in the Public Archives of Canada include none relating to his tenure of the Department of Finance.

Early in 1941 it was difficult for the British government and Chiefs of Staff to devise a strategy that offered a genuine hope of victory. Publicly, victory was never despaired of; but there seems to have been, not surprisingly, some pessimism in confidential official circles. The Commonwealth's manpower resources were quite unequal to providing an army that could land on the Continent and challenge Germany's 200 or so divisions. Some British military economists were doubtful of being able to do this even if the United States should play an active part. In June 1941 the Future Operations Section of the Joint Planning Staff in London wrote, "The effort involved in shipping modern armies with the ground staff of Air Forces is so great that even with American help we can never hope to build up a very large force on the Continent."<sup>118</sup> A lucid summary was given to the Canadian Cabinet War Committee on 27 January 1941 by Mr. C. D. Howe, who had that day returned from the United Kingdom (his trip had nearly cost him his life, for the ship in which he made his eastward passage, the *Western Prince*, was torpedoed and sunk). It was difficult, he reported, to say how the actual defeat of Germany could be accomplished. Germany would continue to command a vast superiority in army divisions. The numbers of aircraft at the Germans' disposal, and the shorter distances over which they had to operate, gave them distinct advantages. Everyone felt that an attempt at invasion of the United Kingdom, which was still considered probable, could be beaten off; but the difficulties in the way of achieving positive victory, without internal trouble in Germany, were very serious. And there were no real signs as yet of serious economic deterioration or weakness in the enemy's country.

The only offensive weapons immediately available to Britain were economic pressure and a mounting air campaign, plus subversion in the occupied countries, and these were accordingly made the basis of policy. In July 1940 Winston Churchill wrote, ". . . when I look round to see how we can win the war, I see that there is only one sure path. . . that is an absolutely devastating attack by very heavy bombers from this country upon the Nazi homeland."<sup>119</sup> It was hopefully felt, however, that when Germany had been worn down, a relatively small land striking force sent to the Continent might clinch the matter. The British Prime Minister emphasized the importance of armour. "We cannot hope to compete with the enemy in numbers of men, and must therefore rely upon an exceptional proportion of armoured fighting vehicles."<sup>120</sup> He wanted ten armoured divisions; but the War Office preferred to think in terms of organizing its tank resources in terms of five armoured divisions and ten independent army tank brigades. If more of the former were organized, it would simply mean fewer of the latter. The War Office in September 1940 was planning for 1942 a possible field force of 55 divisions, though it seemed likely that the actual practicable total would be only 50. It should be noted that of the 55, only 34 would come from the United Kingdom; India was expected to provide nine, and Canada and Australia three each. Other countries of the Commonwealth and Empire would find the rest. An appreciation by the British Chiefs of Staff dated 4 September 1940 spoke optimistically of passing "to the general offensive in all spheres and in all theatres with the utmost possible strength in the spring of 1942". In discussions with U.S. officers a few days earlier, the Chiefs of Staff had emphasized the elimination of Italy from the war as a strategic aim of the first importance.<sup>121</sup>

The course of 1941, however, saw the whole war situation transformed. On 22 June Germany attacked Soviet Russia. Hitler failed to achieve his aim of crushing Russia in a single brief campaign; and thereafter the bulk of the German

Army was tied down by the vast and exhausting struggle on the Eastern Front. This fact dominates the strategic situation in Europe from that moment. On 7 December Japan attacked territories of the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. The immediate result was catastrophic defeats and appalling embarrassments in the Far East; but the involvement of the United States, with its vast war potential, in fact sounded the knell of Japan and Germany alike. The British and American leaders at once confirmed a tentative decision made some months before — that in the event of the United States coming into the war alongside Britain, and against Japan and Germany, the basic Allied strategy would be to *beat Germany first*. The result of all these developments was that at the end of 1941 major land operations against the Germans bade fair to be practicable in the not remote future. In the meantime, however, the only theatre where the Western Allies were engaging Germany on land was the Mediterranean basin. Early in 1941 Hitler had sent a small German force under General Erwin Rommel to North Africa to rescue his Italian ally, who had been sorely smitten by General Wavell. For many months thereafter a doubtful and dramatic battle raged back and forth across the desert.

Against this background we can consider briefly the question of the employment of the Canadian services at this period. For the moment this was not a particularly serious problem with respect to either the Navy or the Air Force. The expanding Navy had slipped naturally and as though inevitably into the task of convoy escort. It was fully employed in cooperation with British naval forces in the battle to protect the all-important trans-Atlantic lifeline from North America to Britain against the attacks of German submarines. As for the Air Force, its squadrons based on Canada's east coast were sharing in this vital task; while the R.C.A.F. units gradually formed overseas from graduates of the Air Training Plan (there were 21 squadrons in the United Kingdom by the end of 1941) \* were absorbed, as they became operational, into the pattern of Royal Air Force operations in defence of Britain and in the offensive against the Germans on the Continent.<sup>122</sup>

The employment of the Army was the issue of which the government and the public were most aware, chiefly because circumstances resulted in the Canadian overseas force being denied active employment for a very long period. The Allied *débâcle* of 1940 ruined the plan by which the 1st Canadian Division was to serve with the British Expeditionary Force in France, and it, and the 2nd Division when it arrived, found themselves committed to the defence of Britain against what seemed imminent invasion. But the invasion did not come; and by December 1940 a Canadian Press correspondent was speculating, "The Canadians may be thrown into Britain's increasingly important campaign in the Near East".<sup>123</sup> It was doubtless this report that led General Crerar (then in England with Colonel Ralston) to mention the matter on 4 December to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Sir John Dill replied that there were British divisions available for the Middle East, and there would be employment for the Canadians "nearer home". Crerar told him that he knew of no desire on the part of the Canadian government to discourage the use of its forces in any operations in which they could usefully play a part, "no matter where the theatre might be".<sup>124</sup> But although it had not told its Chief of the General Staff, the government (and the Prime Minister most particularly) were on the whole hostile at this time to having Canadian troops sent to the Mediter-

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\*On overseas units formed as a result of the B.C.A.T.P., see below, pages 257-60.

ranean. Mr. King had raised the question briefly in the Cabinet War Committee on 1 October, none of the Chiefs of Staff being present; and the opinion was expressed that the Canadian public, while not questioning the importance of defending the British Isles, would not be enthusiastic about sending Canadian soldiers to new and distant scenes of operations.

On 14 November 1940 Colonel Ralston had asked the War Committee whether there would be any objection to his mentioning in the House of Commons the possibility of Canadian troops serving in Egypt, or in overseas theatres other than the United Kingdom. The Committee's decision was that this would be "inadvisable". "It had not been decided whether or not Canadian forces would be sent upon active service elsewhere than to Great Britain (apart from Iceland), and no proposal to that effect had come from the U.K. government. The question involved a most important one of policy, upon which no decision had yet been taken."

Now, on the same day on which Crerar discussed the question with Dill, the Prime Minister, in Ralston's absence, again brought the matter before the War Committee, doubtless on the basis of the same press report.\* There was a long discussion, and some variety of opinion. Mr. Power, King sadly recorded in his diary, argued that the morale of the forces was suffering because of lack of opportunity for fighting.<sup>125</sup> Mr. J. G. Gardiner, who had lately returned from England, reported that Mr. Eden had raised the question with him and had inquired whether the Canadian government would object to Canadian troops going to Egypt. General McNaughton had also mentioned the matter, Gardiner said, but was inclined to oppose any such course.

The Committee agreed unanimously "that no decision with regard to the despatch of Canadian troops for service outside of the United Kingdom should be made until there had been full consideration of the question by the Canadian government". It was also agreed that a telegram should be sent to Colonel Ralston in England, "stating that it was understood that a proposal to transfer Canadian troops to the Near East might be raised, or might already have been discussed, [and] that, while it was recognized that there might be strong arguments in favour of such a course, there were also strong arguments against it and that, in any event, full opportunity for preliminary consideration by the Canadian government was essential". The telegram, drafted by Dr. Skelton, was dispatched on 6 December. It went somewhat beyond the mere terms of the Committee's resolutions. "It is pretty certain to be felt", it remarked, "that if troops are being sent to the Near East they should be sent from the parts of the Commonwealth which control policy in the Near East or which are more geographically concerned with the Near East. It is one thing for Canada to raise additional forces to assist Britain in the British Isles or in Western Europe, it might become a very different thing to get the support necessary for Canadian forces to be sent to other parts of the world."<sup>126</sup>

Ralston replied on 9 December. He had found, he said, that the press report had no authoritative foundation, and Crerar (as we have already seen) had received from the British staff the impression that there was little likelihood of such a proposal being made. McNaughton and Crerar would be against "such a disposition", except in the event of new strategic developments arising. Ralston

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\*The statement in J. W. Pickersgill, *The Mackenzie King Record*, I, 156, that this was "a suggestion emanating from the Canadian Army authorities", is mistaken.

concluded, "Will be meeting the Minister\* this week and will have views and considerations mentioned in your telegram fully in mind."<sup>127</sup> Ralston's record of a conference between himself and Churchill on 17 December<sup>128</sup> says:

I mentioned that in Canada already there had been newspaper reports already [sic], intimating that it was proposed to send Canadians to the Middle East. I had advised the Government that such a proposal had never even been put forward and I intimated that we would assume that employment of our troops, outside of the United Kingdom, be left for our suggestion. His reply was "of course."

After his return to Ottawa Ralston reported to the War Committee on 24 January that there had been no suggestion that Canadians be employed in North Africa. Mr. Churchill, he said, had confirmed that there had been no thought of so doing.

Two things seem to emerge from these exchanges with the British authorities. First, those authorities appear to have had little disposition to send Canadians to the Mediterranean (and criticisms that circulated during 1941 of an alleged British tendency to fight battles with "other people's troops and blood" can only have stiffened this attitude).<sup>129</sup> Secondly, Ralston's communication to Churchill after receiving King's telegram of 6 December was certainly likely to leave in British minds, for the moment, the impression that the Canadian government preferred not to have its forces transferred to the Middle East. Mr. King's diary reinforces the official records and leaves no doubt of his own views. He had no objection whatever to the army's remaining inactive in England; he was anxious to avoid casualties (and, undoubtedly, the manpower problem which long casualty lists would bring in their train). Of the War Committee discussion on 4 December 1940 he wrote, "I strongly stated my view that we owed it to our men to seek to protect their lives."<sup>130</sup>

In May 1941 the Department of National Defence, increasingly conscious of the problems arising from the Canadians' static role, including the fact that "absence of active participation of Canadians in recent operations is having a frustrating effect on public outlook" in Canada,<sup>131</sup> made an attempt at authorizing General McNaughton to seek opportunities for raiding operations for his troops. There was another difference of opinion in the War Committee when the proposal was discussed on 20 May. Mr. Power suggested that Canada offer a brigade for service in Egypt. King recorded, "I said at once that I would not countenance anything of the kind: that it might be my Scotch conscience, or it might be common sense, but I do not feel that any Government has the right to take the lives of any men for spectacular purposes. Moreover, I do not think we should interfere with the disposition of troops, when our policy was that of allowing the High Command to make whatever disposition was thought most effective."<sup>132</sup>

Next day the Committee considered a revised draft, prepared by General Crerar for Colonel Ralston in the form of a telegram to the British Secretary of State for War, which suggested that while it had been indicated to Ralston during his visit that the British authorities desired to keep the Canadians in England, the Canadian government would be glad to consider any proposals which the Secretary of State might forward for more active employment if this now seemed desirable "in the view of your military advisers".<sup>133</sup> The Committee agreed "that a telegram be sent to the U.K. Prime Minister along the lines proposed by Mr. Ralston", containing a reference to a recent conversation on the subject which Mr. King had had with the British High Commissioner. No such telegram has been found; but the draft is in the King Papers with a note by the Prime Minister to one of his secre-

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\*This was obviously garbled in transmission. Ralston probably wrote "the Prime Minister".

taries, "not sent — hold", and in the following September the file containing the draft which Ralston had placed before the Committee was returned to his secretary by the Privy Council Office with a note indicating that it "was not used and is now out of date".<sup>134</sup> It seems probable that Mr. King put off dispatching the telegram and ultimately simply did not send it. Nevertheless, the War Committee's decision, even if King circumvented it for the moment, was apparently not without effect. On the following 6 November Ralston, reporting to the Committee on his latest visit to Britain, said that he had discussed the question with the Secretary of State for War and had "again" emphasized the Canadian government's position: Canadian troops were to be regarded as available for service anywhere and at any time they might be needed; the government would gladly consider any suggestion that might be made. Mr. Margesson had, however, made it quite clear that for the present the Canadians' job was in Britain.

Mackenzie King remained reluctant to see Canadian troops committed to battle. On 2 October 1941, when the War Committee approved the sending of two Canadian battalions to reinforce Hong Kong, he did not oppose the action, but "stressed the importance of care being taken to see that our agreement in that particular did not later afford an argument for conscription".<sup>135</sup> After the Dieppe raid of 19 August 1942, when the Canadian Army fought its first European battle of the war and the 2nd Division suffered crippling losses, King, doubtful of the wisdom of the enterprise, wrote, "It goes back, I feel, above all to the time when it was felt it was necessary to have the Canadians do something for a variety of reasons."<sup>136</sup> Nevertheless, as time passed and the overseas army remained in England, King found himself obliged to compromise with the feeling that had manifested itself in the War Committee as early as 1940.

The increasing criticism levelled at the inactivity of the Canadian Army Overseas, and the disturbed state of public opinion on the issue, are described in the Army history. Even officials of the Department of External Affairs (Skelton having died early in 1941) were arguing by January 1943 that Canadian influence in the post-war world would suffer if Canada made no demonstrable contribution to victory.<sup>137</sup> On 21 October 1942 Colonel Ralston, just returned from another visit to Britain, reported to the War Committee that he had made it clear both to Mr. Churchill and the political and military chiefs of the War Office that the Canadian Army was available for service anywhere it could be most effectively employed. He told them that no condition that the Army must be employed as a whole was being imposed; the sole consideration was how and where it could serve best. The Canadian government were willing to consider any project, though they would of course wish to have the advice of their own military advisers upon any operations which were proposed. There is no evidence that King took any exception to this report.<sup>138</sup> It was after all only a reinforced version of that of the previous 6 November; and it was probably conceived by Ralston as authorized by the decision of 21 May 1941, which the Prime Minister, even if he had omitted to act upon it, had doubtless not forgotten.

From this time the Canadian government brought increasing pressure upon the British cabinet to find active employment for the Canadian troops. A climax came on 17 March 1943, when it was reported to the War Committee that there was still no prospect of early action and that Mr. Churchill had proposed moving additional United States airmen to the United Kingdom at the expense of the movement of Canadian Army personnel. The Committee decided to tell Churchill "that his proposal had come as a serious shock". That night King sent to Churchill

a strong personal cable urging "earnest re-examination"\* of the desirability of sending Canadians to North Africa.<sup>140</sup> It is clear from King's diary that he was doubtful about this action, but his protests seem to have been limited to private conversations with Ralston. His great interest was still "the conservation of our men";<sup>141</sup> , but he was finding it necessary to swim with the tide. Moreover, his concern with manpower itself worked to influence him in favour of Mediterranean operations<sup>142</sup> (below, page 237). Both Ralston and the Chief of the General Staff (Lieut.-General Kenneth Stuart) were strongly in favour of early action for the Army. The ultimate results of insistence by them and others were the participation of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division and the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade in the invasion of Sicily on 10 July 1943, and the movement of additional units sufficient to form a complete Canadian Corps to the Mediterranean in the following autumn.<sup>143</sup>

All this had, essentially, been arranged between the Canadian and British governments over the head of General McNaughton, the Canadian Army Commander in Britain; and he was not in sympathy with the policy of dividing the Army. He was thus in difficulties with his own government at the time when the British military authorities decided to represent to Canada that he was not the best person to command the First Canadian Army in the field (below, pages 231-47); and in spite of the fact that the Prime Minister had recorded on 21 March 1943 that he felt it his duty "to back up McNaughton rather than Ralston",<sup>144</sup> it was McNaughton who lost the fight — for the moment.

The question of the employment of the Army was closely linked with another difficult problem which likewise tended to divide the government: that of the proper balance between the armed services in the Canadian war effort. The publication of portions of Mr. King's diary has served to establish beyond question a fact which indeed was already evident — the fact that from the beginning the Prime Minister envisioned the proper orientation of Canadian military policy in terms of concentration upon air and (to a somewhat lesser degree) naval forces, and upon industrial production, in preference to the creation of a large army. It is also very clear that the basic reason for this preferred policy was the hope which it held out of avoiding the infinitely dangerous question of overseas conscription.

We have already seen (above, pages 36-7) that this policy, so important in King's eyes, received a severe setback in the summer of 1940. A large increase in the Canadian Army was rapidly authorized in circumstances — notably the tremendous impact of the French collapse — that prevented the Prime Minister from offering the opposition that might normally have been expected from him. The active strength of the Army rose from about 63,500 all ranks at the end of 1939 to about 178,000 at the end of 1940.<sup>145</sup> But subsequent further increases were usually made only in the face of resistance from the Prime Minister, who may be said to have fought a consistent rearguard action against a large army and in favour of an effort concentrated primarily upon the air force and war industry. Sometimes his attitude verged on the comic, as when he said of the butter famine of 1942, "It all comes down again to too large an army. They have been buying up most of the butter."<sup>146</sup>

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\*There appears in fact to have been no formal request earlier that Canadians be employed in North Africa. But the War Committee on 21 October 1942 had approved (without mentioning the objective) participation in a proposed operation against the Canary Islands, which in the event was never required;<sup>139</sup> and King seems to have remembered this as a North African project.

and about 100 corvettes. The Air Force required 96,818 men between 1 December 1941 and 31 March 1943, including 56,692 by 31 July 1942. The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Vice-Marshal L. S. Breadner, explained that by 31 March 1943 it was expected that in addition to 28 "all-Canadian" R.C.A.F. squadrons overseas and certain Canadian station and group headquarters, there would be more than 100 squadrons in the field\* whose aircrews would be completely Canadian. By that date R.C.A.F. personnel would total approximately 196,000 (less wastage); by the beginning of "next year" (presumably 1 April 1942) 15,000 would be overseas; while some 90,000 would be required to remain in Canada for operation of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan at full capacity. Neither the navy nor the air force had had any difficulty in obtaining the men they needed by voluntary enlistment. Since the army programme required 104,000 additional men by 31 March 1943, the total needs for the three services for the period amounted to about 214,000.

The problem was remitted to the full Cabinet, which began studying it on 9 December. By this time the war situation had been fundamentally altered by the Japanese attack and the consequent involvement of the United States in the war. (Canada's declaration of war on Japan was authorized by the Cabinet on the evening of the 7th, anticipating those by the United Kingdom and the United States which followed on the 8th.)<sup>153</sup> This, combined with Mr. Churchill's visit to Ottawa on 29-31 December, and Mr. King's to Washington (26-28 December), no doubt had some effect on the outcome. Churchill made it clear at this time that another armoured division was very desirable. Nevertheless the Cabinet discussions were long and serious, and again there was a collision between Ralston and King on the still theoretical question of conscription. On 5 January the Prime Minister recorded that he felt that the Cabinet was largely in favour of granting the additional armoured division provided it did not involve overseas conscription. He added, "I have felt strongly that Ralston would resign if he did not get the extra armoured division and that Angus Macdonald would follow his example." King now gave his support to the armoured division accordingly.<sup>154</sup> On 6 January the Cabinet approved the Navy, Army and Air Force programmes as they had been presented, the only reservation being financial; officials of the Department of Finance had expressed the view that economic facts might compel some revision of the R.C.A.F. plans, which they considered impossible of accomplishment within the period (see below, pages 50-51).

These discussions, in which manpower had been so prominent, left no doubt that in essentials the Army had reached its furthest expansion. General Crerar's six-division army would never eventuate. Only minor increases were authorized after January 1942. A number of such measures were included in the Army Programme for 1943, approved by the War Committee on 6 January of that year. At this time a "manpower ceiling" was approved for the army overseas. Including the base units in England and three months' reinforcements calculated at the "intense" rate of activity, it amounted to about 226,000 all ranks. A final adjustment in August 1944 fixed it at 234,500 all ranks.<sup>155</sup>

The controversy over the Army Programme did not lay the manpower difficulty to rest. On the contrary, it shaded off into the "first conscription crisis" which nearly blew the King government apart early in 1942. Within ten days of the

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\*He may have said "the equivalent of more than 100 squadrons".

attacks on Pearl Harbor and Hong Kong, Mackenzie King was beginning to think in terms of the possibility of a direct appeal to the public to release the government from its commitments against overseas conscription. This might, he thought, serve to counteract the growing agitation in the country for such conscription, which found expression on 17 December 1941 in a resolution of the legislature of Manitoba. He certainly did not intend to use the proposed release to introduce overseas conscription; on the contrary, he proposed to continue to pursue a policy of avoiding it unless and until compelled to adopt it. He saw a plebiscite as a means of avoiding a split in his party and in the country over the issue.<sup>156</sup>

The plebiscite was duly held on 27 April 1942; Quebec, holding to its traditional attitude, voted strongly against release, but every other province voted "Yes". The next step was to introduce legislation amending the National Resources Mobilization Act to remove the prohibition against overseas conscription (above, page 00). The result was the resignation on 9 May of the senior French-speaking Minister from Quebec, P. J. A. Cardin, the Minister of Public Works. This was not the end of the difficulty. Before the amending bill ("Bill 80") became law, King was assailed from the opposite side. J. L. Ralston, supported by Angus L. Macdonald, had already taken exception to King's proposition that before using its new powers to send conscripts to Europe, the government should go again to Parliament and "ask for an expression of confidence". Over this issue there was conflict in the Cabinet until 7 July, when Ralston offered his resignation. King did not accept it, and within a few days the cracks in the two men's relationship were temporarily papered over by an-exchange of conciliatory letters (below, page 401).<sup>157</sup>

French Canada was, of course, the centre of the government's anxieties over the manpower question; and the ministry had been weakened there by the death on 26 November 1941 of King's great lieutenant, Ernest Lapointe, the Minister of Justice, who had shown such high resolution in the Quebec crisis of 1939 (above, page 10). Replacing him was not easy; but on 10 December King brought into the Cabinet in the same portfolio Louis S. St. Laurent, a Quebec lawyer of high reputation though of little political experience. This appointment was to prove one of King's most successful strokes.

The outbreak of war with Japan in December 1941 was the beginning of a period in which the needs — real or supposed — of home defence received increased attention from government. No informed and competent officer ever suggested that the Japanese were in a position to undertake anything more than nuisance raids against the coast of North America. On 11 December the Chiefs of Staff Committee submitted to the Ministers of National Defence a memorandum<sup>158</sup> forecasting that "considerable pressure" might be brought to bear on the government to increase the military strength on the Pacific Coast. The Chiefs recommended that "this pressure should be resisted". They pointed out that in certain respects the Canadian situation on the Coast was actually better than before Pearl Harbor, since the powerful forces and installations of the United States, formerly neutral, were now cooperating in the defence effort. The cooperation of the U.S. coast defences meant that the sea approaches to Victoria, Vancouver and Seattle were effectively blocked. "The defence of the West Coast of Canada", the Chiefs pointed out, "is primarily a matter for the Navy and the Air Force. The Army acts as 'goalkeeper' of the team. It is there for the purpose of resisting any attacks that have eluded the forces of the other two Services." The memorandum concluded:

We must not allow ourselves to be stampeded by public opinion on the West Coast. The decisive theatre in this war is to the East and not to the West. If we forget this truth and divert an unnecessary proportion of our strength to the West, then we are merely playing into the hands of our enemies.

On 17 December the Cabinet War Committee "took note" of this advice. But it was without effect. The people of British Columbia and the Pacific Coast States were frightened; they duly brought pressure to bear upon their governments; and in Canada, at least, the pressure was not very seriously resisted. Although on 7 December there were already the equivalent of two brigades of infantry in British Columbia, and some additional units were moved thither at once, panic feeling grew in the province as the Japanese swept across South-East Asia and the islands early in 1942. On 16 March the Chief of the General Staff was moved to recommend that units be mobilized to complete the order of battle of the 6th Division (which as we have seen was authorized for home defence in July 1941) (above, page 44) and that authority be given to mobilize the three brigade groups of a 7<sup>th</sup> Division, also for home defence. This was authorized on 18 March by the War Committee, which simultaneously approved a great increase in the Home War Establishment of the Royal Canadian Air Force — the record says, an addition of 49 squadrons, to cost some \$206 million. This was still not considered enough. Two days later General Stuart recommended the completion of the 7th Division and the mobilization of the brigade groups of an 8th.\* The War Committee approved this action the same evening.<sup>159</sup> The contrast between the ease with which authority was obtained for these unnecessary home defence formations, and the difficulty of obtaining that for divisions to fight overseas, is very marked. The whole series of events is a striking example of the extent to which Canadian military policy was sometimes governed by political considerations to the exclusion of genuine military considerations and professional military advice.

The Chiefs of Staff, indeed, might well have saved their ink, for there are indications that Mackenzie King had made up his mind on this question even before Pearl Harbor. He visited President Roosevelt at Hyde Park on 1-2 November 1941. On 7 November Grant Dexter of the *Winnipeg Free Press* set down what he had been able to learn about their discussions:

Hyde Park conversations. King has told something of his talks to various colleagues, etc.

King thinks conscription talk stupid and due largely [to] habits formed of rivetting their eyes on Europe. They forget Pacific. Roosevelt told him that war between United States and Japan regarded as certain and almost certain to come within 30 days. † This will mean radical changes in priorities and this was discussed. We will have to put two or three divisions, perhaps more, on the Pacific coast as they think Japan very likely to attempt a diversion for the purpose of compelling North America to ease off support for Britain and Russia and thus help Hitler. The national mobilization act will be used for this purpose. Many thousands of young men will be called up. We will have to equip them and therefore will have to cut down to some extent our aid to Britain. The realization of the Pacific peril, Mr. King thinks, will put an end to talk of conscription for overseas service.

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\*The writer has been assured that General Stuart told officers about him that he made this recommendation under political pressure, feeling that he would not retain his appointment unless he did so.

†The effect of this rather remarkable statement is somewhat reduced by two circumstances: (a) it is second-hand, for it does not appear that Dexter had himself talked to King; (b) there is nothing to this effect in King's diary record of the visit. It is hard to believe that he would have failed to note so important a remark, particularly in view of the significance of an outbreak in the Pacific for the Canadian Hong Kong force, which had sailed from Vancouver on 27 October. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister at this time was in a condition of extreme fatigue, which may have affected the completeness of his record. Dexter's memorandum is in the Dafoe Papers, Public Archives of Canada.

This would indicate that the policy followed in British Columbia can hardly be called a military policy at all. King's pervading concern with the political question of overseas conscription seems to have been a controlling factor. We have here a striking example of that wishful exaggeration of the direct threats to Canada which was characteristic of King and his civilian advisers, and which had appeared so prominently in Skelton's fundamental paper of August 1939 (above, page 9).

As the result of these measures of exaggerated precaution — apart from the free balloons the Japanese sent over, which did no harm whatever in Canada, the only enemy missiles that fell on Canadian soil were the few shells which a submarine fired at Estevan Point on 20 June 1942 — large numbers of men and great quantities of equipment were accumulated uselessly on the Pacific Coast. Two of the three home defence divisions were stationed there — the completion of the 8th was authorized on 17 June 1942 — and there were about 35,000 men of the Active Army in the Pacific Command when it reached its greatest strength in the spring of 1943. As for the Air Force, its actual strength in Canada rose from 16 squadrons at the end of 1941 to 36 a year later. Of these, 17 were in Western Air Command, including four in Alaska — two at Annette Island, one at Anchorage and one at Kodiak.<sup>160</sup> Unlike the Army formations in British Columbia, some of the Air Force units in the west saw action with the enemy — the Japanese who installed themselves in two western Aleutian islands in June 1942 (below, page 390).

We may note here, a little out of order, what the actual strengths of the three Canadian services were at their peaks. The Active Army reached its greatest strength on 22 March 1944 — 495,804 all ranks, including 74,391 men compulsorily enlisted under the National Resources Mobilization Act and 15,845 women. Its strength in the European zone was then 242,463 all ranks. The Air Force peak came at the end of 1943 — 206,350 all ranks, including 15,153 women. There were then 46,272 R.C.A.F. personnel overseas. The Navy attained its highest point somewhat later, in January 1945, with a total of 92,441 officers and ratings, of whom some 5300 were women.<sup>161</sup>

Those aspects of the Canadian war effort lying outside the direct purview of the Department of National Defence can be dealt with only briefly in this book, but a word may be said here concerning the further development of war production (see also Part VIII, below).

We have seen (above, page 36) that the summer of 1940 witnessed great activity in Canadian production planning, as under the impulsion of the defeats on the Continent orders were placed for a great variety of equipment on British or Canadian account. The harvest then sown began to be reaped on a large scale only in 1942. The exceptions were chiefly those items of equipment for which some foundation for manufacture had existed in 1939. Thus 1941 saw the production of over 383 million rounds of small arm ammunition, some 17,800 Bren guns, more than 1300 field guns and, above all — for Canada had a well-developed peacetime automotive industry — over 189,000 mechanical transport vehicles. But in all these fields, even the last-named, production was higher — as to all except vehicles, very much higher — in 1942. And in many other fields — artillery ammunition, naval and anti-aircraft guns, rifles and pistols, aircraft and ship-building — 1942 was a great year of achievement. Although by the summer of 1942 "the phase of expansion was virtually complete" and the requirements of

the British Army, Canada's most important overseas "customer", actually began to decline that year, 1943 witnessed still greater total production.<sup>162</sup>

New arrangements had been made to overcome the exchange barrier which made it difficult for Britain and other Allied countries to pay for Canadian supplies. The passage of the Lend-Lease Act by the United States Congress in March 1941 inevitably affected Canadian policy. The Cabinet War Committee discussed the question a number of times early in 1941 (11 and 26 February, and 12, 13 and 21 March). Apprehension was expressed that the new U.S. policy would result in large diversions of British orders from Canada to the United States. It was evident that Canada must provide credit in some form to match the American action, and on 27 March the Committee approved an offer to finance the whole United Kingdom deficit in Canada, on certain conditions. The result was an agreement under which no British orders were diverted from Canada to the United States, and Canada met British requirements for Canadian dollars. By the end of 1941 Canada had accumulated large "sterling balances" in London. On 27 January 1942 Mr. King announced that these funds were being converted into an interest-free loan to Britain, to the amount of \$700 million, for the duration of the war; and that as from December 1941 all war supplies, including food, produced in Canada for Britain would constitute an outright gift to the amount of one billion dollars. This "billion-dollar gift" was superseded in 1943 by "Mutual Aid" instituted under acts passed by the Canadian parliament<sup>163</sup> and administered by a Canadian Mutual Aid Board consisting of five (later six) members of the Cabinet under the chairmanship of the Minister of Munitions and Supply. Mutual Aid was available to any Allied country.<sup>164</sup>

Proper pride in Canada's production achievement, and in the direction of it by the Department of Munitions and Supply headed by Mr. C. D. Howe, should not blind us to the fact that weaknesses in Canada's economy as compared with that of the greater industrial powers had certain inevitable results. A notable example is thus described in the British official history, which dwells with reason on the facts that Canadian industry "was dominated to an undue extent by automobile production" and that the Canadian automobile industry was so dependent upon American components: ". . . no engines were built in Canada either for tanks or for aircraft. As a result, these forms of production occupied a relatively small place in the Canadian war effort; for there was clearly little advantage to Britain in encouraging the creation of a really large capacity which would have had to be fed with supplies of the most crucial limiting components from the United States."<sup>165</sup> With respect to tanks, it may be doubted whether the production of these vehicles in Canada really made economic sense, the more so as the Canadian cruiser tank, the Ram, never actually saw battlefield service as a fighting tank. The Ram contained very important components from the United States.\* It appears that the original "mock-up" model of the Ram, said to have been influenced by the British Tank Mission in the United States, may have considerably influenced in its turn the designers of the American Sherman;<sup>167</sup> but the Sherman when it emerged was undoubtedly a better operational tank, and it was the Sherman that Canadian armoured formations used in the field.

Finally, a word about finance. We have said that the dollar sign came off the Canadian war effort in 1940, in the sense that peacetime notions of economy and

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\*Cast steel hull tops; cast steel turrets; engines; transmissions; Browning machine-guns.<sup>166</sup>

treasury control ceased to be a brake upon the effort. As the years passed, the figures of appropriation and expenditure became, by peacetime standards, increasingly astronomical. A summary of the financial statistics for the whole war period will be found at Appendix "B".

For the fiscal year ending on 31 March 1941, the total Defence Department appropriations were \$681,438,416, and the total Defence Department war expenditures \$647,676,557, or somewhat more than five times those for 1939-40. In October 1940, when estimates for 1941-42 were under discussion, the Minister of Finance, noting that the total for the three fighting services amounted to approximately \$1,300,000,000, expressed doubt as to whether it would be possible within the next fiscal year to attain in Canada the scale of production which would be required to permit the expenditure of such a sum. On 24 October the Deputy Minister of Finance, Dr. W. C. Clark, discussed the problem before the War Committee. His department, he said, was studying the country's productive capacity; the evidence was still incomplete, but Canada's probable national income for the coming year in round figures was \$5,000,000,000. The known present commitments, for war purposes and ordinary purposes, by the national, provincial and municipal governments, amounted to some \$3,000,000,000, or 60% of the national income. In Clark's opinion, it was impossible for Canada, under existing conditions, to spend such a proportion; 45% might be the maximum. It will be remembered that 42% had been mentioned a year before (above, page 11). What was possible physically, in the way of production, he emphasized, was possible financially. There was no need to worry about the financial problem, provided the problems of men and material were solved. This presentation left the Prime Minister feeling that the long-term prospect was bright.<sup>168</sup> On 27 January 1941 Mr. Ilsley presented to the War Committee the results of the study of the national productive capacity made by the War Requirements Board and the staff of the Finance Department. They had concluded that \$1300 million might be taken as the maximum production in 1941-42 which would be available for war purposes, and \$5300 million as the probable total national income.\* Ilsley reported that the government at the moment was spending at the annual rate of approximately \$1000 million. It was estimated that this could be raised to the \$1300 million rate, but only by great strain and widespread sacrifices, for which the people of Canada were apparently not yet prepared. It was agreed that the Ministers of Finance, National Defence and Munitions and Supply should meet to discuss the situation.

The matter was settled at meetings of the War Committee on the two following days. The proposed programmes, it was reported, had reached a total of \$1500 million: \$766 million for the Army, \$191 million for the Navy, \$452 million for the Air Force, and a "rather arbitrary" figure of \$91 million for Munitions and Supply. It was agreed on 28 January that the departments concerned should adjust their programmes to "bring them within a total figure" of \$1300 million. Ralston had not been prepared to eliminate any projects from the Army programme, but was willing to readjust the figures to bring about a reduction. On this basis the Army estimates were reduced by over \$100 million, and the Air estimates were cut to \$400 million with a reservation similar to Ralston's. It is worth noting that the final Defence Department appropriations for 1941-42 actually totalled \$1,033,528,888, and the final expenditures \$1,011,451,063.

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\*The net national income for 1940 turned out to be \$5112 million; for 1941, \$6514 million; for 1942, \$8277 million.<sup>169</sup>

To some extent these events of 1940-41 set a pattern for the rest of the war. Estimates and expenditures continued to rise at an extraordinary rate, but the Department of Finance contrived to assert a degree of control. Under the conditions of this period, however, its natural scruples did not constitute any such trammel on the effort as the government's financial fears had imposed in the opening months. We have already seen (above, pages 44-5) the discussion of the programmes for 1942-43; though the difficulty on that occasion arose more from manpower than from finance, the Finance Department made itself felt in connection with the R.C.A.F. programme. On 4 February 1943 we find the Minister of Finance reporting to the Cabinet War Committee that the total draft estimates submitted by the various departments for 1943-44 had amounted to some \$6359 million. After consultation with the departments, this sum had been reduced to \$6068.2 million. Actual expenditures during the current fiscal year (1942-43) would be about \$4500 million; and in the opinion of Mr. Ilsley's advisers \$5500 million represented the maximum amount which should be estimated for the coming year. This would mean a further reduction of \$570 million. To accomplish this, additional "arbitrary cuts" had been made — \$300 million off the Army estimates, \$135 million off the Navy, \$95 million from the Air Force, \$15 million from Munitions and Supply and \$25 million from Finance itself, leaving a total estimate of \$5497.5 million. These last reductions had, Mr. Ilsley said, not yet been considered by the Ministers affected. His Deputy explained further that the \$5497.5 million included the War Appropriation, an appropriation of \$1000 million for Mutual Aid, and "non-war" estimates. Even with the cuts that had been made, he said, the government would still have to borrow over \$3000 million in the coming year, part of which would have to come from the banks; this would place dangerous pressure on the established price and wage ceilings. The proposed \$5500 million was a very large amount for Canada to spend in one year. Nevertheless, if a gross national income of \$9000 million should be achieved, as was expected, and the public were wholeheartedly behind the war effort, it should be possible to achieve this goal. The Committee accordingly approved \$5500 million "as a maximum ceiling for the total estimates for 1943-44"; the necessary adjustments to effect this were to be worked out by Finance with the other departments concerned.\*

By the end of the year 1943, the Canadian effort, built up gradually through four years, was almost at its peak. War production had reached its greatest expansion. Over 1,100,000 Canadians were working in the war industries.<sup>171</sup> There were some 790,000 in the armed forces. The recession of the small direct threat to Canada's shores (especially the expulsion of the Japanese from the Aleutians during the summer of 1943) had resulted in the disbandment of the 7th and 8th Divisions and a reduction in the Home War Establishment of the R.C.A.F. The Royal Canadian Navy, still expanding, was deep in the war in many sectors, but above all in the Battle of the Atlantic; in the spring of 1943 its contribution had finally been adequately recognized when it took over the control of convoy work in the North-West Atlantic (below, pages 313-14). The Royal Canadian Air Force, with the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan producing aircrew at capacity (the number of "graduates" in the second half of 1943 averaged

\*The calculations of the Department of Finance were close, but a little on the low side. The "net national income at factor cost" for the year 1943 turned out to be \$9069 million. For 1944 it was \$9685 million. The actual total expenditures of the Dominion government for the 1943-44 fiscal year were \$5,322,253,505.<sup>170</sup>

over 3700 per month),<sup>172</sup> was now also fighting on a large scale overseas. Since the beginning of 1943 it had had a Group of its own operational in the R.A.F. Bomber Command (below, pages 288-91). As for the Canadian Army, its long period of frustration was at last drawing to a close. Since July 1943 it had had one division in action in the Mediterranean theatre, and now there was a full Corps there. But the supreme moment for all three Canadian services, and for the nation as a whole, still lay ahead. It came with the invasion of North-West Europe on 6 June 1944. The campaign launched on the Normandy D Day was to bring Canada her greatest military triumphs and also her most acute political crisis of the war.

## 6. CRISIS AND VICTORY, 1944-1945

The strategic picture was bright for the Allies when 1944 dawned. The tide of war had turned during 1942, as the great resources of the United States and the latent strength of Russia began to tell. The Axis had now been expelled from North Africa, Italy had been driven out of the war and Allied forces were on European soil halfway up the Italian peninsula. In the vast campaign in Eastern Europe the Russian armies were rolling forward, approaching the Polish frontier of 1939. In the Pacific the Americans and their allies were advancing through the Japanese-held islands, and the British were shortly to smash a last Japanese offensive on India's eastern borders. But for the moment public attention in the Western countries was centred on North-West Europe and the expected Allied invasion there. Plans for this had in fact been discussed at the conferences at Quebec in August 1943 and at Cairo and Teheran late in the year. The great air offensive to clear the way for it was already in progress. On 6 June 1944 the landings in Normandy inaugurated the final phase of the war against Germany.

In this phase the Canadian Army's whole field force was engaged for the first time in this war. The toll in blood was very heavy; two Canadian infantry divisions had heavier losses than any others in Field-Marshal Montgomery's army group in the summer campaign, and by the end of the Falaise battle the Canadian Army's casualties in Normandy since D Day exceeded 18,000. There were likewise very severe losses in Italy in the late summer and autumn. All told, the army had just over 50,000 casualties in 1944, of which nearly 13,000 were fatal; and only 1300 of the grand total were not sustained in battle.<sup>173</sup>

In these circumstances, the manpower question, which had haunted the minds of Canadian politicians so long, assumed the critical form which the Prime Minister in particular had always feared. The "second conscription crisis", which arose in the autumn of 1944, was caused by the sudden shortage of infantry reinforcements. It is fully described in Part VII below. The long contention between Ralston and King over overseas conscription, the lines of which had been drawn in the Cabinet War Committee as early as the spring of 1941,<sup>174</sup> now issued in the "acceptance" by the Prime Minister of the resignation offered by Ralston in 1942 and the appointment of General McNaughton, the former commander of the First Canadian Army, to the portfolio of National Defence. McNaughton, ever an optimist, hoped and believed that men in sufficient numbers could still be obtained under the voluntary system; but they were not forthcoming. On 22 November, after McNaughton had received a strong recommendation from his military advisers, the Prime Minister accepted what he now recognized as the condition of his government's continuance; for the demands for compulsion heard

from the country were being strongly echoed in the Cabinet. An order-in-council was passed providing for sending overseas 16,000 soldiers enlisted under the National Resources Mobilization Act. This measure caused the resignation of an anti-conscriptionist Minister, Mr. C. G. Power, but it nevertheless saved the government by averting the mass withdrawal of six conscriptionists. Quebec may be said to have accepted it, though with great and obvious reluctance. Mr. King's position, which for a moment had been seriously threatened, was restored as strong as ever. Angus L. Macdonald took over Mr. Power's Air portfolio, in an acting capacity, until 10 January 1945, when Mr. Colin Gibson was appointed. On 17 April 1945 Mr. Macdonald relinquished the appointment of Minister of National Defence for Naval Services to return to his own kingdom in Nova Scotia; he was succeeded by Mr. D. C. Abbott. Simultaneously King got rid of another of the conscriptionists who had plagued him when Mr. T. A. Crerar left the Cabinet to go to the Senate. General McNaughton, the neophyte in politics, was the chief political victim of the crisis. He failed of election to the House of Commons both in a by-election and in the general election of 11 June 1945, but he remained Minister of National Defence until 20 August 1945, by which time the Second World War was over.

Of the operations of the fighting services during these months we need say little here. All three were heavily engaged on the Normandy D Day, and all continued to bear heavy burdens until the end of that campaign and of the war with Germany. The Navy, in addition to playing a considerable part in European waters, remained hard at work on the Atlantic convoy routes which it protected in cooperation with the air forces. The crisis of the submarine war was long past, but there was still danger and there were still losses; as late as 16 April 1945 the Canadian minesweeper *Esquimalt* was sunk in the approaches to Halifax.<sup>175</sup> The convoys were larger now, and the Royal Canadian Navy was furnishing a larger proportion of the escorts. Many British vessels were withdrawn for the invasion operations, and Canadian ones with them; but by June 1944 "Canadian ships were providing all the close escort for trade convoys from North America to the United Kingdom and were also furnishing several of the support groups."<sup>176</sup> In July- August 1944 the largest North Atlantic trade convoy of the war, HXS-300, consisting of 167 vessels, crossed the ocean without casualty under the escort of one frigate and six corvettes of the R.C.N.<sup>177</sup>

The Royal Canadian Air Force had 46 squadrons overseas at the end of 1944, including 14 in No. 6 Bomber Group, 17 in North-West Europe, one in Italy, and two in Burma. It was also continuing to play its part in the anti-submarine war in the Atlantic; one Coastal Command squadron had sunk four U-boats and shared in the destruction of a fifth in the single month of June. In these various intense operations of the R.C.A.F. was suffering heavy casualties, particularly as usual in the bomber group. One example may illustrate the scale of the effort. On 14 October No. 6 Group put up a total of 501 bombers for two attacks on Duisburg within 16 hours; its loss was four aircraft, fortunately much less than in some earlier attacks.<sup>178</sup>

The curtain was now falling on the great British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. The original agreement had been for three years; on 5 June 1942 its duration was extended to 31 March 1945 and at the same time its scope was somewhat enlarged (below, pages 282-3). The Plan was wound up on schedule, having fully achieved its purpose. It had produced 131,553 trained aircrew — 72,835 for the R.C.A.F., 42,110 for the R.A.F., 9606 for the R.A.A.F., and 7002 for the

R.N.Z.A.F. Recruiting of both air and ground personnel for the R.C.A.F. had been suspended as early as May and June 1944.<sup>179</sup>

As for the Army, it was at last doing the job for which it was created. General Crerar's First Canadian Army, serving in Field-Marshal Montgomery's 21st Army Group, fought on the left of the Allied line throughout the eleven-month campaign that led to victory. One Canadian division and an armoured brigade took part in the D Day landing. Thereafter came the bitter and bloody fighting, lasting two and a half months, that ended in the destruction of the greater part of two German armies in and around the Falaise Gap. The next task was the hard one of capturing the fortresses of the Channel Coast, followed in the autumn by the even nastier assignment of clearing the Germans from the Scheldt Estuary to enable the Allied armies to use the port of Antwerp. February and March saw the costly battle in the Rhiineland, the object of which was to evict the enemy from the corridor between Rhine and Maas and drive him across the Rhine. The losses inflicted on the Germans in this desperate struggle served to prevent them from offering equally formidable resistance to our advance beyond the great river. When the fighting ended early in May the Canadians were still driving on towards the coast of the North Sea. The campaign cost the Canadian Army 44,339 casualties, of which 11,336 were fatal.<sup>180</sup>

Before the end, General Crerar's command had been joined by the 1st Canadian Corps from Italy. It is a notable fact that, although as we have seen the creation of that corps in that distant theatre in 1943 was the result of the strong insistence of the Canadian government, the same government was urging the British authorities, even before the 1st Corps had been in full action, to arrange for its return (below, Part V). This can only be called a silly chapter in Canadian war policy.<sup>181</sup> But before the Corps returned, Canadian regiments had earned many battle honours and left many of their dead on the famous fields of Italy. They had broken the Hitler Line and helped to break the Gothic Line. From Sicily to the Senio the whole campaign resulted in 26,254 Canadian Army casualties; 5764 men lost their lives.<sup>182</sup>

## 7. PLANNING FOR THE PACIFIC WAR

Victory in Europe came in May of 1945; but the Second World War was not ended. The Japanese were not yet defeated.

About the beginning of 1944 the authorities in Ottawa began to give serious thought to the part Canada should play against Japan after Germany was beaten. Mackenzie King's diary for 5 January records a discussion with C. G. Power which indicates the Prime Minister's line of thought:

Power and I agreed that there was really no place for sending any army over the Pacific. The Canadian people excepting the province of B.C. are not going to be enthusiastic about going on with the war against Japan. However, I feel we have an obligation to share with both the British, Americans and Australians in this, but it will be reasonable to take into account our four years of war to the Americans' two. Also we may be sure we will get little credit for anything we do, either on the part of the U.S. or Great Britain.

On 20 January the Cabinet War Committee "noted with approval" that Mr. Power had written a letter to the British Secretary of State for Air stating that Canada's position made it desirable that she take part in this phase of the war. But settling the precise nature and extent of the Canadian contribution, in the air and elsewhere, turned out to be a longer business. The fact that the forces planned never

engaged in actual operations does not diminish the significance of the planning as an act of national policy. It is accordingly dealt with here at some length.

The Canadian government attitudes that emerge from the discussions are interesting. They reflect the hard experience of five years of war, and in particular the influence of the R.C.A.F. "Canadianization" controversy and the crisis over reinforcements for Europe which flared up before they were completed. At the very outset it was made clear that with respect to the R.C.A.F. component there must be firm understandings as to Canadian control: no further struggle of the sort that Mr. Power had engaged in for many months (below, pages 264-88). In February 1944 conversations were going on in Ottawa with United Kingdom representatives on proposals that the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan should be continued after March 1945 on the basis of a 40 per cent overall reduction in training capacity. On 9 February the Cabinet War Committee approved these proposals, but on conditions. The government seized the opportunity to give a general definition of its attitude towards the Japanese war and occupation duties after the defeat of Germany, in an *aide-memoire* (personally revised by the Prime Minister) which Mr. Power handed to Captain Balfour, the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Air, on 10 February.<sup>183</sup> With respect to both these phases, the paper said, "The Canadian government . . . is of the opinion that the nature and extent of Canadian participation should be defined in advance, with as much clarity as possible." And contribution by Canada to the policing of Europe "would have to be carefully defined after consultation with other United Nations". As for the Pacific war, "The Canadian commitment must be determined in the light of such factors, amongst others, as Canada's place as a Pacific nation, her membership in the Commonwealth, and her close friendship and common interest with the United States, as well as her interest in completing the destruction of the Axis by the overthrow of Japan." Various considerations, including "the importance which the northwestern route to Asia, across Canada, may assume in the later stages of the war" might "render it advisable for Canada to play her part in the Japanese war in very close cooperation with the United States, at any rate in certain operational areas". With respect to the air force, it was vital that after the German war was over R.C.A.F. personnel at present attached to the R.A.F. should "at once become effectively and unconditionally at the disposal of the Canadian government". Plans should be put in hand forthwith to provide that after the defeat of Germany all R.C.A.F. personnel would be regrouped into Canadian units or formations; and with respect to the new training scheme the paper remarked, ". . . the Canadian government feel that training should be so ordered that Canada will have at her disposal, after the period of deployment on the termination of the German war, a fully integrated Canadian Air Force available for service wherever the Canadian government may decide that it can be most usefully employed in the interests of Canada, of the Commonwealth, and of the United Nations".

In this period of planning there was no revival of the policy, so important in Mr. King's eyes at earlier periods, of emphasizing air and naval participation at the expense of the Army. The Army's proposals for the Pacific war were modest from the beginning; those of the Air Force and the Navy were much larger, and it was they that were cut down by the government. The Cabinet, and particularly the Prime Minister, had no intention of allowing Canada, at the end of her great commitment in Europe, to become involved in a national effort of debilitating scale in the far Pacific. Mr. King took the view that British and American participation

in the Far East was based upon British and American interests there. Canada herself had no essential interest in that part of the world. On one occasion, the Prime Minister is recorded as having said that the conduct of the Japanese war was primarily a United States obligation. Token forces and nothing more was his formula for the Canadian effort in this area. He strongly supported the Department of Finance in its opposition to larger measures.

The process by which these general ideas were translated into firm decisions on operational areas and the nature and strength of forces was a gradual one. Before Mr. King left for the Prime Ministers' Conference in London in the spring of 1944 the three Canadian services prepared for his use memoranda on possible employment in the Pacific. At that date these could only be vague. The Navy suggested that it might contribute vessels both for fleet work and escort duty in Far Eastern waters, as well as landing craft; the Army, very tentatively, suggested the possibility of using one division from the Canadian Army Overseas, perhaps to serve with British forces in South-East Asia, and such brigade groups as might be available from Canada for employment with U.S. forces farther north; the Air Force, also, tentatively, mentioned the possibility of using 45 operational squadrons and 15 transport squadrons in South-East Asia, or the North Pacific if that region became a major sphere of operations<sup>184</sup> (These figures appear to have been suggested by Balfour in February. Since the R.C.A.F. never had more than 48 squadrons of its own overseas during the German war, this was an ambitious suggestion; the more so as it did not include the occupation force for Germany.) The Prime Ministers actually hardly touched the matter in London; but after King's return to Ottawa the War Committee, on 24 May, referred it to the Chiefs of Staff, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Secretary of the Cabinet.

On 14 June this group rendered its report.<sup>185</sup> This recalled the discussions with Captain Balfour in the previous February and the memoranda prepared for Mr. King. It remarked that from the purely military point of view the simplest course would be for the three Canadian services to continue to work in combination with the British services — which would lead to Canadian participation in South-East Asia; The United Kingdom would tend to favour such employment of Canadian forces "as an element in the 'British' contribution to the eventual defeat of Japan". The United States, on the other hand, would not be likely to request Canadian cooperation in the Pacific, since they would have adequate forces of their own available. But the reporting group, harking back to the memorandum handed to Balfour, remarked, "On the other hand, Canadian and indeed Commonwealth interests might be better served if the Canadian contribution to the war against Japan were made in an 'American' theatre, namely the North or West Pacific". So far as the Army was concerned, "it is felt by the Army Staff that Canadian Army participation should be at a stage and in a theatre in which operations are directed against Japan proper or against the Japanese Army in China, rather than in preliminary campaigns in Burma or the Malay Peninsula. The value of such participation from the point of view of national prestige would be much greater and the training and experience of Canadian overseas personnel would be better suited to such operations without extensive re-training which would be required for service under tropical conditions." With respect to the Air Force, it was noted that the force suggested by the British authorities (60 squadrons for the Japanese war alone) had now been reduced to 58 squadrons, which moreover included those required for European occupation duties. The report ended by pointing out that if the government wished Canada to be free "to make her national

contribution to the war against Japan in the North or Western Pacific" the matter should be discussed at an early date, as a matter of high policy, with the British and U.S. governments. The War Committee agreed on 14 June that Such action should be taken. It also noted the British Air Minister's suggestion for the employment of a total of 58 R.C.A.F. squadrons after the German war; and it agreed that this should "be accepted tentatively, as a basis for planning and subject to review in relation to the whole Canadian contribution at that time; also on the distinct understanding that no commitments were implied as to the theatre or theatres in which these squadrons would be employed, decision in respect thereto to be determined by the Canadian government".

On 27 June Mr. King sent a telegram to Mr. Churchill advising him of these decisions and observing, "It would clearly be very difficult to have the major Canadian air effort based, say, on South East Asia if large United States forces were to operate from Northwest America." Similar considerations, he remarked, were "also likely to affect the form and extent of the participation of Canadian military and naval forces and the theatre or theatres in which they are to be employed after the defeat of Germany". King also recalled the paper which Balfour had been given in February.<sup>186</sup> Churchill evidently passed the telegram on to the British Chiefs of Staff, who in turn referred it for report to the Joint Planning Staff; and on 24 July the latter produced a comprehensive *aide-memoire* on the employment of Canadian forces after the defeat of Germany.<sup>187</sup>

This document pointed out that "British manpower will be severely strained" by the demands of the Japanese war, occupation in Europe and the defence of lines of communication to the Far East, and that any Canadian contribution would be most welcome. Final strategic plans had yet to be made; but the British. Planners inclined to the view that North Pacific operations at an early date were possible, if not probable, and in such a case the Canadian government's suggestions would be acceptable on strategic as well as on political and administrative grounds. As to specific areas of operations for the three services, they clearly hoped that Canadian naval forces would be available to reinforce the main British fleet, probably in the Bay of Bengal or the South-West Pacific area, with the possibility of a switch to the North Pacific kept in view. There would be little advantage in moving Canadian land forces direct from Europe to the South-West Pacific or Bay of Bengal; it would be desirable to move them to Canada, where they would be available for employment in whatever area of the Far East was indicated as the situation developed. As for the air force, the planners hoped that it would "initially" be available "as a part of the main British effort from South East Asia or the South West Pacific". The British attitude had developed just as forecast in the report of 14 June.

As to strength of forces, the British Chiefs of Staff had recommended British forces which one year after the defeat of Germany would be about 70 per cent of the existing British strength. "On a similar basis the total strength of the Canadian armed forces one year after Germany's defeat would be about 510,000." The British planners went on to recommend very large Canadian forces. on the naval side, they suggested that virtually all Canadian ships suitable for the Japanese war be kept in commission: these included two cruisers, two escort aircraft carriers, five "Tribal" class destroyers, the two infantry landing ships and 111 escort vessels. A great number of small Canadian vessels would be unsuitable for the new phase of the war, and the hope was expressed that their crews could be drawn upon to man more modern ships. With respect to the Army, the planners wrote, "Allowing for a

measure of demobilisation after the defeat of Germany, it is suggested that three divisions would be a reasonable contribution by Canada, of which two would be employed in the war against Japan, and one in the occupation of Europe." Turning to the R.C.A.F., and noting that its present strength was 70 squadrons (41 being overseas), they recalled the Canadian government's recent acceptance of 58 squadrons as a basis for planning, and noted that the British Air Staff proposed that of the 47 squadrons to be used against Japan 14 should be heavy bombers. (This was equivalent to the whole strength of No. 6 Group.)

This *aide-mémoire* was of course closely studied in Ottawa, and on 17 August the Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed that each Chief should submit his views on it to his own Minister. The Chief of the General Staff told his colleagues that day that "his views, which were concurred in by his Minister", were that the Army should contribute only "about two" divisions instead of the three suggested — one with ancillary troops for occupation, one for the Japanese war. The reasons for this decision were not stated; but it would be strange if the difficulty of replacing casualties in a fighting force of two divisions was not one of them.<sup>188</sup> When on 6 September the Chiefs of Staff reported collectively to their Ministers, they remarked that it was most important "that, should a major war effort be inaugurated against Japan by way of the North Pacific, either through Hawaii or the Aleutians, Canada be represented in the final assault on the Japanese homeland". They recommended that the Army operate in the North or Central Pacific area — recognizing that this would involve acting under United States command; "that the R.C.N. reinforce the R.N. operating in the Pacific theatre as soon as possible after the defeat of Germany"; and that the main R.C.A.F. effort be in conjunction with the R.A.F., "but that should a major operation take place in the North Pacific, the R.C.A.F. should be represented by a token force". The Army contribution was recommended as one division with ancillary troops; with respect to the other services, the Chiefs essentially accepted the British suggestions - for the Navy, "all modern units down to and including 'Castle' class corvettes"; for the Air Force, 47 squadrons with necessary staffs and ancillary formations.<sup>189</sup>

On the same day (6 September 1944) the Cabinet made its basic decisions. The discussion lasted all afternoon, St. Laurent taking an active part. King wrote in his diary, "All were agreed Canada should participate. Seemed to be a consensus of view of having one division prepared to go to Japan; one to remain as army of occupation in Europe, Navy to be cut down 50%. The contribution of the Air Force to be made smaller than contemplated." The formal decisions were that Canadian forces should "participate in the war against Japan in operational theatres of direct interest to Canada as a North American nation, for example in the North or Central Pacific, rather than in more remote areas such as South-east Asia"; that policy on the employment of Canadian forces should be based on this principle; and that the form and extent of the three services' contributions should be decided following the second Quebec Conference, which was about to take place.<sup>190</sup> That conference was largely concerned with the Pacific war.

During the conference the Canadian ministers themselves discussed their policy further. On 13 September the War Committee met at the Chateau Frontenac. King described the meeting in his diary: "I held very strongly to the view that no government in Canada once the European war was over would send its men to India, Burma and Singapore to fight with any forces [sic] and hope to get through a general election successfully. That to permit this would be to raise at a general election, a nation-wide cry of Imperial wars versus Canada as a nation." Ilsley and

Macdonald made difficulties. King recorded that he told St. Laurent after the meeting that matters had "reached a crisis" and that if Canadians were to fight in the South-West Pacific somebody else would have to assume the leadership of the government. He confided to the diary, "Tomorrow promises to be a very difficult day if Churchill presses the demands from Britain. . . ." The following day the War Committee met with Mr. Churchill, at first alone, later with both countries' Chiefs of Staff. The Canadian Prime Minister recorded in his diary that he began by explaining to Churchill that his government was "contemplating a general election" and that all policies had to be considered in the light of that fact. He then read a statement embodying the formal decisions of 6 September. Thus prepared, Churchill took the attitude that Canada should not be asked for great efforts, and (according to King) he asked the British Chief of the Air Staff in particular, "Why do you put such a heavy burden on the Canadians?"

The Americans, and most particularly Admiral King, were not enthusiastic about British participation in the Pacific; but during the conference Mr. Churchill offered a British fleet, President Roosevelt accepted it, and after some wrangling in the Combined Chiefs of Staff it was ultimately definitely agreed that "the British fleet should participate in the main operations against Japan in the Pacific".\* Subsequently, as a very minor part of the conference business — too minor for mention by the United Kingdom official historian of strategy—Churchill (now fully briefed) stated that Canada would like an assurance in principle that her forces would take part in the main operations against Japan, adding that her government would prefer that they act in the northern part of the Pacific, as Canadian troops were unused to tropical conditions. The conference record notes, "Canadian participation is accepted in principle."<sup>192</sup>

In the weeks that followed, the contributions to be authorized from the three Canadian services were somewhat painfully hammered out. British naval officers long believed, unfortunately, that the recommendations of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff were likely to be approved (below, page 319).<sup>193</sup> However, in the light of the Prime Minister's opinions as we have described them above, this was far from being the case. King had been greatly encouraged by finding Churchill amenable to his views on 14 September, and on the 20th he lashed out in the War Committee, telling the story later in his diary:

. . . I pointed out that the Defence Ministers and their staffs had fought me on everything that I had said about it being not necessary for us to serve in the South East Pacific, † India, Burma, etc. That we were not expected to do more at most than have a token force, etc. That in all of this, I had been shown at Quebec to be right; that they had heard the P.M. of England ask Si Charles Portal why he had put such a burden on Canada so far as the Air Force was concerned. . . .

After pointing out that unlike the British and Americans "Canada had not an acre of land or property in the Orient", King polled the ministers present. Even Ilsley, he says, agreed with him:

There were only the 3 Defence Ministers who said nothing but realized that they were put on the spot. I said it was painful to have to disagree with colleagues but I knew they felt an

\*It will be noticed that the British authorities, like the Canadians, were now anxious that their forces should have a share in the operations against Japan proper, and should not be relegated to minor theatres. In the event the British Pacific Fleet played a considerable role in the final operations; nevertheless, the United States Navy continued to show a certain jealousy of its presence. It was usually allotted secondary targets; in particular, the Americans clearly sought to deny it any opportunity for claiming that it had had a share in the final destruction of the Japanese fleet.<sup>191</sup>

†The King diary always says "South East Pacific" when it clearly means "South West Pacific".

obligation to support their officials, but it was the duty of all of us to tell the officials what they could and should do.

On 22 September Mr. Macdonald presented the Navy's programme to the War Committee: 20,258 men afloat for service in the Pacific, some 30,000 ashore, and some 3000 more for Europe. The opinion was immediately expressed that the figures should be drastically cut, to reduce the burden on both manpower and finance. On 11 October Mr. Macdonald laid an amended programme before the Committee: 8812 Canadian naval personnel for the Central Pacific, to serve with the British force under Admiral Nimitz, manning two cruisers, one anti-aircraft ship and some 40 frigates and corvettes; while two light fleet carriers and eight destroyers (4600 personnel) would be added later. It was also proposed to allot six vessels (1726 personnel) for duty in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal. This last proposal met adverse criticism as being contrary to the policy agreed by the Cabinet on 6 September; and Macdonald withdrew it. The Committee then approved the other proposals in principle, noting that this involved approximately 13,412 officers and ratings.

King's diary reveals this meeting as a bitter one, in which the long-standing hostility between Prime Minister and Naval Minister found open expression. "I was amazed at Macdonald's crudeness and indifference to decent amenities toward his colleagues in repeating statements that have been gone over time and again. I kept very quiet but finally said that I thought there was not much use discussing the matter further in War Committee but we would take it to the Cabinet as a whole which had already given its decision. I . . . stated that I had said my last word with respect to ships serving in South East [*sic*] Pacific. . . ." The Prime Minister recorded his own arguments, which suggest that perhaps he did not keep quite so quiet after all:

The point I kept urging was that the Canadian people could not countenance our men serving in India, Burma or elsewhere to enable Britain to reconquer her colonial possessions. While the request might be a small one and desirable on some grounds, it would raise a political issue in Canada out of all proportion to the good that could be rendered. . . . I am sure that any yielding on Southern Pacific would be fatal politically and would help to hand over the govt. to the C.C.F.

Unlike the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force discovered at Quebec that Canadian assistance on the scale requested was not to be forthcoming. When the British Chief of the Air Staff (Sir Charles Portal), at the meeting of 14 September already described, made a tentative reference to the figure of 58 R.C.A.F. squadrons, this drew a Canadian ministerial comment that this was too large in itself and disproportionate to the contributions proposed for the other services. As we have seen, Portal got no help from Churchill. On 20 September the Minister of National Defence for Air reported to the War Committee that the total programme had been reduced to 32 squadrons — seven for Europe, 25 to be used against Japan. At a further meeting on 5 October the suggestion was made — a suggestion which would have sounded strange at an earlier stage of the war — that the Navy and Air Force cut their proposals to a percentage of their present overseas strength comparable to that proposed by the Army. On 20 October the R.C.A.F. proposals had actually risen by one squadron to 33 — 11 for occupation, 22 for Japan; but the number of personnel involved had been reduced from 33,000 to 23,000 by eliminating administrative personnel and airfield construction units. The War Committee finally approved this plan on 11 December. The Army's project, the

only one not considered controversial, had been accepted by the Cabinet, as a basis for planning only, on 8 September, and definitively on 20 November. Already during the Quebec Conference, on the Prime Minister's authority, there had been preliminary discussion with the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army concerning the possibility of Canadian troops sharing in the final assault on Japan under American command.<sup>194</sup>

There was one final interesting flurry before the Canadian plans for the Pacific settled down. On 7 March 1945 it was reported to the War Committee that Air Marshal Sir Hugh Lloyd, commander-designate of British Air Forces for the Pacific, had been in Ottawa. The Americans having made it clear that his forces would be expected to provide all their own supplies and services, he had inquired whether it would be possible for the R.C.A.F. to provide construction and supply units even at the cost of a reduction in the number of Canadian operational squadrons. This was regarded as raising the possibility of effecting some measure of integration between the Canadian services, some arrangement by which the three of them would operate to some extent as a national unit instead of separately; perhaps army units could be provided capable of building airfields and undertaking their local defence? Possibly, looking further, some independent operation might be found for an integrated Canadian force? The Chiefs of Staff were asked to consider the matter. On 20 March they made the report that might have been expected: only tasks of minor importance would be allotted to a composite Canadian force, and without a greatly increased commitment on the part of all three services, participation on a self-contained basis should not be considered. The Chiefs recommended that the arrangements already made should be maintained, and this was done, except that decision on the R.C.A.F. contribution was deferred pending clarification of the R.A.F.'s plans. On 19 April a Special Committee of the Cabinet (the War Committee did not meet after 11 April) was told that information had been received that the United Kingdom would shortly propose an R.C.A.F. Pacific force of 10 very-long-range bomber squadrons and three transport squadrons, plus 10,000 airfield construction personnel, in addition to a European occupation force of 11 squadrons: a grand total of 36,400 men. The Committee felt that no sufficient reason had been advanced for so large an increase in the agreed commitment, and withheld decision pending further information. The problem was resolved by the Americans, who announced in June that there would probably be airfields for only ten British bomber squadrons in 1945. Canada, it was now arranged, would provide two of these, plus three transport squadrons. Next month it was agreed that she would find six more bomber squadrons for 1946. To keep within the authorized commitment of 23,000 men, the occupation force for Europe was reduced from 11 squadrons to nine.<sup>195</sup>

One aspect of policy concerning the military effort in the Pacific war remained unsettled until a very late date: namely, manpower. The situation was clarified only on 4 April 1945, when the Prime Minister announced in the Canadian House of Commons that the men to be employed against Japan would "be chosen from those who elect to serve in the Pacific theatre"; that is, even men who had enlisted for general service would not be required to serve unless they specifically volunteered for Pacific duty.

This announcement, whose motivation was primarily political (below, page 483), took the services by surprise. It was particularly embarrassing to the Navy, whose first unit for the new phase of the war, H.M.C. cruiser *Uganda*, had already joined the British Pacific Fleet. During May, June and most of July she was actively

engaged in operations about Okinawa and off Japan; then the new manpower policy put an end to her service. Under it the members of her crew had the same right as anyone else to opt for or against Pacific service; and even if they chose to serve they were entitled to 30 days' home leave first. *Uganda's* officers made strong appeals to them, but the majority insisted on their rights; and on 27 July the cruiser turned her bows towards British Columbia, leaving Canada — except for individuals — unrepresented in the final days of the war against Japan.<sup>196</sup>

The Prime Minister's uncompromising insistence on completely voluntary service also disturbed the Canadian Army planners. Four days after his statement was made they recommended substituting an armoured division for an infantry division as the main army contribution for the Pacific. This would mean a smaller requirement in men, particularly infantrymen. But the U.S. Chiefs of Staff declined to sanction the change. The plan stood as first approved, and arrangements went forward for organizing the division on American establishments (a measure which General Crerar, for one, thought unnecessary) and providing it with U.S. weapons and equipment.<sup>197</sup> While this was going on, however, United Kingdom and United States authorities were discussing a plan which, if proceeded with, would have seriously modified these Canadian arrangements. From the spring of 1945 planners in London were working on a scheme for British participation in the final attack on the Japanese homeland. At the end of June the British Chiefs of Staff recommended, as an army component, "A British Commonwealth Force to participate in 'Coronet' [the assault on the island of Honshu] under American Command, of three to five divisions".\* There were recurring references to the possibility of the Canadian division being incorporated in this force. General MacArthur in July suggested a Commonwealth corps of three divisions - one British, one Canadian, one Australian. The intention was that they should use U.S. equipment.<sup>199</sup> It appears that these plans were never broached to the Canadian authorities, who, in the light of the whole background, might have had serious doubts about them. But events rendered the discussions academic. On 6 and 9 August atomic bombs dropped on Japan hastened the decision which the Japanese government had been considering for months — to sue for peace. On 14 August active hostilities ended; on 1 September the surrender of the defeated Japanese imperialists formally terminated the Second World War. The Canadian forces to be used in the final phase, the organization of which had consumed so much time, thought and paper, never went into action.<sup>200</sup>

## 8. DEMOBILIZATION, REHABILITATION AND OCCUPATION

A little (and it can be only a little) must be said here on the subject of the process of demobilizing the great wartime forces and returning their personnel to civil life.

In accordance with the average serviceman's undoubted wishes — and also those of the Department of Finance, as represented to the Cabinet War Committee by its Deputy Minister on 11 December 1944 — the reduction of the forces after

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\*It may be noted that just before the Japanese surrender the British government proposed the following commanders for the Commonwealth forces for the final attack on Japan: for the Navy, Vice Admiral W. G. Tennant, R.N.; for the Army, Lieut.-General Sir Charles Keightley, British Army; and for the tactical air force, if one should be included, an Australian officer. It was expected that the T.A.F. would consist largely of Australian squadrons.<sup>198</sup>

the end of hostilities was rapid. The Navy reported at the end of the fiscal year 1945-46 that 76,905 all ranks and ratings had been discharged; the Air Force released 147,263 service personnel during that year, and the Army 342,361, of whom 33,265 were men serving compulsorily under the National Resources Mobilization Act.<sup>201</sup> The process of repatriating the forces abroad, which it had been feared might be prolonged, was also carried through with gratifying speed.\* Each of the three services set up an Interim Force to ensure the performance of essential functions until the peacetime forces could be placed upon a permanent footing.

The experience available to guide the Canadian government in the matter of re-establishing discharged servicemen in civil life was mainly that of the First World War, and to a considerable extent the events of 1919 provided cautions rather than models. One notable lesson was the importance of planning in good time. In the earlier crisis, the formation of a Department of Soldiers' Civil Re-establishment was authorized only by an order in council of 2 February 1918.<sup>202</sup> This department was replaced in 1928 by the Department of Pensions and National Health, which was available in the Second World War to serve as a focus of planning. And a cynic might remark that in this war the government began planning for demobilization even before it had made provision for a really effective war effort. On the suggestion of Mr. Ian Mackenzie (Minister of Pensions and National Health), which was warmly received by the Prime Minister, the government, by an order in council of 8 December 1939, set up a special committee of the Cabinet "to consider the problems arising from the demobilization of members of the Armed Forces".<sup>203</sup> This committee in turn appointed a General Advisory Committee on Demobilization and Rehabilitation (an interdepartmental committee of senior civil servants) which had power to appoint sub-committees. To a large extent, the reports of these sub-committees, dealing with a wide variety of subjects, were accepted by the General Advisory Committee and the Cabinet committee and became the basis of government policy. A Veterans' Welfare Division of the Department of Pensions and National Health was established as early as November 1940,<sup>204</sup> and in 1944 the Department of Veterans Affairs was set up by statute.<sup>205</sup> The machinery for supervising the "rehabilitation" of fit ex-servicemen, and for caring for those who could not look after themselves, was thus in existence long before the war ended.

Much experience was gained as the war proceeded, for year by year many men and women were discharged from the forces for medical and other reasons; and legislation (orders in council and statutes) was enacted to cover their cases. An order in council of 19 December 1940<sup>206</sup> provided that members of the forces who had served for not less than 183 days might receive on discharge thirty days' pay (plus Marriage and/or Dependents' Allowance as applicable) as a "Rehabilitation Grant". A clothing allowance had already been authorized. At first only \$35, it rose by 1944 to \$100.<sup>207</sup> The serviceman's civil employment was also protected. The Reinstatement in Civil Employment Act<sup>208</sup> passed in 1942 ensured members of the forces the right to return to their former jobs under conditions "not less favourable" than if they had not enlisted. A notable landmark was "The Post-Discharge Re-Establishment Order" of 1 October 1941.<sup>209</sup> This provided for the payment of "out-of-work grants" (\$13.00 per week for a married person, \$9.00

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\*See *Six Years of War*, 433-4; Tucker, *Naval Service of Canada*, II, Chapter 17; and *Report of the Department of National Defence for fiscal year ending March 31, 1946*, 53.

per week for a single person) for discharged persons unable to find work, payable for periods not longer than their periods of service and in no case longer than 52 weeks. It also provided for grants of the same amount for discharged persons attending vocational or university courses, and for the payment of the fees of such courses in addition, on the condition of the persons concerned maintaining acceptable academic standings.\*

In the summer of 1944 Parliament passed, with much goodwill and expedition, the War Service Grants Act.<sup>210</sup> This provided a "basic" cash gratuity of \$7.50 for each 30-day period of service, plus 25 cents for each day served outside the Western Hemisphere; and a "supplemental" gratuity of seven days' pay and allowances (which thus varied according to rank) for each six months of service outside the Western Hemisphere. In addition, however, something quite new to Canadian policy was provided: a "Re-establishment Credit" equal to the basic gratuity and available to discharged persons who did not choose the alternative benefits of education or vocational training or the assistance in settling on the land which was to be had under the Veterans' Land Act<sup>211</sup> passed in 1942. This credit was not payable in cash; but it might be used for the acquisition, repair or modernization of a home; the purchase of furniture and household equipment; providing working capital for a business; assisting in the purchase of a business; and other parallel purposes. "Service" eligible for recognition under the War Service Grants Act was defined as time served "while enlisted or obligated to serve without territorial limitation", or while in or proceeding to or from overseas theatres, including the Aleutian Islands; men compulsorily enlisted under the National Resources Mobilization Act, who did not "go active" and did not serve overseas, were thus excluded from its benefits.

It goes without saying that comprehensive provision was also made, as in the case of the previous war, for the care of ex-servicemen who had suffered disability as the result of war service. This took the form of pensions proportioned to the degree of disability, combined with free treatment and hospital service in appropriate cases where it was required. Pensions were provided also for widows, children and dependent parents.

The foregoing short and necessarily inadequate survey mentions the major benefits received by discharged Canadian servicemen. In point of generosity they compared very favourably, on the whole, with those given their counterparts in other Commonwealth countries and the United States. † The present writer's impression at the time, indeed, was that the men of the services were agreeably surprised by the extent of these benefits; and although all parties in Parliament supported them it is possible that satisfaction with them had something to do with the degree of support which servicemen gave government candidates in the Canadian general election of 11 June 1945. It was computed immediately after the election that 35 per cent of the service vote (118,537 votes) went to the Liberals, 32 per cent (109,679) to the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, 26 per cent (87,530) to the Progressive Conservatives, and seven per cent (27,117) to others. This support, however, did not extend personally to the Prime Minister.

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\*Subsequently the amount of the monthly allowance for educational or vocational training was increased to \$60 for a single and \$80 for a married person, with additional provision for dependents; the out-of-work allowance was increased to \$50 (single) and \$70 (married), plus provision for dependents. There was also provision for loans to ex-servicemen while completing their education.

†The text of the numerous Statutes dealing with the rehabilitation of servicemen, accompanied by a short history of "Veterans legislation" in Canada, and a comparison of benefits provided in a number of other countries, are to be found in *The Veterans Charter* (Ottawa, 1947).

Mr. King's unpopularity in the services was well known; and in this election, while his party won a considerable victory — although its previous large majority was materially reduced — he lost his own seat in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan, by the servicemen's vote.<sup>212</sup>

A little has already been said of the planning of the Canadian contribution to the occupation of the territories of the defeated enemy. A little more must be said here.

On 11 December 1944 the Cabinet War Committee approved Army and R.C.A.F. programmes for occupation forces in Germany. The R.C.A.F. was to provide 11 squadrons. The Army force would be a group of about 25,000 all ranks. The Minister of National Defence (General McNaughton) explained that the force would be allocated to the British zone of occupation and the commitment would be specifically for Stage II, the term used for the period of adjustment and disarmament immediately following the operational occupation of Germany. Thereafter, he said, the personnel would be returned to Canada with all possible speed.

These programmes were carried out. A reconstituted "3rd Canadian Infantry Division, Canadian Army Occupation Force" did the work for the Army. It was composed — to the extent of about 10,000 men — of volunteers; the balance of its strength, which actually amounted in all to about 18,000 all ranks, was found from men with a low priority for repatriation and release. It was stationed in North-West Germany under Headquarters 30th British Corps District. The R.C.A.F. had a total of 13 squadrons overseas for a time — four bomber, four transport and four fighter squadrons and one air observation post squadron — but two bomber squadrons were disbanded in October 1945 and one transport squadron in December.<sup>213</sup> All these commitments were liquidated during 1946.

For this temporary Canadian withdrawal from Europe\* there were more reasons than one. The Canadian government told the United Kingdom in December 1945 that "the serious administrative problems that are involved in maintaining comparatively small forces at so great a distance from Canada" prompted the decision. Under the conditions of 1946, it would probably not have been easy to find the men to keep them up to strength, and indeed there was some unrest in the C.A.O.F. before the government policy was announced. But it is evident also that the fact that there was no provision for any but the great Allied powers to share in the control of Germany was a factor. This matter had been raised with the British government as early as September 1944, when Mr. Churchill was in Canada; but no formula was ever found for associating Canada, or other similarly situated countries, with the arrangements for control. In these circumstances there evidently seemed to the government to be no strong reason why Canada should subject herself to the expense and inconvenience of maintaining forces in Germany indefinitely. The Canadian Army Occupation Force was accordingly withdrawn, in spite of strong British urging for postponement, in the spring of 1946; and the last R.C.A.F. squadron overseas was disbanded in June.<sup>214</sup>

## 9. THE COST

For Canada as for other countries, the war had been a painfully costly business. In terms of money — the least important form of wartime expense — "war"

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\*Six years later Canadian army and air units returned under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.


expenditures during the eleven fiscal years ending on 31 March 1950 amounted to \$21,786,077,519. This does not include the costs of dependents' and disability pensions and medical expenses for ex-service men and women. At 31 March 1966 there were 122,077 Second World War pensions in force, and the total amount paid had been \$1,613,468,269 (see Appendix "B"). The cost in blood, though happily less than in 1914-18, was still tragic. Of the 1,086,343 men and women who performed full-time duty in the three fighting services, 96,456 were killed or wounded or died on service; 2343 in the Royal Canadian Navy, 75,596 in the Canadian Army, 18,517 in the Royal Canadian Air Force. Those who lost their lives numbered 2024 in the Navy, 22,917 in the Army, and 17,101 in the Air Force (the last a particularly high figure in relation to total strength);<sup>215</sup> Such was the ultimate price paid by Canada for the victory of the good cause for which she had drawn her sword, so grimly and reluctantly, far back in September 1939.

The stages by which the Army expanded have been described elsewhere.<sup>147</sup> General Crerar's original Army Programme for 1941 envisaged building the Canadian force overseas up to three divisions and an army tank brigade; in addition the 4th Division might go overseas late in the year. But while in England at the end of 1940 Ralston and Crerar were strongly pressed by the British authorities to provide and send overseas during 1941 a complete armoured division, for which the War Office would find the tanks. (The armoured division had already been authorized in principle on 13 August 1940.) The programme was amended accordingly, with the dispatch of the 4th Division (likewise in accordance with British advice) postponed until 1942. The War Committee approved its essential features on 28 January 1941. A few weeks later General Crerar, writing to McNaughton, remarked that Colonel Ralston had "backed the Programme 100% and needed to use fairly strong arguments with some of his colleagues".<sup>148</sup>

The Army Programme for 1942-43 encountered stronger opposition and was approved only after prolonged discussion. In the summer of 1941 the Chief of the General Staff, General Crerar, was considering, very tentatively, the possibility, as an ultimate objective, of an overseas Canadian Army "comprising 2 Corps each of 2 Divisions and an Armoured Division". The programme for 1942 gradually developed after conversations overseas in which the United Kingdom authorities emphasized the desirability of another armoured division from Canada. It comprised the formation of an Army Headquarters, an armoured division to be obtained by converting the 4th Infantry Division, a second army tank brigade, and a large number of miscellaneous Corps and Army units. The picture thus emerged of an overseas Army of five divisions, which was to be organized in two Corps.<sup>149</sup>

Increasing governmental worry over manpower supply had been reflected in a decision of 29 July 1941, when the Cabinet War Committee approved the mobilization for home defence purposes of a 6th Division. During this meeting there was specific discussion of the possibilities of conscription latent in a large army. It was agreed that Canada should maintain abroad four divisions and an army tank brigade; at home, two divisions; beyond this, there were no commitments.<sup>150</sup> In these circumstances, the new programme, which was formally placed before the Committee on 2 December, occasioned a controversy which was not resolved for over a month. The issue opened on 29 July immediately arose again. There was what may be termed a head-on collision between the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence. King inquired whether the programme could be implemented without recourse to overseas conscription, and said that he could not lead a government that resorted to that expedient. Ralston on his side said that he could not guarantee that conscription might not be necessary. He always kept himself free to advocate it, though he would do his utmost to get the men without it.<sup>151</sup> On 3 December General Stuart, who had now become Chief of the General Staff, was specifically asked whether the programme could be carried out by the voluntary method; and whether it was being presented as a maximum contribution or would be subject to increase later. He replied that in his opinion the programme could be carried out by volunteering, and that it represented the visible ceiling of army expansion. Mr. King was delighted with this reply and with the new C.G.S.<sup>152</sup>

On 4 December the Navy and Air Force Programmes for 1942-3 were presented to the War Committee. The Navy required 13,000 additional men by 31 March 1943, bringing the total strength to some 40,000 all ranks and ratings. The Naval Minister (Mr. Macdonald) explained that under the present building programme Canada would have by then some 15 destroyers and 448 minesweepers,



## Part II

### PLANNING AND PREPARATION IN THE YEARS BEFORE THE WAR

THE COURSE of every war is dictated, in very large measure, by events that took place before hostilities began; and the historian would be false to his trust if he failed to examine the measures of timely preparation that were then taken — or omitted. We have already sketched in broad outline (above, pages 3-5) the steps, limited and inadequate but yet useful, that the government of the day took by way of preparing the Canadian armed forces for the threatened contest. Here we must take note of certain other aspects of preparation.

#### 1. THE MACHINERY OF DIRECTION

Since 1 January 1923 the three Canadian armed forces had been directed by a single department of government and a single minister. The unification had been recommended in 1920 by General Currie and again the following year by the professional heads of the services.<sup>1</sup> The National Defence Act, 1922\* gave the new department's minister authority over "all matters relating to defence, including the Militia, the Military, Naval and Air Services of Canada"; this authority had formerly been divided between the Department of Militia and Defence, which had existed since Confederation, the Department of the Naval Service (1910) and the Air Board (1919). The old Militia Council, provided originally by the Militia Act of 1904 "to advise the Minister on all matters relating to the Militia which are referred to the Council by the Minister",<sup>2</sup> was replaced by a Defence Council presided over by the Minister of National Defence as President.<sup>3</sup> The Deputy Minister (as Vice-president), the Chief of the General Staff, the Director of the Naval Service and the Comptroller of the Navy, had seats on the Council, while the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General and the Director of the Canadian Air Force were Associate Members. By the outbreak of war in 1939 the composition of the Council had somewhat altered. The Minister was still President and the Deputy Minister Vice-president; but the three members were the Chief of the General Staff (Major-General T. V. Anderson); the Director of the Naval Service and Chief of the Naval Staff (Rear Admiral Percy W. Nelles); and the Chief of the Air Staff (Air Vice-Marshal G. M. Croil).† The Associate Members were four in number: the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General, the Master General of the Ordnance and the Judge Advocate General (who was concerned with all

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\*12-13 George V, Chap. 34; short title subsequently changed to "Department of National Defence Act".

†The Director of the Naval Service was designated Chief of the Naval Staff in 1928. The Director, R.C.A.F., became Senior Air Officer in 1932 and Chief of the Air Staff in 1938.

three services).<sup>4</sup> The membership was thus equally balanced between the services, but the associate membership was heavily weighted in the direction of the Militia.

Two points are worth making about the organization of this period. First, the Defence Council, like its predecessor the Militia Council and unlike the Army Council in Great Britain from which the Militia Council was in some degree copied, had no powers independent of those of the Minister; the political head of the Department had in himself complete legal control of the forces. To paraphrase a famous observation of Lord Sydenham's, the Defence Council was a council for the Minister to consult and no more. Secondly, it is interesting to note that in 1922 an attempt was made to concentrate the military direction of the three armed forces in a single officer. The senior officer at Militia Headquarters (i.e., the Chief of the General Staff) was designated "Chief of Staff, Department of National Defence", and Inspector General of the Militia, Navy and Air Force. A move was made to combine certain administrative services for the three forces, and to establish uniform rates of pay for them. These innovations were strongly resisted by the Director of the Naval Service, and the reorganization never really became effective; in 1927 the Chief of Staff, Major-General J. H. MacBrien, resigned, the appointment was abolished, and the senior soldier's appointment was again designated "Chief of the General Staff".<sup>5</sup>

This unfortunate attempt — forty years ahead of its time — at imposing unity was followed by a more successful essay in the direction of inter-service coordination and cooperation. In 1924 the United Kingdom, building upon the lessons of the late World War, set up what came to be known as the Chiefs of Staff Committee (it was first designated the Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence). This committee had the responsibility of advising on "defence policy as a whole"; its creation gave the country for the first time "recognised machinery for close and continuous consultation between the Fighting Services".<sup>6</sup> Something of what this meant may perhaps be gathered from a comparison of parallel passages in two British Army manuals, of 1924 and 1935. In the former year *Field Service Regulations, Volume II, Operations*, contained the following:

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff is responsible to His Majesty's Government for advice upon all questions of military policy affecting the security of the Empire.

In the whole section on "Military Policy and Plans" which begins with these words there is no reference to the importance of inter-service cooperation. But by the time *Field Service Regulations, Volume III, Operations — Higher Formations* came to be published in 1935, there had been a significant change in form and spirit :

There must be unity in the direction and control of the armed forces. This is exercised by the Government of the day which, with the assistance of the heads of the three fighting Services, decides on the policy for the conduct of the war and provides and maintains the necessary personnel and material.

The representative heads of the Services in Great Britain are the First Sea Lord (Chief of the Naval Staff), the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, and the Chief of the Air Staff. Close touch is kept between them in order to secure co-ordination between the three Services and joint action in all matters relating to more than one Service. When strategical or political considerations indicate the necessity, the Government calls for a combined military appreciation by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence. This appreciation as finally approved by the Government becomes the official expression of the policy for the conduct of operations.

The change of outlook was salutary, and had much to do with British successes in planning and operations in the Second World War. And Canada reaped

a benefit from her British connection and her tradition of following British military patterns when in 1927 she set up partly on the United Kingdom model a "Joint Staff Committee" composed of the Chief of the General Staff, the Director of the Naval Service and the Director R.C.A.F., with the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (who had certain Intelligence responsibilities) as an associate member.\* It was re-christened Chiefs of Staff Committee in January 1939, after the professional head of the Royal Canadian Air Force was given the title "Chief of the Air Staff" and the right to report to the Minister directly and not, as previously, through the Chief of the General Staff.<sup>7</sup>

From the time the Joint Staff Committee was set up, the Canadian government had available inter-service professional advice on the country's military problems. But Canada was still without the invaluable machinery for the consideration of defence problems at the highest political level which Britain had possessed since 1904, or even less formally since 1902, when the Committee of Imperial Defence was established under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister and provided with an efficient professional secretariat.<sup>8</sup> It appears that the formation of some such body in Canada had been advocated at intervals since 1911 (when the Committee of Imperial Defence recommended this action to all the Dominions). The suggestion was made again during the Imperial Conference of 1926. General MacBrien recommended it to the Minister of National Defence in 1927; and Major-General E. C. Ashton, Chief of the General Staff 1935-38, suggested it at least twice.<sup>9</sup> Action was finally taken in August 1936, when Mr. King's third administration, formed in October 1935, was giving serious consideration to future defence policy. It then set up a Canadian Defence Committee (later spoken of as the "Defence Committee of the Cabinet"), which was presided over by the Prime Minister and had the Ministers of Justice, Finance and National Defence as members.<sup>10</sup> It would however be a mistake to think of this committee as maintaining close and continuous study of defence problems in the manner of the Committee of Imperial Defence. It had no permanent secretariat of its own; it met very seldom; and full records of its proceedings were not kept. Its main function was to afford a meeting-place for senior Ministers and the Chiefs of Staff to discuss proposed service estimates. Mr. King said in the House of Commons on 19 February 1937 that the Committee had had "three important meetings with officers of the defence department, in addition to other conferences". There is no record of another meeting thereafter until 14 November 1938; and meetings took place on 30 January and 5 September 1939.<sup>11</sup> It is possible that there were one or two others.

At the same time something was done to improve the central organization for the coordination of defence further by setting up committees to study and plan special aspects. In September 1936 an inter-service Navy, Army and Air Supply Committee was formed under the chairmanship of the Master General of the Ordnance;† it had the particular task of directing a survey of Canadian industry to ascertain its potentialities for military production (below, page 103).<sup>12</sup> In the spring of 1938, with the international situation becoming increasingly threatening, the pace of preparation quickened somewhat. It was necessary to plan the parts which government departments would be required to play at the outset of a war.

\*This committee was set up by authority of the Minister of National Defence, not by order in council. There had been a somewhat similar inter-service committee before 1923.

†This appointment had been revived in 1935 after being in abeyance since 1922. Mr. Mackenzie said in the House of Commons on 28 May 1936, "the idea I had in mind in appointing the master general of the ordnance was to survey the industrial field of Canada, and in a humble and unpretentious way to prepare for what may eventually be a due necessity in this dominion".

On 14 March six standing inter-departmental committees were set up by order in council.<sup>13</sup> The most important of these was the Committee on Defence Co-ordination. On it all departments, plus the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, were represented; the Deputy Minister of National Defence (Major-General L. R. LaFlèche) was its chairman, and Colonel M. A. Pope (who was also Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee) was secretary. This committee's main task was the preparation of a War Book detailing the action required of the various departments if the worst came to the worst. By May 1939 the book had been completed in provisional form. It was none too soon. The book was very valuable when war broke out, only four months later.\*

The other committees set up on 14 March 1938 dealt with Censorship (this was a new committee, though there are references in 1930-36 to a committee on this subject then existing) ; Treatment of Aliens and Alien Property; Treatment of Ships and Aircraft; Air Raid Precautions; and Emergency Legislation. All six committees reported to the Minister of National Defence, who was to submit their reports to the Cabinet.<sup>14</sup> While some of these committees were backward, most of them ultimately made useful contributions to pre-war planning and the compilation of the War Book.<sup>15</sup>

The headquarters staffs of the armed services, the inter-service committees, and to a lesser degree the six inter-departmental committees, were the active elements in defence planning; for the Defence Council was no more active than the Cabinet Defence Committee. Its extant minutes indicate that the Council did not meet at all between 3 December 1930 and 8 July 1936. It met once in 1936 and once in 1937; in the latter year, however, there were two meetings of the Council's Militia sub-committee, consisting of the Minister, the Deputy Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General and the Master General of the Ordnance. In 1938, the Council again met once, on 12 September, in the midst of the Munich crisis. This meeting, in which the C.G.S. seems to have taken most of the initiative, reviewed the state of defence planning and the progress — or, at this stage, most frequently the lack of progress — made by the committees set up in the previous March. In 1939 there were two meetings of the Defence Council before the outbreak of war, on 29 June and 14 August. After the outbreak of war, the Council met weekly.<sup>16</sup>

From the foregoing it is evident that the years preceding the outbreak of war witnessed a degree of improvement in Canada's central machinery for the direction of defence. It is equally evident that the degree was small. As has been remarked above, no country which did not, like Canada, enjoy the advantages of geographical isolation and powerful friends could have afforded to maintain so inadequate a military organization, to postpone the reform of it so long, or to contain the reform within such narrow limits. The defence appropriations (above, pages 3-4) suggest that it was only after the Munich crisis in the autumn of 1938 that defence acquired a genuine priority in the minds of the Cabinet. And at all times its political aspects bulked larger than the military ones. Mr. Mackenzie was far from being Canada's worst Defence Minister, yet his papers do not leave on the reader the impression of an administrator who was closely and constantly concerned with

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\*The C. D. Howe Papers in the Public Archives of Canada contain a copy of the committee's "First Annual Report", 7 July 1939. It recommends the compilation of a Government War Book and, "to illustrate what we have in mind", attaches a draft of such a book. This was the document used when war broke out. It was fortunate for the country that the committee not only recommended that the thing be done but, simultaneously, did it.

the military work of his department. As for Mr. King, he was entirely innocent of military experience or military knowledge. Moreover, in the words of his Official biographer "his distrust of the army was deep-seated and life-long";<sup>17</sup> and there is no reason to believe that the other services commanded more of his confidence, though he regarded them as less dangerous because their personnel requirements were less likely to contribute to a demand for conscription. The conscription question entirely dominated his thinking on questions of defence.

In these circumstances, the initiative and responsibility in military matters rested with the professional officers of the services. Unfortunately, however, such people had never enjoyed much prestige in Canada, either with politicians or the public, and the increasing danger of war did not enhance their status. Far more influential in government circles were the senior civil servants of the Department of External Affairs, whose permanent head, Dr. O. D. Skelton, author of the life of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, was — to quote another well-informed biographer — "Mackenzie King's closest adviser on all public affairs, domestic as well as external".<sup>18</sup> There was some tension at times between the Chiefs of Staff and the Department of External Affairs, but in anything remotely resembling a trial of strength the latter invariably won. The Chiefs regarded Skelton as an enemy of defensive preparation; Skelton and some of his associates, on the other hand, clearly regarded the armed forces with suspicion, considering that their activities tended to involve Canada in dangerous entanglements abroad. The contrast with the situation in Britain at this period is striking. There the Foreign Office supported the Royal Air Force in its struggle to obtain larger appropriations from the Cabinet.<sup>19</sup> In Canada in 1939 some officials of the Department of External Affairs were strongly touched with "isolationism". Skelton certainly had a bias towards neutralism.\* However, we have seen (above, page 7) that by 1938 he realized that neutrality was not practicable for Canada.

The atmosphere between External Affairs and National Defence can be judged from a memorandum by Loring C. Christie, a senior External Affairs official, dated 6 September 1939 and sent to Skelton, who passed it on to the Prime Minister.<sup>20</sup> Christie, who tended to express himself in strong terms on such matters, is commenting on the Chiefs of Staff paper of 29 August on "Canada's National Effort (Armed Forces) in the Early Stages of a Major War" (above, page 9). He wrote, "The paper may perhaps give some notion of why certain things have been left undone in the past years at the Woods Building. They were spending most of their brains on this baby (see paragraphs 24-28). It has been 'most painstakingly worked out' (par. 24) — 'the product of years of careful thought and effort, and is complete in so far as existing conditions will allow' (par. 28). I like this last clause and 'existing conditions'! . . . . The need for home defence is now thrown overboard (see par. 19) — something of a hairpin curve from the line of the propaganda of recent years about the attacks on Canada."

After this, it is not surprising to discover that army officers had mental reservations about Christie. Colonel H. D. G. Crerar wrote in 1936, "I admire his brain, but his reasoning is cold and his conclusions, on such matters as I know about, always seem to ignore the human factors such as sentiment. He is I consider, a 'Super-isolationist', and I am not at all happy about the effect his advice may have on his Department."<sup>21</sup>

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\*On Skelton's position in 1937, see James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament*, 54.

## 2. COORDINATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS

The actual progress made by the Canadian armed forces in the years 1935-39 is very briefly sketched above (pages 3-5) and is described in more detail in the histories of the individual services. Here we may move on to consider the very important matter of the extent of combined defence planning between the Canadian government and other governments, inside and outside the Commonwealth.

It may be said at once that there was almost none. Looking back today, the simple statement seems appalling. We know that the Second World War was won by the effort of a great alliance of nations, and that Canada's share in the effort required to be coordinated at innumerable points with the policies and actions of many countries, and above all those of Great Britain and the United States. The absence of even the simplest planning for such coordination before September 1939 is an absurdity and an affront to military common sense. Yet in the light of the policies of Mr. King's government this omission seemed rational. It was a natural consequence of the political principle of "no commitments" and the assurance that when decision became necessary "Parliament would decide" (above, page 2). Coordinated military planning with other countries would have been regarded as inevitably in some degree compromising Canada's freedom of action; and it is possible that even if a government had been found to advocate such planning, the people of Canada, the atmosphere of the time being what it was, might have rejected it. The fact that in the event of war the absence of any plans for combined action would inevitably entail inefficiency and waste of precious time, and might even lead to disaster, was for the moment of secondary importance. Such arguments meant little to the Canadian public. In any case they were very seldom presented to it; and never by either the government or the parliamentary opposition.

### A. MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM

Traditionally, there had always been very close relations between the Canadian armed forces and those of the mother country. In the days when British regiments were stationed in Canada, the local militia looked to them for support, leadership and example. When the British troops were withdrawn — from central Canada in 1871, from the coastal fortresses in 1906 - the tie was weakened, but it did not cease to exist. The First World War saw Canadian soldiers slipping naturally and easily, on the whole, into the British Army pattern, and serving on the Western Front as a Canadian Corps which fought at various times in different British Armies. The Canadian naval and air services, as they developed, cultivated parallel relationships with the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force.

These traditional connections were to be sources of strength in the Second World War. In the pre-war years, however, they were regarded in some quarters as a political embarrassment and a possible threat to that Canadian detachment which the government considered so important.

#### *The Exchange of Liaison Letters With the War Office*

Turning first to the relations of the Canadian Militia with the British Army, we at once confront the question of exchange of information between the two forces. This had been in progress in a formal manner since 1909, and less formally apparently even earlier.

In 1909, when an Imperial General Staff was under discussion, the Canadian government authorized direct communication, on military matters of mutual

concern, between its own principal military adviser and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff\* in London — subject to the important condition that all communications from the former "other than those on purely routine or ephemeral questions" must be submitted for the concurrence of the Minister of Militia before dispatch.<sup>22</sup> The exchanges that took place as a result seem to have been intermittent and mainly devoted to specific problems. In 1920, however, the C.I.G.S. inaugurated a series of more formal Periodical Letters designed to keep his colleagues in India and the Dominions fully informed on military developments. Later the same year the Chief of the General Staff, Canada (Major-General MacBrien) began sending to the C.I.G.S. quarterly Liaison Letters "dealing with the more important elements of the situation in Canada". These letters, (copies of which were sent to the officers commanding land forces in India, Australia, South Africa and New Zealand) were not an imitation of the C.I.G.S.'s Periodical Letters, but originated in a report by a visiting Canadian officer that the War Office in London was not well informed on Canadian matters.<sup>23</sup>

The systematic exchange of liaison letters thus inaugurated continued for 19 years (1920-39). Much classified and unclassified military information passed to and fro, and the exchange certainly had great advantages for the Canadian Militia. As a general rule the Canadian letters kept well within the spirit of the instruction of 1909; and when in 1936-37 suggestions were made that individual Heads of Branches or Directors at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa might correspond direct with their opposite numbers at the War Office, the idea was discouraged, the argument being used that the C.G.S. was responsible to the Minister for making sure that correspondence did not "step outside the limits we have been allotted by our political chiefs".<sup>24</sup> The then C.G.S. (Major-General E. C. Ashton) declined in October 1937 to recommend to the Minister a widening of correspondence, considering the time not "auspicious".<sup>25</sup> He was in fact already in difficulties with his political superiors over the liaison letters.

Early in March 1937 Mr. King called the attention of the Minister of National Defence to two papers on supply matters submitted by the United Kingdom government in connection with the approaching Imperial Conference. One of them proposed arrangements for (in the Prime Minister's words) "Canadian liaison with and representation on certain subsidiary organs of the Committee of Imperial Defence". He went on:

... While this paper makes certain statements as to the Canadian Government's having set up a supply organization and as to our intention to expand it, I am not aware of any communication to the United Kingdom Government which could justify such statements. . . .

These papers refer to certain discussions during the Imperial Conference of 1930, and it is stated that certain recommendations, which were then made as to the setting up of supply organizations in the Dominions and as to liaison with the United Kingdom organization, were approved by the Committee of Imperial Defence and finally communicated, for consideration, to the Governments of the Dominions and India. So far as I am aware they have never been considered or approved by the Canadian Government.

When asked for his comments, General Ashton furnished his Minister with information on the history of the liaison letters and of supply organization. Among other things, he pointed out that *King's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Militia, 1926*, specifically charged the Chief of the General Staff with the duty of "Correspondence with chiefs of the General Staff of the other portions of the

\*This title was borne by the British government's senior military adviser until 1964, though it was little more than a monument to a conception which was essentially stillborn.

Empire and with Military Attaches";<sup>27</sup> that the Deputy Minister of National Defence had in December 1935 been furnished with full information concerning the liaison letters to enable him to answer an inquiry from External Affairs; and that the Minister himself had given "full publicity" to the Canadian Navy, Army and Air Supply Committee (above, page 69) in the House of Commons on 15 February 1937. Ashton also mentioned that he had written a special letter on supply matters to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff on 17 December 1936, "after consultation with and approval of the Minister"; this letter referred to what he now called "the interdependence of the several portions of the Empire in the problem of the production of war material", qualifying this as follows: "While I am not permitted at this time to say that the above is the policy of the Canadian Government, I am authorized to state that the Minister of National Defence will be prepared to discuss the question more fully at the Imperial Conference next year."<sup>28</sup>

Mr. Mackenzie's reply to the Prime Minister made no mention of the fact that the C.G.S. had consulted him in these matters and received his authority. Otherwise, he repeated the facts as stated by General Ashton. He concluded by saying that since the printed documents from England "almost refer to questions of government policy in Canada" it was time to consider whether the exchange of liaison letters "should any longer be permitted". He suggested that the matter might be discussed at the first meeting of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet.<sup>29</sup> The question appears in fact to have been discussed by the full Cabinet, and Mr. Mackenzie was asked to review the liaison letters and report on their contents. On the basis of an examination of the letters of 1929-36 by his private secretary, he wrote at length to the Prime Minister on 10 April 1937, in part as follows:

1. The correspondence throughout assumes the desirability of Canada's Military and Air Force establishments being modelled as closely as possible on those of Great Britain. Much information is exchanged with a view to ensuring this standardization.

2. No references to possible association of the two countries in war, and to preparations by the Canadian military organizations to that end appear to have been made in these letters without some such qualifying phrase as, — "assuming this to be the policy of His Majesty's Government in Canada."

3. There is, however, especially in the letters of General McNaughton,\* a continual reference to the sending of an expeditionary force.

4. The staffs of the two countries appear to derive great benefit from interchange of technical and scientific data. . . .

5. The War Office has kept Canada very fully informed as to all military and political military matters in the Far East. . . .

7. It is disclosed that when the United States in 1934 despatched substantial air fleets across Canada to Alaska, the Department of National Defence advised the Dominion Government against granting permission, but this advice was rejected by the Government of the day. . . .

In conclusion, a decision should be rendered by the Defence Committee of Council in regard to these Liaison letters in the future.

1. It is conceded that much valuable information is exchanged and that this is of great benefit to us in Canada.

2. The discussion of possible policies in such Liaison letters may be fraught with great danger, especially when they are not within the Council of the Government.

3. Two courses are therefore open:

(a) to discontinue these letters entirely, or

(b) to have them continued but forwarded through External Affairs to the British authorities.

I would recommend that the latter be adopted.<sup>30</sup>

\*Chief of the General Staff 1929-35.

This recommendation was followed, and until the outbreak of war the actual procedure was that the C.G.S. sent the liaison letters to the Minister of National Defence for approval before they were dispatched through the Deputy Minister to the Department of External Affairs. On occasions draft letters caused discussion. In one case, in the autumn of 1937, the Deputy Minister of National Defence objected to a reference to obtaining equipment (the Martin-Parry adaptor for converting iron-tired guns to pneumatic tires) unless it could be manufactured in Canada. The passage was removed and the letter sent.<sup>31</sup> Another case was more important. On 6 August 1938 General Ashton submitted a letter to the Minister for approval and dispatch, and the Deputy Minister sent it on to External Affairs at once. No acknowledgement having been received, the Deputy Minister asked on 20 September whether the letter had been forwarded. External Affairs made no reply. On 7 October another inquiry was made, and again there was no reply. On 18 October the C.G.S. asked the Minister to investigate.<sup>32</sup> Consultation between the Minister's staff and that of the Prime Minister (who was also Secretary of State for External Affairs) elicited the information that the letter "at present lies as an entirely secret matter between Dr. Skelton and the Prime Minister".<sup>33</sup>

In November Major-General T. V. Anderson replaced General Ashton, who was assigned special duties in connection with the medical service. Another attempt was now made to obtain information about the letter, but again without success. Finally, on 20 January 1939, Dr. Skelton asked General Ashton (not the incumbent C.G.S.) to call upon him and handed him the letter, explaining that "the Prime Minister had taken exception to paragraph 4 (Military Co-operation between the United States and Canada) on the ground that he considered that information of this nature should better be transmitted by the Department of External Affairs direct to the British authorities rather than through the medium of a Military Periodical Letter". Ashton suggested that if these comments had been received earlier the required deletion could have been made and delay avoided, and he mentioned the inquiries that had been addressed to External. "Dr. Skelton told me that he had known of two or three enquiries and he further stated that he assumed full responsibility for the delay which had been occasioned."<sup>34</sup>

The offending paragraph is of sufficient interest in itself to warrant quotation in full:

*4. Military Co-operation between the United States and Canada.*

There have been recent indications that a formal approach from the United States Government regarding a regular interchange of information concerning the defence of the Pacific coast might possibly be forthcoming in the not distant future.

This possibility, and its important implications, were studied by the Joint Staff Committee (Chief of the General Staff, Chief of the Naval Staff and Senior Air Officer), and our views were submitted to the Minister of National Defence in the following sense:—

- (a) It would be desirable that interchange of military information concerning the defence of the Pacific coast should proceed between representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments.
- (b) In undertaking such conversations it should be impressed on the United States representatives that Canada undertakes no military commitments in advance of an actual crisis developing.
- (c) In all interchanges it should be made clear to the United States representatives that, in the contingency under review, the Canadian appreciation is based upon *The British Empire and the U.S.A. vs Japan*, and that the gist of these discussions should not be withheld from other commonwealth Governments.

These views were placed before the Prime Minister by the Minister of National Defence, and have been accepted.

I might add, however, that it is the intention to allow the initiative to remain with the United States.<sup>35</sup>

That exception should be taken to this being forwarded through a military channel is, in all the circumstances, not particularly surprising. The delay in dealing with the question was the aspect of which the Chief of the General Staff had a right to complain.

The letter prepared in August 1938 was never sent, items of continuing interest in it being transferred to a new letter dated 31 January 1939. In the meantime, another had been prepared and was passed to the Department of External Affairs in November 1938. That department apparently held it up pending settlement of the fate of the August letter. Both it and the January letter were forwarded to the United Kingdom on 8 February 1939.<sup>36</sup> It is curious to reflect that these events had resulted in severing the only important military liaison channel between Canada and the United Kingdom for ten months,\* and that when the resumption of the exchange was permitted the outbreak of a desperate struggle in which the two countries were to be closely associated was only some seven months away.

#### *Liaison Officers in London*

In the light of the foregoing, it is obvious that the King government was unlikely to welcome proposals to station representatives of the Canadian armed forces in the United Kingdom. Nevertheless, thanks to historical accident and the logic of the situation, before war broke out in 1939 both the Canadian Militia and the Royal Canadian Air Force had officers in London performing at least limited liaison duties.

The Air Force, indeed, had a representative in London from shortly after the end of the First World War, and even before the R.C.A.F. itself was in full official existence. The Canadian Air Board had a liaison officer at the Air Ministry from 1919, and when the new Department of National Defence took over the Air Board's functions at the beginning of 1923 the arrangement was continued on a more regular basis, a Squadron Leader and two civilian clerks being included in the R.C.A.F.'s establishment for the purpose.<sup>38</sup> Although this staff was under the supervision of the High Commissioner for Canada, it was physically located at the Air Ministry. The liaison officer carried out duties in connection with both the Royal Air Force and civil aviation. It is relevant to note that the Air Ministry's memorandum of 5 November 1919 on the 'duties of Dominion liaison officers contained the following general paragraph:

It will be understood that the functions of the Liaison Officers are confined generally to the giving and receiving of information, and to assisting to expedite correspondence. Any questions of policy whether on the service or the civil side will be dealt with through the Air Ministry and the appropriate department of Government.<sup>39</sup>

In July 1939, with war little more than a month off, the staff of the office was increased, the incumbent liaison officer, Squadron Leader F. V. Heakes, being given another officer, Squadron Leader A. P. Campbell, as an assistant.<sup>40</sup>

The Air Force thus maintained its contact in London throughout the inter-war years with no apparent difficulty. (This prompts the observation that Mr. King's government rarely if ever interfered with an established Commonwealth liaison channel; the establishment of new channels, however, tended to be difficult.) The

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\*"I have no letter of yours to answer as the last one received was No. 2 of April 1938" (Chief of the Imperial General Staff to C.G.S. Canada, 26 January 1939).<sup>37</sup>

Royal Canadian Navy never actually possessed a liaison officer at the Admiralty; but it did profit between the wars by the services of a civil servant, Mr. E. J. MacLeod, at Canada House. Mr. MacLeod was a member of the staff of the Department of the Interior there until 1921, when he was transferred to External Affairs. In addition to other duties, he served as a naval point of contact, being particularly concerned with financial business in connection with the purchase or transfer of ships. The R.C.N., however, had other methods of keeping in touch with the Royal Navy. There was apparently always considerable direct liaison correspondence between the Naval Secretary at Ottawa and the Secretary of the Admiralty; Naval Intelligence, we shall see, had a direct line of communication; and there was likewise always some correspondence between the Chief of the Naval Staff in Ottawa and the Admiralty.<sup>41</sup>

As for the Militia, when it attempted to station an officer in England it encountered difficulty. As early as 1926 the Chief of the Imperial General Staff inquired concerning the possibility of a military representative being appointed to the staff of the Canadian High Commissioner in London; at the time, Australia was the only Dominion possessing such a representative there. The Canadian C.G.S. replied that an appointment was under consideration; in the meantime, he said, Brig.-Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton, then attending the Imperial Defence College, "is our representative in London in so far as his duties at the Defence College will permit".<sup>42</sup> Early in 1928, however, the C.G.S. informed his British colleague that the appointment of a liaison officer "is not approved": "consequently the present arrangement of using as far as possible, the services of our officers attending the Imperial Defence College must be continued".<sup>43</sup> There the matter rested.

In 1937 an official of the Canadian Car and Foundry Company, who was interested in obtaining orders for war material from the United Kingdom, suggested that it might be helpful to Canadian manufacturers if a military attaché were appointed to the High Commissioner's office in London. In this connection the Deputy Minister of National Defence informed the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs on 28 January that National Defence had for some time been considering the appointment of "a competent Ordnance Officer" to London.<sup>44</sup> On 15 February he wrote again, informing Dr. Skelton that authority for the position had now been obtained and that Colonel G. P. Loggie, R.C.O.C., had been selected for the appointment. Tentative arrangements had been made for him to sail late in March. The Deputy Minister asked that the High Commissioner be informed and that, if possible, Colonel Loggie be given office accommodation in Canada House. He proceeded:

I am further to say that an organization has been set up in the Department of National Defence known as the Navy, Army and Air Force Supply Committee whose functions are somewhat similar to those of the Principal Supply Officers Committee [in the United Kingdom] and on which [sic] the departmental committee has been modelled. In this connection it is felt that mutual benefits would be derived if the necessary arrangements could be made whereby the Officer above named may attend the meetings of the Principal Supply Officers Committee.<sup>45</sup>

External Affairs made no immediate reply. But early in March it was recorded that "higher authority" had made some objection to a proposal that Loggie should be designated "Military Liaison Officer", and "Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps Officer, London, Eng." was substituted. Then on 19 March the Deputy Minister received a telephone call from External Affairs indicating that Loggie's move

would have to be postponed.<sup>46</sup> On 23 April, in reply to an inquiry from the Deputy Minister, Dr. Skelton wrote, "I am informed by the Prime Minister that the Minister of National Defence had indicated that it is not proposed to make such an appointment before September."<sup>47</sup> Inquiries early in September having produced no decision, on 23 September Colonel Loggie pointed out that he had been living since the spring with half his household effects packed for departure and that his position was embarrassing in the extreme, The following day the Acting Under Secretary of State for External Affairs (Skelton being ill) wrote to the Deputy Minister of National Defence as follows:<sup>48</sup>

I have received the Prime Minister's instructions regarding your Department's proposal to station an ordnance officer in London. . . .

I am instructed to say that the proposal is approved on the following understandings:

This officer's duties are to facilitate technical arrangements between the Department of National Defence and the appropriate United Kingdom Departments and agencies regarding supplies obtained from the United Kingdom for the Canadian Forces.

He will be under the general supervision of the High Commissioner. . . . Any special questions concerning this supervision will be referred to this Department. . . .

This officer might be described as Ordnance Representative of the Department of National Defence, the term "liaison" being considered inappropriate for the purposes of the title or description.

As regards meetings of the Principal Supply Officers Committee or other organs of the United Kingdom Committee of Imperial Defence, this officer will not attend unless specially authorised in specific instances where it is shown that such attendance would be essential to his function.

Colonel Loggie accordingly sailed on 22 October 1937, and was still doing duty in London when war broke out.<sup>49</sup>

### *Exchange of Officers*

There was a long-standing tradition by which professional officers of the Canadian forces received advanced training in the United Kingdom. It would have been both difficult and uneconomic for the small Canadian services to maintain a full scale of establishments for the specialized training of officers; it was more sensible for Canadians to attend the British schools and incidentally gain some knowledge and experience of the handling and administration of forces much larger than those Canada could afford to maintain in peacetime. Thus we find that in the years before the First World War two vacancies at the British Army's Staff College at Camberley were normally allotted annually to the Canadian Permanent Force; and in 1912-13 a total of 25 Permanent Force officers actually attended various courses in England.<sup>50</sup> At the same time some 33 officers of the British or Indian Armies were serving in Canada with temporary commissions in the Canadian Militia; nine of them were or had lately been employed at the Royal Military College, Kingston.<sup>51</sup>

After the First World War the training of Canadians in England was quickly resumed; in 1921 it was reported that 18 officers and three other ranks of the Permanent Active Militia had been sent to courses in England during the past year.<sup>52</sup> Both the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Chief of Staff of the Department of National Defence were anxious that there should be wider contact; and on 20 June 1924 the Defence Council approved the latter's recommendation that the system of loans, interchange and attachments of officers which had been in force before the late war should be reinstated. The Canadian Cabinet's concurrence was obtained and was reflected in an order in council dated 27 June 1924.<sup>53</sup> As of January 1927, 23 officers of the Permanent Active Militia were abroad: one

(Brig.-Gen. McNaughton) at the Imperial Defence College, London, then newly opened; four at the Staff College at Camberley, and two at the Indian Staff College at Quetta; seven at other schools and courses; and nine on attachments or exchange. Of these last, two (one of whom was Lt.-Col. H. D. G. Crerar) were at the War Office and one was an instructor at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. There were five officers of the British regular army serving in Canada: three on the staff of the Royal Military College, the others attached to Permanent Force units. The operation of this well-established system was not interfered with during the tense period before the Second World War. In January 1939 there were 26 Permanent Force officers in Britain or India, and six British Army officers in Canada.<sup>54</sup>

On a slightly smaller scale, the Royal Canadian Air Force was pursuing the same policy. Following the precedent set by pre-war conferences with respect to land and naval forces, the Imperial Conference of 1923 affirmed the "desirability of the development of the Air Forces in the several countries of the Empire upon such lines as will make it possible, by means of the adoption, as far as practicable, of a common system of organization and training and the use of uniform manuals, patterns of arms, equipment, and stores (with the exception of the type of aircraft), for each part of the Empire as it may determine to cooperate with other parts with the least possible delay and the greatest efficiency".<sup>55</sup> Under the authority of a subsequent Canadian order in council,<sup>56</sup> the R.C.A.F. proceeded to implement a programme similar to the Militia's. In January 1927 two R.C.A.F. squadron leaders, L. S. Breadner and G. M. Croil (both future wartime Chiefs of the Air Staff) were at the R.A.F. Staff College at Andover; while (including the liaison officer at the Air Ministry) eight other R.C.A.F. officers were on course or attachments in England. By January 1939 the R.C.A.F. picture had somewhat enlarged. Fifteen Royal Canadian Air Force officers were now in England (among them, one at the Imperial Defence College, two at the R.A.F. Staff College, and three on exchange to the R.A.F.). Moreover, three officers of the Royal Air Force were on exchange to the R.C.A.F.<sup>57</sup>

The Royal Canadian Navy was rather more closely involved with its British counterpart service than was the case with the other Canadian forces. The Royal Military College of Canada served, in effect, as a cadet college for both the Permanent Active Militia and the Royal Canadian Air Force (in addition to producing a certain number of officers for the non-permanent forces);<sup>58</sup> but the Royal Canadian Naval College was closed in 1922. As a substitute, the British Admiralty agreed to accept Canadian cadets for training; and until the second World War all R.C.N. cadets were trained in England,<sup>59</sup> though a proportion of them came from the Royal Military College, withdrawing from the College before completing its four-year course.<sup>60</sup> At the same time, many officers of the Royal Canadian Navy underwent advanced training in Royal Navy establishments or served in ships of the R.N. (often, ships of types which the tiny Canadian service did not possess). Thus in 1927 three R.C.N. officers were on courses in England; 16 more were "serving in H.M. Ships"; and six midshipmen and cadets were under training in R.N. ships or establishments. In 1939 there were two R.C.N. officers on courses in England, including one (Commander E. R. Mainguy) at the R.N. Staff College; 39 sub-lieutenants, midshipmen and cadets were under training with the Royal Navy; and four officers were serving in British ships. In the period of reorganization immediately after the First World War, the infant Royal Canadian Navy had relied heavily upon personnel — officers and ratings — lent from the Royal Navy. In

1939 only one R.N. officer was shown as serving in Canada; but he held a very important appointment — that of Director of Naval Intelligence and Plans.<sup>61</sup> As late as 1932 the annual report of the naval service had stated, "The Naval Intelligence centre at Ottawa is a part of the Admiralty world-wide intelligence system. The Ottawa centre embraces all the North American continent." This situation continued to exist until the outbreak of war, and afterwards.<sup>62</sup>

#### *Other Personal Contacts*

There were other forms of personal contact between the Canadian and British services which, though they did not involve planning, helped to maintain and improve general understanding and provide information. We have seen (above, page 74) that the Chief of the General Staff was formally charged with the task of correspondence with "Military Attachés". This meant British military attaches, for Canada before 1939 had none of her own. In practice it meant the attaches in Washington and Tokyo, with whom the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence dealt on behalf of the C.G.S. These attaches furnished the Canadian General Staff with copies of their reports to the War Office and the Air Ministry, in addition to carrying on a certain amount of semi-official correspondence with the D.M.O. & I.<sup>63</sup> The only other contacts with the British Army were those resulting from informal and unofficial visits to Canada by British officers. These tended to be few and far between. In 1937 Colonel H. D. G. Crerar, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, sought in personal correspondence with one of his opposite numbers at the War Office to encourage the idea of unofficial visits by British officers returning from India or the Far East; though he admitted that *official* visits by senior officers would probably be "embarrassing and unwelcome to my Government". (The last such visit, he recalled, had been that of Lord Jellicoe in 1919.)<sup>64</sup>

The nature of naval activities, however, opened up for the naval forces the possibility of important contacts being made in a relatively informal way. It was customary for the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Navy's America and West Indies\* station to visit Montreal in his flagship every second year; and in 1929 he suggested that advantage be taken of the visit to hold conversations between his staff and officers of Canadian Naval Service Headquarters, Accordingly such conversations, followed by talks between the Commander-in-Chief and the Canadian Chief of the Naval Staff, took place in Ottawa in August, setting a precedent which was followed until the outbreak of war in 1939. In 1933 the C.-in-C. America and West Indies suggested that in the years when his flagship did not visit Montreal there should be an exchange of memoranda; and this was carried out.<sup>65</sup> In 1939 a little more was accomplished. It appears that the Admiralty had asked the then C.-in-C. (Vice Admiral Sir Sidney Meyrick) to make a tactful attempt to discover what assistance might be expected from the Royal Canadian Navy in case of war. During his visit to Ottawa on 28-30 June Sir Sidney lunched with the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence, and subsequently reported that Mr. King had told him that the R.C.N. would be ready to cooperate with the Royal Navy as soon as Parliament had given its approval, but that he could give no formal assurance at that time. This cautious declaration apparently gave some satisfaction at the Admiralty. It is evident, however, that the Prime Minister cannot have said very much; for though his diary mentions pleasant social contacts with the Admiral, it makes no reference to any discussion of policy.<sup>66</sup>

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\*"North America and West Indies" until 1927.

*The Negotiations on Air Training, 1936-1 939*

During the First World War the Royal Flying Corps, and later the Royal Air Force, carried on air training of Canadians in Canada on a large scale. In the absence of a distinctively Canadian air service, this training establishment was entirely under British control.<sup>67</sup> Whether as the result of this earlier experience or not, during the three years preceding the outbreak of the Second World War the British Air Ministry exerted itself to arrange a new training programme in Canada for the Royal Air Force. Limited plans were put into effect. So many difficulties arose, however, that more general arrangements were not completed until the spring of 1939, and the still relatively small scheme then agreed upon had not gone into effect when war came.

These discussions are dealt with in detail here for several reasons. First, although the episode was publicly and angrily discussed in Canada at the time, the facts have never been quite fully published. Secondly, the plans discussed have an obvious relationship to one of the greatest Canadian contributions to the effort Of 1939-45, the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. Finally, the affair is somewhat inaccurately reported in the British official history, which gives the impression that Canada refused all cooperation until after the outbreak of war.<sup>68</sup> The Canadian government was certainly unenthusiastic and made many difficulties; nevertheless the Royal Air Force was getting some help from Canada before September 1939.

On a very restricted scale, the Royal Canadian Air Force had been training pilots for the R.A.F. for some years. As early as 1921 the Air Council in the United Kingdom initiated a scheme whereby university graduates from the Dominions could obtain permanent commissions in the Royal Air Force; but it appears that for a decade or more few if any Canadians took advantage of it.<sup>69</sup> At the Imperial Conference of 1926 Mr. King mentioned that by "an arrangement just made" R.C.A.F. courses, conducted for university students and cadets of the Royal Military College as qualification for R.C.A.F. commissions, were "also accepted for permanent commissions in the Royal Air Force".<sup>70</sup> A Canadian contribution to the officer strength of the R.A.F. seems to have begun seriously only in 1932-33; the annual report of the Department of National Defence for that year notes that four Canadian candidates were nominated and accepted for permanent R.A.F. commissions, while one was accepted for appointment to the Royal Air Force College, Cranwell, and one for a short-service commission in the R.A.F.<sup>71</sup> It is a pity that such appointments did not begin earlier; it would have been a great advantage to the Royal Canadian Air Force in 1939-45 had there been even a few Canadian senior officers in the R.A.F. From 1933 onwards Canada normally selected annually two graduates of universities or of R.M.C. for permanent commissions in the Royal Air Force. These young men were given a year's training in the R.C.A.F. and then transferred to the R.A.F. There were, however, some cases in which candidates after qualification withdrew their applications for the Royal Air Force and applied to serve with the R.C.A.F.<sup>72</sup>

By the mid-thirties, nevertheless, Canadian interest in R.A.F. commissions was much more active than it had been earlier. Young Canadians in considerable numbers were making their own way to England and applying for short-service commissions. Inevitably some of them were found physically unfit, and in due course the Air Ministry asked the Canadian authorities to arrange for medical examinations in Canada. This was agreed to, and for a time the examinations were

carried out by officers of the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps (which served the R.C.A.F. as well as the Militia). When the numbers grew, however, it was necessary to transfer this work to civilian practitioners. Apparently in November 1935, the Air Ministry asked that the Department of National Defence should interview and "screen" candidates before they left for England. In the first instance the Canadian government agreed that the R.C.A.F. would perform this service for 25 candidates a year; the Air Ministry paid their fares to England and undertook to accept any candidates approved by the R.C.A.F. The annual report of the Department of National Defence for 1935-36 notes that 36 Canadians have been recommended for R.A.F. short-service commissions. (The number reported the previous year was six.) In April 1937 the British government asked that the number should be considerably increased. Receiving no reply, it called attention to the matter in July, October and November; finally in December the Canadian government replied that it would prefer not to increase the number beyond 25 "so as not to prejudice the position in Canada should it be necessary at a later date to secure this type of candidate for service in the Royal Canadian Air Force". The United Kingdom however continued to press; and in March 1938 Canada agreed to increase the number of R.A.F. candidates so screened to 120 per year, though it took the precaution of adding, "it will be understood that this cannot be regarded as a commitment". This was known as the "Direct Entry Scheme". Under it 118 Canadians were sent to England in the fiscal year 1938-39.<sup>73</sup>

The 120 candidates were to receive no training in Canada. About the same time, however, a modest training scheme was instituted. The Air Ministry proposed and the Canadian government accepted a plan whereby 15 Canadian candidates for commissions in the Royal Air Force were annually to be selected, medically examined and given *ab initio* training in Canada at Canadian expense. These men were assured of short-service commissions in the R.A.F. on arrival in England. On reaching the end of their R.A.F. terms of service they were to be returned to Canada, where they would serve their period of reserve service with the R.C.A.F., thus providing a trained reserve of pilots for Canada. The Chief of the Air Staff reported in June 1938, "The first course of this scheme is now in progress, the officers attending being due for transfer to the Royal Air Force on January first next."<sup>74</sup> The British government paid Canada £1550 per pupil towards the cost of this scheme, and Canada's own expenditure was estimated at about £1500; the costs were thus virtually equally shared.<sup>75</sup> This came to be known as the "Trained in Canada Scheme".

In 1938, then, there were three schemes in effect by which Canadians might acquire commissions in the Royal Air Force: the original plan by which two candidates annually might be selected and trained in Canada for permanent commissions; the "Trained in Canada Scheme" (15 candidates); and the "Direct Entry Scheme" (120 candidates).<sup>76</sup> Any appointments to the cadet college at Cranwell were additional. All these plans continued to operate independent of the various proposals for a large-scale training scheme in Canada.

The first approach on large-scale training seems to have been made in 1936. On 4 September of that year Mr. Ian Mackenzie, the Minister of National Defence, wrote the Prime Minister informing him that while in London recently he had been asked by Lord Swinton, the British Air Minister, "what would be the attitude of the Canadian Government with reference to the British Government having a Training School for airmen on Canadian territory". Mackenzie said he would appreciate a decision "from Council" on the matter.<sup>77</sup> The Cabinet rendered it on 10 September.

"The view of Council was to the effect that it would be inadvisable to have Canadian territory used by the British Government for training school purposes for airmen. It is the intention of the Canadian Government to establish training schools of its own. The situation might give rise to competition between governments in the matter of fields, pilots, equipment and the like."<sup>78</sup> Evidently before hearing Of this decision, Swinton wrote Mackenzie on the subject. The British authorities, he said, were "anxious to put forward our proposals on this subject in the form which is most likely to prove acceptable to the Canadian Government". But the Cabinet, if it considered the matter again, did not change its view. "My impression is that this suggestion was already rejected by our Colleagues", wrote Mackenzie to King. When in the following year the Joint Staff Committee recommended that the British government be allowed to finance a training station in Canada, to be under R.C.A.F. control, the Prime Minister negated the suggestion.<sup>79</sup>

In the spring of 1938 the Air Ministry made another attempt. A mission headed by Mr. J. G. Weir was sent to North America to purchase aircraft and investigate aircraft production potential<sup>80</sup> (below, page 106); and, perhaps as an afterthought,\* it was instructed also to make an approach on the question of a scheme of flying training in Canada. On 13 May the United Kingdom High Commissioner, Sir Francis Floud, had an interview with the Prime Minister on the aircraft production aspect of the Mission's work, in advance of its arrival. Mr. King (his own memorandum of the conversation records) said that the government would be glad to help. "It was not, however, for the Canadian Government either to advise the Mission as to where its contracts were to be placed, or on what terms or conditions, or to act in any way as an agent of the Mission or of the British Government." At a further interview on the morning of 16 May Floud introduced the question of air training. King wrote:

England was a small country. . . . He wanted to know if we would be agreeable to having the British Government construct flying fields in Canada, erect aerodromes, send in necessary machinery, etc., and arrange for training of numbers of their pilots in Canada. *They would like to have those Canadian pilots who were to go to England for training later, to [sic] receive their preliminary training here.* †

In reply, King recalled the discussion "a year or two ago" and mentioned the government's policy of avoiding commitments. "I explained how careful we had to be to avoid issues of the kind being raised, if we were to keep Canada and the Empire united. I enlarged upon the discussion that would certainly take place in Parliament, also in the Press, etc., and the probable drift more strongly towards complete isolation were it to be thought that pressure was being placed upon the Government by the British Government to make anything in the nature of commitments for war purposes, or to permit courses of action which would be misunderstood."

When Floud asked if he might send a note on the subject, King advised against it: "That if he wrote me, I would have to reply in writing. If I were subsequently asked if the British Government had sought to put pressure on the Canadian Government to undertake war projects in Canada, I would have no alternative

<sup>78</sup>In a note to Mr. King,<sup>81</sup> Sir Francis Floud wrote, ". . . on May 13th I was informed by the Secretary of State that, in connection with the visit of the Air Mission, the Government of the United Kingdom desired that the Canadian authorities should be approached as to the possibility of the establishment of flying training schools in Canada to train pilots for the Royal Air Force, the whole cost of which would be borne by the Air Ministry."

†The italics have been supplied.

but to admit that such was the case, and state frankly what the matter was. Sir Francis then said that he would not send a note." King added that he now felt that it would be inadvisable for him to attend a dinner which the High Commissioner was giving for the Mission, though earlier he had "accepted provisionally". He also said, in answer to a question, that he saw "very decided objection" to the Mission meeting representatives of Canadian aircraft firms in Ottawa, and suggested that the meetings be in Montreal or elsewhere.<sup>82</sup>

The storm signals were flying, and the British representatives would doubtless have been wisest to drop the matter of air training for the time being. However, the Mission had been instructed to discuss it, and Weir evidently felt, not unnaturally, that he should at least mention it. The same afternoon the Mission was introduced to Mr. King, and when the other members withdrew Weir and Floud remained for a private interview. The former brought up the question of training and "spoke of the problem being one of air congestion". He inquired whether the Prime Minister would object to technical discussions with officers of the Defence Department "to disclose the need for the proposals he was making." Unfortunately, however, King appears to have taken a dislike to Weir:

He repeated the question in another form and said: Would you refuse technical discussions? I said to him: 'No, not so long as they did not involve commitments'. He then said that the discussions would be of little value unless something was to come of them. He said that a refusal meant an unwillingness to allow space in the air. I replied that we would agree to cooperate to the extent of all the space they might wish but that was not what was wanted. I confess I did not at all like Weir's attitude in speaking. . . . It seemed to me that his attitude was one of seeking to corner or embarrass me. He then asked me if I did not want anything said about the request that had been proffered and the Government's attitude towards it. My reply was: That is just as you wish. It might be well, however, to ask yourself what would probably happen once the matter was stated in the form of the British Government having asked for the permission to construct air training ports in Canada, and to train their air pilots here. . . . soon we would have the country divided over an issue which would disclose a wide cleavage of opinion in a manner which would undoubtedly be welcomed by the aggressor nations, at this time, and which would probably have the effect of preventing anything in the nature of united action at a time of real crisis. . . .

Sir Francis then said that one of the advantages of Canada was that we had all kinds of weather here; also great distances; moreover, we were nearer England than any other Dominion. . . . Moreover, *they were anxious to have young Canadians as pilots, and they would get their training here first.*\* I replied that what he had said was wholly apparent, and that, on the other hand, what I had said was equally true. The policy of the Government was to declare neither for neutrality nor participation in war, in advance, but to allow Parliament to decide Canada's position when the time came. This might not be an ideal policy but it was the best so far as this country was concerned. That my desire was to keep the country united; that I believed if divisions arose before actual situations were confronted, the result might be very serious. Sir Francis then said the matter had only been mentioned by himself, and Mr. Weir, to me. They had spoken of it to no one else. I said I had told my colleagues of my conversation with Sir Francis in the morning. There was a very full Cabinet, and, I might say, there was practical unanimity of opinion.<sup>83</sup>

This necessarily ended the matter for the moment. It is to be feared, however, that this interview left the Prime Minister hostile; and his hostility was increased when in the course of a few weeks a leakage of information took place about the conversations. † On 14 June Senator Arthur Meighen raised the question in the Senate, asking the government for information. Next day Senator Dandurand, the government leader in the Senate, stated that there had been "no request from the

\*Italics supplied.

† There was a great deal of newspaper publicity about the Mission while it was in Canada; all of it, however, seems to have dealt with the possibility of orders for aircraft.

British Government to the Canadian Government in any shape or form concerning the matter mentioned". When asked whether there had been any inquiry of the government "as to what its attitude would be" on the question, Dandurand replied, "That I am unable to answer." After a further exchange Dandurand conceded on 22 June, "Some informal conversations have taken place with persons who did not indicate they had been authorized or instructed by the British Government to make any proposals. . . ." These replies drew strong confidential protests from Sir Francis Floud, who wrote to Mr. King on 22 June, "I certainly considered that I was making a definite request to you on behalf of the United Kingdom Government", and on 24 June added that he felt that Dandurand's answer of two days before was "open to reasonable objection". Mr. King now proceeded to protect his position by sending a cable to the British Prime Minister. "My definite impression", he wrote, "was that such conversations were exploratory with a view to ascertaining whether it would be expedient to put forward such a proposal and also that they were entirely confidential." Mr. Chamberlain replied on 1 July, "Our intention certainly was that as in the case of other approaches through United Kingdom High Commissioner any conversations should be exploratory and confidential in the first instance with a view to ascertaining whether such a proposal would be acceptable to Canadian authorities. . . . The United Kingdom High Commissioner fully reported to us his two talks with you on the 16th May and in the light of them we had naturally regarded question as closed. . . ." <sup>84</sup>

On the same day, the Opposition having raised the question in the House of Commons, Mr. King made a statement there. It reflected in some degree one of Loring Christie's more extreme papers. On 22 May Christie had written, "My own working rule is that anything coming out of the Air Ministry is *prima facie* wrong or at least suspect." <sup>85</sup> On 19 June, in a more formal "personal and confidential note" which Skelton passed to the Prime Minister on the 22nd, <sup>86</sup> Christie wrote, "Long ago Canadian Governments finally nailed down the constitutional principle that in Canadian territory there could be no military establishments except [*sic*] they were owned, maintained and controlled by the Canadian Government responsible to the Canadian Parliament and people. In the end the Imperial naval stations and army garrisons were withdrawn. . . ." (Christie had apparently forgotten the flying training scheme conducted in Canada by the British authorities in the First World War.) After making hostile references to the existing plan by which 120 men a year were selected and examined in Canada for the R.A.F., he concluded that the idea behind the current scheme was "one that cannot be defended on grounds of constitutional principle, of history, of patriotism, or of morality". It is hardly necessary to say that Mr. King in his speech of 1 July did not go so far. He did repeat (merely improving the grammar) Christie's statement about the "constitutional principle" settled "long ago"; but he went on to offer Canadian training facilities to British trainees: "We ourselves are prepared to have our own establishments here and to give in those establishments facilities to British pilots to come and train here."\*

\*In the Commons debate on 1 July Mr. Mackenzie, the Minister of National Defence, stated that after the Vancouver Sun of 7 July 1937 had reported a Canadian refusal to extend air training facilities in Canada to Britain, he had received the following report from the Senior Air officer: "I regret I have been unable to trace the authority for the statement in question. A search of central registry has failed to reveal any request by the air ministry for authority to establish a training station in Canada. No one in this office has any recollection of having seen correspondence dealing with such a request." Mr. Mackenzie may perhaps have forgotten the Swinton request of a few months before (above, pages 82-3); this was addressed to him personally, was presumably not filed in the departmental central registry, and was doubtless unknown to anyone outside the Cabinet circle.

At this point politics in the crudest form impinged upon defence policy. Mr. King's diary for 5 July tells the story. The Conservative party was holding a convention in Ottawa to choose a new leader; and King had been told that Senator Meighen had decided to accept the leadership and "make the question of British Air Camps & Schools in Canada an issue". At a cabinet meeting that day, after hearing that Meighen had indeed made a speech to the convention on the question, the Prime Minister acted with the speed characteristic of him in political matters. "I suggested. to the Cabinet", he recorded; "that we should immediately let the British Government know that we were quite prepared to have their pilots come to Canada to train and to co-operate with them toward that end. I said I thought we should be prepared to go a considerable way in establishing satisfactory schools of our own. That flying was bound to be all important through years to come, and that the real defence of Canada would be from the air. That everything was to be said for our limiting expenditures on land forces, resenting naval services to the protection of coasts, but strengthening in every possible way the air branch of the Defence forces." The Cabinet agreed. Posthaste, Sir Francis Floud was called to the meeting, and asked to inform his government of Canada's willingness to take British pilots for training, in the establishments of the Royal Canadian Air Force, responsible to the Minister of National Defence. It was indicated that Canada would be glad to receive qualified instructors and would welcome British aircraft for these purposes.<sup>87</sup> Then, with equal haste, the Prime Minister called in the press and told it of the offer that had been made. Thus the ground was cut from under the feet of Meighen and his party. On 7 July King wrote happily in his diary,

I hear that Manion,\* in his nomination speech, had said that I had thrown a 'monkey wrench' into the proceedings of the Convention. In this, I think he was entirely right. Meighen and the others were ousted [sic] by their own petard.

The Canadian offer. was mentioned in the British House of Commons on 7 July, and the Air Minister (Sir Kingsley Wood) announced that in accordance with a suggestion of the Canadian Prime Minister (made to Floud on the 5th)<sup>88</sup> an officer would be sent to Canada at once to discuss details. There were still difficulties ahead, however. The Commandant of the R.A.F.'s Central Flying School, Group Captain J. M. (later Air Chief Marshal Sir James) Robb, arrived in Canada about the end of July and began to survey 'the problem in consultation with R.C.A.F. officers. The assumption on which he was working was that 300 *Canadian* candidates a year would be trained for the R.A.F., but if enough Canadians did not offer then the 'Royal Air Force would send young men from the British Isles.<sup>89</sup> The Prime Minister felt that the Defence Department and the Air Ministry were trying to force the government's hand. At a Cabinet meeting on 10 August he gave the Deputy Minister of National Defence, General LaFleche, a rough ride. Robb was called to the meeting. The Prime Minister, who had been nettled by a new leak to the press, complained that Robb's plan differed from "the original proposal" in that it had been understood that the R.A.F. would be sending trainees from Britain. In these circumstances, King said, there could be no immediate decision.<sup>90</sup> His comment on the meeting in his diary is interesting:

I could see quite a division of feeling on the part of those present; Rogers, Ilsley and Power and Howe taking a less critical view of the whole business than Lapointe and Cardin, though all saw the political implications and the danger that this step might seem a commitment of war [sic]. I was glad to find Lapointe and all present agreeable to my taking the view that

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\*Dr. R. J. Manion was actually chosen leader of the Conservative party in this convention.

we should be in a position to co-operate in the event of Parliament deciding we should do so; in other words, follow the Laurier naval policy in relation to air, of having an efficient service in Canada which, if Parliament so decided, could be made a part of one great service in time of war. The meeting lasted over two hours. On the whole, it was a very satisfactory one.

A regrettable argument now took place. The following day Floud called on Skelton and expressed surprise that the Prime Minister thought there had been a change. "The British idea from the beginning had been that the schools to be set up in Canada would provide instruction for at least the 120 Canadian candidates now going to England, and who might be supplemented by candidates from the United Kingdom." He thought this had been made clear in the conversations with himself and Weir. But Skelton replied blandly that he "had seen the Prime Minister's detailed notes of the conversation and had been advised of the conversations he had had with his colleagues, and there never was the remotest suggestion in any of these conversations of anything other than British flyers being involved. . . ." <sup>91</sup> The extracts from King's "detailed notes" given above (pages 83-4) show that in fact the Prime Minister had recorded, at least twice, though not very prominently, the expressed desire of the British to train Canadians. Skelton, undoubtedly unintentionally, told the High Commissioner an untruth. Floud's feelings can be understood and appreciated. And the suggestion that at least the 120 Canadians should be trained before importing trainees from England was the simplest kind of common sense. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the Canadian offer of 5 July was very specifically made within the limits of King's statement four days earlier — "We ourselves are prepared . . . to give . . . facilities to British pilots to come and train here" — and the British authorities might have been well advised to take it literally. But the Air Ministry was evidently too full of its own needs to take note of Canadian political factors. The Canadian liaison officer there wrote a few weeks later that he had foreseen difficulties, "for . . . I knew what the R.A.F. was after was really Canadian man power". <sup>92</sup>

When Robb submitted on 2 September a final summary of his plan signed by both himself and the Canadian Chief of the Air Staff, Air Vice-Marshal Croily, <sup>93</sup> King pointed out to the High Commissioner that it lacked detailed calculations on finance, or specific information as to where the 300 candidates a year were to be drawn from. <sup>94</sup> In a later discussion of the matter, Skelton said more bluntly to Floud, "It was plain that a scheme such as was suggested was purely and simply a recruiting scheme, and that it was an entirely different proposition from that which the Prime Minister had in mind in the early discussions and to which he had referred in his Parliamentary discussion." <sup>95</sup> King (who incidentally was displeased with the procedure by which it was proposed to take action on the basis of a report by a British officer countersigned by a Canadian officer which had reached the government through the British High Commissioner) now asked Mr. Mackenzie to have a full study of the implications of the project made by his department, and also suggested that a Cabinet committee should consider the matter (the committee was appointed, but no record of its findings has been found). <sup>96</sup>

The developments of the next few months constitute a complicated story which must be briefly summarized here. On 5 November the Chief of the Canadian Air Staff submitted a new plan, worked out in great detail, which contemplated an annual output of only 201 pilots instead of 300, with Canadian and R.A.F. training going on in the same schools simultaneously, the R.A.F. taking 134 pilots per year and the R.C.A.F. the rest (Robb had proposed that the training stations for his

scheme should be independent of existing R.C.A.F. stations).<sup>97</sup> One new aerodrome would be needed, for navigation training. It was proposed that Canada would provide the new aerodrome, works and buildings, and the United Kingdom the initial supply of aircraft, engines and spares; initial costs, and annual maintenance costs, to be divided between the two countries on a per capita basis in proportion to the number of pupils trained for each. The total cost was estimated at \$13,057,510 capital expenditure, and \$3,947,805 for maintenance, for the first year, and \$5,749,327 for maintenance for the second year.

The British Air Ministry, however, was working on a revised scheme of its own.<sup>98</sup> This was submitted to Mr. King by the new British High Commissioner, Sir Gerald Campbell, on 9 December 1938.<sup>99</sup> It was based on an expansion of the scheme already in effect for training 15 pilots a year for the R.A.F. in Canada. Adding the 120 recruits selected annually in Canada, it arrived at a total of 135 a year. It was assumed that this number could be trained without borrowing instructors from the United Kingdom, and in the interests of economy it was proposed that elementary training should be given in civil schools organized by flying clubs, the R.C.A.F. giving only intermediate and advanced training. Navigation training would be done in England. The total cost of training in Canada was estimated at £4,500 per pilot. The British government proposed to pay Canada £1550 per pupil as under the 15-pilot scheme, and to 'loan' the necessary aircraft; this was estimated to amount to £1500 more per pupil, leaving Canada to pay £1450 per pupil. This was very close to the estimated figure of Canada's contribution under the 15-pilot plan (£1500).

After analysis and further discussion, this proposal was, in effect, rejected by Mr. King in a letter to Sir Gerald Campbell dated 31 December 1938.<sup>100</sup> He again stated that it was a reversal of the idea broached by the Weir mission, in that it appeared that all the trainees would be Canadians. He wrote:

Under the proposed arrangement, the Canadian Government would undertake over a term of years to recruit and train Canadians for service in the air forces of the United Kingdom, in numbers considerably larger than the total number at present trained for the Canadian service. Such an arrangement does not appear to us consistent with the established policy of autonomy in defence, as in other matters, nor with the primary responsibility of each part of the Commonwealth for developing forces to meet its probable defence requirements.

King added that the government intended to submit to Parliament "estimates which will provide for a very material increase in the strength and effectiveness of the Royal Canadian Air Force"; and he reiterated, after quoting again his own words of 1 July, that the Canadian government were "prepared to afford their facilities, as far as practicable, for the training in Canada, under the final direction and control of the Minister of National Defence, of pilots recruited in the United Kingdom for the Royal Air Force". On this basis there were further discussions,<sup>101</sup> and on 2 February the High Commissioner's office let it be known that the Air Ministry now desired only 50 pupils annually to be trained for the R.A.F. in Canada, and for only the intermediate and advanced stages, elementary training being carried out in England. The remark was made that the Air Ministry felt that the estimated cost of training in Canada was too high.<sup>102</sup>

By April 1939 this limited plan had been worked out; and, final agreement having been reached between the two governments on details, Mr. Mackenzie described it to the House of Commons on 26 April. A vote of \$6,000,000 for

"Training of Pilots" was included in his department's estimates. This was intended to provide for training annually, in addition to those provided for in the regular estimates, 126 pilots, of whom 50 would be for the Royal Air Force and the remainder for the R.C.A.F. The British government was to reimburse Canada on a *per capita* basis; and the three former schemes, by which the R.C.A.F. annually trained two pilots for permanent and 15 for short-service R.A.F. commissions, and selected and examined 120 candidates, were to remain in effect.<sup>103</sup> Thus while 50 Britons came to Canada for training, 120 Canadians would go to Britain untrained. The Canadian government's scruples in the matters of constitutional propriety and national commitments were respected, while the Royal Air Force would receive at least a small annual increment of trained men. And a precedent had been established which would serve as the foundation for a great structure when war came. In the meantime, however, the agreement had come too late to improve preparedness for the coming struggle. The first pupils under the new scheme were to go into training in September 1939; but that month found the Commonwealth at war.

*Imperial Conferences and the Committee of Imperial Defence*

The periodical Imperial Conferences had played an important part in the development of the Commonwealth military system, so far as such a system can be said to have existed at all. The conferences held before 1914 had established the principle of general uniformity in organization, training, doctrine and equipment with respect to military and naval forces; and as we have seen (above, page 79) the conference of 1923 had accepted the same principle with respect to air forces — except in connection with types of aircraft. In Canada Mr. King's successive governments never challenged this basic idea. At the Conference of 1926 Mr. King himself, indeed, specifically reaffirmed it:

In military matters, the general policy of Canada has been the organisation and training of our forces on lines similar to those maintained in Great Britain, with the necessary changes required by local conditions. . . .

Among the steps taken to ensure that the Canadian forces are trained as closely as possible on the same lines as the British may be mentioned the interchange of officers, the attendance of officers at numerous courses in England, including the Staff College, and exchange of visits between staff officers.<sup>104</sup>

The amount of attention devoted to defence by the Conferences naturally varied according to the international outlook. In 1930 there were no "plenary discussions on Imperial Defence", though there were discussions between senior officers of the countries represented (see below, page 104). In 1937, on the other hand, with war an only too evident possibility, defence questions were prominent on the Conference's agenda and in its discussions.<sup>105</sup>

As was to be expected in the light of the policies which have been described, the Canadian government approached this 1937 conference with much caution. The senior officers of the three Canadian services attended as advisers to the Canadian delegation; but they were admonished in strong terms against involving their country in anything that could in any way be regarded as a commitment. General Crerar recalled in 1951 how the members of the Joint Staff Committee, and himself as Secretary, were "carefully instructed" by Dr. O. D. Skelton (surely a most unusual procedure) to this effect. They were even told that they must not discuss with their British colleagues "the steps planned by the United Kingdom for the protection of Newfoundland", the island that lay athwart Canada's eastern gateway!<sup>106</sup>

Mr. King told the Conference that there was still-growing feeling in Canada against involvement in war; and that it was most important in the interest of national unity to avoid any commitment in advance of an actual crisis. The statement made by the Minister of National Defence contained confident assertions that Canadian public opinion supported the present defence policy and would not, under existing conditions, support larger defence appropriations than those made for the current year; the Minister also declared that opinion was "definitely opposed to extraneous commitments" but would support a "National" (i.e. evidently a local) defence policy. The government also made it clear that while it would welcome the placing of defence orders in Canada by other governments, it would not take any responsibility for the negotiation of contracts.<sup>107</sup> In these circumstances, the conclusions of the Conference could be little more than cautious generalizations.\*

The Conference noted with satisfaction that in accordance with recommendations of previous Conferences a common system of organization and training and the use of uniform manuals, patterns of arms, equipment, and stores had been adopted, as far as practicable, for the naval, military and air forces of their several countries. Each of them would thus be enabled to ensure more effectively its own security and, if it so desired, to co-operate with other countries of the Commonwealth with the least possible delay. . . .

In the course of the discussions, the Conference found general agreement among its members that the security of each of their countries can be increased by co-operation in such matters as the free interchange of information concerning the state of their naval, military and air forces, the continuance of the arrangements already initiated by some of them for concerting the scale of the defences of posts, and measures for co-operation in the defence of communications and other common interests. At the same time the Conference recognized that it is the sole responsibility of the several Parliaments of the British Commonwealth to decide the nature and scope of their own defence policy.<sup>108</sup>

It is necessary here to say something of the relationship of Canada to what may be called the central ganglion of British defence planning, the Committee of Imperial Defence (above, page 69). This body was composed of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom as Chairman, and such members as he chose to invite, Most of its work was done through a variety of standing or ad hoc sub-committees. As we have seen, the Chiefs of Staff committee was originally a sub-committee of the C.I.D. An almost equally important subcommittee was the Principal Supply Officers Committee, on which sat the senior officer of each of the three services concerned with supply. The Man-Power Committee was a parallel one concerned with personnel. The Oversea Defence Committee dealt with the security of overseas territories.<sup>109</sup>

The overseas Dominions had had a degree of connection with the Committee of Imperial Defence from the beginning. Sir Frederick Borden, the Canadian Minister of Militia, attended a meeting in 1903. Between that date and the outbreak of war in 1914, the connection was relatively close. After the First World War it slackened off. Mr. Baldwin told the Imperial Conference of 1926, "Owing, perhaps, to the more frequent meetings of the Imperial Conference, there have been very few, if any, visits from individual Dominion Ministers concerned in Defence matters." Representatives of Dominion governments had, however, taken part in the work of sub-committees. Baldwin emphasized the elasticity of the Committee and its "purely advisory and consultative character". He was clearly anxious to get the

\*The King Papers contain some characteristic "Notes" by Loring Christie (31 May 37) on an Australian draft resolution on "Co-operation in Imperial Defence". Its suggestion that it be optional with each Dominion whether or not to take part in the General Staff planning which was proposed was described by Christie as "calculated impertinence".

Dominions to take advantage of its facilities.<sup>110</sup> It appears that the Dominion Prime Ministers attended a meeting of the Committee during the Conference, but in Canada Mackenzie King's government was unresponsive to Baldwin's approach. In January 1929 the Chief of the Imperial General Staff wrote to the Chief of the General Staff, Canada:

The Committee of Imperial Defence is an Advisory Committee and the Prime Minister of this country, who is its *ex-officio* President and Chairman, can invite anyone he wishes to attend its meetings. During the Imperial Conference [of 1926] the Prime Ministers of the Dominions accepted invitations to attend, and at the same Conference Mr. Baldwin made to his Dominion colleagues the suggestion that the Dominions might perhaps be associated more closely with the Committee. Most of the Dominions have now authorized their High Commissioners to attend meetings when matters in which their Dominion is concerned are likely to be discussed. The Prime Minister of Canada has not yet authorized his High Commissioner to do so, but I understand the matter is under consideration.<sup>111</sup>

During the Imperial Conference of 1930 the new Canadian Prime Minister, Mr. Bennett, attended and spoke at a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence (on 28 November); and as we shall see (below, page 104) Canadian representatives also attended a meeting of the Principal Supply Officers Committee at the same time. But there is no record of the Canadian High Commissioner ever being authorized to attend the C.I.D., although the High Commissioners for other Dominions did so. Moreover, when the minutes of the meeting he had attended reached Mr. Bennett, he expressed the view that he and his Personal Assistant (Mr. W. D. Herridge) had been present merely as unofficial observers, and suggested that their names and his own remarks be deleted from the record. (This however was not done.)<sup>112</sup> Doubts about the Canadian relationship to the C.I.D. do not seem to have been a monopoly of any one Canadian political party.

The discussion between the C.I.G.S. and his Canadian colleague mentioned above arose from an inquiry from the latter concerning the possibility of obtaining direct from the War Office copies of papers issued by the Committee of Imperial Defence and its sub-committees. "I cannot but feel", he wrote, "that it is a precarious and unsatisfactory situation when we have to depend upon two non-military Departments (the Dominions Office in England and the Department of External Affairs here) for the receipt of the most important Secret documents issued by the C.I.D."<sup>113</sup> The C.I.G.S. explained that, as a result of the nature of the C.I.D., its papers were distributed only on a Prime-Minister-to-Prime-Minister basis.<sup>114</sup> Subsequently, after inquiries were made through External Affairs, a list was obtained from London of all Oversea Defence Committee memoranda which had been issued to the Dominions since the war. Fourteen documents were listed, and all of them had duly reached the Department of National Defence.<sup>115</sup> It is evident that a good deal of useful military information was coming to Canada from the C.I.D.

The discussions in 1937 over the appointment of Colonel Loggie to London (above, pages 77-8) reflect what seems to be a special sensitiveness in Mr. King and his advisers in the Department of External Affairs in connection with the Committee of Imperial Defence. It seems possible that it was the request that the ordnance officer should be enabled to attend the Principal Supply Officers Committee that produced such hostility to this appointment; and the prohibition ultimately placed upon his attending that committee "or other organs of the United Kingdom Committee of Imperial Defence" unless specifically authorized is striking. In the years preceding the outbreak of war King and his advisers seem to have

regarded the C.I.D. less as a channel of liaison with a probable ally than as a potential threat to Canadian autonomy and freedom of action.\*

### *The Defence of Newfoundland*

One local North American question which involved discussion with the United Kingdom remains to be noticed. The status of the important island of Newfoundland was anomalous. Since 1949 it has been by the choice of its people a province of Canada, but until that year there was no political connection between the two communities. Newfoundland had lost its self-governing status and reverted to that of a crown colony in 1933, when economic disaster forced it to apply to the British government for support. Its military protection was thus a matter for the United Kingdom. Newfoundland, incidentally, had no local forces or defences whatever beyond its civil police.

The island's military importance to Canada was obvious. Enemy naval or air forces based upon it could cut Canada's communications with Britain and strangle its Atlantic trade. Its significance in connection with transatlantic flying was evident, and the British Air Ministry was assisting in the construction of Newfoundland Airport at Gander, where experimental flying was carried on as early as 1937. Finally, the Nova Scotia steel industry was dependent upon Newfoundland ore, mined at Bell Island in Conception Bay. This last factor gave the Canadian government's military advisers an excellent practical reason for raising the question, and they did so in March 1937 in a memorandum to the Minister of National Defence entitled "The Defence of Sydney and its Steel Industry".<sup>116</sup> This mentioned the question of Newfoundland ore and passed thence to the matter of Newfoundland defence generally:

Canada has undertaken to make provision for her own local defence and insofar as her Atlantic coast is concerned that defence is intimately bound up with the defence of Newfoundland. The two problems are really one and no good purpose can be served by treating them separately. It is therefore important that Canada should receive information as to the nature and scope of British plans for the defence of Newfoundland and the waters adjacent thereto and to take these into account when drawing up her own scheme of defence. This is clearly a case in which cooperation between the two countries is required and to this end it is recommended that the matter be noted for discussion with the responsible British authorities at the forthcoming Imperial Conference.

This recommendation, we have already seen, was not carried out; on the contrary the Canadian government, through the mouth of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, cautioned the members of the Joint Staff Committee against discussing the question of Newfoundland with British military authorities during the Conference (above, page 89).

A little progress was made in the following year. A "Newfoundland Defence Scheme" apparently drawn up by the Committee of Imperial Defence in 1936 came into the hands of the Department of National Defence. The Joint Staff Committee remarked after examining it that it appeared that "the defence preparations contemplated by the British Government in conjunction with the Administration of Newfoundland are of a somewhat superficial nature". (After all, given the state of the world and of British defences in 1936, Newfoundland was certain to

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\*Dr. Skelton would doubtless have agreed with Richard Jebb, who back in 1912 had taken the view that the C.I.D. was unconstitutional and a means for safeguarding British ascendancy within the Empire. See Donald C. Gordon, *The Dominion Partnership in Imperial Defense, 1870-1914* (Baltimore, 1965), 270-71.

be a much smaller item on the British than on the Canadian horizon.) The Joint Staff Committee suggested that since the Governor of Newfoundland was shortly to visit Ottawa the opportunity be taken of having "exploratory" discussions with him.<sup>117</sup> This was done. On 12 April 1938 the Governor's Secretary, Captain C. M. R. Schwerdt, R.N., discussed the question at Canadian Naval Service Headquarters, and pointed out that the defence of Newfoundland was a United Kingdom problem. On 27 July 1938, accordingly, Mr. Mackenzie King, in his capacity as Secretary of State for External Affairs, wrote to the Dominions Office, London, inquiring "whether the United Kingdom Government are in a position to state, for the information of the Canadian Government, what measures, naval and air, for the defence of Newfoundland are contemplated in the event of war".<sup>118</sup> In due time the Secretary of State for the Dominions replied:<sup>119</sup>

The position . . . is that no specific measures for the local defence of Newfoundland in war are proposed . . . other than the despatch to St. John's of six auxiliary mine-sweeping vessels and three auxiliary anti-submarine vessels at a later stage after the outbreak of war. It is, however, contemplated that the general defence of the territory would rest on the cover provided by the Royal Navy. Present plans are based on the assumption that, in the contingency envisaged in your despatch, trade protection units of the Royal Navy would be based at Halifax and that an air squadron, if available, would also be located there for the same duties. No squadron of the peacetime Royal Air Force, however, is earmarked for this purpose and, in order to carry out the above plans the necessary Squadron would either have to be raised as a new unit in the United Kingdom after the outbreak of war or be provided from some other source in the British Commonwealth.

From this the Canadian officers concluded that in the early days of an emergency, when there would probably be a large number of German vessels, some armed as raiders, on the high seas, little British help would be available in Canada's east coast area. On 27 December 1938 the Joint Staff Committee recommended to the Minister of National Defence that another communication be sent to the British government

to inform them that . . . Canadian Defence Measures include the basing of several Royal Canadian Air Force Squadrons at Halifax, that for the further protection of the Gulf of St. Lawrence and Newfoundland ore supply, base facilities in Newfoundland are required, and that the Canadian Government desire to ascertain whether the United Kingdom Government would agree to this matter being taken up direct with the Government of Newfoundland.<sup>120</sup>

No action having been taken, the Chiefs of Staff Committee (as the Joint Staff Committee had now become) returned to the question again on 3 April 1939. But two days later the Minister's office informed the Secretary of the Committee that the Minister was "not prepared, at the moment, to deal with this question".<sup>121</sup> The result was that war came five months later without any information having been exchanged between Canada and Britain or Canada and Newfoundland on the measures which Canada could and would take in a crisis, and without any discussion on the use of Newfoundland bases by Canadian forces. Military absurdity could not have gone much further.

### *The Anglo-Canadian Military Relationship*

The military relationship between Canada and Britain as it existed before 1939 has now been fairly fully examined. Seen from the viewpoint of a historian of the Second World War, it had both its dark and its light sides. The dark side consisted in the total absence of any joint planning between the two nations, and the virtual absence even of consultation. Such planning and consultation were not

only desirable but essential to facilitate proper cooperation in the struggle which was more and more clearly seen to be probable, and in which everyone knew they were almost certain to be very closely associated. Canada was fortunate that their absence did not have more serious consequences than it had. But in this, as in so many other matters dealt with in this study, domestic and political considerations enjoyed a total precedence over military ones. As has been pointed out above (page 6) this policy may have made a contribution to that maintenance of national unity which Mr. King always proclaimed as his paramount object. This must be its historical justification.

The light side consists in the continued existence of a close general relationship between the armed forces of Canada and those of the rest of the Commonwealth and particularly of the United Kingdom. The pre-war maintenance of a high degree of uniformity in organization, training and equipment — a policy which as we have seen antedated the First World War and was reaffirmed after it — did a great deal to promote effective cooperation during the six years of the Second. We shall have to report a certain amount of friction between Canadian and British forces and commands; but these difficulties were insignificant by comparison with the general achievement of goodwill and friendly and effective joint effort. The achievement owed much to social and political tradition; but it also owed a good deal to the long-standing military policies which we have described. Not the least contribution was made by the personal relationships created or cemented between British and Canadian officers by associations encouraged by the system. It was an advantage to both countries in 1940 that Sir John Dill, who then became Chief of the Imperial General Staff, had been Army Instructor at the Imperial Defence College when General McNaughton was a student there in 1927.

A recent writer has argued forcibly that these military arrangements of the so-called "Old Commonwealth" helped to render it "a peculiar kind of military alliance of sovereign states" which — fortunately for all of us, he implies — has "proved stronger than any relationship that has ever been forged by treaty between other independent political entities".<sup>122</sup> These views reflect the sobering influence of the Second World War. It is amusing to recall that in 1937, before this influence was brought to bear, another Canadian academic critic, having discovered that Canadian officers were attending the Imperial Defence College and otherwise engaging in liaison contacts with the British forces,\* drew similar conclusions, but used them to make an attack on the system. In an article entitled "An Anglo-Canadian Military Alliance?"<sup>123</sup> he recalled the entangling influence of Britain's famous "military conversations" with France before 1914, and remarked darkly, "perhaps military conversations without an alliance are more important than an alliance without a military convention." Such isolationist views, we have seen, were not uncommon at this period and had their echoes within the circle of the government. But the critic need not have worried. Military planning of the sort carried on through the medium of the Anglo-French conversations would have been very useful in 1939 had it gone on between Britain and Canada during the years just past. But no such planning was done. What was effected was such a degree of uniform practice between the forces of the different countries of the Commonwealth, and such a degree of personal contact between the forces' officers, as helped to make efficient cooperation possible when those countries' governments decided in 1939 to make common cause against aggression.

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\*The facts were always fully stated in the annual report of the Department of National Defence.

## B. MILITARY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

Canada's military relationship with Britain was old and tried. At the beginning of our period there was no parallel relationship with the United States. In earlier times that country had long been a traditional enemy; and though there had been a fairly steady improvement in the state of Canadian-American relations since about 1871, a real *rapprochement* to the point where one could think in terms not only of friendship but of alliance awaited the rise of Hitler and the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt. In the case of Britain we have had to study a difficult stage in the history of a well-established relationship; in the case of the United States we deal with the tentative and awkward beginnings of a new one. We shall find that little was accomplished before the outbreak of war.

### *The Beginnings of Military Contact*

It may be said that since the last war between the United States on one side and Great Britain and Canada on the other ended, in 1814, Canadian-American relations have passed through three fairly distinct phases. Between 1814 and 1871 Canadians and Americans viewed each other with hostility and suspicion, and war between the two communities was always a possibility. Between, 1871 (when the Treaty of Washington laid to rest the dangerous Anglo-American issues raised by the American Civil War) and the Second World War, relations became increasingly friendly but were still distant and occasionally strained. But the Second World War, and particularly the events of the year 1940, inaugurated a period in which the two countries became and remained, in effect, close allies.

During the First World War there were minor instances of military cooperation between Canada and the United States (one being the training of Canadian airmen — under British auspices — in Texas, and of a certain number of Americans in Canada), but in general the war had no very fundamental effect upon the two nations' relationship. When it was over, there were still people in Canada who felt that it was necessary to lay plans for the contingency, however remote it might seem, of war with the United States;\* and recent writers have laid perhaps unnecessary emphasis upon the fact that during these immediate post-war years there did exist an incomplete draft plan ("Defence Scheme No. 1"), based upon British plans of the nineteenth century, for action in such an event.<sup>124</sup> The United States War Department undoubtedly had similar plans among its dustier files. It would perhaps be more relevant to emphasize that late in 1919 Admiral of the Fleet Viscount Jellicoe, heading a naval mission to Canada, indicated that war between the British Empire and the United States was so unlikely a contingency as scarcely to affect future Canadian defence plans.<sup>125</sup> It is worth while also to recall that in 1931 Major-General A. G. L. McNaughton, Chief of the General Staff, remarked, "the direct defence of Canada against invasion by the United States is a problem which in the last ten years has become increasingly susceptible to political solution but quite incapable of being satisfactorily answered by Empire military action".<sup>126</sup>

During the years following Adolf Hitler's seizure of power in Germany in 1933, apprehension of war grew steadily in North America. The people of the

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\*The situation in fact had its amusing side. The new Joint Staff Committee held one meeting in 1927, one in 1928 and one in 1929. At both the 1927 and 1928 meetings, the minutes show, there was some discussion of measures of defence against the U.S. At the 1929 meeting the C-in-C. of the Royal Navy's America and West Indies Station was present. He was told that Canada was "on the most friendly terms with the United States, with whom the possibility of war is not seriously considered in any Defence Plans". General McNaughton had become Chief of the General Staff that year.

United States reacted strongly and instinctively against the German National Socialist regime. "By the autumn of 1937 hardly a trace of intellectual or spiritual neutrality remained."<sup>127</sup> Along with fixed hostility to Hitler, however, went an equally fixed determination to stay out of any war that might start in Europe. This was reflected in the Neutrality Act passed by the United States Congress in 1935. That measure, itself reflecting current popular beliefs concerning the causes of American involvement in 1917, prohibited the export of arms and munitions to belligerent nations or the shipment of such goods in American vessels, while also authorizing the President to forbid Americans to travel in ships of warring states and making other provisions designed to isolate the United States from any European conflict. At the same time, the republic began to show increasing concern for the security of the Western Hemisphere. This found expression in President Roosevelt's Chautauqua speech of 14 August 1936 in which he said, "Our closest neighbors are good neighbors. If there are remoter nations that wish us not good but ill, they know that we are strong; they know that we can and will defend ourselves and defend our neighborhood."<sup>128</sup> This was the first presidential utterance that can be said to have foreshadowed the military cooperation of Canada and the United States.

Canada had established direct diplomatic relations with her neighbour in 1927, when a Canadian legation was opened in Washington. But no military attaché was appointed to the legation,<sup>129</sup> and a full decade passed before any significant discussion of mutual defence arrangements took place between the two countries.\* The first such contacts were facilitated by the existence of a degree of personal friendship between President Roosevelt and Mr. Mackenzie King. In March 1937 King visited the President in Washington and stayed at the White House. At this time, Mr. King told the House of Commons on 12 November 1940, President and Prime Minister spoke of the possibility of Canadian and American staff officers meeting to discuss problems of common defence. It must be added that Mr. King's record of the conversation in his diary indicates however that defence matters were a very minor part of it. In the following October, Colonel H. D. G. Crerar, Director of Military Operations and Intelligence in the Department of National Defence, Ottawa, visited Washington on the invitation of the British Military Attaché there. The Canadian Minister, Sir Herbert Marler, arranged for Crerar to make a courtesy call upon the Chief of Staff of the United States Army; this was done in spite of the fact that Crerar explained to Marler that he was in Washington "on a personal visit and not in any official capacity". On 19 October he had "a very pleasant half-hour's talk on non-military subjects with the Chief of Staff". General Craig invited him to write to him personally "if at any time some matter arose in which he could be of assistance". Crerar also had brief contacts, chiefly social, with other senior U.S. officers, but his report<sup>132</sup> does not indicate that he did any official business with them. This then was a purely informal visit, but it doubtless helped to prepare the way for the official contacts established a few months later.

In December 1937 the United States Minister to Canada, Mr. Norman

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\*At the the of the Ogdensburg arrangements of 1940, Conservative politicians asserted that General McNaughton had military conversations with American officers when Chief of the General Staff under the Bennett government. General McNaughton has stated, however, that though he did visit Washington discussions there had no particular military significance.<sup>130</sup> His file relating to this visit, which took place on 15-18 December 1934, indicates that it was made on the invitation of the Canadian Minister (Major W. D. Herridge); there is no indication whatever of any military Purpose or discussions.<sup>131</sup>

Armour, made an opportunity of having a conversation with Colonel Crerar on a social occasion. He said that the question of cooperation with Canada was "much in the President's mind", and suggested the desirability of "somewhat closer contact between the U.S. War Department and the Dept. of National Defence". (Since the only recorded contacts had been those just described, this was by way of being a diplomatic euphemism.) Mr. Armour said that he "felt greatly constrained" to discuss the matter shortly with Mr. King.<sup>133</sup> The King diary throws little light on the sequel, but American records establish that Armour pursued the matter with the State Department in Washington, and that on 22 December the President issued a definite direction<sup>134</sup> suggesting that Canada might well send an army and a naval officer there for off-the-record conversations — nothing to be put in writing. On 7 January 1938 Armour had an opportunity of putting this suggestion to King, who showed him an exchange of letters in which the President suggested the Prime Minister come to Washington shortly to discuss various matters, particularly the Far Eastern situation, and King had replied that it would be difficult for him to get away at present. Armour then said that if he could arrange for an army officer and a naval officer to go to Washington ("in mufti of course, and preferably not together"),<sup>135</sup> arrangements would be made for them to see the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations. The Prime Minister received the idea favourably, and on 13 January Armour telephoned the Under-Secretary of State in Washington (Mr. Sumner Welles) that he had had another conversation with Mr. King and that the Chief of the General Staff and the Chief of the Naval Staff would be sent to Washington next week.<sup>136</sup>

The talks thus arranged took place on 18-20 January. As a result of the American suggestion, they were conducted in an atmosphere of almost comic-opera secrecy. The arrangements in Ottawa were made by Dr. Skelton, the Under-secretary of State for External Affairs (above, page 71 ). The Chief of the General Staff, Major-General E. C. Ashton, left Ottawa one day, followed by the Chief of the Naval Staff the next. In Washington the Canadian Minister took steps to prevent their ranks or mission "from becoming known even in the Legation", and they did not leave the building "except for exercise". General Craig and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William Leahy, came to the Legation and the four officers discussed defence matters generally, and in particular the defences of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, on which information was exchanged. It is evident that the call to meet the Canadians had taken the American officers by surprise, and that they had not been told that the conversations had originated with the President personally; Craig remarked during their second interview that "he had traced the origin of our meeting to the American Minister to Canada",<sup>137</sup> and Leahy observed "that he had no information as to the reason or cause of our meeting, did not know how or by whom it was originated and, in consequence, had no plan ready to discuss".<sup>138</sup> Only three copies of the Canadian officers' reports were made — one for the Defence Minister, and one for each Chief of Staff himself. Subsequently, it appears, the Minister asked for and received the Chiefs' copies.<sup>139</sup>

The European situation was growing rapidly worse, and as a result Canadian-American cooperation showed signs of coming out into the open. During the summer of 1938 Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. King made public speeches on the two countries' military relations. On 18 August Mr. Roosevelt, at Kingston, declared that the United States would "not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened"; and on the same occasion the President had a further—but apparently still limited — conversation with Mr. King on defence, with particular reference to

the Atlantic coast. Two days later, at Woodbridge, Ontario, the Prime Minister publicly welcomed Roosevelt's pledge and promised that Canada in her turn would see to it that "enemy forces should not be able to pursue their way either by land, sea or air to the United States across Canadian territory".<sup>140</sup> On this day King set down a sententious reflection in his diary:

I think at last we have got our defence programme in good shape. Good neighbour on one side; partners within the Empire on the other. Obligations to both in return for their assistance. Readiness to meet all joint emergencies.

It is curious that the Prime Minister should be so complacent at a time when Canada's forces were still in an extreme state of unpreparedness, when military liaison with the United States was in the earliest and most elementary state, and when his government was still refusing to sanction any military discussion whatever with Canada's "partners within the Empire" by way of preparing for "joint emergencies". It is curious too to think that—within a fortnight Canada was confronting an imminent danger of war arising from Hitler's demands on Czechoslovakia, and that King then recorded telling two of his colleagues that he "would stand for Canada doing all she possibly could do to destroy those Powers which are basing their action on *might* and not on *right*, and . . . would not consider being neutral in this situation for a moment"<sup>141</sup> (above, page 7). This was admirable — even though the sentiments remained for the moment severely confidential; but Canada possessed little in the way of means for making such principles effective.

We have already seen the nature of the advice tendered the Canadian government at this period by the Joint Staff Committee (above, pages 75-6), and have observed the canny decision of the Canadian authorities not to force the pace, but to leave the initiative to the United States. After the "Munich crisis" there was further military contact with Washington. The new Chief of the Canadian General Staff, Major-General T. V. Anderson, visited there on 15-16 November 1938 and had conversations with General Craig and other senior American officers. A useful exchange of views took place, and Anderson was impressed by the cooperative attitude of the War Department.<sup>142</sup> In the same month, when Mr. King went to Washington to sign the new Canadian-American trade agreement, he again discussed defence matters with Mr. Roosevelt. They were still a subordinate topic, but Roosevelt spoke of the danger of the Germans establishing a base in South America, and incidentally expressed the opinion that both Britain and Canada should set about producing large numbers of aircraft. The President reverted to this topic in June 1939, when in the course of their North American tour the King and Queen (with Mr. King present as Minister in Attendance) visited Mr. and Mrs. Roosevelt at their home at Hyde Park. On the evening of 10 June the King, the President and the Prime Minister talked intimately "from half past eleven until after half past one". Roosevelt spoke largely and loosely. Canada, he thought, should develop aircraft assembly plants "for all she was worth"; the United States would provide material and parts. He also spoke of the possible use of the Halifax base by United States ships: "If we could assist his vessels there he could assist in keeping the waters of the Atlantic free of German ships of war." "His whole conversation with the King was to the effect that every possible assistance short of actual participation in war could be given. He added that he hoped he might get free of the Neutrality Act. . . . He was going to try . . . to see if he could not get it repealed." There was also some discussion of personalities. King recorded, "The

King indicated he would never wish to appoint Churchill to any office unless it was absolutely necessary in time of war. I confess I was glad to hear him say that because I think Churchill is one of [the] most dangerous men I have ever known."<sup>143</sup> Many things were to change in the months ahead.

This was as far as things went before the outbreak of war: the cautious establishment of contact, some very friendly general discussion, some exchange of information. There was still no permanent machinery for military liaison, no joint planning. These things were to come only in 1940, as the result of a peril deadlier than most people even dreamed of in the summer of 1939.

### C. THE TWO RELATIONSHIPS

The Anglo-Canadian and the Canadian-American relationship in matters of defence on the eve of war are interesting to contemplate and speculate upon, and an attempt should perhaps be made to explain the attitudes that emerge in the foregoing narrative.

With respect to the Anglo-Canadian military relationship, there is an evident cleavage of opinion between the Prime Minister and his External Affairs advisers on one side and the government's military advisers on the other. King and Skelton and Christie clearly all viewed this relationship in purely non-military terms and with a degree of suspicion. As we have said more than once, it seemed to them a potential threat to the government's policy of no commitments. The Chiefs of Staff, on the other hand, looked at the matter in the light of their responsibility for national security. They saw war approaching; they saw that in all human probability Canada and Britain would be associated in the war if it came, and that Canada in fact was very unlikely to be involved in any war except in close association with Britain; they saw that in these circumstances joint planning in advance of the crisis was militarily desirable and indeed dictated by common sense. At the same time they did all they could to encourage the government to move towards military cooperation with the United States. It was perfectly evident that any direct threat to North America could only be effectively countered by Canadian-American cooperation, and that Canadian security in such an event would depend upon American support. In this relationship pre-crisis planning was if possible more important than in that with Britain; for the established uniformity of organization, training and equipment provided a ready-made basis for cooperation with the British forces that was entirely lacking in the case of the United States.

Nevertheless, in the Canadian officers' eyes the American link was secondary. The British military connection was well established and a sure resource, and moreover it was almost certain to be effective from the very outbreak of a war; the American one was new and uncertain, involving a foreign government, and a government which, except in the rather improbable contingency of direct military aggression against North America, was likely to be neutral in the early stages of hostilities. In these circumstances, the Joint Staff Committee, as we have already seen (above, page 75) took the line that it should be assumed that any cooperation with the United States would also involve the United Kingdom, and that Canada should make it clear that she should not be expected to keep from other Commonwealth governments any secret information obtained from American sources.

Here again there was a noticeable difference of opinion with External Affairs. In December 1938 the Joint Staff Committee appealed to the government to

resolve it. They recalled the submission they had made (14 April 1938) recommending that negotiation with the United States should be based upon the principle just described, and the fact that on 10 June, apparently after consultation with the Prime Minister, the Minister of National-Defence had instructed them to proceed on that basis. Now, however, the Department of National Defence had received copies of correspondence between Sir Herbert Marler in Washington and the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, in which Marler expressed the opinion that Canadian officers had been given information and assistance far beyond any given to others, and reported that officials of the U.S. War Department had recently indicated to him that the information was "for Canada and Canada only". Marler had given this assurance, and Dr. Skelton had fully approved his giving it. On 9 January 1939 Mr. Mackenzie sent to Mr. King the Joint Staff Committee's memorandum strongly maintaining their previous position and asking for further instructions.<sup>144</sup> What decision if any was rendered does not appear from the available records.

No doubt the positions taken were not the result of mere logic. Prejudices were involved on both sides. The service officers were undoubtedly influenced by the long tradition of friendly association between the British and Canadian forces. The External Affairs officials were doubtless influenced by the North American isolationism so active at the time. And it would be a mistake to forget that pursuit of national status which had been a major concern of so many Canadians so long; it was still influential. There had been a time, when Canada was emerging from colonial dependence, when consultation by the imperial authorities and such privileges as attendance at the Committee of Imperial Defence were themselves valued as badges of position; now some persons feared these things as possible trammels on national independence. Just as Sir Robert Borden had seen the Paris Peace Conference less as a critical moment in European and world history than as an opportunity to assert Canada's national position, so now there were people more interested in Canadian status than in the crisis confronting mankind as the result of the rise of Hitler. And an independent military relationship with the United States doubtless seemed to them an object worth struggling for — for its practical advantages, but also as a symbol of emancipation from the British ties which Skelton and his circle disliked and resented.

### 3. SUPPLY PLANNING

No problem was more urgent for the Canadian services in the period of preparation than that of procurement of weapons and equipment; and with none, on the whole, was so little progress made. It was relatively easy to produce a blue-print of the organization for the forces that Canada required; the men were available if the government would provide the money to pay them; but weapons to arm them could not be obtained merely by appropriating funds for purchase.

Canada, as already mentioned (above, page 4) possessed hardly the rudiments of a munition industry. In the First World War the country had made great quantities of shells and had built merchant ships, small naval vessels and aircraft; but it made no weapons except Ross rifles. During the period 1918-35 nothing was done to develop its military supply potential. When the King government undertook its modest rearmament programme the intractable problem of supply at once confronted it. The story as it affected the naval and militia services is told in great part in the official histories of those forces; something more is said in Part

VIII, below; here, accordingly, only a general outline will be attempted, including a brief account of air force procurement problems.

*Private Industry Versus Government Factories: The Bren Gun Case*

One question which had to be faced was that of how equipment for the Canadian forces was to be produced: by private industry, or in government factories. This matter was prominent in the public mind on account of publicity being given in the United States (particularly by Senator Nye's committee) to what were alleged to be the unduly large profits and influence of private armament manufacturers. This was the sort of issue that appealed to the Prime Minister; and in January 1937 he appointed, of his own motion, an interdepartmental committee of civil servants (headed by the ubiquitous Dr. O. D. Skelton) to report on control of profits on government armament contracts.<sup>145</sup> Canada had a clean slate for planning, for apart from the fact that the country had no private munition industry, it possessed only one government munition factory — the Dominion Arsenal at Quebec, whose production was limited to small-arms ammunition and field-gun shell.

The soldiers had been pressing for years for the establishment of government small-arms and gun factories in connection with the Dominion Arsenal. The capital cost involved was apparently the main factor militating against such a policy.<sup>146</sup> Skelton's committee now reported, with respect to suggestions made abroad that arms manufacture should be "entirely in the hands of the state", that they were "unable to support such a proposal as being practicable under present conditions in Canada". The problem of profit control seemed to them "essentially an administrative one", and they suggested the institution of a standing Interdepartmental Financial Committee "to assist the officials charged with the placing of contracts under the defence program" and having the sole function of helping to prevent undue profits.<sup>147</sup> In March 1937, accordingly, the government set up an inter-departmental committee on profit control. The question of government versus private production seems never to have been formally settled; but it is clear that the government, unwilling to spend the money to establish publicly-owned plants, followed in practice a policy of reliance on private industry combined with rigid limitation of profits.<sup>148</sup>

Only one really important contract for weapons was placed in Canada before the war began; and this one caused so much political difficulty as to impose a brake on progress in military supply. On 31 March 1938 a contract for the production of 7000 Bren light machine-guns was signed with the John Inglis Company Limited of Toronto, which concurrently obtained a contract from the British War Office to produce 5000 guns. The total order for 12,000 guns meant that the cost of Canada's 7000 would be considerably lower than if they alone were to be produced. The contract came under serious criticism, largely on the ground that no other company than John Inglis had been given an opportunity of tendering for it, and a Royal Commission was appointed to investigate the matter. The Commissioner (the Hon. Henry Hague Davis, a Judge of the Supreme Court of Canada) concluded that the Interdepartmental Committee on profit control had proved an inadequate safeguard, and recommended that "the negotiations leading up to and the making of contracts between the Government and private manufacturers either for the purchase or production of . . . munitions or armaments should be put into the hands of an expert advisory group of competent business men".<sup>149</sup>

The government went rather further than this. It brought in legislation to establish a Defence Purchasing Board of the sort suggested; but the act also laid down as a principle the desirability of competitive bids, and provided that where such bids were impossible the maximum profit permitted would be five per cent per annum of the average amount of capital employed in the performance of the contract.<sup>150</sup> The Minister of National Defence said of this, "we have worked out, in my judgment, the most drastic system of profit control ever enacted, so far as we could ascertain".<sup>151</sup> This was a popular idea at the time. It met little criticism in the House of Commons, and although more doubt was expressed in the Senate that body would not take the responsibility of raising the permitted margin of profit. The net consequence was that this proved to be one more case where political considerations took precedence over military expediency with unfortunate results. On 12 September 1939, after the outbreak of war, Mr. C. D. Howe described those results to the House of Commons:

The provision of 5 per cent was put in the last act after a good deal of consideration as a minimum return for the service rendered, but it was one which men of considerable experience believed to be unworkable. I can say . . . that from that day to this the defence purchasing board has done its very best to place contracts on that basis and has used every pressure that could be brought to bear in the form of patriotism and so on, but to date it has not succeeded in placing a single contract on that basis. . . . That part of the act we can consider as having proven to be unworkable.

Both from the point of view of the government's desire to avoid scandals, and from that of efficiency in equipping the forces, it is pretty evident that a policy of government manufacture would have had much to recommend it. It is difficult to see why it would not have been possible to set up a government small-arms factory just as cheaply and efficiently as the John Inglis plant, since the latter had to be created virtually from the ground up. The Canadian government lent the firm the machinery of the old Ross rifle factory and the rest was provided by the British and Canadian governments jointly.

Two points remain to be made. The Commissioner found no evidence whatever of any act of corruption; and the John Inglis contract was carried out efficiently. The plant began to produce Bren guns on schedule in the early spring of 1940, when they were very badly needed, and before the end of the war it had made over 200,000 of these weapons.<sup>152</sup>

#### *Home Supply and Sources Abroad*

It was official policy — expressed, among other places, in the act setting up the Defence Purchasing Board — to produce equipment for the Canadian forces in Canada as far as possible. On the whole, however, remarkably little was accomplished in this respect before the outbreak of war. The Militia gradually received Canadian-made anti-gas respirators; some wireless sets were produced; and — presaging a vast development of the war period — cooperation with the automotive and tire industries resulted in new designs for military vehicles. The annual report of the Defence Department for 1937-38 noted, "Final design of a military pattern of four-wheeled mechanical transport vehicle, to take the place of the horse-drawn limbered general service wagon, was achieved. A number were ordered from the trade." But how very far the Militia was from being mobile was indicated in the statement to Parliament in April 1939 that it had received 122 vehicles.<sup>153</sup> No weapons were received from Canadian sources.

Even if Canada had had an existing munition industry, there were many items, particularly of heavy equipment, which it would have been uneconomic to produce in Canada for her needs alone. Britain was her traditional source of supply, and, as we have seen, it had long been established policy to use equipment of British types. But when Canada began to re-arm, and sought to place orders for weapons in the United Kingdom, she at once found that the British factories were working to capacity to serve Britain's own rearmament programme, and deliveries were not to be had for a long time to come. When war broke out, Canada in consequence possessed — to mention one item of many — exactly *four* modern anti-aircraft guns. She had 16 light tanks, of which two had been received in 1938 and the rest on the very eve of hostilities.<sup>154</sup>

In these circumstances, it was natural for Canada to look to the United States as an alternative source of supply. There were, of course, strong arguments against such a departure from established policy. A Canadian formation equipped with American weapons requiring American ammunition would have been very difficult to incorporate into a British field force — the most likely role for Canadian divisions abroad. There would be less objection to the use of U.S. equipment in roles outside the field army — e.g., in coast defence. But even here the United States neutrality legislation of 1935-37 would prevent any further equipment or ammunition from being obtained after the outbreak of a war. However, the possibility was worth investigating; and in April 1938 Colonel N. O. Carr, the Director of Mechanization and Artillery at Militia Headquarters, was sent on a highly confidential mission to Washington for this purpose, (The Department of External Affairs vetoed a suggestion that the British Embassy should be informed of the visit.)<sup>155</sup>

This mission drew a blank. Among the points that emerged was the fact that no guns had been made by private industry in the United States since the war, and for the U.S. government to deal with Canada would have required special authority from Congress. The U.S. War Department was planning to place an order for anti-aircraft guns with private industry shortly, but all other weapons would continue to be made in government arsenals. American coast-defence guns were considerably more expensive than British. It would take twenty months to obtain delivery of anti-aircraft guns, and height-finders and predictors, without which the guns were useless, would take even longer. The U.S. War Department was prepared to cooperate by providing information and specifications, but there might be patent difficulties. All told, it is not surprising that the U.S. Army's Chief of Ordnance, Major-General William H. Tschappat, offered the "unsolicited opinion" that the Canadian government would be wiser, in the circumstances, to abide by British sources of supply.<sup>156</sup> The Canadian Master General of the Ordnance (Major-General A. C. Caldwell) took the same view,<sup>157</sup> and no attempt was made to arrange production in the United States.

Slight as the achievement was in actual pre-war production of equipment in Canada, a foundation was laid; and one useful measure was the initiation in 1936 of a Survey of Industry, the first comprehensive attempt in Canadian history to catalogue the resources of Canada available for war production. This was part of the work of the Navy, Army and Air Supply Committee.

The establishment of this committee was the result of long effort. During the Imperial Conference of 1926 the United Kingdom's Principal Supply Officers Committee (above, page 90) held a special meeting (18 November) at which a Canadian representative was present, and passed a resolution that the Dominion

governments should be invited to consider setting up committees similar to the P.S.O.Cs. in Britain and India. In Canada Major-General H. C. Thacker (Chief of the General Staff 1927-28) recommended such action, but though the Minister of National Defence approved in principle nothing further was effected at this time. At the Imperial Conference of 1930 there was an informal meeting of the Principal Supply Officers Committee with members of the Canadian delegation, of whom one was Major-General McNaughton, then Chief of the General Staff, and the matter was again mentioned. Again no action was taken. In the autumn of 1935, however, Mr. King's new government gave an indication of increased interest in the military supply question by reviving the appointment of Master General of the Ordnance (above, page 69); and in September 1936 the Navy, Army and Air Supply Committee, roughly a Canadian equivalent of the P.S.O.C., was set up with the Master General as chairman (see also above, page 69). In the following November a chairman was appointed for a Central Investigation Committee, to carry out the industrial survey under the Navy, Army and Air Supply Committee's super-vision; and by 31 March following, with the assistance of various other departments, "preliminary investigations" of 167 industrial plants had been made<sup>158</sup> By the spring of 1939, 1597 establishments had been surveyed.<sup>159</sup>

The existence of such a record of industrial resources was calculated, among other things, to facilitate obtaining orders for military equipment from the United Kingdom. This possibility was important from two points of view. First, as we have seen in connection with the Bren contract, a concurrent order from the British government was a powerful means of reducing the unit cost of Canadian-made equipment. Secondly, Canadian industry was anxious for British armament orders. During the later 'thirties Canadian industrialists were actively engaged in this quest. The Canadian government encouraged the pursuit to a degree, though as we have seen it declined to act as an intermediary; by the summer of 1939 this encouragement had reached the point of lending the services of General McNaughton, the President of the National Research Council, who accompanied a delegation of the Canadian Manufacturers Association to England.<sup>160</sup>

Leaving the aircraft situation aside for the moment, it may be noted that the British government actually placed few orders for equipment in Canada before war came. The explanation was, in great part, Britain's shortage of Canadian dollars. We have spoken of the Bren gun order. There was also an order for 100 tracked machine-gun carriers, concurrent (as in the Bren gun case) with a Canadian order; but the British treasury insisted on this being cancelled after the outbreak of war. An order was placed for 800,000 lbs. of T.N.T., and another for 3.7-inch anti-aircraft shells; and just before hostilities began the War Office made an epoch-making contract with Marine Industries Limited of Sorel, P.Q., for 100 25-pounder field guns and 200 additional carriages. Few as the orders were, it should nevertheless be remembered that there was almost no important defence production project in Canada that was not being supported by the British taxpayer. It is salutary to quote the summary given by a British official historian:

Thus, at the outbreak of war, the Canadian munitions industry, outside the Dominion arsenal,\* still consisted of only one firm in actual production on British orders. This was the National Steel Car Corporation, which was turning out 3.7-inch shells at the rate of 3000 rounds per week. Even the plants in preparation could be numbered on the fingers of

\*The Dominion Arsenal had expanded its operations considerably before war began. Its Wartime plant at Lindsay, Ontario, had been reopened, and a contract was made with a Montreal firm in 1937 by which 18-pounder and 4.5-inch shell bodies were produced under the Arsenal's supervision.<sup>161</sup>

one hand. There was the Inglis Bren gun factory then nearing completion; the Defence Industries T.N.T. factory, which was due to begin production in December at the rate of 150 tons per month,\* a second plant for 25-pounder shells being set up by the National Steel Car Corporation; and the Marine Industries factory on which work had just begun. The total value of the capital provided and projected did not exceed L 1 million. Although each of these schemes was of great importance as a nucleus for the future development of munitions production, the capacity actually in preparation, even including aircraft, was negligible in comparison with the total resources of Canadian industry.<sup>162</sup>

### *Aircraft Production in Canada*

The story of aircraft production in Canada is a special question, to which we must now turn.

It will be remembered that General McNaughton reported in 1935 that Canada did not possess a single service aircraft fit to use in active operations (above, page 3). The improvement of the country's air defences was, he said, the greatest requirement. When the King government launched its rearmament plan there was thus much to be done in the air, and as we have seen the government proposed to give the Royal Canadian Air Force priority over the other services. Modern service aircraft were urgently needed.

The quickest way of getting at least some was to purchase them in the United Kingdom. The R.C.A.F. proceeded to order from the British Air Ministry, which clearly was disposed to be cooperative, a number of used Wapiti general-purpose aircraft (not very modern but still with some useful life in them), and also a number of Shark torpedo-bombers, which were rather more formidable. Subsequently Hurricane fighters and Battle single-engined bombers were ordered and obtained. At the same time, it was desirable from every point of view to encourage aircraft production in Canada, and from the outset of the new programme training machines in small numbers were ordered from Canadian manufacturers. In 1935 no plant in Canada was equipped to build service aircraft; but this was the next step.<sup>163</sup> The Canadian government, an Air Ministry official is quoted as remarking, "embarked on a very ambitious programme of local construction of airframes of British Service types in quantities confined for the moment to R.C.A.F. requirements".<sup>164</sup> Airframes, be it noted, are aircraft without engines; no attempt was made to produce engines in Canada. And the fact that the aircraft were to be made in such small numbers meant inevitably that costs would be high. The "ambitious programme" was launched late in 1936 when an order for large Stranraer flying boats (five in the first instance) was given to Canadian Vickers Limited of Montreal.<sup>165</sup> Later other Canadian firms received R.C.A.F. orders for Sharks, Lysanders, and Bolingbrokes. Producing these planes in the small and inexperienced Canadian plants was a slow business; the first Stranraer was delivered to the R.C.A.F. late in 1938, but no Canadian-built aircraft of any other service type seems to have been received before September 1939.<sup>166</sup>

Almost entirely as a result of this R.C.A.F. programme, the Canadian aircraft industry expanded rather remarkably in the five years before the war. In 1933 no aircraft were produced in Canada; in 1934 there were 18, and the "selling value at works" was just \$117,689. Thereafter the number rose steadily to 282 aircraft in 1938, with a selling value of \$4,001,622; the last twelve months had seen the

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\*T.N.T. was however being produced in Canada for the War Office before the outbreak of war. The report of the Department of National Defence for the fiscal year ending 31 March 1939 states, "This Department has carried out the inspection of the T.N.T. being supplied by Canadian Industries Limited to the War Office. . . ."

main increase. The capital employed had still been only \$2,836,836 in 1937; the following year it was up to \$8,641,790.<sup>167</sup> Though the expansion was impressive, the industry was still small; and the fact that it was entirely dependent on imported engines must be remembered.<sup>168</sup>

Thanks in part to the beginnings of this new industry, but thanks still more to British imports and the cooperation of the Air Ministry, the Royal Canadian Air Force had a fair number of aircraft available when it was called upon to guard the country's gates in September 1939. Service-type machines numbered 92, including 19 Hurricanes, 11 Sharks, 10 Battles and eight Stranraers, plus Wapitis and other types long obsolete. Only the Hurricanes and possibly the Battles could be considered modern military aircraft.<sup>169</sup> It was a slender muster, but infinitely superior to what would have been possible three or four years before. And behind it a rather larger array of training machines, 130 in number, was employed in laying the foundations of a greater air force. The United States\* as well as Britain and Canada had been drawn upon for trainers.<sup>170</sup>

We have so far said little about a development which promised to do far more for aircraft manufacture in Canada than the relatively small orders the R.C.A.F. could place: the production of aircraft for the Royal Air Force.

The Air Ministry watched the Canadian production programme with interest. When in May 1938, as we have seen in another connection (above, page 83), the Weir Mission was sent to North America, it had two main tasks, apart from that of looking into air training in Canada with which it had so little success: to make purchases of aircraft, including trainers, in the United States; and to explore "the possibilities of creating a war potential in Canada". The Canadian aircraft industry was eager to do business, and in spite of Mr. King's not very helpful attitude (above, page 84) Weir and his colleagues had discussions with representatives of the ten firms which effectively composed it. The Mission talked of the desirability of developing "a war potential for the production of heavy long-range bombers", and the firms expressed their readiness to set up a central contracting company which would make contracts with the British government and assemble airframes from parts made by sub-contractors. The Mission returned home and recommended that this action be encouraged and an order for bombers placed in Canada.<sup>171</sup>

This recommendation was approved, and in July 1938 another Air Ministry mission, headed by Sir Hardman Lever, went to Canada. Keeping the Department of National Defence informed, it proceeded to negotiate an agreement with six aircraft firms who undertook to establish a central company (Canadian Associated Aircraft Limited) which would set up two assembly plants, near Toronto and Montreal, to be fed by components from the six companies' plants. The companies would simultaneously develop their own facilities and undertook to maintain during the next ten years manufacturing capacity available for further potential orders. The order placed at this time was for 80 Hampden twin-engined bombers; and a promise was made of a follow-on order for 100 more bombers of more advanced type. The contract was signed in November 1938. At the same time the Air Ministry placed a separate order for 40 Hurricanes with the Canadian Car and Foundry Company of Fort William, Ontario.<sup>172</sup>

The first Canadian-built Hurricane was test-flown in January 1940. The first

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\*For the emergency R.C.A.F. mission sent to Washington at the time of the Munich crisis to buy aircraft, see Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament*, 148-52. The Americans were cooperative, but the Canadian government withdrew the mission's authority when the crisis eased. An opportunity to acquire aircraft that would have been very useful in 1939 was thus lost.

Hampden did not take to the air until the following August.<sup>173</sup> The Canadian Associated Aircraft experiment was not a success. The Hampden contract was not completed until the summer of 1942, by which time the Hampden was virtually obsolete. The plan to follow it up with the production of four-engined Stirlings was abandoned, after "many vicissitudes", in January 1941. The productive capacity of Canadian Associated Aircraft was taken over by the Canadian government, and the triumphs of Canadian wartime aircraft production were achieved under other auspices.<sup>174</sup>

### *Ships for the Navy*

The question of "procurement" of ships for the Royal Canadian Navy is dealt with in the official history of that service, and need merely be summarized here. The naval service was so small, and funds for its support so limited, that all the fighting vessels acquired for it during the five years before the war could be enumerated on the fingers of two hands.

The first major vessels ever built expressly for the Canadian naval service were the destroyers *Saguenay* and *Skeena*, in 1929-31. Consideration was given to the possibility of building them in Canada, and the authorizing order in council provided for tenders to be called for in Canada as well as Great Britain. But the cost in Canada would have been 50 or 60 per cent higher; moreover, destroyers had never been built in Canada, and it was doubtful whether there was any Canadian yard capable of undertaking the task with efficiency. It appears that there were no Canadian tenders, and the ships were built by Thornycrofts of Southampton, England.<sup>175</sup> All the destroyers acquired between 1931 and the outbreak of war were purchased from the Royal Navy. As we have already remarked, this method of acquisition meant that Canada got a great deal for her money.

Smaller and less complicated vessels were constructed in Canada. Four minesweepers were so built in 1938, one on the Atlantic coast, one on the Great Lakes, and two in British Columbia. The two latter cost much more than those built in the east.<sup>176</sup> At this period the shipbuilding industry in Canada was nearly moribund. Its total payroll in 1938 was only \$943,302,<sup>177</sup> and its main activity was certainly ship repairing rather than construction. Except for the small Canadian naval programme just mentioned, nothing comparable to the measures taken in connection with the aircraft industry was done by either the Canadian or British governments, before the outbreak of war, to revive its war potential. It was nevertheless to make a considerable contribution to victory in 1939-45.

## 4. NATIONAL READINESS FOR WAR

A brief comment upon the effectiveness of the Canadian defence programme of 1936-39 has been attempted above (page 6). The chief point to be made is that although forces had been provided adequate to deal with a mere raid against Canadian territory, means were lacking either to counter a major menace to Canadian soil (which was not an immediate possibility in 1939) or to intervene effectively to assist Canada's allies abroad (which was the actual need at that moment). It is true that a division of Canadian troops crossed the Atlantic only three months after war broke out; but it was far from ready for action at that time in point either of training or equipment. The degree of capacity of the other Canadian services for action abroad is not inaccurately reflected in the four destroyers

that crossed to the Royal Navy's aid in May 1940, or the three R.C.A.F. squadrons that went to England during the first six months of the same year. No. 1 Fighter Squadron, which arrived there in June, took with it 16 Hurricanes; though since they were "not of the latest type" the Commander-in-Chief of the R.A.F. Fighter Command at once took steps to replace them with new ones.<sup>178</sup> No. 112 Army Cooperation Squadron could be equipped on departure with "12 only" Lysanders. Sending these aircraft entailed closing the R.C.A.F.'s Army Cooperation School, the source of aircrews for the two overseas army cooperation squadrons; and with respect both to the fighter and the army cooperation squadrons the Canadian government was obliged to state that it was understood that the Royal Air Force would "provide reinforcements as required, there being no facilities for training here".<sup>179</sup> This was some nine months after the outbreak of war. Both the air and naval services were in reasonably efficient condition when war came, despite their recent considerable expansion in personnel; but the Navy was very small, and the Air Force, it is obvious, was still very short of modern aircraft and trained aircrews.

Some account should be given of the three services' basic war plans.

The Militia's, known as *Defence Scheme No. 3 (Major War)*, is described at some length in the Army history. As revised in 1937, it provided for the mobilization from the Permanent Force and the Non-Permanent Active Militia of a Mobile Force of a Corps Headquarters, two Divisions and ancillary troops (a cavalry division was also included until the spring of 1939). This Mobile Force, under the conditions of the time, had for its "primary object" the direct defence of Canadian territory; but it was recognized that it could also be used as a field force for dispatch overseas, should the government of the day so decide. There was separate provision for mobilizing units to man the coast defences and guard "vulnerable points".<sup>180</sup> This, it is evident, was a mobilization plan combined with a plan for local defence. It could not be a general war plan or plan of operations without discussion and coordination with Canada's potential allies; and this, we have seen, was not permitted by the government of the day.

The other services did not possess plans comparable to Defence Scheme No. 3, in the sense that there seems to have been no single overall document in either case prescribing the action to be taken. Nevertheless a great deal of planning had been done covering all three forces. The minutes of the Joint Staff Committee/Chiefs of Staff Committee reflect attention to both broad principles and local details, increasing in intensity as war came closer. It was only in 1936 that the Committee began to meet with any frequency; from 1927 to that year it seems to have averaged only about one meeting a year, but in 1936, from June onwards, there were half a dozen.<sup>181</sup>

In 1938 the Committee began more active planning. In January, on the initiative of the C.G.S. (General Ashton) and with the approval of the Minister of National Defence, an inter-service sub-committee with Lt.-Col. Pope as chairman was set to the task of compiling a Joint Staff Committee Plan for the Defence of Canada. By 27 June the Plan was complete. It was submitted to the Minister on 14 July, and thereafter with his authority distributed to subordinate commanders for their guidance and action. Naval, Army and Air plans were dealt with in separate sections of it. It was not extremely detailed, for local commanders had the responsibility of drawing up their own defence plans within the general framework it provided. The Militia's Defence Scheme No. 3 remained in effect, and

provided much of the detail required. An appendix to the Joint Staff Committee Plan specified the peace and war stations of R.C.A.F. units.<sup>182</sup> Among the local defence plans existing in 1939 were very detailed tri-service Defence Schemes for Halifax and Esquimalt which covered in themselves much of the action to be taken by the three services on the outbreak of war.<sup>183</sup>

The Canadian government's general protective plan may be said to have been contained in the draft War Book drawn up by the Committee on Defence Co-ordination appointed, none too soon, in March 1938 (above, page 70). Thanks to that document and the others we have mentioned, the essential measures of local defence were taken in August and September 1939 with considerable efficiency and comparatively little confusion by the forces that were available. There had been solid accomplishments in the last few years. But real readiness for the crisis that then burst upon the nation could only have been achieved by a much longer period of active preparation, and by far larger expenditures than those provided for in the limited defence programme of 1936-39.

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**THE DIRECTION OF THE CANADIAN  
WAR EFFORT**

1. THE CABINET AND THE WAR COMMITTEE

**I**N THE CANADIAN system of cabinet government, as in the British system from which it derives, the position of the Prime Minister is one of exceptional authority.

The Prime Minister chooses his cabinet colleagues; he presides over cabinet meetings; he recommends dissolutions of parliament; and when he resigns the whole ministry automatically ends. It is the Prime Minister who carries the main burden of explaining the policies of the administration to the people, both indirectly through the House of Commons and directly by such media as radio and television broadcasts; he is frequently the only one who can arbitrate the inevitable differences between Ministers; and it is he who, by his daily decisions, must determine the extent and nature of the Cabinet control exercised over the machinery of government. Ministerial and interdepartmental committees are established on the Prime Minister's initiative (although with the consent and advice of his colleagues), and he alone is responsible for the committees' terms of reference, their powers in relation to finance, revenue and expenditure, their membership, and their duration. His practical authority is, of course, greatly enhanced by his position as party leader. In constitutional theory he is responsible to the House of Commons and his power depends upon it. In practice, however, in normal circumstances and as long as his party retains a safe majority he possesses a large degree of control over the House.

His authority, great as it is in times of peace, is commonly enlarged in times of war. Then the attention of Government is focussed on matters directly related to the war effort, while those departments whose functions are primarily of a peace-time nature diminish in importance. Power thus becomes concentrated in fewer hands, and the need for final authority is accentuated. Indeed, during a war, and provided only that he can retain his support in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister, it was said long ago, may "take upon himself a power not inferior to that of a dictator".<sup>1</sup>

These facts were illustrated in Canada during the Second World War. William Lyon Mackenzie King might seem rather unlikely material for a dictator, but in fact he exercised enormous and increasing powers. The official parliamentary opposition was so ineffective that frequently his worst problems arose within his own party. Nevertheless, as the records of the War Committee clearly show, he was almost always the undisputed master of his Cabinet. If his party grew restless, he could bring it to heel by a threat of resignation,<sup>2</sup> for it considered him politically indispensable. Only twice was his power seriously menaced — in the two conscription crises of 1942 and 1944; and as we have already said he emerged from the second

and the worse of these stronger than ever. In the last days of the war he ruled, abused as always, but effectively unchallenged.

Under the aegis of the Prime Minister's prestige and his very real authority, the system of cabinet government, both in the United Kingdom and in Canada, has developed a flexibility and a resilience which have so far enabled it to adapt itself successfully to widely varying circumstances. Before the Second World War, meetings of the Canadian Cabinet were "a mixture of formality and informality". When the members of the administration of the day met as the Cabinet, a body "unknown to the law", they freely discussed whatever matters came before them, but did so without agenda, order of priority, the taking of minutes, or the recording of conclusions. Thus policy was determined. Yet, although it is not generally realized, the Cabinet as such can take no executive action. Before any decision can be implemented, this body of men must resolve itself into another and a legal entity, "the Committee of the Privy Council", whose decisions, when approved by the Governor General, become within wide limits the law of the land. Senior Canadian government officials are usually careful to draw the distinction between "Council" and "Cabinet", pointing out that the former is, strictly speaking, the executive body which passes submissions to the Crown's representative, while the latter is a purely deliberative body which determines policy. Four Ministers form a quorum of the Council, but no fixed number is required for a quorum of the Cabinet. Since, however, Council Committee and Cabinet have an identical membership, the distinction is often apt to be overlooked, even by the Ministers themselves, and it is reasonable to consider the two bodies merely as different "aspects of the same constitutional organism". Before the Second World War, no minutes or conclusions had been written down at Cabinet meetings, although the Prime Minister sometimes made his own notes. "Council" decisions, however, were recorded as orders in or minutes of council.<sup>3</sup>

The story of the development of cabinet government in Canada during the Second World War is in many respects similar to that in the United Kingdom in 1914-18. In both cases the real executive authority came to be vested in a small group of Ministers rather than in the Cabinet as a whole, and in both cases the establishment of a secretariat to serve this "inner Cabinet" resulted in a general formalization and clarification of Cabinet procedure. Yet although the Canadian pattern of development obviously owes much to British experience and example, a number of important variations were consciously introduced to suit the Canadian situation. Moreover, the Canadian Cabinet system did not in all respects develop as far between 1939 and 1945 as the British system did in the First World War. In November 1915 the British Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, established a War Committee, consisting initially of six and eventually of 11 members, who were responsible to the Cabinet as a whole.\* In December 1916 the new Prime Minister, Mr. Lloyd George, formed a War Cabinet which at no time contained more than seven members, most of whom were free of departmental duties and who directed the entire conduct of the war. As we shall see, during the Second World War the Canadian system never moved beyond the stage of the War Committee, and there were in fact important differences between this Committee and a War Cabinet proper. Notably, in Britain in both wars the full Cabinet, though appointments continued to be made to it, never met after the establishment of the War Cabinet; in Canada in 1939-45 the full Cabinet continued to meet.

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\*The Canadian Cabinet set up a War Committee in October 1917.

Until shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War, the Canadian Cabinet had to consider only a relatively small amount of business concerned with defence; a task which imposed no very onerous burden upon the time or attention of Ministers. By August 1936, however, as we have seen, the international situation appeared sufficiently menacing to justify the establishment of a Canadian Defence Committee under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister (above, page 69). Senior officers in the Department of National Defence welcomed this development "with intense satisfaction", regarding it as "the most important step taken with respect to defence for a great number of years."<sup>4</sup>

The purpose of the committee (which later came to be called the Defence Committee of the Cabinet) was to deal with matters of defence and security which could be handled more expeditiously by the smaller body than by the entire Cabinet, and, as the Prime Minister, Mr. King, told the House of Commons in the following year, to provide members of the Cabinet with "the fullest possible information with respect to the general defence services."<sup>5</sup> Yet in point of fact the Defence Committee, as already noted, was not a very active or important body (above, page 69). Nor were its proceedings fully recorded. When Mr. A. D. P. Heeney was appointed Principal Secretary in the Prime Minister's Office in 1938, he also became Secretary to the Defence Committee, and minutes were kept thereafter of some, though not all, of its few meetings; the only apparent record of the meeting of 30 January 1939, for instance, is a memorandum from Mr. King to Mr. Heeney informing him that the meeting had been held and naming those present.

By the eve of hostilities the requirements for centralized Cabinet control of a Canadian war effort began to emerge more clearly. In general there were three principal problems to be solved. In the first place, the nature of many wartime Cabinet decisions would demand a 'much higher degree of secrecy than that necessary in peace, and therefore it was imperative that as few individuals as possible should be informed of the progress of policy in the course of preparation. Secondly, the volume of Cabinet business would be greatly increased, so that methods would have to be found for dealing with it expeditiously, for establishing priorities on agenda, and for separating matters of purely routine administration, which nevertheless required the formal approval of Council, from more weighty affairs. Finally, a means would have to be found for equitably sharing the work-load among Ministers.

The experience of the First World War, especially in the United Kingdom, had indicated that an extensive Ministerial committee system was a suitable device for meeting these difficulties. Therefore, on 30 August 1939 a Canadian order in council established six "sub-committees of Council" to function in specific fields of responsibility. Most important of these was the Emergency Council (Committee on General Policy), which was instituted to "consider all questions of general policy; to receive reports from all other departments, and, generally speaking, to co-ordinate all operations of government". The Prime Minister was Chairman of the Emergency Council and the original members were the Ministers of Justice (Mr. E. J. Lapointe); National Defence (from 19 September 1939 Mr. N. McL. Rogers); Finance (Colonel J. L. Ralston); and Mines and Resources (Mr. T. A. Crerar) ; together with the Leader of the Government in the Senate (Senator R. Dandurand) . Designed as a supervisory body which would review the war effort as a whole, the Emergency Council took the place of the pre-war Defence Committee. The other five sub-committees dealt, respectively, with supplies, legislation, public information, finance, and internal security.<sup>6</sup>

Even before the actual declaration of war there had been an appreciable increase in the number of ministerial submissions to the Governor-in-Council concerning defence matters, and this trend was greatly accelerated after the outbreak of hostilities. Formal executive proceedings were necessary not only for vital war-time legislation but also for a host of relatively minor administrative matters which required the sanction of the Governor-in-Council. From 25 August 1939 to 2 September 1945 the Governor-in-council actually passed a total of 92,350 items of business, including 36,148 Treasury Board proceedings.<sup>7</sup> With an average of more than 15,000 items a year thus having to be cleared by the central executive, it was only natural that normal organization and procedure should have been modified to ease the extra strain. One device to assist the rapid dispatch of Cabinet business was the establishment of a Government Business Committee which reviewed in advance all matters requiring Council action and separated items of purely administrative routine which were then disposed of by a Special Committee of Council. Nevertheless, sufficient matters of substance remained to necessitate a further extension of the central committee system.

Accordingly, on 5 December 1939, a far-reaching re-organization took place in which the six sub-committees of Council were replaced by nine "Committees of the Cabinet". The role of the new Committees was, in the words of the order in council, "to provide more effectively for the conduct of all phases of Canada's war effort and for the efficient co-ordination of the various activities of government, related thereto".<sup>8</sup> The most important of them was the War Committee, which superseded the Emergency Council. The remaining committees dealt with War Finance and Supply, Food Production and Marketing, Fuel and Power, Shipping and Transportation, Price Control and Labour, Internal Security, Legislation, and Public Information. Three days later a tenth Committee, on Demobilization, was added (above, page 63).<sup>9</sup> Other committees were set up as the war proceeded. Generally speaking, committees were composed of those Ministers whose portfolios, special qualifications, or seniority appeared to make them best suited for the particular task in hand.

As might be expected, the Cabinet committees of 1939 were of varying usefulness. The duties of some were soon taken over by one or another of the government departments, while others, such as the Committee on Legislation, functioned actively for a considerable time. The orders in council constituting the committees were not revoked until 5 September 1945. Two committees, the War Committee and the Committee on Demobilization, continued to have an active existence throughout the conflict.<sup>10</sup>

Initially the War Committee had the same membership as the Emergency Council, and its terms of reference were essentially similar to its predecessor's, namely, "to consider questions of general policy, to consider reports from special and other committees and to coordinate war activities; the said committee to have power to call before it any official or employee of the government, and any officer of the naval, military, or air forces of Canada, whose duty it shall be to render the committee assistance in the discharge of its duties and, in particular, to accord the committee information upon any subject concerning which information may be requested".<sup>11</sup> The War Committee was enlarged in May 1940 by the addition of the Minister of Munitions and Supply, Mr. C. D. Howe, and the newly appointed Minister of National Defence for Air, Mr. C. G. Power.<sup>12</sup> Two months later the Minister of National War Services, Mr. J. G. Gardiner, and the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services, Mr. Angus L. Macdonald, were added to the Com-

mittee.<sup>13</sup> However, Mr. Gardiner never attended a Committee meeting while holding this portfolio, and when he relinquished it on 10 June 1941 his successor did not become a member of the War Committee. Although from time to time orders in council were issued fixing the War Committee's composition, one might say of it in practice almost what was said of the pre-war Committee of Imperial Defence in the United Kingdom: it consisted of the Prime Minister and such other ministers as he chose to invite. Mr. Louis S. St. Laurent became Minister of Justice on 10 December 1941 and was thereby a member of the Committee under the original order in council; but he did not attend a meeting until 14 May 1942, from which date he was usually present. The fact is that on 13 May Mr. King had spoken to him and said he wanted him to be a member "to have Quebec represented".<sup>14</sup>

Almost invariably the Prime Minister presided over the War Committee, but on the very few occasions of his absence the chairmanship was usually assumed by the Minister of Mines and Resources, Mr. Crerar.\* Other Ministers often attended meetings of the War Committee without being named as members, and although they were commonly invited only when some matter of direct concern to their own departments was under discussion, this was found to be a desirable procedure. Dr. Skelton, the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, was regularly present, as was his successor, Mr. N. A. Robertson, after Skelton's death. Various departmental officials appeared before the Committee to tender information and advice.

It is curious and interesting that the government's senior military advisers did not begin to attend the Committee with any regularity until the war was nearly three years old. The Chiefs of Staff did attend on occasion when invited, but these invitations were relatively rare. On 17 June 1942, however, the Committee agreed that "for a stated period" the Chiefs of Staff should attend the first and third meetings each month. This formula was not precisely adhered to, but the Chiefs were usually present for parts of one or two meetings per month for the rest of the war. It is computed that they actually attended about 45 of the 167 meetings held between 17 June 1942 and the dissolution of the Committee. Here, we may note in passing, we have an important difference between the higher direction of the war in Britain and in Canada. In the United Kingdom Mr. Churchill combined in his own person the offices of Prime Minister and Defence Minister, so that, in his words, ". . . for the first time the Chiefs of Staff Committee assumed its due and proper place in daily contact with the executive Head of the Government, and in accord with him had full control over the conduct of the war and the armed forces".<sup>15</sup> It should perhaps be added that in practice in Britain the War Cabinet played little part in the direction of strategy; this was increasingly left to the Minister of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff.<sup>16</sup> Had the Canadian government been regularly called upon to make strategic decisions, the Minister or Ministers primarily responsible would have had to have the same close and continuous contact with the Chiefs of Staff that was the rule in England. As it was, the times when the War Committee seems to have felt the strongest need for consultation with the Chiefs were those moments when the war showed signs of approaching the shores of Canada — notably, just after Pearl Harbor, when the Chiefs attended Committee meetings on 7 and 10 December 1941 and reported on the defences of the Pacific coast, and in the Aleutian crisis beginning late in May 1942. It was at this latter period that the Chiefs' regular attendance at the War Committee began.

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\*Except for Senator Dandurand, who did not attend frequently and who died in 1942, Mr. Crerar was the senior Privy Councillor in the Committee after Mr. King.

This Aleutian crisis is described below (page 389). In it, for a few days at the end of May and the early part of June 1942, we see for the only time in the war the War Committee exercising something approximating to general supervision over an operational situation: receiving reports, watching developments and giving decisions. It is interesting that at this time, on 5 June, the Committee agreed that a "War Committee Room" be set up, with the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in charge, all Operational information made available and regular resumes prepared for the Secretary of the Cabinet War Committee. The Chiefs of Staff, the War Committee was told on 11 June, were disposed to question the desirability of this; the immediate crisis passed, and the plan was never fully carried out.

The most peculiar aspect of the arrangements at this juncture was the fact of the Chief of the General Staff (Lieut.-General Stuart) going to the Pacific Coast and taking personal charge there, superseding the G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command, Major-General Alexander, though without giving up the appointment of C.G.S. There is no record of this arrangement having been discussed in either the War Committee or the Chiefs of Staff Committee, and it may have been settled between Stuart and the Minister of National Defence. It was not a good expedient. At this crisis, the place of the government's senior Army adviser was beside the government, not elsewhere. If the G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command was not considered equal to dealing with such circumstances, he should have been removed before they arose. But it was a well-known fact that there had been a tendency for the younger and more active-minded officers to gravitate to the growing Canadian Army Overseas, and for senior appointments in Canada to go to others, in view of the evident fact that actual attack on the soil of Canada was very improbable. And indeed this "flap" in May and June 1942 was exaggerated: there was no danger of an attack on British Columbia.

In the summer of 1940 the Prime Minister rejected suggestions that a War Cabinet be created, similar to the one formed by Lloyd George in the United Kingdom during the First World War. The most attractive feature of Lloyd George's War Cabinet was that it had been composed of a small number of Ministers, all except one of whom had been free from administrative responsibility and were therefore able to devote their entire attention to the direction and co-ordination of the war effort. In discussing this suggestion in the House of Commons, Mr. King claimed that his government was actually proceeding along such lines.

... It has been urged, as already mentioned, that the efficiency of the government might further be enhanced by the work of the cabinet being so arranged, and responsibilities of ministers so divided, as to free as largely as possible from other duties and responsibilities, the ministers of the crown who are concerned with those departments of government which have primarily to do with war activities, in order that their time and attention may be given as exclusively as possible to the consideration and effective execution of war policies.

As a corollary, it has also been urged that matters pertaining to war policy and the direction of the war effort should, as largely as possible, be entrusted to a war committee of the cabinet, the members of which would be free to give most, if not the whole of their time, to matters pertaining to the war, leaving to other members of the government, the administration of the departments concerned with matters of state which, in time of peace, are of great importance, but which, in time of war, are relatively less important.

From what I have already said with respect to the war committee of the cabinet, it will be seen that it has been precisely along these lines that the government has been proceeding. . . .<sup>17</sup>

In fact however the majority of members of the War Committee always remained responsible for important government departments. Mr. King's policy was rather



**CHURCHILL AND McNAUGHTON, 1941**

This striking photograph was taken when the British Prime Minister visited General McNaughton's headquarters at Headley Court, near Leatherhead, Surrey, in February 1941.



**CABINET MINISTERS VISIT THE ARMY IN ENGLAND, 1942**

This photograph taken at a church service at Headquarters First Canadian Army, 4 October 1942, shows in the foreground, from left to right Mr. C. D. Howe (Minister of Munitions and Supply), Lt. Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton, Mr. J. L. Ralston (Minister of National Defence), Lt. Gen. Kenneth Stuart (Chief of the General Staff, Canada), and Maj. Gen. P. J. Montague.

to lighten the administrative load of his senior Cabinet Ministers by co-opting into the government service outstanding private individuals, utilizing these men in an executive or advisory capacity. (In June 1940, indeed, he offered Cabinet posts to five leading citizens outside of Parliament; all refused.)<sup>18</sup> In 1943, moreover, Parliamentary Assistants were appointed to various Ministers to lighten their responsibilities in the House of Commons.\*

It should, perhaps, be noted that in the British War Cabinet in the Second World War there were no Ministers without heavy departmental or parliamentary duties — a circumstance which at least one competent critic considered unfortunate. Lord Hankey, who as Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence for 26 years, Secretary of Lloyd George's War Cabinet and a member of Chamberlain's War Cabinet and Churchill's ministry, was in a unique position for judging between the two systems, has claimed that greater flexibility and administrative efficiency were achieved when a number of the members of the War Cabinet were left free from all other responsibilities.<sup>20</sup>

Mr. Mackenzie King also rejected the suggestion that the War Committee should include "outside" appointments and members of opposition parties. He did, however, offer two members of the official Opposition positions of associate membership on the War Committee and promised that, if this invitation were accepted, he would consider similar invitations to leaders of other political groups. As an alternative, the Prime Minister suggested that, while Parliament was in session, a series of regular weekly conferences might be held between the War Committee and selected members of the Opposition and that, when Parliament was not in session, such conferences might still be held at intervals.<sup>21</sup> These offers, however, were not accepted.

With the development of the central committee system, a need naturally arose for a secretariat to handle the growing volume of agenda, minutes and circulated conclusions, and it was decided to associate this work with the Privy Council Office. A secretariat was especially necessary for the War Committee, since the procedure adopted at its meetings differed from that of the Cabinet or other committees in that minutes of discussions and decisions were kept. From the beginning the official responsible for keeping these minutes was Mr. A. D. P. Heeney. When in March 1940 Mr. Heeney was appointed Clerk of the Privy Council he was also made the first Secretary of the Cabinet and became Secretary to the War Committee.<sup>22</sup>

From this time, under the pressure of business, there was a gradual abandonment of the informal methods which had previously characterized Cabinet and Cabinet Committee meetings. By midsummer of 1940 the War Committee had adopted regular procedures for circulating agenda together with explanatory memoranda identified by document numbers. In addition, a routine was developed for communicating decisions for action, and for a follow-up procedure with the departments. Gradually a group which came to be known as the Cabinet Secretariat grew up by small additions to the Privy Council Office staff. They never numbered more than ten, but included in this Secretariat were officers on loan from both civil and military departments as well as some individuals appointed from outside the Civil Service.<sup>23</sup>

In September 1944, when it was felt that a closer link should be provided between the Chiefs of Staff organization and the War Committee, a Military Secre-

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\*Somewhat similar appointments had been made during the First World War but discontinued when it ended; there had been an earlier experiment of the sort in the 1890s.<sup>19</sup>

tary was added.<sup>24</sup> This was Major-General M. A. Pope, who had been appointed Military Representative of the War Committee in Washington in March 1942, and had remained there as Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff. He now became Military Staff Officer to the Prime Minister and a member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. In this capacity, he was at least theoretically responsible for advising the Prime Minister and members of the War Committee on military matters under discussion. Early in 1944, moreover, the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee had become a member of the Cabinet Secretariat.<sup>25</sup> A small map room and operational summaries were provided for the information of the War Committee.<sup>26</sup>

Mr. King's diary indicates that Pope's appointment had been suggested by Colonel Ralston, and that King and Ralston agreed on the nature of it.<sup>27</sup> The two men may have had in mind the work General Ismay did for Churchill and Admiral Leahy for Roosevelt. It would seem that the Prime Minister hoped that Pope's presence would make up in some degree for his own lack of military knowledge, of which he was sometimes painfully conscious:

I had a pleasant talk with Pope. . . . I explained that I wanted someone to whom I would not have to tell what to do but' who would tell me what was required, why and how it should be done, and who would keep me fully informed on everything I should know. I explained the relationship of Robertson, Heeney and others, of confidence and mutual trust et cetera. I emphasized what I was most concerned in was making sure that Canada's contribution was what was right and just but not anything that was unnecessary. . . .<sup>28</sup>

In fact, General Pope has recorded, the Prime Minister gave him little opportunity to play this role, for Pope "really had little direct contact with him".<sup>29</sup> But the General became a loyal and efficient member of the inner circle in the East Block, and incidentally, in the conscription crisis that broke shortly after his arrival there (below, Part VII), his sympathies were all with King against Ralston;<sup>30</sup> he was unusual among Army officers in being an anti-conscriptionist.

The War Committee's field of operation was as wide as Canada and the Canadian war effort. Since Canada had little to do with the higher direction of the war, the Committee had slight concern with strategy. It normally looked in upon the Canadian scene rather than out towards the battle areas of the globe. But subject to that very important reservation the range of its activity knew few limits. Among the multitude of matters it considered, were Canada's relations with the Commonwealth and foreign states; war finance; the production and distribution of warlike stores; the regulation of civilian consumption; the size, organization and employment of the Canadian services; the appointment and removal of senior commanders; the proportion of the Canadian effort to be devoted to home defence; wartime labour difficulties; and the thorny and ever-recurring problems of military manpower.

We have noted above (page 32) the manner in which the tempo of War Committee activity quickened after the spring of 1940. Until the Germans attacked in the West the Committee seldom met. From that moment it met frequently: almost never less than weekly, sometimes with intervals of a day or two, occasionally twice in the same day. All told, it held 343 official meetings. (There are indications — e.g., below, page 408 — that in addition there were occasional informal meetings of which no minutes were kept.) The minutes of those 343 meetings (normally kept by Mr. Heeney) are in large measure the record of Canada's war effort, and they are a basic source for this book.

There were times, even at critical moments, when the Committee's activity was suspended. Its meetings, like its membership, were at the discretion of the Prime

Minister; and sometimes, it is clear, he preferred to dispense with it. Between 9 November and 11 December 1944 — the latter period of the second and greater "conscription crisis" — the Committee did not meet: the drama was played out in the full Cabinet. Sometimes, too, matters of import were omitted from the Committee's agenda. On 21 October 1943 the Committee considered the uncertain future of the First Canadian Army and the personal position of General McNaughton as its commander (below, page 238); and it was agreed that McNaughton's own views should be sought for the consideration of the Committee. But the matter never came before the Committee again until 1 December, when the Prime Minister reported that medical officers had found General McNaughton physically unfit for active command in the field, and that he was being given extended leave and would be succeeded by General Crerar.

All these qualifications notwithstanding, the War Committee was a most powerful and formidable engine of government. In spite of the continuing meetings of the full Cabinet, and the fact that the latter never made any "formal delegation of authority", the Committee, composed of the most "experienced and influential" ministers with the Prime Minister at their head, enjoyed a prestige which enabled it to function more as a War Cabinet than as a mere cabinet committee. It exercised the Cabinet's powers when it saw fit. It did not hesitate on occasion to reverse a Cabinet decision.\* It received reports from other Cabinet committees — for example, the Manpower Committee (below, page 404). In the words of its distinguished Secretary, it functioned "as the mechanism of decision upon all major matters of policy"; "while the War Committee like other Cabinet Committees was never an executive body but was, in fact as in form, purely advisory in character, its prestige was such that its decisions were for practical purposes the decisions of the Government."<sup>31</sup>

The last meeting of the War Committee was held on 11 April 1945, when the conflict in Europe was obviously near its end. Shortly thereafter, when the Prime Minister left to attend the San Francisco Conference, he expressed to the Cabinet the desire that the War Committee should not meet in his absence but that matters of war policy should be decided by the full Cabinet. In fact, a Special Committee of the Cabinet briefly replaced the War Committee to deal with the remaining issues of the war, but this met only three times, on 19 and 25 April and 16 May. Mr. Ilsley presided on the first two occasions, Mr. Howe on the third. In August 1945 a new Cabinet Defence Committee was set up, and has existed ever since under one designation or another. After Japan's surrender the full Cabinet again decided major policy questions, and a series of new Committees were created.

## 2. WARTIME DEPARTMENTS OF GOVERNMENT

By 1939 it was evident that the conduct of modern war affected in some degree every branch of Government. Practically all major military operations now

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\*On 10 June 1940 the full Cabinet decided to exclude from Canada the *Saturday Evening Post*, whose comments on the war had been exciting indignation. That was the day of Italy's entry into the war. It was also the day of President Roosevelt's great speech of encouragement to the Allies made at the University of Virginia. That evening the War Committee met and, in the light of Roosevelt's speech, revoked the ban on the *Post*. It then proceeded, "acting for the purpose as 'The Committee of the Privy Council'", to ratify the Prime Minister's action in signing an order in council authorizing the submission to the King of the advice of his Privy Council for Canada that a proclamation issue declaring a state of war with Italy. It should be added that this was a formality; a resolution approving the declaration of war had passed both houses of Parliament earlier in the day.

relied for success upon combined action by land, sea and air forces, while all the services were almost totally dependent upon the nation's resources of industry and skilled manpower. In Canada it was found necessary to establish new government departments to deal with, some specific wartime problems, while virtually every existing department was faced with fresh responsibilities, some of which were radically different from those of peacetime. Naturally enough, the Department of National Defence was the one affected first and most directly.

After 1922, as we have seen (above, page 67) the three Canadian fighting services were administered by a single Department of National Defence with one Minister. This system would scarcely have sufficed for a country maintaining really large forces, but in Canada in peacetime the problems of defence were relatively small and simple. In 1937 the professional heads of the three services were unanimous in the opinion that the unified system (which was also followed in all other important Dominions) was the most suitable for Canada.<sup>32</sup>

War changed all this. The centralized nature of the Canadian Department of National Defence and the statutory powers vested in the Minister made him responsible, not only for the general policy, but also for the detailed administration of his department. Even in peacetime this was no light burden, but with the war the Minister's responsibilities increased sharply. By the spring of 1940 all three armed services had grown to the point where new arrangements were needed for their administration. This need was first felt in respect of the Royal Canadian Air Force, for, soon after the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan agreement was signed the Government realized that the importance of the Plan to the Allied war effort and Canada's position as principal organizer, supervisor, and operator would call for the attention of a separate Minister.<sup>33</sup> In addition, the R.C.A.F. generally was increasing rapidly in size. The result was the "Act to Amend the Department of National Defence Act" which provided for the appointment of a Minister of National Defence for Air responsible for all matters relating to military air services.<sup>34</sup> Major C. G. Power, formerly Postmaster General, assumed this portfolio.

The statute provided that the Minister of National Defence for Air should exercise all the powers of the Minister of National Defence in matters relating exclusively to the air service, and that in any matter affecting both the air service and any other defence service those powers should be exercised by the Minister of National Defence acting in consultation with the Minister of National Defence for Air. It also provided that "in order to ensure continuity of departmental administration and the coordination of the defence services within the Department", either Minister might exercise the powers of the other, in his absence. Thus, in effect, a situation was created in which there were two Ministers of National Defence, one responsible for the Army and the Navy and one for the Air Force. However, on the day the amendment was passed, the Prime Minister made it clear in the House of Commons that there was no intention, at least for the time being, of creating separate government departments. He foresaw the probability of a reversion to the more centralized system shortly after the close of hostilities, and felt that this could more easily be effected if the department remained unified throughout the war. Thus, for the present, the three services would still be correlated and coordinated under the Minister of National Defence, who, in addition to retaining direct responsibility for the Army and Navy, would also have the final deciding vote in any inter-service matter. Mr. King, in explaining this relationship, was considerably more precise than the statute itself: "I doubt very much if a question of the kind is likely to arise between the Minister of National Defence for Air and the present Minister

of National Defence, but should there be an occasion where some authority must give the final word on any matter of interrelation between the departments, the Minister of National Defence would have the responsibility for that final word. . . . We are making it clear now that on questions that are interrelated, when a final word is necessary, it will be given by the Minister of National Defence."<sup>35</sup>

Less than two months later circumstances had arisen which lent a new importance to the Royal Canadian Navy, France had fallen; all Western Europe was under German occupation or German influence; and the sea-lanes of the British Commonwealth had become a crucial battlefield. With British sea power thus extended, the Royal Canadian Navy assumed a heavier responsibility for the defence of Canadian coasts and harbours, while at the same time it began to operate in European waters and faced the likelihood of an important role on the Atlantic convoy routes. Now a further amendment to the Department of National Defence Act, passed in July, authorized the appointment of a Minister of National Defence for Naval Services who would have the same powers in respect of the Royal Canadian Navy as had been granted the Minister of National Defence for Air over the R.C.A.F.<sup>36</sup> Mr. Angus L. Macdonald, formerly Premier of Nova Scotia, assumed the new portfolio.

The same statute made provision for the appointment of an Associate Minister of National Defence who would be "entitled to exercise all the powers of the Minister of National Defence". Major Power, in addition to being Air Minister, became Associate Minister of National Defence. In respect of any matter relating exclusively to his own service, each of the other Ministers exercised all the powers of the Minister of National Defence, and in the absence of one service Minister his powers were exercisable by one of his colleagues, so that if the Minister of National Defence and the Associate Minister were both absent, the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services administered the whole department, and if he too were away the Minister of National Defence for Air was responsible. It should be noted, however, that even now formally separate Ministries were not established to control the naval and air services. The Department of National Defence — in theory at least — remained one organic whole. Colonel J. L. Ralston was, we have seen, by intention if not strictly by law, the senior Minister. In practice, however, he limited his activities to the Army, and seldom if ever interfered with the Air Force or the Navy. To all intents and purposes those services were administered by separate departments, each with its own Minister and Deputy Minister.

Nor were the Prime Minister's expectations of harmony within the department disappointed. Probably the principal reason why the rather vague division of authority did not result in clashes was the excellent personal relationship existing between the Ministers. Mr. Power was later to write:

The language of the statutes is such as to leave considerable doubt with respect to the over-riding authority of the Minister of National Defence . . . but it must be remembered that the three service ministers followed the provisions of the statute literally and endeavoured to ensure coordination of the defence services. . . . Besides there was the overall feature that the three were bound together by ties of intimate friendship and on the part of Macdonald and Power particularly had such admiration and respect for Col. Ralston that they had no difficulty whatsoever in granting him the primacy over both, and by consent if not law he was looked upon by all as the senior Minister.<sup>37</sup>

Yet although Mr. Ralston was regarded as the senior Minister, he did not in fact perform functions parallel to those of the Minister of Defence in the United Kingdom, where Mr. Churchill was both Minister of Defence and Prime Minister.

In Canada, on the political level, the formal coordination of the armed forces was achieved through the Defence Council (below, page 125). High military policy was the business of the Cabinet War Committee (of which the three service ministers were members) or sometimes of the full Cabinet. In both bodies the preeminence of the Prime Minister was strongly felt.

Even before the appointment of separate Ministers for Naval Services and Air, the trend towards division of responsibilities had been evinced at the Deputy Minister level. At the outbreak of war, Major-General L. R. LaFleche was Deputy Minister of the Department of National Defence. When he went on sick leave on 8 September 1939, two "Associate Acting Deputy Ministers" were appointed, Lt.-Col. K. S. Maclachlan\* (Naval and Air) and Lt.-Col. H. DesRosiers (Militia).<sup>38</sup> In April 1940 Lt.-Col. Maclachlan was relieved of his responsibility for other than naval matters by the appointment of an Associate Acting Deputy Minister for Air, Mr. J. S. Duncan. On 3 September 1942 Lt.-Col. DesRosiers' appointment was changed from that of Associate Acting Deputy Minister to Deputy Minister (Army) and a second Deputy Minister (Army), Lt.-Col. G. S. Currie, was also appointed.<sup>39</sup> No further changes of importance occurred in the higher organization of the Department of National Defence during the war.

All departments of government felt the effects of the war. Among those, apart from National Defence, most directly concerned with various aspects of the effort were External Affairs, Finance, Agriculture, Fisheries, Trade and Commerce, Mines and Resources, Transport, Labour and Justice.<sup>40</sup> The exchange of information with allies, the fostering of goodwill among neutrals, and the problems of paying for the war, of feeding our own and Allied populations, of utilizing national resources and manpower to the best advantage, and of wartime legislation were only some of the duties which the emergency imposed.

The problem of military supply, however, was a special and paramount one; and very early in the conflict the need was felt for a new department which would direct the purchase, production and distribution of munitions and "warlike stores", and control the process of applying Canada's reserves of raw materials, plant, labour and capital — which were far from being fully utilized in 1939 — to the business of making war. We have seen (above, pages 101-2) the halting steps taken before the outbreak in the direction of providing an organization for these purposes, and the sequence of events which led to the creation of the Defence Purchasing Board in the summer of 1939. On 14 July the new Board began its operations with a small staff recruited largely from the purchasing departments of the Canadian National and the Canadian Pacific Railway Companies. After the outbreak of war, at the emergency session of Parliament in September, an act was passed providing for the establishment, when necessary, of a new Department of Munitions and Supply.<sup>41</sup> For the time being, however, the task was allotted to a smaller War Supply Board which was set up by order in council in September<sup>42</sup> and took over from the Defence Purchasing Board. The War Supply Board enjoyed greater freedom of action than its predecessor, thanks to the abrogation after the outbreak of war of the five per cent limitation on profits (above, page 102).

Nevertheless the need for an organization with greater authority and wider terms of reference was evident. To meet it the Department of Munitions and Supply was established on 9 April 1940 under the terms of the 1939 statute, with Mr.

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\*Colonel Maclachlan served for many months without remuneration. At a later stage of the war he relinquished his civil appointment to serve overseas as a naval officer.

C. D. Howe, formerly Minister of Transport, as its Minister.<sup>43</sup> The organization and personnel of the War Supply Board formed the nucleus for the new department, but subsequent expansion was rapid. The war in Europe having developed so disastrously for the Allied cause, it became obvious that Canada's industrial effort would have to be substantially increased. The United Kingdom now required as much equipment, munitions, and aircraft as Canada could send and, since the British Isles could no longer be counted upon as a sure source of supply for the expanding Canadian armed forces, the only answer, apart from purchasing as much as possible in the United States, was to accelerate orders and production in Canada. By midsummer the emphasis in the Department of Munitions and Supply had already shifted to the organization and initiation of sources of production, although its purchasing functions remained important.<sup>44</sup>

Throughout the remainder of the conflict the Department of Munitions and Supply controlled, directly or indirectly, all matters of war supply. It acted as the purchasing agent for the armed forces, although it was not responsible for inspection, nor did it receive or pay for the supplies it purchased. Liaison officers of the Department maintained contact with the corresponding agencies in the United Kingdom and the United States, and all purchases in Canada of war supplies and equipment on behalf of the United Kingdom, the other Dominions, the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, the United States, or other allied governments were coordinated through the Department.<sup>45</sup> Further details are given in Part VIII, below.

The Department of Munitions and Supply was materially assisted in its supervisory activities by the Wartime Prices and Trade Board, a body composed of senior civil servants, which from 3 September 1939 was responsible for controlling prices so as to prevent profiteering and artificial shortages. This board was under the supervision of the Minister of Labour until 14 August 1941, when it passed to the Minister of Finance. The control of prices was notably more effective than in the First World War, and has been generally considered one of the most successful aspects of the Canadian war effort.<sup>46</sup> In June 1940, a Wartime Industries Control Board, composed of Controllers appointed on the recommendation of the Minister of Munitions and Supply to be responsible for the supply and allocation of certain essential materials and services, was also established. It operated in close cooperation with the Wartime Prices and Trades Board.<sup>47</sup>

One other new government department was created during the war. We have noted (above, page 33) the passage of the National Resources Mobilization Act in June 1940. Before the compulsory military service authorized by this act could be introduced, it was necessary to conduct a registration of all persons resident in Canada who were of, or near, military age. It was decided that the task of national registration could best be undertaken by a new department which would also administer the N.R.M.A. and take the responsibility for organizing and coordinating all existing and planned voluntary war services. In July, accordingly, the Department of National War Services was established by statute, with Mr. J. G. Gardiner as its first Minister.<sup>48</sup>

Because extensive preliminary preparations had been made ahead of time by an interdepartmental committee under the chairmanship of the Dominion Statistician, it was possible for the new department, with the cooperation of the Chief Electoral Officer, to begin the National Registration on 19 August 1940 and to complete it within three days. The registration recorded all persons resident in Canada over 16 years of age, both male and female, providing sufficient basic

information not only to serve as a guide for a system of compulsory service but also to be of use in the direction and control of labour. At the same time, a series of 13 administrative bodies (one for each Military District), known as National War Service Boards, were established across Canada. Each consisted of three members under the chairmanship of a Judge of a Superior or other Court of the Province in which the greater part of the administrative district was situated. These boards, whose majority ruling was final, decided upon requests for postponement of compulsory military training (see below, Part VII).<sup>49</sup>

By the War Charities Act of September 1939,<sup>50</sup> all appeals to the Canadian public for funds in connection with the war were strictly controlled and no charitable organization was permitted to solicit funds or make a public appeal unless it had been registered with and approved by the Government. An amendment to this Act was passed on 14 June 1941 making the Minister of National War Services responsible for its administration.<sup>51</sup> The Voluntary and Auxiliary Services Division of the Department of National War Services, set up in September 1940, coordinated the operations of the voluntary organizations. In 1942 the desirability of avoiding private appeals to the public for the very large sums of money now required for the services they rendered led the government to undertake the financing of the war services of the Canadian Legion, the Knights of Columbus, the Navy League of Canada (hostel operations only), the Salvation Army and the Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A.\* Expenditures from the government grant were supervised by the National War Services Funds Advisory Board, established on 22 June 1940 to advise the Minister of National War Services.<sup>52</sup>

In addition, during the early part of 1941 the Minister of National War Services was made responsible for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the Canadian Travel Bureau, and the National Film Board. In October of the same year the department was reorganized to consist of six divisions, dealing respectively with National Registration, Mobilization, Public Information, Voluntary and Auxiliary Services, Women's Voluntary Services, and Salvage.<sup>53</sup> Until May 1942 the responsibility for Censorship was divided between several departments. At that time the Minister of National War Services was made responsible for all censorship duties, and provision was made for setting up a Directorate of Censorship.<sup>54</sup>

In the same year, however, the Department lost its functions concerning public information and manpower. Mr. King had been dissatisfied with the manner in which National War Services discharged the information function, and in September this was transferred to a new Wartime Information Board responsible to the Prime Minister himself.<sup>55</sup> In March 1942 the National Registration functions and records were transferred to the Department of Labour for the purposes of the National Selective Service System; and in September the administration of the National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits) under the National Resources Mobilization Act likewise passed to the Minister of Labour, who henceforth was charged with the task of filling the requisitions of the Department of National Defence for men to be called up for training (see below, page 413).<sup>56</sup>

The Department of National War Services had various miscellaneous functions. It administered the civilian "Corps of Canadian Fire Fighters" formed in 1942 to serve with the National Fire Service in the United Kingdom. It was charged with Government Office Economies Control; and it was responsible for contacts of next-of-kin with prisoners of war in enemy hands.<sup>57</sup>

\*For the work of the voluntary organizations in providing comforts and amenities for the forces in the field, see *Six Years of War*, 421-3.

The Department of Labour had other important wartime tasks besides that of mobilization for compulsory military service which it assumed in 1942; but these cannot be dealt with in detail here. The Director of National Selective Service, in addition to his functions under the N.R.M.A., was charged with controlling civilian employment to ensure the most effective allocation and utilization of manpower in the war effort. The Department also administered the government's wage stabilization policy, was responsible for the adjustment of industrial disputes, and carried on youth training, specialized trades training for the armed forces, rehabilitation training of discharged service personnel, and training of workers for war industries.<sup>58</sup>

### 3. MILITARY COORDINATION

Something has already been said concerning the history and development of the Defence Council (above, pages 67-70). We have seen that before 1939 that somewhat unwieldy body charged with the function of advising the Minister of National Defence was an ineffective organ which very seldom met. After the outbreak of war, however, the Council met regularly every week.<sup>59</sup>

After the major reorganization of the Department of National Defence in the summer of 1940, the Defence Council was itself reorganized and became a more effective coordinating body. The Minister of National Defence was Chairman, the Associate Minister and the Ministers for Naval Services and Air, Vice-Chairmen. The Members were the Associate Acting Deputy Ministers and the three Chiefs of Staff.<sup>60</sup> The disproportionate Army representation vanished with the Associate Members of the old organization (above, page 67). It is worth noting that this reorganization was generally along lines suggested by the Militia's Directorate of Military Operations and Intelligence in March 1937, and concurred in by the professional heads of the three services in the following June.<sup>61</sup>

In its new form the Defence Council continued to meet, on an average, about once a week. It was able, on almost every occasion, to reach agreement on matters of common interest to all services and it also provided a valuable means of keeping those attending informed of the activities of the sub-departments other than their own. In the early days each service normally presented a verbal report on its state and recent activities; later these reports were tabled in written form and attached to the Council's minutes as appendices.<sup>62</sup> The Council did not discuss matters that could be called questions of high military policy. These, so far as they affected more than one service, were discussed in the Chiefs of Staff Committee and normally decided in the Cabinet War Committee. The Defence Council was primarily concerned with administrative matters, and very largely with personnel questions. Leave policy; honours and awards; regulations concerning civilian employees; rehabilitation and demobilization; medical treatment of servicemen; pay and allowances — such matters were the staples of the Council's agenda. Sometimes however matters that were not purely administrative appeared: for instance, minor coast defence questions involving more than one service, internal security measures on the Pacific Coast, the terms of reference of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission in London, or defence research policy. Some of the Council's business was passed to a sub-committee, the Deputy Ministers Committee, set up by the Council on 27 April 1943 to deal with administrative matters that could properly be disposed of by the Deputy Ministers in consultation with the appropriate service officers.<sup>63</sup>

The reorganization of the Department and the Defence Council brought in its train the establishment of individual councils for the three services. These came into existence at different times and in rather different ways. The Air Force had had an Air Council as early as 1938, a purely professional body which at its inception consisted of the Senior Air Officer and the heads of branches at Air Force Headquarters. This was superseded in June 1940 by an Air Council set up by order in council and composed of the Minister of National Defence for Air Services as President, the Deputy Minister (Air), the Chief of the Air Staff, the Air Member for Aeronautical Engineering and Supply, the Air Member for the Air Staff, the Air Member for Organization and Training, and the Air Member for Personnel. The Army Council, at first called the "Army Committee", followed; it was set up by ministerial minute on 16 September 1940, and consisted of the Minister of National Defence, the Deputy Ministers (Army), the Chief and Vice-Chief of the General Staff, the Adjutant General, the Quartermaster General and the Master General of the Ordnance. A Naval Council was constituted by order of the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services in August 1940. It comprised the Minister as Chairman, the Deputy Minister (Navy), the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, the Director of Naval Intelligence and the Director of Plans; later the Directors of Naval Personnel and Operations and the Chief of Naval Engineering attended meetings. This was replaced in January 1942 by a Naval Board set up by order in council. It consisted of the Chief and Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff, the Deputy Minister (Navy), the Chief of Naval Personnel, and the Chief of Naval Engineering and Construction. The Naval Minister frequently took the chair at meetings of the Naval Board although he was not officially a member.<sup>64</sup> These individual service councils discussed matters exclusively the concern of their own services, such as promotions, postings and equipment. They were useful organs for coordinating matters affecting more than one branch of the same service. Any subject relating to more than one service would be referred by them to the Defence Council.

Inter-service coordination on the highest military level was effected through the Chiefs of Staff Committee. While the Defence Council dealt with matters of general policy for the services as a whole, the Chiefs of Staff Committee was, in the words of a memorandum of 1937, "the technical instrument whereby higher professional advice and plans [were] submitted for the Minister's, and in some cases the Cabinet's, consideration and approval".<sup>65</sup> This committee, as we have seen (above, page 69) had been in existence since 1927, although until January 1939, when the Senior Air Officer became a Chief of Staff, it was known as the Joint Staff Committee.<sup>66</sup> The Army's Director of Military Operations and Intelligence acted as secretary to the Committee, but when its name was changed to "Chiefs of Staff Committee" a full-time secretary was added to the membership. By its terms of reference the Joint Staff Committee was required to "advise on questions relating to organization, administration, and combined training, preparation for defence, procedure on mobilization, and on such other questions as may be referred to it by the Naval, Military or Air Services."<sup>67</sup>

The wartime Chiefs of Staff Committee normally met once a week. Between 5 September 1939 and 10 August 1945 there were 264 meetings. The chairmanship was decided by personal seniority. Major-General Anderson was chairman at the beginning of the war; after he retired as Chief of the General Staff Vice Admiral Nelles was chairman until he ceased to be Chief of the Naval Staff in December 1943, and thereafter Air Marshal Leckie was chairman for the rest of the war.

Major-General Pope was a member of the Committee after his appointment as Military Secretary to the Cabinet War Committee and Military Staff Officer to the Prime Minister. Ministers did not attend meetings of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. After the reorganization of the Department of National Defence in 1940, the Committee was responsible to the three Defence Ministers jointly, and its formal advice to the government normally took the form of memoranda addressed to "The Ministers" and signed by the three Chiefs of Staff. These memoranda were frequently discussed by the Defence Council and not infrequently went to the Cabinet War Committee. Some of them resulted from governmental requests for reports; others were spontaneous offerings by the Chiefs. In frequency and in topic they varied widely. In one three-week period in February and March 1943 at least three such memoranda went forward. One dealt with probable forms and scales of attack on the East Coast of Canada, Newfoundland and Labrador; one concerned the allocation of structural timber resources; and one called attention to the fact that a statement made in the House of Commons by the Minister of Munitions and Supply had revealed facts concerning shipping losses which would be useful to the enemy. Many other matters were dealt with less formally.<sup>68</sup>

From the beginning the Joint Staff Committee delegated the detailed study of the questions brought before it to inter-service sub-committees, largely composed of officers of the Operations and Plans Divisions of the three services.<sup>69</sup> Even before 1939 there were a number of sub-committees reporting to the Chiefs of Staff Committee which had interdepartmental membership, including the sub-committees on censorship, signals and communications, railways, remounts, and land transportation. Many of these committees, however, did not function actively, and later had their functions taken over by the interdepartmental committees established by the Cabinet in March 1938 (above, page 70). We have noted the attempts to establish an inter-service Principal Supply Officers Committee concerned with industrial mobilization, which issued in September 1936 in the creation of the Navy, Army, and Air Supply Committee (above, page 104).

During the war, the structure of the sub-committees which reported to the Chiefs of Staff Committee or were otherwise closely related to it changed from time to time, but at the end of the conflict the Chiefs of Staff Committee was controlling two small groups of sub-committees, was responsible for two missions abroad, and was concerned with seven other inter-service or interdepartmental committees.<sup>70</sup> The sub-committees reporting directly to the Chiefs of Staff were between them responsible for the traditional General Staff functions of operations, planning, and intelligence, although, as will be seen, the operational committees were distinct from the others and in time came to assume a command function as well.

The sub-committees which inquired into and reported upon questions referred to them by the Chiefs of Staff were the Joint Planning Sub-committee, the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Joint Communications Committee, all with functions broadly corresponding to their titles. The Joint Planning Sub-Committee and the Joint Communications Committee had both been in existence before the war, but the Joint Intelligence Committee was not established until 10 November 1942. The Director of Naval Plans, the Director of Military Operations and Planning, and the Deputy Air Member for Air Staff (Plans), together with one assistant from each of the services, composed the Joint Planning Sub-committee; the Joint Communications Committee was made up of two officers from each service who respectively represented the operational directorates and the technical directorates

of the Communication and Radar divisions; the Joint Intelligence Committee, besides having as members the Directors of Intelligence in the three services, also had as associate members representatives from the Department of External Affairs and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.<sup>71</sup>

Dealing with operations connected with the local defence of Canada were two Regional Committees, the Joint Service Committees Atlantic Coast and Pacific Coast, which coordinated the details of tri-service defence in their respective areas and reported to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. These committees and their duties are dealt with below (pages 130-32). Under the Chiefs of Staff, also, were the Canadian Joint Staff Mission in London and the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington. These missions are likewise considered in more detail below (pages 193, 357).

Also related to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and dealing with defence subjects were a series of inter-service and interdepartmental committees of varying authority and importance. The Personnel Members Committee, composed of the Chief of Naval Personnel, the Adjutant General of the Army, and the Air Member for Personnel, was formed on 28 April 1944 to deal with all matters of policy affecting personnel. The principal object of this committee was to establish and maintain uniform practices throughout the three armed services.<sup>72</sup> A number of sub-committees functioned under the Personnel Members Committee to advise on various aspects of administration.

On 3 October 1944, Cabinet approval was given for the establishment of a Committee on Research for Defence, but, although an *ad hoc* committee composed of senior representatives of the Department of National Defence, the National Research Council, and the Department of Munitions and Supply functioned in the interim, the Committee on Research for Defence was not actually formed until 10 August 1945.<sup>73</sup> Then it met under the chairmanship of the Minister of Munitions and Supply and included in its membership the three Chiefs of Staff, the President of the National Research Council, and a number of qualified officers and civilians. This committee, the fore-runner of the Defence Research Board of Canada, considered and recommended to the Cabinet measures designed to further military research and development in Canada.

After the conclusion of hostilities in Europe, but before the surrender of Japan, a Joint Committee on Enemy Science and Technology was formed, which contained representatives from each service, the National Research Council, the Department of Munitions and Supply, and the Department of External Affairs.<sup>74</sup> Joint service combined operations training problems were considered by the Combined Operations Training Board, which was established on 25 February 1945;<sup>75</sup> while the establishment, abandonment and disposal of joint Canadian-United States defence projects were considered by an inter-departmental Joint Defence Construction Projects Panel, formed 7 June 1942.<sup>76</sup> The Panel reported to the Cabinet War Committee. All matters relating to cadet corps for the three services were considered by the Inter-Service Cadet Committee, authorized by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 1 June 1943, and composed of the Directors of Cadets in the services.<sup>77</sup>

As already indicated (above, page 115) the facts that Canada had so little concern with the strategy of the war, and that there was little in the way of operations in the North American zone, inevitably reduced the dependence of the Canadian government on military advice and restricted the role of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. We have noted that in 1939 the status of the Chiefs was low in the eyes of the government. In the early part of the war, it is evident, the Chiefs of

Staff were sometimes ignored at times when they should have been consulted. Thus when the British government on 13 July 1940 informed Canada of the desire of the United States to obtain bases in West Indian colonies and Newfoundland, and asked for comment, the Minister of National Defence gave the Prime Minister an opinion favourable to the cession without seeking any professional advice whatever. The Chiefs of Staff subsequently pointed out to their Ministers that they had never been consulted in connection with "the leasing of defence facilities, in particular in Newfoundland, to the United States". They did not know whether the Canadian government had been consulted (which, of course, it had). The Chiefs of Staff Committee protested in the following terms:

The Committee desires to place on record its apprehension of the serious military situation which Canada may face if important decisions concerning the defence of North America are taken without opportunity for consideration by the Defence Services of Canada. Not only do such decisions affect the present problems which are the direct responsibility of the Navy, Army and Air Force, but new problems are created which may require immediate and drastic alterations to our defence policy.<sup>78</sup>

It was pretty clearly of this affair General Crerar was thinking when about this time he spoke strongly in confidence to a newspaperman about Ralston's tendency to act without military advice, and indeed talked of resigning if the practice continued.<sup>79</sup> There is no evidence that the Chiefs' protest was ever discussed in the Cabinet War Committee. But it is certainly relevant that only five days later they were commenting for the benefit of the Ministers on communications from the British government concerning the proposed concessions in Newfoundland.<sup>80</sup> As the war progressed the advice of the Chiefs of Staff came to be more valued by their political superiors. A turning-point is probably the advent of Crerar as Chief of the General Staff, and the exposition which he gave the Cabinet War Committee on 26 July 1940 (below, page 131). Yet as we have seen Crerar some months later was kept completely in the dark concerning the government's views on the employment of the army (above, page 39). The Chiefs were perhaps not always assessed entirely for their strictly military qualities (Mr. King, for instance, seems to have been impressed by General Stuart at the outset because he gave the sort of opinion on the manpower prospect that the Prime Minister wanted to hear; Stuart, moreover, was unusually articulate).<sup>81</sup> The prestige of the Chiefs of Staff was no doubt somewhat enhanced after 19 November 1941, when the Cabinet War Committee approved their being promoted from Major General or equivalent to Lieutenant General or equivalent. But a passage in Mr. King's diary for 13 December 1944, when the war was nearly over, suggests that the Prime Minister still held these officers in something very like contempt. He is speaking of a meeting of the War Committee:

I ruled out having the Chiefs of Staff present as it leads to controversy between myself and officials and to their witnessing controversy between the Cabinet which I think is wholly wrong. It has been Heeney who has arranged these meetings himself as he says just to give the Chiefs of Staff a "look-in" and let them feel important. This is all well enough if it does not result each time in increasing the public expenditures. The proceedings made it apparent that they were not needed and by their not being present, the discussions were shortened.

At this juncture, of course, King was probably particularly displeased with the government's military advisers because of the part the military members of the Army Council had played in the recent conscription crisis — even though their intervention had in fact been most providential for him (below, pages 470-72).

#### 4. ORGANIZATION FOR THE DEFENCE OF CANADA

All Canada's pre-war defence planning was implicitly conditioned by the knowledge that Canadian territory was protected by geography and by the naval power of the United Kingdom and the United States. So long as the British and American navies controlled the two great oceans, the danger of any invasion of Canadian territory was virtually non-existent. The most that was to be feared in the event of war was an occasional seaborne nuisance raid. This opinion was held by almost all senior service officers throughout the war, but at times of crisis — after Dunkirk and still more after Pearl Harbor — many civilians, who lacked the professional knowledge necessary to make a sound appreciation of the situation, felt serious alarm over what seemed to them to be the inadequacy of Canadian home defences.

In fact, Canada's alliance with Britain and her contiguity to the United States were more than adequate safeguards for Canadian territory. This was true of both coasts, although for most of the period between 1918 and 1939 the declared American policy of neutrality and the fact that most British naval forces were concentrated in areas other than the Pacific meant that the Canadian West Coast was theoretically more exposed than the Atlantic seaboard to isolated hit-and-run attacks by submarines, surface craft, or even amphibious raiding parties. For these reasons, and doubtless also because the political climate of the period was less sensitive to preparations directed towards the Pacific than to those facing Europe, the Canadian West Coast was given priority over the Atlantic Coast in defence projects for some years before 1939 (above, page 4).

From time to time the senior officers of the three Canadian services on the East and West Coasts had met informally to discuss joint defence plans and matters of common interest. On 18 July 1938, the Joint Staff Committee formalized this arrangement by establishing Joint Service Committees at Halifax, Nova Scotia; Saint John, New Brunswick; and Victoria, British Columbia. In each case these committees were composed of the District Officer Commanding the local Military District, the senior naval and the senior R.C.A.F. officer in the area.<sup>82</sup> The committees reported to the Joint Staff Committee on measures for coordinating the local defence of Canadian territory and coastal waters, although each committee member remained responsible as before to the head of his own service. Before the war, the Joint Service Committee Halifax and the Joint Service Committee Pacific Coast in particular performed useful functions, of which not the least important was that their members acquainted themselves with joint defence problems on the two seaboards. The committees considered such matters as the protection of vital industries, questions of internal security, the defence of harbours, the protection of oil storage facilities, and the necessary scales of land, sea and air effort for reconnaissance and defence.<sup>83</sup>

At the outbreak of war, in addition to its responsibility for the defence of coastal waters and harbours, the Dominion Government also undertook to protect defence establishments, certain vital points along railways and canals, oil depots, drydocks, cable landing-places, wireless stations, the hydro-electric plants in the Niagara area, and the grain elevators at Port Arthur and Fort William. The chief danger to installations such as these was from sabotage, and the Dominion Government could not, of course, protect every possible target. Apart from the vital points specifically mentioned, protection had to come from the normal peacetime sources such as the local police or company watchmen. The duties assumed by the

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Dominion Government were divided between the military forces and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, with the services bearing the heavier responsibility on the two coasts and the police doing more of the work inland.<sup>84</sup>

Throughout the war the Army contributed to the defence of Canada by supplying internal security forces, by manning fixed defences, and by providing mobile reserves which could counter-attack in the event of attack on coastal areas. In the early months of the conflict the Royal Canadian Navy's chief task was the defence of Canadian coastal waters, but during the period when the Battle of the Atlantic was still in doubt — roughly from the spring of 1941 to the end of 1943 — the R.C.N. was principally concerned with the protection of transatlantic shipping. During the remainder of the war Canadian naval operations were progressively extended to European and Asiatic waters.<sup>85</sup> The main role of the Royal Canadian Air Force in the defence of Canada lay in the provision of bomber-reconnaissance aircraft to cooperate with the Royal Canadian Navy in guarding coastal waters.

Until the early summer of 1940 the defence of Canadian territory did not appear to be a pressing problem, but after the defeat of Allied armies on the Continent and the appearance of the possibility of invasion of the British Isles, this situation had to be re-assessed. Canada's contribution to the defence of Britain had left few available forces for the protection of Canadian territory and, although this policy was considered "wise and justified by results", home defence, especially on the East Coast, was now felt to be an urgent matter.<sup>86</sup>

The essence of the problem was to provide adequate defence against probable scales of attack without at the same time lessening the effort in the decisive theatre of war, which was now the British Isles. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff were firmly of the opinion that no invasion of Canada was possible so long as Britain held out, and General Crerar, now Chief of the General Staff, appreciated that, even if Britain should be conquered, no major attack upon Canada could be mounted for a considerable time thereafter. In such an eventuality a large portion of the British fleet and perhaps part of the Royal Air Force would probably be based upon Canada, the C.G.S. believed, and Iceland would have to be converted into a Nazi base before an invasion threat appeared. Crerar developed these views for the benefit of the Cabinet War Committee at its meeting of 26 July, and they presumably had a calming effect on the minds of Ministers. (The Committee had shown anxiety for home defence on 9 July by deciding, without hearing military advice, that "no further commitments involving the despatch of forces or materials outside of Canada should be made, without full consideration and specific authority being obtained in each particular case".) Crerar nevertheless emphasized that in the new circumstances there was an increased danger of raids, which might be directed against British forces which had moved to Canadian bases. He recommended improvements in Canadian organization, as well as closer contact with the United States.\*

The Minister of National Defence had already approved Crerar's recommendation that the Army establish a new operational command for the East Coast area, and a General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Atlantic Command, with headquarters at Halifax, was appointed on 1 August. The new Command embraced the whole Canadian coastal area south from Cape Chidley: the three Maritime provinces, eastern Quebec, Newfoundland and Labrador. The G.O.C.-in-C. was to

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\*On the development of defence planning at this period, see *Six Years of War, 161-4*. On relations with the United States, see below, pages 332 ff.

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control all mobile forces in the area and be responsible for fortresses, internal security measures, and the protection of vulnerable points, A Mobile Reserve, consisting of the three brigade groups from the newly created 3rd Division, was given the role of reinforcing coastal garrisons in the event of attack.<sup>87</sup>

On 28 August 1940 the Joint Service Committee Halifax was re-named the Joint Service Committee Atlantic Coast and the G.O.C.-in-C. Atlantic Command was appointed chairman, with the Navy's Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast and the Air Officer Commanding Eastern Air Command\* as members.<sup>88</sup> The Halifax committee thus assumed responsibility for the whole Atlantic coast, and when in October the Army formed a Pacific Command similar to that on the East Coast, the Joint Service Committee Pacific Coast conformed to the organization on the other seaboard. The Chiefs of Staff Committee Plan for the Defence of Canada, August 1940, provided that in the coastal areas Navy, Army and Air Force would be directed by "a joint system of command", the three commanders having "a collective as well as an individual responsibility for the success of the enterprise as a whole". A joint operations room was to be maintained at headquarters on each coast.<sup>89</sup> On 4 July 1941 a Joint Service Sub-Committee, Newfoundland, composed of the senior officers of the three Canadian services on duty there, was formed to coordinate the defence of that island and to report to the Joint Service Committee Atlantic Coast.<sup>90</sup>

The Japanese entry into the war in December 1941 brought increased danger to both Canadian coasts, but, strangely enough, more to the east than the west. As long as there had been a chance of the United States remaining neutral, Hitler had refused to allow German submarines to attack shipping in the vicinity of North America, but in January 1942 they became active off the American coast. The first sinkings in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the lower river occurred. on the night of 12-13 May. Sporadic submarine activity continued here throughout 1942 and by the end of the year 23 ships had been torpedoed and 22 sunk in the Strait of Belle Isle, the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and the St. Lawrence River.<sup>91</sup>

These developments inevitably caused considerable alarm, and the Canadian services took active measures to counter the new menace. The Navy built up its Gulf Escort Force, formed in the spring of 1942, to 19 vessels by the autumn, and a smaller force was created based on Quebec. The Army somewhat strengthened its forces in the area, provided mobile patrols and used two local Reserve Army battalions for coast-watching and local defence.<sup>92</sup> The Navy's activity and R.C.A.F. patrolling, though they destroyed no U-boats in the Gulf or river, may have had a discouraging effect on the Germans, for there were in fact no sinkings in the area in 1943 and the one small renewal of enemy activity there was in the autumn of 1944, when three ships were torpedoed, of which one was lost. However, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, as the shipping season of 1943 approached, had to assume that the year would see the submarines at work again in the St. Lawrence; and they set a special committee under the chairmanship of Air Vice-Marshal N. R. Anderson to work to study counter-measures. The committee ultimately recommended the appointment of a Defence Coordination Officer to be stationed at Gaspé and to report direct to the Chiefs of Staff. He was to be responsible for investigating and reporting on the progress of defence measures in the Gaspé and lower St. Lawrence districts, and was to maintain contact with the local authorities.<sup>93</sup> This recommendation was approved by the Cabinet War Committee on 13 May 1943.

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\*Organized in 1938 (above, Page 5).

The three services took careful precautions in the lower St. Lawrence area throughout the rest of the war. In 1944 the Chiefs of Staff considered that a Defence Coordination Officer was no longer needed, the required degree of cooperation between the services, police and civil defence organizations having been achieved. Otherwise much the same measures as before were put into effect. These included local protection for shipping by one R.C.A.F. anti-submarine and general reconnaissance squadron with headquarters and one flight at Gaspé and one flight each at Seven Islands and Summerside.<sup>94</sup>


Not unnaturally, the inhabitants of the Canadian West Coast felt themselves directly threatened by Japan's sudden attack. The heavy blow struck at United States naval power at Pearl Harbor, and the further Japanese victories that immediately followed, inevitably alarmed British Columbia. Insistent demands were made in the press, in parliament, and more privately that the government should increase the West Coast defences. Panic feeling grew towards the end of February when a Japanese submarine fired a few shells at the Californian coast, and increased further when on 20 June another submarine shelled Estevan Point on Vancouver Island.<sup>95</sup>

In actual fact the defence of the West Coast had by no means been neglected, and in December 1941 the forces available there were adequate to meet any really probable scale of attack, except for the absence of anti-aircraft guns, which were simply not to be had. As we have seen (above, pages 46-7) the Chiefs of Staff counselled the government not to allow itself to be stampeded by public pressure. But the Cabinet listened to the frightened voters of British Columbia instead of to its military advisers, with the result that great numbers of men, great quantities of material and many millions of dollars were wasted in accumulating on the West Coast forces which were not needed there and whose presence there could have no possible useful effect upon the course of the war. As in so many other matters, policy here seems to have been influenced by Mackenzie King's concern with avoiding overseas conscription (above, page 47).

Public pressure also produced changes in organization. On 7 February 1942 the Chiefs of Staff presented a paper suggesting that unification of command on the Pacific Coast, either between the Canadian and United States forces or between the three Canadian services, was not necessary. At the Cabinet War Committee meeting on 1.8 February this was discussed and doubts were expressed concerning its conclusions; it was decided to invite the Chiefs to attend the next meeting to discuss the matter. This discussion took place on the 20th. The Prime Minister put the question before the Chiefs, referring to Pearl Harbor, the sinking of H.M. Ships *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* by the Japanese and the successful passage of the Channel by the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* as arguments for unity of command. The Chiefs argued that the existing arrangements amounted in fact to unified command and that cooperation was preferable to unification; but the War Committee referred their paper of 7 February back to them for reconsideration. The meeting moved on to consider defence policy generally, and again a difference of view was revealed. On behalf of the Chiefs it was observed that there were two primary decisions to be made: first, was the defeat of Germany Canada's major objective? Second, against what scale of attack was Canada aiming to defend herself? The prompt reply on behalf of the government was that the answer to the first question was "yes"; but with respect to the second it was pointed out that the government had to take into account two considerations additional to those

# THE ATLANTIC COAST

Showing aspects of the Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan No. 2



**PRINCIPAL HEADQUARTERS LOCATED IN THE ST JOHN'S AREA**

FLAG OFFICER NEWFOUNDLAND FORCE, R C N (1941)

COMMANDER, COMBINED NEWFOUNDLAND AND CANADIAN FORCES, NEWFOUNDLAND

AIR OFFICER COMMANDING, NO 1. GROUP R C A F

COMMANDER, NEWFOUNDLAND BASE COMMAND (US)

**PRINCIPAL HEADQUARTERS LOCATED IN THE HALIFAX AREA**

C-IN-C., CANADIAN NORTH WEST ATLANTIC

GOC-IN-C., ATLANTIC COMMAND

AOC., EASTERN AIR COMMAND

**C, D, E**

H.Q. COMMANDER TASK FORCE 24 (USN)

**BASES ACQUIRED IN NEWFOUNDLAND BY THE U.S. UNDER TERMS OF AGREEMENT**

**A** - Argentia naval base and airstation, (Ft McAndrew)

**B** - Stephenville, airfield (Harmon Field)

**C** - Quidi Vidi Lake, 2 sites (Ft Pepperell)

**D** - White Hills, St. John's (near Ft Pepperell)

**E** - St. John's Harbour (site for naval installations)

**LEGEND**

☒ Fortress

★ Defended ports

○ Other defended places


○ RCAF operational bases (mid June 1943)

× Bases from which US air operations were flown

▼ Airfield on Northeast Staging Route

**NOTE:**

The designation (US) indicates that those areas were under US control for all purposes including defence; in all other areas defence was provided by Canada or Newfoundland, exceptions being Gander Airport and St John's where US batteries augmented the anti-aircraft or harbour defences



# THE PACIFIC COAST

Showing aspect of the Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan No.2

100 0 100 200 300  
Miles

PRINCIPAL HEADQUARTERS	
VICTORIA-ESQUIMALT AREA	VANCOUVER AREA
PACIFIC COMMAND, RCN (ESQUIMALT) TO 28 NOV 1942	FROM 28 NOV 1942
PACIFIC COMMAND, CDN ARMY TO 30 NOV 1942	FROM 30 NOV 1942
WESTERN AIR COMMAND RCAF TO 30 JAN 1943	FROM 30 JAN 1943

HQ 8TH CDN DIV FEB 1943  
Prince George

HQ NORTH WEST AIR COMMAND RCAF FROM 1 JUN 1944  
HQ ALASKAN WING, AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND (USAAF) 1 NOV 1942  
EDMONTON

- LEGEND**
- Defended ports ..... X
  - Bases from which RCAF operations were flown ..... Tofino
  - Northwest Staging Route ..... - - - - -
  - Mackenzie River Air Route ..... - - - - -
  - Mackenzie River Water Route ..... •••••
  - Oil Pipe Line (Canol Project) ..... - - - - -

Compiled and drawn by Directorate of History

advanced by the Chiefs of Staff — popular apprehension of danger, and the possibility that the situation might deteriorate rapidly.

The question was further discussed at subsequent meetings of the War Committee. On 5 March there was reference to the concern expressed at a recent meeting of Liberal members of Parliament, who had urged the government to strengthen the country's home defences. The following day General McNaughton, on a visit from overseas, attended a meeting of the Committee and, in reply to a question, stated that he agreed with the conclusions of the Chiefs of Staff: for the present, raids of nuisance value were the probable limit of what the Japanese could undertake against Canada. But in the end the caucus and "popular apprehension of danger" carried the day over professional military opinion. On 18 March the Prime Minister reported to a meeting of the War Committee (at which General McNaughton was not present) on his private conversations with him. McNaughton, he said, recognized the need for measures to allay public apprehension, and had expressed the view that a large mobile force should be established on the West Coast. The meeting proceeded to approve in principle an air programme adding 49 squadrons to the Home War Establishment of the R.C.A.F. It also approved the completion of the Army's 6th Division and the mobilization of the three brigade groups of a 7th Division (still another division was to be authorized only two days later). Finally, it approved an amended paper by the Chiefs of Staff on command.<sup>96</sup> This, dated 10 March, recommended that the senior members of the Joint Service Committees on the east and west coasts should be designated respectively as Commanders-in-Chief East and West Coast Defences. Each in his own area would exercise "strategic direction" of all three services as well as tactical command of his own service, but not tactical command of the other services. The commanders-in-chief would coordinate the preparation and execution of defence plans, allocate tasks and coordinate the combined effort. At the same time the senior member of the Joint Service Committee in Newfoundland was to be designated as Commanding Newfoundland Defences; Newfoundland would be considered a sub-command of the East Coast. As the Chiefs of Staff informed the Joint Service Committees, the new system approximated very closely to that which had already existed: "However, reasons of State have made it advisable that publicity be given to the system of command in connection with Canadian defence."<sup>97</sup>

Late in May 1942 reports of intended Japanese thrusts at Midway Island and the Aleutians produced further alarm in British Columbia and Ottawa, and another adjustment in command relations. Lieut.-General Stuart, the Chief of the General Staff, arrived on the Pacific coast at the end of the month to take personal control. Throughout the summer by a very unusual arrangement, he combined the appointment of C.G.S. with those of G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command and Commander-in-Chief West Coast Defences.<sup>98</sup>

During the Second World War the strategic importance of Newfoundland to Canada lay primarily in the fact that the island covered the Gulf of St. Lawrence and St. Lawrence ports, which could be approached only through Cabot Strait or the Strait of Belle Isle. Additional considerations were that St. John's, the most easterly port in British North America, lay athwart the main North Atlantic shipping routes; that the island was a vital link in transatlantic air transport and an important centre of the North Atlantic cable communications system; and that the considerable number of uninhabited harbours along the Newfoundland coast might serve to shelter enemy submarines.<sup>99</sup>

As we have seen (above, page 93) the Canadian government before the

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war refused to sanction any discussion of possible Canadian participation in the defence of Newfoundland. Only after the guns began firing in Europe in September 1939 did it request permission from the Governor of Newfoundland for the R.C.A.F. to fly over the colony and to use its airport facilities, a request which was promptly granted on 6 September.<sup>100</sup> On 13 March 1940 the Cabinet decided that, because of the importance of the Bell Island iron-ore supply to the Nova Scotia steel industry (above, page 92), the defence of that island should become a Canadian responsibility.<sup>101</sup> Accordingly, Canada provided two coast defence guns for Bell Island, and an engineer officer to supervise construction of the battery.<sup>102</sup> As the year advanced the deteriorating military situation in Europe lent urgency to the question of Newfoundland's defences. The Army's General Staff felt that the defence of Newfoundland was "primarily a task for naval and air forces who alone are capable of preventing the enemy establishing sea and air bases", but the R.C.A.F. desired that provision be made for the ground defence of the Newfoundland airport and the Botwood seaplane base.<sup>103</sup> On 14 June the Chiefs of Staff Committee recommended that one flight of bomber-reconnaissance aircraft be stationed at the Newfoundland airport; that one flight of fighter aircraft should be dispatched when available; and that an infantry battalion together with detachments of other arms be sent to Newfoundland for ground defence as soon as possible. When the concurrence of the Newfoundland government was received on 16 June, the infantry battalion and aircraft were promptly dispatched.<sup>104</sup>

As the crisis grew and Canada and the United States, under its influence, began to draw closer together, both, separately and jointly, began to take more interest in Newfoundland. On 7 August Mr. Power, the Air Minister, reported to the War Committee that he proposed shortly to visit Newfoundland to survey the requirements for the defence of Newfoundland Airport and Botwood and complete a general defence survey of the Atlantic area; it would be necessary, he said, for him to confer with the Newfoundland government. It was then suggested that it would be necessary to keep the United Kingdom and United States informed of measures taken there, and that Power ought to consult Dr. Skelton. Whatever came of his consultations before his departure, Mr. Power on 20 August, two days after Mr. King made his historic accord with President Roosevelt at Ogdensburg (below, page 339), made an only less important informal agreement with the Newfoundland government at St. John's. Canada made it clear that she was prepared to assume wide responsibilities for the defence of Newfoundland, and the island government on its side placed Newfoundland's forces under Canadian command: "It was agreed that a unified command under the General Officer Commanding in charge of Eastern [sic] Command should under the circumstances be accepted."<sup>105</sup>

The way was thus opened for the inclusion of Newfoundland within the Canadian Army's new Atlantic Command and for large activities there by the other Canadian services. Subsequently Newfoundland passed a Visiting Forces Act (see below, page 21 1) and under it the island's forces were placed "in combination" with the Canadian garrison.<sup>106</sup> Very considerable Canadian forces were stationed there as time passed, and as we have seen (above, page 134) their command was unified under the new arrangements made in March 1942. The major function of the Canadian naval and air forces based in Newfoundland was in practice participation in the Battle of the Atlantic against the German submarines.

The United States entered the Newfoundland picture partly as a result of the

Ogdensburg agreement with Canada, which led to joint consideration of the whole problem of North American defence, but mainly as a result of the British concession to the United States of military bases there. American forces began to arrive in Newfoundland early in 1941. Their presence inevitably produced some complications, which are dealt with at length in Part VI below.\*

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\*Since questions relating to the Danish territory of Greenland, and the French colony of St. Pierre et Miquelon, resolved themselves in practice into matters of Canadian-American relations, these too are dealt with in Part VI.

## Part IV

### CANADA AND THE ALLIED DIRECTION OF THE WAR

#### 1. A "MIDDLE POWER" AT WAR

WHEN CANADA went to war in 1939 she found herself a position for which there were no real constitutional precedents. Her status had undergone a fundamental change since the day in August 1914 when she followed the United Kingdom into the First World War. The modern Commonwealth is largely a by-product of that war. The concept of the Dominions as independent states under the Crown resulted in great part from their effort in it. By the end of the war their position had been revolutionized. The advances made were registered, after some natural time-lag, in the proceedings of the Imperial Conference of 1926 and, still more formally, five years later in the Statute of Westminster. The British Empire of 1914 had been transformed into the British Commonwealth of Nations, a partnership of states with established rights to foreign and military policies of their own. The new situation presented Canada with new military problems, most of which had to be resolved after the outbreak of the new war.

Underlying these problems was a basic difficulty which inevitably presents itself in wartime coalitions, and more particularly in coalitions between countries of different scales of power: the competing claims of military efficiency and national sovereignty. This question is especially embarrassing for what are now sometimes called the "middle" powers, a category to which most of the "Dominions" of 1939 may be said to belong. A great power, simply because it is in a position to make a very large military contribution, will have little difficulty in making its voice heard.\* A small country will make a small contribution, if any, and probably will not expect to exert much influence. But a country of "medium" status, which makes a contribution to victory materially less than those of the great powers, but large enough to be valuable and to represent a heavy sacrifice on its own part, is in an awkward position. In certain circumstances it may feel with some resentment that it is pouring out blood and treasure in accordance with plans which it had no share in making and over which it has little or no control. Members of the Canadian government in the Second World War sometimes entertained such feelings; and the situation might have been still more difficult had the Canadian public not been so generally ignorant of the real facts.

Perhaps this ignorance was actually for the best, for the problem is not one that can safely be considered on the low level to which political partisanship and popular excitement are likely to condemn discussion of such issues in a time of war. It is generally agreed, with excellent historical warrant, that military efficiency

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\*It is worth observing, however, that in the later stages of the Second World War even the United Kingdom found difficulty in maintaining what it considered its proper share in strategic decision-making against the growing power and assertiveness of the United States. Churchill wrote to Smuts on 3 December 1944, "it is not so easy as it used to be for me to get things done".<sup>1</sup>

requires the largest possible concentration of power in the fewest possible hands. Since the days of ancient Rome, nations at war have found it necessary to allow their own leaders much larger domestic powers than are accorded them in peace.

In seasons of great peril  
Tis good that one bear sway;  
Then choose we a Dictator,  
Whom all men shall obey.

Similarly, it usually seems necessary to make sacrifices of national sovereignty when war is being waged by a coalition. Such sacrifices are painful; but they are much less painful than defeat. The directing authority of a coalition will normally be some sort of committee; and the larger the committee, and the more numerous the interests it has to reconcile within itself, the less effective its leadership is likely to be. It would be poor economy to seek to safeguard national sovereignty at the cost of a sacrifice of military efficiency which may lead to national sovereignty being extinguished totally and permanently by the enemy. The commander to whom a coalition entrusts its forces must be able to command in very truth, if he is to win the victory which the interests of all so urgently require.

On the other hand, the fact must be faced that the great powers who are the dominant members of a coalition may sometimes make decisions in accordance with the dictates of their own interests rather than those of the group as a whole. They will not take particular account of the interests of their junior partners as elements in the situation; they may not even take time to consider what those interests are. They may use the argument of military efficiency merely as an expedient for keeping authority in their own hands, which is of course much more convenient for them. In these circumstances, the position of a "middle power" is bound to be uncomfortable, and its policy is almost certain to be a succession of compromises. If it takes a genuinely responsible attitude, it must be prepared to make large concessions to the leadership of the great powers who are fighting on its side; but it must also raise its voice to assert its own interests and must seek to influence its great associates to take account of those interests. And yet it can properly do this only to the extent that it can be done without injury to the common cause. Broadly speaking, this may be said to have been the line of policy which the Government of Canada sought to pursue in the Second World War.

The problem of efficiency versus sovereignty exists on all levels of coalition war: on the low "tactical" level where units and formations from different countries cooperate on the field of battle against the common enemy; and on the much higher levels where politics and grand strategy jostle and where the statesmen and the chiefs of staff conduct their complicated operations. Here we are concerned with the latter field. The control and cooperation of the forces will be dealt with in the succeeding Part.

Mr. King's government, it is fair to say, was autonomist by disposition. From the time when he first became Prime Minister in 1921, King had pursued an independent line in external policy, eschewing Sir Robert Borden's conception of a Commonwealth which would proclaim with "one voice" a policy arrived at by consultation of the member states. He might be expected to follow the same line in wartime, and in fact so far as circumstances allowed he did. He was advised in the early months by O. D. Skelton, whose ideas in this matter certainly largely paralleled his own and probably had helped to shape them; and it may be said that throughout the war his policy was independence and cooperation, and that he

never used Commonwealth machinery as such if he could help it. He once confided to his diary the view that the only position for Canada to take "is that of a nation wholly on her own vis-a-vis both Britain and the United States"<sup>2</sup> (below, page 150). Obstructionist in terms of the Allied war effort, however, his policy never was — although his critics might argue that the obsessive concern with the necessity for avoiding overseas conscription which was so long the strongest single factor in his thinking tended in this direction. Support for these generalizations will be found in the pages that follow.

This emphasis on independence, with its perhaps inevitable overtones of withdrawal, might tend to hold the King administration back from any attempt to exert influence upon the Allied higher direction of the war. Moreover, the personnel of the government included no one with the background or apparently even the inclination to support or justify such an attempt. Canada had no Winston Churchill or Jan Smuts. Those men were students as well as practitioners of war, fighting men in their youth, and in their maturity contributors to the grand strategy of 1914-18. By contrast, it would be hard to imagine a more complete civilian than Mackenzie King, a man of the library who was not even in Canada during a great part of the First World War, and who would have cut no figure in uniform. We may recall again his biographer's words about his distrust of the army, "deep-seated and lifelong".<sup>3</sup> His natural affinities were with the "man of peace", Neville Chamberlain, rather than with the warrior Churchill; it is significant that the telegram of sympathy which King sent on 10 May 1940 to the fallen Chamberlain is much warmer and more personal in tone than the message of good wishes that went simultaneously to Churchill, the new Prime Minister.<sup>4</sup>

Although King's cabinet contained several men of military background, there was none who possessed the sort of experience that would enable him to make a useful contribution to Allied strategy. Layton Ralston, though a very distinguished battalion commander of the old Canadian Corps of 1914-18, had no particular qualifications for the higher direction of war; and, deeply involved in the detailed administration of the Department of National Defence, he seems to have had no ambition to extend his activities in that direction. Of Ian Mackenzie, Norman Rogers and C. G. Power, all of whom had also served in the First World War, much the same might be said. Perhaps the minister who came closest to exerting a powerful personal influence on war policy in London and Washington was C. D. Howe; but Howe did not operate in the strictly military sphere. The only people in Canada actually trained in matters of strategy were the comparatively small number of professional officers of the three services who had attended the British staff colleges and more particularly the Imperial Defence College. But these men, like Ralston, were more than busy with the local problems of creating large fighting forces where there had been virtually none before. Moreover, they were unsupported by anything parallel to the old-established Committee of Imperial Defence and its sub-committees in the United Kingdom; and Canada had very little in the way of a military intelligence organization of her own to provide her staffs with a basis for independent assessment of events. Notably, before the war there were no military attachés in Canadian missions abroad. Lieut.-General Maurice Pope, who was in a position to see and judge, has written,<sup>5</sup>

Canada is a big country geographically, and also as a trading nation. But our standing as a military nation was not as important as many of our people had led themselves to believe. We did not dispose of enough "battalions." No opportunity was ever given us to proffer advice as to how the war should be directed and if it had been I wonder if our

knowledge of the general situation and our limited experience in matters of this kind would have made us competent to give it effectively. As a consequence, we remained in the second rank.

Even if Canada had been able to offer the Grand Alliance the services of a statesman or general of quite unusual reputation, experience or competence, it is questionable whether much use would have been made of them. The great powers who produced the big battalions were, as we shall see, determined to retain control in their own hands.

## 2. THE PERIOD OF THE ANGLO-FRENCH ALLIANCE, 1939-1940

When war began in 1939, Britain and France constituted a Supreme War Council as an organ to coordinate their joint effort. In it "France and the United Kingdom should each be represented by the Prime Minister and one other Minister, and other Allied Powers, perhaps, by their ambassadors".<sup>6</sup> Fairly frequent meetings were held, in London or Paris.

With this organization Canada established no direct contact, through her minister in Paris or otherwise. She made no formal alliance or other such arrangement with France and no evidence has been found of serious consideration being given to such action. It is clear however that some few logical-minded Canadians found this a strange omission. The Canadian Minister to France (Lt.-Col. G. P. Vanier) wrote to General McNaughton in April 1940 suggesting that, as a result of the Statute of Westminster, the Canadian troops would come to France as "part of the armed forces of a sovereign state" and might serve under the French General Gamelin "in the same way as the B.E.F." To the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Rogers), then overseas, he sent a copy of a dispatch he had written to the Department of External Affairs seeking instructions, remarking in the covering letter,<sup>7</sup>

I appreciate, as well as anyone, that the unity of command must not be impaired but the idea that the Commander of a Canadian autonomous force which, presumably, might become a Corps of two or more divisions, would have no access to the Commander-in-Chief of all the land forces — French, British, Polish and possibly others and, who knows, eventually even American — except through the British Commander-in-Chief who takes his orders, presumably, from the United Kingdom Government through the Imperial General Staff, does not seem to be proper constitutionally. If the Imperial General Staff were really imperial and included representatives from the dominions — not that I advocate this — the situation would be different because, then, the Imperial General Staff would take its orders from the several Governments represented.

It was immediately pointed out that arrangements had been made under the Visiting Forces Acts (below, pages 211-13) for the Canadians to serve under the Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force.<sup>8</sup> The Department of External Affairs in a reply sent when France was already tottering instructed the Minister to inform the French government that to facilitate unity "and effectiveness of Defence Measures" it was not intended to place Canadian forces directly under the French Commander-in-Chief, but that Viscount Gort would operate "by virtue of the Canadian Statute Law" as commander of the combined forces. The Canadian commander would not have direct access to the Allied commander-in-chief. Nevertheless, the Secretary of State for External Affairs emphasized, Canadian forces continued "to hold Canadian identity" and were governed by Canadian law. "Further, the Canadian Commander has the right of direct communication with Canadian Service Authorities, and, while in relation to the French Commander-in-

Chief the position of the Canadian Forces is anomalous, I am sure that the French Authorities will realize that their acting in combination with the British Forces and under the British Officer appointed to Command the Combined British and Canadian Forces will simplify Command and add to the effectiveness of the operations against the enemy."<sup>9</sup> Even had circumstances been different, it would have been awkward for a force as small as one division (which was General McNaughton's command at that time) to give itself the airs of a national force entitled to the same status as the B.E.F. It is worth remarking, however, that General Freyberg's 2<sup>nd</sup> New Zealand Expeditionary Force, a command of similar size, contrived to do very nearly that without exciting adverse comment from the British authorities. Freyberg was authorized in emergency to "make decisions as to the employment" of his force quite independently.<sup>10</sup>

At least one other Canadian official was seriously disturbed by the failure of his government at this period to demand a higher status in relation to the direction of the war. This was Mr. L. B. Pearson, Official Secretary in the office of the High Commissioner for Canada in London. At the end of April 1940 Mr. Pearson composed two memoranda<sup>11</sup> on the subject which were also communicated to the Minister of National Defence during his visit. The first, arising out of the Norwegian episode (below, page 208), was mainly concerned with the application of the Visiting Forces Acts to the situation; the second raised "(the whole question of consultation and communication" between the Canadian and British governments in wartime, and specifically the question of information on military plans and operations. It remarked, "At present, it is suggested, we are not kept sufficiently informed. We are told what has happened; very seldom, what will happen or may happen." While this might often be due to the fact that those directing the war did not themselves know what was going to happen, a more forceful reason was that local Canadian contacts with these people were inadequate. As for direct communication between the governments, "The Dominions Office telegrams are admirable for information; less helpful for consultation or warning."

Mr. Pearson continued by pointing out that the Canadian government itself was "largely responsible" for this, in the light of its peacetime avoidance of consultation on foreign policy and defence. Nevertheless, he argued, "a system which may have been best for us in time of peace, when it was far from certain that we would participate in another war, is not satisfactory when we are actually at war, not as a colony of Great Britain but as an Allied power, as France, Poland or Norway are Allied powers":

Our constitutional position has been recognized. We can participate or refuse to participate in this war. We can send a Division to England; refuse to send it to Norway; or recall it to Canada, in theory. In fact, however, we have no such powers and, so far as policy and planning in this war are concerned, our status is little better than that of a colony. We have practically no influence on decisions and little prior information concerning them. We have no Service representatives on Planning and Operations Boards; we have no representatives on the War Cabinet or on Cabinet Secretariats, for the purpose of securing firsthand information. The Allied War Council meets with Norwegian and Polish representatives; but not Canadian. A very important meeting of that Council took place last Saturday but we have not yet received any information as to what took place at that meeting; neither has North Borneo. . . . But we do not seem to have been concerned at our exclusion from the Councils of our Allies in a war in which our whole future is at stake.

Canada's part, Pearson went on, was to supply soldiers and pilots; she would be told where they were to fight and under what conditions, "as a result of deliberations in which we have had no part". "When we send over air squadrons from

Canada the situation will be even more difficult. Are the Air Ministry — without consultation with Canadian representatives — to send Canadian squadrons at will all over Europe? Personally, I dislike this role of unpaid Hessians."

In conclusion, the Secretary proposed remedies.

What steps can be taken to improve this situation during the war?

(1) Canada should be informed of all the deliberations of the War Cabinet. This could be done through the Dominions Office, or, preferably, through the Cabinet Secretariat via Canada House. A Canadian official should be brought into touch with this Secretariat.

(2) Should not a Canadian representative have the right to attend the War Cabinet when questions which concern Canadian participation are under consideration so that the Government in Canada can be informed at once by its own representative?

(3) Certainly Canada should have the right to attend meetings of the allied War Council either in London or Paris.

(4) Should not Canadian Staff Officers be attached to the Secretariat of the Chiefs of Staffs Committee or to the Military Secretary to the War Cabinet? This might, in fact, be the most effective way of securing advance information on strategic proposals which may involve the use of Canadian troops or Canadian airmen. The above suggestions may or may not be practicable or desirable. It cannot be denied, however, that the machinery for intergovernmental contact and communication which may have been satisfactory in peace-time, may well prove dangerously inadequate in war-time. That machinery should therefore be re-examined in the light of war conditions.

Nothing came of any of these suggestions, and no evidence has been found that they were seriously discussed in Ottawa. The fact is that they were put forward at a particularly unpropitious moment. Before they could reach Canada by sea mail the face of the war had changed. The German *Blitzkrieg* had been launched in the West, and a moment of desperate emergency was not the time to discuss status and the machinery of direction. Within a few weeks France had collapsed, and the Supreme War Council was a thing of the past. Moreover, Britain had a new government, headed by a statesman likely to be less sympathetic than the fallen Chamberlain to the sort of aspirations which found expression in Pearson's memoranda. We shall see that, in essentials, the situation which Mr. Pearson described in the spring of 1940 continued to exist throughout the war; in 1944 officials in Ottawa were still trying vainly to find a solution for the Canadian dilemma (below, pages 187-93).

One thing King and Skelton did attempt to do. It will be remembered that the Doctor in August 1939 prescribed "Statement of War Aims" as an essential of Canadian policy (above, page 9). And before the year was out the Canadian government put forward to London, in the involuted and roundabout language typical of King, suggestions for world settlement. The most specific was the avoidance of a severe punitive policy which might unite the German people behind Hitler. For the future maintenance of peace King saw as the best hope, "in international as in industrial disputes" — a characteristic reminiscence of his own earlier years — "the adoption of the flexible procedure of investigation and report, supported by the powerful sanction of public opinion".\* But this had no result. In the spring of 1940 academic discussion of "war aims" was forgotten as the Allied countries suddenly found themselves fighting desperately for mere survival.

In the absence of adequate documentation,† one can only speculate —

\*On these matters, see James Eayrs, *In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament*, pages 154-62 and Document 4.

†At this early period of the war, the Cabinet War Committee seldom met (above, page 31); and the absence of its minutes deprives the historian of valuable guidance which is available after May 1940.

always a rather perilous expedient — as to the motives of Canadian policy in the first months of the war. It may well be that Mr. King was not easily to be convinced that the time had come to abandon those peacetime practices referred to by Pearson, with which King was so fully identified. The reader will also recall, however, the determination of the Canadian government at this period to maintain a strictly "moderate" war effort. It is at least possible that this affected the government's apparent decision to refrain from raising any question of Canadian status in relation to the Anglo-French alliance and the Supreme War Council. Any request for association with the higher direction of the war might have opened the door to embarrassing suggestions for an increase in the Canadian effort. The British government itself considered the question of liaison with Dominion governments "soon after the outbreak of war" and, we are told, it was agreed "that the time was not propitious for inviting Dominion Ministers to serve as members of the Supreme War Council, nor for a meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in an Imperial War Cabinet, after the model of 1917". But it was thought desirable to invite Dominion High Commissioners "to occasional meetings with members of the War Cabinet" and to encourage visits to the United Kingdom by Dominion Ministers and their technical advisers.<sup>12</sup>

Except for the normal diplomatic contacts with France and some ceremonial visits, then, Canadian liaison with the Anglo-French alliance was entirely through the United Kingdom government. We must now examine the nature of the expedients adopted early in the war for ensuring effective consultation between London and Ottawa.

On 21 September 1939 Mr. Chamberlain sent a circular dispatch<sup>13</sup> to Dominion Prime Ministers apprising them that the War Cabinet had been reviewing the existing system of collaboration. Full use was being made of the channels already available: direct communication between governments, exchange of information through the High Commissioners in London and the Dominion capitals, and utilization of political and service officers serving under the Dominion High Commissioners in London. Chamberlain did not feel justified in suggesting "a personal meeting between Prime Ministers in London" at the existing stage, but he did think that there would be advantage in "early personal contact on ministerial plane". He therefore inquired whether the Dominion Prime Ministers would each designate one of his Cabinet colleagues to make a brief, early visit "to discuss the position in all its bearings with us and if possible with Ministers from other Dominions also". He added that a "complementary extension of liaison arrangements on service matters" would be "a natural corollary". Naval liaison seemed adequate for the present, but it was suggested that the visiting ministers might be accompanied by "military and air officers of the status generally corresponding to Deputy Chiefs of Staff here". These might perhaps remain in London "for day to day discussions with their service colleagues here after the minister had left". The appointment of liaison officers to United Kingdom civil departments concerned with economic and supply matters might also be considered.

The Canadian government's reaction to these suggestions reflects that dislike of Commonwealth machinery which is mentioned above. Mr. King replied on 4 October<sup>14</sup> that he was asking Mr. T. A. Crerar, the Minister of Mines and Resources, to go to London as suggested. But he discreetly discouraged the idea of anything like a Commonwealth conference. "While we recognize that it would be helpful to discuss common questions also with Ministers from other parts of Com-

monwealth who might be in London, we do not consider, in view of difficulty of arranging for simultaneous presence in London of Ministers from all the various parts of Commonwealth and of necessity of making Mr. Crerar's visit brief, that it would be desirable to make this an essential condition of the arrangement." He recalled that Canada had recently decided to appoint High Commissioners to Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Ireland. While an attempt would be made to have senior army and air force officers accompany Mr. Crerar, "we are doubtful whether arrangements could be made for their remaining indefinitely in London". Economic and supply matters were dealt with at length, and indeed throughout these exchanges the Canadian emphasis on such questions, as compared with the very brief treatment of military liaison, is noteworthy. When public announcements of the impending visits were made on 4 October, there were press reports in London that the formation of some sort of Imperial War Cabinet (as in 1917-18) was imminent. Mr. King at once issued a statement denying this:

The Prime Minister stated that the press report that an Empire War Cabinet or Conference was being set up is without foundation. No suggestion for setting up such a body has been made.<sup>15</sup>

When Mr. Crerar reached London on 28 October he was accompanied not only by his namesake Brigadier H. D. G. Crerar (who in fact *did* remain in London to set up Canadian Military Headquarters there) and Air Commodore L. S. Breadner, but also by representatives of the Departments of Trade and Commerce and Agriculture and of the Canadian Wheat Board.<sup>16</sup>

In spite of the lukewarm Canadian attitude, the occasion did assume something of the appearance of a miniature Imperial Conference. Australia was represented by Mr. R. G. Casey, New Zealand by Mr. Peter Fraser, South Africa by Colonel Deneys Reitz, and India by Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan.<sup>17</sup> The meetings began on 1 November with a session, on "foreign policy and the general situation" at 10 Downing Street. On subsequent days there were reviews of the general strategic situation, United Kingdom financial policy, "strategic questions and Dominion militarization programmes", and United Kingdom civil defence. The British Chiefs of Staff prepared for the information of the visitors a "Review of the Strategical Situation" which emphasized Allied inferiority to Germany on land and, still more, in the air.<sup>18</sup> There were visits to units of the British fighting services and a short visit to France. The Canadian High Commissioner informed his government that the meeting were to be "purely informative in character", and added:

The programme finishes on Wednesday November 15th after which I am arranging for bi-lateral conversations between Crerar and members of his mission with corresponding United Kingdom Ministers and officials on such subjects as the following:

1. Wheat.
2. Bacon, cheese and other agricultural produce.
3. Financial questions.
4. Shipping.
5. Supply questions.

Mr. Crerar and Mr. Massey both felt that as "problems of finance bulk very large in all the questions under consideration" it was desirable that a representative of the Canadian Department of Finance or the Bank of Canada should be present.<sup>19</sup> As we have seen (above, page 23), the Governor of the Bank was accordingly dispatched to join the Canadian delegation. Something has been said elsewhere (pages 11, 24) of Mr. Crerar's difficult economic negotiations and the extent to which these became involved with the equally difficult discussions concerning the British

Commonwealth Air Training Plan which were proceeding simultaneously in Ottawa. The Minister left London on his return journey to Canada on 15 December.<sup>20</sup>

In the last weeks of 1939 and the early ones of 1940 Canadian land and air forces began to arrive in Britain (above, pages 28, 29-30). On April 1940 the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Norman Rogers, went to the United Kingdom to visit them and to discuss various outstanding issues with the British government. Military questions were more important now, and there was considerable discussion as to the basis on which a Canadian Corps might be set up in England. But the conversations were still very largely concerned with economic and financial matters, and the question on which Rogers seems to have laid most stress in them was the smallness so far of British equipment orders placed in Canada.<sup>21</sup>

It was while Rogers' visit was in progress that the British government advanced a proposal for a conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers to be held in the summer of 1940. Mackenzie King cabled Rogers asking him to see Chamberlain and discourage the project. The interview took place on 8 May, when Chamberlain was close to his fall. Rogers recorded it as follows:<sup>22</sup>

I explained that I had come to see him at the express request of Mr. Mackenzie King in order to place certain considerations before him which, in the opinion of the Canadian Government, would make it unwise or impracticable for the Canadian Prime Minister to attend such a conference this summer. These considerations were: (1) The uncertain duration of our parliamentary session in Canada which was to open on May 16th and the importance of the Prime Minister being present throughout the first regular session since the outbreak of war and the general election, (2) The importance of maintaining an unbroken front and a united sentiment behind our war effort in Canada and the special responsibility of the Canadian Prime Minister in achieving this result. (3) The importance of the Canadian Prime Minister being available in Canada in the event of a situation arising in which he might be called upon to assist in maintaining the most friendly relations between Great Britain and the United States.

Chamberlain in reply expressed regret, but added that it was apparent that local circumstances in other Dominions besides Canada would make it difficult for Prime Ministers to attend; it would probably be necessary to give up the idea of a conference at the time proposed. It appears that General Smuts had taken much the same line as Mr. King. In January 1941, when Rogers' successor, Colonel Ralston, was in London, King arranged to have him visit the new Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, and present very much the same set of arguments against holding a conference of Prime Ministers.<sup>23</sup>

General liaison arrangements were working pretty satisfactorily. The establishment of Canadian service headquarters in Britain had opened new channels or expanded old ones. A daily telegram recording the progress of operations went from the British government to the Dominion Prime Ministers "for their most secret and personal information"; copies of the Chiefs of Staff *Weekly Résumé* went also, though by sea mail. The Secretary of State for the Dominions met the High Commissioners every day (below, pages 154-5). Occasionally a special appreciation by the British Chiefs of Staff went to the Dominion governments; and in general those governments were kept fairly fully informed of current important developments. We have already given examples of some of the more important communications that went out (e.g., page 32 above). Information about future operations, however, the British government kept severely to itself.<sup>24</sup> The conduct of the war remained solidly in British and French hands; and as we have noted above, there is no evidence that the Canadian government ever questioned this situation.

## 3. THE COMMONWEALTH ALONE, 1940-1941

The catastrophic Allied defeat in France and Flanders in May and June 1940 resulted in France being driven out of the war and the countries of the Commonwealth being left to carry on alone the conflict with Germany, who was joined now by Italy. A new Prime Minister gave new dynamism to the British effort. Canada's own effort expanded to meet the situation, and for a year, until the German attack on Russia in June 1941, the Dominion was Britain's most important single ally. Nevertheless, there was no significant change in Canada's relationship to the higher direction of the war. The heir of the Anglo-French Supreme War Council was not a Commonwealth council but the British War Cabinet and the British Chiefs of Staff. Under Churchill's leadership, indeed, the War Cabinet as such came to have less and less to do with military direction. In the first instance this function tended to pass to the Defence Committee (Operations); but then this too declined, and after 1941, if not earlier, it may be said that, essentially, British strategy was made by the Prime Minister (who was also Minister of Defence) in consultation with the Chiefs of Staff.<sup>25</sup>

In the circumstances existing after June 1940, it would, perhaps have been strange if no voice had been raised in advocacy of an Imperial War Cabinet; and in fact the government of Australia did advocate it. The Australian Prime Minister, Mr. R. G. Menzies, made a long visit to London early in 1941 and attended meetings of the War Cabinet. He thought the existing situation very unsatisfactory; the war, he felt, was being left far too much to Churchill's personal direction, and even in London he found it hard at times to get strategic information of great interest to Australia. "He desired", says Churchill, "the formation of an Imperial War Cabinet containing representatives of each of the four self-governing Dominions." He returned home by way of Ottawa, where, arriving on 7 May, he put his views before Mackenzie King and also, it appears communicated them in writing to Fraser of New Zealand and Smuts of South Africa.<sup>26</sup>

King reacted strongly against these ideas. He suggested that Menzies' own experience indicated that Dominion representation in London was not a very useful idea — it would be more appearance than reality; while the domestic consequences of Prime Ministers leaving their own Dominion might be serious. When Menzies argued that some imperial council was needed to decide questions of strategy, King's reply was that he could not offer advice on such questions without expert assistance. He recorded in his diary his opinion that "any Prime Minister, going to England, would have to bring these advisers with him. If they were in England, they would be out of Canada, where they would be most needed. Also, that, even then, I would be separated from my colleagues. I could not say what division might arise in the Cabinet or in the country while I was away." King told Menzies that he thought "the more effective way was to have individual Ministers go over and take up matters with their opposite numbers". Ralston and Howe, both of whom had made trips to England late in 1940, supported this opinion.<sup>27</sup> King also referred again to the service he might be able to render, at a crisis, "in relation with the U.S." Menzies, at least temporarily overborne, it would seem, is reported to have admitted that the most that could be effected was "a meeting for some special occasion when some practical thing was to be done"; but when he got home he went on record in favour of the holding of an early Imperial Conference and the direct representation of Australia in the British War Cabinet.<sup>28</sup> Not long afterwards he fell — for the moment — from power; and King, who had predicted this at a

party caucus, frequently referred to it afterwards as an example of what happened to Prime Ministers who spent too much time abroad.<sup>29</sup>

It was perhaps as a sop to Menzies that Churchill, shortly after the Australian left England, proposed that an Imperial Conference be held in the summer of 1941. King discouraged the idea in his usual manner.<sup>30</sup> On 24 June he told the War Committee that he had explained to Churchill why he could not attend such a meeting: it would be unwise in the interest of the war effort to have the Prime Minister leave Canada now. Churchill was perhaps not unwilling to have the proposal scotched. On 29 August he wrote at length to the new Australian Prime Minister, A. W. Fadden; about the Australian position on these matters of representation. By this time Mackenzie King himself was in London and Churchill was in consultation with him.<sup>31</sup> The basic point he made was that, while the Prime Minister of a Dominion visiting England was "always invited to sit with us and take a full part in our deliberations", it was out of the question that "a Minister other than the Prime Minister" should join the British War Cabinet. Churchill stated that he had ascertained that the Prime Ministers of Canada, New Zealand and South Africa did not desire such an arrangement, and it would have been very awkward from the British domestic viewpoint. (This stipulation was really an insuperable bar to the creation of a permanent Imperial War Cabinet, since no Prime Minister could leave his own country for more than a limited time.) The United Kingdom was quite prepared to receive a "special envoy" from Australia, but "he would not be, and could not be, a responsible partner in the daily work of our Government". Churchill added:

We should of course welcome a meeting of Dominions Prime Ministers if that could be arranged, but the difficulties of distance and occasion are, as you know, very great. We are also quite ready to consider, if you desire it, the question of the formation of an Imperial War Cabinet. So far-reaching a change could not however be brought about piecemeal, but only by the general wish of all the Governments now serving His Majesty.

In the end, all Australia obtained was the acceptance of Sir Earle Page in London as a Special Representative of the Australian Government who might attend Cabinet and Defence Committee meetings when what Churchill called "war matters and Australian matters" were discussed. When Australia asked "that an accredited representative of the Commonwealth Government should have the right to be heard in the War Cabinet in the formulation and the direction of policy", the British government agreed. New Zealand asked for similar representation, and the other Dominions were offered it if they so desired.<sup>32</sup> Canada did not accept the offer, and certainly lost little by her abstention. Just how much, and how little, such liaison in London was worth under Churchill is made apparent by a memorandum<sup>33</sup> written by the British Prime Minister to the Secretary of the Cabinet on 27 February 1942 on "Cabinet arrangements for the next week":

*Monday, 5.30 P.M. at No. 10.* General parade with the constant attenders, the Chiefs of Staff, and the Dominions and Indian representatives. Business: the general war situation, without reference to special secret matters such as forthcoming operations; and any other appropriate topics.

When the Australian High Commissioner became privileged to attend War Cabinet meetings, he found that he got little information there on the conduct of the war.<sup>34</sup>

It is apparent that Churchill and King were at one in opposing the establishment of anything like an Imperial War Cabinet; but clearly their reasons for opposing the idea were somewhat different. The British Prime Minister, who was always rather readier to accept responsibility than to share it, saw that the

permanent attendance of Commonwealth ministers would render the War Cabinet unwieldy, and doubtless felt also that it would derogate from his authority and create additional complications for him. The Canadian Prime Minister evidently felt that participation in an Imperial War Cabinet would be in some degree a threat to Canadian autonomy: that it might involve implied commitments without any real authority, "responsibility without power", as he said to Menzies. He took in fact much the same line as he had in the 1920s when resisting those who would have liked to see the Imperial Conference become an Imperial Peace Cabinet. The references in his diary to mere "appearances" are significant.<sup>35</sup> On 17 February 1941 he gave a detailed exposition of his views to the Canadian House of Commons, emphasizing the effect of modern means of communication, cable, wireless and transatlantic telephone, and the presence in each Commonwealth capital of representatives of the other countries of the partnership.

The real but invisible imperial council made possible by these means of constant and instantaneous conference has one all-important advantage which would be denied to an imperial war council sitting in London. It affords the prime minister of each of the dominions the opportunity of discussing immediately with his colleagues in his own cabinet all aspects of every question raised. His expression of view, when given, is not his alone — it is the expression of view of the cabinet of which he is the head. It is an expression of view given by the cabinet in the light of its responsibility to parliament. It is, moreover, an expression of view given in the atmosphere, not of London, but of the dominion itself.

The final sentence is, perhaps, especially revealing.

It is worth while to add that it appears that, although there was some advocacy of an imperial war cabinet among the Opposition and in the press, King's cabinet colleagues supported him on the issue. On 29 July 1941 the Cabinet War Committee approved a draft reply to Menzies' proposal for Dominion representation in an empire war cabinet, opposing anything of the sort.

One other stillborn project of this period should be noted. In November 1940 the British government proposed a revival of the old Supreme War Council in the form of an organization in London comprising representatives of the exile governments of Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Czechoslovakia and Greece; a Free French observer; and the Dominion High Commissioners. This, it was thought, would provide a useful manifestation of allied solidarity. Mr. King disliked the scheme intensely. Such a council would, he thought, be a mere facade a sign of weakness; and he also feared that it might involve commitments for the liberation of Europe and the assumption of obligations on the Continent. On 5 November the Cabinet War Committee approved a negative reply to the proposal. On 13 November the Canadian government told London firmly that it objected to any "post war military security commitments".<sup>36</sup> The plan was not proceeded with, though it does not seem to have died at once.<sup>37</sup> On 14 November the War Committee was told that the United Kingdom now agreed with the Canadian view, but felt that a conference of Allied and Dominion governments might be desirable. Canada made no objection. Mr. Churchill presumably had never intended to surrender any real degree of strategic direction to the proposed council. Military control remained firmly in United Kingdom hands.

It is worth while to record here the circumstances in which Mackenzie King, after all his reluctance, made a visit to Britain in August and September 1941.

Enough has been said (above, pages 145, 146) to indicate that he attached great importance to the supposed role played by Canada, and more specifically by

Canada's Prime Minister, in maintaining the soundest possible relationship between Britain and the United States. He was devoted to the "linch-pin" or "interpreter" theory, and many times he used the importance of his being available to perform this function in a crisis as an argument against his leaving Canada to attend meetings in London. We shall see more of this in a later section of this book, and shall note that at the moment of the French collapse King was in fact called upon to play the interpreter's part in a very specific manner (below, pages 328-32).

As late as mid-June 1941 King was sending communications to Churchill which suggested that really dire consequences might ensue if King were obliged to leave Canada that summer. On 14 June he sent a five-page "most secret and personal" telegram listing numerous reasons why this was the case. As so often, he emphasized his own special relations "with the President and Mr. Hull." He also spoke of his belief that advantage would be taken of his absence to force the issue of conscription. "If I felt that I could leave Canada for even a few weeks", he wrote, "without the now virtual certainty of situations arising which would threaten our national unity, I would naturally, greatly welcome the opportunity of meeting with you and if possible the Prime Ministers of other Dominions." He followed this up the same day with another long telegram to Massey, asking him to explain personally to Churchill that if he went overseas he would be obliged to invite Ernest Lapointe to be Acting Prime Minister. In the event of the conscription issue or any other likely to embroil Quebec with the rest of the country being raised, Lapointe would be a target of abuse and the effects on Quebec's cooperation in the war effort would be disastrous. "I am sure", he said, "the present position in this country has only to be understood by Mr. Churchill to have him realize how grave, as respects possible cleavages both within the Cabinet and throughout the country, might be the consequences of my being in England instead of in Canada for however short a time." The previous day Lapointe himself had sent a cable to Massey: ". . . please convey my views to Churchill that King is one national leader who cannot must not leave own country. Canada now united. Some politicians here who dislike unity are behind suggestion that King leave Canada for England. . . . As far as Quebec concerned King is the leader whom they will trust exclusive of all others. . . ." <sup>38</sup>

It may seem extraordinary that two months after this King was in England. During his tour through Western Canada in June and July he had begun to think that a trip thither might be desirable after all; <sup>39</sup> and on 29 July the War Committee was told of his intention, when King reported that Churchill had recognized that his earlier suggestion of a conference was not practicable. Early in August there was a further change in the situation, and the complacency with which King viewed his own role in Anglo-American relations was severely shaken. On the 6th of the month he received from the British High Commissioner, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, a message from Churchill giving the first news of his intended meeting with President Roosevelt off Newfoundland. Churchill was already *en route*. The whole thing had been arranged without King's knowledge, and the fact that the meeting was to take place almost in Canadian waters underlined the omission. At Hyde Park in the previous April Roosevelt had told him that he wanted a meeting with Churchill, suggested Newfoundland as the place, and indicated that he might travel thither by way of Ottawa. <sup>40</sup> But now a curtain had come down. King's anger was confided to his diary: "I feel that it is taking a gambler's risk . . . the apotheosis of the craze for publicity and show. . . . At the bottom, it is a matter of vanity. . . . Neither the Prime Minister of Britain nor the President of the United States should

leave their respective countries at this time. . . ." He left MacDonald in no doubt of his views. Canadians, he said, would think it extraordinary that Canada had been ignored in this way. The episode confirmed his view "that the only real position for Canada to take is that of a nation wholly on her own vis-a-vis both Britain and the United States". When on 12 August MacDonald brought King information that Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed on a statement to be published (the "Atlantic Charter") the High Commissioner had another rough ride: here again, said King, Canada was being ignored. He read MacDonald one of his messages to Menzies "about means of communication being perfect, and that we had no reason whatever to complain about not being consulted". Now the very opposite was taking place. "It was the way in which the British lost their friends, wanting them in foul weather and ignoring them in fair. So long as they got their own way that was all they wanted." Nevertheless, it is important to note that in spite of these private fulminations, King said more than once that he intended to make no formal protest: such action would be useless.

Curiously enough, Roosevelt happened to put on paper an explanation of why he changed his plan:

I considered the possibility of visiting Ottawa, being met by a cruiser at Quebec, and departing without newspaper men on a trip ostensibly to survey the defenses of the lower St. Lawrence. I realized, in the first place, that it would be difficult to explain my failure to take Prime Minister Mackenzie King with me, and I knew that it would be difficult to take the head of one Dominion Government to the Churchill Conference in the absence of the Prime Ministers of the other Dominions. . . .

If Roosevelt anticipated any trouble with King, he need not have worried. King, characteristically, vented his anger on the British and had none left for the Americans. In fact, by 15 August, when he wrote Roosevelt a fulsome letter congratulating him on the conference, he had convinced himself that the President had taken him into his confidence:

. . . Having in mind our talk together on the verandah of your own little house overlooking the Hudson on that glorious Sunday (April 20th) of my visit to Hyde Park, and the day of the Hyde Park Declaration,\* I was not surprised when I learned of your having put to sea, and at what took place subsequently. I *knew* what was in the air the moment I received word, in reply to my inquiry, that you were not going to Campobello but would be back in Washington by the 19th of this month. . . .

Let me again congratulate you on the outcome of the meeting between Churchill and yourself, and upon your vision and courage in bringing it about. It makes me very happy to know that, perhaps, before anyone else, I learned from you of what you had in mind. I managed to keep the secret all right. It has been a guiding star in watching your movements ever since.

With affectionate good wishes,  
Your good neighbour,  
Mackenzie<sup>41</sup>

On 13 August the Prime Minister reported to the War Committee on the affair giving an account of what he had told MacDonald. He now spoke of the proposed trip to Britain in different terms from before. Fraser of New Zealand was in London, Menzies (who was in fact to resign on 29 August) had spoken of going there soon; his own visit might provide a suitable occasion for the suggested conference of Prime Ministers. He reported that he had mentioned this to MacDonald, who had passed the suggestion on to London. It is evident that the realiza-

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\*See below, page 489.

tion that the two great powers were now leaving Canada and himself out of their councils had somewhat changed King's attitude on Commonwealth questions.

Mackenzie King's 1941 visit to Britain lasted from 20 August to 7 September. His report to the Cabinet War Committee on 10 September after his return, and still more his diary, afford a good picture of his activities. He attended meetings of the British War Cabinet on 20, 25 and 28 August and 4 September, and formed a more favourable impression of its procedure than he had received from Menzies. The agenda, doubtless arranged in part for King's benefit, seem to have covered a wide field of war policy and strategy in general terms. There is no evidence of specific discussion of operations. Indeed, as we have seen, such matters were passing out of the purview of the War Cabinet, nor could King have made much contribution in connection with them. He did make a useful general contribution on 25 August, emphasizing the importance of a cautious approach to the question of the relationship of the United States to the war.<sup>42</sup>

King's private discussions with Churchill likewise ranged widely. The British Prime Minister gave a full account of the meeting with Roosevelt, and there is no evidence that King now gave the slightest indication of the violent feelings which he had expressed to Malcolm MacDonald. He told Churchill that he "fully understood" and "could see the embarrassment I would have been to other parts of the Empire" had he been given a privileged position. There was much discussion of Commonwealth organization, and the two Prime Ministers continued in complete agreement on this question. Churchill explained that a conference was not possible at the moment, since Fraser could not stay,\* Smuts could not leave South Africa, and the situation in Australia was uncertain.<sup>44</sup> King did not repine. On 21 August he held a press conference in which he stated the same conception of Commonwealth communication that he had given the Canadian Parliament in February: "they had in existence to-day in actual practice the most perfect continuous conference of Cabinets that any group of nations could possibly have."<sup>45</sup>

King was entertained by the Royal Family, saw a good deal of the British war effort, visited the Canadian forces, was booed by some Canadian soldiers at a sports meet on a rainy day, had conversations with General McNaughton, and flew home again having evidently enjoyed himself. At the War Committee meeting on 10 September he suggested that visits by Ministers to the United Kingdom should be restricted to essential occasions; it was important, he thought, that the Canadian people should realize that the government was not merely taking directions from Britain. He confided to his diary that he was "really trying to persuade Ralston not to go over at present". His full motives can only be a matter of conjecture. In any case, the Minister of National Defence replied that he could not avoid going in the near future.<sup>46</sup>

#### 4. COMMONWEALTH COOPERATION IN PRACTICE

It may be worthwhile at this point to deal with some aspects of the Commonwealth relationship on the higher levels of policy as it worked in practice from day to day in wartime.

Mr. King's "continuous conference of Cabinets" was more than a mere theory. Consultation was always easy and it was a continuing process. The cables exchanged between the British and Canadian Prime Ministers during the war would

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\*King did have contact with Fraser while in London, however.<sup>43</sup>

fill a considerable volume, to say nothing of those which passed on lower levels. A great many proposals from London, and some from other Commonwealth capitals, went before the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa for consideration. Nevertheless, consultation sometimes did not take place even when it was obviously desirable, and these breakdowns of communication tended to happen particularly at times of stress.

What might be considered a notable example took place at the moment of the French collapse in June 1940. The British Cabinet on 16 June was faced with a request from the French government for release from its pledge not to make a separate peace. In the words of the British official historian, the issues raised "were of vital interest to the Commonwealth as a whole, but the Cabinet agreed that the emergency was too pressing to allow of prior consultation with the Dominions".<sup>47</sup> It could be argued that legally speaking the Dominions were not parties to the mutual Anglo-French pledge and therefore could not claim to be consulted about its abrogation. The same however could not be said of another decision taken the same day, likewise evidently without consultation: the decision to make the Declaration of Union offering France total union with Britain, under which every citizen of France would "enjoy immediate citizenship of Great Britain", and *vice versa*.<sup>48</sup> This was a matter of the deepest Commonwealth concern, and it could be said that the British government had no real right to make such an offer without consultation with the Dominions. But consider the circumstances. France was in agony. This offer was a desperate measure which it was hoped might nerve her to continue the struggle. If it was to have any effect it had to be made instantly. It was quite out of the question to communicate with four Dominion capitals and await their replies. If action was to be taken at all it had to be taken at once on United Kingdom responsibility. As it turned out, the offer was an empty gesture which France's divided and dissolving government "brushed aside".<sup>49</sup> But the incident serves to show how totally illusory the idea of consultation can be at a moment of great crisis.

Another episode of a different type more than two years later is also worth recalling. In October 1942 the Germans, angered by the binding of prisoners taken at Dieppe and in other raids, shackled British and Canadian soldiers who had been captured at Dieppe. The British government proceeded to announce that reprisals would be undertaken against an equivalent number of Germans in our hands. Two Canadian cabinet ministers (Howe and Ralston) were then in London; yet this action was taken without any consultation with Canada, although most of the menaced Allied prisoners were Canadian; while all but 200 of the German prisoners against whom the reprisals would have to be taken were in Canada, and Canada would have to take the action against them. All this was explained to the Cabinet War Committee at its meeting of 9 October. The Canadian ministers found the situation most disturbing. Nevertheless, it was clearly highly undesirable to have a public difference with the British government on the question. Accordingly the Committee approved handcuffing 1100 Germans in Canada from noon the following day. The United Kingdom was informed of the decision by a telegram<sup>50</sup> which added:

This decision has been reached with reluctance. We feel that we have been committed without proper consultation to a course of doubtful wisdom. Not only are nearly all the Dieppe prisoners Canadians but the task of applying reprisals to German prisoners falls mainly on Canada. We fear a futile contest may follow in an attempt to match with the Germans an eye for an eye. In such a contest in the application of harshness to prisoners the Germans are certain to win.

Next day the War Committee had before it the British explanation that the need for immediate decisions had precluded consultation. This explanation is much less convincing in this instance than in the previous one, the more so as in this case there was only one country to consult. However, it was not easy to refuse Churchill's appeal to King: "Earnestly hope that you will stand by us in this anxious business in which we both have much at stake. Am sure it will be of short duration."<sup>51</sup> The Germans were now proposing to manacle three times as many British prisoners as we had manacled of the Germans, and the British government asked Canada to increase the number of Germans so treated in proportion. But the War Committee now called a halt, recommending to Britain that further action on our part be at least delayed. The shackling already ordered produced resistance among the prisoners; and incidentally the Committee was told on 14 October that the United States had refused to provide Canada with handcuffs needed to carry out the policy. The Canadian government would have preferred to end the shackling in Canada at once and altogether, but out of deference to the British government's view it was reluctantly continued until 12 December. Canadian and British prisoners in Germany remained shackled for almost a year longer.<sup>52</sup> The British government does not come particularly well out of this affair. The policy which it adopted — it seems to have been Churchill's — was itself more than doubtful; and in all the circumstances the failure to consult Canada about it was really indefensible. There is a certain grim humour in the Australian complaint (reported to the War Committee on 21 October 1942) that Canada had prejudiced the position of Australian prisoners of war by taking part in the reprisal shackling.

Apart from the question of consulting the Dominions on the military direction of the war — which in general simply was not done — or on particular matters of interest to them, there is also the allied question of merely keeping them informed of the progress of events. On this Mr. Churchill had a well-defined attitude, which he has himself documented by publishing a number of memoranda which he wrote on the subject.<sup>53</sup> His influence was always exerted on the side of limiting the information sent out, and he regularly bullied the Dominions Office on the subject. Thus he wrote on Christmas Day 1940:<sup>54</sup>

No departure in principle is contemplated from the practice of keeping the Dominions informed fully of the progress of the war. Specially full information must necessarily be given in respect of theatres where Dominion troops are serving, but it is not necessary to circulate this to the other Dominions not affected. Anyhow, on the whole an effort should be made not to scatter so much deadly and secret information over this very large circle. . . .

While therefore there is no change in principle, there should be considerable soft-peddling in practice.

I wish to be consulted before anything of a very secret nature, especially anything referring to operations or current movements, is sent out.

It is evident that he preferred that all important information should be sent personally by himself on a Prime-Minister-to-Prime-Minister basis. The weakness of relying upon a personal channel in such a case is obvious — particularly when the individual concerned is bearing the chief burden of directing a great war and is frequently travelling about the world. We shall see one or two instances in the later part of the war where the channel broke down (e.g., below, pages 180-81 ). On the general question of information for the Dominions, one can sympathize with Churchill's view that "deadly secrets" should be kept within the narrowest possible circle; this is a sound military principle. But one would scarcely think, sometimes, that the communities he is excluding are mature nations having the closest ties with Britain, making enormous contributions to the prosecution of the war, and possess-

ing governments of the highest degree of responsibility. These things too are worthy of consideration.

One small but pointed example may be worth quoting. In the course of Mackenzie King's final interview with Churchill during the former's visit to England in the spring of 1944 (below, page 155) King mentioned that he had been somewhat embarrassed by an inaccurate statement by a *New York Times* writer that he knew the date of the future D Day. King wrote in his diary on 19 May, "I . . . said to him that I was not anxious to know any exact time, but that with the numbers of men that we had and the part we were taking I would be glad if he would let me know in a general way so that I might have matters in my mind. He then gave me enough to satisfy me, but he said he hoped I would not find it necessary to even tell Ralston. I said I would not." Churchill added that he would be able to send "more particular word" later.

The "more particular word" never arrived, and the next stage in the story took place on 6 June when a Mounted Police constable on duty at Laurier House in Ottawa knocked on Mr. King's bedroom door in the small hours and announced D Day. King was puzzled. He now recorded in his diary, what he very properly had not set down before, that Churchill on 19 May had "indicated that it might be as late as the 21st of this month before the invasion would take place". After some speculation King convinced himself that there must have been alternative dates for the operation and that an earlier one had been adopted as the result of rapid progress in Italy. He was apparently unwilling to consider the possibility that Churchill had misled him. This however was obviously the case. What the British Prime Minister seems to have done was to mention to King the date that would have been the first possible one for the invasion had it had to be postponed from 5-6 June. The date of D Day was a most closely guarded secret, and necessarily so. Nevertheless, it might almost have been thought that the Prime Minister of Canada was one of those who could properly be admitted to it. Churchill, however, clearly was not of this opinion. His action might be uncharitably defined as an exercise in the art of how to deceive a Dominion prime minister without actually lying. Nevertheless, it could also be argued that he had in fact given King the "general" indication for which he had asked.

The Churchill attitude was reflected in the experience of the Dominion High Commissioners. Before the war, to Mr. Massey's disgust, Mackenzie King had forbidden his taking part in meetings of the Commonwealth High Commissioners in London with the Dominions Secretary; this, a typical aspect of the King policy of eschewing the use of Commonwealth channels, meant that a busy minister had to repeat to Massey individually the information which he had given to his fellow High Commissioners collectively. After the outbreak of war, however, Mr. Massey regularly participated in such meetings, and it was arranged that the four Dominion High Commissioners (Ireland, a neutral, having ceased to attend) would meet with the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs daily — sometimes including Sundays — to be kept informed of events. No record was kept of these meetings, but Massey has described them as he remembers them. They were not without value, but they had definite limitations. As long as Mr. Anthony Eden was Dominions Secretary, they were useful, for although not a member of the Chamberlain War Cabinet he attended all meetings of it and was therefore in a position to keep the High Commissioners well informed if he chose; but when the Churchill administration was formed he moved to the War Office. Lord Caldecote (formerly Sir Thomas Inskip) now became Dominions Secretary, and was to attend only two

War Cabinets a week. This resulted in a "little private protest" being sent to Mr. Churchill by Massey as spokesman for the High Commissioners. The result was an interview with senior officers of the services and a meeting of the High Commissioners with the Prime Minister; but the previous "continuous flow of confidential information" was not restored. After October 1940 Lord Cranborne was Secretary of State for the Dominions, but in due course his attendance at War Cabinets was reduced to one a week. The result of a further protest was the appointment to the Dominions Office early in 1942 of a member of the War Cabinet, Mr. C. R. Attlee; but the High Commissioners found him very close-mouthed. Massey confided to his diary, "It is very irksome to have from shopkeepers and taxi-drivers information you should have received officially or to be asked by Cabinet Ministers about a matter on the assumption you have been told when you have been kept in complete ignorance."<sup>55</sup>

It would nevertheless be unfortunate to leave the reader with the impression that the Dominion governments got little information from London during the war. On the contrary, official communications from the United Kingdom were certainly the most important source of intelligence on the military and political situation which those governments, including Canada's, had available. The various channels of communication which we have noticed were constantly at work, even if there were many limitations on the nature of the information sent. In the nature of things, Canada received far more information than she was able to impart; and if her government was in general well-informed about the situation in the world at large, it owed this in great part to its membership in the Commonwealth network.

The one Prime Ministers' Conference actually held during the war took place in London in May 1944. Mackenzie King made his second wartime flight to Britain to attend it. Churchill and the Chiefs of Staff reviewed the war situation for the visitors; there was considerable discussion concerning the war in the Pacific, though nothing solid emerged concerning plans for the period after the defeat of Germany (above, page 56); and foreign policy was surveyed at length.<sup>56</sup> As an episode in the history of the war, the conference may be said to have had little importance except in the not insignificant departments of morale and public relations.

Perhaps its most interesting aspect in terms of Commonwealth "organization" related to the composition of the meeting. King felt strongly that the dice were loaded against the Dominion delegations in that the United Kingdom representatives were more numerous and were on their own ground and of course supported by their officers and officials. Churchill discouraged the idea of the Prime Ministers having military officers or civil servants present with them at certain of the meetings.\* King wrote in his diary:<sup>58</sup>

... one could not but feel how unfair the position was with matters of foreign policy and the rest of it carefully studied, as Churchill said, by a special Committee selected in advance on which none of the Dominions had been represented. That we should be there without any advisers. That there should be six British Ministers to the four other self-governing parts, all of them with their colleagues and officials close at hand. Also British Ministers were prepared to lead off in discussions, knowing what they were to say, but expecting Premiers [unprepared] to deal with matters in reply. Personally I felt the hopelessness of

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\*This evidently applied only to the most private meetings. The official Agenda show that for the discussions of the war situation on 1-2 May Mr. King was accompanied by General Stuart in the first instance and subsequently by Mr. Norman Robertson and Air Marshal Breadner in addition. At the first meeting, on 1 May, he was accompanied by Mr. Massey as well as by Stuart and Robertson.<sup>57</sup>

the situation; so far as really being able to battle on matters that might require discussion, my attitude would be to make clear I am not the Cabinet and that decision on matters of contribution to the war would have to depend on decision of our War Committee.

Characteristically, also, King exerted himself against any tendency to set up new Commonwealth "machinery" or revive anything resembling old centralizing practices. Churchill had spoken to him of the possibility of annual conferences of Prime Ministers and, apparently, regular meetings of the "Committee of [Imperial] Defence" — evidently with Dominion representatives present. The Canadian Prime Minister used the opportunity of a luncheon given by the Secretary of State for the Dominions (Lord Cranborne) to warn his hosts against trying to set up "any kind of new machinery", advising them to "leave well enough alone, not to create some facade that would only raise suspicion as to commitments and also quite emphatically urging not to attempt anything in the nature of commitments for annual meetings of Prime Ministers in London".<sup>59</sup>

Visits by Canadian ministers to London were fairly frequent, as we have seen; they were not ended by the cold water Mr. King poured on them in September 1941. British ministers also visited Canada, though less frequently. Churchill was there in 1941, attending a meeting of the Cabinet War Committee on 29 December, and again at the time of the Quebec Conferences (August 1943 and September 1944), both of which likewise afforded opportunities for him to meet with the War Committee. Mr. Eden was in Ottawa in March 1943; he too attended a meeting of the War Committee. These personal contacts certainly facilitated exchanges of view more forceful and effective than anything that could be done by cable or even by telephone.

It remains to notice some specific requests for assistance which passed between Commonwealth countries.

In the nature of things, Great Britain, conducting a world-wide war on the basis of resources which though large were still limited, found herself obliged from time to time to ask Canada (who always had some military forces uncommitted except to local defence roles at home) for help in certain areas of the world. The most famous and most ill-starred of these requests was that for troops to reinforce Hong Kong, which resulted in two Canadian battalions being involved in the hopeless defence of that colony in December 1941. This story is fully told elsewhere.<sup>60</sup> The controversy and criticism which followed certainly tended to influence the Canadian government to examine subsequent requests of the same sort with unusual care.

In the Army history<sup>61</sup> it is noted that small Canadian forces were stationed, as the result of representations from the British government, in Bermuda (1940 and 1942-46), Jamaica (1940-46), Nassau (1942-46) and British Guiana (1942-45). Late in April 1945 an incident occurred which caused momentary disquiet in Ottawa. A report that the mainland colony of British Honduras was threatened with invasion from Guatemala led the British commander of the troops in Jamaica (Brigadier J. Jefferson) to issue on 28 April a warning order to the Canadian unit there, The Brockville Rifles (his only effective unit of infantry) to be in readiness to move by air to British Honduras. Jefferson himself flew to Belize to investigate and discovered that the report was unfounded. No further action was necessary, and none was taken. On 3 May a message from The Brockville Rifles' C.O. (Lt.-Col. D. F. Lewis), necessarily sent by a roundabout route (Washington and London) for want of cipher facilities between Jamaica and Ottawa, reached the

Canadian capital. An inquiry to the British Army Staff in Washington quickly established that the proposed move had been called off. This information was sent to Lewis, with an additional caution:

For your information policy is that Canadian Troops in Caribbean Area will not repeat not be despatched outside areas in which they are presently employed without prior reference to Defensor [National Defence Headquarters].<sup>62</sup>

The British authorities explained that there had been no intention of employing Canadian troops in British Honduras without the consent of the Canadian government, but since the operation was cancelled while still in the planning stage no request was made.<sup>63</sup> The authorities in Ottawa never had to make the decision whether or not to allow Canadians to be used to keep British Honduras British.

At least one British request was refused. On 14 January 1942 an inquiry reached Ottawa from Mr. Churchill (then in Washington) through the British High Commissioner: would the Canadian government consider sending a Canadian force of one or two battalions and a battery of field artillery to ensure the security of the Falkland Islands? The Cabinet War Committee considered the matter the same day and deferred decision. The basis for the request was evidently fear of a Japanese raid; but during the discussion reference was made to the long-standing Argentinian claim to the islands. The Canadian General Staff considered the question of what force it would be necessary to send, and came to the conclusion that one infantry battalion would be a sufficient core, but that anti-aircraft artillery would be necessary, along with small engineer, signals and service detachments, including a hospital unit. (Anti-aircraft guns, it may be recalled, were almost non-existent in Canada in January 1942.) One Canadian worry was removed when information arrived that Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador in Washington, had discussed the matter with President Roosevelt and ascertained that the United States would have no objection to Canadian troops garrisoning the Falklands. However, on 18 February the Chief of the General Staff (Lieut.-General Stuart) submitted to the Minister of National Defence a memorandum recommending "from a military point of view" that the force be not sent:

If the commitment were accepted, trained personnel could only be provided by withdrawing units now training to complete the overseas Army Programme and by depleting our home defences of equipment that is urgently required in Canada. I consider that the completion of our overseas Programme at the earliest possible date will contribute more to the main war effort than the undertaking of this isolated commitment.

On 26 February the Cabinet War Committee agreed that the Canadian government could not assume this task. A reply in this sense was finally made to the United Kingdom High Commissioner on 11 March, and this ended the matter.<sup>64</sup> So far as the written record goes, it would seem that throughout the discussion nobody in Ottawa ever mentioned Hong Kong. But Mr. Churchill's request was made just three weeks after that colony, and the Canadians who formed part of its garrison, had surrendered to the Japanese. In January and February 1942, it is fair to say, very powerful arguments would have been required to prevail upon Mackenzie King's government to accept another military commitment in a remote British possession.

During 1942 there was discussion of the possibility of Canada giving some direct help to the sister dominion of Australia. The attack by Japan placed Australia in a very exposed position, and her government was forced to explore every possibility for strengthening her defences. The Canadian High Commissioner in

Canberra was Major-General V. W. Odlum, a former commander of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Canadian Division, and on 14 January 1942 the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa was told that he had made suggestions concerning Canadian military assistance to Australia. It was noted that there had been no request from the Australian government, and the matter was deferred. On 28 January, however, the Committee was informed that concrete suggestions had now been received from the government of Australia through Odlum. There were requests for equipment, and it was suggested that Canada might provide a military force to form a G.H.Q. Mobile Reserve, and naval units for local defence duties. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff, however, took the obvious line of suggesting that such measures, involving the disposition of large military resources, should not be taken except with the assent of the central military coordinating authority of the alliance. The Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Munitions Assignments Board had now been set up; and the War Committee agreed that this was where the Australian proposals should be submitted.

The Canadian Chiefs of Staff again considered the whole question in a long memorandum addressed to their Ministers on 4 March 1942.<sup>65</sup> Their general recommendation was:

We are led to the conclusion that Military assistance can only be provided by Canada at the expense of other commitments and other needs, We desire to stress once again, however, that the ultimate decision in this respect must be made in conjunction with the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the United Kingdom and the United States.

General Odlum, nevertheless, continued to make suggestions. The meeting of the War Committee on 18 March was told that he had requested permission to place himself at the disposal of the Australian government in any capacity if and when occasion warranted. The Committee agreed, however, that it was important that the General should continue to discharge the functions of Canadian High Commissioner in Australia. On 26 March the Committee heard that Mr. H. V. Evatt, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, would be visiting Ottawa shortly; and that the suggestion had been advanced that Canada might send an armoured division. On 8 April Mr. Evatt attended a meeting of the War Committee and the Australian situation was discussed in some detail. Australia's needs for equipment were emphasized. The differing Canadian and Australian views on the desirability of some sort of imperial war cabinet were stated once again. At the next meeting of the Committee, on 9 April, it was mentioned that Mr. Evatt had attached importance to even a token force, and it was agreed that the Chiefs of Staff should reexamine the question. However, their report, made the following day and laid before the War Committee on 22 April, reaffirmed their previous conclusion, that decision on this question required consultation with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Although General Odlum made further representations later, the War Committee's decision (19 August 1942) remained adverse.

Some Canadian soldiers did serve in Australia later in the war. Canadian-made radar equipment was sent there; and on 26 April 1944 the War Committee approved sending a detachment of some 70 all ranks, which Australia had asked for, to maintain the sets and instruct Australians in their use. These men served in Australia, or in more forward areas of the Pacific theatre, until the end of the Japanese war. Subsequently No. 1 Special Wireless Group, Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, organized originally for duty in India and numbering 335 all ranks, was sent instead to Australia. There it worked intercepting enemy messages until the end of hostilities.<sup>66</sup> Finally, on 17 January 1945 the Cabinet War Committee

agreed that up to 100 suitable Canadians of Japanese race might be accepted for enlistment in the Canadian Army and subsequent loan to Australia for special duty. It appears, however, that only three of these "Nisei" were sent to Australia before hostilities ended. Thirty-five others of a total of 127 enlisted for special duties were posted to the South-East Asia Command for service in India.<sup>67</sup>

#### 5. THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, 1942-1945

After the bombs of Pearl Harbor blew the United States into the war on 7 December 1941, a new organization was set up to control the war effort of the Western Allies. As might have been forecast, this organization proved to be almost exclusively Anglo-American.

Mr. Churchill, as we have already seen, had wisely done his utmost to establish close personal contact with President Roosevelt and had had one formal meeting with him, in the waters of Newfoundland, in August 1941. He was now determined to cement this relationship. Shortly after Pearl Harbor he set out for Washington, accompanied by Lord Beaverbrook (Minister of Supply and a member of the War Cabinet) and senior service officers. The "Arcadia" Conference, as it was called, began immediately after their arrival in Washington on 22 December. From it emerged the new machinery for the higher direction of the war.

There had already been some tentative discussions on this. The State Department in Washington had drafted in mid-December a plan for a Supreme War Council representing the United States, the United Kingdom, China and Russia. Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador, made the comment that "the British Dominions probably would have to be given a status in the Supreme War Council similar to that given Britain". Mr. Hull, the Secretary of State, replied that "if the Council should comprise a large number of representatives it would become unwieldy and ineffective".<sup>68</sup> But both these eminent statesmen were talking in the air. Halifax was obviously not in Churchill's confidence, and the State Department's role in United States war policy was far more narrowly restricted than that played by, for instance, the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa. The new machinery finally set up had no place in it for Russia or China, let alone the British Dominions.

More realistic, perhaps, were the Anglo-American military staff conversations in Washington early in 1941, whose basic object was to "determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth, with its allies, could defeat Germany and its allies, should the United States be compelled to resort to war". In these conversations the Dominions were allowed no effective part. Although the British representatives were careful to call themselves the "United Kingdom" delegation, the Americans deliberately chose to term them the "British" delegation and seem to have considered them authorized to speak for the whole Commonwealth — which in fact they were not. The American representatives were apparently mainly responsible for the decision not to allow Dominion officers actually to be present at sessions as observers.<sup>69</sup> Canadian and Australian representatives\* (and apparently one from New Zealand also) were told by the British staff, after each meeting, what had taken place.<sup>71</sup> From these staff conversations emerged the report known as ABC-1.<sup>72</sup> This agreement (which incidentally was never formally ratified by the U.S. government) provided

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\*Canada was represented by Commander Barry German, who travelled to Washington in the guise of a ship-broker.<sup>70</sup>

that in the event of the United States entering the war "the High Command[s] of the United States and United Kingdom" would "collaborate continuously in the formulation and execution of strategic policies and plans which shall govern the conduct of the war". Annex 11 laid down that the United States would take responsibility for the strategic direction of its own and British forces in the greater part of the Pacific Ocean Area and in the Western Atlantic except for "the waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of military forces, as may be defined in United States-Canada joint agreements".

The relationship of the Dominions, including Canada, to the organization for directing the war, as proposed in this report, was what might have been expected from the composition of the conference. It took the form of representation on the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington by their service attaches stationed there. Any participation would thus have been through British channels and on a subordinate level. In Ottawa this was considered very inadequate. It ran counter to that unwillingness to work through Commonwealth channels, that determination that Canada's position should be that of "a nation wholly on her own" which we have noted as the settled policy of Mr. King and his government (above, pages 139, 150). ABC-1 was forwarded to the Canadian government by the United Kingdom High Commissioner on 19 May. On the 21st it was considered by the Cabinet War Committee, which also had before it a comment by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff dated the previous day. The Chiefs, who had already expressed on 15 April their dislike of the way Canada was being excluded from consultation, felt strongly that the report did not recognize the importance of Canada's responsibilities under her agreements with the United States; and they recommended that, instead of accepting mere representation on a British mission in Washington, a separate Canadian military mission should be established there.

After a second consideration by the War Committee, on 3 June, Mr. King replied to Mr. MacDonald at length on the 6th.<sup>73</sup> The tone of his letter was extremely moderate, but the Canadian position was made quite clear. It referred to the procedure followed in the Washington conversations, and remarked that "Canada's interest in and relation to the matters discussed (which, in the event, went far beyond the purely technical questions which were understood to be originally scheduled) was of such a character that full representation of the Government would have been more appropriate". Canada, however, welcomed the report's proposals for cooperation in the event of the U.S. becoming a belligerent:

Canada, also, is anxious to cooperate closely, both with the United Kingdom and the United States. So far as Canada and the United Kingdom are concerned, it has never been found necessary to reduce the basis of our collaboration to contractual terms. Our common interest in the successful prosecution of the war and the mutual recognition of respective responsibilities and capacities has, I think, resulted in the closest, most effective and most friendly cooperation possible.

Since August 1940, and indeed for some months before that, the Canadian authorities have also been working in increasingly close collaboration with the United States Defence Services. This collaboration, which has been developed within the framework of the Ogdensburg Agreement,\* has resulted in joint arrangements by Canada and the United States for the solution of problems of continental defence through the instrumentality of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence established by the two Governments.

The Canadian Government, therefore, welcome all the more warmly the fact that in this vitally important matter an agreement similar to that which they have themselves reached with the United States Government, has now been arranged between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States.

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\*See below, pages 336-40.

It is not thought that the above agreement should conflict in any way with those arrangements already made between Canada and the United States and Canada and the United Kingdom, which have been referred to above. There are, however, a number of points in the proposed Agreement which it is thought may require modification to fit antecedent arrangements made between Canada on the one hand and the United Kingdom and the United States on the other.

It is also felt that the recommendation that Canada should be represented on the British Military Mission in Washington by our Service Attaches there, would not be satisfactory, having regard to the importance of present relationships between Canada and the United States.

It is, therefore, the intention of the Canadian Government to initiate discussions immediately with a view to the establishment of a Canadian Military Mission in Washington. I feel sure that there will be the closest and friendliest cooperation between the Military Missions of all three countries.

An attached memorandum made more detailed comments. In particular, it criticized the tendency of ABC-1 to group Canada, Australia and New Zealand together as "Dominions" and assume that their interest in the report's recommendations would be the same. "Canada's strategic and geographic position as a belligerent in the North Atlantic and the importance and intimacy of her political and industrial contacts with the United States makes her relationship to any conversations concerning the North Atlantic area different from that of any other part of the British Commonwealth of Nations."

This carefully prepared statement had no effect whatever. As we shall see when we come to analyse Canadian-American relations, the United States refused to receive a Canadian military mission, and persisted in the refusal for a long period (pages 354-7). The British seem to have refrained from transmitting the Canadian objections to Washington and presumably merely pigeonholed them.\* Churchill certainly had no sympathy with them and would have been unwilling to run the risk of allowing them to disturb the smooth course of Anglo-American collaboration. On 19 June the British High Commissioner's office informed Mr. King that Lord Cranborne had asked them to say that in the event of a Canadian military mission being set up in Washington, he might depend on the closest cooperation of the British Mission. The letter proceeded blandly, "He adds that the United Kingdom Government are assuming that your comments are not intended to be read as raising any objection to their accepting the report of the staff conversations on their own behalf and that they are informing the United States Government accordingly of their acceptance."<sup>74</sup>

The organization for strategic direction set up by the "Arcadia" Conference of December 1941-January 1942 centred in the famous committee known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This body, however, took shape only gradually. For a time there was uncertainty as to the form which the Allied strategic organization would take: would it be regional or "global"? One regional authority, the ABDA† Area under General Wavell, was set up while the discussion continued (and Wavell's appointment, though not the terms of his directive, was cleared with the governments of the Australasian Dominions and the Dutch exile government in London).<sup>75</sup> On 10 January 1942, however, the British Chiefs of Staff presented to their American colleagues a paper on strategic organization which after discussion and some revision was submitted to Roosevelt and Churchill on 14 January and

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\*Colonel Dziuban, the author of the careful study *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945*, did not find them in the U.S. records.

† American-British-Dutch-Australian.

following final revision was adopted on 10 February. This was the origin of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, a committee which in fact held its first formal meeting on 23 January 1942 and may be said to have existed in practice throughout the "Arcadia" Conference.<sup>76</sup>

The Combined Chiefs of Staff consisted, in ordinary circumstances, of the professional heads of the three United States armed forces — including the Air Force, which was still formally part of the Army — and of "three high officers representing and acting under the general instructions of"<sup>77</sup> the British Chiefs of Staff. In addition there was a representative of Mr. Churchill as Minister of Defence — until his death in November 1944, Field-Marshal Sir John Dill — and after a time Admiral William D. Leahy as Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt. The Combined Chiefs had their permanent headquarters in Washington throughout the war. Their most important decisions, however, were taken in a series of conferences, chiefly held elsewhere, which the British Chiefs of Staff usually attended in person and at which Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill were normally present and exercised dominant influence. "Of the two hundred formal meetings held by the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee during the war no fewer than eighty-nine were at these "conference."<sup>78</sup>

The Combined Chiefs of Staff was the most important combined organization to emerge from the "Arcadia" Conference, but not the only one. There were three others. Of these by far the most significant was *The Munitions Assignments Board*. This operated under the Combined Chiefs of Staff and was divided into a Washington committee and a London committee (the latter being subordinate in that, apart from allocating United Kingdom production to all concerned, it re-allocated, to the Dominions and European allies, what the Washington committee had assigned to it in bulk from U.S. production). The importance to the Allied war effort of the establishment of this body having the task of coordinating the assignment of weapons and equipment to various theatres in accordance with the needs of strategy needs no emphasis. The other bodies set up at this time were *The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board* and *The Combined Raw Materials Board*. Two more boards were established in June 1942: *The Combined Food Board* and *The Combined Production and Resources Board*. It may be immediately noted here that Canada ultimately became a member of these last two boards (below, pages 175-7). All the rest were purely Anglo-American bodies.

Passing mention should perhaps be made of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). This was in a different category. It was not set up until November 1943, and it was directed by a Central Committee consisting of representatives of China, the U.S.S.R., the United Kingdom and the United States.<sup>79</sup> Canada contended strongly in this case against the principle of control by the great powers. It was explained to the Cabinet War Committee on 21 January 1943 that the United Kingdom supported Canada's stand, but that it was vigorously opposed by Russia, and that the United States and China inclined to the Russian position. On 7 April the Committee in effect accepted defeat on this issue, specifying however that this was not to constitute a precedent and affirming that this action "did not affect the Canadian government's views on the principle of control of United Nations organization by the four great powers". However, when UNRRA began work Canada was able to obtain rather larger powers for producing nations not represented on the Central Committee.<sup>80</sup>

It is a rather extraordinary fact that Canada, far from being consulted about the establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, was never even

officially informed that it was being set up.\* This was the case in spite of the fact that Canada was clearly expected to put her large overseas forces at the disposal of the Combined Chiefs and place the lives of hundreds of thousands of Canadians at risk in accordance with the decisions, wise or otherwise, which that committee might make. For this situation it would probably be rather difficult to find a precise historical parallel.

During Christmas Week of 1941, Mr. Churchill came to Ottawa from Washington, and on 29 December he met the Cabinet War Committee. He reviewed the recent conversations in Washington for the benefit of the Committee and reported that agreement had been reached in principle to set up a unified command in the South-West Pacific. Mr. King raised the question of Canada's having some voice in the making of strategic decisions, and Churchill agreed that she should certainly be consulted where her interests were concerned. In matters of joint interest to Canada and the United Kingdom, he would consider it his own responsibility to see that the Canadian government was fully informed. Mr. King's record in his diary should be quoted:<sup>82</sup>

I spoke specifically about the Atlantic coast and the question of command between the Americans and ourselves in the Newfoundland area. Said quite openly to him the problem we faced was that while we had been in [the war] during two and a quarter years, things would be so arranged that the U.S. and Britain would settle everything between themselves, and that our services, Chiefs of Staff, etc. would not have any say in what was to be done. That in the last war, there had been a Military Mission at Washington. People thought, in Canada, there should be a Military Mission there now, watching Canada's interests. That he would understand our political problem in that regard.

I got the Chiefs of Staff later to explain the position. He said he thought we should be entitled to have representation there, but expressed the hope that we would take a large view of the relationships of the large countries, to avoid anything in the way of antagonisms.

Canada, in fact, was being asked, in the interest of Allied unity, not to "rock the boat". It may be noted that in these discussions of December 1941 there was no mention of the Combined Chiefs of staff; as we have seen (above, page 161) that body had not yet been formally proposed.

On 14 January 1942 (the day on which Mr. Churchill left the United States en route home) the War Committee discussed these matters again. It was reported that the United States was still objecting to the establishment of a Canadian military mission in Washington; and that the new Chief of the General Staff (General Stuart) had proposed a joint Commonwealth staff. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Norman Robertson) commented that the government had no information whatever of the nature of the Allied "war council" that was to be set up, and added that Canadian representation only through a joint Commonwealth staff would represent a reversal of Canadian policy, since Canada had always insisted on her right to separate representation. The Committee agreed that the Canadian Minister in Washington should be instructed to inquire "as to the form of joint machinery likely to be proposed"; in the meantime, no views were to be expressed. It appears that the Minister's inquiries elicited little information (and there was obviously no intention of "proposing" anything to Canada). At a further meeting of the War Committee on 4 February Mr. Robertson spoke of the new

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\*Communications were sent to Canada in January 1942 concerning the establishment of the Munitions Assignments Board, the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the Combined Raw Materials Board;<sup>81</sup> but search in External Affairs and elsewhere has failed to uncover any telegram about the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In these circumstances the omission seems likely to have been deliberate.

combined war organizations; public announcements concerning them had been made in London on 27 January.<sup>83</sup> Canada, he said, had not been consulted about them either by London or Washington; and such information as had been received through Sir John Dill (a recent visitor to Ottawa) and other British officers, and through the Legation in Washington, had been wholly informal. The Prime Minister reported that he had himself informed Dill that, while Canada realized the practical necessity of limiting representation upon combined bodies for the efficient conduct of the war, and would not seek to complicate the situation by unreasonable requests, at the same time Canada had been in the war for more than two years and Canadians would expect that their interests would not be ignored in any of these fields. Reporting this to the War Committee, Mr. King added the observation that the present position was unsatisfactory, but that there was, at present, no useful initiative that Canada could take.

At the next meeting of the Committee, on 12 February, the Minister of National Defence (Colonel Ralston) returned to the subject. He reported that although Canada had received no invitation to be represented on the new bodies, and her government had made no representations, it was apparently being assumed in Washington that Canadian production and requirements would be dealt with by the Anglo-American allocation machinery. It was also reported that there was a proposal for a committee including Dominion representatives to sit in London and evaluate Commonwealth demands on North American production; thus a united case for the Empire might be presented in Washington, and allocations within the Empire would be made in London. The Committee agreed that a draft telegram be prepared for the approval of the Prime Minister and interested ministers, making it clear to the United Kingdom and the United States that Canada had not yet been consulted and in consequence was not included in the arrangements made for the allocation of munitions and raw materials. It appears however that no such telegram was actually sent. The apparent unwillingness of Mr. King to make a formal protest against the treatment Canada had received is only less remarkable than the treatment itself.

Australia and New Zealand, naturally desperately concerned about the Pacific situation early in 1942, asked that they should be represented on the Combined Chiefs when the strategy of their area was under discussion. This request, forwarded by Churchill, was duly turned down by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.<sup>84</sup> Canada, on the other hand, never asked formally for a seat on the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This, pretty clearly, was because informal investigation led to the conclusion that any such request was certain to be refused. Late in February 1942 the Department of External Affairs telegraphed the High Commissioner in London, with respect to the combined organizations, "The question is . . . a most complicated one from the Canadian point of view and government policy here is not yet definitely settled. Pearson has been in Washington securing information on working of Boards there and Mr. Howe goes to Washington this weekend. It is hoped that on his return some definite policy may be announced."<sup>85</sup> The Cabinet War Committee discussed the question on 11 March, and the Prime Minister reported (undoubtedly on the basis of the information obtained in Washington) that it had been said that full and formal Canadian representation could not be secured, although the right of representation, when any question that affected Canada was under consideration, could be obtained. His conclusion was that a senior Canadian service representative should be stationed in Washington to maintain close and continuous contact with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the

combined planners. The Minister of National Defence reported that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff were disinclined to agree that one officer, of one service, should represent all three services; however, the same objection would not apply if one officer were appointed to represent *the War Committee*. Mr. Pearson, who was present, now stated (doubtless as the result of his recent inquiries in Washington) that the alternative to one representative was none at all; however, if one officer was appointed he could and would send for officers of the other two services where these were involved. The War Committee accordingly agreed,

that Major-General Maurice Pope\* be appointed as the representative of the War Committee in Washington, for the purpose of maintaining continuous contact with the U.K.-U.S. Combined Staffs and the Combined Planning Committee, and to represent the War Committee before the Combined Staffs when questions affecting Canada were under consideration.

It was understood that, when matters of concern to Canada, specifically Navy or Air Force in character, were before the Combined Staff, a Naval or Air Force officer, named for the purpose, would replace General Pope.

This placed General Pope in the peculiar position of representing a political and civil authority (the War Committee) before a purely military authority (the Combined Chiefs of Staff). A few weeks later, however, the long difficulty with the United States over the establishment of a Canadian mission in Washington (dealt with in detail below, pages 354-7) was resolved, and General Pope became Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff there. In such circumstances (the War Committee was told on 4 June) the Canadian Chiefs of Staff considered it satisfactory for Pope to act as their representative with the Combined Chiefs of Staff, on the understanding that his air and naval colleagues would be associated with him when matters affecting their services were under consideration. By July the Joint Staff was functioning in Washington, and its first report, dated 30 July, which is printed below as Appendix "E", serves to indicate what the state of Canadian representation before the Combined Chiefs of Staff was in practice at that period.

From it and other sources it is apparent that although the Combined Chiefs were willing to allow "a Canadian representative (and in certain circumstances, representatives)" to appear before them when a question having a direct bearing on Canadian affairs was being discussed, such occasions hardly ever arose. In point of fact, search of the diaries of General Pope and his successor in Washington, General Letson, yields only one concrete case of a Canadian representative appearing before the Combined Chiefs in formal session, This was very early, on 16 June 1942, when there was some discussion of the North Atlantic Ferry Route (General Marshall stating that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff desired to postpone consideration of it until a modified plan had been worked out).<sup>87</sup> It seems possible that General Pope was invited on this occasion as a courteous gesture to him and to his country following the decision to recognize a Canadian Joint Staff. That the invitation was never repeated is not perhaps particularly important. The Canadian representatives performed their task mainly through contact with the Combined Chiefs' subordinate committees (where in fact the great bulk of the Combined Chiefs' actual work was done) ; and their most constant activity was using the facilities available to them to collect information for their superiors in Ottawa.

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\*General Pope had been serving as Vice Chief of the General Staff in Ottawa, and Canadian Army member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. It seems evident that his new appointment had in fact been decided upon some time before the War committee approved it, for his tenure as V.C.G.S. ended officially on 14 February, and he actually arrived in Washington on 6 March, five days before the Committee acted.<sup>86</sup>

For these facilities they were indebted mainly to the British Joint Staff Mission. That organization had made what might be called an attempt to "absorb" General Pope, on his first arrival in Washington, by offering him the then vacant appointment of Major General, General Staff, on the British Army Staff. When he declined, on the ground that it was not practicable to serve two masters,<sup>88</sup> the British Joint Staff Mission nevertheless continued to assist the Canadians in many ways. Doubtless with United States concurrence, it made many documents available for perusal, in the manner described in Appendix "E". Beginning in June 1943 Sir John Dill instituted a weekly off-the-record exchange of information with Dominion representatives. In the beginning the status of these talks was not made fully clear, and on 17 June 1943, after General Pope had actually forwarded to Ottawa a report on the first of them, he was told by Brigadier Redman of the British Army Staff that the Field Marshal would be able to give the Dominion Missions very little unless it was understood that no reports could be sent. If reports were sent, they would have to be "screened" through Redman. Pope replied that he would cheerfully give an assurance, for the future, that no reports would be forwarded, though he pointed out that since his function was to keep the Canadian Chiefs of Staff informed of events the meetings would have little value for him in these circumstances. "I added", Pope wrote in his diary, "however all this might be, I would be damned if I would screen any of my reports through him. He seemed a little taken aback by my remark. . . ." Not until 1945 was permission obtained to report these talks by personal letter to individual Chiefs. of-Staff in Ottawa.<sup>89</sup>

It is clear that the Canadian Joint Staff had closer contact with the British Joint Staff Mission than with the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both the United Kingdom and the United States would have been glad to see the whole Commonwealth war effort coordinated in London,\* and to establish and maintain anything like an independent position for Canada in Washington required some degree of constant struggle. However, the Canadian Joint Staff had the duty of representing the Canadian Chiefs of Staff with the U.S. Joint Chiefs as well as with the Combined Chiefs,<sup>91</sup> and there was considerable business to be done with respect to the defence of North America. In August 1942 the Joint Chiefs designated their Joint Staff Planners, their Joint Intelligence Committee, and the Army and Navy Bureaus of Public Relations to maintain liaison with the Canadian Joint Staff in such matters.<sup>92</sup>

As already noted, most of the work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington was done in subordinate committees. These should be listed:<sup>93</sup>

- Combined Staff Planners
- Combined Administrative Committee
- Combined Intelligence Committee
- Combined Military Transportation committee
- Combined Communications Board
- Combined Meteorological Committee
- Combined Shipbuilding Committee (Standardization of Design)
- Combined Civil Affairs Committee
- Combined Secretariat
- Munitions Assignment Board.

\*Mr. Hume Wrong of the Canadian Legation reported on 27 January 1942 a conversation with Sir John Dill in which the latter stated "that a tentative decision had been reached (apparently between Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt) (sic) that the war effort of the Commonwealth should be coordinated in London".<sup>90</sup>

Canada (and Australia and New Zealand) were represented on the Combined Communications Board. The Combined Meteorological Committee's Commonwealth membership comprised the members of an "informal" Commonwealth Joint Meteorological Committee, on which the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were represented. On the Combined Shipbuilding Committee (Standardization of Design) Canada was the only Dominion represented. It should be noted that on this Committee there were six US. Members while British and Canadian members together also totalled six. Similarly on the Combined Communications Board there were six U.S. members, and six from the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand together. It appears that the United States, in effect, was prepared to concur in the United Kingdom allowing some of its places on these committees to be filled by Dominion representatives, but not to accept these representatives as additional members. Thus it can scarcely be said that Canada possessed independent representation. The Canadian Joint Staff raised the question with Ottawa, but it was never fought out.<sup>94</sup> Liaison was maintained as required with the other committees on which Canada was not represented.

Of the other combined organizations, the most important, as noted above, was the Munitions Assignments Board, which was responsible to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The Canadian government made a determined but unsuccessful effort to obtain membership in this Board.

This effort was based on Canada's wartime importance as a munitions producer. It may be noted that Canada in this respect stood third among the Western Allies. She was, it is true, far behind the United States and the United Kingdom — her production of small arms and other infantry weapons, for instance, was only 5 per cent of the grand total for the three countries, as compared with Britain's 33 1/3 per cent and the United States' 61 2/3 per cent, although in the field of motor vehicle production, where Canada scored her greatest triumph, she produced 20 per cent of the three countries' total.<sup>95</sup> On the other hand, she was far ahead of her other competitors, the value of her total wartime munitions production being estimated as nearly five times as great as that of Australia, India, South Africa and New Zealand combined — \$7,971 million against \$1,614 million.<sup>96</sup> Of all the munitions produced for the Commonwealth countries, the United Kingdom produced by value 69.5 per cent, the United States 17.3 per cent and Canada 7.9 per cent.<sup>97</sup>

Although this situation was not as clear early in 1942 as it became later — the peak of Canadian production, as we have seen, came in 1943 — the Canadian government felt that it had a strong claim to membership in the Munitions Assignment Board. This feeling, we have already noted, was active in the War Committee from the time of the "Arcadia" Conference; and we have remarked the British suggestion that Canada participate in the work of the London committee of the Board. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff considered that Canada's problems could only be satisfactorily met by full membership in the Assignment Boards in both Washington and London.<sup>98</sup> The matter was discussed by the War Committee on 11 and 18 March 1942, and on the latter date it was agreed that a message should be sent to the United Kingdom recommending the desirability of Canada participating in pooling arrangements on finished munitions in Washington rather than in London, and informing the British government that Canada proposed to communicate with the United States suggesting that Canada be represented on the

Washington Munitions Assignment Board, but that it would like to have the United Kingdom's views before taking this action. London's reply disagreed with the Canadian suggestions, but on 8 April the War Committee authorized a further communication to the British government reaffirming the opinion that Canadian production should be "tabled" in Washington rather than in London, except for requirements from North American production for the Canadian forces overseas.\*

A week later Mr. King visited President Roosevelt in Washington and took the opportunity of raising the question with him personally. He wrote subsequently in his diary,<sup>100</sup>

The President said that he agreed with my point of view that Britain and the U.S. and Canada were the big producers. That the other people were always asking and receiving, and that Canada ought to be represented on a Board which would have Britain and the U.S. on it. He said Harry Hopkins [Chairman of the Washington Munitions Assignment Board] would be here next week, and that he would tell him that matters should be arranged in this way.

On 22 April the British government agreed to support the Canadian request for membership in the Washington Board, making however certain reservations: Canadian requirements in the North American area from British production would have to be tabled in London as part of the bulk bid from Washington, and the requirements of the R.C.A.F. overseas, which operationally was an integral part of the R.A.F., would have to be handled by the British Air Ministry.<sup>101</sup> Mr. King reported these developments to the War Committee on 29 April.

The Canadians, accustomed to the relative simplicity of British governmental organization, assumed that the successful appeal to the highest visible political authority in the United States had settled the matter. It was in fact very far from settled. A formal request for representation on the M.A.B. was made through the State Department in Washington on 13 May,<sup>102</sup> but on 4 June the War Committee was told that there had been no reply; the matter was being discussed between the Canadian Minister in Washington and Hopkins. Five days later the establishment of the Combined Production and Resources Board and the Combined Food Board was announced in Washington, both on a purely Anglo-American basis. This was discussed in the Cabinet War Committee on 11 June; the point was made by one minister that it was unsound to accept exclusion silently; and it was agreed to suggest to the U.S. Government that a Canadian representative be added to the Combined Food Board. But on 24 June the Committee was told that the request for membership on the Munitions Assignment Board was still before Hopkins; and it had been decided (one must assume, by the Prime Minister) not to make in the meantime any request for representation on other organizations such as the Food Board. At this time Mr. King was on his way to Washington, having been invited by the President to attend a meeting of the Pacific War Council at which Mr. Churchill, who was then in the United States, would also be present. On his return to Ottawa King told the War Committee (26 June) that Harry Hopkins had written the Canadian Minister discouraging the suggestion of membership in the M.A.B. He suggested that it would be enough if Canadian representatives had an oppor-

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\*The Canadian action was not taken without much consideration. On 10 March 1942 Brig.-Gen. Henry S. Aurand, Chairman of the Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground) in Washington, told Colonel W. Mavor, who was dealing with him on behalf of Canada, that he believed Canada could obtain membership on the Munitions Assignments Board; and Canadians drew the inaccurate conclusion that this represented the views of higher U.S. authorities. Both the Canadian Minister in Washington and the High Commissioner in London recommended that Canadian production be pooled in Washington<sup>99</sup>

tunity to present their needs and their views to the Board, its staff and its committees. Actual membership would lead to "many difficulties" — he indicated the usual argument that other countries would want the same privilege — and he suggested that it was more important for Canada to be properly related to the Combined Production and Resources Board.<sup>103</sup> King had spoken with Hopkins on 25 June. The comment in his diary is sour:<sup>104</sup>

After luncheon I had a word with Hopkins about Canada being given representation on the Assignment Board. He said he had written McCarthy [the Canadian Minister] about this, but his letter clearly showed he had not understood our position or wanted to understand it. He took it as related to Canada's needs instead of to her rights as a producer. The United States and Great Britain wish to keep all assignment work in their own hands. In other words, they get entire credit for distribution of many supplies which we produce.

On 1 July the War Committee decided to persist in the campaign to obtain membership; the Minister was instructed to see Hopkins, and if necessary Mr. Cordell Hull, Mr. Sumner Welles or even the President. He was told,<sup>105</sup>

In general we feel that the trend of Hopkins' argument reduces Canada to a position of undue subordination in a vital aspect of the organization of the war effort. Does he realize that in effect he is asking Canada to make available for assignment in Washington her entire production of Munitions (including those needed for our own forces overseas, for home defence and for training) without giving Canada any voice in their disposition beyond the promise of a full opportunity for Canadian representatives to present to the Board "their needs and their views"? It seems to us that if there is to be bona fide pooling the Governments which pool in any volume must, in order to discharge their own responsibilities towards their own forces and for their own defence, have a direct voice in the disposition of the pool. This principle applies with special force to a country which, on balance, is a substantial producer of munitions for the use of others among the United Nations.

The implied suggestion that Canada should apply for membership on the Combined Production and Resources Board instead was not embraced, though the Canadian government reserved its position on this. Hopkins remained unmoved; but Lieut.-General Sir Gordon Macready, head of the British Army Staff in Washington (whose advice was believed to have been instrumental in bringing the British government round to accepting the Canadian position) now suggested a compromise. Major-General James H. Burns, Executive Officer of the Munitions Assignments Board, discussed it with General Pope, who made various suggestions,<sup>106</sup> and on 8 August Burns made a formal offer in a letter to Pope.<sup>107</sup>

I have been directed by Mr. Hopkins, the Chairman of the Munitions Assignments Board\* to offer Canada membership on the Munitions Assignments Board and the corresponding Assignments Committees when Canadian production and Canadian North American requirements are under discussion, provided Canada agrees to the following proposals:

- (1) All Canadian production of finished military stores would be tabled in Washington along with United States production.
- (2) Canadian bids from this total North American production, to be used for Canadian forces in the North American Area, would be made in Washington.
- (3) That part of Canada's requirements for her naval, military and air forces overseas, which is to be met from North American production, would be included in a bulk bid made on the Washington Board from the London Board. This bulk bid would cover the requirements of all of the members of the British Group of Nations. In other words, while all Canadian production would be pooled in Washington, Canada's requirements would be met partly through the Washington Board and partly through the London Board.

\*There was a difference between British and United States designations. The London body was termed the London Munitions Assignment Board; the Washington one, the Combined Munitions Assignments Board or merely the Munitions Assignments Board.

In Ottawa this offer led to a long debate, for opinion was divided. The first discussion in the War Committee, on 19 August, was inconclusive. On 26 August the offer was again discussed and referred to the Ministers of National Defence and Munitions and Supply for further consideration. On 2 September it was agreed that (a) Canada should seek to obtain full membership on the Production and Resources Board; (b) Ralston and Howe should confer further on the Munitions Assignments Board; (c) Canada should not be represented on a Commonwealth Supply Council which was proposed;\* and (d) the United Kingdom should be informed that proposals made for Canadian association with the Food Board and with UNRRA were not satisfactory to the government. On 4 September Ralston reported that after his discussion with Howe the conclusion was that the Bums offer should not be accepted; but again there was no decision.

On 16 September the Prime Minister reported to the War Committee the results of discussions that day between members of the Cabinet (King, Ralston, Ilsley, Howe and Gardiner) on one side and on the other Sir Robert Sinclair (Mr. Oliver Lyttelton's Washington representative on the Combined Production and Resources Board), † Mr. R. H. Brand (head of the British Food Mission and British chairman of the Combined Food Board), and the United Kingdom High Commissioner. Mr. King said that the principal conclusions were, *first*, that a Canadian member should be added to the Production and Resources Board on the ground that this was necessary to ensure the integration of North American and United Kingdom production; Sinclair had reported that the British and U.S. governments would be agreeable to this "if questions regarding the Canadian relationship to the other Boards were satisfactorily settled". *Secondly*, it was recommended that the Bums proposal concerning the Munitions Assignments Board should not be accepted. It did not satisfactorily meet the Canadian position; on the other hand, informal arrangements for allocating Canadian production were working reasonably well and in fact resulted in the effective pooling of Canadian production. *Thirdly*, with respect to the Food Board, and in view particularly of the fact that procurement for the United Kingdom and other countries was not directly a function of the Board, it had been agreed that Canada might accept its present constitution (i.e., as an Anglo-American body) and appoint members to those committees of the Board in which Canada was interested; this on the condition that a public statement be issued to the effect that there would be no change in the procedure for direct procurement of foodstuffs from Canada by the United Kingdom and that Britain would continue to give preference to Canada where Canadian supplies were available.

The War Committee approved these recommendations, which included provision for General Burns being informed that his proposal was not accepted. Nevertheless, on 7 October the Committee was told that action had not yet been taken; the Chiefs of the Naval and Air Staffs both felt that the Bums proposal

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\*The Commonwealth Supply Council was set up in London late in 1942 to coordinate the supply requirements of Commonwealth countries apart from Canada. It is worthwhile here to refer also to the establishment in Washington in 1942 of "the Chairman's Commonwealth Committee" (the "Chairman" was the Chairman of the British Supply Council there, who was the British Resident Minister for Supply). It was replaced in June 1943 by the Principal Commonwealth Supply Committee, on which a representative of the Washington office of the Canadian Department of Munitions and Supply sat as an observer. The Minister of Munitions and Supply, Mr. C. D. Howe, sat on the British Supply Council itself, the only member from outside the United Kingdom.<sup>108</sup> See Part VIII, below.

†Mr. Lyttelton, the British Minister of Production, and Mr. Donald Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board in the U.S., were joint Chairmen of the C.P.R.B.

should be accepted, at least one Minister spoke for it, and in the absence of Ralston and Howe decision was once more deferred. There was further discussion on 21 October. On 28 October the War Committee discussed the Munitions Assignments Board for the last time, without any final action being recorded. In practice, it may be said, the decision of 16 September stood; the only part of it not actually carried out was the courtesy of notice to General Burns. General Pope records ruefully,<sup>109</sup> "no reply was ever made to General Burns' letter. Nor, I regret to say, was it ever acknowledged. . . . Thus a unique opportunity to enhance our national prestige was allowed to pass." It is obvious that there might have been considerable advantages in even partial membership of the Munitions Assignments Board.

The treatment of the Burns proposal was certainly influenced by internal jealousies within the Canadian government: specifically, between the Departments of National Defence and Munitions and Supply. General Pope attributes it to the unwillingness of the civilian Department of Munitions and Supply (which had enjoyed from the early days of the war a monopoly of the business of Canadian military procurement in Washington) to see this business transferred to military officers. This would inevitably have happened had Canada participated directly in the work of the Munitions Assignments Board, for the U.S. officers would have been willing to deal, in such matters, only with "persons holding military rank".<sup>110</sup> There is on file a sharp memorandum from Mr. Howe to Mr. Ralston<sup>111</sup> taking strong exception to a proposition advanced by the latter, that "the Departments that should give direction regarding allocation of Canadian production are the three Service Departments". "I must point out", Howe writes, "that if allocation of production is taken out of the hands of this Department, then all our munitions programme becomes impossible, as Canadian orders represent only a very small fraction of production now in hand. All-out production is not possible unless large and continuing orders for equipment can be obtained. . . . I cannot see what possible interest the three Services can have in the allocation of Canadian production ordered direct by the British Government, the U.S. Government, or, in fact, any Allied Government. . . . I suggest that any request for re-allocation be by a memo from yourself to myself, rather than by direct negotiation with our customers in the United States or in Great Britain." Mr. Howe, it is evident, did not believe in the principle of allocation from an Allied pool on the basis of strategic need; he desired to retain something more like the peacetime customer-supplier relationship, the basis on which he and his department had built up an enormous production effort. The Under Secretary of State for External Affairs wrote later, with respect to the Munitions Assignment Board, "We . . . came within range of reaching what might have been a satisfactory relationship to it. Differences of views between our own Ministers prevented this relationship from ever being formalized."<sup>112</sup>

It is interesting to note that on 26 May 1942 Mr. King recorded in his diary<sup>113</sup> that he had told the Governor General (Lord Athlone), "When we wanted to get a thing done, we did it through the Americans. We had had, for example, with the Munitions Board, more trouble with the British than with the Americans. . . ." The recorded facts scarcely justify this statement. The British government, after its initial demur, was quite prepared to support the Canadian position; and all available information suggests that what prevented Canada from obtaining full membership on the Board was the personal opposition of Harry Hopkins. It is worth noting that in the end Canada in effect accepted the original proposition made by Hopkins abandoning the application for membership on the Munitions Assignments Board in return for membership on the Combined Production and

Resources Board. What King seems to have remembered was Roosevelt's easy acceptance of his request, which in the sequel meant nothing. At the time of his conversation with the Governor General the Prime Minister had not yet encountered the unyielding attitude of Hopkins.

It remains to say something of those "informal arrangements for allocating Canadian production" which were referred to on 16 September. As a result of the failure to achieve membership in the M.A.B., Canadian production was never formally pooled, but what was done came to much the same thing.

Late in 1941 enough difficulty was occurring over the allocation of the growing Canadian output of munitions to make some special arrangements necessary, and Mr. Howe and Colonel Ralston agreed to set up an *ad hoc* committee to allocate current production between orders placed by the Canadian and British governments and by War Supplies Limited.\* This committee, comprising the Canadian Master General of the Ordnance (Mr. Victor Sifton) and representatives of the Department of Munitions and Supply and the British Army Staff, Washington, held its first meeting in January 1942. In the following July it was turned into a permanent committee, and in October it was designated Canadian Munitions Assignments Committee (Army), since it dealt with "controlled stores" for the Army and those common to the other services. From the autumn of 1942 a U.S. Army officer from the Services of Supply in Washington was a voting member of the Committee. By July 1943 the Committee consisted of Mr. H. J. Carmichael (Chairman of the Production Board, Department of Munitions and Supply) as Chairman, and representatives from the three Canadian armed forces, the British Army Staff, Washington, and the U.S. War Department. Representatives of other authorities attended individual meetings as required. Subsequently a representative of the Canadian Mutual Aid Board (set up in the spring of 1943 to administer the Mutual Aid programme by which Canada was now to finance British and Allied purchases in the Dominion) was added to the Committee. The presence of the British and American military representatives ensured coordination with the Board in Washington and London, with which moreover the secretary of the Canadian Committee maintained contact.<sup>114</sup>

The final working of the system of allocation cannot be examined here in all its detail; but it may be noted that in the summer of 1943 a (Canadian) Washington Advisory Committee was set up to advise the Mutual Aid Board on allocations, and that in the following August a Canadian-American Joint War Aid Committee was established to advise on coordination of allocations under Canadian Mutual Aid and U.S. Lend-Lease. Although complete formal machinery for the allocation of Canadian production in accordance with strategic needs was never set up, and there were occasional complaints that Canadian aid was not being distributed on this principle, in practice close informal contact between the Washington Advisory Committee and the British Army Staff ensured general conformity with strategic allocation as interpreted by the Munitions Assignments Board.<sup>115</sup> Possible conflicts between Canada's own needs and those of countries receiving mutual aid were dealt with by a system established in practice by the spring of 1944, under which the appropriate Canadian Chief of Staff signed a certificate of "strategic, need" for the placing of orders from British Empire countries; those from others required a

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\*War Supplies Limited was a Crown company incorporated on 13 May 1941 (the month after the Hyde Park Agreement) to negotiate and receive orders from departments of the United States government for war supplies to be manufactured in Canada.

recommendation to the Mutual Aid Board from the Joint War Aid Committee. Final deliveries to non-Empire countries were subject to advice by the Joint War Aid Committee and the British Joint Staff Mission, Washington; Empire countries' stores required release by the appropriate Chief of Staff and the Canadian Munitions Assignments Committee (Army).<sup>116</sup>

Some note should be taken of the practical relationship of Canada and the Canadian forces to the Munitions Assignments Boards in Washington and London.

Like the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Assignments Board in Washington did most of its real work in its subordinate committees. There were Ground, Navy and Air committees, each headed by a U.S. service officer. The practical Canadian problem was to get Canadian requirements accepted by these committees. The approach was through the British representatives. These were in general extremely cooperative; and Canadian officers were in practice permitted to attend meetings of the Ground and (after an initial rebuff by the Royal Air Force representative) the Air Committee. Air Commodore S. G. Tackaberry, representing the R.C.A.F. in these matters, discovered that much could be accomplished by "lobbying" in advance of meetings to discover whether the several members would support a particular Canadian bid, (Allocations of aircraft were probably the most important and difficult item of supply with which the Canadians in Washington had to deal.) The British War Office agreed in April 1943 that the Canadian representative might argue his case in the Ground Committee, provided the British Army Staff representative had been previously informed. Tact and patience were needed, but with the passage of time the Canadian position in Washington gradually strengthened.<sup>117</sup> The Royal Canadian Navy at first saw little need for representation before the Munitions Assignments Committee (Navy), but by March 1943 this was found to be desirable, and arrangements were made accordingly.<sup>118</sup>

In London the largest problem concerned the equipment of the Canadian Army Overseas. In general, its requirements from both United Kingdom and United States production were bid for at the London Munitions Assignment Board; the bids were based on estimates prepared by a Canadian Army Requirements Committee set up at Canadian Military Headquarters, London, in May 1942, and in the following year a Canadian Army Requirements (London) section was set up in the Quartermaster-General's Branch at C.M.H.Q. to handle this matter, though the actual tabling of bids was a General Staff responsibility. Requirements from U.S. production were included in bidding cables from the London Munitions Assignment Board and handled in Washington by the British Army Staff there. (Requirements for the Canadian Army in Canada were handled from Ottawa through the Canadian Army Staff and the British Army Staff in Washington as just described.) Items designated as constituting "continuing Canadian supply" (those where the Canadian authorities insisted that their army should be equipped with material of Canadian types produced in Canada) were outside the assignments procedure and were shipped direct from Canada to the Canadian forces overseas. These included almost all "B" ("soft-skinned") vehicles, as well as such "A" (armoured) vehicles as were made in Canada. The only other really large item of continuing Canadian supply was clothing. Since in general the Canadian Army's armament and equipment were of British type, it usually mattered little whether it came from Canadian or British factories, and it was sometimes most efficient to equip the Canadian forces overseas from United Kingdom sources and to ship Canadian-produced equipment to other theatres.

Canada was not, of course, a member of the London Munitions Assignment

Board. But Canadian Army staff officers attended meetings of the L.M.A.B.'s Army Assignment Sub-Committee, and of other committees dealing with special categories of army equipment. The other Canadian services had little to do with the Board. Since R.C.A.F. units overseas were operationally integrated into the Royal Air Force, the British Air Ministry took responsibility for their equipment, in addition to providing its share of aircraft and equipment for the Combined Training Establishment in Canada. R.C.A.F. representatives found it unnecessary to attend meetings of the Air Assignment Sub-Committee after June 1942. And the British Admiralty was kept informed of Canadian naval supply requirements and handled them along with its own.<sup>119</sup>

How well, in general, it may be asked, did the Assignments system work?

An adequate answer would require a much more complete examination of the question than has been possible here; but our brief survey leaves the impression that the system functioned moderately well. The United States, being by far the greatest producer, was in the driver's seat. The head of the Requirements Section of the Canadian Army Staff wrote at the end of the war,<sup>120</sup>

Basically, the British took the stand that all equipment should be allocated strictly in accordance with strategic necessity while many of the Americans considered themselves to be at the council table for the prime purpose of protecting the interests of the U.S. Forces. The latter view was voiced in no uncertain terms by the OPD [Operations Division, War Department General Staff representative at a memorable meeting of the Munitions Assignment Committee (Ground) when he shouted "We don't assign U.S. production to the United States Army; we take what we need and place the rest on the assignment table".

A volume of the U.S. Army's official history expresses the view that General Aurand (who left the Munitions Assignments Board for the new Combined Production and Resources Board in July 1942)\* was "the ablest defender of the lend-lease principle within the War Department". He was succeeded as chairman of the Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground), by Brig.-Gen. Lucius D. Clay. Clay and his chief, Lieut.-General Brehon. B. Somervell, Chief of the Services of Supply (later renamed Army Service Forces), took, according to the US. historians, a rather different line from Aurand: "their experience and orientation was towards supplying the U.S. Army first, and they tended to subordinate lend-lease to this end. They preferred direct action within the confines of the SOS staff to the involved deliberation of combined committees. In sum, the new management adopted a more national outlook, aimed at preventing foreign raids on the U.S. supply pool."<sup>122</sup>

So far as Canada was concerned, for all the disabilities and difficulties we, have described, the system seems to have worked in practice without producing serious practical disadvantages to the Canadian forces or Canadian interests. In spite of Canada's failure to gain membership on the Munitions Assignments Board, her considerable productive capacity certainly gave some strength to her position in negotiating with the greater powers. Moreover, the fact that Canadian fighting forces in all three services were so closely integrated with those of the United Kingdom gave one member of the controlling "Big Two" a degree of interest in ensuring that Canadian forces in operational theatres were adequately equipped. And under the arrangements that have been outlined the Canadian authorities were in a position, within their narrower limits, to follow the same "national" policy as

\*His career there was brief. He was promoted and transferred in August after the C.P.R.B., on his recommendation, adopted a proposal which allocated a quantity of armour-piercing shot steel to Britain at the expense of a temporary cut in the U.S. Army programme.<sup>121</sup>

the United States and ensure that Canadian ground forces, at least, were adequately equipped with such items as were made in Canada before stocks of these items were released to other countries of the alliance.

We have briefly mentioned the four civilian "Combined Boards" and the fact that Canada achieved membership in two of them. A further word must now be said about these. *The Combined Raw Materials Board* had the task of planning "the best and speediest development, expansion, and use of the raw material resources, under the jurisdiction or control of the two governments, and make the recommendations necessary to execute such plans."<sup>123</sup> In the opinion of British official writers, it was "perhaps the most successful of the Combined Boards".<sup>124</sup> The historian of the Boards states that the Canadian viewpoint was presented to the C.R.M.B. "by the American member of the Combined Raw Materials Boards, who held a similar position on the United States-Canadian Materials Coordinating Committee".<sup>125</sup> The Cabinet War Committee was told on 29 July 1942 that the procedure was for the Canadian members of the Joint Materials Co-ordinating Committee\* to meet with the members of the C.R.M.B. to deal with questions affecting Canada. In practice, as time passed, it appears that the U.S. member of the C.R.M.B. acted as liaison officer on behalf of Canada, explaining Canada's views to the Board and *vice versa*.<sup>126</sup> *The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board* was set up, in the words of the announcement of its creation, "to adjust and concert in one harmonious policy the work of the British Ministry of War Transport and the shipping authorities of the United States Government". It was not a powerful body, and in practice there was no real pooling of shipping resources. The Board facilitated negotiation and exchange of information, but beyond this its role was limited, and after a serious difference of opinion between the British and American members early in 1943 it was virtually inoperative.<sup>127</sup>

The two Boards on which Canada achieved membership require slightly more extended notice. Of these, by far the more important for the purposes of this study is *The Combined Production and Resources Board*.

This Board was organized mainly on British initiative. The joint statement issued by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt when it was set up in June 1942 defined its task as to "Combine the production programs of the United States and the United Kingdom into a single integrated program, adjusted to the strategic requirements of the war, as indicated to the Board by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and to all relevant production Factors."<sup>128</sup> Hopeful people thought of it as a sort of "Combined Chiefs of Staff for Production".<sup>129</sup> It never became any such thing. At the very outset of its career a blow was struck at it which was probably fatal to the possibility of its becoming the powerful body which it was apparently planned to be, in the removal of General Aurand (above, page 174). It thus lost its Director of Staff, who was both a believer in lend-lease and the "common pool" principle and an unusually energetic administrator; and in spite of urging from the British side the American member (Donald M. Nelson, Chairman of the War Production Board) did not appoint a successor for seven months.<sup>130</sup> Presumably the departure of Aurand was ordered by his military superior, General Somervell; and it may perhaps be relevant that Somervell was close to Harry Hopkins, the President's confidant, in whose sphere the Combined Boards were generally supposed to lie.

\*Set up in May 1941 to ensure the best possible use of the resources of Canada and the United States.

The Boards' unofficial American historian, Dr. Rosen, finds Hopkins an enigma, and remarks that there was "serious doubt as to whether he desired to make of the combined boards anything more than spot-adjustment agencies".<sup>131</sup> It is at least possible that when Hopkins in June 1942 suggested that it was more important for Canada to be properly related to the Combined Production and Resources Board than to be a member of the Munitions Assignments Board, he had his tongue in his cheek and had neither the expectation nor the intention that the C.P.R.B. should become important. One must add that investigators who have studied the subject seem unanimous that the Board never succeeded in establishing satisfactory relations with the U.S. military authorities and was unable to obtain vital information from them.<sup>132</sup>

In all the circumstances, it is hardly worth while to explore at length the relationship of Canada to the Combined Production and Resources Board. She became a member of it on 7 November 1942. At the meeting of the Cabinet War Committee on 28 October, it was agreed "that it be pointed out to the United Kingdom and the United States that, since Canada was not represented on the Combined Chiefs of Staff or on the Munitions Assignment Board, it should be understood that membership on the Combined Production and Resources Board would not prejudice Canada's primary responsibility to utilize Canadian production to meet the needs of her own forces". However, the following day, this decision was revoked, and the Committee agreed to membership "without the addition of any express reservation". It is quite possible that Britain and the United States would have objected to such a reservation being made explicit; whereas in practice Canada looked after the interests of her own forces in much the manner indicated, but without proclaiming the principle publicly.

Mr. C. D. Howe, the Minister of Munitions and Supply, was the Canadian member of the Board; his permanent Deputy in Washington was Mr. E. P. Taylor. Mr. Taylor's contemporary dissatisfaction with the Board's failure to get full information from the military authorities, and with the "loose organizational arrangements" on the American side of the Board, is on record.<sup>133</sup>

The *Combined Food Board* is somewhat less relevant to this study, but the manner in which Canada became a member of it is not without interest. We have seen the War Committee (above, pages 168, 170) deciding as early as 11 June 1942 to ask for membership in this Board, though as a matter of tactics the request was not made at once. On 15 July Mr. King told the Committee that it had now gone forward through the Minister in Washington and the High Commissioner in London. It was not immediately successful. On 29 July the Committee was told that Mr. R. H. Brand, the British member of the Board and Chairman at the time of the British Supply Council in the United States, saw "difficulties" in the way of full membership, but had suggested that Canada might participate through a joint Canadian-American agricultural policy committee. The Committee agreed that this would be unsatisfactory. However, on 16 September, as we have already seen (above, page 170) the Committee accepted the existing constitution of the Board. There the situation rested until 10 February 1943, when the War Committee was told that the Food Board was assuming functions beyond those described in September, and agreed that the request for membership should be revived. This decision was reaffirmed on 7 April. However, progress was slow. The whole constitution of the Food Board was under consideration in Washington.

The precise connection (if any) with the pressure Canada was exerting is not clear, but in August 1943 the United States' War Food Administrator, Marvin

Jones, suggested to the Secretary of State that membership in the Board be extended; and Mr. Hull then recommended to the President that in view of the contribution to food supplies being made by Canada, Australia and New Zealand, it would be appropriate to invite them to join the Board. With President Roosevelt's approval, this proposition was placed before the British government. London, however, while assenting to the inclusion of Canada, preferred to have Australia and New Zealand participate in the London Food Council. The following draft message to Mr. King was then submitted by Washington to London:

Canada's contribution to war effort is source of admiration to us all. The strength which Canadian effort in whole field of production has contributed to U.N. is already reflected in Canada's participation as member of Com. Prod. and Res. Bd. The importance of Canada as supplier of food makes it desirable that she participate fully with U. Kingdom and U.S. in consultations and decisions which are made in this vital field as well. Mr. Churchill and I would accordingly be gratified if you would name a representative to Comb. Food Bd.

Mr. Churchill however proposed a different and slightly shorter form:

Canada's contribution to war effort in whole field of production and strength which she has thus lent to cause of U.N. is source of admiration to us all. The importance of Canadian food supplies and close interconnection of all North American food problems makes it appropriate and desirable that she should be directly represented as member of Comb. Food Bd. sitting Wash. Mr. Churchill and I would accordingly be gratified if you would name representative to *Combined Fd. Board*.

The U.S. Assistant Secretary of State (A. A. Berle, Jr.) commented to the President that Churchill's reference to "close interconnection" seemed somewhat beside the point but that it was probably related to the susceptibilities of Australia and New Zealand, who were not being invited to join. Berle wrote, "Churchill's redraft submitted by the Empire people cuts down recognition of Canada's right to be consulted. We do not agree; but it is not worth a fuss." The President approved the new draft on 25 October.<sup>134</sup> The Canadian government had already heard that the invitation was coming; for on 21 October the Cabinet War Committee had agreed that the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Gardiner, should be the Canadian Member of the Combined Food Board. On 27 October the Prime Minister told the Com mittee that an invitation to join the Board had been received from Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt and had been accepted.

It would probably be a mistake to attach too much importance to the wording of the two drafts, and it is doubtful whether the Churchill revision did in practice reduce the recognition of "Canada's right to be consulted". But the incident at least illustrates the difficulties to which the great powers felt themselves exposed in dealing with Canadian requests for higher status in relation to the direction of the war. The British government always found it difficult to concede anything to Canada which was not conceded to the other Dominions too. The United States was always conscious, not only of the other Dominions, but still more of the South American republics. Canada's population and wealth were materially larger than those of any other Dominion, and as time passed her general war effort was larger in proportion, as we have seen in the case of munitions production (above, page 167). And her effort was incomparably greater than that of any of the Latin American countries which gradually followed the United States' example in declaring war on Germany. Nevertheless, she found it difficult to obtain recognition in competition with these other nations.

Membership in two of the civilian Combined Boards was the most Canada achieved in this respect. No one was in any doubt about the fact that — as E. P.

Taylor said at the time — she was a "junior partner" in these two organizations.<sup>135</sup> Nevertheless, it was something to be admitted to even junior partnership with the Big Two, the more so as no other "middle power" was so honoured. In spite of Mr. Berle's remarks, in the case of the Food Board Canada had the British government to thank for this distinction. Mr. King's government was certainly grateful for this contribution, such as it was, to Canadian prestige; and it must be said that it was mainly prestige that was involved, for there is no evidence of any great material advantage.

Finally, one must, by way of maintaining proportion, observe that — as has already indeed been indicated — the Combined Boards were really not extremely important bodies. As Dr. Rosen notes, many Americans were inclined to regard them as devices invented by the British as a means of acquiring supplies from the United States, and were in consequence "suspicious as well as cautious".<sup>136</sup> This attitude militated against the Boards becoming the powerful agencies they might have been. Had they become such, Canada might have found it still harder to gain membership in them.

A word must be said about two other bodies which also might have been important but were not: the Pacific War Councils. The first of these was set up in London in February 1942; it comprised in the first place representatives of the British, Australian, New Zealand and Netherlands governments and was presided over by Mr. Churchill. China was represented later.<sup>137</sup> (The absence of any United States representative is noteworthy.) This Council sent what amounted to recommendations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington, and some attention seems to have been paid to these. The Council did not meet after August 1943.<sup>138</sup> A somewhat parallel Pacific War Council was created in Washington on 1 April 1942; this consisted of the President, Harry Hopkins, and political representatives of the United Kingdom, China, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Canada; later India and the Philippines sent representatives.<sup>139</sup> This rather peculiar dual arrangement was the outcome of a long and confused discussion which can be studied in the documents published by the New Zealand government. The Pacific Dominions saw that the Pacific war was going to be controlled from Washington, and were anxious for a voice in its direction, while still desiring effective representation in London. Mr. Churchill did not want to see the Council established in London moved to Washington, and by 17 March he had arrived at the view that there would be two Councils; the one in Washington, he wrote, "will naturally have more practical and more effective influence upon events than its reproduction in London".<sup>140</sup>

Canada was not for the moment playing much part in the Pacific war, but she was a Pacific state and the tragic episode at Hong Kong had made her more aware of it. British Columbia was alarmed and vocal. The Canadian government was therefore anxious to have some share in the Pacific machinery of direction. On 26 March 1942 the Cabinet War Committee agreed that Canada ought to be a member of the Pacific War Council wherever it sat, and that communications in this sense should at once be sent to the British and U.S. governments. No difficulty was made about this; on 1 April Mr. King reported that "the Council" was now established in Washington, and that for the present Canada would be represented on it by Mr. H. H. Wrong of the Canadian Legation.

At first neither the British nor the Canadian government had much wanted Canada to be represented on the London Council; but after the Washington one

began to function the Canadian attitude changed, and the Canadian High Commissioner was named as Canadian representative on the London Council the day after Mr. Wrong's appointment was reported to the War Committee. But it was at once clear to Mr. Massey that the Council was "a piece of make-believe", and nothing was ever done to alter this situation.<sup>141</sup>

Mr. King attended meetings of the Washington Council at least three times, on 15 April and 25 June 1942 and 20 May 1943. All these visits were by special invitation and the last two took place while Mr. Churchill also was in Washington. Meetings of the Council thus at least served the purpose of providing occasions for contact between the Canadian Prime Minister and the British and American leaders. And the April 1942 meeting gave King an opportunity of saying what must be considered a useful word of warning on the dangers of a premature attempt at invading German-held Europe.<sup>142</sup> But in general the meetings of this Pacific War Council in Washington, which the Australian government had hoped would be "a Council of action for the higher direction of the war in the Pacific",<sup>143</sup> turned out to be something much weaker.\* The U.S. Chiefs of Staff brought this about by the simple expedient of not attending it. That acute observer of the Washington scene, General Pope, wrote in retrospect, "The military in Washington just do not recognize civilians, and particularly politicians. Consequently, if their Commander in Chief desired political advice, that was his business and not theirs, and they would have no part in it. As a result, the Pacific Council from the very outset degenerated into a sort of fireside chat in the President's study at the White House."<sup>144</sup> The difference in the British approach is reflected in the fact that the overworked Chiefs of Staff in London had to find time to attend meetings of the Pacific War Council there.<sup>145</sup>

Was there a "philosophy" behind Canadian policy in these days of 1942 when the Allied organization for the direction of the war was being hammered out? There is little sign of it, and this is not surprising. The problems were unprecedented and the approach had to be pragmatic. King and his colleagues were feeling their way, "playing it by ear" and getting what they could for their country. But as time passed a coherent idea began to emerge: the "theory of functional representation". General Pope seems to suggest<sup>146</sup> that this theory originated with Mr. Hume Wrong (above, page 178). It was clearly enunciated by Mr. King in a statement on the country's external policies made in the House of Commons on 9 July 1943. He was speaking specifically of the problem of post-war international organization, but the relation to the Canadian experience with Allied war organization is clear enough :

Representation should be determined on a functional basis which will admit to full membership those countries, large or small, which have the greatest contribution to make to the particular object in question. In the world there are over sixty sovereign states. If they all have a nominally equal voice in international decisions, no effective decisions are likely to be taken. Some compromise must be found between the theoretical equality of states and the practical necessity of limiting representation on international bodies to a workable number. That compromise can be discovered, especially in economic matters, by the adoption of the functional principle of representation.

This was both ingenious and well founded in common sense, an excellent theoretical answer to the problems of a middle power. But the Canadian attempt

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\*It is significant, and amusing, that there appears to be no mention of the Pacific War Councils in Louis Morton's volume *Strategy and Command: The First Two Years* in the "War in the Pacific" series of the United States Army's official history.

to put the principle into practice in wartime yielded only modest dividends. Canada was doubtless wise not to seek membership in the Combined Chiefs of Staff if she had been able to place in the field ten divisions instead of five, while at the same time maintaining her naval and air contributions, she would probably not have been welcomed at that board, but she might have fought her way in. There is no argument like big battalions. As it was, it was largely hopeless. On the other hand, as the third producer of munitions among the Western Allies, she had a fairly good case for membership in the Munitions Assignments Board, and yet did not achieve it. The senior partners, taking credit for generosity, admitted her to two of the relatively unimportant Combined Boards. The reluctance to give her a place on the Munitions Assignments Board, a really significant body, reflected the determination of the great powers (and primarily of the United States) to keep effective authority in their own hands, however logical the contrary arguments might be; though we should not forget that Canada would have had limited membership if there had not been disagreement between her own ministers (above, page 171) .

It has been made clear that Canada was almost entirely excluded from the Allied organization for the higher direction of the war, and that the Canadian government, however reluctantly, in general accepted this situation. Another aspect of the matter is the degree of information on the progress of the war, and particularly on the plans of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for future operations, that was given to the Canadian government. In the main this boils down to the question of information received concerning the great strategic conferences (above, page 162).

The fact that Canada was not represented on the Combined Chiefs of Staff led naturally to the Canadian government's having no part in these conferences. As has been explained (above, page 153), Mr. Churchill constituted himself, long before Pearl Harbor, the main channel through which strategic information reached the Dominions. After Pearl Harbor he maintained this position, though now the information he forwarded was frequently Anglo-American rather than British. It came to be accepted procedure for him to send to the Dominion Prime Ministers after each major conference a message or messages summarizing the discussions and decisions. These messages varied in their degree of frankness. Printed as Appendix "F" to this volume, as examples, are the two messages sent after the Casablanca Conference early in 1943. These were sent about a week after the conference ended. It is notable that while they give a very accurate general summary of the decisions, they do not mention the resolution which had been taken to invade Sicily that summer. They merely forecast "further amphibious offensive operations on a large scale".

This highly personal method of communicating information broke down, by accident or design, during the important Anglo-American discussions of 1942. After the conversations held with Mr. Hopkins and General Marshall in London in April a full and accurate summary was circulated to the Dominions<sup>147</sup> (though not until three weeks after the meeting); but the later discussions in London in July, when the fundamental decisions were taken not to attempt a landing in France in 1942 but to invade French North Africa, were not, it appears, communicated to Canada at all, for no telegram can be found in either the London or Ottawa records. Yet this decision was of great importance to Canada, since the large Canadian force in England was preparing for the expected cross-Channel operation. It is possible that the omission was an oversight resulting from the other preoccupations of Mr. Churchill, who left England for North Africa and Russia not many days after the

conference terminated. However, at the same moment the military channel of information, from the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to General McNaughton, also failed to operate. The C.I.G.S. (Sir Alan Brooke) was likewise out of England; but when on 3 August the Chief of the Canadian General Staff (General Stuart), then in London, went to the War Office and discussed the strategic situation with the Acting C.I.G.S. (General Nye), no mention was made of the recent decisions. It appears that no Canadian authority got any real information of the North African project until September. General Pope in Washington deduced late in July that an African operation was pending and sent Stuart a message, necessarily somewhat cryptically worded, which was intended to alert him; but it had no effect.<sup>148</sup>

The Quebec conferences of August 1943 ("Quadrant") and September 1944 ("Octagon") require special notice. Even in these cases Canada was not formally a party to the meetings except as host; but the circumstances of them are worthy of attention.

Sir Winston Churchill has given in his memoirs an account of the relations of Canada to "Quadrant":<sup>149</sup>

Mr. Mackenzie King welcomed the proposal. . . . The President, while gladly accepting Canadian hospitality, did not feel it possible that Canada should be formally a member of the Conference, as he apprehended similar demands by Brazil and other American partners in the United Nations. We also had to think of the claims of Australia and the other Dominions, This delicate question was solved and surmounted by the broadminded outlook of the Canadian Prime Minister and Government. I for my part was determined that we and the United States should have the Conference to ourselves, in view of all the vital business we had in common. . . .

There was in fact considerably more to the story than this.

On the afternoon of 23 July 1943 the British High Commissioner in Ottawa (Mr. Malcolm MacDonald) called at Laurier House and left with Mr. King a copy of the following message<sup>150</sup> from Mr. Churchill which he had himself deciphered:

I do not anticipate any difficulty in arranging for Mackenzie King and his principal military advisers to be adequately associated with the Conference. My idea is that Mackenzie King himself together with the Canadian Chiefs of Staff should attend all *plenary* meetings over which the President and I preside and that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff should attend all *plenary* meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee. (Underline "*plenary*" above in two cases.)

2. These arrangements will not of course prevent my having private and off-the-record discussions alone with the President whenever he or I may think it necessary: nor will they prevent the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee (which consists of the American and British Chiefs of Staff) from meeting alone and in camera whenever the nature of the discussion renders this desirable.

3. The above is of course business only and apart from all social and personal meetings between hosts and guests and special Anglo-American-Canadian discussions to which I am looking forward.

4. Pray sound Mackenzie King on the above proposals and say that if they are agreeable to him I will seek the President's approval.

King, having presumably accepted these suggestions, subsequently received from Churchill the following telegram,<sup>151</sup> dated 25 July:

2. I submitted my telegram No. --- for the High Commissioner in Canada to the President. He sees insuperable difficulties in the Canadian Chiefs of Staff attending plenary meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He points out that this will almost certainly result in an immediate demand from Brazil and China for membership of the Combined Staffs in

Washington; also from Mexico as well as from the other British Dominions and Allied Nations. He tells me that McCarthy\* has left for Ottawa to explain the position to you.

3. I must say I see the difficulties as of course very little business can be done when large numbers are present. It seems to me, therefore, that the Canadian and British Staffs should confer together as may be necessary but that the British alone should be represented at the combined meetings of the two principal Allies.

4. As Colonel Warden [Churchill] is coming by the same method as last time by sea] and runs on schedule he and the whole party will arrive at 'Abraham' on the 10th. . . . While awaiting the arrival of P.Q. president Roosevelt], the British-Canadian Staffs' discussions can take place and we can confer formally on various important imperial questions which are outstanding.

On the same day King sent to Churchill a telegram containing the text of a message which he had sent to Roosevelt "after McCarthy's arrival Ottawa late last night".<sup>152</sup>

I have had a talk with Leighton (meaning McCarthy) this evening and hasten to let you know that I am not pressing for participation of Canadian Staffs in discussions of Combined Staffs. You will realise that when the Combined Staffs are meeting in Canada, and matters affecting Canadian Forces may be a subject of consideration, our people would expect some opportunity of conference or consultation such as was given them at meeting in Washington. † I would, however, not wish to have any conditions attached to proposed meeting and know that you and our friend (meaning Colonel Warden) will be only too ready to see that what may be advisable, all circumstances considered, is adequately met.

As host, you may rely upon me not to permit any situation to arise which would be a source of embarrassment to other United Nations who will not be represented.

It is evident that Roosevelt had conveyed to King, presumably through the mouth of McCarthy, an implied threat, for on 24 July King, recording in his diary a conversation with the Minister of National Defence (Ralston) wrote, "I let him know that the President had been doubtful if he would come to Canada at all, if arrangements were such as would embarrass him with other countries."<sup>155</sup> The difference between the British and American attitudes in this affair needs no emphasis.

The fact is however that King had not the slightest disposition to make difficulties over the conditions of the conference; for he had at once desisted in the project, whatever the conditions might be, large possibilities of personal and political advantage to himself. He recorded on 20 July, "My own feeling is that Churchill and Roosevelt being at Quebec, and myself acting as host, will be quite sufficient to make clear that all three are in conference together and will not only satisfy but will please the Canadian feeling, and really be very helpful to me personally." He reflected happily, "it will be a pretty good answer to the Tory campaign of 'our leaders, Churchill and the President.' " "I said to Ralston the important thing was to have the meeting held in Quebec. That, of itself, would cause all else to work out satisfactorily."<sup>156</sup> It was clearly not of the higher direction of the war that he was thinking.

The Canadian aspects of the actual conference are worth reviewing. So far as the Quebec Conference proper — the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff — was concerned, the Canadians had no more to do with it than if it had been held in Timbuctoo. General Pope, who was in Quebec, writes, "The Combined Chiefs of

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\*Canadian Ambassador in Washington.

†The reference is to the "Trident" conference of May 1943. As already noted (above, page 179) the Pacific War Council was used as a device for inviting King to be in Washington at this time; and Ralston and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff were also brought down "to confer with the British Chiefs of Staff and also to attend a Commonwealth meeting at the White House on May 20 at which Churchill gave one of his appreciations of the war".<sup>153</sup> Note that while in Washington the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had no contacts with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and few with U.S. officers at all<sup>154</sup> — a point which King may not have fully appreciated.

Staff and their advisers met morning and afternoon, but what might be the subject of discussion at any particular time we Canadians had no means of knowing." Pope reverted during the conference to his normal Washington role of unobtrusively collecting titbits of information for the benefit of his Canadian superiors.<sup>157</sup>

However, as forecast in the exchange of messages between Churchill and King, there was in fact a subsidiary Anglo-Canadian conference before the Americans came. (Sir Alan Brooke wrote, "The Americans do not arrive till Friday, which is a pity and means wasting a few days.")<sup>158</sup> On the morning of 11 August there took place at the Chateau Frontenac the 254th meeting of the Cabinet War Committee, designated as a joint meeting with the War Cabinet of the United Kingdom, which was represented by Mr. Churchill and Sir John Anderson, Lord President of the Council. Churchill remarked that two of His Majesty's governments were sitting together in formal conference: the occasion was unique and of major importance. (He nevertheless did not think it worthy of much notice in his war memoirs.)

Mr. King took the opportunity to define the Canadian government's attitude towards the conference and the direction of the war. He said that the government had accepted the position that the higher strategic direction of the war was exercised by the British Prime Minister and the President of the United States, with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It was recognized that the participation of the Canadian military heads in meetings of the Combined Chiefs might give rise to difficulties. It had been agreed that suitable opportunities would be made for consultation between the British and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. Mr. Churchill remarked that a meeting between the two groups of Chiefs of Staff was to take place that afternoon (in it, we learn, the British explained "the general trend of operations").<sup>159</sup> Further meetings could be held as required, and the conclusions reached could be reviewed later by the two Prime Ministers. The Committee agreed that the position as described by King and Churchill was satisfactory.

Subsequently King returned to the subject of higher direction of the war. While recognizing that authority should rest with Churchill, Roosevelt and their combined staffs, he said that the Canadian public were increasingly concerned that there should be adequate recognition of the substantial contribution which Canada was making to the United Nations' effort. It was widely felt that, while Canada had been at war two years before the United States, she was not being accorded in the councils of the United Nations a role proportionate to her contribution; and that in certain fields in which Canada was playing a major role her right to a more decisive voice might well be recognized. The Canadian government appreciated the day-to-day information which was received from London and the fact that in most cases where Canadian interests were affected there was an opportunity for consultation. Nevertheless, in some cases decisions affecting Canada had been taken jointly by the United Kingdom and the United States and announced without giving Canada an opportunity for comment. King felt sure that the Canadian position in this respect would be understood; and Churchill expressed appreciation of the points which he had made. The meeting discussed various more specific matters, the chief of which was the employment of the Canadian Army Overseas; the Minister of National Defence represented the desirability of additional Canadian formations being sent to the Mediterranean.<sup>160</sup>

The Anglo-American conference ended on 24 August. After a few days spent resting and preparing a broadcast, Mr. Churchill met again with the Cabinet War Committee at the Quebec Citadel on the 31st. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff and

various British officers and officials were present. The British Prime Minister read and commented on the usual summary of the conference decisions which had been prepared for the information of the Dominion Prime Ministers. Several matters of detail were discussed and the British representatives presented a request for some additional forms of naval assistance from Canada. Churchill had already telegraphed comments on the conference to the War Cabinet in London; he included the remark, "There is no doubt that Mackenzie King and the Canadian Government are delighted and feel themselves thoroughly 'on the map'."<sup>161</sup>

The Second Quebec Conference could take place without the preliminary of discussions about the position of Canada, thanks to the precedent of 1943; nor does the meeting require such extended notice here. On 14 September 1944, the day after the Anglo-American conference began, Mr. Churchill attended a special meeting of the Canadian Cabinet War Committee at the Citadel. (This was not called a joint meeting with the British War Cabinet, probably because the only other United Kingdom minister present — Lord Leathers, the Minister of War Transport — was not a member of that body.) Both the British and Canadian Chiefs of Staff attended. The chief matters discussed were the war against Japan and the nature of Canadian participation in it (above, pages 59, 60). That afternoon there was a meeting between the British and Canadian Chiefs of Staff. A rather notable difference as compared with the conference of 1943 is the fact that now there was more Canadian contact with the American representatives. At the War Committee meeting on 14 September Mr. King suggested that it might be desirable for the Canadian Chiefs of Staff to confer with those of the United States on the Canadian role in the Pacific. His diary for that date suggests that he put the matter before Churchill almost timidly; no such meeting had occurred before:

I raised directly the question of our Chiefs of Staff having an interview with the American Chiefs of Staff, I said we had hesitated to have that arranged without first acquainting him with what was in our mind. He seemed a little hesitant at first and said he could see no reason why that could not be done. He referred to Sir Alan Brooke and asked him if he saw any reason why it should not. Sir Alan said he thought that would be all right, but Churchill added that he would speak to the President about it and that he would do so at once.

Before dinner that evening, King records, he had a chance of telling Roosevelt that Churchill would be speaking to him on the subject. "He said: by all means. We were allies. That would be expected." Nevertheless, there is no record of any general meeting of the two countries' Chiefs of Staff. On the 16th, however, there was a cordial meeting on the Pacific question between General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, General Pope (now Military Secretary of the Cabinet War Committee) and General Murchie, the Canadian Chief of the General Staff.<sup>162</sup>

## 6. THE SITUATION IN 1944-45: THE PROJECT OF LIAISON WITH THE SUPREME COMMANDERS

As D Day for the invasion of North-West Europe approached, the Canadian government considered its position with respect to operations in that theatre, where the bulk of its overseas ground and air forces were to be engaged, and found it unsatisfactory.

It will be useful at this point to examine the relationship of the Pacific dominions to the Allied command organization in their theatre, about which the Canadian government had some information. The government of Australia had in

fact been permitted the privilege of going through the form of nominating General Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander in the Southwest Pacific. MacArthur had been "virtually promised" this command by his United States superiors some time before. On 10 March 1942 General Marshall instructed the Commander of U.S. forces in Australia to notify the Australian Prime Minister of MacArthur's arrival in his country "within the hour" of the event, and proceeded, "you will propose that the Australian Government nominate General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area, and will recommend that the nomination be submitted as soon as possible to London and Washington simultaneously." (It is important to note that Britain had not been consulted.) Mr. Curtin acted as requested. New Zealand (which was not in MacArthur's area) was not consulted. The New Zealand Prime Minister observed to Churchill on 19 March that his government had learned of the appointment "from broadcast and press sources". New Zealand appears to have had at least some informal advance information of the appointment of Admiral Chester Nimitz as commander of the Pacific Ocean Area,\* which included New Zealand within its limits.<sup>163</sup>

The sovereignty of both Australia and New Zealand was scrupulously respected, at least in form, in the process of preparing directives for MacArthur and Nimitz. These directives from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, dated 30 March 1942,<sup>164</sup> both bore the heading, "By agreement among the governments of Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States", and included the following provisions:

8. Commanders of all armed forces within your area will be immediately informed by their respective governments that, from a date to be notified, all orders and instructions issued by you in conformity with this directive will be considered by such commanders as emanating from their respective governments.

9. Your staff will include officers assigned by the governments concerned. . . .

The total absence of these courtesies and formalities in the two great powers' dealings with Canada seems as remarkable today as it seemed to informed people in 1944, and perhaps a brief attempt should be made to account for the difference.

Part of the explanation was doubtless to be found in 'geography'. The Pacific was a theatre of war, the Pacific dominions were directly menaced, and MacArthur's headquarters was in Australia. North America, on the other hand, was not a scene of operations. In these circumstances, the problems of the Pacific dominions were thrust upon the attention of British and the United States in a manner that was not the case with Canada, whose forces in Europe operated from a base in the United Kingdom. Those forces, moreover, were incorporated into higher British formations; they did not come directly under United States command as was the case with Australia and New Zealand; and it was easy for the Americans to regard them as part and parcel of the British forces, as the British themselves were almost always ready to do if not checked. In Europe, moreover, there was a complication in the shape of the small forces of the governments in exile, who might have claimed to be admitted equally to any privileges accorded Canada; the French Committee of National Liberation would, as always, have presented an especially thorny problem. (Nevertheless, in the Pacific the great powers saw no difficulty in excluding the Dutch from the MacArthur and Nimitz directives.)

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\*The war against Japan in the Pacific was divided between these two theatres and commanders — primarily, it appears, because the U.S. Army and Navy were unable to agree upon a single Supreme Commander drawn from either service. New Zealand and Australia did not wish to be placed in different areas, but their wishes were disregarded.

When one has said all this, however, the fact remains that part of the explanation is probably to be found in the failure of the Canadian government to assert its rights in a sufficiently forceful manner. The government of Australia tended to be more vocal; the result was some unpleasant exchanges (the Canadian High Commissioner in London was told by the Dominions Office, propos of one sharp communication to Canada, that telegrams to Ottawa were "examples of old world courtesy compared to some that have gone to Australia"),<sup>165</sup> but at least it was difficult to overlook the Australian position. There is an old saying that the creaking wheel gets the grease. Mr. Massey set down more than once his disappointment with the failure of Canadian ministers visiting London to speak out. In October 1942 he wrote, "Howe was reluctant to talk as I hoped he would about the problem of our relation to the direction of the war effort. I wish our Ministers would be more forthcoming in talking about such matters when they meet their opposite numbers here. . . ." And in May 1943 he made this comment on Mr. Eden's visit to Ottawa:

. . . none of the Ministers, with the exception of St. Laurent, said a word to him in support of the claim to parity with the Great Powers on the postwar relief organization. . . . They were [apparently] very voluble on the subject before Anthony arrived in talking about it amongst themselves, but when the Foreign Secretary appeared they subsided . . . this is exactly the same experience as I constantly have had here when ministerial visits take place. They won't stand up to their opposite numbers here and state their view firmly and candidly. When this does happen, as in the case of St. Laurent, the reaction on the British side is always favourable. . . .<sup>166</sup>

King himself was perhaps the worst offender, because his was the main responsibility. We have noted (above, pages 150-51, 164) that he seems to have entirely refrained from mentioning to Churchill and Roosevelt the anger he had felt (and expressed to his colleagues and to Malcolm MacDonald) concerning his exclusion from the Churchill-Roosevelt Newfoundland meeting, and that he also refrained, in spite of approval by the Cabinet War Committee, from making any strong formal protest against the failure to consult Canada concerning the Allied combined organizations set up early in 1942, or to associate her in any way with them. His attitude, we have seen, was that the situation was unsatisfactory, but that there did not seem to be any useful initiative that Canada could take.

King's position and actions are doubtless to be explained at least partly in terms of his natural preference for the indirect approach to any problem. Certainly they are in keeping with a long-established pattern of his thought. One remembers his reluctance in the 1920s to have a Canadian become President of the League of Nations Assembly, or to have Canada seek a seat on the 'League Council. Where some people saw national opportunity, King saw complications and commitments. It is possible, however, that there is another partial explanation. His diary documents very fully his conviction that it was most important to his own political fortunes that he should appear to the Canadian public as a close and intimate associate of Churchill and Roosevelt and as a personal link between them.<sup>167</sup> We have seen his readiness to accept the exclusion of the Canadian government from the Quebec Conference of 1943, provided only that the conference was held in Canada so that the three men might appear together before the public. Norman Robertson, who seems to have had definite views on the matter, had discreetly encouraged him to ask for a higher position for the Prime Minister of Canada, but on consideration he refrained from doing so, feeling that Churchill might resent it.<sup>168</sup> It is at least arguable that a desire to maintain his friendly relations with Churchill

and Roosevelt, motivated by personal political considerations, was a force tending to restrain King from fighting more strongly for the international position of Canada.

These attitudes had the effect of leaving British politicians after the war with the impression that Canada had not troubled herself, as Australia had, over the higher direction of the war.<sup>169</sup> At the time they almost certainly had the more serious effect of leaving British and American statesmen with the impression that Canadian views on this question could safely be ignored. The contrast between the Pacific directives of 1942 (above, page 185) and the North-West Europe directive given to General Eisenhower in February 1944 (under much less urgent conditions) is instructive. The Eisenhower directive<sup>170</sup> contains no reference to agreement with any allied country other than the United Kingdom and the United States (it does remark that relations with allied governments will be dealt with separately) ; it prescribes no procedure by which the forces of other allied countries can be placed under General Eisenhower's command; and it makes no provision for officers of those countries to be assigned to his staff. There is no reference whatever to Canada, although in the early stages the campaign would be shared, in essentials, between British, American and Canadian forces, and Canadians would play an important part throughout. And there was not even a pretence of consultation with Canada over the appointment of the Supreme Commander under whose orders her troops were to fight; her government read about it in the newspapers. The United States records of the preparation of the directive, and the discussion of it between British and American officers, do not indicate that the question of the position of Canada ever arose; it was apparently simply not discussed, and no one mentioned the parallel Pacific directives of 1942.<sup>171</sup> This could hardly have been the case had the Canadian government asserted itself more strongly.

Early in 1944 the group of External Affairs officers in Ottawa who were so influential with the Prime Minister (above, pages 71, 115), seem to have taken the initiative. They did not know what was happening about the Eisenhower directive, for no Canadian had been told that a directive was in preparation; but they were disturbed by the general situation. Precisely who first produced the idea of a Canadian Joint Staff Mission in London may be uncertain; but the earliest document on the relevant External Affairs file is a memorandum addressed to the Prime Minister by Norman Robertson, the Under Secretary of State, on 19 February 1944.<sup>172</sup> It began by referring to the circumstances of General McNaughton's recent relinquishment of the command of the First Canadian Army (below, pages 231-47), an episode which had evidently led to some serious thinking in the East Block. On 1 March a revised version of this memo went to Mr. King.<sup>173</sup> It now began :

In view of the early approach of major operations in which the Canadian Army will take part, you may wish to consider with the Defence Ministers and with War Committee some aspects of the association of the Canadian armed forces with those of our allies, which are not as clear-cut or well defined as they might be. I think something could be done to clarify the formal character of the relationship of the Canadian armed forces to our allies, without limiting or impairing the effectiveness of our military contribution to the winning of the war.

It went on to compare the McNaughton retirement with the more recent appointment of the Supreme Commander and the British ground commander for North-

West Europe. (The appointments of General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander for that theatre, of General Montgomery as Commander-in-Chief of the British group of armies serving under him, and of General Maitland Wilson as Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, had been announced on 24 December 1943. The appointment of General Eisenhower was, essentially, made by President Roosevelt with the concurrence of Mr. Churchill.)<sup>174</sup> Robertson wrote:

The contrast between the steps leading up to General McNaughton's retirement and those that led to the appointment of General Montgomery is instructive. In the first case, there was the fullest and most receptive consultation of competent United Kingdom opinion by the responsible Canadian authorities. In the second case, which involved the choice of the Commander of the group of armies of which the Canadian Army is to form part, there was, so far as I know, no consultation of the Canadian Government to ascertain whether or not the proposed commander would be acceptable to it. When it came to choosing the Supreme Allied Commander for the Northwest European theatre and the officers under him who were to direct the land, air and naval operations in which the Canadian forces were to participate, it does not appear to have occurred to Churchill or Roosevelt that this country might have expected to be consulted about the constitution of the command under which its troops were to serve. In fact as far as our records show, Canada was not only not consulted in any way about the selection and organization of the Invasion Command, but has not yet been officially advised, apart from press announcements, of the appointments of the officers under whom our troops will operate. If my memory is correct, the designation of the Supreme Allied Command in the Southwest Pacific was formally agreed between the governments of the United States, Australia and New Zealand, and the forces of the latter countries were placed under General MacArthur's command by a formal directive of their Governments.

As for "the old question of the relationship of Canada to the supreme direction of the war", Robertson remarked that while something had been accomplished in the economic field — that of the Combined Boards — Canada had never "worked out any formal relationship to the Combined organization on the strategic side"; although the Joint Staff in Washington might be "regarded as 'accredited', in a more or less diplomatic sense, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff". His memorandum concluded:

To straighten out this situation you might consider formally delegating to the Combined Chiefs of Staff those duties and powers in respect of Canadian forces which they have, in fact, been exercising without ever having received any formal assignment of these duties and powers from the Government of Canada. Such a delegation would, I think, regularize and strengthen the position of our Joint Staff mission in Washington and prepare the way for the establishment of a similar Joint Staff Mission in the United Kingdom which might be "accredited" to the Combined Allied Command, of which General Eisenhower is head. In this way, it might be possible to work out a feasible method of associating Canada with the planning and direction of operations in the success of which this country is vitally concerned and in which Canadian armed forces will play a not inconsiderable part. Use of a Joint Staff Mission for purposes of top level liaison would avoid some of the practical difficulties referred to above in speaking of the anomalous position of the Canadian Army and make unnecessary the sort of irregular personal liaison between the Commander of the Canadian Army and Cossac, which General McNaughton attempted to establish. The fact that the three former Chiefs of Staff of the Canadian Services\* are now in the United Kingdom, gives us an opportunity of setting up a strong Joint Staff Mission, dissociated from the operational control of the Canadian formations fighting in combination with United Kingdom forces, and at the same time capable of ensuring suitable Canadian association at a high level with the strategic conduct of the invasion operations.

On 1 March, the day on which he received this memorandum, the Prime Minister laid the matter before the War Committee. The Chiefs of Staff were not

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\*Admiral Nelles, General Stuart and Air Marshal Breadner.

present at this meeting. Mr. King's report followed the lines of the memorandum. The Canadian relationship to strategic planning was discussed. The basic planning for the invasion of France had been completed long before this date, without Canadian participation, although as Robertson had recalled General McNaughton had been kept informed through 1943 by the "irregular" expedient of placing a personal liaison officer, Major-General G. R. Turner, at the headquarters of the Chief Planner, Lieut.-General F. E. Morgan, "Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate)". Colonel Ralston quoted General Stuart, then Acting G.O.C.-in-C. First Canadian Army, as reporting that Canada could scarcely have expected to take part in this planning, but that it would be the responsibility of the Canadian Army Commander to see that the detailed plans now made for the role of his own Army were proper and adequate. Subsequently, on 3 May, the Committee was informed that the new Army Commander, General Crerar, had formally expressed confidence in General Montgomery and in the plan, and had, in answer to a specific inquiry from the Minister of National Defence, declared himself satisfied that his Army's prospective tasks were "feasible operations of war".

Mr. King having referred to the desirability of constituting a new Joint Staff in London, the War Committee agreed that Messrs. Robertson and Heeney, "in consultation with the Chiefs of Staff", should examine the questions that had been raised and prepare recommendations "for the establishment of improved machinery for consultation and participation in matters of command and planning, where Canadian forces are employed". On 8 March the Chiefs of Staff, who it appears now heard of the project for the first time, met with Messrs. Robertson and Heeney (and Mr. Hume Wrong) to discuss it. The officials had prepared two draft messages for consideration — one for Churchill and Roosevelt, and a supplementary one for Churchill alone. The Chiefs betrayed doubts about the practicability of the plan for a Joint Staff Mission in London. The question was asked whether better results might not be achieved through seeking Canadian representation on the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and it was suggested that "the working from a practical standpoint" of the proposed Mission would present difficulties. The minutes of the meeting do not record any specific approval of the project; but the messages, somewhat revised, were sent on to the War Committee, which considered them at a meeting the same day at which the Chiefs of Staff were present. The joint message requested that the Supreme Commanders be informed that their authority over Canadian forces under their command derived from the government of Canada, suggested that it be made clear that Generals Wilson and Eisenhower were Commanders-in-Chief of the participating forces of the United Nations, and advised that the Canadian government was considering setting up a Joint Staff Mission in London to serve as a channel of communication between the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Commands in Britain and the Mediterranean. Reference was also made to the desirability of arranging for the employment of Canadian officers in the combined organizations. This last question the committee decided should be left to be taken up separately at a later date.

The draft message to Churchill dealt with liaison with the British Chiefs of Staff on plans involving the use of Canadian forces, "not only in current European and Mediterranean operations, but also in such matters as the post-war occupation of the Continent and the war against Japan".<sup>175</sup> The drafts having been approved, the messages were duly sent.

President Roosevelt replied first, and his message was a severe blow to the project. It took the form of forwarding a comment by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of

Staff, with which, he said, "I am in agreement".<sup>176</sup> The Joint Chiefs were brief and rather brusque:

... Although the establishment of a Canadian Joint Staff Mission in London is a question for decision by the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada, military implications involved make it necessary that, should such a mission be established, the appropriate channel of communications between the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Commands must be through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and not directly through the Mission, to the Supreme Commands, as proposed by the Canadian Prime Minister.

We feel that there is no need from the military standpoint, to make any announcement clarifying command authority since the chain of military command is well established. There is no objection, however, to such an announcement if other than military considerations warrant it. An announcement should make clear that the Supreme Commanders derive their authority from the Governments concerned through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and not directly from the Governments, as suggested in the letter from the Canadian Prime Minister. We recommend that if any announcement is made, it be general in scope and cover all participating nations.

It is clear that the Joint Chiefs were somewhat alarmed at the thought of a political authority being placed in a position to interfere with the military command relationship existing between the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Commanders who operated under their orders; and their alarm can be understood. Nevertheless, one wonders whether they realized that Canada, which was making what they certainly considered an unnecessary fuss over the national status of the considerable naval, ground and air forces, which it was contributing to General Eisenhower's command, had never even received the courtesy of being told officially that the Combined Chiefs existed, let alone been asked to authorize them to dispose of her forces. One wonders too whether they knew of "the right of direct reference by the Canadian commander to his own government and the power [under the Visiting Forces Act] to withdraw from combination" — which had just been mentioned in King's separate communication to Churchill, though with the remark, "I am sure that you would expect that the power would not lightly be exercised".<sup>177</sup>

Mr. Churchill, who certainly saw nothing very shocking in political interference with military authority, made a reply<sup>178</sup> which was less austere in tone. (Cynics might remark that since he mentioned that he had seen Roosevelt's, he knew that the Americans had already blocked the scheme.) He welcomed the proposal for a Canadian Joint Staff Mission in London, and while agreeing that matters of high policy could be dealt with only through the Combined Chiefs of Staff indicated that the mission could have direct contact with the Supreme Commands on day-to-day liaison matters. Churchill also took the view that any announcement made in the matter of command should be made on behalf of Canada alone, and not, as the Joint Chiefs of Staff had suggested, on behalf of all participating countries; he saw the probable difficulty of getting agreement from all the numerous parties concerned.

With the two replies before it, the War Committee on 19 April approved the immediate constitution of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission, London; "precise definition of the functions of the mission and their relationship to the Supreme Commands and to the U.K. Chiefs of Staff to be the subject of further consideration along with the nature of the replies to be sent to Mr. Churchill and the President". The proposal for liaison by the mission with the Supreme Commanders had yet another obstacle to encounter, this time a Canadian one. General Crerar (who understandably thought it strange that he, the senior Canadian commander in the field, had not been consulted before these decisions were made) agreed that

a link between the Canadian and British Chiefs of Staff was desirable, but argued that since he was Commander of the Canadian Army operating under Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Canadian liaison with the Supreme Commander was properly his own responsibility, normally to be conducted through Headquarters 21st Army Group.<sup>179</sup>

The question of the authority of the Supreme Commanders over Canadian forces was dealt with in communications<sup>180</sup> sent to Mr. Churchill on 6 June (the Normandy D Day) and to Mr. Roosevelt on 16 June.\* (General Stuart in London had recommended that no more messages should be sent until the invasion had been launched.)<sup>181</sup> In these the Canadian Prime Minister agreed with the expressed preference of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff that no public announcement should be made concerning the relation of the Supreme Commanders to Canadian forces; it was requested however that these Commanders should be "formally notified that they exercise command over the Canadian Armed Forces in these theatres with the full authority of the Canadian Government". In other words, the government was executing a delegation of authority to the Supreme Commanders, providing a formal and legal basis for their exercise of command over Canadians which had not existed before. The telegram to President Roosevelt should be quoted at some length :

5. We have noted that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff regard it as necessary that the appropriate channel of communication between Canadian Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Commands must be through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and not directly through the Canadian Mission to the Supreme Commands. We have no desire to disturb, in any way, the established chain of command, whereby the Supreme Commanders receive their instructions from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. At the same time there can, we believe, be no objection to the Canadian Mission having regular contact on liaison matters with the Supreme Commands, so long as matters of high policy are dealt with through our contacts with the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. I may say that our view, in this respect, is shared by the United Kingdom Government.

6. We note that your Joint Chiefs of Staff regard the Supreme Commanders as deriving their authority from the "Governments concerned" through the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and not directly from the Governments.

I feel bound to point out that while we have recognized that the higher direction of the war should be exercised by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, under Mr. Churchill and yourself, the relationship of the Canadian Government and Armed Forces, to the Combined Chiefs of Staff has never been defined with any degree of precision, nor, specifically, has the Canadian Government ever been requested to recognise the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the source of authority of the Supreme Allied Commanders.

In drawing attention to this state of affairs, which is somewhat unsatisfactory from the Canadian point of view, I need hardly say that we have no desire to upset existing arrangements, particularly at this critical time.

7. We trust that the establishment of the Canadian Mission in London will result in improved collaboration in all matters affecting the disposition and use of Canadian Forces. In this belief we have gone forward with its establishment.

8. It is assumed that matters of high policy will continue to be dealt with between Governments through whatever channels are most appropriate to the questions in hand, while our Staff Missions in London and Washington will provide ready and constant means of consultation and communication on military matters.

It does not appear that these propositions were questioned — at any rate, overtly. Roosevelt replied briefly on 29 June.<sup>182</sup> He stated that he was "in full agreement" with the Canadians in thinking it desirable that the Supreme Commanders should be formally notified that they exercised command over the

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\*The delay in the latter case was due only to Mr. King's slowness in approving a draft which he did not alter.

Canadian forces with the full authority of the Canadian government, and he would so inform the United States Chiefs of Staff. He appreciated, he said, the statement that the Canadian government had no desire to disturb the established chain of command. On the question of "regular contact on liaison matters" he was notably silent. As for Churchill, he telegraphed on 20 June that the British military representatives in Washington had been instructed to obtain agreement to the required notification being issued to the Supreme Commanders.<sup>183</sup> Nevertheless, there was delay, and the Canadian government made inquiries. Finally, on 3 July 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staff dispatched the message requested to General Eisenhower in London and General Wilson in Algiers, in the following form:<sup>184</sup>

In order to formalize the constitutional position of the Canadian forces serving in Allied commands, the Canadian government have asked us to notify you that you exercise command over the Canadian Armed Forces in your operation theatre with the full authority of the Canadian government.

This message merely did for the European theatres much the same thing that the MacArthur and Nimitz directives had done for the Pacific in 1942. At any rate, a theoretical point had been gained, and the position of Canada with respect to the higher direction of the war had been clarified in some degree.

The project for the Canadian Joint Staff Mission, London, aroused active confidential discussion among those who knew about it. The aspect of the plan which the civil servants who originated it certainly thought most important was the liaison with the Supreme Commanders; and this was also the aspect which every soldier who commented on it disparaged in some degree. There is in existence a file of correspondence<sup>185</sup> which passed between General Pope and Mr. Heeney, the Secretary of the Cabinet, who was one of the scheme's defenders and doubtless one of its originators. Pope argued, in effect, that 'Canada had agreed that the direction of the war should be left to the "Big Two", and the only practical policy was to have confidence in them and their organization: "We cannot have it both ways." At the same time, the C.J.S.M., he argued, would be another Canadian agency interposed between the Canadian commander in the field and his government, and its effect would be "completely to cut the ground from under the feet of your Army Commander".<sup>186</sup> We have already noted the doubts of the Chiefs of Staff in Ottawa. On 10 May 1944 General Stuart, the Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters, London, wrote to Mr. Robertson that he was "not too happy" about liaison with the Supreme Commanders; this, he felt, would not be "productive of any great results", while at the same time it made difficulties with General Crerar. He suggested that, in the light of Washington's attitude, this function of the mission might be eliminated. "What is really required", he wrote, "is contact on the policy and strategy side with the British Chiefs of Staff in London and with the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. The Joint Staff Mission in London has been made responsible for the former. Why could not our Joint Staff Mission in Washington look after the latter more specifically than it does at present."<sup>187</sup>

The thinking of the civilians who fostered the scheme is also not in doubt. Heeney wrote to Pope on 24 May 1944, "The Canadian government alone are ultimately responsible for the disposition and employment of Canadian forces. No agreement, formal or otherwise, no statute of the United Kingdom or Canadian Parliament, can alter or diminish this responsibility. This being so, there should be some channel through which the responsible ministers can be provided, in advance of actual planning, with advice upon which to exercise some independent judgment where Canadian forces are to be involved. . . . There is no lack of political

confidence at home.\* On the contrary, what I fear is the failure to appreciate, until it is too late, the unavoidable responsibility which rests upon Ottawa."<sup>188</sup> Mr. J. E. Read, the Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, commenting on the Pope-Heeny correspondence, struck a similar note:<sup>189</sup>

The Canadian government cannot get away from responsibility. The Hong Kong experience is conclusive on this point and, if the Canadian Army is thrown away on another Grecian fiasco,† the politician who will be hounded out of public life will be Mr. Mackenzie King and not Mr. Churchill. . . . There is grave danger in the present situation but the danger would be far greater if no effort were made to ensure a reasonable disposition and use of Canadian forces by SHAEF or its Mediterranean equivalent.

. . . Another Hong Kong on a wholesale scale might be defended in Parliament if the disaster had been caused by incompetent planning in Washington. The Government could say that we had General Pope there looking after our interests. If it was due to incompetent planning and organization in SHAEF, the Government would have no answer.

It was perhaps natural that civil servants in daily touch with Ministers should view the possibility of a military disaster mainly in terms of its effect upon the political fortunes of the government. The references to Hong Kong and the embarrassments it had brought to the King administration suggest how deep a mark that painful episode had left in Ottawa.

We have still to note what actually happened to the Canadian Joint Staff Mission, London. General Pope had given a somewhat facetious assessment of its prospects.<sup>190</sup> The British Chiefs of Staff, he said, would feel that there was no worthwhile point to the idea, but would also know that they could see to it that it did no real harm.

Consequently it will be arranged that the Canadian Mission meet with the British Chiefs of Staff to be kept in the picture, say, about once a fortnight. Two or three of these meetings will be held, at some cost to their rather valuable time. On the third or fourth occasion, the meeting will be postponed. Thereafter they will become desultory, and finally the whole business will become quite perfunctory. . . .

What actually happened was not as bad as this, but the Mission was certainly not very active. Although the British Chiefs of Staff were in fact most accommodating,‡ it held only five formal meetings with them before the end of hostilities, the last being on 22 June 1945; but there were other contacts, some of them undoubtedly very useful, on the "secretarial level", and the Mission was allowed access to some important papers, including the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the second Quebec Conference — a document no other Canadian had seen.<sup>192</sup> On 15 December 1944 Mr. Massey, the Canadian High Commissioner in London, confided to the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa that he had received almost no communications from the Mission and had never met with the members as a body. "Perhaps I may add very confidentially", he wrote, "that I am less concerned at this omission than I otherwise might be because I have the strong impression that the Joint Staff Mission functions only at very rare intervals. . . ."<sup>193</sup> Undoubtedly as a result of this letter, Mr. Massey had a formal meeting with the Mission on 16 January 1945.<sup>194</sup>

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\*General Pope had remarked, not for the only time, that more "political confidence" was needed in Ottawa. See *Six Years of War*, page 500.

†The reference presumably is to the Greek campaign of 1941, in which Australian and New Zealand formations suffered heavily.

‡The Mission reported to Ottawa on 26 January 1945 that the Chiefs of Staff had "always appeared anxious to encourage the C.J.S.M. to meet with them, and in fact recently suggested that the C.J.S.M. should meet with them about once a month to discuss the progress of the war".<sup>191</sup>

On the whole, the Mission probably justified its creation by the manner in which it performed the first of its two prescribed functions — to provide a link with the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff. At the meeting with Mr. Massey just referred to, the Mission's Joint Secretary (Commander G. F. Todd, R.C.N.V.R.) was invited to express his views on the value of the contacts that had been made. He stated that it appeared to him that the existence of the Mission had opened some channels of information which would not otherwise be available, since the British services were organized on an inter-service basis for dealing with various matters above a certain level, and on such matters an inter-service approach by the Canadians facilitated access to information. In addition, he considered that the existence of a Canadian inter-service organization, which could meet from time to time with the British Chiefs of Staff, contributed to the Canadian forces' prestige.<sup>195</sup> All this was undoubtedly true.

On the other hand, the Mission never even attempted to carry out its second task — liaison with the Supreme Allied Commanders. Here we must note the nature of its terms of reference. Instructions were approved by the Cabinet War Committee on 5 October 1944, subject to the concurrence of the Minister of National Defence (Colonel Ralston), then overseas. They ran in part as follows:<sup>196</sup>

B. The general purposes of the Government in establishing the Mission were to provide a link with the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff and with the Supreme Allied Commands in European operational theatres in which Canadian forces are employed and to provide a means of collaboration in all matters affecting their disposition and use.

C. In this connection it has been noted that while the formal channel of communications between the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Allied Commands is through the Combined Chiefs of Staff the Mission shall have contact on day to day liaison matters with the Supreme Commands, matters of high policy being dealt with between the Governments and through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

D. Subject to the foregoing general purposes it shall be the duty and responsibility of the members of the Mission:

- (1) To inform themselves, at the planning stage, of operations consequent upon strategic decisions of the Combined Chiefs of Staff so far as such plans may affect the employment and disposition of the Canadian forces or may be of concern to the Government.
- (2) To maintain day to day liaison with the Supreme Allied Commands and with the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff, with the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry, and with such other authorities as may be concerned with matters relating to (a) the conduct of the war (b) the employment of Canadian forces and (c) the immediate military problems consequent upon the cessation of hostilities.
- (3) To arrange for the interchange of information of mutual interest to the three services.
- (4) To submit joint reports on all matters of Canadian interest.

Colonel Ralston never did approve the instructions. The reinforcement crisis of the autumn of 1944 (below, Part VII) caused his resignation, and his successor, General McNaughton, had no time to deal with the matter until about the end of the year. He then revised the portion dealing with liaison with the Supreme Commands, and the revised version was approved by the War Committee on 8 January 1945.<sup>197</sup> The revision consisted of the addition of a new paragraph, following (4) as above quoted, which had the effect of somewhat limiting the Mission's scope and ensuring that it would not trench upon the executive responsibilities of Canadian field commanders:<sup>198</sup>

- (a) The corporate responsibility of the Mission in respect of the employment and administration of Canadian forces is limited to liaison with the authorities mentioned in paragraph [D.2], and the collection and transmission of information relating to the planning and conduct of the war and proposals for the employment of Canadian forces. (b) Instructions or official notifications relating to the employment of Canadian forces will issue from the

appropriate Chief of Staff at Ottawa through the senior Staff Officer in the United Kingdom to the Admiralty, the Canadian Army Commander or the Air Ministry as the case may be. The channel thus established will also apply to communications for the Service Headquarters originating with any of the above sources and it will be the responsibility of the individual member concerned to ensure that his colleagues are informed. (c) Matters affecting air training and the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan are specifically excluded from the above channel and communications of this nature will continue to be passed between Air Force Headquarters and the Chief Liaison Officer, United Kingdom Air Liaison Mission, or direct to the Air Ministry.

Subject to these limiting stipulations, the Mission was thus still charged with liaison with the Supreme Commanders. Before these final instructions reached it, the Mission's members considered the draft ones and recommended a change:

It is considered that day-to-day liaison with the Supreme Commanders should not be a specific function of the Mission, and that such liaison would be more appropriately maintained by the Canadian service commanders in the field or on the station, especially now that neither the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, nor the Supreme Commander, Mediterranean Theatre, have their headquarters in the United Kingdom.<sup>199</sup>

On 20 February 1945 the Mission considered the final version of its instructions and decided that the objections made to the draft applied to this also. There was some delay in obtaining General Crerar's concurrence, and the Mission's new observations went to Canada only on 23 March 1945.<sup>200</sup> On 25 April the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed to recommend to the Ministers that the Mission's instructions be amended as proposed.<sup>201</sup> By that time the war with Germany was virtually over, the War Committee of the Cabinet had ceased to function (above, page 119), and nothing further seems to have been done. Thus, mainly because of the attitude of the United States Chiefs of Staff, but partly because of the unanimous conviction of senior Canadian service officers that the plan as proposed was impracticable, the project for direct liaison with the Supreme Commanders was completely abortive.

In spite of the fate of the scheme, its implications were so important that it deserves rather extended comment.

If its civilian sponsors had taken military advice at an earlier stage, it might have been advanced in a somewhat more practicable form. There is little doubt that the idea of a mission in London conducting effective liaison with the Supreme Commanders in North-West Europe and the Mediterranean was unworkable. The Combined Chiefs of Staff would never have agreed to the interposition of an agency representing the government of a minor allied country between themselves and the theatre commanders conducting operations under their general direction. The Churchillian distinction between "high policy" and "day-to-day liaison" would have been a difficult one to draw in practice, and the function desired by the Canadian government could scarcely have been performed without constant impingement upon the policy sphere. And it could not have been performed from London. Nor would casual visits have served the purpose. It could have been carried out only by a senior officer permanently stationed at Supreme Headquarters, possessing the complete confidence of the Supreme Commander and his staff and admitted to their secrets, and at the same time endowed with the right of independent communication with the Canadian authorities. Few commanders would tolerate the presence of such a "licensed spy" if they could possibly avoid it. One remembers the notorious Dutch Field Deputies of the War of the Spanish Succession, who hampered Marlborough and often vetoed operations which he desired to carry out.

Marlborough had to accept this situation because the Netherlands was in fact the senior member of the coalition which he served; it "maintained continuously in Flanders double the army of England".<sup>202</sup> Canada's position in 1939-45 was very different. The sort of representation the Supreme Commanders might be prepared to accord her is indicated by an interview between General Stuart and General W. B. Smith, Eisenhower's Chief of Staff, in April 1944. Smith was most cordial, and said that he and his chief would be prepared to see General Stuart at any time to discuss operations or operational planning, not only operations in which Canadian troops might be involved but operations in general. He added that he would be glad to accept as a member of his staff a Canadian brigadier, who would be responsible only to himself and General Eisenhower but could bring to his attention any points where Canadian interests might be involved.<sup>203</sup> This was, in all the circumstances, a good offer, which might well have been accepted for its own sake. For reasons which are not apparent, it was not. The reasons were probably related to the doubts implied in the Cabinet War Committee decision of 8 March (above, page 189). The Smith offer was far from being what Ottawa desired, which would have involved any Canadian stationed at SHAEF having free communication with higher Canadian authority.

Some Canadian staff officers were subsequently stationed at SHAEF, but they — notably Lt.-Col. J. P. Page, who acted as the senior Canadian officer on the staff — were concerned mainly with special personnel matters, primarily investigation of enemy war crimes. An R.C.A.F. officer, Group Captain F. A. Sampson, was a liaison officer in prisoner-of-war matters, Another Canadian officer, Lt.-Col. R. A. Harris, was Military Assistant to the British Deputy Chief of Staff, Lieut.-General Sir Frederick Morgan.<sup>204</sup> It seems remarkable, in retrospect, that the Canadian element at this great integrated headquarters, under which so many Canadian sailors, soldiers and airmen served, was so tiny. It is evident from the foregoing that this was not entirely the fault of the SHAEF authorities, for in the spring of 1944 Canada had an opportunity which was not embraced; but there is no evidence that any offer of a proportion of appointments was made to Canada when SHAEF was being organized during the previous winter — or, for that matter, that Canada asked for such representation. Canadians served in North-West Europe under a Supreme Headquarters composed, essentially, of Americans and Englishmen.

There would also have been serious difficulties in the way of effective liaison with the Supreme Commander being conducted by the G.O.C.-in-C. First Canadian Army. Field-Marshal Montgomery, being who he was, would certainly have disliked being bypassed. General Crerar could have overcome this difficulty, with the support of his government; but it would have been a chronic complication in his relations with Montgomery. Moreover, commanding an army in the field is, to put it mildly, a full-time job; and this additional responsibility would have been serious. It could not have been carried out without stationing a liaison officer at SHAEF, and this officer, as already noted, would have needed to be in the full confidence of the highest authorities there. Eisenhower might or might not have consented to such an arrangement.

In Italy the problem would have been still more difficult simply because the Canadian force there was smaller and the G.O.C. 1st Canadian Corps was one rung farther down the military ladder than the G.O.C.-in-C. First Canadian Army. Liaison with the Supreme Commander would have been, to that extent, harder for him to arrange. Here we encounter once more the effects of the unfortunate

decision to divide the Canadian Army's field force. If the Canadian government desired to have its forces respected as national entities, it should have kept them together, and thereby strengthened the arm of its field commander. Crerar's position would have been none too strong if he had had all his five Canadian divisions together under his hand; with two of them absent it was materially weakened.

It is a curious fact that in Italy a specific arrangement for liaison with Allied Force Headquarters was set up in 1944; but it had no relation to the project being discussed in Ottawa and served none of the purposes of that project. There had long been in Italy a Canadian static administrative headquarters known as "Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon"; but though accommodated at Allied Force Headquarters in Naples (later Rome), it was actually accredited to Headquarters 15th Army Group. In the summer of 1944, however, "No. 1 Canadian Liaison Detachment" under Brigadier G. R. Bradbrooke (who had recently ceased to hold a field command by reason of his age) was set up and accredited to Allied Force Headquarters with the approval of General Wilson and of National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. It was made clear that Bradbrooke would be concerned with policy and administration, but not with operations. This would have made it quite impossible for him to carry out the function that Robertson and his colleagues in Canada had in mind. In fact it is evident that the brigadier found very little to do; and when illness led to his withdrawal from Italy in December 1944 he was not replaced, the appointment being considered redundant. It seems clear that it had originated with General Stuart in London, and the records give the impression that the object was simply to provide a place for a senior officer for whom there was no other employment overseas.<sup>205</sup>

It is the course of events in Italy in the second half of 1944 which may be considered as giving most point to the anxieties of the officials in Ottawa who originated the abortive project for liaison with the Supreme Commands. It is true that there was no Greek fiasco, no Hong Kong disaster, such as they had feared. The year 1944 brought an almost unbroken series of victories to Allied arms in the theatres where Canadians were serving. It also brought many casualties, however; and it is possible that not all of them were necessary.

The planners of the Normandy invasion originally envisaged that an attack on the southern coast of France (Operation "Anvil") should be launched simultaneously with it. It was assumed at this stage that by the time the attacks were launched the Allies in Italy would have reached the enemy's prepared defences on the Pisa-Rimini line (later known as the Gothic Line) where the Allied forces could "maintain pressure without diverting resources from the new operation".<sup>206</sup> In September 1943 Mr. Churchill wrote that he would "like it to be considered whether we should not, when we come up against the main German positions, construct a strong fortified line of our own. . . . Thus, by the spring, we should be able in this theatre either to make an offensive if the enemy were weak, and anyhow to threaten one, or on the other hand stand on the defensive . . . and divert a portion of our troops for action elsewhere. . . ." <sup>207</sup> However, the operations in Italy moved much less rapidly than had been hoped, while at the same time there was a painful shortage of assault shipping. Late in March 1944 the idea of an "Anvil" simultaneous with the Normandy landings was abandoned.<sup>208</sup>

During the months that followed there was a long and sometimes bitter Anglo-American debate over whether "Anvil" (later re-christened "Dragoon") should be carried out at all. The British commanders in the Mediterranean, supported by Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff, would have preferred to keep in Italy the

seven divisions that the project would take from that theatre, and use the force there for an offensive against the Gothic Line and into the Po Valley. This might thereafter be continued through the "Ljubljana Gap" in Northern Yugoslavia towards Vienna or perhaps across the Hungarian plain.\* At the end of June Roosevelt and the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff finally made it clear that they absolutely insisted on "Anvil", and the British, very reluctantly, had to assent. A directive went to General Wilson on 2 July instructing him to mount "Anvil" with a target date of 15 August, and directing him further to use all available Mediterranean resources not required for "Anvil" "to carry out your present Directive with regard to operations in Italy". This directive, in effect since the spring of 1943, was to carry out such operations as would be best calculated to contain the maximum number of German divisions.<sup>210</sup> Among the reasons cited by Roosevelt for persisting in the "Anvil" policy were several which were entirely political. One, which would doubtless have been decisive in itself, was domestic: "for purely political considerations over here I would never survive even a slight set-back in 'Overlord' if it were known that fairly large forces had been diverted to the Balkans". Another was the fact that he could not see the French agreeing to their troops — four divisions in Italy — being used to the eastward.<sup>211</sup> (They had long since been consulted on the "Anvil" plan, and General de Gaulle had told General Wilson that "any perspective which did not include the battle for France was unthinkable for a Frenchman".)<sup>212</sup>

As recently as 14 June the Combined Chiefs of Staff, having before them General Alexander's expressed desire to break through the Pisa-Rimini line and undertake operations beyond, had ruled that he should destroy the German forces south of that line and halt before it. Three courses would then present themselves for consideration, all involving amphibious operations: attacks against the South of France, against the West of France, and at the head of the Adriatic. At this time the Combined Chiefs evidently did not envisage an attack on the Gothic Line as a probable operation.<sup>213</sup> Nevertheless it emerged as soon as "Anvil" was finally confirmed. (Brooke wrote on 30 June that he was not certain that the withdrawal for France "need cripple Alexander's power to finish crushing Kesselring".)<sup>214</sup> It was implied in the directive sent to Wilson on 2 July, and was made explicit in the directive which Wilson sent to General Alexander on 5 July: he was "to advance over the Apennines" — this involved breaking the Gothic Line — and close to the line of the Po, securing the area Ravenna-Bologna-Modena. He was then to cross the Po to the line Venice-Padua-Verona-Brescia, on reaching which he would receive further instructions.<sup>215</sup>

The decision to abandon the earlier intention to halt in front of the Gothic Line, and instead to throw the Allied Armies in Italy against it, was thus taken almost casually. It was incidental to the bitter Anglo-American controversy over "Anvil", and there is no evidence that it was ever really considered on its own merits. In the effort to reconcile the British to "Anvil", the Americans — both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President — argued that even without the seven divisions to be withdrawn for "Anvil" there, would still be enough forces in Italy to carry on an active offensive there. "I am convinced", Roosevelt wrote late in June, "we will have sufficient forces in Italy with 'Anvil' forces withdrawn, to chase

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\*It is worth while to note that Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, himself doubted whether this ambitious scheme was practicable at the time. The Americans for their part calculated that only six divisions could be maintained beyond the Gap "within a decisive period".<sup>209</sup>

Kesselring north of Pisa-Rimini and maintain heavy pressure against his army at the very least to the extent necessary to contain his present force."<sup>216</sup> After this the Americans could scarcely object to the plan to attack the Gothic position. They approved it specifically on 7 August.<sup>217</sup> As for the British, although during the controversy they represented the withdrawal of the seven divisions as ruinous to the Italian campaign - Churchill said that it would "leave all our hopes there dashed to the ground"<sup>218</sup> — they nevertheless at once proceeded to commit Alexander's weakened forces to the Gothic Line attack. Churchill's earlier ideas about a halt before the line were forgotten, and indeed in August he was talking again about an advance by Ljubljana on Vienna.<sup>219</sup> Italy was a British sphere of command, and British prestige would hardly have allowed people like Churchill and Alexander to see it become a mere static backwater while Eisenhower's forces marched across North-West Europe to victory.

The Line was duly broken, but on 26 September, a month after the offensive began, General Alexander wrote to General Wilson, "The trouble is that my forces are too weak relative to the enemy to force a break-through and so close the pincers. The advance of both Armies is too slow to achieve decisive results. . . ." <sup>220</sup> The year 1944 ended with the Allied Armies in Italy bogged down on a line from south of Spezia to Ravenna. The dividends returned by the final phase of the Italian campaign were small, and the decision to continue the offensive after the reduction of the force, so lightly taken at the beginning of July 1944, seems a classic example of falling between two schools. It would surely have been sounder to go over to the defensive as Churchill had urged in September 1943 and withdraw additional troops for action in a more decisive theatre — as was done in February 1945, when the 1st Canadian Corps and other troops were transferred to North-West Europe without in fact preventing a final effective offensive being undertaken in Italy in April. These forces might well have gone eight months earlier, when General Eisenhower was using the need of port facilities to bring in fresh divisions from the United States as a powerful argument for "Anvil". As it was, they remained, to take part in what Colonel Nicholson has called "the bitter and unprofitable struggle which wore out the last four months of 1944, and cost Canada her heaviest casualties of the campaign". Canadian battle casualties in the battles of the Gothic Line and the Rimini Line alone (25 August-22 September) numbered 4511; in the 1st and 5th Divisions together, over 1000 men lost their lives.<sup>221</sup>

The relevance of these facts to the present discussion is simply this. Although the lives of so many Canadian soldiers were involved in the strategic decision to continue the offensive in Italy after we reached the Gothic Line, no Canadian authority was consulted upon it or even informed of it. France, as represented by the Committee of National Liberation, was consulted on the use to be made of her forces in Italy, but Canada was not. The Canadian Corps in that theatre received its orders for the new offensive through British command channels, and carried them out. General Burns, the Corps Commander, could have appealed to his government against them, but he had no real reason to do so. The attack on the Gothic Line was a practicable operation of war, though a difficult one; and Burns had no more knowledge of the strategic background than any British corps commander. The information which would have made clear the strategic doubtfulness of the conception and provided the basis for a reasoned protest against it was only obtainable at a higher level. And it may be noted that the records do not indicate that the Canadian Joint Staff Mission, London, ever heard from the British Chiefs of Staff of either the "Anvil" controversy or the decision to continue the Italian

offensive after the withdrawals for "Anvil". Discussions between the C.J.S.M. and the Chiefs of Staff, so far as they touched Italy at all, were concerned exclusively, or almost exclusively, with the Canadian desire to reunite the 1st Canadian Corps with the First Canadian Army in North-West Europe.<sup>222</sup> Had the members of the mission had a clear grasp of the strategic situation in Italy, and of the situation between the British and American strategists, they might have been in a position to represent to the Chiefs of Staff that the circumstances in July 1944 constituted an ideal opportunity for withdrawing the Corps from Italy.

As things actually stood, the fact must be faced that although the Canadian government committed over 90,000 of its soldiers to Italy, it never had any information to speak of concerning plans for future operations there after the campaign was launched. The fate of the Canadian force in that country was entirely at the discretion of the senior Allied commanders there. There was no possibility of any Canadian influence being exerted on planning short of the occurrence of a crisis in which the Canadian Corps Commander might be allotted a tactical role so impracticable that it would lead him to appeal to his government. It should also be said that the Canadian government's own action in forcing upon the Allied Mediterranean command an army corps which it did not want would have made it much more difficult for it to insist upon making conditions as to the corps' employment and control. And that command would not have appreciated strategic interference by the political proprietors of a mere two-division corps.

Was there an answer to the Canadian problem? For there was a problem. The civilians watching from Ottawa were clearly largely right in their delineation of it, though they had failed to provide a solution. It is possible that, given the military logic of the situation and the fixed determination of the British and American leaders — especially the latter — to keep all effective authority in their own hands, the problem was in fact insoluble. It is a notable point, however, that both Stuart in London and the Chiefs of Staff in Ottawa inclined to the opinion that the place where it could best be tackled was the offices of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. It may be that the External Affairs officials had rejected this approach, in their own minds, on the basis of past experience and also, it is possible, because the Canadian forces were more important in the two theatres where they were chiefly operating than they were in the eyes of a body overseeing operations all around the globe. We have seen, however, the practical difficulties in the way of effective liaison at the headquarters of the Supreme Commanders in the theatres. Were the possibilities better at the Combined Chiefs of Staff?

Here too the difficulties were very formidable. Perhaps the worst of them would have been the fact that any concession to Canada would have led immediately to requests from an indefinite number of other states for parallel concessions. It would have made it much harder to resist the demands of the French Committee of National Liberation, which in 1944 was understood to be pressing for membership in the Combined Chiefs of Staff.<sup>223</sup> It is true that France was the only country among the western allies, apart from the "Big Two", that had larger forces in the field than Canada.\* Canada's five fighting army divisions, and her large contributions in the air and at sea, gave her material claims. But whether the Combined

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\*Eight French divisions, armed and equipped by the United States, took part in the later stages of the North-West Europe campaign. Australia had raised relatively enormous ground forces (actually 12 divisions in existence in the spring of 1943); but most of them were on home-defence duty in Australia, with three others garrisoning eastern New Guinea.<sup>224</sup>

Chiefs of Staff, or the political leaders from whom they took their orders, could have been persuaded to recognize these claims, is another thing. Doing so would certainly have entailed giving similar recognition to at least one other Dominion — Australia — and being prepared to resist the pressure of a number of other countries, probably including Brazil, which provided one division for the force in Italy in the autumn of 1944. The Combined Chiefs would undoubtedly have preferred to avoid such embarrassments and complications.

The maximum that could possibly have been hoped for was the right to have one officer — certainly not representatives of all three services — accredited to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as an observer, with no right to take part in discussion except where the interests of Canada or Canadian forces were directly involved. Even so, such an officer could not have performed his task adequately without very full access to information and full knowledge of the strategic discussions being conducted at the highest levels; nothing less could have enabled him to take in good time such action as might have led the Allied strategists to reconsider the hasty decision to attack the Gothic Line. Whether Canada could ever have achieved such facilities and such status for her military representative in Washington may well be doubted.

What then ought Canada to have done? One thing is fairly evident. The moment when the Canadian government was in the best position to bargain was before its forces were formally committed to a new theatre of operations: in the case of North-West Europe, before January 1944, when First Canadian Army was placed "in combination with" the 21st Army Group.<sup>225</sup> At that moment, it might well have been explained that Canada wished to station a senior military observer at Supreme Headquarters in the theatre, and desired that he should be given facilities for keeping the Canadian Chiefs of Staff fully informed concerning planning and operations. At such a time a request of this sort would have had a chance of acceptance; and the right officer, making himself agreeable and perhaps useful to the theatre command, and working in close contact with the senior Canadian commander or commanders in the theatre, though responsible not to them but to higher Canadian military authority,\* might perhaps have solved the worst of the problem. Such an expedient would have placed the Canadian government in a rather better position to watch over the interests of the Canadians — well over a quarter of a million of them — who served in North-West Europe during the campaign of 1944-45.

These suggestions prompt the reflection that the Canadian government had been guilty of two fundamental errors of military policy, which militated strongly against its gaining its point in any discussion like that of 1944. The first was in 1939, when financial considerations led it to accept an arrangement under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan which resulted in its overseas air forces being removed from Canadian control and scattered about the globe. The second was in 1943, when the government put strong pressure on the United Kingdom to force a complete Canadian corps on the Mediterranean command at a time when there was no military requirement for it there. By thus breaking its army field force in two it reduced its own control of it and exposed the fragments to the sort of situation in which the corps in Italy became involved in the autumn of 1944, And

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\*Presumably, to the Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff Mission. It would have been inappropriate for an officer charged with looking after the interests of all three services to be responsible to the commander of one of them.

it merely made itself ridiculous when, having realized the error it had made, it began asking to have the Mediterranean force brought back at a time when it had not yet fought a major battle. Any future Canadian government that may be faced with similar problems would do well to remember that there is a definite correlation between the concentration of its forces and the degree of national control which it can hope to exercise over them.

# THE ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF CANADIAN FIGHTING FORCES: CANADA IN THE COMMONWEALTH AT WAR

## 1. INTRODUCTORY: BACKGROUNDS

THE LAST section dealt with Canada's wartime external relations, including her Commonwealth associations, on what may be called the high military-political level. We turn now to review events on a lower and more exclusively military plane. Our theme is the organization and control of Canadian fighting forces engaged in or preparing for operations. In the main this Part deals with Occurrences outside of Canada; and it is concerned very largely with Commonwealth relations. All three Canadian armed services did most of their fighting under British higher command, and any analysis of their command problems is chiefly a matter of Anglo-Canadian relations. Military relations with the United States are in general reserved for the succeeding section. They were not primarily concerned with the control of Canadian forces.

We have already made some comment (above, pages 137-8) on constitutional backgrounds. The Statute of Westminster of 1931 had established the legal status of Canada and the other three "Dominions" of those days — Australia, New Zealand and South Africa — as nations within the Commonwealth co-equal with Great Britain. What this meant, in practice, in military terms in wartime remained to be worked out. It is true that some legal foundation for a military relationship under the new circumstances had been provided in the shape of the Visiting Forces Acts (below, page 211). Canada, unlike other Commonwealth countries,<sup>1</sup> chose to use these acts as the formal basis for her forces' relationship to those of the United Kingdom throughout the war. The fact that she thus possessed a convenient basis in law for a command relationship with British forces, and had no such basis with respect to foreign forces — notably, those of France and the United States — is a point of some importance. But since the Visiting Forces Acts seem to have been thought of, at the time when they were passed, more as a convenience for such minor purposes as peacetime exchanges of military personnel than as a basis for cooperation in a great war, here too much remained to be worked out in practice.

Apart from these rather exiguous British and Canadian statutes, there remained as a basis for action the experience of the First World War. For the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force this had limited value. The Canadian naval forces of 1914-18 were very small and operated almost exclusively in Canadian home waters, and Canada possessed no air force of her own in those days. There was, on the other hand, an army tradition resulting from the experience of the Canadian Corps of 1915-18, the general tendency of which was towards a sturdy policy of autonomy. This attitude had taken form more particularly during the

period of Sir Arthur Currie's command, after June 1917, and was certainly in accord with the general views of the Canadian Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden. The spirit that was abroad was not inaccurately described by the British Secretary of State for War when he said rather sadly of the "Colonial Forces", "They look upon themselves, not as part and parcel of the English Army but as Allies beside us. . . ."<sup>2</sup> The position that had been reached at the end of the war may be briefly stated by quoting a passage from the *Report* of the Ministry of Overseas Military Forces of Canada for 1918 which describes the result of negotiations carried on with the War Office and the British command in France:

Broadly, the statement made by Canada of her position, in which the Imperial Government concurred, was that for matters of military operations the Canadian Forces in the Field had been placed by the Canadian Government under the Commander-in-Chief, British Armies in France; in matters of organisation and administration, the Canadian Government still retained full responsibility in respect to its own Forces.

It was clear that matters of organisation and administration would frequently have a direct bearing upon military operations and discipline, and vice versa, and it was agreed that in such cases these matters should be made the subject of conference between the Canadian and Imperial Authorities.

To meet this situation in France in the most effective manner, a Canadian Section of General Headquarters of the British Armies in France was formed in July, 1918, after full discussion and agreement. In forming such a Section it was not intended to interfere in any way with the responsibility of General Headquarters and the Supreme Command, in relation to matters affecting military operations or discipline, but through this Section the full control of the Canadian Government over matters of organisation and administration within its Forces was rendered capable of fruition. Important matters, such as the allotment of reinforcements in emergencies, War Establishments, the appointment of General Officers, and those other matters which from their relation to military operations should properly receive the consideration of General Headquarters, would still be made the subject of conference between the Canadian Authorities and General Headquarters.<sup>3</sup>

Even in operational matters there was some extension of Canadian autonomy in the last two years of the war. Currie is said to have insisted in the autumn of 1917 that the Canadian Corps would fight the Passchendaele battle as a united Corps or not at all;<sup>4</sup> as we shall see, twenty-six years later the Chief of the Imperial General Staff threw this up to General McNaughton in terms which indicated that it still rankled in some British minds (below, page 227). In the spring of 1918 Currie found that divisions were being taken from him to such an extent that the Corps was being broken up. To the indignation of Sir Douglas Haig he made representations, supported by his government, which resulted in the four divisions of the Corps being reunited. Haig would have preferred to use the divisions individually to plug holes in the British battle-line.<sup>5</sup> As it was, the Corps played no part in resisting the last great German attacks in the spring — but it was available to play a major offensive role in the Allied advances in the summer. Throughout the final Hundred Days the Corps' four divisions remained together under Currie. The Corps Commander himself was to write later that the Canadian Corps, "while technically an army corps of the British Army, differed from other army corps in that it was an integral tactical unit, moving and fighting as a whole".<sup>6</sup> It is piquant to find Haig, who so resented Canadian national aspirations and thought Currie was "suffering from a swollen head", almost simultaneously taking a strong British national line against Marshal Foch when the latter pressed him to undertake attacks which he thought unwise. "I . . . let him understand that *I was responsible to my Government and fellow citizens for the handling of the British forces.*"<sup>7</sup> To a British soldier of 1918, it seemed incongruous that a commander from a British "colony" should take a similar line on behalf of his country.

From the Canadian positions taken during the First World War there would be some advance in the Second; but in general the principles laid down in 1918 were still applicable in 1939-45.

In the pages that follow, the armed services are dealt with, not in the order of their official seniority, but in the order of their size — which was also in general the order of their share in public controversy. The Army, the largest of the three, was kept in the public eye by discussion of the question of its employment and the bitter national contention over manpower policy; Air Force administration became a matter of public interest as the question of the "Canadianization" of the R.C.A.F. overseas attracted more and more attention; while the Navy, the smallest of the services, was happy in being allowed to do its duty, generally speaking, without its activities becoming in any large degree a subject for parliamentary or popular debate.

Both the Army and the Navy have published official histories which deal with many, though not all, of the policy questions that form the subject of this chapter. Wherever a matter has been adequately dealt with in this way, the present writer has been content to provide merely a brief summary of the essentials, and to refer the reader to the individual service history for a fuller account and references to sources of information. Since no history dealing fully with policy matters concerning the Royal Canadian Air Force has as yet been published, it has been necessary to give fuller attention to that service in this chapter; while Army and Navy questions not dealt with in the service histories are discussed in as much detail as they seem to merit.

## 2. THE CANADIAN ARMY OVERSEAS

In the First World War Canada's overseas Army had been the chief vehicle of the national effort and the national spirit. The country's memories of those days remained strong; and although in 1939-45 the Army shared the limelight with large and active naval and air forces, Canadians still tended to some extent to think of their war effort primarily in army terms. The long period when the Canadian Army Overseas was idle in the United Kingdom was a time of national frustration, and it was only in 1943, and still more in 1944, when Canadian soldiers came to grips with the enemy in Italy and North-West Europe, that the country's spirit found full release. The Army was commanded by senior officers — notably Generals McNaughton and Crerar — whose ideas and attitudes had been formed in the strongly national atmosphere of the Canadian Corps of 1915-18.

In these circumstances, the story of the control of the Canadian Army Overseas is a topic of national significance and even of some fascination. A great part of it, however, has already been told in the Army's history. This can accordingly be briefly recapitulated here, along with a more detailed account of those matters which the authors of the Army volumes left aside as being more suitable for treatment in a book concerned with national military policy at large.

### A. CANADIAN CONTROL MACHINERY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

In the early stages of the First World War, Sir Sam Hughes, the Minister of Militia and Defence, exercised control of the growing Canadian force in the United Kingdom by means of a succession of expedients, including the appointment of a "Special Representative" (October 1914) and an "Acting Sub-Militia Council"

(September 1916). During this period of experimentation in a field in which Canada had neither precedents nor experience to guide her, the Canadian organization in England was characterized by uncertainty, division and confusion, and the limits between the authority of British and Canadian commanders and headquarters were vague — the more so as many Canadian formations and establishments at this period were commanded by British officers. By the autumn of 1916 the Prime Minister Was convinced that "the direction of a member of the Government resident in London" was essential. Late in October the Ministry of Overseas Military Forces of Canada was created and Sir George Perley appointed Minister.\* The reaction of Sir Sam Hughes to these developments was such that Sir Robert Borden demanded and received his resignation.<sup>8</sup>

The new' Ministry ("Argyll House") was the means of enabling Canada to exercise effective control over her troops in England. The Minister set up a complete military staff headed by Major-General R. E. W. Turner, V.C., with the title, in the first instance, "General Officer Commanding Canadians in England", which was changed in the spring of 1918 to "Chief of the General Staff". From the time of Turner's appointment "all Canadian military control in the British Isles was concentrated in a single authority". The administrative situation was now much improved; but there was friction between the Ministry in London and Canadian Corps Headquarters in France and Militia Headquarters in Ottawa, and Argyll House was undoubtedly unpopular with the field army. Static headquarters in safe areas always are, but in this instance personalities doubtless made things worse, the more so as Turner had hoped to be Corps Commander, but was passed over in 1917 in favour of Currie.<sup>9</sup>

With the outbreak in 1939 of a new war, and the decision to send another Canadian expeditionary force overseas, a further decision was required as to the nature of the Canadian control organization to be set up in Britain. As early as 26 September 1939 authority was given for a Canadian Military Headquarters in London, to be headed by Brigadier H. D. G. Crerar as Brigadier General Staff. During the visit paid to England later that autumn by Mr. T. A. Crerar, a senior member of the Canadian Cabinet (above, page 144), Mr. Crerar cabled the Prime Minister, "Anything resembling Argyll House Organization in last war should be wholly avoided." Mr. Crerar apparently believed that Canadian Military Headquarters should form part of the High Commissioner's organization and that its principal duties would be to give advice on questions of policy and to conduct liaison between National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, the British War Office, and the senior Canadian military commander overseas.<sup>10</sup> The reasons for his prejudice against the Argyll House system are not recorded; very probably it was based upon the advice of his namesake the brigadier, who as an officer of the Corps Headquarters of the previous war had strong memories of the difficulties of those days and considered that Argyll House had been "more of a barrier than a link" between the Militia Department in Canada and the Corps in France.<sup>11</sup>

It would not be surprising if Mr. King, the Prime Minister, agreed with the views of the two Crerars. A cabinet minister permanently domiciled in London might have proved difficult to control, and the position of a minister separated from his cabinet colleagues is constitutionally peculiar. At any rate, no new Ministry of Overseas Military Forces was set up. The senior Canadian civil representative in London continued to be the High Commissioner (throughout the war, Mr. Vincent

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\*He was succeeded a year later by Si Edward Kemp.

Massey); but although Canadian Military Headquarters was a very near neighbour of Canada House and maintained close contact with the High Commissioner and his staff, it was a quite separate organization, responsible to the Minister of National Defence (through the Chief of the General Staff), and not, like the High Commissioner, to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. The High Commissioner was nevertheless (more particularly in the early days, perhaps) the channel for communications on high policy between the Canadian government and the Canadian field commander; and his relations with the successive field commanders and heads of C.M.H.Q. were always friendly if hardly intimate.<sup>12</sup>

The functions of Canadian Military Headquarters, including the changes that took place in them from time to time, are fully discussed in the official history of the Army\* and the details need not be repeated here. In general, all routine communications between National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa on the one hand and both the British War Office and the Canadian field headquarters (after April 1942, Headquarters First Canadian Army) on the other, passed through C.M.H.Q. Canadian Military Headquarters commanded the Canadian Reinforcement Units in the Aldershot area and other Canadian static units and establishments in England; usually, also, formations and units of the field army not yet ready to take their places in the order of battle. Broadly speaking, it was C.M.H.Q.'s function to relieve Army Headquarters of all possible administrative matters not relevant to the efficient operation of a fighting formation. C.M.H.Q. dealt with the War Office and other British government departments; Army Headquarters dealt with G.H.Q. Home Forces and other British field headquarters.

Special and unanticipated problems presented themselves. The organization had been framed on the assumption that the Canadian fighting force would be operating on the Continent; but, as things turned out, the senior field headquarters was in England, alongside C.M.H.Q., for four and a half years. The instructions for the G.O.C. 1st Division approved by the Minister of National Defence in 1939 stated, "As regards the relationship between the Canadian Military Headquarters in England and the 1st Canadian Division, the former will exercise no command over the latter, even while the Division is in England."<sup>13</sup> In practice, though not officially, the reverse situation arose. The commander of the field force (from 1939, through 1943, General McNaughton) was the senior Canadian army officer in England; and in his capacity as what came to be called Senior Combatant Officer, Canadian Army Overseas, he was impelled to assume responsibilities not directly connected with training his army or directing it in operations. The Canadian Army's quasi-political activities in England, including policy dealings with the War Office, inevitably fell mainly into his hands. After General McNaughton was removed from his command and replaced temporarily by General Stuart, who was also Chief of Staff at C.M.H.Q. and who came to England in some sort as a personal representative of the Minister of National Defence, C.M.H.Q. became rather more important; and when General Crerar was appointed Army Commander in the spring of 1944 active operations were imminent and he concentrated his attention on preparing First Canadian Army for them and was glad to leave other matters to Stuart at C.M.H.Q. Nevertheless he was always ready to give very firm guidance to the London headquarters in matters which he considered important to the efficient functioning of the field force.

At intervals during the war there was discussion as to whether Canadian-

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\*Volume I, *Six Years of War*, Chapters VI and VII.

Military Headquarters was a "forward echelon" of National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, or part of the lines of communication of First Canadian Army. General McNaughton insisted on regarding it as the latter, and made this point to the Prime Minister when Mr. King was in England in 1941. General Crerar when Chief of the General Staff in Ottawa not unnaturally regarded it as the former. As Army Commander in 1944 he made the acute remark that C.M.H.Q. could perform its functions properly only if National Defence Headquarters regarded it as the rear echelon of First Canadian Army, and if First Canadian Army regarded it as the forward echelon of the Department of National Defence. The nearest thing to a formal official definition was in a memorandum drawn up following discussions between Ralston, McNaughton and Stuart in Canada in March 1942, which stated that C.M.H.Q. would "continue to be the advanced echelon of N.D.H.Q." The controversy as a whole was academic and not very rewarding. In such matters the spirit is more important than the letter; and the thing that is most vital is that all establishments in rear of the field army should subordinate all other considerations to serving that army and maintaining its efficiency for operations against the enemy.<sup>14</sup>

#### B. THE POWERS OF THE ARMY COMMANDER

The limits of the powers which the senior Canadian Army officer overseas could exercise without reference to the Department of National Defence were the subject of much negotiation and discussion. Two main categories of activity were concerned: powers with respect to committing Canadian forces to operations against the enemy; and powers with respect to organization and administration — mainly appointments and promotions, and the modification of army organization as expressed in the authorized "war establishments" of units.

The question of General McNaughton's power to commit his force to action without reference to Ottawa was first raised in April 1940, during the campaign in Norway. Without repeating the detail given in the Army history, it may be recalled that, faced with an urgent request from the War Office for a Canadian detachment to take part in the proposed frontal attack on Trondheim, McNaughton agreed. Having been advised that the powers vested in him by an order in council made under the Visiting Forces Act were adequate to meet the case, he proceeded to organize the necessary force — which as it turned out never went to Norway, since the British plan was changed. He allowed thirty hours to pass after the first British approach before any information was sent to the Department of National Defence. This procedure was censured by the Canadian government, and not least by the Department of External Affairs (whose permanent head was still Dr. O. D. Skelton). The High Commissioner in London was told that the matter should have been dealt with between the two governments, and the argument that the military emergency allowed no time for this was not accepted. It would perhaps be fair to say that there were faults on both sides: that Ottawa took less than proper account of the urgency of the moment, and that General McNaughton underestimated the importance of keeping the Canadian government (which was responsible to the people of Canada for the proper employment of their forces) promptly and fully informed of projects that might involve the forces in battle.

Be this as it may, the incident wounded McNaughton, and the wound was salted when on 1 April 1941 the Minister of National Defence (Colonel Ralston) referred to the matter in the House of Commons and said boldly that employment of Canadian troops outside the United Kingdom was a matter for the government:

the "appropriate Canadian service authority" under the Visiting Forces Act could not authorize the embarkation of Canadian forces "without the authority of the Minister of National Defence". It had so happened that at the moment of the Norwegian affair Mr. King was absent in the United States and Ralston, then Minister of Finance, was Acting Prime Minister. It happened also that McNaughton had disliked Ralston since the latter's previous tenure of the National Defence department in 1926-30 (he told King in 1942 that he had his resignation as Chief of the General Staff written out and would have submitted it had not the general election of 1930 removed Ralston from the department).<sup>15</sup> This personal antipathy doubtless embittered the policy dispute in McNaughton's mind. In 1941, when King came to England, the general spoke strongly to him about Ralston's attitude over the Norway incident; McNaughton's memorandum of the conversation contains the brusque phrase, "Warning that I would *not* accept censure, and that he should be very certain that he was right before he gave it."<sup>16</sup>

In the meantime the small expedition to Spitsbergen had taken place (August-September 1941) under authority given on 31 July by the Canadian Cabinet War Committee (which had only a general proposition before it and did not know the objective). On 10 September Mr. King reported to the War Committee on his discussions with McNaughton, referring to the latter's view that Ralston's statement in the Commons had gone too far in limiting his authority. No immediate decision was made, but during a visit to Britain the following month Ralston discussed the question with McNaughton and subsequently recommended that in view of the extreme need for secrecy in raiding operations the War Committee should now accord the Corps Commander "general authority to act in such cases subject to his own judgment". On 29 October the War Committee agreed that the decision of 31 July should extend to other operations. McNaughton now had blanket authority covering "minor operations", but when the project of the Dieppe raid arose at the end of April 1942 he naturally felt it necessary to ask that the word "minor" be deleted. On 1 May the War Committee agreed to this. The Army Commander (as he had now become) was told that this was subject to the same conditions that had been laid down at the time of Spitsbergen: namely, that the operation had the approval of the government of the United Kingdom, and that McNaughton was satisfied that the prospects of success in the operation justified the risks involved. On 8 May Ralston reported to the Committee that the general had been instructed not to hesitate to withhold approval of any ventures that appeared to him questionable, and the Committee approved. McNaughton's authority over operations had thus been, by a gradual process, very considerably widened. The extension authorized on 1 May 1942 was not limited to the particular case of Dieppe;\* but as it turned out the question of raiding operations never arose again.<sup>17</sup>

The question of the Army Commander's administrative powers can be more briefly dealt with. In his discussion with Mr. King in England in September 1941, General McNaughton asked for more authority over war establishments (i.e. the detailed composition of units) and the right to make promotions up to the rank of brigadier. This, he said, was "to enable decisions to be taken promptly on a vast variety of minor matters affecting detailed administration". In the following spring, before the formation of First Canadian Army, these matters were adjusted in conferences with McNaughton in Ottawa. He was now given power to make

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\*In this, as in other cases, the War Committee was not told the objective.

appointments and promotions up to the rank of colonel (not brigadier); this power extended to C.M.H.Q. subject to the concurrence of the Senior Officer there. He was also given authority to set up provisional war establishments "to cover experimental and temporary organizations and special courses of instruction," and to amend existing Canadian war establishments within prescribed limits as to increase of strength. These powers General McNaughton exercised thereafter. Under the different conditions existing at the time when General Crerar took command of the Army in 1944, they were largely delegated to the Chief of Staff at C.M.H.Q. or (in the case of the powers over establishments) transferred to him by order in council.<sup>18</sup> Crerar explained that he wished to be consulted on details of organizational changes only where they had a bearing on the efficiency of units or formations under his own command. As for appointments, he desired to approve only appointments of the rank of brigadier and above throughout the Army Overseas, and first-grade staff appointments in formations under his own command. (His power over other appointments within his own Army was taken for granted.)<sup>19</sup>

### C. RELATIONS WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES

#### *Concepts and Statutes*

It has been pointed out above that the springs of modern Canadian military autonomy must be sought in the Canadian Corps of 1915-18, and more especially in the years 1917-18 when it was commanded by a Canadian officer, Lieut.-General Sir Arthur Currie. From 1918 onwards the problem of the Canadian relationship to British forces in a possible future war was much in the minds of the ablest Canadian regular officers, and particularly that of General A. G. L. McNaughton.

McNaughton's memories of 1914-18 were vivid. In England in 1941 he remarked that the autonomy of Canada was worked out on the battlefields of France, and recalled that while the First World War was still in progress a group of Canadian officers, one of whom was Major Talbot Papineau,\* had repeatedly discussed the matter and arrived at the conclusion of the need for a larger degree of independence. In the same conversation he made the observation that the "acid test" of sovereignty was found in the control of the armed forces.<sup>21</sup>

In 1926-7, as noted elsewhere (above, page 79), General McNaughton attended the first course conducted at the Imperial Defence College, London. While there he read to the College a paper entitled *The Principles of Imperial Defence: A Canadian Aspect*. To the surprise, undoubtedly, of many British officers, he advanced the proposition that Canadian forces in a future war would, in effect, be in the position of allied forces operating in cooperation with British formations rather than being in a colonial and subordinate position. As revised at a later time, one passage of this paper ran:

As a result of war experience, it is now anticipated in Canada that in any future war in which our forces may take part with those of Great Britain and the other Dominions, the following principles will apply:—

(a) Canadian personnel will be reserved for Canadian units and services, but individuals may be loaned to the forces of other portions of the Empire if required.

\*Major Papineau was a great-grandson of Louis-Joseph Papineau, the rebel of 1837. He was a graduate of Oxford University and joined Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry in 1914. He won the Military Cross at St. Eloi in April 1915. In a famous open letter to his cousin Henri Bourassa (*Gazette*, Montreal, 28 July 1916) he appealed for French-Canadian support of the war. He was seconded to Canadian Corps Headquarters from February 1916 to May 1917, and this presumably was the period of the discussions remembered by General McNaughton.<sup>20</sup> Major Papineau was killed in action at Passchendaele, 30 October 1917.

- (b) That the forces will be, as far as practicable, administratively self-contained with a direct channel of responsibility to the Canadian Government.
- (c) That tactically, while the Canadian Commander will probably be under the orders of the commander-in-chief, he will not be free from responsibility to the Canadian Government for the safety of his troops.
- (d) That initially and in order to facilitate transportation and deployment the British war establishments will be accepted without change, but that Canada holds herself free to modify these establishments in the light of experience and of her own special conditions as found advisable.

With further reference to tactical command it is considered that the position of the Canadian commander will approximate to that of Sir John French in command of the B.E.F. when operating in co-operation with the larger French forces under General Joffre and in this connection regard has also been had to the relations set up in 1918 between Sir Douglas Haig and Marshal Foch which, though in theory amounting to unity of command, was in fact nothing of the sort. The actual instructions to Sir Douglas Haig show that he had in no sense been relieved of his constitutional responsibility and that for his actions, even in compliance with Foch's *instructions*, he would still be accountable to the British Government.<sup>22</sup>

The influence of these ideas and principles which took shape in McNaughton's mind between the wars is written large in Canadian Army policy in 1939-45.

The Imperial Conference of 1930 "assumed", in the light of constitutional changes made or impending, that all the Commonwealth governments would desire to take such action as was necessary to secure "that the military discipline of any of the armed forces of the Commonwealth when present, by consent, within territory of another, rests upon a statutory basis". This was a consequence of the Report of the Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legislation held in 1929, which as approved by the 1930 Conference formed the basis of the subsequent Statute of Westminster.<sup>23</sup> In 1931 General McNaughton, as Chief of the General Staff, Canada, suggested that the Canadian government establish an interdepartmental committee to study the necessary changes in legislation. The committee was duly organized, and the following year General McNaughton took part in intergovernmental discussions in the United Kingdom in the course of which, characteristically, he emphasized that the proposed legislation should make it clear that Dominion forces were as much "His Majesty's Forces" as those of the United Kingdom.<sup>24</sup> From these discussions emerged the Visiting Forces Acts passed under various designations by the United Kingdom, Canada and South Africa in 1932-3, and by Australia and New Zealand in 1939.\*

Being based upon prior agreement between the countries concerned, the British and Canadian statutes were virtually identical. The Canadian act<sup>26</sup> dealt at length with the problems of individual members of the forces, and as we shall see (below, page 248) it had important effects on the administration of discipline. As to the relations between bodies of troops belonging to different Commonwealth countries, the most important section of the act was this:

- “4 (4) When a home force† and another force to which this section applies are serving together, whether alone or not:—
- (a) any member of the other force shall be treated and shall have over members of the home force the like powers of command as if he were a member of the home force of relative rank; and

\*The first act actually passed was South Africa's (assented to 30 May 1932); the United Kingdom's received assent on 29 March 1933, Canada's on 12 April 1933, Australia's on 20 May 1939 and New Zealand's after war had broken out, on 6 October 1939.<sup>25</sup>

†Here "home force" means a Canadian force; "other force" means one belonging to another Commonwealth country.

- (b) if the forces are acting in combination, any officer of the other force appointed by His Majesty, or in accordance with regulations made by or by authority of His Majesty, to command the combined force, or any part thereof, shall be treated and shall have over members of the home force the like powers of command and punishment, and may be invested with the like authority to convene, and confirm the findings and sentences of, courts martial as if he were an officer of the home force of relative rank and holding the same command.
- (5) For the purposes of this section, forces shall be deemed to be serving together or acting in combination if and only if they are declared to be so serving or so acting by order of the Governor in Council; and the relative rank of members of the home forces and of the other forces shall be such as may be prescribed by regulations made by His Majesty."

The act thus provides for two different relationships: "serving together" and "acting in combination". The legal interpretation which emerged in due course was that in the former case the forces are essentially independent of each other; but with the forces "in combination", unified command comes into being and the commander of one force accordingly acquires wide powers over the other. It may be said at once that the normal situation in theatres of operations was that Canadian forces were placed "in combination" and so came under British higher command. In the United Kingdom, however, on the other hand, Canadian forces were normally "serving together" with the British, and were placed "in combination" only when there appeared to be an imminent emergency or when they were given a specific operational role in defence of the country.

It is worth noting that when this legislation was under discussion in the Canadian House of Commons in 1933, its future importance was little recognized. The object emphasized was that of facilitating the traditional peacetime interchange of personnel between the forces of different Commonwealth countries, which was clearly the only one that seemed urgent at the moment. The Prime Minister, Mr. R. B. (later Viscount) Bennett, did it is true remark, "It might well be that if parliament had taken action as required by existing statutes, 'serving together' might be in time of war." Mr. King, as Leader of the Opposition, was troubled lest the measures should constitute authority for sending expeditionary forces abroad. The Prime Minister reassured him, but suggested that at a later time, with the consent of other Commonwealth countries, an amendment might be passed stating specifically that the act had no such effect. This was never actually done.<sup>27</sup>

After war broke out in 1939, the Canadian government sought the advice of an interdepartmental committee on the effects of the Act (below, page 324), and on the basis of its report passed an order in council providing that the Canadian military forces in Great Britain would be "serving together" with the British forces until the moment of embarkation for the Continent, after which they would be "in combination". The same order authorized "appropriate Canadian Service Authorities" — subsequently designated as the G.O.C. 1st Canadian Division and the Senior Officer at C.M.H.Q. — to place Canadian forces in the United Kingdom in combination if circumstances required it. Since it seemed doubtful whether this delegation of authority was legally possible under the Visiting Forces Act, another order in council brought it under the government's special powers under the War Measures Act.<sup>28</sup> These measures laid down the general lines which Canadian policy followed throughout the war. On 29 April 1943 a consolidating order in council provided a new authority for the system that had evolved.<sup>29</sup> The Canadian Army would "serve together" with any other Commonwealth forces with which it was "at any time serving in the same place"; and the "appropriate Canadian Service Authorities" designated by the Minister of National Defence had the right to detail

parts of it to act "in combination" until one of the same authorities directed otherwise (see below). The same day the Minister designated as appropriate service authorities the senior combatant officer of the army serving in the United Kingdom or on the Continent, with respect to the forces under his command; the Senior Officer at C.M.H.Q. with respect to forces in the United Kingdom not under command of the officer just mentioned; and the senior combatant officer of any Canadian military force "serving in or based upon or operating from the Continent of Africa", with respect only to forces detailed by one of the other two authorities to act in combination with other Commonwealth forces so serving, based or operating. This designation, like earlier ones, specified that forces should be detailed to act in combination only when such action was "necessitated by military exigencies of the moment".<sup>30</sup>

The procedure followed in practice in the United Kingdom was that General McNaughton as Senior Combatant Officer, Canadian Army Overseas, issued when occasion required an "Order of Detail" placing elements of his force in combination with British forces. A list of these Orders, with a few facts concerning each occasion, forms Appendix "G" to this volume.

Beginning with the Order of 1 June 1940 issued when the 1st Canadian Division was preparing to move to France as part of the "Second British Expeditionary Force" after Dunkirk, General McNaughton included in these documents a significant new phrase: the Canadian force specified would continue to act in combination "until I shall otherwise direct". The Canadian commander's position was thus greatly strengthened, for he now had the means, in an extreme case, of withdrawing the force from under British command.

#### *Relations in England*

The directive which the Chief of the General Staff (Major-General T. V. Anderson), with the approval of the Minister of National Defence, gave to General McNaughton before the latter embarked for England in- 1939 is printed as Appendix "H" of this volume. It did not go into great detail. It dealt with relations with the British authorities, in the main, in a single sentence, which remarked that all questions of "military operations and discipline in the Field", being the responsibility of the British Commander-in-Chief in the theatre of operations, would be dealt with by the Canadian field commander through the C.-in-C., whose powers would be as laid down in the Visiting Forces Acts. Little was said about relations within the United Kingdom, though it was specified that Canadian Military Headquarters, while maintaining close contact with the British War Office, would "be in no way under" it.

The first question on which there was any appearance of controversy with the British military authorities was that of training. The British Army Council in January 1940 designated the 1st Canadian Division as part of the "3rd Contingent" of the British Expeditionary Force, and indicated that the commander of the 4<sup>th</sup> British Corps would be responsible to the War Office for the training of all troops in that contingent. Although the Canadian C.G.S.'s directive did not specifically mention the training of the 1st Division, it did specify with respect to the Canadian non-divisional troops that even if they were separated from the Division "training and administration of personnel" would be a matter for the Division's commander. This made the intention clear, and the matter was taken up with the War Office. Following a conference with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (General Sir Edmund Ironside) — the first of many such conferences with various authorities

during the war in which the position of the Canadian forces was explained — the War Office issued new orders clarifying the situation. Arrangements connected with "movements, quartering, sanitation, passive air defence and the allocation of training facilities" were to be the responsibility of the commander of the British Command in which Canadian forces might be located. But control "in all matters relating to training policy, discipline and internal administration of the Canadian Forces is reserved for the appropriate Canadian Service Authorities".<sup>31</sup>

This very comprehensive and Satisfactory arrangement formed the basis of the Canadian Army's position in the United Kingdom throughout the war. The rapid and amicable way in which it was arrived at serves to typify the general nature of the Anglo-Canadian relationship on both the official and the private levels. It could have been extremely troublesome. It was in fact, as every Canadian who spent much time in England during the war can testify, generally easy, smooth and agreeable. There were difficulties but they were seldom serious; and they became both less serious and less frequent as the British community and their guests came to know each other better.\*

The story of how the training of the Canadian Army Overseas was carried on under the arrangements just described is told in detail in the volume of the Army history called *Six Years of War*. Here just two points need to be made. The first is that though Canadian Army training was Canadian-controlled, it followed British lines throughout. The Canadian formations were to fight under higher British command alongside British formations; uniformity of training practices was highly desirable. So Canadian training followed the same sequence of stages as British training, culminating in the major exercises staged across England by the British command, in which the Canadian formations played their parts and their senior officers shared with their British counterparts the pain and profit of the comments made by British umpires and directors in the post-exercise conferences. The second point relates to the "training facilities" for which British commanders were to be responsible. Those facilities — including large numbers of specialized British Army courses — were made available to the Canadians on the freest possible basis. The Canadian debt to them is very great.

Training was a comparatively simple matter. The question of the relationship of Canadian and British forces in actual operations was more complicated, and less susceptible of solution by set formulas. It continued to develop throughout the war; but during the long static period in England, though there were few actual operations, the question arose a number of times and some important principles were established.

General McNaughton, we have noted, had formed long before the war the view that, notwithstanding the fact that Canadian forces would have to be subordinated to British higher command in operations, the Canadian commander would still have a special responsibility to his government for the safety and welfare of his own troops. This view was doubtless reinforced by the events of June 1940,

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\*See the booklet *The Canadians in Britain, 1939-1944* (Ottawa, King's Printer, 1945); also *Six Years of War*, pp. 419-24. It should be noted that the Canadian government reimbursed the British government for material and services furnished to the Canadian Army Overseas. This was done by an agreed "capitation rate" per man per day; in the United Kingdom this began at 50 pence in 1939-42 and rose to a peak of 98 pence between 31 March and 30 September 1944. In the two theatres of operations, Italy and North-West Europe, where the Canadian forces were maintained over British supply lines, the rate was 384 pence per man per day. For women (who were not armed) the United Kingdom rate rose gradually from 27 pence to 40 pence (D. Hist 951.009, D50).

when the "Second B.E.F." under the command of Sir Alan Brooke was being formed to support the French. The 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade went to France as the vanguard of the 1st Division, became dispersed over an enormous area, and was lucky, when the evacuation order was given, to get back to England almost intact except for its transport.\* McNaughton's reaction was expressed in a letter to his friend Sir John Dill, who had become Chief of the Imperial General Staff: "I was under no illusion as to the probable result but I was content that we should be used . . . provided we were given a chance to concentrate before going into battle and this, I was assured by Brooke would be arranged."<sup>32</sup> This affair may be considered as forming the background for a significant incident seven months later.

On 22-24 January 1941 G.H.Q. Home Forces (General Brooke being now C.-in-C. Home Forces) conducted a major home defence exercise known by the code-name "Victor". This was a command and signals exercise, in which troops did not actually move but formation headquarters issued orders and directed a theoretical battle in accordance with a scheme laid down by G.H.Q.<sup>33</sup> Headquarters Canadian Corps took part, with the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions under command. In the absence of General McNaughton, Major-General V. W. Odlum, G.O.C. 2nd Division, acted as Corps Commander. After the exercise, Major-General G. R. Pearkes, V.C., commanding the 1st Division, reported to McNaughton that in the course of it portions of his division had been taken from under his command (over his protests) and placed under British formations; in the later stages of the exercise, the 1st Division was divided between four, if not five commanders. It had been, he said, "mutilated and thrown piecemeal into battle". This was evidently the result of orders from higher British headquarters.<sup>34</sup> General McNaughton regarded the matter as important, for it seemed to him to involve his own responsibility for the proper handling of his force. On 31 January, accordingly, he called on Sir Alan Brooke, and laid the matter before him. Brooke accepted his position, and the following day McNaughton wrote to him saying,

I appreciate . . . your ready acceptance of the need for taking appropriate steps to make certain that no such situation should arise in actual operations and your willingness to recognize the position of the Canadian Forces and my own continuing responsibilities to my Government for the safety and proper employment of the Canadian Troops which have been entrusted to my command.

He went on to point out the military advantage of employing the present Canadian Corps as a whole, remarking that if it were not so used a very heavy price would be paid in effectiveness against the enemy. The letter proceeded:

I am naturally most anxious, on grounds both of military advantage and constitutional propriety, that the Canadian Corps should be kept together; nevertheless you will recall my own recognition of the fact that in the special circumstances of the battle of Britain this might not always be best in the general interest and my agreement that for valid reasons our Divisions might be detached, as such, for so long as might really be necessary.

I recall your promise that before any 'instructions' to make a detachment are issued, that [sic] the alternatives will be carefully weighed, and I confirm that under this condition I will accept your judgment at the time; it being definitely understood that a Canadian Division is not to be subdivided except with the consent of its commander and that it will be returned to the Canadian Corps at the first practicable moment; the fact that a Canadian Division is detached will not interfere in any way with the normal system of Canadian administration nor with my right and duty to intervene should the situation so require.<sup>35</sup>

Subsequently General McNaughton circulated to his divisional commanders and (for information) to General Montague, the Senior Officer at C.M.H.Q., copies

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\*See *Six Years of War*, 279-85.

of a letter from General Brooke observing, "I agree with all you say, and have forwarded a copy of your letter to the Army Commanders of Southern and South Eastern Commands."<sup>36</sup> McNaughton quoted the paragraph of his own letter of 1 February concerning Brooke's promise (above) and added a significant instruction :

It is possible that in the course of operations, the situation may develop in such a way that it becomes of definite military advantage to detach a portion of your Division, and place it temporarily under the command of another formation.

Whenever your Division is detached from the Canadian Corps, decision in this matter rests with you. Your action at the time should be guided by one principle, namely, that the resources at your disposal are used to obtain the maximum possible effect on the enemy.<sup>37</sup>

Little comment seems necessary on this revealing episode. Three points are noticeable: the emphasis upon the independent responsibility of the Canadian commander; the belief that a Canadian force would be most effective in action when acting united as a national entity; and the determination that insistence upon the proper rights of Canada shall not result in any conceivable advantage to the enemy. Brooke, we shall see, remembered the affair, and seems even to have exaggerated its significance (below, page 226).

In the early summer of 1942 the War Office was working out preliminary organizational plans for the "expeditionary force" that would some day cross the Channel and take the Germans by the throat. On 11 June 1942, during one of the rehearsals for the Dieppe raid, General Sir Bernard Paget, now C.-in-C. Home Forces, told General McNaughton that a committee [of which Paget would be chairman) was to be set up to direct the planning of the great future operation. The C.-in-C. Dover would represent the Navy, the C.-in-C. Fighter Command the R.A.F. There would be a senior soldier to represent the United States (this turned out to be General Eisenhower) ; and General McNaughton. would represent Canada. McNaughton cabled to Ottawa that he now hoped for the first time to be able to keep the Chief of the General Staff informed of plans for future operations. However, Paget had apparently "spoken out of turn"; the invitation to McNaughton to join the "Combined Commanders" — as the committee was called — never came.<sup>38</sup> But if the British government did not want the Canadian commander in a position of international authority, it did want his troops to fight in its expeditionary force.

The day after Paget's conversation with McNaughton, the Secretary of State for the Dominions asked Canada, through her High Commissioner in London, to agree to the inclusion of Canadian formations in the expeditionary force and asked further that these forces "should be regarded as under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces".<sup>39</sup> Commenting on these requests McNaughton said that he saw no reason why the Canadian Government should not agree to the inclusion of Canadian forces in the expeditionary force's order of battle, but that the phrase "operational control" might give rise to differences over interpretation. "For example", he wrote, "C-in-C might well consider it included at some future time control over discipline, organization, administration, training and equipment, in which matters I consider Canadian authorities should have exclusive control." McNaughton added that his doubts were "prompted by the experience of the U.K., Australian and South African forces in Libya".<sup>40</sup> On 24 June the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa considered the request and McNaughton's comments, and agreed to take the action requested, Canadian authorities retaining control in matters not affecting operational control and unity of command; the

Canadian commander, it was specified, would retain his "right of reference" to his own government. This reservation, including the phrase "right of reference", had in fact been recognized in advance in the Dominions Secretary's memorandum of 12 June.

On 14 July the Canadian High Commissioner replied to the Dominions Office agreeing to both British requests but adding:

The arrangement that Cdn forces would be under the C-in-C's operational control would be subject in each case to the retention by the Senior Cdn Combatant Officer of his right of reference to the Cdn Govt.

It should also be understood that by operational control is meant the general direction of the military efforts of the Cdn troops in combined forces and that such direction will be exercised through, and any task or plan of operation assigned the Cdn troops will be subject to the approval of, the Senior Cdn Combatant Officer Overseas unless otherwise specified by him.

Cdn Forces will be placed in combination under the Visiting Forces Act, and appropriate action will be taken to establish the relationship of the C-in-C of any combined force to the Cdn Force.

It is understood that there would be reserved to Cdn authority exclusive control over such matters as discipline, organization, administration, training and equipment except when in the opinion of the Senior Cdn Combatant Officer circumstances otherwise require.

The detailed measures to establish such relationship and reservations are now under consideration and a communication will be sent with regard to them later.

The Senior Cdn Combatant Officer has been instructed to place himself in contact with the C-in-C designate of the British Expeditionary Force and with him to concert the plans for the employment of Cdn forces. He has also been instructed to keep the Govt of Canada informed of these plans as they develop.<sup>41</sup>

After some further discussion the British government on 3 September agreed to these rather precise Canadian limitations, and expressed the view that "no practical difficulties will arise in the association of U.K. and Cdn troops against the enemy".<sup>42</sup> In the event, this expectation was fully justified.

During the course of these discussions, the Dieppe raid had taken place (19 August 1942). The Anglo-Canadian relationship in connection with this famous affair is described in detail in the Army history.<sup>43</sup> It is enough to recall a few facts here. General Crerar had campaigned actively in London in March 1942 for raiding operations for Canadian troops, and this probably influenced the selection of Canadians to execute the raid. However, no Canadian had anything to do with the actual inception of the operation, the making of the original outline plan for it, or the basic decision to carry it out. (The most vital decision, though a merely confirmatory one, seems to have been taken by Mr. Churchill at a meeting at No. 10 Downing Street on 30 June at which no Canadian was present, and at which, the evidence indicates, the decisive advice was given by Sir Alan Brooke, who had succeeded General Dill as Chief of the Imperial General Staff in the previous November.)\* Major-General J. H. Roberts, the G.O.C. 2nd Canadian Division, as Military Force Commander played, with his staff, an important part in the detailed planning. General McNaughton as Senior Combatant Officer could have rejected the operation when it was offered to him by General B. L. Montgomery (G.O.C.-

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\*Vice-Admiral Hughes-Hallett, who was present, is very positive on this point. Sir Winston Churchill's original memory of the meeting would seem to have been to the same effect, for in the serial version of *The Hinge of Fate* he wrote, "the C.I.G.S. stated that until an operation on that scale was undertaken, no responsible general would take the responsibility of planning for the main invasion". In the subsequent book the reference to the C.I.G.S. is eliminated, and the passage reads, "military opinion seemed unanimous that until an operation on that scale was undertaken. . . ." The book *The Turn of the Tide*, based on extracts from Brooke's diary, makes no reference to the 30 June meeting; one would think that nothing worth chronicling had happened that day.

in-C. South-Eastern Command), but did not, and though neither he nor General Crerar (G.O.C. 1st Canadian Corps) had much to do with making the plans, they both specifically approved them in the final stage.

Throughout the long planning period General McNaughton acted on the principle that he was responsible to the Canadian government for the Canadian participation in the operation, and that his national responsibilities required that he approve what was done, even though as long as General Montgomery was in charge of the operation McNaughton had no official place in the military chain of command for it. It is worthwhile to recall the contention with Montgomery over who was to be present at Headquarters No. 11 Fighter Group, Uxbridge, the only place in England from which the operation could be effectively influenced once it had been launched. The first British intention was to have no Canadian officer there — to act, in other words, as if the 2nd Canadian Division had been a British formation. It was General Crerar who — using McNaughton's analogy of more than a decade earlier — suggested to Montgomery that the relationship of McNaughton to the C.-in-C. Home Forces was "very similar" to that of Haig to Foch in the last war. Montgomery was convinced, and invited both Crerar and McNaughton to join him at Uxbridge. But when the operation was revived after being cancelled, McNaughton instead of Montgomery was placed in charge of it; and before it was carried out Montgomery, indeed, had left for Egypt to take command of the Eighth Army.

#### *Problems in the Field*

When in the summer of 1943 the 1st Canadian Infantry Division and the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Army Tank Brigade, as the result of pressure exerted by the Canadian government on Mr. Churchill, were substituted for British formations slated to take part in the assault on Sicily, General McNaughton issued a formal directive to Major-General G. G. Simonds, the divisional commander. It had nothing to do with the operations ahead; those were the business of the Mediterranean command under which Simonds' men were to fight. It concerned the administration and national status of the Canadian force and its relation to the British higher command in the area. The point is worth making that there was only a passing reference to the highest Allied headquarters in the Mediterranean, Allied Force Headquarters, and none to the Supreme Commander, an American, General Eisenhower. The fact is that there was no convenient legal machinery available for placing Canadians under any but a British higher command; for that the Visiting Forces Acts were adequate. So the directive specified that on embarkation the Canadian force would come under the command of the C.-in-C. 15th Army Group (General Alexander), the senior British officer in the theatre.\* That officer was authorized to place the Canadian formations "under command of armies, corps and other formations subordinate to him and forming part of 15 Army Group as may be appropriate to the operational tasks contemplated".

The necessary Order of Detail had been issued (above, page 213). The directive specified the nature of the use which Simonds might make of the power to place his troops "in combination" or withdraw them therefrom which had been granted him by the Minister's designation (above, page 212). His action would

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\*On the other hand, when late in 1944 command of the 15th Army Group passed to a U.S. officer, General Mark Clark, and Field-Marshal Alexander became Supreme Commander in the theatre, it was considered necessary to place the Canadian troops in Italy under Allied Force Headquarters.<sup>44</sup>

be "such as is in your opinion necessitated by the military exigencies of the moment, and in other cases you will make prior reference to me". The power to withdraw, the directive went on, "is to be used by you only in circumstances that the orders and instructions issued to you by the Comd Combined' Forces do not, in your opinion, represent a practicable operation of war or are otherwise at variance with the policy of the Government of Canada on any matter; provided always that by so doing an opportunity is not lost nor any part of the Allied Forces endangered." Simonds was further told:

7. You continue to enjoy the right to refer to the Government of Canada in respect to any matter in which the forces under your command are or are likely to be involved or committed or on any question of their administration which may require correction.

8. Reference to the Government of Canada will be made by you through me and only when the remedial or other action deemed by you to be necessary has been represented to the Officer Comd the Combined Force and he shall have failed to take appropriate action.

Copies of this directive were sent to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff both for his own information and for communication to the Commander-in-Chief at Allied Force Headquarters and the G.O.C.-in-C. 15th Army Group.<sup>45</sup>

When in the autumn of 1943 the Canadian force in the Mediterranean was built up into a Corps and General Crerar went out to take command, General McNaughton issued to him a directive along the same lines as the foregoing, which however also contained the following passage:

4. You, together with selected members of your staff, will now proceed to the Mediterranean theatre by air with all convenient despatch, and on arrival you will report personally to the GOC-in-C 15 Army Gp.

You will advise him that it is the intention of the Government of Canada to set up the Cdn force in the Mediterranean theatre as a Corps under your comd, and you will request that instructions be issued by him to bring the several Cdn formations and units of 1 Cdn Corps Tps under your comd at the earliest convenient date.<sup>46</sup>

This was a clear indication of the Canadian desire that the Canadian force should serve together as a national entity. It is worth noting that these directives contain no injunction against Canadian formations being removed from under Canadian command or subdivided; but the authority granted the Canadian commanders put them in a strong position to protest against such action if they considered it desirable. In fact, circumstances delayed the concentration of the Canadian formations in Italy under the Corps, and General Crerar made representations to General Alexander. The two Canadian divisions and Corps Troops were finally united under Crerar on the Adriatic front early in February 1944. They operated together as a Corps thereafter.<sup>47</sup> The 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade (late the 1st Army Tank Brigade), however, remained separate. In Italy, where the terrain imposed severe limitations on the employment of tanks, the 5th Canadian Armoured Division contained as much amour as the Corps could use. The 1st Armoured Brigade worked with a variety of British and Commonwealth formations, earned a high reputation, and drew much satisfaction from its varied associations. As fate as the autumn of 1944, when Colonel Ralston was in Italy, he asked Sir Oliver Leese, commanding the Eighth Army, whether he intended to bring the 1<sup>st</sup> Armoured Brigade back under the 1st Canadian Corps. Leese replied that while he would bow to the Canadian authorities' wishes he favoured "mixing up Dominion and British troops" and would recommend against an inflexible arrangement. The matter was not pursued.<sup>48</sup>

In the spring of 1944 when First Canadian Army was, at long last, about to take the field, a detailed directive was issued to General Crerar as Army Commander. This directive is in print,\* and it is unnecessary to quote it at length here. It is fully foreshadowed in those already described. It noted that since it had been agreed that interchanges of formations might take place between First Canadian Army and British elements of the 21st Army Group, appointments on the staff of the Army Headquarters might by agreement between the C.-in-C. of the Army Group and the Army Commander be filled, up to 50 per cent, by British officers. (In practice, the proportion was more like 15 per cent.)<sup>49</sup> The right of emergency reference to the Canadian government was emphasized; the commander of a Canadian force in the theatre not operating under Crerar's command would make such reference through Crerar. The authority to withdraw Canadian forces from "in combination" was dealt with, and the circumstances to be considered before taking such action were set forth in detail. Only Crerar himself could take it; it was not permitted to junior Canadian formations separated from his command. Although a Canadian division and a Canadian armoured brigade were being detached from the Army to take part in the initial assault under British command, "the Government of Canada considers that only the urgent requirements of military operations should justify the continuance of detachment of such forces and the resultant loss of the obvious practical advantages resulting from unified Canadian control and administration".

The directive was discussed and approved by the Cabinet War Committee on 24 May 1944. It was signed by the Chief of the General Staff, Lieut.-General J. C. Murchie. At this time General McNaughton, having relinquished the command of the Army in the previous December, † was temporarily in private life. This document prepared in Ottawa was in some ways more pedantic and more verbose than the forthright papers drafted earlier overseas. Yet those who have followed this narrative so far will have no doubt of its provenance. In all essentials the mark of McNaughton was clear upon it.

To an extent, however, the vigorous nationalism of this directive had been defeated, before it was issued, by a conversation between the Prime Minister of Canada and General Montgomery. On 18 May Mr. King lunched with the general — who was already a great figure in the eyes of the world — at the latter's headquarters in England. King's account in his diary makes it evident that Montgomery spoke a little condescendingly of the two senior Canadian officers serving under him — Crerar, the Army Commander, and Lieut.-General G. G. Simonds, now back from Italy and commanding the 2nd Canadian Corps. He "spoke well of Crerar . . . it would have been better if he could have had a little more battle experience. That there were some things he had to keep advising him on. He then spoke of Simonds as being a first class officer, a little headstrong perhaps, but very quick and able." Montgomery went on to say "that he hoped that so-called national considerations would not be allowed to override military considerations . . . . He said, more or less directly, that Crerar had kept asserting there were national reasons why such and such a thing should be done. He had reference to keeping all the Canadian formations together in the fighting, and, at all times, having Canadians commanded by Canadian officers as against British officers. He said some of the officers had not had the experience that was needed for com-

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\**The Victory Campaign*, Appendix "A".

†Below, pages 231-47.

manding, particularly in the initial assault. That it was dangerous to have lives of men entrusted to those who had not had the needed experience."<sup>\*</sup>

King's reaction, as described by himself, seems to have been mild. He told Montgomery, and it was a statement which many people in Canada would have found surprising, that as head of the government he had always "insisted that no political considerations of any kind should be permitted to override a military consideration". He did say that "our men, naturally, would wish to fight together and might fight better together than under others". Montgomery argued that (in King's words) "emergency in the field might lead to separation and amalgamation, all of which had to be done very quickly"; and he asked the Prime Minister for support. King reports himself as replying, "I will give you the assurance that the Government of Canada will not put any pressure on you for political reasons, or ask that any such pressure be placed upon you where there are military considerations involved." He added however that Canada would hope "that her own men could, as largely as possible, be brought together and kept together", and Montgomery assured him that he understood this point.<sup>50</sup>

On 24 May Mr. King reported this conversation to the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa, including the assurance he had given to Montgomery that Canadian policy was always subject to over-riding military considerations. He also said that he had communicated the substance of the interview to General Crerar. The Committee took no exception to the Prime Minister's report, though the remark was made that since the Canadian view was that Canadians fought better together, the concentration of Canadian formations was also a "military" consideration.

The episode is difficult to comment on. There is something slightly unpleasant in what might be considered an attempt on Montgomery's part to undermine the Canadian Army Commander with his own government and to obtain assurance that would give him an advantage in any future controversy on "national" relationships with his Canadian subordinate. But this clearly made no adverse impression on King, for he recorded in his diary that he had found Montgomery "very much a man after my own heart".

No one can object to Montgomery's general proposition that political considerations should on no account be permitted to take precedence over military ones. Had King been better informed, he could have told the Army Group Commander that all Canadian military instructions had been carefully framed to ensure that insistence on respect for Canadian national identity would not result in military opportunities being lost or advantages conferred upon the enemy (pages 216, 219, and 256). It would of course have been more convenient for British high commanders if they had been able to disregard national considerations and treat Canadian divisions as completely interchangeable with British divisions.† But this slight complication of their problems can hardly be considered a serious military disadvantage, and it was a military advantage of some value to have the Canadian formations operating smoothly together in the national pattern to which they were accustomed.

General Montgomery's somewhat thorny attitude on the matter of the national

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<sup>\*</sup>There was much force in this, though the British tended to make a fetish of battle experience. But the problem existed about equally in the British and Canadian forces that were preparing in the United Kingdom for the North-West Europe campaign. Mr. King, of course, could hardly have been expected to appreciate this.

†See General Crerar's remarks on this subject, 2 July 1944, *The Canadians in Italy*, 451.

responsibilities of the Canadian Army Commanders was reflected in an exchange with General Stuart, a week after the interview with King, which is described in the Army history.\* It turned on the question of Crerar's responsibility for Canadian formations and units within Montgomery's army group but not under Crerar's own operational command. Montgomery wrote as though he feared that Crerar would expect to approve operation orders issued to such formations and units — which no one had thought of. Nor could he refrain from another reference to Crerar's alleged "inexperience". "I am a great friend of Canada and you can trust me to look well after the interests of all Canadian troops. Actually I am not a bad person to trust as I have some small practical knowledge of the business — and Crerar has none!"<sup>51</sup> Stuart tactfully omitted this passage in the extract of the letter which he sent to Crerar. The point of course was not whether Montgomery was or was not a friend of Canada; it was that he had no responsibility to the Canadian government, or to any authority except the government of the United Kingdom.

With the Normandy landings only a few days off, there was no desire to distract Montgomery with a constitutional tussle, and the Canadians contented themselves with stating their views clearly to the War Office, from which Montgomery would take his orders in a crisis. The communication was along the lines indicated by General Crerar to General Stuart:

To sum the matter up, while I consider that you will need definitely to maintain the principle of Canadian autonomy in your intended exchange of views with the CIGS, and to indicate that, in the last resort, my responsibility to the Cdn Government for the employment of all Cdn troops in 21 Army Group cannot be questioned, you would be quite safe to assure him that I have no intentions of allowing that autonomy, and that special responsibility of the Cdn Comd, to endanger a military situation, or to cause bad personal and professional relations between Monty and myself.<sup>52</sup>

In fact, although there were some difficulties between Montgomery and Crerar during the campaign that followed, there seem to have been none over the issues discussed during this controversy. The right to withdraw forces from combination, and the right of reference to the government of Canada, whether by the Army Commander or by Canadian units detached from the Army, remained academic and theoretical; they were never exercised, because they were never needed.

In general, the Canadian formations operated together under Canadian command, and on this basis their cooperation with British forces was smooth, friendly — and militarily effective. The 3rd Infantry Division and the 2nd Armoured Brigade, which took part in the D Day landings on 6 June under the 1st British Corps, remained under that Corps until 11 July, when the 2nd Canadian Corps took over part of the front and they passed to its command. The First Canadian Army in turn took over a sector on 23 July. At first it had only the 1st British Corps under command, the 2nd Canadian Corps remaining under the Second British Army for operations then in immediate prospect; but the 2nd Canadian Corps came under General Crerar on 31 July, and thereafter there were few occasions when all the Canadian divisions in North-West Europe were not under First Canadian Army. An exception was the Rhine crossing operation in March 1945, when the 2nd Canadian Corps came temporarily under the Second British Army, a Canadian brigade took part in the initial assault (24 March) under a British division,† and subsequently the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was under

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\* *The Victory Campaign*, 44-6.

† In the very earliest stage, a Canadian battalion was under a British brigade.

the 30th Corps until the 2nd Canadian Corps could take it over. The 2nd Corps itself went back under First Canadian Army on 1 April, and stayed there until the end of the campaign.<sup>53</sup>

The fact that one of the two Canadian corps was in Italy until close to the end of hostilities, and that British and Allied formations had to take its place in the order of battle of First Canadian Army, contributed to there being so few occasions when Canadian formations were employed outside their own Army. On the other hand, within the overall framework of First Canadian Army, Canadians sometimes fought under British command. Thus in the Battle of the Scheldt during October 1944, the 2nd Infantry Division and the 4th Armoured Division served under the 1<sup>st</sup> British Corps and the 2nd Armoured Brigade under the 49th Division. In the Rhineland in February 1945, both the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions were temporarily employed under the 30th Corps.<sup>54</sup>

The fact is that there was a high degree of flexibility in the Anglo-Canadian operations. Although the principle of national concentration was in general maintained, formations were interchanged when there were military reasons for it, and the records show no evidence of these interchanges causing any friction. Thanks to many circumstances, but not least to the close contacts made and maintained during the long years in the United Kingdom, cooperation between Canadian and British headquarters was almost always easy and pleasant. Witness the comment made in the General Staff war diary of the 2nd Canadian Corps when the latter went from under Second British Army on 31 July 1944:

While there is satisfaction in becoming part of First Cdn Army, there will be genuine regret in H.Q. 2 Cdn Corps at leaving Second Brit Army. 2 Cdn Corps' relations with Second Brit Army and other corps of that formation have been excellent, and while we learned much from them we found our ideas and methods of working already fitted theirs surprisingly well. Three somewhat complicated plans were made and carried out with a minimum of fuss and no serious hitches.

It might be suggested that in these circumstances the rather elaborate precautions, taken to extend the protection of national autonomy over the Canadian formations, were unnecessary. This does not follow. Much British and Canadian money was spent, over the years, in fortifying the port of Halifax; but the guns of the forts never fired a shot in anger, because the place was never attacked. Yet it would be unsound to argue that because of this the money was ill-spent. If the guns had not been there, Halifax might have been attacked. No such episode as the theoretical one in Exercise "Victor" (above, page 215) ever took place in practice; but the complaint made by General McNaughton after "Victor" rendered such a happening less probable. And the fact that Canadian commanders were well known to be armed with the right of appeal to their own government undoubtedly made British commanders under whom they served considerably more cautious in their relations with them.

And yet the "colonial" aspect of the relationship died hard. Neither side was wholly used to the idea of Canada, as an independent country. This appears in the interview between King and Montgomery. Can one imagine Montgomery speaking of United States forces placed under his command in quite the patronizing and proprietorial tone which he used to King? And can one imagine an American statesman deferring to the famous general quite as King seems to have done? To come down to a lower level, one recalls that Sir John Crocker, the commander of the 1st British Corps, flatly declined to obey the first operational directive he received from General Crerar on finding himself under the latter's command.<sup>55</sup>

That directive originated with Montgomery, and it is likely that Crocker's action would have been different if he had received it direct from the Army Group Commander. There may have been something personal in his attitude, for his previous relations with Crerar had not been entirely happy;<sup>56</sup> he no doubt resented being placed under an officer whom he regarded as less experienced than himself; but it is likely also that he resented being placed under a Dominion officer. One would like to know precisely what passed between the two Englishmen in the interview in which Montgomery made it clear to Crocker that the orders Crerar gave would have to be obeyed. Montgomery gave his own version of the affair to Colonel Ralston on 8 October 1944, and Ralston's notes of the conversation are too interesting not to be quoted.

C[rerar]. five Staff Officers.\*  
 No experience in command.  
 Instance  
 Took over 12 noon  
 12:05 wrote long directive to  
 Cr[ocker].  
 Also long treatise on how to  
 beat Germans.  
 Crk had been fighting Germans.  
 Much put out.  
 C[rerar] wrote in must go.  
 He had him (C) [rerar] up.  
 Don't do it that way—lead—  
 see personally.  
 Don't put down plan—send  
 say do it. Let the  
 junior give his views.  
 Had Crk. up. C[rerar]  
 is your comdr.  
 Wrote C[rerar] giving bit of  
 advice. See your  
 Commanders.  
 C[rerar] replied thanking him.

No one can doubt that the advice to deal with subordinates face-to-face rather than merely through written directives was sound. It is interesting however that Montgomery seems to have given Ralston no inkling that the orders Crocker refused to execute were in fact Montgomery's own, and that he contrived to convey the impression that the fault was almost entirely on Crerar's side. Crerar, he said, was "adequate but not a ball of fire"; as an Army Commander he was far from being the equal of Simonds, then acting while Crerar was on sick leave. Incidentally Montgomery remarked that Simonds was "not influenced by national [Canadian] idea. His one idea was to beat the Germans." He added that if Crerar didn't come back and Simonds became a casualty there was no other Canadian in whom he would have confidence as an Army Commander. Ralston was content to say that he preferred not to make decisions in such a matter until he had to.<sup>57</sup>

#### *McNaughton's Exclusion from Sicily*

An episode which requires some notice at this point is the unsuccessful attempt by Generals McNaughton and Stuart to visit Sicily during the campaign

\*Meaning, presumably, five staff appointments.

there in July 1943. The affair is summarized in the Canadian Army history;\* here we can deal briefly with the issues which it raised.

The essential facts were tersely stated in McNaughton's cable sent to the Chief of the General Staff, for the information of the Minister of National Defence, after his return to London:

In the result while we had every courtesy and consideration from Eisenhower, Alexander at instance of Montgomery denied us permission to land in Sicily to see Cdn troops.<sup>58</sup>

McNaughton and Stuart got as far as Malta, but no farther.

Although General McNaughton stated in his later report that his objects were to witness a combined operation for the benefit of Canadian Army training in the United Kingdom, and to be available to ensure that the Canadian contribution to the Sicilian operation was "completely in accordance with the requirements of the G.O.C.-in-C. 15 Army Group", the War Office message to General Eisenhower's headquarters before the visit did not indicate this. It stated that the Canadian government had asked that Stuart and one staff officer should "visit you on 7 July for about one week . . . particularly in connection with organization and preparation of Canadian forces in Canada for later use in war against Japan", and added that McNaughton had asked to accompany Stuart with three staff officers. There was no reference to a visit to the Canadian force taking part in the campaign.<sup>59</sup> Whatever the reasons for this may have been — and security would have severely limited references to the forthcoming invasion in cables — the clearances arranged for the visit were inadequate for McNaughton's purposes, and it is fairly clear that the War Office was unwilling to put pressure on the British commanders in the theatre in connection with it. It appears that McNaughton probably did not see this cable at the time. There is no reference to it in his very detailed report.

As McNaughton's own later telegram indicated, on this occasion the Canadian commander received more consideration from the Americans than from the British. His Personal Assistant's memorandum of McNaughton's conversation with Eisenhower at H.Q. Tunisia District on 17 July contains the statement,

General Eisenhower said that he was very sorry that the Cdn Army had not been associated with the U.S. Army so that he could have intervened and made General McNaughton's visit possible. He said that he was very loath to interfere in the internal adm of the British Army except by suggestion, which he had done. . . .

The account by General Eisenhower's naval aide indicates how embarrassing the American general found the affair. The aide himself, in conversation with a senior British officer, "ventured the query as to how the British had ever succeeded in holding together an empire when they treat the respected military representative of its most important Commonwealth [*sic*] so rudely". It was not altogether a bad question. General Foulkes, who was one of McNaughton's party, writes, "It was obvious from the start that we were not wanted." There were constant difficulties and delays, and "The only time any enthusiasm was shown by the British was when McNaughton asked for transportation to go back to England."<sup>60</sup>

It is evident that the objection originated with General Montgomery, commanding the Eighth Army. He states in his memoirs that he did not want General Simonds, commanding the 1st Canadian Division, "bothered with visitors when he was heavily engaged". But he went to see Simonds and asked him whether he

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\**The Canadians in Italy*, pages 177-8.

would like McNaughton to come, and according to him Simonds' reply was: "For God's sake keep him away."<sup>61</sup> (One could wish that the young divisional commander had given a different reply; but it is worth remembering that, not only was he fighting a battle, but, as he points out, his headquarters had lost its camp equipment in the sinking of a transport and was in no condition to receive a distinguished visitor.) Alexander was unwilling to press Montgomery, and Eisenhower unwilling to press Alexander; and there the matter rested,

On 21 July, after his return to England, General McNaughton had a somewhat unpleasant interview with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. McNaughton's memorandum of it runs in part as follows:

7. At first, General Brooke expressed the view, forcibly and with some passion, that I had no right to visit Cdn troops, and he referred to a case in which Field Marshal Smuts had not pressed his request when he had been told that the South African Division in Egypt was preparing for an operation, and that if he insisted on seeing them, they would have to be assembled with loss of time and great inconvenience. I replied that the cases were not parallel, as I had proposed at the time only to visit troops assembled in reserve in the rear areas near the coast — I mentioned that at the time 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde was concentrated near SYRACUSE and that I could have seen them without inconvenience to anyone. There would have been no need to go near Eighth Army H.Q. or 30 Corps H.Q., or to interfere with operations in any way. . . .

9. I said that I was concerned over this incident as a matter of principle that there should be no doubt that representatives of the Cdn Army would have access to our troops at all times in their discretion — that I must maintain this principle, and that he need be under no anxiety that this right would be used to hamper the appropriate conduct of military operations, as we were just as much concerned as anyone else with the effective prosecution of the war. I said that it was for this reason I had reported the incident to the Government of Canada. I also pointed out the special considerations relating to myself as the Comd of the Cdn Army, which included the formations in Sicily, and that I was fully aware the people of Canada would expect me to at least see something of our troops in their first battles.

10. I think General Brooke realized my position, for he said he apologized for any lack of courtesy and consideration which might have been shown to me in NORTH AFRICA and I replied that there was no question of apology to me personally, and that so long as the principle of my right to visit Cdn troops was not in doubt I was prepared to let the matter drop. . . .

At the end of the conversation, McNaughton referred again to this "principle of the access of myself and other representatives of Canada to the Cdn Army at all times in our discretion", and said that Brooke need have no fear that the maintenance of this principle "would prove any disadvantage". The Canadian recorded, "While I cannot recall that General Brooke made any direct reply to this statement, I was left with the impression that he agreed." The memorandum proceeded, "We shook hands, and he agreed with my final words that the effective prosecution of the war was the important matter, and that all other considerations must be bent to this."

At one point in the interview, there were references to incidents which were now history. Brooke, wrote McNaughton, "referred to the views which I had often expressed to him on the military advantage of keeping the Cdn Army together, and, with some heat, to the letter I had written to him when, in the course of an exercise while he was C-in-C Home Forces, he had detached a couple of our bns from 1 Cdn Div.\* He said these views had influenced him against proposing operations involving only a part of our force — he spoke of Mr. Ralston's insistence last year that battles be found for the Canadians, and he implied that this he would

\*The reference is clearly to Exercise "Victor", January 1941 (above, page 215).

now do. . . ." Brooke also harked back to 1917 and Passchendaele, complaining that Sir Arthur Currie had then insisted on bringing in the Canadian heavy artillery, at great inconvenience, so that the Canadian Corps could fight as a unit, though Brooke had argued that other heavy artillery units were available locally. "In this part of the conversation", wrote McNaughton, "very little sympathy was expressed for the Cdn Army and their difficulties".<sup>62</sup>

McNaughton's attitude at this time was that though he had reported the affair to his government, he proposed to use his influence to prevent it from being made the occasion of a disturbance in Anglo-Canadian relations. He must nevertheless have been surprised at the absence of any serious reaction in Ottawa to his report. The fact is that the whole incident must be viewed against the background of the British military authorities' having already launched, behind McNaughton's back, a campaign to procure his removal from command, and that Stuart and Ralston were prepared to cooperate with them (below, pages 231-4). Brooke had spoken to Stuart more than once in this sense before the interview with McNaughton on 21 July in which the C.I.G.S. showed himself so much less sympathetic to McNaughton's point of view than on previous occasions; he now evidently felt it less necessary than before to defer to the Canadian general.

Looking at this painful Sicilian episode as a whole, one is tempted to say that every major actor in it was wrong, except perhaps Eisenhower. It can hardly be doubted that, constitutionally speaking, General McNaughton was right in claiming that the senior Canadian officer overseas was entitled to access to formations of the Canadian Army at any time; any other interpretation would make nonsense of Canadian sovereignty.\* And yet McNaughton surely chose a bad moment to assert this constitutional right. With the battle for Sicily at its height, the presence in the theatre of a senior Canadian general with no place in the chain of command for the operations could hardly have failed to be in some degree a disturbing element. It would have been better to let Simonds win his spurs without any appearance of interference. Simonds himself recalled later that in England shortly before the operation he heard McNaughton consult Brooke about the possibility of making such a visit, and heard Brooke warn him concerning Montgomery's well-known hostility to visitors during operations.<sup>64</sup> McNaughton's judgement would seem to have been at fault here, and perhaps the episode tended to confirm Brooke in the opinion that he was showing the effects of the load which he had carried so long. And yet, since he had chosen to assert his rights at that moment, it would have been much wiser in the British authorities to accept the situation and permit the visit, begging him to make it brief, as he would doubtless have been glad to do. Had they taken the attitude they did at a time when the Canadian commander's personal position was not in question, it would certainly have brought on an international contention in which they would inevitably have been the losers. It is hard to avoid the feeling, here as in some other cases, that the British generals were still thinking in colonial terms.

About a week after McNaughton had returned to England, Montgomery wrote him a letter which made no reference to the recent difficulty. It is worth quoting at length:

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\*It is worth noting that one of the rights specifically asserted by the Ministry, Overseas Military Forces of Canada, in correspondence with the War Office in 1917, was that of the senior military officer at O.M.F.C. "to proceed at will to G.H.Q., to Headquarters of the Canadian Corps, and to other Canadian formations and units in the Field".<sup>63</sup> There is a copy of this letter, apparently obtained in 1939, in General McNaughton's papers.

My dear Andy

You may like to have news of your 1st Div. They are doing magnificently and are getting a very good dividend from the long and careful training they received in England. They naturally have a good deal to learn; but they are very willing to learn and we have plenty of veterans out here who can teach them. When they first landed they were a bit soft, and felt the heat very much and the hot sun; their operational discipline was not too good. So I pulled them out of the fighting for two days, rested them, and Simmonds [sic] got busy on the discipline side. I then loosed them once more, on my left flank; they have never looked back since, and they have been quite splendid. The Division has fought its way forward with great drive and tenacity, over very difficult country. Before I launched them I spent a whole day with the Division, visited every unit, spoke to all the men of each unit, and welcomed them to the Eighth Army. I have done the same with the Tank Bde. I find Warren\* invaluable as a direct liaison officer between myself and Simmonds. I get their troubles direct and can take action quickly. We had a little trouble between Simmonds and ----- and I had to intervene. Simmonds sacked ----- . . . I imagine there were faults on both sides. Anyhow I stepped in, smoothed the thing out, and ----- went back to his [command].

Simmonds has got to learn the art of command just as his Division has got to learn the art of battle fighting. I shall teach him; and he is learning well. He will be a 1st Class Div. Comd in due course, and he will have a 1st Class Division. . . .

Not the least interesting item in this characteristic letter is the Army Commander's account of his intervention in the "trouble" between the Canadian divisional commander and one of his subordinates. Although Canadian records are silent on the episode, it seems to have taken place on 15 July, while General McNaughton was cooling his heels in Malta. McNaughton, had he got to Sicily, might have assisted in adjusting the difficulty. Nevertheless, these things are best and most effectively done by a senior commander having responsibility for the operations. McNaughton's brief cabled reply to the letter made no specific comment on the incident, but remarked, "I do appreciate the great personal interest you are taking in 1 Cdn Division and 1 Cdn Army Tank Bde."<sup>65</sup>

General Charles Foulkes, who was General McNaughton's senior staff officer in 1943, has lately recalled one incident connected with the Canadian commitment to Sicily that may have some significance. McNaughton, it will be remembered, thought it his national duty to satisfy himself that the campaign plan represented a practicable operation of war before finally recommending the participation of the Canadian force.† For Brigadier Foulkes, as he then was, this involved visiting the War Office on a Sunday late in April to examine the planning files. For Lieut.-General Nye, Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff, it involved giving up his only free day in months to watch the Canadian brigadier conduct the examination. Foulkes remembers the atmosphere at the War Office as hostile. The Canadian division had been pushed into the operation in Sicily by political pressure; and now the Canadian commander was insisting on his constitutional rights in a manner which the War Office staff clearly considered unreasonable. It was about a month later, in Washington, that Sir Alan Brooke opened the campaign to unseat McNaughton from his command (below, page 231 ). The Sicily affair may possibly have influenced Brooke's decision. It must also have been evident to Brooke, from the manner in which the Canadian participation had been arranged, that there was dissension between McNaughton and his own government. McNaughton was now vulnerable.

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\*Major T. Warren, a Canadian officer who served on General Montgomery's personal staff.

†See *The Canadians in Italy*, page 26.

*Problems of Army Employment*

The changing attitudes of the Canadian government on the employment of its army overseas have been discussed at some length in Part I (above, pages 39-43). It is worth while to reiterate here that it was only at moments when Canadian forces were being committed to a new theatre that the government had any real influence over (or even any real knowledge of) their strategic employment. And like other aspects of Canadian military policy, this one was strongly influenced by domestic and political factors. The pressure for action for its troops which the Canadian government — in contrast with its earlier attitude — brought to bear upon the British authorities in 1942-43 seems, we have seen, to have been motivated by press and other agitation in Canada, as well as by apprehensions of the effect of continued inaction upon the morale of the troops in England, and even by representations from the Department of External Affairs that Canada's post-war influence would suffer if her troops did not fight.<sup>66</sup> (Whether enhancing an influence which was going to be slight at best would be an adequate justification for the sacrifice of thousands of lives is perhaps a question for philosophers.)

It is worth noting that in its campaign to get part of its army into action in Italy the government of Canada worked entirely through British channels, and the British authorities exerted themselves to meet its views, even though military considerations might have justified a different attitude. It is curious to find the Allied Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean (General Eisenhower) writing in October 1943 to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, "While the arrival of these troops at this time is likely to cause us considerable embarrassment, General Alexander advises me, and I agree, that, appreciating the political considerations which may be involved, we accept the Canadian Corps Headquarters, Armoured Division and non-divisional troops. . . ." Alexander's own remarks to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff were even blunter:

The proposed move of the Canadian Armoured Division has come as a complete surprise to me. We already have as much armour in the Mediterranean as we can usefully employ in Italy. I should have preferred another Canadian Infantry Division.\* . . . I do not want another Corps Headquarters at this stage. I shall be grateful if I can be consulted in future before matters of such importance are agreed upon. These decisions upset my order of battle which in turn affects my plans for battle.<sup>67</sup>

In view of these military considerations, the British authorities would have been on strong ground in continuing to resist the Canadian government's importunities. Instead, they went to great lengths to meet its views. Canadian policy in this matter, doubtful at best, was made to look thoroughly silly when the government began to ask for the return of the 1st Canadian Corps from the Mediterranean before it had even fought a corps battle.<sup>68</sup> A policy which is inimical to effective national control of the forces (above, page 197), and at the same time is open to criticism on military grounds, has little to recommend it.

We have already commented at length (above, pages 199-200) on the fact that once the Canadian forces were committed to a theatre of operations the Canadian government had no control over the employment of them short of a crisis in which a Canadian commander might appeal against a military task that had been assigned to him. No such appeal was ever made; but in December 1944, when there was a report that the Canadian Corps might be used in an operation

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\*If another Canadian infantry division had been sent from England, it would have left there only one infantry and two armoured divisions, a very unbalanced Corps and a tactical impossibility as a permanent grouping.

against the coast of Yugoslavia, the government instructed the Corps Commander (General Foulkes) that Canadian troops would not be employed outside of Italy without the Canadian government's concurrence. When Mr. King informed Mr. Churchill of this, mentioning specifically that he had given a public assurance that Canadian troops would not serve in Greece without their government's consent,\* there was something of an outburst from the British Prime Minister, who used the phrase "a marked reflection on our credit and honour" and added that there had never been any intention of sending Canadians to Greece. Mr. Churchill had, undoubtedly, been nettled by the widespread criticism, in the United States and elsewhere, of the British forces' recent intervention to prevent the Communist ELAS army from seizing control of Greece. Mr. King mildly replied that his message must have been garbled in transmission — after all, he had merely required that the Canadian government be given an opportunity to consider and approve — and did not change his attitude.<sup>69</sup>

#### *British Influence on Appointments*

The influence of the British military authorities upon appointments within the Canadian Army merits some attention.† That British senior officers should interest themselves in this matter is not surprising; for not only were the Canadian formations to serve in the field under British higher command, but (particularly in First Canadian Army after the dispatch of the 1st Canadian Corps to Italy) large bodies of British troops were going to serve under Canadian command. Even so, the old colonial relationship visibly asserted itself here too, and at least one British officer — General Montgomery — pushed his suggestions beyond what he would have attempted had he been dealing with the forces of an Allied power outside the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, he did not do this without consulting Canadian authorities; his suggestions were worth having; it is evident that careful attention was paid to them, and they probably had a useful effect on the efficiency of the Canadian formations.

Early in the winter of 1941-42 the Canadian Corps moved into Sussex and assumed responsibility for the defence of that section of the English coast, coming under the operational control of the G.O.C.-in-C. South-Eastern Command. Shortly afterwards General Montgomery took over that Command. General Crerar was in acting command of the Corps from 23 December, General McNaughton remaining Senior Combatant Officer Canadian Army Overseas and taking command of First Canadian Army when its headquarters was organized in April 1942. Crerar recorded in 1946 that he had felt that a good many changes in command were desirable, but that as a *locum tenens* he was scarcely in a position to make them.

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\*What had actually happened was slightly different. On 6 December Fred Rose (a Communist member of Parliament who later served a term of imprisonment for espionage) asked the Prime Minister whether any Canadian troops were in Greece; and whether the government would "abide strictly by the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of liberated countries, as enunciated by our ally and neighbour, the United States of America". King replied that as far as he was aware ("and I think I should know") there had been no Canadians in Greece, and added, "I have no hesitation in giving the assurance that this government has no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of liberated countries where that can possibly be avoided." Churchill must have written in much haste, and perhaps under the influence of reports of King's remarks in Parliament rather than of the telegram he was supposedly answering.

†On Lieut.-General E. L. M. Burns' difficult relationship with his British superiors while commanding the 1st Canadian Corps in Italy, see Nicholson, *The Canadians in Italy*, 451 and 606. A passage of Mr. C. G. Power's memoirs, *A Party Politician*, 248-9, concerning a Canadian officer in Italy who was supposedly dismissed and then reinstated, may be a garbled version of Burns' experience. The present writer knows of no such incident as that described by Mr. Power.

Montgomery suggested that he, Montgomery, would like to visit the Canadian formations and give Crerar observations on commanders; and Crerar agreed.<sup>70</sup> The reports on individual Canadian brigades which Montgomery sent to Crerar give a fascinating glimpse of a great trainer of troops at work.<sup>71</sup> A general document entitled "Notes on the Command Element in Canadian Corps", which Montgomery sent to Crerar in March, and Crerar subsequently forwarded to McNaughton, ran in part as follows:

I have now visited every InE Bde and every Inf Bn in Canadian Corps.

I have met and talked to—

Every Brigadier.

Every Battalion Commander.

Every Company Commander.

Every R.S.M.

A good many C.S.Ms.

I have by question and answer carried out a very careful examination into the life of every battalion. . . .

As a result of these visits I consider that certain commanders in the Corps are not fit to hold their commands. I give below the names of these officers, with remarks in each case.

Adverse comments followed on one divisional commander, one brigadier, six battalion commanders, and four battalion seconds-in-command. Montgomery observed that if these changes were made the command element would be satisfactory. "The Canadian Corps will then go ahead rapidly, and no other Corps will be able to touch it." In the following May Montgomery sent McNaughton some notes on an exercise recently concluded which canvassed severely the performances of two Canadian divisional commanders, one of whom was the same officer criticized in March. McNaughton thanked him for his frank statements, which, he said, "are of very great help to me in assessing the situation and determining the steps to be taken with a view to improvement."<sup>72</sup>

A search of Canadian Routine Orders establishes that within a few months almost all Montgomery's recommendations were carried out. The only officers who appear to have remained in command in spite of them were one battalion commander and one second-in-command. Montgomery had remarked that Brigadier H. L. N. Salmon would make a good divisional commander. Salmon was promoted into the command of the 1st Canadian Division on 8 September 1942.

#### *The Resignation of General McNaughton*

The most striking instance of British influence on appointments is concerned with an episode which, whatever interpretation one chooses to put upon it, had the proportions of tragedy: the removal of General A. G. L. McNaughton from the command of First Canadian Army at the end of 1943.

According to Lieut.-General Kenneth Stuart, then Chief of the Canadian General Staff, the question of General McNaughton's fitness for command in the field was raised by Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, in Washington in the early summer of 1943. In a memorandum composed in London in the following November<sup>73</sup> Stuart wrote:

3. In June, 1943,\* Sir Alan Brooke, the C.I.G.S., in the course of a casual conversation at the White House in Washington, made certain remarks on his own volition about

\*General Stuart was evidently writing from memory. General Brooke was in Washington in May 1943 for the "Trident" conference, but he left for the Mediterranean on 26 May. General Stuart was in Washington with Messrs. King and Ralston on 20-22 May.<sup>74</sup> Any conversation must therefore have been in May. One would give a good deal for a precise record of this interview. It is not mentioned in the published extracts from Brooke's diary.

McNaughton to the Minister and myself. This was the first time that any doubts were in my mind as to McNaughton's fitness to command the Canadian Army in the field.

4. A few weeks after this, I received a copy of Paget's report on "Spartan" exercise. This report was highly critical of action taken by Headquarters First Canadian Army during the exercise. It came as a distinct shock to me.

5. I proceeded to the United Kingdom early in July, 1943, for the purpose of proceeding to North Africa, and before leaving the United Kingdom for Africa was told in no uncertain terms by Brooke and later by Paget that, in their opinion, McNaughton was not suited to command an army in the field. Brig. [R. B.] Gibson, one of my Staff Officers, was then in the United Kingdom. I told him what had taken place and instructed him to return to Canada at once. I asked him to convey that information to the Minister with the suggestion that the Minister should come over to the United Kingdom to deal with this and certain other problems that had arisen. I suggested that his arrival might be timed to coincide with my return from North Africa in the last week of July. I was particularly anxious that the Minister should hear personally from Brooke and Paget just what each had to say to me about McNaughton. On arrival in Ottawa, Brig. Gibson reported to the Minister and later to the Prime Minister in the presence of the Minister.

This interview in Ottawa was on 10 July, General Murchie (Vice Chief of the General Staff) being present in addition to Ralston and Gibson. King incorporated a detailed memorandum of it in his diary. This indicates that there was discussion as to whether Canadian Army morale would withstand further waiting for action, and Ralston used the argument that Canada's voice would be less effective in the post-war settlement if her troops did not fight. King continued to contend for the McNaughton position:

R. clearly favours early action for all or most of our men — I believe the other strategy tho' more difficult & harder to endure the sounder to keep Army as intact as possible & for the final blow, — a very strong blow at the end.

The Prime Minister went on to record his impressions of Ralston's attitude towards McNaughton:

McNaughton of course is for keeping his Army intact as possible. He is agreeable to a second division going to the Mediterranean — but here comes the real crux of the situation. It is clear that Ralston wd. like to see Crerar in command of Canadian Corps.\* He has dropped words from time to time making this clear — Is it not true that 'Andy' has taken much to heart the death of his son, — feeling it inwardly, 'she' is outspoken. — Is he not holding the Army too much together, responsible for its not fighting etc etc. — But now the more serious thing — In the Sparta[n] operations, did not Paget's report show that McNaughton and Sansom (?) had not measured up as they should . . . all to be found in Paget's report not yet read by Ralston. He is to send it to me. There was as a consequence a feeling now between Paget & McNaughton with possibility McN. wd. not be chosen to lead Can. Forces in European invasion. . . .

King continues: "It came down to this Should not Ralston go over at once, join Stuart before he (S) came back." The proposal evidently was that Ralston and Stuart should proceed to settle McNaughton's fate in consultation with the British. King discouraged the idea of Ralston leaving for England at once; he could not be spared from Parliament, he argued, especially as the Sicilian campaign had begun that day. Thus an immediate crisis with McNaughton was perhaps averted.

King's contemporary record seems to leave very little doubt that by July Ralston was determined that McNaughton should go, (Who or what had influenced him is a matter of conjecture; but no doubt the discussion with Brooke and Stuart in May had been important.) However, in a memorandum written some consider-

\*This is obviously a mistake for "Canadian Army". This slip led Mr. Pickersgill to misinterpret this passage, and to underestimate the importance of the incident, in *The Mackenzie King Record*, I, pages 604-5.

able time later Ralston said of the interview of 10 July, "I have no notes of the conversation. The substance was that the Prime Minister was very much concerned, as I was. We both felt that the opinions held by the War Office respecting General McNaughton might change, as training proceeded, and that we could not arrive at any final conclusion as to what could be done until I had had a chance to consider the matter on the ground."<sup>75</sup>

In London on 14 July Brooke had a talk with Mr. Massey, the Canadian High Commissioner, in which (Massey recorded) Brooke said that McNaughton, "although a genius in connection with applied science and the development of weapons, lacked many qualities of a military leader".\* When Massey mentioned Exercise "Spartan" Brooke said that exercise "provided evidence in support of his view". He was "nervous" about McNaughton commanding in the field. Massey suggested that he should discuss the matter personally with Colonel Ralston, who would be in England shortly. Brooke professed to have doubts about the propriety of doing this (though as we have seen he had already done it in Washington in May); but the High Commissioner urged him to do so.<sup>76</sup>

In the absence of more definite evidence, the precise reasons for the British officers' views can only be conjectured: how far they resulted from the disappointing performance of First Canadian Army in "Spartan", † from the state of General McNaughton's health, or perhaps even from his insistence upon a degree of respect for Canadian autonomy which some people considered exaggerated. (General Stuart described General McNaughton, in a conversation with the present writer on 6 February 1944, as "hipped" on autonomy and "more constitutional-minded than the Prime Minister".) Brooke and McNaughton had never been as compatible as McNaughton and Sir John Dill had been; there had been friction between them as long ago as 1917, when Major Brooke, on loan from the British Army, was an artillery staff officer at Headquarters Canadian Corps, where Lt.-Col. McNaughton was also serving. It is worth noting that Lieut.-General E. W. Sansom's fitness to command the 2nd Canadian Corps was questioned by the British during the discussions in July 1943, specifically on the basis of "Spartan". General McNaughton was told of this; he had received the same opinion from General Paget immediately after the exercise, but had considered it "a quite inadequate test".<sup>77</sup> General Foulkes states that McNaughton did in fact intend to replace Sansom; but he wished to wait until General Simonds had had enough experience of field command to justify putting him into the vacancy. He feared that otherwise the British authorities would seek to appoint one of their own generals or to break up the corps.

During the visit which McNaughton and Stuart made to the Mediterranean in this same month of July (above, pages 225-7), Stuart mentioned the British views

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\*This phrase is surprising. Many people, I think, would agree with General Charles Foulkes who said to the present writer in 1947 that, although it was difficult to get General McNaughton to devote adequate time to training the Army, when he "got away from Headley Court" (his headquarters near Leatherhead) he was as able a field commander as any he had known.

†See *Six Years of War*, 249-51. To the present writer, who watched "Spartan" closely from the information room at H.Q. "Second Army", attended the subsequent conference, read the relevant papers and talked to many informed individuals, it seemed that General McNaughton's worst error of judgment — if it was an error — concerning it was committed long before the exercise began, when with characteristic optimism he advised employing in it the newly-formed and very green Headquarters of the 2nd Canadian Corps, with its inadequate signals organization. He was thinking, undoubtedly, of the great training value of this very large exercise; not of the influence which it might have upon his own career. It was primarily H.Q. 2nd Corps' actions that were later criticized by General Paget. See, however, the further reference below, page 235.

about McNaughton to Brigadier Foulkes, McNaughton's senior staff officer and a member of the party. Foulkes got the impression that he was being encouraged to pass the information on to McNaughton, but he did not consider that the C.G.S. had the right to expect him to take this responsibility.<sup>78</sup> Stuart himself said nothing to McNaughton, and the Army Commander was not apprised of these British opinions until the following November. One can understand the reluctance of Colonel Ralston and General Stuart to discuss the matter with him, but the fact that he was kept in the dark for six months is surely the most doubtful aspect of their proceedings in the whole affair.

The Canadian Minister of National Defence himself, having postponed his trip to meet Mr. King's views, arrived in the United Kingdom on 28 July. A series of important and sometimes painful interviews followed. On 29 July Ralston and Stuart discussed with McNaughton the possibility of sending additional Canadian forces ("one or possibly two divisions and a Corps Headquarters") to the Mediterranean. According to Ralston's notes, "In the discussions I made it very clear that I wanted it to be clear that sending a Corps to the Mediterranean might result in having to give up idea of Canadian Army, and- this had a most direct bearing on McNaughton himself. He said that the cause was bigger than the man — and that it could be discussed without any reference at all to its effect on him personally." Ralston said he proposed to discuss the project with the British Prime Minister and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The Minister recorded that McNaughton "agreed 100%" on the desirability of getting a corps into action. McNaughton's own notes state that in this interview of 29 July he accepted this idea only on the condition that the corps could be brought back to join the Canadian Army in England "before the date set for a major offensive on the Continent"; but Ralston's record asserts that the General did not suggest this condition until 5 August.<sup>79</sup>

On 30 July Ralston had a conversation with Lieut.-General H. D. G. Crerar, commander of the 1st Canadian Corps, while driving between headquarters; and he recorded that Crerar was "Very strong for additional participation by further troops now in England", and that he commented — perhaps in reply to a question from Ralston about McNaughton — that it was impossible "for one individual effectively to do so many jobs".<sup>80</sup>

On 1 August Colonel Ralston saw Mr. Churchill and put the case for getting a Canadian corps into action, indicating, he says, the following reasons:

- “(i) battle experience for Corps H.Q.  
and for troops;
- (ii) morale of Canadian Army generally  
and troops in U.K. particularly;
- (iii) morale of Canadian people.”

Churchill "said U.K. had commitments with the U.S. and he did not want to appear to be forgetting them by sending troops out of U.K. without consultation". Ralston argued that the troops could be replaced by bringing back divisions that had been fighting for some time in North Africa. Churchill was sympathetic. Ralston's notes contain no reference to McNaughton — or to the possibility of the Canadian corps being brought back from the Mediterranean before the cross-Channel attack. The following day while driving with McNaughton Ralston told him about this talk. The Minister's notes of this conversation run in part,

He gave impression that he had thought more about the effect of the project on the Canadian Army and, in view of that possibility, was viewing the project of further participation with more coolness.

He is doubtful of Brooke's enthusiasm about Canadians. Thinks he is irritated because of constitutional limitations.

He is not so sure about Mediterranean strategy. Feels we must be sure about committing ourselves because it may turn out only to be garrison duty.

He said some people wanted to break us up. I asked who. He did not answer. . . .<sup>81</sup>

On 3 August Ralston and Stuart had a long discussion with Sir Alan Brooke. They found him favourable to the idea of building up a Canadian corps in the Mediterranean and disposed to recommend it to Churchill. Ralston's notes continue:

2. Feels that if Corps went, it would be advisable to abandon idea of Canadian Army. Not much point in maintaining Army H.Q. and Staff to administer one Corps. Even if other Corps came back, would want Army Commander and Staff with battle experience. In preparational stage might do with Army Staff without battle experience, but would want to be very sure that change would be made well before operational stage. Not a difficult matter to constitute Army Staff in short time if required.

When Ralston reminded Brooke that in conversation with McNaughton in November 1942 he had advised maintaining the Canadian Army, Brooke replied that he had thought at that time that this was the desire of the Canadian government. Ralston noted privately that this hardly seemed an adequate explanation. He noted at the same time another remark of Brooke's: "At one stage he said it would of course be easier for him to have Canadians in Corps rather [than] one big group of one nationality. (This may have been said in connection with his opinion that abandoning idea of Canadian Army would be sound from his military point of view.)"

They passed on to discuss the question of the Army Commander. This is Ralston's record of Brooke's statements:

For some time had been worried about McNaughton. Great abilities in research, development, and scientific and technical side of Army organization, but doubtful as to command. Instanced Spartan as confirming these doubts, where McNaughton in his presence ordered Sansom to move across Crerar's line of communication.\*

Brooke said he had a high regard for McNaughton, but "wouldn't feel like" putting a British corps under him. He had been searching without success for a post where his abilities could be used. Ralston's notes<sup>82</sup> conclude;

Matter was left that decision would probably be made in N[orth] A[merica] which would determine whether Canadian Corps would be sent. Then we could decide best man to deal with Army question.

This is a clear reference to the forthcoming Quebec Conference, which however did nothing to clarify this particular question.

This is as good a place as any to insert perhaps the best piece of evidence that is available concerning Brooke's views on McNaughton. It is a memorandum<sup>83</sup> written by Stuart for Ralston on 13 November, 1943; it is "a summary of the views of the CIGS as told to me in our conversations in July and November 1943", and

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\*During the exercise the capture of a 49th Division order revealing "German" intentions led General McNaughton to consider moving the 2nd Corps east across the Thames through the 1st Corps, with a view to making a wide sweep around the enemy's rear. Preliminary orders to this effect were issued shortly before midnight on 6-7 March. Executing this plan would have been a complicated and difficult process, and McNaughton subsequently abandoned it and adhered to his original design of using the 2nd Corps in a sweep to the west. This decision seems to have been clearly sound, but the circumstances in which McNaughton changed his mind are not recorded. His diary establishes that General Brooke visited him on the morning of 7 March, between the issuance of the warning order and its cancellation.

it bears this certificate signed by Brooke: "The above is a fair and accurate statement of my conversations with General Stuart":

The CIGS always spoke very frankly. He said that McNaughton's case had been worrying him for a considerable time. His doubts as to McNaughton's suitability for high command first arose when McNaughton was commanding I Div. These doubts became certainties during the period that McNaughton commanded I Cdn Corps and First Cdn Army. McNaughton, he said, was a good organizer and had contributed much in the way of weapon development. He was more interested in the development side than in command. His command was a full-time job, but his interests covered such a wide field that he neglected his responsibilities as a commander and spent too much time in attending to the other interests referred to. He said that McNaughton did not handle his command well on exercises; he was not a good trainer and seemed to lack both the interest and ability to conduct and supervise the training of his commanders; he was interested in the mechanical rather than the human side of his command; he was excitable and very highly strung. In other words, the CIGS stated, he lacked most of the attributes for high command.

The CIGS was equally emphatic regarding McNaughton's future. He stated that he could not accept him as a commander in the field. He had discussed the case of McNaughton with Paget, with the Secretary of State for War and with Mr. Churchill. . . .

On 5 August Ralston and Stuart again met McNaughton, in what was clearly a highly strained atmosphere. Nothing was said of Brooke's opinion of McNaughton himself, but the Minister reported the C.I.G.S.'s views concerning a corps going to the Mediterranean and the likely effect of this on First Canadian Army. The recommendations made to the British, Ralston said according to his notes, were simply "What all had agreed on at former meeting" (that is, the meeting of Ralston, Stuart and McNaughton on 29 July). To this McNaughton replied, "Given a bias", to which Ralston rejoined that there was no bias whatever. With respect to the question of battle experience, Ralston recorded McNaughton as saying, "by that time Crerar might be in position to take on. It was frequently the case that one man did the building and another got the benefit. It would be a case of 'to him that hath shall be given.'" On the basic point of policy concerning division of the Army there was complete and blunt disagreement. Both sides agree that McNaughton stated that Canadian interest required the maintenance of the Canadian Army; in the words of his own notes, "the important thing for Canada at the end of the war was to have her Army together under the control of a Canadian". Both agree also that McNaughton said that if the Army was to be broken up someone else should be put in command. McNaughton accused Ralston of being "against a Canadian Army", and Ralston in reply recalled his long record of support for McNaughton's policy in the matter. Ralston recorded that McNaughton was in an excited state: "He was quite worked up. His mind was apparently closed, for the time being, to reasoning. He went out rather abruptly with a 'good day' as we shook hands."<sup>84</sup>

Here, essentially, the contention ended for the moment; for later that day \*Colonel Ralston received two urgent cables from Mackenzie King recalling him to Canada for the Quebec Conference. (There is nothing in King's diary to suggest that he was intervening to avert a final crisis between Ralston and McNaughton or even that he knew what was going on between them.) A last conference between the two men on 7 August was more cordial; McNaughton had had a talk with his friend Sir John Dill who had suggested that the Allies might reduce the scale of their Mediterranean operations, in which case there would be no object in sending more Canadians there.<sup>85</sup>

It is obvious that General McNaughton's position *vis-a-vis* the British military authorities was fatally weakened by the fact that at the moment when the War Office began its campaign to procure his removal from command he was engaged

in a very serious controversy with his own government arising from its desire to get a large portion of the long-idle Canadian Army into action in the Mediterranean. Mackenzie King, we have seen (above, page 43), was less devoted to this idea of fighting in the Mediterranean than Ralston and Stuart, Nevertheless, by this period his obsession with the manpower problem was inclining him towards their view. "The more of our men participate in the campaign in Italy, the fewer there are likely to be who will be involved in the crossing of the Channel, which, as Churchill says, will be a very tough business" (31 August). "Then, when the main assault comes, instead of our men bearing the brunt of this assault, it will be divided between the British, Americans and ourselves" (21 October). It was largely on the basis of these ideas that King accepted the plan to send additional troops to the Mediterranean. But he still gave a degree of support to McNaughton against the increasingly evident determination of Ralston and Stuart to unseat him, even after Brooke, in personal conversation during the Quebec Conference, told King that the Army Commander had "become more suited for planning and research than for action in the field". When on 8 October news came that the British authorities were prepared to accept a Canadian Corps in Italy, Stuart and Ralston were disposed to send a communication to McNaughton in terms which might have produced his immediate resignation; but King resisted this, insisting that McNaughton should be asked for his comments and not be "ignored or walked over".<sup>86</sup> Four days later, at a War Committee meeting at which the Prime Minister was not present, Ralston reviewed the events of the past few months and made it clear that McNaughton was not sympathetic to the action proposed; and Stuart, reporting that the Army Commander did not favour sending another division to the Mediterranean unless it could return to England for the future "major offensive operation", said that no such assurance could be given. Stuart nevertheless firmly recommended sending the division. It was now clear that McNaughton and his government were on collision courses.

On 18 October General Sir Bernard Paget, commanding the 21st Army Group, told General McNaughton what changes were planned as the result of the 1st Canadian Corps' impending departure. It was now proposed, he said, that for the invasion the 21st Army Group would be composed for the time being of "an American Army, the Second British Army and a combined Anglo-Canadian Army". The 12th British Corps would be placed under the First Canadian Army. He added that in these circumstances it would be desirable to include in the staff of the Canadian Army a proportion of British staff officers.<sup>87</sup> When McNaughton reported this conversation, Stuart commented on it in terms (reflecting the interview with Brooke) which read into Paget's suggestions far more than McNaughton had said. Stuart's memorandum contained the following paragraph:

I am in favour of this proposal for the following reasons:—

- (a) The British will undoubtedly request that, initially at least, this new Army will be commanded by a battle experienced British officer who will be supported by a number of battle experienced British Staff Officers. Such an arrangement, in my opinion, is in the best interests of Canada and of the 2nd Canadian Corps.
- (b) If, at a later date in the war, the bulk of our Canadian formations were serving in the same theatre, it would be possible to reconstitute a First Canadian Army by utilizing the framework of the proposed Anglo-Canadian Army.
- (c) There is only one practical alternative to Paget's proposal, that is to disband H.Q. First Canadian Army and fit our 2nd Cdn. Corps and our ancillary units into one or more British Armies. Paget's proposal, for the reason stated in (b) above, is the more attractive. I have not given any consideration to the retention of H.Q. First Canadian

Army in its present form simply because it is not a practical proposition; the British would not accept it, This is borne out by Paget's proposition.

Stuart recommended to the Minister that the Paget proposals should be approved by the Cabinet War Committee and that he should then himself go to the United Kingdom and tell Generals McNaughton and Brooke the Committee's views. He added, "I would also like to confirm that Brooke and Paget are still of the same mind regarding Commanders of First Canadian Army and 2nd Cdn. Corps. If they are of the same mind, then your presence in the U.K. would be necessary to settle that issue."<sup>88</sup>

This memorandum suggests that General Stuart had seen in the new British proposals a solution for the question that had arisen concerning General McNaughton, and that he was prepared to concur in the effective dissolution of First Canadian Army in order to solve the personal problem.

Stuart's memorandum was read to the War Committee at a meeting on the afternoon of 21 October, and the Committee was told that it was not likely that the War Office had in view General McNaughton's retaining command of the Army. The Committee, after extended consideration, did not directly approve the recommendations of the C.G.S., but decided that General McNaughton should be asked for his observations upon them. It was recorded however that the Committee's present feeling was favourable to the proposals, subject to consideration of McNaughton's views when received.\* On 29 October the Chief of the General Staff informed General McNaughton that the Minister of National Defence and himself would shortly leave for the United Kingdom to discuss the situation with McNaughton. They arrived in Britain on 4 November.<sup>89</sup>

There was a preliminary interview with McNaughton on 5 November, in the course of which it emerged that the Army Commander thought that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff was opposed to sending a Canadian Corps to the Mediterranean, and Ralston and Stuart said that in conversation with them he had favoured the idea. In the light of the earlier discussion of battle experience, the Minister asked McNaughton whether Brooke and Paget envisaged his remaining in command of the Army, and McNaughton indicated that he believed they did. On the 6th Ralston and Stuart saw Brooke, who told them that he had not changed his view of McNaughton. According to Stuart's notes,

If he were asked by the Supreme Allied Command, when appointed, whether he had complete confidence in McNaughton as an Army Commander, he was bound to say that he could not truthfully answer in the affirmative. He stated that in his opinion McNaughton was not suited to command an army in the field. He said that once Crerar proved himself as a Corps Commander in the field, he would, without hesitation, recommend him to command the First Canadian Army. This, however, would take a few months. If a change of Army Command was made at once there would be no alternative to the appointment of a British Officer. He would prefer to wait a few months and then appoint Crerar.

The Minister said that the C.I.G.S. proposal would be most satisfactory. . . .

Ralston already had an appointment to see General Paget. It was agreed that he would subsequently see General McNaughton and inform him of the British generals' views about himself and that "it was probable that he would not command the Army when it took the field". Brooke told the Canadians that he felt that the "so-called new Anglo-Canadian Army" should retain the name Canadian Army, though it might be necessary to change the number. "He wished to maintain the existing structure, including ancillary troops, of the Canadian Army. It was working

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\*The War Committee seems never to have discussed the matter again.

well and the British had not the means to create another such structure."<sup>90</sup> This was a more practical point of view than Brooke had expressed in the earlier interview on 3 August.

On Monday 8 November Ralston and Stuart had lunch with Paget (who was himself to be removed from his appointment at the 21st Army Group within a few weeks to make room for Montgomery). After some mention of the agreements that were being discussed for adding British staff officers to the Army's headquarters, they went on to speak of McNaughton. Here are Ralston's notes:

Paget said he could not accept McN in the field. He needed the First Cdn Army staff now and McN would be satisfactory for organization and planning up to a certain point. (He mentioned some time early in the year.) Stuart said that Crerar might not be fully battle trained until possibly April. Mention was made of putting in a British commander. I said that would not be satisfactory to Canada, mentioning Alderson and Byng.\* I said that calling it a Canadian Army was not enough. It would have a Canadian Corps and the Army and Corps Troops of the Cdn Army, but that that would not be regarded as sufficient to recognize Canada's contribution unless it had a Canadian in command. We discussed as other commanders Crerar and Simonds. Paget said Simonds would no doubt make a good Corps Commander. Finally Paget said in answer to a question from me that he would accept Crerar any time he could come and that he was prepared to accept him as Army Commander without any experience in the field.

Continuing about McNaughton, he expressed great admiration for [him] and appreciation of his co-operation but felt that he had been under too great a strain to last as Army Commander in the Field. He spoke of "Spartan" and said he believed his report on McNaughton's work in that exercise had been just. He spoke of his trying to do two jobs, one as Army Commander and another in connection with administration of Cdn matters generally. It was too much. And then he had done a lot of work on technical matters. He said that he (McN) had not been the same since he was ill. and since he lost his son, and mentioned "Spartan" again.

Ralston spoke of "my problem as to telling McNaughton". Paget said 'he had himself said nothing as he did not wish to interfere with McNaughton's relations with his government. "Stuart said jocularly you have given us a dirty deal in going on. as if McNaughton would command the show.'" Paget said he felt it was for the Canadians to tell him when they had learned of the British attitude, and Ralston agreed. He felt that McNaughton should be told at once, and Paget said he was willing to talk to McNaughton when this had been done.<sup>91</sup>

At four o'clock that afternoon (8 November) Ralston and Stuart presented themselves at McNaughton's headquarters. The interview with the Army Commander that then took place is perhaps best described in the words of Ralston's notes:

I said that it seemed clear from both Brooke and Paget that what was being proposed was that the Cdn Army should be augmented by a British Corps and have a proportion of British officers on the staff, and that as to command he as Army Commander would continue for the present but I felt it was my duty to tell him, although I found it very hard to do so, that they had made it clear that his continuing in command did not mean any commitment for command in the field. I told him that I was most sorry to have to be the one to bring him that news but I had considered what I ought to do and I felt it was due to him to know the position. He took it like a soldier. Nothing was said by any of us for a moment or two. Then I told him that they had mentioned Crerar. I said that Paget had rather suggested that a British General might be found. He said that would mean that it would only be a Canadian Army in name. I said I had pointed out that that would not be satisfactory to Canada. I had said it was going to be the Canadian Army and I considered that it was necessary that it be commanded by a Canadian. . . . We came back again to command. . . . I said that we owed him a debt for his outstanding

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\*British commanders of the Canadian Corps, 1915-17.

service to Canada and that I knew that not only I but the Prime Minister and my colleagues would want to do everything possible to meet his wishes as to himself. He said we were under no obligation to him. I said that was not what we thought. . . .

He said he was going to make it his business to see both Brooke and Paget at the earliest opportunity and get from them their reasons for their conclusions. Stuart said that he felt that he ought to do that rather than for us to attempt to give them. . . .

Then after tea he came out with us. As he left he said "I take it that I can go ahead and get things lined up" and I said "Yes".

The interview was the most painful I have had since I took over the Department. I was deeply sorry for him and admired the quiet soldierly way he discussed the prospect of losing what to him must have been the height of his ambition and the fruition of over four years of ceaseless faithful, untiring effort.<sup>92</sup>

It seemed that the personal crisis had been surmounted. But there was still to be a violent explosion.

On the morning of 9 November Ralston telephoned McNaughton to mention that the new arrangements with the British should be reduced to writing, McNaughton, the Minister recorded, "seemed quite normal and characteristically energetic". Later in the morning McNaughton called on Paget. Unfortunately the two parties to this interview emerged from it with widely varying impressions as to what had been said or implied. Paget told Ralston by telephone that afternoon that McNaughton "came in very upset". Paget (according to Ralston's notes of the telephone conversation) "told McN that he had been under a great strain the last four years. He had done a great deal of work not pertaining to the job of Army Commander. He had given a great deal of time to development of weapons which might more advantageously be devoted to command. McN didn't argue the matter at all. He thanked him for being frank about it. . . . He said McN went away in a much better frame of mind than when he came in."<sup>93</sup>

Very different was the Canadian general's version as set down the following day. The most important portions of his notes of the conversation (which are part of a memorandum covering the whole episode) run as follows:<sup>94</sup>

29. Paget . . . said that the Minister had taken the initiative in expressing doubt as to my fitness to command an Army. Paget said he had felt the unfairness of the suggestion, but he had in fact said in reply that there was some doubt if I would stand up to the strain. He had said he thought I had had an unfair load to carry over four years and he thought I now might be made "Head of a Military Headquarters in London" or given "a big job coordinating Allied Supply".

30. He said he had felt in a very difficult position and perhaps had not been clear and definite in his replies. He had said that the last four years had been tough, and that I had shown on occasion some signs of strain. I had had "much more than any other Army Comd to bear". He said he had thought on occasion that my "interest in the technical side might possibly be absorbing more than could properly be given without detriment to training and command".

31. Ralston had said that I would continue to comd First Cdn Army, but there was no guarantee I would take it overseas. Stuart had asked about my handling of the Cdn Army in "Spartan" and Paget said he had replied that this had nothing to do with the matter as "Cdn Army had had less criticism than the other" British Army. He expressed great regret and chagrin at Ralston's unfair suggestions, and said something about people being ground between the stones of criticism given in conversation. . . .

41. Paget said . . . he had not the least reserve that we could work together in operations, in fact, he would welcome my continuing both while in the U.K. and also if he were to continue as Comd 21 Army Gp, in war. He repeated with emphasis that it was Ralston and Stuart who had suggested doubts about my fitness to command, not he, and he had felt it was unfair to have pressed him for any opinion under the circumstances.

Paget subsequently questioned this account of the interview by McNaughton in various particulars in a letter. He stated that his own conversation with Ralston

and Stuart began with discussion of the future organization and role of First Canadian Army. "It was later in our talk that the Minister and Stuart raised the question of your fitness to command the Army during active operations. I gathered they were both doubtful about this, and I told them frankly that I was too: that you had had four very strenuous years of command and in addition a great deal else to do which was outside the sphere of any Army Commander, and that the heavy strain had begun to tell." Paget added that he did not remember speaking about feeling in a difficult position and not having been definite in his replies to Ralston and Stuart, and said also that in saying he would be glad to have McNaughton remain in command, "I was not referring to Command during active operations, for which I had already told you, and Ralston and Stuart, that you were not fitted."<sup>95</sup>

One would like to know who, if anyone, was advising McNaughton at this stage. At any rate, the interview with Paget having-left in his mind the impression that the initiative in expressing doubts about his fitness had come from Ralston, on the morning of 10 November the Army Commander sent a cable to the Prime Minister of Canada.<sup>96</sup> It began by recalling to Mr. King that he had twice told McNaughton to communicate with him direct "if any very serious matter arose", and proceeded, "Today I have to report a situation which is beyond my powers to deal with. I have lost all confidence in Ralston and I must say that I can no longer remain in comd of First Cdn Army responsible to any government of which he is a member." After recounting the events of the past few days and describing his interview with Paget in much the terms of his own notes already quoted, McNaughton continued:

V. The situation we have to face is that a Minister of the Crown on whom I have every right to rely for support comes here and by suggestions and suppositions casts doubts in the minds of senior officers of another country with whom I have to work as to my fitness. Then takes their silence or partial replies as assent to the view he has implied. Then comes to me and no doubt to others also and imputes his suggestions to them as a positive statement of their opinion.

VI. I would say Mr. Prime Minister that quite apart from the question of the support which a Minister of National Defence owes I think to a Cdn Army Comd I regard Ralston's action as one of the meanest and most despicable of my whole experience and this is not the first time he has acted in .this way to cause me very great anxiety for the welfare of the Cdn Army.

VII. I have given a copy of this telegram to the Hon. Mr. Ralston and with the greatest regret for any trouble it may cause you I place my resignation in your hands.

On receiving this cable, Ralston again visited Paget, received from him detailed comments on McNaughton's account of the interview between the two men (along the lines indicated above) and then himself sent to the Prime Minister a cable which Massey, the High Commissioner, who was strongly on Ralston's side, assisted him in drafting.<sup>97</sup> Ralston had gone to see Paget in the first place, he explained, "because Brooke had expressed a definite opinion adverse to McNaughton's commanding in the field and I felt I should exhaust the subject by getting the views of Paget who is directly in command of the Army Group of which the Canadian Army is a part before deciding finally on a course of action". He passed on Paget's comments and made the additional remark that McNaughton had sent his cable without seeing Brooke.\* Ralston concluded:

17. The situation created by the terms of McNaughton's cable to you appears, I regret to say, intolerable and past mending. On the merits and quite apart from his attitude towards

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\*McNaughton never did see Brooke. He wrote in his memorandum of the episode that he told Stuart, "I had been through the agonizing performance with Paget and I did not wish to repeat it".

me the cable itself bears evidence of temperamental instability not in keeping with the judgement required of an Army Commander and that coupled with complete inaccuracy on crucial points which our conference with Paget last night discloses makes it necessary for me to advise that I propose to direct, on the 12th instant, that he go on leave pending action on his resignation and that Sansom be put in temporary command of the Canadian Army.

18. My recommendation is that the resignation be accepted.

19. Naturally I have the keenest regret at this sorry turn of events. I hope you will accept my assurance that it was not due to any lack of recognition of the serious nature of the discussions nor to any want of anxious and careful thought nor solicitous consideration for the man involved. While I had to act as I considered would best promote the Canadian Army's contribution to the war, I assured him that you and my other colleagues and I, deeply appreciated his great services to Canada and were ready and anxious to go just as far as we possibly could to meet his wishes. I had hoped that with a further period of command and the avoidance of any sudden dislocation there would be an opportunity to find a worthy place where his talents could be availed of.

In Ottawa Mackenzie King was deeply troubled on receiving these communications; but he was clearly reluctant to admit that the situation was "past mending".\* Immediately upon receiving McNaughton's cable, and before getting Ralston's, he cabled the Minister, "Matter referred to is of such gravity that I think it would be best if both you and McNaughton could be here at earliest possible moment so that War Committee may all share responsibility of any decision. If you agree I will wire McNaughton asking him to come." To McNaughton himself he telegraphed, ". . . I cannot begin to express the distress I feel. I hope you will not find it necessary to take any further step until I have heard from Ralston and I have had a chance to communicate with you again."<sup>99</sup>

Ralston's reaction to King's suggestion that he return to Canada was immediate. He had planned to visit Italy, and since "No member of the Government has yet visited our troops on an active front", he felt strongly that the visit should be proceeded with. He rather assumed, he told the Prime Minister,<sup>100</sup> that King's views on his returning would have changed since receiving Ralston's own remarks on what he now termed McNaughton's "outrageous message". After reading this and Ralston's earlier message, Mr. King replied on 12 November<sup>101</sup> quoting the text of his own cable to McNaughton, and of McNaughton's reply giving the assurance that he would take no further step until he knew the Prime Minister's wishes. King proceeded:

4. I am more distressed than ever at the very painful situation which has arisen. It is obvious that the highest interests of the State must be the first consideration in seeking to meet it.

5. I feel very strongly that, if at all possible, the present situation should be met in some way which will avoid a public controversy. It should not be beyond the power of our joint endeavours to accomplish this. A public controversy would be certain to have disastrous effects upon the morale of Canadians at home and abroad, and gravely affect our whole war effort.

6. If there is any risk whatever that the action contemplated in paragraph 17 your telegram . . . would result in an open break, I trust you will suspend such action until you have heard further from me. . . .

In a further message to Ralston sent later the same day<sup>102</sup> the Prime Minister developed the same theme. It was clear, he said, that McNaughton had been "under a terrible strain" and that it was in this light that his communication to King should

\*Reverting to the opinion he had recorded on 10 July (above) King set down in his diary the comment that Ralston and Stuart had been over-anxious "to get Crerar in McNaughton's place". Neither then nor later, however, did King accept McNaughton's contention that Ralston had influenced the British against him. He considered that the facts as he knew them disproved this.<sup>98</sup>

be viewed. It was important to find means of coping with the situation without its becoming a matter of public knowledge and controversy. Before leaving England for Italy, Mr. Ralston should be quite sure that the existing situation would not be worsened in any way during his absence; "unless a solution can be found before you leave England, opportunity should, I think, be afforded to me and other members of the War Committee to review the situation with you, and I, myself, should have a chance to talk with McNaughton as well as with yourself".

Simultaneously the Prime Minister appealed to McNaughton in similar terms.<sup>103</sup>

4. May I say to you as I am saying to Colonel Ralston that at this very critical moment in the prosecution of the war every possible step must be taken to see that an irreparable injury is not done the war effort of the United Nations and Canada's war effort in particular through any failure on our part to find some means, if they can be found, at all, of coping with the existing situation in a manner which will prevent its becoming a matter of public knowledge and controversy the baneful consequences of which none can begin to foresee.

The Prime Minister added that he believed that "by joint endeavours of all immediately concerned" a way could be found. "You will know", he wrote, "how keenly I realise what your anxieties and feelings are and how anxious I am to be of what assistance I can in seeking every possible honourable means of overcoming existing difficulties and thereby avoiding the appalling series of consequences which otherwise would be inevitable. You will I know agree that the highest interests of the state must be the first consideration in seeking a solution of the existing situation."

Mr. King's intervention appears to have had a decisive effect. His cable reached McNaughton about 12: 15 p.m. on 13 November. That day Stuart lunched with Paget and made the suggestion that the latter invite McNaughton to a "three-cornered talk" with Stuart and himself. At 2:30 p.m. General Paget telephoned McNaughton and invited him to meet himself and Stuart at Paget's headquarters later that afternoon. McNaughton accepted, and arranged for his close friend and associate Major-General G. R. Turner to accompany him, though Turner was not actually present at the interview.<sup>104</sup>

At this meeting Paget read, and handed to McNaughton, the following written statement.<sup>105</sup>

*Interview with Generals McNaughton and Stewart.*  
13/11/43.

We three know each other well and there should be no need for us to finesse against each other. What we are here for now is to speak frankly and to do our best to clear up misunderstandings which have arisen.

I have two frank statements to make:—

(a) the first is that I do not consider you (McNaughton) fitted to command the 1st Canadian Army in active operations. I gave you my reasons for this opinion at our last meeting, namely that you have had four very strenuous years in command and in addition a great deal else to do which is outside the sphere of an Army Commander, and the strain has told on you.

Also your enthusiasm and ability in research and development work has led to your becoming too much absorbed on the technical side at the expense of training and command.

(b) And the other frank statement I have to make is that it was not General Stewart [sic] nor Mr. Rolston [sic] who inspired this opinion: it is one to which the C.I.G.S. and I have been coming for some time, though I had not intended to speak to you about it until I knew what other employment there might be for you & that does not rest with me. I did not know when I met Mr. Ralston and General Stuart that the C.I.G.S. had already given his opinion to them, nor did I know that I was going to be asked for

mine: but that is why I was asked for my opinion: it is not because either Mr. Ralston or Stuart were trying to make suggestions to me that you were not fit to Command an Army in the field. I hope that from what I have now said it is clear that Mr. Ralston and Stuart have played straight in this matter, and that if anyone is to blame it is myself for not having told you (McNaughton) earlier of my doubts about your fitness for command — in the field. As I have said, I did not wish to do so until I knew what other employment there was for you. I am very sorry for the misunderstandings which have arisen and led to so much trouble, and I hope it is not too late to get the matter put right.

After some discussion McNaughton told Paget and Stuart what he proposed to do. What he did on returning to his own headquarters was to send Mr. King another signal.<sup>106</sup> He told him that he had received his cable, "and you may be quite sure that I will make every endeavour to find a solution for the difficulties of the existing situation which will in no way redound to the disadvantage of Canada and the Canadian Army". With this in mind he had accepted Paget's invitation:

3. Paget states, (a) that he and Brooke had come to the conclusion independently that I was not fit to command the Canadian Army in the field and (b) that it was neither Ralston nor Stuart who had inspired this opinion.
4. He regretted that he had not made this clear in our interview.
5. I have accepted these statements.
6. As a consequence of (a) I request that you accept my resignation to take effect at the earliest date which is possible without detriment to the public interest or trouble to yourself.
7. As a consequence of (b) I relieve Ralston and Stuart of the charge I made against them that they had inspired this adverse opinion against myself.

McNaughton added that to avoid controversy and provide continuity he was prepared to carry on until his successor had arrived and taken over, "and to work with Ralston and Stuart to the best of my ability in the service of Canada"; but the interim period should be brief, "as it is of the utmost importance that the officer who is to lead the Canadian Army in battle should take over the helm at the earliest date".

Two final quotations are necessary to complete the record of this tragic affair. One is from General McNaughton's notes of the interview with Paget.

8. At Cdn Army Headquarters I gave Maj-Gen Turner a brief resume of the discussion and the action I intended to take. Among other things, I said that it was quite evident Paget had not been truthful; that my account of our first interview was absolutely correct; that I thought that Paget was probably acting under instructions of higher authority. However, my future action had to derive from the Prime Minister's appeal and Paget's two statements which, while I did not believe them, I must accept. I would carry on for the minimum time necessary but I would make no commitment beyond that.

It seems likely in fact that Paget's statement did represent his real views. He wrote a note to Stuart on 11 November. He sends Stuart a copy of the letter he has written to McNaughton, promises to let him know what McNaughton's reactions are, and concludes, "His telegram to your Prime Minister is unbalanced."<sup>107</sup>

In Ottawa the Prime Minister must have been vastly relieved. On 14 and 15 November he sent McNaughton two cables of warm appreciation;<sup>108</sup> the second thanked him for "the forthrightness and characteristic loyalty of your message . . . and may I add . . . your patriotism". It added, "As to the future I hope you will have no concern. I shall of course greatly welcome any suggestion from you as to what would most accord with your wishes. . . . I marvel at how you have met as you have the responsibilities of the past four years."

It thus appeared that General McNaughton might remain in command for an indefinite interim period. On 7 December, however, he wrote to General Montague,



**A WET DAY AT ALDERSHOT**

Mr. Mackenzie King speaking to Canadian soldiers at a track meet, 23 August 1941. This was the occasion when he was booed by some of his auditors.



THE CANADIAN AIR MINISTER IN LONDON

Mr. C. G. Power at Canada House, 1942. Left to right, Air Marshal Harold Edwards, Air Officer Commanding in Chief, R.C.A.F. Overseas; Mr. Power; Mr. Vincent Massey, High Commissioner for Canada; and Air Marshal L. S. Breadner, Chief of the Air Staff, Canada.

the Senior Officer at C.M.H.Q., "the experience of the past few days has shown me conclusively that I have not the strength left to look after the Army properly". He asked Montague to tell Ralston, who was then visiting the Mediterranean theatre, that "the general interest" now required that someone else take charge. Medical officers who had examined him on 26 November and recommended that he be freed of military responsibility for three months now examined him again and reported that he still showed "definite signs of exhaustion" and should rest for not less than three months.<sup>109</sup>

This raised new problems. However, the possibility of McNaughton not continuing had been discussed between Ralston and General Crerar on 29 and 30 November during the Minister's visit to Sicily. Ralston had told Crerar what had happened and raised the possibility of his becoming Army Commander after a period of operational experience commanding the 1st Canadian Corps in Italy; and Crerar recommended a formula by which General Stuart might be nominated as Senior Officer at Canadian Military Headquarters, London, and Acting Army Commander pending a permanent appointment. After McNaughton asked to be relieved there were several days of uncertainty during which three alternatives were considered: leaving the Army command vacant for an indefinite period, bringing back Crerar at once to command, and placing a British officer temporarily in command until Crerar had gained the necessary experience. Decision was complicated by the absence of Brooke in the Mediterranean. However, on 18 December, after consulting the British Secretary of State for War and the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Colonel Ralston cabled the Canadian Prime Minister from London recommending the above formula concerning Stuart, subject to the concurrence of Brooke on his return. The Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa approved this proposal on 21 December; and on 28 December the newspapers announced that General McNaughton had been relieved of his command on medical grounds and that Stuart was to succeed him in an acting capacity, combining these duties with the new appointment of Chief of Staff, Canadian Military Headquarters. As it turned out, General Crerar took command of First Canadian Army on 20 March 1944, without having participated in any major operations in Italy and without any formal report being made on his capacities as a commander in the field.

Headquarters First Canadian Army thus continued to exist in much the same form as before, and under a Canadian officer. However, the War Office proposed on 4 January that a proportion of British staff officers, not exceeding 50 per cent, should be appointed to the Army Headquarters, and that the Army Commander should be "appointed by the Canadian Government after consultation with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom". Since large numbers of British soldiers would now be fighting under the Army, this was at once agreed to. These arrangements were essentially those made verbally with Brooke and Paget on 6 and 8 November (above, pages 238-9) and confirmed by Ralston later with the Secretary of State for War (Sir James Grigg). In practice, the number of British officers actually appointed was under 15 per cent, and all the senior staff officers were Canadians.<sup>110</sup>

The Canadian Minister of National Defence had showed little disposition to accept the dissolution of First Canadian Army which Brooke had proposed, rather casually, on 3 August (above, page 235). General Stuart was more disposed to accept it; this complaisance came rather strangely from the chief military adviser of the Canadian government. The British authorities never showed much tendency to insist on an army commanded by a British officer, and as Brooke later recognized,

if the Canadian army organization had been dissolved, the British would simply have had to provide, very late in the day, another to take its place. In the unlikely event of the Canadian government accepting a British officer at the head of First Canadian Army, there would certainly have been an outburst from Canadian public opinion. Perhaps it is not irrelevant that without Canada's five divisions and other troops that fought in Europe there could hardly have been a second Commonwealth army to serve under Montgomery.

The McNaughton resignation had confronted Mackenzie King with one of the most difficult crises that he had to deal with during the war; and he overcame it, almost entirely by his own efforts, by a striking display of the political skill for which he is properly famous. It is clear that the last thing in the world he wanted to do was to make a direct choice between Ralston and McNaughton; he resisted the pressure that was brought to bear upon him to do so, and he sought to hold the scales even between them. He did not consult the War Committee, probably because he felt that it would embarrass him by pressure on behalf of Ralston; and when on 11 November he told Power, the Acting Minister of National Defence in Ralston's absence, what was happening, Power did just that.<sup>11</sup> When finally choice was forced upon King, it could hardly fail to be in favour of the Minister as against the General. But he handled McNaughton with such consummate skill and tact that the general left his appointment feeling no anger against the Prime Minister; it was Ralston and Stuart whom he blamed for what had happened.\* The motives that moved King will probably never be precisely known but it is at least conceivable that he was looking ahead to the possibility of another personal crisis. The resignation which the Minister of National Defence had tendered in July 1942 (below, page 401) was still in King's hands. During the McNaughton crisis the Prime Minister wrote in his diary, "A somewhat ludicrous aspect of the whole affair is that . . . literally I have, at the moment, both McNaughton's and Ralston's resignations in my possession."<sup>12</sup> Did it fail to occur to him that in case of further trouble with Ralston, McNaughton was an alternative Minister of National Defence? It is possible that this thought had, something to do with the distinguished consideration with which he treated the general.

Two aspects of this affair call for further comment. The question of the employment of the army has already been dealt with (above, pages 42 and 229). It seems extraordinary, in retrospect, that Ralston, Stuart and others pressed the argument for dividing the Army to the extent they did, in the face of military good sense as well as of Canadian tradition, which was soundly based in the close relationship between concentration of the forces and national control of them. It had apparently become an obsession with them. The historian can only speculate about men's motives; but it seems likely that in the final weeks of the controversy Ralston and Stuart had become fully convinced that the national interest and the interest of the Army required that McNaughton should be removed,† and that this

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\*Shortly before General McNaughton left England he told the present writer that he proposed to find out whether what had happened was the work of the government of Canada or the work of "two men".

†In February 1944, when it seemed that the matter might be further aired in Parliament, Stuart cabled to Ralston, "My opinion as stated verbally to you on more than one occasion was and is that McNaughton's actions and attitude throughout the period of our discussions proved conclusively to me that the views of Brooke and Paget as to his fitness to command in the field were correct. My verbal recommendation to you was that McNaughton was not physically or temperamentally fit to command an army in the field. I felt so strongly on this point that I would have placed my resignation in your hands if my recommendation had not been acted upon." In reply to a question from Ralston, Stuart told him that he had never expressed these views to McNaughton.<sup>13</sup>

question and the question of sending additional Canadian forces to the Mediterranean, the policy which McNaughton so disliked, had become completely identified in their minds. Nevertheless it seems evident that on this question of policy McNaughton was right and they were wrong; and the government may be said to have recognized this fact — long before McNaughton became a member of it, as he did in November 1944 — when it pressed for the early return from Italy of the troops whom it had insisted on sending there.

The personal aspect — the fitness or otherwise of McNaughton to command in the field — is a different matter, and not so easily settled. A. G. L. McNaughton was one of the most remarkable Canadians of his generation. He was a man of vast and far-ranging abilities; he had a singularly vivid and compelling personality; and he was a great Canadian patriot. When he lost the command of the Army he had created he was 56 years of age. He had always worked hard, and he had worked particularly hard in the years since 1939. It is possible that the peak of his military capacities had been reached in the active years 1940 and 1941. In the light of the long and important public career that still lay before him it would be absurd to say that he was burned out in 1943; but it is pretty evident that he was tired. Leaving aside the business of Exercise "Spartan", which as we have seen is arguable; leaving aside the question of personal prejudice, which in the case of Alan Brooke may have been important; reviewing as we have just done the copious record of this long and painful crisis, it seems, to the present writer at least, that there is considerable evidence to indicate that he was hardly in a mental or physical state to undertake the responsibilities of high command in a great campaign. Paget, who seems to have been an essentially honest man, may have been right when he said he "had been under too great a strain to last as Army Commander in the Field". Perhaps, indeed, his abilities had never lain most particularly in the direction of field command. Perhaps the more workaday qualities of the less brilliant but solid Crerar were what the occasion required in 1944.

One further point. At the time when the decision was made General Montgomery was commanding the Eighth Army in Italy; and no evidence has been found that he was consulted or exercised the slightest influence concerning the removal of McNaughton. The decision that he was to replace Paget at the 21st Army Group was taken later and was announced on 24 December. Nevertheless, it seems quite impossible to conceive of McNaughton as an army commander in an army group commanded by Montgomery.

*Responsibility for Discipline*

It will be recalled that in 1918 Canada still recognized that the British G.H.Q. in France was responsible for "discipline" as well as for "military operations" (above, page 204). In practice, in an extreme case this meant that a Canadian soldier convicted of a capital military offence could be executed on the decision of the British Commander-in-Chief. That this actually took place is evidenced by an entry in General Routine Orders issued by G.H.Q.:

*Court-Martial*

No. .... Private .....  
..... Canadian Battalion, was tried by Field General Court-Martial on the following charge:—

‘When on Active Service. Deserting His Majesty’s Service.’

The accused left his platoon when it was proceeding to the trenches and remained

absent till apprehended by the French police behind the fighting area sixteen days later. After his arrest he escaped and remained absent till again apprehended five days later.

The sentence of the Court was 'To suffer death by being shot.' The sentence was carried out at 7.11 a.m. on 7th December, 1916.

There appear to be no official statistics of executions, but General Routine Orders contain at least 26 such entries relating to Canadian soldiers. It is interesting by contrast that there were none concerning Australians. The Australian Defence Act allowed the death penalty only in cases of mutiny or desertion to or treacherous dealings with the enemy; and Australian policy (influenced perhaps by a controversial episode during the South African War) required that the death sentence be confirmed by the Governor General of the Commonwealth in Council. No Australian soldier was in fact executed for a military offence during the war. The different Canadian practice did not go entirely unchallenged at home, and the honorary president of the National Prison Reform Association wrote to the Minister of Overseas Military Forces of Canada in 1918, "This Association is of opinion that the people of Canada are justified in asking that their own Government shall have full jurisdiction over its subjects [*sic*] while engaged in warfare on foreign soil."<sup>114</sup>

Throughout the First World War, although the vast majority of Canadian soldiers tried by courts-martial were in practice tried by courts entirely composed of Canadian officers, there was no actual requirement for this or even for Canadian representation on a court trying a Canadian. The court-martial jurisdiction under which Canadians overseas were tried was that of the King's warrant to his generals as provided in the British Army Act, which in turn was applicable to Canadians in England and France by virtue of the Canadian Militia Act. There was an alternative source of jurisdiction, the Governor-in-Council in Canada under Section 89 of the existing Militia Act; but no attempt was made in 1914-18 to apply this beyond the boundaries of Canada. A curious feature of the situation, reflecting the general uncertainty concerning the status of the Canadian forces, was the system adopted early in the war by which every Canadian officer sent overseas received, in addition to his Militia commission, an "Imperial" commission in the British Army, promulgated in the *London Gazette*. The Canadian Deputy Judge Advocate General overseas (Lt.-Col. R. M. Dennistoun) suggested that this plan was probably adopted to meet a doubt as to the right of Canadian officers to sit on a British' court-martial trying a British soldier, but pointed out that it might be considered "as imposing an obligation to serve generally under the orders of Imperial officers without reference to the wishes of the Government of Canada or the Parliament thereof". In 1919 the Ministry of Overseas Military Forces of Canada suggested that the practice be discontinued, since "it appears. that the King's Commission is the same whether issued in the right of the Imperial Government or the Canadian Government"; and the War Office accepted the proposal.<sup>115</sup>

The constitutional developments of the inter-war period, culminating in the Statute of Westminster and the Visiting Forces Acts, altered the aspect of these questions materially. It may be said that with the enactment of the Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act by the Canadian Parliament in 1933, complete control of punishment in the Canadian forces finally passed to the Canadian government. The most vital portion of the statute in this connection has already been quoted above (page 212). This meant, in effect, that all disciplinary matters affecting members of the Canadian forces serving abroad were controlled by the Canadian government — either directly, through its own officers, or indirectly, by authority *delegated* to the appropriate officer of another Commonwealth country.

In spite of this, as we have seen, the original instructions issued in 1939 to the G.O.C. 1st Canadian Division began by assuming that all matters "concerning military operations and discipline in the Field" were the responsibility of the British Commander-in-Chief, though they added that his powers were exercisable within the limitations of the Visiting Forces Acts.\* In fact, Canadian discipline was largely to be removed from the sphere of British Commanders-in-Chief. The matter is too abstruse to be dealt with in all its legal detail here, but an attempt will be made to present the essentials.

From the beginning, the Canadian Army's disciplinary situation in the United Kingdom was well defined. A Canadian order in council of 13 January 1940 (effective from 15 December 1939) authorized the commander of the 1st Division or the Senior Officer at Canadian Military Headquarters to convene courts-martial and to confirm sentences and have them put into execution. There were material limitations on these powers, however. Section 99 of the Militia Act provided that no sentence of a general court-martial should be carried into effect until approved by the Governor in Council. The new order was not quite so stringent; it gave the officers mentioned the powers of confirmation and execution,

other than, in the case of officers a sentence of death or penal servitude or imprisonment with or without hard labour, or cashiering or dismissal from His Majesty's Service and, in the case of soldiers or airmen, a sentence of death or penal servitude. . . .

These sentences were still reserved for the Governor in Council. The A.A. & Q.M.G. at C.M.H.Q., Colonel the Hon. P. J. Montague (a Judge of the Court of King's Bench in Manitoba who throughout the war remained the senior Canadian Army legal officer overseas, combining these duties with those of other appointments culminating in that of Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q.) explained what was happening, for the benefit of the British Army's Aldershot Command:

The Militia Act which is part of the law of Canada and which has been brought with it into England by the Canadian Force, provides in Section 93 that the Governor in Council may convene courts martial and delegate the power to convene such and to approve and confirm sentence of such.<sup>116</sup>

The situation in a theatre of war on the Continent remained to be provided for. General McNaughton discussed the question with General Lord Gort (C.-in-C. British Expeditionary Force, 1939-40), who said, in effect, that the less he had to do with matters of Canadian discipline, the better he would be pleased.<sup>117</sup> Nevertheless, a Canadian order in council of 14 June 1940<sup>118</sup> provided that when Canadian forces were "in combination" under the Visiting Forces Act on the Continent the commander of the combined force might have the powers of convening and confirming, and that in such a case the limitations imposed by Section 99 of the Militia Act would not apply. However, the military disaster on the Continent changed everything and no Canadian court-martial warrant was issued to Lord Gort. Later that summer the altered strategic situation was reflected in another Canadian order in council<sup>119</sup> which authorized the Senior Canadian Combatant Officer in the United Kingdom to approve, confirm and put into execution any sentence of a court-martial without the provisions of Section 99 applying. Authority for thus suspending the provisions of a statute was provided by the War Measures Act of 1914.

There would be no point in rehearsing every detail of policy as it developed as the war proceeded. When in 1940 a detachment of Canadian engineers was sent

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\*Appendix "H", below.

to Gibraltar, the British Governor and Commander-in-Chief there was furnished by the Canadian authorities with a court-martial warrant authorizing him to convene courts to try Canadians and to confirm sentences without respect to Section 99 of the Militia Act. He was authorized when he thought fit, however, to reserve confirmation for approval of the Governor-in-Council in Canada.<sup>120</sup> In the summer of 1943 a much larger body of Canadian soldiers went to the Mediterranean when the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Army Tank Brigade took part in the Sicilian campaign, General McNaughton issued delegated court-martial warrants not only to the commanders of the division, the tank brigade, and the 1st Canadian Base Reinforcement Group, but also to the British generals commanding the 15<sup>th</sup> Army Group and the Eighth Army.\* All these warrants provided that confirmation of sentences in the same serious cases specified in the order in council of 13 January 1940 (above, page 249) would be reserved for the Senior Combatant Officer of the Canadian Army Overseas. Subsequently, when preparations were being made for the participation of First Canadian Army in the invasion of North-West Europe, a rather different procedure was followed. General Crerar issued delegated warrants to the officers in command of the 2nd Canadian Corps, the Canadian divisions, the independent armoured brigade and certain other Canadian commanders. General Montague, as Major General in Charge of Administration at C.M.H.Q., issued warrants to Canadian commanders on the lines of communication and the officer in charge of Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon, 21st Army Group. No Canadian warrants were issued to the Commander-in-Chief, 21st Army Group (General Montgomery) or to the British Commander, Lines of Communication.

General Montgomery's headquarters questioned this. It pointed out that British troops under General Crerar's command were "fully under him for the administration of discipline, including courts-martial",† and argued that a fully reciprocal arrangement should prevail. The Canadian authorities were unwilling to agree. General Montague suggested that it would be "inappropriate and an anomaly under the principle of command" to have the G.O.C.-in-C. First Canadian Army or even an authority at C.M.H.Q. delegate authority to the Commander-in-Chief and require, as stipulated by Canadian order in council, "that certain severe sentences be reserved by him for confirmation"; moreover, the wide distribution of delegated warrants to Canadian commanders made any action by British officers unnecessary. In any case, the Commander-in-Chief could always direct the appropriate Canadian officer to convene a General Court-Martial to try a particular accused. He could, indeed, if he chose convene a Field General Court Martial of his own volition — for courts of this special type were convened under the provisions of the Army Act for active service conditions and not through warrants.<sup>122</sup> The British feared that if British and Canadian soldiers accused of the same or similar offences were not tried by the same court there might be some danger of different scales of punishment growing up. It was in the rear areas that these possibilities seemed chiefly to present themselves; and General Montague took the view that such difficulties could be avoided by maintaining close contact between the officer in charge of Canadian Section G.H.Q. 1st Echelon and the British officer commanding the Lines of Communication.<sup>123</sup>

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\*When new warrants were issued in June 1944, as the result of passage of a new Canadian order in council, the British commanders did not receive them.<sup>121</sup>

†Confirmation of death sentences was reserved in the traditional British manner to the Commander-in-Chief in the field (i.e. General Montgomery).

It is evident that as the war proceeded the tendency was to give less and less encouragement to British authorities to concern themselves with Canadian discipline. It is evident also that where only small Canadian detachments were present, wide disciplinary powers were conceded to the British commander under whom they were serving. Thus the Governor and Commander-in-Chief at Gibraltar was given unlimited powers of confirmation in the case of courts-martial trying personnel of the Canadian detachment there. (In practice, in very serious cases he would probably have reserved sentences for approval of higher Canadian authority.) On the other hand, where a larger Canadian force was present, power of punishment was increasingly reserved to Canadian commanders. It is interesting that in the case of the force sent to Hong Kong in 1941 — basically, two battalions, under a brigadier — no Canadian court-martial warrant was issued to the British commander-in-chief, and powers of punishment over members of the Canadian force were therefore restricted to its own officers, subject to the reservation of the power of confirmation in serious cases to the Governor-in-Council in Canada.<sup>124</sup>

A word must be said on the special question of the imposition of the death penalty.

In the Second World War Canadian policy in this unpleasant matter tended to be assimilated in some degree to Australian policy in 1914-18 (above, page 248). For one thing, by the latter part of the war the confirmation and execution of death sentences were exclusively reserved, not only to Canadian authorities, but to the Governor-in-Council in Ottawa; for another, the sentence of death, though not abandoned,\* was much less frequently imposed than in the First World War.

It is obvious that there had been advances both in public opinion and in neuropsychiatric science on this matter, which were reflected in military practice. Many situations which in 1914-18 would have been treated as disciplinary matters were dealt with in 1939-45 through medical channels as "exhaustion" cases.<sup>125</sup> In contrast with the earlier war, in the Second World War not a single member of the three Canadian fighting services was executed for a military offence. Only one individual — a soldier serving in Italy — was executed after conviction by a court-martial; and he had been convicted of "When on Active Service, Committing a Civil Offence, that is to say, Murder". The sentence was confirmed by the Governor General in Council, through the medium of an order in council;<sup>126</sup> and the unfortunate man was shot at Avellino on 5 July 1945.†

There was considerable discussion at various times of where the responsibility for confirmation of death sentences should lie. In the beginning, as we have seen (above, page 249) all serious sentences were reserved for confirmation in Ottawa; subsequently this limitation was entirely withdrawn, and the Senior Combatant Officer, Canadian Army Overseas, for a time possessed the right to confirm all court-martial sentences, including death sentences had there been any.‡ But in July 1942 an order in council<sup>128</sup> dealing with R.C.A.F. courts-martial reserved confirmation in all serious cases for the Governor in Council. Thereafter there was

\*Throughout the war, by virtue of a section in the Militia Act, the (British) Army Act, and the penalties for military offences which it imposed, were the law in the Canadian Army. Only in 1950 did a new National Defence Act introduce a distinctively Canadian Code of Service Discipline, applicable to all three services.

†The murder apparently took place on 1 November 1944. Both the murderer and the victim were members of a gang of deserters operating in and around Rome.

‡In the United Kingdom the Canadian Army accepted the jurisdiction of British civil courts in connection with civil offences, and six Canadian soldiers were convicted of murder and hanged by the judgement of such courts.<sup>127</sup>

pressure to bring Army policy into line with this Air Force practice, so far at least as the death penalty was concerned. Generals McNaughton, Crerar and Montague all expressed the view that the right of confirmation of death sentences should be retained overseas: there might be occasions when rapid confirmation would be desirable, and Canadian officers should not be armed with powers less extensive than those possessed by British officers serving alongside them.<sup>129</sup> Nevertheless, the view of the legal authorities in Ottawa prevailed, and on 18 May 1944 an order in council<sup>130</sup> was made which contained this provision:

7. Where a sentence of death has been passed by a Court-Martial held under Canadian military law, the Governor in Council, or such other authority as may from time to time be designated by the Governor in Council, shall have the exclusive power to confirm both the finding and sentence of such Court-Martial. . . .

### 3. THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE OVERSEAS\*

#### A. RESULTS OF THE AIR TRAINING PLAN AGREEMENT

The story of the Royal Canadian Air Force overseas, and its relations to the Royal Air Force and the British Air Ministry, are inseparably connected with the history of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. In Part I of this volume we described in detail the origins of the Plan, and commented briefly upon the ill-effects of the agreement of 1939 — dominated as it was on the Canadian side largely by considerations of financial economy — upon the status of the R.C.A.F. overseas (above, pages 17-29 and 201). The arrangements made in December 1939 resulted in a long series of frustrations, which form the basic subject of the pages that follow. These apparently unending policy difficulties stand in curious contrast with the brilliant story of R.C.A.F. fighting in the field.

We have seen (above, pages 23-5) that the Prime Minister of Canada desired that the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan should be, not merely Canada's chief contribution to the air war, but her chief military contribution to the war as a whole. The Plan presented the Royal Canadian Air Force with a vast problem. On the eve of war the R.C.A.F. was straining all its resources to set up a programme for training about 125 pilots a year, of whom 50 would be for the R.A.F. (above, page 89). Under the B.C.A.T.P. it was now asked to produce some 1460 trained aircrew every four weeks (above, page 28). The training organization was to begin functioning on 29 April 1940, just over four months after the signing of the B.C.A.T.P. agreement, and all the proposed 58 schools were to be active by the end of 1942. Preparatory work on construction tasks began even before the agreement was signed,<sup>131</sup> and many young flyers in the R.C.A.F., who at the beginning of the war had looked forward to taking their places in the front-line defense of freedom overseas, reluctantly turned to the task of teaching others to fly.

Preoccupation with the training plan did not imply that the R.C.A.F. had resigned itself to performing a mere training role for the duration of the war. We have seen (above, page 18) how when a very large training scheme was first spoken of, in mid-September 1939, Air Vice-Marshal Croil, the Chief of the Air Staff, recommended against sending any R.C.A.F. personnel overseas in the near future. He was, nevertheless, strongly convinced of the importance of Canada

\*The first draft of this section was written by Mr. F. J. Hatch, and although it has been much altered and expanded in the course of revision it was an essential contribution for which I am most grateful.

placing fighting air units of her own in the field; and on 23 November 1939, when the discussions on the B.C.A.T.P. were approaching the point of agreement, he sent a memorandum<sup>132</sup> to the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Rogers) arguing that it was essential that the R.C.A.F. "should participate in overseas war activities and not be restricted entirely to Home Defence and training activities". He wrote,

The Training Scheme will prepare Canadians for combatant duties in the air but if Canada has no squadrons overseas, the work of the individuals will be merged in the R.A.F. We have every reason to expect that Canadians will do well in the air. If they can serve in Canadian squadrons they will bring credit to Canada as a nation, and build up tradition for the R.C.A.F. and their squadrons.

There were plans already for an Army Cooperation Wing of a headquarters and three squadrons to cooperate with the Canadian Army. Croil now recommended an additional programme of formations and units to be formed "progressively as the Training Scheme develops": an "Overseas Command Headquarters, R.C.A.F. to operate under R.A.F. Headquarters in the field"; a bomber group headquarters, with under its command three wing headquarters and six bomber squadrons; and a fighter group headquarters, similarly with three wing headquarters and six fighter squadrons under it.

On the question of how these units should be provided, the Chief of the Air Staff saw two possibilities: first, R.C.A.F. squadrons in which the flying personnel would be Canadian but the ground personnel R.A.F., and, secondly, R.C.A.F. formations and units in which all personnel would be Canadian, "the administrative and ground personnel being released from Training Scheme duties in Canada by the exchange of R.A.F. personnel who have already had overseas service". Croil, only too well acquainted with the contemporary financial views of his government, wrote, "It is appreciated that the Training Scheme involves such a large financial commitment as to preclude any scheme for R.C.A.F. participation overseas which would involve any considerable additional financial commitment, but it is thought that a suitable plan can be evolved in co-operation with the R.A.F." He added:

As the proposed R.C.A.F. effort in the Training Scheme is equivalent to the maintenance of at least 50 squadrons in the field, it is not unreasonable to ask the R.A.F. to co-operate in arranging and financing a token R.C.A.F. Overseas Force.

Specifically, the C.A.S. recommended that the personnel for his proposed formations and units be released from the Air Training Plan by exchanging them with R.A.F. personnel with service in the field, and further,

- “(c) That the squadrons be equipped by the R.A.F.
- “(d) That the R.A.F. meet all cost of the formations and units as if they were R.A.F. formations and units, paying the personnel at R.A.F. rates.
- “(e) That the R.C.A.F. pay the personnel the difference between R.C.A.F. and R.A.F. rates.
- “(f) That the R.C.A.F. pay the cost of transporting exchange personnel to Canada and R.A.F. [R.C.A.F.?] personnel overseas.”

Mr. Rogers and his colleagues were generally sympathetic to Croil's point of view, and as we have seen they sought in the last stages of the negotiations for the B.C.A.T.P. agreement to ensure the creation of R.C.A.F. units overseas. In the long run, however, it was to prove unfortunate that the government, while adopting Croil's financial formula, did not put forward his or some similar specific programme for the creation of bomber and fighter formations and units. Partly because this matter was left vague, and partly because of the government's fear of financial commitments, the pursuit of the ideal of a national air force overseas was to prove a long and complicated business.

The launching of the training plan clearly made it impossible for Canada to dispatch to the United Kingdom a self-contained air contingent analogous to the Army's 1st Division, whose first flight, as we have seen, arrived there the day the B.C.A.T.P. agreement was signed (above, page 28). Precisely how Canadian graduates of the plan would be organized in the field was left for decision in later negotiations. In the meantime, as already noted (above, page 29) No. 110 (Army Cooperation) Squadron, R.C.A.F., was sent overseas, supposedly to work with the 1st Division.<sup>133</sup> Unlike the squadrons formed later from graduates of the plan under Article 15 Of the agreement, No. 110, and the two squadrons which followed it in June 1940, remained entirely Canadian financial responsibilities.

The decision to send No. 110 Squadron overseas precipitated the establishment of an R.C.A.F. headquarters in the United Kingdom. The Overseas Headquarters came into official existence in London on 1 January 1940, absorbing both the staff and the functions of the Air Liaison Office which had existed there since 1919 (above, page 76). The Air Liaison Officer, Wing Commander F. V. Heakes, continued in charge until 7 March, when Group Captain G. V. Walsh, who had been appointed Officer commanding R.C.A.F. in Great Britain,\* took up the appointment.

The legal relationship between the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Royal Air Force, like that between the Canadian and the British Armies, was governed by the Visiting Forces Acts of 1933, which have already been described (above, pages 211 ff.). These statutes figure as prominently in the wartime history of the R.C.A.F. as in that of the Army, though sometimes more in the breach than in the observance. There was a difference of opinion on the application of them in the beginning. When it was pointed out that the relevant Canadian order in council provided that Canadian ground and air forces should "serve together" with British forces in the United Kingdom, and be placed "in combination" on moving to the Continent, the British Air Ministry suggested (3 February 1940) that "in the circumstances in which Air Forces are operating, it is unnecessary and not realistic to maintain any distinction between those in the United Kingdom and those on the Continent of Europe". This would have meant that R.C.A.F. units arriving in the United Kingdom would immediately pass under the command of senior R.A.F. officers. After discussion between Canada House and the Dominions Office, the Air Ministry issued an Order (8 March 1940) accepting the principle of the Canadian order in council. In these circumstances, No. 110 Squadron, which arrived in England on 25 February 1940, was "serving together" with the R.A.F. until the summer; that is, as readers of earlier portions of this Part will remember, it was not actually under R.A.F. command. The collapse of France altered the aspect of affairs. On 5 July Air Commodore Walsh (as he had now become) issued an Order of Detail under which the squadron was to

act in Combination with that part of the Air Forces of the United Kingdom under the command of the Air Officer Commanding, No. 22 Group, Royal Air Force, serving therein until I shall otherwise direct.

In other words, the unit was now under the operational command of the A.O.C. No. 22 Group. The R.C.A.F., acting on the advice of Army lawyers (below, page

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\*In June 1940 the official title became "Air Officer Commanding R.C.A.F. in Great Britain". In November 1941 it was changed to Air Officer-in-Chief R.C.A.F. Overseas; in July 1942 it was again changed, to Air Officer Commanding-in-chief R.C.A.F. Overseas, and in February 1943 finally became Air officer Commanding in Chief, Headquarters, Royal Canadian Air Force Overseas.

305), was following the precedents lately established by the Canadian Army Overseas (above, pages 211 ff.)<sup>134</sup>

In general, indeed, the Canadian authorities at this early period took the line that the R.C.A.F. Overseas would be commanded and administered in a manner almost precisely parallel to that followed in the case of the Army. On 22 April 1940 Mr. Massey, the High Commissioner for Canada in London, communicated to the Secretary of State for the Dominions (Mr. Eden) the substance of instructions received from Ottawa in this matter.<sup>135</sup> It was suggested that, where R.C.A.F. units were "Serving together" with R.A.F. units in the United Kingdom, authority in matters of supply, accommodation and "medical, technical and like auxiliary services" should rest with the Royal Air Force, subject to such adaptations as the Senior Officer at R.C.A.F. Headquarters in Great Britain should think desirable. The control of training was "ultimately the responsibility of R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters", but it was desired that No. 22 Group should continue to supervise the training of No. 110 Squadron as it was already doing. On the other hand, when R.C.A.F. units in the United Kingdom were placed "in combination", operational control and authority over training would be exercised by the R.A.F., and when they were "in combination," elsewhere, the R.A.F. would have authority "in respect of administration and discipline as well". Mr. Massey's letter continued:

In all circumstances a Royal Canadian Air Force Officer Commanding has the right to communicate with his immediately superior officer of the Royal Canadian Air Force with regard to any matters which he may wish to bring to attention, notwithstanding that these may relate to matters wherein authority is exercisable by the Royal Air Force. . . .

After emphasizing that the powers of the R.A.F. officer commanding a combined force were exercisable "within the limitations laid down in the Visiting Forces Acts", the letter went on:

Royal Canadian Air Force units, formations and the personnel thereof, in the United Kingdom will come under the command of the Senior Officer of Royal Canadian Air Force Headquarters in Great Britain, except to the extent that, when "acting in combination" with the Royal Air Force, they are, within the limitations set out above, under the command of the Officer Commanding the Combined Force.

The relationship between Royal Canadian Air Force Headquarters in Great Britain and the Air Ministry will be one of close liaison, but not of subordination. . . .

The conception evident here is that the R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters, though not an operational headquarters, would possess over R.C.A.F. units in Britain wide powers of administration, discipline and general supervision, parallel to those of Canadian Military Headquarters, London. We shall see however that this conception began to be seriously eroded almost at once.

Readers of the Canadian Army history are acquainted with the undignified wrangle which took place between the British and Canadian governments over the cost of unit equipment for the "non-divisional" technical units which the former had asked Canada to supply.\* There was a precisely similar Controversy Over the cost of the equipment of No. 110 Squadron. In November 1939 the British Air Ministry stated that it would be glad to substitute an R.C.A.F. unit for the R.A.F. army cooperation squadron planned for the corps of which the 1st Canadian Division would form part; and (as reported by Air

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\*See *Six Years of War*, pages 64-8.

Commodore Breadner, then in London), "If this consisted of personnel only they were prepared to equip and supply it."<sup>136</sup> On this basis No. 110 was dispatched. Subsequently it transpired that the Canadian government, with that regard for economy which we have so often seen it display at this period, was assuming that the arrangement implied that the squadron would be equipped at British expense; whereas the British government interpreted it as meaning that Britain would provide the aircraft and other equipment but would be reimbursed by Canada. The matter was discussed in London during Mr. Rogers' visit in the spring of 1940. It was then proposed by the British authorities that they should bear the cost until a Canadian Corps was formed in the field and the squadron was attached to it.<sup>137</sup> Ultimately, in the very different atmosphere that prevailed after Dunkirk, the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa agreed (10 December 1940) that Canada should assume full financial responsibility for No. 110 Squadron from 1 September 1940, and for the two squadrons subsequently dispatched — Nos. 1 and 112 — from the date of their departure from Canada in June 1940.

Although No. 110 was the first unit of the R.C.A.F. to be placed "in combination" with the R.A.F., No. 1 (Fighter) Squadron was the first to go into action. It was sent as one of Canada's emergency contributions to the security of Britain in the spring crisis of 1940;<sup>138</sup> the intention to dispatch it was reported to the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa on 22 May. With the main body of No. 112 (Army Co-operation) Squadron, it arrived in England on 20 June — the day before the armistice between France and Germany was signed at Compiègne. As we have seen (above, page 108) No. 110 was able to take with it 16 Hurricane aircraft — though they were of an already obsolescent type — while No. 112 took 12 Lysanders. The R.A.F. Fighter Command was forming its battle-line for the coming trial of strength with the German Air Force; and after a short stay at R.A.F. Station Middle Wallop on Salisbury Plain No. 1 Squadron was moved to Croydon, just south of London, where it began operational training under the critical eyes of combat-experienced British fighter pilots.

Even as Britain braced itself to meet the attack of the *Luftwaffe*, the nice legalities of Commonwealth cooperation had to be observed. But the R.C.A.F., like the Canadian Army, was determined that there should be no possibility of these formalities conferring any advantage on the enemy. To avoid misunderstanding, delay and perhaps embarrassment, and doubtless to emphasize the point that No. 1 Squadron was, after all, a Canadian unit, Air Commodore Walsh early brought the necessity of conforming to the Visiting Forces Acts to the attention of the Air Officer Commanding No. 11 Group R.A.F., under whom the squadron would fight:

As soon as you consider the Squadron fit for operations by day I assume you will . . . take action with us in order that the Squadron can be declared acting "in combination". As previously stated, however, should a grave emergency arise . . . I will . . . place the Squadron as acting "in combination" at once, leaving you free to employ qualified personnel immediately on operations.<sup>139</sup>

The Battle of Britain is considered to have begun in earnest on 12 August. The Canadian squadron was passed as fit for operations four days later. On the 17<sup>th</sup> its pilots began patrols and scrambles, covering the approaches to London from their new base at Northolt, Middlesex. For the next 53 days they were in the front line of the furious air fighting. The squadron's combat reports told of the destruction of 30 enemy aircraft, the probable destruction of eight and damage to 35 more. On the other side of the ledger 16 R.C.A.F. Hurricanes were lost in action; three pilots were killed and ten others wounded or injured.<sup>140</sup>

On 30 September, some five days before the pilots of No. 1 Squadron fired their last shots in the Battle of Britain, the first course of pilots to graduate under the B.C.A.T.P. proudly received their wings at R.C.A.F. Station Camp Borden, Ontario. Owing to an oversight on the part of training authorities, a class of air observers, who were actually further ahead in their training, did not get their wings until they completed the advanced training course at Trenton on 27 October and thereby lost official recognition as the first B.C.A.T.P. course to graduate.<sup>141</sup> Both courses' students were all Canadian, since trainees from the other Commonwealth countries concerned in the B.C.A.T.P. had just begun to arrive in Canada. The pilots, much to their dissatisfaction, were posted to duties in the expanding training organization; the 37 observers were dispatched overseas, arriving at Liverpool on 24 November, the vanguard of the 13 1,533 aircrew who graduated under the B.C.A.T.P.

In these circumstances it was urgently necessary to complete the arrangements governing the employment overseas of Canadian graduates of the Training Plan. Under Article 15 of the original agreement (above, page 000, and Appendix "D"), the British government was to "initiate inter-governmental discussions" to effect this. It had in fact made proposals in this direction as early as February, asking the Canadian government's views "as to a date which would be convenient for meetings between representatives of the four governments", and suggesting that the meeting-place be Londond.<sup>142</sup> This was not at all what the Canadian government had in mind; it considered that Lord Riverdale's famous letter of 16 December 1939 (above, page 27) clearly implied that the question would be settled, so far as Canadian pupils were concerned, by an intergovernmental committee representing Britain and Canada only, and that the discussions might most suitably take place in Ottawa, "to facilitate reference to members of the Canadian Government of any problems arising out of such discussions". The British government, it felt, would understand from the discussions leading up to Riverdale's letter that the matter involved "major questions of Canadian policy which can be better dealt with effectively and authoritatively by Ministers". Subsequently the Canadian government would be quite ready to send representatives to London to discuss matters of organization and equipment which might properly be discussed between all four governments.<sup>143</sup> When these views were telegraphed to London, there was no reply; and the autumn came without, apparently, anything further being done. The delay was unfortunate.

On 9 October the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa took a decision fundamental to Canadian policy. The Air Minister, Mr. Power, reported a recommendation of the Air Staff that the R.C.A.F. headquarters overseas be abolished and a mere liaison office of the former type substituted. This stemmed from the assumption that Canadians graduating from the Air Training Plan would simply be absorbed into the R.A.F., and that administration, command and promotion would be matters solely for the R.A.F.<sup>144</sup> The proposal drew an adverse reaction from the Committee and was disapproved, reference being made to the Riverdale letter and the importance of the "identification" of Canadian airmen. It was agreed that the Minister of National Defence should take the matter up with the British authorities, during his forthcoming visit to England. It was quite evident that the Canadian government considered it undesirable that Canadian airmen should be merely scattered broadcast through the Royal Air Force remote from Canadian association or control. Nevertheless, this is precisely what happened on a large scale in the course of the next few months.

On 5 November the Cabinet War Committee gave further consideration to the question of Canadian "identification". It had before it a memorandum which the Chief of the Air Staff (Air Vice-Marshal L. S. Breadner, who had succeeded Air Vice-Marshal Croil in June)\* had written to the Air Minister on 12 October.<sup>145</sup> Breadner urged that negotiations be undertaken at once. He felt that forming "completely manned and equipped Canadian Squadrons" was not practicable because the Air Training Plan provided aircrew only and no groundcrew; because there had been difficulty in meeting the demands of both the Air Training Plan and the Home War Establishment for equipment and personnel; and because the cost "would be an enormous financial strain detracting from Canada's other war efforts". "As a token of recognition", he wrote, "discussions should be initiated based on the R.A.F. designating certain units as R.C.A.F. Squadrons or, if this is not agreed to, designating them as 'Canadian' R.A.F. Squadrons." He felt that the number of squadrons so designated should be in proportion to the capacity of the Canadian output of the Air Training Plan for producing both the initial aircrew strength and the later requirements in reinforcements; and he made calculations indicating that on this basis 72 squadrons could be designated by April 1942 and 77 by December. He added,

It would be undesirable to make any hard and fast rule that the units must be completely manned by Canadians, as this would handicap the R.A.F. in postings and might interfere with the careers and promotions of both R.A.P. and Canadian personnel. Further, the infiltration into squadrons must be gradual until the new crews gain experience under seasoned leaders. After this experience has been gained, it would then be practicable to arrange for the majority of Canadian aircrews to be allotted to R.C.A.F. or Canadian R.A.F. designated squadrons.

Having considered this paper, the Cabinet War Committee made no attempt to prescribe in detail what was to be done or attempted. It did however agree to stand by the principles of the Riverdale letter; the methods of implementing it would be taken up by the Minister of National Defence in the United Kingdom.

Colonel Ralston began his conversations in London early in December, the month after the first aircrew produced under the Plan reached England. The Air Ministry, however, had already obtained some tentative agreements on a lower level, through the medium of discussions conducted not bilaterally with Canada, but with representatives of all the Dominion air forces. At a meeting on 31 October, at which the R.C.A.F. Headquarters in Great Britain was represented, the Air Ministry argued strongly that "considerable difficulty could be anticipated unless the postings were centrally controlled", and it was provisionally recommended that the Royal Air Force should have full authority over the posting of Dominion air force personnel sent overseas, provided however that "in posting Dominion personnel priority must always be given to the requirements of the 100% Dominion Squadrons, with second priority to Squadrons identified with the Dominions, formed under the Empire Air Training Scheme".<sup>146</sup> It had also been separately agreed that the "400" block of numbers should be used to designate all Dominion squadrons. This idea had apparently originated with Air Commodore L. F. Stevenson — later an outspoken opponent of Mr. Power's "Canadianization" plans — who had succeeded Air Commodore Walsh.<sup>147</sup> As a result, Nos. 110, 1 and 2 Squadrons R.C.A.F. were in due time renumbered 400, 401 and 402 respectively,

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\*Major Power states in his memoirs that he removed Croil because he thought him "too regimental" and unlikely to give the Minister the sort of cooperation he required. He nevertheless pays tribute to Croil's performance in his new appointment of Inspector General.

while the first Canadian squadron formed under Article 15 was designated No. 403. There were some advantages in the arrangement — No. 1 Squadron R.C.A.F. might perhaps have been confused with No. 1 Squadron R.A.F. — but it also had the effect of suggesting that the renumbered squadrons were in fact units of the Royal Air Force rather than of the Royal Canadian Air Force.

At the middle of December Ralston telegraphed to the Prime Minister and Mr. Power an account of his discussions with the British Air Minister, Sir Archibald Sinclair.<sup>148</sup> He had had the assistance of Mr. Massey and Mr. L. B. Pearson from Canada House as well as of Air Commodore Stevenson. Their problem had been difficult. Three possibilities were considered. "Method No. 1", he wrote, "was to compute number of squadrons for which Canadian pilots could have provided the aircrew personnel, amounting to 112." "Method No. 2 was to compute the number of squadrons which Canadian personnel at the training establishments could have manned entirely, amounting to 76." Both these methods being "questionable", Ralston proceeded,

We therefore estimated number of squadrons which our Canadian aircrews plus personnel in training establishments could man and maintain if we had also to maintain our own rearward activities and lines of communication, We call this method No. 3 and it gives approximately 27 squadrons, on basis of one man in a squadron for five behind the lines.\*

While admitting that under this method flying personnel were treated as "being only on a parity with other Air Force personnel", and that the R.A.F., with its rearward activities already set up, might not have to increase them in the ratio of five to one to take care of additional squadrons, Ralston added, "On the other hand, we had to remember that the United Kingdom was providing ground crews, pay and allowances, and initial and maintenance equipment, our financial obligations being to the extent of our eighty per cent contribution under the Plan." He had felt that there were two points which must be pressed:

First, there should be a substantial embodiment of the R.C.A.F. to represent to the Canadian public in some measurable degree Canada's contribution and to ensure that [in ?] any operations in which this Canadian personnel took part, the press references to the formations would permit instant recognition of them as Canadian. Secondly, there should be some provision for, or assurances of consultation with Canadian authorities in the employment of this personnel in major operations.

With these considerations before them, and feeling that in the circumstances the number of R.C.A.F. squadrons they could ask for was limited, Ralston and his advisers took the view that the best course was to try to obtain a "sizable" number of such squadrons "and if possible to provide for the remainder of the personnel by way of some assurance that they would be kept together and Canadian

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\*Ralston, not surprisingly, seems to have been a trifle confused as to the basis on which the rejected "methods" were calculated. The approach to the Air Ministry was evidently based upon an unsigned and undated "Aide Memoire on Article 15, Air Training Agreement",<sup>149</sup> which may have been prepared by Canada House and was clearly the result of consultation with Air Commodore Stevenson, though not written by him. It indicates that "Methods Nos. 1 and 2" were based on suggestions by Air Vice-Marshal Breadner; the latter derived from "the Canadian output of the Air Training Plan", i.e. in aircrew, to April 1942, resulting in a figure of 67 squadrons, altered in Ralston's cable to 76; the former derived from "the total strength of ground crews in Canada which would be available for overseas service if not employed in Canada . . . on the basis of 235 men per squadron". "On this basis, Air Vice Marshal Breadner got 110 [*sic*] squadrons by January 1st, 1942." (It seems evident that this was a modification of the plan which Breadner had put forward in October.) It is stated that the third method — 25 squadrons, calculated on a ratio of five "rearward" personnel to one operational — was "submitted" by Air Commodore Stevenson. It is interesting that Ralston arrived from Canada without definite plan or instructions. As we have seen, the Cabinet War Committee had not attempted to provide them.

officered as far as could be reasonably arranged". They would be in R.A.F. squadrons, but these squadrons might in some way be identified with Canada "or at least there should be individual identification of the personnel as Canadian". Accordingly, the Canadian negotiators, "not too hopeful of ready acceptance", put forward "purely by way of exploration and not as a proposal", the suggestion that the first 25 squadrons be R.C.A.F., in addition to the three all-Canadian squadrons already in England.

They were, Ralston said, "agreeably surprised" by the reception of this really rather modest proposal; but the squadron identification of Canadians outside the 25 squadrons "seemed to give more trouble". The Air Ministry, while seeing no difficulty about identifying individuals by means of "Canada" badges, was loath to make any commitment to preserve the separate identity of these "twilight" units, as Ralston called them. When the Canadians argued that one R.A.F. squadron (No. 242)\* was already on a Canadian basis, the reply was that "while one squadron might be handled in this way, it was a very much more formidable task to deal with an indefinite number". Ralston took comfort in the thought that the question of the "twilight" units would presumably not arise until the 25 squadrons were filled, "which may be a year".

Mr. Power advised the Prime Minister to accept Ralston's proposals for an agreement, asking only for a future review of the position and organization of Canadian aircrew who could not be absorbed into R.C.A.F. squadrons. On 18 December the Cabinet War Committee was told that Ralston had been informed accordingly. On the 23rd Ralston signalled the text of the agreement which he had initialled with the Secretary of State for Air and now submitted for the approval of his own colleagues. The War Committee considered it on 26 December and asked for clarification of paragraph 6, which provided for the replacement of R.A.F. men drawn from the Air Training Plan establishments. If this meant that British groundcrew would replace Canadians in the B.C.A.T.P. it was satisfactory; if it meant raising additional Canadian ground personnel (estimated to number 7500), further consideration would be required. Ralston confirmed the former as the intention; he had already written of paragraph 6,

It is really not much more than an expression of hope that something may some time be done by way of exchange. The Royal Air Force service people were particularly anxious to have some paragraph of this kind; their earlier draft was much stronger, but, as you will note, final draft only binds as far "as may mutually be considered practicable".<sup>150</sup>

On 2 January 1941 the War Committee gave final approval, and the "Ralston-Sinclair Agreement" was signed in London on the 7th.<sup>151</sup> It forms Appendix "I" of this volume.

Two matters separate from the question of "identification" had been dealt with during these negotiations. One was consultation concerning employment of Canadians in "major operations" (above, page 259). The Canadian negotiators were at pains to avoid alarming the British on this question. Their *aide-memoire*<sup>152</sup> which was evidently the basis of their approach contains this final paragraph:

The 25 R.C.A.F. squadrons will be serving in combination with the R.A.F. under the Overseas Visiting [Forces]† Act [*sic*], but it should be made clear that on any *major quest[ion of]†* policy concerning their use the Canadian Government would be consulted through

\*An R.A.F. fighter squadron formed in October 1939 from Canadian pilots who were regular members of the R.A.F. After the Battle of Britain, in which No. 242 was led by Squadron Leader D. R. S. Bader, it gradually lost its Canadian character.

†File copy damaged.

R.C.A.F.H.Q. or Canada House. In respect of operational and administrative matters not involving questions of policy, no such consultation would be necessary. The R.C.A.F. squadrons would be under the immediate control of the higher R.A.F. formations just as a Canadian division in a U.K. Corps or a Canadian corps in a British army is under the control of the [British] G.O.C. Difficulties may be advanced by the Air Ministry on this score, but their fears of divided operational control should be removed if we emphasise that it is only on questions of policy that the Canadian Government would be expected [sic] to be consulted — such questions as the movement of R.C.A.F. squadrons from one theatre of war to another; or the conversion of [an] R.C.A.F. squadron from say, bombers to fighters.

The other matter concerned exchanges between senior officers of the R.C.A.F. and R.A.F. Canada desired this to enable Canadian officers to gain the experience necessary to qualify them for higher command overseas, and to provide against senior R.C.A.F. personnel in Canada being "restricted to training activities there for the duration of the war". In putting this forward Ralston added,

The Canadian Government would also desire that, when practicable, Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons should serve together in stations and groups, and that Canadian officers should, when qualified, be given commands and staff appointments, not only in stations and groups in which Canadian squadrons would normally be serving, but also in the Commands and at the Air Ministry, to the extent that such commands and appointments should be proportionate to the numbers of Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons serving overseas.

This clearly looked forward to something like a Canadian operational air force overseas, and a situation moreover in which Canadian senior officers would hold a respectable proportion of appointments in the R.A.F. organization. Sinclair's reply was friendly but guarded.

I am in full agreement with what you say as to the purpose of the suggested exchanges between senior officers of the Royal Air Force and senior officers of the Royal Canadian Air Force, and as to the desirability of arranging that in so far as suitably qualified Royal Canadian Air Force officers are available, they should be given commands and staff appointments, not only in stations and groups in which Canadian squadrons would normally be serving, but also in the Commands and at the Air Ministry. It would be our endeavour to arrange that such appointments were given to Royal Canadian Air Force officers in numbers fully proportionate to the number of R.C.A.F. squadrons overseas. We will also endeavour to arrange that where practicable, R.C.A.F. squadrons will be grouped together in the same stations and in the same groups, but, as I am sure you will appreciate, the first consideration must be to retain the high degree of mobility which is essential to operational efficiency.<sup>153</sup>

Some comment on these negotiations is in order. It would seem that the Canadian government at this point very largely resigned itself to the fact that a considerable proportion of the R.C.A.F. graduates of the Training Plan would have to serve in R.A.F. squadrons, the R.C.A.F. keeping such contact with them as it could. Article 5 of the new agreement indicated the hope that something could be done for these men. But it is evident that the government's hopes for a Canadian entity in the air war overseas centred on the 25 R.C.A.F. squadrons which the Royal Air Force had undertaken to form and which the Minister of National Defence, we have seen, rather optimistically assumed could be filled with Canadians within a year. Long before that period had elapsed the United Kingdom was to find itself in a position where it could pay little more than lip-service even to that important part of the bargain. This situation was to provoke what the Canadian Air Minister later called "a long history of struggle and discussion".<sup>154</sup>

It seems fully apparent that the Canadian negotiators leaned over backwards to avoid embarrassing the Royal Air Force or making any appearance of presenting unreasonable demands. It was always recognized that squadrons should be

formed around a nucleus of experienced personnel, and since few Canadians of senior rank or with recent experience of air combat were available\* this inevitably meant that progress in producing genuinely Canadian squadrons would be `slow. As we shall see, it turned out to be almost preternaturally slow; and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Ralston and his colleagues did not sufficiently impress upon the Air Ministry negotiators that Canada expected that the formation of these squadrons would be pushed with genuine energy. Here perhaps was an example of what Vincent Massey complained of (above, page 186) — the failure of Canadian ministers visiting Britain to speak out firmly and frankly.

It is amply clear, however, and in justice to Ralston it must be recognized, that the Canadians in these discussions felt themselves hamstrung by one awkward fact — that Canada was allowing Great Britain to pay the Canadian airmen whose status was in question. Ralston himself must have been the more aware of this aspect since as Minister of Finance in 1939 he had had a primary responsibility for the arrangements. The national aims that Canada was pursuing could have been fully realized only through a national air force fully under Canadian control. Failing this, 'the Canadian government's position would have been greatly strengthened had it undertaken the full financial responsibility for its airmen overseas. But no one seems to have ventured to suggest this before or during these negotiations. On the contrary, the Sinclair-Ralston agreement specifically reiterates that "the cost of the twenty-five squadrons . . . will be borne by the United Kingdom Government. . . ."

With the disposition of the B.C.A.T.P. graduates more or less settled, the question of the three original all-Canadian R.C.A.F. squadrons overseas arose. Were they to continue to be administered by the R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters on the basis of the Visiting Forces Acts, or should they be turned over to the Royal Air Force for administrative as well as operational purposes in much the same manner as the 25 proposed "Article 15" squadrons and the other B.C.A.T.P. personnel from Canada? The latter course was strongly recommended by Air Commodore Stevenson. This would have the advantage of providing uniformity of treatment for all R.C.A.F. aircrew overseas as well as removing what were seen as military objections to employing these few and separate units administered by the R.C.A.F. in formations administered by the Royal Air Force. In April the Canadian Air Council (above, page 126) approved Stevenson's recommendation in principle, but the Air Minister, loath presumably to see the R.C.A.F.'s only independent operational units overseas pass from Canadian control, reserved judgment, noting that the matter should be submitted to the War Committee.<sup>156</sup>

In the meantime, some problems had arisen concerning the Royal Air Force schools that had been transferred to Canada in increasing numbers. We have seen (above, page 35) that it had been agreed that these should be treated as "in combination" and placed under the R.C.A.F., Commands in which they were situated. It could have been argued that on the analogy of the Canadian Army in Britain they should have been merely "serving together", and indeed General Crerar, who was present at the meeting of the Cabinet War Committee (20 July 1940) at which the question was discussed, suggested that the R.A.F. in Canada should not

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\*It will be recalled that Canada, in addition to staffing the Air Training Plan, had to maintain a Home War Establishment which had heavy operational commitments — large anti-submarine tasks off the Atlantic coast, and (from June 1942) participation with U.S. air forces in operations against the Japanese in the Aleutians. At its peak late in 1943 the Home War Establishment had 43 squadrons on its strength.<sup>155</sup>

be less independent than the Canadian Active Service Force in England. Mr. Power however reported that the Canadian Air Staff were insisting upon Canadian command. In 1941 the possibility presented itself of a bargain in which concessions to Canada concerning these schools could be balanced against Canadian concessions concerning the three overseas squadrons. Air Commodore G. O. Johnson, lately Deputy Chief of the Air Staff, who was going overseas for a period of duty with the R.A.F., was authorized to discuss the two questions with the Air Ministry. In the minutes of a meeting of the Air Ministry's "Empire Air Training Scheme Committee" on 23 May, over which Captain Balfour presided, Johnson (who clearly had not been acquainted with the Cabinet War Committee's decision of 9 October, above, page 257), is recorded as saying, "His own view was that R.C.A.F. squadrons should be administered entirely by the R.A.F. and that the present Headquarters of the R.C.A.F. in London should in future exercise, liaison functions only." The British naturally had no objection. On 12 June Johnson, with Stevenson's concurrence, sent the Chief of the Air Staff in Ottawa a draft memorandum of agreement. This provided for Canadian administration of the R.A.F. schools in Canada,\* while the R.A.F. received the administration of the three squadrons. The R.C.A.F. was authorized to post R.A.F. personnel employed in Canada, and the R.A.F. authorized to post all overseas members of the R.C.A.F. except those serving at the R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters. To simplify accounting, the R.C.A.F. was to take over the financing of the R.A.F. units in Canada (the cost to be recoverable from the United Kingdom) ; the R.A.F. doing the same with Nos. 400, 401 and 402 squadrons, in respect of which Canada would reimburse the United Kingdom. The relationship then obtaining between the R.A.F. and the R.C.A.F. Overseas was thus summarized in the draft agreement:

All R.C.A.F. squadrons and units in the United Kingdom, or other theatre of war, to which they have been moved with the concurrence of the Canadian Government, including Nos. 400, 401 and 402 Squadrons which are financed by Canada, and the 25 squadrons to be organized and financed by the United Kingdom Government in accordance with the Memorandum of Agreement . . . dated 7th January, 1941, shall be administered by the Air Ministry of the United Kingdom through the appropriate R.A.F. formations, without prejudice to the terms of the said Memorandum of Agreement.

The draft agreement further provided that the R.C.A.F. Headquarters in Britain should be "re-organized as a Canadian Air Liaison Mission"; but Johnson's covering letter to Ottawa reported that the High Commissioner for Canada, while not questioning the general proposition, considered that reversion to the use of the word "Liaison" would "involve loss of prestige".

This draft agreement seems never to have been formally confirmed. There was little if any discussion of the questions raised in it during Mr. Power's subsequent visit to England (below, pages 265-8). On 15 October 1941 the Chief of the Air Staff wrote Power remarking that "the reciprocal terms in respect of the administration of R.C.A.F. Squadrons in United Kingdom have, in all essential respects, already been put into effect", and asking for action with respect to the control of the R.A.F. schools in Canada. The matter came before the Cabinet War Committee on 6 November and decision was deferred. It seems to have been finally settled only by the new agreement made at the Ottawa conference in the following June (below, page 282). The record thus appears to indicate that the administration of the three original overseas squadrons was transferred to the Air Ministry

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\*On 30 July 1941 the Cabinet War Committee acceded to a British request to move 16 more R.A.F. schools to Canada at British expense.

without any formal decision having been made by the Canadian government. There is no doubt however that the three squadrons were in fact administered in the manner provided in Johnson's draft agreement.<sup>157</sup>

#### B. "CANADIANIZATION": "STRUGGLE AND DISCUSSION"

The arrangement just described ended what may be called the first phase of Canada's overseas air force policy. The country had been pursuing two objects which in Canadian eyes seemed not contradictory but complementary: to make the largest possible contribution to the air war against Germany, and to lay the foundations for a national air force overseas. A few months would show that much more progress had been made towards the first object than towards the second. But people better acquainted with Canadian history than the Air Ministry or the Royal Air Force could possibly have been would have realized that as soon as the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan got into full operation and the number of Canadian flyers overseas increased, the demand for national recognition would have to be complied with.

From the early summer of 1941 a new force begins to make itself felt. In 1939 Major C. G. Power had been Postmaster General, and he had little or no part in the negotiation of the agreement for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. After he became Minister of National Defence for Air in May 1940 his energies seem in the first instance to have been largely absorbed in the organization of the Training Plan in Canada and in other North American questions, including the defence of Newfoundland. As we have seen, it fell to Colonel Ralston to conduct the discussions in England at the end of 1940. But now the Plan was functioning relatively smoothly and it was the fate of its human products in which the Minister increasingly interested himself. Henceforth Major Power is the unmistakable architect of Canada's overseas air force policy.

On 23 June 1941 Power wrote a letter to the Prime Minister. There were today, he said, in Britain or spread across the war zones, well over 5000 young R.C.A.F. men who were moral if not legal responsibilities of the Canadian government. They were in three categories — the men of the three original squadrons; the graduates of the Air Training Plan, who from their embarkation from Canada were handed over to the R.A.F.; and a group of what were later called "radar" technicians, who were entirely under British control. The creation of 25 squadrons which were to be "nominally at least" Canadian took care of "by no means more than one quarter of our men". Power proposed that these squadrons should be "made more Canadian" by the provision of ground crew, which Canada would shortly be in a position to furnish. But the other B.C.A.T.P. graduates and radar men "become completely cut off both from our responsibility and our care and supervision". He gave examples concerning individuals (it was characteristic of Power that the human aspect of the situation struck him forcibly) :

Saturday's press carried a despatch that a flying boat crashed off the coast of Portugal with six Canadians on board. We don't know who they are, or why they are there. What makes it more tragic is that under [the present] set-up our Air Force Headquarters in London know no more than we do.

Such instances would vastly multiply shortly, wrote the Air Minister, and immediate remedial steps should be taken. What he proposed was greatly to strengthen the R.C.A.F. Headquarters in London, "by augmenting the personnel even at the risk of somewhat expensive duplication, particularly in records offices", and to have

"a general clarification of the situation with the United Kingdom Authorities". Power submitted that it was imperative that he go overseas for this purpose "almost immediately".<sup>158</sup>

The following day, undoubtedly by arrangement with the Prime Minister, Major Power gave an exposition of the situation, in very similar terms, to the Cabinet War Committee. The Committee agreed that he should go overseas as he proposed, and approved his recommendation that ground crew should be provided gradually for the 25 squadrons. It was suggested that perhaps 1500 could be made available by 1 January 1942. At the end of June Power, accompanied by the Chief of the Air Staff and other officers and officials, left on his mission to London.<sup>159</sup>

Power's main formal meeting with representatives of the British Air Ministry was held on 8 July, with Captain Balfour in the chair. Its minutes<sup>160</sup> reflect the new note that was being struck in Canadian policy. It is evident that Major Power spoke in much the sense of his letter to King, pointing out the large and growing number of R.C.A.F. men serving with the Royal Air Force, and remarking that the Canadian government had "a moral responsibility in regard to their general conditions and welfare". "They remained members of the Royal Canadian Air Force, and the connection between them and their Home Government must be more than a gesture." The Minister said that he proposed three measures to achieve this end. He was going to establish a Directorate of Overseas Personnel at the R.C.A.F. Headquarters in Great Britain; it would have responsibility for maintaining closer touch with individuals. More Canadian representation was required in the Royal Air Force postings organization, Record Office and Pay Office. Finally, more information "must be available" to R.C.A.F. authorities on the disposal of individuals.

These proposals clearly troubled the British representatives in some degree. Balfour, though sympathetically disposed, pointed out that there could be "only one channel of direct command"; to which Power replied that he and his colleagues "did not raise the question of channel of command". It was also remarked that it could be awkward if, for instance, an airman had access to the R.C.A.F. headquarters on matters properly dealt with through ordinary service channels; and the R.A.F.'s Air Member for Personnel, who was present, thought it undesirable that there should be watertight compartments dealing with postings of personnel for a particular country. Nevertheless, it was agreed that the three steps proposed should be taken.

Power reported that his government were prepared to begin providing ground crew for the 25 new Canadian squadrons. His suggestion now was that some 1000 men could be provided by the end of 1941. He would prefer that they be employed directly on the maintenance of operational squadrons and move with the squadrons; but when it was pointed out that the main servicing echelons remained part of the station headquarters organization, and that it was hoped that Canada could provide personnel in this category as well as the 80 or 90 maintenance men who moved with each squadron, Power confirmed that this was the ultimate intention.

The Canadian Air Minister then turned to the question of higher organization in the field. Could the arrangement concerning the 25 squadrons, he asked, be extended by forming Canadian Groups and Home Stations? It was explained in reply that there were difficulties in the way of forming Canadian fighter groups, but less in the case of bomber groups. In the Fighter and Coastal Commands squadrons were frequently moved, whereas the composition of a bomber group was more stable. What the Air Ministry representatives evidently had in mind was that if the R.C.A.F. provided a fighter group Canada would expect that group to remain together as a permanent entity, whereas it was much more convenient from the R.A.F.

point of view to be able to move squadrons freely into or out of a group according to circumstances. The Deputy Chief of the Air Staff is quoted as saying,

One of the difficulties in regard to a Canadian Fighter Group would be the small number of R.C.A.F. Fighter Squadrons so far available. It would be quite practicable if, say, 40 to 50 R.C.A.F. Fighter Squadrons were available. . . .

This was not to say that 40 or 50 squadrons were needed for a group; 30 would have been a large group.\* But the R.A.F. was evidently asking Canada to supply enough to form an entire group plus additional squadrons to provide flexibility. When it is remembered that at the end of the war the R.C.A.F.'s overseas strength was only 48 squadrons of all types, it is fairly evident that the Air Ministry was discouraging any idea of forming a Canadian fighter group.

The idea of a Canadian bomber group, on the other hand, was given a degree of encouragement. It would be quite possible, it was explained, to form one or more such groups when the bomber squadrons were available. However, the present object of the Air Ministry was to bring Bomber Command's squadrons up to a strength of 24 aircraft each, and more squadrons would not be formed until this was done. Major Power noted that the principle of a Canadian bomber group was accepted; it was a definite objective although delayed.

This was an important turning-point in policy. The Canadian bomber group duly came into existence, though not until a year and a half after this meeting. The decision had one effect which, perhaps, few if any of the people present at the Air Ministry that day fully anticipated. By channelling the operational effort of the R.C.A.F. heavily into Bomber Command, it probably ensured a considerably higher rate of casualties than would otherwise have been the case. Nearly 10,000 R.C.A.F. officers and men<sup>162</sup> were to lose their lives in Bomber Command's offensive against Germany. †

Allied to the question of Canadian formations was that of opportunities for Canadian senior officers to train for higher commands, from group commander down. Power said he would like the R.A.F. to afford early opportunities for such training, and Balfour said those officers would be welcome, adding however that wing commanders and below, if pilots, would have to go to operational training units before taking over their appointments if these were in operational units. Major Power remarked that he did not desire that officers should be appointed to higher commands just because they were Canadians, "but he was anxious that they should not be denied these appointments because they were Canadians".

The question of the employment of R.C.A.F. squadrons in theatres of war outside Great Britain was briefly discussed. Power explained that the Canadian government "had no objection whatever" to such employment provided it was consulted under the general terms of Article 10 of the Ralston-Sicclair agreement. Nor did the government object to the formation of R.C.A.F. squadrons outside Great Britain, but again it desired to be consulted.

On two items on the agenda of this conference the British and the Canadians held almost completely opposite views: the commissioning of aircrew, and the question of public relations. It was a source of annoyance to Major Power that Canada was not in a position to take independent action in these matters, both of

\*At the Normandy D Day the two fighter groups in the Second Tactical Air Force numbered 29 squadrons each. At the beginning of the Battle of Britain in August 1940, No. 11 Group, the strongest in Fighter Command, had 21 squadrons on its order of battle.<sup>161</sup>

†Of course, by no means all of these were in the Canadian group. Many Canadians would have served in Bomber Command even if No. 6 (R.C.A.F.) Group had never been formed.

which affected recruiting in Canada, where there was some apprehension of future difficulty in finding enough men to fill Canadian quotas under the B.C.A.T.P.

The B.C.A.T.P. agreement of 1939 provided merely that "a number of pilots and observers" would be selected, on passing out of training, for commissioned rank in the R.C.A.F. The actual practice in 1941 was that "up to 33%" of pilots and observers were commissioned on passing out and the balance to make up a total of 50 per cent at a later stage.<sup>163</sup> Major Power considered this inadequate, and suggested at the meeting on 8 July that 50 per cent of pilots and observers should be commissioned on passing out; the R.A.F.'s Air Member for Personnel (Air Marshal Babington) thought this was "proceeding too far at present". Power disliked still more the limited opportunities available to Wireless Operator Air Gunners and Air Gunners; the Air Ministry had just agreed to commission 10 per cent of the former on passing out and 10 per cent later, while of the Air Gunners 5 per cent would be commissioned on passing out and 15 per cent later. The R.A.F. offered the assurance that if this limitation was keeping men in the ranks who were suitable for commissions it would be relaxed.<sup>164</sup> Here once more it is evident that the Canadian position was weakened by the fact that Canada was allowing the United Kingdom to pay her overseas aircrew. Different attitudes towards commissioning were affected by different recruiting methods — Britain, of course, had universal conscription — and the issue remained contentious throughout the war.

On the matter of public relations Britain and Canada were far apart. The British fondness for reticence vexed the Canadian Air Minister. Reticence was better business for the R.A.F. than for the R.C.A.F., for if nothing was said to particularize the participants in an action the Royal Air Force automatically got all the credit and the Royal Canadian Air Force or other national components got none. Power complained that "unless the Canadian Press could be furnished with good stories of the exploits of Canadian personnel there would be much recruiting difficulty". On the British side Babington "said that it was extremely undesirable to break the rule of anonymity" which discouraged references to individuals by name. Nevertheless the British conceded that the two public relations officers stationed at Canada House could not cover the overseas activities of the R.C.A.F. adequately and concurred in Power's proposal to send two more from Canada immediately and three more later. Consequently the Air Minister was able to report to Mr. King that "a greater volume and a wider coverage of news items" might be expected.<sup>165</sup>

The heterogeneous nature of the 25 "Article 15" squadrons, R.C.A.F. in name but with mixed aircrew and in the beginning almost wholly R.A.F. ground crew; might have seemed to defy legal definition within the framework of the Visiting Forces Acts because they could scarcely be properly classified either as a British home force or a Canadian visiting one. No orders of detail placing these units "in combination" were issued until the summer of 1941. However, the question of the status of individuals had been settled for the time being by a decision reached in December 1940\* that all B.C.A.T.P. graduates going overseas were to

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\*The original agreement of 17 December 1939 provided that Australia and New Zealand aircrew "on embarkation for service with the Royal Air Force, . . . will be attached to that force". But with respect to Canadians the agreement said, "On embarkation for service with, or in conjunction with, the Royal Air Force, officers and airmen will . . . receive from the appropriate Royal Air Force paying authority the pay, allowances, etc., of the rank and branch (or group) in the Royal Air Force corresponding to that held in the Royal Canadian Air Force. . . ." Nothing was said about attachment. Extraordinary as it now seems, the Judge Advocate General in Ottawa suggested that the agreement implied

be attached to the R.A.F. at the time of embarkation. This lawfully placed them at the disposal of the R.A.F. under the Visiting Forces Acts although they remained members of the R.C.A.F. While the Minister of National Defence for Air was in England in 1941 it was decided to issue orders of detail placing the "Article 15" squadrons in combination, thus giving them the form, if not the substance of a Canadian visiting force and strengthening the rather slender ties between them and the R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters. This brought the squadrons under Canadian air force law. To keep the situation in harmony with reality as represented in the actual mixed personnel of the squadrons, the two air forces' legal branches were required to draft similar orders in council to be passed by their respective governments, the effect of which was to leave R.A.F. members of R.C.A.F. squadrons subject to Royal Air Force law. By the summer of 1942 a system of reciprocal orders had been completed based on the principle that a serviceman in his own country should be subject to his own country's military law. As a result the R.C.A.F. personnel who had been in the rather odd position of being attached to one of the R.A.F. units in Canada, and therefore subject to Royal Air Force disciplinary regulations, were brought back within the pale of Royal Canadian Air Force law. Canadians attached to the R.A.F. abroad remained subject to R.A.F. law — which however differed only in details from their own.<sup>167</sup>

With respect to the question which Power had raised concerning opportunities for senior officers, it may be said here that although the principle of posting senior R.C.A.F. officers to operational units and formations was accepted at the Air Ministry, it was, in the words of Air Marshal Curtis, "resisted in the Commands". Curtis recalled in 1969 the refusal to post a Canadian group captain to an anti-submarine formation on the ground that such appointments were reserved for wing commanders who had finished a tour of duty and were due for promotion; not even one exception could be made. In another case, a Canadian wing commander attached to the R.A.F. in the Middle East was "kept supernumerary for months with no duties or responsibilities", until his tour was ended by his jeep striking a mine and sending him to hospital. In May 1943 Curtis happened to meet Captain Balfour, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Air Ministry, in Malta. Balfour told him that Canadians were good fighters but not suitable to command squadrons or wings. Curtis forcefully challenged this assertion and asked the basis for it. Balfour replied that it had lately been made to him by Air Vice-Marshal Harry Broadhurst, commanding the Desert Air Force in North Africa.

The meetings between Power and his party and the Air Ministry representatives doubtless brought the United Kingdom and Canada to a better understanding of what each expected of the other in air cooperation. It is a curious fact, however, that the matter which was shortly to become the most contentious issue between the partners — "Canadianization" of the Article 15 squadrons — was referred to in these discussions only briefly. For this there were two reasons. Air Marshal Breadner had always emphasized that Canadianization would have to be accomplished gradually in order that the new squadrons might profit fully by the experi-

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that Canadian aircrew were to be discharged from the R.C.A.F. at the point of embarkation in Canada and simultaneously enlisted in the R.A.F. The Air Member for Personnel (Air Commodore H. Edwards) reasonably pointed out that "it is very likely that the majority of the graduates would refuse to fall in line with any such plan, and the utmost chaos would prevail". When it was ascertained that Australia and New Zealand were attaching their personnel to the R.A.F. in accordance with the agreement, it was decided that Canada would follow the same practice.<sup>168</sup> Trouble would have been saved if Canada had been willing to use the same formula as the other Dominions in the beginning.

ence and ability of the seasoned R.A.F. aircrew personnel, In fact, most if not all of the higher officers of the R.C.A.F., including Air Commodore Edwards, soon to become the outspoken champion of Canadianization, took the view that the process should not be rushed. The second reason was that in the early summer of 1941 Canadianization seemed to be making satisfactory progress. Squadrons had been formed on schedule as provided in the Sinclair-Ralston Agreement. Power at the meeting on 8 July "expressed his appreciation of the fact that it had been found possible so far to appoint Canadian officers to command 11 out of the 13 new squadrons which had been formed and that the Canadianization of these squadrons would proceed as rapidly as possible".<sup>168</sup> Indications were that No. 403 (Fighter) Squadron, formed on 1 March, and Nos. 404 (Coastal Fighter) and 405 (Bomber), formed in April, would be completely Canadian by October. Even more promising was the development of Nos. 411 and 412 (Fighter) Squadrons. These units, created only in June, were operational in August with all-Canadian aircrew complements, under two members of No. 401 in its Battle of Britain days: Squadron Leader P. B. Pitcher commanded No. 411 and Squadron Leader C. W. Travena No. 412.

Unfortunately, these good omens were misleading. Subsequent reports from overseas showed that less than 10 per cent of Canada's B.C.A.T.P. graduates were finding their way into R.C.A.F. squadrons. By the end of 1941, 18 new Canadian squadrons had been brought into existence: five fighter squadrons (Nos. 403, 411, 412, 416 and 417); one coastal fighter squadron (No. 404); one army cooperation squadron (No. 414); three coastal reconnaissance squadrons (Nos. 407, 413 and 415); three night fighter squadrons (Nos. 406, 409 and 410); one intruder squadron (No. 418); and four bomber squadrons (Nos. 405, 408, 419 and 420). Of the 1037 aircrew in these units only 499 were members of the Royal Canadian Air Force.<sup>169</sup> And yet 8595 Canadian B.C.A.T.P. graduates had been sent to the United Kingdom. The aircrew strength of all the single-engined fighter squadrons was 100 per cent Canadian, or nearly so. But none of the twin-engined units, with the possible exception of No. 419, whose aircrew was about 80 per cent Canadian, was making anything like satisfactory progress. Less than half the flying personnel of Nos. 404 and 405 were Canadians. Worse off still were the three night fighter units, where not more than one-third of the aircrew were R.C.A.F.

By and large, this situation was produced by centrifugal forces working in the training process, not only in the B.C.A.T.P., where recruits were trained to "wings" standard, but still more in the advanced training given in the United Kingdom to prepare aircrew for duty in the front-line squadrons. The main difficulty seemed to centre in the operational training units (O.T.U.s.) where the eager flyers were formed into crews and schooled in working together as teams before being posted to operational squadrons. The existing shortage of experienced instructors, operational-type aircraft and flying-fields made it seem quite out of the question to set up O.T.U.s. on a national basis. And it is important to note that the rate of loss being suffered by the R.A.F. both in fighters and bombers was such that in November 1941 Mr. Churchill insisted on bringing its growing offensive temporarily to a standstill.<sup>170</sup> This decision eventually paid dividends in fewer aircraft accidents and better-trained aircrew. But it only worsened the Canadian problem. During the lull Britons, Canadians, Australians, New Zealanders and others were funnelled into the O.T.U.s. with little or no thought given to organizing them into national crews. The possibility of forming Canadian crews was lessened by the fact that R.C.A.F. aircrew were not arriving overseas in the proportions required; for example, there

were not enough R.C.A.F. air gunners to match Canadian pilots and navigators. All the radio navigators, who worked with the pilots in two-man night-fighter crews, had to be trained in the United Kingdom because the radar air interception (A.I.) equipment was on the secret list and available only in Britain. By the time enough Canadians were entering the R.A.F. school for radio navigators, the crew pattern in the night-fighter squadrons had been set and could be changed only as casualties and tour-expired men were replaced.<sup>171</sup>

Aircraft production problems also contributed to the difficulties. When No. 420 (Bomber) Squadron was formed the selection of its aircraft, the Hampden, was not announced far enough in advance for Bomber Command to get Canadians into the Hampden O.T.U. Rather than hold aircraft in idleness while Canadians underwent operational training, the Air Ministry authorized the squadron to be formed on schedule on 19 December and filled with R.A.F. aircrew. When it became operational about a month later its aircrew strength was only about six per cent Canadian.<sup>172</sup>

The other Dominions taking part in the Air Training Plan had the same problems but were somewhat less concerned about them. New Zealand had informed the British government at an early date that it did not wish to restrict the posting of New Zealanders to New Zealand squadrons, or even to have New Zealand squadrons formed where this might adversely affect the efficiency of the R.A.F.<sup>173</sup> Australia's aim was much the same as Canada's, but Canada was in a rather better position to do something about the situation. An Australian official historian has written about this in what to Canadian eyes seem curiously envious terms:

Canada, whose aspirations and problems were basically the same as Australia's, achieved a considerable part of her aim but was favoured by her geographical position; by almost complete concentration of effort on the European war; a relatively high industrial capacity; an economic strength which enabled her to accept a large part of the financial burden of her air effort; a much larger and more balanced contribution of air personnel; a greater participation by her senior air force officers in both military and administrative fields; and a prompt, sustained and pertinacious attack by an adequate group of liaison officers in the various commands against any tendency which threatened to defeat the aim.<sup>174</sup>

From a Canadian viewpoint the situation looked rather less satisfactory. The aim was, of course, to get as many Canadians as possible into the Article 15 squadrons. Major Power at first set his sights on making all R.C.A.F. squadrons, 100 per cent Canadian. This objective had to be modified as the problems involved became better understood. But from the closing months of 1941 until the end of the war the country's administrative policy concerning its overseas air force could be summed up in one rather unlovely but expressive word — "Canadianization". Increasingly, as time passed, there was unity of mind and purpose on this question between the political and the professional chiefs of the Royal Canadian Air Force. The professionals, notwithstanding their well-founded conviction that Canadianization must be gradual, could not reconcile the obvious lack of method obtaining in the posting of R.C.A.F. personnel with their conception of the future shape of the R.C.A.F. Overseas. Power, while also concerned about the future of the force, continued to be troubled about the growing number of Canadians posted to R.A.F. units, who could be sent anywhere in the world at the discretion of British authorities and over whom their own government had no control. He knew, moreover, that these matters had a close relationship to recruiting and public morale.

On 25 November 1941 Air Vice-Marshal Harold Edwards\* succeeded Air

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\*Promoted Air Marshal on 20 June 1942.

Commodore Stevenson as the senior R.C.A.F. officer overseas with the task of inaugurating the new phase in Canadian policy. (The title of Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, adopted in July 1942, itself served as an indication of the direction of that policy.) It would be an error to assume that Edwards' opinions, close as they were to those of the Air Minister and the Chief of the Air Staff, were the only reason for selecting him. As Air Member for Personnel he was well acquainted with the overseas situation and had assisted in overcoming some of the problems that had arisen. It is worth noting too that as A.M.P. he had played an important part in R.C.A.F. development, having been responsible for the introduction of the Medical,\* Accounts and Provost and Security branches. Like Croil, Breadner and Air Commodore W. A. Curtis, whom Edwards chose to accompany him as his Deputy A.O.-in-C., Edwards had been a leading air fighter in the R.A.F. during the First World War. Like them too he was thoroughly Canadian.

The importance attached to Edwards' task is reflected in the Air Minister's decision to set "no specific limitations" on his authority.<sup>176</sup> The mission, however, was not an enviable one. To move too fast was certain to arouse misgivings and opposition at the Air Ministry; to go too slowly was just as certain to meet with reproof from Ottawa. It is small wonder that before Edwards' two years of overseas service ended he had, at different times, incurred the displeasure of both sides and become known as the most controversial officer in the Royal Canadian Air Force.

On arriving in London Edwards found a situation which he considered thoroughly unsatisfactory, and relations with the Air Ministry were not the worst of it. Extracts from a racy "personal & confidential" letter<sup>177</sup> which he sent back to Ottawa from the new R.C.A.F. Headquarters at 20, Lincoln's Inn Fields† tell the tale:

I found the place, to be quite honest with you, as dead as a door-nail, everyone complaining that they had nothing to do, but nobody doing anything about it. . . .

The discipline of the place is lousy. The men are turned out in a frightful manner. Nobody seems to give a goddam whether the ship sinks or swims, but above all, I found that everybody was diametrically opposed to all the policies emanating from Canada.

I got all the officers together the moment that I appeared in the office, and for the first time in my life I felt I was in a hostile atmosphere, but I do think that when I had finished with them, they were more friendly disposed, and could see the light as I wished them to see it.

As far as our troops in the R.A.F. are concerned, I find that they are being dispersed all over Hell's half acre, without restraint. The officers that we have put in the postings department have apparently, due to poor direction, just let the thing slide, and have done little towards concentrating our troops into Canadian Squadrons.

I dropped a hint in a devious way that I would not be satisfied, as far as Canadian representation and control is concerned, with less than membership on the British Air Council. Apparently, it is shaking them to the core, realizing as they do, the justice of the request and yet the extraordinary situation that it would create. . . .

The discipline of our troops in England is tragic. How I regret my weak-kneed efforts to get our training department to spend more time on discipline training! They come over here with little idea of discipline, no idea as to how an officer or N.C.O. should behave. . . . What makes it worse, the R.A.F. authorities are diffident about dealing with R.C.A.F. airmen. They treat them (and I must say that it is kind of them) more like guests than culprits.

. . . No thought has been given at all, despite my most vigorous protests, to teach[ing] these men leadership, and time must be made to do it because in the end without it (and this is proven by present actual experience) the product of the Joint Air Training Plan leaves a Hell of a lot to be desired. . . .

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\*The Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps was responsible for the medical needs of the Royal Canadian Air Force until the autumn of 1940.<sup>175</sup>

†In the beginning the R.C.A.F. had occupied space in the Sun Life Building on Cockspur Street, the same building in which Canadian Military Headquarters maintained its most important offices throughout the war.

The choice of Air Commodore Curtis as Edwards' Deputy was fortunate. Ill-health dogged Edwards all the time he was in England, and Curtis' role was enlarged accordingly. The Air Vice Marshal, indeed, was obliged to go into hospital soon after arriving overseas, and it fell to Curtis to introduce the Air Ministry's Directorate of Postings to the new line of thinking at the R.C.A.F. Headquarters:

Definite instructions have been received at this Headquarters from R.C.A.F. Headquarters, Ottawa, to the effect that action is to be taken to ensure that personnel comprising the aircrews of all R.C.A.F. squadrons, is to be made completely Canadian as rapidly as possible. It is understood that the Air Ministry concurs in this policy.

In spite of the very evident desire to cooperate towards achieving this end on the part of both Air Ministry and this Headquarters, there have been many recent examples of postings which have had the effect of postponing, rather than advancing, the date of arriving at a condition under which all aircrew positions in R.C.A.F. squadrons would be filled by R.C. A.F. personnel. . . .

There are R.C.A.F. officers with considerable operational experience who are considered competent to fill the squadron and flight command vacancies in the newly forming R.C.A.F. squadrons, yet apparently due to the fact that recommendations for postings are frequently made at the Group level, R.A.F. personnel are posted to positions in R.C.A.F. Squadrons at considerable inconvenience to the R.A.F., when in actual fact R.C.A.F. personnel are available in other Groups.

As a temporary remedy to this undesirable situation, it is requested that, before postings are made which affect the positions of squadron and flight commands in R.C.A.F. squadrons, the proposed posting be referred to this Headquarters, and that before vacancies in R.C.A.F. squadrons are filled by R.A.F. personnel, this Headquarters be asked for recommendations. . . .

It will be necessary to make other arrangements to deal with this situation as the numbers of R.C.A.F. personnel increase. It is therefore recommended that consideration be given to the establishment of additional positions on the personnel staff of each Command immediately, and each Group later, to be filled by R.C.A.F. squadron leaders and flight lieutenants, respectively. The duties of these officers would be to advise the Commands and Groups and maintain contact with this Headquarters in all cases of postings affecting R.C.A.F. personnel.<sup>178</sup>

Curtis gave three examples of postings that were considered unwarranted. One of these concerned Flight Lieutenant L. V. Chadburn, later considered by many the R.C.A.F.'s greatest fighter leader. Chadburn had been posted from No. 412 Squadron to No. 19 Squadron R.A.F. Curtis pointed out that the young Canadian pilot was quite capable of leading No. 416 Squadron, recently formed under the command of a British officer. That Chadburn was shortly appointed to command No. 416 indicates that the Air Ministry was disposed to cooperate with the R.C.A.F. Headquarters where it could see its way clear to do so.

Postings in the field, however, were not the major obstacle to Canadianization. Curtis struck closer to the root a few weeks later when he wrote to the Air Ministry,

. . . some O.T.U.s and Groups in Bomber Command are not cooperating in the matter of Canadianizing the squadrons. . . . It would be appreciated if the policy affecting the R.C.A.F. was again brought to the attention of Bomber Command and particularly to Nos. 6\* and 7 Groups.<sup>179</sup>

It was regrettable to have to press the Air Ministry at a time when it was encountering such serious difficulties in the air war against Germany. But the R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters had no alternative. The tone of the official correspondence from Ottawa reveals the gravity of the situation as viewed from the Canadian capital. "Canadianization situation as outlined by you . . . entirely unsatisfactory", cabled Breadner to Edwards early in February 1942.<sup>180</sup>

\*Not to be confused with No. 6 (R.C.A.F.) Group (below, page 288). At this time Nos. 6 and 7 Groups specialized in operational training. They were later re-numbered 91 and 92.

. . . over 7,000 aircrew 3,200 ground crew posted overseas which is more than three times number aircrew and one half numbers ground crew required to man 25 squadrons. . . . Advise Air Ministry reaction and remedial measures proposed.

Major Power, he added, proposed to inform the House of Commons and the press of the exact numbers of Canadian aircrew in the Canadian squadrons unless steps were taken to remedy the situation. Air Vice-Marshal Edwards replied that no immediate change could be effected. Nevertheless, he went on,

if the Canadianization of squadrons does not proceed I . . . will refuse to permit any Canadians to be posted to R.A.F. squadrons either in England or overseas until this demand has been met. I have just been informed that Coastal Command posting fifty Canadians to R.C.A.F. squadrons immediately. . . . The Air Ministry is most co-operative . . . and continues to send strong letters to Commands.<sup>181</sup>

Whether Edwards either could or would have carried out his threat to prevent postings may perhaps be doubted. But he went on to mention an even more desperate expedient:

If I cannot make a more satisfactory report by March 1st I shall be prepared to recommend that the R.C.A.F. be withdrawn from Air Ministry Control and that we organize our own Air Force the Joint Air Training Plan Agreement notwithstanding.

It seems rather unlikely that he thought of this as a very serious possibility.

The Canadian Air Minister considered the matter serious enough to warrant a personal reply to Edwards:<sup>182</sup>

What is previous action and at whose instance which makes it difficult to proceed rapidly with Canadianization? Difficulty you mention namely that crews made up at O.T.U.s from all personnel could surely be rectified by insisting that Canadians be trained together in O.T.U.s. . . . Approve your action in notifying Air Ministry that serious situation might ensue if proper action not taken in near future.

Two days later Edwards was able to give the Minister reassuring news:<sup>183</sup>

I have insisted and action is being taken accordingly that crews must be made up all Canadian in O.T.U.s. . . . Situation rapidly improving and expect further improvement after to-day's meeting where these points were taken up in no uncertain terms. . . .

Thus ended this rather stormy series of trans-Atlantic exchanges.

A personal report<sup>184</sup> which Edwards sent to the Chief of the Air Staff just at this point describes the situation as he saw it. He had found in the first place, he said, that Canadians in England as well as R.A.F. officers, while regarding Canadianization as "all right in due course", were disposed for the moment to accept "being mixed with the R.A.F. and other Dominion Air Forces" in the interest of getting on with the war:

In our discussions I got madder and madder until finally it was necessary for me to resist the posting of anyone of Canadian Nationality to anywhere but into a Canadian Squadron. The Air Ministry protested vociferously that their policy was our policy, the C.-in-C.s the same, but nevertheless, some of the most annoying things would take place.

The complaint was levelled that Canadians were not developing leaders in this war; that you could not put a person in command of a Squadron that had no experience, that would be murder it was said; that Inter-Empire crews were better than united crews of each Dominion; that we shouldn't break crews once formed, despite the fact that they should have been formed from one Dominion in the first place. . . .

My biggest opponents were Sholto Douglas of the Fighter Command and Leigh-Mallory of No. 11 Group — it didn't take long to find that out. Louis Greig,\* who has been of the greatest help, arranged a lunch yesterday as between Sholto, Philip Babington,†

\*Group Captain Sir Louis Greig, Personal Air Secretary to Sir Archibald Sinclair.

†Air Marshal, Air Member for Personnel in the British Air Council.

myself and Louis. I felt that it was a great moment. Sholto standing high and clear by his successes of the Battle of Britain was hostile. I told him our problem and he almost laughed. We came to severe grips and I am afraid the language was not as diplomatic as it might have been but I do think that he might turn around to our side. This, I cannot predict, but if, as may be possible, there is not a decided change of mind, if not of heart in the coming week, I propose to see Archie Sinclair and if that brings no fruit I am very much afraid that this is no place for me and that possibly you have sent the wrong man here.

Things, nevertheless, are improving; bomber crews are being torn apart — which is regrettable; a temporary stoppage has been placed on Canadians leaving England — which is also regrettable but I do feel, regardless of whatever unpopularity and hostility it may bring to me, that we are on the right track.

The point is that under the J.A.T.P. Agreement we have done all that we contracted to do and more and when I say more I mean it in the sense of R.D.F. Personnel, Ground Crews, and a thousand other things. We only ask that the R.A.F. will stick to its part of the bargain which is really not asking much.

Statistics at the end of February, showing a slight upward trend in Canadian postings to R.C.A.F. squadrons, were reflected in a more cordial tone in correspondence. Edwards wrote to the Air Ministry:

It is most heartening to see the progress. . . . I realize that many difficulties are being encountered in trying to meet our wishes . . . but I feel sure that with the help and co-operation of everyone we will be able to bring about a situation that will be entirely satisfactory to all.<sup>185</sup>

This optimism proved premature. Disparity between the number of Canadian aircrew arriving overseas and the number entering R.C.A.F. squadrons continued to try his patience and to vex the home authorities.

On 13 May 1942 Major Power spoke very frankly about the problem in the Canadian House of Commons:

. . . there is nothing in the whole department more dear to my heart than the Canadianization of the Royal Canadian Air Force. I should like to get all the support I can in parliament. I do not know when I have had a greater sense of frustration than in my attempts to Canadianize the Royal Canadian Air Force Overseas. . . . Unfortunately — and I am saying this without blaming anybody — there was not always the same enthusiasm, if I may put it in that way, on the part of the air ministry, and particularly on the part of the officers of the Royal Air Force, for the Canadianization of our squadrons.

Perhaps I had better go one step further. A large number of officers of the Royal Canadian Air Force, having been trained in the old Royal Flying Corps or Royal Air Force, naturally had their roots more deeply embedded in the traditions of the Royal Air Force than in those of the Royal Canadian Air Force. Therefore there was — perhaps obstruction is too strong a word — some resistance. . . . There was some resistance both on the part of the senior officers of the Royal Air Force — though I must say that eventually, after my visit last summer, the air ministry came around to what I call the Canadian point of view — and among the officers of our own Royal Canadian Air Force. Therefore, even the Canadianization of our twenty-five squadrons has been somewhat difficult. . . .

That there had been some doubts about the Power policy among senior officers of the R.C.A.F. was certainly the case. It is possible however that at this point the frustrated Minister was in some degree confusing that conviction of the necessity of gradualness in Canadianization, which we have noted, with actual opposition to the policy. It is evident also that there was some opposition to the policy among members of the Royal Canadian Air Force whom he did *not* mention. The idea of national squadrons often had comparatively little appeal for the young and the brave. Youthful Canadian flyers, impatient above everything else to reach an operational squadron, and conditioned by many months of training with comrades-in-arms from all parts of the Commonwealth, quickly made themselves at home in mixed R.A.F. squadrons. Even today many members and ex-members

of the R.C.A.F. look back nostalgically on their service in these cosmopolitan units which offered many things: a companionship symbolic of the common cause for which they were fighting, a chance to rub shoulders with leading flyers from every country of the Commonwealth, and friends to act as guides, or perhaps as hosts, when it came time to go on leave. It was inevitable that rumours would circulate in the barracks and dispersal huts to the effect that Canadianization was to be accomplished by uprooting Dominion personnel from R.A.F. squadrons. This was not intended, for R.C.A.F. officers were as convinced as the R.A.F. itself that it would be unwise to disturb these happily working crews. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the thing sometimes happened; and the idea persisted. It is possible that the obstruction to the Canadian government's policy which is discernible on Group and lower levels of R.A.F. command was in fact encouraged in some degree by these Canadian youngsters.

Still another source of opposition was the theory that mixed squadrons were superior to those formed on a national basis. This idea, which had roots going back to the First World War, was widely current in the R.A.F. A popular version maintained,<sup>186</sup>

... an English squadron having a number of Canadian pilots in it is assured of a vivid display of guts in a tight corner. . . . On the other hand, the presence of R.A.F. pilots in a squadron which has a number of Canadians, tends to sober them down a bit, and improve their discipline.

Naturally this hypothesis got little countenance at R.C.A.F. Headquarters in Great Britain. Air Vice-Marshal Edwards, a stern disciplinarian himself, felt that any unruly tendencies Canadians might exhibit could be best overcome by concentrating R.C.A.F. personnel in their own units and formations. He brought pressure to bear on the Air Ministry to discourage the speculation that mixed squadrons were better than national ones, especially at O.T.U.s., where he felt, probably not without reason, that it influenced those responsible for posting Dominion personnel.

The best evidence concerning the opinions of R.C.A.F. men themselves on the Canadianization question is found in reports on the subject compiled by British censors who read their letters.\* But the dominant facts revealed by these reports are that there was wide variety of view and no consensus, and that Canadians complained impartially whether they were under R.A.F. or Canadian command. A report dated 28 May 1943,<sup>188</sup> after the formation of the Canadian Bomber Group, remarks that the compiler's task is complicated by the diversity of the views expressed:

Some idea of this diversity may be gained by comparing the opinion of one Canadian airman who said "Tomorrow we are no longer under the R.A.F. but under R.C.A.F. Command. That will mean better treatment than we've been getting under the R.A.F. It was really rotten", with the feeling of another who wrote "Most of the lads are not in favour of this Canadianisation idea as our association with the R.A.F. has been very pleasant."

3. It has been characteristic of Canadians to criticise certain aspects of R.A.P. organisation, and favourite targets for invective were what they considered to be lack of organisation, slowness, "old school tie attitude" and, most often, red tape. This characteristic remains dominant, and R.C.A.F. men criticise their own Command and its system with the same vehemence and volubility as they applied to the R.A.F. . . .

5. On R.A.P. Stations Canadian airmen form the opinion that English officers are antagonistic towards them. That there has been friction is beyond argument but whether it is due to lack of tact and oppressive behaviour on the part of Englishmen or to the Canadians'

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\*One of these reports, not identified as such, is printed as appendix to Mr. Power's memoirs *A Party Politician*. The original is dated 14 December 1942.<sup>187</sup>



#### HEADS OF THE CANADIAN NAVAL SERVICE

The Naval Minister, Mr. Angus L. Macdonald (in civilian clothes) on the steps of Naval Service Headquarters, Ottawa, March 1943. In the foreground, on the left, Vice-Admiral P. W. Nelles, Chief of the Naval Staff, 1934-1944.

- ebullient social behaviour and desire to argue about orders may remain as a subject for speculation. . . .
7. It is probably true to say that the idea of the Canadian Command had a considerable appeal to the majority, although there were many critics who did not like to contemplate what they believed would be the breaking up of existing mixed crews; but when the plan became a reality, the airmen affected transferred their criticism to a new target, with few signs of intellectual indigestion.
8. Diametrically opposed views are expressed on almost every aspect of the matter being considered. . . .

The debate on mixed versus national squadrons went on — and, where veteran flyers gather, it goes on still.

Outside of the single-engined squadrons Canadianization appeared to be in the doldrums throughout 1942. A noteworthy exception, however, is the case of No. 425 Squadron which at Major Power's request was made distinctively French-Canadian in character. "It is apparent", wrote Edwards, "that, up to my arrival here, no one liked the idea and everyone found a thousand reasons why it should not be formed."<sup>189</sup> It is evident that there was both Canadian and British opposition. The Air Ministry was at first reluctant to take on this project, because "the more penny packets there are the more complicated the posting"; but when once committed to it the British officials gave it their whole-hearted support. The Mark III Wellington was selected as the new squadron's aircraft, and every R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. unit in Bomber Command was combed for French-Canadian pilots, navigators, wireless operator-air gunners, air gunners and bomb aimers.\* The way was cleared for personnel sent from Canada, including the squadron C.O., Squadron Leader J. M. U. St. Pierre and his flight commanders, Flight Lieutenants C. A. Roy and J. L. Savard, to go directly to a Wellington O.T.U. without enduring the usual waiting period of one to three months at the Bournemouth Reception Centre. When in October 1942 No. 425 began flying operational sorties from R.A.F. Station Dishforth (Yorks.) as part of No. 4 Group, it was completely officered by Canadians, most of whom were French-speaking. Of the total aircrew strength of 131, only 13 were R.A.F. (all warrant officers or N.C.Os.); of 377 non-flying personnel only 128, about one-third, had to be contributed by the R.A.F.<sup>190</sup> Letters from the squadron indicated that, in spite of some reservations, the people most directly concerned were delighted: the censors reported "joy unconfined among the French Canadians . . . excellent morale and much enthusiasm".<sup>191</sup>

Apart from its primary aim of achieving a better concentration of Canadians in R.C.A.F. squadrons, the Canadianization policy also involved extending the supervision of the R.C.A.F. Headquarters in Great Britain over all R.C.A.F. personnel attached to the Royal Air Force. Towards this end a Directorate of Records and Statistics was added to the headquarters early in 1942. One of its first tasks was to prepare a set of "Who and Where" cards showing the location of all R.C.A.F. personnel overseas; this soon found a practical application in the distribution of ballots for the Canadian plebiscite on compulsory service overseas. Returns from the new directorate were also used to keep Ottawa informed on such matters as the progress of Canadianization, the names of Canadians commissioned or promoted in the field and the numbers of enemy aircraft shot down by Canadian flyers. The link with Canadians serving with the R.A.F. was further strengthened through a staff of field liaison officers who visited R.A.F. units and formations to

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\*Until March 1942 Wellington crews comprised two pilots, a navigator and two wireless operator-air gunners. Thereafter crews consisted of one pilot, navigator, air bomber, wireless operator-air gunner and air gunner.

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consult with C.Os. and A.Os.C. on difficulties concerning R.C.A.F. personnel. In addition R.C.A.F. "district headquarters" were established during 1942-43 at seven suitable centres in Britain "for the purpose of providing field liaison, chaplain, welfare and public relations services for R.C.A.F. personnel".<sup>192</sup> Another was set up in the Middle East, and subsequently still another in South-East Asia. Mail delivery to Canadians, and the everlasting complaints about its slowness, were a major care of these local headquarters.

The increased activity of the Overseas Headquarters was reflected in the growth of its staff. From 58 officers, 108 other ranks and 22 civilians at the beginning of 1942 it grew to 219 officers, 536 other ranks (including 39 airwomen) and 58 civilians as the year ended.<sup>193</sup> About one-third of the personnel were employed at the various district headquarters. During the year Air Vice-Marshal Edwards himself spent much time travelling by air to visit distant units and personnel of the R.C.A.F. He made a tour of the Middle East, Ceylon and India. Often he flew in armed aircraft escorted by fighters in order to reach advanced landing grounds in the war theatres. He played a great part in developing *esprit de corps* among the men of the R.C.A.F. Overseas, making them aware of what other Canadians were doing and of the important part their country was playing in the air war.<sup>194</sup>

#### *The New Agreement of 1942*

The Ottawa Air Training Conference held in May and June 1942 was an episode of some importance in the history of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan and therefore of the Royal Canadian Air Force Overseas. It is also an incident at least worth noting in the history of Canadian wartime external relations generally.

The origins of the conference are to be found in the fact that the original B.C.A.T.P. agreement of 1939 was to expire on 31 March 1943, and if the Plan was to continue arrangements had to be made well in advance of that date. Another element in the situation was the fact that British pilots were now being trained in the United States as well as in Canada. The Canadian government had viewed this development with mixed feelings. The Air Training Plan had been a source of pride to Canadians and had been regarded as an exceptionally important and distinctive Canadian contribution to the war. The Canadian apprehension that training in the United States might be considered as in some sort reflecting on the usefulness of the B.C.A.T.P. is clearly visible in an exchange between Mackenzie King and Churchill as early as October 1940,<sup>195</sup> long before arrangements for such training were actually made.\* In November 1940 King made a definite offer of "a further substantial expansion of the joint programme" in Canada; this for the moment Chur-

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\*On 8 October 1940 the Canadian Cabinet War Committee heard mention of a story that Lord Beaverbrook (Minister of Aircraft Production) was spreading in Britain a report that the Air Training Plan was a failure. It was agreed that the Prime Minister should take the matter up with Mr. Churchill. The latter replied that a conversation in which Beaverbrook was alleged to have made these remarks never took place, but that it was true that Beaverbrook was strongly opposed to sending any operational aircraft out of England at present. He added: "We are fighting for our lives here, and he is feeding the fighting line from day to day in a truly marvellous manner. Factories are bombed almost nightly, and continuous readjustments and dispersions have to be made. . . . Nevertheless, in spite of all, we are more than holding our own, largely thanks to the genius of this man. . . . Do not on any account, my friend, suppose we do not value the great Empire Training Scheme, or that we are not going to push it with all our strength. But there is the inevitable conflict between the short-term and the long-term view. . . . Do not underrate the gravity of the pressure to which we are subjected here. . . ." Beaverbrook sent King a memorandum developing his views, and King replied with a message expressing confidence in and admiration for the work Beaverbrook was doing.<sup>196</sup>

chill declined with thanks, on the chief ground that "the Air Ministry is absorbed in current operations and in making ready for the spring battle".<sup>197</sup>

The Canadian feeling found further expression in a discussion between Ralston and Sir Archibald Sinclair in January 1941. Ralston pointed out the apparent contradiction between the British reluctance to extend the scope of the B.C.A.T.P. and the reports of training to be undertaken in the United States, Sinclair made a firm reply: apart from all other considerations, "it was highly desirable politically that we should make use of this opportunity to get the United States to take part in our common effort to win the war". Ralston was given an *aide-mémoire* which indicated that the help most urgently needed from Canada was an increase in the production of advanced trainer aircraft and consent to the transfer to the Dominion of additional R.A.F. training units. A paragraph referring to the use of training facilities in the United States was cut out on Ralston's suggestion.<sup>198</sup> However, Canadian misgivings continued, and it is evident that the absence of consultation with Canada in the matter had been somewhat resented. In March 1941 the United States finally offered- the British government large air training facilities, and a still bigger programme was launched later in the year.<sup>199</sup> There was no provision for any coordination between the Canadian and U.S. programmes.

The entrance of the United States into the war changed the aspect of things. Many of the considerable number of Americans who were involved in the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan either as students or instructors now desired to transfer to their own country's forces; and the United States was clearly going to need its air training facilities for its own use. Within twenty-four hours of the attack on Pearl Harbor the U.S. Minister in Ottawa was discussing with the Canadian government the possibility that Canada could lend for United States use some of its air training installations which might become surplus as the result of the withdrawal of Americans from the Plan. On 20 December 1941 the air training situation was discussed by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence; Canada-United States, which adopted the following as its Twenty-Third Recommendation:

That the Canadian and United States Governments should consider the advisability of arranging for a meeting of appropriate representatives of Great Britain, Canada and the United States to make appropriate recommendations for co-ordination of the entire aviation training programs to be conducted in Canada and the United States.

It is evident that this recommendation originated with the U.S. Section of the Board, but the Americans did not make clear precisely what they had in mind. During the months that followed, Canadian inquiries elicited the facts that while the United States Army Air Force was interested in the possibility that as a result of the cessation of the enlistment of Americans in the R.A.F. there might be training facilities in Canada that could be used. by either the R.A.F. or the U.S. services, the U.S. Navy was using the Board's recommendation as a basis for discussing providing training for the Royal Navy's Fleet Air Arm in Canada or the United States or both. Mr. Power disliked this being done "without much consultation" with Canadian authorities, and instructed R.C.A.F. officers that they were to make no commitments. In the meantime, both governments had approved the Board's recommendation (in the case of Canada, the Cabinet War Committee accepted it on 14 January 1942).<sup>200</sup>

It is evident that the Americans were pressing the British to release some of the training facilities which they were using in the United States.<sup>201</sup> On 19 March 1942 the Dominions Secretary telegraphed Mr. King that the British government would like to arrange for more flying training in Canada, as offered by him sixteen

months before.<sup>202</sup> While this approach was still being studied in Ottawa, there was some discussion with London of the long-delayed conference suggested by the Permanent Joint Board, which clearly had a relation to it. As recently as 18 March the Canadian Cabinet's War Committee had authorized a communication to the British High Commissioner suggesting such a meeting. On 9 April the Committee discouraged a British suggestion that there should be a preliminary Commonwealth meeting before the United States was brought in; the official Canadian view was that the Americans should be invited to participate from the beginning.

The Americans on their side made an attempt to arrange that the meeting should be held in Washington on a limited and purely military basis. On 2 April General Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces, announced to the Chief of the Air Staff in Ottawa that it was desired to implement the 23rd Recommendation at once, and that a conference would accordingly take place in Washington on 15 April "under the chairmanship of Major General Barton K. Yount, United States Army Air Forces" (who commanded the Flying Training Command). The R.C.A.F. was invited to send "a representative" or to suggest a more convenient place and date. This did not suit the Canadian book at all. On 11 April Breadner replied that the Canadian External Affairs Department had already invited the United Kingdom to attend a conference in Ottawa early in May, and that he expected that the Canadian Prime Minister would discuss the question with the President "in Washington on Wednesday next". And on 15 April Mackenzie King duly suggested to President Roosevelt that this was a good time for a conference on air training with the United States taking part. The President seems to have been in an expansive mood — this was the occasion when he agreed that Canada should have a seat on the Munitions Assignment Board (above, page 168) — and King's diary tells the rest:

The President at once said that he thought that was a good idea, and I then suggested possibly South Africa in addition to Australia and New Zealand. The President then spoke of some other countries of the United Nations who were training pilots on this continent. He referred to Norway, the Netherlands and China. He made notes on the cover of a brown envelope, and said he would take up the matter in the morning.<sup>203</sup>

On the 16th he duly took it up with Admiral King and General Marshall's deputy General Joseph T. McNarney (General Arnold was out of town) in Mackenzie King's presence. The Prime Minister intervened to ensure if possible that the conference was kept on the political level:

As the President had spoken of chief officials being present at the conference, I said we had thought of it on a Ministerial level. The President remarked he had no Minister of Air; did not know whom he could send.

I mentioned it being desirable for us to have Sinclair, from England and also that our Ministers, Power and others who had negotiated the agreement would need to participate in the discussion on its revision.

The President said he could see no objection to Sinclair coming; certainly the Ministers would have to participate. That he could find the right persons to send, someone that would be sufficiently high up to represent the U.S.

It was clearly desirable to consult the British before making an announcement. King wrote, "Discussed the desirability of getting the message over to Churchill before making announcement but both the President and I felt that if the announcement could relate to the night I had spent with him at the White House, it would be all the better. He tried to get Halifax to approve the message. Halifax was away." Subsequently Lord Halifax's senior subordinate at the British Embassy, Sir Ronald Campbell, gave the required consent. Later, however, King seems to have been troubled:

I rang [Norman] Robertson up at midnight to make sure that word got over to Churchill in time. . . . Also to see that some paragraph was added to the effect that Great Britain had agreed to the conference in advance. I did not want to have it appear that the U.S. was being invited before Britain had agreed.

It was too late to insert this in the release as the President had left for Hyde Park, but Robertson said he would get Early,\* in giving out the notice, to add a verbal word to this desired effect.

The press release in fact appeared as an announcement by King and Roosevelt jointly that all members of the United Nations with air training programmes either in Canada or the United States were being invited to a conference in Ottawa early in May.<sup>204</sup> The meeting was thus made to appear as primarily a bilateral project of Canada and the United States. It was now presumably the turn of the British to feel miffed.

While a triangular discussion over the conference agenda proceeded, not entirely smoothly (the British objected to a large mass of statistical and other information on the state of air training being circulated to all governments that might take part in the conference, and the United States Minister presented on 14 May an informal but ominous note which expressed the fears of the U.S. War and Navy Departments that the meeting might stray outside the strict limits of air training, and emphasized that U.S. air forces would remain intact for operational purposes), the membership of the conference grew and grew. Canada, as host originally sent invitations to the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, China, Norway and the Netherlands (the last two represented by their exile governments in England). It appears however that other Allied governments, particularly that of Poland, expressed disappointment; so invitations were also sent to Poland, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Greece, as well as South Africa; it being made clear that large delegations were not expected, and that one representative would be sufficient. On 29 April the Cabinet War Committee agreed that in addition to nations conducting training in North America, other allied countries with air forces, including Russia, should be invited. Invitations now went through the Canadian High Commissioner in London to the Soviet Union, India (after consultation with the British government) and the French National Committee. The United Kingdom suggested an invitation to Southern Rhodesia, which had an air training plan of its own and was making a greater contribution to the Allied air effort than many countries that were being invited. Southern Rhodesia and India declined the invitation on the comprehensible ground that there was not enough time to arrange representation.

Early in May (after seeking clarification from Ottawa on the proposed agenda and the status of Russia at the conference) the High Commissioner extended the invitation to the Soviet Union through its ambassador in London, M. Maisky. On 11 May, no reply having been received, External Affairs indicated uneasiness; but Mr. Massey learned that Maisky had not heard from Moscow. On the 14th, Ottawa cabled Massey again. It was now assumed that the Russians would not attend, but could not a polite letter of regret be obtained from them endorsing generally the aims of the conference? It was public knowledge that Russia had been invited, and unnecessary significance might be attached to her non-appearance. On the 16th, Mr. Massey replied that he had made this request, but M. Maisky could do nothing without his government's authority. Nothing more seems to have happened, and on 19 May the conference opened in Ottawa with 14 nations represented (including

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\*The President's press secretary.

Canada), but with no representation from Russia, even apparently in the form of a letter, polite or otherwise.<sup>205</sup>

The American delegation was headed by Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary of War for Air, who presumably was designated by Roosevelt to meet Mackenzie King's views (above, page 279). Major-General Yount (see same page) was also present. The British delegation was led not by Sir Archibald Sinclair but by Captain Balfour, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Air, who is already familiar to the reader.<sup>206</sup> The Governor General, Lord Athlone, was pained by not being invited to open the conference, and King later explained to him at length that this would not have been suitable, including among other arguments the suggestion that His Excellency's participation would have led the Americans to believe that the conference "was Great Britain's move, using Canada as her instrument". The conference in fact opened with an address by Mr. King himself.<sup>207</sup>

The main points of the agenda were: (1) the necessity of relating training capacity of the United Nations to the output of operational types of aircraft by those nations; (2) balancing of training capacity between United Nations with a view to ensuring continuous flow of trainees, adequate trainer aircraft and other necessary equipment; (3) practicability and desirability of adopting standard systems of training; (4) composition of aircrews. The conference broke up into committees to study these matters. Its first phase — the "United Nations" phase — ended on 22 May. Its main decision was published: the formation of a combined committee on air training in North America to promote the coordination of United Nations air training capacity. The United Kingdom, the United States and Canada were to be represented on this committee; the United States representative was to be chairman, and the headquarters was to be in Washington. The committee was to have advisory functions only.<sup>208</sup>

This portion of the conference had no great effect on the course of the war. Mackenzie King, reporting upon it to the War Committee on 22 May, observed that not only had it accomplished important practical results, but, it had been significant as the first real conference held by the United Nations during the war. Looking at it retrospectively, one is tempted to apply to it one of King's favourite phrases for conferences organized by other people: a "mere facade" (above, page 148). The Combined Committee on Air Training in North America, however, had rather more importance than it has been credited with; though it took a very long time to get into action. On 29 July 1942 the Cabinet War Committee was told that although the conference's decision had been approved by both governments, the U.S. had as yet taken no steps to constitute the committee, and inquiries in Washington had brought no satisfactory response. On 30 September it was reported that the United States had finally appointed representatives. On 21 January 1943 the War Committee heard that the Combined Committee had not yet held its first meeting, and was told that it was evident that the American services were not eager for it to assume its functions. On the basis of the War Committee's records, indeed, one might assume that the Combined Committee never did begin to function.\*

In fact, the Committee ultimately did useful if limited work. But months of pressure from Canada were required to get it moving. When the U.S.A.A.F.'s Director of Individual Training was approached on the matter in January 1943 his reply was that no meeting could be held without a request by the Combined Chiefs

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\*Colonel Dziuban (*Military Relations between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945*, page 283) might be understood as implying the same conclusion.

of Staff! The Canadian Joint Staff then pointed out that the creation of the Committee had been agreed by an international conference and approved by the United States and Canadian governments. The first meeting finally took place in Washington on 26 and 27 April, 1943, under the chairmanship of Brig.-Gen. Robert W. Harper, U.S.A., Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Training. A variety of detailed training matters were discussed and procedures were agreed upon for reciprocal visits to permit exchange of information on training methods. It was decided that the next meeting would be held at the R.C.A.F. Station, Trenton, Ontario, in June. For the rest of the war the Committee met every two months, alternately in Canada and in the United States. In the words of an historical account of the United Kingdom Air Liaison Mission (whose head represented the United Kingdom on the Committee), it was felt that it "provided a link of the greatest value between the three countries concerned and, unquestionably, was a great stimulus to the development of air training on the soundest lines and on approximately a common basis". But North American training facilities were never pooled and, contrary to earlier Canadian expectations and offers, no U.S. air training was carried on in Canada.<sup>209</sup>

The more effective portion of the Ottawa conference began on 22 May, when representatives of Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand sat down to discuss the extension of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. These discussions issued on 5 June in the signing of a new agreement (Appendix "J") which superseded both the original B.C.A.T.P. agreement of 1939 and the supplementary Sinclair-Ralston agreement of 1941. It extended the Plan to 31 March 1945 and enlarged it by nine more training schools and 10 specialist schools. The 27 R.A.F. training units already established in Canada were now to be administered and controlled by the Canadian government; in effect they were incorporated into the B.C.A.T.P., and the whole was termed the "Combined Training Organization". In its enlarged form the B.C.A.T.P. was capable of turning out monthly approximately 3000 aircrew trained to wings standard, roughly one-half of whom would be members of the R.C.A.F.

The new agreement materially furthered Canada's national aims overseas. The employment of Dominion aircrew was dealt with in detail, and Canada got special treatment. This was particularly marked in the agreement on commissioning; all pilots, observers, navigators and air bombers who were "considered suitable" by Canadian standards and were recommended were now to be commissioned. Wireless operators and air gunners remained subject to commissioning by quota, on the basis arranged during Major Power's visit to England in 1941 (above, page 267), though it was provided that the quota was not to operate to exclude airmen in these categories from commissions. The Royal Air Force was now obliged to apply two commissioning policies, one for R.C.A.F. personnel attached to British squadrons and a different one for aircrew from other Commonwealth countries, who remained subject to the percentage system (also page 267). Inevitably this caused a degree of ill-feeling, felt in the early stages of training but most noticeable at the O.T.U.s. Fortunately, none of this feeling carried over into the front-line squadrons, where the common bond of operational flying transcended differences of rank as well as of nationality.

Other concessions made to Canada included the right to recall R.C.A.F. officers and men attached to the R.A.F. (subject to operational expediency as interpreted by the R.A.F.) ; to be consulted in the selection of Commanding Officers for R.C.A.F. squadrons; to have general supervision over Canadians attached to the

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R.A.F.; to control the R.C.A.F. Personnel Reception Centre at Bournemouth; to command and man the parent stations of R.C.A.F. fighter squadrons; and to have the number of R.C.A.F. squadrons overseas increased from 25 to 35, in addition to the three original squadrons. The long-discussed R.C.A.F. bomber group was to be formed as soon as enough squadrons were available.

From the Canadian point of view the 1942 agreement resulted in a better distribution of powers and responsibilities. Past events had showed, however, that it was one thing to have the Dominion's policy officially accepted by the Air Ministry but quite another to have it effectively carried into practice. An incident connected with the Dieppe Raid of 19 August 1942,<sup>210</sup> more than two months after the new agreement was signed, is revealing. That agreement had repeated the assurance given in the Sinclair-Ralston agreement that the A.O.C.-in-C. at R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters would be "furnished with advance information about any major questions which arise from time to time affecting the employment of R.C.A.F. personnel and squadrons", yet six Canadian fighter squadrons, two army-cooperation squadrons and two aircraft from No. 418 (Intruder) Squadron were assigned to the operation without any information being furnished to Air Marshal Edwards. Although this had entailed transferring the two army-cooperation squadrons from Army Cooperation Command to No. 11 Fighter Group, nobody at the R.C.A.F. Headquarters knew what was going on until the Canadian Army Commander, Lieut.-General A. G. L. McNaughton informed Air Marshal Edwards on 8 August very confidentially, when Edwards visited his headquarters. This was done, McNaughton recorded, "as an act of courtesy, in the belief that he, as the responsible head of the R.C.A.F. in England, should be informed, and with the knowledge that in all probability this information would not be forthcoming from any other source."<sup>211</sup>

Edwards, a man forthright in all things, did not conceal his displeasure at being by-passed in this manner. After the raid he took the matter up with the Secretary of State for Air without getting much satisfaction.<sup>212</sup> It was easy to argue that secrecy was absolutely vital to an operation of this sort, and that it was necessary to limit knowledge of it to those with a definite "need to know".\* It was however rather less easy to justify excluding a person holding Air Marshal Edwards' rank and responsibilities. To make matters worse, Canadianization (as we have seen) still seemed to be getting nowhere. For the rest of the year relations between the Air Ministry and the R.C.A.F. Headquarters were, at times, rather less than cordial. The tensions, however, were somewhat abated by the successful conclusion of arrangements for the R.C.A.F. Headquarters to operate its own war room in association with the Air Ministry's. Edwards had been pressing for this for some months, and it was finally achieved by the representations of Major Power, who was in London in August. In conjunction with the war room the R.C.A.F. was given the right to issue its own *communiqués* for publication in the Canadian press. Minor repercussions followed the release on 9 September 1942 of the first R.C.A.F. news flash, dealing with a raid on Germany in which R.C.A.F. squadrons formed part of the attacking force. Intended only for Canadian consumption, the bulletin nevertheless appeared also in British newspapers, much to the embarrassment of the R.A.F. officer responsible for preventing such occurrences. R.C.A.F. Headquarters was both annoyed and amused by a London paper's inquiry whether this

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\*General McNaughton himself did not inform Canadian Military Headquarters, London, although that headquarters controlled the hospitals that would have to deal with casualties.

was the first time Canadian squadrons had flown over enemy territory? They had been carrying out such attacks more or less regularly since June 1941. Nevertheless, the publicity was welcome. A rent had been made in the curtain of anonymity; the names of Canadian flyers and (under nicknames) their squadrons. continued to appear on the front pages of London dailies. For the first time some effective means existed of informing the public in Canada, the United States and Great Britain that Canadians were in fact playing a large day-to-day part in the air war.<sup>213</sup>

### *The Final Crisis*

By the end of 1942 ten more R.C.A.F. squadrons had been formed overseas, but with few exceptions they contained relatively small numbers of Canadians. R.C.A.F. authorities both in London and Ottawa found this exasperating, and early in the New Year there took place what may be called the final serious crisis of the Canadianization question.

On 9 January 1943 Breadner sent to Edwards this concise signal.<sup>214</sup>

It is noted that the total Canadian aircrew of each of the following squadrons is less than 60 per cent: Squadrons 418, 422 and 423. Why?

On 20 January Breadner signalled again:<sup>215</sup>

Note that 4 most recently formed bomber squadrons Nos. 427, 428, 429 and 431 are commanded by R.A.F. personnel. Also that percentage of Canadian aircrew Nos. 429 and 431 only 33.61 and 16.67 respectively. Advise why it was necessary that, R.A.F. officers be selected for command these units and why so few Canadian aircrew these squadrons.

Under this "needling" from home, Edwards boiled over. On the 22nd he sent the Air Ministry a strong letter<sup>216</sup> which remarked that since the Canadianization policy had not been "steadily pursued", he was now "called upon to cancel all agreements which have been made involving the dispersal of R.C.A.F. aircrew". He accompanied it with a copy of a violent signal to Ottawa<sup>217</sup> which should be quoted at some length:

Your [signals] dated January 9 and . . . January 20. . . . The question of manning R.C.A.F. squadrons with one hundred per cent Canadian aircrew has been continually referred to Air Ministry authorities ever since my arrival overseas. We all appreciate that certain difficulties were apparent but as over a year has now elapsed . . . I can see no reason why our objective should not have been reached by now and can only conclude that for some reason unknown to us an attempt is being made to frustrate the implementation of this policy. I have today sent an official letter to the Air Ministry pointing out that sufficient time has now elapsed to put into effect any necessary corrective measures and bearing in mind the large number of R.C.A.F. aircrew arriving in this country and the small proportion required by our Canadian units there is no reason why the Canadianization of our squadrons should not have been completed long ago. I have requested that instructions be issued that no R.C.A.F. aircrew are to be posted from the United Kingdom except to Canadian units until the R.C.A.F. squadrons have one hundred per cent Canadian aircrew and [stated] that I am recommending to you that this headquarters take over the postings and records of all R.C.A.F. personnel. This I do hereby recommend most strongly.

The numbers required to completely Canadianize our squadrons are so small as compared with the numbers arriving in this country that this whole question is ridiculous. A census taken at Bournemouth revealed that of 1061 personnel who were requested to state whether they would prefer a posting to an R.C.A.F. or an R.A.F. unit 999 expressed preference for a Canadian squadron 34 for R.A.F. and 28 immaterial yet when personnel are posted to R.A.F. squadrons many protest without being questioned that they do not wish to join a Canadian organization. [sic] The whole thing lies in the fact that once a Canadian is posted to an R.A.F. unit he is indoctrinated by the C.O. and rightly so in the interests of morale with the idea that his particular unit is the finest in the wing group or command as

the case may be. . . . The fault mainly lies with the provisions of the J.A.T.P. agreement whereby our personnel are turned over to the R.A.P. for disposal and while we can recall any officer or airman it is subject to operational expediency the final decision on which rests with the R.A.F. The expression operational expediency is used greatly almost to the same extent that many shortcomings are hidden behind the expression there is a war on.

Reason for posting R.A.F. officers to command new squadrons contained in my monthly report dated January 12. . . . R.C.A.F. personnel being dispersed as they are throughout the R.A.F. and the better ones deliberately or otherwise being posted elsewhere than to Canadian squadrons we are not building up a supply of prospective leaders to take command of squadrons and we must submit to the judgment of the R.A.F. who make comparisons between our personnel and their better men of longer experience. . . . Unfortunately R.C.A.F. Commanding Officers are not available here. It is essential that a large number of potential squadron commanders in the rank of squadron leader and wing commander be posted overseas to gain experience and be available to take command when new squadrons formed. A small number have already been posted but these have been absorbed in existing squadrons. To give you some idea of the atmosphere one member of the Air Council advised me that if my headquarters had never been formed it would have made no difference to the war. It is easy to be wise after the event but we should never have participated in the J.A.T.P. but should instead have built up an air force of our own. I have sent a copy of this signal to the Air Ministry. Only 585 aircrew required to complete Canadianization our squadrons and yet there are approximately 8518 R.C.A.F. aircrew in the U.K. excluding Bournemouth where there are approximately 4000 aircrew the majority being R.C.A.F. SNAFU.\*

As might be expected, these communications exploded very loudly both in the Air Ministry and in Ottawa. The Air Member for Personnel in the former (Air Marshal Sir Bertine Sutton), to whom the letter had been directed, wrote briefly to Edwards' headquarters remarking, "The implementation of the process of Canadianization does not proceed more rapidly because of practical difficulties of which you and your liaison officers should be well aware and not because of any unwillingness in regard to its acceptance." After observing that Edwards' recommendations would involve a breach of the existing agreements, and that he would therefore inform the Chief of the Air Staff of the correspondence, Sutton concluded, "Finally, I must express my personal regret that your letter and signal were expressed in terms which make the solution of problems more and not less difficult to attain."<sup>218</sup> The C.-in-C. Bomber Command was particularly incensed; Edwards reported to Breadner, "Latest news bulletin. Bert Harris sends me following message through my liaison officer quote I will get that so and so Edwards out of this country if it is the last thing I do."<sup>219</sup> Breadner, alarmed by the unforeseen consequences of his own provocative messages, wrote to Edwards, "Easy pal, our signals were not intended to start you on the warpath",<sup>220</sup> and commented on the danger that if the Air Ministry took literally his request on posting no R.C.A.F. aircrew from the United Kingdom it would result in "breaking up many efficient and happy aircrews in both RCAF and RAF squadrons . . . contrary to the wishes of all concerned".† He begged Edwards to "do all in your power to pour oil on troubled waters and not under any circumstances go gunning".<sup>222</sup> Major Power himself sent Edwards an angry memorandum<sup>223</sup> observing that it seemed to him that it had been his "plain duty" on receiving Breadner's telegrams simply to make inquiries and report, instead of sending the Air Ministry what amounted to a threat of a change in Canadian government policy from that laid down in the agreement of June 1942.

Edwards was disposed to stand by what he had said. He signalled on 27

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\*A wartime noun understood to derive from the initial letters of the observation Situation Normal All messed Up.

†Edwards replied that he had in fact written to the Air Ministry on 23 January impressing on them "the necessity of not splitting crews once formed under any circumstances".<sup>221</sup>

January, "You may expect an approach to the Canadian Government through a different channel complaining of inaccuracy of my statements and protesting my lack of diplomacy. As far as inaccuracy is concerned you have the answers. As far as diplomacy is concerned I have tried that for fourteen months."<sup>224</sup> To the credit of the Air Ministry, there seems to have been no attempt to raise the matter with Ottawa through a "different channel".\* Yet Edwards' erratic outburst probably had a good effect in the end, for it brought into the Canadianization question the British Chief of the Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal.

On his return to England from the Casablanca Conference (14-24 January) Portal found himself confronted with the Edwards correspondence and was "greatly disturbed". On 29 January he dispatched a very sensible signal to Air Marshal Breadner.<sup>225</sup> He was, he said, at a loss to understand Edwards' allegations:

It is the agreed policy of our two Governments that R.C.A.F. squadrons should be manned as far as possible by Canadian aircrews and it has been our desire faithfully to carry out that policy; but in giving effect to it we have necessarily had to have regard to the paramount needs of operational efficiency. As you know, most of the Fighter Squadrons are already practically 100 per cent Canadian and the remaining Squadrons will be brought into line as soon as possible. But the difficulties of completing the process of Canadianisation in the larger types of aircraft are very real; and it is mainly in the R.C.A.F. Bomber Squadrons formed during the last few months that the position is least satisfactory.

The issues were far too complicated and vital to be dealt with satisfactorily by cable, and it was important nevertheless to lose no time in disposing of them, Portal therefore asked Breadner to "come over to this country and discuss the matter personally with us".

Breadner made a hurried trip accordingly. The line he took can perhaps be deduced from the communications from Ottawa to Edwards just quoted. The only record of the two Chiefs' discussions that has been found is a preliminary telegraphed report from Breadner to Power dated 3 February which states that he had found Portal "most cooperative":

I am satisfied that Portal is out to ensure that when I return I will be able to report to you that under the difficult circumstances confronting them Air Ministry are doing all that is possible and practicable. . . . Present indications are that Edwards' cause for complaint will be removed. . . .

Mr. Massey recorded a conversation with Breadner (10 February) about "his pacifying mission at the Air Ministry":

Edwards, in his efforts to carry out what he conceived to be his instructions, had obviously overplayed his hand. . . . Breadner told me that he very nearly had to disown him. However everything is tranquillised and certain arrangements made for consultation which ought to go a long way towards avoiding trouble in the future. . . .<sup>226</sup>

On 19 February, after Breadner's return to Canada, Air Marshal Sutton issued to all R.A.F. Commands a confidential letter on the subject of Canadianization,<sup>227</sup> which forms Appendix "K" to the present volume. It remarked,

Canada is a Dominion and as such is no less entitled to a separate and autonomous Air Force than is the United Kingdom. This right she has temporarily surrendered in the interests of war efficiency, accepting the fact that unity of organization and of operational command is essential in the prosecution of total war.

The letter goes on to urge all concerned to spare no effort in Canadianizing the R.C.A.F. squadrons and encouraging R.C.A.F. *esprit de corps*.

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\*It would seem that it never came to the attention of Mackenzie King. It was apparently never raised in the Cabinet War Committee. Power was less disposed than Ralston to bring his service problems to the Committee.

This letter is interesting from two points of view. On one side it represents a considerable and one might say final success for the Canadianization policy, which from this time onward met few of the obstacles that had hindered its progress hitherto. On the other it amounts to a very frank and rather hard-favoured statement of what the Royal Canadian Air Force had lost by the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. In this respect its phrasing may perhaps reflect Sutton's anger at the slap he had received from Edwards. Canadians would have been loath to admit baldly that their country had "surrendered" quite so much as this document states, and one cannot help reflecting that the Canadian Army would have laughed at the allegation that unity of "organization" as well as of "operational command" was necessary in total war. A situation where the Air Ministry was calling upon R.A.F. Commands to foster the *esprit de corps* of the R.C.A.F., and was indulgently acknowledging "the right of the R.C.A.F. to some form of self-expression" was not a satisfactory one from a national point of view.

In the course of this crisis there had been a development which doubtless helped to resolve it and changed the whole atmosphere of the Canadianization discussion. We have pointed out above the contradiction between the manly policy of independence which Canada was trying to follow in respect of the R.C.A.F. Overseas and the idea of allowing Great Britain to pay most of the bill for the force. The new B.C.A.T.P. agreement made in June 1942 saw Canada assume a larger proportion than formerly of the cost of the Training Plan, but the opportunity to take on also the cost of the overseas R.C.A.F. squadrons and personnel was not embraced. That autumn the Air Member for Finance in the Canadian Air Council, Air Commodore K. G. Nairn, returning from a visit overseas, voiced a conclusion which he certainly was not the first to reach: as a matter of "broad equity", and also from the point of view of efficient administration and the welfare of Canadian personnel, it was desirable that Canada should assume the whole cost of her overseas air effort. The Chief of the Air Staff and the Air Minister accepted the recommendation.<sup>228</sup> On 13 January 1943 the Cabinet War Committee, as part of a general reorganization of financial arrangements with the United Kingdom, approved in principle the assumption from 1 April of the responsibility for equipping and maintaining "the thirty-five R.C.A.F. squadrons now forming or to be formed in the United Kingdom" at a total cost of \$287 million for the year, plus possibly certain miscellaneous establishments costing \$60 million more; as well as the assumption from the same date of responsibility for "pay and allowances, clothing and other personal necessities, of all Canadian aircrew now serving in the R.A.F., at an estimated cost of \$35 million, and possibly capitation charges of about \$15 million, in addition". On 22 January (the day Edwards boiled over in London) these proposals were approved by the full Cabinet.\* The decision was announced in the Governor-General's Speech at the opening of Parliament on 28 January in general terms, and in more detail by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on 1 February. The whole Canadian position on Canadianization — both moral and practical — was thus vastly strengthened.

Had an early intimation of the proposed change been sent to Air Marshal

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\*At the same time Canada undertook to purchase the United Kingdom's interest in Canadian war plants, estimated at about \$200 million, and assumed the cost of certain minor activities carried on in Canada for British or joint British-Canadian account, such as the capital cost of camps built for internees or prisoners of War. The Minister of Finance explained in the House of Commons on 8 February that the new policy concerning the air force would "have the effect of increasing our expenditure in sterling in the United Kingdom, thereby providing indirectly additional Canadian dollars to Britain to assist her in purchasing supplies she requires from Canada".

Edwards, who had evidently himself recommended it, much trouble might have been avoided. As it was, he was not told until the decision was made final on 23 January. Breadner cabled him, with reference to his recommendation that his headquarters take over postings and records, "It is our assumption that in effecting an operative basis for pay of personnel, R.C.A.F. maintenance of records must automatically follow. There is no point therefore in raising this issue at present with Air Ministry. We feel that Air Ministry may mistrust our reasons for suddenly wanting to pay our share and therefore consider that any pressure for control other than is necessary for effective working of pay arrangements may be viewed with suspicion and for that reason be ill-timed."<sup>229</sup> Edwards replied, "I certainly would have avoided this angle if I had known that you were pursuing the suggestion I put forward months ago."<sup>230</sup>

Implementing this decision thrust new responsibilities upon R.C.A.F. administrative services overseas. R.C.A.F. base accounts offices were formed in the United Kingdom, the Middle East and India.<sup>231</sup> R.C.A.F. accounting personnel were stationed at every R.A.F. unit with 100 or more Canadians on its strength. New paybooks were prepared for all officers, airmen and airwomen showing pay entitlement in dollars as well as in sterling. The problem was enormous, but with the cooperation of the Air Ministry the Accounts Branch of the R.C.A.F. contrived to introduce the new system with a minimum of inconvenience to the men in the field.

### C. THE CANADIAN BOMBER GROUP

The year 1943 marked an important turning point in the history of the Royal Canadian Air Force. In Canada the B.C.A.T.P. reached its peak expansion; in the United Kingdom the R.C.A.F. Overseas at last began to take on something of the aspect of a national air force fighting in its own right. The first significant step in this direction produced what Air Marshal Edwards described as "one of the great moments in the life of our air force": the formation of No. 6 R.C.A.F. Bomber Group. This project, we have seen, had been under consideration since July 1941; but setbacks in aircraft production and airfield construction restricted the plans to paper for a year. As we have seen (above, page 283), final agreement on the formation of the Group was reached in Ottawa in June 1942. In August 1942 Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, A.O.C.-in-C. Bomber Command, informed the Canadian Air Minister, then in England, that Canadian squadrons were already moving into the area allocated to No. 6 R.C.A.F. Group.

On 10 July Air Marshal Edwards was asked by Air Force Headquarters, Ottawa, to nominate three officers, in order of merit, for the Group command. On the 15th he signalled his choice, with Air Vice-Marshal G. E. Brookes at the head of the list. The following day the Chief of the Air Staff informed him that Brookes had been selected. What consultation, if any, there had been with the Air Ministry does not appear. Brookes, an air force veteran of 1914-18 who had been an officer of the R.C.A.F. since its official beginning in 1924, had been Air Officer Commanding No. 1 Training Command (Toronto) since 1940. He went overseas at once to begin "double-banking" (understudying) to gain experience of Bomber Command practice. In the late summer and autumn, the squadrons were concentrated in No. 4 Group in Yorkshire, preparatory to being taken over by the still unformed Canadian group. It was to be the most northerly group in the Command, with its headquarters at Allerton Hall in Allerton Park in Yorkshire's North

Riding.\* Bomber Command Organization Order No. 151, dated 17. October, required the advance party to arrive on the 25th. On that date Air Vice-Marshal G. E. Brookes, Group Captain C. R. Slemon, the Senior Air Staff Officer, and Wing Commander J. R. Fauquier, an outstanding Canadian bomber leader who was to be in charge of air operations, were taken on strength No. 6 R.C.A.F. Group. They formed the nucleus of the headquarters organization, "double-banking" at No. 4 Group until 27 December, when their own operations room at Allerton Hall was ready. There they carried out "dummy runs" until one minute past midnight, 31 December-1 January, when, by Order of Detail No. 30, No. 6 R.C.A.F. Group was declared to be acting "in combination" with Bomber Command, R.A.F.<sup>232</sup>

As at first organized No. 6 Group comprised three bomber stations with their satellites or sub-stations, and 11 squadrons.† During 1943 three more squadrons (Nos. 432, 433 and 434) were added, and the senior Canadian bomber unit, No. 405, was transferred to the famous No. 8 (Pathfinder) Group. In March the base system of organization was introduced, when R.C.A.F. Station Topcliffe was upgraded to a bomber base, with sub-stations at Tholthorpe and East Moor. Air Commodore C. M. McEwen, who was to succeed Brookes as Air Officer Commanding No. 6 Group in February 1944, became the group's first base commander. The organization grew in strength and complexity with the formation of another base at R.C.A.F. Station Linton-on-Ouse, recently transferred from No. 4 Group. In 1944 the number of bases was increased to four, one of which provided specialized services including group aircraft servicing, communication flight, and the administration of the heavy conversion units where newly-arrived bomber crews went through a minimum of 25 hours of intense training on the type of aircraft they were to fly over enemy territory.

As with Canadian Army formations, No. 6 Group operated under higher British operational command, and indeed it was under somewhat closer supervision. The nature of air force organization demanded that R.A.F. Bomber Command Headquarters exercise not only strategic but tactical control over No. 6 Group, as over the other components of the bomber force. The same would have applied to a Canadian group provided for any other R.A.F. Command. It would have been scarcely practicable to make the R.C.A.F. Overseas, or any part of it, an independent command, and this was never seriously proposed., Bomber Command itself was a highly centralized fighting organization; this was made necessary by the general (though not invariable) policy of concentrating the bulk of the bomber force against a single objective on every night suitable for air operations. In these circumstances the main bomber stream might contain squadrons from every group in the Command. No. 6 Group had no concern with strategic policy; it hit the targets that were given to it. Neither its headquarters nor any other Canadian authority on any level was ever consulted about the policy of "area bombing" which made concentrations of workers' dwellings aiming points for the British bomber offensive;<sup>233</sup> but Canadians dropped a great many of the bombs that implemented it.

\*See the map of Bomber Command headquarters and stations in March 1943, facing page 91 in Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, *The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany* (4 vols., London, 1961), II.

†The stations at first kept their R.A.F. designation, but later were designated as R.C.A.F. The first three were: Leeming (commanded by Group Captain C. R. Dunlap), with a satellite at Skipton-on-Swale; Middleton St. George (Group Captain A. D. Ross), with a satellite at Croft; and Topcliffe (Group Captain B. F. Johnson), with satellites at Dishforth and Dalton. The squadrons were Nos. 405, 408, 419, 420, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429 and 431.

From the beginning relations between Command Headquarters and No. 6 Group left little to be desired. After overcoming the usual teething troubles the Canadian formation rapidly won respect. At the beginning of June 1943 Air Chief Marshal Harris signalled his congratulations on its performance to date:<sup>234</sup>

Last month you again beat handsomely all [Canadian?] records for tonnage of bombs delivered on Germany. Taking the last three months as a whole the work you have done has been outstanding.

No. 6 Group's greatest effort in terms of bomb tonnage came on 14 October 1944 when a daylight attack on Duisburg carried out by 258 Lancasters and Halifaxes was followed by a night attack of 243 aircraft; in the two together some 2049 tons were dropped. Canadian losses in the two operations, both of which were part of 1000-plane raids, amounted to four aircraft. But casualties were not always so light. The Group's most costly operation was against Hamburg on 28-29 July 1943, when 22 bombers did not return.<sup>235</sup> Between the Group's formation and VE Day it suffered 4272 fatal operational casualties to its Canadian personnel. This does not include training casualties or casualties to non-R.C.A.F. personnel serving in the Group. It flew 40,822 sorties during which 126,122 tons of bombs and mines were dropped. The other side of the ledger showed a total of 814 aircraft lost on operations.<sup>236</sup>

No. 6 Group afforded an effective means for furthering the Canadianization programme. From the outset it was the policy to find personnel from the R.C.A.F. where possible, and during the first five months of 1943 the percentage of R.C.A.F. personnel in the Group increased from 37 to 56. By the end of 1944, 87 per cent of the Group's personnel strength of 16,844 were Canadians;<sup>237</sup> the aircrew complement was 85 per cent Canadianized. The Royal Air Force assigned four O.T.U.s. to feed crews into the R.C.A.F. group, thus making Canadianization more or less automatic. In the beginning, however, three of these were rather heavily loaded with R.A.F. personnel, and mixed crews continued to arrive at the Canadian squadrons through the first part of 1943. As the intakes at the O.T.U.s. became more exclusively Canadian the situation gradually righted itself. The idea of making No. 6 Group completely Canadian was never rigidly held, partly because of the policy of disturbing crews as little as possible once they had begun to work together as a team, and partly because of the shortage of flight engineers and air gunners among the Canadian B.C.A.T.P. output. The flight engineer problem, which arose as a result of this category being introduced especially for the new heavy four-engined bombers, was overcome to a certain extent by "remustering" qualified ground tradesmen to the flight engineer branch. The air gunner deficiency was principally a recruiting problem; but it may be noted that the policy of giving priority to bringing Home Defence squadrons in Canada up to strength was a contributing factor.<sup>238</sup>

One of the most urgent problems was finding operationally experienced officers to act as squadron and flight commanders. There was no lack of Canadians with these qualifications in the R.A.F. bomber squadrons, but it was not always easy to locate them. To meet the need the R.C.A.F. in Canada transferred overseas some of its senior squadron leaders and wing commanders, earmarking them for positions of command with the bomber group. After taking the O.T.U. training and flying as second pilots on a few operational sorties to get "the feel of things" these officers were moved up to the command of squadrons or flights as vacancies arose, taking their new responsibilities with a confident efficiency that was perhaps surprising,

but withal pleasing, to the R.A.F. These appointments of officers from Canada, however, aroused some hostility among Canadians with long service overseas.<sup>239</sup> By the end of 1943 all R.C.A.F. bomber squadrons were commanded by Canadian officers.

Canadianizing ground crew was a relatively simple matter, for it was in effect controlled entirely by R.C.A.F. authorities in Canada. Virtually all Canadian ground personnel posted overseas, except for those employed on radio direction finding (R.D.F.) — later called radar — who were widely spread over R.A.F. units, served with the R.C.A.F. When No. 6 Group was formed about one-half of its ground strength (4937 individuals, including three Women's Division officers and 87 airwomen) were R.C.A.F. Early in 1943 the Canadian government notified Bomber Command that between February and June a total of 10,000 Canadians would be sent overseas to free R.A.F. ground personnel to work in R.A.F. units. At the end of 1944 the non-flying personnel strength of No. 6 Group was 83 per cent Canadian. It remained close to that figure for the rest of the war. If one limits the calculations to male personnel only, excluding the 1160 members of the R.A.F. Women's Auxiliary Air Force and the 509 members of the R.C.A.F.'s Women's Division, the proportion of Canadian to total ground strength at the end of 1944 was 93 per cent. If one included the personnel of No. 76 (R.C.A.F.) Base, the proportion would be lower.<sup>240</sup>

We have seen (above, page 261) that Canada expected to be consulted on such matters as the transfer of R.C.A.F. squadrons from one theatre to another or from one role to another. This was punctiliously done. No British request for transfer of a unit was ever refused, and it seems evident that the government's interest was in the observance of the constitutional form rather than in the actual employment of the squadrons. Thus on 29 October 1941 the Prime Minister reported to the Cabinet War Committee that at the urgent request of the British government he had consented to the immediate dispatch of No. 411 Fighter Squadron from the United Kingdom to the Middle East. On 26 February 1942 the Committee was told that this permission had never been acted upon, but Canada had now concurred in No. 413 (Coastal) Squadron being moved to India. On 22 April following the Committee approved a request received from the Air Ministry through the R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters for the formation of a bomber squadron and its being moved to the Middle East; but the A.O.C.-in-C. was to be advised that requests of this sort should in all cases be made "from government to government". On 16 April 1943 the War Committee noted with approval the proposed early dispatch of three Wellington squadrons from the United Kingdom to North Africa (where they formed No. 331 Wing under Group Captain C. R. Dunlap; R.C.A.F., and played an important part in the air operations which prepared the way for the invasions of Sicily and Italy).<sup>241</sup>

It was explained to the War Committee that this movement of the three squadrons was a sensible act, since Wellingtons were virtually obsolescent for use from British bases, but were suitable for North African operations and were being used extensively there. This brings up the question of the equipment of R.C.A.F. squadrons overseas. This was a Royal Air Force responsibility, but obviously of the greatest interest and importance to the R.C.A.F. It was a matter of constant concern to the R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters. Air Marshal Curtis recalls that he approached the Air Ministry many times to have R.C.A.F. Hurricane squadrons re-equipped with Spitfires, the Wellington and Halifax squadrons re-equipped with Lancasters and the two squadrons with Lysanders and Tomahawks re-equipped

with Mustangs; and that he pointed out that casualties were heavier in squadrons using obsolescent aircraft. Curtis succeeded only with respect to the two squadrons last named. Air Ministry officers remarked that the British taxpayer was paying for the aircraft; and the Canadians had to wait their turn.

Group Captain H. L. Campbell, who was Director of Air Staff at the R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters from the summer of 1942 to September 1943, worked hard at this problem. It was accepted that in the beginning No. 6 Group, as the junior member of Bomber Command, would have to put up with a rather large proportion of the twin-engined Wellingtons. In March 1943 the Group in fact had six Wellington squadrons and only three squadrons equipped with four-engined Halifaxes.<sup>242</sup> Campbell could not reconcile himself to this situation for long. His continual representations to the Air Ministry brought about progressive improvement; by October 1943 the Wellingtons were on their way out, and No. 6 Group ended the year operating with four-engined Halifaxes and Lancasters.\* But its equipment position never became completely satisfactory. Late in March 1945, when the war with Germany was virtually over, the Group still had six squadrons completely equipped with Halifaxes; only seven had a full establishment (that is, 20) of the more satisfactory Lancasters. This placed No. 6 Group in a below-average position in Bomber Command in this respect; three operational Groups (Nos. 1, 3 and 5) had nothing but Lancasters, while one (No. 4) had only Halifaxes.<sup>244</sup> Canadian airmen tended to complain that the best aircraft were kept for the R.A.F.<sup>245</sup>

At the time of his resignation late in 1944 Mr. Power remembered particularly difficulties he had had with the C.-in-C. Bomber Command over home leave for Canadian aircrew :<sup>246</sup>

... Harris ... was always insisting on keeping our lads for a longer tour, or for a second tour, and was not too discriminating about the means employed. Cajolery, fear of being called a quitter, the onus of abandoning pals, and straight bribery by offers of promotions, all served the purpose, till I had a showdown. Finally, before a boy embarked on an immediate second tour, he was obliged to go to Canadian Headquarters, away from the squadron influence, and after having his rights explained to him, sign a waiver of his right to a trip home before a second tour of operations. ...

The available records<sup>247</sup> indicate that the course of events was this. About June 1942, it appears, informal arrangements were made between the R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters and Bomber Command that Canadians could be returned to Canada on leave during the winter months when bad weather often hampered operations. This was done with Air Chief Marshal Harris' approval and appears to have been his suggestion.

In September 1943, however, Mr. Power arranged for Canadian aircrew in the United Kingdom to have special leave (eight weeks) in Canada at the end of an operational tour plus an instructional tour at an Operational Training Unit or Heavy Conversion Unit in Britain. This was apparently done without consulting Harris, and he opposed it, believing that it would interfere with operations. He insisted that the instructional tour be not less than 12 months and that any Canadians sent from O.T.U.s. or H.C.U.s. in No. 6 Group be replaced by Canadians. It was probably Harris also who insisted that the leave scheme operate on a rotation basis, with those waiting to go on leave waiting until another group returned from

\*The Halifax was a disappointment, but the Lancaster, which began its operational career with the R.A.F. in March 1942, was probably the best heavy bomber of the war. The Lancaster was subsequently produced in Canada, the first aircraft made there being test-flown in August 1943.<sup>245</sup>

Canada. He was apprehensive that the R.C.A.F. would keep these men in Canada. Those who were eligible for the special leave but didn't wish to take it had to sign a waiver to that effect. After two operational tours and an instructional tour Canadian aircrew could be repatriated. A third operational tour was optional. The leave scheme applied to all the R.A.F. Commands, but Bomber Command was most affected.

#### D. FIGHTER ORGANIZATION: AIR SUPPORT FOR THE CANADIAN ARMY

The formation of No. 6 Group only partially fulfilled Canadian hopes for a national air force overseas. Mr. Power and Air Marshal Breadner looked to the possibility of organizing a fighter group (in spite of the attitude which we have seen the Air Ministry taking in 1941, above, page 266), and an army cooperation wing. As a result of Power's discussions with Sir Archibald Sinclair and the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Fighter Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas, during his second visit to Britain (1942), a decision was made to establish a Canadian fighter wing in the active Kenley sector south of London as soon as possible. Furthermore, Power reported to the Prime Minister on his return to Canada,

... I indicated that while perhaps premature at the present juncture, the formation of a R.C.A.F. Fighter Group in the United Kingdom was desirable. This ultimate objective will be kept in mind when considering the disposition of R.C.A.F. Fighter Squadrons.

About the end of November the R.C.A.F. fighter wing, equipped with the Spitfire Marks V and IX, came into existence under the command of Wing Commander C. J. Fee, an experienced R.C.A.F. officer who had won the D.F.C. over Dieppe, who was killed in action in the following January.<sup>248</sup> The strength of the Kenley wing varied at different times from three to four squadrons. In the first half of 1943 all six of the Canadian Spitfire squadrons in the United Kingdom took part in its operations on a loosely-organized rotation basis. As a rule four of them flew from R.A.F. Station Kenley and its satellite station Redhill, while the others were in other fighter groups.

The possibility of an army cooperation wing being formed to work with the First Canadian Army was actively discussed during 1942. On 5 March, when the First Canadian Army was about to be formed, the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa approved a request to be made to the United Kingdom for the formation of four more army cooperation squadrons (making a total of six) from Canadians graduating from the Air Training Plan. The question of whether these should be part of the 25 "Article 15" squadrons was deferred. At this time General McNaughton was in Ottawa. The following day, he attended a meeting of the War Committee and gave it his views on many things (above, page 134). On air support for the Canadian Army, he reported the situation in Britain as thoroughly unsatisfactory. Referring to the previous day's decision, he said that the six squadrons should remain under R.C.A.F. command, exercised through an R.C.A.F. wing headquarters attached to the Canadian Army. The Army command would assign the tasks to be performed by the R.C.A.F., but the latter would be responsible for carrying them out, retaining full command over their personnel. What McNaughton wanted is thus not in doubt. However, he did not get it. On 11 June the War Committee was told that he was having difficulties; the Air Ministry did not like the scheme. The Committee approved discussing the question with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

The matter does not seem to have come before the War Committee again, but the four army cooperation squadrons were not formed. As we shall see, an army cooperation wing was organized from existing units. But policy in Britain gradually took shape on a new basis. The Army Co-operation Command of the Royal Air Force ceased to exist on 1 June 1943.<sup>249</sup> The future lay not with formations of army cooperation squadrons, but with composite tactical groups of fighter, fighter-bomber and reconnaissance squadrons working closely with headquarters of armies. This organization, deriving mainly from experience in the North African campaigns, was first tried out in England in Exercise "Spartan", March 1943. At the end of that exercise, General McNaughton reported to Ottawa, "One of the important matters of organization tested was the new composite group of the Royal Air Force. In this for the first time I see a possibility of providing the Army with the air support which it requires."<sup>250</sup>

As early as 13 February 1943 Air Marshal Edwards, on the basis of reports of the new organization, suggested to the Department of National Defence for Air that "an R.C.A.F. Composite Group" might be formed "to enable the Canadian Army to go into action". The Chief of the Air Staff recommended that Edwards be instructed to press for this as soon as the new policy was accepted; and Mr. Power approved this action on 17 March. The matter was discussed when Edwards was in Ottawa in May, and Curtis in London was told that the Minister favoured the proposal and that he, should talk it over with McNaughton. On 16 June Air Marshal Breadner made a formal recommendation to Power. Unfortunately, however, there was an awkward corollary:

Cabinet authority is desired

- (a) to negotiate with Air Ministry for the formation of an R.C.A.F. Composite Group for affiliation with the First Canadian Army;
- (b) to create an additional manpower demand of 12,500.

On 18 June the recommendation came before the Cabinet War Committee. It was explained that the proposed- group would absorb all Canadian squadrons overseas except for three flying-boat squadrons and No. 6 Bomber Group. It would simplify the administration of the R.C.A.F. Overseas and provide a tactical air force for operation with the Canadian Army. The Chief of the General Staff (General Stuart) said that the Army would welcome operating with a Canadian group and suggested that the United Kingdom might perhaps provide the additional personnel involved for- headquarters and other services. But this was a time when the government, and particularly the Prime Minister, had become extremely sensitive on manpower. The Committee "authorized exploratory discussions with U.K. authorities, with a view to the establishment of an R.C.A.F. composite group to serve with the First Canadian Army, on the understanding that no commitment be made involving additional ,manpower demands by the R.C.A.F. and that the possibility of obtaining the further personnel involved, from existing establishments or from the R.A.F. be explored". It is evident that the manpower difficulty was once more an inhibiting factor- in a matter of the greatest importance for national military policy. No further report was `ever made to the War Committee, but by 4 August the Chief of the Air Staff in a submission to the Minister was referring to "the R.C.A.F. content in the R.A.F. Composite Group which is to support the First Canadian Army Overseas".<sup>251</sup> The scheme for a Canadian group was dead:

General McNaughton had discussed the matter with Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory, A.O.C.-in-C. Fighter Command and had told him that it did not

seem to matter greatly what group supported the Canadian Army "provided that whatever Group was detailed incorporated the Canadian components agreed to by Air Marshal Edwards". To form an all-Canadian group the R.C.A.F. would have had to find on rather short notice about 14 squadrons beyond the seven day-fighter squadrons and three army cooperation squadrons then in the United Kingdom. Discussion as to how this could be done ranged widely. To form new fighter squadrons at this time seemed out of the question because 29 of Canada's quota of 35 Article 15 squadrons had been created and Bomber Command had priority on those still to come. Consideration was given to converting most of the miscellaneous R.C.A.F. squadrons in the United Kingdom, as suggested to the Cabinet War Committee. This would have resulted in converting to fighter or fighter-bomber squadrons all the following: Nos. 404 (Fighter Reconnaissance), 407 (General Reconnaissance), 415 (Torpedo Bomber), 418 (Intruder) and 406, 409 and 410 (Night Fighter). The three first-mentioned were all under Coastal Command, as were also Nos. 422 and 423, which were flying-boat squadrons.<sup>252</sup>

While this conversion would have had obvious advantages from the Canadian viewpoint, there were strong objections from that of the R.A.F. These squadrons were performing important functions, even though their aircrews sometimes found their routine of defensive patrols rather dull, since the once proud *Luftwaffe* now thought it too dangerous to risk sending aircraft, other than the occasional tip-and-run raider, over Britain. Nevertheless there was apprehension lest Hitler launch a sudden submarine and air offensive to thwart the Allied plan for invading Europe, now being actively pursued. These fears were not unfounded; it should be remembered that in January-March 1944 the Germans contrived to mount the so-called "Little Blitz" against London and nearby areas, and after the Normandy landings made an attempt to knock London out with the flying bomb. The Canadian night fighter and intruder squadrons were to play important parts in countering these menaces; No. 418 Squadron alone destroyed 83 flying bombs. If these units had been withdrawn the R.A.F. would have had to find others to replace them. Likewise Nos. 414, 417, and 415 had the vital task of helping to keep the approaches to the English Channel free of enemy submarines and destroyers during the invasion preparations. That our invasion fleets in June 1944 were so little molested by U-boats or surface craft is in part a tribute to the efficiency of the units of Coastal Command.

Although the all-Canadian group never came into existence, the discussion concerning it produced a large increase in the Canadian fighter force overseas. A suggestion made by Air Marshal Edwards, that squadrons from the Canadian Home War Establishment be sent overseas to help complete a tactical group, was accepted in Canada and Britain. Mr. Power approved the idea in principle. On the basis of a survey of domestic requirements in fighter and army cooperation squadrons, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff recommended that four fighter squadrons (two on each coast) and two army cooperation squadrons (one on each coast) be disbanded and re-formed overseas. At the first Quebec Conference in August 1943 the matter was discussed between Air Chief Marshal Portal and Air Marshal Breadner. The latter "said that he was much interested in increasing the R.C.A.F. content of No. 83 Composite Group, Tactical Air Force, which would be employed in support of the First Canadian Army"; and assurances were asked and given that the R.A.F. would keep the squadrons intact as Canadian units and keep their personnel "as near one hundred per cent Canadian as possible". After consulting the Air Ministry, Portal wrote to Breadner on 25 August.

. . . We should of course keep the squadrons intact as Canadian units and man them with Canadian personnel to the fullest extent which the supply of flying and ground personnel will allow. It will also be our aim to locate Canadian squadrons with Canadian airfield H.Q. I feel bound to point out, however, that operational requirements may result in Canadian squadrons being located on a non-Canadian airfield and vice versa.

On 31 August the Cabinet War Committee discussed the proposal, and when the Minister of Finance reported that it would involve additional expense as well as some pressure on manpower decision was deferred. On 22 September, however, it was approved in principle. Accordingly, Nos. 123, 125 and 127 Squadrons from Eastern Air Command and Nos. 14, 111 and 118 from Western Air Command — about 1150 men in all — were dispatched overseas about the end of the year. Renumbered respectively 439, 441, 443, 442, 440 and 438, they formed two new R.C.A.F. wings (No. 143, flying Typhoons, and No. 144, flying Spitfires) which were duly incorporated into No. 83 Group, Royal Air Force.<sup>253</sup>

The final stage of air organization for the North-West Europe campaign presents what can only be called, from the Canadian viewpoint, a sorry tale. What happened is objectionable in terms of Royal Canadian Air Force policy because fifteen R.C.A.F. squadrons were concentrated in a tactical group — No. 83 Group — which was commanded by a headquarters that was entirely British in the beginning and almost entirely British to the end. It is objectionable in both Air Force and Army terms because the group that contained all the Canadian squadrons was separated from the Canadian ground forces and assigned to support the Second British Army — while the First Canadian Army was supported by No. 84 Group, R.A.F., which did not contain a single Canadian unit. The process by which this unfortunate situation was created must now be examined.

With respect to the Headquarters of No. 83 Group, which was formed on 1 April 1943 at Redhill, Surrey, the initial difficulty seems to have arisen from the fact that the staff was necessarily appointed at an early stage, before the body of the formation began to take shape. The theory that it was good to mix people from all parts of the Commonwealth and Empire, to which the Royal Air Force adhered in other circumstances, apparently was not considered to apply at this level, and a British Air Officer Commanding and an all-British staff were selected. Subsequently, when the group had been assigned to support the Canadian Army and it appeared that there would be a considerable R.C.A.F. element in it, McNaughton, Edwards and Curtis pressed for the appointment of senior R.C.A.F. officers at its headquarters. Fighter Command, however, was unwilling to go further than to agree to consider R.C.A.F. officers as candidates for unforeseen vacancies arising in future; it was considered too late to make changes in a staff which was already working as a team. The contrast with the Army situation, where the British authorities, finding that British formations were to serve under First Canadian Army, asked and received the appointment of a large number of British staff officers to the Army's headquarters (above, pages 239, 245), is too striking not to be noted.

When Air Vice-Marshal N. R. Anderson arrived from Canada to replace Air Vice-Marshal Curtis as Deputy Air Officer Commanding at the R.C.A.F. Headquarters in Great Britain, he attempted to re-open the question. It was now very late, and he got little further than his predecessors, being informed that the A.O.C. 2nd Tactical Air Force (Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham) was willing only to establish a post of Group Captain (Administrative) *supernumerary* at No. 83 Group "so as to allow of the attachment of a Group Captain R.C.A.F. to that

Headquarters". He was further told that the Supreme Allied Commander had insisted that in the forthcoming operation "there shall be only one Air Force and the best man available fills the job irrespective of nationality". Anderson pointed out that, while this might be an excellent theory, in practice, in many cases where the R.A.F. and the U.S.A.A.F. were operating together, "the Supreme Air Force Commander is a U.S.A.A.F. officer and his Deputy is a R.A.F. officer or vice versa". However, the R.A.F. authorities stood their ground. A few Canadian officers were "attached" to H.Q. No. 83 Group before D Day. One of these was Group Captain G. R. McGregor (below, page 390) who from March to July 1944 seems to have been understudying the group's Air Officer Administration. In July he left the group to take command of No. 126 Wing R.C.A.F. Air Marshal Curtis recalls that before himself returning to Canada he had, he thought, arranged for McGregor to be appointed Air Officer Administration. However, it appears that before the appointment took place McGregor was offered and accepted the operational command. Thus Curtis' plan to place a Canadian air commodore in the headquarters of No. 83 Group was defeated. After the Group was established on the Continent, two openings were made on its air staff for R.C.A.F. officers.<sup>254</sup>

Turning to the problem of air support for First Canadian Army, we have seen that it is evident that from the beginning of the war the Canadian government had desired and assumed that when its ground forces went into action they would be supported by units of the Royal Canadian Air Force. On this assumption Nos. 400 and 414 Squadrons in the United Kingdom carried out numerous tactical exercises with the Canadian Corps and subsequently with the First Canadian Army.\* When a third army cooperation squadron, No. 430, came into being in January 1943, the three units were formed into a Canadian Army Cooperation Wing whose headquarters were located with that of the First Canadian Army at Leatherhead, Surrey. Under the command of Group Captain D. M. Smith, who was later commended by the R.A.F. for building it into a "complete and efficient organization", No. 39 Wing was trained for the ground support role. On the formation of No. 83 Group, after the change of policy on army cooperation (above, page 294), No. 39 Wing was incorporated into it as No. 39 Reconnaissance Wing and was equipped with Mustangs and Spitfires.

In the first instance it was decided that No. 83 Group should be affiliated to the Second British Army and merely give the Canadian Army facilities for training when possible; but after Canadian representations it was assigned to the First Canadian Army in June 1943, and this relationship subsisted until January 1944. By that time General McNaughton, who as we have seen had been a strong advocate of the close association of the Canadian Army and the R.C.A.F., had been removed from command, and First Canadian Army had only an acting commander, General Stuart. Furthermore, the planned role of First Canadian Army had just been changed, and instead of landing in France ahead of the Second British Army as had been proposed it was now to be the "follow-up" army.<sup>256</sup> In these circumstances Air Chief Marshal Sir T. Leigh-Mallory, C.-in-C. Allied Expeditionary Air Force, told a conference on 26 January that No. 83 Group would now support the Second British Army "and not the 1st Canadian Army, as in the original plan". Although the reasons were not stated, it was presumably considered desirable that the older and presumably better-trained air group should

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\*These squadrons, along with two R.A.F. squadrons, were at first under No. 35 Wing R.A.F., attached to H.Q. South-Eastern Command. This wing subsequently became the reconnaissance wing of No. 84 Group.<sup>255</sup>

support the army which was conducting the assault — an argument of some force. Leigh-Mallory held out the hope that No. 39 Wing would be transferred from No. 83 Group to No. 84, which was now to support First Canadian Army.<sup>257</sup> This, however, was not done. The British authorities would certainly have found it more difficult to gain acceptance for these decisions — so adverse to Canadian policy — had General McNaughton remained in command of the Army.

No. 83 Group's Order of Battle for the Normandy D Day numbered 29 squadrons. Of these 15 were R.C.A.F. units organized into five wings controlled by two sectors: No. 17 commanded by Group Captain W. R. MacBrien and No. 22 under Group Captain P. Y. Davoud. Except for No. 144 Wing, which was led by Wing Commander J. E. Johnson, the highest-scoring R.A.F. fighter pilot of the war, all the R.C.A.F. units were commanded by Canadians. Besides the flying units the R.C.A.F. contributed personnel to three sector headquarters, six airfield headquarters, 12 mobile signals units, one mobile field hospital, two field photograph sections, three repair and salvage units and three air stores parks. Altogether this commitment, representing about one-half of the group's ground strength, involved 5180 members of the R.C.A.F. At the end of 1943 all but six hundred of them were in readiness in the United Kingdom.<sup>258</sup>

With respect to Wing Commander Johnson, just mentioned, it is worth noting that No. 144 Wing was the second R.C.A.F. formation he led into action. In March 1944 he was chosen to succeed Wing Commander N. R. B. Hodson as leader of the Kenley Wing. He proved highly popular with the Canadians. His acceptance by them and the R.C.A.F. invitation to return for a second tour were typical of the comradeship that existed at the operational level, and which contrasted so strangely with the policy disagreements and delicate negotiations that went on at higher headquarters. There is an agreeable parallel in the case of Group Captain C. R. Dunlap, R.C.A.F., who was asked for by the Royal Air Force to command a British medium bomber wing, No. 139, in No. 2 Group of the 2nd Tactical Air Force.\* Dunlap flew 35 operational sorties with his wing, which scored outstanding successes in attacks on V-1 and V-2 sites as well as in close support for the Allied armies advancing across North-West Europe.

At the end of 1943 Air Marshal Edwards was succeeded in the command at R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters by Air Marshal Breadner.† Both men were approaching retirement, Edwards having only a few months to serve while Breadner had about a year, which he apparently wished to spend in command of the force which he had watched over anxiously as it slowly grew from a single squadron to 35 squadrons. Air Marshal Robert Leckie, a Canadian officer formerly in the R.A.F., who as Air Member for Training had had much to do with the success of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, succeeded Breadner as Chief of the Air Staff on 1 January 1944. By a somewhat unusual arrangement the new Air

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\*No. 2 (Bomber) Group, with Nos. 83 and 84, made up the bulk of the R.A.F.'s 2nd T.A.F., commanded by Air Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham. The 2nd T.A.F.'s headquarters was associated with the 21st Army Group's in the same manner in which the 83rd and 84th Groups were associated with the two armies.

†Power would probably have liked to remove Edwards at the time of the incident in January (above, pages 284-7). In the Power Papers, file D-1090, there is a memorandum of a conversation between Power and Malcolm MacDonald, the British High Commissioner, on 3 February 1943, which contains the following passage: "He [MacDonald] made some reference concerning the resumption of cordial relations after the incident itself was closed. I stated it might be difficult to withdraw Edwards for some little time. To do so might be an indication that the Canadian Government was backing down on its Canadian policy, and that this was not the case.

Officer Commanding-in-Chief continued to report to the Minister of National Defence for Air, not through the Chief of the Air Staff, but direct.\* Eminently approachable, Breadner was nevertheless a strict disciplinarian and immovable in purpose. A principal figure in the development of the Canadianization policy, he was determined to carry his predecessor's work to its logical conclusion.

Air Marshal Edwards might have looked back on his two years in the United Kingdom with mixed feelings. Personally he had got along fairly well with his opposite numbers at the Air Ministry, but the pertinacity with which he had pursued his task of Canadianizing the R.C.A.F. squadrons can scarcely have won him their affection. He had largely achieved his ends, though it is hard to avoid the conclusion that a powerful factor in this result was the belated decision on the part of the Canadian government to pay the full bill for its overseas air force. At all O.T.U.s. the R.A.F. authorities were now making a conscientious effort to crew Canadians together. What must have been equally pleasing to the Air Marshal was that young Canadian graduates of the B.C.A.T.P., who at one time had been attracted by the opportunity of serving in the Royal Air Force, were now looking forward to flying in R.C.A.F. squadrons and formations.<sup>259</sup>

What had been accomplished is suggested by an episode during Edwards' final months in command. In July 1943 he instructed Group Captain Denton Massey to investigate and report on the state of Canadianization in the overseas squadrons. Massey's report, tendered to Edwards on 24 November, did not meet the Air Marshal's full approval. Massey found that as of 7 October 1943 the proportion of R.C.A.F. to total aircrew strength in the Article 15 squadrons averaged 64% over all Commands; in Fighter Command (including the Tactical Air Force) it was as high as 86%, but in Bomber Command, where it was lowest, it was 56%. The percentage of R.C.A.F. personnel to establishment in ground crew covering the R.C.A.F. Overseas was 76.5% in officers and 97% in airmen. Massey made a number of recommendations, including setting up Canadian Advanced Flying Units and placing postings entirely in the hands of "an R.C.A.F. Aircrew Postings Branch". Edwards disagreed with both these suggestions, in the former case because it was inconsistent with the decision to set up "nominated" R.A.F. squadrons to which Canadians would be posted, in the second case because he considered that the existing system of having an R.C.A.F. section within the Air Ministry's Posting Directorate, and R.C.A.F. posting liaison officers at R.A.F. Commands and Training Groups, was "operating most satisfactorily, and . . . achieving the results in crewing Canadians together to the limit of available aircrew components". Edwards denied Massey's assertion that the R.C.A.F. posting officers did not have actual authority to make postings. It is pretty evident that by the autumn of 1943 Edwards felt that the situation was considerably improved by comparison with that existing at the time of the crisis early in the year.<sup>260</sup>

#### E. THE R.C.A.F. OVERSEAS IN THE FINAL PHASE

Air Marshal Breadner's position overseas was materially strengthened by the outcome of a conference held in Ottawa in February 1944 between Captain

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\*There was no parallel in the Canadian Army. Although two Chiefs of the General Staff on going to duty overseas were succeeded by officers formerly junior to themselves, the appointment of C.G.S. remained the senior appointment. On 21 February 1945 the Cabinet War Committee was told that the Ministers of National Defence had agreed that channels of communication should be identical, and that the R.C.A.F. should be brought into line with the Army and Navy in this respect at an appropriate time.

Balfour, Major Power and Air Marshal Leckie. A major matter of discussion at this meeting — and the one of most interest to the Cabinet War Committee — was R.C.A.F. participation in the war against Japan. We have already taken note of these aspects (above, page 55) and have observed the firmness with which the Canadian government declared its determination to possess "a fully integrated Canadian Air Force" in the coming phase. In these circumstances it was to be expected that arrangements for the final stage of the war with Germany would reflect the same spirit, and they did.

Major Power recalls that the Ottawa discussions began with Captain Balfour having doubts about the Canadian views, but the final result was satisfactory to the Canadian government. It was a document usually called the "Balfour-Power Agreement",<sup>261</sup> the last in the series of wartime agreements relating to the Air Training Plan (see Appendix "L"). In the main, it took the form of amendments to those appendices of the four-party agreement of June 1942 which affected only Britain and Canada. It provided that in general, in the R.C.A.F. as well as in the R.A.F., such matters as recall of personnel to the parent force, repatriation, length of tour of duty, and commissioning of all categories of air and ground personnel were to be determined by the respective governments. In effect, the Air Ministry now acknowledged that control of all R.C.A.F. personnel overseas was vested in the R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters. Until this time the autonomy of the R.C.A.F. Overseas had rested somewhat precariously upon the demands of operational efficiency as interpreted by the R.A.F. Now, operational efficiency was still to be considered, but the decision as to whether, and how far, it was affected in any specific case was a matter for consultation between the two air forces. Canada remained the junior partner. Obviously, however, the Balfour-Power Agreement had opened a new phase in R.A.F.-R.C.A.F. relations: one in which the Air Ministry discarded its earlier tendency to consider the Canadian force merely as a source of trained manpower, and began to deal with it as one independent force to another.

In April the Air Ministry addressed a letter to all Commands emphasizing the importance of the agreement reached two months earlier, which, it said, must be observed "both in the letter and the spirit".<sup>262</sup> This letter, which will be found at Appendix "M" of this volume, observed that while there had been misunderstandings in the past "no shadow of misunderstanding must be allowed to occur in the future" that might possibly impair the excellent relations between the two air forces. It also informed all concerned that for the war against Japan there was to be

a fully integrated Canadian Air Force available for service wherever the Canadian Government may decide that it can be most usefully employed in the interests of Canada, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations.

This was a quotation from the *aide mémoire* handed by Major Power to Captain Balfour on 10 February (above, page 55). It is amply evident that the Ottawa meeting of February 1944 had been an important turning-point. The tone of the letter of April 1944 is in rather marked contrast to Sutton's of February 1943 (above, page 286, and Appendix "K"). For the first time, the general situation was becoming satisfactory from the Canadian point of view. Inevitably, however, the earlier difficulties had left their mark.

So far as the European war was concerned, the North-West Europe campaign

was about to begin, the United Kingdom still needed Dominion aircrew and Canada recognized that there was a moral obligation to continue to assist her great ally in this respect. The Canadian government in effect resigned itself to finishing the German war with most of its overseas aircrew in the British Air Force. The constant movement of Canadian personnel in and out of R.A.F. squadrons makes accurate statistics on the number of R.C.A.F. aircrew attached to the R.A.F. almost impossible to obtain. However, a report from the R.C.A.F.'s Division of the Air Member for Personnel in August 1944 shows 17,111 R.C.A.F. aircrew in R.A.F. units and establishments as compared with 9993 in overseas R.C.A.F. units and formations.<sup>263</sup> In Bomber Command alone, at the end of the war, the R.C.A.F. had approximately 1250 pilots, 1300 navigators, 1000 air bombers, 1600 air gunners and 750 wireless operators, including personnel on operations, on nonoperational types of employment and undergoing operational training. None of these figures include the Canadians in No. 6 (R.C.A.F.) Group.<sup>264</sup>

Although the R.A.F., in deference to the wishes of the Dominion, took steps in 1943 to concentrate its attached R.C.A.F. personnel in certain designated ("nominated") British squadrons, not a great deal was accomplished in this direction. It is safe to say that Canadians served in every R.A.F. squadron, and took part in every major operation in which the R.A.F. was engaged after they began to arrive overseas in numbers. One distinguished example may be cited. When on the night of 16-17 May 1943 the celebrated No. 617 Squadron attacked and breached the Möhne and Eder Dams, 29 of the 133 men in the attacking force were members of the R.C.A.F., and seven of them were decorated for gallantry in the action.<sup>265</sup> The near-impossibility of producing a proper history of the work of these Canadians who served scattered through the Royal Air Force, or of giving them the recognition they deserve, except in general terms, is only too evident.

Nor has much note been taken of the approximately 6000 R.C.A.F. radar personnel who were posted overseas to the R.A.F. They were employed principally to man ground stations in the United Kingdom and the theatres of war, but they also performed other duties. In Coastal Command they formed as high as 90 per cent of the ground crews who serviced airborne radar equipment. Their valuable services came fully to light only when the operation to repatriate them from the distant corners of the world got under way.<sup>266</sup>

Canadianization, as a contentious issue, came to an end when the Balfour-Power Agreement recognized that the R.C.A.F. controlled all its members overseas. However, it was not so easy to remove all the practical difficulties that prevented the squadrons from being completely Canadianized. For example, the shortage of flight engineers in the R.C.A.F. continued. The British Commonwealth Air Training Plan produced only 1913 flight engineers (all for the R.C.A.F.) in the course of its existence.<sup>267</sup> At the end of hostilities No. 6 Group had on its strength 350 R.A.F. flight engineers as compared with only *two* R.A.F. pilots! In the last year and a half of the war Canadianization remained a matter of concern only in the R.C.A.F. squadrons that were serving individually in various R.A.F. groups; and even here the situation was improving rapidly. At the close of the war hardly any of these miscellaneous squadrons were less than 70 per cent Canadian in aircrew strength; most were between 85 and 95 per cent Canadian. The matter may be shortly summarized by a table<sup>268</sup> showing the situation in operational squadrons at the beginning of 1945:

<i>Squadron*</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Percentage R.C.A.F.</i>	
		<i>Aircrew</i>	<i>Ground Duties</i>
400 (PR)	Netherlands	100	100
401 (F)	Netherlands	100	86.66
402 (F)	Netherlands	100	100
403 (F)	Belgium	100	88.23
404 (CF)	U.K.	85.40	83.82
405 (B-PFF)	U.K.	71.71	97.60
406 (NF)	U.K.	94.33	100
407 (GR)	U.K.	94.05	85.79
408 (B)	U.K.	85.51	100
409 (NF)	France	89.13	100
410 (NF)	France	87.03	100
411 (F)	Netherlands	100	87.50
412 (F)	Netherlands	100	94.11
413 (GR-FB )	Ceylon	59.66	98.18
414 (FR)	Netherlands	100	100
415 (B)	U.K.	90.22	100
416 (F)	Belgium	100	88.23
417 (F)	Italy	100	98.09
418 (Int)	U.K.	57.40	100
419 (B)	U.K.	87.54	100
420 (B)	U.K.	85.62	100
421 (F)	Belgium	100	100
422 (GR-FB)	U.K.	75.25	95.81
423 (GR-FB)	U.K.	76.47	99.40
424 (B)	U.K.	86.59	100
425 (B)	U.K.	86.88	100
426 (B)	U.K.	91.41	100
427 (B)	U.K.	83.65	100
428 (B)	U.K.	87.68	100
429 (B)	U.K.	87.92	100
430 (FR)	Netherlands	100	89.28
431 (B)	U.K.	85.66	100
432 (B)	U.K.	86.02	100
433 (B)	U.K.	84.08	100
434 (B)	U.K.	86.00	100
435 (T)	India	96.11	96.00
436 (T)	India	89.41	97.27
437 (T)	U.K.	99.41	99.63
438 (F/B)	Netherlands	100	93.93
439 (F/B)	Netherlands	100	100
440 (F/B)	Netherlands	100	100
441 (F)	U.K.	100	100
442 (F)	Netherlands	96.15	88.20
443 (F)	Belgium	96.42	86.66

The quota of 35 "Article 15" squadrons had been rounded out with the creation of three transport squadrons, Nos. 435, 436 and 437, all equipped with Dakotas, No. 437, formed in September 1944, acted "in combination with" and under the command of No. 46 (Transport) Group in the United Kingdom. The other two units, both organized in October, formed part of No. 229 Group in India. All three were rapidly Canadianized. Personnel from transport squadrons in

\*Of the 48 R.C.A.F. squadrons serving overseas at the end of the war with Germany, four are not included in this table: Nos. 664, 665 and 666 Air Observation Post Squadrons (formed December 1944-April 1945, with flying personnel from the Royal Canadian Artillery) and No. 162 (in Iceland).

Canada were flown to India to man the two squadrons forming there; while No. 46 Group used some of its experienced Canadian crews to form the nucleus of No. 437. The 45 R.C.A.F. squadrons on air operations overseas at the end of 1944 comprised the three original squadrons (Nos. 400, 401 and 402); the 35 units (Nos. 403 to 437) formed under the B.C.A.T.P. agreements; the six sent from Canada (Nos. 438 to 443); and No. 162 (Canso) Squadron, detached in January 1944 from Canada's Eastern Air Command to serve under the R.A.F. Coastal Command in Iceland. Finally, the three air observation post squadrons just mentioned brought the overseas total of R.C.A.F. squadrons to 48.

In line with Canadian policy, No. 415 Squadron, which for three years had carried out torpedo-bomber duties in Coastal Command, was transferred to No. 6 Group in July 1944 and re-equipped with Halifax aircraft. Previous to its conversion it was flying Fairey Albacores, biplanes usually associated with the Fleet Air Arm. The Albacores did yeoman service on coastal operations and the R.C.A.F. crews achieved a good deal of success with them in combatting the enemy's elusive E- and R-boats. They also used them to lay smoke-screens to cover Allied naval forces crossing the Channel. Nevertheless, officers at R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters had long been disturbed by the spectacle of an R.C.A.F. squadron flying such obsolete aircraft; and after the Normandy landings, when the squadron's anti-shipping role became less vital, Air Marshal Breadner insisted on the transfer to No. 6 Group. A change was also proposed for No. 413 (Coastal) Squadron, operating since April- 1942 under No. 222 Group in Ceylon. At the end of 1944 the squadron was on its way to the United Kingdom where it too was to be reformed as a bomber unit in No. 6 Group. But the war in Europe ended before the reorganization was completed.

#### F. CONTROL OF DISCIPLINE IN THE R.C.A.F. OVERSEAS

With the question of responsibility for discipline in the Royal Canadian Air Force Overseas we must deal briefly. The problem was different from the Canadian Army's, simply because the units and individuals of the R.C.A.F. were so widely scattered through the Royal Air Force.

We have already seen indications that the Visiting Forces Acts (above, page 211) were as important for the Air Force as for the Army. To a considerable extent, indeed, in the beginning Army and Air Force discipline abroad were governed by the same orders in council. The order of 13 January 1940 (above, page 249) which gave the commander of the 1st Division and the Senior Officer at Canadian Military Headquarters, London, the power to convene courts-martial and confirm sentences, conferred the same power upon the "Senior Combatant Officer of the Royal Canadian Air Force Headquarters in Great Britain".<sup>269</sup> But in the circumstances of the R.C.A.F. Overseas as they developed, this power was limited in practice to the personnel of his own headquarters. More important were the similar powers subsequently granted by Canadian order in council to "the officer appointed to command any Command of the Royal Air Force with which any . . . Air Forces of Canada may be acting in combination".<sup>270</sup> The Visiting Forces Acts provided for individual members of one Commonwealth country's forces "attached" to those of another Commonwealth country to be subject to the latter's military law;\* and as we have seen, while the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan agreement of 1939 did not use the word "attached" for Canadians

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\*Units "in combination" were subject to their own country's law.

serving with the Royal Air Force — as it did for Australians and New Zealanders — this was in fact the relationship, and it was — recognized in due course (above, pages 267-8).

In the first instance the British officers commanding R.A.F. Commands had, at least in theory, unrestricted power to confirm findings and sentences of courts-martial on R.C.A.F. personnel (it is a fair assumption that, had there been a death sentence — which there was not — it would in practice have been reserved for confirmation or otherwise by the Canadian authorities). These powers were curtailed by agreement reached with the Air Ministry during Major Power's visit to the United Kingdom in the summer of 1941.<sup>271</sup> The new arrangement was confirmed the following year by a Canadian order in council<sup>272</sup> which provided in part,

... the powers hereby granted with respect to the confirmation of findings and sentences, and to the carrying into effect of such sentences, shall not extend to the proceedings of any Court-Martial which, in the case of an officer, involve a sentence of death, penal servitude, imprisonment with or without hard labour, cashiering, or dismissal from His Majesty's Service, and, in the case of an airman, involve a sentence of death or penal servitude, confirmation of which findings and sentences shall be reserved for the approval, or otherwise, of the Governor in Council.

The same order confirmed procedure for transmitting proceedings to the Canadian authorities and provided a form of court-martial warrant suitable for issue to commanders of R.A.F. Commands. Here we have a legal and disciplinary aspect of the "Canadianization" programme, part of the process of restoring Canadian authority over the R.C.A.F. officers and airmen scattered through the Royal Air Force. We have already seen that the same reservations had been in effect for both the Canadian Army and the R.C.A.F. for a time in 1940, even with respect to confirmation by Canadian commanders; and that the new R.C.A.F. policy of 1941-42 was ultimately used as a precedent for depriving Canadian Army commanders overseas of the right to confirm sentences of death (above, pages 249 and 251-2).

Air Marshal Edwards clearly thought of the supervision of discipline as an important aspect of the necessary extension of Canadian control. In February 1942 he wrote,<sup>273</sup>

I have asked the Air Ministry to refer to me all Convening Orders of a Court Martial so that I, as a Canadian, may assemble a Court entirely of Canadians so that there can be no complaint on the part of the accused.

In the fulness of time I hope to take over all-the disciplining of Canadian airmen. Just what form this process will take I do not at the moment know. . . .

For the senior R.C.A.F. officer in London fully to control courts martial across half the world was hardly practicable, and the Air Ministry could scarcely have been expected to agree. But the new B.C.A.T.P. agreement made in Ottawa in the following June (above, page 282) dealt with the matter in its appendix on "Control and Administration of R.C.A.F. Overseas" in these terms:

4. The responsibilities of R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters in respect of Courts-Martial on R.C.A.F. personnel will be as follows:—

- (i) District Courts-Martial on R.C.A.F. personnel shall be convened by the group concerned and unless circumstances render it impracticable, shall be predominantly composed of Canadian officers.
- (ii) General Courts-Martial on R.C.A.F. personnel shall be convened by the Command concerned and unless circumstances render it impracticable, shall be predominantly composed of Canadian officers selected in consultation with the Air Officer-in-Chief.

- (iii) Proceedings of District Courts-Martial shall be passed to R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters for review after promulgation. Proceedings of General Courts-Martial shall be passed to R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters for review prior to conhation.

During the early years of the war Major-General the Hon. P. J. Montague at Canadian Military Headquarters, London, exercised "the powers, duties and functions of the Judge Advocate-General" with respect to the R.C.A.F. Overseas as well as the Canadian Army Overseas.<sup>274</sup> Early in 1943, however, these responsibilities so far as they concerned the R.C.A.F., which were necessarily steadily growing, were transferred to an R.C.A.F. officer, Wing Commander J. A. R. Mason, whose duties comprehended not only the United Kingdom but also "the Continents of Europe, Asia and Africa".<sup>275</sup>

Although as the war proceeded the effective Canadian control of the discipline of the R.C.A.F. Overseas was much increased, there were limits to what could be done. As long as thousands of Canadian officers and airmen were serving as individuals in R.A.F. units around the world, considerable disciplinary powers over them had to be conceded to R.A.F. commanders. Had the war in the Pacific continued, and a "fully integrated" Canadian air force been organized for participation in it along the lines contemplated in planning in 1944-45, then the discipline of that force could have been as fully Canadian as that of the Canadian Army Overseas.

During the war 232,632 men and 17,030 women served in the Royal Canadian Air Force.<sup>276</sup> Of these, it appears, a grand total of 93,844 served overseas, i.e., in the United Kingdom, Europe, or the more distant theatres where the Royal Air Force fought.<sup>277</sup> The R.C.A.F. Overseas suffered 14,541 fatal casualties, of which 12,266 were the result of flying operations and 1906 were caused by training accidents.<sup>278</sup> Of these fatal casualties, 9980 were suffered in Bomber Command, and 8240 of these by aircrew on operations.<sup>279</sup> It appears that at the beginning of 1945 almost exactly one-quarter of the aircrew of Bomber Command were Canadians.<sup>280</sup> We have already seen (above, page 301 ) that of Canadian aircrew overseas in August 1944 nearly 60 per cent were still serving in units of the Royal AirForce.

#### G. A WORD OF COMMENT

It is evident that long before the war was over the chief demands of Canadian policy with respect to the R.C.A.F. Overseas had been met. It had not been practicable, under the conditions of the time, to think in terms of an operationally independent national air force. But a great deal had been accomplished. The Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons overseas had been rendered truly Canadian — not the travesties that had existed in 1941-42; and Canada was at last paying the bill in a manner worthy of an independent state. A genuinely Canadian bomber group was playing an important part in the offensive against Germany. A somewhat better grouping of R.C.A.F. fighter squadrons had been achieved. The Royal Canadian Air Force had established rather more effective contact with, and control over, the Canadians who were attached to the Royal Air Force.

The least satisfactory element in the situation was the organization of Canadian air power for the North-West Europe campaign of 1944-45. That 15 Canadian squadrons should have been serving under an almost exclusively British group headquarters, and that they should have been separated from the First Canadian Army, which was supported by an entirely British group, was absurd.

From the Army point of view the situation was most unfortunate. No Canadian soldier would have anything but praise and gratitude for the gallant young airmen who flew in the squadrons of No. 84 Group R.A.F.; but no staff officer who was in touch with the situation at Headquarters First Canadian Army would for a moment accept the relationship with that Group's headquarters as a completely satisfactory solution to the problem of army air support.\* The present writer has often heard such officers express regret that the Group associated with the Army was not Canadian. What a Canadian Army associated with a Royal Canadian Air Force tactical group could have done remains one of the might-have-beens of history. It is unlikely that the circumstances of 1944 will ever recur; but if they should do so there is a lesson here for the makers of Canadian military policies.

It is worth while to look for a moment at the causes of the "long history of struggle and discussion" which we have described. Why did it take so long for the Canadian identification policy ("Canadianization") to become effective? The question is the more pertinent in that, as we have seen (above, pages 25-8) the Canadian government was aware of the issue in 1939, and it caused vast difficulty in the final stages of the negotiation of the original British Commonwealth Air Training Plan agreement. Why did the arrangement then so painfully arrived at prove to be not the end of the question but only the beginning of it?

It is apparent, for one thing, that the arrangement — Article 15 and the interpretation of it provided in Riverdale's famous letter to Rogers — was very vague and general. Its precise meaning remained to be worked out later. It would have been better if a precise formula could have been reached at the time; but — largely for non-military reasons — time pressed, and civilian ministers, though well aware that the problem was important, clearly had little notion as yet of the concrete terms in which it would present itself. It was unfortunate that no attempt was made to write into the agreement something along the lines of Air Vice-Marshal Croil's programme (above, page 253) for an operational air force overseas; and that in general there was (as it appears) so little consultation, during the critical stages of the negotiation, between the Canadian ministers and their air force advisers, who were at least in a somewhat better position to assess the future problems.

It seems evident that the Canadian government rendered the solution of those problems much more difficult when they allowed the British government to shoulder what would be the major share of the cost of the R.C.A.F. Overseas. Perhaps this mistake was almost inevitable: first, because of the extent to which the government's approach to its war programme was dominated by financial considerations of a peacetime nature; and, secondly, because they had become convinced, not inaccurately, that the Air Training Plan was primarily "a recruiting scheme for the Royal Air Force", and in these circumstances there seemed less reason for Canada to pay the bill. But it is somewhat surprising that nobody except O. D. Skelton seems to have seen the contradiction between insisting on the organization of the Plan graduates in R.C.A.F. squadrons, and insisting that Britain should pay the cost of the squadrons (above, page 26), and that his warning was not heeded.

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\*For a comment on the problem of air support for First Canadian Army in Normandy, see the present writer's volume *The Victory Campaign*, page 238. In essentials, the situation remained the same throughout the campaign. In the late autumn of 1944 an exasperated Army Headquarters staff officer told the writer that it was "a full-time job" to keep 84 Group interested in the task for which, presumably, it existed — the close support of First Canadian Army.

We have seen that Ralston was visibly embarrassed by this financial aspect during his negotiations with the British Air Minister in London in 1940-41 (above, page 259), a critical stage of the question when the Canadian government should have left the British authorities in no doubt as to its views and desires. It seems extraordinary that the Canadian government, having made the initial error, did not correct it until the spring of 1943; and we have seen that there is a coincidence in time between the Canadian decision to pay the costs of the R.C.A.F. Overseas and the Air Ministry's new readiness to make the Canadianization of the R.C.A.F. squadrons a reality.

While fully admitting the Canadian government's insensitiveness on this issue, one still cannot acquit the British Air Ministry and the Royal Air Force of the same shortcoming. For nearly two years the struggle to Canadianize the squadrons went on with only limited progress being made, and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the R.A.F. authorities did not try very hard to meet the views of the Canadian government; and that the Air Ministry's cooperative intentions were pretty consistently frustrated in the R.A.F. Commands. We have suggested that it is more than likely that this attitude at the lower levels was encouraged by young Canadians who had little understanding of the broad issues or of their country's national policy, but who were quite happy fighting the Germans in the mixed squadrons of the R.A.F. Canada was making an enormous contribution to the Commonwealth air effort and the effort of the Royal Air Force, providing a vast number of fighting men for the R.A.F., conducting and largely financing the great Air Training Plan,\* and certainly carrying out her engagements and going beyond them (above, page 274). In these circumstances the long-continued passive resistance which the Canadian government met in its attempt to realize its relatively modest aims for the Royal Canadian Air Force Overseas seems unfortunate and regrettable. The wartime difficulties certainly had an adverse long-term effect upon the relations of the two air forces.

#### 4. THE ROYAL CANADIAN NAVY: ORGANIZATION IN OPERATIONS

##### A. NAVAL POLICY BEFORE 1939

The Royal Canadian Navy was brought into existence by the Naval Service Act of 1910, passed at the instance of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's government. That measure was the centre of one of the bitterest political controversies in Canadian history, revolving (at least ostensibly) around the question of whether Canada should maintain a separate naval service or merely make a contribution to the United Kingdom's Royal Navy. The Act was founded upon the former principle; but it also contained the following sentence:

In case of an emergency the Governor in council may place at the disposal of His Majesty, for general service in the Royal Navy, the Naval Service or any part thereof, any ships or vessels of the Naval Service, and the officers and seamen serving in such ships or vessels, or any officers or seamen belonging to the Naval Service.

This provision (Section 23 of the original Act, Section 20 of Chap. 139 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1927) was still in effect in 1939.

The continuance of political battle having prevented the implementation of

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\*In the end, in 1946 the Canadian government cancelled the United Kingdom's outstanding indebtedness under the financial agreements concerning the Plan, amounting to \$425,000,000.<sup>281</sup>

the Act by the construction of effective naval vessels, the outbreak of war in 1914 found the Canadian naval service possessing only two old cruisers which had been purchased in 1910 as training ships. These ships and their inadequate crews were placed at the disposal of the Admiralty on 4 August 1914 in accordance with Section 23.<sup>282</sup> In answer to an informal inquiry, the Admiralty somewhat loftily discouraged further Canadian cooperation in naval matters, recommending that Dominion assistance be concentrated on the Army. Nevertheless, a large and useful patrol force of small vessels came into existence on the east coast of Canada as the war proceeded. This force, like all other Canadian naval units, was employed in accordance with Admiralty guidance.<sup>283</sup>

Between the two World Wars the Royal Canadian Navy remained tiny; there were times when its actual survival as a service seemed in doubt.<sup>284</sup> Although, as we have seen, its size and status were much improved after 1935 (above, page 4), its fighting strength in September 1939 was still a mere half-dozen destroyers. This force was too small to be more than an adjunct to larger Allied navies. We have also noted that its relations with the British Admiralty had continued to be close. Its fighting ships were built in Britain or purchased from the Admiralty. Having no longer a college of its own, it sent its cadets to be trained by the Royal Navy, to which the higher instruction of senior officers was also entrusted. The 45 cadets and officers actually training or serving with the Royal Navy at the beginning of 1939 (above, page 79) represented more than one-third of the R.C.N.'s total professional officer corps of 129.<sup>285</sup> In many ways and for many reasons, the Royal Canadian Navy- was the most British of the: Canadian services. This continued to be the case throughout the Second World War.

In view of that "autonomist disposition" of Mackenzie King's administration which we have remarked upon (above, page 138), this might have made the Navy an object of special surveillance by the government. In fact, it had no such effect. The Prime Minister's anti-military prejudices centred upon the Army, actually the most national of the services. He had little awareness of the Navy, the smallest of the three forces, which seemed to represent no threat to the manpower situation which was his most obsessive concern. (His feelings towards it, so far as he had any active ones, cannot have been rendered less friendly in 1943 when a Liberal M.P., an R.C.A.F. officer who had just returned to Canada in a destroyer, told him that he thought the Navy was Liberal.)<sup>286</sup> The Navy, as already remarked (above, page 205) was happy in being allowed to fight its battles, in general, well outside the circle of the political limelight.

## B. RELATIONS WITH THE BRITISH ADMIRALTY AND THE ROYAL AND U.S. NAVIES

### *The First Phases*

In spite of the absence of official planning, it cannot be doubted that as a result of the close personal contacts which had existed between the two navies (above, page 80) there was general understanding on both sides concerning the tasks which Canada's exiguous naval forces would assume in the event of the Dominion becoming involved alongside Britain in a major war. But when the guns opened fire in Europe there was still no knowledge of the basis on which naval cooperation would rest.

Naturally and inevitably, the Admiralty in London would have welcomed a repetition of the Canadian decision of 1914 to act upon the section of the Naval

Service Act permitting placing the Canadian fighting force at its own complete disposal; and as we have seen the first phrase of its memorandum of 6 September 1939 on Canadian cooperation was "The six destroyers of the Royal Canadian Navy to be placed under Admiralty orders". It is evident that the Chief of the Canadian Naval Staff (Rear Admiral Percy W. Nelles) was prepared to accede to this request. His diary indeed indicates that as early as 1 September, the day on which the R.C.N. was placed on active service, he put forward a draft order in council placing the service "at disposal". This was not passed. On 11 September, after the British request, he made a further report to the Cabinet in the same sense which was again "turned down". He recorded the answer and his own reaction: "Could not instructions to co-operate suffice? Will fight that tomorrow." His memorandum to the Minister of National Defence written the next day was to the effect that the reply to the question depended on the interpretation of the term "cooperate".<sup>287</sup>

In my opinion it is most desirable that we have one Officer and Staff only directing naval operations at sea on the America and West Indies Station and the most suitable person is the Commander-in-Chief of the Station. . . .

If co-operation means that the Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies will direct operations of H.M. and H.M.C. Ships on the America and West Indies Station as was done in the last war with great success, then it achieves my object and will be eminently suitable.

The case in point is that four destroyers cannot defend our East Coast and focal areas. The Commander-in-Chief has therefore stationed two eight inch gun cruisers to add to our efforts. . . .

An order in council of 14 September granted authority for the Canadian destroyers "to cooperate to the fullest extent with the forces of the Royal Navy". The decision not to take the action requested by the Admiralty was clearly a fundamental one, which had the effect of reserving to the Canadian government the right to decide whether or not to commit its naval forces to any specific theatre or operation. Yet (though no definition of "co-operation" was provided) it was clearly taken also in the spirit of Nelles' recommendation. As the admiral had indicated, Canada's half-dozen destroyers could not fight an independent naval war; and in local terms the decision amounted in practice to placing them under Admiralty orders.\* On 17 November 1939 another order in council generalized the authority, ordering that "all Canadian Naval Establishments and all H.M.C. Ships now in commission or to be commissioned, together with the officers and seamen serving therein, shall during the present war co-operate to the fullest extent with the Royal Navy, and with all other Naval Forces of His Majesty".<sup>288</sup> These measures may be said to have fixed the general course of Canadian naval policy for the duration of the war. Their practical effect was that when British and Canadian ships found themselves working together they operated as if they were members of the same force; the senior officer present took over tactical command whether he belonged to the R.C.N. or the Royal Navy. In many cases, particularly in the early years of the war, this meant that command was exercised by British officers.

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\*The Plaxton Committee (below, page 324) criticized this order's "ambiguous terms", noting that it referred to Section 20 of the Naval Service Act (*Revised Statutes*, 1927), which it should not have done if it was not intended to place the ships at disposal for general service in the Royal Navy. The revised order of 17 November 1939 met another point raised by the Committee when it extended the principle to other Dominion Navies; and this order was issued under the War Measures Act, not the Naval Service Act. It did not however attempt to provide a specific definition of "co-operation".

During the first nine months Canadian naval activity was limited to Canada's coastal areas (where Canadian destroyers provided local escort for convoys) and the West Indies, where one destroyer operated from September 1939 at the request of the British Commander-in-Chief of the America and West Indies Station, who was in general charge of operations in the North Atlantic.<sup>289</sup> The convoy command organization has been described (above, page 16); it is worth mentioning that though the organization of convoys was a Canadian responsibility, the Admiralty memorandum of 6 September remarked that two trained officers of the Royal Navy would be sent to assist in this work at Halifax. With no Canadian ships operating in European waters, no R.C.N. shore establishments were needed or provided in the United Kingdom at this period. This situation changed when four destroyers were ordered across the Atlantic in the May crisis of 1940. As a result, in October of that year a small R.C.N. accounting base and manning depot (H.M.C.S. *Dominion*, later re-named *Niobe*) was set up at Plymouth.<sup>290</sup> There was still no R.C.N. liaison establishment in London; contact with the Admiralty was maintained through the Canadian High Commissioner's Office, by direct signals between the Admiralty and Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa, and through the senior Admiralty representative on the British Purchasing Mission in Canada. However, the increasing numbers of Canadian naval personnel on loan to the Royal Navy for duty or training had led in June 1940 to the appointment to London of a Canadian Personnel Liaison Officer who was attached to the staff of the Second Sea Lord in the Admiralty.<sup>291</sup>

The Commanding Officer of H.M.C.S. *Dominion* also held the appointment of Senior Naval Officer of H.M.C. Ships in United Kingdom Waters.<sup>292</sup> This did not involve any operational control; his functions were administration and liaison. By January 1941 there were ten Canadian destroyers operating from the United Kingdom, and Commodore L. W. Murray became Commodore Commanding Canadian Ships and Establishments in the United Kingdom, this appointment replacing that of Senior Naval Officer and having the same limited functions. In March 1941 Murray set up his office in Canada House, London.<sup>293</sup> But though the office remained, Murray's own tenure there was brief. Almost immediately, he and the ten destroyers were ordered back, to the Western Atlantic.

#### *Problems of Command at Newfoundland*

The redistribution of Canadian naval forces was the result of the enemy's submarine operations extending farther and farther westward in the Atlantic to the point where it was necessary for the Admiralty to think in terms of continuous escort across the ocean. This would replace the system by which strong anti-submarine escorts were accorded to convoys in areas within reach of British bases, and weaker ones in areas within reach of bases on the Canadian side, where in fact Hitler, fearful of American intervention, had so far refused to allow the U-boats to operate (above, page 132). What was now needed was, basically, three escort forces. One would work from British bases, escorting convoys as far as an Eastern Ocean Meeting Point, where they would exchange charges with units of the second force, based on Iceland. These would repeat the process at a Mid-Ocean Meeting point with the third force, working from St. John's, Newfoundland, where a new escort base would be required.<sup>294</sup>

On 21 May 1941, immediately upon hearing of the new plan from the Admiralty, which inquired how many Canadian vessels would be available, Naval

Service Headquarters in Ottawa offered to undertake the escort task in the Newfoundland area.<sup>295</sup>

Seven corvettes available now fifteen more within one month. Total of forty-eight within six months. Seven are being sailed for St. John's Newfoundland, May twenty-third, being augmented by a group of five in a fortnight. The force being further strengthened as ships become available. We should be glad to undertake task of anti-submarine convoy escort in Newfoundland focal area which would involve utilization of all R.C.N. destroyers. With such a force we should feel confident of being able to carry out anti-submarine convoy escort from Newfoundland Banks to rendezvous with Iceland escort basing this force on St. John's. Approximate operating strength by mid-June would be eight destroyers and twenty corvettes. Command of St. John's force would be given to an R.C.N. officer with experience of operations in Western Approaches probably Commander [E. R.] Mainguy with rank of captain. Suitable staff would be provided. It is hoped that Admiralty will assume direction of this force when necessary to coordinate its operations with those of the Iceland escort.\*

Three days later the Admiralty, evidently though not specifically in reply to this Canadian message, signalled, "In view of the importance of this appointment it would appear desirable that a flag officer should fill it. As Commodore Murray's duties on this side would be so greatly reduced and as he has a very good knowledge of conditions in Western Approaches he would be most suitable and it would give us great confidence if you saw your way to selecting him for appointment."<sup>297</sup> N.S.H.Q. was "very pleased" to accept the suggestion.<sup>298</sup>

The appeal of the Newfoundland project to Canadian naval officers is evident. For the first time, an opportunity had arisen to employ the main Canadian, naval fighting force concentrated under Canadian command; the task, moreover, was one directly related to the defence of Canada.

During the next few weeks the Canadian Cabinet War Committee and the full Cabinet spent a good deal of time discussing the proposed Newfoundland base. The Canadian Naval Service had cheerfully told the Admiralty that it was prepared to provide the necessary shore facilities; but the government had doubts. The probable cost was not less than \$10,000,000, and at the War Committee meeting on 10 June it was suggested that it would not be politic to undertake such an expenditure in an area not under Canadian control. On 20 June the Committee decided that the British government should be told that it seemed most appropriate that the title to the base should be vested in that government, and that it should bear the cost; on the other hand, if the United Kingdom wished Canada to undertake the financial responsibility, then it was felt that the title should vest in Canada. Four days later the Committee authorized proceeding with the scheme pending final decisions on these matters. Final agreement was in fact not reached until October; the War Committee was told, on the 29th that the Admiralty would be responsible for acquisition and construction, Canada for administration and physical maintenance. Titles would vest in the Admiralty or in Newfoundland according to circumstances. At the request of the Admiralty Canada undertook the placing of contracts and supervision of the work.<sup>299</sup> Long before this the Newfoundland Escort Force was in fact working out of St. John's; the first three corvettes sailed

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\*It is presumably on the basis of this sentence that the British official history states, "Canadian Naval Headquarters had agreed without hesitation that control of Canadian ships should be freely exercised from London in exactly the same manner as was the case with British ships."<sup>296</sup> The offer to the Admiralty was doubtless made on the authority of the Naval Minister. The first mention of the matter in the Cabinet War Committee seems to have been on 27 May, six days later, when the Committee agreed that Canada should undertake responsibility for the establishment and operation of convoy escort forces at St. John's.

thence on escort duty on 3 June, the command came into official existence on 6 June, and Commodore Murray arrived at St. John's on the 13th.<sup>300</sup>

A large degree of unity of command was essential to the success of the tremendous trans-Atlantic convoy operation; and as we have seen Naval Service Headquarters had proposed that the Newfoundland Escort Force should act under Admiralty direction. From the beginning of the war, Canadian naval officers had been accustomed to accepting British command. But a new element now appeared in the situation. The United States, pursuing President Roosevelt's policy of aid to Britain "short of war", was ready to assume part of the burden of the task of convoy in the Western Atlantic. American forces relieved the British in Iceland beginning on 7 July 1941; and during the "Atlantic Meeting" of Roosevelt and Churchill at Argentia, Newfoundland (9-12 August) a naval plan, of which Harry Hopkins had informed the British during his recent visit to London, was approved. Under it, as Churchill told the Prime Minister of Australia, "United States Navy is effectively taking over America-Iceland stretch of Atlantic, thus giving us relief equal to over fifty destroyers and corvettes, soon to be available for home waters and Atlantic."<sup>301</sup>

For this relief given by a friend who was still neutral the British Commonwealth might well offer much thanks; but for the Canadian naval forces it brought problems of which the major participants took little note. The arrangements made at Argentia transferred their new main operational body, the Newfoundland Escort Force, to United States command. This happened at short notice, and there seems to have been little consultation with Canada; there is no evidence of any on the Cabinet level, though Canadian naval representatives in Washington had known of the American naval plan concerned (WPL-51) as it developed.<sup>302</sup> Information about it began to reach Ottawa from the Naval Attaché there late in July.<sup>303</sup> The minutes of a Naval Council meeting held on 5 August indicate that the members (including the Naval Minister) were still awaiting details.<sup>304</sup> Shortly thereafter the Minister and the Chief of the Naval Staff went to London. At a meeting at the Admiralty on 13 August, the day after the Argentia conference ended, Admiral Nelles "accepted with regret" the departure from Canadian waters of the 3rd Battle Squadron; the old British "R" class battleships, which had been employed on Atlantic convoy protection since the beginning of the war, would now be available for duty elsewhere. It was also noted that the Newfoundland Force would now "take instructions from the U.S. Naval Authorities instead of from Commander in Chief, Western Approaches"; there would be direct communication between the Chief of the Naval Staff in Ottawa and the Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, with signals repeated to the Admiralty.<sup>305</sup>

Whatever mental reservations the Royal Canadian Navy may have had about the new plan, there is no evidence that it was in any way backward about implementing it. The Newfoundland Escort Force now came under Rear Admiral A. LeR. Bristol, Jr., U.S.N., commanding the Support Force of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet. The Support Force was shortly redesignated Task Force 4,\* and Commodore Murray's force became Task Force 4.11. Other Canadian vessels served with U.S. ones in Task Force 4.19 separate from Murray's command.<sup>306</sup> Under the system instituted beginning in September 1941, a Canadian escort from Task Force 4.11, acting under U.S. overall command, protected eastbound fast convoys from Halifax to a Western Ocean Meeting Point off Newfoundland: thence the predominantly

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\*Later still it became Task Force 24.

American Task Force 4.19 provided escort to the Mid-Ocean Meeting Point, which had now been shifted farther to the east; here ships destined for Iceland parted company and the balance continued to the United Kingdom under British convoy. Slow convoys assembled at Sydney, N.S., and were escorted mainly by Canadian vessels on the first leg of the voyage and by British ones, from Iceland and Britain, in the mid-ocean and eastern sectors. General coordination and routing continued to be the responsibility of the Admiralty, in consultation of course with the U.S. Navy.<sup>307</sup>

The actual system of command as the Americans saw it is expressed in a directive from the C.-in-C. U.S. Atlantic Fleet to Admiral Bristol, dated 10 October 1941:<sup>308</sup>

2. There is hereby delegated to you all appropriate authority to control and supervise the conduct of trans-Atlantic escort-of-convoy operations within the northern Western Atlantic Area. . . .

3. The said authority embraces not only direct control of U.S. escort units but also coordinating supervision of the operations of Canadian escort units, which latter will be effected through and with the Commodore Commanding Newfoundland (now Commodore L. W. Murray, R.C.N.) who will have entire charge of the *availability* of Canadian escort units. The same coordinating supervision will be effected through and with the Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast (headquarters at Halifax) when appropriate.

The operation of this system of "coordinating supervision" was promoted by tact on both sides. The C.-in-C. U.S. Atlantic Fleet, Admiral Ernest J. King, refrained in the first instance from issuing formal instructions to Commodore Murray, but hoped that a draft instruction he forwarded to him would provide the necessary guidance.<sup>309</sup> The tone and content of the correspondence passing between Bristol and Murray suggests a friendly and effective professional relationship.<sup>310</sup>

If the smooth working of the new arrangements on the service level was noteworthy, not less so was the quiet acceptance of it on the political level in Canada. The Canadian Cabinet, which had devoted so much attention to the question of financial and other responsibility for the St. John's escort base, apparently gave very little to that of the command of the forces that were to use it. The transfer of the major part of Canada's naval force to United States command seems to have been mentioned in the Cabinet War Committee only very incidentally (on 9 October 1941), and there is no evidence that the Prime Minister took any special note of it. It is a remarkable example of the Cabinet's general lack of interest in naval matters.

The system of command set up in 1941 lasted until 1943.\* In spite of the fact that American forces were increasingly withdrawn from the Atlantic area after the United States became an actual belligerent at the end of 1941, Canadian naval forces at Newfoundland remained under a U.S. admiral. The system worked without generating serious friction — not least perhaps because the commanders of Canadian ships received their orders from a Canadian commodore, and were scarcely aware of the superior American authority — but there was an occasional mild incident. Late in 1942 and early in 1943 there were Canadian protests when both American and British authorities sent signals affecting the disposition of Canadian ships in the Atlantic without repeating them to N.S.H.Q. in Ottawa.<sup>311</sup> On one or two occasions the Commander of Task Force 24 caused difficulty by ordering transfers of Canadian ships between forces in a manner affecting local

\*Other aspects of the command problem are dealt with in Part VI, below, which is concerned with military relations with the United States.


Canadian coastal escort, a responsibility of the R.C.N.'s Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast at Halifax, and really no business of C.T.F. 24 at all. On 12 January 1943 Admiral Nelles felt obliged to signal to Admiral King (now the United States Chief of Naval Operations), "The actual allocation of R.C.N. ships to the various forces or commands is the responsibility of N.S.H.Q. only", and requesting that "all appropriate R.N. and U.S.N. authorities be informed that any proposals for transfers of R.C.N. ships from one force or command or station to another are to be referred to N.S.H.Q. for concurrence".<sup>312</sup> After some further discussion the U.S. naval authorities issued an instruction that any transfer of British or Canadian naval vessels between the commands of Commanding Officer Atlantic Coast and Flag Officer Newfoundland was to be made "only with concurrence of N.S.H.Q."<sup>313</sup>

Early in 1942, in the light of the limited contribution being made by the United States Navy to Atlantic convoy operations, the British Admiralty raised the question of a possible change in the system of command; but Admiral King insisted that the U.S. continue to control the convoy forces in the North-West Atlantic.<sup>314</sup> By November of that year the U.S.N. contribution to the Atlantic escort forces was down to two destroyers and a cutter; it is calculated that these represented only two per cent of the total, whereas Canada was contributing 48 per cent and the Royal Navy 50 per cent. On 1 December, accordingly, Admiral Nelles took the matter up in a private letter to Admiral King, suggesting that an international conference be held to review the whole question of operational control in the North Atlantic. King, while taking a more conciliatory tone than he had used with the Admiralty in the previous February, indicated that he did not think the proposal timely.<sup>315</sup> But Nelles persisted, and on 2 February 1943 King sent to Ottawa and London a proposal for a conference, remarking, "One proposal which I shall make is withdrawal of Task Force 24 from the trade convoy set up in order to put an end to the confusion of mixed forces in the 'Canadian area.'<sup>316</sup>

The result was the Atlantic Convoy Conference, held in Washington beginning on 1 March 1943. Though the proposed American withdrawal had apparently surprised the Admiralty,<sup>317</sup> all parties now agreed upon the adoption of a new and more logical system of direction. The conference is fully treated in the Canadian naval history;<sup>318</sup> here it is enough to note that it instituted the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command. From 30 April 1943 Rear-Admiral Murray (as he had now become) assumed responsibility for the protection of convoys to and from the British Isles north of New York City and west of the 47th meridian; this was subject to the United States retaining general strategic control of the Western Atlantic, and to the concurrence of the commander of the U.S. Eastern Sea Frontier in movements within his command. Though the ocean area directly concerned was not a large one, the Royal Canadian Navy now for the first time assumed command responsibilities commensurate to the contribution it had long been making to the Battle of the Atlantic. At the moment when this change was made, however, the bitterest phase of that battle was already nearing its end. The convoy actions of the month of May 1943, when no fewer than 41 U-boats were sunk,\* marked the final turn of the tide; "the battle never again reached the same pitch of intensity, nor hung so delicately in the balance, as during the spring of 1943".<sup>320</sup>

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\*One of these was destroyed by an aircraft of No. 5 Squadron (Eastern Air Command), R.C.A.F., and one by the cooperation of an aircraft of No. 423 Squadron with two surface escorts, one of which was H.M.C.S. *Drumheller*. The rest were sunk by British, U.S. or Australian units.<sup>319</sup>



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*Technical Liaison and the Equipment Crisis of 1942-43*

The expansion of the Canadian naval service in 1939-45 was extraordinary: from some 3600 personnel in all categories, and 13 vessels, at the outbreak of war, to a peak of some 93,000 personnel and 939 vessels (of which 373 were reckoned as fighting ships) in 1945. This vast enlargement, of the force, a remarkable achievement in itself, was inevitably accompanied by growing pains, and some of them were serious.

We have noted that at almost every point the Royal Canadian Navy worked very closely with the Royal Navy. Its ships, though in most cases built in Canada, were of British types; and the same applied to their armament and equipment. After large numbers of new ships began to join the R.C.N., the problem of keeping Canadian ships properly fitted with modern technical equipment was a difficult one. The Royal Canadian Navy was dependent upon the Royal Navy for technical information and to some extent for the equipment itself; and by the later months of 1942 the R.C.N. was seriously behind in technical matters. In those months there was a series of disasters which reflected on Canadian naval vessels' fitness for operations. A large number of ships, including two Canadian escort vessels, were lost by enemy action in the St. Lawrence river and gulf and Newfoundland waters; and one Atlantic convoy under Canadian escort (SC-107) lost 15 ships and another (ONS-154) 14. In none of these cases was an enemy submarine sunk by naval action.\* The Canadian naval historian comments that, in spite of extenuating circumstances, "it was evident that the inferior equipment of Canadian escort vessels had contributed largely to their failure, and that this inferiority was in the main the result of delays in manufacturing and fitting improved patterns of radar and anti-submarine gear. Canadian ships were generally six months or a year behind their sisters in the Royal Navy."<sup>322</sup>

Until mid-1943 there was only one technical liaison officer on the staff of the Commodore Commanding Canadian Ships in the United Kingdom. He could not possibly keep in touch with the details of the experimental projects being conducted by the Royal Navy's various technical branches throughout the British Isles. All he could hope to do was to maintain contact with the main Admiralty technical organization in London so that when inquiries on specific pieces of equipment were made by Naval Service Headquarters, he could forward the reports required. A principal difficulty, however, was that the detailed drawings and specifications needed before any article could be manufactured in Canada were not produced by the Admiralty until well after manufacture had begun in England. At the same time, weaknesses in the organization in Ottawa also slowed progress. Investigation late in 1943 showed that although some required information had been sent from London promptly upon the receipt of requests, it had not been distributed to the officers who most needed it at N.S.H.Q.<sup>323</sup> Occasionally perhaps the Admiralty was at fault. The history of the British Admiralty Technical Mission in Ottawa remarks, in connection with production in Canada for British account, that the B.A.T.M. was sometimes embarrassed by the U.S. Navy Department being given information about both German and British weapons that had not been released to the Mission; while drawings and specifications were slow in arriving. The Admiralty "often apparently failed to realize the distances between the various parts of North America. Requests for drawings or equipment for use in Halifax or  
Toronto, for

\*R.C.A.F. aircraft however destroyed two during the early fighting around SC-107, both on 30 October. An aircraft from Iceland sank another at a later stage of the passage.<sup>321</sup>

example, often elicited the reply that such items had already been sent to Washington, Brooklyn Navy Yard or New Haven and should be borrowed from those places."<sup>324</sup>

Action to increase the technical staff in London was slow, but increases were made during 1943, and an adequate organization existed by the early part of 1944. This did not happen, however, until the seriousness of the equipment crisis as it affected Canadian ships had come to the attention of Mr. Angus L. Macdonald, the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services. The information reached the Minister through an unusual channel.

In July 1943 Lieut.-Commander William Strange, Assistant Director of Naval Information at Naval Service Headquarters, took passage from Newfoundland to Londonderry in the senior ship of a Royal Navy escort group. The group commander, Commander Peter Gretton, R.N., shocked and surprised Strange by telling him that Canadian escort vessels were, almost without exception, inadequately equipped to fight submarines. At Londonderry Gretton introduced Strange to Commodore G. W. G. Simpson, R.N., Commodore (D)\* Western Approaches. In spite of Strange's protestations that such matters lay quite outside his province, Simpson insisted on giving him an account of the inadequacy of the Canadian vessels' anti-submarine equipment, and made it evident that he hoped that Strange would make the situation clear in Ottawa. Strange's recollection is that the commodore told him that he had briefed more senior R.C.N. officers in the matter, but without result; he felt that something quite unorthodox might now have to be done. Other British and Canadian sea-going officers told Strange much the same story, and he became convinced that existing communication channels and organization were ineffective, and that he had a duty to see that the information reached the Canadian Naval Minister.

On returning to Ottawa in August, Strange sent a memorandum to the Minister's Executive Assistant, Mr. John J. Connolly, summarizing what he had heard. He stated that Commodore Simpson had expressed the opinion "that if we had fewer ships with better equipment, our contribution would be more effective, and our final record more impressive". Later that month the Minister sent to the Chief of the Naval Staff a request for a full report on, among other matters, "the completeness of our Anti-submarine equipment as compared to similar equipment on U.K. escort vessels on the North Atlantic run . . . [with] particular attention given to the comparison as regards Asdic equipment, R.D.F., Gyro compasses and hedgehogs". Admiral Nelles referred the request to his staff and received reports from the Directorate of Warfare and Training and the Chief of Naval Personnel, together with a general appraisal of these reports by the Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff. These documents he submitted to the Minister on 1 September with the remark, "I think this covers the situation."<sup>325</sup>

The Minister clearly was not satisfied, and he took the somewhat exceptional action of dispatching his civilian Executive Assistant to make on-the-spot investigations at St. John's, Londonderry and London. Mr. Connolly (whom Strange had provided with letters of introduction to the officers who had given him information) was able to gather sufficient evidence from the sea-going and shore personnel involved in the operation of Canadian escorts to confirm that a serious Situation did indeed exist and that the equipment in the majority of Canadian ships was inferior to that of their counterparts in the Royal Navy.<sup>326</sup>

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\*Commodore, Destroyers.

There is no doubt about the facts. One striking piece of evidence — there are others — is a report\* made on 9 August 1943 by Commander K. F. Adams, R.C.N., Senior Officer, First Canadian Escort Group.<sup>327</sup> This group comprised eight vessels, five of the R.C.N., three of the R.N. Adams reported the British ships' equipment as far superior to the Canadians'. His three Canadian corvettes had lately come from refit and were in good general condition. "Their value as escort vessels, however, is sharply reduced by the fact that they have not extended foc'sles, modern bridges, gyro compasses, hedgehogs or modern Radar sets. I consider all of these items absolutely essential to the successful waging of Anti-submarine warfare under current conditions." Adams proceeded:

5. It may appear from the above that I have some lack of confidence in H.M.C. Ships. Lest this impression be created, I wish to add, at once, the following qualifying remarks.

The ability, attitude and tenacity of R.C.N. personnel of the Group is, in my opinion, beyond criticism. They are a fine level-headed collection of men, recruited from all walks of life, who are in the Navy for the sole purpose of accelerating a satisfactory conclusion to hostilities. They are, man for man, certainly the equal of personnel of the Royal Navy, and there is no doubt in my mind that their enthusiasm and determination provide full compensation for whatever they may lack in experience.

They do at the present time, require additional training within their ships. I consider, however, that this is a matter that can be effectively remedied within the Group. I intend that every opportunity shall be given for all ships to become internally fully efficient.

6. It is regretted that the same complete confidence cannot be expressed in regard to equipment. During recent months I have spent much time in study, and . . . have visualised various possible situations . . . in which it would be necessary to detach a ship, or ships, to deal with threat or attack by enemy submarines. Since joining this group, and following a study of the capabilities of the various ships resultant upon their equipment, I have found myself again and again forced to the reluctant conclusion that the R.N. Ships would — in the interests of safety of the convoy and destruction of the enemy -have to form the striking units.

Commander Adams went on to speak of certain special items of equipment:

8. I would like . . . to lay particular stress upon the necessity for fitting Hedgehog and Gyro-compass to those ships at present without them. Hedgehog as a means of administering the coup de grace is by far superior to the ten-charge pattern fired from the stern. The theoretical chances of a kill are over four times as great with the ahead-thrown projectiles; and from recent practical and personal experience on exercises these figures would appear to be borne out in practice. For Hedgehog to be effective it must be, supplemented with Gyro-compass. The steering accuracy required to bring about a kill cannot be maintained with magnetic compass in any but the calmest weather; such conditions are rare in the North Atlantic.

Adams' superiors forwarded his report with their full concurrence. Commodore H. E. Reid, Flag Officer Newfoundland; sending it on to Naval Service Headquarters on 30 August, wrote in part,<sup>328</sup>

The lack of modern equipment is common to all "C" [Canadian] Groups, as a brief comparison with R.N. Ships quickly shows. Of the 14 R.N. Corvettes, *all* have extended forecastles, 11 have Hedgehogs, and all but two have A/S [Asdic] Type 127. Of the 16 R.C.N. Corvettes, 12 have *short* forecastles, *all* have A/S Set Type 123 and *none* has Hedgehog. These facts speak for themselves.

Alongside this evidence from the men who were doing the job at sea, we may place some extracts from the official record of Mr. Connolly's findings, as he presented them to a Naval Staff meeting in Ottawa on 15 November 1943:

\*Captain Strange, who returned from overseas in Commander Adams' ship, states that he wrote the first draft of this report in collaboration with Adams and at his request.

2. At St. John's, Captain "D" had produced a chart showing equipment in Mid-Ocean Escort ships, indicating Canadian ships were much more poorly equipped than those of the R.N.
3. At Londonderry, Mr. Connolly stayed with Commodore Simpson, C.B.E., R.N. He is Commodore "D" and is greatly interested in Canadian personnel. The Commodore not only talked at length on many occasions to Mr. Connolly about the comparative lack of efficiency of R.C.N. ships, but made it possible for him to interview all the responsible officers on his staff. . .
- 4...The British and American officers at Derry expressed great concern at the relative fighting inefficiency of the Canadian Escort Craft as a whole, due to lack of modern fighting equipment.
5. At the Admiralty; Mr. Connolly interviewed Admiral Sir Max Horton, C. in C., W.A. [Western Approaches] for about two hours and his views coincided exactly with those of Commodore "D", and confirmed Mr. Connolly's impression that those in the R.N. in possession of the facts are concerned about the small percentage of R.C.N. ships which have been modernized to the same extent as the R.N. ships, and the consequent lack of fighting efficiency and comfort of the men therein. R.N. Flower Class Corvettes are almost 100% modern. The Same class of R.C.N. Corvettes are said to be 15 to 20% modern. The view was expressed to Mr. Connolly that the modernization programme should be given priority over the construction programme in Canada.
6. Great satisfaction was expressed at the fact that Technical Canadian Staff Officers have recently been appointed to S.C.N.O. [Senior Canadian Naval Officer, London] and to Commodore "D. To improve the situation, however, much can be done. This would involve:
  - (a) Easier and more frequent communication between S.C.N.O. and N.S.H.Q., both ways. Faster handling of requests and answering signals at N.S.H.Q.
  - (b) Complete liaison, especially technical, between S.C.N.O. and the Admiralty.
  - (c) Complete liaison, especially technical, between S.C.N.O. and Londonderry.
  - (d) Avoidance of delays in authorizing installations in Derry, such as happened in H.M.C.S. "SKEENA" re hedgehog. . . .
  - (g) Higher priority with Admiralty sources of supply for Radar, Asdic, Hedgehog and generally Anti-Submarine equipment. . . .
7. As a concrete example of some of the problems encountered in Derry, Mr. Connolly cited the instance of "WOODSTOCK", just out of refit in Canada, which asked for more improvements than all other ships of the group together. . . .
9. C.N.E.C. [Chief of Naval Engineering and Construction] stated that the majority of points brought out by Mr. Connolly were known at N.S.H.Q. and action had been already taken to remedy them except in isolated cases which are under consideration. . . . Secretary, Naval Board remarked that 'a proposal to speed up replies in Headquarters had already been submitted to V.C.N.S. [Vice Chief of the Naval Staff] and would be in operation shortly. . . .

It will be noted that some remedial action was already under way. More followed. Notably, in January 1944 a letter went out from Naval Service Headquarters advising that: since "No exact information as to the armament and equipment . . . fitted in H.M.C. Ships is presently available in N.S.H.Q." a staff section was being created to maintain accurate records of these matters; effect was given to this by a Canadian Confidential Naval Order issued on 12 February. Authority was also given for a much enlarged W.R.C.N.S. signal staff in London to improve communications with Ottawa.

The reorganization of Naval Service Headquarters and the R.C.N. establishments in the United Kingdom, already undertaken, was carried further. In January 1944 Vice-Admiral Nelles, who had carried the heavy burden of the senior naval appointment since 1944, relinquished the office of Chief of the Naval Staff and was sent to London with the title of Senior 'Canadian Flag Officer (Overseas). He was succeeded as Chief of the Naval Staff by Vice-Admiral G. C. Jones. As a result of the energetic action taken in Ottawa and in particular of the formation in the United Kingdom of an adequate Canadian Technical Liaison Group, capable of

keeping in touch with both the Admiralty technical establishments and the various bases from which Canadian ships were operating, the situation was materially improved. Eventually most Canadian ships attained at least near-parity in equipment with their counterparts in the Royal Navy, and this was reflected in their growing number of successes against U-boats.<sup>329</sup> Unfortunately, the crisis of the submarine war was then long past.

#### *Liaison in London in the Final Phases*

With the arrival of Vice-Admiral Nelles in London on 23 January 1944, there were two Canadian naval authorities in the United Kingdom charged with similar responsibilities. The Senior Canadian Naval Officer (London) continued to enjoy a semi-independent status, conduct liaison and report directly to Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa. Admiral Nelles' proposal that an R.C.N. overseas Commander-in-Chief be appointed to replace both the Senior Canadian Flag Officer (Overseas) and the Senior Canadian Naval Officer (London) was rejected by Naval Service Headquarters, but on 15 May a new organization, entitled the Canadian Naval Mission Overseas, was established. The Mission, headed by Admiral Nelles with the former S.C.N.O.(L), Captain Houghton, as Deputy, had duties and responsibilities corresponding closely to those formerly allotted to the Senior Canadian Flag Officer (Overseas) and the Senior Canadian Naval Officer (London). Five sections were established, dealing with Weapons and Equipment, Personnel and Welfare, Policy and Plans, Accounting, and Public Relations. A secretariat was also organized. The liaison work of the Mission was concerned with such matters as negotiations for the acquisition by the R.C.N. of British cruisers and aircraft carriers, the building, manning and commissioning of British-built destroyers and frigates, and technical liaison on shipbuilding, armament and electronic gear. Until mid-1944 military liaison in the United Kingdom was conducted by the three Services separately, but with the establishment of a Canadian Joint Staff Mission a measure of co-ordination was achieved. However, the Canadian Naval Mission Overseas continued to be responsible for most liaison on naval matters.<sup>330</sup>

The misunderstanding which arose in the last stages of the war between Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa on one side and the Canadian Naval Mission Overseas and the Admiralty on the other over the question of Canadian naval participation in the war against Japan has already been touched on in Part I (pages 59-60, above). The difficulty was probably due in part to the fact that whereas at earlier stages the Canadian Government had been largely content to leave the direction of naval policy to the Naval Minister, and to the Naval Staff working closely with the Admiralty, now on the important question of the Japanese war the Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the Cabinet War Committee rather abruptly asserted their control in a manner Admiral Nelles had not anticipated. It is also the fact that the final decisions came late. Those who had to implement Canadian naval policy in the Pacific were long uncertain what that policy was going to be.

As we have seen (above, page 57) , British planners in July 1944 submitted large suggestions for Canadian contributions to the Japanese war; and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, while reducing the proposed Army component, recommended for the R.C.N. and the R.C.A.F. essentially what the British had asked. Naval Service Headquarters took too little account of the Cabinet decision of 6 September against Canadian forces operating in "remote areas such as Southeast Asia"; and British

naval representatives went home from the Quebec Conference that month expecting that Canada would provide the forces the Chiefs of Staff had recommended. But when on 22 September 1944 Mr. Macdonald presented to the War Committee a large naval programme based on those recommendations, exception was immediately taken (above, page 60). The Canadian Naval Mission Overseas was not apprised that the programme was to be drastically cut; and when on 2 October Naval Service Headquarters signalled it, "actual extent of participation not yet decided", the signal added, "Plans to refit *Prince Henry* and *Prince David* [infantry landing ships] are being made in anticipation of Cabinet approval to allocate them to the Eastern Theatres."<sup>331</sup> When Mr. Macdonald submitted his much reduced plan to the War Committee on 11 October, it still included a detachment — of which H.M.C. Ships *Prince Henry* and *Prince David* were part — for employment in the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal; and the Committee eliminated this before approving the programme in principle. At the time when this decision was made, Admiral Nelles in London was complaining to Naval Service Headquarters of the latter's failure "to answer the queries contained in my recent C.N.M.O. signals" and recommending that he and members of his staff be permitted to visit Ottawa immediately for discussions with the Minister and the Naval Staff.<sup>332</sup> When information of the War Committee's decision of 11 October reached London two days later, both Nelles and the Admiralty were disturbed, since the programme now approved, involving only about 13,000 naval personnel, was much smaller than the one which the Admiralty had been counting upon. The special point was made that *Prince Henry* and *Prince David* were "absolutely essential"<sup>333</sup> for amphibious operations planned for the capture of Rangoon.\* On 16 October Admiral Nelles signalled directly to the Naval Minister, pointing out that there was now "real danger of a gap appearing between the R.N. and the R.C.N. which would be most regrettable from all points of view", that he did not possess a "full understanding of the situation", and that it was imperative that he and some of his staff return to Canada "to obtain the necessary background information to enable the Mission to discharge its duties".<sup>334</sup>

Ottawa was at first reluctant to permit Nelles to return home for consultations, and it was not until early November that he, his flag lieutenant, and his Naval Assistant (Policy and Plans) arrived at Naval Service Headquarters. Among the Admiral's last official acts as head of the Canadian Naval Mission, it appears, was the preparation in Ottawa of a revised aide memoire for the First Sea Lord outlining the changes in R.C.N. planning necessitated by the War Committee's decision to limit R.C.N. participation in the Japanese war.<sup>335</sup> Vice-Admiral Nelles did not return to London, and on 7 January 1945 he was promoted Admiral and placed on the Retired List. Captain Houghton became Head of the Mission. Much liaison work remained to be done in Britain, but with the end of the war with Japan in early August and the return to Canada in September of the last of the *Bangor* mine-sweepers engaged in post-war mine clearance, it was possible to make substantial reductions in the staff of the Canadian Mission and to begin converting it to a peacetime establishment.

#### *Assignment of Canadian Ships to Specific Operations*

As we have already noted, the decision of the Canadian government in September 1939 not to place all Canadian ships unreservedly at the disposal of the

\*This situation was met when on 30 November the Canadian Cabinet agreed that the two landing ships infantry should be paid off from the R.C.N. and loaned to the Royal Navy.

Admiralty meant that the government would have the opportunity of deciding from time to time whether the ships of the Navy should be permitted to take part in specific operations or assigned to specific theatres. In the course of the war, the Cabinet War Committee\* dealt with a good many requests for such assignments from the British authorities, and some from the United States; and no record has been found of any ever being refused.

The first occasion when the War Committee was faced with such a question was in May of 1940, when the decision was taken to sail four Canadian destroyers across the Atlantic to take part in the critical operations around the British Isles (above, page 32). The following year, when the Newfoundland Escort Force was set up, it does not appear, as we have seen, that the Committee was consulted until after the initial arrangements had been made.

The War Committee did hear of one similar case in 1942. On 26 August the Naval Minister reported to the Committee that the Royal Canadian Navy's Commanding Officer Pacific Coast (Commodore W. J. R. Beech) had some time before received from the United States naval command on that coast a sudden request for help in the Western Aleutians. Commodore Beech had promised the assistance of three armed merchant cruisers and two corvettes. This arrangement had been reported to the Minister only when the ships were on the point of sailing, the decision to dispatch them having virtually been taken, and American arrangements having been based upon it. Mr. Macdonald was not satisfied with this procedure but in the circumstances had given his approval. He reported that information concerning the United States plan of operations and the strength of the naval and air forces involved had been obtained only after considerable difficulty. The Committee approved the assistance that had been given. "It was agreed, however, that in such circumstances, the War Committee should be provided with full details of operations in which Canadian assistance was requested."

Another request arrived almost immediately. On 9 September Mr. King read the War Committee a communication from Mr. Churchill requesting a loan of Canadian escort vessels from both coasts for participation, in the near future, in planned operations in European waters.† This was in fact Operation "Torch", the allied amphibious operation against French North Africa, which was finally carried out on 8 November; the Committee, however, was given no details of the plan. Mr. Macdonald reported that the Naval Staff had concluded that 17 Canadian corvettes could be spared, although this would weaken the forces in Canadian waters and involve the risk of further sinkings there like the ones that had taken place within the last few days. A total of 12 corvettes could be diverted from the Gulf of St. Lawrence area, but only by closing the St. Lawrence to ocean traffic and thereby reducing escort requirements, and replacing corvettes by minesweepers in coastal convoys. All the five corvettes on the Pacific coast would be withdrawn.

The War Committee, with these facts before it, approved sending 17 corvettes‡ from Canadian waters. "It was understood that a time limit would be set for the return of the Canadian vessels and that it would be pointed out to the Admiralty

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\*The Committee's records suggest that practice was not uniform. Some projects went to the Committee; others were authorized through other channels — most frequently, doubtless, by the Naval Minister.

†Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, the naval Commander-in-Chief for the operation, had already sent a staff officer to give Admiral Nelles a "guarded summary" of the plan and ask for help from the R.C.N.<sup>336</sup>

‡Actually, however, only 16 were Canadian. The seventeenth, H.M.S. *Nasturtium*, was a Royal Navy vessel operating under Canadian command.

that this decision involved a serious risk of increased sinkings on the Canadian coasts where the losses had recently been heavy." It should be noted that it was not Canadian waters only that were stripped of protection for Operation "Torch". The British naval historian (who does not mention the Canadian contribution) writes, "The British warships needed for the operation, about 160 in all, could only be provided by removing a substantial part of the Home Fleet's strength, by stopping the Russian convoys, by reducing our Atlantic escort forces and by temporarily suspending the mercantile convoys running between British and the south Atlantic."<sup>337</sup> Fortunately, the enemy's submarines did not succeed in taking much advantage of the situation.

It was a considerable time before the Canadian corvettes detached to the Mediterranean returned to their normal duties. Two of them, indeed, did not return at all; they were lost in the course of the operations. The survivors left the Mediterranean theatre one by one in the spring of 1943 to play their parts again in the Battle of the Atlantic, then at its climax.<sup>338</sup>

The greatest of the special operations still lay ahead. The Royal Canadian Navy contributed to Operation "Neptune", the Normandy landings of June 1944, some 110 ships and "10,000 men. It does not appear that an overall request was made to the Cabinet War Committee for this contribution, but one important part of it was specifically authorized. On 12 January, 1944 the Committee agreed that there was no objection to accepting a British request to transfer 12 Canadian *Bangor* class minesweepers from the east coast to the Mediterranean to relieve ships of longer endurance for anti-submarine duty in the Atlantic. However, at the next meeting of the Committee, on 20 January, it was reported that the Admiralty had now submitted an alternative proposal — that 16 *Bangors* should be employed in the forthcoming operations against the European continent. This was approved; the *Bangors* (which in Canadian waters had been used for escort rather than minesweeping) were hastily re-equipped; and on the night before the Normandy D Day these Canadian sweepers, in the van of the Allied armada, helped to clear the way to the assault beaches.<sup>339</sup>

In general; it is evident, the degree of control that the Canadian government possessed over the employment of Canadian ships was parallel to that it exercised over the employment of the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force. Thanks to the decision taken against Admiral Nelles' advice in September 1939, the government was able to control the commitment of its men and vessels to distant theatres of operations; but once a Canadian naval unit was so committed, it was essentially beyond Canadian control. Even when, as in the case of Operation "Torch", an attempt was made to impose a time limit on the commitment, in practice this could not be very effective; Once ships were involved in operations against the enemy, it was virtually impossible to withdraw them from the officer controlling the battle until the state of the Operations allowed it;

#### *Canadians Serving with the Royal Navy*

Like the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force, the Royal Canadian Navy loaned considerable numbers of its personnel to the British authorities. This began quite early in the war, as we have seen, and necessitated stationing a Canadian officer in London to deal with personnel problems (above, page 310).

As time passed, the number of personnel on loan grew. On 5 August 1941 the

Naval Council considered a Royal Navy request for 50 officers and 300 men as landing craft crews for the Combined Operations Pool (H.M.S. *Quebec*):

The Naval Staff felt that such a policy was desirable from the point of view of bringing the R.C.N. into prominence but pointed out that it was contrary to our policy of consolidation. The Minister felt that it would be essential for this R.C.N. contingent to retain its Canadian identity; He instructed that the matter should be held in abeyance until after his visit to England.<sup>340</sup>

The request was ultimately approved, and a "Staff Officer Combined Operations" (Lt.-Cdr. K. S. Maclachlan, the former Deputy Minister of the Navy, who had now asked for employment in uniform) was stationed with the Captain Commanding Canadian Ships overseas to look after these men's interests. Seventy Canadians served in the landing craft that landed and evacuated the troops in the Dieppe raid, and a number became casualties; but as yet there were no complete Canadian flotillas. Six such flotillas, however, later took part in Operation "Torch", and four — as well as many Canadians serving in British flotillas — in the Sicilian landings in July 1943.<sup>341</sup> There was similar Canadian involvement in later Mediterranean amphibious operations. Although the landing craft crews were the largest group of Canadians loaned to the Royal Navy, Canadians served in the R.N. in many capacities. Particularly important were the 155 radar officers who were provided; they represented 14 Canadian universities and one American institution, but the great majority had attended special radar classes at the University of Toronto.<sup>342</sup>

On 22 July, 1942, the Cabinet War Committee approved a recommendation from the Naval Minister to increase the number of Canadians on loan to the Royal Navy from 500 to 2000. It was stipulated that the individuals concerned would retain Canadian identity and status, and the Canadian government would be responsible for their pay and allowances at Canadian rates. At the peak in 1943, some 2400 Canadians were serving with the British fleet.<sup>343</sup>

During the Quebec Conference in August 1943, Mr. Churchill and the British First Sea Lord presented to the Canadian government a request for assistance in manning ships of the Royal Navy. The Canadian government agreed to examine the proposals. In the light of the current manpower stringency, they caused some alarm; but on 8 September, after being assured by the Chief of the Naval Staff that the proposals involved no increase in the Navy's total manpower commitment, the Cabinet War Committee agreed to man two Royal Navy fleet destroyers, to "infiltrate" personnel into two Royal Navy cruisers with the understanding that these would later become R.C.N. ships, to form three Royal Canadian Navy flotillas of landing craft and a beach commando,\* and to provide ten commissioned Warrant Officer candidates each month for training and service with the R.N. The question of manning aircraft carriers was to be given further study, but later in the autumn the government agreed to man and operate two escort carriers and ten British frigates. The cruiser *Uganda* was commissioned as ad R.C.N. ship in October 1944, and the cruiser *Ontario* in April 1945. It is worth noting that on 5 January 1944 the Cabinet War Committee agreed that the United Kingdom should be told that cruisers and destroyers then being acquired at no cost from the Royal Navy were being accepted, not to expand the Royal Canadian Navy, but to assist the Royal Navy in meeting its manpower shortage; but that nevertheless these vessels would become an integral part of the Canadian Navy and as such, would be at the sole disposal of the Canadian government and parliament.

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\*Ultimately, five R.C.N. landing craft flotillas (including the two carried in H.M.C. Ships *Prince Henry* and *Prince David*), and the beach commando, took part in the Normandy landings.<sup>344</sup>

## C. LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS AND CONTROL OF NAVAL DISCIPLINE

The Royal Canadian Navy's status in the matter of discipline was somewhat different from those of the other Canadian services. We have seen that the basis of those services' legal relationship to the forces of the United Kingdom was the Visiting Forces Acts (above, pages 212 and 254). Those Acts were not applied to the relations of the Canadian and British Navies until after the Second World War.

One of the early measures taken by the government after the outbreak of war in 1939 was to convene a committee to report upon "certain legal and constitutional questions affecting, Canadian forces when serving outside of Canada". This *ad hoc* interdepartmental committee was composed of Mr. C. P. Plaxton of the Department of Justice (Chairman), Mr. J. E. Read of the Department of External Affairs, and two officers from the Department of National Defence: Colonel R. J. Orde, the Judge Advocate General, and Group Captain H. Edwards, the Director of Air Personnel. The Plaxton Committee was responsible for the initial interpretation of the Visiting Forces Acts as affecting the army and the air force, and its report, submitted on 26 October 1939,<sup>345</sup> provided the basis for policy concerning them. With respect to the naval forces, however, the Committee expressed the opinion,

that the Naval Discipline (Dominion Naval Forces) Act, 1911, as made applicable to Canadian Naval Forces by Section 46 of the Naval Service Act, R.S.C. Chapter 139, and the Imperial Order, in Council of August 12th, 1913, as made applicable in Canada by Order in Council of June 28th 1920, which came into operation on September 15th, 1920,\* Sufficiently cover the present situation to the extent of R.C.N. and R.N. Naval Forces serving together.

The Committee, as already noted, considered that recourse to the Visiting Forces Acts might be necessary if circumstances arose where R.C.N. ships were serving with, ships belonging to a Commonwealth country other than the United Kingdom. This point, however, was covered by a later order in council deriving its authority from the War Measures Act (above, page 309).

Throughout the war the legal relationship of British and Canadian naval forces rested upon the foundation thus defined. The Naval Service Act passed by the Canadian Parliament in 1910 had recognized the Naval Discipline Act, passed by the British Parliament in 1866 and amended from time to time since, and the British King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions, as applying to the naval service of Canada, except in so far as they might be inconsistent with the Naval Service Act itself or regulations made under it.<sup>347</sup> Various legal difficulties which presented themselves had been disposed of by the British Parliament's Naval Discipline (Dominion Naval Forces) Act of 1911, the Act Respecting the Naval Discipline (Dominion Naval Forces) Act passed by the Canadian Parliament in 1918, and the British and Canadian orders in council.<sup>348</sup> passed in 1920. These provided an adequate basis for relations between British and Canadian naval forces and for the maintenance of discipline on Canadian ships, whether serving alone or with British forces, and over the personnel of both navies, including British sailors serving in Canadian ships and *vice versa*.

Under these Acts and Orders, provision was made for the legal convening of naval courts martial to try either British or Canadian personnel. If the senior officer

\*Actually, the order of 28 June was a British order; the corresponding Canadian order was made on 15 September and was effective on 1 September 1920.<sup>346</sup>

of a combined force belonged to the Royal Navy, he could order a court martial for any officer or man of the Royal Canadian Navy serving in any vessel of the Royal Canadian Navy in his force — provided he held a court-martial commission (the naval equivalent of an army "warrant") from the Canadian Minister of National Defence (Navy). Similarly, if the senior officer of the force belonged to the Royal Canadian Navy, he could order a court martial for any Royal Navy officer or man serving in any R.N. vessel in the force — provided he held a court-martial commission from the British Admiralty. In a Royal Navy court martial of a R.C.N. officer or man borne in an R.C.N. ship, normal R.N. practice was modified in certain respects: (1) it was deemed desirable though not essential that at least one R.C.N. officer should sit on the court, if possible as President; (2) the minutes of the court were to be sent to the Minister in Ottawa, with a copy to the Admiralty for information; and (3) it was considered generally desirable that offenders should serve sentences of detention or imprisonment in their own country, while those dismissed the service got free passage home.<sup>349</sup>

Where R.C.N. personnel were serving not in their own ships but in ships or establishments of the Royal Navy, they were subject to the same laws as personnel of the R.N., but it was ordered that in this case too a R.C.N. officer should if possible sit on the court, preferably as President, that the Canadian Minister should receive the minutes, and that dismissed personnel should get free passage back to Canada. However, sentences of detention or imprisonment were normally served in United Kingdom rather than in Canadian establishments. Royal Navy personnel serving in R.C.N. ships or establishments were subject to the same laws as R.C.N. officers and men,<sup>350</sup> nor does any provision appear to have been made for R.N. representation on Canadian courts martial trying such people.

The records are incomplete — for a great number of R.C.N. court-martial minutes were accidentally destroyed after the war — but all available information indicates that the foregoing principles were regularly followed in practice and that the system worked with little serious difficulty or friction. In cases where a court martial was necessary in a Canadian ship serving in a British force whose commander had no Canadian court-martial commission, the situation could be met by transferring the accused to the books of a Royal Navy ship; and this was evidently done in a good many cases, though it was an expedient which the Naval Minister, Mr. Macdonald, did not greatly like.<sup>351</sup> Macdonald watched the situation fairly closely, and in January 1945 he asked for information concerning R.C.N. representation on R.N. courts trying Canadians.<sup>352</sup> Long before this he had taken the initiative in making officers of the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve and the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve eligible to sit on courts martial and disciplinary courts (the R.C.N. made increasing use of the latter during the war, as being less cumbersome). In the light of the smallness of the pre-war regular service and the great wartime expansion, it was clearly absurd, in Canadian terms, that only "regular" officers of the Royal Canadian Navy should be allowed to sit on courts. The change was affected by an amendment to Canadian Naval Regulations promulgated in June 1943.<sup>353</sup> Since, however, the Admiralty made no change in its own regulations, courts martial on British personnel convened by an R.C.N. officer holding a court-martial commission from the Admiralty still had to be composed of regular officers.<sup>354</sup>

It is in order to say a word on the machinery for reviewing court-martial proceedings in Ottawa. For both the Army and the Air Force this was done by the Judge Advocate General throughout the war. In 1942, however, the Royal Cana-

dian Navy appointed its own court-martial authority, the Deputy Judge Advocate of the Fleet, who reviewed the minutes of naval courts thereafter. The relation of the D.J.A.F. to the Judge Advocate General was never precisely defined, but in practice the former operated largely independently.<sup>355</sup>

In 1943 work began on a new code to consolidate the Royal Navy's King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions (which, as already noted, had been made applicable to the Canadian Navy by the Naval Service Act of 1910) and the growing number of Canadian regulations which had come into existence. The annual report of the Department of National Defence for the fiscal year 1943-44 remarks, "The use of King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions in the Royal Canadian Navy is not satisfactory as insufficient control exists over such regulations."<sup>356</sup> To give the new code the necessary statutory authority, a new Act was required; and in the summer of 1944 the Canadian Parliament passed the Naval Service Act, 1944.<sup>357</sup> The legal basis of Canadian naval discipline was thus altered. The British Naval Discipline Act and King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions ceased to apply to the Royal Canadian Navy. The legal basis of relations with other Commonwealth naval forces would now be Section 6 of the Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act, 1933. The new statute, however, did not become effective until after the war was over. It was brought into force by a Canadian order in council of 7 September 1945.<sup>358</sup>

## Part VI

### MILITARY COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES

#### 1. INTO THE CRISIS: 1939-1940

THE IMMEDIATELY preceding portion of this study dealt with the organization and control of Canadian forces in operations. It was mainly concerned with relations with the Commonwealth, and almost entirely with the United Kingdom. At certain points, however — particularly with respect to naval operations — it did touch upon relations with the United States, because this seemed natural and convenient. Relations with the United States at large are the subject of the present Part.

Except at sea, Canadian fighting forces had relatively few contacts with their American counterparts outside of the North American zone. What we have to tell of here, then, is not cooperation in military operations, but planning and preparation, and the defence of North America against menaces which happily never took very material shape. The story is an interesting one nevertheless, if only because it introduces a new phase of Canadian history and Canadian external relations.

In Part II (above, pages 95-9) we have described the small beginnings of a new military relationship with the United States in 1936-39, and have seen that the contacts made were very limited. They consisted of conversations between Mr. King and President Roosevelt in which defence matters were briefly mentioned along with other things which were considered more important; and of a very few visits to Washington by Canadian senior officers. There was no established machinery for regular discussions on defence matters between the two countries.

The first result of the outbreak of war in September 1939 was to interrupt the development of this new relationship. Canada entered the war after one week's formal neutrality; the United States, standing neutral and hoping to avoid involvement, now became more aloof. Mackenzie King, strange as it seems, was taken aback by the American attitude. He wrote in his diary on 1 September, "I was terribly shocked and surprised when I learned that Roosevelt had told the press this morning that the U.S. ought to be able to keep out of the European war." And on the 3rd, he listened to the President's broadcast with "an almost profound disgust": "America keeping out of this great issue, which affects the destiny of mankind. And professing to do so in the name of peace when everything on which peace is based is threatened." King, it would seem, had put too naive an interpretation on Roosevelt's large talk at Hyde Park three months before (above, page 98).

On 5 September there was a famous telephone conversation between Mr. Roosevelt and the American Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, on one side and Mr. King on the other, in which the Prime Minister assured the Americans that Canada was, for the moment, at peace. The result was that the Dominion was not included in the first American application of the Neutrality Act, and during the

next few days use was made of this technical neutrality to deliver to Canada aircraft which could not be sent to Britain or France.<sup>1</sup> The Neutrality Act was shortly modified by permitting belligerent powers to purchase goods in the United States, though they had to take title to them before they were shipped and transport them in their own vessels. These "cash and carry" provisions were an important advantage to the Allies, who controlled the seas.

Apart from this single conversation, there seem to have been almost no direct contacts between King and Roosevelt during the first seven months of the war. There was no visit by King to the President between September 1939 and April 1940, and few if any telephone conversations.<sup>2</sup> But on 9 April 1940, the German invasion of Denmark and Norway ended the "phony war" and seriously troubled the American government and people. On 23-4 April King visited Roosevelt at Warm Springs, Georgia, and on the 29th he saw him again in Washington.<sup>3</sup> This was the beginning of a new cooperation between the two countries, which grew more intimate as the situation in Europe went from bad to worse following the launching of the German *Blitzkrieg* in the West on 10 May.

On 23 May, as we have seen (above, page 32), the War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet, answering an appeal from London, dispatched the four available Canadian destroyers for service in British waters. "It was agreed that the United States should be advised of the grave situation with respect to possible invasion of the United Kingdom, and of the contemplated despatch of Canadian Naval Forces to European waters", and the Prime Minister stated that he would send a personal message to the President. The following day, before the message had been sent, Mr. Hull telephoned Mr. King asking that someone who could be implicitly trusted should come to Washington at once for conversations with the President. King sent Mr. H. L. Keenleyside of the Department of External Affairs.<sup>4</sup> Keenleyside was already known to the President, for he had been sent to Washington a few days before to deliver to the President a personal message from King asking for aircraft for the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, which Britain was now unable to supply as a result of the new German offensive in North-West Europe. The President had told Keenleyside that he could see no direct or indirect method of complying with the request; but he took the opportunity of sending a message to King to the effect that he would like to see him, privately, at Hyde Park or Washington. Keenleyside reported,<sup>5</sup>

The object of the proposed meeting would be to discuss "certain possible eventualities which could not possibly be mentioned aloud" for fear of laying the speaker open to the charge of being a "defeatist". He added that if I would mention to the Prime Minister the words "British Fleet" Mr. King would understand the lines along which the President's mind was working. . . .

Now, on 25 May, Keenleyside again visited Washington and had an interview with the President and Mr. Hull. His reports to the Prime Minister on this and subsequent conversations have something of the atmosphere of a mystery novel, for he thought it necessary to camouflage the names of the participants, calling Roosevelt "Mr. Roberts", Hull "Mr. Hughes", King "Mr. Kirk", and so on. In the interview on 25 May, the President referred to the alarming news from Europe indicating the probable collapse of France. If this happened, the Nazis, he said, would be free to devote their strength to devastating the United Kingdom, and, facing an air superiority of about five to one, "it is unlikely that the United Kingdom can withstand such an assault for many weeks". Roosevelt anticipated that the United Kingdom might be "forced to sue for peace" and faced with demands

for "the surrender of the Empire — and handing over of the British Fleet". Since the alternative would be destruction, Roosevelt feared that "the temptation to buy a reasonably 'soft' peace will prove irresistible". Roosevelt and Hull were desperately anxious to ensure that, when the last hope of successful resistance was gone, "the remnants of the British Fleet should be sent out to South Africa, Singapore, Australasia, the Caribbean and Canada". At the last moment, the King should be brought to safety "and given temporary refuge in say, Bermuda". With respect to this point, "Mr. Roberts started to say that the King might come to Canada. He hesitated and Mr. Hughes intervened to point out that this would have an adverse political effect in the United States. They agreed that it would be used by political opponents of the Administration to accuse Mr. Roberts of 'establishing monarchy on the North American continent'. They further agreed in suggesting that the King might take refuge temporarily at say, Bermuda, without arousing the republican sentiment in the United States."

The American statesmen are recorded as saying, with respect to the withdrawal of the remnants of the British Fleet, "The people and Government of the United Kingdom will probably be terribly punished for taking these steps but they will be no worse off than previous victims of German aggression and their suffering will have a real objective in that it will make possible the ultimate triumph of civilization." Opinion in the United States was changing, "but not with sufficient rapidity to make effective aid possible — unless the United Kingdom can hold out for months alone. If this can be done, perhaps direct aid can come in time. Otherwise the ultimate freedom of the British Isles will be dependent upon the United States and the Dominions getting control of the British, and if possible the French, fleet." Roosevelt explained, not surprisingly, that he did not feel that he could put this argument to Mr. Churchill, "but he hopes that Mr Kirk [King] will obtain the concurrence of Mr Manz [Menzies], Mr Frank [Fraser] and Mr Smith [Smuts] and make common and very strong representations along these lines."<sup>6</sup>

There is a theory, particularly popular among after-dinner speakers, that Canada performs the functions of a "linch-pin" as between Great Britain and the United States. At this moment, if at no other, the Canadian government was in that position with a vengeance; and Mr. King immediately found it somewhat embarrassing. He confided to his diary that his first reaction was one of instinctive revolt; "for a moment it seemed to me that the United States was seeking to save itself at the expense of Britain". On thinking the matter over a second time, he decided that the President's intentions were not entirely clear, and after a telephone conversation between King and Hull on 27 May (the day the Dunkirk evacuation began), Keenleyside made yet another trip to Washington.<sup>7</sup> On the 29th, he had a 90-minute interview with the President and the Secretary of State. He told Roosevelt that it was King's opinion that if faced with the alternatives of a "soft" peace conditional upon the surrender of the fleet to Germany, or a viciously "hard" peace if the remnants of the fleet were sent to the Dominions and the United States, the British would grimly accept the latter. While fully recognizing the political difficulties, King was still hopeful that the events of the next few days might so affect American public opinion as to enable further aid to be given immediately; this would encourage the French, deter Italy and "make British resistance even more certain". If Roosevelt and Hull still thought it impossible to give further help at present, then King was prepared to consider approaching Churchill; but for reasons "involving elements of time, secrecy and personality" he did not think it advisable to arrange a common approach involving Menzies, Fraser and Smuts. He thought

the best method would be for Roosevelt to make the approach himself, but if the President felt unable to do so, King was prepared to place his views before Churchill. In that case however he would need to know "just how far he can go in promising United States cooperation" after Britain had made the required sacrifice.

Roosevelt and Hull continued to argue that the case they wished to make could not be put effectively by the United States. As for overt action by the U.S., "the single fact must be recognized that *the United States is not ready*":

Even if public opinion were ready for such a move, little could be done as there are in the United States today not more than 800 useful Army planes (Naval planes would be useless, for present purposes, to Great Britain). Neither Mr Roberts nor Mr Hughes would be prepared to accept responsibility for denuding their country's defences further.

Roosevelt still hoped that King would be willing to act alone. Keenleyside's memorandum of the conversation concludes, "Mr Roberts and Mr Hughes will now wait anxiously to hear what steps Mr Kirk takes and what reception they are accorded. They feel very strongly that their proposal is the only plan that can save democratic civilization — unless the Allies can hold the Germans on the Western Front throughout the present summer." Against the last eleven words, Mr. King minuted, "Note — this done by U.K. & Dominions — in other words — saved democratic civilization."<sup>8</sup>

On receiving Keenleyside's report, King, who had already been in the process of drafting a message to Churchill about these conversations, produced a final cable<sup>9</sup> which he dispatched on 30 May. He did not describe the negotiation carried on through Keenleyside, as he had at first considered doing, or otherwise explain specifically how he got his information. The point about the fleet was made:

9. The United States cannot, it is considered, give immediate belligerent aid. If, however, Britain and France could hold out for some months, aid could probably then be given. If further resistance by the Fleet in British waters became impossible before such aid could be given, the President believes that having ultimate victory for the allies and the final defeat of the enemy in view, it would be disastrous to surrender the fleet on any terms, that it should be sent to South Africa, Singapore, Australia, the Caribbean and Canada. He would also deem it wise that in such a contingency, that [*sic*] vessels which cannot be moved should be destroyed, especially naval ships under construction, and that the same steps should be taken with regard to merchant marine.

In these circumstances, the United States would assist by opening its ports to the British Fleet so far as the most liberal interpretation of international law would permit, and would help in building up bases at Simonstown, Singapore, Halifax and elsewhere, and the U.S. Fleet would defend Australia and New Zealand against Japanese or other attacks. King's message continued:

11. Both President and Secretary believe that if Germany should threaten any unusual or particularly vicious action against the United Kingdom as punishment for allowing the Fleet to escape when further resistance had become useless, public opinion in the United States would demand active intervention If, for example, the Germans should attempt to starve Great Britain into ordering the Fleet to return, the United States would immediately send food ships under naval escort to the British Isles. Any interference with such ships would mean instant war. . . .

Mr. Churchill did not immediately reply to King's long communication. But on 4 June he made a speech in the House of Commons which was to become famous, and which was obviously written with the message before him:

Even though large tracts of Europe and many old and famous States have fallen or may fall into the grip of the Gestapo and all the odious apparatus of Nazi rule, we shall not flag or fail. We shall go on to the end, we shall fight in France, we shall fight in the seas and

oceans, we shall fight with growing confidence and growing strength in the air, we shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing-grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender, and even if, which I do not for a moment believe, this island or a large part of it were subjugated and starving, then our Empire beyond the seas, armed and guarded by the British Fleet, would carry on the struggle, until, in God's good time, the New World, with all its power and might, steps forth to the rescue and the liberation of the Old.<sup>10</sup>

On 5 June Churchill replied to King.<sup>11</sup> The message contained the following passage:

3. We must be careful not to let Americans view too complacently prospect of a British collapse out of which they would get the British Fleet and guardianship of the British Empire minus Great Britain. If the United States were in the war and England conquered locally, agreed naturally that events should follow line you describe. But if America continued neutral and we were overpowered, I cannot tell what policy might be adopted by a pro-German administration such as would undoubtedly be set up.

4. Although the President is our best friend, no practical help has been forthcoming from the United States as yet. . . .

It is amusing, that in the version of this message published in his memoirs, Churchill omitted the words "line you describe" and substituted "the above course", thus concealing from the reader the fact that he was answering a message from King.

Keenleyside was now sent off to Washington once more, equipped with a long memorandum to be read to President Roosevelt. This did not quote the whole of Churchill's paragraph 3, but only the two sentences beginning "if the United States were in the war". It also quoted the words "the President is our best friend" but not those that followed, though it went on to emphasize the need, stated by Churchill, for destroyers, aircraft or a visit of an American squadron to South Irish ports. On 7 June Keenleyside saw Roosevelt, and Hull. The opening passage of his report<sup>12</sup> should perhaps be quoted:

1. When I entered the study I was greeted enthusiastically by Mr Roberts who commented at once on Mr. C's "wonderful" speech by which he had been "thrilled and delighted". He felt that this was the answer to Mr. K's representations and he was very pleased by the way in which it had been given.

2. As instructed I then read Mr. K's memorandum in full and without comment.

3. When I had finished reading there was a brief pause, after which Mr R in a very much subdued manner began by saying that although the memorandum had covered a great deal of ground he would try to comment on all the points raised. The first and most important aspect of the subject covered was, of course, the quotation from Mr C's telegram to Mr. K.

This, if it really represented Churchill's attitude, Roosevelt found "alarming and distressing". All the Americans wanted was for Churchill "to stick to the programme outlined in his speech — a 'marvellous' performance worthy of the best traditions of British history". Reference was made to the difficulty of transferring war material, though it was mentioned that 500,000 rifles had just been released. As for destroyers, 40 were engaged in neutrality patrol, all others were on duty with the Fleet in the Pacific or in drydock. Both Roosevelt and Hull expressed the hope that King would continue the discussions and asked particularly that the project concerning the Fleet, should not be described as an American plan. They hoped and believed that Churchill meant what he had said in the House of Commons and that his telegram to King was not his final word "on this all-important matter".

King's difficulties in this negotiation are obvious. He evidently felt that he

could not be quite open with either Churchill or Roosevelt. He told Churchill part of, what Roosevelt had said, and Roosevelt part of what Churchill had said. He did not act as Roosevelt had suggested, concealing the President's part in the affair and taking the full responsibility for the suggestion about the Fleet himself. On the contrary, he told Churchill, with considerable frankness, of the suggestions that the Americans had made. The lynch-pin was clearly under strain.

As the campaign in Europe moved rapidly towards its tragic end, alarm on both sides of the border in North America grew. On 14 June — the day the Germans marched into Paris — the Acting Minister of National Defence (Mr. Power) reported to the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa that there was concern for the security of Newfoundland. Although no large-scale attack seemed likely, raids were possible. Measures were being taken for action in the island in cooperation with the Newfoundland government, and small Canadian ground and air forces were to move, there shortly; but Power recommended, and the War Committee agreed, that there was an immediate need for conversations between Canadian and United States officers on the defence of the Atlantic coast. The same day Mr. King approached President Roosevelt on the subject through the new American Minister, Mr. J. Pierrepont Moffat; the Prime Minister thought the time had arrived for staff talks, but he was uncertain whether the suggestion would embarrass the President or be welcomed by him. Two days later, before Moffat had reported the suggestion, King had another meeting with him and apparently asked that the United States should provide Canada with war material and training assistance and, in case of an emergency, send troops.<sup>13</sup>

The next day, 17 June, the matter was taken up more formally. The Canadian *chargé d'affaires* in Washington handed to Mr. Hull an *aide-mémoire* suggesting staff conferences "with respect to the naval, military and air defences of North America and having particular regard to the defences of the Atlantic coast". A similar note, delivered the same day, asked that Canada be allowed to purchase 48 fighter and 40 patrol aircraft from the United States.<sup>14</sup>

In spite of the extreme apprehension that had been reflected in the conversations with Keenleyside, the Secretary of State was not enthusiastic over the idea of Canadian-American staff talks. He, had just refused a similar British request for naval staff conversations, and was shortly to suggest that, instead, information should continue to pass through normal diplomatic channels. On 27 June the State Department replied formally to the Canadian suggestion, saying that it was not yet possible to 'give' a definite answer. At President Roosevelt's instance, however, the Under-Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, wrote to Moffat suggesting that he visit Washington and discuss the Canadian proposal, with General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army, and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations. After this had been done, Welles believed, it would be possible for a Canadian officer to come to Washington secretly for "technical conversations"<sup>15</sup>

On 27 June Mr. Moffat delivered this suggestion to Mr. King, and that evening the Prime Minister reported the matter to the War Committee. It was agreed that the Minister of Finance and the Acting Minister of National Defence, with the appropriate officers, should confer with Moffat as soon as possible, "to inform him of the specific problems which they had in mind, as suitable for joint conversations with U.S. service authorities".

On 29 June, accordingly, Moffat met two ministers, Colonel Ralston (who was about to move from Finance to National Defence) and Major Power. Moffat's record notes that the ministers stated that they wished neither to seek commitments

nor to give them, but proposed that the agenda for the staff conversations should include the defence of Newfoundland and of St. Pierre and Miquelon, as well as the problems of the Maritime Provinces, Greenland and Iceland. The three men also discussed the possible transfer of the British Fleet to Canada and the future of the Commonwealth Air Training Plan. The Canadians asked for American help to meet urgent equipment deficiencies, and suggested that the United States might conduct reconnaissance flights over the Northwest Atlantic. They also inquired, says Moffat, "Could we rent, acquire, or purchase land in the West Indies or Newfoundland and develop them as American air bases"? In the urgency of the moment, large ideas were being thrown about, perhaps without all their implications being considered. Before Moffat left for Washington, the Canadian Prime Minister met him again to remind him of previous Canadian requests for rifles, machine-guns and artillery.<sup>16</sup>

In Washington, on 2 and 3 July, Moffat presented a pessimistic report on the Canadian defence situation. General Marshall believed that the United States was already so short of equipment that a better alternative to sending supplies to Canada might be to plan to send American forces there when the situation required it. Admiral Stark, who took a more positive view of Canadian-American staff talks, suggested that the Canadian officers might come to Washington, ostensibly to consult with the British Purchasing Mission, but actually to meet their American counterparts. Neither Marshall nor Stark felt that Canadian-American staff conversations could discuss matters of substance, since the United States Government had not yet made certain basic policy decisions on defence problems. There was, for instance, no policy on what the United States would do if the British Fleet moved to the North American coast. Mr. Morgenthau, the Secretary of the Treasury, suggested however that a knowledge of Canadian defence plans and capabilities would be helpful if war came to North America, and on 3 July President Roosevelt gave permission for informal staff talks, although he specified that they were to remain secret and that no commitments should be made.<sup>17</sup>

An American joint staff report, "Decisions Required If Military Assistance Is To Be Afforded To Canada In The Immediate Future", was apparently used as the basis for the United States' position in the ensuing conversations. It recommended that only 28,500 Lee-Enfield rifles, plus perhaps another 20,000 which had been earmarked for Eire, should be released to Canada. Ammunition for them would not become available until January 1941. All available American training personnel and facilities were required for the United States armed forces, but some 1200 Canadian servicemen could be accepted for "on-the-job" training with American units. The paper further recommended that American troops be sent to Canada and Newfoundland only if attack were imminent and that they be limited, in the case of Newfoundland, to one reinforced infantry division and one composite air group, and in the case of the Maritime Provinces, to one reinforced infantry division with supporting corps and army troops.<sup>18</sup>

On 11 July the Canadian visitors, Brigadier Kenneth Stuart, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Captain L. W. Murray, Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, and Air Commodore A. A. L. Cuffe, Air Member, Air Staff, held their first meeting with officers of the American services in Admiral Stark's house in Washington.\* In

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\*The secrecy cloaking this meeting is indicated by the fact that there is no mention of it in Colonel S. W. Dziuban's *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada*, which is based on a very thorough examination of United States records.

addition to Admiral Stark, the other American officers present were General Marshall; Brig.-Gen. G. V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, War Department; Commander Forrest P. Sherman U.S.N., an expert on naval aviation; and Captain Harry W. Hill, Director of Plans, U.S.N. At this preliminary meeting, after "an excellent dinner, which succeeded admirably in breaking down restraint"; two major topics were considered in a general way first; the extent to which the United States might be able to assist Canada by 'providing equipment and supplies, and secondly, the common action which might be taken in case the defence of Britain failed. The Canadian officers pointed out that they were far from pessimistic about Britain's chances of survival and that they considered the defence of the United Kingdom vitally important both to Canada and the United States. If this defence succeeded, the war could not be extended to North America other than by small raids against the eastern seaboard, This being the case, the Canadians requested that no material assistance the United States might offer to Canada be taken from stocks earmarked for the United Kingdom.<sup>19</sup>

During this first conversation, General Marshall and Admiral Stark showed themselves primarily interested in the facilities available in Eastern Canada and Newfoundland for United States sea, land and air bases. Both emphasized the need for keeping the talks secret and stressed that any public report of them would curb future contacts and cooperative efforts. There was even a possibility, Marshall suggested, that if the conversations became known the Administration might be forced to curtail some of its military appropriations. Nevertheless, the discussions were continued the next day in the Navy and War Departments.

On 12 July the Canadian officers were somewhat encouraged to find that the American attitude towards releasing equipment appeared to have improved overnight. In fact, however, the United States still had very little to offer. Brigadier Stuart was told that Canada could have 48,500 Lee-Enfield rifles and that after January 1941 the Canadian government could obtain 4000 Springfield rifles per month till April, when the quota could be increased to 12,000. A surplus production of 200 Thompson sub-machine guns per month might be available until April 1941. From February 1941 on, the U.S. Army could release five mobile four-gun batteries of 75-mm. anti-aircraft guns per month; but these would have no searchlights or sound locators, and only a limited supply of ammunition was available. Two hundred light field-guns could be made available by December, as well as 50 medium howitzers and 100 medium guns, although these categories could be supplied with very little ammunition. Twenty-nine 8-inch railway guns with 3000 rounds of ammunition per gun could be made available at once for coast defence purposes, on or off railway mounts. The U.S. Army also suggested that Canada might purchase at junk prices 500 light two-man tanks and 98 heavy tanks for training purposes.<sup>20</sup>

General Strong next put forward a list of 23 questions pertinent to common defence measures that might be taken in Eastern Canada and Newfoundland by U.S. and Canadian forces. The United States wished to know what Canada regarded as vital strategical areas, what forces would be necessary for the defence of those areas, and what part of the minimum requirements Canada could furnish. The Americans also inquired whether "in the event of combat operations" Canada would be prepared to set up an American sector or sectors in which command and responsibility in operations would be vested in a commander of the United States forces; and they asked whether, in the event of the U.S. Army operating in Newfoundland, Canada would be responsible for the administration of the civilian

population. In addition, there were a number of purely technical questions concerning the availability and capacity of airports, naval bases, defence material, fuel, railroad carrying capacities, labour and climatic conditions. Many of the questions were not answered until 5 August, when a detailed written reply was sent to Washington.<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, much of the Canadian reply was apparently given verbally on 12 July.

The Canadian officers argued that Germany and Italy were unlikely to attempt a major invasion of Canada's east coast without having first established an advanced air base or bases from which landings could be supported by shore-based aircraft. They believed that successive or simultaneous attempts to establish such bases in Iceland, Greenland, Newfoundland and the Maritime Provinces were possible. Attacks on Greenland and Newfoundland could not be interpreted in any other sense than as preliminaries to an attack on North America, but the Canadians considered that any major attack on Canada's east coast was unlikely before the summer of 1941. Therefore, equipment rather than troops was what was immediately required, and it was emphasized again that the United States' first line of defence lay in Britain. In the event of active operations, Canada was prepared to vest command in a U.S. officer "wherever applicable". The administration of Newfoundland was a matter for the Newfoundland government. The Canadians suggested that, if the United States entered the war, it might be desirable for it to "take over the entire defence of Newfoundland". As far as the defence of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Eastern Quebec was concerned, U.S. formations could best be employed as mobile reserves, kept concentrated in brigade groups, presumably within the United States. It was considered that a total American force of some three divisions, along with the available Canadian forces, would be adequate for the defence of these areas.<sup>22</sup>

During the naval conversations, United States officers expressed interest in the possibility of establishing bases in Newfoundland. Pistolet Bay, Lewisporte and St. John's were mentioned as possible sites, and the Americans felt that they might require a seaplane base on the south coast, probably between St. Pierre and Cape Race. The question of the command arrangements that would be necessary if part of the United States Navy came to be based on Canadian ports was raised, and Captain Murray informed his American counterparts that, in this eventuality, Canadian naval vessels would "in all probability" be placed under the command of the American Navy for operational purposes, although they would still be administered by the R.C.N.<sup>23</sup>

Because the United States did not then have a separate air force, the R.C.A.F. conversations took place in both the War and Navy Departments. American officers in both felt that Canada could not expect additional American aircraft in the near future, but suggested that Britain was not giving Canada a fair proportion of the aircraft made available to the Allies by the United States, an opinion which may have been partly based on their pessimistic view of Britain's chances of withstanding German attack. The Americans were interested in air bases in Greenland, and suggested that some aerial bomb production might be available for Canada after September. They also gave tentative estimates of the numbers and type of aircraft which might be sent to Canada in the event of a major threat, suggesting that about 120 army aircraft might be sent to Newfoundland and a similar force to the Maritime Provinces.<sup>24</sup>

From these conversations the United States obtained information of some military value, and the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff

was sufficiently interested to ask the Intelligence Division to prepare detailed information on Newfoundland and the Maritime Provinces.<sup>25</sup> The principal reason why more was not achieved was that, while Americans and Canadians were both discussing hypothetical cases, each was far more interested in the realities of its present position. At least until they received a definite policy directive, the American services had no intention of sacrificing their own expansion programme to supply arms to Canada, and it was just this type of material assistance in which the Canadian services, for their part, were most interested. The next action taken to bring the two countries closer came at the political level, between President Roosevelt and Mr. King.

In the meantime, the United Kingdom on 13 July informed Canada that the United States wished to obtain air facilities in certain West Indian colonies and in Newfoundland, and invited comment. Colonel Ralston, without troubling to consult the Chiefs of Staff (above, page 129), expressed the opinion, "From the point of view of defence, all these projects would seem to be advantageous". The Canadian government accordingly told the United Kingdom on 16 July that since "the proposed activities would be an effective contribution to North American defence", Canada considered it "highly desirable that the facilities in question should be afforded". On 3 August Ottawa was informed that Britain was offering the United States the facilities in the West Indies and Newfoundland "as proposed". A British message of 28 August gave the details of the offer of bases to the United States.<sup>26</sup> By that time, however, many other things had happened.

## 2. THE SUN OF OGDENSBURG

In this desperate summer Britain as well as the United States showed a new interest in Canada's possible role as a channel of communication and influence between the two great powers. Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador in Washington, twice suggested to Loring Christie, the Canadian Minister, that Mr. King should make some sort of public appeal on the question of American destroyers for Britain. Christie had replied that he was not convinced that such a move would be effective at that moment; and King agreed. When the minister reported Lothian's approaches, the Prime Minister scribbled a minute on the paper: "I would not think of doing so. It would help *undo* for the future any influence I may have. Such a step would be in the nature of 'coercion' — no wonder some diplomacies fail."<sup>27</sup>

The Canadian government was not satisfied with the state of its own relations with the United States. An air attaché had been appointed to the legation in Washington February. On 26 July, when General Crerar made his presentation to the Cabinet War Committee (above, page 131) he advised that naval and military attachés should also be appointed; and the Committee at once approved taking the matter up with the United States. The appointments were made later in the summer.<sup>28</sup> By mid-August, then, military liaison between the two countries had considerably improved, but there was still no established machinery for continuous consultation on defence matters at a high level. Public opinion in both countries had been deeply disturbed by the collapse of France; in the United States the anxiety was dramatically reflected in the introduction in Congress in June of the Selective Service — draft — bill, which was passed in September.<sup>29</sup> Suddenly there was widespread concern for the security of North America. On 9 July Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter, a personal friend of President Roosevelt's,

suggested to Loring Christie that it would be desirable for Mr. King to come to see the President at Hyde Park to discuss a common plan of defence.<sup>30</sup> And on 14 August Moffat, the United States Minister, reported in a private and "strictly confidential" letter to Sumner Welles, the Under-Secretary of State in Washington, what he called a growing "public demand" in Canada for "some form of joint defence understanding with the United States". "Even elements which in the past have been least well disposed toward us", he wrote, "such as the Toronto public and the English-speaking sections of Montreal, are now outspoken in its favor. . . . The old fear that cooperation with the United States would tend to weaken Canada's ties with Great Britain has almost entirely disappeared. Instead, Canada believes that such cooperation would tend to bring Britain and the United States closer together, rather than to force Britain and Canada apart." Welles passed this letter to the President on the 16th.<sup>31</sup>

At this moment King was also in touch with Roosevelt through Christie. On 10 August the latter had reported to Ottawa an unconfirmed story that "the President was somewhat disappointed" that no Canadian response to the project for transferring destroyers to Britain, now under active discussion, had been received. On the 12th King telegraphed Christie that he could not understand this, as he had always urged providing the destroyers; but he was glad to send a message to the President through Christie, whom he asked to emphasize the "great and decisive importance" of destroyers in the coming struggle in European waters. Although Canada regarded the English Channel as the democracies' first line of defence, Christie was to add that the Canadian government hoped that "if and when discussions for transfer of such destroyers were undertaken there would be an opportunity for discussing the most effective means of strengthening naval defences on our side of the North Atlantic".<sup>32</sup> Thus two aspects of defence were raised together.

On 15 August, accordingly, Christie had a short private interview with President Roosevelt. The President "indicated that he intended to act favourably" on the destroyer question in the near future. On the other matter, the direct defence of North America, he said that he had been thinking of proposing to Mr. King to send three United States staff officers to Ottawa for discussions with three Canadian officers; they might survey the situation on the east coast of Canada from the point of view of "base facilities for United States use". Roosevelt would contemplate making anti-aircraft and other guns available, and in certain eventualities would dispatch destroyers. He intimated that he might make definite suggestions along these lines to King "as soon as the beginning of next week", probably through the U.S. Legation in Ottawa. At the end of the interview he said he would probably be speaking to the Prime Minister by telephone, but Christie got the impression that this would not be until the following week.\* There was no suggestion of a personal meeting.<sup>35</sup>

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\*Colonel Dziuban, on the basis of the opinion of Sumner Welles, believes that at this point King suggested a personal meeting to Roosevelt (*Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945*, page 21). There is nothing in the King Papers or any other Canadian record to support this. The interview between Christie and the President, in which Welles thought the suggestion was made, took place on 15 August, not the 14th as believed by Welles, with no third party present. Neither King's instructions to Christie which led to the interview, nor Christie's two reports on the interview,<sup>33</sup> contain any reference whatever to a suggestion of a personal meeting. And contrary to the impression given in Langer and Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation*, page 704, neither Moffat's letter to Welles written on 14 August nor the covering letter from Welles to the President (above) makes any such suggestion. It was evidently Mr. Roosevelt's own idea. On 16 August, after the President's press conference, Christie wrote to Skelton that he had discovered that "early this morning" Roosevelt had told Lord Lothian that "he hoped to see Mr. King over the week-end or in the next few days."<sup>34</sup>

On the 16th, it would seem, the President received Moffat's letter written to the State Department two days before; and this appears to have triggered one of those impulsive acts for which Roosevelt was noted. At noon he held a press conference in which he announced that the United States was holding conversations with Britain concerning the acquisition of naval and air bases "for the defence of the Western Hemisphere, and especially of the Panama Canal", though he said that destroyers were not being discussed; and as a separate matter, he said, the U.S. government was also carrying on conversations with Canada on Western Hemisphere defence.<sup>36</sup> This might have seemed a little premature; but "shortly before two o'clock" Mr. Roosevelt telephoned Mr. King, told him what he had said at the press conference, and invited him to meet him the following evening at Ogdensburg, New York, on the St. Lawrence, where the President would be inspecting troops. The Prime Minister accepted with alacrity.<sup>37</sup>

There is no record of King having taken any steps to consult either his political colleagues or the Chiefs of Staff in advance of the meeting with Mr. Roosevelt. However, the Minister of National Defence, Colonel Ralston, having learned of the proposed meeting from the morning papers of 17 August, hastened to write a note to King asking for an opportunity for a word with him before he left for Ogdensburg; and at the interview he handed the Prime Minister a list of military equipment particularly required from the United States. Mr. King went to Ogdensburg alone, except that — at the President's suggestion — he took Mr. Moffat with him in his motor car. They reached the presidential train at Ogdensburg at seven p.m.<sup>38</sup>

They found the President "tired but exhilarated".<sup>39</sup> He had spent the day in the beautiful St. Lawrence countryside visiting some seven divisions of regular and National Guard troops, the vanguard of the forces which the great republic was beginning to organize to meet the menace of the uncertain future. With him was the new Secretary of War, Colonel Henry L. Stimson. After a period of cheerful general conversation Roosevelt, King and Stimson dined privately together, the President demolishing "a huge steak"; and the three statesmen remained in conference until after eleven o'clock in the President's "little sitting-room at the end of the car", in what Stimson called "one of the most momentous talks which I have ever participated in".<sup>40</sup>

The President began the discussion by describing the negotiations with Britain on the exchange of destroyers for bases, indicating that Mr. Churchill had now accepted his programme virtually in full (Roosevelt evidently considered Churchill's statement in a telegram of 15 August, "We intend to fight this out here to the end, and none of us would ever buy peace by surrendering or scuttling Fleet",<sup>41</sup> a sufficient assurance on this point). On the President's further remarks the Stimson's record should be quoted:

When he came to the Canadian matter, he pointed out that of course Canada being a Dominion, the negotiations must be with Canada, and that was the purpose of the meeting that night. He suggested that there should be a Joint Board composed of representatives of the Army and Navy and Air Force in Canada, together with one lay member, and a similar group from the United States. The function of this Committee should be to discuss plans for the defense of the Northern Half of the Western Hemisphere, but particularly in regard to an attack from the Northeast and he pointed out how vitally important it was that there should be conferences, discussions and plans made between the Services of the respective countries in case there should be an attack by way of the St. Lawrence, or the Northeastern coast of Canada, where sudden attack was very likely. He pointed out that he wanted to have a naval and air base somewhere in that region. He mentioned specifically some place

like Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, or some place further along to the Eastward on the Nova Scotia Coast.

Mackenzie King was perfectly delighted with the whole thing. He said, almost with tears in his eyes that the President's courage and initiative in bringing this out would be a most tremendous encouragement to the morale of Great Britain and Canada. He said he would at once agree to the creation of such a Board and that it should be done immediately. He again and again referred to the gratification which the British and he and Canada would feel on this subject.

It thus appears that it was President Roosevelt who suggested the creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. King's personal record is less definite than usual at this point, but there is nothing in it to contradict Stimson's.<sup>42</sup>

It would seem also that in the President's mind the acquisition of bases in Canada was important, and that the negotiation with King was in this respect simply a continuation of that with Churchill. He may have assumed that they could be leased in the same way as those being acquired from Britain, but King made it clear that this could not be done. "During the evening", he wrote in his diary, "I . . . explained that we would not wish to sell or lease any sites in Canada but would be ready to work out matters of facilities." The Prime Minister was also at some pains to emphasize Canada's interest in any arrangement concerning Newfoundland.<sup>43</sup>

King spent the night on Roosevelt's train, and the following morning, the 18<sup>th</sup> (Sunday), attended a military church service with the President and the Secretary of War. On their return to the train, the Prime Minister handed Roosevelt the list of military equipment that Colonel Ralston had given him, with some additions made by Mr. Macdonald, the Naval Minister; the President and Stimson received it sympathetically, but "each remarked that they would have a great deal of difficulty".<sup>44</sup> While King and Stimson looked at the list, the President drafted a statement for the press. This was discussed and some verbal changes made (on King's suggestion, the word "Board" was substituted for "Joint Commission", Roosevelt's first idea, in the title of the new body);<sup>45</sup> and the President and the Prime Minister then issued to the waiting reporters the statement that has come to be called the Ogdensburg Declaration:

The Prime Minister and the President have discussed the mutual problems of defence in relation to the safety of Canada and the United States.

It has been agreed that a Permanent Joint Board on Defence shall be set up at once by the two countries.

This Permanent Joint Board on Defence shall commence immediate studies relating to sea, land and air problems including personnel and material.

It will consider in the broad sense the defence of the north half of the Western Hemisphere.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defence will consist of four or five members from each country, most of them from the services. It will meet shortly.

The Ogdensburg meeting was a landmark. It signaled the fact that the United States was moving closer to the war and to the hard-pressed Commonwealth. It marked for better or for worse, as we can now see, the beginning of a new era in Canadian-American relations. Colonel Stimson perceived that the occasion was historic; for he wrote in his diary:

At the close of the evening's talk I said I had been reminded, during our conversation, of the words of Benjamin Franklin at the close of the Constitutional Convention. Franklin had sat quiet through the latter part of the Convention — looked with his eyes fixed upon a carved image of the rising sun, which was fixed in the chair of the Presiding Officer of the Convention — George Washington. Franklin said: "I have been for a long time watching

that sun and wondering whether it was the image of a rising or a setting sun. Now, however, that the Constitution has been formulated and agreed to, I have come to the conclusion that it is the image of a rising sun." I said I felt that way about this meeting. I felt that it was very possibly the turning point in the tide of the war, and that from now on we could hope for better things.

Coming at the precise moment when it did, the announcement of the Canadian-American arrangements may be called a masterpiece of political timing; and it met with virtually unanimous approval in the countries most directly concerned.\* The Canadian Department of External Affairs, surveying the reactions of the press, reported that examination of 54 editorial articles in 37 Canadian newspapers and magazines revealed no opposition to the agreement; nor was any hostility found in 48 editorial articles in 38 newspapers and magazines in the United Kingdom. In the United States, a survey of 46 editorial articles in 33 newspapers similarly adduced no opposition, but it was reported, "Some editors have criticized the form of the Agreement and certain isolationist papers have warned against its implications, but none have questioned its desirability from the point of view of hemisphere defence."<sup>49</sup> To this almost unanimous chorus of praise, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs in Ottawa, Dr. O. D. Skelton, added his own note. He wrote to the Prime Minister on 19 August, "It was certainly the best day's work done for many a year. It did not come by chance, but as the inevitable sequence of public policies and personal relationships, based upon the realization of the imperative necessity of close understanding between the English-speaking peoples."<sup>50</sup>

One distinguished statesman, however, did not share this satisfaction. Mr. King's first act on returning to Ottawa from Ogdensburg, after making his formal report to the Governor General, was to draft a long cable informing the Prime Minister of Great Britain of what had taken place.<sup>51</sup> He had not communicated with Mr. Churchill before going to see the President, and indeed, as we have seen, he had little contact even with his own colleagues and certainly did not consult them formally. He now described the meeting in some detail, writing, "I have President's authority to let you know he hopes to be able to arrange, before present week is out, to begin supplying you with destroyers and to let you have fifty in all." After referring to other equipment which Roosevelt hoped to be able to provide, King proceeded:

11. The President will take up direct with your Government matters pertaining to bases in colonies including matters pertaining to Newfoundland. As you are aware, Canadian government is already assisting in defence of Newfoundland and is, at the moment, contemplating additional large expenditure for developments there. There will probably be necessity for co-operation between the three governments in matters pertaining to that island.

Having quoted the press release concerning the Permanent Joint Board, King went on to emphasize the fact that he had stressed to the President "the significance of the conflict in the United Kingdom area as constituting the first line of defence of this continent". He reported the President as quite satisfied with what King called

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\*Shortly, however, the Conservative opposition in Canada attempted to belittle the Ogdensburg arrangement. Senator Meighen, predictably enough, boiled over privately at once: "this world-shaking achievement . . . this disgusting publicity. . ."<sup>46</sup> On 2 September the acting leader of the party, R. B. Hanson, under Meighen's influence took a similar line publicly at the Canadian National Exhibition in Toronto: the British forces were still Canada's first line of defence; Roosevelt had engineered the affair to win votes; and the Joint Board was nothing new, for there had been military conversations with the United States under the Bennett regime<sup>47</sup> (above, page 96). On 24 September C. H. Cahan, in a letter published in the *Montreal Gazette*, accused the government of writing off Great Britain.<sup>48</sup>

"the statement you propose making, similar to the one in June last, which will afford the assurance he felt so greatly in need of in considering the defence of this hemisphere and the lengths public opinion might be counted upon to let him go in parting with material, etc. which might otherwise have had to be retained". The reference was of course to the question of the British-Fleet, though King tactfully refrained from using the words.

Churchill clearly felt no enthusiasm whatever concerning what had happened at Ogdensburg. He did not reply to King until 22 August, and when he did so, he sent a copy of a secret and personal cable to Roosevelt, dispatched that day, which contained the remark, "I had not contemplated anything in the nature of a contract, bargain or sale between us". It is probable that the implied reference to the Fleet had nettled him, for he wrote to King,<sup>52</sup>

It would be better to do without the destroyers sorely as we need them than to get drawn into a haggling match between the experts as to what we ought to give in return for munitions. Immediately people would say how much are they worth in money and is not advantage being taken of our being hard-pressed. Any discussion of this kind would be injurious to the great movement of events. Each should give all he can without any invidious comparison. I am deeply interested in the arrangements you are making for Canada and America's mutual defence. Here again there may be two opinions on some of the points mentioned. Supposing Mr. Hitler cannot invade us and his Air Force begins to blench under the strain all these transactions will be judged in a mood different to that prevailing while the issue still hangs in the balance.

King, not without reason, had considered the Ogdensburg result a triumph. He was now in the sad position of the cat who has killed a songbird and presents it to his mistress, fully expecting praise, and is bitterly surprised when instead he finds himself severely scolded. That the episode put him out of countenance is indicated by the series of replies to Churchill which he drafted but did not send.<sup>53</sup> He reported to the Cabinet War Committee on 27 August that he was in strong disagreement with Churchill's observations: his whole purpose in the negotiations with the United States had been to draw that country into closer relationship with Canada and the United Kingdom, not only for any immediate gain but for the more permanent advantage which would result for all concerned. The Committee agreed that a reply should be sent to Churchill to this effect. Yet still no cable went. Then, on 11 September, came the magnificent broadcast in which Churchill frankly announced to the British people the German preparations for invasion, and told them that the next week or so would rank "with the days when the Spanish Armada was approaching the Channel, and Drake was finishing his game of bowls; or when Nelson stood between us and Napoleon's Grand Army at Boulogne". It stirred unnumbered hearts, and one of them was Mackenzie King's. Forgetting his pique and embarrassment, he sat down and sent Churchill a message expressing Canada's deep pride in standing beside Britain in that desperate hour. The defenders of, the citadel, he wrote, "may. count on our continuing support to the utmost of our strength. Never were our people more united or more determined."

Churchill's answer was very different from his Ogdensburg telegram, and much better. "I am very glad to have this opportunity of thanking you personally for all you have done for the common cause and especially in promoting a harmony of sentiment throughout the New World. This deep understanding will be a dominant factor in the rescue of Europe from a relapse into the Dark Ages." It raised King from the depths to the heights. Characteristically, he concluded that "the hand of Providence" had restrained him from sending a reply to the earlier telegram. Characteristically too, he confided to his diary that he now had all he would

ever need "in the way of an answer to any attempts at detraction on the part of the Tories".<sup>54</sup>

In commenting on the Ogdensburg arrangement, it may be remarked in the first place that it was entirely political, in that it was arranged by the statesmen; the professional heads of the fighting services had nothing to do with it. In Canada, the services had of course been urging the establishment of closer military relations with the United States for some time past (above, page 75); but in the United States there is no evidence of any parallel demand from the Army or Navy. They seem to have considered, probably rightly, that any immediate menace to the Americas from Germany was most likely to take the form of penetration in South America; and they were more interested in the eastern "bulge" of Brazil than in Newfoundland and the St. Lawrence. Shortly before the outbreak of war in Europe, General Marshall, who was about to take office as Chief of Staff of the United States Army, had made a ceremonial visit to Brazil which marked the American services' interest in that area.<sup>55</sup> They had shown no such interest in Canada. In 1938, it may be remembered, the first contact between the Canadian and American service chiefs had been arranged on political initiative and had taken the American soldiers and sailors by surprise (above, page 97). They were perhaps hardly less surprised by Ogdensburg and the creation of the Permanent Joint Board. "The War and Navy Departments were not consulted as to their views on the need for such a board or on its composition and terms of reference, and were not even aware of the President's intention to set up a board."<sup>56</sup>

A second point which may be made is the extreme informality of the proceedings at Ogdensburg. No treaty, no agreement of any sort, was signed; the celebrated press release remained the authority for the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. Canada published it in her Treaty Series and incorporated it in an order-in-council ratifying and confirming the Prime Minister's action at Ogdensburg.<sup>57</sup> The United States regarded the arrangement as an executive agreement not subject to ratification by the Senate, and it was never submitted to that body.

Thirdly, it should be noted that the new Board was not, and never became, an executive body. In describing the Ogdensburg arrangements to the Cabinet War Committee on 20 August, Mr. King said that the duty of the Board would be to study and to recommend. Any action which might result would be a matter for decision by the two governments.

Finally, the process by which the actual composition of the Board was settled remains slightly obscure. The press release made only a general statement on this. King reported to the War Committee on 20 August that he and the president had agreed that the Board might be composed, in each section, of one officer from each of the three armed forces, plus a representative from the State Department and the Department of External Affairs respectively, who might be joint secretaries. Nevertheless, it had apparently already been settled that an eminent civilian would in addition be chairman of each section, for King had told Moffat during their drive back from Ogdensburg that James V. Forrestal would probably lead the American section at the first meeting.<sup>58</sup> In the form which was already fixed when that meeting took place (in Ottawa on 26 August), each section of the Board had a civilian chairman and a civilian secretary, the other members being from the services. In the first instance, the American section of the Board had one more member than the Canadian section, for the reason that as a result of American military organization the U.S. section had officers representing both the Army Air

Force and naval aviation. The disparity was rectified in October 1940 by the appointment of an additional Canadian officer to the Board.

The organization in two national sections, each with its own chairman, is an obvious parallel to that of the highly successful International Joint Commission organized as a result of the Canadian-American Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. It is likely that President Roosevelt had this useful precedent in mind, for, as we have noted, he proposed at first to call the new body a Joint Commission rather than a Joint Board.

### 3. THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE AT WORK

As Chairman of the Canadian Section of the new Defence Board the government appointed Colonel O. M. Biggar, an eminent Ottawa patent lawyer. His military rank recalled his service as Judge Advocate General in the First World War, but he had no recent military experience and his appointment was well understood to be a civilian one. The Board set to work with a speed which reflected the needs and tensions of the moment. As just noted, it held its first meeting on 26 August 1940, in Ottawa. The initial composition of the Canadian Section was as follows:

Colonel O. M. Biggar, K.C. (Chairman)  
Brigadier Kenneth Stuart, Deputy Chief of the General Staff  
Captain L. W. Murray, R.C.N., Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff  
Air Commodore A. A. L. Cuffe, Air Member, Air Staff  
Mr. H. L. Keenleyside, Department of External Affairs (Secretary).

Subsequently as we have said, another officer (Lt.-Col. G. P. Vanier) was added to the Section.

The suggestion that Mr. Forrestal might become Chairman of the United States Section was not realized. That Section was at first composed of the following members:

The Hon. Fiorello H. LaGuardia (Mayor of New York City) (Chairman)  
Major-General S. D. Embick  
Lt.-Col. J. T. McNarney  
Captain H. W. Hill, U.S.N.  
Commander Forrest P. Sherman, U.S.N.  
Mr. J. D. Hickerson, Department of State (Secretary).

Membership in the Canadian Section of the Board was not a full-time occupation. The service members held other appointments. One example may be cited. When the original Canadian Army member, Brigadier Stuart, left the Board in the spring of 1941, he was replaced by Brigadier M. A. Pope, who was then Assistant Chief of the General Staff. In due course, Brigadier Pope was promoted Major General and appointed Vice Chief of the General Staff. In March 1942 he went to Washington as representative of the Cabinet War Committee, and he remained there as Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff when it was formed. Still later he returned to Ottawa as Military Staff Officer to the Prime Minister and Military Secretary of the War Committee. But he remained Canadian Army representative on the Permanent Joint Board throughout. In the U.S. Section, on the other hand, in some but not all cases the Board appointments of the service members seem to have been their only responsibilities.<sup>59</sup>

Meetings of the Board were normally held in Canada and the United States alternately, the most frequent meeting-places being Montreal and New York. How-

ever, it often met in areas of, military significance with which it was concerned. Thus, on 13, 14 and 15 November 1940 it met successively in San Francisco, Victoria and Vancouver; on 27 September 1942 it met in St. John's, Newfoundland; and in July 1943 sessions of the 40th meeting were held on board the S.S. *Princess Norah* en route to Alaska, and on an aircraft between Winnipeg and Ottawa.\*

Much of the Board's business was concerned with Newfoundland. That colony was not represented on the Board, but its voice was heard there. On various occasions representatives of the Newfoundland Commission of Government were present; notably, at the eighth meeting of the Board, held in Halifax on 4 October 1940, Mr. L. E. Emerson, Commissioner of Justice and Defence, and Mr. J. H. Penson, Commissioner of Finance, sat with the Board. The same two Commissioners attended the 18th meeting of the Board, held at Montreal on 17 April 1941.

At the Board's first meeting, its journal records, "Mayor LaGuardia suggested that Mr. Biggar should act as Chairman. The latter proposed that Mayor LaGuardia should join him in a joint chairmanship and this was accepted." This system was followed thereafter, and although it has been stated that the Canadian Chairman presided in Canada and the U.S. Chairman in the United States, this is apparently an error. The Board's journal never mentions an individual chairman, and the record of the 18th meeting notes that the Newfoundland representatives "were welcomed by the Chairmen" and again that a member made a presentation "at the request of the Chairmen".

Mr. King reported to the Cabinet War Committee on 27 August 1940 that the two Sections of the Board would not make joint reports, but each would report to its own government. Nevertheless, the basic procedure which came to be followed was for the Board as a whole to present formal Recommendations, to the two governments through the two Sections. Thirty-three such Recommendations were presented in the course of the war. These Recommendations have been published.† There is therefore no point in printing them at length here, but it may be worthwhile to summarize them as an indication of the nature of the Board's work:

## RECOMMENDATIONS

1. 26 August 1940  
Complete exchange of military information between the two Sections of the Board, each being free to convey such information to its government.
2. 26 August 1940  
Strengthening defences of Newfoundland, measures to include increasing Canadian garrisons and preparing bases for U.S. aircraft; also installation of port defences.
3. 27 August 1940  
Strengthening the Maritime Provinces, including defences at Halifax, Sydney, Gaspé and Shelburne; improvement of aircraft-operating facilities; and preparation in Canada and U.S. of strategic reserves for concentration in the Maritimes if required.

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\*Two Canadian accounts of the work of the Board have been published in *International Journal* (Toronto): C. P. Stacey, "The Canadian-American Permanent Joint Board on Defence" (Spring, 1954), and H. L. Keenleyside, "The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, 1940-45" (Winter, 1960-61). The former article, which is freely drawn upon in these pages, is based on an examination of Canadian official records; the latter, on Mr. Keenleyside's personal knowledge as Secretary of the Canadian Section of the Board (and Acting Chairman during Colonel Biggar's illness in 1944-45). Complete lists of the members of both Sections and of the dates and places of meetings are to be found in Colonel Stanley W. Dziuban, *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada, 1939-1945* (Washington, 1959), Tables 1 and 2.

†They form Appendix A to Colonel Dziuban's *Military Relations Between the United States and Canada*.

4. 27 August 1940  
Arrangements concerning allocation of weapons and equipment mentioned in the Board's Recommendations; such material when provided to implement Board recommendations not to be used for any other purposes.
5. 27 August 1940  
Communications between Newfoundland, Maritime Provinces and other portions of Eastern Canada and the U.S. require to be examined (railways, water, roads, and air); additional commercial airways essential.
6. 27 August 1940  
The service members of the Board to collect and exchange information on production of military equipment in their respective countries.
7. 27 August 1940  
The service members of the Board to proceed at once with preparation of a detailed plan for the joint defence of Canada and the United States and keep the Board informed of the progress of the work.
8. 11 September 1940  
That U.S. initiate as expeditiously as practicable such portions of increased defence of Newfoundland (2nd Recommendation) as fall within limits of bases now being acquired by U.S.
9. 4 October 1940  
That Canada recommend that German prisoners from the U.K. be not sent to Newfoundland for confinement, as this might constitute a military hazard.
10. 14 November 1940  
That to implement recommendation in the Board's First Report, suitable landing fields be provided on route across Canada between the U.S. and Alaska.
11. 15 November 1940  
That an aerodrome be constructed at Ucluelet (Vancouver Island).
12. 17 December 1940  
That a war industry member be appointed to the Board by each of the two governments.\*
13. 20 January 1941  
That each government constitute a single authority, clothed with necessary powers, to be responsible for safety of navigation through the Sault Ste. Marie Canals and St. Mary's River, and to cooperate in this matter as required.
14. 21 January 1941  
That most urgent priority be given provision of facilities for at least one U.S. squadron of patrol planes at Halifax and one U.S. squadron in Botwood area (Newfoundland).
15. 16 April 1941  
That Canada provide increased aviation fuel storage capacity in Newfoundland; U.S. to assist with priorities.
16. 17 April 1941  
Arrangements for improvement of railway communications in Newfoundland.
17. 29 July 1941  
That Canada construct an air base in the vicinity of North West River, Labrador, providing specified facilities as quickly as possible (Goose Bay).
18. 29 July 1941  
That U.S. proceed with installation of underwater defences in the Argientia-Ship Harbour area (Newfoundland).
19. 29 July 1941  
In view of Far Eastern situation, completion of both Canadian and U.S. sections of the airway to Alaska now of extreme importance.
20. 30 July 1941  
Road communications in Newfoundland — U.S. and Canada to be given right to construct and maintain such roads as each individually requires.
21. 10-11 November 1941  
Principles applying to maintenance, upkeep and servicing of facilities provided by the government of either country for occupation of the forces of the other.

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\*Approved, but not implemented, as the object was considered to have been attained through other organizations.

22. 20 December 1941  
That U.S. and Canada now authorize commanders named in Joint Defence Plan ABC-22 to effect by mutual agreement arrangements necessary for common defence.
23. 20 December 1941  
That Canada and U.S. consider advisability of arranging a meeting of representatives of U.K., Canada and U.S. to make recommendations for coordinating the entire aviation training programmes to be conducted in Canada and U.S.
24. 25-26 February 1942  
That a highway to Alaska be constructed following the general line of the existing airway.
25. 25-26 February 1942  
R.C.A.F. to make further study of danger of air attack on Sault Ste. Marie area; Canadian Army to assign a heavy anti-aircraft battery to this area, to Serve under operational command of Commanding General, Sault Ste. Marie Military District, Michigan.
26. 9 June 1942  
That airfields in Canadian territory be constructed to improve ferrying facilities across the North Atlantic (North-East Staging Route).
27. 6 July 1942  
That Canada and U.S. eliminate or suspend, for duration of the war, customs formalities, etc., interfering with the free flow between the two countries of munitions and war supplies and of persons or materials connected therewith.
28. 13 January 1943  
Principles governing post-war disposition of defence projects and installations built by U.S. in Canada.
29. 24-25 February 1943  
Arrangements for expeditious completion of the airway from U.S. to Alaska.
30. 1-2 April 1943  
That U.S. and Canada appoint a joint board of officers to report on proposal to utilize non-rigid airships in anti-submarine activities in Eastern Canadian waters and selection of base sites.
31. 6-7 May 1943  
Principles governing defence, maintenance and control of airfields on Canadian territory (U.S. normally to be responsible where airfield is used principally or exclusively by U.S. forces; Canada to be responsible in all other cases unless some special arrangement has been made).
32. 24-25 August 1943  
Application of 3 1st Recommendation (airfields for which each country responsible listed).
33. 6-7 September 1944  
Disposition of defence facilities constructed or provided in Canada by U.S. or in U.S. by Canada.

The formal Recommendations are of course far from being the whole record of the Board's work. It is apparent from the records that a great deal of informal discussion took place which was not reflected in these Recommendations; and in fact a good many informal suggestions and recommendations went from the Board to one government or both governments as the result of discussions either in meetings of the Board or between individual members of it.

All the thirty-three formal Recommendations were unanimously approved by the Board. The members did not reach decisions by voting — this would have been impracticable in an international body — but by discussion which proceeded until a basis was found on which unanimity could be achieved. The Recommendations then went forward to the two governments for approval. The procedure for approving them differed in the two countries. Mayor LaGuardia reported direct to the President, with whom the power of approval lay. It is clear, however, that Recommendations were not invariably submitted to the President.

The

United

States government evidently considered it sufficient in practice that the War and Navy Departments should approve them. Thus the Secretary of the United States Section wrote to the Canadian Secretary on 28 September 1943: "The United States Government has . . . approved the Board's 32nd Recommendation. The War Department's approval was communicated to me in a memorandum dated September 9th. The Navy Department's approval was contained in a letter dated September 24th."<sup>60</sup> Reflecting the fact that the Board's operations were more important to Canada than to the United States, Canadian procedure tended to be more formal. The Canadian Section was responsible to the Prime Minister; and the Board's Recommendations were in practice considered and dealt with by the Cabinet War Committee, over which the Prime Minister presided. The Committee normally sought the comments of the Chiefs of Staff before taking action on Recommendations.

Virtually all the thirty-three Recommendations received the approval of the two governments. The Canadian Government did not actually approve the 29<sup>th</sup> Recommendation, a detailed scheme for completing the North-West Staging Route. On 3 March 1943 the War Committee deferred action on it owing to doubts concerning supply of materials, etc. Plan "A" for the task, which was included in the Recommendation, was shortly superseded by new U.S. proposals known as Plans "B" and "C", which the Committee accepted; thus, though the Recommendation was not formally agreed to, the work was done. The War Committee also refrained from approving the 30<sup>th</sup> Recommendation in the form submitted, but informed the Board that it did not object to the appointment of such a board of officers (to report on the use of non-rigid airships) as the Recommendation had suggested. Occasionally there were reservations as to the mode of execution of a Recommendation. Thus, with respect to the 26<sup>th</sup>, concerning the chain of airfields known as the North-East Staging Route or "Crimson Project", the R.C.A.F. and the Canadian government had doubts as to the practicability and value of the tremendous project; it was nevertheless approved, but the government decided that the cost would mainly have to be borne by the United States. The scheme was in fact never carried to completion (below, pages 374-7).

In addition to its thirty-three formal Recommendations, the Board also submitted to the two governments, on 4 October 1940, a "First Report"<sup>61</sup> (which was also the last report, as this procedure was not followed afterwards). This contained detailed recommendations for improvement of defences on both the Atlantic and the Pacific. It was approved by the Cabinet War Committee on 10 October 1940, subject to one reservation as to desirability of a highway which had been recommended between Terrace and Prince Rupert, B.C. The President of the United States approved the report on 19 November 1940.

Not all the Board's Recommendations originated within itself. The 31<sup>st</sup>, for example, had its origin in a decision made by the Canadian Cabinet War Committee on 24 February 1943. After discussion in the Board, and amendment to meet American views, it emerged as a Board Recommendation. Thus the Board served as a convenient channel through which one government could make its views known to the other, and mutually satisfactory arrangements could be worked out.

We have seen that at Ogdensburg Mr. King made it clear to President Roosevelt that, although Canada was prepared to give "facilities" to the United States, it was not prepared to sell or lease land. The members of the United States Section may well have been told about this when they met the President before the first meeting of the Board. It would seem that no attempt was ever made through the

Board to obtain a cession of sites in Canada. At the Board's fourth meeting, on 10 September 1940, Mayor LaGuardia offered to make a public refutation of press reports that the U.S. was seeking bases in Canada. He did so next day in characteristic terms ("This is a Defense Board, not a real estate board").<sup>62</sup> The Board's First Report made no reference to the acquisition of bases in Canada, but did recommend that Canada should expand "facilities" to provide for the operation of U.S. aircraft.

The Board was most important during the period of United States neutrality. After the U.S. entered the war in December 1941, military liaison between the two countries' Chiefs of Staff tended to become more important and the functions of the Board somewhat less so. It met repeatedly during 1942, but thereafter meetings became less frequent and Recommendations less frequent still. As noted above, there was only one formal Recommendation after 1943.

There were occasions when, for one reason or another, the Board was bypassed. The United States authorities in particular, not excluding the President, sometimes ignored the body which the President had invented. Thus, for example, on 9 April 1941 the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa discussed a communication from the United Kingdom High Commissioner stating that the British Prime Minister had heard from Mr. Roosevelt that he was concerned at the possibility of surface raids against Newfoundland and was sending certain artillery and air units thither. It was remarked in the Committee that, although the defence of Newfoundland had been a primary interest of the Permanent Joint Board, the Board had been quite unaware of the President's proposals. Here not only the Board but Canada was being by-passed. It seems likely that the President's action was deliberate, stemming from a combination of alarm over German naval activity in the Atlantic and dissatisfaction with Canada's apparent slowness in providing facilities which she had promised to prepare for U.S. air units at Gander<sup>63</sup> (below, page 361).

There was a somewhat similar episode concerning the Alaska Highway. As we have seen, the Board advised the construction of the highway by its 24<sup>th</sup> Recommendation dated 26 February 1942. The fact is, however, that all the essential decisions had been made before the matter was referred to the Board at all. The Cabinet War Committee was informed on 12 February that informal advice had been received that the United States would shortly make a request for permission to have U.S. Army engineers begin a survey for the highway. The United States Minister was reported to have said that the President and the Secretaries of War and of the Navy had come to the conclusion that the highway was needed. The Committee agreed that there was no objection to the survey. The War Committee approved the 24th Recommendation on 5 March. President Roosevelt had in fact considered the matter as almost a *fait accompli*, and had allocated \$10 million for the project from his emergency fund on 11 February.<sup>64</sup> His direction that arrangements be made with Canada through the Permanent Joint Board evidently assumed Canadian concurrence.

Some important international projects were not considered by the Board at all. For instance, it never made a recommendation on the Canol project in the Northwest Territories. General Pope has said that Mr. Hickerson, the Secretary of the United States Section of the Board, "once told us that he thought the Canol project to be such a fool idea that he did not have the heart to route it through the Board, which he held in such warm regard".<sup>65</sup>

*The Joint Defence Plans and the Problem of "Strategic Direction"*

As a result of the Permanent Joint Board's 7th Recommendation (above, page 345) the service members of the Board prepared during the war two Basic Defence Plans.

The first of these was the "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan — 1940", usually called "Basic Plan No. 1".<sup>66</sup> This, dated 10 October 1940, was designed to meet the urgent needs of that moment: in particular, the situation that would arise "if Great Britain is overrun by the Axis Powers or if the British Navy ceases to control the North Atlantic". The Plan also took account of "aggression by an Asiatic Power", obviously Japan. It allocated tasks and responsibilities as between the forces of the two countries in these contingencies. The Plan itself merely stated briefly the tasks that required to be performed without specifying how these tasks were to be carried out. The question of higher direction of the possible operations was not specifically dealt with until the spring of 1941. The service members of the Board then drafted a "Joint Operational Plan. No. 1" intended to implement Basic Plan No. 1. The Canadian service members accepted on 15 April a version of this Plan known as the "Montreal Revise", which vested the "strategic direction" of the two countries' land and air forces in the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, subject to prior consultation with the Canadian Chief of Staff concerned. "Strategic direction" was succinctly defined as "the assignment of missions and the allocation of the means required to accomplish them".<sup>67</sup>

The matter was very seriously complicated by the fact that the service members were simultaneously working on a second Basic Defence Plan intended to meet the changing aspect which the war then presented. This was known as "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan No. 2" and was usually called "ABC-22". Staff conversations between the United Kingdom and the United States, to which Canada was not a party (above, page 159), had now resulted in a plan known as "ABC-1", meant to provide a basis for action in the event of the United States entering the war. The new Canadian-US. plan was ancillary to ABC-1; it was thus designed to meet a situation in which the United States and the Commonwealth would be partners in a war whose object was to defeat the Axis, and not merely to prevent the Axis from conquering North America. The provisions of ABC-22 concerning command led to the most serious difference of opinion between the two national Sections of the Board that took place during the war; but the difficulty was due in part to simple misunderstanding, to which mismanagement on the Canadian side made a contribution.

The American view, naturally enough, was that Canada should, as part of the new plan, concede the strategic direction of her forces to the United States in the same manner as the service members had agreed should apply to Plan No. 1. As put forward by the U.S. service members, the draft of ABC-22<sup>68</sup> provided for American strategic direction of all forces in Newfoundland, the Maritime Provinces, the Gaspé peninsula and British Columbia. Although the Canadians apparently were not told, the American intention was evidently to incorporate these areas into the United States Northeast and Western Defence Commands. The Defence Commands would of course be commanded by American officers, although under them the Maritime and British Columbia areas would be commanded by Canadian officers, as would Newfoundland until such time as United States forces there outnumbered Canadian forces."<sup>69</sup> Canadian strategic control of naval forces would be limited to "coastal and inshore patrol vessels and aircraft in the inshore waters of

Canada and Newfoundland".<sup>70</sup> This was particularly resented by the Royal Canadian Navy, which made the points, among others, that it would not be able to move a vessel from one coast to the other without U.S. authority, and that the British Admiralty had always recognized that Canada possessed strategic control in her coastal areas. It was the Navy that first and most strongly objected to the U.S. proposals.<sup>71</sup> Canadian Army officers seem to have entertained some private doubts as to whether the Navy was wise in resisting the American contention that "the protection of sea communications within the coastal zone involves a co-ordinated task extending from Norfolk to Greenland which can be performed effectively only if all the operations involved are performed under a common strategic direction".<sup>72</sup>

The Canadian Section of the Board, and the higher authorities' to whom it reported, were not prepared to accept the American proposals. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff were willing to agree to United States strategic direction, subject to consultation with Canada, in the circumstances visualized in the 1940 plan, which as noted was a defensive plan designed to meet the desperate situation that would arise if Nazi Germany were in complete control of Europe, including the British Isles. On 22 April 1941 the Chiefs of Staff explained their position to the Ministers of National Defence:<sup>73</sup>

In the case of "BASIC PLAN 2", the circumstances which this plan would be brought into effect are entirely different. "BASIC PLAN 1" is primarily 'defensive'; "BASIC PLAN 2" is essentially 'offensive'. In one case the 'Front Line' is in the Western Hemisphere in the other it is in Europe. In "BASIC PLAN 1", the United States, with Armed Forces in the proportion of about twelve to one as compared to those of Canada, is obviously the major partner, and, it is eminently reasonable that she should initiate strategic direction of the combined forces. In "BASIC PLAN 2" the primary object of the entry of the United States into the war will not be the defence of the North American Continent but to assist in the destruction of the enemy in any part of the world where Allied Forces may be sent to operate.

In the circumstances in which "BASIC PLAN 2" is operative, the Chiefs of Staff therefore desire to advise most strongly against the acceptance by Canada of any proposal giving the United States unqualified strategic control of Canadian Armed Forces.

Instead, they wish to recommend the following basic principles governing Command Relations in the preparation of "BASIC PLAN 2":—

- (i) That Canada retain strategic direction over its forces based on Canadian and Newfoundland territory and waters.
- (ii) That the United States retain similar control over its forces similarly based.
- (iii) That specific Navy, Army and Air Force operational tasks be assigned to the United States and Canada respectively; and, the co-ordination of responsibilities be attained by the same mutual co-operation which has been so evident between United Kingdom and Canadian Forces now operating in the Atlantic Area.

The following day (23 April) the Cabinet War Committee discussed the matter in the presence of Colonel Biggar and the Chiefs of Staff. The latter developed the views put forward in their memorandum, making a strong distinction between the circumstances of Plan No. 1 and Plan No. 2. The Chief of the Air Staff (Air Vice-Marshal Breadner) pointed out that the concession of strategic direction would give the United States supreme command over Canadian forces in Canada. The Committee agreed that Colonel Biggar should have the Permanent Joint Board on Defence explore command relations under Plans 1 and 2 with a view to reaching a "mutually satisfactory arrangement":

With respect to Plan 1, the Committee recognized that, if no more satisfactory solution could be found by the Board, it might be necessary to accept strategic direction by the United States, subject to consultation with Canada.

With respect to Plan 2, the Committee were of opinion that it would be desirable to

have the question of command settled, if possible, along the lines of the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Colonel Biggar now had the task of communicating and interpreting these decisions to the Americans. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that he handled it somewhat ineptly. Perhaps because of the War Committee's phrase, "if no more satisfactory solution could be found by the Board", he refrained from making distinction between the Canadian attitudes to the two Plans. On 29 April he wrote Mayor LaGuardia expressing dislike of the concession of strategic direction to the United States (he implied, in connection with both Plan 1 and Plan 2), and enclosing a draft Second Report of the Board on the question of command — apparently prepared without consulting any service officer — which attempted to provide a formula covering both Plans on the basis of the definition of tasks and the assignment of forces being concerted between the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries.<sup>74</sup>

The Americans were amazed and shocked. Fresh from the meeting at Montreal at which the Canadian service members of the Board had accepted American strategic direction under Plan No. 1, they now felt that Canada had gone back on an agreement and that a military matter had been taken out of the hands of the military members of the Board and turned into a political issue. Canadian officers, when they heard what had happened, were scarcely less perturbed.<sup>75</sup>

LaGuardia wrote to Biggar on 2 May, "I fear we are getting dangerously apart", and added, "It seems to me that it is far better to trust to the honor of the United States, than to the mercy of the enemy". Biggar replied the next day that he fully appreciated the necessity of reaching cordial agreement, but that LaGuardia's letter had disturbed him. "Canada", he wrote, "is all out in the war: the United States is not — yet. The time is therefore a very unpropitious one for it to be suggested that Canada should surrender to the United States what she has consistently asserted *vis-à-vis* Great Britain".<sup>76</sup>

In Washington the War Department General Staff apparently looked at Biggar's attempt at a formula and found it quite unacceptable. Mayor LaGuardia then, on 7 May, carried the matter to President Roosevelt. He recommended that the President take the matter up with the Prime Minister of Canada. Roosevelt did not do this, but after consulting the Secretaries of War and of the Navy, he advised LaGuardia that he agreed with his position and made suggestions for the arguments which should be presented:

- a. Although not a belligerent, the United States was virtually ready to undertake the defence of eastern Canada and Newfoundland.
- b. Canada had neither the men or the materiel for this task except as a participant on a smaller scale than the United States.
- c. The Canadian war effort was designed primarily to send men and materials overseas.
- d. Since the defensive effort would fall nine-tenths to the United States, the strategic responsibility should be vested in that country.

It is worth noting that all these arguments are more relevant to Plan 1 than to Plan 2. Mayor LaGuardia informed Colonel Biggar that the U.S. government completely supported his own position and proposed an early meeting of the Board to resolve the issue.<sup>77</sup>

On 27 May the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa considered a letter from Biggar asking for further direction. The same day the Secretary of the Committee wrote Biggar giving the Committee's decision. There would, he said, be objection to the United States possessing unlimited authority over Canadian forces. How-

ever, there would be no objection to such authority provided it was "subject to the determination of war policy by the governments of the two countries". The Committee specified that any decision should be definite: a formula "capable of two interpretations" was not desired. The value of this decision was somewhat reduced by the fact that it had reference only to "the circumstances contemplated in Plan 1". This was the result, apparently, of the phrasing of Biggar's letter.<sup>78</sup>

The nineteenth meeting of the Board, held in Washington on 28-29 May 1941, was probably the most strained in its history. General Pope recalled it long afterwards :

I remember that tragic Washington meeting. We met in one of the U.S. Government's big public buildings\* during a particularly warm spell. We began shortly after nine in the morning, broke off for lunch in a cafeteria upstairs and then sat right through without dinner, until about 10 o'clock in the evening. To make matters worse, the air-conditioning system was turned off at about 6.00 o'clock, and we often wondered if our American friends were subjecting US to a special form of heat treatment. In any event, after prolonged wrangling, our two civilian Secretaries, namely, John Hickerson and Hugh Keenleyside, came up with a formula which appeared to gain acceptance. On this, I so well remember the "Little Flower" banging the table and saying "Now that this has been approved, let's hear no more about it".

I felt myself in a most difficult position, for I was the "new boy" on the Board, having so lately followed Ken Stuart. The resolution was dangerous to a degree and why the other Canadian Service members ever allowed themselves to accept it, I could never understand. I, however, called out to the Mayor for one moment, please. I said I found myself in a most difficult position, — I was the new boy. I had been told that the Board never voted, but, on the contrary, reached its conclusions by unanimous agreement. In my judgement, the formula produced by the two civilians was essentially and basically wrong. While I still knew very little about the Board and its procedures, there was something that I did know and that was the minds, not only of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, but also of the Canadian Government. And, I continued, I knew that our Chiefs of Staff would never advise the Government to accept this proposed recommendation, and I also knew the Government would not approve it without such a recommendation. Having said this, I felt that I would have to go along with my other Canadian colleagues, but with great reserve and with this definite warning as to what fate lay in store for the recommendation.

We never heard of it again.<sup>79</sup>

The journal of this meeting of the Board is brief and not very informative: yet the atmosphere General Pope describes may perhaps be sensed between the lines :

Throughout the afternoon of the 28th and during the two meetings of the Board on May 29th, the entire time was devoted to a general discussion of the question of the preparation of a Plan No. 2 and the matter of command relationships under that Plan. The basic assumption of Plan No. 2 would be the entry of the United States into the present war against the Axis Powers in association with Great Britain and Canada. AS no mutually acceptable solution of the problem of command relationship was found after a full discussion of this subject, it was agreed that it would be desirable for the question of command relationship under Plan No. 2 to be considered on the basis of command by cooperation at a meeting of the Service members of the Board to be held in Montreal at their earliest convenience.

Even now the controversy was not quite over,<sup>80</sup> but by 30 July "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan No. 2 (short title ABC-22)" was completed, and on that date the service members of the P.J.B.D. submitted it to the two countries' Chiefs of Staff for approval. The Plan was approved by President Roosevelt on 29 August and by the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa on 15 October.<sup>81</sup>

\*The Board's journal records that it was the Federal Reserve Board building.

The final stage, it will be noted, had been handled entirely through military channels, and indeed the actual military planning had been done wholly by the service members of the Board throughout. It is doubtful if any other procedure would have been, acceptable to the Americans. Colonel Biggar, in reporting to the Minister of National Defence that the Chiefs of Staff would presumably recommend approval to the government, wrote, perhaps a trifle querulously,

... I hope you will make it clear to the War Cabinet [*sic*] that the plan in question has never been submitted to the Board as such, and that the civilian members of the Canadian section are unaware of its contents.

... The plans themselves have been concerted by the Service members but have not been considered by the Board as a whole. At a recent meeting the Service members merely reported that they had reached an agreement on Plan 2 and that it involved no obligations upon the Governments not already accepted pursuant to the recommendations made in the First Report.<sup>82</sup>

The Plan's provisions covering command<sup>83</sup> ran as follows:

6. Coordination of the military effort of the United States and Canada shall be effected by mutual cooperation, and by assigning to the forces of each nation tasks for whose execution such forces shall be primarily responsible. These tasks may be assigned in Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plans, or by agreement between the Chiefs of Staff concerned, the United States Chief of Naval Operations being considered as such.

7. In effecting mutual cooperation, as provided in paragraph 6, the forces of one nation will, to their utmost capacity, support the appropriate forces of the other nation.

8. Each nation shall retain the strategic direction and command of its own forces, except as hereinafter provided.

9. A unified command may, if circumstances so require, be established over United States and Canadian forces operating in any area or areas, or for particular United States and Canadian forces operating for a common purpose:

(a) when agreed upon by the Chiefs of Staff concerned; or

(b) when the commanders of the Canadian and United States forces concerned agree that the situation requires the exercise of unity of command, and further agree as to the Service that shall exercise such command. All such mutual agreements shall be subject to confirmation by the Chiefs of Staff concerned, but this provision shall not prevent the immediate establishment of unity of command in cases of emergency.

10. Unity of command, when established, vests in one commander the responsibility and authority to coordinate the operations of the participating forces of both nations by the setting up of task forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such coordinating control as the commander deems necessary to ensure the success of the operations. Unity of command does not authorize a commander exercising it to control the administration and discipline of the forces of the nation of which he is not an officer, nor to issue any instructions to such forces beyond those necessary for effective coordination. In no case shall a commander of a unified force move naval forces of the other nation from the North Atlantic or the North Pacific Ocean, nor move land or air forces under his command from the adjacent land areas, without authorization by the Chief of Staff concerned.

11. The assignment of an area to one nation shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other nation from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.

12. For all matters requiring common action, each nation will require its commanders in all echelons and services, on their own initiative, to establish liaison with and cooperate with appropriate commanders of the other nation.

The United States service members of the Board, and their military superiors, had disliked these provisions intensely. Brig.-Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division in the War Department in Washington, wrote to General Embick on 17 June,<sup>84</sup>

As pointed out in previous memoranda relative to earlier drafts of the subject plan, the War Plans Division considers mutual cooperation an ineffective method of coordination of

military forces. The present draft of the plan therefore is considered defective in its provisions relative to command arrangements.

During the long discussion the Canadian Army member of the Board had become increasingly convinced that the U.S. representatives actually wanted not only strategic direction of Canadian forces but also tactical command. Reporting to the Chief of the General Staff on the Washington meeting on- 28-29 May, Brigadier Pope, describing a discussion between himself and Embick on the definition of "strategic direction", wrote:<sup>85</sup>

7. It was at about this stage that there began to be confirmed in my mind that whereas the United States have constantly spoken of strategical direction, they really have had in mind an altogether different thing, namely, operational control which so far as the Army is concerned really does not differ from tactical command. In any event, every example furnished the meeting of what the United States had in mind clearly fell within the latter definition. . . .

9. At a later stage the U.S. Members made it clear to us that they were supporting the views of their Government which I presume is simply an expression of the views that have been given the President by the two Chiefs of Staff. The statement is, think, of considerable importance, namely, that whatever the motive may be, the U.S. War Department are determined to obtain, if they can possibly do so, the direct control of operations including, even, static defence operations, of the whole Western Hemisphere, not only in the case of Plan I, for which indeed a good argument can be made, but also under Plan 2 in which case I submit a reasonable argument cannot be maintained.

That General Pope was not exaggerating seems indicated by a passage in the United States official history: "Apart from the near impossibility of the two forces ever agreeing as to which should exercise unity of command, the great defect according to American staff planners was that unity of command, as defined in Joint Basic Defense Plan No. 2, did not confer authority over administration and discipline. Without this authority, there was, they contended, only the semblance of command."<sup>86</sup> The basic principle of Allied cooperation in the great campaigns later in the war was that "administration and discipline" should remain under national control, being kept quite distinct from operational command, which was and had to be conceded to a Supreme Commander. It would seem that the value and importance of this principle was not clear to the War Plans Division in Washington in 1941. If the Canadians concerned sensed this attitude, it is not surprising that they were so cautious about accepting American command. The American view might have involved the right of an American commander to convene courts-martial to try Canadians or to confirm the sentences of such courts-martial. It is not difficult to imagine the storm that such a situation would have raised in Canada.

#### 4. CANADIAN MILITARY REPRESENTATION IN WASHINGTON

In Part IV of this study (above, pages 159-61) we described the Anglo-American staff conversations in Washington early in 1941, and the report called ABC-1 which resulted from them. It will be recalled that this report assumed that Canadian military representation in Washington in the event of the United States entering the war would be through the medium of the British Joint Staff Mission; that neither the Canadian Chiefs of Staff nor the Canadian government considered this adequate; and that Canada announced in June 1941 her intention to ask for the establishment of a Canadian Military Mission in Washington. The discussions on this project proceeded simultaneously with the final stage of those just described concerning the question of command under the Canadian-American Basic Defence Plans, and it would seem that the latter had some effect upon the former.

The United Kingdom established its own military mission (later called the British Joint Staff Mission) in Washington early in April 1941. On 22 April the Chief of the Canadian General Staff (General Crerar) wrote to the Minister of National Defence that a military mission might be required in Washington, and the Cabinet War Committee approved the "general idea" the following day.<sup>87</sup> At the time of the "Montreal Revise" (above, page 349) the American service members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence had accepted the idea of an exchange of army and air force missions between Ottawa and Washington, and on 12 May the Canadian Chiefs of Staff went on record as favouring the immediate establishment in Washington of a small service mission which would be capable of expansion if the United States entered the war.<sup>88</sup> On 1 July 1941, following the Canadian reaction against ABC-1, the Canadian government formally requested the United States to permit the establishment of a Canadian Military Mission in Washington, stating that it felt very strongly that the arrangements for Canadian-American liaison suggested in ABC-1 were inadequate.<sup>89</sup>

Although the U.S. State Department seems to have had no objection to such a mission, the War and Navy Departments opposed it. They took the view that representation through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and the service attachés in Washington and Ottawa met all Canadian needs. They feared that the establishment of a mission would form a precedent for requests for similar missions "by certain other British Dominions and by the American Republics". The War and Navy Departments, however, would not object to the establishment in Washington of permanent offices for the Canadian military members of the Joint Board.<sup>90</sup> The Canadian request had given an opening for this, as it indicated that the government would consider the possibility of appointing these military members as members of the proposed mission.<sup>91</sup> On 31 July the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa referred the question to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Chiefs of Staff. The latter stood on their original recommendation, and on 13 August the War Committee again agreed that it was desirable that a mission be established and that the Prime Minister should re-open the question through the United States Minister. This Mr. King did on 18 August, telling Mr. Moffat that the prolonged refusal of the United States to accept a mission was the only aspect of Canadian-American relations that seriously troubled him. He urged "with great earnestness" that the United States reconsider its decision, and that "at least as much weight be given to the political considerations involved as to service considerations".<sup>92</sup> Moffat in discussions with the State Department emphasized the importance of the question from the point of view of general relations between Canada and the United States, and also it appears, perhaps unfortunately, suggested that considerations of domestic politics might have contributed to the Canadian attitude.<sup>93</sup>

The War and Navy Departments remained adamant. The Secretary of War, after consulting the Chief of Staff, took the view "that foreign political considerations inimical to our military interests should not be allowed to determine the attitude of the War Department".\* The two military departments again proposed setting up in Washington a permanent office for the service members of the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board; but they were also prepared to accept the appointment of "alternate" members and the use of a separate "working title" to disting

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\*It is just possible that Mr. King and the Americans were using the word "political" in different senses.

their Washington activities from those directly connected with the Board.<sup>94</sup> Although there seems to be no direct evidence, an American historian has suggested that the attitude of the War and Navy Departments may have been connected with the Canadian reluctance to accept United States "strategic direction" in connection with Basic Defence Plan No. 2; it is possible that the American officers felt that the refusal to accept the mission might serve as a form of pressure on Canada in this other matter.<sup>95</sup>

On 2 September 1941 the Minister of National Defence reported to the Cabinet War Committee that the original suggestion of stationing the Canadian service members of the P.J.B.D. in Washington was not adequate to meet the case; the important point was that the United States should agree to the performance of the functions which a mission would fulfil. (This suggests that Moffat may have been right in feeling that the Canadian interest in a mission was largely "psychological";<sup>96</sup> at any rate, it was directly related to the assertion of status *vis-à-vis* Britain and the United States.) Mr. L. B. Pearson had been asked to inquire informally whether suitable Canadian officers appointed as "technical advisers" would be accorded by the United States the opportunity desired; On 2 October the Prime Minister told the War Committee that it was unlikely that the American reply would be favourable. The Chiefs of Staff had reaffirmed their earlier recommendation, and it was agreed that the government should continue to press for a mission.

On 29 October the Prime Minister read the War Committee a letter from the United States Minister putting forward the idea of "alternates"; this, the Americans suggested, would give freedom of choice as to personnel, increase the prestige of the Permanent Joint Board and accomplish everything sought for a military mission, at the same time avoiding setting any undesirable precedent. Mr. Norman Robertson, for the Department of External Affairs, said that this was probably the United States government's last word; and it was agreed that the matter should be further discussed with the Chiefs of Staff. The Vice Chief of the General Staff is on record as saying, "I am inclined to think that we should take what we are offered and be thankful."<sup>97</sup> Mr. King however shortly seized the opportunity of discussing the matter on the highest level. On 6 November he told the War Committee that during his recent visit to the United States he had discussed the matter with President Roosevelt, and the latter had agreed "that Canada should certainly be adequately represented in Washington by appropriate Service officers". But no further progress was made in the matter while the United States remained neutral.

The first result of Pearl Harbor seems to have been to strengthen the objections of the U.S. War and Navy Departments to the establishment of a Canadian mission; they feared a flood of applications for such missions from the belligerent nations.<sup>98</sup> However, it shortly appeared that the new situation was in fact more favourable to Canadian aspirations. The Canadian government kept up the pressure for a mission, making the point to Mr. Churchill when he met with the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa on 29 December 1941; not unnaturally, his attitude was somewhat noncommittal (above, page 163). On 2-3 January the Canadian Chiefs of Staff attended meetings in Washington with the British Chiefs of Staff (who were there with Churchill) and "discussed individually with the U.S. Chiefs of the Armed Forces the question of defensive measures on the Pacific Coast"; the absence of collective contact with the Americans is perhaps significant. The newly-organized Combined Chiefs of Staff subsequently made recommendations for representation of the Dominions and other Allied nations in Washington. Churchill and Roosevelt

approved these recommendations early in February 1942.<sup>99</sup> As we have seen (above, page 164), on 11 March the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa was told that it was practicable to send one serving officer to represent the War Committee before the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Accordingly General Pope, who in fact was already in Washington, was appointed. In the following July, the United States finally accepted the idea of a Canadian service staff in Washington. General Pope was appointed Army Member and Chairman, with Rear Admiral V. G. Brodeur as Naval Member and Air Vice Marshal G. V. Walsh as the R.C.A.F. Member. General Pope's functions in Washington have been described (above, page 165).

The United States did not establish a parallel mission in Ottawa. In the Canadian capital there was no organization similar to the Combined Chiefs of Staff which justified special liaison arrangements in Washington. The United States continued to be represented in Ottawa by the normal service attachés, while additional contact was provided through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. In November 1943, however, the level of the two countries' diplomatic representation was raised when their respective Legations in Ottawa and Washington became Embassies.<sup>100</sup>

An American historian has observed that the controversy over the establishment of the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington — it is interesting that it was never officially termed a "Mission" — is "one of the least happy aspects" of Canadian-American relations in the Second World War.<sup>101</sup> With the concurrent trouble over command under Basic Defence Plan No. 2, it constituted a difficult episode of a type which fortunately never recurred.

## 5. CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES IN NEWFOUNDLAND

We have seen that one of the first concerns of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence when it was constituted in August 1940 was the security of Newfoundland (above, pages 344, 345). Canada had already become seriously disturbed by the undefended state of Newfoundland, and at the very moment when Mr. King was conferring with President Roosevelt at Ogdensburg, the Canadian Air Minister, Mr. Power, was in the island making mutual defence arrangements with its government. As a result of this, Canada assumed large responsibilities for Newfoundland's defence, and Newfoundland's small forces were placed under Canadian command. Canadian air and ground units were stationed there from June 1940 onwards, and Canada made a small beginning on developing defences in the island.<sup>102</sup>

Canada thus had a military foothold in Newfoundland before the United States became a factor in the situation. As a result of the Permanent Joint Board's recommendations, the United States provided guns and other equipment to assist in the island's defence. Direct American intervention followed. The arrangement announced in September 1940 by which Britain leased certain naval and air bases on British territory in the Western Hemisphere to the United States for a period of 99 years, and 50 American destroyers were transferred to the Royal Navy, included the transfer of bases in Newfoundland.

As we have seen, at Ogdensburg King emphasized to Roosevelt that Canada had a special interest in Newfoundland, and there is plenty of other evidence that the Canadian Prime Minister was fully alive to the island's importance to Canada. Nevertheless, he seems to have felt that there were limits to what he could do. The keen eye of Dr. O. D. Skelton perceived possibilities of future difficulty in the

arrangement concerning Newfoundland bases, and on 22 August 1940 he wrote to Mr. King,

In any arrangement made for giving facilities to the United States in Canada you have made it clear that there will be no leasing or transfer of territory Presumably any additional facilities will be under Canadian control whether built by Canadian funds or United States funds.

In view of the definite possibility of a movement on the part of Newfoundland to enter Confederation, the question arises whether we should seek to have any arrangement made by the United States as regards Newfoundland brought into harmony (in the event of Newfoundland becoming part of Canada) with the Canadian arrangements. Possibly we can take a chance on that being settled satisfactorily when the day comes but it might be well at least to issue a caveat.

Opposite the last phrases of this memorandum, Mr. King minuted, "This I should think all that is necessary at present."<sup>103</sup> In fact, the attempt at issuing a caveat did not prove particularly successful.

Early in 1941, information was received that Anglo-American conversations were shortly to take place in London on detailed arrangements concerning the transferred Western Hemisphere bases. The Cabinet War Committee was told on 20 January that no provision had been made for Canadian representation, though Canada was interested because Newfoundland was involved. The Committee agreed that Canada ought to be represented. On 31 January, however, the Committee further agreed that the Canadian representatives — the High Commissioner (Mr. Vincent Massey), Commodore L. W. Murray and Mr. L. B. Pearson of Canada House — should be observers rather than delegates at the meeting; the United Kingdom wished Newfoundland to appear as a principal.

The discussions in London were prolonged, and on 5 March the War Committee was told that the British Ambassador in Washington had been instructed to take up with the State Department some of the problems involved. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff had made strong representations concerning Canada's interest in the matter. Back in September 1940 they had accepted in general the concessions which it was proposed to make to the United States in Newfoundland, making the point however that it should be clearly understood that Canada retained the right to establish any defences in Newfoundland which were considered to be required in the interest of Canadian defence.<sup>104</sup> Now they reported that they viewed the trend of the London discussions "with grave concern", "inasmuch as the U.S. Delegation appears to be insisting on rights, or on the inclusion of clauses, which, in an emergency, would give them complete control of the whole of Newfoundland (sea, land and air)". They cited particularly the proposed right of the United States "to regulate and control all communications within, to and from areas leased", and the further provision that "when the United States is engaged in war or in time of other emergencies, it shall have all such rights, powers and authority in territories and surrounding waters and air space as may be necessary for conducting any military operations deemed by it desirable".

The Chiefs of Staff proceeded to recommend that discussions and agreements concerning Newfoundland should be held separately from those connected with the other leased bases.\* "The problems involved", they wrote, "are entirely different to those connected with Bermuda and the West Indies; and in addition Canada is vitally interested in Newfoundland and has in fact assumed responsibility for its

\*The Newfoundland representatives in London had suggested this to the Canadian High Commissioner there on 27 February.<sup>105</sup>

defence." The Chiefs further recommended that in the proposed discussions, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Newfoundland should have equal representation, and they added that it would be preferable if the discussions were held in Canada. They advised that the Permanent Joint Board on Defence should review the recommendations resulting from the discussions before any governmental action by any of the parties was taken to implement them; and that the results of such a review should be considered by the Chiefs of Staff and reported upon to the Cabinet War Committee. The paper concluded:

Finally, the Chiefs of Staff Committee desire to make it very clear that in their opinion Newfoundland represents a most important outpost, and is in fact Canada's first line of defence in this hemisphere, the preservation and protection of which is absolutely vital to her interests.<sup>106</sup>

On 5 March the Cabinet War Committee recorded its agreement with the contentions of the Chiefs of Staff and agreed that a communication along these lines should be sent to the British government.

These recommendations were ineffectual. On 11 March Mr. Massey in London reported that the British authorities thought that though separate discussions on Newfoundland might have been possible three weeks earlier, it would be "most difficult" now, since a general agreement with the United States was almost completed. Mr. Massey also discussed the question with the new American Ambassador, Mr. John G. Winant, who took a similar view. He agreed with the British, however, in favouring a tripartite exchange of notes between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada recognizing the special interests of Canada in Newfoundland. The Cabinet War Committee agreed to this suggestion on 12 March; Mr. Massey was told that the government had "reluctantly come to the conclusion" that the exchange of notes should be accepted.<sup>107</sup>

In the discussions in London, the U.S. representatives took a very "tough" line. On 19 February the Foreign Office told the British Ambassador in Washington that the negotiations were in "a somewhat difficult stage" and remarked, "In general American representatives, no doubt on instructions from Washington, seem to have adopted the attitude that no account need be taken of any interests in the territories."<sup>108</sup> Among the points causing difficulty were questions of customs duties and court jurisdiction; the British negotiators were very unwilling to agree that British subjects might be tried by American military courts. On his arrival in London, Mr. Winant carried the problem to the Prime Minister. The final result was that the Americans won almost every point.<sup>109</sup> Mr. Churchill questioned the breadth of the military powers conceded to the Americans, but finally agreed to the following formula (Article II) :

When the United States is engaged in war or in time of other emergency, the Government of the United Kingdom agree that the United States may exercise in the territories and surrounding waters or air spaces all rights, power and authority as may be necessary for conducting any military operations deemed desirable by the United States, but these rights will be exercised with all possible regard to the spirit of the fourth clause of the preamble.

The fourth clause of the preamble ran:

And whereas it is desired that this agreement shall be fulfilled in a spirit of good neighbourliness between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States of America, and that details of its practical application shall be arranged by friendly cooperation. . . .

The United States was given the right to try British subjects charged with "an offence of a military nature" within the leased areas in United States courts sitting

in the leased areas. Brigadier Pope summarized the agreement for the benefit of the Chief of the General Staff:

Generally . . . the US. at all times may do pretty well what they please within the leased areas and in time of war or other emergency pretty much what they please in the surrounding territories, always provided that these rights shall be exercised in a spirit of good neighbourliness and friendly co-operation.<sup>110</sup>

In this negotiation the United States had in general declined to compromise and had got everything it wanted. The long-term interests of the British colonies concerned were subordinated to what Mr. Churchill might have called "the great movement of events" (above, page 341 ). Having been so successful in their negotiations with Britain, the American military authorities may have been surprised when in the weeks immediately following they failed to win their point in the negotiation with Canada in the matter of command under ABC-22.

The final agreement<sup>111</sup> on the bases was signed in London on 27 March 1941. On the same day, a Protocol concerning Newfoundland, which had replaced the exchange of notes earlier proposed, was signed on behalf of the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. The text of the Protocol<sup>112</sup> ran:

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries of the Governments of Canada, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, having been authorized by their respective Governments to clarify certain matters concerning the defence of Newfoundland arising out of the Agreement signed this day concerning the Bases leased to the United States, have drawn up and signed the following Protocol:—

1. It is recognised that the defence of Newfoundland is an integral feature of the Canadian scheme of defence, and as such is a matter of special concern to the Canadian Government, which has already assumed certain responsibilities for this defence.

2. It is agreed therefore that, in all powers which may be exercised and in such actions as may be taken under the Agreement for the use and operation of United States bases dated the 27th March, 1941, in respect of Newfoundland, Canadian interests in regard to defence will be fully respected.

3. Nothing in the Agreement shall affect arrangements relative to the defence of Newfoundland already made by the Governments of the United States and Canada in pursuance of recommendations submitted to those Governments by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence — United States and Canada.

4. It is further agreed that in all consultations concerning Newfoundland arising out of Articles I (4), II and XI (5) of the Agreement, or of any other Articles involving considerations of defence, the Canadian Government as well as the Government of Newfoundland will have the right to participate.

Under the main agreement, the United States acquired six leased areas in Newfoundland:<sup>113</sup> one constituting the naval base at Argentia and Fort McAndrew: two at Quidi Vidi Lake, where the army post of Fort Pepperrell was established; a small area on the White Hills near St. John's, for an emergency landing ground; an airfield site at Stephenville; and a site for a dock installation on St. John's Harbour. Subsequently some small additional plots of land adjacent to the original sites were also ceded.<sup>114</sup>

#### *Problems of Liaison and Command*

As already noted (above, page 136), the first United States troops arrived in Newfoundland in January 1941. From this time onward, cooperation with the Americans in the island was a principal responsibility of the Canadian commanders there, and sometimes it presented rather thorny problems. We have already discussed the naval relationship (above, pages 312-13), and observed that, in spite of the fact that the Royal Canadian Navy's Newfoundland force was subordinated to

American command, it was on the whole easy and pleasant. Army and air force relationships were sometimes more complicated.

On the day on which the Newfoundland Protocol and the general agreement on bases were signed in London, the Cabinet War Committee agreed that Canada should be represented in Newfoundland for the present by the Minister of National Revenue, Mr. Colin Gibson, accompanied by Mr. H. A. Dyde. On 25 April, Mr. Gibson reported to the Committee on the situation he had found in Newfoundland. For one thing, he said, the United States was spending much larger amounts there than Canada was. American troops were arriving in considerable numbers and larger forces were to follow. The U.S. Army appeared to be acting, in the local situation, on their own initiative, and without reference to the Newfoundland authorities or to the arrangements made by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. For example, on orders received from senior officers in the United States, the local American commander was proposing to make a reconnaissance of Newfoundland Airport (Gander) with a view to determining what forces were required for its protection, and subsequently moving troops in. Unilateral action of this sort, Mr. Gibson suggested, raised difficulties in the matter of local command. From this moment the Cabinet War Committee watched the situation closely. Its immediate reaction on the day on which it heard this report was to authorize spending \$1,900,000 on a new Canadian air station at Torbay, Newfoundland, in accordance with recommendations of the Permanent Joint Board previously approved.

These Canadian doubts were largely the result of the action (above, page 348) taken by the United States earlier in April, when President Roosevelt decided to move additional forces into Newfoundland by agreement with Mr. Churchill and without reference to Canada. The most disturbing aspect of this operation was the fact that it involved a rather large American movement into Newfoundland Airport, which was not within one of the areas leased to the United States. However, the President's action was motivated by apprehension resulting from the current activity of German surface raiders in the Atlantic; and since it was from Newfoundland Airport that American bombers were being flown for delivery to the United Kingdom (below, page 374) it would have been impolitic for Canada to object. On 6 May Colonel Stimson made a broadcast calling for the use of U.S. naval power "to make secure the seas for the deliveries of our munitions to Great Britain".<sup>115</sup> This led Brigadier Pope to comment to the Chief of the General Staff that Stimson had made it clear that the United States would not "for one moment tolerate anything which, however remotely, might risk the impairment of the friendly control of the Western Atlantic which they now enjoy":

In the circumstances, I think it is pretty clearly indicated that our future policy should be to make it abundantly clear to the United States, that our provision for land defence not only in Newfoundland, but also on our own coasts, will be such not as to meet our needs as we see them, but also theirs as they see them, with possibly a proviso that their appreciation as to what is required should be not too unreasonable.<sup>116</sup>

We have already seen that the Cabinet War Committee was acting along these general lines, and this continued to be Canadian policy as the months passed.

In June 1941 there was a revealing incident. At the meeting of the Cabinet War Committee on 5 June, the Chief of the General Staff (General Crerar) recommended that another battalion of the Canadian Army be sent to Newfoundland. The Minister of National Defence, Colonel Ralston, explained that at present there was one battalion at St. John's, and another responsible for Botwood and Newfoundland Airport and its approaches. It was important to provide what the United

States regarded as adequate. military protection for the air personnel at the Airport. Crerar reported that both Canadian and U.S. officers were of the opinion that further troops were required, and it was feared that if Canada were not prepared to provide them; the United States would send forces of its own. It was anticipated that the air personnel at Gander would be about 3400 men of the U.S. Army Air Corps, 500 of the R.C.A.F., 600 civilian ferry-service personnel, and construction staffs. The Committee approved sending another battalion. There was no doubt that the Committee, and not least the Prime Minister, were of the opinion that all necessary steps should be taken to keep Newfoundland within the Canadian orbit.

In the circumstances that have been described, questions of command were almost certain to arise. We have already noticed the manner in which the Royal Canadian Navy's Newfoundland Escort Force passed under United States command in September 1941. In October the United States Chief of Naval Operations wrote to the Canadian Chief of the Air Staff inviting him to place such Canadian air forces as were assigned to ocean escort duty in the Western Atlantic area under the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Atlantic Fleet. This request was based on the provisions of ABC-22 (above, pages 349-53). The Cabinet War Committee was told on 9 October that the R.C.A.F. opposed this suggestion, arguing that there was no reason to give to a foreign neutral power more than had been conceded to the Canadian and British Navies. It was considered that adequate results could be obtained by cooperation. The matter was deferred, but at the next meeting, on 15 October, the Minister of National Defence for Air told the Committee that the Chief of the Air Staff would reply to Admiral Stark expressing the willingness of the R.C.A.F. to cooperate to the-fullest extent with the U.S. Navy in ocean escort duty in the Western Atlantic. On 6 November the Committee heard that Admiral Stark had answered this communication; he had welcomed the C.A.S.'s assurance and had accepted cooperation between the two forces as an alternative to unified command. After Pearl Harbor, however, there was a closer approach to such command with respect to the Canadian air units in Newfoundland (below, page 363).

The Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence was now feeling the need of direction on Canadian policy. in Newfoundland; and on 18 October 1941 Colonel Biggar requested clarification on the point of whether Newfoundland outside the American base areas should be treated as far as possible as part of Canada, or whether the United States should be encouraged to assume responsibility in order to permit releasing Canadian forces for service elsewhere. After discussing the question the Cabinet War Committee agreed on 29 October,

- “(a) That the defence of Newfoundland was an integral part of the defence of Canada, and that, in agreeing to dispositions for the defence of the Island, it should be assumed that, after the war, Newfoundland would continue to be a primary Canadian interest;
- “(b) That the possibilities of having the U.S. government undertake expenditures in connection with Newfoundland defence, without taking title to the property involved, and by the extension of the provisions of the lease-lend law, should be explored.”

General Canadian policy with respect to Newfoundland was thus made quite clear. Nothing seems to have come of the Committee's suggestion concerning Lend-Lease.

Shortly controversy arose with the United States Army commander in Newfoundland on the question of his relationship to Canadian forces. The existence in the island of two uncoordinated defence authorities had troubled both Canadian and U.S. commanders from the beginning.<sup>117</sup> As time passed the rank of the commander of the U.S. Newfoundland Base Command rose from colonel to major

general, this last increase coming with the arrival of Major-General G. C. Brant in the autumn of 1941. On 29 November General Brant wrote to his Canadian "opposite number", Brigadier Philip Earnshaw, with reference to the cooperation of Canadian and U.S. units in the defence of St. John's:

2. Until arrangements can be made whereby unity of command can be established, I agree to the principle of cooperation as indicated in present plans. From past experience I am of the opinion however, that cooperation which may work very well in peace is apt to break down under war time conditions.

General Brant forwarded with this letter a copy of a joint defence plan for Newfoundland agreed upon between the U.S. Army and U.S. Navy. Brigadier Earnshaw sent the letter to the G.O.C.-in-C. Atlantic Command at Halifax (Major-General W. H. P. Elkins) with the following observation:

From the remarks General Brant has passed informally, and from what I understand he said when he attended the Permanent Joint Defence Board meeting in Montreal, I feel that pressure is being exerted and will continue to be exerted with a view to the establishment of unity of command, and that command to be vested in a United States officer. I feel quite convinced that unless Canada makes it crystal clear that she has assumed the responsibility for the defence of Newfoundland, and therefore must, by the nature of that assumption, retain command, that we shall find ourselves jockeyed into a position whereby we shall have lost control of the situation.<sup>118</sup>

Ten days later came Pearl Harbor and the United States became a belligerent. Plan ABC-22 now came into effect. It will be remembered that this provided for command by "mutual cooperation". In the new circumstances, however, the United States became still more anxious for unity of command. On 10 December, the Cabinet War Committee considered a letter from the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom suggesting a direct communication from Mr. King to President Roosevelt to ensure that the command in Newfoundland would be in Canadian hands. It was evidently felt, however, that the matter should be dealt with through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in the first instance. As an immediate measure, nevertheless, a decision seems to have been taken to replace Brigadier Earnshaw in Newfoundland with a more senior officer who would outrank General Brant. On 15 December the Minister of National Defence reported to the War Committee that Major-General L. F. Page, formerly commanding the 4th Division, was being appointed to Newfoundland. He was two days senior to Brant. Another meeting of the Committee on 17 December heard that Commodore G. C. Jones, the Senior Naval Officer, Halifax, and Commodore Murray, commanding at Newfoundland, were being promoted Rear Admiral.

The P.J.B.D., meeting in New York on 20 December, discussed the situation in Newfoundland. Its journal noted:

The degree of cooperation now existing was noted with gratification, but the Board considers it necessary to stress the need for decentralization of command sufficiently to permit local operational control and full cooperation between all forces assigned to the local defence of Newfoundland, and also to permit immediate local action on requests from Task Force Commanders of the United States Atlantic Fleet for support of naval operations by the forces present.

The journal for the Board's next meeting, in Montreal on 20 January 1942, recorded that "the Air Officer Commanding, Eastern Air Command, had decentralized tactical control of all R.C.A.F. forces in Newfoundland to the Air Officer Commanding, No. 1 Group, St. John's, Newfoundland, as from January 20, 1942."

The effect, it is evident, was to make No. 1 Group available to support the U.S. naval forces based in Newfoundland.

The Canadian government continued to be troubled by the Newfoundland situation, so much so that during the Cabinet War Committee's meeting with Mr. Churchill in Ottawa on 29 December (above, page 163) Canadian Ministers referred to their apprehension that the United States would seek to obtain command of Canadian forces in the Western Hemisphere and to the likelihood of a single command in Newfoundland being requested in the near future. We now know that in fact this was discussed on the United States side. In February 1942 General Hugh A. Drum, commanding the U.S. Eastern Theatre's. of Operations, recommended, we read, "that all forces in Newfoundland, Canadian as well as American, be placed under the command of an American officer, without any limitation". General Headquarters U.S. Army, to which General Drum reported, supported his recommendation; but the War Department thought otherwise, General Embick, the senior U.S. Army member of the U.S. Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, argued in the light of the earlier difficulties over ABC-22 that any attempt to carry out Drum's recommendation would fail and would damage the existing cooperation. Embick's view carried the day, and no approach was made to Canada in the matter.<sup>119</sup> The episode is an interesting commentary on the value of the P.J.B.D. as an international lubricant.

On 18 March 1942 the Cabinet War Committee, we have seen (above, page 134), approved a new Canadian organization for command in the Canadian coastal areas, under which a Commander-in-Chief was designated on each coast. As part of this reorganization, the senior member of the already existing Joint Service Sub-committee in Newfoundland was designated as Commanding Newfoundland Defences, Newfoundland becoming a sub-command of the East Coast. The Canadian command in Newfoundland was thus itself more formally unified; but the Canadian and United States forces still remained separate, dependent merely upon cooperation in the event of an emergency.

Occasional difficulties continued to happen. On 24 June 1942 the War Committee considered a dispatch from the Canadian High Commissioner in Newfoundland reporting the failure of General Brant to cooperate with Canadian commanders. The Secretary of the Committee was instructed to discuss the matter with Colonel Biggar with a view to his raising it in the Permanent Joint Board if this seemed appropriate. On 1 July the Committee was told that Biggar felt that it would be better to deal with the matter in Washington through the Chiefs of Staff. In the meantime, the R.C.A.F. commander in Newfoundland had reported that General Brant had flatly refused to cooperate in agreed, arrangements for the control and identification of aircraft. The Chief of the Air Staff suggested that the best plan would be for the Canadian Commander-in-Chief, East Coast Defences, to approach Brant's immediate superior, General Drum. The Committee agreed that this should be done. General Elkins spoke to Drum accordingly. On 9 September the Chief of the General Staff reported to the War Committee that General Drum had expressed regret that unfortunate incidents had occurred which, in his view, were more the result of carelessness than intention. General Brant had been informed of these views and had been instructed to conform with regard to local regulations on control and identification of aircraft. In the circumstances, the matter was regarded as closed.

Since the spring of 1942 the various commanders in Newfoundland had been engaged in drawing up a combined plan for the defence of Newfoundland. In May,

the Canadian Joint Service Committee, Atlantic Coast, considered the draft plan as recommended, and in the light of their observations it was amended, chiefly in the direction of removing "provisions which, in the opinion of the Committee, made the Plan one primarily to establish Unity of Command". The Plan as drafted had contained the following paragraphs:<sup>120</sup>

0501. Coordination of the Canadian and United States Military (including Naval) effort will be effected by mutual cooperation, except as hereinafter stated.

0502. The forces of one nation will, to their utmost capacity, support the appropriate forces of the other nation.

0503. In order to ensure maximum of effectiveness in the employment of available forces, the Commanders of the several Armed Forces in Newfoundland agree to the establishment of centralized strategic direction, under the principle of paramount interest, in the following cases:

- (a) The Senior Naval Officer in operational command in Newfoundland will exercise strategic direction of all units of the United States and Canadian Forces operating against enemy surface craft operating off-shore.
- (b) The Ranking Army or R.C.A.F. Officer\* present in Newfoundland will exercise strategic direction of forces engaged in repelling enemy attack on or denying enemy control of the territory of Newfoundland when the units regularly stationed in the area attacked are unable to repel the attack.
- (c) U.S. Army and U.S. Navy Forces will operate under the direct command of the appropriate [U.S.] Army or Navy Officer as provided in Appendix (C), in support of this Joint Plan.

In the final version paragraph 0503 including sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) was altered to read:

0503. In order to ensure maximum effectiveness, the Commanders of the several Armed Forces in Newfoundland agree to the establishment of Operational Control as follows:

- (a) The Senior Naval Officer in operational command in Newfoundland will exercise operational control of all units of the United States forces and Canadian Naval units operating against enemy surface craft operating off shore. The R.C.A.F. will co-operate in support of these co-ordinated operations.†
- (b) In the event of Unity of Command being imposed under the provisions of para 9 (b) of A.B.C. 22, the ranking Army or R.C.A.F. Officer present in Newfoundland will exercise operational control of forces engaged in repelling enemy attack on or denying enemy control of the territory of Newfoundland when the units regularly stationed in the area attacked are unable to repel the attack.

It is worth noting that the Canadian view was that true "strategic direction" could only be exercised on a higher level than that of any commander in Newfoundland.

In forwarding the amended Plan for approval in Ottawa, the Joint Service Committee wrote as follows:<sup>121</sup>

4. The Committee wishes to point out that they feel that they have achieved protection of the principle of co-operation as opposed to the American desire for Unity of Command, largely through the co-operative attitude of the American Naval Commander, notwithstanding his expressed belief in the necessity for Unity of Command to ensure success. It is pointed out that the Plan now provides for certain action *in the event* of Unity of Command being established under the provisions of A.B.C. 22. While the Committee considered that these arrangements are unnecessary, in view of the co-operation shown they consider that it is desirable not to press the matter further since no Unity of Command is established under the Plan as now amended.

In August the Chiefs of Staff Committee in Ottawa approved the combined Plan as amended. It also received United States approval.<sup>122</sup>

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\*It will be recalled that at this time the United States had not yet established an Air Force separate from the Army.

†See above, page 363.

In sending a copy of the draft plan to Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa in May, Admiral Murray made some interesting observations:<sup>123</sup>

5. The plan, as it now stands, is admittedly a compromise which depends for smoothness in operation upon the Canadian Army taking steps to arrange that the Canadian Commanding General is always Senior to the U.S. Army's Commanding General.

6. From the Naval point of view this is necessary in order that the R.C.A.F. may remain free from the domination of the U.S. Army in addition to its present role of co-operation with the U.S. Naval Air Service. Domination by the U.S. Army might, and very probably would, involve a loss of R.C.A.F. effort over the sea, thereby weakening the support now given to the R.C.N. in its responsibility for protection of trade in coastal waters.

Admiral Murray in fact expressed some apprehension lest the United States might choose to promote General Brant to Lieutenant General, and suggested that provision should be made in advance for the action to be taken in such a case: either by providing for promoting General Page and giving him the necessary seniority, relieving him by a more senior officer, or arranging with the United States Army to replace General Brant by a more junior officer. These anxieties were unfounded. When General Brant left Newfoundland early in 1943, he was replaced by an officer of lower rank, Brigadier-General John B. Brooks, who was, however, shortly promoted.<sup>124</sup>

In August 1942, when the Combined Defence Plan was about to receive final approval, General Brant suggested that the time had come to undertake combined Canadian-American manoeuvres in the various defence areas of Newfoundland. These manoeuvres began the following month.<sup>125</sup> It may be said that from this time on there were no serious difficulties between the forces in Newfoundland; although to the end of the war the Canadian and United States defence organizations in Newfoundland remained essentially separate and charged with parallel responsibilities.

In September 1943 a new U.S. naval commander at Newfoundland, Rear-Admiral J. B. Oldendorf, suggested that the Combined Defence Plan for the island was out of date and should be revised.<sup>126</sup> In the light of the strategic conditions then existing, this was largely an academic exercise, but it was proceeded with, and covered some of the same ground as the earlier discussions. By April 1944 the local commanders had agreed on a new plan, which was duly approved on higher levels. It was to apply only in the event of unity of command being established under ABC-22. The section on "Co-Ordination" ran in part as follows:<sup>127</sup>

401. The Senior Naval Officer permanently stationed in Newfoundland will exercise the operational direction of all Allied Naval Forces and Air Forces co-operating with Naval Forces for off-shore defence operations.
402. The Senior Naval Officer permanently stationed in Newfoundland engaging the enemy off shore [*sic*] will release appropriate Allied Air Forces, that may be under his operational direction, to the Senior Land and Air Forces Commanders whenever air support is required to repel enemy forces on shore or inland,
403. In the case of air attack, the Air Officer Commanding No. 1 Group, R.C.A.F., will exercise command over the Fighter Forces in Newfoundland.
404. The Ranking Army or R.C.A.F. Officer present in Newfoundland will exercise operational direction of Allied Land and Air Forces to defend the shores and territory.

These formulas seem sensible and practicable. But they never required to be brought into use.

When the naval command in the Atlantic was reorganized in the spring of 1943 and the Canadian Northwest Atlantic Command was set up (above, page 314), cooperation in the Newfoundland area became still closer. The Atlantic

Convoy Conference, recognizing the fact that anti-submarine operations were largely a matter of cooperation between naval and air forces, decided that the Commander-in-Chief Canadian Northwest Atlantic should have general operational control of all anti-submarine aviation in his area. In consequence of this decision the new Commander-in-Chief moved into a combined headquarters at Halifax which he shared with the Air Officer Commanding Eastern Air Command. The United States military and naval anti-submarine aircraft stationed in Newfoundland were placed under the A.O.C., and thereafter he exercised general control, designating missions without prescribing tactics or techniques.<sup>128</sup>

By this period, as we have already noted, the Battle of the Atlantic was past its most critical stage. From 1943 the more favourable general military situation resulted in a downward revision of the anticipated scales of attack on Newfoundland and it was possible to reduce the Canadian garrison. On 5 October 1944, however, the Cabinet War Committee approved a recommendation of the Chiefs of Staff "that withdrawals be coordinated with those of the United States, so that the strength of the Canadian Army Garrison would not fall below that of the United States".<sup>129</sup> This serves to emphasize a fact which emerges clearly from the story told above. The Canadian forces in Newfoundland had two tasks. One was to defend the area against the Germans in cooperation with the Americans. The other was to safeguard by their mere presence the permanent interests of Canada in the island and to ensure that no other influence became predominant there.

## 6. PROBLEMS IN THE WESTERN ATLANTIC

### *Greenland*

Following the German victories in the spring of 1940, the islands of Greenland and Iceland suddenly took on a new importance to the defence of the Western Hemisphere. Not only were they possible staging areas for an invasion of North America, but they also offered sites for air and submarine bases and weather and communication stations for either the Allies or the Germans. Moreover, Greenland, a Danish possession, was the world's principal source of natural cryolite, a mineral essential in the production of aluminium, which in turn was vital to Allied aircraft production.

As a belligerent, Canada was more immediately concerned with these strategic possibilities than the United States, and indeed the developing American attitude towards Greenland well illustrates the dilemma in American policy caused by the conflict between the traditional principles of neutrality and hemispheric isolation and the tightening necessities of global war. After the Germans occupied Denmark on 9 April 1940, officials of the Aluminum Company of Canada, who had received urgent representations from Mr. G. Cunliffe, the Aluminium Controller for the United Kingdom, approached Colonel J. L. Ralston, the Canadian Minister of Finance, pointing out the danger to the cryolite mine at Ivigtut from German raids or occupation and the possibility of Canada now obtaining a larger share of the mineral.<sup>130</sup> It was felt that a Canadian occupation of Greenland would not meet with as much opposition in the United States as would similar British action, and accordingly the Department of National Defence drew up plans for an expedition (basically, an infantry company and some artillerymen) to be known as Force "X".<sup>131</sup> The United States apparently apprehended some such action, and on 13 April Mr. Cordell Hull let Britain and Canada know that the United States did not

recognize the right of any third government — including theirs — to occupy or interfere with Greenland.<sup>132</sup>

Nevertheless, a few days later, in spite of this warning, Canada, at Britain's urging,<sup>133</sup> informed the United States that it was considering sending a small defence force to Greenland for the duration of the war. Concern was expressed over the safety of the cryolite mine, the possible establishment of German bases in the island, and the economic plight of the Greenlanders who were now cut off from their customary export markets. The Canadian note explained that if Canada sent a force to Greenland it would be acting "as trustee for a restored and independent Danish Government".<sup>134</sup>

The State Department, however, feared that Japan might claim such action as a precedent for the seizure of the colonial possessions of other occupied European nations. Some United States officials did not hesitate to say that the Aluminum Company of Canada was primarily responsible for the Canadian interest in Greenland and that the bettering of that company's position in relation to the cryolite mine was the real motive for Canadian concern. Moreover, there was the traditional American reluctance to countenance any change in the status of European possessions in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>135</sup> On 19 April the Canadian Minister in Washington was firmly told by the State Department that it was considered "highly inadvisable" for Canada to take the proposed action. The British government was now informed (23 April) that the plan was being suspended, and the Chiefs of Staff were subsequently instructed (2 May) that Force "X" was to stand down. In the Cabinet that day, the Canadian Prime Minister recorded, "Power asked if they should be demobilized and I said certainly and at once."<sup>136</sup>

By this time Mr. King had had an opportunity of discussing the matter personally with President Roosevelt at Warm Springs on 23-24 April (above, page 328) as well as with Mr. Hull and the Canadian Minister in Washington on 28-29 April. King told the President that Canada had "undertaken, in correspondence with Britain, to see that men were supplied who could be of service about the mine in protective ways", and that a Canadian ship took supplies to Greenland annually; this year it would be taking more than previously. Roosevelt said the Americans would also send a supply ship, but "if a real danger arose, he would have to leave it to the British to deal with submarines, etc., at sea. He thought no effort should be made, either by the United States or Canada, to get possession of Greenland, that whatever was done should be done subject to Greenland managing her own affairs." Apparently it was from the Canadian Minister that King first heard that the Force "X" proposal had been made. He thought he had scotched any such notion by a telephone call to Dr. Skelton before he left Ottawa. He wrote in his diary, "I thought the position taken by the Americans was wise. . . . Clearly our people had been a little over-zealous in preparing for a little war on Canada's own account." Hull emphasized the importance of not giving the Japanese a handle that they might use to justify aggression. The only encouragement to Canadian action given by the U.S. authorities was Roosevelt's suggestion that Canada follow an American example by sending a consul to Greenland."<sup>137</sup>

The United Kingdom still pressed for more positive Canadian action. On 2 May Mr. Anthony Eden, from the Dominions Office, wrote to the Canadian High Commissioner in London that his government "would be glad if the Canadian Government would consider the immediate despatch of an expedition to Greenland for the purpose of taking control of the cryolite mines". The force could be described as a relief expedition, and could carry supplies for the local population.

It did not seem necessary to inform the U.S. in advance, but the Canadian Government would no doubt advise the United States Government as soon as the force had arrived.<sup>138</sup> Not surprisingly, in the light of King's recorded attitude, the Canadian government on this occasion preferred to follow Roosevelt's advice rather than Eden's. On 9 May the United States was informed that a Hudson's Bay Company ship, the R.M.S. *Nascopie*, would be dispatched to Greenland and that a Canadian consul would be appointed. The Canadian note also suggested that the United States might supply arms for Danish nationals in Greenland. On the advice of the United Kingdom, however, the Canadian government sent an artillery officer in plain clothes aboard the *Nascopie* to conduct a reconnaissance of the vicinity of the cryolite mines at Ivigtut with a view to their defence should an expedition be sent later.<sup>139</sup> The United States was informed of this officer's presence. Nevertheless, when an exaggerated account of his activities reached the State Department from the Greenland authorities, it occasioned a sharp exchange between the Canadian and American governments.

The Canadian *chargé d'affaires* in Washington was bluntly told on 3 June that "the President had said he would be 'very angry' if Canada attempted to occupy Greenland".<sup>140</sup> In fact, the total force in the *Nascopie* was two Royal Canadian Mounted Police constables plus four civilians deputized to assist in handling the three machine-guns which the ship carried; there were also on board 60 rifles and 10,000 rounds of small arm ammunition. (For a vessel venturing into uncertain waters in wartime, the *Nascopie* was certainly not over-protected.) Some of the weapons on the *Nascopie* would presumably have been available for issue to the Danish authorities for their people. The Canadian government told its *chargé* to tell the State Department

that from the first the Canadian Government has kept the Government of the United States fully informed of all its plans relating to Greenland. In return we feel justified in asking that our statements be accepted by the officials of the State Department.<sup>141</sup>

The United States was itself at this time preparing to move into Greenland, though on a very modest scale and with the full encouragement of the local authorities. The United States Coast Guard cutter *Campbell* arrived at Ivigtut about the same time as the *Nascopie*. She landed a 3-inch gun and other weapons,\* and some members of her crew were taken on by the mine administration to man the gun and serve as a guard. In these circumstances, none of the arms aboard the *Nascopie* were distributed in Greenland.<sup>142</sup> The United States took no further action that summer, other than to institute a survey for possible air base sites. When Canada sought United States approval on 27 August for a Canadian survey, the War Department did not object but the State Department suggested that it be postponed until the American one was completed. In September Mr. Hull repeated the warning (above, page 367) that he had given Britain and Canada in April.<sup>143</sup> The United States, while taking no adequate measures of its own to defend Greenland, was objecting to measures being taken by anyone else.

In January 1941 the Canadian government urged Washington to take additional defensive measures in Greenland, proposing that an air base be constructed by Canada, by the United States, or by Greenland with American assistance. In the spring, an American survey party, accompanied by an R.C.A.F. officer,

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\*Mr. Eayrs (*In Defence of Canada: Appeasement and Rearmament*, pp. 171-2) seems to suggest, mistakenly, that a gun supplied by the U.S. was landed from the *Nascopie* and set up under the Canadian officer's direction.

discovered a suitable site near Julianhaab, east of Ivigtut. The United States now decided to ask Greenland to establish an air base with United States help, and the Canadian government expressed itself satisfied with this arrangement. On 9 April an agreement was signed with the Danish Minister in Washington whereby the United States accepted "the responsibility of assisting Greenland in the maintenance of its present status"<sup>144</sup> and the island virtually became an American protectorate for the duration of the war.<sup>144</sup> In May, when the German battleship *Bismarck* was loose in the North Atlantic, one final suggestion that Canada was prepared to provide immediately a garrison for the defence of the cryolite mine was firmly declined by the United States.<sup>145</sup> It had been evident throughout that Washington did not want unilateral action by Canada in Greenland and was not anxious for Canadian cooperation there. The United States Army began work in Greenland in July, eventually developing five military installations on the island's east coast and eight on the west.<sup>146</sup>

There were some actual German activities in the Greenland area later in the war, but they were extremely minor, consisting entirely, it appears, of attempts to establish weather stations. Early in 1943 there was some fighting between German parties and the Danish North-East Greenland Patrol, which had been set up with U.S. assistance, and there were further incidents in 1944. That autumn U.S. Coast Guard cutters finally cleaned up the situation, capturing a number of Germans and taking or sinking the small vessels that supported them.<sup>147</sup> The United States military occupation of Greenland which was undertaken in the summer of 1941 continued into the post-war period.

#### *St. Pierre and Miquelon*

Close to the south coast of Newfoundland lie the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon. There was no change in their political administration after the fall of France in 1940, and the Canadian government, for its part, did not believe them to be of much significance.

On 30 June 1940 the Royal Canadian Navy's Director of Plans reported to the Chief of the Naval Staff that St. Pierre and Miquelon would be of little use either to Canada or the enemy, but recommended that air patrols should visit the islands regularly for reconnaissance purposes. The C.N.S. forwarded this memorandum to the Acting Minister of National Defence with the comment that for the duration of the war Canada, possibly in conjunction with Newfoundland, might consider setting up "a system of administration supported by the R.C.M.P." On 4 July the Governor of Newfoundland, Sir Humphrey Walwyn, telegraphed Ottawa expressing apprehension lest St. Pierre be used as a hostile base for attacks against Allied shipping. Later in the month, however, Commander J. W. R. Roy, R.C.N., and Mr. J. H. Penson, Newfoundland Commissioner for Finance, visited the islands and reported that they offered few facilities as an enemy base.<sup>148</sup>

Towards the end of July, at a meeting in Havana of representatives of the American republics, the United States sponsored a resolution proposing that in the event of the war bringing about changes in the *status quo* of European-controlled Western Hemisphere territories, a temporary inter-American trusteeship should be established over such territories. About the same time the American Minister in Ottawa expressed to the Prime Minister the hope that Canada would undertake no unilateral occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon; and Mr. King apparently gave him an assurance that "he would not send any troops".<sup>149</sup> In August 1940 General

de Gaulle, the Free French leader, suggested to the British government that St. Pierre and Miquelon be "rallied" to Free France. The British were favourable to the idea, but no action was taken.<sup>150</sup> On 31 October the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa considered the problem of the islands and agreed that, in the event of a hostile act by the French, counter-action should be taken only after consultation, and if possible agreement, with the United States.

That the question was receiving some consideration in Washington was indicated by the fact that President Roosevelt mentioned it in conversation with the new Canadian Minister to the United States, Mr. Leighton McCarthy, on 12 March 1941. The President, speaking perhaps on the impulse of the moment, said the United States had no desire to take over the islands and wondered whether Britain or Canada had considered the possibility of acquiring them. He seemed to assume that they would not remain under French sovereignty.<sup>151</sup> A week later, however, Mr. King told the House of Commons that there was no cause for Canadian concern over St. Pierre and Miquelon. The Governor of Newfoundland was troubled, nevertheless, by the possibility of the United States acquiring the islands; this, he wrote, would make it possible for them "to dominate Newfoundland politically", and if they chose, to threaten Newfoundland's fisheries. He went on to suggest that if St. Pierre and Miquelon passed out of the control of the French government at Vichy, they should be entrusted to Newfoundland. The Canadian government replied that "there was not the least likelihood" of the United States annexing the islands and that it saw no need at the time to alter the existing situation.<sup>152</sup>

Late in May 1941 a Royal Canadian Mounted Police inspector was sent to St. Pierre to study political sentiment on the islands. His report made in mid-June noted that although the Administrator and the governing circle entertained pro-Vichy sentiments, the great majority of the inhabitants favoured de Gaulle. One disturbing feature, however, was that, contrary to previous reports, the main wireless station on St. Pierre was capable of communicating with both France and Martinique and 'was in fact in constant touch with them.'<sup>153</sup> From this time this aspect of the matter became more and more prominent.

In the meantime, a leader of the Free French movement in Manitoba suggested that Free French residents of Canada might be allowed to undertake an enterprise against St. Pierre and Miquelon. General Crerar, the Chief of the General Staff, thought the idea might "have a good deal to commend it".<sup>154</sup> The War Committee on 27 May had no difficulty in rejecting it. Simultaneously, however, military planners in Ottawa were considering what would be involved if the Canadian government itself decided to act; and on 28 May the Chiefs of Staff instructed the Joint Service Committee in Halifax to make a plan. This was ready by 11 June; as amended in Ottawa, it provided for a possible expedition ("Q" Force) consisting in the main of a company of The Lake Superior Regiment carried and supported by two corvettes with air cover. From 14 to 22 August the Army element of the force was standing by at Camp Debert on four hours' notice for a move. The force was kept on foot until after the end of the year in case there was a call for its services.<sup>155</sup>

Through the summer of 1941 anxiety in Ottawa over the St. Pierre situation increased. Both the Naval Minister and the Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police indicated to the Department of External Affairs that they took a serious view of it.<sup>156</sup> Finally, on 18 August, the government took its first positive step when it decided to establish a Canadian consular office in the colony. By this time the Chiefs of Staff were decidedly disturbed. On 21 August they recommended

to their Ministers that "an early occupation of the islands should be carried out". The recommendation was approved by the Defence Council on 29 August, but the Cabinet War Committee decided that no action was needed at the moment, noting that the Canadian representative who was to watch the situation was now on his way to St. Pierre.<sup>157</sup>

On 21 October the United Kingdom High Commissioner suggested that Free French naval forces based on Newfoundland should rally St. Pierre and Miquelon, but the Cabinet War Committee, considering the matter on the 29th, decided that a better course would be for the Canadian Consul on St. Pierre to ask the Administrator to allow Canadian personnel to control all incoming and outgoing traffic at the wireless station. During the next few weeks this proposal was discussed with London and Washington. On 10-11 November the Permanent Joint Board on Defence `unanimously agreed that the existence on the Islands of an uncontrolled and high-powered wireless transmitting station constitutes a potential danger to the interests of Canada and the United States".<sup>158</sup> On 3 December, Mr. King suggested to Mr. Churchill that the suggestion of Canadian supervision of the wireless station might be backed up by the presence of a small Canadian naval vessel. Churchill countered with the suggestion that the Canadian government ascertain the American attitude towards allowing General de Gaulle to occupy the islands, and added that this seemed preferable to Canada taking action that might create an embarrassing political situation.<sup>159</sup>

The United States, whose administration was not friendly to de Gaulle, reacted strongly against Churchill's proposal. Mr. Hull feared that such action would drive Marshal Pétain's government into outright collaboration with Hitler and lead to Axis control of French possessions in North Africa. The Americans preferred the Canadian proposal, but with the proviso that economic pressure was preferable to the threat of force if the St. Pierre Administrator refused to accept Canadian control of the wireless station.<sup>160</sup>

This was the situation on 15 December, when Vice-Admiral E.-H. Muselier, representing General de Gaulle, visited Ottawa from Halifax, where he had lately arrived with some Free French naval vessels detached from the Canadian Newfoundland force. In discussions with officials of the Department of External Affairs and with the United States Minister in Ottawa, the Admiral recommended an immediate Free French occupation of the islands, arguing that such an operation would be, bloodless, that it would remove the threat of the wireless station on the flank of the convoy routes, and that action by Free French forces would create less political unpleasantness between the United States and Vichy than if Canadian forces were involved. However, both President Roosevelt and the Cabinet War Committee (which considered the matter on 16 and 19 December) were of the opinion that any action should be a Canadian undertaking. When this decision was communicated to Admiral Muselier, he agreed not to proceed with his plan for the occupation. Mr. King himself had consistently opposed any overt or hasty move, and particularly any action by Canada until Britain and the United States reached agreement.<sup>161</sup>

General de Gaulle, however, felt that the Canadian proposal to take over the wireless station at St. Pierre constituted a threat to French sovereignty. Accordingly he ordered Admiral Muselier to rally the islands, "sans rien dire aux étrangers". He wrote, "Je prends l'entière responsabilité de cette opération devenue indispensable pour conserver à la France ses possessions."<sup>162</sup> On 22 December, therefore, Muselier put to sea from Halifax with three corvettes and the submarine *Surcouf*,

heading ostensibly for St. John's. The next day the Free French landed on St. Pierre and took peaceful possession of the colony. On Christmas Day a plebiscite was conducted, the result of which showed that 98 per cent of the voting population were in favour of de Gaulle.

In Ottawa and Washington that Christmas Day the Free French action created a diplomatic furore which' today it is difficult to regard as anything but comic. Mr. King himself was angry with the French, but not so angry as Mr. Hull, who forced Moffat to present what King called "an ultimatum"<sup>163</sup> demanding that Canada evict Muselier.\* Hull then issued a famous press release.<sup>166</sup>

Our preliminary reports show that the action by the so-called Free French ships at St. Pierre-Miquelon was an arbitrary action contrary to the agreement of all parties concerned and certainly without the prior knowledge or consent in any sense of the United States Government.

This Government has inquired of the Canadian Government as to the steps that Government is prepared to take to restore the *status quo* of these islands.

The sequel doubtless took Mr. Hull by surprise. The phrase "so-called Free French" touched off a violent explosion of American public opinion and the State Department found itself the target of much bitter criticism.<sup>167</sup> The Canadian government was acutely embarrassed, but its reply to Hull's demand for intervention, drafted by Messrs. King, Ralston and Macdonald on the train that was taking them to Washington for talks with Roosevelt and Churchill, was quite firm:

Canada is in no way responsible for the Free French occupation of St. Pierre. We have kept in close touch with both the United Kingdom and the United States on this. Question and have always been ready to cooperate in carrying out an agreed policy. We decline to commit ourselves to any action or to take any action pending such agreement. In the circumstances and until we have had an opportunity to consider action with the President and Mr. Churchill, the Canadian Government cannot take the steps requested to expel the Free French and restore the *status quo* in the islands.<sup>168</sup>

Mr. Hull long remained obdurate in his refusal to accept the *fait accompli*. But he found little real support in any quarter, General de Gaulle refused to be intimidated. In Ottawa the Cabinet War Committee decided on 14 January 1942 that Canada would not participate in any coercive measures against the Free French. Only on 2 February did Hull himself finally admit to President Roosevelt that the matter should be allowed to rest until the end of the war.<sup>169</sup> By that time Canada's "Q" Force had finally ceased to exist. At the end of January The Lake Superior Regiment left Debert Camp and returned to Saint John, New Brunswick, to resume its regular duties with the 4th Division.<sup>170</sup>

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\*The reason for the American anger with Canada seems to have been a belief that since the French ships had been working under Canadian command at Newfoundland Canada must have been privy to the French action. In Washington on 26 December the President asked Mr. King where Muselier got the ships.<sup>164</sup> The fact is that the Canadian Flag Officer Newfoundland Force, properly desirous of showing courtesy to a senior officer from the Free French headquarters in London, had permitted Muselier to take the three Free French corvettes on what Muselier says was represented as a trip to inspect them at sea. "Murray hésitait un peu. Il me dit, en riant: 'Je ne sais pas s'il est prudent de vous laisser passer près de Saint-Pierre avec ces trois corvettes?' Je lui répondis, en souriant: 'Je vous ai dit que je me rendrais directement à Halifax.' I n'insista pas." Rear-Admiral Murray said in his monthly report, "Admiral Muselier . . . proceeded to sea [from St. John's] with the three corvettes on 10th December for exercises and passage to Halifax."<sup>165</sup> It is evident that there was no consultation with the higher U.S. naval command under whose general supervision the Canadian Newfoundland force had been operating for some weeks (above, page 312). It is not impossible that the much-resented phrase "so-called Free French ships" in Hull's communique was meant to refer to ships called French rather than Frenchmen called free!

*The North Atlantic Air Ferry*

In July 1940 the British Ministry of Aircraft Production and the Canadian Pacific Railway Company cooperated in inaugurating a ferry service for aircraft to be flown by civilian pilots to the United Kingdom from Californian manufacturers. The first delivery over this route, whose western terminal was Gander, Newfoundland, and whose eastern one came to be Prestwick, Scotland, was made on 10-11 November 1940. Within the next four months, various types of long-range aircraft — Boeing Flying Fortresses, Consolidated Liberators, and Lockheed Hudsons — were successfully delivered over this 2100-mile gap; On 1 August 1941 the newly-established Royal Air Force Ferry Command took over the ferry service and established its headquarters at the new airfield at Dorval near Montreal.<sup>171</sup>

There was also a need for ferrying short-range aircraft to the United Kingdom by way of Greenland and Iceland. The British already had two airfields in operation in Iceland, at Reykjavik and Kaldaharnes, and in July 1941 the United States undertook the construction of two staging airfields in Greenland, at Narsarssuak and Søndre Strømfjord. It shortly became apparent that the facilities at Gander for ferrying long-range aircraft to Britain would have to be expanded. There was also a need for alternate fields less subject to temporary closure because of weather. In the spring, and early summer of 1941, Canadian and American survey teams found a suitable site near North West River, Labrador (later to be known as Goose Bay). In the middle, of July the United States Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence proposed construction of an airfield at Goose Bay, and at its meeting on 29 July, we have seen, the Board recommended that the Canadian government construct it as quickly as possible (above, page 345). Cabinet War Committee approval in principle was given on 13 August. Work proceeded rapidly thereafter, and the field was in use by 9 December. Early the following summer a Canadian Army garrison was sent to Goose Bay. Meanwhile Canada authorized the United States to establish weather stations at Fort Chimo in Northern Quebec and Upper Frobisher Bay and Padloping Island in the Baffin Island area. By the end of 1941 these were in operation.<sup>172</sup>

By, 1942 there was a need for additional staging airfields to increase the flow of aircraft, especially medium bombers and fighters, to the United Kingdom. With larger numbers of aircraft becoming available for delivery, congestion at Gander and Torbay\* Airports would be much increased, a situation which would be aggravated when the spring thaws forced the temporary closing of Goose Bay, whose runways were still unpaved. The United States was now in the war. At a meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on 26 and 27 May the United States Section presented a War Department memorandum proposing a vast and imaginative project known by the code name "Crimson". The Crimson project would cater for up to 100 combat and 40 transport aircraft er day to be ferried through airfields 400 to 500 miles apart along three routes. The routes varied somewhat in different versions; that presented to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff on 29 May<sup>173</sup> envisaged an eastern route which would be a modification of an existing one: Presque Isle (Maine) and/or Montreal — Chicoutimi or Mont Joli — Seven Islands — Goose Bay. The western route would begin at San Francisco and run through Regina, The Pas, Churchill, and Southampton Island to Baffin Island and on by way of Greenland to Iceland. A central route, originating at Detroit, would run by North Bay — Kapuskasing — Moosonee — Richmond Gulf (on the east shore of Hudson

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\*Near St. John's, Newfoundland (above, page 361).

Bay) — Fort Chimo to join the western route at Baffin Island. On 9 June the Permanent Joint Board on Defence recommended that Canada construct, or authorize the United States to construct, the necessary airfields and facilities, including weather stations; and that the system be made available for the use of the R.A.F. Ferry Command.<sup>174</sup>

Mayor LaGuardia had found the plan headily exciting, and he momentarily believed that the Permanent Joint Board faced a crisis over it. A letter which he wrote to President Roosevelt on 28 May 1942<sup>175</sup> is revealing:

I have just returned from Quebec where the Permanent Joint Board on Defense held its monthly meeting. I consider this meeting the most important we have had. The question of the new plans for Ferry Command came up. The plan itself challenges imagination. It is so gigantic and dramatic. It took our Canadian colleagues by surprise and frankly they have not yet recovered. We recessed until Monday and we must put it through on that day as every day now is precious.

We may encounter the usual difficulties because of pride and the little brother attitude with which you are familiar.

There is a remote chance that I may need your help Monday to get a phone call through to the Premier. I say remote because I really believe that we will be able to put it through. In the event that there is an impasse, I will phone you from Ottawa. . . .

There was no impasse, but the later history of the scheme did a good deal to justify the little brother's cautious approach. The Cabinet War Committee had considered it on the same day on which LaGuardia made his comment. It was told that the R.A.F. and the R.C.A.F. both had reservations about it, considering that aircraft losses in passage would certainly be great. The cost was estimated at up to \$200 million. But the object was to bring the weight of American aircraft production and air power to bear against Germany; and the United States wanted an immediate decision. The Committee approved the project in principle, but referred the defence aspects to the Chiefs of Staff and the higher political aspects to the Prime Minister (who was not present). The Chiefs of Staff, after very rapid consideration, expressed the general opinion that, "given time, the routes are practicable, but. . . the problems of construction and transportation are very great".<sup>176</sup> On 12 June the P.J.B.D.'s recommendation of the 9th came before the War Committee, with the Prime Minister now in the chair; and the Committee decided that, in view of the great importance which the United States attached to it, it should be approved.

The Americans had obviously rushed the plan forward while still considering even its major features; and modifications and — in spite of the haste with which Canada had been asked to act — delays, at once set in. At the highest strategic level the Combined Chiefs of Staff had serious doubts — simply because the shipping requirements for the enormous scheme as planned would interfere seriously with the build-up of forces in the United Kingdom for the intended invasion of Europe.<sup>177</sup> On 17 June the War Committee heard that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff desired to postpone further action until a modified plan had been worked out; this might involve deferring work on the western route. On 1 July the Committee was told that modified proposals had now passed the Combined Planning Committee in Washington and were before the Combined Chiefs of Staff.\* They involved converting the Regina — The Pas — Churchill route, which had been conceived as a fighter route, into one for bombers; abandoning the proposed central route through Moosonee; and developing as planned the existing Presque Isle — Goose Bay route. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff had made a further report, recommending

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\*They were approved the following day.

that Canada pay for completion of the facilities at Goose (as already approved) and the necessary construction at Regina (where in fact the work had already been done), The Pas and Churchill; while the United States would develop the field at Southampton Island (Coral Harbour) and fields for winter use at Chimo and at Frobisher Bay or Cape Dyer on Baffin Island. Canada, the Chiefs recommended, should take the responsibility for defence at Regina, The Pas and Churchill (though in fact defence was required only at the last-named).<sup>178</sup>

The War Committee, however, decided against Canada taking any financial responsibility for constructing any of the new fields. It was argued that the project was an American one and that Canada's commitments were already enormous. The Committee agreed that Canada would cooperate fully, but that all the costs of the new aerodromes and facilities would have to be borne by the United States; the construction would be carried on in collaboration with Canadian authorities, taking account of Canadian conditions; and the defence of all fields and facilities would be provided by the U.S. to a standard regarded as adequate by Canadian authorities. On 8 July, however, the Committee considered a letter from Colonel Biggar, who was concerned about the decision to hand over the defence of The Pas and Churchill to the Americans. These were essentially interior positions; the defence problem was not serious in any case; and the decision might constitute an awkward precedent. The War Committee accordingly amended its order of a week before: Canada would now accept responsibility for both construction and defence of the airfield at The Pas, while that at Churchill would be constructed by the U.S., "who should be asked to accept responsibility for the provision of such defences as Canada was not in a position to provide and the Canadian Staff might deem necessary". In fact, the United States subsequently took over the responsibility for defence at The Pas under the general policy prescribed in the Permanent Joint Board's 32nd Recommendation (24-5 August 1943).

The U.S. Army's Corps of Engineers set to work with great energy immediately after the initial Canadian authorization of the project on 12 June 1942.<sup>179</sup> In the first instance their whole construction programme was directed from a "Crimson" project headquarters at Churchill, but in March 1943 it was divided into Western and Eastern Sectors, with headquarters for the latter at Goose Bay.\* Even the much reduced "Crimson" scheme, however, was not fully carried into effect. The airfields at The Pas and Churchill were built, as were — rather less rapidly — the more remote ones at Chimo, Southampton Island and Frobisher Bay; while an extra one was built at Mingan as an emergency field between Presque Isle and Goose. But the increasing range of aircraft and an easier situation with respect to shipping to move them by sea made the whole operation now appear less important than the American enthusiasts had thought it not many months before. By the spring of 1943 the U.S. were proposing that Canada take over The Pas, Churchill and Southampton Island. This was not immediately done, but there was some curtailment of construction and the much enlarged programme of weather stations authorized in connection with "Crimson" was cut back.<sup>180</sup> In June 1944 an agreement was made by which Canada reimbursed the United States for expenditures "of permanent value"† which it had made on airfields in her territory.

\*The rather complicated U.S. command structure in Canada and Newfoundland is set forth in a chart in Dziuban, *Military Relations*, p. 132.

†For a table of both countries' expenditures, see *Canada Year Book*, 1945, p.712. The United States spent on the North-East route in Canada (to April 1944) \$39,494,300, of which \$31,631,310 was reckoned to be "of permanent value". Canadian expenditure authorized to 31 March 1944 totalled \$11,249,690; of this nearly \$10,000,000 was for Goose.

On 25 April 1945 the Special Committee of the Cabinet which had temporarily replaced the War Committee agreed that the United States should relinquish responsibility for the "Crimson" project. The Pas, Churchill and Southampton Island were handed over in August and September of that year, but the Americans did not give up Mingan, Chimo and Frobisher Bay until 1949-50.<sup>181</sup>

The North Atlantic air ferry moved great numbers of aircraft to the United Kingdom. But very few of these went by way of the far northern Canadian fields. Only 87 aircraft landed at Chimo, for instance, in 1944. Stephenville, Gander and Goose saw most of the traffic: from them the aircraft crossed the ocean in one leap, or staged through Greenland and Iceland.<sup>182</sup> In some respects the mountain of 1942 known as the "Crimson" project had produced a rather modest mouse.\*

It may be noted here that from October 1941 onwards Canada was negotiating with Britain and Newfoundland for a long lease of the Goose Bay air base, on which Canada was spending great sums of money. The Cabinet War Committee was told on 20 August 1943 that there was still no agreement, and that the United Kingdom was seeking a provision granting postwar use of the base to all British civil and military aircraft on terms as favourable as those for Canadian planes. Similar reports continued to be made at intervals until 13 September 1944, when the Committee heard that the United Kingdom had accepted Canadian proposals for postwar military and civil use of the field. On 10 October an agreement was signed for a 99-year lease, to run from 1 September 1941. This provided that for the duration of the war, and such time thereafter as the Canadian and Newfoundland governments might agree to be desirable, the use of the base would be available to British and United States military aircraft, and to civil aircraft concerned with the war effort; while for the duration of the lease, civil and military aircraft owned by the Newfoundland government would have the right to use the base on terms not less favourable than those of the government of Canada. The right of the United Kingdom to use the base for military aircraft would be the subject of "consultation and agreement between the Governments of Canada, the United Kingdom and Newfoundland after the war"; in the meantime, the United Kingdom's wartime rights would continue unimpaired. The question of the use of the base for civil or commercial flying would be discussed between the three governments "not later than twelve months after the war". In contrast with the terms of the U.S. leases, it was declared that the laws of Newfoundland would apply "throughout the Air Base and to all persons therein or thereon".<sup>183</sup>

## 7. PROBLEMS IN CENTRAL AND WESTERN CANADA

The security of the Canadian and United States canals at Sault Ste. Marie, on the St. Mary's River between Lake Superior and Lake Huron, was a matter of long discussion between the two countries' authorities. The precautions taken here are described in the Army history† and the story need not be repeated. The canals had tremendous economic importance, but military danger to them was very remote. The chief interest of the matter lies in the different appreciations of the threat made by the two countries. There was always some possibility of sabotage; but the Americans tended to worry about air attack launched from an enemy vessel that

\*For a summary history of the "Crimson" project based on U.S. official records, see Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* ("United States Army in World War II: The Western Hemisphere") (Washington, 1960), pages 399-403.

†*Six Years of War*, 158-59. See also Dziuban, *Military Relations*, 193-98.

might penetrate Hudson Bay. The keynote was struck on 26 March 1942, when the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa was told that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff considered the risk slight, but that they appreciated the American concern. The Canadian authorities "went along with" the Americans, just as in the matter of "Crimson" — to the extent of organizing a special heavy anti-aircraft battery for the Sault and placing it under the operational command of the local U.S. military district commander (it was obvious that unified command of the anti-aircraft defences of the area was essential). Considerable numbers of U.S. troops were also stationed on the Canadian side of the canals, and in the autumn of 1942 the United States was permitted to deploy a chain of radar stations along the main line of the Canadian National Railways from Cochrane to Armstrong, covering Sault Ste. Marie from the north. The R.C.A.F. organized a "Central Canada Air Detection Corps", which was reported "well established and in operation" in August 1942.<sup>184</sup> During 1943, however, these precautions were abandoned, the active forces involved were withdrawn to areas where they could play a more useful part in the war, and "the security of the canals was left in the hands of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police on the Canadian side and of a military police company on the U.S. side".<sup>185</sup>

These developments suggest that the Americans, partly under the influence of the increasingly favourable general strategic situation of 1943, were coming around to the Canadian view that there was really no serious menace to the Sault. Back in 1941 President Roosevelt himself had talked of the desirability of a naval patrol of Hudson Bay, and had been told by the Chief of Naval Operations — on what authority does not appear — that Canada would resent the United States setting up such a patrol in what she considered Canadian territorial waters.<sup>186</sup> By July 1942 the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, considering the matter, "was unanimously of the opinion that, in view of the urgent requirements of available naval forces for immediate commitments, and particularly the protection of shipping, it could not recommend to the two Governments that naval vessels be diverted to patrol Hudson Bay and Hudson Strait to meet so remote a menace".<sup>187</sup> Nevertheless, as late as January 1943 the United States was trying to influence Canada to emulate the U.S. action in setting up a Military Area at the Sault "in order to place control of all defence activities, including control of aliens and military security, under one commander".<sup>188</sup> In a Canadian-American conference held at Headquarters Military District No. 2 (Toronto) on 12 April, "all Canadian representatives present" expressed the view that such action was not required.<sup>189</sup>

Although the western parts of North America got considerably less attention than the eastern ones before Pearl Harbor, they were not neglected. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence met on the Pacific coast on 13-15 November 1940, and its Recommendations (above, pages 344-6) indicate that it was taking an intelligent and searching interest in the security of the region. Nevertheless, after 7 December 1941 this coast became a matter of much more urgent interest to both Canadian and American defence authorities than it had been before, and in the end it was in the west that the largest and most expensive American activities in Canada took place.

As we have seen (above, page 349) the United States planners in 1940-41 made an effort to provide for U.S. "strategic direction" in British Columbia. Immediately after Pearl Harbor an attempt was made to gain actual command there; the U.S. War Department asked the President to approach Mr. King with a

request that the defence of the province be placed under U.S. strategic control. Mr. Roosevelt, however, preferred that the matter should be handled initially through other channels; and Mayor LaGuardia then took it up with Colonel Biggar, suggesting that British Columbia be incorporated in the United States Western Theatre and that all Canadian army and air forces assigned to its defence, "except Air units assigned to over-water operations", be placed under the Theatre Commander, Lieut.-General John L. DeWitt. Biggar, in a very quick reply,\* reported that the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence had met on 3 January and decided that the matter required to be referred to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff.<sup>190</sup>

The Chiefs of Staff considered the question on 7 January, and saw no reason for so drastic a measure as the Americans had proposed. They pointed out that they had just conferred individually with their American opposite numbers in Washington on the Pacific defences (above, page 356) and had not gathered that there was any dissatisfaction with the present organization. Under ABC-22 they considered that command was no longer a matter for the P.J.B.D., but strictly for the Chiefs of Staff; and they did not propose to take any further action "unless or until this matter is brought to their attention by the United States Chiefs of Staff themselves".<sup>191</sup>

An attempt by General Embick to pursue the matter in correspondence with General Pope drew the answer that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff felt that a proposal of the sort that had been made would only be appropriate if the method of cooperation laid down in ABC-22 should break down.<sup>192</sup> At the meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence on 20 January 1942 the American representatives again raised the question of "possible developments" in the Pacific, and the "exposure of the West Coast to enemy attack":

The members of the United States Section expressed the opinion that in view of these possible developments it is advisable that unity of command be established over the ground forces on the West Coast and over the air forces assigned to support them in order to ensure that available means are so coordinated and employed as to afford the most effective defence. They are of the opinion that failure to provide such unified control subjects both British Columbia and Northwestern United States to an unnecessary hazard.

The members of the Canadian Section expressed their willingness to consider the possible developments referred to by the United States members with a view to determining the circumstances which would require unity of command and its appropriate scope, but were of opinion that although Japan might quite possibly attempt to harass the West Coast of North America, major land operations or invasion would not be practicable operations of war and therefore felt that the continued co-ordination of the military effort by mutual co-operation is adequate to meet the situation as now appreciated.<sup>193</sup>

This seems to have ended the matter.

### *Routes to Alaska*

A question which inevitably arose was that of military communications between the United States and its territory of Alaska across Western Canada. In various forms, this question was responsible for much international discussion and for a great proportion of the American military activity in Canada.

The Canadian Department of Transport had long had some interest in the possibility of an air route to Alaska, and in 1935 had conducted a survey of airfield

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\*Colonel Dziuban (page 120) is mistaken in thinking that Biggar made a sidelong reference to the absence of Canadian military representation in Washington. He mentioned the fact that the Chiefs were in Washington when he wrote and that the matter would be dealt with on their return.

sites, which might one day be used on a great-circle route to the Orient. Construction, undertaken in 1939, continued after the outbreak of war in Europe; and by 1941 small airfields existed at Grande Prairie, Alberta; Fort St. John and Fort Nelson, B.C.; and Watson Lake and Whitehorse, Yukon. The route was considered usable in daylight that September.<sup>194</sup>

From the early days of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, the United States Section took an interest in the development of this air route, and the Board's 10th Recommendation, 14 November 1940 (above, page 345) had advised that Canada develop the route "at the earliest possible date", providing two additional airfields, at Prince George and Smithers, west of the main route. Work began in February 1941. Late in July, by its 19th Recommendation, the Board, calling attention to "the recent change in the Far Eastern situation", recommended the completion of the airway to Alaska as a matter "of extreme urgency". The Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa approved this recommendation on 18 September. Before the proposed work could be completed, the Japanese attack took place, and the United States was compelled to use the route to send air reinforcements to Alaska. This was attempted in January 1942 with unfortunate results. Thanks to "the inexperience of the pilots, together with poor communications and inadequate landing fields along the route" there were heavy aircraft casualties. Five of 13 medium bombers dispatched were wrecked beyond repair in transit and casualties to pursuit planes were of the same order.<sup>195</sup>

From this time the improvement of the route was an important American and Canadian interest. There were, however, many complications. Some of them arose from the attempt of the United States to use civil airlines as instruments. As early as February 1942 the U.S. made a contract with Northwest Airlines for military transport services on the route to Alaska. At the meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on 25-26 February the Canadian Section undertook to obtain authority for such service; but before this could be done a Northwest Airlines aircraft landed at Edmonton without any Canadian clearances and was impounded. Difficulties continued for months, the Canadian authorities fearing that the American airline was in fact attempting to establish itself in Canada with a view to postwar advantages.<sup>196</sup> At the same time there was continued difficulty over responsibility for the development of the airfields. The United States, anxious for the quickest possible progress, would have liked to use American military engineers, but the Canadian authorities were doubtful. On 22 April 1942 the Cabinet War Committee had before it a request from Colonel Biggar for guidance on the question of financial responsibility; he was troubled lest acceptance of American offers to pay the cost involved might lead to postwar embarrassment. The Committee agreed that the United States should be allowed to pay for improvements required beyond Canadian standards, on condition of Canada retaining full title and control. This meant that the U.S. would pay for additional work on the existing airfields, but not for emergency landing grounds. The cost of defence installations in Canada used by Canadian forces, up to Canadian standards and requirements, would be paid for by Canada.

The United States air forces continued to be dissatisfied with the progress of construction, and to urge that U.S. Army engineers should be used. The matter was complicated by the opposition of Canadian labour organizations to such action. This seems to have prevented any consistent use of American troops during 1942. On 19 August, however, the Cabinet War Committee gave its approval for American construction of eight flight strips along the Alaska Highway.<sup>197</sup>

Early in 1943 the Americans were pressing for a change of policy on the North-West Staging Route, and on 24 February the Permanent Joint Board on Defence approved its 29th Recommendation to the effect that while the Canadian Department of Transport should be responsible for completing facilities on the route which its contractors were actually working on, "wherever possible and in order to expedite construction" U.S. engineer troops be used to assist. The Canadian government was unwilling to accept this recommendation as it stood. On 3 March the Cabinet War Committee deferred decision on it, partly because of lumber shortages. The same meeting considered an American request for an alternative air route to Alaska, related to the "Canol" project (below, page 384) and known as the "low-level" route, via the Mackenzie, Porcupine and Yukon Rivers. The Committee decided that no action should be taken without further examination and that officials of the departments concerned should be told that no major or substantial United States defence construction or installation in Canada should be undertaken until government approval had been obtained. It is evident that the extent and nature of American activity in the North-West were beginning to arouse some anxiety. The 29th Recommendation was in fact never approved by the Canadian government (above, page 347), but on 2 June 1943 the Cabinet War Committee agreed that while permanent construction on the North-West Staging Route should continue to be undertaken by the Canadian government with Canadian contractors and labour, other construction might be undertaken by the United States government. On 18 June the Committee considered new and expanded American proposals for the route. The project was now so large that in existing circumstances Canadian resources were not equal to carrying it out in the time available; and the Committee accordingly agreed that the Americans should do the work, with the proviso that in the Edmonton area (to avoid wage difficulties) they should carry out all construction with Canadian contractors and labour.

During the next few months, accordingly, the United States developed the North-West Staging Route very considerably, a major new project being a satellite airfield at Namao just north of Edmonton.<sup>198</sup> On 3 December the Cabinet War Committee agreed that Canada would not request or accept payment from the United States for construction of permanent facilities or improvements made by Canada for United States account on airfields in the north-west; and that the Canadian government wished to pay the United States for all construction of a permanent nature carried out by the U.S. government on air routes in North-West Canada. On 15 March 1944 the War Committee decided to revert to the policy of construction by "Canadian contractors and Canadian labour"; Canada would let all contracts for construction of a permanent nature. The American authorities protested this without complete success, but it was agreed that the U.S. would do the work at Fort St. John and Whitehorse. In June 1944 a further step was taken in the consolidation of Canadian control, when the R.C.A.F.'s North West Air Command was established with headquarters at Edmonton. It replaced No. 2 Wing Headquarters which had formerly been responsible for the North-West Staging Route. This was part of the process of re-establishing Canadian control of the fields on the Route, where traffic movement was largely under American direction; but even with American technical and supply help, the process was slow.<sup>199</sup>

On 29 February 1944 the Minister of Munitions and Supply, Mr. Howe, made a statement to the House of Commons explaining the government's decisions on finance and forecasting the total cost to the Canadian government of the Staging Route from Edmonton to Alaska at about \$46,000,000. Of this sum by far the

greater part had been expended in the first instance by the United States. To the spring of 1944 the U.S. spent on the Route somewhat over \$37,000,000, of which more than \$31,000,000 was calculated as being "of permanent value" and therefore subject to repayment by Canada. The greatest American expenditure at any single point was at Whitehorse, where over \$8,000,000 had been spent. Authorized Canadian expenditure on the North-West Staging Route to 31 March 1944 amounted to somewhat more than \$18,000,000, the largest single items being for Edmonton and Whitehorse.\*

In the course of the war the North-West Staging Route was valuable for the delivery of aircraft to the Soviet Union and for logistical support of American forces in Alaska and American projects in Western Canada. Far more aircraft for the Soviet Union than for the Alaska garrison were flown over the Route, but most of those delivered to Alaska were short-range types that could not have been delivered by air in any other way.

The second and minor staging route along the Mackenzie River, originating in landing strips built in conjunction with the Canol project (below, page 384), was built — so far as it was built — entirely by the United States. As we have seen (above, page 381) the Canadian government was unenthusiastic about this "low-level" route; and the United States itself withdrew the formal request for its construction only a month after it was made, explaining that it seemed better to concentrate the effort on the "principal route".<sup>200</sup>

The possibility of constructing a military highway from the United States to Alaska across Canadian territory was fairly actively canvassed in the years before 1939. Various routes were suggested and supported in accordance with regional interests; and many Canadians both inside and outside the government service had doubts about the project because of its possible implications for Canadian sovereignty.<sup>201</sup> In 1938 Canada and the U.S. both appointed commissions to study the plan in consultation. The Canadian commission submitted in 1941 a report mainly concerned with the question of routes.<sup>202</sup> It favoured, on balance, one adjacent to the airway already under construction.

After the collapse of France in 1940, the project was raised in the United States Congress. It was also considered by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, which however unanimously agreed (15 November 1940) that the military value of such a road would be "negligible". The U.S. War Department had long been of the same opinion.<sup>203</sup> At a later time the Canadian Chiefs of Staff considered the question, and on 4 February 1942 they made an adverse recommendation to the Defence Ministers:<sup>204</sup>

After careful review of the many considerations involved, and taking into account the fact that even if this highway could be completed during the present war, it would only indirectly affect the defence of the West Coast, we are of the opinion that the construction of this road by Canada is not warranted.

The United States was now at war, however, and at this moment its government was coming to the conclusion that the road was essential to American interests. We have already mentioned (above, page 348) the process by which approval was obtained, and noted that President Roosevelt apparently considered Canadian concurrence practically a foregone conclusion. The Canadian government's approval of the 24th Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (above,

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\*For a list of the North-West Staging Route airfields, with U.S. and Canadian expenditure to this period, see *Canada Year Book, 1945*, page 712.

page 346) could in fact have been confidently forecast, The Chiefs of Staff, while recalling that they had not favoured the road being built by Canada, now fully concurred in its being constructed by the United States on the terms proposed.<sup>205</sup> On 5 March the P.J.B.D. Recommendation came before the Cabinet War Committee, which was told that the United States government was pressing through diplomatic as well as service channels for early action. The Committee approved the Recommendation on the conditions proposed by the United States through the P.J.B.D. — mainly, that the U.S. pay the whole cost of building the road and maintaining it during the war; and that at the end of the war it would become "an integral part of the Canadian highway system".

On 17 and 18 March a formal international agreement was made by an exchange of notes between the U.S. Minister to Canada and the Prime Minister as Secretary of State for External Affairs.<sup>206</sup> By that time U.S. Army engineers had already undertaken a survey, and trainloads of American engineer troops were pouring into Canada to do the job.<sup>207</sup> Seven engineer regiments were used, totaling with the other units employed over 11,000 officers and men. The enormous task was carried out with remarkable speed. By the end of October 1942 a passable "pioneer road", 1428 miles long, had been completed between Dawson Creek, B.C., and Big Delta, Alaska. The engineer troops had been reinforced by a civilian construction organization working under the United States Public Roads Administration, which did most of the work of developing the pioneer road into the final highway, "an all-weather, gravel-surfaced road" averaging 26 feet in width. The highway was virtually completed by November 1943. The cost of construction had been almost \$1 16 million, while ancillary expenses amounted to about \$31.5 million more.<sup>208</sup>

The route was that recommended by the Permanent Joint Board, following the general line of the existing airway. It was of course strongly criticized by local interests which had contended for different lines. It had however the special and paramount advantage that a road built connecting the airfields would serve the task of developing and improving the airway, which essentially was much more important to the Allied war effort than the highway itself.

A great deal of traffic passed over the Alaska Highway during the war, particularly in its early years; American official historians state that during 1943 there were "approximately 17,000 government and civilian contractor trucks and several hundred commercial vehicles on the highway".<sup>209</sup> Nevertheless the road served primarily for the supply of the military and civilian construction forces and the airfields and other installations along the route. As a military route carrying supplies to Alaska, the highway was completely insignificant; it is stated that by the fall of 1943, by which time the Aleutian campaign was over and the importance of Alaska was rapidly declining, only 54 tons had been delivered to the Alaska Defence Command by motor transport.<sup>210</sup> When all due allowance has been made for the fact that the highway had been thought of after the Pearl Harbor disaster mainly as an emergency facility in the event of sea communications being interrupted, it still seems evident that the opinion often expressed earlier by Canadian and United States military authorities was thoroughly sound: apart from its utility in connection with the airway, there was no real military requirement whatever for the Alaska Highway.

Far more significant than the highway, by any practical standard, was the combined rail and sea route through Prince Rupert, B.C.

Prince Rupert, a Pacific terminus of the Canadian National Railways, had an excellent harbour and good rail connection with the interior of Canada and with the United States. Since it was 500 miles north of Seattle, there would be a very material economy in shipping involved in maintaining sea transport to Anchorage, Alaska, as compared with operations based on the American port.

At the meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence on 20 December 1941 the Canadian representatives inquired whether the United States would wish to use the port. Subsequently, at the meeting of 25-6 February 1942, the U.S. Section of the Board reported that the War Department had "decided to use Prince Rupert as an embarkation base in sending supplies, equipment and troops to Alaska". The volume of traffic was estimated at 2500 tons daily. The U.S. War Department had in fact on 20 February ordered Prince Rupert activated "as a subport of the Seattle Port of Embarkation".<sup>211</sup> The United States undertook a large construction programme at the port, including a personnel staging area at Port Edward nearby. Although the movement began slowly, vast quantities of American supplies, and great numbers of American military personnel, ultimately went to Alaska through Prince Rupert. At the peak, in July 1943, about 95,000 measurement tons went forward from the port, which also handled "over 12,600 military and civilian personnel arrivals and departures" in the course of the month. Thereafter the movement fell off. The total cargo shipped from Prince Rupert by or for the U.S. Army, from February 1942 to August 1945, both inclusive, is computed at 940,270 tons; this does not include bulk liquid cargoes.<sup>212</sup>

#### *Problems in the North-West*

The enormous communication projects which we have described caused a large influx of American military personnel and a great increase of American activity in Western Canada. Another major project, known as "Canol", had similar effects. This was a scheme for the production of oil from the Mackenzie River field at Norman Wells to meet American military requirements in Alaska and North-West Canada.

"Canol" was launched in the spring of 1942. It was undertaken in great haste and apparently with rather inadequate consideration. As we have already seen (above, page 348), it was never really considered by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence;\* the approach to Canada was made through ordinary diplomatic channels. On 16 May 1942 the matter was considered by the Cabinet War Committee on the basis of a request from the United States Minister in Ottawa. The plan involved the construction of a pipeline from Norman Wells to Whitehorse, which would cost approximately \$30,000,000. The Committee was told that some departments of the Canadian government had expressed doubts about the project, and these doubts had been placed, informally, before the United States Minister. However, it appears that the Minister of Munitions and Supply (Mr. C. D. Howe) had in fact, doubtless without intention, forced the government's hand; for on the previous day, under Opposition questioning, he had said in the House of Commons that arrangements had been made for further development of the Fort Norman field: "Additional wells are being drilled, the refinery capacity is being increased, and a short pipeline is being installed to bring the oil across to the location of the Alaska

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\*At the Board's 31st meeting, on 6 July 1942, an exchange of notes relative to the project, including an agreement for a supplementary pipeline from Skagway to Whitehorse, to carry to Alaska oil brought to Skagway by sea, was reported.

Highway." In these circumstances, the Committee's approval was recommended and given.

When Mr. Howe first heard about the project, or how far, if at all, he took it on himself to approve it, does not appear. But it is a remarkable fact that Lieut.-General Brehon B. Somervell, commanding the U.S. Army's Services of Supply, "directed the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, to carry out the project" on 30 April 1942, and that the U.S. Army the following day made a contract with the Imperial Oil Company to drill and operate the wells. This was over a fortnight before the question was presented to the Cabinet War Committee in Ottawa for consideration. It appears that the first informal U.S. request for approval was made on 1 May — the same day the contract was signed.<sup>213</sup> The Americans were acting with considerable assurance.

There is no need to tell the story of "Canol" here. The pipeline was built and much oil moved through it to the refinery which began work at Whitehorse in the spring of 1944. The whole operation came under serious criticism in the United States at an early date, and in 1943-44 it was severely criticized by a Special Committee of the United States Senate presided over by Senator Harry S. Truman.<sup>214</sup>

This great operation further enlarged the scope of American activity in the Canadian North-West. These works were somewhat alarming to the Canadian government if only because of the possible menace which they represented to the system of controls which Canada had successfully imposed on its wartime economy. Canada attempted to resolve some of the difficulties by the establishment in February 1943 of a Crown company, North-West Purchasing Limited, to buy at non-competitive prices all the requirements for the air staging route and other military construction in the North-West. This experiment was only partly successful, since neither the American authorities on the spot nor local Canadian merchants were anxious for purchasing to be conducted on a non-competitive basis. As time passed, however, the Americans found the company valuable and were glad to make use of it.<sup>215</sup> On 17 May 1943, in an attempt to stabilize wages and prices, the government established a Western Labour Board at Edmonton and invited the United States to appoint a representative to it as a special consultant.<sup>216</sup>

Aside from the economic aspects, Canadian officials were troubled by a tendency on the part of Americans to disregard Canadian sovereignty. American officers and officials, very properly interested in getting on with their jobs as rapidly as possible, and no doubt inadequately briefed on international matters by their superiors, were sometimes as little disposed to worry about respecting Canadian national rights as they were to concern themselves with avoiding disturbance to the Canadian economy, and acted as if they were on their own soil. The fashion in which the Canol scheme was initiated is itself an example, and there were a good many others. Thus on 7 October 1942 the Cabinet War Committee took note of a report that a succession of projects had been put in hand without reference to Canada: seven "aerodromes" connected with Canol, a pipeline from Skagway to Watson Lake, and an all-weather road from Fort Norman to Norman Wells.<sup>217</sup> The Committee "agreed that the Canadian government should, in all such instances, be consulted in advance". But it was easier to make such decisions than to enforce them.

An early organ for the surveillance of such matters was provided by the institution in June 1942 of the Joint Defence Construction Projects Panel (above, page 128). But this panel met in Ottawa and was not closely in touch with the situation in the North-West. In due course something more seemed to be required.

On 31 March 1943 the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, attended a meeting of the Cabinet War Committee and the Prime Minister invited him to report on a visit he had lately made to the North-West. This in itself was a matter of some note, as it was rather unusual for Mr. King to pay such deference to the views of a British official. MacDonald expressed concern as to the results of the immense United States activity in the North-West. The scale of the programme, he said, could not be appreciated without actual experience, and it seemed to him quite evident that these vast undertakings were being planned and carried out with a view to the post-war situation. Canadian representatives in the area, he said, were few, and quite unable to keep control or even to maintain touch with day-to-day developments. He felt that the Canadian government might well send a special official to the North-West to review the question and report.

At the Committee's next meeting, on 7 April, the matter was further discussed and it was reported that the Deputy Minister of Mines and Resources (Dr. Charles Camsell) was to be asked to make a report on the present situation. Dr. Camsell presented his report on 16 April, and the Committee then agreed as follows:

- “(a) That all U.S. and joint defence undertakings in the Canadian Northwest be the subject of specific agreement between the two governments;
- “(b) that Canada participate as actively as possible in the actual programme of development in the area; and,
- “(c) that the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Secretary [of the Committee], in consultation with departments concerned, prepare a draft submission to Council to provide for the appointment of a commissioner, responsible directly to the War Committee, to represent the government in the area, together with appropriate recommendations as to the instructions to be given such commissioner.”

On 5 May the Prime Minister reported to the Committee that Brigadier W. W. Foster had agreed to accept appointment as Special Commissioner for Defence Projects in the North-West.

On 19 May the War Committee approved instructions for Brigadier Foster (who was shortly promoted Major General). He was to ensure that all requests from the United States for permission to launch new projects or expand existing ones were referred to the Canadian government through established channels (the Department of External Affairs or the Permanent Joint Board on Defence). Where requests had no major significance, Brigadier Foster himself might decide whether they should be granted. The economic problems already noted were called to his attention. And he was told, "The Canadian Government desires to ensure that the natural resources of the area shall be utilized to provide the maximum benefit for the Canadian people and to ensure that no commitments are made and no situation allowed to develop as a result of which the full Canadian control of the area would be in any way prejudiced or endangered."<sup>218</sup>

To the American authorities the appointment of General Foster appeared as intended to improve and simplify liaison with United States agencies in the North-West, to centralize Canadian authority in the area and at the same time to delegate authority from Ottawa. There is very little doubt that in fact the appointment had all these effects and did make for better relations with the Americans in the area. It is evident, however, that the Canadian government's main object in making it was to provide more effective control over American activities in the North-West and more effective protection for Canadian sovereignty.

General Foster set to work at once, establishing his office in Edmonton; and his first report<sup>219</sup> was considered by the War Committee on 2 July 1943. His

advent appears to have had most useful results. The Americans were pleased to have in the North-West a Canadian official with wide powers with whom they could deal locally, and they found Foster agreeable and cooperative.<sup>220</sup> From the Canadian point of view there was certainly better control and coordination of American projects and activities from the time of Foster's appointment. Nevertheless, occasional complaints of unauthorized American activity continued to be made. On 16 December 1943, for example, it was reported to the Cabinet War Committee that the United States was constructing five landing strips along the Canol pipeline without any approval from the Canadian government, and the Committee agreed that an appropriate protest should be made to Washington. On 21 December, however, the Committee was told that, while there was no formal authority, the American plans had been known for some time to officials of the Department of Transport and the Department of National Defence for Air. Fuller information was being obtained before the matter was raised formally with the United States. On 5 January 1944 the War Committee heard that the United States was now requesting authority for grading the landing strips in question, of which only one had so far actually been graded. The Committee decided that the Special Commissioner should be empowered to deal with such requests without reference to Ottawa.

Mr. King, in spite of his friendship with Mr. Roosevelt and an evident disposition to place a favourable interpretation on American activities affecting Canada, was, in the words of one of his biographers, "never without suspicions of the ultimate designs of the Americans".<sup>221</sup> He recorded in his diary that on 30 December 1942 he took exception in the War Committee to a proposal for joint study with the United States of the territory opened up by the Alaska Highway. Referring to "the efforts that would be made by the Americans to control developments in our country after the war, and to bring Canada out of the orbit of the British Commonwealth of Nations into their own orbit", the Prime Minister wrote:

I am strongly opposed to anything of the kind. I want to see Canada continue to develop as a nation, to be, in time, as our country certainly will, the greatest of nations of the British Commonwealth.

He took a similar line in February and March 1944 when the Canol project was being actively discussed in the War Committee. He wrote that he "held strongly with one or two others to the view that we ought to get the Americans out of the further development there, and keep complete control in our own hands. . . . With the United States so powerful and her investments becoming greater in Canada, we will have a great difficulty to hold our own against pressure from the United States."<sup>222</sup> The tendency to presume which many Canadians felt in American war-time actions was not wholly absent even from Roosevelt's personal attitude as King saw it. In his diary for 11 September 1944 he recorded their meeting on Roosevelt's arrival for the Second Quebec' Conference: "The President said at once: I wanted to see you first; also to be ahead of Winston, so I gave orders to have the car moved in. It seemed to me that the President was rather assuming that he was in his own country."

7 It is not surprising that apprehensions should have existed in the Prime Minister's mind. As Malcolm MacDonald had said, the American projects in Canada were on an enormous scale; a list of "United States Defence Projects in Canada", dated 6 May 1943,<sup>223</sup> is an impressive document. At the same period (3 May 1943) the number of U.S. Army personnel working in North-West Canada was

reported as approximately 33,000.<sup>224</sup> This included engineer troops, Army Air Forces transport personnel, and civilian employees of the Corps of Engineers or American contractors. It did not include the troops at the Prince Rupert subport.

## 8. DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE PREPARATIONS AND OPERATIONS

On the whole there were, as we have said above, remarkably few contacts between Canadian and United States forces in the course of active operations against the enemy. Most Canadians did their fighting under higher British command. The few operations in which Canadian and American forces were closely associated took place chiefly in the Pacific. Most of them are dealt with in the Canadian Army's History and will be merely mentioned here.

There was ample cooperation between the two nations' forces on the West Coast in the matter of coast defence, but it is scarcely necessary to explore this matter in detail here, particularly as the defences were never tested by an enemy attack. It is enough to say that during the war there was very close liaison between the defenders on the two sides of the border. This was particularly the case with respect to Juan de Fuca Strait. It will be remembered that the defences here were the main subject of discussion between the Canadian and U.S. Chiefs of staff at the time of their first contact in 1938 (above, page 97). In the period of closer contact initiated by the Ogdensburg Conference, there was much joint planning with reference to this area, and the Americans lent guns to improve the armament on the Canadian side. After Pearl Harbor there was further joint development, and close liaison between the commanders on the two sides of the Strait. In case of seaborne attack, the gun defences in Canada and the United States could have cooperated very effectively, but the guns' mere presence made such attack very improbable.<sup>225</sup>

The United States also cooperated in providing additional armament for the protection of Prince Rupert, where two 8-inch railway guns arrived on 24 March 1942. After the movement of large American forces into the Prince Rupert area, a joint local committee of Canadian and United States officers was formed to consider defence and other problems there. The Prince Rupert Defences were of course commanded by a Canadian officer, and a local defence scheme dated 26 October 1942 provided that he would exercise command in an emergency over all troops in the area.<sup>226</sup>

In the period of anxiety after Pearl Harbor, units of both the Canadian Army and the R.C.A.F. moved into Alaska to assist in providing against Japanese attack. In May 1942, No. 115 Fighter Squadron, R.C.A.F., was sent to the American airfield on Annette Island at the south end of the Alaskan Panhandle, an area important to the defence of Prince Rupert. No. 118 Squadron joined it there in June. At the beginning of June, a detachment of Canadian anti-aircraft gunners was dispatched to protect Annette. The Canadian armament there rose to eight Bofors guns which were finally withdrawn only in November 1943. For a time in 1942-43 there was also a Canadian heavy anti-aircraft battery and an infantry detachment at Annette.<sup>227</sup>

Late in May 1942 intelligence arrived of an intended major Japanese offensive movement which involved a stroke at Midway Island combined with a secondary operation against the Aleutian Islands. In this crisis General DeWitt of the U.S.

Western Defense Command asked urgently on 29 May for two R.C.A.F. squadrons to help meet the expected attack. Major-General R. O. Alexander as C.-in-C. West Coast Defences telephoned Air Force Headquarters in Ottawa. The Chiefs of Staff Committee considered the request at once, and acted generally in accordance with decisions made earlier with such an emergency in view.\* They decided to send two R.C.A.F. squadrons, from Sea Island and Patricia Bay, to Annette Island, but to hold them there under R.C.A.F. control prepared to move farther north should the situation develop. Two other squadrons would be brought from Dartmouth, N.S., and Ottawa to Sea Island and Patricia Bay. These arrangements were approved by the Minister of National Defence for Air, Major Power.<sup>228</sup>

DeWitt considered these measures inadequate. He now appealed to the War Department in Washington to intercede with Ottawa, and General Embick, the U.S. Army member of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, on 1 June telephoned Air Commodore Heakes, the R.C.A.F. member, invoking paragraph 7 of ABC-22 (above, page 353) and begging him to arrange to release the two squadrons, at least until 8 June. As a result Major Power and the Chiefs of Staff (who were consulted individually) changed their minds and ordered the two R.C.A.F. squadrons to Yakutat at once.<sup>229</sup> The Cabinet War Committee was informed on 3 June that the initial refusal was due to the fact that the Joint Service Committee, Pacific Coast, had taken the view that these squadrons should not move north of Annette Island until the reinforcements ordered from the East Coast were available to cover the Prince Rupert area.

The War Committee was told that although further requests from the United States might be expected, it would not be possible to send additional air support without seriously depleting the available strength on the East Coast, where the squadrons available were fully engaged on anti-submarine work. Nevertheless, the reconnaissance squadrons there were being made ready to move west in case of emergency. The Chief of the Naval Staff reported that the U.S. naval commander at Seattle had already been told that the few Canadian vessels on that coast, and the Canadian port facilities there, were at U.S. disposal. The Committee approved the measures that had been taken, and while it agreed that "further diversions should not be made at present", it also decided that in the event of an emergency the Ministers of National Defence should be authorized to act immediately on their own judgment; and that, in the event of an attack on United States territory, Canada would "provide every possible assistance".

The procedure followed in this crisis deserves some comment. The channel used by the Americans in their approach to Ottawa was irregular; control of operations and the movement of units was no business of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, and the appropriate channel would have been from Chief of Staff to Chief of Staff. General Embick's special standing in the War Department and with the

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\*On 14 May the War Committee had considered comments by the Canadian Air Staff on the fact that at the P.J.B.D. meeting of 27 April a U.S. representative had appeared to place on Canada the onus of providing air reinforcement in the event of attack upon Alaska. The Air Staff stated that no Canadian reserve was available for major commitments in Alaska; defence there would have to be a primary concern of the United States, and Canadian reinforcement would have to be limited to local support in the Panhandle. The Committee directed that these comments should be called to the P.J.B.D.'s attention; but they appear in the Journal of the Board's 30th meeting (26-7 May) in a perhaps too-diplomatic form. Air Commodore Heakes "reported that plans have been made by the local Royal Canadian Air Force Commander with the United States Army Air Corps Commander such as to permit the reinforcement of Alaska promptly and to the maximum extent possible in the circumstances. It was agreed that there was no intention of affecting the basic responsibilities for the defence of Alaska as defined in Plan ABC-22."

President may provide the explanation. Nevertheless it is interesting to see the personal relationships established through the P.J.B.D. being so influential at this point, and from the American point of view the procedure followed was thoroughly effective.

The Canadian military authorities themselves were adopting irregular expedients at this moment. We have seen how the Chief of the General Staff, Lieut.-General Stuart, went west at the end of May and acted throughout the summer as G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command and Commander-in-Chief, West Coast Defences, without giving up the appointment of C.G.S. He thus superseded General Alexander,\* who was appointed Inspector General for Central Canada as of 1 July. These arrangements cannot have made for efficient functioning of the Chiefs of Staff organization in Ottawa at this crisis (above, page 134).

The movement of Canadian air units into Alaska early in June 1942 proved to be the beginning of a considerable active intervention in the Aleutian campaign. The defeat of the Japanese in the battle of Midway (4 June) was crushing, but on that same day and the previous one they bombed Dutch Harbor in the Aleutians, and on the 6th and 7th they occupied Kiska and Attu Islands there. The R.C.A.F. squadrons did not go back to Annette on the 8th; on the 5th, following a "request" (actually an order) from General Buckner, commanding in Alaska, to the officer commanding the wing, it was agreed that they should go on to Anchorage. The Air Officer Commanding Western Air Command and the C.-in-C. West Coast Defences (presumably in practice General Stuart) both advised holding the squadrons at Yakutat, but the Deputy Chief of the Air Staff in Ottawa recorded, "I have discussed this with the Minister [Mr. Power] and Chiefs of Staff. All agree that the request of General Buckner should be met."<sup>230</sup> In July part of No. 111 Squadron moved farther on, to Umnak, and in September it mounted its first operation against Kiska, from Adak. From March 1943, personnel of two R.C.A.F. fighter squadrons alternated in operations based on Amchitka against the Japanese on Attu and Kiska. The R.C.A.F. had only one air combat, in which a Japanese aircraft was shot down. There were however relatively heavy casualties caused by the Aleutian weather. In these operations the R.C.A.F. units naturally and inevitably worked under United States operational command, apparently without any serious difficulties.<sup>231</sup> The Minister of National Defence had reported to the Cabinet War Committee on 3 June 1942 that no request for unified command on the West Coast, such as had been made earlier (above, page 379) had been received from the United States; but it was assumed that Canadian forces serving on United States territory would be under U.S. command. The general command situation is described in a review by the A.O.C. Western Air Command written in February 1943:

Group Captain G. R. McGregor, who has been commanding the R.C.A.F. Wing in Northern Alaska, is coming South to command Patricia Bay and Acting Wing Commander [R. E. E.] Morrow is replacing him in Alaska and will join General [W. O.] Butler's Headquarters at Kodiak. From this position he can maintain general supervision of the two R.C.A.F. Squadrons which, of necessity, must be under the operational control of United States General, Commanding 11th Air Force.<sup>232</sup>

In the later stages of the Aleutian campaign the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Army as well as the Royal Canadian Air Force played parts, though they did not prove rewarding. The three Canadian armed merchant cruisers, and

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\*The General Staff war diary of H.Q. Pacific Command records that Stuart temporarily assumed the duties of G.O.C.-in-C. on 16 June.

two corvettes, worked under U.S. naval command (above, page 389), having no contact with the enemy but, like the R.C.A.F., more than enough with Aleutian weather.<sup>233</sup> The story of the expedition against Kiska is told in the Army history\* and does not need to be retold here. One or two aspects of it, however, deserve a word of comment. Mr. King's diary reveals, more fully than the records of the War Committee, his displeasure at the original proposal for Canadian participation in this expedition having been discussed through military channels and through members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. King "took the position very strongly that the Joint Defence Board had no right to take any step which entered the field of strategy and operations. . . . Next, I objected strongly to our Chiefs of Staff and others of the High Command in Canada negotiating with corresponding numbers in the U.S. before the Minister had a full knowledge of what was proposed, the War Committee included [sic], and, most of all, myself as the Prime Minister".<sup>234</sup> The Chief of the General Staff, General Stuart, explained at this meeting (27 May) that the discussions with American officers had taken place on his own responsibility, that they were purely exploratory, and that no commitments had been made. He might have added that the first low-level approaches came from the American side.<sup>235</sup> To explore the possibilities before putting a project forward for consideration was surely not a grave crime; but King seems to have come very close to thinking that it was.

The Committee's decision was that the government would be prepared to "receive and consider" a proposal from the United States government for Canadian participation; and the Canadian representatives in Washington were able to obtain an invitation written by the U.S. Secretary of War to the Canadian Minister of National Defence. This procedure was adopted in deference to the wishes of the Canadian government and in spite of the fact that it had caused some initial surprise in Washington, where such matters were usually dealt with through exclusively military channels.<sup>236</sup>

Although the Kiska expedition ended in fiasco — the Japanese having evacuated the island before the attack was made — it provided an example (the first example) of a Canadian force operating in the field under United States higher command and on U.S. organization. The Canadian commander was given wide emergency powers allowing him the right of reference to his government through Pacific Command Headquarters, and in "extraordinary circumstances" the right of withdrawal from the undertaking. Such powers could only have been exercised in extreme cases, and no occasion for using them ever arose. The general relationship with the higher U.S. command and with the American force at large was pleasant and satisfactory.<sup>237</sup>

In Part I of this book (above, pages 54-62) we have described the planning for Canadian participation in the anticipated final operations against Japan, which, as it turned out, never took place. This phase might have provided something unprecedented in Canadian history: operations by a comparatively large Canadian ground force under United States higher command and using United States organization and equipment. But fate, which had decreed that the Kiska force would not fight, decreed also that the larger Canadian Army Pacific Force never came into full existence.

One word may be said here about that unique experiment known as the First Special Service Force. This remarkable organization, whose personnel came partly

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\**Six Years of War*, Chap. XV.

from the Canadian and partly from the United States Army, did meet the enemy and acquitted itself extremely well. Its story, a rather fascinating incident in the story of Canadian-American relations and of the two armies concerned, is also related in the Canadian Army history.\* The First Special Service Force was a fine fighting unit, and the relations of Canadians and Americans within it seem to have left very little to be desired. Nevertheless, the administrative and other difficulties that were encountered in connection with it — in matters of pay, decorations, and the tendency of the United States to regard Canadian members of this international unit as Canadians serving in the U.S. Army — suggest that any such enterprise should not be undertaken on another occasion without careful thought.

## 9. PROBLEMS OF LEGAL STATUS AND JURISDICTION

With such very large numbers of United States troops stationed on Canadian soil (above, page 388), the question of their status with respect to Canadian law was certain to arise and to cause a degree of difficulty. It did in fact occasion much discussion between the two governments and was not finally disposed of until late in 1943.

We have already mentioned that whereas before the outbreak of war an adequate basis for legal relationships between Canadian forces and those of other Commonwealth countries existed in the form of the Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Acts, there was no such basis in respect of the United States forces (above, page 203). In developing an American relationship, the Canadian authorities were presumably influenced in some degree by their experience with the parallel Commonwealth relationship, but this proved in practice to have little relevance.

As we have seen, within the framework of the Visiting Forces Acts there was little difficulty in working out satisfactory bases for jurisdiction over the very large numbers of Canadian military personnel stationed in England and the Britons (chiefly airmen) who came to Canada. The Canadian forces, while exercising complete jurisdiction over their own troops in matters of military offences, accepted the jurisdiction of British civil courts even in cases of capital offences, and as we have seen there were cases of Canadian soldiers convicted of murder being executed by the judgement of United Kingdom courts (above, page 251). This was one respect in which the Commonwealth relationship stood for something practical, and Canadians in general had such confidence in British justice that this situation aroused no serious protest. But when United States forces came to be stationed in the United Kingdom, their government, not unnaturally, took a different attitude, claiming the right that a United States serviceman accused of any offence whatever should be tried in a United States service court. This principle was accepted by the United Kingdom in The United States of America (Visiting Forces) Act† passed by Parliament in the summer of 1942.<sup>238</sup> It took rather longer for Canada to accept it.

Before the United States entered the war, men of a good many other Allied countries' forces were stationed in Canada — many of them for air training — and the problem of jurisdiction over them was dealt with in April 1941 by a Canadian order in council known as The Foreign Forces Order, 1941.<sup>239</sup> This

\**Six Years of War*, pages 104-8 and 501, and *The Canadians in Italy*, pages 453-7 and 666-71.

†The eminent British jurist Lord Atkin, in a letter to *The Times* (London) published on 3 August 1942, said of this act, "It is a proposal unique in the constitutional history of this country, but the Government of the United States have been so ungrudging in the aid given to this country that if they express a desire for such legislation no one would hesitate to grant it."

made provision for the service courts and service authorities of friendly foreign forces present in Canada to exercise, in relation to members of those forces, "in matters concerning discipline and internal administration, all such powers as are conferred upon them by the law" of the foreign country concerned. The Order proceeded to provide that such courts or authorities should not have jurisdiction "in respect of any acts or omissions which would constitute the offences of murder, manslaughter or rape under the Criminal Code", while there were also some limitations on the imposition of the death penalty for other offences. The Order went on,

Nothing in the last preceding section shall affect the jurisdiction of any civil court in Canada to try a member of any foreign force for any act or omission constituting an offence against any law in force in Canada.

The situation thus established was roughly parallel to that accepted by the Canadian government in respect of Canadian forces in Britain.

After Pearl Harbor, when United States forces were sent into Canada in considerable numbers in connection with the construction of the Alaska Highway and other projects, the question of jurisdiction over them immediately arose. The first Canadian action was to issue on 26 June 1942, "as an interim measure", an order in council<sup>240</sup> designating the United States of America "as a foreign Power to which The Foreign Forces Order, 1941, shall apply". This established a legal status for United States military courts within Canada, but left them subject to the limitations prescribed by the Foreign Forces Order.\* This situation the United States was not disposed to accept, and it pressed for a change in Canadian policy parallel to that which the United Kingdom accepted by its statute passed in the following August.<sup>241</sup>

Presumably because of apprehension that Canadian public opinion would be hostile to allowing U.S. service courts in Canada jurisdiction concerning offences committed by U.S. servicemen against Canadians, the government was reluctant to make this concession. On 16 December 1942 the Cabinet War Committee considered the American request for what its records call "exclusive and unlimited criminal jurisdiction", and noted that the U.S. authorities were offering a reciprocal arrangement with respect to Canadian forces in the United States. The matter was referred to the full Cabinet. When the War Committee next dealt with it, on 4 February 1943, it took note of the fact that on 22 December the Cabinet had decided that the government could not agree to the United States' request. The matter had now been informally explored further by the Canadian Legation in Washington. It had been pointed out that the United States had agreements of the type requested with practically all other countries where U.S. troops were serving; yet Canada was the only nation that had been offered reciprocity. The State Department hoped that the Canadian government would reconsider its position. The Committee decided, however, that the Cabinet decision of 22 December should stand. It was agreed that, before a formal note was sent to the United States, the Canadian Minister in Washington should be instructed "to explain the views of the Canadian government, informally, to the U.S. Secretary of State and the President, with a view to obtaining, if possible, the withdrawal of the formal request submitted".

On 11 March the War Committee considered the matter again. It was reported that an agreement had been reached, but subsequently information had been

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\*Contrary to the impression given by Colonel Dziuban (*Military Relations Between the United States and Canada*, page 297), the new order did not specifically re-assert the powers of Canadian civil courts over U.S. servicemen.

received from Washington that, for constitutional and other reasons, the United States could not grant Canada the measure of reciprocal treatment which had been agreed upon. The matter was deferred, but on 25 March the Committee decided to make a large concession to the United States. The Foreign Forces Order was to be amended, with respect to the United States, to permit American courts to try cases concerning the major crimes; and the Supreme Court of Canada was to be asked to give an opinion on the extent of the government's legal powers in the matter. Accordingly, on 6 April, a new order in council<sup>242</sup> discriminating in favour of the United States exempted its forces from the proviso in the Foreign Forces Order which denied foreign service courts jurisdiction in cases of murder, man-slaughter or rape and also limited the imposition of the death penalty. The order also declared that the Foreign Forces Order should not be construed "as prejudicing or curtailing in any respect whatsoever any claim to immunity" from the operation of Canadian law by members of the U.S. forces. In August the Supreme Court of Canada rendered the opinion requested by the government, The judges disagreed as to whether members of the American forces in Canada could properly be considered exempt from criminal proceedings prosecuted in Canadian criminal courts; but they had no doubt that both Parliament on one hand and the Governor General in Council, acting under the War Measures Act, on the other, had the authority to enact legislation, similar to that of the United Kingdom, granting such exemption to United States forces.<sup>243</sup> Further action was not taken until the United States had exerted more diplomatic pressure; but on 20 December 1943 another Canadian order in council<sup>244</sup> was made which gave the United States everything it had asked for. Its most important provision ran:

3. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 3 of the Foreign Forces Order, 1941, a service court of the United States of America shall have jurisdiction to try all members of its forces in Canada in respect of every offence committed by any of its members in Canada.

It was further provided that after a request in writing had been made by a competent United States officer for the surrender of a member of the United States forces detained by any Canadian authority, "no criminal proceedings shall be prosecuted in Canada before any court of Canada against the said member based on the offence in respect of which the said member was detained".

The United States was reluctant to pass legislation providing for reciprocity, for, in the words of an American historian, it "considered the basic privileges already to be available to Canada without agreement or legislative or other action, since Canadian forces, in the U.S. view, possessed such privileges under international law, which was deemed to be a part of the law of the United States".<sup>245</sup> There was some support for this point of view in the opinions lately expressed by the Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada. Nevertheless, in 1944 the United States Congress enacted Public Law 384 (78th Congress, Chapter 326, 2d Session), "To implement the jurisdiction of service courts of friendly foreign forces within the United States, and for other purposes". This authorized the arrest of members of foreign forces having service courts within the United States "for trial in such service courts within the United States for such offenses as shall lie within the jurisdiction of the service courts of such friendly foreign force". Provision was made for compelling the attendance of witnesses and otherwise supporting the jurisdiction of the foreign service courts. In October 1944 President Roosevelt by proclamation made the provisions of this act applicable to Canada and the United Kingdom.<sup>246</sup>

On the whole, the arrangements thus rather painfully arrived at appear to have worked well. Since there were few Canadian servicemen in the United States, and many American servicemen in Canada, the problem chiefly concerned the latter situation. There were doubtless some cases in which there was criticism Of the adequacy of the punishments awarded by United States service courts for offences committed in Canada; but such complaints seem to have been few.\*

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\*In 1947 the Parliament of Canada passed the Visiting Forces (United States of America) Act, to provide for the situation created by the presence of U.S. forces in Canada in peacetime. This act (Revised Statutes of Canada, 1952, Chap. 285) did not exempt United States servicemen from the jurisdiction of Canadian civil courts.

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## Part VII

### MANPOWER AND CONSCRIPTION

#### 1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROBLEMS AND POLICIES, 1939-1942

THE SUBJECT of this Part is inevitably complex and contentious.\* Much of the story, however, has been told in earlier sections of this book. Notably, in Part I the development of the controversy has been outlined in general terms. The Army history deals with the question through 1943 in *Six Years of War*. The detail is not repeated here. However, that history left aside certain special matters, including inter-service aspects of the subject and measures taken to ensure economical and efficient use of manpower. These are dealt with in the present Part, which also concerns itself with the final stages of the Army manpower question, "when it assumed the proportions of a crisis and became a national problem of the most serious nature".<sup>1</sup> An effort is made to relate service manpower policy to national manpower policies as a whole.

The attempt of the writer has been to deal with this thorny topic from a military rather than a political point of view, and he certainly has no desire to make a contribution to party history. The reader will easily appreciate, however, that manpower in 1939-45 is one field in which it is unusually difficult to make a clear and satisfactory distinction between military and political history. In particular, it is impossible to understand the development of manpower policy without some attention to conditions inside the government.

In Part I (above, page 5) we noted how seriously the manpower question embarrassed Canadian political leaders as war approached. We also made the point that in March 1939 the leaders of the two major political parties found a formula to meet the immediate situation: a combination of resolution to take part in the coming war at the side of Britain with a commitment not to conscript Canadians for service Overseas.†

This formula, we have seen (above, page 6) was first enunciated by the Conservative leader, Dr. R. J. Manion — who was eager to improve his party's position in the province of Quebec — in an interview given to the Toronto *Telegram* on 27 March 1939. Dr. Manion's statement, however, preceded by only three days a similar declaration by the Prime Minister, and it was apparently specifically

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\*Part VII is based to a large extent on excellent documented narratives written by Dr. J. M. Hitsman, to whom I am also indebted for a great deal of other assistance.

†In the Bennett Papers there is a letter written by W. D. Herridge to R. B. Bennett's Private Secretary, R. K. Finlayson on 8 October 1935 (i.e., in the later stages of the general election campaign of that year, and in the midst of the Ethiopian crisis). Herridge urges that Bennett should make a statement "that hereafter, no compulsion will be put upon any Canadian to leave the shores of Canada to engage in a war in Europe or elsewhere". I owe this reference to Mr. F. W. J. Major. One would like to know what connection, if any, there is between Herridge's idea in 1935 and Manion's initiative in 1939.

intended to anticipate such a declaration. On 31 March Manion wrote to his son James that he had been "tipped off on Sunday night [26 March] that King was coming out anti-conscription and Lapointe was coming out in support of the idea that there could be no neutrality" in a war in which Great Britain was involved; he accordingly made his statement first.<sup>2</sup>

It was in the House of Commons on 30 March 1939 that Mr. King made his own statement:

One strategic fact is clear: the days of great expeditionary forces of infantry crossing the oceans are not likely to recur. Two years ago, I expressed in this house the view that it was extremely doubtful if any of the British Dominions would ever send another expeditionary force to Europe. . . . Profits could and would be rigidly controlled, and profiteering suppressed. But men's lives and men's wills cannot be put on the same basis as goods and profits. The present government believes that conscription of men for overseas service would not be a necessary or an effective step. Let me say that so long as this government may be in power, no such measure will be enacted.

In the same debate Dr. Manion reiterated his declaration of three days before.

After the outbreak of war in Europe, the Prime Minister solemnly repeated his undertaking. Speaking in the House of Commons on 8 September, he said:

I wish now to repeat the undertaking I gave in parliament on behalf of the government on March 30 last. The present government believe that conscription of men for overseas service will not be a necessary or an effective step. No such measure will be introduced by the present administration. We have full faith in the readiness of Canadian men and women to put forward every effort in their power to preserve and defend free institutions, and in particular to resist aggression on the part of a tyrannical regime which aims at the domination of the world by force. The government, as representing the people of Canada, will use their authority and power to the utmost in promoting the most effective organized effort toward these imperative ends.

Thus both the government and the official Opposition were fully committed at the outbreak of war to a manpower policy involving repudiation of conscription for overseas service. Many Canadians were still unemployed, and there was no difficulty in obtaining as many men as the government wished to enlist; army recruiting was virtually suspended at a very-early date.<sup>3</sup> The public seemed as little disposed as the politicians to demand a policy of compulsion. In the general election campaign in the late winter of 1939-40 (above, page 11) Dr. Manion reiterated his opposition to conscription;<sup>4</sup> it appears that at the beginning of the campaign the Conservative parliamentary caucus endorsed this policy with enthusiasm;<sup>5</sup> but Manion's personal defeat, and his subsequent retirement as Conservative leader, would make it easier for the Opposition in parliament to espouse a different, policy if it chose.\*

Canadian manpower policy, and the views of politicians and the public upon it, were inevitably to be deeply affected by the course of the war abroad. During the so-called "phony war" few people thought about compulsory service. The first of the successive crises which changed the situation was the Allied disasters in Europe in the spring and early summer of 1940. We have described the manner in which the collapse of France and the Dunkirk evacuation led both government and Opposition in Canada to the conclusion that compulsory military service for home defence was now necessary. This conclusion was implemented by the passage of the National Resources Mobilization Act (21 June 1940). The effect of this

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\*I am grateful to Mr. J. L. Granatstein for allowing me to read and make use of his thesis on the Conservative party in the war period, which has since been published under the title *The Politics of Survival*.

statute (above, page 33), was to legalize compulsory service at home while still maintaining the position that no Canadian could be compelled to serve abroad. The first great change of policy was thus carried out without affecting in any way the government's existing pledges. Under the new law, men were being called Up for home defence from September 1940 onwards: in the first instance, for thirty days' training only, but after January 1941 for four months and after April 1941 for permanent duty in Canada. Many of the men thus called chose to "go active" and volunteer for general service; throughout the war a total of 58,348 men called up under the N.R.M.A. volunteered in this manner for the Army, either on receiving their call-up orders or after a period of service. The Navy got 747 such volunteers and the Air Force 5079.<sup>6</sup>

As a result of these developments, the active Canadian Army came to be composed of two categories of soldier: the general-service man, available for duty anywhere, and the N.R.M.A. soldier, compulsorily enlisted, who could not be sent abroad. Thus the army built up overseas with a view to taking part in the process of defeating the enemy in the field was entirely composed of general-service men; whereas the force created in Canada for home defence, which as we have seen was greatly enlarged during 1942 (above, page 47), was composed partly of general-service men but mainly and increasingly of N.R.M.A. soldiers.

From the summer of 1940 onwards the services were expanding rapidly. The Navy and the Air Force had no difficulty in obtaining the men they needed. Neither did the Army in the exciting days of 1940, when volunteers came forward in great numbers. By the spring of 1941, however, some difficulty was being encountered in obtaining the men necessary for the new army programme, and on 8 April the Ministers for the three services made a broadcast on manpower needs; the calculation was that 116,000 recruits were needed during the coming year — 72,000 for the Army, 35,000 for the Air Force, and 9000 for the Navy. From this time recruiting was an urgent matter for the Army and special publicity expedients were constantly being devised to encourage men to enlist. These expedients were adequately effective for a long period. General-service enlistments for the Canadian Army, including conversions from N.R.M.A. and enlistments in the Canadian Women's Army Corps, numbered 93,529 in 1941 and 130,438 in 1942. This latter figure was the largest for any calendar year of the war, a little higher than 1940, when the total had been 121,823. We shall see, however, that it was only achieved by steadily widening the field of call-up under the N.R.M.A. In 1943 enlistments began to decline seriously.<sup>7</sup>

## 2. THE FIRST CONSCRIPTION CRISIS, 1942

The second of the war crises which fundamentally affected manpower policy began in December 1941 with the attack by Japan. British Columbia now felt itself threatened; and although Canada had been at war for more than two years, the bloody and inevitably unsuccessful defence of Hong Kong brought Canadian soldiers into action for the first time.

Even before Japan entered the struggle the leadership of the Canadian Opposition had changed its policy on conscription. When the Conservative parliamentary caucus accepted Dr. Manion's resignation as leader in May 1940, it chose Mr. R. B. Hanson as temporary leader. Hanson found many members of the caucus, particularly among those from rural ridings, hostile to conscription; As late as October 1941 he was reported to have said to a Conservative gathering, "Immedi-

ately the Conservative Party in Parliament nailed conscription to its masthead, we'd consolidate all those forces that have been opposed to us since 1917 and they would be marshalled against us."<sup>8</sup> But influential urban Conservatives thought differently. On 12 November 1941 Senator Arthur Meighen, a former Prime Minister and prominently associated with the introduction of conscription in 1917, accepted the invitation of a conference of prominent Conservatives to become leader of the party. In doing so he demanded what seemed to amount to a general policy of compulsory service. In his statement accepting the leadership<sup>9</sup> he wrote:

Manpower is vital and manpower is lacking. . . . Our present methods are illogical, cruelly unjust and tragically inefficient. I shall, therefore, urge with all the power I can bring to bear compulsory selective service over the whole field of war.

That the manpower question was entering a new phase was further demonstrated on 9 December, two days after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, when Mr. Hanson issued a statement demanding the amendment of the National Resources Mobilization Act by "the immediate repeal of the clause limiting compulsory military service to Canada". He said:

Canada is surely in an extraordinary position, having regard to the powers conferred on the Government of the United States in the question of compulsory service. That great nation, even before becoming a belligerent, had compulsory national service for the armed forces, and its manpower may be used to defend Canada. On the other hand, Canada has not full national service and her manpower raised by compulsory methods may not be used to defend the United States.<sup>10</sup>

At the same time, the Ministers within Mr. King's cabinet who, unlike the Prime Minister, had some disposition towards overseas conscription, became more troubled, and King, after much consideration, came to the conclusion that the solution for the immediate problem was a plebiscite in which the country might release the government from its commitment against compulsory service overseas. An important factor in bringing him to this decision was the resolution demanding general conscription which was passed by the legislature of Manitoba on 17 December (above, page 46).<sup>11</sup> As we already remarked in that connection, the Prime Minister did not adopt this expedient with a view to actually introducing overseas conscription; much the contrary. He believed that the plebiscite was the best available means of preventing a serious split in his party and in the country, and of laying the question to rest at least for the present.

The intention to hold the plebiscite was announced in the Speech from the Throne at the opening of Parliament on 22 January 1942. The voting took place on 27 April, and during the intervening weeks there was bitter controversy. The decision to ask for release from the government's commitments gave the more .extreme opponents of its war policies in Quebec their first important opportunity, and they addressed themselves strongly to organizing opposition to the release. Some of these critics, who in September 1939 had found the people of the province in general not disposed to follow them in opposing participation in the war, now discovered that they had a more popular issue.<sup>12</sup> When the votes were counted on the question "Are you in favour of releasing the Government from any obligation arising out of any past commitments restricting the methods of raising men for military service?" it was found that 2,945,514 Canadians had voted "Yes" as against 1,643,006 who voted "No".\* But in the province of Quebec, and in that

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\*The fact that whereas 84% of the service voters in Canada voted "Yes", only 72% of overseas service voters did so seemed surprising, since there was little doubt that sentiment among Canadians overseas was strongly conscriptionist. The overseas vote was widely interpreted as expressing general dissatisfaction with government war policies.

province only, there was a majority against release: 993,663 voted "No" and only 376,188 voted "Yes".<sup>13</sup>

The fact that Canadians outside Quebec voted so strongly to release the government from its commitments is not to be taken as indicating that public sentiment in English-speaking Canada was now conscriptionist. That it was not is suggested by the fate of Mr. Meighen. The Conservative leader sought a seat in the House of Commons in a by-election in York South, Ontario, which took place on 9 February 1942. No Liberal candidate opposed him, but he was disastrously defeated by the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation nominee Joseph Noseworthy. (The result both surprised and delighted Mackenzie King, who had not relished the prospect of facing Meighen again across the House of Commons.) That such an episode could take place, especially in a constituency in the Toronto area, suggests that Meighen's policy had little appeal to the country in 1942; though it is an interesting point that he did much better in the wealthy than in the working-class sections of the riding.<sup>14</sup> He had nailed conscription to the Conservative masthead, and the result was what Hanson had foretold.

When the government proceeded to follow up the result of the plebiscite by introducing "Bill 80", intended to remove from the National Resources Mobilization Act the prohibition against compelling men to serve overseas, Mr. King had difficulty on both flanks of his Cabinet. P. J. A. Cardin left the government because he disapproved of the amendment. J. L. Ralston resigned on 7 July 1942 because King insisted that in spite of the amendment it would be necessary to go back to Parliament again for approval when and if the time came for overseas conscription. Ralston wrote, "That course of action gives an impression of indecision and evasion of responsibility from which I must disassociate [*sic*] myself." King however prevailed upon him to remain. The Prime Minister wrote, "If you do not feel that you should withdraw the letter, I hope you will be willing to allow its existence, at least for the present, to be a matter of confidence between us, and that I may not be obliged to place our correspondence before His Excellency. . . ." Ralston replied, ". . . In view . . . of your assurance as to your own general attitude and on the understanding indicated in your letter that I will not be bound to the course you have outlined, nor limited in any way in my right to take at any future time whatever course of action I may feel necessary and in the national interest, I am prepared not to press my resignation for the present."<sup>15</sup> But the letter of resignation was not withdrawn and remained in King's hands.

It was, indeed, a deeply divided Cabinet that faced these questions. People with inside information, like Grant Dexter of the Winnipeg *Free Press*, who was on intimate terms with T. A. Crerar, a member of the War Committee, had a sorry tale to tell. On 5 December 1941 he wrote, "The War Committee became a tussle between T. A. and Ralston." (Crerar agreed with King that it was absurd to be sending more troops overseas when the need, they argued, was not for a larger army but for greater production, and when the future supply of reinforcements was doubtful.) C. D. Howe was reportedly hostile to conscription at this point because he believed war industry, his special care, was more important than the Army.<sup>16</sup> On 12 January 1942 we find Dexter writing, "Cardin and Angus [Macdonald] had an appalling row in cabinet last week."<sup>17</sup> On 13 May he reported on the battle then raging over the theoretical question of action under the National Resources Mobilization Act as amended:

Talked with Angus this morning. He and Ralston had been reviewing events last night. They strongly suspect a secret deal between King and St. Laurent to return to parliament

before imposing Conscription. They resent this deeply. Indeed, it would be impossible to exaggerate their distrust for King. Angus had kept notes of King's speech to caucus and went over them to show that King never once made a direct statement. Weasel words popped out at every sentence.

He does not agree with the Chief\* that such an agreement does not do great harm. He hates King so much that he is scarcely reasonable. . . .<sup>18</sup>

With divisions like this existing within the government, it may seem surprising that it continued to hold together. That it did so may be attributed to King's consummate political skill and to his indispensability to his party.

The Prime Minister's own public attitude was expressed in the famous phrase which he used in the House of Commons on 10 June 1942, "not necessarily conscription but conscription if necessary". Those who had heard him discuss the question privately, in the War Committee or elsewhere, knew that he would accept overseas conscription only as a very last desperate resort. Ralston on the other hand clearly felt that it was probably inevitable but could be postponed. The relationship between the two men was increasingly tense, and ultimately it was to become tragic. Back in 1939 King had confided to his diary, "If I were designating tomorrow the man for Prime Minister, I would select Ralston without a moment's hesitation. . . . He is the most unselfish man, I think, that I have ever met, a public spirit equal to Norman Rogers."<sup>19</sup> But from the moment in April 1941 when Ralston first mentioned in the War Committee the possibility of conscription the relations between the two men had deteriorated. There is no need to dwell on the difference in their backgrounds: King, the complete civilian, with his mistrust of the military and his obsessive fear of conscription; Ralston, the famous colonel of the 85th Battalion of 1914-18, feeling it increasingly incumbent upon him to support the men overseas as the pressure of the war grew. On 23 June 1942, during the discussion of "Bill 80", he said in the House of Commons:

I would always prefer to see our Canadian army overseas purely a volunteer army. But if to maintain and reinforce and strengthen it, it should become necessary to require men to serve overseas, then obviously so far as I am concerned there can be no alternative, because we cannot let the army down, and, what is even more important, we cannot let Canada down.

The ultimate collision between Ralston and King has something of the inevitability of Greek tragedy.

Nevertheless, after the crisis of 1942 in the Cabinet and the country, there was a period of quiet. As King had hoped, the amendment of the N.R.M.A. ended for the moment the agitation for overseas conscription. Following Meighen's defeat the Conservative party relapsed into a more cautious attitude on the question; and the Canadian Army was not yet in major action, for the raid on Dieppe on 19 August 1942 was merely an isolated episode. The new powers that had been granted to the government were largely held in reserve, and in fact conscripts were not to be ordered across the Atlantic until late in 1944. In the meantime, however, under the authority of successive orders in council they were sent on duty to various areas within the North American zone, including Newfoundland, Alaska and the West Indies; and in 1943 N.R.M.A. men were used in the enterprise against Kiska, which might have led to very bloody fighting.<sup>20</sup> The final crisis over conscription had, as it turned out, been merely postponed, but it was not to take place until the Canadian Army was fully committed to battle in the summer of 1944.

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\*J. W. Dafoe, Editor of the *Winnipeg Free Press*.

### 3. MANPOWER STUDIES AND CONTROLS, 1941-1943

The army manpower problem was only the most prominent and insistent aspect of a larger problem. From the latter part of 1941 into 1943 the government was struggling painfully with the general question of utilization of national manpower resources. It was seeking to evolve policies that would meet the steadily increasing needs of both the military and the industrial sides of the war effort without arousing too much antagonism among the people of a country far from the firing-line, or too much hostility between the sections of a country that was becoming increasingly divided. The task was not easy, and it was the harder because both the Cabinet and its advisers were at odds among themselves.

In June 1940 the government had established the National Labour Supply Council to advise on matters relating to labour supply for industry.<sup>21</sup> On the recommendation of this body an Inter-Departmental Committee on Labour Co-Ordination was established in the following October. This was intended to coordinate the work of all government agencies in matters affecting labour; it ultimately included members from the Departments of National Defence, Munitions and Supply, and Agriculture, while the representatives of workers and employers on the executive committee of the National War Labour Board\* were also members.<sup>23</sup>

The Committee on Labour Coordination itself set up a Labour Supply Investigation Committee to elicit the facts of the general situation. This committee submitted in October 1941 an extended report<sup>24</sup> which the Cabinet War Committee considered on 1 and 2 December. A basic point made in it was (although it did not put it quite this way) the absence of an overall national manpower policy:

The Committee was deeply impressed by the widespread failure to regard the manpower problem as a single problem. This country is engaged in a life and death struggle in which its entire resources, including its man-power, must be allocated to their most effective uses. While an individual responsible for the success of a given enterprise may be the best judge of the best uses to which labour may be put in the operations of that enterprise, he is not necessarily the best judge of whether labour should be available for this enterprise. Each man worth his salt will do everything he can to make his particular enterprise a success; but the success of this enterprise may be at the expense of another serving even more valuable national purposes.

Despite lip service to the contrary, the Committee thinks that many responsible persons are concerned primarily about the man-power supply for their own purposes and only secondarily, if at all, about the man-power available for others. This situation has produced a condition in which man-power resources are allocated on the basis of the competitive ability of various enterprises and less on the basis of national interest. Thus there is competition between the armed forces and industry, between war and non-war industries, and among industrial concerns generally. The Committee doubts that this situation results in the most effective use of the nation's man-power.

The last sentence may be described as a notable understatement.

The report offered detailed recommendations, urging among other things that "there be a comprehensive study of the means of determining the allocation of manpower as between the armed forces and industry" and that steps be taken to popularize the idea that women, by entering industry, would make a great national contribution to the war effort. Measures respecting labour supply should be the concern of the Cabinet War Committee. The Director and the Secretary of the Labour Supply Investigation Committee (Mr. J. A. Walker and Mr. T. A. Robinson) attended the War Committee meeting of 1 December. It was explained that

\*Set up by order in council of 24 October 1941 to administer the government's wage stabilization policy. In effect, it replaced the National Labour Supply Council.<sup>22</sup>

the committee estimated that a maximum of 609,000 men could be made available for the armed forces, but only if drastic changes were made in existing labour policy by the introduction of large numbers of women into employment, the wide extension of training facilities, the adjustment of wage policies and an active policy of industrial recruitment.

Under the impulsion of this study, reinforced doubtless by the outbreak of war with Japan and the changing political climate, the Cabinet War Committee on 10 December agreed that a Cabinet Manpower Committee should be established under the chairmanship of the Minister of National War Services. This decision was ratified by the full Cabinet on 16 December. Apart from the Chairman (Mr. Thorson) the new committee's members were Mr. Gibson (Minister of National Revenue) and Mr. St. Laurent (Minister of Justice). Mr. Alex Skelton (a son of the late Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs) was appointed Secretary. A report rendered by the new committee was before the War Committee on 28 and 31 January 1942. By 4 February, when the War Committee gave the matter further consideration, the Manpower Committee had submitted a draft plan for a system of National Selective Service. Mr. Skelton explained at this meeting that three steps involving compulsion might be taken at once: the government might refuse to permit men eligible for military service to enter certain non-essential occupations; it might "freeze" agricultural labour and at the same time institute a policy of government subsidies; and it might place under control a limited number of technical personnel required for war industry. No immediate decision was taken; but on 13 February the War Committee agreed that, subject to the ability of the Department of National Defence to absorb them, 5000 men should be called up monthly under the N.R.M.A., and that liability to call-up — so far applying only to men of 21 to 24 years of age — be extended to men up to and including the age of 30.

On 26 February the matter was again considered on the basis of another report from the Manpower Committee which recommended among other measures the "freezing" of skilled and other workers in war and other essential industries. This met some criticism on the ground that it would discourage recruiting for overseas service by enhancing the importance of industrial occupations, and it was strongly argued that a National Selective Service system should pay due attention to the needs of the armed forces. Colonel Ralston reported that every possible means was being adopted to persuade men called up under the N.R.M.A. to enlist for general service. The result was that some 30 per cent of all the men called for training volunteered for one of the services, 20 per cent going to the Army. However, unlimited numbers of men could not be called for home service in order to obtain this percentage for duty overseas. The War Committee agreed to the Manpower Committee's report, specifying nevertheless that the Department of Labour should include as part of its responsibility for the administration of a National Selective Service system provision for the needs of the armed forces for overseas service, "and exercise all of its powers, under the system, to direct able-bodied men to enlist in the armed forces".

On 24 March 1942 the Prime Minister outlined to the House of Commons the National Selective Service programme which had resulted from these long discussions, and tabled 13 orders in council designed to implement it. Among these were one<sup>25</sup> providing for the appointment of a Director and Associate Director of National Selective Service in the Department of Labour and the establishment of a National Selective Service Advisory Board, and another<sup>26</sup> appointing as Director Mr. Elliott M. Little (an executive of Anglo-Canadian Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd.

who had been serving as head of the Wartime Bureau of Technical Personnel)\* and as Associate Director Mr. Paul Goulet. Another<sup>28</sup> forbade men between 17 and 45 years to enter without permission a long list of non-essential "restricted" occupations. Still another<sup>29</sup> transferred the maintenance of the National Registration (carried out originally in August 1940) from the Department of National War Services to the Department of Labour. The calling up of men for compulsory military service remained for the moment the responsibility of National War Services. The Prime Minister explained that the programme of National Selective Service would be largely carried on through the facilities of the Employment Service of Canada. Appeals against orders affecting civilian labour would be heard by the National War Services Boards, so far mainly concerned with the appeals of men called up for military service. The Prime Minister emphasized the measures that were being taken to encourage women to take employment in industry. And he referred to other orders providing that no male person wholly or mainly employed in agriculture should enter any other employment without written permission from a National Selective Service Officer,<sup>30</sup> and requiring employers of technical personnel who were willing to accept more essential work to release them and subsequently to reinstate them.<sup>31</sup> Speaking generally, the Prime Minister said that while the government would not hesitate "to apply compulsion where compulsion will serve to increase the total war effort", it preferred to avoid this, and to continue to use voluntary methods where these were working satisfactorily.

In spite of these new measures, the summer of 1942 saw increasing difficulties over both military and civilian manpower. On 15 July the Cabinet War Committee agreed to hold a special meeting on the 17th to review the whole manpower situation.

At this meeting, in addition to the members of the Committee, the Ministers of Agriculture, National War Services and Labour were present, along with numerous officers and officials. The Prime Minister called upon the various Ministers for statements on their manpower requirements. The Minister of National Defence reported that a stage had been reached when the Army's manpower needs could be met only by the curtailment of non-essential industry, the replacement of men by women and the replacement in essential industry of physically fit men by those unfit or over age. It was calculated that to 31 March 1943 the Army's requirements in Canada and overseas would amount to a net drain on manpower of 153,980 men, and that, allowing for wastage, in order to obtain the required number it would be necessary actually to enlist 184,980 men; the difference between the two figures (31,000 men) would be available to return to industry or agriculture.<sup>32</sup> With respect to the Air Force, Mr. Power reported that the R.C.A.F.'s major manpower problem was maintaining the quality of aircrew enlistments. The number of applicants had been falling off. The annual requirement for aircrew was about 26,500 men, and allowing for wastage, 37,950 would need to be enlisted. R.C.A.F. total requirements, including ground crew, to 31 March 1943 would be 53,193, of whom approximately 10,240 would be women. Mr. Macdonald, reporting on the Navy, said that 13,755 men would be required to 31 March 1943, in addition to 300 women per month.

The Minister of Munitions and Supply, Mr. Howe, reported that the present major problem in his area was maintaining manpower in primary production and

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\*This bureau had been set up in February 1941 to organize and assist in the effective placement of technically trained personnel in war industries or government service.<sup>27</sup>

heavy industry, particularly mining, base metals, steel and lumber. The estimated required total personnel for essential war industry was 910,000 persons. To make up this total, 100,000 additional workers were required, and more would be needed if new production was undertaken. About 175,000 women were at present employed and this figure was rapidly increasing; but employing women could not meet the situation in the field of primary production. Mr. Gardiner, the Minister of Agriculture, stated that the number of male agricultural workers had decreased by 12 per cent during 1940 and 1941. There could be no further reduction of the total labour now employed if the present level of supplies to Britain was to be maintained. Women could be substituted for men only to a limited extent.

The Minister of National War Services reported on difficulties being met in getting the men requisitioned by the Army under the National Resources Mobilization Act. Army -manpower requirements were considerably higher than those presented earlier in the year (the Minister of National Defence stated that this increase was caused by a greater training wastage and a greater lag in the period of training than had been expected, and by the outbreak of war in the Pacific which had required men enlisted for overseas to be diverted to service in Canada). The age for call-up had again been extended, to include men of 20 years of age and men from 30 to 40. Mr. Thorson reported that in the age group from 35 to 40, out of 93,000 called, not more than 7000 to 10,000 men could be expected to be obtained. Out of 140,000 men in the age group from 30 to 35, from 20,000 to 25,000 might be obtained, Out of 100,000 in the 20-year class, some 20,000 might be available. These small returns were attributable to the large numbers of men already enlisted from these groups, or deferred as essential workers. The majority of men called up now were applying for deferment. In some cases it was necessary to send out as many as nine notices to obtain one man.

On behalf of National Selective Service, the Minister of Labour (Mr. Humphrey Mitchell)\* reported that the labour market had congealed, but had not dried up. The obvious step now was the curtailment of non-essential industry. The Director of National Selective Service, Mr. Little, agreed; he also recommended wider employment of women. He considered that a real reduction in the standard of living would have to be accepted.

At the end of this comprehensive review, the War Committee referred the problem to the Cabinet Manpower Committee for further examination. On 22 July that Committee, of which Mr. Mitchell was now Chairman, made its report, recommending among other matters that the Unemployment Insurance Commission become an integral part of the Department of Labour and that various steps be taken for control of employment. These recommendations the War Committee approved. The Manpower Committee had raised the question of "centralization of ministerial responsibility for manpower policy and administration". This the War Committee referred to the full Cabinet, which on 31 July decided that the Employment Service of the Unemployment Insurance Commission should be transferred to the Department of Labour, and that steps should be taken to strengthen the employment offices in quality and numbers of personnel in order to enable them to provide efficient administration of National Selective Service and fit them to deal with post-war problems of employment. When the National Selective Service organization was equal to the task the business of military mobilization under the N.R.M.A. would be transferred to it, under the Department of Labour.

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\*Mr. Mitchell had joined the government in December 1941. The former Minister of Labour, Mr. Norman McLarty, became Secretary of State.

On 17 September the Cabinet War Committee again reviewed the general manpower situation. The Minister of National Defence directed attention once more to the serious discrepancy between the number of men requisitioned under the N.R.M.A. and the number actually being obtained. Major Power again reported difficulties in the matter of aircrew — primarily in terms of quality. The Director of Selective Service reported that a rough calculation indicated that "some 427,000 fit males" were available for the armed services, but that strong expedients were necessary if these were to be obtained. He was convinced that there was still a substantial pool of manpower to be drawn upon, but the men could only be obtained by a drastic programme of curtailment of civilian employment. The Committee asked Mr. Little to prepare plans in consultation with the Chairman of the Wartime Prices and Trade Board (Mr. Donald Gordon, a former officer of the Bank of Canada).

The result was that at the meeting on 23 September both Little and Gordon submitted reports. They were not in agreement. Little, indicating that almost 50,000 men and women would be needed monthly for the armed forces and war industry until 30 April 1943, argued that the only way to obtain them was "a rapid and drastic curtailment of civilian industry and a large scale transfer of men and women from their existing employment to more essential occupations". He believed that it would be necessary to draw off 11 per cent of the labour force in "non-essential" industry or 27 per cent of its male labour force, as well as withdrawing workers from the less efficient and essential sectors of agriculture.<sup>33</sup> Mr. Gordon on his part argued that 50,000 more persons per month could be obtained only by "direct draft", without regard to the dislocation caused to industry and trade. He painted a picture of "a possible major breakdown of civilian supply of goods and distribution", plus a very heavy administrative burden on government. He suggested that such a system of regimentation as Little recommended could be made to work only if the fullest cooperation of industry were secured and the Canadian people made to understand that very drastic controls over their lives were necessary.<sup>34</sup> A number of Ministers took the view that a complete change of attitude on the part of the public would be required before such a programme could be introduced. It is evident from Mr. King's account that Mr. Ilsley strongly supported Gordon, arguing that the measures advocated by Little were impossible in a democracy, and that King himself took the same line: "I said I thought the only sensible course was one of gradualness. . . ."<sup>35</sup>

The problem was remitted to the full Cabinet, which grappled with it on 25 and 29 September and clearly found it difficult. It made the very general decision that the object of National Selective Service should be to make available to the maximum extent the men required for the armed services and war industry as rapidly as this could be done without producing a situation where the effect would be such as to reduce rather than increase the number of men available. Further progress was slow, and it is evident that disagreements continued between the Ministers responsible for the armed forces and those whose interest was in production. On 14 October the Cabinet War Committee took a forward step when it approved a report recommending the orderly curtailment of gold mining. In this connection the decision of the United States to close gold mines was evidently influential. On 21 October Mr. Howe, returning from the United Kingdom, reported to the War Committee that Britain was short of aeroplane spruce, Canadian ship-ments having been reduced by the manpower shortage. There were large requirements in lumber generally and aluminium. The former Canada could not meet for

lack of manpower; the latter was a question of electric power, and Mr. Howe hoped to overcome this.

On 18 November Colonel Ralston again reported to the War Committee on deficiencies in call-ups under the N.R.M.A. As a result of his recommendations, the Committee agreed,

- “(a) That the Ministers of Labour and National War Services confer and make early recommendations regarding the calling up of married men;
- “(b) that the issue of blanket proclamations for the further calling up by age groups, not by name, of single men who had not reported under previous calls be approved, details of procedure to be worked out by the Ministers of Labour and National War Services, with the Department of National Defence.
- “(c) that the existing authority to call up aliens be exercised forthwith;
- “(d) that the intention of the Army to accept for compulsory service a certain number of "B1" and "B2" category men be noted;
- “(e) that physical examination of men called for compulsory service be undertaken, at the outset, by Army Boards rather than by local physicians; and
- “(f) that speedy and vigorous enforcement measures be taken against defaulters; the Ministers of Labour and National War Services to confer and make recommendations regarding methods.”

The difficulty of the situation had been emphasized on 16 November when Mr. Little resigned as Director of Selective Service. In his letter of resignation<sup>36</sup> he wrote:

In the fourth year of war we find ourselves with no clear directive from the Government on manpower policy and with quite inadequate organization to achieve a total and balanced manpower effort.

As director of National Selective Service, I find myself carrying grave responsibilities without commensurate authority. The present situation is one of ambiguous and divided authority, which has led progressively from confusion to friction and obstruction. The result has been virtual paralysis in the organization. . . .

On July 31 Cabinet decided on the transfer of the military call-up to National Selective Service and there was to be immediate co-operation with the Department of National War Services to facilitate the transfer. This co-operation was not fully forthcoming and our efforts to prepare our organization to take this necessary responsibility by December 1 have been seriously obstructed. . . .

In a statement subsequently published in the press<sup>37</sup> Little developed his charges. He had demanded that "the Director shall, under the Minister, have the exclusive management and direction of the National Selective Service Branch and shall, for that purpose, be the Deputy of the Minister". Little had complained to Mackenzie King of the attitude of Mr. Mitchell, his Minister, and made it clear that he would not continue to serve under him in any circumstances.<sup>38</sup> Under these conditions he was allowed to go, and his place was taken by Mr. Arthur MacNamara, who had been serving as both Chief Commissioner of the Unemployment Insurance Commission and Associate Deputy Minister of Labour.\* At the end of the year MacNamara became Deputy Minister of Labour while remaining Director of National Selective Service. In December King came very close to removing Mitchell, but ultimately allowed him to remain as Minister.<sup>39</sup>

The departure of Little may be considered a victory for those in favour of

\*In *The Mackenzie King Record* Mr. Pickersgill, on the basis of Mr. King's diary, states that Little's resignation was discussed in the War Committee on 17 November. There was no official meeting of the War Committee that day; the 206th meeting took place on 11 November and the 207th on 18 November. What actually happened, the diary shows, was that on 17 November these thorny matters were discussed at an informal meeting of the Committee of which no record was kept; King "had members of the War Committee wait" after a meeting of the full Cabinet.

gradualness over those who favoured more drastic policies; also, perhaps, for the cautious career civil servant over the impatient wartime recruit from industry; and also, in effect, for the civilian point of view over the military. As time passed, events moved in the direction desired by Ralston, Little and the soldiers; but the movement was sufficiently deliberate to take place without serious social dislocation. And, given the state of Canada in 1942-43, gradualness was probably not only inevitable but desirable.

In a history primarily concerned with the military forces, it seems scarcely necessary to describe in full detail the further development of the control of civilian labour. A brief summary must suffice. In January 1943 an order in council authorized a new set of National Selective Service Civilian Regulations, which developed a first version of these Regulations authorized in August 1942.<sup>40</sup> The annual *Report* of the Department of Labour<sup>41</sup> summarizes the changes incorporated in the new Regulations as follows:

To prevent hoarding, employers must notify the employment service of any surplus workers in their employ; persons between 16 and 65 years of age, other than full time students, housewives and clergy must register for work if not gainfully occupied for seven consecutive days; persons in age groups subject to military call-up may be compulsorily required to accept alternative employment if remaining in civilian life; employed persons may be authorized to leave present employment on seven days' notice to accept more important work; persons normally employed in agriculture may now accept employment without permit in another industry, only to a total of 60 days in a year, and then only outside towns and cities with more than 5,000 population; causes for waiving the seven days' notice before separation from employment are clarified and enumerated; (persons joining the Armed Forces voluntarily do not have to give seven days' notice; building construction workers are exempt from the seven days' notice requirements) ; the Minister of Labour may request that persons failing to furnish evidence to their employer that they have not contravened military call-up regulations, may be dismissed from employment; similarly, those seeking work and failing to furnish evidence on this point may be refused permits to work, on instructions of the Minister.

The major development in control of employment during the year that followed was a succession of Compulsory Employment Transfer Orders issued by the Minister of Labour, from May to November 1943. "By March 15, 1944, the number of workers interviewed and registered under these Orders was 99,453. Approximately 15 per cent of the workers covered in these seven Orders were transferred. Of this number, 575 were transferred to farms, 481 to coal mines, 361 to other mining operations, 869 to lumbering and logging, and 13,073 were placed in other high priority industries."<sup>42</sup>

During the following year (1944-45), in the words of the Department of Labour,<sup>43</sup> the Compulsory Employment Transfer Orders "continued to be enforced with due consideration of the many factors involved. . . . Probably the greatest benefit resulting from these Orders was the increased voluntary movement from low to higher priority industry." The Department's *Report* proceeds:

However, an appreciable number of satisfactory transfers were arranged and these, together with the voluntary movement to higher priority activities induced by the Orders, assisted in meeting the demands of the war production program. Including those subject to the Compulsory Transfer Orders, and rejects from military training, 278,652 men were registered and interviewed up to March 15, 1945. Of these, compulsory transfers were effected for 18,250 under Compulsory Transfer Orders and 8,706 rejects from military service, resulting in a total of 26,956 men placed in essential employment.

The general policy of avoiding compulsion as far as possible has been followed in the administration of these Orders, compulsion being resorted to only during periods of most acute labour shortages.

Competition for manpower between different departments and interests was a continuing feature of the year 1943.

The service departments' dissatisfaction with the situation was reflected in discussions in the Cabinet War Committee on the working of the National Selective Service organization. On 24 June 1943 the Committee agreed "that the Prime Minister discuss with the Minister of Labour the advisability of separating the office of Director of National Selective Service from that of Deputy Minister of Labour and strengthening the administration of Selective Service". The Minister of Labour opposed the suggested separation, and in fact it was not carried out.

Looking desperately about for expedients to ease the situation, the War Committee was glad to hear of the possibility that war industry might be able to give up some men to the armed forces. On 5 May the Minister of Munitions and Supply reported that he had heard from the Minister of Supply in the United Kingdom that that country's needs in certain fields, especially particular types of guns and ammunition, had now been adequately met. This would have the effect of releasing about 30,000 employees directly, and perhaps a large number indirectly. On 28 July the War Committee dealt with shipbuilding. Mr. Howe recommended the continuance of the existing programme, though not its expansion, The Committee agreed that the recommendation be referred back "for revision so as to provide for a reduction of fifty per cent in the rate of construction for the merchant shipbuilding programme". This was clearly intended to save manpower. On 8 September the Department of Munitions and Supply made a new submission under which the earlier programme of 84 vessels of 10,000 tons would be reduced to 42. There would also be nine 4700-ton vessels, but it was explained that these were not an expensive item and were needed for Canadian use. The new programme was approved.\*

At the same time the Army was able to make a contribution to solving the current difficulties by reducing the home defence force in Canada. We have seen that Mr. King in 1941 considered that building up this force might contribute to reducing the demand for overseas conscription (above, page 47). Now, reducing the force provided men to make such conscription seem less immediately necessary. Its reduction had been suggested in the War Committee, from the Munitions and Supply point of view, as early as 2 December 1942. On 5 July 1943 the Deputy Minister of Labour and Director of Selective Service made the suggestion that the existing problem might be solved by converting "the Home Defence Army" (by which he may have meant the men serving compulsorily) into "a Labour Corps", or, alternatively, giving leave to men who had completed six months' training provided they accepted and carried out work to which they were assigned by Selective Service.<sup>44</sup> A staff officer in the Department of National Defence made privately the unkind remark that Mr. MacNamara was prepared to use the Army for his purposes "because he is unable to fill his part of the bargain".<sup>45</sup>

The Army authorities were not disposed to accept such a suggestion, since there was still some need for home defence, and the troops serving in Canada were "a source of potential reinforcements for the Army overseas" and "a strategic Reserve to be used if and when required".<sup>46</sup> On 21 July, however, the Cabinet War Committee decided that the Chiefs of Staff should be directed to re-examine the manpower requirements for the defence of Canada in the light of the strategic

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\*We have seen that the crisis of the Battle of the Atlantic had been passed in the previous spring (above, page 314).

situation and the existing manpower shortages; and that the Ministers of National Defence and Labour should agree "as to the method of organizing and employing a 'works' battalion". The result of the latter suggestion was the formation of two Port Companies, Royal Canadian Army Service Corps, for longshoremen's duties.<sup>47</sup>

The time was ripe, however, for a considerable reduction of home defence units. On 30 July the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence reported, after a visit to the Pacific coast, that in its view "there is not now any present or prospective military necessity for maintaining two divisions in defensive dispositions in the British Columbia area".<sup>48</sup> Moreover, just at this moment the Japanese finally took themselves off from the Aleutian Islands (where the Kiska operation went in on 15 and 16 August). The Chiefs of Staff considered the matter (obtaining an opinion on "forms and scales of attack" from the Combined Intelligence Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington); and on 30 August the Chief of the General Staff reported that it was now possible to disband the 7th and 8th Divisions (on the East and West Coasts respectively), involving a reduction in establishment of 20,873 men. Volunteers of suitable age and category would be transferred to the reinforcement stream, and N.R.M.A. men to other units in Canada to release General Service men for service overseas. Lower-category personnel could be released for return to civilian occupations. The Minister of National Defence explained to the War Committee on 31 August that since the operational formations in Canada were below authorized establishment, the proposed action would mean, in fact, a net reduction of approximately 14,000 men. The proposals were approved.<sup>49</sup>

The 6th Division continued to exist in British Columbia, on the basis of three infantry brigade groups of, for the moment, four battalions each. Counting other units on coast-defence duty and a training brigade group in eastern Canada, there were still 26 infantry battalions in the country, plus two in Newfoundland and one in Jamaica. There were in addition two airfield defence battalions and one machine-gun battalion.<sup>50</sup> There was thus ample provision for such home-defence needs as remained, and the "source of potential reinforcements" for the overseas army was likewise still present. It was to play an important part in the reinforcement crisis in the autumn of 1944 (below, pages 441-79).

We have mentioned the manpower shortage in the lumbering industry. As early as October 1942, it was reported, there was a collision between Colonel Ralston and Mr. Howe over the latter's suggestion that part of the Canadian Forestry Corps might be brought back from the United Kingdom for work in Canada.<sup>51</sup> On 15 September 1943 the Cabinet War Committee noted with approval that action was being taken in accordance with a suggestion from the British government that British requirements could now best be met by returning some of the Forestry troops to Canada. Ten of the 30 C.F.C. companies overseas were repatriated in October. However, the Committee heard on 16 December that of about 2000 men thus brought back, only 584 had accepted leave to engage in lumbering in Canada. It had been considered undesirable to employ these men in military organization in competition with civilian labour, and thereby perhaps incur trade union hostility.<sup>52</sup>

There were other special instances of men being released from the forces for industrial employment. The manpower problem in the coal industry was so serious that on 17 May 1943 an order in council<sup>53</sup> proclaimed a state of national emergency in this respect. Coal miners were "stabilized" in their jobs even to the extent of

forbidding voluntary enlistment in the forces. Furthermore, arrangements were made to release ex-coal-miners actually serving:

These men were given leave without pay for three months during which time they returned to work in the mines at regular rates of pay. Their transportation costs were paid and working clothes were provided, where necessary, free of charge. When it was necessary for men to live apart from their dependents, supplementary allowances were provided. Some men were released from the Armed Forces under the same conditions. Under these arrangements 2,144 ex-coal miners were returned from the Armed Forces to coal mines.<sup>54</sup>

As early as 1940 there had been provision for soldiers to be given leave to return to employment in essential industry, without army pay or medical benefits. This policy was continued and clarified by a routine order of May 1942.<sup>55</sup> It was always on a voluntary basis so far as the soldier was concerned. In the autumn of 1944 provision was made for the employment of soldiers on "Industrial Duty" — a plan under which the soldier received his normal military pay and allowances, and the employer paid an agreed wage to the Department of Labour, which handed it over to National Defence. This procedure applied only to projects jointly agreed on by the two departments, and it was used mainly in connection with soldiers in General Employment Companies, 'of which a number were formed at this time.<sup>56</sup> Brick-making and railway maintenance were the chief beneficiaries of the "Industrial Duty Plan", which never operated on a large scale. On 19 November 1944 there were 925 soldiers on Industrial Duty.<sup>57</sup>

The industry that benefitted most by assistance from the armed forces was, however, agriculture. In the summer of 1940 certain soldiers were permitted to take leave without pay, for not more than eight weeks, on a "compassionate" basis, to harvest their own or their parents' crops.<sup>58</sup> Such arrangements continued to be made as the war proceeded. But in 1943, in addition, a "Farm Duty Plan", a forerunner of the Industrial Duty Plan just described, was introduced; under it men were detailed for farm duty and continued to draw their military pay, while the farmer paid the Department of Labour from \$3.00 to \$4.00 per man per day (according to the region) in addition to providing board and lodging. At the end of his employment, if the amount payable to the Department of Labour exceeded the soldier's pay and allowances, he was paid the difference.<sup>59</sup> In 1944 Army units were moved long distances to enable their personnel to be used under this plan.<sup>60</sup> The other services made similar arrangements to assist farmers. The *Report* of the Department of Labour describes the assistance given for the 1944 harvest season:

Members of the Armed Forces contributed, to a very great extent, in meeting farm labour emergencies. During September, more than 20,000 were engaged in harvest operations.

Soldiers granted compassionate leave to work on their home farms supplied substantial year-round help. The number rose from a minimum of 4,000 in the early months of the year to nearly 10,000 at the height of the harvesting season. Similar arrangements to those in effect last year were again made under the Farm Duty Plan, and the services of the 4,060 soldiers detailed for farm work as a part of their military duty were especially valuable in meeting emergency requirements. Spring and harvest leaves were also given to soldiers to work on any farms where needed and about 2,000 men were on harvest leave in September.

Substantial help was also obtained from men in the Air Force in the spring and harvest leave. The harvest leave regulations were amended to make it possible for the men to work for any farmer. In the autumn, there were 3,700 airmen employed on farms. In addition, 275 men in the R.A.F. helped with apple picking in Nova Scotia under an arrangement similar to the Farm Duty Plan.

Through a special arrangement with the Navy, some 500 sailors were made available to help with harvesting on the Prairies, and over 200 for a short period in Ontario.<sup>61</sup>

*Pursuing the Defaulter*

It was evidently considered that the task of administering the home-defence conscription programme was best confided to a civil department of government, which would be responsible for calling up men in the numbers required by the military authorities, arranging for them to be medically examined, and, if they were found fit, handing them over to the Department of National Defence for enrolment. These tasks, we have seen, were at first the responsibility of the Department of National War Services; but an order in council<sup>62</sup> of 26 September 1942 transferred them to the Department of Labour effective 1 December of that year. Thereafter the Director of National Selective Service became responsible for these operations as well as for the control of industrial manpower. The organization, essentially, remained the same as before; the country was still divided into 13 administrative divisions, each with a Registrar and a Mobilization Board (formerly called a National War Services Board); the National War Services Regulations, 1940 (Recruits) now became National Selective Service Mobilization Regulations. The Boards, each presided over by a judge, had the primary task of ruling on applications for postponement.<sup>63</sup>

During his last weeks as Director of National Selective Service Mr. Little was planning the organization to carry on the Army call-up. It is evident that he thought it desirable to obtain the assistance, as Joint Associate Directors of National Selective Service, of two Army officers with distinguished fighting records in the First World War, one English-speaking and one French-speaking. The Minister of Labour accordingly applied to the Minister of National Defence for the secondment to his department of Brigadier H. J. Riley, D.S.O., who was about to retire as D.O.C. Military District No. 10 and whom Labour now desired to promote to Major General, and of Major-General T. L. Tremblay, C.M.G., D.S.O., Inspector General Eastern Canada.<sup>64</sup> Colonel Ralston agreed to the arrangement, and the two officers set to work at once. General Tremblay, however, did not feel certain that he would "fit in" well in the National Selective Service programme, and made the unusual request that his appointment as Inspector General be kept open.<sup>65</sup> In April 1943 he expressed a wish to resume that appointment, and was permitted to do so.<sup>66</sup>

General Riley carried on in charge of mobilization at Ottawa until November 1943, when he became a regional Associate Director of National Selective Service (Mobilization) at Winnipeg; this was done, in Mr. MacNamara's words, "largely because Major-General H. J. Riley wishes to reside in Winnipeg and because we need a man in the West". His work at Winnipeg was on a part-time basis after 1 January 1944.<sup>67</sup> He was succeeded at Ottawa as Associate Director, National Selective Service (Mobilization) by his assistant, Mr. S. H. McLaren. At the same time Major J. B. Cowell was appointed regional director for the Pacific region and Mr. Hector Dupuis regional director for the Quebec region with headquarters at Montreal.<sup>68</sup>

The small numbers of men obtained as a result of the requisitions for compulsory service made to the Department of Labour continued to disturb the Department of National Defence. As we have already seen, the scope of the call-up was steadily widened.\* A measure which had been discussed for some time was finally taken on 15 December 1942 when married men were called up for service;<sup>69</sup> in the first instance, this applied only to men born between 1917 and 1923. The last

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\*The successive changes are analysed in Appendix "N".

extension of the age-limits took place on 16 June 1944, when the decision was made to call married and single men born from 1913 to 1926 and single men born from 1902 to 1912. Although this made men up to 42 years of age liable to call, in practice the Army asked the Department of Labour not to call men who had "passed their 38th birthday".<sup>70</sup> Men married after 15 July 1940 were treated throughout as if they were single.

As time passed the measures for enforcement of National Resources Mobilization Act were progressively tightened. There had always been a great many attempts to evade military service, though firm overall statistics on men who could be called defaulters are not to be had. In June 1943 a return tabled in the House of Commons showed that there had been 1351 prosecutions for non-compliance with orders to report, and that the police were "tracing" 14,932 other cases.<sup>71</sup> Apart from the men who failed to report, there were a good many deserters. All told, a grand total of 7255 compulsorily enlisted men were ultimately struck off strength as deserters.<sup>72</sup>

A man who was absolutely determined to evade service could sometimes contrive to do so for a long period without even going into hiding. Headquarters Military District No. 12 (Regina) reported in June 1944 the case of a man called up in January 1943 who at once applied for postponement, and who failed to take the farm labour to which he was then directed.<sup>73</sup> He continued to offer objections and reasons for postponement and in the early summer of 1944, after a correspondence in the course of which he was six times ordered to report, was working on a farm where the local Supervisor of Farm Labour Requirements stated that he was needed until 15 July. Military District No. 12 wrote,

The above is submitted as an illustration of the handling of many such cases and to indicate the amount of work involved by both the [Mobilization] Board and Representatives of this Department. It will be seen that a man may defer his actual Call almost indefinitely, simply by returning his Call Papers as often as they are received.

The Department of Labour, pressed by National Defence, improved its procedures for dealing with defaulters. Special measures taken were thus reported on for the fiscal year 1943-44:<sup>74</sup>

Throughout the year under review, special efforts were made to trace men who failed to respond to Orders-Medical Examination and Orders-Military Training served upon them by registered post at their last given address appearing on National Registration cards. It was found necessary to employ two commercial reporting organizations to assist the staff of the Mobilization Section in this work of locating missing men. As of March 31, 1944, these commercial reporting organizations had located 25,701 missing men. It was found that the assistance given by these organizations was of great help to the R.C.M.P. and other police forces and that in many cases the men being traced had either voluntarily enlisted in the armed forces or had failed to give change of address to appropriate authorities.

Up to March 31, 1944, there were commenced 5,227 prosecutions and 5,150 convictions were obtained. Special raids were made by the R.C.M.P. and other police forces in company with military police on public places throughout the country. Up to the close of the year 3,775 places were visited in Canada; 63,506 persons were checked for compliance with Mobilization Regulations; 373 were charged with breach of the Mobilization Regulations and 271 persons were charged with breach of National Registration Regulations. In addition to this, the police apprehended 145 deserters during the raids.

By 15 August 1946 the number of prosecutions had risen to 11,519, and the number of convictions to 9285. There were 2203 sentences of imprisonment, 111 of fine and imprisonment and 5955 carrying the option of fine or imprisonment.<sup>75</sup>

The Department of National Defence felt that the results obtained were not

completely satisfactory. The Adjutant General's Branch reported to the Minister of National Defence in May 1943 that the regulations were fairly well enforced in provinces where the Royal Canadian Mounted Police "operates" — meaning, presumably, those where it served as provincial police. The report went on, "In the other provinces — Quebec, Ontario, part of the Maritimes — where the law enforcement is in the hands of a force other than R.C.M.P., because of the lack of personnel of the latter, enforcement is not very active, results are poor. The local police affords but little cooperation." The general conclusion was, "The question of enforcement is one that is being constantly discussed with Mr. MacNamara and Major-General Riley, and I think it is only fair to state that we feel the situation is slightly better now than it was some months ago, but not good enough."<sup>76</sup>

Two special devices assisted in detecting defaulters. One was the policy, introduced by order in council<sup>77</sup> on 11 December 1942, which provided for the compulsory re-registration of men who had previously been designated by proclamation for call-up but who for one reason or another had not yet been served with an order to report for medical examination. By 15 March 1943, 139,517 men had re-registered, many of them in fact unnecessarily. It is impossible to determine how many men this actually made available for military service, but the Department of Labour considered it a success. The other measure was the compulsory check-up by employers of all male personnel in their employ. An order in council<sup>78</sup> of 31 December 1943 required employers to examine their employees' documents with a view to discovering whether they were persons liable for military service who had not met the legal requirements. The result of this procedure was that 10,040 men were found "not to be in good standing" under the regulations, and 258 presumed absentees or deserters were located.<sup>79</sup>

In the Appendices to this volume tables are given affording overall statistics on certain aspects of military manpower. Appendix "O" shows that on 7 May 1945, out of a total of approximately 1,800,000 men in age classes liable for service, some 770,000 were in the forces; approximately 281,000 had been granted postponement of service. About 20,500 were "not accounted for", and it must be assumed that a large proportion of these were unapprehended defaulters. (In April 1944 the number not accounted for had been 49,000.)<sup>80</sup> Finally, it is an extraordinary and alarming fact that about 608,000 men — almost exactly one-third of all those liable for service — had been found medically unfit. Appendix "P" shows the number of postponements of compulsory service which were in effect at various dates, and the reasons for them. It is evident that by far the largest number were granted to persons considered necessary to agriculture. Appendix "Q" shows postponements requested and granted in the various Administrative Divisions across the country. This indicates that in all some 746,000 requests were made, and that some 664,000 postponements were granted at least temporarily.

It will be remembered that under the regulations governing service under the National Resources Mobilization Act, there was no such thing as exemption, as there had been in 1917-18, except for certain limited occupational groups such as judges, clergymen and members of religious orders, policemen and firemen. Apart from these, postponement of service was all that was granted, the individual being given leave of absence without pay for the period specified.<sup>81</sup>

In the later nineteenth century, when few people thought that the need would ever arise again for Canadians to be compelled to serve in defence of their country, the government of Canada gave guarantees against compulsory military service to

Mennonites (1873) and Doukhobors (1898).<sup>82</sup> These undertakings had to be honoured, and other groups with similar conscientious scruples could scarcely be treated differently. Accordingly, from the beginning, the right of members of religious denominations whose tenets forbade bearing arms to apply for indefinite postponement was recognized; but persons granted postponement under such conditions were "compellable to do non-combatant duty either with the Naval, Military or Air Forces or with any civil authorities, or both".<sup>83</sup> In May 1945, a total of 10,843 men were on postponement under these conditions (below, Appendix "P"). Orders in council of 1943 and 1944<sup>84</sup> had facilitated the employment of such people in agriculture and other essential activities; and in the last weeks of the war about 70 per cent of them were working in agriculture and the rest "mainly in industrial employment".<sup>85</sup>

#### 4. SOME SPECIAL TOPICS

##### *The Women's Services*

The part played by Canadian women in the war effort was so important, and is so obvious, that it does not need to be dwelt upon at length here. We have mentioned the appeal made to women to serve on the industrial front, and their response. Two statistics reflect this. In August 1939 there were 638,000 women "gainfully employed" in Canada. On 1 October 1943, when employment was approximately at its peak, there were 1,075,000. This does not include the "over 750,000" women who were supplementing the work of men on family farms.<sup>86</sup> Nor does it include the members of the women's services of the armed forces.

The Canadian government approached the question of enlisting women in the forces with much caution, although Great Britain had organized women's auxiliary corps before the outbreak of war and Canadian women were extremely anxious to serve. Only in 1941, when the possibility of some shortage of Army manpower began to appear, was the matter very seriously discussed. Even then it was forced on the government's attention by a form of external pressure: the desire of the Royal Air Force to employ members of its Women's Auxiliary Air Force at the R.A.F. schools which had been transferred to Canada. This was reported to the Cabinet War Committee on 25 April 1941. On 13 May the Committee took the decision in principle to enlist "female auxiliary personnel", though at this point thinking was along the lines of the Department of National War Services providing these personnel for the armed forces. Within a few weeks, however, the forces had decided to organize their own separate women's services. The Canadian Women's Army Corps came into existence after the War Committee approved Colonel Ralston's plans for it on 30 July; the Canadian Women's Auxiliary Air Force, later redesignated the Royal Canadian Air Force (Women's Division), had been authorized earlier in the same month; but the Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service was not officially created until July 1942.

A major consideration in setting up these forces was to enable women to replace men and thereby alleviate the growing manpower shortage. This object was certainly achieved, and admirably; but, war being what it is, the relief could be effective only in rather limited spheres. The total numbers of women enlisted or appointed to the three women's services during the war were: W.R.C.N.S., 6781; C.W.A.C., 21,624; R.C.A.F. (W.D.), 17,018. In addition, at least 4518 women did duty in the medical services, most of them as nursing sisters.<sup>87</sup> In all these

capacities many Canadian women served overseas. The detailed story of their contributions, there and elsewhere, is to be found in the individual histories of the three armed forces.

*Competition Among the Services for Men*

We mentioned (above, page 397) the inter-service aspects of the manpower problem. Competition between the forces for men in fact went on through most of the war. The government attempted to check its undesirable effects at least as early as March 1941 when the senior personnel officers of the three services consulted together on a combined recruiting campaign, and the three ministers made a joint broadcast. But this did not end the difficulty, which in fact grew more serious as recruits became harder to get. On 8 May 1942 the Minister of National Defence called attention in the War Committee to the recruiting activity of the other services in Army basic training centres. We have seen that a considerable proportion of the men compulsorily enlisted under the National Resources Mobilization Act chose to join the Navy or the Air Force. Colonel Ralston reported that those services were taking the cream of the volunteers, men the Army needed as specialists or non-commissioned officers. The War Committee agreed on 14 May that no transfers to the Navy or Air Force would be permitted after men reported to training centres.

Early in 1943 discussions were undertaken between the Army and the R.C.A.F. with a view to effecting an arrangement for more efficient use of manpower. The R.C.A.F. needed men of the highest category for aircrew, but could use low-category men for ground duties. It had a supply of "washed-out" (failed) aircrew candidates, physically fit for overseas service, whom it was willing to exchange for potential aircrew and low-category men from the Army. However, each party feared that the other would get the better of the deal, and no progress was made until the Minister of Labour forced a solution by a letter to the Prime Minister written on 18 August. The result was an agreement between the two services to institute a joint recruiting campaign.<sup>88</sup>

On 30 September 1943 Colonel Ralston reported the agreement to the War Committee. Each service was to station representatives in the other's recruiting centres. If an Army volunteer appeared to possess special qualifications for aircrew he would be referred to the R.C.A.F. representatives, while, in turn, the Air Force would accept only Category "A" volunteers possessing the necessary qualifications for aircrew. Transfers on a controlled and voluntary basis would be made between the Army and the R.C.A.F. overseas. Similar measures of cooperation were being worked out with the Royal Canadian Navy.<sup>89</sup>

This was the beginning of better things. In 1944, when the Army's manpower difficulties were at their worst, the other services were able to assist by reducing their recruiting. On 21 June there was a meeting of what seems to have been a new "War Manpower Committee" of the Cabinet; the Minister of Labour was chairman and the three Defence Ministers and the Ministers of Munitions and Supply, Agriculture and National War Services were all present, Mr. Power reported that he had arranged to stop R.C.A.F. recruiting until 1 October, and to reduce the R.C.A.F. establishment in Canada by ten per cent. Mr. Macdonald said that the Navy had been enlisting men at the rate of 2600 per month and would like to continue at the rate of 1700 for the next three months, but agreed to investigate the possibility of reducing the number to 1000 per month. On 28 June 1944 the War Committee heard that the Navy did not intend to recruit beyond absolutely

minimum requirements; by 1 September it would not be taking more than 500 male ratings per month. By October 1944 a very large surplus of trained aircrew had become visible; Mr. Power told the War Committee on 19 October that the R.A.F. surplus had risen as high as 60,000. It is evident that the British Air Ministry had either miscalculated badly or over-insured very heavily. The unsatisfactory nature from the Canadian point of view of the arrangements governing the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan is reflected in the fact that the government of Canada, to which manpower questions were of such supreme importance, had gone on channelling high-grade recruits into the air training stream at a time when it must have been evident at the Air Ministry that this was no longer necessary. Mr. Power stated that aircrew in Canada already trained would now be immediately released and put "on reserve" so that their services could be recovered should they be required at a later date. Trainees in the schools, whose training could be completed by 31 March 1945, would be retained until that date and then likewise released and put "on reserve". All others not already in the training scheme would at once be discharged and the R.C.A.F. would accept no more recruits in any category. As a result of these arrangements, a number of R.C.A.F. personnel were transferred to the Army.

On 17 January 1945 the Minister of National Defence (now General McNaughton) reported that R.C.A.F. personnel seemed to be ignorant of arrangements which had been made for the transfer of officers, N.C.Os., and Women's Division personnel to the Army upon favourable conditions, and it was agreed that the Acting Minister of National Defence for Air should look into the matter. On 21 February it was reported that a procedure had been worked out between National Selective Service, the Army and the Air Force by which R.C.A.F. personnel, upon discharge, would be required to enrol at once in the Army, unless unacceptable on medical grounds or postponed on the recommendation of a Mobilization Board. To encourage voluntary transfer of R.C.A.F. N.C.Os. and tradesmen to the Army, an order in council of 6 March 1945 allowed airmen to retain their R.C.A.F. rates of pay for up to 10 months after transfer.<sup>90</sup>

#### *Personnel Selection: The Efficient Use of Manpower*

In the circumstances described in the foregoing pages it was obviously of the greatest importance to use the manpower available to the services in the most efficient possible manner, and as time passed more and more careful arrangements were made with this in view. It is impossible, however, to give here any full account of personnel selection in the wartime forces, and it is the less necessary to do so as an account is given in the history of the medical services.\*

From a very early date consideration was given to achieving scientific means of assessing the abilities of recruits. In 1940 the Minister of National Defence sought the assistance of the Canadian Psychological Association. The National Research Council gave some financial help, and the President of the Association, Professor E. A. Bott, spent May and June of 1941 with the Canadian forces overseas. There was also consultation with the U.S. War Department. Professor Bott conducted experimental intelligence testing and, as a result of his conferences with senior officers, it was agreed that an overseas personnel selection branch was very desirable.<sup>91</sup> From this time there was increasing activity in this field. A Personnel

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\*See W. R. Feasby, ed., *Official History of the Canadian Medical Services, 1939-1945*, II (Ottawa, 1953), Chap. 6.

Selection Section was organized at Canadian Military Headquarters, London, in July, 1941, and in September action was taken to establish a Directorate of Personnel Selection at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa with Colonel G. B. Chisholm as Director.<sup>92</sup> In the course of 1942 interviewing teams interviewed and tested most of the men of the Canadian Army Overseas, both in the Canadian Reinforcement Units and the field force. By the autumn of 1945 there were 670 personnel officers working in the Canadian Army in Canada and 200 overseas.<sup>93</sup>

The utilization of low-category personnel was a problem which received increasing attention as the war proceeded, It involved both making the best possible use of men who were handicapped in one way or another, and giving them opportunities for improving themselves where this was practicable. Thus on 22 April 1942 the Cabinet War Committee approved in principle the establishment of an Army Educational (Basic) Training Centre to be formed at North Bay, Ontario. This had the special function of educating illiterate recruits as well as giving them basic military training. A second such training centre, primarily for French-speaking personnel, was established at Joliette, P.Q., later the same year.<sup>94</sup>

Beginning in March 1942, Canadian General Pioneer Companies were created overseas to utilize illiterates and men of a mental standard unequal to absorbing the training necessary to produce efficient fighting soldiers. A total of six such companies was finally organized. In 1944 authority was given to form nine Special Employment Companies overseas, from personnel with a low "S" (stability) rating, mainly men returned from operational areas. Three of these companies replaced the General Pioneer Company already serving with the 1st Canadian Corps in Italy. Three more worked in the United Kingdom with the three General Pioneer Companies still existing there. The other three companies, and later a fourth, served with the 21st Army Group in North-West Europe. There was plenty of casual labour for all these units to perform, and in many cases men posted to them who had previously been problems settled down and became useful soldiers. Eight similar Special Employment Companies were formed in Canada.<sup>95</sup>

Personnel selection work in the Royal Canadian Air Force began about the same time as in the Army. In due course Selection Boards were set up in all recruiting centres and manning depots to administer tests to all aircrew and ground crew recruits. At the initial training schools aircrew recruits were screened for assignment to their appropriate aircrew category. The result of this programme was "a very significant reduction in training failures".<sup>96</sup>

The Royal Canadian Navy, which never had any serious difficulty in obtaining an ample number of recruits, clearly felt less need for a personnel selection service than the other forces. Nevertheless, a Directorate of Personnel Selection was set up at Naval Service Headquarters in September 1943 and made use of the other services' experience. It concentrated upon "the more effective utilization of those already serving, rather than upon the screening of personnel at the recruiting level". Personnel Selection Officers were appointed to training and manning establishments as advisers to the Commanding Officer. In the autumn of 1944 it was reported, "Certain classes of personnel are now systematically referred for inter view, such as candidates for certain courses, and officer candidates, while others are referred at the discretion of the Commanding Officer."<sup>97</sup>

In all three services Personnel Selection Officers played an active part in counselling members of the forces returning to civil life either during the war or after the end of hostilities.

*French-Speaking Representation in the Forces*

In a bilingual country with the background which we have sufficiently indicated, the question of maintaining in the armed forces something like a due proportion between French-speaking and English-speaking personnel was both important and very difficult.

In the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force, where men worked in operations as members of the crews of small ships or of aircraft, and frequently in cooperation with units from other countries which were normally English-speaking, it was considered that only one language could be used in giving or explaining orders. Before French-speaking personnel could function efficiently in these services, therefore, it was necessary to ensure that they could speak and understand English well. The consequence was a need for training French-speaking recruits in English. Ernest Lapointe is reported to have said of this situation, "We have discovered that we can't fight a bilingual war." In September 1940 the R.C.A.F. established at Quebec City a Manning Depot which was designed particularly to give French-speaking candidates a basic knowledge of English before commencing training. During the summer of 1941 the R.C.A.F. took steps to increase enlistments from the French-speaking population of Quebec; recruiting facilities there were enlarged, schools and colleges were visited by bilingual officers, and a separate course for French-speaking mechanics was established at the Cartierville Aircraft School.<sup>98</sup>

We have already mentioned the formation overseas of No. 425 ("Alouette") Squadron, which from the beginning was composed, so far as aircrew was concerned, almost entirely of French-speaking Canadians. No doubt a great deal of French was spoken socially in this squadron; but as a unit of the R.A.F. Bomber Command, and as a unit which itself moreover contained for a long period a considerable proportion of non-Canadian aircrew (above, pages 276, 302), even No. 425 Squadron had to use English as the language of command. And it is quite obvious that any French-speaking Canadians serving as individuals in R.A.F. units — as so many R.C.A.F. men did — had to be able to speak and understand English.

The Royal Canadian Navy pursued a generally similar policy, taking the line that it could not make use of French-speaking personnel unless they were comparatively fluent in English, and making provision for language training for French-speaking recruits who lacked this qualification. In July 1943 a special school, H.M.C.S. *Prévost*, was established at London, Ontario, to give a 12-week English-language course for French-speaking recruits.<sup>99</sup> No attempt was made to man individual vessels with completely French-speaking crews; it was considered that this would have been, administratively speaking, difficult almost to the point of impossibility.

It was in the Canadian Army that the problem presented itself in the most acute form, and here a great deal of time and effort were devoted to attempts at solving it.

In the Army the question presented a different face, for it was practicable to maintain units entirely or almost entirely manned with French-speaking Canadians. There had always, of course, been a considerable number of French-speaking units in the Canadian Militia, and after the First World War a distinctively French infantry regiment, the Royal 22e Régiment, was organized in the Permanent Force.

Nevertheless, although a good many French-speaking units and French-speaking officers were available in 1939, they were fewer in proportion to the French-speaking population than the English-speaking units and officers were to the population of English Canada. There was thus a narrower foundation on which to build French-Canadian representation in the wartime Army. In 1946, when the Army was making plans for post-war organization, and it was desired to ensure that there would be due French-Canadian representation, the Vice Adjutant General (Brigadier W. H. S. Macklin) wrote:<sup>100</sup>

For all the talk there has been about "conscription" these past seven years no one has ever explained to me how the Cdn Army could have absorbed the proper proportion of French-speaking manpower if there had been compulsion in 1939. There was no trained cadre on which to build and we never could overcome this in the stress of war.

This deficiency made itself felt early in the war, when an attempt to organize a complete French-speaking infantry brigade in the mobilized force was frustrated. The brigade proposed was the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade, the headquarters of which was organized in May 1940 under Brigadier P. E. Leclerc. The plan to make it a fully French brigade with a French-speaking staff was defeated by the shortage of qualified French-speaking officers for command and staff appointments, and in October 1940 Brigadier Leclerc suggested that the plan be abandoned. Other officers argued that it was less desirable to segregate French Canadians in a formation of their own than to have them cooperating with English-speaking Canadians in mixed formations. Although National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa would have preferred to see the plan for a French brigade proceeded with, it was perforce abandoned, and the 5th Brigade fought through the war with one French-speaking battalion only.<sup>101</sup> In the Canadian Army Overseas there were four French-speaking infantry battalions in fighting formations, one in the 1st Division, two in the 2nd, and one in the 3rd.

There were also a good many French-speaking units in other arms. The list in Canada in March 1944 is comparatively long, including one field regiment and eight coast and anti-aircraft batteries of artillery, a field company of engineers, two medical and two Provost units and many miscellaneous ones. Overseas there were a medium regiment of artillery and in addition two batteries, an engineer battalion and about ten miscellaneous units.<sup>102</sup> These units were of course a special problem in terms of replacements for casualties, and we shall see that the four French-speaking infantry battalions presented a particularly serious aspect of the infantry reinforcement crisis in 1944 (below, page 439).

No question commanded more urgent attention at National Defence Headquarters than that of French-speaking representation in the Army. On 5 August 1941 the Minister of National Defence approved a coordinated plan for increasing and improving this representation, Major elements in this programme were to reduce the handicap of language for French-speaking personnel by publishing military manuals, training pamphlets, textbooks, etc., in French as well as English; the institution of additional courses, schools and instructional staffs on a bilingual basis; the mobilization of additional French-speaking units; the provision of more French-speaking staff for the Directorate of Public Relations, to provide more complete information of the Army's activities to the French-language press; visits by senior officers to French-language universities and their Officers Training Corps contingents, to discuss ways and means for stimulating interest in professional military studies among French-speaking students and encouraging them to enter the Army; establishment of liaison with senior members of the Roman Catholic

clergy to explain the need for meritorious candidates for commissioned and non-commissioned ranks; and taking all possible measures to provide a larger proportion of French-speaking officers, particularly in staff and command appointments, and especially in Military Districts Nos. 4 and 5 (Montreal and Quebec).<sup>103</sup>

From this time onward, periodic progress reports were prepared on measures taken under this plan. The latest such report which has been found is dated 1 March 1944.<sup>104</sup> It stated that 359 military manuals, training pamphlets and textbooks had been translated and published. The French-speaking section of the Directorate of Public Relations comprised an Associate Director, a news Editor and five other French-speaking officers and civilians in Canada and four overseas. A Junior Leaders School established at Megantic, P.Q., was in August 1942 turned into an entirely French establishment to train potential non-commissioned officers. From that time to the closing of the school in December 1943 a total of 1566 candidates passed through it. Further training of French-speaking junior leaders was to be carried out thereafter at an infantry training centre through a small wing attached for the purpose. The French-speaking instructional staff at training centres in Quebec had been brought up to approximately 80 per cent of the total number of instructors. At the Officers' Training Centre at Brockville, Ontario, approximately 125 French-speaking candidates per month were qualified during the calendar years 1942 and 1943; thereafter, with an adequate supply of French-speaking personnel available in reinforcement pools of officers, the quotas were reduced.\* On the problem of finding French-speaking officers the report commented:

As nominations from the ranks of both the Active and Reserve Armies did not meet requirements of French-speaking Officers, authority was granted in Dec 41 for the formation of Civilian Committees for the Selection of French-Canadian Officers. These committees, whose members served without remuneration, recommended French persons in civil life for officer training; After enlistment: in, Reserve Units as private soldiers, they were given a special basic training course of four weeks at the St Jerome Basic Training Centre. If successful, they were posted to the Cadet Wing at St Jerome for additional four weeks of special preparatory training to fit them for the Officers' Training Centre at Brockville.

As quotas have now been reduced considerably, the need for the Cadet Wing at St Jerome disappeared and it was disbanded in Oct 43. During its existence 1900 candidates passed through the wing. Civilian Selection Committees have also ceased to function. There are 51 French-speaking Officers presently completing their training at Advanced Training Centres.

Appended to the report was a list of 84 French-speaking officers employed at National Defence Headquarters. There was an impressive list of decorations won by French-Canadian officers and soldiers, headed by Major Paul Triquet's Victoria Cross. The report calculated that French-speaking officers were approximately 14 per cent of all the officers of the Army; French-speaking other ranks were 19.5 per cent of all the other ranks of the Army; and the overall average of French-speaking personnel in the Army was 19.1 per cent of the total strength.†

National Defence Headquarters gave constant thought to the representation of French Canada in the senior ranks of the Army, but in the light of the situation as already described this was a difficult problem. Only gradually would French-speaking officers qualified for senior ranks, particularly in operational theatres, come to the front. At 1 February 1944 it was calculated that there were 4090

\*The result of this programme was that in 1944-45, when French-speaking other-rank reinforcements were in short supply, there was a surplus of French-speaking officers (below, page 480).

†These figures can only have been approximations. In neither the First nor the Second World War were Canadians entering the services required to state their mother tongues or national background.

French-speaking officers in the Army, of whom 1339 were overseas. There were four major-generals, three of whom were in Canada and the fourth (Major-General G. P. Vanier) seconded to External Affairs for duty abroad. There were seven brigadiers, of whom two were overseas.<sup>105</sup>

N.D.H.Q. regularly urged the Army command overseas to find employment for senior French-Canadian officers. In April 1941 General Crerar as C.G.S. cabled C.M.H.Q. on behalf of the Minister of National Defence, in part as follows: "It is realized that there is dearth of readily available senior qualified officers among French Canadians but this is just another problem which makes it necessary for us all as part of our task to search for solutions. One method which will occur to you is for us to compile lists of promising officers and give perhaps extra attention to them in the way of courses and training generally and in employing them in positions where they would get experience which would be useful in fitting them for eventual appointment to senior posts. . . . The one thing we can all agree on is to give each case of this kind extra attention." C.M.H.Q. replied, "McNaughton wishes you informed that he is entirely in sympathy with the need of taking very special action in these circumstances and that he will continue to select promising French speaking officers for special appointments and training wherever this may be possible in the public interest."<sup>106</sup>

In May 1944, in response to a message asking that an appointment be found for a brigadier too old for operational employment, the Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters London signalled :<sup>107</sup>

I feel that we have done pretty well in respect to French-Canadians. We now have a Brigade Comdr\* in Italy . . . and we have given [Brig. G.] Francoeur the prize reinforcement job namely in command of reinforcement group going overseas with 21 Army Gp. . . .

In the following September, after the Minister of National Defence had sent him copies of letters complaining of alleged discrimination against French-speaking officers, Stuart wrote Colonel Ralston<sup>108</sup> saying that he was writing on the subject to the Canadian commanders in North-West Europe and Italy, Generals Crerar and Burns. He cited the case of one French-speaking officer who had been promoted over the objections of senior British commanders who did not consider him up to the required standard, and went on to speak of another:

- - - has not been as good as I expected and Montague and I have had to withstand considerable pressure to keep him there. . . . I cite this case because he would have been removed some time ago if he had been an Anglo-Saxon.

The enclosed list shows that we are doing everything possible to bring French Canadians along. We have representatives in practically every formation staff in the field, at C.R.U.† and at C.M.H.Q. If these lads produce the goods they will get on.

In fact, at the end of the fighting in Europe two Canadian infantry brigades were being commanded in the field with success by experienced French-Canadian officers (Brigadiers J. P. E. Bernatchez and J. V. Allard), both of whom became general officers in the post-war Regular Army; and another French-Canadian officer (Brigadier J. G. Gauvreau) had commanded a brigade until he was incapacitated by wounds in October 1944.

This is perhaps hardly the place to attempt a philosophical discussion of the Second World War's influence on the development of relations between the two

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\*Brig. J. P. E. Bernatchez, who took command of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade on 13 April 1944.

†Canadian Reinforcement Units (in the Aldershot area),

"founding races" in Canada. But it may not be out of place to express the opinion that in fact the relations which grew up between English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians in the forces had a useful effect, and that broadly speaking the two groups got on together better in military than they did in civil and political life. In the services a good many Canadians had contact for the first time with members of the other great section of the Canadian community. Certainly these contacts did not always advance the cause of national unity; but in a great many instances they did precisely that. This was particularly the case overseas, where comradeship in battle was a great solvent of differences.

Nevertheless, it would of course be idle to suggest that the two sections of the country did not take different attitudes towards the war. Of this there is ample statistical evidence. The relative detachment of French Canada from the crisis is suggested by the table at Appendix "R". This shows that, whereas in British Columbia, the province that made the greatest contribution to the war in terms of military manpower, just over 50 per cent of the male population from 18 to 45 was in the forces during the years 1939-45, in the province of Quebec the parallel figure was only 25.69 per cent. Many circumstances — differing health standards, the presence of minorities, etc. — prevent these figures from being strictly comparable; but they clearly have some general significance.

#### 5. APPROACH TO THE SECOND CONSCRIPTION CRISIS, 1943-44

The military and political crisis that shook Canada in the autumn of 1944 was, it is obvious, only the final chapter of a long story. Of one aspect of this we have so far said little directly: the question of provision of reinforcements for the formations fighting in the field. This question has technical aspects which cannot be fully explored here. Merely to detail the history of the discussion of "wastage rates" and summarize the successive "projections" of probable reinforcement requirements would fill a large book. Here, as so often, we must attempt to reduce a large and complex subject to brief compass, and to state only the most important points concerning a situation that filled many official files in Ottawa and London and taxed the time and temper of many military commanders and staff officers, to say nothing of politicians.

The question of providing an adequate pool of "reinforcements" (replacements for casualties) for the fighting formations was an urgent and difficult one for Army planners long before Canadian soldiers entered upon their first protracted campaign. How many men it was desirable to hold available in the reinforcement units in England was a matter of active discussion during 1942, when the Canadian government was trying to make decisions on the final shape of its field army. On 6 January 1943 the Cabinet War Committee approved a new basis for the organization of the Canadian Army Overseas: an Army of five Divisions organized in two Corps with necessary ancillary units, and "the completion of the pool of reinforcements based upon three months overseas at the intense rate", plus one, month's reserve to be held in Canada for the Army Overseas and to be available' after 31 March 1944.<sup>109</sup> The programme also noted:

- (iii) This would involve the despatch of 64,000 during the first 8 months of 1943 which, taking into account normal wastage and the replacement of illiterates, would result in the completed force (including reinforcements overseas) totalling 226,500 less such battle casualties as occur in the meantime.
- (iv) On completion of the foregoing programme, the despatch abroad of 5,000 per month

commencing 1 Sep 43 for the maintenance of this force, allowing for battle casualties on the scale of 6 months' intense, 3 months' normal and 3 months at the "no activity" rate.

This programme had been limited, not only by the present and prospective number of trained men available, but also by the shipping space which the Allied authorities could provide.

The question of "rates of wastage" was fundamental. From August 1940 the Canadian Army Overseas had calculated its own probable rates of wastage at a slightly higher figure than those accepted for the British forces, for various reasons, including the time-lag involved in shipping men from Canada.<sup>110</sup> In the summer of 1942, however, when the so-called "Third Proposal" for the composition of the Canadian Army Overseas was under discussion, General McNaughton decided that the War Office calculations of probable casualties should be adopted as the basis of providing reinforcements for the Canadian Army Overseas, and this policy was followed thereafter.<sup>111</sup> The Canadian Army, after all, had had no battle experience on which to base rates of its own. After Canadian troops got into action in Italy, however, questions began to be raised about the War Office rates. In December 1943 Brigadier A. W. Beament, in charge of the Canadian static headquarters in Italy, suggested that "the trend of casualty incidence in fighting in Europe is substantially different from that in Africa", in that the proportion of infantry casualties to those in other arms was higher than indicated in the official rates and that the proportion of officer to other rank casualties was also higher. Beament quoted no statistics, however, and remarked, "It is impossible to give anything even approaching an accurate forecast based on the experience of 1 Cdn Div." He nevertheless suggested that emphasis should be placed on the production of infantry officers and that other ranks in arms in which there appeared to be a surplus should be retrained as infantry.<sup>112</sup>

Canadian Military Headquarters in London replied<sup>113</sup> that close contact was being maintained with the War Office on the subject and that in fact statistics for the British forces in the Mediterranean area for the period since 1 August showed that actual wastage closely approximated to the forecasts. In the case of infantry the actual casualties as known on 18 November were approximately 20 per cent below the estimates. C.M.H.Q. continued:

So far, there is, as you say, insufficient evidence or information upon which to build up an accurate forecast of a purely Canadian trend, but gradually as time goes on we will be able, by following the methods adopted at the War Office, to draw upon our own experience in arriving at any future estimate of our own purely Canadian requirements.

At this moment there was some disagreement between National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa and C.M.H.Q. concerning the number of men to be sent across the Atlantic during the next period. On 3 December the Adjutant General and the Vice Chief of the General Staff cabled the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the General Staff, both of whom were in England, suggesting that to send 70,000 men overseas at the rate of 5000 per month (as approved in January) for the next 14 months was unnecessary, since C.M.H.Q. estimated casualties for 1944 at 75,000 all ranks, of whom 50 per cent, it was hoped, would be recoverable after six months.\* This suggested that only 37,500 men would need

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\*This was a War Office calculation. Only in April 1944 did C.M.H.Q. discover that the War office did not consider that all these men would recover to the point of being fit for employment in active operations.<sup>114</sup>

to be replaced from Canada, in addition to 2000 more to compensate for casualties expected during November and December 1943 and 6000 to replace "unsuitables" to be returned to Canada. This would indicate a total requirement to the end of 1944 of about 45,500. In these circumstances, the Ottawa officers suggested sending only 4000 reinforcements per month for 14 months, subject to a further reduction late in 1944 should casualties suffered prove to be below the estimates.<sup>115</sup>

At Canadian Military Headquarters this proposal was resisted. The staff there feared that, particularly because Canadian troops would now be serving in two distinct theatres of operations, with the reinforcement flow exposed to interruption by the conditions of sea communication, reinforcement holdings might fall dangerously low in June, July and August of 1944. They recommended that 5000 reinforcements should be sent during each of the first six months and 3000 for each of the last six months of 1944.<sup>116</sup> The total for 12 months — 48,000 — would be the same as suggested by Ottawa, but the distribution would be different and there would be provision against the contingencies of the summer campaign.

Lieut.-General Kenneth Stuart, formerly Chief of the General Staff in Ottawa, was appointed Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q., and Acting Army Commander, as of 26 December; but two periods in hospital and a trip to Italy prevented him from dealing with the reinforcement problem until 19 January. He then rejected the recommendations of his new staff at C.M.H.Q. and accepted the suggestions from Ottawa, writing, "I am satisfied that our requirements will be covered by 48,000 at rate of 4,000 per month. Will review again in April. . . ."<sup>117</sup>

General Stuart's arrival in England was the result of the departure of General McNaughton. The Minister of National Defence placed Stuart there to "take on . . . questions of policy . . . which have been gradually gravitating to the Army Commander". As the *Manchester Guardian* remarked on Stuart's appointment, he came to England "as Colonel Ralston's senior service lieutenant and thus will bring Canadian troops under the direct control of the Minister."<sup>118</sup> It seemed that the underlying rivalry between National Defence Headquarters and the two headquarters overseas had been decided in favour of the former. It is fairly evident that Stuart considered it his business to re-assert the control of Ottawa over the Canadian Army Overseas, and it was doubtless with this in mind that he accepted the views of N.D.H.Q. on the question of reinforcements. Nevertheless, those views proved to have been mistaken.

On 14 March Stuart issued instructions that no important communication on reinforcements was to be "despatched out of CMHQ to Defensor [NDHQ], 21 Army Group or anywhere else" without being seen by himself.<sup>119</sup> A little later he cabled to the Chief of the General Staff,<sup>120</sup>

I have already spoken to all senior staff officers at CMHQ on the NDHQ viewpoint in connection with such matters as reinforcements and equipment of CAO [Canadian Army Overseas]. I propose early next week to speak to all officers above rank Major at CMHQ on this subject. I shall continue to watch this matter closely and am confident that satisfactory results will be obtained.

Later still, in May, Stuart wrote to the Minister of National Defence, "I feel that we are making considerable progress in respect to the C.M.H.Q. viewpoint, and in respect to the tendency to write alarmist cables. I feel that all are playing the game and are leaning over backwards to try and meet my wishes."<sup>121</sup> These exchanges are important in view of later charges that the Army kept Ralston in the dark concerning the reinforcement situation. The actual fact is that, in part at least with Ralston's knowledge, the officer whom he had placed in charge in England after

McNaughton's removal enforced a policy of soft-peddling on this question and saw to it that communications which he considered "alarmist" were not sent to Ottawa.

At the same period, Headquarters 21st Army Group put forward the disturbing possibility that the assault formations charged with launching the North-West Europe campaign would suffer casualties at a rate higher than that normally calculated for "intense periods of activity".<sup>122</sup> Inevitably this caused alarm at C.M.H.Q. and in Ottawa. Further anxiety was generated when General Montgomery evinced an interest in the Canadian reinforcement situation in March. On 16 March a statement of the situation was sent to Montgomery's headquarters.<sup>123</sup> This showed that the total resources of fit reinforcements held in the United Kingdom for the Canadian Army Overseas amounted to 3597 officers and 36,145 other ranks. The overall figures represented a surplus of 890 officers and 1790 other ranks over the number required at the accepted rates of wastage. These figures, however, included 293 officers and 6718 other ranks who were on the strength of "ad hoc" units which had been formed in the United Kingdom.\* There was, moreover, a very serious proviso. The report concluded:

Action is being taken to remuster surpluses in certain Corps to offset as far as practicable the deficiencies in others. The largest of these deficiencies is in Infantry which has a deficit of 8,744 ORs.

On the following day, General Montgomery signed personally a letter<sup>124</sup> to the Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q., which reflected his anxiety at this situation:

An analysis of the figures in this paper indicate that although the Canadian Reinforcement situation appears to be numerically satisfactory, it is evident that steps must be taken to make this reinforcement personnel more readily available in the arms in which requirement exists, than is at present the case. Three factors which prejudice the situation appear to be:—

- (a) reinforcements attached away;
- (b) reinforcements posted to establishments of "GSD 602" units; and
- (c) surpluses in some arms and deficiencies in other arms.

With regard to sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), I hope that as many personnel as possible will be placed in the training stream at an early date, so that they may be available and battle-worthy when required.

Regarding sub-paragraph (c), I note that in paragraph 14 of your letter, you state that it is the intention to remuster surpluses into corps where deficiencies exist. As you point out, the largest of these deficiencies is in infantry, and in the light of proposed operations, this deficiency is most serious. Considering the rigorous training which remustered personnel must undergo before they will be fit to take the field as reinforcements, I sincerely hope that everything possible will be done to expedite this remustering and re-training process.

At this time General Stuart was again in hospital. On 24 March he replied to Montgomery,<sup>125</sup> stating that the condition he mentioned was "in active process of being rectified":

The status of 602 units is under constant review and action is being taken regarding absorption of surpluses to assist in meeting deficiencies. Every effort will be made by this means and by direct shipment of reinforcements from Canada to make good deficiencies in the infantry arm by target date.

Stuart did not report Montgomery's comment to Canada; but the day after his reply C.M.H.Q. cabled Ottawa, pointing out that when the reinforcements then planned for dispatch overseas had been received, there would still be an infantry

\*These were commonly referred to as "GSD 602" units, from the designation of the cable which had authorized General McNaughton to form them.

deficiency overseas, allowing for three months' wastage, of approximately 5000. Recalling that Army Group now estimated that infantry casualties in the initial phases would be "higher than usual intense wastage rates", C.M.H.Q. wrote, "Consider therefore, that we must have available our full reinforcement pool of general duty Infantry when action starts." It went on to say that it proposed to endeavour to adjust the situation by remustering general duty armoured corps and artillery soldiers to infantry, but that this would take time. Noting that future planned dispatches from Canada included 1750 armoured corps men, 820 field artillerymen and 800 engineers, C.M.H.Q. asked that except where these men were tradesmen being sent to fill known vacancies, they should be replaced in the drafts with general duty infantry other ranks, C.M.H.Q. itself issued authority on 28 March for 1000 artillerymen, 500 engineers and 500 armoured corps men to be remustered to infantry and sent to infantry reinforcement units for training.<sup>126</sup>

Ottawa's reply approved the remustering action taken overseas and added that while some of the armoured corps, artillery and engineer personnel already earmarked for dispatch overseas would have to go, as there was not time to make the change suggested, these men too should be remustered overseas. The Adjutant General, much disturbed by the new situation, pointed out that the first intimation that casualties in the opening phase might be at a rate higher than intense was conveyed in a letter from C.M.H.Q. written on 22 February and received on 1 March. Arrangements had already been made for two representatives from N.D.H.Q., Brigadier J. A. deLalanne, of the Adjutant-General's Branch, and Mr. G. S. Currie, Deputy Minister (Army), to fly to London where they would discuss the whole reinforcement situation.<sup>127</sup>

At the end of March a staff officer in the Adjutant-General's Branch at C.M.H.Q. made a general comment<sup>128</sup> on the infantry situation, pointing out that a deficiency in infantry reinforcements had persisted throughout 1943 in spite of everything that had been done to counteract it. A major cause of the difficulty had been an increase in the war establishment and reinforcements authorized for the infantry units of the Canadian Army Overseas from 51,083 in January 1943, to 57,592 in January 1944; a great part of this increase, in turn, having been accounted for by the formation of a new infantry brigade (the 10th) for the 4<sup>th</sup> Armoured Division. The memorandum ended,

. . . it may be concluded that the particular efforts on the part of Defensor [N.D.H.Q., Ottawa] to overcome the large deficiency which existed at the beginning of last year have to a large extent been offset by the added requirements brought about by reorganization and the preponderance of Inf casualties in the Mediterranean theatre.\*

While staff officers overseas continued to calculate with deep anxiety the reinforcement needs of First Canadian Army after the Normandy D Day, now drawing rapidly nearer, officers in Canada, equally anxiously, were exploring expedients for finding more infantry recruits.

It occurred to the Adjutant General (General Letson) that "one way in which we might get a lot of N.R.M.A. to go active" was to ship some of the battalions in Canada, now composed largely of N.R.M.A. men, overseas as units, "and use them as battalions in reserve or as reinforcement battalions." While it would be necessary to tell them that they would eventually be broken up, an effort could be made "at

<sup>126</sup>What became of this memorandum of 29 March, which was addressed to the Deputy Adjutant General, C.M.H.Q., is not clear; but on 11 July 1944, while General Stuart was in Italy, General Montague minuted on it to the D.A.G., "Please ensure this is carefully preserved on proper fyle."

least to keep platoons together." On 28 March Letson made this proposal to General Stuart with particular reference to the 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade, recently returned from Kiska, pointing out that "these units composed of well trained and seasoned soldiers would be most acceptable as immediate additions to Inf pool." Stuart at once cabled acceptance, and N.D.H.Q. launched a campaign to prevail upon the N.R.M.A. personnel of the brigade's four battalions to volunteer.<sup>129</sup>

This hopeful project was largely a failure. As soon as the proposal to send the brigade overseas was broached, the general service men and the N.R.M.A. men in the units, who had cooperated so well at Kiska, began to fall apart; and the conscripts offered the resistance to "going active" that had long been familiar to their officers. After a month of unremitting effort, only 769 men of the brigade had been prevailed upon to enlist for overseas service. The brigade was reinforced — though not to full strength — by volunteers from other units, and was duly sent overseas. At Appendix "S" is the long report<sup>130</sup> on this recruiting operation made by Brigadier W. H. S. Macklin, who commanded the brigade. This tragic and revealing document perhaps renders it unnecessary to say much more in this volume about the nature of the relationship between the general service soldier and the conscript, or the difficulties encountered in attempts to induce the N.R.M.A. man to volunteer for general service.

These attempts had been in progress now for several years, with varying degrees of intensity. A considerable history could be written dealing with the expedients adopted in the hope of getting these compulsorily enlisted men to offer themselves for active service. The story began as early as July 1941, when the Adjutant General telegraphed all District Officers Commanding, "Great opportunity to obtain R recruits for active service at this time when those completing four months training will otherwise be going to coast defence or other home service units."<sup>131</sup> Already, at one training centre, No. 31 Basic Training Centre at Cornwall, Ontario, an active campaign by officers, including the offer of a long week-end pass if 100 per cent of the men concerned would go active, had had the desired effect,<sup>132</sup> but in the country as a whole the results were less satisfactory. The trend as evident by the autumn of 1941 indicated that only about 20 per cent of the conscripts could be prevailed upon to volunteer for general service; another 20 per cent went to the Navy or the Air Force; and the remaining 60 per cent were content to continue to serve as N.R.M.A. men in whatever unit they might be posted to.<sup>133</sup>

One unexceptionable means of bringing pressure to bear on the conscripts was giving a distinctive badge to the man who enlisted for general service. A routine order effective 17 December 1941 prescribed that the "Canada" badge should be worn only by general service volunteers.<sup>134</sup> When N.R.M.A. men were sent to parts of the North American zone outside of Canada this policy had to be abandoned,<sup>135</sup> but simultaneously a "General Service Badge" was authorized for wear by volunteers (December 1942).<sup>136</sup> Recruiting publicity made much of the GS badge thereafter. During 1942 a total of 18,274 N.R.M.A. soldiers converted to general service. During 1943, in accordance with the general trend of enlistment, the numbers fell off the total for the year was only 6560. The month of December 1943 was the lowest in this respect before the end of hostilities with Germany: 295 N.R.M.A. soldiers converted.<sup>137</sup>

By 1944 the N.R.M.A. men serving in the units in Canada were, to a considerable extent, a "hard core": veterans of the struggle against "the Army" and "the Government", who had listened to many appeals and been proof against them all. Thus when the Adjutant General on 17 April gave his approval for a "gloves off"

recruiting campaign, including a special effort to persuade N.R.M.A. soldiers to go active,<sup>138</sup> many officers who heard his words or received the orders must have felt that they were going into one more skirmish in a long battle which the Army had fought with little profit and much loss of: dignity. However, the attempt was made, and as always some recruits were obtained. In Atlantic Command an attempt was made to appeal to units on the same basis as with the 13th Brigade in Pacific Command. Le Régiment de Montmagny (in Newfoundland), Le Regiment de Joliette (at Rimouski) and The Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles (at Sussex, N.B.), were told that they could go overseas as formed units if at least 500 of their men would volunteer in each case.<sup>139</sup> In the event, although Le Régiment de Montmagny failed to obtain the required 500 men, it was allowed to sail after absorbing the available volunteers from Le Regiment de Joliette, where the recruiting campaign had been largely abortive. The Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles failed to get enough volunteers; as in many other cases, the men are reported to have said that the government could send them overseas as conscripts if it so desired.<sup>140</sup>

In February 1944 orders were issued that all general service men up to and including the rank of corporal should be withdrawn from Pacific Command. The G.O.C.-in-C. (Major-General G. R. Pearkes, V.C.) protested, on the ground that the operational efficiency of his units would be adversely affected out of all proportion to the numbers withdrawn, since "nearly all the individuals concerned fill key positions." The Minister of National Defence ruled that the withdrawal should proceed, subject to N.R.M.A. men being trained as replacements.<sup>141</sup> Similar instructions were issued to Atlantic Command a little later; 1400 men were to be withdrawn by 22 April and 1600 by 7 May.<sup>142</sup>

The results of the recruiting campaign conducted in the spring of 1944 may be summarized here. General service enlistments in the Army showed a material increase, rising from 3394 in March to 4379 in April and the still more considerable total of 6634 in June. These figures include N.R.M.A. men who volunteered and who, in fact, were responsible for a considerable number of the enlistments: 1736 in April and 3259 in June. The relatively high figure for June may have reflected the influence of the Normandy landings. But the figures were unimpressive at best, and particularly so in relation to the effort involved in obtaining these recruits; while it must be noted that the improvement was purely temporary. N.R.M.A. conversions dropped back to 1308 in July.<sup>143</sup>

While Army officers had been pressing conscripts to volunteer, the Minister of National Defence was engaged in another phase of the continuing controversy with the Department of Labour over the limited success of the latter's attempts to produce adequate numbers of N.R.M.A. recruits. On 6 March, Colonel Ralston had written Mr. Mitchell complaining of the chronic deficiencies.<sup>144</sup> For the fiscal year 1943-44, he pointed out, "we obtained only 75,000 instead of the 102,000 (8,500 per month for twelve months) which were called for in the earlier part of the year." Requirements for 1944-45 were 5000 men per month. Colonel Ralston emphasized that this was a net requirement and that it was up to the Department of Labour to call up enough men to "give us a net of 5000 enrolled and enlisted in the aggregate each month". Ralston concluded, "I cannot impress upon you too strongly the necessity for this objective being attained each month, and I count on you to do everything to achieve that." In reply, Mr. Mitchell explained the difficulties of his department:

During the last six months the Army, Navy and Air Force have obtained 65,021 men. During this period to obtain the foregoing result, National Selective Service has sent Orders-

Medical to 184,971 men. During this period the Army obtained 34,040. To attain 5,667 men per month for the Army we had to call 184,971 men.

In these circumstances, Mr. Mitchell felt that he was not in a position to give the unqualified assurance asked for by Ralston.<sup>145</sup>

Ralston replied demanding stronger measures to deal with defaulters:

You say that "No stone has been left unturned to meet the demand". I, of course, have to accept that, but can I suggest that there are some stones that, while they may have been turned, have, perhaps, not been turned all the way over, under which there will be found quite a number of prospective recruits.

The Minister of National Defence continued: "First of all it seems to me that the number of defaulters is strikingly large. . . . Secondly, postponements could now, I should think, be very materially decreased due to the change-over in Industry from production on capital account to production for replacements. . . . It also seems that more stress might be placed on the opportunities in the Army to men who are being laid off from employment in industry. . . . There are still those in the designated classes who have not yet been called at all. Apparently the bulk of these are married men in the Province of Quebec. . . . Finally, there are those who reach the age of 18½ this coming year. . . ." <sup>146</sup>

In reply, Mr. Mitchell denied most of Ralston's implications, and stated that there were actually only 14,077 men unaccounted for. He blamed the situation in Quebec on poor management in the early days. Although the population was almost as large as Ontario's, there were only two Mobilization Boards against Ontario's four. Latterly, National Selective Service had been requisitioning more men than the Medical Corps could cope with — more than 700 a day in Montreal. Mr. Mitchell assured Colonel Ralston that "everything within the bounds of possibility is being done." <sup>147</sup>

One cannot help sympathizing with Mitchell, for it is evident that the division within the Cabinet over conscription resulted in his coming under heavy pressure from two opposite directions. Six months after this exchange with the Minister of National Defence, in which Ralston more than hinted that enforcement in Quebec was ineffective, Mitchell was in trouble with the Prime Minister. On 27 September 1944 Mr. King recorded in his diary an interview with Adélar Godbout, the erstwhile Liberal premier of Quebec who had been defeated by the Union Nationale under Maurice Duplessis in a general election on 8 August. Godbout blamed his loss on "the feeling there was against the federal government because of the recruiting for the war and the way it had been gone about. Said it was largely the women's vote. . . ." He complained further that "the same thing was being started anew now, new regulations being made, men of the National Selective Service and the Army interfering in a way that was again rousing the fears and prejudices of the people". On "a previous occasion", Godbout asserted, the Mounted Police had entered his house, even his bedroom, at night, searching presumably for draft evaders. The diary records that King at once sent for Messrs. St. Laurent, Power and Mitchell to hear Godbout's story and spoke to them strongly: "I did not intend to have our party submarined in Quebec." How much practical influence this incident had on policy would be difficult to determine. There is no evidence that it led to any relaxation in the attempts to enforce the N.R.M.A. in Quebec (that, after all, would have been politically disastrous in the rest of Canada) ; and we shall see that in the final months of the war such attempts were active enough to produce serious disorder (below, page 479).

In those final months, National Selective Service took more stringent measures

to obtain men for the call-up. In particular, fit men who had been discharged from the forces were recalled. Until 1 December 1944 men with two or more years service in Canada only were not recalled. Thereafter the period was extended to three years or more, and still later discharged men were ruled to be subject to recall if the service was confined to Canada only, regardless of its length. However, service in the North American zone outside of Canada, including Newfoundland, was leniently considered as constituting overseas service.<sup>148</sup>

There seems to have been ample reason for Mr. Mitchell's unwillingness to promise to produce 5000 men per month. N.R.M.A. enrolments, which had reached a peak of 7324 in January 1942, never totalled as much as 2000 in any month after January 1944, and in September 1944 the figure actually fell below 1000 (Appendix "T"). The fact is that the manpower pool in Canada was finally drying up, and the National Resources Mobilization Act was no longer producing men in very important numbers.

What was the actual situation with respect to Canadian reinforcements available overseas when the North-West Europe campaign was launched on 6 June 1944? General Montgomery had been assured in March that every effort would be made to make good the considerable deficiencies by that date. Much was certainly done, but without complete success.

In Ottawa in April the Minister of National Defence was sufficiently troubled about the infantry reinforcement situation to call for a review. On 18 April the Adjutant General presented a comprehensive survey.<sup>149</sup> It concluded once again that the reinforcement pool overseas was "well up to the planned full strength" *overall*; it reported the overseas deficiency in *infantry* at 29 February as 6077 other ranks, but indicated that a total of 6300 more men should be available by 31 May as a result of changes in establishments, remustering and dispatches from Canada. This was additional to the normal flow overseas of 1600 men monthly. The Adjutant General described the special measures that had been taken — the intensive drive for infantry volunteers, the withdrawal of G.S. personnel from units in Canada, the reallocation of most armoured corps recruits to infantry, and remustering — and expressed confidence that these steps, along with those being taken overseas, would "overcome the present shortage in infantry and maintain the supply of infantry reinforcements at a satisfactory level".

A return prepared for the Minister of National Defence some months later<sup>150</sup> indicates that during April and May 1944 a total of 5656 infantry other ranks were sent overseas from Canada. During the same period, under the orders issued in March (above, page 428), 1875 men were remustered from other corps to infantry overseas.<sup>151</sup> Needless to say, during these months normal wastage was continuing, and battle casualties in Italy were heavy during the Liri Valley campaign (11 May - 4 June).

Even though officers in both London and Ottawa had been alive to the situation for some months and had been taking active measures to remedy it, there was still a deficiency of infantry reinforcements overseas at D Day. The monthly statistical return of reinforcements maintained at C.M.H.Q. shows a deficit of 3337 infantry other ranks at 31 May 1944.<sup>152</sup> The 13th Infantry Brigade, which had in its four infantry battalions a total strength of about 2000 other ranks — the great majority of whom would be available as reinforcements — landed on 1 June.<sup>153</sup> The deficit would have been further reduced accordingly, but it would still have existed. We shall shortly see that — as some people had already suspected — the

accepted rates of wastage made quite inadequate provision for infantry casualties. Even on the basis of those rates, however, it is evident that the Canadian Army was already short of infantry reinforcements on the day on which its greatest campaign began.

General Stuart in London was clearly troubled. On 2 June, four days before D Day, he sent a telegram<sup>154</sup> to the Chief of the General Staff which, while it did not state the existing deficiency, admitted that the latest War Office forecasts of activity indicated that not enough reinforcements were in sight to provide for operations during the next twelve months:

Firm forecasts of activity western European theatre for balance of 1944 and tentative forecasts western European theatre for first six months 1945 have been received from War Office and are being transmitted to NDHQ in separate cables. I emphasize that 1945 forecasts are tentative only but will be followed in July or August by firmer forecasts covering the whole of 1945. You will appreciate that these forecasts are and will be based on worst possible condition namely continuation of war with Germany in 1945, this condition I hope will not eventuate but nevertheless it should be given consideration in our long term planning.

You will note that these forecasts represent a monthly requirement over the next twelve months in excess of the figure we have requested per month during 1944 which figure as you know was based on last forecast of activity received from War Office.

It would appear on superficial examination that only two courses were open to US. The first being to cut our cloth in accordance with our ability to reinforce over the period stated. The second being to press for extension of compulsory service. I am definitely opposed to the acceptance of either of these courses at the present time. My reasons are as under:

- (a) Fighting in the next three or four months I am convinced will indicate whether or not the war with Germany will continue to 1945.
- (b) With our present reserves and a continuation of present flow from Canada I am confident that we can meet demands during next four months giving priority of course to 21 Army Group over AAI. \*
- (c) Must not eliminate a formation from our Order of Baffle at present time it just cannot be done. It would not be understood either here or in the US or in Canada and would be detrimental to morale of whole Canadian Army.
- (d) It would be most unwise to advocate an extension of compulsory service now when there is an excellent chance of our being able to finish the war with Germany on a voluntary basis.

My recommendations are as follows:

- (a) Do everything possible in Canada without departing from voluntary system to increase the flow of reinforcements particularly Infantry.
- (b) Do everything possible in Canadian Army Overseas to deflect the greatest possible number of fit men in static units and establishments into the reinforcement stream.
- (c) CMHQ to re-examine reinforcement situation at end of June and at end of each subsequent month and to forward results of each examination together with recommendations to NDHQ.

The new War Office forecast thus produced on the eve of the invasion, as compared with the previous one made in November 1943, increased the overall number of anticipated Canadian casualties from 26,198 to 37,936 for the period June through September 1944, and from 36,212 to 60,328 for the period June through December.<sup>155</sup> These overall estimates proved in fact to be considerably inflated.

In Ottawa the Adjutant General considered' Stuart's message and on 7 June made the following comment<sup>156</sup> to the Minister of National Defence:

I concur in Gen. Stuart's opinions . . . that we can meet demands during the next four months from present available sources, and therefore see no necessity to contemplate elimination of any formations at the present time.

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\*Allied Armies in Italy.

On account of the many variables involved, it is both difficult and inadvisable to predict with confidence the number of G.S. personnel that can be made available up to the end of 1945. However,, I can state with confidence that from our present resources, we will meet our commitment for the year 1944. . . .

After further consideration, General Letson sent another memorandum to the Minister on 13 June<sup>157</sup> confirming these conclusions. Referring back to a statement submitted earlier showing strength overseas as at 30 April, adjusted for shipments during May but not for casualties or recoveries, he wrote, "You will note that this table shows surpluses in all the larger corps, over and above a reserve of three months wastage at intense rates." It is apparent that the authorities at N.D.H.Q. believed at D Day that there was a surplus overseas of reinforcements in infantry as well as in other corps.

General Stuart's cable, and the Adjutant-General's comment of 13 June, were considered by the Cabinet War Committee on the 14th. The Minister of National Defence suggested that the Royal Canadian Navy and the Royal Canadian Air Force should try to help with the situation. The Air and Naval Ministers reported that the R.C.A.F. had virtually discontinued recruiting and that naval recruiting would be at a low level in future. It was agreed that these two Ministers should explore the possibility of helping the Army to meet its requirements. We have already seen what was accomplished as a result (above, page 417).

What emerges from the exchanges before D Day is that even before the Normandy campaign began there was considerable apprehension, both in Canada and overseas, concerning the future supply of reinforcements for the army in the field; and that infantry reinforcements were a particular cause of anxiety. At Canadian Military Headquarters, London, General Stuart was restraining those officers who took a gloomy view of the problem, and was preventing them from sending "alarmist" interpretations of the situation to Ottawa. It seems apparent that Stuart, and those in Ottawa who acted on his advice, were banking rather heavily upon an early conclusion of the war. They were fairly confident that, without the fundamental change of government policy of which there seemed no prospect, enough men could be found to maintain the Army during the next few months of fighting. Beyond that, the situation could not be estimated. It was, in fact, in the hands of Providence.

## 6. THE SECOND CONSCRIPTION CRISIS: INFANTRY REINFORCEMENTS, 1944

The early days of the North-West Europe campaign seemed to indicate a situation that was unexpectedly favourable from the viewpoint of those dealing with the Canadian reinforcement problem. As is well known, the total casualties on D Day turned out to be fewer than had been feared; and since Canadian formations, apart from the 3rd Division and 2nd Armoured Brigade which took part in the initial assault, were delayed in getting into action, Canadian losses during the first few weeks seemed gratifyingly small. The reinforcement organization worked well, and the casualties suffered by the units in the early stages were smoothly and promptly made good. Nevertheless, it soon became evident that appearances had been deceptive. Though the overall total of losses had been low, the infantry had been suffering at a much higher rate than the accepted calculations allowed for; and when additional Canadian divisions went into action the situation soon became serious.

We have seen (above, page 425) Brigadier A. W. Beament writing from Italy in December 1943 suggesting that more infantry casualties were occurring than had

been forecast and recommending action to provide more infantry reinforcements. Beament had now moved to North-West Europe and as Officer-in-Charge Canadian Section G.H.Q. 1st Echelon, 21st Army Group, was performing the same function that he had formerly carried out in Italy. As early as 15 July he reported to C.M.H.Q. recalling his earlier prediction and stating that it had now been fully justified by experience.<sup>158</sup> He wrote:

The recent operations in Normandy prove, beyond all shadow of doubt, that the prediction that the proportion of Infantry casualties, vis-a-vis other Corps, would be much greater than indicated by FFC\* rates was sound.

Beament supplied the following statistics to support his statement, based upon the known actual battle casualties suffered by the small Canadian force so far in action and the forecast of casualties at "FFC rates" for the same force and the same period (6 June - 10 July):

	<i>Casualties</i>			
	<i>Infantry</i>		<i>Other</i>	
	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Other Ranks</i>	<i>Officers</i>	<i>Other Ranks</i>
Forecast	132	2150	120	1211
Actual	220	3885	123	994

He wrote: "I recommend that the situation be again reviewed and that surpluses . . . be quickly and drastically dealt with, and suitable personnel be remustered into Infantry, and put through the immediate and intensive course of conversion training". General Montague, the Major General in Charge of Administration at C.M.H.Q., to whose attention Beament's letter had been addressed, passed the letter to the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, C.M.H.Q., on 17 July, directing that the utmost possible remustering and conversion in all corps, as recommended by Beament, should be "ensured". He added, "Immediately upon the return of the C of S [Chief of Staff] we must put him in the picture as other action by him may be required."<sup>159</sup>

General Stuart, who was then in Italy discussing with Canadian and British commanders the Canadian Corps Commander's request for a second infantry brigade for the 5th Canadian Armoured Division, returned to C.M.H.Q. on 20 July. On 23 July he made a flying visit to General Crerar's headquarters in France and returned to London. On 25 July he left for Ottawa.<sup>160</sup> By that time he had approved a recommendation, based on new staff calculations made at C.M.H.Q., † that up to 25 per cent of the Artillery reinforcements, and up to 60 per cent of the Army Service Corps reinforcements, allotted to the theatres of operations should be remustered to infantry.<sup>162</sup>

In Ottawa General Stuart wrote and talked about the reinforcement situation in optimistic terms. On 2 August he wrote to the Chief of the General Staff:<sup>163</sup>

On 30 Jul 44, after over twelve months fighting in the Middle East [Italy] and two months in France, we have a reinforcement pool overseas with a strength in excess of three months reinforcement requirements at intense rates. This is a most satisfactory situation. . . .

\*"Field Force Contingent", the phrase used to designate the British rates of wastage.

†These calculations were based on figures less alarming than Beament's; they stated the forecast of other rank infantry casualties for North-West Europe for the period 6 June-6 July as 3835, and the actual casualties as 3038.<sup>161</sup> The paper however fully accepted the inaccuracy of the forecast in terms of proportions between corps, and recommended that future calculations should be based on 75 per cent of all casualties being in the infantry. Two possible explanations suggest themselves for the difference between these figures and Beament's: (a) the former presumably were based on the "double intense" rate for the period 6-23 June, which was already known to have been unrealistic, whereas Beament's probably used the normal intense rate: (b) Beament's figures covered four additional days, which included the bloody battle for Caen on 8 and 9 July. Lt-Col. E. G. Pullen, the officer who made the C.M.H.Q. study, wrote, "I have examined a mass of figures, many of which are misleading." The historian with a still larger mass of figures available, can only cry Amen.

Stuart went on to say that estimated casualties for the remaining five months of 1944 were "about equal to our reinforcement holdings at 31 Jul". The reinforcement pool at the end of 1944, he said, should stand at about 25,000, "or about one and a half months at intense rates". A further projection to the end of March 1945 gave an estimated pool of about 17,000. Stuart then proceeded:

The above forecasts, as you know, are based on scales of wastage adjusted in the light of battle experience and on forecasts of activity provided by the War Office. Up to date our casualties have been less than anticipated and although our estimates may be exceeded for short periods I do not anticipate an increase of casualties over our estimates in any period of six months or over.

I am satisfied therefore, with the general reinforcement situation, It is in a healthy position today because our casualties have been less than the number anticipated and because the agreed flow of reinforcements from Canada has not only been maintained but has been exceeded. I congratulate those responsible and hope that the agreed flow will be maintained in future months.

The only part of the reinforcement problem that is worrying me at the moment is the finding of reinforcements for our French-Canadian Infantry Battalions. I am withdrawing French-Canadians from English speaking units overseas for this purpose but unless I can get additional French-Canadian Infantry reinforcements from Canada I shall be faced with the alternative of disbanding units to provide reinforcements or reinforce [*sic*] with English speaking personnel. I do not relish either alternative and consequently I hope every effort will be made to increase the flow of French speaking reinforcements.

On 3 August General Stuart attended a meeting of the Cabinet War Committee and reported along the foregoing lines; the record suggests that he had his memorandum to the C.G.S. before him as he spoke. The War Committee thus received a very optimistic report. Mr. King was naturally pleased. This is the record of Stuart's testimony which he wrote in his diary:

General Stuart who has returned from overseas gave an exceedingly interesting account of the invasion and progress of the war. . . . He was most emphatic about there being no doubt of ultimate success and the possibility of war being over sooner than we expected. He made clear that we had plenty of reserves. Presented a request for some additional men for use in Italy but emphasized that this would not lead to any pressure for further men. I asked him the question pointedly. His reply was equally definite to the effect that the war would likely be over before any further numbers would be required beyond those already available.

The reference to men for Italy was to the formation of a second infantry brigade for the 5th Division, which the meeting approved. The Committee was told that this and other new requirements would be met from the overseas pool, which was adequate to meet these demands without any change in the projected supply of manpower from Canada. Stuart reported that while the new brigade would increase the estimated net casualty replacement requirements to the end of March 1945 by some 900, this was a risk he was prepared to accept in the present situation. (He had in fact told the British senior commanders in Italy that the reinforcements already available would simply have to be "spread thinner and cover the extra bde". )<sup>164</sup>

Everything Stuart reported was true, but the reinforcement pools he mentioned were calculated in terms of overall strength, including all arms and services. There is no evidence that he mentioned the infantry deficiency, already evident overseas in mid-July, except with reference to the French-Canadian units. Why he chose to omit these important facts can only be a matter of conjecture. It has been made clear that he was a sick man, and it may be that his judgement had been somewhat affected. It is also fair to remember that when he visited First Canadian Army (on 23 July) General Crerar was in the very act of taking over a section of the line for

the first time, and that the troops he was taking under command were the 1st British Corps. Not until 31 July, when he took over the 2nd Canadian Corps (and the Caen front) from the Second British Army, would he be in regular and routine touch with the administrative situation in the Canadian divisions. Stuart therefore probably did not hear about the infantry situation from Crerar. Furthermore, when he left London (on 25 July) the worst of the situation was not yet evident. On that very day the Canadian Army had its heaviest single day's losses of the war (except for Dieppe); the 2nd Corps suffered roughly 1500 casualties, and the vast majority of them were in the infantry.<sup>165</sup>

An unfortunate slip had complicated the matter. The Adjutant General queried some of the figures in the calculations brought by Stuart from C.M.H.Q., which had been prepared under pressure and in the greatest haste; and C.M.H.Q. admitted in embarrassment that the forecast of casualties in the document was about double what it should have been.\* Correcting the figures, General Montague cabled on 29 July, "New figures will indicate much more satisfactory position and all information tends to show we have no cause for undue concern."<sup>166</sup> This doubtless made its contribution to Stuart's optimism and a general absence of crisis thinking at N.D.H.Q.

Nevertheless, it is evident that Stuart had some knowledge of the impending crisis before he left London; as we have seen, he authorized measures to meet it. King's account leaves little doubt that the ailing general was still betting, rather desperately it would now seem, on an early end to the war. But the moment at which he made his encouraging report was terribly unfortunate, for at this very time the situation was, in fact, becoming extremely serious. On 4 August, the day after General Stuart met the War Committee, General Crerar telegraphed C.M.H.Q., reporting that his Canadian infantry battalions were already short of men:<sup>167</sup>

Am concerned about infantry general duty deficiencies which approximate 1900. Our ability to continue severe fighting or to exploit a break out would be seriously restricted through lack of replacement personnel. . . . I consider this the most serious problem of Cdn Army at the moment and to require most energetic handling.

The Army Commander stated that after drawing all possible reinforcements from No. 2 Canadian Base Reinforcement Group, the reinforcement organization on the Continent, 15 of his infantry battalions, which he named, had deficiencies exceeding five per cent of unit strength. Five battalions were short 100 men or more; two of these were French-speaking. Two battalions, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada and Le Regiment de Maisonneuve, were, short over 200 men each. These statistics reflected the bloody fighting of July, and particularly the heavy casualties sustained by the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division since it was put into the line on the night of 10-11 July.†

The remustering of men of other corps to infantry now began in earnest. It is, perhaps, surprising that more had not been done after General Stuart's assurances to General Montgomery late in March. The record shows that 1311 men were remustered on 19 April and 564 on 1 May. There was no further remustering until

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\*This did not affect the figures cited in the footnote on page 435, above.

†This signal of 4 August subsequently became notorious. Mackenzie King wrote in his diary on 24 October that at the Cabinet meeting on that date Ralston stated that he had never seen the signal until that same day. It was addressed to General Montague, in charge of administration at C.M.H.Q.; but presumably General Stuart's order forbidding any important message on reinforcements to go unless he had himself seen it (above, page 426) was still in effect; and Stuart, for some reason on which his personal documents throw no light, did not return to London from Canada until 17 August. The substance of the signal, it seems clear, was never sent to Ottawa. Stuart must have brought it from London among his papers in October, which would account for Ralston seeing it at that time.

August.<sup>168</sup> On 25 July, after receiving General Stuart's instructions for more remustering, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff at C.M.H.Q. (Brigadier M. H. S. Penhale) wrote, "It will be necessary to carefully work out a detailed programme to implement this decision." A conversion training programme was developed and, on 12 August, 1949 men were remustered, chiefly from the Armoured Corps, the Artillery and the Engineers. On 25 August, 1077 more men were remustered; on 31 August, 489; and on 1 September, 573. Remustering in smaller numbers went on into January. All told, from April 1944 through January 1945, 12,638 other ranks and 396 officers were remustered to infantry in the United Kingdom. This includes 496 other ranks sent to Italy for remuster there.<sup>169</sup>

Headquarters First Canadian Army continued to press for rapid action. On 8 August General Crerar telegraphed to C.M.H.Q.,<sup>170</sup>

It is quite clear that only solution lies in vigorous remustering and strenuous conversion training. Request careful study of possibility of shortening conversion training by grading on entry and so securing a proportion in four weeks. . . .

In view distinct possibility that operations of next four weeks may prove turning point remustering policy should be based on short view. It is vital that our offensive power be maintained and long term futures must be risked to produce early.

It was decided to use the 13th Infantry Brigade (above, page 432) as a re-training organization. Instructions for dispatching remustered men to it had been issued on 5 August.<sup>171</sup>

On 10 August Brigadier Penhale visited Army Headquarters to discuss the situation with Crerar and his staff. Thereafter, Army Headquarters considered the possibility of accepting infantry reinforcements with a lower standard of training. Infantry reinforcements newly arrived from Canada received four weeks' refresher training, particularly designed to familiarize them with the latest weapons and techniques. The Army Commander accepted the staff's recommendation that no lowering of standard for general duty infantrymen should be accepted, and C.M.H.Q. concurred, adding however that men from Canada found to be sufficiently advanced to complete refresher training more quickly would be dispatched to meet outstanding demands for reinforcements.<sup>172</sup>

Very considerable numbers of infantry reinforcements were sent forward from the United Kingdom to First Canadian Army during August. General Montague on 5 August estimated that 3773 all ranks, including 671 then in transit, could be dispatched by the 19th; 2000 more would be ready by the end of the month, while 840 infantrymen were in transit from Canada.<sup>173</sup> Nevertheless, the furious fighting around Falaise took such a toll that deficiencies in the infantry battalions continued to mount. On 16 August, Army Headquarters reported that on the previous day there was an actual deficiency in the Canadian battalions of 2644 general duty infantrymen, of whom 1674 were in the 2nd Infantry Division. The Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General, First Canadian Army, wrote:<sup>174</sup>

It is again stressed that all available Infantry General Duty, whether returned from hospital or otherwise provided, should be despatched as soon as available. Reinforcing is now on a day to day basis, and every available man produced adds to the "bayonet" strength of some unit during this decisive phase of operations.

The crisis in North-West Europe reached its worst point, in terms of statistics, on 31 August,\* when the Canadian infantry units had a total deficiency in "other

\*In Italy it came later, the largest figure for unit deficiencies available on record being 1209 other ranks on 4 November. There were 15 rifle battalions there as compared with 21 in North-West Europe.<sup>175</sup>

ranks" of 4318.<sup>176</sup> Thereafter the remustering programme began to produce improvement.

The French-speaking battalions had presented the most extreme aspect of the problem. As we have seen (above, page 436) this problem had been clearly seen before D Day; nevertheless, on 1 September Le Régiment de Maisonneuve was short 276 other ranks and Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, 333.<sup>177</sup> It was very difficult to find a solution. Experience had shown that French-speaking individuals in English-speaking units were, in practice, quite reluctant to leave them.<sup>178</sup> The problem was still serious in the autumn, and on 23 October General Simonds, then Acting Army Commander, called attention to the situation in his three French-speaking battalions.<sup>179</sup> The deficiency of general duty infantrymen in them on 20 October, he reported, had been 340 other ranks:

It has been found necessary already to give special battle tasks to these regiments because of their dwindling strengths. The undesirability of having to follow this course of action is obvious. Failure to bear a full share of the battle will become increasingly noticeable to other units and formations and resentment will develop against the regiment concerned. This in turn will prejudice the national interest.

Simonds recommended a policy of accepting one complete English-speaking rifle company to each battalion. General Crerar reported that this would have to be done unless adequate French-speaking reinforcements were forthcoming very shortly.<sup>180</sup> A final solution was not found until after the Cabinet crisis of November 1944.

By the last week of August, with the infantry situation clearly extremely serious, General Stuart in London felt obliged to cable Ottawa modifying the optimistic statements he had made there only some three weeks before. On 26 August he telegraphed to the Chief of the General Staff:<sup>181</sup>

We will have the infantry reinforcement situation in a satisfactory condition in from three weeks to one month's time when remustered personnel will- begin to come out of the stream in reasonable numbers. At present time because of recent heavy casualties in general duty infantry I am unable to keep inf units up to strength in general duty personnel although we have a considerable surplus of inf tradesmen and inf specialists. At present time we show a shortage of about 3000 general duty infantry in our 21 battalions in 21 Army Group. By utilizing general duty infantry now under training at CRU for tradesmen and non tradesmen specialists plus general duty inf available I shall be able to find drafts totalling about 2000 within the next six days. . . .

The present situation is not a manpower problem in the true sense. We have the men. It is not a problem of general supply. It is a problem of detailed distribution. We have taken British FFC rates as a guide. Experience of particular conditions of war in France has shown that FFC rates for infantry are too low and for practically all other arms are too high. In addition we did not anticipate that practically all inf casualties would be in general duty personnel. We are now going through a period of adjustment. In three weeks to a month we shall be alright [sic]. I need assistance to bridge this intervening period. . . .

Stuart asked for authority to use temporarily as general duty infantrymen a proportion of infantry "tradesmen" who were receiving "trades pay", without these men losing this pay. It was to be understood that they would be re-absorbed as tradesmen when the supply of general duty men allowed. The Adjutant General agreed to this suggestion with some slight demur.<sup>182</sup>

It will be noted that Stuart's cable announced a very serious situation for the first time, but announced it in terms of a specific administrative problem, and represented it as a very temporary matter. It is, nevertheless, rather surprising that the Minister of National Defence, harassed though he was, failed to note its significance. Colonel Ralston told the House of Commons later that he had seen the cable

but had not called it to the Cabinet's attention. "If I remember correctly", he said, "it was a Sunday morning, and I simply initialled the telegram and handed it back to the chief of the general staff."<sup>183</sup>

Stuart, still perhaps trying to avoid seeming an "alarmist", refrained from pointing out in this cable an obvious danger: that the emergency programme might result in putting into action men whose training as infantry was less adequate than it should have been. There is considerable evidence that this did happen. In The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada, it was recorded on 19 October that there were 131 men in the rifle companies with one month of infantry training, 29 with less than one month and 14 with none. A report to the Commanding Officer stated, ". . . very few men arrive with knowledge of the PIAT,\* or elementary section and platoon tactics. Some reinforcements have never fired the Bren L.M.G. or handled grenades."<sup>184</sup> In this battalion, which had had heavier losses than any other, the situation presumably appeared at its very worst, but there is little doubt that it was unsatisfactory in some degree throughout the infantry of First Canadian Army.

It was this aspect of the matter that first brought the situation forcibly to the attention of both the Canadian public and the Cabinet. On 18 September Major Conn Smythe, M.C., a prominent sportsman, reached Toronto from overseas. He was recovering from a wound received in France on 25 July while commanding an anti-aircraft battery. On the day he arrived he issued to the press from Christie Street Military Hospital a decidedly unusual signed statement. It ran in part:<sup>185</sup>

During my time in France, and in the hospitals of France and England, . . . I talked to officers from far eastern Canada, French Canada, Ontario and all the western provinces. They agreed that the reinforcements received now are green, inexperienced and poorly trained.

Besides this general statement, specific charges are that many have never thrown a grenade. Practically all have little or no knowledge of the Bren gun and, finally, most of them have never seen a Piat anti-tank gun, let alone fired one.

These officers are unanimous in stating that large numbers of unnecessary casualties result from this greenness, both to the rookie and to the older soldiers, who have the added task of trying to look after the newcomers as well as themselves.

Major Smythe's conclusion was that the taxpayer should insist that the "well-trained soldiers in this country" — the N.R.M.A. men — should now be sent "to the battlefronts". "The relatives of the lads in the fighting zones should ensure no further casualties are caused to their own flesh and blood by the failure to send overseas reinforcements now available in large numbers in Canada." This statement reverberated loudly across the country.

It is interesting to speculate on the relationship of Major Smythe's experience to the remustering programme. We have seen (above, page 438) that although nearly 1900 men were remustered in the spring, well before D Day, the main remustering programme did not begin until after Major Smythe was wounded, and the reports he received while in hospital could scarcely have been the results of it. It is a notorious fact of army life that no commanding officer ever admits that the reinforcements his unit receives have been properly trained. The complaints Major Smythe heard may have been in part these normal ones, in part the consequence of the spring remustering. But, paradoxically, if his statements perhaps exaggerated the facts of the situation in August, they were probably considerably more accurate

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\*Projector Infantry Anti-Tank. Experienced infantry officers have suggested that, while no doubt there were reinforcements without this training, some men may possibly have understated their training in the hope of getting safer assignments.

as descriptions of it in October, the month after they were made, when remustering had had its full effect.

Curiously enough, if Mr. King's diary is a reliable guide, Smythe's remarks did not greatly trouble the Prime Minister; at any rate, he made no note of them. They undoubtedly did trouble Colonel Ralston, who shortly afterwards left for Europe for what proved to be his final visit to the Canadian Army Overseas. At the last Cabinet War Committee meeting he attended before his departure (that of 23 September) he reported, in the face of contrary opinions, that at the moment no physically-fit N.R.M.A. men could be released from the Army. They constituted, he explained, an eventual reserve of reinforcements to be used overseas, if and when the need arose.<sup>186</sup>

What Ralston saw and heard overseas, and the conclusions which he reached, set off the most serious Cabinet crisis of the war.

### *Crisis in the Cabinet: Colonel Ralston Goes*

Colonel Ralston went first to Italy, flying by New York and Casablanca and arriving at Naples on 26 September. He had conversations with the Commander of the 1st Canadian Corps (General Burns) and the officer in charge of the Canadian static headquarters (Brigadier E. G. Weeks), and other Canadian senior officers, as well as with the most senior British officers in the theatre, Generals Wilson, Alexander and Leese. He visited a number of hospitals and a good many fighting units, including The Cape Breton Highlanders — who perpetuated his First World War battalion — in the front line. Of his many conversations with officers and men one is particularly prominent in his papers. On 29 September the Regimental Sergeant Major of the 48th Highlanders of Canada told the Minister that — according to Brigadier Weeks' record — in a recent draft of 72 men that had joined the battalion only seven were found to be fully trained. The Minister asked for names; the R.S.M. was able in due course to produce 34, of whom 32 could be identified. Their records were closely checked, and it turned out that every one had been in the Army more than a year and 25 per cent of them more than three years. A number were trained specialists who had been asked for as such, and some were exceptionally well-trained infantrymen. This experience clearly left Ralston feeling that the situation concerning the training of reinforcements was not at all bad.<sup>187</sup>

On the problem of numbers there was some difference of opinion among Canadian senior officers. Brigadier Weeks wrote to General Stuart just after Ralston's visit,

From the military point of view, I am not unduly concerned regarding the reinforcement situation in this theatre. Gen Burns naturally feels that his future operational plans may be adversely affected by the fact that now, or within a few days, some of the infantry units may have to fight slightly under their War Establishment. The British are in very much the same position and have had to reduce their infantry battalions to a 3 company basis. They have always fought their infantry some 10% or 15% below WE. Some of their Senior 'A' Officers cannot understand why we are so concerned about always keeping our units up to WE. I have done my best to explain to them the political implications in respect to the Canadian units. . . .

. . . My own guess is that the Italian front will become a quiet sector with an active defence. . . . If we accept this line of reasoning, then I feel that 1 Cdn Corps will not have many casualties and our reinforcement situation will tend to improve.

Gen Burns is not so optimistic and feels that units under his command must be maintained at full WE ready to fight as the situation demands. . . .

General Burns himself has recorded that he told Ralston that in his opinion "the troops would not feel that the government and country was supporting them whole-

heartedly" if, possessing the power to send the N.R.M.A. men overseas, "it allowed them to sit safely and comfortably in Canada".<sup>188</sup>

On 4 October the Minister flew on to England. There he studied the situation as seen from Canadian Military Headquarters. On the 8th he flew to the Continent and talked to General Simonds, who as acting commander of First Canadian Army was conducting the Battle of the Scheldt. Ralston's notes of their conversation on the question of reinforcements are interesting:

Asked about reinforcements.

Have been down somewhat. Did Commanders speak about it?

Although have numbers very well up — the casualties are in rifle companies and larger proportion of shortages consequently is in these companies.

Never got to a point where fighting efficiency impaired.

Stuart had explained to him.

I said remustering every man possible. Memo seemed to show numbers enough till year end.

Only other source N.R.M.A., which wouldn't be easy.

Asked about training. Said any C.O. would say men not trained as he would train them.

They do talk of training at times but when pinned down they really haven't any serious complaint.

Taken as a whole standard of training of reinforcements very satisfactory.<sup>189</sup>

Back in Ottawa government supporters were troubled. On 7 October a party associate of Ralston wrote Ralston's Military Secretary complaining that the Smythe statement had not been effectively answered and that the acting Minister of National Defence (Mr. Power) could not be reached. On the 9th the Prime Minister twice cabled Ralston. Premier Drew of Ontario had taken up the Smythe charges and attacked Ralston personally; King felt that Ralston should make "an authoritative statement" as soon as possible. Ralston did not receive these cables until his return to England from the Continent on 13 October. He refers in a communication then sent to King to a "broadcast" from Brussels in which he referred to the question of training of reinforcements. The text of this is not to be found in his papers, nor is there any reference to it in the press; perhaps he was thinking of a newspaper interview of 9 October in which he described the general situation as satisfactory. But the statistics which Ralston had been given greatly alarmed him for the future, for they indicated the probability that by 31 December the Canadian pool of infantry reinforcements overseas would be empty. On the 13th he cabled King:

... Think what have already broadcast sums up situation on training but to cover hostile statements should deal with numbers as well. On that point I regret to say that conditions and prospects of which I have learned will I feel necessitate reassessment in light of the future particularly regarding infantry involving I fear grave responsibilities.

Seeing Crerar tomorrow and under circumstances am trying to leave for Canada on Sunday [15th] if transportation available bringing Stuart. Would ask early opportunity to present situation...<sup>190</sup>

That day Mackenzie King, faced with the contingency he had so long succeeded in postponing, wrote in his diary:

I received this afternoon just before going into Cabinet, a telegram from Ralston which has occasioned me great concern. It was in part ... an intimation that he was coming back with the intention of making proposals which may involve the whole question of conscription. ... All of this I can see means that he is coming back prepared to urge that the situation has become so much more serious than contemplated and that drastic steps will have to be taken to secure the necessary numbers of trained men. It will not be so much the question of numbers of reinforcements as the training. All of this of course will be an effort to have the NRMA men serve overseas. ... I feel that the conscriptionists in the govt. are still working together, particularly Macdonald and Ralston; possibly Ilsley who, however, is pretty certain to support anything Ralston suggests.

The Prime Minister proceeded to confide to the diary his views on the crisis that now confronted him:

. . . I could not bring myself to being [sic] the head of a government which would take that course — a course which might, after five years of war in Europe, and preparation for a year and a half of another war in the Pacific — lead to spurts of civil war in our own country. It would be a criminal thing, and would destroy the entire war record, as well as help to dismember the Empire, for I am certain that its after effects would be all in the direction of demand for complete independence, if not annexation with the U.S. Anything to be separated from being in wars because of Britain's connection with them. I want to see the Empire endure. It can only endure by there being complete national unity in Canada. This is going to be a trying experience for me. Indeed, Ralston has been a thorn in my flesh right along. However, I have stood firm before and I shall do so again. The situation is very different today than it has been heretofore. But these are the heavy loads to carry. It is a repetition of the kind of thing that led to the creation of the Union government after Borden's return from England [in 1917]. That will not take place under me.

The omens were clearly very unfavourable for the task which Colonel Ralston had felt obliged to undertake. Nevertheless, the next six weeks were to see strange reversals.

Ralston, on his return to Ottawa on 18 October, suggested to King that it would perhaps be best to discuss the problem in the War Committee before going to the full Cabinet. He also asked that General Stuart should stand by, and remarked that Stuart "felt he had painted too rosy a picture when talking to the War Committee in the summer". The War Committee met on the afternoon of 19 October. Before the meeting General Pope and Mr. Heeney confirmed to King from the War Committee minutes the assurances that had been given that there would be no need for conscription, especially Stuart's on 3 August. Mr. Robertson was also present at this interview. The three officials heartened the Prime Minister by assuring him that he was right in opposing overseas conscription. Robertson suggested that the Canadian Army "should do as the British army had done, reduce its size and possibly its commitments".<sup>191</sup>

Stuart was present for part of the War Committee meeting, and the Prime Minister (King's diary indicates) gave him rather a bad time. "I asked Stuart about his statement, his assurance two months ago as to there being plenty of reinforcements, and also about the additional brigade in Italy not making any additional drain on manpower. He gave some sort of an explanation about the latter that it simply meant changing over certain units; did not touch the question of extra men involved. As to the former, he said he had made a mistake. Later I said to him that having given us the wrong information and having made a mistake, I hoped he would, as I knew he would, do all he could to help the govt. out of the present situation". Nevertheless, General Pope in 1968 remembered Stuart's attitude at this meeting as "cocky"; he showed no evidence of realizing that he was sitting on a powder-keg.

Colonel Ralston reported on his overseas visit and on the problem resulting from the unexpectedly heavy infantry casualties. He read a memorandum with which Stuart had provided him,<sup>192</sup> which explained Stuart's earlier optimism:

In early August every indication pointed to an early collapse of Germany. I felt very strongly, as did the Army Commander and many senior British Commanders and Staff Officers, that the German Army was in the process of being decisively defeated and would probably collapse before December 1944. Today, largely because of the successful German strategy of denying the Channel ports to us, a German collapse cannot be regarded as imminent. We cannot deploy our superior strength against Germany simply because lack of suitable port facilities will not permit of an "all out" offensive on all sections of the front

for some time to come. Intelligent planning demands, therefore, that we must prepare for the prolongation of the war against Germany into 1945.

Stuart reviewed the latest figures on infantry casualties and available reinforcements, pointing out that infantry losses, instead of being 45 per cent of total casualties as anticipated, had proved to be 75 per cent. He continued:

We are carrying out an aggressive remustering campaign and will continue to do so. It must be appreciated, however, that there is a definite limit to what can be done. We have now remustered to infantry practically all surplus other arms that meet infantry age and physical standards and who are not highly skilled tradesmen in the other arms.

Remustering would go on, to the greatest extent possible, and Stuart hoped that there would be "a small plus holding" of infantry by 31 December; nevertheless, this did not "alter the main picture" as indicated by the best calculations for that date — "a total holding of trained reinforcements in U.K., in N.W. Europe and in Italy of less than 10,000 reinforcements in all arms with little or no infantry".

Stuart added that the question of home leave was already affecting morale in Italy and might soon have a similar effect in North-West Europe: "All concerned know that the absence of a generous leave policy is due to shortage of replacements. The men cannot understand why they, who have volunteered, must keep on going into battle and living constantly in the greatest danger and discomfort when trained replacements are available in Canada living in comparative safety and luxury."

The nub of Stuart's recommendations was the following:

The only solution that I can see is to find an additional 15,000 infantry to add to our reinforcement pool on or before 31 Dec 44, and to ask that replacements sent monthly from Canada in 1945 shall be increased to 5300, of whom 4300 should be infantry. The above addition to the pool will give us one month's holding in each theatre and one month in the U.K. for each theatre.

It is apparent, of course, that I am leading up to a recommendation that the future effective maintenance of our Canadian forces in two theatres requires that additional personnel be made available from Canada for service overseas. Actually such is my belief today.

I can assure you that I am not anxious to make the recommendation implied above. On the other hand, I consider that, as Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q., one of my major responsibilities is to ensure that formations in the field are supplied with adequate and well-trained reinforcements. I am satisfied that the reinforcements being sent to both theatres have been well trained. I am satisfied that, up to the present time, reinforcements have been adequate in respect to overall numbers but, for a series of military reasons beyond my control, I must admit that reinforcements have been inadequate as to numbers in respect to the infantry arm. I am not satisfied, and I have attempted to express my reasons in this letter, that anticipated reinforcements will be adequate to meet future requirements of this war against Germany.

I recommend, therefore, if the numbers required cannot be found from General Service personnel in Canada, that the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel be extended to include overseas service in any theatre.

Remembering Stuart's insistence on 2 June on the unwisdom of advocating an extension of compulsory service at that stage of the war (above, page 433), the impact of the summer's events on military thinking becomes obvious.

In the discussion King and Ralston met head-on. Ralston argued that trained N.R.M.A. men were now needed to keep the army up to strength. King replied (his diary records), emphasizing the consequences of such action for national unity; moreover, he says, "I pointed out that clearly what was being asked for was not needed to win the war." No decision could be reached, and the Committee agreed that a special meeting of the full Cabinet would be called to discuss the matter on the following Tuesday, 24 October.

In the meantime, the War Committee itself covered the ground twice more, on 20 and 24 October, in the latter case at a morning meeting preceding that of the full Cabinet in the afternoon. On the 20th Ralston stated the difficulties in the way of meeting the situation by reducing establishments (that is, the size of the field army) or by any proposal for lightening the military tasks which the Army would be called upon to undertake during the final phase of the war in Europe. These, it will be noted, were the expedients that had been proposed by Norman Robertson. The former, one might think, would have entailed the gravest criticism within Canada; the latter would have been extremely embarrassing in dealing with Canada's allies, and would also have been a political liability if the proposal came to public knowledge. At the Committee meeting on 24 October, Ralston again reviewed Stuart's report of 19 October and further analysed the probable future needs. By 31 December, it was now calculated on the basis of new Canadian rates of wastage based on experience since D Day (below, page 453), Canadian infantry units in the two theatres would be deficient some 3780 men, which number could be reduced by possibly 2000 as a result of remustering. The reserve pool in the United Kingdom would be exhausted. Furthermore, it was estimated that about 500 men per month would shortly have to be allowed home leave.

Ralston read a memorandum from the Chief of the General Staff<sup>d93</sup> discussing the sources in Canada from which the required 15,000 additional reinforcements might be obtained. After mentioning various expedients, including a reduction in physical standards, which might produce 5500 more men from among the general service soldiers available, General Murchie wrote:

. . . There is also the possibility of further voluntary conversion of trained NRMA to General Service soldiers though the numbers from this source have decreased during recent weeks. An intensive campaign has been carried on since last Spring to encourage such conversions and in spite of the many conflicting factors such as farm leave and requests for the use of NRMA on labour projects some 9000 personnel converted to General Service during the past six months. These non-military demands and the campaign being carried on in the Press and elsewhere for further employment of NRMA personnel on such projects have built up a resistance against conversion which is becoming increasingly evident by reduction in the number of conversions during recent weeks. It is possible that an intensive campaign to induce volunteering at this stage may only increase that resistance.

7. It will be evident that the total referred to in para 4 [5500] falls considerably short of the requirements stated by the Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q. There are three other methods by which the additional numbers required by 31 Dec 44 might be found:—

- (a) By accepting a reduction in the strength of infantry battalions . . . from 4 rifle companies to 3 . . . .
- (b) By the withdrawal from the Order of Battle and disbandment of one infantry division. . . .

There were many military objections to either of these courses, which the C.G.S. stated; among others, they would reduce the offensive power and effectiveness of the Canadian Army, they would — particularly (b) — involve a major reorganization in the midst of operations, and they would have "a serious effect on the morale of the troops". The paper continued,

- (c) The third alternative is to extend the terms of service of N.R.M.A. personnel to permit their despatch overseas as reinforcements. . . .

10. Adoption of either of the above courses is a matter of Government policy but before a decision is reached to accept either of the proposals made in para 7(a) and (b) it would be essential the field commanders be consulted. Based on purely military consideration the adoption of the course proposed in para 7(c) would in my opinion meet the requirement which the Chief of Staff has put forward both as to numbers and without disruption of the organization and fighting efficiency of the Canadian Army.

The Prime Minister himself suggested that consideration should be given to increasing the financial incentives to N.R.M.A. men to go active. The war gratuities might be increased to cover the whole or at least part of N.R.M.A. service prior to volunteering. The Prime Minister also suggested that "fighting pay" might be provided for general duty infantrymen in operational employment. The War Committee deferred further consideration of the whole problem pending discussion by the full Cabinet.

At 3:30 p.m. on 24 October the Cabinet assembled. Every one of its 21 members was in his place.\* Ralston made a statement describing his overseas trip and the conclusions he had reached. He reported incidentally that he had asked General Eisenhower what the future held: an end to the war before the year was out, a stalemate ("i.e., dig in for the winter"), or "go ahead regardless". According to King's diary, "Eisenhower had said they would go straight, ahead; there would be no let up no matter what came." Ralston's notes of his presentation<sup>194</sup> show that he reported that whereas the forecast of infantry casualties for the period 1 July - 30 September 1944 had been 10,967 all ranks, the actual total was 17,941 all ranks. The infantry casualties for October, November and December 1944, for both theatres, were now estimated at 22,207 all ranks; this included both battle losses and sickness involving evacuation from the theatre. Ralston offered detailed calculations made at Canadian Military Headquarters which indicated that "if fighting continued into 1945, only 2,000 infantry reinforcements would be available in January in U.K. or in either theatre against casualties"; and it was considered likely that the heavier incidence of sickness in the winter season would wipe out even this small reserve. His *aide-mémoire* concludes,

I must say to Council that, while I am ready to explore the situation further, as I see it at the moment, I feel that there is no alternative but for me to recommend the extension of service of N.R.M.A. personnel to overseas.

The Prime Minister wrote:

When Ralston had concluded, there was intense silence. . . . The men who had not heard anything before looked intensely surprised amazed and concerned.

When I started to speak I pointed out that I did not want the discussion to be regarded as a debate between Ralston and myself. It was his duty to give the military point of view. It was mine to raise points of national significance. . . .

King spoke of the absence of earlier information about the crisis and the assurances that had been received concerning the adequacy of the supply of reinforcements. He stated that reports he had received did not support Ralston's view that the war would go on into 1945. He dwelt upon the danger conscription held for national unity. He recalled the famous words of Lord Durham ("two nations warring in the bosom of a single state") and forecast that if Ralston's policy were followed "we would now find out we had the same condition only on a much larger and much more dangerous scale". His diary proceeds:

I then left the matter there but no one in Council had a word to say. There was complete silence for some time. I then re-opened the matter. . . .

King now spoke of party considerations: "That all I would say was that if we were driven to the extreme indicated, the Liberal Party would be completely destroyed and not only immediately but for indefinite time to come. That the only party that

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\*Mr. King's diary says 23; but the actual number had been 21 since Mr. Brooke Claxton joined the Cabinet on 13 October.

would gain would be the C.C.F. who would be handed, in an easy fashion, complete control of govt." The discussion then became "a little more general".

There is no point in rehearsing in full detail here the discussions during the next week. The Cabinet War Committee discussed the matter further on 26 and 27 October. It then held no more meetings until 9 November, by which date there was a new Minister of National Defence. It is a fair assumption that King felt that the War Committee was dominated by the conscriptionist group, including Ralston, Macdonald, Ilsley and Crerar. The discussions in the full Cabinet showed that the conscriptionists were a minority there, although a very impressive one. The full Cabinet met to grapple with the problem on 25, 27, 30 and 31 October; and on 1 November, the meeting on that date being the last attended by Colonel Ralston. It may be best to try to describe the salient happenings of this eventful week, and particularly the development of the Prime Minister's ideas and action, without attempting a chronological narrative.

We have already seen something of the arguments that King used in opposing Ralston's recommendations: the threat to national unity, involving even a danger of civil conflict; and the political consequences for the Liberal Party. Another argument which he used certainly struck some of his hearers as forced, nor is it very easy to follow his reasoning.\* He argued in the Cabinet meeting on 25 October that conscription in Canada might ruin the prospect for a world organization which was to maintain peace, by force if necessary. In this connection he referred to the possible defeat of his government removing Canada as "a steadying force" between the British and the Americans. Angus Macdonald seems to have commented on these ideas with what King thought was a degree of rudeness,

A wide variety of expedients, some of them of a rather desperate appearance, were put forward by the Prime Minister as alternatives to the use of N.R.M.A. men. He repeatedly mentioned additional financial inducements for volunteering, and complained that people did not take this idea seriously enough. He suggested that he himself might make a tour of the camps and make personal appeals to the N.R.M.A. soldiers to volunteer; though he felt that he must have special inducements to offer them. He was quite prepared to consider reductions in the establishments of the field army, in spite of the handle that this would give the Opposition. One of his strangest suggestions was made to General Stuart on 25 October.<sup>195</sup>

I told him I thought efforts should be made overseas in the matter, if need be, of combining units. One thing I suggested was that the French government might, now that we were recognizing the provisional government of France, — might be willing to let one or two of their units fight with one of our French units.

When Stuart replied that "he did not think France would do that, that they were anxious to get their own forces as strong as they possibly could", King replied, he recorded in his diary, that "I thought a wire from me to General de Gaulle making the request was all that was necessary; that de Gaulle realized he owed the freedom of France in large part to Canadians. . . . I knew him personally, knew the type he was, and felt we had only to communicate with Vanier for Vanier† to get the consent of the General to what we wanted in a day." King added in the diary at this point, "What annoys me about the Defence Dept. is that any proposal made, short of conscription of N.R.M.A. men, meets with instant rejection."

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\*See however General Pope's memorandum of his explanation to President Roosevelt, below, page 467.

†Canadian representative with the French provisional government.

During the crisis the Prime Minister made a series of personal interventions, interviewing members of the other party in the Cabinet and attempting to win them over. This course was suggested on 25 October by Major Power,<sup>196</sup> the only one of the three Defence Ministers not a conscriptionist, who was trying hard to find a formula for maintaining unity.

On 26 October King had an interview with Ralston. In the Cabinet the previous day Ralston, according to King, had spoken as follows:

He had said that he would see the army was maintained at strength and that he had seen, in visiting hospitals, men being returned to the front too quickly, and that if we did not get the reinforcements that were needed his integrity would be attacked. . . . He did not see how he could remain in the government unless we could be sure of the reinforcements.

King now told Ralston<sup>197</sup> that he did not think "any of us" should entertain the thought of resignation, and went on to present the political and other arguments against conscription. He found the Minister of National Defence adamant:

Ralston said he had thought the whole matter through but could not see how after what he had said in Parliament, that he could do other out of self respect than to resign. He could live in retirement and obscurity but at least would feel that he had carried out what he said he would do, the inference was that he would do this if he did not keep the army up to strength,

King then used arguments which he had tried out on Norman Robertson earlier in the day. He told Ralston that he had "an obligation as a soldier" not to take any step which might "make it more difficult to further the war effort". He also asked Ralston whether as a Minister of the Crown, "knowing what the consequences of your resignation from the Cabinet might be", he would be "serving the State as you have sworn to do" in allowing situations to arise "which would be helpful to the enemy by destroying altogether the progress that has been made in bringing about a world organization which would maintain peace by force, if necessary". There is a certain piquancy, to put it no higher, in the spectacle of Mackenzie King lecturing J. L. Ralston on his duty as a soldier; and it is not surprising that the lecture made no impression. King recorded, "To all this he came back simply saying that he had thought the matter out and owed it to what he had talked over with himself." King's phrasing is awkward, but Ralston's position is amply clear.

This was only the most important of King's interviews. Later on the 26th he had a talk with Angus Macdonald which was apparently not unfriendly; indeed, the whole series of exchanges was carried on in a civilized manner without personal recrimination. Subsequently, still on the same day, King argued at some length with T. A. Crerar; and Norman Robertson took on the task of having a conversation with J. L. Ilsley, the Minister of Finance, in the hope of at least prevailing upon him not to oppose remunerating N.R.M.A. men who volunteered for part of the time they had spent in training. On the previous day, as already mentioned, King, at his own request, had had a long talk with General Stuart.<sup>198</sup>

All these expedients, however, were subordinate in King's mind to another. He long believed that the key to the solution of his difficulties lay with Winston Churchill, and that Churchill could be relied upon to intervene in a decisive manner.

On 21 October King had a conversation with Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom, with whom he was on friendly terms. MacDonald, who was sympathetic to King's attitude on conscription, agreed with him that it would be well to communicate with Churchill, asking him frankly — the words are those of King's diary — "what he knew of the strategy of the war and

its probable duration; whether he thought it was necessary or desirable that we should resort to conscription; also whether matters could not be so arranged as to keep the Canadian army intact". The following day King drafted a telegram for Churchill, which was sent to MacDonald for dispatch by him. King recorded, "The message got off at night and I feel very sure that once Churchill has read it he will be helpful in seeing, from the European end, that nothing in the way of conscription becomes necessary at this end."<sup>199</sup>

The message given to MacDonald as it survives in the King Papers<sup>200</sup> — it is clearly not precisely the one that was sent to Churchill — is characteristically long, running to 11 paragraphs. It began,

I am faced with the most critical situation which has risen since Canada's entry into the war. It is beset with possible consequences so dangerous to the remainder of Canada's war effort in Europe and Asia, to the future of Canada, to future relations within the Commonwealth, and to all Government war activities and policies, including those being considered with respect to organization for maintenance of world peace that I feel I should inform you of the situation, and inquire of you whether in your opinion conditions as they are in Europe, at the moment, or as they are likely to become at any time before the conclusion of the war render necessary the step that is being proposed.

King proceeded to quote Stuart's recommendation of 19 October (above, page 444) and to describe the possible political results of overseas conscription: parliamentary discussion, closure, defeat of the government; "and most certainly a dissolution of Parliament itself to be followed by a general election extending over two months". He asked Churchill "if you will let me know whether in your opinion the probable duration of the war, or the Allied strategy necessitates, or would render advisable for any reason that will be helpful to the Allied cause, the taking of the risks involved in raising a conscription issue in Canada at this stage of war":

8. In no way do I desire to shift any responsibility upon you for a decision. I am quite prepared, as it is my duty, to become responsible for any decision the Canadian Government may take in relation to any matter of policy in so far as it relates exclusively to the Canadian forces. I recognize however that in this matter I have a special responsibility to bring to the attention of yourself what is involved in the decision to be reached and wherein it cannot fail to have far reaching effects upon the immediate and prospective efforts of all the United Nations and in particular those of the United Kingdom. I also recognize that once these have been brought to your attention the British Government not less than our own could not escape responsibility if all aspects of the situation were not fully thought out by both Governments. . . . I feel I must in the interests of all concerned, seek the widest measure of guidance and assistance in endeavouring to find a solution which will prevent the appalling consequences I foresee, if a course cannot be found which will avoid the risks involved in raising in Canada an overseas conscription issue at this time. . . .

As the crisis developed, King continued to pin his faith to the arrival of a message from Churchill. He wrote in his diary on 24 October, "It is almost certain he will consult with Brooke and Brooke with Montgomery before communicating a reply to me. I feel very strongly that the reply will relieve my mind very largely, if not entirely." But no reply came. On the 26th, the Prime Minister went to see Malcolm MacDonald and subsequently the latter sent a cable<sup>201</sup> expressing the hope that King would soon get an answer, and emphasizing his need for answers to two questions which MacDonald had (as King recorded in his diary on 22 October) suggested incorporating in the message, though they are not in the draft in the King Papers above referred to: first, what were Churchill's views as to the expected duration of the war against Germany? And secondly, what was the likelihood of the Canadian Army being engaged in the next large operation?

On the afternoon of 27 October King finally received a reply from Churchill through Malcolm MacDonald.<sup>202</sup> It was short, polite and canny.<sup>203</sup> Churchill had, he said, consulted the Chiefs of Staff in strict secrecy concerning King's two questions:

... they advise with my concurrence that the reply to (1) should be 'That war in Europe may well go on until the summer of 1945,' and to (2) 'it must be anticipated that the Canadian Army will be engaged in large scale operations for the final defeat of Germany but we cannot say yet whether they will be in the next operation as plans are not yet complete'. I do not of course, know what numbers are involved in the next six months or so.

The British Prime Minister went on to say that he was naturally much concerned at Mr. King's difficulties the seriousness of which he could fully appreciate: "But I feel from your para 8\* that no comment is called for from me at this juncture. Whatever you may decide you may be sure that it would in no way prevent His Majesty's Government and myself from continuing to pay the warmest tributes to the brilliant and massive help which the Canadian Army has given to the whole of our war effort, for which the British nation will ever remain profoundly grateful."

King found this message acutely disappointing. He was "greatly surprised that Churchill had not indicated his desire to meet the situation".<sup>204</sup> Certainly this was not the solution for his problems for which he had hoped. And if he communicated to the Cabinet the authoritative statement on the length of the war and the continuing Canadian involvement which he had now received his position would be weakened.

The Prime Minister had not told his colleagues that he had approached Churchill; but before this reply came such an approach had been discussed with them. During the Cabinet meeting on 25 October, King 'had remarked that he was prepared if need be to leave at once to explain the situation to Mr. Churchill. He recorded in his diary,

I was asked if I would suggest the taking of a month out of the line. I said I would suggest nothing. I would let the situation be known and ask that it be known to the Americans as well; leave it to the British to decide whether it was worth while to interest themselves in the situation or not.

When the matter was mentioned again in the War Committee on 27 October, Ralston asked if the question could not "be dealt with as a purely domestic one". King said the British government "ought to know anything that affected 'the Allies'". King's record continues, "When they were pressing for getting a decision; today, I said well, I would wish to go across, would be ready to leave on Monday [30th]. Ralston said he did not want to oppose that course but the getting of reinforcements was pressing and that each day's delay increased the difficulty. To this I replied well, if that is the case, I will communicate by telegram and I will do so this afternoon." The message from Churchill came after the Committee meeting. Had it been more satisfactory from his point of view, King would doubtless have read it to the full Cabinet at the meeting that took place later the same afternoon. Instead, he chose to conceal it. He wrote in his diary, "I told the Ministers that . . . I had said in the morning, I would telegraph Churchill today but had concluded it would be better to wait until we heard from those overseas, our own men. . . ."<sup>205</sup> It seems hard to acquit him of essential dishonesty.

It is fairly apparent that although King merely asked Churchill for information,

\*It is not completely certain that this is the same paragraph 8 quoted on page 449 above, but it seems probable.

he had in the back of his mind the hopeful possibility that the British Prime Minister might use his influence to prevent the First Canadian Army from being heavily involved in operations in the next phase. The reference to Brooke and Montgomery (above, page 449) strongly suggests this. But Churchill evidently had no intention of turning the grindstone for King to this extent; and it is curious that King and MacDonald should have seriously expected him to do so.

One matter which arose during the discussions requires to be examined in some detail. During the Cabinet meeting on 25 October the point emerged that there were 120,000 general service men serving in Canada. Subsequently it was stated that there were 90,000 more in the United Kingdom. According to Mr. King the figure of 120,000 drew from Mr. Power the remark, "My God, if that is the case, what are you talking about getting more men under conscription?"<sup>206</sup> The same attitude has been taken by other people since; one of them being one of King's biographers, who found it impossible to believe that the 15,000 men who were needed could not have been secured from these pools. This writer remarks, "the sceptic will be pardoned if he retains the conviction that a Sir Clifford Sifton or a C. D. Howe would after two weeks' work have extracted the men or the army would have lost a large number of officers".\*

On 26 October the War Committee agreed that the three Defence Ministers should examine these figures overnight and report back the following day on the possibility of finding additional reinforcements from among the general service men in Canada and the United Kingdom. On 27 October Mr. Power himself reported on behalf of the Defence Ministers that unless the high medical standards for infantry could be lowered, examination of the figures supported the conclusion that the required numbers of infantry reinforcements could not be obtained from among the present general service personnel by 1 January. (In his memoirs Mr. Power terms the overnight discussion "rather inconclusive", but the official record of the meeting of the 27th indicates that he made a definite report.) Mr. Angus Macdonald reported with respect to the 90,000 men in the United Kingdom that it appeared that not many additional infantry reinforcements could be found from this source.

It seems desirable to go into this matter a little more deeply. A memorandum of 23 October,<sup>207</sup> supplied to the Minister of National Defence, gave the figure of 120,000 general service men in Canada and the North American area generally on 27 September (there were in addition 5800 on extended leave). Of these 120,000, 67,000 were over age, under age, or in a quite low medical category (PULHEMS 3, 4 or 5).† There were 11,000 men not medically suitable for infantry but not below PULHEMS 2; and there were 42,000 medically suitable for infantry, of whom 30,000 were in the "training stream".

It is quite likely that among these 42,000 the required 15,000 men could, with some trouble, have been found; but they would not have been trained infantrymen

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\*R. MacGregor Dawson, *The Conscription Crisis of 1944* (Toronto, 1961), page 33. The reader should be warned that this little book, published after Professor Dawson's death, was really only a draft, written before Dawson had examined the background of the crisis and certainly based on a less than complete examination of the evidence that Dawson had before him, which was not all the evidence available. It is a fair assumption that the author would have materially revised these chapters before publishing them.

†The PULHEMS system of medical categorization was introduced in October 1943, and was itself a considerable advance in the efficient classification of personnel. PULHEMS stood for Physique, Upper extremities, Lower extremities, Hearing, Eyesight, Mental capacity and Stability.<sup>208</sup> The PULHEMS standard for general duty infantry was 1111221.<sup>209</sup>

and training them would have taken a good deal of time. By the autumn of 1944 practically all general duty infantry privates had already been withdrawn for overseas duty; this left mainly non-commissioned officers, tradesmen and men remustered from other corps for training as infantry. It has to be remembered that a very large administrative and training organization had been created in Canada. While this organization was no doubt susceptible of reduction, it could not be abolished; and reducing it would be a considerable task. It could not be staffed with N.R.M.A. soldiers, and while it could, given time, have been largely staffed with men of age and category unfit for overseas service, in practice a good many men fit for such service were certainly employed in it. Getting them out would have been a slow process and would certainly have left the organization much less efficient. The basic point is that the only place where *a large body of trained infantrymen* was actually available was among the N.R.M.A. soldiers. To try to produce an equivalent from among the general service men in Canada would have been the work of several months, and it is doubtful whether when the task had been completed the men made available would have been equally satisfactory infantry soldiers.

As for the United Kingdom, the actual number of general service men on the rolls there at the end of September was 88,526.<sup>210</sup> The number of "other rank" reinforcements in the country on 27 October was 18,065, of whom 6657 were infantry; 2118 other ranks of other corps were being remustered as infantry but would not be available as reinforcements before 31 December. Of the 88,526, a total of 35,631 were reckoned as "non-effectives". These included sick or wounded men in hospital, men on courses, men on loan to the British, unfit men in "GSD 602" units\* and men listed as prisoners of war and missing. In view of the need to maintain the necessary training and administrative organization in the United Kingdom, including the Forestry Corps and other services, it is not surprising that the Defence Ministers arrived at the conclusion that not many additional infantry reinforcements could be found there. Under existing policy, of course, the whole organization in the United Kingdom had to be staffed with general service men.

It is quite evident that Major Power's statement to the War Committee that the necessary men could not be found among the present general service personnel by 1 January 1945 was the simple truth. This date was used because, according to the best calculations that could then be made, as reported to the Committee by Power on 27 October, at the end of the calendar year infantry units in the field would be approximately up to strength but there would be no reserves. The calculation was that on 1 January there would be no more than 750 infantry reinforcements in the United Kingdom. In the course of the next month, however, some 3000 more reinforcements would have become available to replace casualties sustained in January. It was concluded that, if fighting continued at the intense rate during the first month of the year, infantry units might fall to some 10 per cent below strength.

These calculations were based upon the new Canadian "rates of wastage" which had been compiled on the basis of the actual Canadian losses during the past few months and were approved in September.<sup>211</sup> For the information of the reader, a simplified table of the old War Office rates and the new Canadian rates should be given; it covers only a few of the corps of the Army. It should be added that during the war all material of this sort was treated as Top Secret in accordance with British War Office practice:

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\*See above, page 427.

### Monthly Rates of Wastage (Percentages)

Corps	British				Canadian (after August 1944)			
	Intense		Normal		Intense		Normal	
	Offrs.	O.Rs.	Offrs.	O.Rs.	Offrs.	O.Rs.	Offrs.	O.Rs.
Infantry Rifle	25	20	7	6	45	30	13	13
Armoured Corps	25	14	5	4	20	7	7	2½
Artillery Field	15	8	5	4	12	5	5	2½
Artillery, A.A.	4	3	2	1½	3	1½	2	1
Army Service Corps	5	4	4	3	2	¾	¾	¾

N.B.: The "Quiet" rate remained ¾ of one per cent for all corps throughout.

The historian of this crisis soon finds himself faced with a basic problem. We have seen that throughout the early days of the affair Mr. King's great object was to prevent the resignation of the Minister of National Defence. It is true that he recorded that on 20 October he told Mr. St. Laurent "that I had about come to the conclusion that if Ralston persisted in his attitude and tendered his resignation, I would accept it and would invite McNaughton to come into the Cabinet".<sup>212</sup> In the days that followed, however, he used, as we have seen, a great variety of arguments, including some rather strange ones, to prevail upon Ralston to remain in the government. Yet the fact is that on 1 November the Prime Minister in effect dismissed Ralston from the Cabinet, at a time when the Minister was still prepared to continue the discussion and to seek a compromise. How and why did this come about?

Mr. King's diary indicates to the present writer that the turning-point came suddenly on the evening of 30 October. The crisis had now been in progress since the 18th, and nerves and tempers were undoubtedly beginning to fray under the strain. The Cabinet meeting that day went on until seven p.m. King then went home to his solitary dinner at Laurier House. Thereafter the diary can tell the story:

... I looked at a telegram from George Fulford which was to the effect that he reiterated his stand for conscription. This, at once, caused me to feel exactly what the conspiracy is, because I believe it has come to be that. It is not merely a question of conscription. The same men who are for conscription are the same identically as those who opposed most strongly the family allowances and other social reforms in the budget: Ilsley, Ralston, Howe, Macdonald, Crerar and Gibson? [*sic*] It is perfectly plain to me that in pretty much all particulars my position is becoming identical to that of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's where his supposedly strongest colleagues left him, one by one, and joined their political enemies and became a party for conscription. ...

... In today's evening Citizen an inspired article appears which is intended to spike McNaughton's guns as G.G.\* I would like to know just how that has come about. ... All this may work together for good in the end. If it comes to opposing Ralston and his con-

\*It had been King's plan to nominate General McNaughton as the next Governor General, and he had consulted Lord Athlone concerning this intention. The McNaughton Papers show that King and McNaughton discussed the General's future on 3 October; King spoke of the possibility of his entering the government and McNaughton said that he could not work with Ralston. There was discussion of the General's notes, but the meaning is clear. King had suggested this on 23 September; McNaughton's possibility of McNaughton becoming Governor General (the name of the office is left blank in the notes add that the suggestion had first been made "some two years ago". McNaughton accepted the idea on 13 October.

scriptionist friends, McNaughton will soon find himself at my side strongly fighting for the peoples' rights in this country.

George T. Fulford was Liberal M.P. for Leeds and an industrialist. His telegram preserved in the King Papers ran as follows:

This is to reiterate my stand twice on record in Hansard that I unequivocally favour universal conscription for overseas service the zombie situation is impossible to explain and has lately been aggravated by the demobilization of recent Air Force recruits.

As evidence of growing dissatisfaction within his own party this would in any case have been disturbing to King. But he undoubtedly remembered — the incident is prominent in his diary — that on 29 June Fulford had attacked his family allowance project in the Liberal caucus on the ground that it was truckling to French Canada. During the evening, evidently after he had formed the conspiracy theory in his own mind — though the diary is not specific on this — King telephoned Mr. Ian Mackenzie, the Minister of National Health and Welfare and a former Minister of National Defence. Mackenzie's advice<sup>213</sup> strengthened King's suspicions:

He felt perfectly sure there was a conspiracy from the Defence Depts. to get me out. I said to him it was rather noticeable however that the men who wanted conscription were those who opposed our social legislation. He said that was quite clear. There was no doubt that that part might lie back of the raising of the conscription issue. . . . Also he thought I ought to take McNaughton into the government. . . .

From this moment, it would seem, King was determined to get rid of Ralston, whom he doubtless regarded — though he never says so — as the centre of the conspiracy against him which he now believed existed. His diary, it is true, continues to speak in terms of Ralston's probable resignation, not of an intention to dismiss him. But the Prime Minister's actions from this moment strongly suggest that he had reached a decision and that from the evening of 30 October he had no doubt that Ralston must go.

Was there actually a conspiracy against King? Neither in the Ralston Papers nor elsewhere has any evidence been found to support such an idea. King in his diary sets down none at all; he seems to have worked simply on an intuitive impulse fortified by the coincidence that he remembered the same members of the Cabinet as opposing him on two issues: social policy and conscription. Ralston's actions after his dismissal, when he continued to give general support to the administration at a time when he could probably have brought it down had he chosen — a course that might well have tempted a man who had received the sort of treatment he had got from King — strongly suggest that in fact the conspiracy existed only in King's mind; that Ralston was perfectly sincere when he said, as King recorded, that he was prepared to live in retirement and obscurity provided he could be at peace with his conscience. Ralston might have been Prime Minister himself had he chosen to turn on King. One may well remember the significant words he used in the House of Commons on 29 November 1944: "I have not any ambition but to be a good Canadian, and I know my place is not on the dizzy heights of leadership. . . . I have no inclination, much less aspiration for preferment in public life. . . . I neither felt nor feel any duty to take a responsibility for which I am not suited." Ralston was speaking specifically of his reply to King's question in the Cabinet on 31 October (below, page 456); but his words pretty clearly had a wider significance.

It is a curious fact that the conscriptionist ministers had apparently not opposed the Prime Minister's social policy in quite the manner or to the extent that the diary at this point would suggest. He had *expected* strong opposition in the

Cabinet; but when he polled his colleagues at a cabinet meeting on 13 January 1944 he found rather to his surprise that there was little disposition to stand strongly against family allowances. Only one minister took this line.<sup>214</sup> That was C. D. Howe; and C. D. Howe was not a strong conscriptionist in the October stage of the crisis — he was refraining from saying anything on the subject. It would seem that the Prime Minister remembered the opposition he had feared rather than the compliance he had in fact encountered.\*

On the morning of 31 October Mr. King communicated with General McNaughton and arranged for him to come to Laurier House at 12:20 p.m. King discussed the situation with him. According to the Prime Minister, McNaughton "agreed that the Canadian Army was not needed for the winning of the war. Also that it was questionable whether it was necessary to resort to conscription at this stage." King raised the question of McNaughton's becoming Minister of Defence. The General said "very strong approaches had been made to him to go into one of the other parties", and added, "McTague and Borden† had pressed him very hard". However, King recorded, "He finally said to me that if Ralston did resign, he would be at my disposal and prepared to take on the task." McNaughton's own terse notes are confirmatory, though not so definite on the matter of conscription. They include the words, "National Emergency. Not political. at PMs disposal if required", and subsequently, "We must satisfy ourselves and Public that there is a real necessity before invoking Conscription".<sup>215</sup>

In the Cabinet meeting that afternoon there was prolonged discussion on the procedure that might be followed in an appeal by the government for recruits. For the first time, it seemed, the possibility of a compromise presented itself: the suggestion that if the appeal was made, and after a month's effort the necessary men were not secured, then conscription would be enforced. King refused to yield: "I did not think it was wise to say that conscription would necessarily follow at that time. That I thought we should hold to what our policy had always been, get the men by voluntary means, and, if necessary to win the war, then have conscription. . . ." <sup>216</sup> It is curious to reflect that if King had agreed to this compromise, the final result might have been exactly what happened anyway; for, as it turned out, within a month the government found itself forced to send conscripted men overseas. Had the compromise been accepted, Ralston would have remained in the government. But by this time, it is pretty evident, King did not want him to remain.

The Prime Minister recorded in his diary the alignment of the Cabinet on conscription. Including those members who were not present, and counting Howe as a conscriptionist, though he had not spoken, he came to the conclusion that in a vote it would be eight to thirteen against conscription. He was taken aback by the fact that a junior member of the Cabinet, Mr. W. P. Mulock, now spoke for conscription, though he had previously taken the opposite position. King wrote:

I am a little surprized at Mulock. I do not forget that Sir Wilfrid had somewhat the same experience.‡

As I sat in Council, I thought of [*sic*] what was happening to me, was exactly the same as what had happened to Sir Wilfrid. I can see this whole thing has been worked out as a plot. Some of the men who were incensed at the proposal at the start are now coming round, being fearful.

\*He did however record in his diary on 15 June that Macdonald, Crerar and Ilsley were still registering objections to the scheme.

†C. P. McTague and Henry Borden, Conservative organizers.

‡Mr. Mulock's grandfather, Sir William Mulock, a former member of the Laurier government, supported the Union Government movement against Sir Wilfrid in 1917.

In the course of this Cabinet meeting, Angus Macdonald remarked that if Ralston resigned, he himself "would have to consider his situation very carefully". Subsequently King took action, he notes, which indicated that the situation was reaching a final crisis:

I then asked Ralston whether tonight because of the division of the Cabinet, I should go to the G.G. and ask for him to send for Ralston. Would he take the responsibility of forming a government and carrying on. He said he would not. I asked Macdonald. He said he would not. I asked Ilsley. He said he would want time to decide. He could not decide in a minute. It is pretty clear he has it in mind he may be the one to be asked to form a govt. If he does, heaven help hi and help the govt. for he will go all to pieces before no time.

King usually slept well, but that night, he records, "It was a long time . . . before I got to sleep and it seemed to me that I did not sleep through the entire night."<sup>217</sup>

On the morning of the fateful first day of November, King again asked McNaughton to come to Laurier House. He explained the situation in the Cabinet, and his own position:

I said: General, let me make perfectly clear what I mean about the need for conscription. I have always used it in reference to the winning of the war, not in reference to keeping the army formations up to strength. . . . The General said I would not regard the keeping of formations up to strength as a necessary thing.

Thereafter, King's diary states, he said to McNaughton, "General, the time has come, I think, for me to ask you to become Minister of National Defence, having the supervision over all the defence departments as well as the army side. . . . I think this should be done immediately. Every hour is important. Ralston will probably tender his resignation this afternoon." The Prime Minister added that he would take the resignation to the Governor General and ask him to accept it, at the same time telling Lord Athlone that he proposed to recommend appointing McNaughton. He asked McNaughton to hold himself in readiness; it would "probably be between 4 and 6 when I would call for him".

Again McNaughton's notes generally confirm King's, though the emphasis is rather different. Part of the General's record should be quoted:

. . . I spoke of the numbers of GS personnel in: Canada. Could not Hdqrs and these be drastically reduced.

I said I was not prepared to say that conscription was necessary for the effective prosecution of our part in the War. This did not mean that the Present Army Estab had to be kept up as it was. The Army Establishment might need to be changed to meet conditions In particular Armd Div in Italy had 2 Inf Bdes in Western Europe it had 1.

Changing from Volunteer system to conscription was a very serious step. We needed to know that it was really necessary before we took it. If it was necessary we should be able to convince the Public in whose judgment I thought we should have confidence.<sup>218</sup>

It seems evident that McNaughton was far from promising that conscription could be avoided. He did say that it should not be adopted unless the need was indisputable, and he suggested that there were still untapped sources of manpower within the Army. It should be remembered that he had not been active in the service for a year past, and had no recent knowledge of military conditions in Canada.

After this interview Mr. King went to Government House to see the Governor General. He had had a number of audiences with Lord Athlone in the course of the crisis and had let him know that Ralston might go. He now told him that he "thought Ralston would not accept" the idea of an appeal without an agreement to use compulsion if it failed, "and that being so I would come down this afternoon

to ask H.E. to accept his resignation". King added that if Ralston "left" Macdonald and Ilsley might resign also. The Prime Minister at this point made a proposal which, constitutionally speaking, seems extraordinary. He advised that Ralston's resignation should be accepted, but those of Macdonald and Ilsley, if tendered, should not be accepted but held up "at least until Parliament had been called and the matter discussed there". Lord Athlone naturally made no difficulty over accepting Ralston's resignation: the other proposal he seems not to have commented upon.<sup>219</sup>

These actions on the part of the Prime Minister suggest that he was preparing to remove Ralston, while at the same time attempting to provide against the government being broken up by a general withdrawal of the conscriptionists. It is a notable fact that King evidently told nobody — nobody — what he pretty clearly intended to do that afternoon. Surprise was essential to his plan. He did, however, take some steps to prepare the ground. He did not venture to approach Macdonald or Ilsley, who were far too close to Ralston. He did telephone Mulock and asked him not to commit himself "too much" at the Cabinet that afternoon but to wait and see what King had in mind. Mulock agreed. King also telephoned Crerar and suggested that he should not "say anything committing himself as to what he will do if certain people did certain things". Crerar, according to King, was "evasive". Crerar's own account says, "I said that I was interested only in getting the problem solved in the right way." Finally, King had an interview just as the Cabinet was assembling with his senior Quebec lieutenant, Louis St. Laurent, and informed him that General McNaughton was willing to become Minister of National Defence and believed he could raise the necessary men without resorting to conscription.<sup>220</sup>

It seems evident that the conscriptionist ministers had no inkling of King's plans. On 1 November before the Cabinet meeting both Ralston and Macdonald spoke to General Pearkes of Pacific Command by telephone, asking his opinion as to the probable result of an intensive appeal to the conscripts. To both Pearkes said that from 2000 to 3000 men might be obtained in a three-week campaign. ("Infantry hardest to get — not more than 1500 Infantry.") The general said to Ralston, "We have tried so hard this summer and have gotten much of the cream away already." To Macdonald he said, "Assuming you started your appeal on the 6<sup>th</sup> November and finished say on the 15th, you should know the results by November 30th." (The men, in other words, would need some time to make up their minds.)<sup>221</sup> It is evident that the ministers were collecting facts bearing on the proposed compromise. Their actions are hardly those of conspirators.

Soon after three o'clock that afternoon the Cabinet assembled. Power, Howe and Gardiner were absent. The issues were covered once again. Colonel Ralston, King records, spoke in "an extremely moderate and mild way". The compromise suggestion, an appeal for volunteers to be followed by conscription after a stated period if the appeal failed, was again canvassed. The discussion dragged, and fell behind the time-table King had forecast to McNaughton. At five o'clock the Prime Minister left the chamber and telephoned the General. Here are the latter's notes:

Mr. King said that the Discussions were taking longer than he had expected. That the (officers of the Dept)? [sic] were showing more willingness to take steps to meet the situation. It may be late before the meeting is over. He had just called me to let me know so that I would not be waiting without news.

I said that my only desire was to get a proper solution. If it can be done peacefully without a cabinet split all the better. And something more to the effect that he was not to consider himself under any obligation to me.

Mr. King said his particular differences with the Minister (Ralston) will come at the

last he was keeping it to the end. He said something to the effect that he was trying to establish the greatest measure of agreement in the Cabinet before hand.

I said I would continue to hold myself available.

"When it got on to about six o'clock", writes King in his diary, "we had narrowed the discussion pretty much to the one point of an agreement on conscription in certain circumstances among ourselves. I said that still leaves open what we mean by the necessity for conscription and I thought we should clear that up. Ralston said there was a fundamental difference between us. He thought the decision on that was already made by Council. It was apparent that most of them were against conscription at any time." King continues with what are evidently Ralston's further words describing King's attitude:

I had been quite frank in stating the position I took. However, different things had been mentioned, particularly the question of adopting the course of an appeal, which he was prepared to consider further. He spoke of taking tonight to think it over. This was so different from his previous attitude as to the necessity of not losing a day that I said to myself at once: here is a scheme to make the situation still more difficult for me. We will be met tomorrow by some condition of things which will mean going over the same ground again to no effect. . . . The moment I sensed this I felt the time had come for me to speak out. . . .<sup>222</sup>

King proceeded to say that a conclusion should be reached without further delay, and he brought forward the name of General McNaughton as a possible Minister of National Defence. He said he would "find out as soon as possible" whether McNaughton would agree to undertake the task (McNaughton, of course, had already assured him of this). He added that he had talked with McNaughton and had been assured that "he thought he could get the reinforcements without resorting to conscription; that he thought conscription would be disastrous for Canada; that he knew the French-Canadians". In these circumstances, King said he thought, in the light of the views which Ralston had often expressed, "he should make it possible for us to bring in to the Cabinet at once — the man who was prepared to see this situation through."

I said that in regard to a resignation from Ralston, that he had tendered his resignation to me some two years ago and had never withdrawn it; that that had been a very trying thing for me to go on day in and day out for this period with this resignation not withdrawn, but simply held.

After some further words from King, to the effect "that the hardest thing for any man to do was to part with a colleague, especially one who had been as close as Ralston had been, and of whom [sic] one had such high respect and, indeed, affection", Ralston spoke, "very quietly", saying that he would of course give King his resignation at once:

Ralston went on to say that he had done the best he possibly could. He knew he was limited in some things, but had done his best. He spoke of the companionship we had enjoyed and what it meant to share in the work with his colleagues; that he sincerely hoped the new Minister — I forgot how he referred to him — I think he said the new move — might be successful. He was not sure that it would be but he certainly hoped it would. He ended by saying that he would retire to private life.

There were a few more words, and then Ralston gathered up his papers, shook hands with the Prime Minister and with all the other members of the Cabinet, and withdrew. He went alone.<sup>223</sup> The Prime Minister's tactical plan had been a complete success. The conscriptionists, totally taken by surprise, were in no position to act together. General McNaughton was sworn in as Minister of National Defence the following day.

One commentator has written, "The dismissal of Ralston and the appointment of McNaughton must be regarded as an outstanding example of King's political shrewdness and his capacity for leadership which no consideration of the purely personal factors involved should be allowed to obscure."<sup>24</sup> This is doubtless true in some degree; the Prime Minister's action was a tactical masterpiece. His strategy — not to speak of his morality — was more questionable. As we have already suggested, a possibility existed of keeping Ralston in the government, and perhaps in the government's interest it should have been pursued, King, however, was now determined to get Ralston out of the Cabinet. This resolve seems to have been based upon unsound premises, in that there is no evidence at all that Ralston was plotting in the manner which King believed. And the Prime Minister's treatment of the Defence Minister was not only ruthless but shabby. His use of the 1942 resignation, although probably not an essential factor in the transaction, is one of its most unpleasant elements. As for Colonel Ralston, it is possible to disagree with his assessment of the situation and its needs in the autumn of 1944; but his sincerity, his consistency and his dignity can scarcely be questioned. He withdrew from politics leaving behind him a reputation for a high order of integrity.

King had of course to reckon with the possibility that Ilsley and Macdonald might immediately follow Ralston out of the government. He was prepared to face this, and even recorded that "if it came to the worst, it would be a relief to be free of further conscriptionist elements in the Government", though he clearly hoped for political reasons that they would remain. (By 16 November he was writing in his diary, "Macdonald would not be a loss but Ilsley In fact, it appears, on the evening of 1 November Ralston himself persuaded Macdonald and Ilsley to remain in the Cabinet and give McNaughton a chance to show what he could do. \*

It would seem that King never fully clarified in his own mind the supposed relationship of Ralston to the cabinet conspiracy against himself which he believed existed. Beside the account of the flash of revelation which he got when he read the Fulford telegram we may put what he wrote in his diary on 1 November, after Ralston had been dismissed:

. . . While I acquit Ralston of any deliberate attempt to destroy the government, I know that behind him there have been forces that have brought this situation about — deliberately planned it to destroy myself and the government. There is plenty of circumstantial evidence to make that as clear as day. They are the same forces that do not want social legislation.

. . . While I am deeply sorry to offend Ralston in any way, I cannot forget that he was prepared to have me and the government destroyed politically.

At no time did King record any specific evidence that Ralston had been intriguing against him.

It can be and has been suggested that the removal of Ralston and the appointment of McNaughton played a vital part in convincing the people of Quebec that the government was determined to go to the utmost length to avoid overseas conscription, and that the final three-week attempt under McNaughton to make the

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\*Dawson, *Conscription Crisis*, 51-2. Mr. Dawson, when drafting this account, interviewed a number of the then surviving participants, including Mr. Macdonald. The latter, I am told, read passages from his diary to Dawson but did not allow him to see the document. Mr. Macdonald's family have refused me access to it. The Ralston Papers contain an exiguous diary covering the period 1 November - 8 December 1944. This establishes that Macdonald and Ilsley were with Ralston for five hours on the evening of 1 November, but says nothing of what they discussed. It appears however that Ralston's new letter of resignation was drafted during the evening.

voluntary system work gave Quebec time to reconcile itself to what was becoming inevitable. But while this may all be true it must be said that King's diary contains no indication whatever that any such ideas entered into his calculations. On the basis of his written record, it appears that he was moved entirely by a sudden access of fear for his own immediate personal and political position; that, acting purely on an intuition — and an intuition which was in fact baseless — he struck out, blindly but with deadly effect, at the nearest and the most prominent of those he thought his enemies. That the ultimate result in Quebec was probably favourable to him seems to have owed nothing to forethought on his own part. In spite of defective or non-existent strategy, he won a victory, thanks to remarkable good luck, to the ruthless excellence of his tactics — and to the fact that the man he victimized was entirely innocent of the sort of political ambition that was King's whole existence.

*Crisis in the Cabinet: Overseas Conscription Comes*

General McNaughton, as Minister of National Defence, was faced at the beginning of November with the task of making the voluntary system work, as he had assured the Prime Minister he believed might be done. The prospects were not bright. The dismissal of Ralston had further embittered the already serious divisions within the Cabinet and had made more difficult such a national appeal for recruits as the Ministers had been discussing before 1 November.

The government set about the task in a workmanlike manner, or so it seemed, on 3 November, when the Cabinet, acting (King's diary indicates) on a suggestion of Mr. Heeneey to the Prime Minister, decided to appoint a Committee on Recruiting. This comprised General McNaughton as Chairman and Messrs. Mackenzie, Gardiner, Mulock, Gibson, LaFlèche and Claxton, with Heeneey as Secretary. It met for the first time on 6 November and approved a report for submission to the Cabinet the following day. The report,<sup>225</sup> based on conferences held by General McNaughton during the past few days with "a group of officers and officials", seems to have been in good part the work of Claxton. It began with statistics concerning the N.R.M.A. soldiers. Excluding those on extended leave (8676 in number), it noted that there were now about 60,000 of them; of the 42,000 considered suitable for infantry, 10,250 came from Ontario, 16,300 from Quebec, and 10,000 from the Prairies; with only 2600 from the Maritimes and 2850 from British Columbia. Of the whole 60,000, it was reported that roughly 6000 had joined in 1941, 25,000 in 1942, 17,000 in 1943 and 10,000 in 1944. It appeared that "not more than 37% are of French origin". The attitude of the N.R.M.A. men was thus summarized on the basis of information from the Army:

It appears that they have a group loyalty to their N.R.M.A. comrades. They do not see the need of going overseas. They are subject to pressure from home and similar influences. They have a sense of importance, even martyrdom. Their attitude has been encouraged by the financial benefits and other amenities which have accrued to the N.R.M.A.

On "General lines to be followed as regards the nation", the report recommended that everything possible be done to allay public alarm and obtain confidence and cooperation. "The first step is to state the facts as soon and as frankly as possible and then to indicate positive lines of policy and action." It should be shown that the situation could be met by the voluntary cooperation of the Canadian people. "We want reinforcements *and* unity."

With respect to the N.R.M.A. men, the committee reported that it should be emphasized that the need for home defence had largely passed; what was wanted now was reinforcements overseas, and N.R.M.A. men should be encouraged to reappraise their own responsibilities in the light of this "fresh situation". The importance of the volunteer spirit should be played up, and the N.R.M.A. soldier urged to join the "great comradeship" of volunteers. ("Some 900,000 men have volunteered;\* only 68,000 remain in the army who have not.") But the points were also made that first preference in demobilization should be given to men with overseas service, and that "it would not be fair to allow N.R.M.A. personnel preferential treatment by giving them civilian work at civilian rates of pay".

Concerning action to be taken by civil authorities, the report recommended:

16. The people are anxiously looking for a statement of the position. On Sunday, November 5th, General McNaughton will speak at Arnprior and on Monday, November 6th, to the Legion Branch at Ottawa . . .

17. On Wednesday, the 8th, the Prime Minister should give a speech over a national network. This should review the facts as frankly as possible, admit a possible future shortage of infantry reinforcements to be guarded against. The speech should indicate the policy of the government and the action it is taking.

18. It should mention Col. Ralston's service in the highest terms and frankly admit the difference of opinion, then state that Gen. McNaughton, like the government, believes that the need can and should be met by voluntary means.

19. The speech should minimize the importance of the N.R.M.A. by lifting people's sights beyond the N.R.M.A. People are shirking their duty if they do not take a long view.

20. Without referring particularly to the N.R.M.A. situation, the speech should say that while the war is not yet advanced to the stage where the government can announce a detailed plan of demobilization, it had been decided as far as possible, to follow the principle that those who have made the greatest sacrifices should first be demobilized. . . .

21. The speech should not contrast the provision of reinforcements with national unity. It should put forth the voluntary effort as the best method to do the job in the light of all the circumstances.

22. It should contain an appeal to young men to volunteer and to the general public to do what they can to encourage volunteers among N.R.M.A. personnel and others. . . .

In addition, the government should seek the aid of the "heads of churches", the owners and editors of newspapers, and veterans' organizations. A "nation-wide publicity campaign" was not recommended, for it was felt that it would not reach the people for whom it was intended, would arouse opposition, and would over-emphasize the importance of the N.R.M.A. men. What was needed was to create a favourable atmosphere and "to persuade people to do their utmost to urge others to volunteer":

31. In this connection, a card should later be obtained from the army for each N.R.M.A. man. This should give information about him and give the name of his next of kin. A civilian organization should canvass each next of kin.

As for action by the Army, whose task it was to approach the N.R.M.A. men, the report remarked, "The reputation of General McNaughton is the biggest weapon we have to induce a favourable attitude on the part of the N.R.M.A." To make the most of this, there should be "something in the nature of a 'new deal' for N.R.M.A. personnel and others"; there should be no discrimination, but N.R.M.A. soldiers should be "treated exactly like General Service personnel", and everything possible should be done to make them feel "that they are soldiers who are well treated and who are being well trained to take part in overseas action".

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\*In all three services.

35. The men should not be talked to in large formations, but should be canvassed individually or in small groups. A card should be prepared for each man and the result of each interview entered and reported to the person holding the next of kin card. If the man says "I will go if my mother agrees", the man canvassing the mother should know this.

General McNaughton, the report proceeded, should "make an inspection tour of the formations in the west and visit the N.R.M.A. camps"; he "might speak to the men". Later, he should make a radio speech mentioning his own findings and experience, and perhaps addressing himself to his comrades of two wars. Moreover, he should issue messages to the army overseas and in Canada.

41. The employment of soldiers on civilian jobs should be re-examined, N.R.M.A. personnel suitable for use as infantry, should be called back for training unless immediately engaged on work of prime essentiality. N.R.M.A. troops working at essential civilian jobs, should only receive soldiers' pay. Consideration should be given to mustering, in pioneer battalions, the N.R.M.A. personnel who are unlikely to become efficient soldiers.

In the light of what had already happened and what happened afterwards, this was a very optimistic programme. Public opinion on the issue was already too excited to give it much chance of success, and the attitudes, both of the N.R.M.A. soldiers themselves and of a great part of the public in English-speaking Canada towards them, had become fixed and inflexible. The use of the term "zombies", which some too-clever person had invented for the conscripts, both reflected the existing state of things and tended to worsen it. However, although a considerable number of the ministers were probably not hopeful, the Cabinet approved the committee report on 7 November. General LaFlèche, the Minister of National War Services, asked to be entrusted with the task of finding reinforcements for the French-speaking infantry battalions overseas, and after considerable discussion his colleagues agreed that he should have a degree of special responsibility in this area.<sup>226</sup>

The Cabinet meeting on 7 November also reviewed in detail the text of the Prime Minister's proposed broadcast.<sup>227</sup> This speech, entitled "Canada's Support of the Army Overseas", was made on the evening of the 8th.<sup>228</sup> It followed the lines of the committee report. King explained the special need for infantry reinforcements. He said that sending the trained draftees overseas was not "in accord with the policy of keeping our army overseas a 100 per cent voluntary army if we possibly can", and asserted, "From a purely military standpoint there is no argument that it is preferable to reinforce a voluntary army with volunteers." He said further, "The voluntary system has not broken down. At the moment, it is subject to an added strain which calls for an intensified effort at home, in the period immediately ahead, particularly to provide personnel in an advanced stage of training."

How great the difficulties would be in substituting conscription for overseas for the voluntary system no one knows. But every one who is honest with himself knows that there would be genuine difficulties and that they might be very grave. Instead, we are redoubling our efforts to meet the existing situation by the voluntary method. In these efforts, I appeal for the patriotic co-operation of all Canadians.

The Prime Minister ended with the "special appeal" that had been recommended, to the young men in the home defence force whose training placed them in "an exceptional position to give service which is particularly needed at this time", and to their friends and families "to help and encourage them in a decision which will mean everything to them through the rest of their lives".

This was the only national broadcast, although a first draft of one exists among General McNaughton's papers. The General attempted no direct personal appeal to the nation as a whole nor to the N.R.M.A. soldiers in particular, nor did he visit the western camps. Influential as he had been with the Canadian Army Overseas, it is doubtful whether words from him would have had much effect on the conscripts. In his speeches at Amprior, Ontario, on 5 November, and to the Ottawa Branch of the Canadian Legion the following day, he made his personal position clear. He said at Amprior, "I am firmly convinced that the best hope lies in the maintenance of our long traditions of voluntary service." He added that his information indicated that there would be "some short period yet before there is danger of the situation becoming acute", and expressed confidence that now the need was known, "our men and women will rally to the support of our gallant comrades overseas".<sup>229</sup> These speeches were not particularly well received; there was some heckling from the Legion audience, and on 9 November the Dominion Executive Council of the Canadian Legion presented to the Prime Minister a brief demanding that N.R.M.A. soldiers be sent overseas.<sup>230</sup>

On 10 November the Chief of the General Staff, on behalf of the Minister, sent out to Army commanders across the country and in Newfoundland a message<sup>231</sup> quoting the Prime Minister's appeal in his broadcast and the Minister's own statements at Amprior and in Ottawa. It concluded:

The N.R.M.A. men are to be informed that the Minister "hopes and believes that they will make prompt response to this call".

The Minister requests that the responsible officers of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Army give close attention to these matters that they will use their best endeavours to carry out the purpose expressed in the Prime Minister's radio address and to implement the decisions on policy therein given.

On 14 November what seems in retrospect an important turning-point was reached. All the senior Army commanders in Canada — General Officers Commanding, District Officers Commanding, and the commanders of Camps Borden and Petawawa — assembled in Ottawa to hear the government's policy explained. General McNaughton spoke, explaining the problem ("a short-term deficiency of Infantry reinforcements for the Army Overseas") and emphasizing "the need for persuasion and careful explanation to NRMA of the national necessity". The commanders' comments thereafter, as set down in the official record of the meeting,<sup>232</sup> were not hopeful:

. . . Comds reported that active recruiting campaigns had been conducted over the past year. Although successful at first, the results now and prospects for the future were not encouraging in view of the fact that for the most part only "hardened cases" now remained incl those not eligible for overseas for security reasons. Factors which contributed against conversion were (a) home influence opposed to overseas service, (b) attractions such as farm leave, not available to GS personnel, (c) rates of remuneration on civilian jobs and (d) the anomalous situation that whereas men would not volunteer, nevertheless they would willingly accept compulsory service overseas.

McNaughton replied that farm leave and other civilian employment would now be restricted to men not suitable for the field, and that soldiers employed on civil projects would not receive more than Army pay.

After the Minister left the meeting, General Murchie remarked "that it was not for them to discuss the Government policy as stated by MND but rather to apply themselves to implement the policy". He then explained the policy towards the N.R.M.A. men, which was presented in much the terms of the cabinet committee's

report, and summarized the further reductions in coast and anti-aircraft defences, and other operational commitments in Canada, which were being undertaken forthwith to make more men available for overseas service. In the afternoon the meeting resumed under the chairmanship of the Adjutant General (Major-General A. E. Walford). There was considerable discussion of administrative detail, and some firm expressions of opinion. Major-General G. R. Pearkes, V.C., G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command, is recorded as saying,

The reason men do not go active is because they do not want to go Overseas. They do not want to leave Canada and will invent a hundred and one different excuses. Their one interest is to go back to civil life, farming or industry or whatever it is. They are not interested, they are narrow, they have been miseducated for twenty-five years and have no feeling of patriotism whatsoever. . . . The fundamental thing is that men do not want to go. For all you say about them not going back to civil life until the others are disbanded, the men do not believe it. . . .

Brigadier F. M. W. Harvey, V.C., D.O.C. Military District No. 13 (Calgary) said that he had frequently been told by men that "the Government did not need them, otherwise they would be sent"; he felt that if sent "these men would do the job". Major-General P. E. Leclerc, commanding in Newfoundland, concurred. Near the end of the meeting questions elicited the fact that the objective was "to establish a reserve of 15,000 trained Infantry from conversions, release of GS [general service soldiers], etc." by the end of the year. The record concludes:

General discussion revealed that the DOsC felt strongly that they would be unable to provide any number approaching 15,000 men by 31 Dec 44. They wished to go on record as stating that after examination of the facts as given they were of the opinion that the numbers stated could not be produced by the means laid down within the time given, but would use every effort to Secure maximum results.

CGS pointed out that as soldiers it was their duty to give the plan a 100% try-out. He summarized their attitude as being that under the existing policy which has been given by the Government and knowing the requirements, they did not feel that the requirements could be met under existing Government policy. DOsC should return to their Districts and do their best to make the policy effective. He further stated that they had made their views quite clear to the Minister at the morning session, but that he would place before the Minister their point of view as above set out.

These views would have discouraged most men, but the optimism which was such a marked trait in McNaughton's character rose above them, at least for the moment. On the following day he issued what seems a very unrealistic public statement, to the effect that "his conference with the District Commanders had only confirmed his original view" that the voluntary system would provide the necessary reinforcements. The result was telegrams of protest to the Chief of the General Staff from the District Officers Commanding Military Districts Nos. 1, 2, 10 and 13, and the G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command. Brigadier Harvey complained that the Minister had placed those present "in an entirely wrong position", adding, "in fact at the very last we asked you to inform him that our opinions were quite to the contrary". General Pearkes followed up his telegram on 18 November with a letter to General Murchie which recalled that he had inquired "if a resolution should be adopted to the effect that after considering plans to implement General McNaughton's policy we were of the opinion that sufficient men could NOT be produced". He proceeded, "You, however, considered it undesirable that any formal resolutions should be passed and agreed to inform General McNaughton of the opinion we had expressed. This I believe you did." Pearkes asked that a press release be issued from N.D.H.Q. "to correct the erroneous impression which has been given". On 20 November

General McNaughton issued a statement indicating that the officers had "frankly stated" there were "very serious difficulties", but having been assured of their full support "in another endeavour to solve the problem", he still believed that the problems could in fact be solved.<sup>233</sup>

Colonel Ralston's resignation and the appointment of General McNaughton, followed by the news — which took many people by surprise — that McNaughton had committed himself to the voluntary system, had produced an atmosphere of crisis in the country. The unfortunate general, once so popular with the military community and the country, suddenly found a vast amount of abuse descending on his head. Mr. King noted, in the interview with Canadian Legion officials on 9 November, their "sullen resentment" towards McNaughton, and recorded in his diary,

In talking with McN. tonight, he mentioned that he was the most hated man of Canada today. Said his desk was showered with anonymous letters of protests, etc. I told him I still thought I could do him one better on that score. He said he was paying no attention to that. . . .

King had never been liked by the forces, but a perhaps unique incident happened outside Laurier House, his Ottawa residence, on 10 November, when a member of the Canadian Women's Army Corps, seeing the Prime Minister, shouted to her friends a comment that included an epithet which Mr. King thought unfit to be written in his diary. "This is an indication of the feeling", he wrote. And indeed public feeling was probably more excited than at any other stage of the war.

At the same time the Prime Minister was disturbed by the apparent apathy of his Cabinet colleagues. On 9 November he confided to his diary,

Of course, if there should be a real response by the men in the camps, that would change everything and be a complete triumph. But what I fear is that now that both McN. and I have spoken, little else will be done. I don't know what further progress there has been in carrying out what the Committee recommended as to individual appeals. No one person seems to have that in hand. General McNaughton cannot be expected to follow it up.

The next day in the Cabinet, King says, "I spoke about the great necessity of losing no time in working out the machinery to carry on the campaign that is needed for the individual approach. As I had expected, after McNaughton's speeches and mine, everything was left dormant." The same day a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Recruiting decided to set up a sub-committee, with the Minister of Agriculture, Mr. Gardiner, as chairman and Mr. G. C. Andrew, Secretary of the Wartime Information Board, as secretary, to direct the "individual canvass of next of kin of N.R.M.A. personnel of infantry standards". The matter was further discussed during the days that followed, but perhaps fortunately any plans made seem to have been overtaken by events before detailed action could be taken.<sup>234</sup> The scheme to canvass individually the families of 42,000 recalcitrant conscripts was surely the most questionable part of the government's programme. It had the appearance of a desperate expedient and could hardly have failed to excite ridicule.

On Sunday 12 November Colonel Ralston, who had made no statement since his enforced resignation, broke his silence with a statement to the press which a correspondent called a "scorching reply to Prime Minister King's radio address". His diary suggests that it had been drafted in consultation with Angus Macdonald and (to a perhaps lesser extent) J. L. Ilsley and General Stuart. Ralston said that the Prime Minister's summary of his report to the Cabinet had omitted the emphasis he had laid upon the need for immediate and drastic action. At the same time he revealed that he had tendered his resignation "as requested by the Prime Minister."<sup>235</sup>

Extraordinary as it may appear, King by now seems to have convinced himself that he had not dismissed Ralston. He recorded in his diary that during the Cabinet meeting on 7 November, when the text of his radio speech was being reviewed, Mr. Macdonald raised the question of its not mentioning Ralston's "readiness to stay on with the Administration and that he had not resigned". King records, "I then had to go over the ground again about his saying repeatedly that he would have to resign and would resign if his recommendation was not accepted." Now Ralston's statement seriously disturbed King. He noted, "Repeated the error that I had asked him to resign, etc. I could see at once that it was part of a plot to keep up this controversy and to get me out on the conscription issue." On 13 November King drafted privately a statement on the subject.<sup>236</sup>

Colonel Ralston either made or did not make a recommendation to Council. His recommendation was either accepted or it was not. He, himself, says he made a recommendation and it was not accepted, and accordingly, he resigned. This scarcely squares with the statement that Colonel Ralston's resignation was at my request. On the contrary, I did my utmost for days not to have Colonel Ralston resign.

As the reader knows, the last sentence is perfectly true. What this statement omits is the fact that King subsequently changed his attitude and, as Macdonald truly said, dismissed Ralston at a time when he was ready to stay on at least for the moment.

Ralston's statement however led King to take one of those rapid decisions which reflect his remarkable political acumen. The House of Commons stood adjourned, to meet on 31 January 1945. On 13 November King came to the conclusion that it should be re-assembled at once. The Cabinet accepted his recommendation that afternoon, though it is evident that many of his colleagues were doubtful. The Prime Minister confided his motive to his diary:

I am sure that to have ignored Parl. would have been the worst thing that could possibly have been done at this time, to show confidence in members is the way to keep their confidence in myself. I do not know what the outcome will be but I shall be surprised if I do not get their support.

The Speaker at the request of the government recalled the House of Commons to meet on the afternoon of 22 November.

King in the end had every reason to be pleased with his decision to recall the House. Another of his measures was less successful. Since Ralston's resignation he had continued his attempts to encourage some intervention favourable to himself by the Prime Minister of Great Britain and had extended the operation to the President of the United States.

On 4 November Mr. King had a conversation with the British High Commissioner, who was leaving for a visit to England. The Prime Minister records that he said to Mr. MacDonald "that I had nothing to ask at all but I would be pleased if when he was in England, he would arrange to see Churchill and tell him that I would be particularly grateful for any help he could give me in meeting the situation. That I was not asking this in any personal way but for what a little help, at this time, might mean in the interests of all concerned, both in relation to the present and the future."<sup>237</sup>

Nothing came of this, for Churchill was out of England during MacDonald's visit.<sup>238</sup> But on 6 November an opportunity presented itself for an approach to President Roosevelt. General Pope, the Prime Minister's Military Staff Officer, was

leaving for Washington to attend the funeral of Field-Marshal Sir John Dill, and suggested that he could perhaps take a message to the President. After thinking the matter over, King decided to embrace this opportunity:

I . . . said to him that he might if the President began to question him on the situation, outline the essential features of it but the one message I wanted him to say was that if, as a friend, he could help me in this situation I would be grateful. To emphasize it was as an ally. That I wished him to understand all that was at stake. I would not ask for any specific thing to be done but I wished him particularly as he was going in all probability to join Churchill, to see if some way could not be worked out which would help to meet the situation in the best interests of all.

Subsequently Mr. King wrote by hand a letter to the President which he entrusted to General Pope to deliver. It merely asked Roosevelt to see Pope, adding, "He enjoys my complete confidence and you may trust him implicitly."<sup>239</sup>

In Washington Pope encountered unforeseen obstacles. The Canadian Ambassador, Mr. Leighton McCarthy, seems to have resented the appearance of this special emissary, and did not exert himself to obtain an appointment with the President. After a long wait, General Pope telephoned the Prime Minister on 15 November. Mr. King himself immediately telephoned Miss Tully, the President's secretary. Pope saw the President that afternoon.\* On returning to Ottawa he gave the Prime Minister a brief written report on his interview with Roosevelt. It ran in part:

I . . . proceeded to acquaint him of the Army reinforcement problem now confronting the Government. Briefly, I said that the seriousness of the position had first been reported to the Cabinet War Committee by the then Minister of National Defence on 19th October. I described the situation that Mr. Ralston had anticipated would exist on 31st December next.

I then told him of the grave view you took of the matter and explained how you had given it anxious and prolonged consideration, not only to ensure that it be examined from every possible aspect but also so as not to jeopardize the success of the current Canadian War Loan, and not least, to avoid any possible adverse effect on his Presidential electoral campaign.

I added that you had several times observed that should events in Canada develop in such a way as to bring about an attempt to enforce overseas conscription at this stage of the war, then there could be little or no hope of carrying the assent of our people to the proposition of the use of force contained in the Dumbarton Oaks scheme for international security.

When I rose to take my leave, the President again asked me to bring you his best wishes and to assure you that he would be glad to be of any possible help to you in the psychological field.

Long afterwards General Pope recorded additional details:

When Mr. King told me to tell the President, 'I want his help', it never occurred to me that he had in mind anything but *direct* help in the difficult situation then confronting him. Nor did the President appear to understand otherwise.

At one moment, the President began to muse aloud and said to himself, rather than to me, 'Perhaps', followed by a thought I did not, catch. Then visibly shrinking as if he had touched a live wire he exclaimed, again to himself, 'No, but that's operational.' I was much struck by this remark and the thought has always remained with me that the President while unquestionably the authority in matters strategic, that is to say, having to do with the higher direction of the war, had schooled himself never to interfere with tactics no matter how grand the said tactics might be.<sup>240</sup>

This long-delayed interview seems to have had no results of importance, and indeed only a week after it took place the whole situation in Ottawa was trans-

\*King wrote in his diary, not surprisingly, "It is a strange sort of Ambassador who will not carry out at all costs the directions of the P.M. of the country he represents, particularly when it relates to a matter between Allies and he knows the nature of my relationship with the President."

formed by the government's change of policy. It should be noted that while in Washington General Pope had also made a tentative approach to the British authorities on the military level. According to King's diary (after the event) this too had been authorized by the Prime Minister;<sup>241</sup> but General Pope states most definitely that it was entirely Pope's own idea. He described the situation to Lieut.-General G. N. Macready, the head of the British Military Mission, whom he knew well, and evidently encouraged him to make a communication to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. The only result was a frosty reply from Field-Marshal Brooke that he could take no action and that Mr. King, if he wanted assistance, should take measures through political channels. When King heard of this he was somewhat disturbed, and emphasized to General Pope that he had never suggested any interference with military operations.<sup>242</sup> This was certainly formally true; nevertheless, it is hard to escape the conclusion that what King had hoped for in approaching Churchill and Roosevelt was that something might be done to provide that "month out of the line" which somebody had referred to in the Cabinet. It would have been politically unwise for King overtly to suggest this, but he would certainly have embraced the idea had it come from a British or American authority. By 29 November he was sadly reconciling himself to the fact that neither statesman had shown any disposition to pull his chestnuts out of the fire for him. He wrote in his diary that day, "The one disappointment I have had with the President was receiving only a line, more of the routine type than any he has at any time sent to me. But I understand the position of both men. It is in a crisis that one learns how far men are prepared to go."

General Pearkes in Pacific Command had showed his feelings during the meeting at Ottawa on 14 November. On 20 November, before a Command conference at Vancouver which General Pearkes had called to make plans for the recruiting effort, some of his senior officers came in contact with members of the press and expressed their views on the situation. With the exception of one remark directly derogatory to the government (which the officer concerned, with the support of witnesses, subsequently denied having made) the statements reported were unexceptionable as statements of personal opinion. Nevertheless, the officers made it quite clear they believed that the campaign would not succeed, and that in fact the N.R.M.A. soldiers were waiting to be ordered overseas. For example, Brigadier G. A. McCarter was quoted as saying, "I have asked these lads time and again why they refused to volunteer for overseas service. Their replies are always the same: They are waiting for the Government to give the order and they are ready to obey."<sup>243</sup> Subsequently Lieut.-General E. W. Sansom was sent to British Columbia to investigate the affair. He reported, and National Defence Headquarters announced, that the officers concerned had been "fully exonerated of any infringement of the regulations".<sup>244</sup> The report was probably justified, though the Adjutant General was clearly also justified in a comment which he made.<sup>245</sup>

On arrival at the conference the G.O.C.-in-C. [General Pearkes] found that press representatives had already been in conversation with a number of officers. Faced with this situation he decided to authorise interviews which he believed would ensure a better and more accurate press report than the casual conversations which had taken place in the anteroom prior to the opening of the conference.

Viewed in retrospect, this decision appears to have been an error of judgment. . . .

It was a very unsuitable moment for conversations with the press, and it was not

easy to square the incident with the paragraph of King's Regulations which ran, "An officer or soldier is forbidden to publish or communicate, either directly or indirectly, to the press, any military information, or his views on any military subject, without special authority from National Defence Headquarters."<sup>246</sup> The whole affair seems to have been the result of mismanagement rather than of malice. Nevertheless, reports of the officers' remarks helped to make an awkward situation worse, and King, hearing the story on the radio, wrote in his diary, "That looks like the Army defying the Civil power."<sup>247</sup>

The results of the recruiting campaign as known at this time were not encouraging. In the House of Commons on 23 November General McNaughton gave the figures of N.R.M.A. men enlisting for active service since he became Minister as follows: 1-4 November, 96; for the week ending 11 November, 173; and for the week ending 18 November, 280. Contemplating these figures, no one could feel optimistic about the success of the appeal to the 42,000. Figures for general enlistment were rather higher, but the grand total as recorded at the time, including 694 N.R.M.A. conversions, was only 3626 for the three weeks 1-21 November.<sup>248</sup>

On 23 October General Murchie had clearly indicated (above, page 445) that in his opinion purely military considerations suggested that the time had come to send N.R.M.A. men overseas. It is pretty evident that none of the soldiers concerned with policy at National Defence Headquarters at this time can have had much confidence in the continued efficacy of the voluntary system. Events in the first three weeks of November must have further sapped any hopes that existed. The opinions received from the conference on the 14th doubtless tended to confirm views held in Ottawa. At any rate, by 22 November the senior officers there had reached the conclusion that the time had come when they must express a strong opinion. They may have felt that if they were to do this they should do it before the Commons session began.

During these same days there was renewed tension in the Cabinet. Colonel Ralston's conscriptionist friends were still there, and as we have seen Macdonald and Ilesley were keeping close contact with the ex-Minister. T. A. Crerar had been conducting a sharp correspondence with the Prime Minister since 3 November, and on 17 November he sent King a letter which spoke of "the storm of indignation rising across Canada" and concluded as follows:

I am sorry I was not at Council when you brought forward the matter of calling the House together. You will agree, I am sure, that the Government should reach if possible a clear understanding of the course to be taken when it meets. But, in any event, I wish to make my own position clear. If the men have not come forward from this trained pool by voluntary enlistment by the end of the present month in the numbers required to meet the need, I would count myself remiss in my duty if I did not make it clear to you that I shall be unable longer to support the present policy.<sup>249</sup>

It is probably fair to say that this feeling within the ministry did reflect the state of opinion in the country at large. The people of Canada had been slow to kindle on the conscription issue, but with the Army finally fully in action and in need of men it would seem that the vocal part of the nation, outside of Quebec, was now approaching unity on this issue. Since June, moreover, the Progressive Conservative Opposition, which since the defeat of Mr. Meighen in York South in 1942 had been backward about committing itself on the issue officially, had taken a definite conscriptionist stand (below, page 484).

On 21 November the Cabinet discussed the situation.\* "In some ways", wrote the Prime Minister, "it was the most solemn meeting of the Cabinet we have had." He spoke to his colleagues in conciliatory terms of the presence within the Cabinet of "a voluntary enlistment wing and a conscriptionist wing". The statement is recorded in his diary:

I thought that we were all agreed the appeal should be continued for a certain length of time. Definite time should be fixed when appeal should end, and if at that time we had not the adequate number of men I would then make it possible for conscription to be enforced without going back to Parliament for any vote of confidence. That I would myself resign and ask H[is] E[xcellency] to call on some one member of the Cabinet to form a Government to carry through conscription. . . . When I spoke of my own intention to drop [out], and let those who believed in conscription carry on, there was a period of intense silence in the Cabinet. No one said a word. All were silent so long that I myself had to break the silence by an observation or two.

After the pause various members began to speak, assuring King of their support. For a moment, he records, it appeared that the Cabinet was united. But the only result was that Macdonald and Ilesley then spoke up and again mentioned resigning. King made a special plea to Ilesley to remain at least for a time. Crerar's account states, "The understanding . . . was reached that the whole matter would be placed before caucus on Wednesday afternoon [22nd], after the House rose. I told the Prime Minister that I would feel obliged to make my position clear at caucus and Ilesley and Macdonald took the same position."<sup>250</sup> The Prime Minister found himself faced with a very real threat to his leadership and the existence of the government. Later in the day he "talked over with St. Laurent the appalling situation that I was being placed in of thinking of carrying on the Government without Ministers like Ilesley, Howe and practically all the Ontario Ministers". He added in his diary the remark, "I cannot see how I could carry on without Ilesley and Howe in particular." It is evident that King felt that he was confronting a final crisis. The moment had come for a change of policy. The opportunity for making such a change was provided the following day by the Army Council.

On the morning of 22 November, the day the House was to meet, the Prime Minister received a telephone call from General McNaughton:

He said he had quite serious news. That the Headquarters Staff here had all advised him that the voluntary system would not get the men. He had emphasized it was the most serious advice that could be tendered and he wished to have it in writing. Said he would come and see me as soon as he had the written statement. He expressed the opinion that it was like a blow in the stomach. He also said that he had the resignation of the Commander in Winnipeg.† That if the Commanders, one after the other, began to resign, the whole military machine would run down, begin to disintegrate and there would be no controlling the situation.

The document<sup>251</sup> which the Chief of the General Staff subsequently handed to General McNaughton had better be printed here in full. The Minister of National Defence noted upon it that it was received at 11:45 [a.m.] on 22 November:

\*Throughout this period, the problem was being dealt with by the full Cabinet. Except for the meeting on 9 November, there was no meeting of the Cabinet War Committee between 27 October and 11 December.

†Brigadier R. A. MacFarlane, commanding Military District No. 10.

*TOP SECRET*

Ottawa, Ontario,  
22 Nov 44.

The Minister.

Provision of Reinforcements  
in the Canadian Army Overseas.

1. In my memorandum of 23 Oct, copy attached, it was stated that the extension of the Terms of Service of N.R.M.A. personnel to permit their despatch overseas would most readily meet the immediate requirements of the Army Overseas and maintain its fighting efficiency.
2. On the 2 Nov I placed before you a statement of the problem as it then existed, copy attached.
3. Careful examination of the problem has continued and every effort within our power has been made to meet this problem by the voluntary system.
4. After a careful review of all the factors including the latest expression of their views by the District Officers Commanding, I must now advise you that in my considered opinion the Voluntary system of recruiting through Army channels cannot meet the immediate problem.
5. The Military Members concur in this advice.

J. C. Murchie  
Lieut.-General,  
C.G.S.

Only two days later Mr. King was to write in his diary, presumably mainly with reference to this incident, "There will be a violent reaction against the military power which the Army has sought to exercise over the civil power." In fact, the government's military advisers had exercised their constitutional function with complete propriety. What is more, the King diary makes it clear that at the moment it took place the Prime Minister was greatly relieved by the Generals' action. This passage follows immediately upon that quoted above describing the telephone call from McNaughton:

Instantly there came to my mind the statement I had made to Parliament in June as to the action the Government would necessarily take if we were agreed that the time had come when conscription was necessary. It is apparent to me that to whatever bad management this may have been due, we are faced with a real situation which has to be met and now there is no longer thought as to the nature [soundness?] of the military advice tendered, particularly by Gen. McNaughton. And if so tendered by Gen. McNaughton who has come into the government to try to save the situation, it will be my clear duty to agree to the passing of the Order in Council and go to Parliament and ask for a vote of confidence, instead of putting before the House the motion that I have drafted and intended to hand the clerk. This really lifts an enormous burden from my mind as after yesterday's Council it was apparent to me that it was only a matter of days before there would be no Government in Canada and this in the middle of war with our men giving their lives at the front. A situation of civil war in Canada would be more likely to arise than would even be the case were we to attempt not to enforce conscription. As I look at the clock from where I am standing as I dictate this sentence, the hands are both together at 5 to 11.

It seems evident that after the Cabinet meeting of 21 November the Prime Minister had come to the conclusion that overseas conscription was now a necessity if the

Government was to be preserved from disintegration. The interests of the ruling party now seemed to demand overseas conscription just as stridently as they had formerly demanded a continuance of the voluntary system to the last possible moment.

Having made his decision, King acted immediately. The Liberal caucus was meeting. It was clearly impossible for him to open the question to the members at large before he had discussed it in Cabinet; but he tactfully gave the rank and file a hint that big things were brewing: "Because of other information reaching me then, that I thought Cabinet should meet tonight. Suggested other members say their prayers tonight and hope all would be well in the morning." He had asked Angus Macdonald "not to take any action", but to come to the Cabinet meeting. In the circumstances the conscriptionist ministers held their fire. King had a quiet talk with Major Power, who, while (King says in his diary) not questioning that King was "taking the right step", nevertheless "felt that he would himself have to drop out".

King's record is hardly an adequate reflection of Power's attitude. It is worth recalling that Power was the last survivor in the Cabinet of the trio — the others being Lapointe and Cardin — who had boldly taken the field against Premier Duplessis in the Quebec election of 1939, and had reiterated to the province the national government's pledge against overseas conscription. On 10 December Power wrote a retrospective memorandum of his views.<sup>252</sup> He had continued to feel that there was no operational necessity strong enough to justify the danger which he considered the change of policy held for the future unity of Canada: "I envisaged the prospect of one-third of our population uncooperative, with a deep sense of injury, and the prey to the worst elements amongst them, and worst of all hating all other Canadians." His memorandum concluded:

I firmly believe that the better course would have been — irrespective of the intrinsic merits of the case — and there are some on both sides, to have fought it out in the English Provinces and tried to keep Quebec Canadian.

Now, just a word as to the personal side of it. I had made up my mind to stick to the Chief and side against Ralston before I took sick. I had many hours of quiet reflection in hospital which helped to confirm that view. I was summoned to Ottawa to help by advice and support to frustrate the Conscriptionists. I gave freely of that advice outside of Privy Council in small conferences of the faithful. I was assured that never never Conscription. I suggested many expedients to stave it off. Some seemed to be well received. Then came the blow. I was summoned to private audience five minutes before Council and asked to canvass my colleagues against a policy which up to that moment had been unquestioned. I could not. I said I would retire with the least embarrassment possible, and this I tried to do.

Power had felt compelled to take an opposite position from that of his friend Ralston, whom he so greatly respected. Two men of integrity had been driven from the government because they would not compromise with the deep personal convictions they held on the issue that was dividing the country. Both will surely command the respect of posterity.

There is no doubt that the government was about to break up. An important turning-point had been reached with the defection of C. D. Howe. The Minister of Munitions and Supply, long undecided and largely silent, told Crerar at luncheon on the 22nd that he had resolved to break with King. (As we have seen, King regarded him as lost the previous day.) After the caucus Macdonald suggested that the conscriptionist ministers should meet to discuss their course. They met at once in Crerar's office at the House of Commons: Crerar, Macdonald, Howe, Gibson, Mulock and, after some delay, Ilsley. Mulock and Crerar both read letters

of resignation they had drafted, and all six agreed to resign simultaneously.<sup>253</sup> This ruinous crisis was staved off by the Prime Minister's reversal of policy; though he did not actually know of their plan.

The atmosphere in which the Cabinet met on the evening of that eventful 22nd of November can be imagined. But the bomb had been defused. The Prime Minister told his colleagues, he says in his diary, that he "had had a conversation this morning with Gen. McNaughton which made it necessary for me to bring them together." (The whole burden of the decision was to be placed upon McNaughton.) The General, King proceeded, "had now got full data. Felt that while the voluntary system might have succeeded, it now looked as though it could not be counted upon to succeed." McNaughton was now thinking of "a proposal to take a limited number of men and train them to meet the situation"; and King added, "I myself had come to feel that his suggestion would have to be most carefully considered." McNaughton then reviewed the situation and to King's surprise what he had to say was quietly received. Mr. Gardiner, who the day before had suggested taking "a limited number of men", now mentioned this again.\* The French ministers were "very quiet". Both Power and Gardiner spoke of resigning. King made "a very strong appeal" to both of them to remain. Crerar records, "Gardiner said something to the effect that he understood that this had been forced by threatened resignations. The Prime Minister said that he had not been threatened with resignations, which was quite true, although I think he realized quite clearly what was about to take place." St. Laurent emphasized the importance of consulting the caucus before going to the House of Commons.<sup>254</sup>

Through the night McNaughton and King's secretarial staff worked at rewriting the speech which the Minister of National Defence had prepared for delivery in the House of Commons the following day. A statement defending the principle of voluntary enlistment was thus transformed into a declaration that overseas conscription had become unavoidable.<sup>255</sup>

On the morning of 23 November Mr. King devoted considerable time to telephone calls preparing the way for the change of policy. He spoke to various newspaper proprietors and editors and gave them hints that new decisions were coming; he called the Cardinal Archbishop of Quebec and warned him that limited overseas conscription was inevitable; he also took Mr. Godbout, the Leader of the Liberal Opposition in the Quebec Legislature, into his confidence. Having done these things, he went to face the Liberal caucus. His diary summarizes his statement. He told the members what was being done and emphasized that there had been danger of the government falling apart had it not been done. "I told them . . . it was like being in some great temple and having pillars pulled out from beneath and the whole thing crashing on my head." He watched the faces of the French members. "Some of them carried an expression with them of a people that seemed to feel that others had their hand out against them." But little was said, and Ralston indicated that he would support the programme. At a short Cabinet meeting which followed Power handed the Prime Minister his resignation and said good-bye to his colleagues.

That afternoon the House of Commons heard the news. King read the Order in Council<sup>256</sup> which had been prepared. It authorized and directed the Minister of National Defence to dispatch to the United Kingdom and to operational theatres "such personnel, in such numbers as may be approved by the Governor in Council

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\*The suggestion of taking a "quota" of N.R.M.A. men seems to have been first made by one of the Prime Minister's secretaries, Walter Turnbull; this is mentioned in King's diary for 20 November.

(the number hereby approved being sixteen thousand) who are serving by reason of their having been called out for training, service or duty pursuant to the provisions of the National Resources Mobilization Act, 1940. . . ." The Order also placed all such personnel "on active service beyond Canada for the defence thereof" as provided in Section 64 of the Militia Act. The secret had been on the whole well kept, though it appears that some inkling of the truth had begun to circulate by lunchtime that day. The ground had been cut from under the Opposition's feet.

The position of the new Minister of National Defence, General McNaughton, was extremely embarrassing. He had no seat in parliament, and it would of course be some time before a by-election could be held. King recorded in his diary for 14 November that he had been prepared to consider making McNaughton a Senator, which would have enabled him to speak at joint sessions of the two Houses, but the General "did not like the thought". He now appeared in the House of Commons, by sufferance of the House, to make a statement and answer questions. He at once became the Opposition's main target. Different observers gave very different impressions of his performance under fire, but a reporter for the *Vancouver News Herald* was full of admiration. He wrote:

Former Defence Minister Col. Ralston pressed his attack with a series of questions. General McNaughton stood up well, answering coolly and efficiently.

Later he was exposed to the full fury of the Progressive Conservative attack, a barrage of questions, insinuations and even . . . the declaration, withdrawn at the Speaker's command, that the Minister lied in the figures he gave.

Through it all — until 11 at night, General McNaughton, though visibly suffering from the physical fatigue of a continuous cross-examination reminiscent of but more protracted and savage than would be allowed in a criminal court, continued to give detailed, courteous and full answers. It has been one of the most remarkable performances the House has ever seen and that from a man who has never before stood on the floor of Parliament.<sup>257</sup>

The Prime Minister set down his impressions in his diary, with a characteristically unusual turn of phrase: "I could see he got very flushed around the temples at times but he maintained a sweet calm. Once or twice he gave a retort which was well deserved. When adjournment came at 6, I think it was felt throughout the House that he had made a very good impression and the sympathy was wholly with him,"

### *The Revolt of the Conscripts*

The days that followed witnessed a bitter debate in the Commons on what amounted to a motion of confidence in the government, moved by the Prime Minister on 27 November: "That this house will aid the government in its policy of maintaining a vigorous war effort." The Opposition the same day moved an amendment regretting, in effect, that the government had not required all N.R.M.A. personnel "whether now or hereafter enrolled to serve in any theatre of war" and had "failed to assure equality of service and sacrifice". While the debate proceeded the government had trouble on other fronts. Although no French-speaking Minister actually resigned, King long feared that one, Alphonse Fournier, the Minister of Public Works, was going to do so.\* And a more serious threat to the Prime Minister's peace of mind came from the conscript soldiers stationed in British Columbia.

\*Louis St. Laurent ("really a magnificent man", King wrote in his diary on 6 December) was a tower of strength. On 30 November the Prime Minister recorded, "It is really little short of a miracle that not a French Canadian member of the Cabinet should have left it in this crisis. This must never be forgotten."

disorders could not be entirely suppressed.<sup>260</sup> Later in the day King called into consultation the available leaders of Opposition groups in the Commons. After he had described the dangers of the situation all agreed that censorship was the proper course.<sup>261</sup>

Fortunately, what might have been a desperate crisis gradually subsided without bloodshed. There was a moment of particular alarm in Ottawa on 29 November when news was received that General Pearkes had ordered the R.C.A.F. to make passes over the camp at Terrace. There was grave apprehension that this might lead to violence; King records in his diary that McNaughton said, "these men must be crazy", and firm orders were sent that such action was not to be taken. What actually happened is described in the general report made by Pearkes:<sup>262</sup>

At the request of 15 Bde to show the dissidents that force was available if required, arrangements were made with Western Air Command for a flight of unarmed Venturas over Terrace. This was delayed by weather and finally cancelled on instructions from CGS.

The events at Terrace are perhaps best described in the words of General Pearkes' report, just quoted:

7. At Terrace, personnel of 1 Bn Fus du St Laurent refused to attend morning parade 25 Nov. Approximately 300 of this unit paraded to PEI Highrs where they persuaded approximately two companies to join them, thence to 1 Bn PA Vols where about 30 men joined the parade. 19 Fd Amb RCAMC did not join in the demonstrations until the next day. The dissidents opened a unit magazine and armed all their personnel, issuing about 100 rds per man.

8. All Commanding Officers of units in Terrace were en route to Lt.-Gen. Sansom's investigation in Vancouver, and in their absence, Lt.-Col. W. B. Hendrie, Mountain Warfare School assumed command. By this time, however, control had been lost by the Junior Officers available and Lt.-Col. Hendrie could only endeavor to protect important buildings by guards organized of Junior Officers.

9. The dissidents drew into their ranks practically all NRMA personnel of 1 Fus du St Laurent, 1 PEI Highrs, PA Vols and 19 Fd Amb RCAMC. They mounted 6 pdr guns on the terrace above the city, and, on 26 Nov paraded above 1600 strong with steel helmets and respirators and armed with rifles, Brens and Stens, to the camp of PA Vols, which they surrounded, and picketed each hut with armed men, to prevent the planned move of that unit to Tofino.\*

10. This was the only proffered violence. Parades and demonstrations were without violence or damage. Administrative duties were carried out at all times. It is worthy of note that discipline of the dissidents within their own ranks was well maintained and their parades and guards well organized.

In January 1945 the present writer, returning to duty overseas, crossed the Atlantic in the same transport with the headquarters and units of the 15th Infantry Brigade — the N.R.M.A. men were sent overseas as units — and had ample opportunity for discussing these disorders with officers who had first-hand knowledge of them. They all commented on how well the "dissidents" had organized their movement. One senior officer mentioned that when his wife went into town to do her marketing the dissidents provided her with an armed escort for her protection. Incidentally, the unanimous evidence of these officers was to the effect that it was not French-Canadian soldiers who were chiefly concerned in these disorders. They stated that the organizers were predominantly men of Central European origin from the Prairies, including a certain number of Germans.

\*General Pearkes issued a public statement on 28 November explaining that this unit (which was not named) was being moved to take up a coast defence role and not, as had been reported, being sent overseas.<sup>263</sup>

Although the situation was most critical at Terrace, there were also disorders of a more or less serious nature in other camps: at Prince George, Courtenay, Chilliwack, Nanaimo and Alberni, as well as at Vernon as already mentioned.

The disorders began to subside with the return of senior officers to their units. The situation at Terrace was already improving, in fact, when Ottawa received the message which so alarmed the Cabinet:

14. The effect of the return to their units of Senior Officers became evident 28 Nov when 19 Fd Amb turned in their arms and resumed normal routine; 1 Bn Fus du St Laurent commenced to pack for their ordered move to Quebec, and 25 NRMA of PA Vols applied to be accepted GS.

15. Picketing of the lines of PA Vols to prevent their movement took place during the night 28/29 Nov, but this was only a half-hearted effort by a comparatively small group and the unit moved to Prince Rupert at 1330 hrs 29 Nov.

Orders had been issued before the trouble began for moving the battalions out of British Columbia and returning the predominantly French-speaking units to Quebec. By the first days of December these movements had been carried out and the possibility of further trouble in British Columbia vanished.<sup>264</sup>

General Pearkes' report rendered on 5 December<sup>265</sup> analysed what he considered the causes of the disorders in some detail. "As investigations continue", he wrote, "it becomes increasingly evident that action was instigated in each instance by a comparatively small group of men who do not want to go overseas in any way, and that the great majority of the men took part in a spirit of bravado or horse play." The G.O.C.-in-C. considered that indiscreet handling of news by the press contributed; the number of men involved in the initial demonstration at Vernon had been exaggerated. He further pointed out that all units in his Command had for some time been considerably under strength in officers of middle rank, and with the senior officers absent at the Vancouver meeting only junior officers were available to try to cope with the disorders. At the same time the recent heavy withdrawals of general service N.C.Os. (above, page 430) had a marked effect on discipline, as it was on these N.C.Os. that Commanding Officers had relied. "In their absence NRMA NCO's, while efficient administratively, were either unable to control the dissidents or were more or less sympathetic to the anti-conscription movement." General Pearkes' final conclusions should be quoted:

34. Investigations and reports to date show that the first reaction to the announcement of conscription for overseas, was distinctly favourable — generally speaking an expression of satisfaction that the question was at last decided. Later news that only 16,000 NRMA were to be sent reacted unfavourably, and caused discontent in that it appeared some would be allowed to stay at home, and the cry of "discrimination" quickly gained volume. This feeling gave the opportunity to the few who do not want overseas service at any price to stir up the easily-led ones to foment demonstrations.

35. Senior Officers being absent the men did not have sufficient confidence in the Juniors left in charge to discuss with them their doubts and worries, and malcontents found it easy to persuade the doubters that demonstration was the only weapon available to them and the only way in which they could place their complaints before the authorities,

36. The situation began to improve as soon as Senior Officers returned to their units, and now that they have the situation under control and are regaining the confidence of the men, reorganization and pulhemizing\* of units for despatch is proceeding and no further trouble is anticipated.

37. While disturbances occurred in several places, involving hundreds of men in camps where thousands were stationed there was no serious bodily harm caused nor was any material damage caused. This is due to the high standard of morale which had previously

\*See above, page 451.

existed in all units; to the discretion used by Regimental Officers, and to the innate common sense of the majority of the men, which enabled discipline eventually to be restored.

The possibilities of the situation had been enormous and extremely unpleasant, and had real violence once broken out there is no telling where it would have ended. The government and the country were fortunate that this affair passed off without much more serious consequences.\*

It remains to say something about the aftermath — the disciplinary action taken against those believed to be the ringleaders of the movement.

At the Minister's morning conference in Ottawa on 14 December the Adjutant General made a report on the disturbances. The Judge Advocate General had advised that there was "a clear prima facie case of mutiny". Decision was required as to whether to proceed on this basis — mutiny being an extremely serious charge — or on lesser charges. General McNaughton decided that the matter should be settled on the principle that "the charge and punishment should be no more drastic than necessary to act as a deterrent to repetition of the offence and to restore and maintain respect for law and order in the community". He instructed the Adjutant General to issue directions that the charges would be disobedience of a lawful order.<sup>266</sup> In fact, not many charges were pressed to a conclusion, partly for the reason that after the units concerned had moved it was extremely difficult to obtain evidence. In the case of one unit, Les Fusiliers du St-Laurent, it was reported in Canada on 5 March 1945 that of 89 men who had been charged, 58 were absent without leave or deserters, 15 had been sent overseas, four had been dealt with in Military District No. 5 "and cases dismissed", while the others were variously accounted for. It does not appear that there had been any convictions.<sup>267</sup> It is on record, however, that in the case of the Prince Albert Volunteers, three men were given two years' imprisonment less one day, and one man 18 months' imprisonment, while in the Prince Edward Island Highlanders† four men were awarded two years' imprisonment less one day.<sup>268</sup> These eight men had been tried by District Court Martial in Pacific Command.

In England, after the arrival of Les Fusiliers du St-Laurent, Canadian Military Headquarters reported to Ottawa that the documents of men of the unit disclosed 90 cases where charges arising out of the trouble at Terrace had been laid in Canada but no disciplinary action taken. (There is an obvious discrepancy between this report and the one on the same unit made in Canada and already quoted.) The charges included mutiny (in spite of the Minister's decision), offering violence to a superior officer and disobeying a lawful command. In many cases witnesses were not available in the United Kingdom, while in others the evidence appeared to be vague. It was essential that all should receive uniform treatment. C.M.H.Q. stated, "The morale and conduct of NRMA personnel in UK to date has been good and in view of fact that charges arose out of incidents in Canada consider it would be retrograde step from point of view of morale to take disciplinary action here." Accordingly, it was recommended that the charges be "washed out" and no action taken.<sup>269</sup> This wise recommendation was approved.<sup>270</sup>

While General Pearkes and his officers were confronting the crisis in British Columbia, the badly frightened Ministers in Ottawa were struggling with the

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\*It seems rather extraordinary that these disorders, and the extreme alarm which they occasioned within the government, are not mentioned in Dawson's account of the crisis.

†It was noted at the time that there were actually few men from Prince Edward Island in this unit by this stage of the war.

The government's policy in 1942 (above, page 47) had resulted in the main body of home defence troops being concentrated on the Pacific coast, and there they still remained, although the force had lately been somewhat reduced (above, page 411). The news that 16,000 N.R.M.A. soldiers were to be sent overseas, flashed from Ottawa on 23 November, produced alarming repercussions in the camps. On 25 November there were newspaper reports of a protest by soldiers in British Columbia. The first demonstration was at Vernon, where two officers were roughly treated when they attempted to stop a group of about 200 men parading through the streets shouting "Down with conscription" and "Conscript money as well".<sup>258</sup> The worst disturbances, however, developed at Terrace, where the 15<sup>th</sup> Infantry Brigade was stationed. The fact that almost all senior officers were absent in Vancouver attending General Sansom's inquiry into the events of 20 November (above, page 468), made a considerable contribution to the trouble.

On 28 November there was a secret session of the House of Commons in which General McNaughton answered further questions about the reinforcement situation. As he sat on the floor of the House near the Prime Minister he handed the latter a message from the G.O.C.-in-C. Pacific Command which he had just received. Mr. King subsequently had it copied into his diary:

The situation at Terrace can now only be considered as mutiny — approximately 1600 men affected in Fusiliers du St. Laurent, Prince Edward Island Highlanders and Prince Albert Volunteers as a demonstration without disorder yesterday. About 25% of Garrison controlling the remainder by intimidation, occupying well organized positions with six-pounders mounted. Have asked Attorney-General to close liquor stores [in Terrace] and prevent movement of liquor into it.

Brigadier [A. R.] Roy and Lt. Col. [J. E. P. H.] L'Heureux now endeavoring to regain control of French units.

That this report seriously alarmed the Ministers goes without saying. McNaughton had remarked more than once that if there was resistance to the new policy among the conscripts there was really no means of reducing them to order, for there were no longer any considerable number of general service soldiers available. McNaughton remarked that all he could do was to call out the Militia — the Reserve Army — in aid of the civil power, but as King noted "its men were for the most part employed in munitions and the like and that would mean cutting down supplies of ammunition and create other difficulties as well".<sup>259</sup> (Moreover, it would inevitably be a grave question whether the Militia could deal effectively with the N.R.M.A. soldiers, who were well trained, well armed and well supplied with ammunition.)

On 29 November Mr. King reviewed the situation at a meeting of the Cabinet. He referred to the oft-repeated statement that "the men were ready to go but were waiting to be commanded" as a lie: "The officers had lied on that."\* It was reported that attempts made locally in British Columbia "to have the press not sensationalise the story" had met with obstacles. The Prime Minister "took the bull by the horns" and called in Mr. Wilfrid Eggleston, the Chief Censor, and Mr. Augustin Frigon, General Manager of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, to arrange for censorship. It was agreed that this could best be done on a voluntary basis, and action was taken accordingly. The result was to reduce the amount of inflammatory material which was circulated after the 29th, although the news of

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\*The officers had not lied; they had reported a statement made to them many times, and which they had believed. It must be assumed that some of the men who told this story as a justification for refusing to go active were rationalizing their own desire to avoid hardship and danger. But the rush of N.R.M.A. men to volunteer after 23 November (below, page 481) suggests that many were telling the simple truth.

Opposition in Parliament. The debate was long. A major feature of it was Colonel Ralston's carefully-prepared speech of 29 November. The ex-Minister said that, while far from satisfied with the "half-hearted, piecemeal method adopted" or "the halting attitude it indicates", he would support the government's motion for a vote of confidence because the Canadian Army Overseas would thus get the reinforcements it needed.<sup>271</sup> The debate finally ended in the small hours of 8 December. Various Opposition amendments having been defeated, the main motion was put at 1 o'clock in the morning. The government was sustained by a vote of 143 to 70. Thirty-four French-Canadian Liberals voted against their party. Nevertheless, although this gesture was made, Mr. King's essential hold on the Province of Quebec remained unshaken. After the vote, the House adjourned, to meet again 31 January 1945. The Prime Minister, who had expected a majority of only 30, was delighted. Next day he stayed in bed till noon.<sup>272</sup>

Arrangements were already being made to send overseas the 16,000 N.R.M.A. soldiers authorized by the order in council of 23 November. During this process there were further difficulties. The men had to be given embarkation leave, and many of them seized this or other opportunities to go absent. On 20 January it was announced that 7800 had at one time been overdue or absent without leave, and that 6300 men were still unreported at that date. At 31 March, 4082 N.R.M.A. men who had been warned for overseas duty were unaccounted for.<sup>273</sup> The first draft of N.R.M.A. soldiers sailed from Halifax on 3 January 1945. One soldier (an individual with a record of instability and attempted desertion) threw his rifle into the harbour while going up the gangplank of the *Nieuw Amsterdam* in the hope that this would cause him to be taken off the draft. In the United Kingdom he was tried by court martial and sentenced to 18 months' detention.<sup>274</sup> The incident was exaggerated and there were stories that large numbers of men had thrown their rifles overboard. This was not true. However, attempts by a minority of the conscript soldiers to avoid being sent overseas led to incidents across the country. The worst was at Drummondville, Quebec, on 24 February, when a strong party of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Provost Corps, searching for absentees and "draft dodgers" was attacked by a mob. Fighting raged for several hours, many people being injured.<sup>275</sup>

As it turned out, the government never needed to give consideration to sending overseas any N.R.M.A. soldiers beyond the number provided in the order in council of 23 November 1944. During February and March 1945 considerable numbers of general service men, presumably including many who had recently converted from N.R.M.A., were sent overseas in the places of N.R.M.A. absentees. All told, 12,908 N.R.M.A. soldiers went overseas, and 2463 were actually taken on the strength of field units. These soldiers suffered 313 battle casualties, of which 69 were fatal. There were no complaints of their performance in action. The fact that they were conscripts was in general not known to their comrades, and one unit war diary observed, "they have generally shown up as well as all new reinforcements do".<sup>276</sup>

Circumstances which could not have been foreseen at the time of the crisis in the autumn of 1944 decreed that Canadian casualties in the final stage of the war should be fewer than had been estimated by the staff officers in Ottawa and London who, necessarily and properly, assumed less favourable conditions. Some of these circumstances were the result of Allied policy, others stemmed from the action of the enemy. The decision of Allied strategists at Malta at the beginning of February 1945 to bring troops from the Mediterranean to the Western Front resulted in the

movement of the 1st Canadian Corps from one theatre to the other. The consequence was that this Corps' formations were not in action for a good many weeks. The 1st Division, for instance, was out of the line from 27 February until 11 April.<sup>277</sup> The attack by the Germans in the Ardennes on 16 December 1944 had the effect of postponing for about five weeks the First Canadian Army's operation called "Veritable" between the Maas and the Rhine, which had been planned to begin on 1 January or as soon as possible thereafter, but did not actually start until 8 February. Since the Ardennes offensive did not directly affect First Canadian Army, that Army had comparatively few casualties during this period.<sup>278</sup> The heaviest Canadian losses of the final phase of the war were those suffered by the 2nd Corps in the Battle of the Rhineland, 8 February - 10 March.

Thanks to the decision taken in Ottawa on 23 November, the Canadian Army was kept well up to strength in the final stages of the war with Germany. There was never any serious shortage of reinforcements during the final weeks, though inevitably units were sometimes slightly below strength for short periods. It goes without saying that the situation was closely watched, and in December General McNaughton again recalled Lieut.-General E. W. Sansom — who had been used to make the investigation in British Columbia earlier (above, page 468) — from retirement leave and designated him as Inspector General to report on the reinforcement situation in the Canadian Army Overseas. General Sansom spent the period from 20 January to the end of March 1945 overseas, and submitted a comprehensive report<sup>279</sup> which, in addition to dealing with current circumstances, provided some analysis of the events of the past few months. The report revealed no reason for serious anxiety concerning the existing state of things, and indeed General Sansom's investigation had elicited the fact that, looking to the six-month period ending 31 August 1945, the Canadian Army's reserves in the North-West European Theatre amounted to 17.3 per cent of unit establishments, whereas the British Army's were only 8 per cent of establishments.<sup>280</sup> General Sansom's broad conclusion was that the general reinforcement situation was satisfactory except that there was a possibility of a shortage of English-speaking infantry officers. Thanks to the measures taken in earlier years (above, page 422), although French-speaking other ranks were deficient, there were plenty of French-speaking officers. The Inspector General did say, "If . . . future casualties are incurred at a rate in excess of that which was experienced during the past three months, the rate of output of the training stream will not suffice to increase the reserves of trained reinforcements held available." However, no such emergency arose.

The 1944 crisis left marks on the careers of two distinguished Army officers. We have already noted (above, page 53) the political misfortunes of General McNaughton, who twice failed to win election to the House of Commons and left the government in August 1945. The servicemen's vote, incidentally, had run heavily against him.<sup>281</sup> The other officer was General Pearkes. His communications to National Defence Headquarters in December, arising out of the controversial press conference and references to it in newspaper reports, became so bitter in tone that consideration was given to disciplinary action against him; but nothing was done, particularly as it was understood that he wished to be retired in order to enter politics.<sup>282</sup> Shortly he asked to be relieved of his command and left the Army. In April 1945 he was nominated as Progressive Conservative candidate for a British Columbia constituency, and on this occasion he stated that the policy of forcing officers to appeal to their men to go active, with the frequent sequel that the men refused, had been destructive of discipline.<sup>283</sup> He was elected in the general election

of June 1945, and when his party came to power in 1957 he became Minister of National Defence.

*A Comment on the Crisis*

The question inevitably arises in retrospect, how genuine was the emergency at this time when the reinforcement crisis arose in the autumn of 1944? Was it really necessary, at that late stage of the war, to resort to overseas conscription with all the domestic difficulties which that action entailed?

The basic facts were summarized in General Sansom's report. It confirmed the statements made earlier by General Stuart that the reinforcement holdings at the outset of the Normandy campaign were adequate in overall numbers to meet the field requirements, "but that they were not in the proper proportion of the arms in which the casualties occurred". The report pointed out the fact, already noted, that an actual shortage of infantry reinforcements existed in the Canadian fighting units in North-West Europe "during the period August to early October, 1944". In other words the actual shortage *in units* had been overcome before the decision was taken to send N.R.M.A. soldiers overseas. The only category in which shortages in the units persisted to a later time was the French-speaking infantry battalions, where the situation, General Sansom wrote, "could not be fully corrected until the arrival of drafts of NRMA French Speaking Infantry in January, 1945".<sup>284</sup>

Since the very worst aspect of the situation had been overcome without drawing upon the conscript soldiers, one is driven to inquire what the situation would have been if the conscripted men who were sent overseas had not been available. It is evident that in the actual circumstances of the first months of 1945 the field units could probably have been kept up to strength without these men, but the reinforcement pool behind them would have been dangerously low. It must also be remembered that, beginning in November 1944, 9603 other ranks\* were sent back to Canada under various leave schemes.<sup>285</sup> If the N.R.M.A. men had not been available, these men could not have been spared and would have had to be kept overseas, with consequences for morale which would have been incalculable.

Another point of importance might easily escape observation. As a result of the decision to send N.R.M.A. men overseas, the Army got far more men than the 16,000 conscripts who were authorized, or the 12,908 who were actually sent. As soon as the decision was announced on 23 November 1944, N.R.M.A. soldiers began to go active in large numbers, knowing that they were likely to be sent overseas anyway and presumably preferring to go as volunteers. During the week ending 25 November, N.R.M.A. conversions increased in number to 886. The following week the conversion figure rose to 1330 — the largest on record.<sup>286</sup> The contrast with the preceding three weeks — the period of General McNaughton's campaign — is painful; McNaughton, it may be recalled, had achieved only 694 voluntary conversions (above, page 469). The contemporary total for N.R.M.A. conversions from 1 November 1944 to 31 March 1945 was 10,279;<sup>287</sup> subtracting the figures for the period before 23 November, it would be 9585. It is clear that the vast majority of these men would not have converted had compulsion not been introduced. Precise figures for the number of men who went overseas are not available; but the House of Commons was told on 5 April 1945<sup>288</sup> that 2454 had then been sent, and a total of 3000 is given for the whole period to VE-Day.<sup>289</sup> Most of them were undoubtedly infantrymen. Thus with the 12,908 N.R.M.A. men we

\*To 21 June 1945, when general repatriation began.

arrive at a rough total of about 16,000 as the number actually added to the Canadian Army Overseas as the result of the order in council of 23 November.

On 27 April 1945, when the war was virtually over, the once-empty other-rank infantry reinforcement pool overseas totalled approximately 24,500, in the United Kingdom and on the Continent.<sup>290</sup> It would seem that, without the application of compulsion, it would have been only some 8500 strong, a very inadequate figure to meet any considerable operational emergency in addition to normal wastage. The number could doubtless have been somewhat increased by canceling the vitally important programme of home leave for long-service men and perhaps by other desperate measures such as the more ruthless use of recovered wounded. To put the figure in perspective, it may be recalled that during the Battle of the Rhineland, lasting 30 days in February-March 1945, Canadian Army battle casualties in the North-West Europe theatre amounted to 5119 other ranks. These operations involved only three of the five Canadian divisions. During the 39 days of the Battle of the Scheldt, October-November 1944, much the same force suffered 5595 other-rank battle casualties in the theatre.<sup>291</sup> None of these figures includes wastage from illness. Had the 1st Canadian Corps not been out of the line for about six weeks while moving from Italy to the Netherlands; had the commencement of the Rhineland battle not been delayed five weeks by the German Ardennes offensive; had the German war lasted a few weeks longer, or had the Canadians had heavier fighting after the Rhine crossing — if one or more of these contingencies had come to pass, more troops than those in the overseas pool at the end of hostilities might have been required from Canada. But thanks largely to the order in council of 23 November, ample reserves were available there.

At the end of March 1945 there were, in round numbers, 20,000 N.R.M.A. men suitable for infantry remaining in Canada; of these, 10,000 were then in the "training stream".<sup>292</sup> Approximately 6500 of the men who had converted from N.R.M.A. since 23 November must also have been available, apart from a larger number of general service men recruited during the past few months and under training (see Appendix "T"). The position overseas was so satisfactory, however, that the Minister of National Defence told the Cabinet War Committee on 29 March that he had recently declined an offer of transatlantic shipping space for 10,000 men in April and May.

The fact is that the crisis late in 1944 concerned, not so much the actual existing situation, as the situation that would inevitably arise if the war with Germany went on and Canadian troops were involved in continuous heavy fighting. Had this been the case, far more than the 16,000 men authorized for dispatch overseas on 23 November would have been urgently required. It was the business of military planners and of the government to make provision, if not for the worst possible conditions imaginable, at any rate for normal conditions of warfare. As it turned out, the German war came to a rapid conclusion, and during its final months the conditions, in terms of Canadian casualties, were exceptionally favourable: at least equivalent to that "month out of the line" that some cabinet minister had spoken of wistfully in October (above, page 450). But in October or November 1944 nobody could possibly have forecast those conditions.

## 7. MANPOWER POLICY FOR THE PACIFIC WAR

It is necessary to say something concerning the government's manpower policy for the continuing war with Japan, but this can be briefly dealt with, the more so as it has already been mentioned above (page 61).

The order in council of 23 November 1944, we have seen, had no relevance to this matter. It authorized sending a specific number of N.R.M.A. soldiers to the United Kingdom and to "European and/or Mediterranean operational theatres". Policy for the Pacific, therefore, remained an open question, and this inevitably made things difficult for the services, and particularly for the Army, in planning their Pacific contributions. Uncertainty continued until 4 April 1945, when the Prime Minister made his statement that the men employed against Japan would be "chosen from those who elect to serve in the Pacific theatre". Since this meant that even men who had enlisted for general service would not be available for the Pacific unless they specifically volunteered for that theatre, all three services were now affected; and the most embarrassed, perhaps, was the Navy, which was obliged to withdraw H.M.C.S. *Uganda* from operations because some members of her crew would not volunteer (above, page 62).

The government's policy had not been finally formulated until just before King's announcement in Parliament. The Prime Minister describes in his diary for 4 April how while "going over the final revise, at about 20 to 3" — apparently in Cabinet, before the meeting of the House of Commons — he was handed a message from Canadian Military Headquarters, London.<sup>293</sup> Since it was from General Montague to the Chief of the General Staff, General Murchie, it was presumably passed to King by General McNaughton. It quoted a report from Ottawa in the London press to the effect that Canada would send "Army forces" to the Pacific but that "Only volunteers will be sent". General Montague wrote,

As this news will quickly reach troops overseas it is considered that the statement if not in accordance with policy should be denied earliest otherwise it will result in dissatisfaction in the event that it becomes necessary to detail personnel to serve in Pacific force. Crerar and I are convinced we will be very unlikely to obtain sufficient volunteers overseas.

Advise earliest.

The Prime Minister kept this cable from his other Cabinet colleagues, His comment in his diary ran,

This fortunately had all been thrashed out in Council during the past week, The Chiefs of Staff had indicated in an early memo they were doubtful if they could get a division and ancillary troops voluntarily. . . . I did not feel there was any need to have that wire shown or to pay any attention to that wire as the whole matter had been settled on the basis as a matter of policy [sic] and agreed to definitely by every member of the Cabinet. It was mighty fortunate that it did not come any sooner as it would have probably evoked more in the way of controversy. It is fortunate too that McN[ughton] and not Ralston is the Minister, or we should have had the whole situation of conscription to battle out anew. Ralston allowed himself to be controlled by his officials. McN. seeks to see that military power is kept in its place relatively to the civil power. He is much sounder in his judgment.

Here again Providence has been working with me. I am being helped in ways undreamed and unthought of.

With a general election in immediate prospect, it is evident that King was thinking of the manpower issue primarily in terms of party politics. His observations in his diary on the reception of his statement in Parliament are interesting:

. . . I saw . . . that the Conservatives were in a quandary as to what they should say when I had concluded. The two or three questions asked made it apparent they were not prepared to raise the issue of conscription at once themselves but were rather seeking to still create the impression that men who had borne the burden and heat of the day were going to have to carry on against Japan. We have cut the ground completely from under their feet on that score. I think today's statement is perhaps the most effective thing that has been said this year and will go further than all else to win us the next general elections, It should bring our Quebec friends completely into line. If they don't fall into line, it will be through the jealousy of factions but I think it makes certain that the majority will be with us in the next

House on our war policies. If govt. means anything, it means govt. by the will of the majority. In this case, I feel that the justice of the whole situation is entirely on our side. Our men have fought for 2½ years before the Americans were in the war at all. There is no reason on earth why we should be sending large additional numbers to the Pacific.<sup>294</sup>

As usual on political questions, King's calculations turned out to be accurate. Although the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. John Bracken, had long pursued a cautious policy on the manpower question, and had not committed himself definitely to overseas conscription until June 1944, after the Normandy D Day,<sup>295</sup> he now made compulsory service against Japan an issue in the forthcoming general election. In an address on 15 May<sup>296</sup> he stated that it was his party's policy to:

See to it that none of the Canadian Armed Forces who have already served in an active theatre of war need fight Japan, except as they choose to voluntarily without coercion of any kind whatsoever.

Insofar as Canadian troops have been promised or are required, send to the Pacific theatre of war physically fit N.R.M.A. troops, thereby giving practical application to our policy of equality of service and sacrifice.

So far as conscription was an issue in the election, and Mr. Bracken certainly emphasized it, it was apparently at this stage, after the defeat of Germany, not a very effective weapon. The electorate in English-speaking Canada was no longer deeply interested in it. In the voting on 11 June, we have seen, the government was returned to power, though with a considerably reduced majority.\*

We noted above (page 62) that after Mr. King's statement the Chief of the General Staff and the Adjutant General sought, unsuccessfully, to alter the organization of the Army's planned Pacific Force in a manner that would "limit the numbers needed from the arm from which it can be expected there will be the greatest difficulty in securing volunteers" — namely, the infantry. The effort to obtain Pacific volunteers began in May. By 17 July they numbered 9943 officers and 68,256 other ranks; but only 2796 officers and 36,386 other ranks were males of a category considered suitable for Pacific service. Compared with the requirement, calculated on a basis of unit establishments plus three months' reinforcements, a small "contingency reserve" and replacements for eight more months of operations — to 30 September 1946 — there was an actual overall deficiency of 382 officers and 19,784 men. This deficiency centred, as had been expected, in the infantry. It is true that the total of infantry volunteers among those suitable for Pacific service was 996 officers and 18,339 men, whereas the infantry strength of the proposed division was 375 officers and 9276 men.<sup>297</sup> Even including three months' reinforcements, this covered the immediate requirement and left something to spare; nevertheless, had the division been heavily engaged for a long period there is every reason to believe that history would have repeated itself and a shortage of infantry reinforcements would have developed.

As it turned out, of course, no such thing happened. Japan surrendered before the training programme for the Canadian Army Pacific Force was much more than begun; and the force was disbanded in September 1945.

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\*The government's decision not to order general service soldiers to the Pacific unless they themselves volunteered was certainly welcome to most of those soldiers, and no doubt contributed to the large service vote for the Liberals (above, page 64).

## Part VIII

### SOME ASPECTS OF SUPPLY AND DEVELOPMENT

THIS BOOK would not be complete without some account of the problems of military supply and the manner in which they were overcome. But time and space are not available for a full treatment of these matters, which moreover were in great part the concern of departments other than National Defence. We must be content to touch upon a few particularly vital points of policy.

A good deal has already been said about these things in earlier portions of the volume. Notably, in Part I developments on the industrial front are very broadly surveyed along with other aspects of the Canadian war effort; and in Part II problems and policies in the pre-war period of defence are examined in more detail. The main objects of the present Part are to provide some analysis of the forces and factors that determined Canadian supply policy, and a brief account of certain topics not dealt with in earlier parts of the book, including Canadian contributions to research and development. No attempt is made to deal in detail with matters which have been covered in other publications. But where information is available from sources not drawn upon in earlier books, that information is summarized here.

#### 1. THE INDUSTRIAL FRONT IN THE WAR EFFORT

When the war began, the Canadian economy had not fully recovered from the long world depression, and industrialists were hungry for orders. We have seen the Canadian Manufacturers' Association sending a delegation to Britain, not long before the outbreak, in the hope of gaining for its members a share in the profits of British rearmament (above, page 104). People so situated were bound to see war as an economic opportunity. And the Canadian government officially took the view that the production of war material would be a primary Canadian contribution; one remembers Skelton's approved memorandum of 24 August 1939 with its conclusion that "the provision of munitions, raw materials and foodstuffs" was the most effective and desirable form of aid the country could give to the common cause (above, page 9).

Nevertheless, it was a long time before Canadian industry was accorded an important share in the war effort. On one side, the British authorities were notably reluctant to place orders in Canada; on the other, the Canadian authorities were almost equally reluctant to order equipment for their own forces unless the British would place concurrent orders which would materially reduce the unit cost. In other words, the pre-war situation simply continued after the war had begun. This was not the fault of Mackenzie King. Deeply impressed, it would seem, by General McNaughton's emphasis in their interview of 6 October 1939 (above, page 14) on the importance of the highest standard of armament and equipment, which would tend to reduce casualties, the Prime Minister contended with his Cabinet colleagues for

an active production policy.\* On 7 December, in their final conversation before McNaughton left for England, the general expressed concern at the failure to mobilize industry. King assured him that he would "go into the matter at once".<sup>1</sup> He did so the following day, in a special meeting of the Cabinet War Committee already described (page 30). It seems that he met determined opposition from Ralston, the Minister of Finance, and also apparently from Howe. These men (and Mr. E. P. Taylor recalls some senior service officers as being of the same opinion) evidently felt that it was impracticable to proceed with ordering weapons in Canada for the Canadian Army until British orders were received, and in spite of the Prime Minister's pressure their views prevailed (see below, page 500). As late as April 1940, we have seen, when Norman Rogers visited England, he was largely concerned with urging the British government to make more use of Canadian industrial capacity; but when Britain did move in that direction it was the result not of Canadian urging but of the desperate strategic situation after Dunkirk. It is doubtful whether in the light of its own performance the Canadian government really had much right to complain. Ralston's attitude in the War Committee on 8 December 1940 suggests that the Department of Finance was still in effect following the government's pre-war priorities: concessions were made on air and naval equipment, but the Army could wait. Few aspects of Canadian war policy are likely to surprise posterity more than the fact that measures to provide Canadian-made arms for the Canadian Army were not taken until June and July of 1940, some nine months after the outbreak of war (below, page 501). Even vehicles, which the Army needed in great quantity and which Canada was exceptionally well equipped to produce, were not ordered in really significant numbers for half a year.

One aspect of this delay is particularly remarkable. The British government had ordered 25-pounder guns — the standard British field artillery weapon — in Canada in August 1939 (above, page 104) ; this therefore was one item where there was no need of waiting for British action. Yet the fact is that (in spite of McNaughton having cabled the Minister of National Defence on 23 December 1939 reporting 25-pounders as one of the items on which the British supply situation was "very acute")<sup>2</sup> no Canadian complementary order was placed until July 1940 (below, page 501).† It is rather surprising that this point escaped King's attention during his campaign to prevail upon his colleagues to initiate a Canadian Army supply programme. He had little knowledge of military detail, but he seldom missed so germane a fact as this.

Dunkirk brought transformation, and thereafter Mr. Howe's new Department of Munitions and Supply was in the forefront of the war effort and much in the limelight. In some degree, in fact, it came to be a rival of the Department of National Defence, the more so as only a relatively small proportion of the war material produced in Canada went to the Canadian forces. We have seen that there was a serious difference of opinion between the two departments in 1942 over the question of the relationship of Canada to the Munitions Assignments Board, and

\*He nevertheless contended also for very strict Cabinet control of the War Supply Board. He wrote in his diary for 24 October 1939, "I was surprised to find both Rogers and Ralston favourable to allowing the War Supply Board almost a free hand in issuing contracts, lessening very much supervision and control by the Cabinet. I told them ministerial responsibility was something we could not free ourselves of, and must, at all costs, maintain. I insisted on requisitions being first submitted to the Cabinet, for matters up to \$15,000, and all contracts over that amount being approved by Council before being awarded."

†The contract demand files have been destroyed; but the fact that the 300 guns authorized on 9 July were the first order is confirmed by a later record that the total number of guns ordered Was 300 for the United Kingdom and 300 for Canada.<sup>3</sup>

Howe and Ralston more than once found themselves on opposite sides of an argument over the allocation of manpower between industry and the services (above, pages 171, 401, 411). The spirit of healthy competition was part of the nature of the businessmen who provided Munitions and Supply with so much of its dynamism.

It is hardly the responsibility of the present writer to assess the achievements of Canadian war industry. Specialized books have been written which provide a better basis for such an assessment than can be provided here.\* But some obvious general points can be made. The contrast with the First World War is marked. In 1914-18 there was great production of artillery shells in Canada, but no weapons were made except Ross rifles. In 1939-45 small arms of many types were produced, as were artillery pieces up to 4-inch. Aircraft production was not a major triumph of the programme, though over 16,000 planes were manufactured and efficiency steadily increased, particularly after the organization of Victory Aircraft Limited in 1942. The aircraft programme was complicated, involving as it did, in the words of a British official writer, "the adaptation of British designs to Canadian conditions of production, the adjustment of the supply of Canadian-built airframes to American mass-produced engines of British design, and the fitting of a large variety of American and Canadian components".<sup>4</sup> No aircraft engines were made in Canada. The shipbuilding industry was in an even lower estate than the aircraft industry before the war (above, page 107) and the story of wartime production was not altogether dissimilar. However, whereas Canadian aircraft factories finally produced sophisticated aircraft like the Mosquito and the Lancaster, production of naval vessels was largely limited to simpler types, corvettes, frigates and minesweepers. The Royal Canadian Navy had been anxious to acquire Tribal class destroyers as early as 1939. Four Tribals were ordered in Canada in 1941-42, but were not completed until the war was over; this is reported to have been largely due to higher priority given to other tasks.<sup>5</sup> At the end of his trip to the United Kingdom in the winter of 1940-41 J. L. Ralston told the Secretary of State for the Dominions (Lord Cranborne) that the only disappointing British response he had met was the unwillingness of the Admiralty to lend key naval personnel to assist in destroyer construction in Canada.<sup>6</sup> The R.C.N.'s Tribals that fought in the war were built in the United Kingdom.

We have already suggested that it would probably have been wiser not to try to make tanks in Canada, and have noted (above, page 49) the remark of the same British writer just quoted as to the results of the domination of Canadian industry by automobile production and by American automobile companies. This situation did, however, facilitate a major achievement in the production of transport vehicles, and the 815,729 such vehicles officially recorded as produced in Canada for war purposes<sup>7</sup> represent the country's greatest single industrial contribution. Indeed, our British writer terms this result "a major factor not merely in British but in global war supply", remarks with some hyperbole, "Here, indeed, more than anywhere else, may be found the specific Canadian contribution to the victory of the United Nations", and goes on to understate the production by 200,000 vehicles.<sup>8</sup> The operations of the Canadian armed forces were a greater contribution to victory than the Canadian automotive industry's; nevertheless, the latter was very great.

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\*J. de N. Kennedy, *History of the Department of Munitions and Supply* (2 vols., Ottawa, 1950) provides the necessary statistics and valuable detailed accounts of the operations of the various components of the Department, but says comparatively little about general policy or international aspects. Two excellent British official studies, H. Duncan Hall, *North American Supply* (London, 1955) and H. Duncan Hall and C. C. Wrigley, *Studies of Overseas Supply* (London, 1956), sympathetic but more detached, enable the reader to view the Canadian effort in perspective.

## 2. INTERNATIONAL FACTORS AND THE INDUSTRIAL EFFORT

*Production for Other Countries*

Only about one-third of Canadian war production went to the Canadian forces. The following table of destinations of rough "percentages of war materials produced in Canada" was given to the House of Commons:<sup>9</sup>

To Canada .....	34
To United Kingdom and other Empire countries .....	53
To United States .....	12
To other Allied nations.....	<u>1</u>
	100

The United Kingdom's interest was predominant. It is calculated that it received "60 per cent. of the tanks, 67 per cent. of the artillery, 70 per cent. of the rifles and 53 per cent. of the combat aircraft made in Canada during the war".<sup>10</sup> It follows that other countries' views and needs, and above all those of Britain, deeply influenced the Canadian production effort.

In the Imperial Defence Conference of 1909, the United Kingdom and the Dominions had agreed upon the principle of standardization of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, and in general Canada — whose forces had of course been armed with British weapons long before 1909 — had remained true to this principle in theory and practice, though as we have seen the matter of types of aircraft was an exception (above, page 79). The tentative investigation of the possibility of obtaining army equipment from the United States, undertaken in 1938, had had discouraging results (above, page 103). The one great experiment in arming Canadian forces with weapons of distinctive type produced in Canada — the adoption of the Ross rifle — had proved a notable failure in the First World War. The traditional policy of using British equipment was confirmed during the Second World War by the initial neutrality of the United States. Canada was in the war for more than two years before the United States entered it, and substantial Canadian forces had been raised and sent overseas before American war production on a large scale got under way. Since Canadian forces in all three services fought in general under British higher command and as parts of larger British forces, there were strong practical arguments for uniformity of weapons and equipment. In fact, throughout the war Canadian ground forces in the field were equipped and maintained, largely over British lines of communication, with British-type "warlike stores"; the main exceptions being a wide range of military vehicles, clothing and personal equipment.\* The Royal Canadian Navy, closely modelled upon its British counterpart and working very closely with it, inevitably followed the Admiralty in equipment matters. In the desperate crisis of June 1940 the R.C.N. did consider the possibility of getting arms and ammunition from the United States;<sup>11</sup> but Britain and the R.N. survived, and nothing came of this. The Royal Canadian Air Force Overseas was so closely integrated with the Royal Air Force that separate supply on any large scale would have been impossible. Even the relatively few items of equipment of American type which Canadian forces used — for instance, certain tanks and aircraft and various technical equipment — had also been accepted by the British.

\*On Canadian Army equipment and administration in the field, see *Six Years of War*, Appendix "G", and *The Victory Campaign*, pages 623-8.

Before the war the United Kingdom and the United States had developed their armament types quite independently; now, even when faced with common danger, neither was willing or easily able to change the pattern of its weapons. Both had established production programmes, and the armed services of both were unwilling to accept the sweeping consequences in changed organization and tactics which new weapons might involve. Nothing like standardization was ever achieved. Each side contended that its own weapons were superior. The American armed services were unwilling to devote U.S. production facilities to equipment which they could not themselves use, while the British pointed out that a proliferation of types in the Commonwealth forces would create serious difficulties in the field. In the event, the United States in general made only American-type equipment during the war, though British suggestions for improvements were often accepted. In spite of prolonged and tortuous discussions during 1940, "the .303-inch rifle was the only complete 'non-common' weapon of any importance to be made for Britain in the United States".<sup>12</sup> The United Kingdom was forced either to accept American models (as it did in the case of tanks and aircraft) or turn to Canada as the sole North American source of British-type weapons. This it did for 25-pounder field guns, 3.7-inch anti-aircraft guns, 2-pounder anti-tank guns, Bren light machine-guns and Boys anti-tank rifles.<sup>13</sup> These weapons could serve the needs of any Commonwealth army, and they were among the staples of production for Mr. Howe's department. Concentration on the production of British types, however, limited the "market" for Canadian-produced equipment to countries whose forces could make use of weapons of those types. Sometimes nevertheless modifications were made to fit weapons to special needs, as when Bren guns (normally of .303-inch calibre) were produced in 7.92-mm. calibre for China.<sup>14</sup>

Although Canada made so much material of British types, Canadian industry generally was based upon American production methods, standards and techniques, and was dependent upon American imports of machinery, spare parts, sub-assemblies and components. The production of British-type equipment frequently involved important adaptations of manufacturing procedure to suit Canadian-American methods. These industrial problems were paralleled by economic ones which were complicated and in part created by the fact that Canada, alone in the Commonwealth, used dollar currency instead of sterling.

The credit arrangements made to facilitate British and foreign purchases in Canada have been mentioned in Part I (page 49). The Hyde Park Declaration of 1941 is also referred to above (page 150). A little more may be said here.

By the spring of 1941 Canada's shortage of United States dollars was very acute, and in April Mackenzie King went to the United States to see what could be done. He suggested to the Secretary of the Treasury "a sort of barter" of war materials, and Morgenthau was receptive. On the morning of 20 April King met Clifford Clark, the Deputy Minister of Finance, and E. P. Taylor of Munitions and Supply at the Harvard Club in New York; and an international agreement based on barter principles was drafted. Mr. Taylor recalls that J. B. Carswell, Director General of the Canadian purchasing organization in the United States, also made a contribution to the draft. That afternoon King went to Hyde Park and presented the paper to the President. After consulting Morgenthau by telephone Mr. Roosevelt agreed to it. Mr. Taylor writes, "Mr. King magnificently performed his task of salesmanship in obtaining an immediate response to the proposal, unchanged from the form in which he represented it." (Mr. King recorded that Roosevelt made one minor change.)

The Hyde Park Declaration was based on the principle that "in mobilizing the resources of this continent each country should provide the other with the defence articles which it is best able to produce". It was also agreed that components for equipment which Canada was producing for Britain could be obtained by Britain under Lend-Lease from the United States. The result was considerable sales of Canadian-made equipment to the United States and (under arrangements made by the United States) to other countries, including China. In Mr. Taylor's words, "The sales under the Hyde Park Agreement turned the tide of Canada's rapidly depleting U.S. dollar reserves and enabled Canada to remain on a cash basis with the United States during the war, and in fact to extend mutual aid to other countries which were wartime allies."

After the Hyde Park Declaration the Department of Munitions and Supply set up a Crown company called War Supplies Limited, with Taylor as president, "to negotiate and receive orders from departments of the United States Government for war supplies to be manufactured in Canada". (We read in the official history of the department that the new company then undertook "an intensive selling campaign" in the United States. It can hardly be doubted that this was a necessity if the agreement and the company were to fulfil their objects; but the phrase tells something about the spirit in which the enthusiastic businessmen who set the tone of Munitions and Supply went about their tasks.) Mr. Taylor recalls that it was questionable whether the President actually had the legal power to make such an agreement at the time; but it was immediately honoured in the United States. Brigadier-General John W. N. Schulz, Director of Purchases and Contracts for the U.S. Army, issued orders under it as early as 24 April 1941, and on 23 May another order notified the creation of War Supplies Limited and laid down procedures for dealing with it.<sup>15</sup>

### *International Organization and Problems*

In the circumstances described above, the coordination of war production between the Allied nations, and the allocation of the equipment produced, were delicate tasks calling for careful organization and for a high degree of tact and skill on the part of individuals. These things were not lacking; even so, inevitably, there were difficulties

Something has been said in Part I (page 30) of the nature of British purchasing arrangements in North America. In the beginning, an attempt was made to centralize the direction of all these arrangements in Ottawa; the British Purchasing Mission which arrived there in the first month of the war became a British Supply Board of which the head of the subordinate British Purchasing Commission that was shortly set up in New York was made a member (as was Mr. Campbell of Canada's War Supply Board). This arrangement did not work. This was partly because the Canadian government made it clear in the beginning that it desired all purchasing for the British government in Canada to be handled through Canadian government agencies — the War Supply Board, and later the Department of Munitions and Supply;\* and those agencies preferred to deal with government departments in London rather than with their representatives in Ottawa. The British commission in the United States had to do its own buying. And after the Anglo-French disaster in

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\*Mackenzie King's diary throws little light on this decision. It was apparently taken on 27 September 1939. The diary notes on that date, "Talked with Ralston about having War Supply Board act as agent for the British Mission in purchase of supplies", and notes that the Cabinet later in the day approved the course proposed.

Europe in 1940 American supplies were of crucial importance to Britain. That summer, accordingly, the British Purchasing Commission in New York became independent, and the British Supply Board in Ottawa was wound up, leaving Munitions and Supply there to deal direct with British supply authorities in London.<sup>16</sup>

It is relevant to note here that in the early months of the war an Air Mission working in the United States on behalf of the British Air Ministry had functioned within the British Purchasing Commission. However, when in May 1940 Churchill formed the Ministry of Aircraft Production under Lord Beaverbrook, a British Air Commission responsible to the new ministry was established, first in New York, later in Washington, with Sir Henry Self as Director General and Mr. Morris W. Wilson (President of the Royal Bank of Canada) as Lord Beaverbrook's personal representative in North America. Other British departments concerned with supply set up their own American missions. By the end of 1940 it was evident that coordination was urgently needed, and as of 15 January 1941 the British Supply Council in North America was formed. This included the heads of the various British missions. Mr. Wilson was Deputy Chairman, and Mr. Howe, the Canadian Minister of Munitions and Supply, was a member.<sup>17</sup>

Although Howe rarely attended the Council, it is clear that in the beginning at least he considered it important that Canada should be represented there. In London on 24 December 1940, when the Council was about to be set up, he recorded, "Purvis insists that I personally become member of North American Supply Committee, but [I] can only agree to this if it can be arranged that [J.B.] Carswell\* will represent me at meetings."<sup>18</sup> In his record of a meeting in London with the British Minister of Supply on 30 December, he wrote,<sup>19</sup>

Also some discussion of representation from Canada on Co-ordination Board at Washington, Duncan taking position that if Canada is represented, India, Australia and other Dominions must also be represented. I gave a short answer that it was immaterial to me whether Canada is represented, but with the distinct understanding that if Canada is not represented on the Board it will sever all connections with British Purchasing Mission and that Duncan can take responsibility. This seemed to carry weight with Duncan.

Howe's name remained on the list of the British Supply Council for the rest of the war.<sup>20</sup> His action in this matter might be interpreted as contrary to King's general attitude on the use of Commonwealth machinery. It was clearly pragmatic, and it was explained to the Cabinet War Committee on 3 February 1941 that it would facilitate the coordination of British and Canadian buying in the United States.

The first Director General of the British Purchasing Commission, and the first Chairman of the British Supply Council, was a remarkable personality contributed by Canadian industry to the British organization. Arthur B. Purvis, president of Canadian Industries Limited, was a London-born Scot who had worked in Canada since 1924. He might have done his war work for Canada instead of Britain, but he seems to have been one of the fairly numerous individuals against whom Mackenzie King nursed a deep prejudice. King felt that "the Purvis influence" was strong in the mind of the Governor General, Lord Tweedsmuir,<sup>21</sup> and when on 13 September 1939 Tweedsmuir suggested Purvis to the Prime Minister for the War Supply Board, King wrote in his diary, "I said nothing but felt he was the last man I would have on it." It may have been Tweedsmuir who subsequently suggested Purvis to the head of the British Purchasing Mission as leader of the supply organization in

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\*Mr. Carswell represented Munitions and Supply in Washington.

the United States.<sup>22</sup> The appointment was a triumphant success. Purvis shortly established a unique relationship with various important Americans, notably Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Roosevelt's Secretary of the Treasury. He commanded on both sides of the Atlantic an unquestioning confidence of which his appointment as an Imperial Privy Councillor was one evidence.\* He rendered enormous services to the Allied cause, to Britain, and, more incidentally, to Canada before he died in an air crash on 14 August 1941, while flying to join Churchill at the Argentia meeting with Roosevelt.<sup>23</sup> His loss was felt as a disaster, and shocked Allied leaders paid tributes to the memory of a man for whom they had come to feel deep respect and affection. (One of the strongest came from Mackenzie King.) Morgenthau, "shocked and saddened beyond measure", said, "He brought to his task an eager intelligence and a clear, broad-gauged understanding of American ways and problems."<sup>24</sup>

Beaverbrook, now Minister of Supply, said of Purvis, "In this organization in Washington he cannot be replaced."<sup>25</sup> In fact he never was completely replaced, but Beaverbrook wrote to the Minister of Aircraft Production on 1 September that another Canadian was the best man:<sup>26</sup>

Mr. E. P. Taylor is here — he is our choice for the virtual successor to Purvis.

You will want to see him, and I am calling a meeting of the Ministers for the purpose of introducing him to the Departments concerned.

Taylor was not in fact appointed Chairman of the British Supply Council † — that office fell to Wilson until his resignation in April 1942 — but he became the Council's Chief Executive Officer, Vice-chairman and President,<sup>27</sup> and minutes of the period after Wilson's departure<sup>28</sup> show him presiding over the Council. He was also Director General of the British Purchasing Commission (later called the British Ministry of Supply Mission). In December 1942 Taylor left the Council and the Mission to become C. D. Howe's representative on the Combined Production and Resources Board (above, page 176) and the composition of these bodies became more completely British.<sup>29</sup>

In the rather rueful words of the British official historians, "After the dissolution of the British Supply Board at Ottawa [31 August 1940], the Canadian Department of Munitions and Supply wielded a wholly sovereign control over war production in Canada. It acted largely as agent for United Kingdom supply departments, but it was an entirely free agent, accepting or rejecting British supply orders, placing contracts, and manipulating priorities at its own discretion." They go on to say very truly, however, that United Kingdom influence with Munitions and Supply was great: it was "not political but economic, being simply that of the largest customer"<sup>30</sup> (In the eyes of Mr. Howe and his staff, the customer was, nearly always, right.) Munitions and Supply had virtually all the threads of Canadian production policy in its hands, and it possessed offices in Washington and London to look after supply matters in the United States and the United Kingdom.<sup>31</sup>

British interests in Ottawa, in the supply field as in others, were now the business of the British High Commissioner and his staff so far as policy was concerned. But after the demise of the British Supply Board British agencies went on

\*It was perhaps felt that the Right Honourable Arthur Purvis would have an advantage over plain Mr. Purvis in dealing with the eminent Britons who sat under his chairmanship on the British Supply Council. He was appointed at the time when the Council was being set up.

†Mr. Taylor recalls that Churchill and Beaverbrook pressed him to become Chairman of the Council, but he preferred to avoid ceremonial and social functions and to work as chief executive officer in the North American manner.

functioning usefully there on the technical level. A United Kingdom Technical Mission continued to exist, and attached to it was an inspectorate headed by Major-General R. F. Lock who had arrived in Ottawa in 1939. This inspectorate had given great and most useful help to the Canadian authorities, who had limited experience in the inspecting of newly manufactured military stores and few personnel trained in the work. On 26 October 1940, following agreement between the British and Canadian governments, an inter-governmental inspection board, shortly termed the Inspection Board of the United Kingdom and Canada, was established by order in council.<sup>32</sup> Its tasks were to coordinate the two governments' inspection activities throughout North America and "to inspect and certify such classes of munitions and supplies as shall be directed by either or both governments". General Lock was Chairman of the Board and Inspector General. There was one other British member of the Board, and two Canadians, one of whom was the Master General of the Ordnance (Mr. Victor Sifton). By the end of 1941 the Board had 12,549 employees, 10,591 in Canada and the rest in the United States. When General Lock's health forced him to give up his appointments in September 1943, he was succeeded by a Canadian officer, Brigadier (later Major-General) G. B. Howard, who had been associated with the work from the beginning. The Board's work, carried on very much out of the public eye, was nevertheless vital to the quality of Canadian war production. How important it was is indicated by an unusual inspection failure at Windsor, Ontario, which led to the later condemnation of 1,500,000 rounds of 6-pounder and 250,000 rounds of 25-pounder ammunition. It came to light through the failure of ammunition in the field, and was the result of the employment of inadequately-qualified inspection personnel, a deficiency difficult to provide against universally under the conditions of the time in Canada.\*

Also to be noted was the British Admiralty Technical Mission in Ottawa. This worked, in close cooperation with the Naval Armament and Equipment Branch of the Department of Munitions and Supply, in placing contracts in Canada for the Royal Navy. Notable among the items produced were guns and gun mountings and Asdic anti-submarine equipment. The Mission played a part in the difficult task of keeping the naval vessels built in Canada technically abreast of the development of naval warfare. It was also the channel for the exchange of technical information with the United States Navy.<sup>33</sup>

The complicated business of the allocation of war material between Allied nations, and Canada's unsuccessful attempt to obtain a seat on the Munitions Assignments Board in Washington, have been fully covered in Part IV above (pages 167-72).

There were many difficulties before the machinery we have described began to operate smoothly. Most of them occurred before the Dunkirk crisis put financial considerations in a new perspective and led the authorities in Canada, Britain and the United States to subordinate such considerations to the demands of common safety. There was, for instance, a rather sordid argument between the Canadian government and the British War Office after the 1st Canadian Division arrived in England in 1939. It was understood that Britain would provide the division with up-to-date equipment at Canadian expense. Canada, her factories avid for orders, suggested that she might replace the equipment in kind with Canadian-made material; Britain, hungry for Canadian dollars, demurred.<sup>34</sup> The possibility seemed to present itself of Canadian-made 25-pounders and 2-pounders being used in such

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\*The story of this important aspect of Anglo-Canadian wartime cooperation is told in detail in J. M. Hitsman, *Military Inspection Services in Canada, 1855-1950* (Ottawa, 1962).

a deal; but when representatives of the War Supply Board visiting London attempted to achieve an agreement along these lines a letter<sup>35</sup> from the Deputy Director of Army Requirements at the War Office (24 March 1940) cooled their enthusiasm:

. . . the [War] Department prefer that complementary orders for 25 pounder or 2 pounder equipments should not be placed by the Government of Canada.

The programme now being dealt with by the [British] Ministry of Supply covers the equipment and maintenance of the Canadian Contingent and will provide a margin for the supply of any local requirements of Dominion Governments. An exception to this arises of course in respect of any special patterns, e.g. badges, which Dominion Governments themselves undertake to supply.

I am accordingly to suggest that in respect of the Dominion Contingent which is already in this country the Government of Canada should leave the matter of initial provision and maintenance of their equipments entirely in the hands of the War Department, and that in respect of training or other requirements in the Dominion the Government of Canada should requisition the quantities desired through the War Department to be met from deliveries off the bulk purchases of the Ministry of Supply.

The apparent suggestion that Canada should limit her manufacturing programme to such items as regimental badges seemed to bring the supply relationship to a very low point. And in the light of later developments it is rather amusing to find the Canadian visitors reporting that when they raised the question of supplying motor transport they were "emphatically informed that production in England was ample to meet requirements".<sup>36</sup> Fortunately, however, the Dominions Office was already taking a more encouraging attitude. The Canadian High Commissioner on 1 April made the formal suggestion of an arrangement by which articles that could be economically produced in Canada should, in effect, be bartered for articles not so produced which the War Office supplied to Canadian forces in Britain. When the Canadian Minister of National Defence, Norman Rogers, visited London a few weeks later he was able to achieve an agreement along these lines.<sup>37</sup> All such arrangements, however, became irrelevant shortly afterwards, when the disaster in North-West Europe reduced Britain to the position where, as Mr. Howe told the Canadian House of Commons on 30 July, she was "asking Canada for practically anything that can be supplied in the way of munitions and war materials".

Late in 1940 there was a tiff — not mentioned in either the British or Canadian supply histories — between London and Ottawa over machine tools. The supply of these was a most important bottleneck in war production, and as early as 3 May 1940 the Department of Munitions and Supply set up a Crown company, Citadel Merchandising Co. Limited, to procure, allocate and distribute machine tools and gauges. The following month, at the moment of the collapse of France, Britain, through Arthur Purvis, acted swiftly to take over a great number of French production contracts in the United States, including many for machine tools.<sup>38</sup> It appears that C. D. Howe thought he had an informal agreement with Purvis that some of these tools would go to Canada. When he found that this was not taking place, an embargo was imposed on the shipment of machine tools from Canada to Britain; and the British were angry. The problem, and the resolution of it, are described in the British minutes of a meeting held during Howe's visit to London in December; the British Minister of Supply, Sir Andrew Duncan, was present, along with Howe and members of both ministers' staffs:

2. The Minister [Duncan] said that in the first place he would like to discuss the position with regard to machine tools. He understood that the embargo imposed by Canada had now been removed, but he was disturbed to think of the amount of production which might have been lost by the embargo. Mr. Howe said that the position was very difficult, but he

thought had now been cleared up. The origin of the embargo had been that Canada was competing with the United Kingdom in U.S.A. and had been embarrassed by the decision (which was contrary to the tentative agreement which he had reached with Mr. Purvis) that the machine tools ordered by the French in the United States should go entirely to the United Kingdom. They were so impressed by the possibility of getting production quicker in Canada that they had felt bound to do what they could to fill the gaps which they had intended to fill by the French orders, before sending more tools to the United Kingdom. The embargo had now been removed.

The [British] Minister agreed that the position was now clearer. He disliked the interposing of Government authority to interfere with orders already placed for munitions production. He did not consider it good business, either for Canada to do that with our orders there or for US to do it with Canadian orders here, as he admitted might have happened in the past. Mr. Banks\* said that they had now appointed Mr. [S. V.] Allen to establish a liaison with the Controller of Machine Tools and that the Controller agreed that they should be able to avoid friction in future.

Mr. Howe said that if the Minister would let him have a list of essential tools to balance production, he would see that the Machine Tools were sent. The Minister promised to facilitate the despatch of Machine Tools to Canada in the same way. . . .<sup>39</sup>

The meeting is described in Howe's own diary of his trip.<sup>40</sup> He wrote briefly, "Duncan very critical of stoppage of export of certain machine tools and protested, [though] knowing that tools in which Britain is interested had been released. His criticism was resented by his deputy chiefs, who stated that he spoke through lack of understanding of situation." The matter was on the whole amicably handled. Colonel Ralston, who was also in London at this time, had already noted,<sup>41</sup> concerning a social occasion,

Howe and Duncan had a word or two regarding stopping of shipments of machine tools. They seem to have made it up. Duncan has been very bitter about Canada having stopped shipments of machine tools which have been ordered by the United Kingdom in Canada. Howe, on the other hand, has indicated that this was done by the officials and must have been justified on the ground that Beaverbrook [British Minister of Aircraft Production] had stepped in and taken many machine tools which Canada had ordered from the United States. There was an intense and lively argument regarding the merits and demerits of amalgamation of the railways system of Canada and regarding Government operation of service utilities generally, in which Duncan was for unification and Howe was for competition and private ownership.

### 3. THE ORGANIZATION OF CANADIAN PRODUCTION

We have briefly outlined in Parts II and III the development of the Canadian government's organization for defence procurement. A little more can be said here.

The Defence Purchasing Board contrived during its short life from 14 July to 31 October 1939 to place \$43,734,713 worth of contracts; over \$35,000,000 of these were placed in October, after the outbreak of war and after the straitjacket of profit control set up by the act establishing the Board had been removed. It is evident that the outbreak of war in Europe found the government with no plan for the organization of production in wartime. On 6 September 1939, the day before the Canadian Parliament met in emergency session, the Prime Minister asked Mr. Power, then Minister of Pensions and National Health, to draft a bill establishing a supply department.<sup>42</sup> The measure thus hastily drawn (no doubt by civil servants under Mr. Power's general guidance) received Royal assent on 13 September;<sup>43</sup> it is not surprising that there were large amendments the following year.

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\*C. A. Banks was the representative of the Canadian Department of Munitions and Supply in London.

The War Supply Board which was set up as an interim measure took over the work of the Defence Purchasing Board on 1 November. Mr. Wallace R. Campbell, president of the Ford Motor Company of Canada, consented to serve as its president. Mackenzie King, recording an interview with Campbell in his diary for 20 September, noted that he was giving his services free. For a short time the new Board was under the supervision of the Minister of Finance (J. L. Ralston). Mackenzie King, who liked to think of himself as the friend of the workingman and the foe of the "big interests", thought that Campbell was unfriendly to labour. Ralston seems to have anticipated difficulty with Campbell and on 16 November asked the Prime Minister to relieve him of the responsibility for the War Supply Board. King and Ralston both felt that the Minister of Transport was the man for the job; and the Board was placed under him accordingly.<sup>44</sup> The order in council of 23 November<sup>45</sup> that effected this began the process that was to make C. D. Howe what one might almost call the absolute monarch of Canadian war production. When on 9 April 1940 the Department of Munitions and Supply came into existence by proclamation under the act of 1939, absorbing and replacing the War Supply Board, Mr. Howe became its Minister, remaining also Minister of Transport until P. J. A. Cardin succeeded him in that portfolio in the following July. Mr. G. K. Sheils, who had been the Board's Director of Administration, became Deputy Minister of the new department.

The position of Howe and his department was materially strengthened in August 1940. Henry Morgenthau then visited Ottawa and had conversations with King and Howe. The Secretary of the Treasury made it apparent that he was dissatisfied with the tendency of the United States armed forces "to keep many things to themselves" when they might, in his opinion, be put to better use by the Allied forces fighting Hitler; and he also made clear his regard for Arthur Purvis. On 27 August King reported these talks to the Cabinet War committee; Morgenthau, he said, felt that the best results could be obtained through Purvis and the Department of Munitions and Supply rather than through representatives of the services. The Committee agreed "that the matter of requests and requisitions for the purchase of munitions and supplies in the United States should be made [*sic*] through the Minister of Munitions and Supply, acting with Mr. Purvis and not through the Service Departments". Military procurement for Canada in the United States was thus placed firmly in civilian hands. In the light of the fact that the military were far more powerful in the United States than in Canada, the soundness of this decision is arguable. Morgenthau had said that difficulty was being encountered in meeting the list of Canadian requirements that had been handed to the President at Ogdensburg (above, page 339). The hope was expressed in the War Committee that studies by the new Permanent Joint Board on Defence might help to change the attitude of the U.S. service authorities. However, when King reported to the Committee on 5 September that Mayor LaGuardia, chairman of the U.S. Section of the Board, had suggested that requests for supplies should go through him, he also observed that in the light of his own conversations with Morgenthau it seemed better to use the Howe-Purvis channel.<sup>46</sup>

On the same day on which the LaGuardia suggestion was vetoed, a more formal approach from Britain met the same fate. The British government had suggested through the Canadian High Commissioner in London that all Commonwealth supply requirements from the United States be dealt with through the British Purchasing Commission there. This, it was pointed out to the War Committee, would involve a pooling of purchases and the settlement of priorities and allocations

in London, through some form of joint Commonwealth consultation. The Committee decided to reply along the lines that the government felt that the present procedure was working adequately and should be continued rather than changed for a procedure which would be centralized and operated from London.

The important decisions of late August and early September 1940 may be said to have reflected two fundamental principles — prejudices, some might call them — of the King administration: a preference for civilian over military channels, and a preference for national over Commonwealth machinery. It may be remarked however that the latter predilection did not prevent full and friendly cooperation; and in general the Department of Munitions and Supply worked most closely and amicably with the British Purchasing Commission, and the latter was extremely helpful. Surviving letters show that Howe and Purvis were on a "Dear C.D." — "Dear Arthur" basis.<sup>47</sup> It appears that the most serious difficulty encountered with British officials in the United States was with representatives of Lord Beaverbrook's Ministry of Aircraft Production. We have already seen a reference to this (above, page 495); on 27 June 1940 the Cabinet War Committee had been told of the absence of agreement on the question of priorities, and on 8 October Mr. Howe had reported to the Committee that though his department was getting on well with the Ministry of Supply there was serious competition between Canada and the United Kingdom in the U.S. over the supply of aircraft engines.

Beaverbrook — to give the reader a glimpse of the obvious — was brilliant but difficult. Harold Macmillan, one of his Under-Secretaries, has given in his memoirs a picture of this extraordinary man at work, pursuing "his own somewhat piratical methods". Like Mackenzie King (and very few other people) Beaverbrook was apparently not partial to Purvis, Howe recorded his views while staying with him in England late in 1940:<sup>48</sup>

Beaverbrook believes in playing a lone hand and has no confidence in business judgment either of Canadian or U.S. Government. Thinks Purvis has done a bad job at Washington in that he has paid heavy cash deposits for everything purchased, and even then has had some of his purchases diverted to U.S. uses. Think I convinced him that his viewpoint incorrect, particularly with regard to the Canadian situation.

Howe got Beaverbrook to admit that he had a large reserve of aircraft engines, and hoped that he had influenced him to relent towards Canada.

Something of the peculiar nature of the Howe-Purvis-Beaverbrook relationship can be inferred from a message which Howe sent through the Munitions and Supply representative in London on the day of Purvis' tragic death. Purvis never received it:

If Purvis is in England please give him following message verbally QUOTE Beaver in Washington. Better get back. UNQUOTE Please destroy this cable.<sup>49</sup>

By this time, it will be recalled, "the Beaver" had become the Minister of Supply.

While the external position of the Department of Munitions and Supply was being thus secured and strengthened, its production and purchasing machinery was also being established and developed. We have noted in Part II the pre-war controversies over the question of whether Canadian defence material should be produced in government factories or by private industry, and the fact that without any clear-cut decision being rendered the matter was essentially allowed to rest on the basis of production by private firms subjected to an extremely stringent control of profits (above, page 101). During the hectic summer of 1940 this battle was to some extent fought over again and the pattern of wartime production was established.

In this connection the story of rifle production in Canada is of particular importance and needs to be told in some little detail. It will be remembered that before the war the Army had pressed long but unsuccessfully for the establishment of a government small arms factory. The crisis early in the summer of 1940 produced a desperate need for rifles both in the United Kingdom and Canada; the former country took all the Ross rifles Canada could send and wanted more, while Canada herself had not nearly enough Lee-Enfields for her rapidly expanding forces. On 31 May Colonel D. E. Dewar, Director of Clothing, Equipment and Manufacturing Establishments in the Branch of the Master General of the Ordnance, made a proposal for the manufacture and repair of rifles in Canada. The M.G.O. submitted this for the approval of the Minister of National Defence on 3 June, recommending that the factory be placed in Toronto, "where labour is available and where the work can proceed under the supervision of Captain [M.P.] Jolley who is the departmental expert on small arms now in charge of the Bren gun plant."\* Mr. Rogers approved the recommendation the same day.<sup>50</sup>

There were still some difficulties to surmount, however, though they did not appear at once. On 10 and 11 June there was consultation between Colonel Dewar and the Deputy Minister of Munitions and Supply; and on the latter date Mr. Sheils told Dewar that his department would be "very pleased to co-operate with you along these lines just as soon as you are ready". Jolley was put in charge of the project and authorized, with the consent of Munitions and Supply, to find a site for the plant and search for the necessary machine tools. This he did; the site was easily found at Long Branch, a Toronto suburb, on land belonging to the Crown and adjacent to the rifle range there; and on 21 June Jolley visited the British Purchasing Commission in New York and arranged with Mr. J. B. Carswell of Munitions and Supply to purchase machine tools.<sup>51</sup> (It may be noted here that on 8 July Munitions and Supply placed with firms in the United States and Canada 32 orders for machine tools, ranging in value from \$452 to \$165,000, to be delivered as advised by Captain Jolley.)<sup>52</sup>

On 13 June, however, a member of the Executive Committee of the Department of Munitions and Supply, Mr. E. P. Taylor, who is already familiar to us in other connections, told Mr. Sheils that the John Inglis Company Limited — the firm working on the Bren contract — had asked that it be selected to manufacture rifles and other small arms. After some preliminary discussion with Colonel Dewar, Sheils told him on 18 June that there was a "school of thought" in Munitions and Supply that favoured "a plant operated by a civil firm particularly the John Inglis Co.", and asked him for a letter explaining the advantages of a government-operated factory. Dewar drafted an impressive statement which went to Mr. Sheils over the signature of the Acting Deputy Minister of National Defence (Militia) the next day. It stated strongly that the Defence Department favoured a government factory. It pointed out, among other things, that John Inglis, in order to increase Bren production as recently authorized, were being obliged to erect new buildings on private property at government expense; and since they had no further land available on their present site they would presumably have to build a rifle factory elsewhere, again "on private property at government expense". Under the National Defence plan, on the other hand, the factory would be erected "on Crown property adjacent to rifle ranges necessary for testing". The Department of National Defence needed a small arms centre suitable for undertaking rectifications, alterations, etc., and "a

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\*That is, he was the departmental representative at the John Inglis Company plant where work was in progress on the manufacture of Bren guns.

properly established and equipped design department and experimental station"; a private firm would not provide these. Finally, the Acting Deputy Minister wrote,

It is strongly believed that under existing conditions, the production of rifles can be undertaken by the government on a much more economical basis than can be done by private enterprise, as high overheads and profit will not enter into the former field.<sup>53</sup>

On 24 June Mr. Sheils replied:<sup>54</sup>

I feel that your letter sets out very clearly the various arguments in favour of the production of rifles being carried out in a Government owned and operated factory.

I fully concur in the decision which your Department has made in this connection.

Mr. Taylor, it must be assumed, was not informed of these exchanges. On 25 June he wrote to Mr. Howe, on behalf of the Executive Committee, a letter which, in addition to other important matters (below, page 500) made another effort on behalf of private enterprise and, specifically, the John Inglis Company. He wrote in part,

We believe that . . . it is a mistake to entrust the task [of rifle production] to National Defence . . . to the best of our knowledge no equipment has yet been bought nor has a site been selected. If this plant had been entrusted to John Inglis, it would now be under construction. We believe it is safe to say that under the auspices of private capital the time factor will be considerably reduced.<sup>55</sup>

This effort failed. It is evident that Mr. Howe supported his Deputy, and the rifle factory was duly built at Long Branch as a government project. Mr. Taylor still believes, however, that it would have got into quantity production sooner under private enterprise (cf. below, page 506).

One other aspect of Mr. Taylor's letter merits passing notice. He remarked, "The war in Europe apparently has shown that the service rifle is of considerably less use in warfare than in the past. The Sub Machine Gun, which weighs about the same as a rifle, is a weapon that has proved to be more effective." He argued accordingly that the S.M.G. should be produced in Canada, and went on to suggest that another item which would be valuable in Canada "either for defence purposes or to quell internal disturbances" was "a light tank or armoured car which could be produced in quantities by our motor car manufacturers". He proceeded, "National Defence apparently does not favour this suggestion, although it is the only type of vehicle that can be produced in quantity for delivery by the spring of 1941." The reason for National Defence's attitude is obvious: such a vehicle would have made no contribution to winning the war. In the light of the history of the conflict, Mr. Taylor's view of the value of the rifle was equally dubious. It is, perhaps, symptomatic of the assurance of the able businessmen whom Mr. Howe had gathered around him that such suggestions should be made. Taylor was an expert on industrial organization, but hardly an expert on the methods of warfare. Nevertheless, in justice to Munitions and Supply it must be said that that department seldom if ever attempted officially to make decisions as to what weapons should be produced. It was content, as it should have been, to produce the weapons the fighting services asked for. Howe wrote to Colonel Ralston on 25 June 1940, "We do not hesitate to attempt to anticipate the requirements of your Department in the procurement of ordinary supplies", but went on to say, "obviously we cannot decide" matters relating to weapons, ammunition, etc.<sup>56</sup>

Although the rifle factory was kept under government ownership, it did not remain under the Department of National Defence. It became the business of a Crown company known as Small Arms Limited, chartered on 7 August 1940, when

the project was transferred from the Department of National Defence to the Department of Munitions and Supply. A basic agreement with Small Arms Limited, under which weapons would be supplied to the government at cost, was approved by order in council<sup>57</sup> on 11 September. Captain (later Colonel) Jolley, seconded to Munitions and Supply, remained in charge, successively as Works Manager, General Manager, and President. It is appropriate to note here that the Dominion Arsenal at Quebec, which had functioned under the Militia Department and subsequently the Department of National Defence since 1882, was likewise transferred to Munitions and Supply with its staff, along with the other Arsenal at Lindsay. Whether this was opposed in the Department of National Defence does not appear; at any rate, the Master General of the Ordnance discussed the matter with Mr. Howe (on Mr. Ralston's instructions) on 10 September 1940, and it was agreed, assuming Cabinet approval, that the transfer would be made on 1 October. On that date the Arsenals and Small Arms Ammunition Production Branch of the Department of Munitions and Supply was set up to control them and related activities. Colonel Dewar (who later became a major general) worked for the rest of the war as Director General of this branch. The presence of experienced military officers like Dewar in Munitions and Supply certainly went far to reconcile National Defence to the loss of its production facilities and to the Munitions and Supply monopoly of military production. The transfer of the arsenals and their civilian staffs was ratified by an order in council of 23 November 1940.<sup>58</sup>

We are not finished with Mr. E. P. Taylor's letter to Mr. Howe written on 25 June 1940. It may have contained some misconceptions, but this communication, made on behalf of the Executive Committee of the Department of Munitions and Supply at that pregnant moment, was nevertheless a rough sketch for the operations of the new department during the war. It listed at length the weapons and certain other equipment which the Committee's inquiries had led it to believe Canada should possess, and it pointed out that so far arrangements had been made to produce in Canada only a few items on the list — among weapons, only 25-pounders and Bren guns. Taylor wrote:

It is contended that all of the equipment should be produced in Canada. Every week in which a decision is not made will mean a month's delay in getting into production due to the increasing scarcity of machine tools. . . .

If this Department is given the authority, we can organize at once to deliver all the weapons listed . . . with minimum delay. If another month is lost, it is almost certain that deliveries, in quantity, could not be promised until 1942.

To tool up for such a programme would probably cost \$100,000,000. The major part of this investment would be in machine tools. It is submitted that this is a relatively small sum in view of the dangers of the present situation and the money being spent in other ways. There will be more than 200,000 Canadian troops in training by the fall of this year, and it would seem only proper that to eventually make them effective they should have all the weapons and equipment necessary to fighting a modern war.

The letter went on to suggest that the best procedure would be a meeting with the Ministers of National Defence and their principal advisers. Neither Howe nor his colleagues now lost any time. The Minister of Munitions and Supply wrote immediately to Colonel Ralston, remarking, "We in the Department of Munitions and Supply have for a long time been greatly concerned over the fact that we have not been asked to organize production on either guns or ammunition." He pointed out that at the moment there was an opportunity to purchase machine tools on order in the United States for France (above, page 494), but that these were likely to be

taken over by the United States government if immediate action was not taken. The proposed meeting took place on the evening of the day on which Taylor's letter was written. Messrs. Howe, Ralston and Power were present, as were Sheils and Taylor, General Elkins (Master General of the Ordnance), the Chiefs of the Naval and Air Staffs, and some others. Taylor's list of equipment was reviewed and a good many items not on it were mentioned.<sup>59</sup> There was universal agreement on the need for immediate action, and while no general policy decisions were recorded the meeting represented an advance in the mobilization of Canadian industry.

What may perhaps be called the fundamental policy decision had in fact been made by the Cabinet War Committee eleven days before. On 14 June the Acting Minister of National Defence (Major Power) laid before the Committee a memorandum written by the Master General of the Ordnance on 18 May, nearly a month before. Following up the arrangements made by Mr. Rogers in London, it recommended that Canada undertake production of all articles of armament and equipment for her troops overseas which character or quantity indicated could be economically produced in Canada. Under the conditions then existing the Committee accepted this principle without question. Within a few weeks the principle would be stretched far beyond anything that could have been anticipated during Rogers' discussions in England.

As a result of the developments just described, the resources of Canadian industry were now at last called upon for the benefit of the long-starved Canadian Army. Taylor's letter had mentioned that during the past fortnight the John Inglis order for Bren guns had been considerably increased, an important step. And beginning on 28 June contract demands were "raised" for both 40-mm. and 3.7-inch anti-aircraft guns. We have already noted the orders placed on 8 July for machinery for a rifle factory (above, page 498). These developments were not merely the result of Canadian needs or Canadian capacity (these had long existed); they clearly owed much to a factor in the situation not referred to in either Taylor's letter to Howe or Howe's letter to Ralston — the sudden British decision to order large quantities of arms and vehicles in Canada, which Howe had announced to the Cabinet War Committee on 5 June (above, page 36).

Mr. Taylor recalls that when requisitions for the equipment to be ordered were slow in arriving from the Department of National Defence, Howe took the responsibility of sending letters of intent to the manufacturers his department had selected to do the work, in order that the wheels should start moving that much sooner.<sup>60</sup>

On 9 July Colonel Ralston (who had been Minister of National Defence for four days) asked and received Cabinet War Committee approval for an amount of \$52,920,000, beyond that already provided for his new department for 1940-41, to enable orders to be placed immediately for equipment required as the result of recent developments. The items listed were 300 25-pounders (\$7,500,000); 900 2-inch mortars (\$300,000); 40 40-mm. guns (\$1,200,000); and 488 Valentine tanks complete with armament (\$43,920,000). It was the beginning of a new era, for Canadian industry, for the Army, and not least for the former Minister of Finance.

We have referred to the device known as the Crown company. It requires some notice here. This "brand new type of Government production-purchasing-control mechanisms" was developed, Mr. Sheils says, by one of C. D. Howe's team, Mr. Gordon Scott, once Provincial Treasurer of Quebec, who lost his life in the torpedo-

ing of the *Western Prince* on 14 December 1940 (above, page 38).<sup>61</sup> The device is thus described:

Crown Companies . . . provided a legal entity to which business men were accustomed, and permitted a degree of decentralization which could not otherwise have been attained. They operated directly under the Department, their accounts were audited by the Auditor-General of Canada, and their financial arrangements were submitted to and approved by the Privy Council.\* Their directors were chosen by the Minister for their knowledge of the operations to be carried out, and they served usually without remuneration. All the issued share capital of the companies was held by the Minister in trust for His Majesty the King, in Right of Canada.<sup>62</sup>

There was no reference to Crown companies in the Department of Munitions and Supply Act of 1939. However, "An Act to amend The Department of Munitions and Supply Act" (assented to 7 August 1940), which was in effect a completely new Act, authorized the Minister to procure the incorporation of companies under the Companies Act, 1934, or under provincial legislation, and to delegate to them any of his own legal powers and duties.<sup>63</sup>

The history of the Department of Munitions and Supply lists 28 Crown companies which worked under the department. The earliest of these were incorporated in May 1940. The companies performed a great variety of tasks. Some, like Small Arms Limited, were manufacturers; some, like Citadel Merchandising (above, page 494), were purchasing and distributing agents; some had functions of supervision and control. The device seems to have been a very flexible and useful one.

It is scarcely necessary to add that not all Canadian war production was effected through the medium of Crown companies; most of it was carried on by private industry under the supervision of the Department of Munitions and Supply. Although the John Inglis Company did not get the rifle factory, it made great quantities of Bren guns and also Boys rifles, Browning aircraft machine-guns and 9-mm. Browning pistols, and apparently with a high degree of efficiency. All the artillery pieces produced in Canada were made by private firms. It was characteristic of the time and place that 40-mm. Bofors anti-aircraft guns were produced by the Otis-Fensom Elevator Co., Limited. The great Canadian production of transport vehicles was achieved by the various firms in the automotive industry, operating "as a co-ordinated unit" with free exchange of services and ideas.<sup>64</sup>

The year 1940, it is obvious, witnessed not only the creation of the Department of Munitions and Supply but a great extension of the powers and functions of the department and its Minister. The act of August 1940 amending the department's statute substituted for the original definition of the Minister's powers considerably broader ones, including the power to

mobilize, control, restrict or regulate to such extent as the Minister may, in his absolute discretion, deem necessary, any branch of trade or industry in Canada or any munitions of war or supplies.<sup>65</sup>

It further provided,

7. The Minister, exclusively, may buy or otherwise acquire, manufacture or otherwise produce, munitions of war or supplies and construct or carry out defence projects required by the Department of National Defence. . . .

It is true that it went on to make exceptions of material manufactured in publicly owned arsenals and factories, or "defence projects constructed or carried out by

\*That is, by the Cabinet, which is a committee of the Privy Council.

persons in the employ of His Majesty the King in the right of Canada", or such supplies or "defence projects" as the Minister or Deputy Minister, at the instance of or with the approval of the Minister of National Defence, might request the Department of National Defence to acquire or to carry out. Although the door was thus left open for some activity by National Defence in the supply field, it will be recalled that Munitions and Supply almost immediately took over the Dominion Arsenals, and in practice the procurement of military supplies became a monopoly of Mr. Howe's department. The last area in which National Defence operated independently in this field was naval procurement in the United Kingdom. Naval supply matters there were handled by Canada House until Munitions and Supply took them over in March 1942.<sup>66</sup>

The historian of the Department of Munitions and Supply remarks that Canada was "the only country of the United Nations that procured all war supplies through a single agency, thereby eliminating competition between the Armed Services for the equipment they required".<sup>67</sup> There is force in this claim, though as we have seen (above, page 171) there was sometimes disagreement and friction between the service departments and Mr. Howe's. His colleagues, it seems, did not entirely appreciate the manner in which the Minister of Munitions and Supply drew authority to himself; Mr. Power says acidly in his memoirs, "he favoured government by boards, committees, crown companies, and commissions, all headed or controlled by the same person: Howe".<sup>68</sup> Yet Howe and his department were in general undeniably efficient; they did an enormous job and on the whole did it well. The main consideration for the armed forces in matters of supply was getting the equipment they needed; and the Department of Munitions and Supply usually got it for them.

#### 4. THE PROGRESS OF PRODUCTION

There is no intention of relating in detail here the story of Canadian war production or providing a catalogue of the items produced. It is desirable however to tell a little more than has been done in earlier portions of this book about the development of policy in placing orders for weapons and equipment in Canada, and something about the results those orders brought.\*

Of the roughly \$44,000,000 in orders placed by the Defence Purchasing Board in its three-and-a-half-month existence, no less than \$24,234,498 were for rolling stock for the Canadian National and Canadian Pacific Railways.<sup>69</sup> There were a number of small orders for motor vehicles, many of which would seem to have been bought individually. (The spectacle of the government of Canada, at the outset of a world war, purchasing a station waggon for the Canadian Army, is one which posterity should relish.) There were some not altogether unimportant orders for aircraft, including some hastily placed in the United States before Canada declared war — an order of \$2,346,600 to the Douglas Aircraft Co. placed on 31 August was the largest.<sup>70</sup> There were orders for machine tools and much miscel-

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\*The Department of Munitions and Supply published a monthly *Record of Contracts Awarded* extending from the beginning of the activity of the Defence Purchasing Board through August 1941. This is useful to the historian and has been drawn upon in the account that follows; but unfortunately it is not complete. In particular it contains almost none of the orders for Army weapons. This omission may perhaps have been prompted by security considerations (though neither the Navy nor the Air Force seems to have been inhibited in this manner). The volumes make no mention of the omissions. It is assumed here that the periodical grand totals of contract money values given in them include *all* contracts awarded by the Department of Munitions and Supply and not only those detailed in the volumes. This appears to be the case.

laneous equipment; and there were considerable contracts for construction. There were numerous orders for cloth and uniforms. There were a few small requisitions upon the British Admiralty and Air Ministry for naval and air weapons. Not one dollar seems to have been committed for Army weapons.<sup>71</sup> Very fortunately, however, work was going forward under the contract for Bren guns made in 1938, which had caused so much political criticism,

In terms of dollar orders the record of the War Supply Board (1 November 1939 - 8 April 1940) does not compare particularly favourably even with that of the Defence Purchasing Board; we are reminded that this was still the period of the "phony war" and what we have called, in Canada, the reign of the dollar. In its slightly more than five months of life the new Board placed orders worth \$137,051,876. Only one month's orders (February 1940, \$41,049,037) much surpassed the Defence Purchasing Board's best month (October 1939, with \$35,154,661); one other, January 1940, roughly equalled it. Orders in November 1939 actually amounted only to \$13,778,554, and in December they fell still lower, to \$6,924,823.<sup>72</sup>

Nothing could be much more unwarlike than the chronicle of contracts awarded through the winter-of 1939-40. However, beginning late in January the record of purchases of butter, cheese, corn syrup and toilet paper is varied by the appearance of orders for anti-submarine patrol vessels and minesweepers (above, page 15): the first such contract, for \$4,561,920, was placed on 19 January, and two more, for \$3,991,680 and \$5,702,400, on 22 January; others followed on 24 January, 1 February, 7 February, 14 February, and 23 February. There were also considerable orders for aircraft, chiefly light trainers. In March 1940 the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan began to be reflected in the contracts on a large scale: on 25 March record-breaking orders were placed for \$12,960,000 for Anson wings and assembly of Anson aircraft, and \$8,299,600 for Bolingbroke aircraft.<sup>73</sup>

The announcement in February that the 2nd Division was to be sent overseas (above, page 15) gave -the Master General of the Ordnance, spurred on by Mr. Campbell of the War Supply Board, an opening for a strong representation to the Minister of National Defence for placing more orders for Army equipment, especially motor transport. Ford and General Motors, he said, would not be able to continue production after the existing limited orders were filled unless new ones were placed immediately, since it would take time to get materials and components from other manufacturers.<sup>74</sup> General Elkins wrote,

It is strongly urged that the present restriction of purchases of clothing and equipment to the minimum requirements of the immediate future should be relinquished and that this Branch should be permitted to provide equipment to the full extent of the funds available since it is evident that such equipment will be used in any event.

It was perhaps as a result of this effort that on 20 March there came what we have already noted as the first really large order for mechanical transport: \$4,440,294 to General Motors of Canada (above, page 30). On 6 April Ford of Canada got a parallel order, for \$4,585,810.<sup>75</sup> There had been numerous orders for miscellaneous Army equipment, notably in the communications field; and on 11 March some \$520,000 worth of Bren gun tripod mountings were ordered, from the Canada Cycle & Motor Co. Ltd., evidently for the Bren guns being made in Toronto. But when the War Supply Board ceased work on 8 April 1940 it could still be said, precisely as at the end of the regime of the Defence Purchasing Board, that not one dollar had been committed for new weapons for the Army. The Canadian troops overseas were being outfitted with modern equipment — so far as it was available

— by the British War Office;\* those in Canada in general made do with last-war weapons, or none.

By coincidence, the day on which the Department of Munitions and Supply came into existence (9 April 1940) was also the day the Germans broke into Denmark and Norway. The new department, therefore, worked from the beginning in a rather different atmosphere from the one that had helped to hamstring its predecessor Boards. Nevertheless, it was not until after midsummer of 1940, when the disaster in France and Belgium in May was having its full effect, that the total money value of contracts awarded began to increase materially. It may be useful to list the monthly totals down to midsummer of 1941 :

Contracts Awarded by Department of Munitions and Supply on Canadian Account	
9-30 April 1940 .....	\$ 11,640,360
May.....	31,009,313
June.....	45,403,572
July .....	82,019,269
August .....	74,404,709
September.....	68,326,872
October.....	148,002,916
November.....	66,565,640
December.....	143,788,776
January, 1941.....	50,897,295
February.....	60,085,469
March.....	64,198,745
April.....	144,035,380
May.....	106,440,774
June.....	39,930,076
July .....	59,102,219

These figures do not include contracts placed by the Civil Aviation Division of the Department of Transport for construction, etc., required under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan. Preliminary totals for 31 August 1941 showed that, including the Department of Transport figures (which amounted to \$23,359,356) contracts on Canadian account since 14 July 1939 totalled \$1,444,588,580. Those on United Kingdom account since 1 December 1939 amounted to \$932,081,000; and on other account, since 1 December 1940, \$37,799,786; the grand total being \$2,414,469,366.<sup>77</sup>

Through the spring of 1940 the established pattern continued; the table above demonstrates the slowness of the tempo. But we have already noted the change that began to come over the supply scene in June (above, page 36), which was reflected in the fact that the total value of contracts awarded in July was almost double that of any earlier month. Thereafter the level remained high, particular peaks being reached in October and December. These impressive figures signify that the industrial mobilization of Canada was seriously under way at last. One reason for the increase was the larger responsibility being taken by Canada for aircraft for the Air Training Plan as a result of British inability to meet the original commitments under the conditions created by the fall of France. Probably the largest single item ever included in the Department of Munitions and Supply's record of contracts was \$58,393,003 to "Various Firms" for Anson aircraft on 31

\*In fact, like other troops in Britain, they were very short of many items. It is an extraordinary fact that in the spring of 1940, when British officials were refusing to consider the possibility of obtaining vehicles from Canada (above, page 494), the headquarters of the 1st Canadian Division at Aldershot was using hired civilian transport with civilian drivers.<sup>76</sup>

Ottawa; a Winter Experimental Establishment at Edmonton, Alberta; a Photographic Research Establishment and a Radio-Wave Propagation Unit at Ottawa; and the Institute of Aviation Medicine in Toronto.<sup>98</sup>

In February 1940 the Royal Canadian Navy asked two scientists from Dalhousie University to assist in developing counter-measures against the magnetic mine, and a small laboratory for this purpose was established at Dalhousie; the scientists were also given some space in Halifax Dockyard. There was expansion in 1941, and in this year it was decided that the National Research Council should become the controlling and coordinating agency for all naval research. The Council was officially recognized as the "Scientific Research and Development Establishment" of the R.C.N. with its Acting President as the establishment's director. In March 1943, however, the Navy assumed the responsibility for its own research division and took over the facilities at Halifax. In January 1944 this scientific section was converted into a separate unit, "H.M. Canadian Naval Research Establishment". By the end of the war the staff numbered 40 officers and scientists plus six members of the W.R.C.N.S. and some 50 ratings.<sup>99</sup>

Inter-service research and development in the field of propellants and explosives was conducted at the Small Arms Proof and Experimental Establishment at Valcartier, Quebec, which had been set up under the Inspection Board of the United Kingdom and Canada (above, page 493) early in 1942. Research on explosives and ballistics was also carried on under the direction of an N.R.C. Associate Committee at various universities.

Research in both chemical and biological warfare was essentially inter-service in nature, although in both cases the Army took the major share of administrative responsibility. In addition to the small respirator assembly plant that had operated in Ottawa before the war, a unit known as the Research Establishment (Chemical Warfare) was set up there in August 1941. When the joint Franco-British chemical warfare experimental station at Beni-Ounif in Algeria was lost to the Allied cause with the fall of France in 1940, the Canadian government signified its willingness to provide an alternative test site, and in February 1941 the Canadian and British governments agreed to establish a chemical warfare experimental station at Suffield, Alberta (near Medicine Hat). After other proposals for a financial basis for the project had been considered, the Cabinet War Committee agreed on 27 March that capital and maintenance costs should be shared equally between the United Kingdom and Canada for the first two years. The Suffield Experimental Station opened in June 1941, and by the end of the war employed nearly 600 persons. In addition to various projects on the use and effects of toxic chemicals, the work at Suffield included developments in the fields of smoke, flame warfare and ballistics.<sup>100</sup>

Wartime biological warfare research in Canada was conducted mainly at the Canadian Army's Kingston Laboratory at Queen's University and at the War Disease Control Station on Grosse Ile, near Quebec City, a joint Canadian-United States project. The most important single project at Grosse Ile was the development of a virus vaccine against rinderpest, a deadly cattle disease — a task performed so brilliantly that the final avianized vaccine effectively eliminated rinderpest as a biological warfare threat. This vaccine also had an important peacetime use; one Canadian scientist claimed that it would "contribute enough to the food supply of a starving world to justify the whole of Canadian wartime expenditure on research."<sup>101</sup> At the Kingston Laboratory research was done on the large-scale production of botulinum toxin and in the development of effective toxoids; successful studies in the rapid and accurate detection of minute quantities of disease-produc-

December 1940.<sup>78</sup> Federal Aircraft Limited, a Crown company, had been incorporated in June to supervise and coordinate the Anson production programme.<sup>79</sup>

It had taken a long time to get the orders; and since most of the plants had to be created "from scratch" it took still longer to produce the goods. Thanks to the fact that a contract had been made in March 1938, Canadian Bren guns began to become available in March 1940. Sorel Industries Limited, which had received a British contract for 25-pounders in August 1939, produced its first guns in July 1941. The contracts placed in 1940 in general got quicker results; complete 2-pounder guns seem to have been produced in just over a year. The Small Arms Limited factory at Long Branch, for which the first sod was turned on 20 August 1940, had produced its first rifles for testing by 30 June 1941, but difficulties were encountered for some time longer; by the end of 1941, however, over 7500 rifles had been produced, and six months later the figure had risen to about 70,000.<sup>80</sup> In Army equipment, as we have seen in Part I (above, page 48) the great harvest of the seed sown in 1940 was reaped in 1942; but the general industrial production peak did not come until 1943. In the Air Force field, 88 Ansons only were produced by the end of 1941; but the total production had risen to 1432 a year later, and to 2269 by the end of 1943.<sup>81</sup> Both in number and in dollar value, overall Canadian aircraft production reached its actual summit in 1944 — 4178 aircraft worth \$248 million, as compared with 4133 worth \$212 million in 1943. Figures for earlier years had been considerably lower.<sup>82</sup> The Canadian shipbuilding industry, almost non-existent at the outbreak of war, responded remarkably to the orders placed early in 1940. With the help of steel plates from the United States, ten keels were laid in February; by the end of 1940, 44 corvettes had been launched and 14 completed;<sup>83</sup> and as we have seen (page 16) a dozen of these useful little vessels were actually commissioned by the end of the year. Merchant shipbuilding reached its peak in 1943 (150 units worth \$250 million) but naval shipbuilding's was deferred until 1944: 2288 units (the majority were landing craft, but there were 73 escort vessels and 50 minesweepers) with a value of \$143 million.<sup>84</sup>

The ultimate value of Canadian war production as a whole (in Canadian dollars) is computed at \$9,544 million.<sup>85</sup> Defence construction, and plant expansion financed by government, amounted to some \$1,566 million more.<sup>86</sup> All these figures refer only to contracts placed by the Department of Munitions and Supply.

On 31 December 1945 the Department of Munitions and Supply passed out of existence, its continuing functions became the business of a new department, that of Reconstruction and Supply.

## 5. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

By definition, research is the acquisition of knowledge by investigation; development is the application of knowledge to the creation of new or improved equipment or methods. In practice, however, the two are often indistinguishable, especially when projects are being conducted against time, as was the case during the Second World War. Nevertheless, although service officers and civilian scientists in Canada were commonly integrated in the same establishments and represented on the same committees, wartime research was largely directed and coordinated by the National Research Council, while the armed forces were more particularly concerned with development.<sup>87</sup>

In a book of this sort it is out of the question to give a full account of wartime "research and development" in Canada. In particular, it is utterly impossible to list

all the projects that were undertaken, or even all the important ones. What one can attempt is to give enough cogent examples to enable the reader to form some opinion of the nature and the effectiveness of Canadian policy.

Before 1939 very little military research or development was undertaken in Canada. The scientific requirements of the First World War had led in 1916 to the creation of the National Research Council, but lack of research facilities obliged it to limit its early activities mainly to a national survey.<sup>88</sup> Between the wars the N.R.C. studied the problems of scientific and industrial research in Canada, directing its efforts particularly towards the more efficient utilization of national resources and the determination and maintenance of fundamental standards; it worked to improve graduate training in the sciences in Canadian universities; and from 1925 onward it conducted laboratory work of its own in physics and engineering, biology and agriculture, chemistry, and mechanical engineering.<sup>89</sup> As the international situation worsened, however, a few primarily military research projects were undertaken at the Council's one laboratory, opened in 1932 on Sussex Street in Ottawa. Between October 1935 and October 1939, when Major-General A. G. L. McNaughton was President of the N.R.C., investigations were begun on the military use of radio, cathode-ray direction-finding equipment for aircraft, ballistics, chemical warfare and (on the basis of secret information from the British Air Ministry) a little on what was later called radar. But the Council was still a small organization with a total staff of some 300 and an annual budget of \$900,000; so not much could be done.<sup>90</sup>

Largely because so many Canadian firms were subsidiaries of American or British corporations, comparatively little industrial research or development was then conducted in Canada, and of what was done a quite negligible amount had military significance. And the Canadian armed services had no scientific establishments or organizations of their own; they were so starved for funds that the only possible policy was to depend on the United Kingdom for research and development in military equipment and methods of warfare. It is however an instructive comment on the nature of modern war that much of the National Research Council's peacetime work later proved to have military implications. By March 1940 some 80 per cent of the Council's activities were already directly centred on war problems.<sup>91</sup>

As in the industrial field, after the collapse of France the British authorities began to display much greater interest in Canadian research and development potential. There were simply not enough scientists and technicians in the United Kingdom for the work there was to do. Moreover, Britain's vulnerability to air attack made decentralization desirable, and as military production increased in Canada there was some increase also in development requirements in spite of the fact that the country was in the main producing British-type equipment. In August and September 1940 a British Scientific and Technical Mission under Sir Henry Tizard, an eminent defence scientist and Rector of the Imperial College of Science and Technology, visited Washington and Ottawa to explore methods of integrating defence research, development and production. From that time no question of patent rights or "security" raised by the British interfered with Canadian participation in the scientific war effort. Specifically, this mission led to the beginning of serious work on Canadian development and manufacture of radar equipment.<sup>92</sup>

Before the end of the war the National Research Council's single laboratory had grown to 22 establishments, including eight new permanent research centres. The Council operated 33 Associate Research Committees and nearly 100 sub-

committees, and close cooperation was maintained with the universities and industry. Apart from the work being done in the Council's own laboratories, there were times when as many as 280 active projects were simultaneously under way at 27 other laboratories across Canada. The N.R.C. opened a liaison office in London and a British liaison office was established in Ottawa; and scientific liaison with the United States was close and continuous.<sup>93</sup>

In the early stages of the war the relationships between the services and the Research Council were informal, but during 1941 the N.R.C. was designated as the research station for all three forces. The Acting President of the Council, Dr. C. J. Mackenzie, was a member of such service organizations as the Army Technical Development Board. Early scientific problems which the N.R.C. investigated for the services concerned electrical engineering and radio, hull design of naval craft, munitions manufacture, proof of explosives, and a wide range of aeronautical matters.<sup>94</sup>

The services, on the other hand, were responsible to their separate Ministers for their own development programmes, while the Department of Munitions and Supply negotiated development contracts. Development problems grew faster than the organization to deal with them, and, especially in the Army, directorates directly concerned with development multiplied rapidly. Much of the Army's development work became concentrated in the Branch of the Master General of the Ordnance," but engineering development came under the Quartermaster General, medical research and development under the Adjutant General, and operational research under the General Staff. In March 1942 the Army Technical Development Board was established under the chairmanship of the Master General of the Ordnance to "promote research, design, experiment and development in connection with all matters and things wherewith the Master General of the Ordnance is now charged",<sup>95</sup> and to coordinate all Army development projects except in such fields as chemical warfare and radar where standing boards and committees were already functioning.

By the end of the war the Canadian Army was operating six research and development establishments: the Canadian Armament Research and Development Establishment at Valcartier, Quebec; the Vehicle Design and Development Establishment; the Chemical Warfare Laboratories; the Canadian Signals and Research Development Establishment; and the Inter-Service Research and Development Establishment (General Stores), all in Ottawa; and No. 1 Airborne Research and Development Centre at Shilo, Manitoba. In addition, an Experimental Establishment R.C.E. worked in Ottawa under the Directorate of Engineering Development.<sup>96</sup>

In the R.C.A.F. the Directorate of Research, Development and Maintenance was originally responsible for development and design requirements on aircraft, engines and equipment. Later this task was taken over by the Directorate of Aeronautical Engineering, while research work on nutrition, aviation medicine and photography was conducted in conjunction with the National Research Council. In March 1942 a Director General of Air Research was appointed to advise the Chief of the Air Staff and Air Members of the Air Council (above, page 126) on matters of research and development.<sup>97</sup> The R.C.A.F. controlled five major research and development centres: a Test and Development Establishment at Rockcliffe, near

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\*The Directorates of Technical Research, Ordnance Services (Mechanization), Chemical Warfare and Smoke, Vehicles and Small Arms, Electrical and Communications Development, and Inter-service Development.

ing agents were carried out; and useful research was done on the properties and behaviour of various airborne bacteria.<sup>102</sup>

All three services were involved in telecommunications research and development, generally in cooperation with the National Research Council and with Research Enterprises Limited, a Crown company organized by the Department of Munitions and Supply in August 1940 with the purpose of manufacturing specialized military equipment, often from prototypes developed by the N.R.C. The Army organizations most especially concerned with development in this field were the Directorate of Electrical and Communications Development at N.D.H.Q. and its subsidiary, the Canadian Signals Research and Development Establishment. The National Research Council carried on much radar development for the Army, especially on the "GL Mark III C" anti-aircraft radar set which was later manufactured in quantity by Research Enterprises Limited. A great deal could be written about the GL Mark III C, of which 667 sets were produced; 600 of them were for the British authorities, who passed more than half of them on to other countries, including Russia. The British War Office preferred a set produced in the United Kingdom in accordance with specifications later than those stated by the Tizard Mission, on which the Canadian design was based. Among other advantages, the British set had greater mobility. The result was that the Canadian sets were used by the British Army in Britain but not in the field. They made a material contribution to the operations of the British Anti-Aircraft Command, and during the "Little Blitz" in the winter of 1943-44, when most of the available British sets were needed in Italy and for units preparing for the invasion of France, the fire of the London defences was mainly controlled by the GL Mark III C. A War Office opinion is that the equipment was good, but that it would have been better had there been closer technical liaison between Britain and Canada in the early days of its development.<sup>103</sup>

A succession of valuable Army wireless sets were also developed in Canada or adapted from British models.<sup>104</sup> Studies of the conditions affecting the transmission of radio waves were carried on under the Canadian Radio Wave Propagation Committee, a composite inter-service group set up in 1944 under the administration of the Royal Canadian Navy. The National Research Council developed radar equipment for the R.C.A.F., and also assisted that service in testing electrical equipment and materials for conformity to specifications. Dr. Mackenzie considers that the N.R.C.'s outstanding success in radar, however, was the development of the excellent 268 set for the Royal Navy. This was mass produced at Research Enterprises Limited.<sup>105</sup>

The British authorities frequently asked that Canadian agencies, and most particularly the National Research Council, should undertake special development tasks. One of the most famous and (it would seem) most fatuous of these was the project called "Habakkuk".\* This was a scheme for an unsinkable aircraft carrier made of "Pykrete", a mixture of wood-pulp and ice; it was the brainchild of an English eccentric named Geoffrey Pyke, who managed to "sell" the idea to Lord Louis Mountbatten and Churchill. The latter has told the story of how Mountbatten demonstrated the admittedly remarkable qualities of Pykrete at the first Quebec Conference in August 1943.<sup>106</sup> By this time the National Research Council in Canada had already been working actively on the project, as the result of a British request, for the better part of a year. On 21 January the Cabinet War Committee had been told that the United Kingdom had asked assistance in certain

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\*"I will work a work in your days, which ye will not believe, though it be told you" (Habakkuk, 1:5).

secret and urgent investigations to which high importance was attached (the name "Habakkuk" — mis-spelled as usual — was used to identify the project). The Committee agreed that the service departments should cooperate with the National Research Council in this work. On 14 April the Committee was given a progress report (without detail being recorded). Canada had now been asked to undertake some construction, and the Committee authorized an initial expenditure of one million dollars.

While at Quebec Churchill wrote Mackenzie King informing him that the British Chiefs of Staff had discussed the project with the Canadian and U.S. Chiefs of Staff, and they had all "resolved that this work of development be pushed forward with vigour" and Churchill asked King to help "to finish a task which I trust will have no small part in the common victory". A joint "Habakkuk Board" to direct research and design was suggested. The result was a report a fortnight later from the Acting President of the Research Council to Mr. Howe. During the cold weather months from January to March 1943, he wrote, a vigorous research programme had been carried on "at the three western universities, Jasper and Lake Louise", as well as in Ottawa. "A model structure was built in Patricia Lake at Jasper on which test data has been kept for several months including the entire warm weather of July and August." Dr. Mackenzie continued:

During the early period we were working at the request of the British authorities on scientific and technical investigations, but when the British Government asked the Canadian government to undertake responsibility for the construction of one Habbakuk [sic] our responsibilities changed, and you will recall that on your authority .the Montreal Engineering Company was engaged to study engineering and constructional problems as we were all of the opinion that the feasibility of the project was more dependent on such factors than on strictly scientific uncertainties. At the same time refrigerating space was rented on the National Harbors Board premises in Montreal and a thorough investigation started to obtain the physical constants of the material which would be necessary for engineering design.

The reports of the Montreal Engineering Company and the various laboratories were now available. Mackenzie summarized the result:

- "1. It is quite impossible to build a Habbakuk by the spring of 1944.
- "2. From a purely technical and scientific standpoint there does not appear to be any reason to doubt that such a project could be constructed.
- "3. The essential difficulties are in engineering design and construction.
- "4. Such a structure cannot be built cheaply and our estimates of cost, which it is admitted can only be approximate in the absence of detailed design, indicate a figure from two to three times as great as the United Kingdom estimate.
- "5. Preliminary studies in steel indicate that such a structure could probably be built at a lesser cost than in pykrete.
- "6. The magnitude of the project is so great that it could not be undertaken as a strictly Canadian enterprise without serious interference with existing war programs.
- "7. The final conclusion is that if the tactical and strategical needs indicate that Habbakuks in some form should be built the only feasible method would be by a co-operative effort of the United States and Canada."

To this Howe replied four days later saying that he thought Canada had "gone as far as is justified" and was confident that the joint committee would endorse Mackenzie's findings:

I feel that the Government of Canada will not wish to be involved in further extensions of this project, even though it was decided to use steel or some other suitable material. Our war programme has been stretched to its limit, and we are moving in the direction of reducing the programme in conformity with our dwindling manpower resources.\*

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\*See above, page 410.

This appears to have been the end of Habakkuk. It would seem that the "Habakkuk Board" never met.<sup>107</sup>

Operational Research, a new field of scientific activity which aimed at providing executive departments with "a quantitative basis for decisions regarding the operations under their control",<sup>108</sup> originated when the Royal Air Force set out to solve the problem of employing radar to the best advantage in the air defence of Britain. It has been claimed that the use of radar increased the probability of fighter aircraft interception by a factor of approximately ten, while the contribution of operational research increased this again by a factor of about two.<sup>109</sup> In August 1942 the R.C.A.F., having followed the British activity with interest, set up an Operational Research Centre at Air Force Headquarters in Ottawa. The following year both the Royal Canadian Navy and the Canadian Army established Operational Research directorates.<sup>110</sup>

The R.C.A.F. set up operational research groups in Eastern and Western Air Commands in Canada, at the R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters in London, and with the R.C.A.F. Bomber Group in England. These groups worked on such problems as methods of search for missing aircraft, aircrew appraisal techniques, bombing and navigational training assessments, and the operation of coastal radar.<sup>111</sup> The R.C.N. had operational research groups at Halifax and at Naval Headquarters in Ottawa; the problems they investigated included the relative effectiveness of various anti-submarine weapons and items of equipment, tactics and plans for air and ship escort in the North Atlantic, the operational routing of convoys, and the most effective search pattern for anti-submarine warfare. Army operational research units were assigned to several of the major training areas in Canada and to Pacific Command. Their projects included analysis of large-scale trials and tests, quantitative studies of the lethality of weapons, studies of training and selection problems and of the protection afforded troops by various types of equipment and shelter. Had the war continued it was intended to assign operational research units to duty with the Canadian Army in active theatres.<sup>112</sup>

It is difficult and indeed impossible to produce any definite quantitative assessment of the value of Canadian research and development as a contribution to Allied victory. A major difficulty is simply the fact that it *was a contribution* — a share, and necessarily in most cases not a major share, in a great and complicated joint effort. Many Canadian projects were closely related to British ones and were essentially adaptations or developments of ideas or devices on which much British work had already been done. To arrive at a definite evaluation of the relative importance of contributions in cases of this sort seems out of the question.

In so far as the two can be separated, research in Canada had a somewhat firmer base to operate from than development. The National Research Council in 1939 was small, as we have seen, but it was a well-established organization possessing valuable contacts both with scientific communities abroad and with Canadian universities and industry. The N.R.C. was the controlling and coordinating research agency for all three armed forces, whereas each of the three conducted development as it saw fit, although as time passed many development functions passed from the services to the Department of Munitions and Supply. Many of the people concerned with development, in the nature of things, had had little if any pre-war experience with armaments or warlike stores. This may have had something to do with the fact that the number of projects undertaken was very much larger than the number that

ultimately produced solid results; but this may also have been in part a natural consequence of wartime conditions. From its inception in March 1942 until the end of the war the Army Technical Development Board recorded upwards of 450 projects; this did not include research problems relating to radar, chemical warfare, operational research, medical matters and activities overseas. Of these A.T.D.B. projects, 126 were cancelled; 208 were completed, and of these in turn 35 were carried to the production stage and resulted in equipment for service use.<sup>113</sup>

In a fair number of cases the time and effort devoted to Canadian scientific or engineering projects turned out to be largely or partly wasted. This happened alike with some of those undertaken at British request and some of those conceived locally. "Habakkuk" was a spectacular example. A more practical and productive undertaking was Canadian work on the "variable time" or "proximity" fuze, designed to explode a shell when close to its target. The National Research Council took on this task at the suggestion of the Tizard Mission of 1940 (above, page 507) and it was assigned to a team at the University of Toronto.\* From a quite early stage there were close contact and cooperation with a much larger group of researchers working on the same problem in the United States, to such an extent that it is difficult to disentangle the contributions made by and the credit due to each side. By the spring of 1943 fuzes had been produced in Canada on a pilot scale with the aid of miniature radio tubes — the heart of the apparatus — which had been made available by the Americans. On 5 January of that year the U.S. Navy shot down a Japanese aircraft with a shell equipped with a proximity fuze. During 1943 the Canadian effort was suspended. It had centred to a large extent on fuzes suitable for smaller shells than the 5-inch ones wanted by the U.S.N., and it is possible that without the Canadian contribution the shells that beat the German flying-bomb offensive against England in 1944 would not have been available in time.<sup>114</sup> Sponsorship of the Canadian project had been transferred from the National Research Council to the Department of National Defence after firing trials at Camp Borden in 1942.<sup>115</sup>

An effective Canadian effort was made in the field of development of new explosives, another in which international scientific cooperation was particularly close and effective. Important work was done at McGill University in connection with RDX, and at the University of Toronto in connection with the flashless propellant finally called Albanite. American scientific historians pay tribute to the Canadian contribution here.<sup>116</sup>

The development of Army equipment was a field to which much Canadian effort and expenditure were directed. Here as elsewhere there were some disappointments. The National Research Council prototypes of the GL Mark III C radar set were produced with gratifying speed; but the record of the set as mass-produced by Research Enterprises Limited was rather discouraging, Canada's great independent venture in the field of armoured fighting vehicles, the Ram tank, has been described above (pages 49,487). The Ram gave Canada tanks for training on a scale which could hardly have been obtained from any other source; and the chassis was used for a number of special vehicles. But in spite of all the money and effort devoted to producing it ("Capital amounting to over \$21,000,000† was provided to create the necessary facilities for tank production"),<sup>117</sup> the Ram never fought as a tank.

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\*Professor Arnold Pitt was in charge of the project; Dr. R. W. McKay and Mr. W. H. McPherson were senior members of the research group.

†This presumably includes the money spent in connection with the British Valentine tank, made earlier.

The American Sherman — a vehicle of later design, which may in fact have been influenced by the plans for the Ram — was more rapidly produced and was undoubtedly a better operational tank, and it was used in battle by all Canadian armoured formations. It would probably have been a sounder international division of labour to have let the United States, with its more developed heavy industry, produce tanks for the alliance, while Canada concentrated on the transport vehicles which she was so well equipped to manufacture. The Ram may perhaps be considered the Second World War parallel to the Ross rifle.

It is pleasant to be able to mention a Canadian-developed and Canadian-produced armoured vehicle, closely related to the Ram, which was a complete success. This was the Sexton self-propelled 25-pounder gun. Designed by the Self-propelled Gun Mounts Design Section of the Army Engineering Design Branch of the Department of Munitions and Supply,\* the Sexton was a normal 25-pounder mounted on a Ram chassis, though the Sherman chassis seems to have been used in some cases. It was produced by the tank arsenal at the Montreal Locomotive Works which had made the Ram. In 1943, after trials in England, it was adopted by the British Army,<sup>119</sup> and it was the weapon of Canadian and British self-propelled field artillery regiments in armoured divisions in the North-West Europe campaign of 1944-45. The British authorities preferred it to the U.S. 105-mm. Priest, if only because it was not dependent on American sources for ammunition. But it was superior to the Priest in other respects: it could attain the full range achieved by the gun on the field carriage (13,400 yards), its interior layout was better, and more ammunition could be carried.<sup>120</sup> The Sexton gave great satisfaction; Canadian gunners transferred from Italy early in 1945 had turned in their Priests reluctantly, but they were well pleased with the Canadian gun when they took it into service in the new theatre. Over 2000 Sextons were produced.<sup>121</sup>

## 6. THE ATOM

The dropping of atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 did more than end the Second World War; it inaugurated a new era in the history of the world. This was at least dimly appreciated by ordinary men at the time, and when the Canadian government issued statements indicating that Canada had had a part in the scientific developments thus revealed it produced much interest and perhaps a certain pride. These announcements rather carefully refrained from claiming a direct share in the process that produced the dreadful weapons the Americans had used against Japan. In fact it appears that Canada's only specific part in it was to provide raw material, nor is it certain that Canadian uranium was used for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs. In these circumstances, it is scarcely necessary to tell the story in detail in a book concerned entirely with the Second World War, It is in any case told in other books.† But since those books made no use of Canadian records on the ministerial level, it is worth while here to attempt at least an outline that will sketch the course of government policy in this matter so pregnant with significance for humanity's future.

\*This branch was organized in 1941 by a transfer of staff and responsibility from the Branch of the Master General of the Ordnance, Department of National Defence.<sup>118</sup>

†The most detailed account of the Canadian effort is Wilfrid Eggleston, *Canada's Nuclear Story* (Toronto, 1965); the author had access to Dr. C. J. Mackenzie's private diary. A British official history, Margaret Gowing's *Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939-1945* (London, 1964) is also valuable on Canadian aspects. A short and modestly impersonal account by a Canadian atomic pioneer is George C. Laurence, "Canada's Participation in Atomic Energy Development", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, November 1947.

No attempt will be made here to describe the long process by which scientists came to believe that it might be possible to effect a bursting ("fission") of the nucleus of the atom of uranium, and that such fission would release energy on a colossal scale. Physicists in several countries came more or less simultaneously to the conclusion that fission could be brought about, and a succession of papers dealing with these remarkable possibilities appeared in scientific journals in the early weeks of the fateful year 1939.<sup>122</sup>

These publications led to immediate discussion in Britain on the possibility of producing an atomic bomb, and after some vicissitudes a committee of eminent scientists (the so-called M.A.U.D. committee) attached to the Ministry of Aircraft Production reported in July 1941 that they considered "that the scheme for a uranium bomb is practicable and likely to lead to decisive results in the war". They recommended that work go forward and that there should be active collaboration with the United States, with which information had already been exchanged. (The United States was given a copy of the draft of the committee report.) Examination of the project by other scientific advisers produced the conclusion that it was too large to be undertaken in wartime Britain, and should be carried out in North America; the specific suggestion was made that components should be manufactured in the United States and "one pilot plant and the full-scale separation plant" assembled in Canada.

These recommendations went to Mr. Churchill, who on 30 August 1941 referred them to the Chiefs of Staff; and the Chiefs of Staff urged that the project should be pushed with all possible energy and all possible secrecy. Perhaps because of this latter consideration, they recommended however that the work should be done in Britain and not abroad. (The United States was still neutral.) Their recommendations were accepted. The unfortunate consequence was that collaboration with the United States was rejected at a moment when Britain was still ahead scientifically. The best opportunity for an equal Anglo-American partnership was thus missed.<sup>123</sup> In October 1941, President Roosevelt approached Churchill on the subject; but the British Prime Minister took two months to reply, and the British in the subsequent discussion emphasized the difficulties caused by the necessity for extreme secrecy. In 1942 however British scientists did visit the United States and discuss the project with their opposite numbers there with a view to a joint programme. They found that the Americans, having expanded their effort after Pearl Harbor, were now pursuing it on a very great scale.<sup>124</sup>

This was the time when Canada was first drawn in (though a Canadian scientist, George C. Laurence, had been pursuing independent experiments in nuclear fission, with very small means, at the National Research Council in Ottawa as early as 1940). In the course of these liaison visits W. A. (later Sir Wallace) Akers, who had been appointed to head the organization directing the bomb project in Britain — it was known by the cover-name "Directorate of Tube Alloys" — went to Ottawa (19 February 1942) and had some discussion on the matter with Dr. C. J. Mackenzie, Acting President of the National Research Council; but "no concrete proposals" for Canadian participation were put forward.<sup>125</sup> Four months later, on 15 June, the Canadian Prime Minister heard about the matter for the first time. The British High Commissioner, Malcolm MacDonald, brought two British scientists, Professor G. P. (later Sir George) Thomson — the British scientific liaison officer in Ottawa — and M. W. Perrin, Akers' deputy, to see King.

The British emissaries' interest was in raw material. In 1942 supplies of uranium were available, practically speaking, in only two countries in the world: Canada and the Belgian Congo. In Canada uranium was in effect a by-product of

radium. Pitchblende, the source of the latter, had been discovered on the shore of Great Bear Lake in the Northwest Territories in 1930 by Gilbert LaBine, managing director of Eldorado Gold Mines Limited. By 1933 Eldorado had a refinery in operation at Port Hope, Ontario, and uranium oxide was being produced as a result of the extraction of radium. In 1940 wartime difficulties forced the company to close down the mine at Port Radium on Great Bear Lake, but the Port Hope refinery remained in operation. In the first interview Mackenzie King was given a glimpse of the project and its possibilities; he wrote in his diary, "The whole business was very secret but it was represented that it might, within a very short time, lead to a development that whichever country possessed this mineral in time would unquestionably win the war with its power of destruction. . . ." He agreed to the visitors discussing the question with Mr. Howe and Dr. Mackenzie. This was done later in the day, and that evening King met Howe and MacDonald for further discussion. He recorded:<sup>126</sup>

They told me there had been complete agreement among them as to desirability of Government not only controlling, but owning, the particular mineral deposit in question, and I was asked if I would authorize the Government getting the majority of shares from the owner. Howe thought there would be no trouble in securing this so that the Government might prevent others entering the field or sending up the price. I agreed to this step being taken at once so long as Americans were advised in advance of the intention. Also that we were taking the step we were to meet the wishes of the British Government. Both MacDonald and Howe thought it inadvisable to have anything said to any other members of the Government or anyone else. . . .

A few days later Mackenzie, on Howe's initiative, visited Washington and discussed the matter with Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development there. Bush took Mackenzie into his confidence on American progress, and Mackenzie recorded, "Bush thinks we should proceed with the acquisitioning [*sic*] of the property, and appreciated very much Mr. Howe's offer." Mackenzie returned to Ottawa and reported to Howe, who undertook to take steps to get the Port Radium mine back into full production as soon as possible. Mackenzie kept in touch with Bush, and on 22 July told him that Howe had begun "informal discussions with the parties interested" soon after the Washington interview and had told Mackenzie "that he would be most willing and anxious to have the output allocated in a manner agreeable to the Government of the United States, the United Kingdom and our own".<sup>127</sup> What had in fact happened was that on 15 July an order in council had been approved authorizing the purchase of any or all of the shares of Eldorado Gold Mines Limited "at a price not exceeding \$1.25 per share, total expenditure not to exceed \$4,900,000". The order noted that the company had an issued and paid up capital of 3,905,046 shares with a par value of \$1.00 each; that Gilbert LaBine, the President, owned 1,000,303 of the shares; and that he had agreed to sell those shares to the Crown at \$1.25 each "and also to sell to His Majesty at their cost to him but not exceeding \$1.25 per share, such further shares as he may be able to acquire from other shareholders, to the end that gradually at least enough stock may be acquired to give His Majesty effective control of the said company by way of a majority voting power".<sup>128</sup>

Howe now proceeded to implement this decision, working confidentially through Gilbert LaBine, with whom he was on friendly terms. Although acquiring a majority holding was bound to take time, the evidence all suggests that from 15 July 1942 LaBine was quite prepared to see to it that Eldorado carried out any instructions issued by the Canadian government. The difficulties which arose later

were not due to any inadequacy in the measure taken on that date, but to inadequacy of the instructions.

While in the United States in June 1942 Mr. Churchill discussed the atomic project with President Roosevelt. The British Prime Minister thought they had arrived at a satisfactory agreement for collaboration, but it was evidently informal and nothing was put in writing.<sup>129</sup> A little later further Canadian cooperation was suggested. On 17 August 1942 the British High Commissioner's office in Ottawa brought forward the proposal that the most important team of scientists working on the project in England (at the Cavendish Laboratory, Cambridge) should move to Canada, and that a Canadian atomic laboratory should be set up where these men would work in collaboration with Canadian scientists. The scheme was at once accepted, and an agreement made under which Canada would pay all costs except the salaries of the scientists from Cambridge. The leader of the Cambridge group, Dr. Hans Halban, arrived in Ottawa in September to discuss the transfer of his activities to Canada. Mr. Howe finally settled the matter during a visit to London in October. Well before the end of the year the Cambridge team were in Canada and preparing to begin work in laboratory space which had been obtained in the new buildings of the Université de Montréal.<sup>130</sup>

At this point, unfortunately, Anglo-American atomic relations became strained. This was due in part to the fact that beginning in the summer of 1942 the United States project was placed under the Army and specifically under Brigadier-General L. R. Groves of the Corps of Engineers. Groves, a man of great ability and energy, had some reservations about cooperation with the British. The two American scientists at the top of the project, Bush and Dr. James B. Conant, President of Harvard, were not behind him in this respect.<sup>131</sup> For their doubts there seem to have been two main reasons. The lesser was the connection of Imperial Chemical Industries with the British activity (Akers in particular was an I.C.I. man); they felt that this meant that Britain was thinking in terms of commercial advantage after the war. More important was fear for the secrecy of the project. The "British" team in Montreal was largely non-British. The core of it was a group of distinguished French scientists (Halban himself seems to have been of French nationality, though actually German-born) and there were citizens of several other European countries, including enemy ones.\* The Americans were afraid of these people; and since one of them went to Russia after the war, and another member of the Montreal staff (not however a foreigner) was convicted of treachery, their fears cannot be treated with complete contempt.

We need not go into details here; but early in January 1943 the British and Canadians were told by Conant that they were no longer going to receive atomic information from the Americans except in certain limited areas. Specifically, it was stated that material ("heavy water") from the United States would be available to the Montreal group if it worked closely with the du Pont engineers who were serving the U.S. and provided them "with basic scientific information". "Engineering design is to be given to the Canadian group by the du Ponts only in so far as is necessary for their carrying out basic scientific work."<sup>132</sup> The British were shocked by this breach of the Churchill-Roosevelt gentlemen's agreement. On the Canadian side, Dr. Mackenzie was not quite so shocked. "I can't help feeling", he wrote in his journal, "that the United Kingdom group [over]emphasizes the importance of their contribution as compared with the Americans." On 18 January Mackenzie visited

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\*For a complete list of the British-paid scientists at Montreal, see Margaret Gowing's *Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945*, Appendix 6. On Halban, *World Biography* [1948], p. 2126.

Washington by invitation and Bush and Conant explained the Americans' security objections. Mackenzie recorded, "I think there is a great deal to be said for their point of view. We had a very pleasant and profitable discussion and they are extremely friendly to us."<sup>133</sup>

The Americans were in the driver's seat. Not only was their project now so far advanced that they could go it alone; but they had contrived to corner the market on Canadian atomic raw material. In the spring of 1943 the British picked up the surprising news that Eldorado\* had made contracts with the United States Army which in effect gave the latter a monopoly of the Canadian uranium output for the immediate future. Churchill was in Washington at the time and Sir John Anderson, the Lord President of the Council, under whom "Tube Alloys" came, cabled him the report. Mackenzie King was also in Washington (18-21 May 1943). A British official historian writes, "It seems that Mr. Churchill told the Prime Minister of Canada that Mr. Howe 'had sold the British Empire down the river'. This was repeated to Mr. Howe who was not amused."<sup>135</sup>

The Canadian evidence is rather against this version. If Churchill made the remark, he probably did not make it to Mackenzie King, for King does not mention it in his diary. The diary contains a memorandum of a conversation at the White House on 19 May with Lord Cherwell, Churchill's scientific adviser, in which the atomic matter was guardedly referred to:

It appears that both the British and the Americans have been experimenting on similar lines. The latter have made contracts with Canada for some of the raw material and power needed, and are now unwilling to let the British know what they have done. This is because the army has got ahold of the matter. It has been removed from the realm of the scientists into the hands of the army. They are as difficult about it in their relations with Britain as Stalin had been in telling of what was being done in Russia.

I had known nothing about the Canadian contracts and will know nothing until I take [talk?] the matter over further with Howe. I simply recall knowing about supplies in Canada being desired by the British for a secret purpose.

On 21 May King's diary records a talk at the Canadian Legation with Malcolm MacDonald:

I spoke to Malcolm about the matters discussed with Churchill: "H.W." and "U" and "T.M." Malcolm said it was not until he was in England on his recent visit, that he learned that Howe had made a contract through Munitions and Supply with the "A.A." which virtually gave the whole supply of both to them for nearly 3 years.†

Britain had been expecting we would control the supplies for them. Howe had been keeping Malcolm in touch with developments but of this, he had learned nothing. I, myself, had had no indication from Howe concerning it.

Churchill had said to me that they might need to have me intervene with the President as the "A.A." were very selfishly keeping everything to themselves, and there certainly should be a sharing. Malcolm hoped I would wait until I saw him on Monday before speaking with Howe. He would know then what developments had been made meanwhile here.

The diary makes no reference to conversations with Churchill on atomic matters beyond that just quoted. If Churchill had made the remark about Howe selling the Empire down the river it is rather unlikely that King would have failed to record it. It is apparent however that he was disturbed by what he had heard. It is apparent also that — although the diary makes no reference to it — he communi-

\*The company's name was changed in June 1943 from Eldorado Gold Mines Limited to Eldorado Mining and Refining Limited.<sup>134</sup>

†"H.W." is clearly heavy water, and "U" uranium; "T.M." is probably a clerical error for "T.A." (Tube Alloys). "A.A." presumably means "American Army". The reference in "both" is perhaps to heavy water and uranium. King presumably used the abbreviations to keep the matter secret from his stenographer.

cated what he had heard to Howe. On 26 May the Minister of Munitions and Supply, apparently genuinely surprised, wrote to Gilbert LaBine.<sup>136</sup>

Dear Gilbert:

Our friends, the British Government, seem to be greatly disturbed about a report that has reached them to the effect that you have sold the output of uranium from Great Bear Lake to the United States Government covering production for the next two years. The British feel that this excludes them from this market.

I have no knowledge of any such sale and I feel sure that you would not dispose of your product in a way that would interfere with filling urgent requisitions from the United Kingdom.

In any event, I would be opposed to selling our full output of uranium for a long period in advance under present day circumstances.

Please let me have the facts as I must report to our Prime Minister on this subject. . . .

Replying on 28 May,<sup>137</sup> LaBine gave Howe "a brief review of the contracts we have on hand at present":

- "1. Contract dated December 21, 1942 covering the refining of approximately 655 tons of ore, apparently of Belgian origin. This contract was supplemented on April 14, 1943, to cover an additional 600 tons of U308.
- "2. Contract dated July 16, 1942 covering 350 tons of U308 from Eldorado ore, to be delivered in the form of Black Oxide. To date, approximately 185 tons have been delivered against this contract and the balance is to be delivered after the treatment of the ore under contract (1 ) has been completed.
- "3. Contract dated December 22, 1942 covering 500 tons of U308 in the form of Black Oxide, from Eldorado ore, for delivery after completion of the two contracts above, but before December 31, 1944."

LaBine said further that Eldorado had delivered about 420 tons of U308 against contract 1; the refinery's present capacity was approximately 120 tons per month, but it was hoped to increase this to 145 tons by the end of August. He added that there was a "verbal understanding with the U.S. Government" that Eldorado would not be prevented from supplying the needs of the Canadian government for any of its products. He expected to have within a few days a written agreement to this effect, but — not surprisingly — this never seems to have arrived. He hoped that this would meet the situation even though "at the moment we are shipping our entire output of Uranium across the line to our American friends". He explained the company's action by saying that after receiving a letter from Howe dated 5 December 1942 he was "of the opinion that it was good policy to accept all contracts that came our way for the refining of ore, in order to give our industry revenue and at the same time protect our company against other interests which were anxious to take on job refining for the U.S. Government".

Howe's Most Secret letter of 5 December to LaBine is in his papers.<sup>138</sup> It ran as follows:

Dear Gilbert:

*Re: Uranium Oxide*

I authorized you some days ago to ship the 15 tons of Eldorado oxide to the United States rather than to England. I have now cleared this with the British authorities, and think that you can now continue to ship to the United States rather than to England, until I notify you further.

The British desire to have 3 tons purified by the Mallinckrodt process and returned to Canada by March 1st, 1943, and also wish to make provision that 5 tons of Mallinckrodt material shall be reserved for England, pending the clearing up of the British requirements. It is my understanding that the 5 tons is an outside figure, and that the actual requirement will probably be less.

I assume that the shipments to Canada and to England above mentioned have been cleared by W. A. Akers, representing the [United Kingdom] High Commissioner, and Dr.

[Arthur H.] Compton of Chicago, representing the U.S. user. However, I suggest that you notify your customer in the United States that all Uranium oxide produced by, your Company can be shipped to him, subject to return shipments of Canadian and British requirements above stated.

I trust that this letter will throw some light on the requirements position.

After this it is scarcely possible to blame LaBine for the contracts he made with the United States Army a couple of weeks later; nor can one blame the Americans for embracing the opportunity. (It seems at least possible, incidentally, that they waited to get the contracts of 21 and 22 December signed before they announced the end of collaboration to Mackenzie and Akers on 2 and 13 January respectively.) But we must attempt to discover how it happened that Howe wrote that letter of 5 December to LaBine.

The basis of it, undoubtedly, was a letter from Akers to Howe dated 4 December.<sup>139</sup> This reported on discussions with Dr. Compton and others at Chicago on 30 November concerning raw material requirements for the Montreal group and for Great Britain; a detailed note of these conversations was sent separately. Akers remarked that he understood Howe was being "pressed by the Americans" to release to them 15 tons of Eldorado oxide that was being held for delivery to England. He wrote :

I suggest that you should instruct Eldorado to deliver to the Americans, for purification by the Mallinckrodt process, the whole of the 15 tons on the understanding that the Americans will arrange to meet the Canadian requirement of 3 tons of Mallinckrodt oxide by March 1st, 1943, and also that 5 tons of Mallinckrodt material should be reserved for England pending the clearing up of the raw material with them.

Alters went on to add that when the British heard of the Chicago discussions, which had indicated that "the Americans will be able to meet the Canadian requirements both for oxide and [uranium] metal", they might be able to reduce the requirement for five tons of Mallinckrodt oxide. He said nothing of any further requirements or of the long-term position on supplies.

On 5 December Howe replied to Akers<sup>140</sup> reporting that he was instructing Eldorado in the manner Akers had suggested. He concluded, "I note that it is not dear whether 5 tons are required in England, but that further advice will be received." Rather surprisingly, he did not mention to Akers the authority he had given Eldorado to sell the United States all uranium oxide beyond the eight tons which had been reserved. It must be assumed that Howe had jumped to the conclusion that the small quantities mentioned in Akers' letter represented the total and final British requirements.

Akers probably never suspected that his letter had had such far-reaching results. Snooping politely around Montreal and Ottawa in the summer of 1943, he was astonished that so little accurate information about what had happened was to be had there. (Mr. Howe was probably almost the only person who knew, and he was presumably keeping his own counsel.) In the course of a few weeks, however, Akers thought he understood the situation. The undocumented British official history provides what is presumably a summary of his reports:<sup>141</sup>

Howe, he believed, was an individualist working in an Administration which was at the best of times a very fine-drawn affair, and was consequently trying to do himself far more than anyone could do. Howe had left most Eldorado affairs to LaBine even though many of them had become Government policy matters. Great exhaustion, added to an unreliable memory for facts and figures, had led to Howe's genuine confusion over the contracts. LaBine himself, thought Akers, had been genuinely unaware of the British interest since British activities hitherto had taken the form of borrowing eight tons of ore and showing some reluctance to

pay for it. This suggested that the British were merely conducting research and that when it was finished, the eight tons would probably be returned. . . .\*

However this may be — and people who knew Howe disagree with much of it — one may speculate that there was another element in the situation which Akers apparently did not specifically mention. The whole matter was being kept extremely secret. It is not clear how many people in the Department of Munitions and Supply knew about it, but there were certainly very few; and the Minister was probably hampered by the fact that his usual staff support and advice were not available to him on the uranium question. And it is fair to assume that Gilbert LaBine had only the most general notion of what the materials that his company produced were being used for.

It seems likely that Howe himself, late in 1942, had no technical understanding of what was going on and no real idea of how much material would be required for a serious atomic operation; very few people had. It would seem that there were faults on both sides: the British representatives failing to make their needs fully clear, the overburdened and unbriefed Minister failing to appreciate the situation accurately. Mr. Howe's incautious letter doubtless had the effect of weakening the British and Canadian position *vis-à-vis* the Americans. Dr. Mackenzie however regards the incident as less important than the British made it out to be at the time and since. Howe, he says, had informal assurances from the Americans that the needs of the Anglo-Canadian project would be met; and this in fact happened. This was Howe's way of working, and his power and prestige were such that he could make it good. The United Kingdom had no serious wartime requirements for uranium apart from that of the joint project in Canada.

The Americans had also acquired Canadian material of another kind. In the summer of 1942 they made arrangements with Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Trail, B.C., a very large producer of electrolytic hydrogen, to build a plant to produce "heavy water", one of the moderators which it seemed possible to use in an atomic "pile" which would produce the plutonium required to make bombs. This seems to have been kept secret from the Canadian government until the question of patents arose in August 1942. Since heavy water was the material most required for the Montreal laboratory, consideration then appears to have been given to using the Canadian government's powers to take over the American contract. But this would undoubtedly have led to a serious crisis with the United States, and Howe decided against it. Instead, in November Mackenzie politely asked the Americans to allocate the first year's production of Canadian heavy water from Trail to Montreal.<sup>143</sup> The reply came in January in the somewhat forbidding form already described (above, page 517).<sup>144</sup> But in fact Canada got the heavy water when it was needed.

All told, the international outlook in the early months of 1943 was gloomy. But it has already been made clear that the Canadian authorities were much less disposed than the British to be violently resentful of the American attitude, and it is evident that they had no intention whatever of being drawn into an anti-American front. On 11 May 1943, in London, Dr. Mackenzie made this clear to Sir John Anderson in what was apparently a rather unpleasant interview. When Anderson remarked that in the absence of agreement with the United States the British would have to consider what could be done in Canada without them,

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\*The British history also records that at one point Eldorado's sales agent, in the best private-enterprise manner, asked the British to define their requirements; they "cold-shouldered" him.<sup>142</sup>

Mackenzie's reply was, "If they [the British] broke off with the United States, we would have to close down, as we could get no priorities or any material and our government would certainly not support a team in Canada to compete with the U.S."<sup>145</sup> A few days later, when London heard of the United States contracts with Eldorado, Canada's stock in the Lord President's office must have been very low indeed.

However, a general improvement was coming. In the early summer of 1943 work in Montreal was virtually at a standstill and the morale of the scientists there was at a very low ebb. But in July Bush and Stimson, the Secretary of War, were in London and discussions with Churchill, Anderson and others somewhat cleared the air. About this time the American President decided that there was no alternative to carrying out the personal undertakings on interchange which he had more than once made to Churchill; and on 20 July he wrote Bush accordingly. At the beginning of August, on Roosevelt's invitation, Churchill sent Anderson to North America. In Washington he further developed a draft agreement for renewed collaboration which had been drawn up during the London discussions; and on 8 August he saw Mackenzie King at Ottawa and brought him up to date, telling him the nature of the proposed arrangement. The first Quebec Conference was now about to begin; and at Quebec on 19 August Roosevelt and Churchill signed the agreement.<sup>146</sup>

This Quebec Agreement<sup>147</sup> provided for full interchange of "information and ideas" in "the field of scientific research and development". In "the field of design, construction and operation of large-scale plants" the matter was left much vaguer. The two countries agreed never to use "this agency" against each other, not to use it against third parties without each other's consent, and to communicate no information about Tube Alloys to third parties except by mutual consent. Britain, to allay American suspicions, agreed that "any post-war advantages of an industrial or commercial character" should be dealt with between the two countries "on terms to be specified by the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of Great Britain". Finally, it was agreed that to ensure effective collaboration a Combined Policy Committee of six members would be set up in Washington. The members would be the U.S. Secretary of War, Bush and Conant; Sir John Dill and Colonel J. J. Llewellyn, since December 1942 British Resident Minister for Supply in Washington; and Mr. C. D. Howe. The functions of the Policy Committee, subject to the control of "the respective Governments", were thus defined:

“(1) To agree from time to time upon the programme of work to be carried out in the two countries.

“(2) To keep all sections of the project under constant review.

“(3) To allocate materials, apparatus and plant, in limited supply, in accordance with the requirements of the programme agreed by the Committee.

“(4) To settle any questions which may arise on the interpretation or application of this Agreement.”

Canada's relationship to the Agreement and the Committee should be examined. The Canadian government was no more a party to the Agreement than it was to the Quebec Conference. Although it had some knowledge of what was going on, it was not really consulted about the terms of the Agreement; however, the Prime Minister, as we have seen, was told of it by Sir John Anderson just before the Conference — an act of courtesy which contrasted with the treatment of Canada on some other occasions (above, pages 162-3, 187). Moreover, Churchill discussed the matter with King at Quebec on 10 August and secured his concur-

rence in the association of Canada with the matter.<sup>148</sup> And although Canada did not sign the Agreement, she was given a seat on the Committee. She was clearly not there as an independent entity; the Americans would certainly never have agreed to being in a minority on the Committee. In effect, what seems to have happened, as in the case of some sub-committees of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (above, page 167) was that the British government chose to give one of its seats to Canada. So Canada had, so to speak, a foot in the door; and that was a great deal better than being entirely outside.

Before the Quebec Conference met the situation concerning uranium supply had somewhat eased. In mid-July C. D. Howe left Ottawa for a holiday without seeing Malcolm MacDonald, who had wished to discuss the matter with him. MacDonald was apparently dissuaded from telephoning him.<sup>149</sup> Instead, he wrote to Howe on 17 July.<sup>150</sup>

I was sorry that we did not manage to meet, as we had hoped, before you left for your holiday. But I quite understand that your preoccupation with many urgent matters made that impossible. . . .

I have had a talk with Mackenzie about his meeting with Groves in New York,\* and he is working to get us the Oxide we want for the most economical programme we can arrange for Montreal. I believe that he may be able to get enough for our requirements up to September 1944, though the prospect is very doubtful after that. However, that matter can wait until we meet. But it is now clear that our requirements and those of the Americans together will far exceed the total output of Eldorado and there are signs that our American friends are therefore seeking to take action about other properties in the region.

I am assuming that LaBine and any others concerned, apart from Mackenzie, have been instructed to avoid negotiations of any sort with the Americans until you are back to take general charge of them. . . .

P.S. I had meant to send you this straight away, but find there is no means of getting it to you without invoking special arrangements. So I am asking that it be kept for you on your return.

MacDonald's displeasure and dismay are obvious in this letter. Howe replied ten days later:<sup>152</sup>

. . . General Groves was in Ottawa last Monday, and I think that the situation up to September 1944 is satisfactory. Beyond that date, if all goes well there will be a shortage unless the Belgian Congo is opened up. It seems to me that this source of supply must be brought in without delay.

I am meeting LaBine tomorrow morning, and will put in hand further extensions to the refinery and an active campaign of exploration at Great Bear Lake. My understanding with Groves is that in future all dealings for the product will be Government to Government, which will give us control of the situation as far as Canada is concerned. . . .

The following day Howe wrote formally to LaBine:<sup>153</sup>

This will advise you that the Government of Canada is taking delivery of all uranium ore produced in this country, for resale to governments requiring this product. From this date your Company is instructed to make deliveries solely on orders from Dean C. J. Mackenzie, President of National Research Council, who is my agent in dealing with this product.

Please notify your agent in the United States that no further shipments will be made to his account or an account of contracts between your company and its customers except as directed by Dean Mackenzie.

Howe went on to ask LaBine to "do everything possible to expand your mining operations, advance exploration for new ore bodies, and improve the production of your refinery." He concluded, "It is important for the prosecution of the war that

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\*This was on 6 July. Mackenzie explained Howe's embarrassing position and sought Groves' cooperation.<sup>151</sup>

Canada shall make a maximum contribution in producing and refining uranium ore."

Although it might be said that this letter amounted to abrogation of the U.S. contracts, it should be read in conjunction with the fact that Mackenzie had assured Groves, when he saw him in New York on 6 July, that there was no intention of interfering with the contracts.<sup>154</sup> Nor, it seems evident, had the U.S. Army agreed to any diminution of them. But at any rate the atmosphere had improved, and it was to improve further as a result of the Quebec Agreement.

On the same day on which he wrote LaBine (28 July), Howe wrote the Minister of Mines and Resources (Mr. Crerar), calling attention to the undesirability of private prospecting for uranium in the area of the Eldorado mine, and strongly recommending that the area "be withdrawn from prospecting and exploration, and that no further leases be granted". An order in council was subsequently made reserving to the Dominion government any radium-bearing deposits found in the Northwest Territories.<sup>155</sup> Shortly the government further strengthened its control of Eldorado Mining and Refining Limited. Late in January 1944 the company's outstanding shares were expropriated and Eldorado became a Crown company. Since a good many individuals were obliged to give up their shares at a price fixed by the government, it was considered necessary to make a public statement on the matter. Mr. Howe made it in the House of Commons on 28 January, at the beginning of the new session; he tabled an order in council approved the previous day<sup>156</sup> which was effective at 3 p.m. on the 28th. He explained that the president, directors and officers of Eldorado had been invited to continue to act as such and had agreed to do so. He added,

I regret that for reasons of secrecy I am unable to give the house any further information on this subject. In the interests of military secrecy I hope that no questions about this matter will be asked until the necessity for withholding information no longer applies.

The price fixed for the expropriation was \$1.35 per share, ten cents more than that offered in 1942 (above, page 516). Those who had already sold their shares to the government were compensated for the difference. The market price of Eldorado shares had fluctuated widely during the past year — between 80 cents and \$1.62<sup>157</sup> — and Howe reported that the directors had agreed with the government that \$1.35 was a fair price. The stock closed on the Toronto market on the day of the announcement — which was made after the exchange closed — at \$1.31.<sup>158</sup>

Mr. Howe's files contain a good many letters from angry shareholders who did not relish having to sell their holdings at a price fixed by the government. The episode also led to a small passage at arms between him and Sir John Anderson, who presumably had not forgotten the incidents in the spring of 1943 (above, pages 518, 521). On 5 February Malcolm MacDonald passed to Howe a message from Anderson:<sup>159</sup>

I am glad to see from Mr. Howe's statement that the Canadian Government have now acquired the Eldorado Mining property. I understand the reasons for which he was obliged to make the statement on the subject in the Canadian House of Commons. I hope that he will be successful in his efforts to avoid any further publicity or discussion of the matter in Parliament in the interests of security. Had he felt able to inform me of this before making the statement I should whilst supporting the action which he proposed, have suggested that before taking the action he should discuss the matter with his colleagues on the Combined Policy Committee. I am afraid that the American authorities, who are very security minded on this subject, may feel apprehensive about the public information which has been given, more so than I do myself. I suggest, therefore, that it would be wise if Mr. Howe took an early opportunity of reporting his action and his reasons for taking it to the Combined Policy

Committee. I understand that there will probably be a meeting of the Committee at an early date. Our United Kingdom representatives will, of course, support him, and I do not anticipate that the Americans would take any other line. But I think it would be a helpful step to report to the Policy Committee.

Howe's letter to MacDonald in reply<sup>160</sup> was at least as stiff as Anderson's. It made by indirection the point that Howe was in touch with the U.S. authorities and considered himself quite capable of doing business with them:

... I will, of course, inform the Combined Policy Committee of the action taken, but having in mind my last discussion in Washington with members of the Combined Policy Committee, I have no doubt of their views. Unfortunately, Sir John Dill was not present when the matter was discussed.

Unfortunately, the time and place of meetings of the Combined Policy Committee are so secret that I have never been able to attend a formal meeting. To date I have no advice of the time and place of the next meeting other than the information given me by Sir John Dill. If you can obtain any information on this subject, I shall be glad if you will advise me so that I can be among those present.

Perhaps you might let your correspondent in Washington know that I would appreciate a formal notice from the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Howe was duly invited to the next meeting of the Committee (held in Washington on 17 February) but his aircraft was held up by weather and he did not succeed in attending.<sup>161</sup> The minutes of the meeting do not appear to be in his papers. His statement in Parliament can hardly have entirely escaped the attention of the enemy, but it was not informative and there is no evidence that it had any effect upon the German atomic effort. That effort was relatively slight and was directed towards power development rather than bombs. Information that became available in the last stages of the German war and later indicated that the Germans knew "practically nothing" of the great development being carried on by the Allies.<sup>162</sup>

It took time to get the Montreal Laboratory properly to work after the Quebec Agreement. The Americans were still troubled about security, and about the participation of Imperial Chemical Industries. Dr. (later Sir) James Chadwick, who was made head of the British team of atomic scientists in North America, worked tactfully to produce a better situation. As a result of his efforts, the meeting of the Combined Policy Committee held on 17 February 1944 set up a sub-committee consisting of Groves, Chadwick and Mackenzie to make recommendations concerning "the joint development of a heavy water pile" for the production of plutonium. This was done in spite of discouragement from Bush and Conant, and in spite of the likelihood that the plant being built at Hanford, Washington, to produce plutonium by the use of graphite as a moderator, could meet the immediate military need. Groves and Chadwick did the actual drafting, the conclusions being largely Chadwick's; Mackenzie concurred in their draft.<sup>163</sup>

On 10 April 1944 Dr. Mackenzie made to Mr. Howe a formal submission of great secrecy and much importance.<sup>164</sup> Part of this consisted of the sub-committee's recommendations, which had better be given here:

- “(a) Make no increase at this time in the present facilities for heavy water.
- “(b) Continue the present programs at Chicago and Montreal for the development of fundamental information on heavy water piles.\*
- “(c) Undertake the design and construction of a heterogeneous heavy water pilot pile in Canada, as a joint American-British-Canadian project.

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\*The Americans were themselves building an experimental heavy-water pile at Argonne near Chicago, and were holding back heavy water for use in it. It was some time before the British and Canadians were allowed to know about these things.

- “(d) When adequate information has been obtained, or when the performance of the pilot plant is known, consider the design, construction, and location of a single heterogeneous heavy water pile of about 50,000 K.W.
- “(e) Review the situation when the performance of the first large scale graphite pile at Hanford becomes known.
- “(f) Set up an organization to supervise the pilot pile project.
- “(g) Strengthen the Montreal Laboratory by the inclusion of American scientists as well as British and Canadian scientists and the appointment of a Director.”

Mackenzie estimated the total capital cost of the project in Canada at \$8,000,000 and the yearly operating cost at \$1,500,000. Assuming that the U.S. Army would supply the raw material and that other expenses would be shared between the United Kingdom and Canada, he suggested the cost to Canada in 1944 and 1945 would be in the order of \$4,500,000. He strongly recommended that Canada should agree to the sub-committee's proposal. Presciently, he drew a picture of the horrors and wonders of the future:

... Since 1941 active research in the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada has been carried out and it is now certain a bomb can and will be made that will be, if not a million times, at least hundreds of times more powerful than anything yet known. It is also certain that power units will be made in the future for aeroplanes, ships and submarines that will drive planes thousands of miles and carry ships across the ocean on a few pounds of fuel.

In 1943, the United Kingdom effort was combined with that of Canada and transferred to Montreal. The American effort has been enormous: expenditures and commitments to date are over two billion dollars.

Time and military urgency demand that every possible avenue be explored. The United States has six separate projects underway — a seventh depending on heavy water . . . could not be started until plants to manufacture heavy water were constructed. These plants, built in America at a cost of perhaps a hundred million dollars, are now coming into production.\*

The present proposal is to build the pilot plant for this important phase of the project in Canada as a joint United States, United Kingdom and Canadian effort. Our ownership of uranium ores, our early interest in the production of heavy water at Trail and the presence of a highly expert group of workers in Canada give us a special interest and facility for this work.

In my opinion Canada has a unique opportunity to become intimately associated in a project which is not only of the greatest immediate military importance, but which may revolutionize the future world in the same degree as did the invention of the steam engine and the discovery of electricity. It is an opportunity Canada as a nation cannot afford to turn down.

The opportunity was not turned down. On the same day, Howe wrote the Clerk of the Privy Council:<sup>166</sup>

At the next meeting of the War Cabinet [*sic*], I wish to place before the Committee three memoranda† prepared by Dr. C. J. Mackenzie on the very secret Radiological project about which the Committee has some knowledge.

The documents deal with a subject that is perhaps the top. secret of the war and therefore I cannot submit them to be circulated.

I am asked to attend a meeting of the Combined Policy Committee having the direction of this project, of which Committee I am a member, on Thursday next. [13 April] in Washington. It will be necessary for me to have the decision of the War Cabinet before I can deal with the matter that will be discussed in Washington. . . .

On the afternoon of 12 April 1944, accordingly, the Cabinet War Committee considered the matter. The exiguous record of the item under the heading "Special

\*There were three plants in the United States in addition to the one at Trail.<sup>165</sup>

†Memorandum No. 1 dealt with the general aspects of the matter and has just been quoted at length; No. 2 gave details of the sub-committee's recommendations; No. 3 contained estimates of cost and Mackenzie's recommendation.

radiological project", shows that the Committee approved an expenditure up to \$4,000,000 capital and \$750,000 operating expenses. With the track thus cleared, Mr. Howe left for Washington. The meeting of the Combined Policy Committee on 13 April went smoothly.<sup>167</sup> General Groves presented the sub-committee's report. Mr. Howe told the committee that Canada was prepared to accept the recommendation and — going somewhat further than Dr. Mackenzie had ventured — said she was "willing to accept the cost of the development now planned". Sir John Dill, on behalf of the United Kingdom, expressed relief that the services of the team of scientists in Montreal could now be fully utilized. Particularly significant were the remarks of General Groves:<sup>168</sup>

Major-General Groves stated that he foresaw no difficulties with regard to American priorities required by the proposed work in Canada. He also explained that whatever information from American sources was required for the successful prosecution of the work in Canada would be forthcoming. He thought the group in Canada should be given full support and should operate under the same security restrictions as a similar group working in the U.S.A.

It may be said at once that this undertaking was fully honoured. Without this American support the Chalk River project in Canada would have been impossible. And it was given, to quote a British official historian, in spite of the facts that the project "gave little real advantage to the Americans with their enormous plants in their own country" and that it was "essentially a postwar project and barely within the terms of collaboration agreed at Quebec".<sup>169</sup> The debt to the Americans, and above all to Groves, should be remembered. It is the more important in that the Chalk River plant was to a large extent the foundation of both the British and the Canadian postwar achievements in atomic energy.

In approving the sub-committee's report, the Combined Policy Committee decided that the same group of men — Groves, Chadwick and Mackenzie — should continue to act, on behalf of and under the general supervision of the Committee, to supervise the execution of the new project in Canada. In the light of what has been said, there seems no need, in a book concerned with the history of the Second World War, to relate in detail the history of that project, for it had nothing to do with producing the bombs that were dropped on Japan. (The material for the plutonium bomb dropped on Nagasaki came from Hanford.) We shall limit ourselves to the barest outline.

A vital step, on which both Howe and the Americans had laid great emphasis, was taken immediately after the meeting of 13 April 1944, when an eminent scientist of British nationality was placed in charge of the Montreal Laboratory and the pilot pile project. Mackenzie and Howe had long felt that a better administrator was needed. The choice was Professor (later Sir) John Cockcroft. Dr. E. W. R. Steacie of the National Research Council of Canada was made his Deputy. The prospect of important work revived the morale of the Montreal scientists. The group, moreover, was reinforced, from Canada,\* from the United Kingdom and from New Zealand. By August 1945, when after the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan Canada's part in the atomic energy development was announced in government press releases, the Montreal Laboratory had "grown to a staff of over 340, by far the largest organization ever created in this country to carry out a single research project".<sup>171</sup>

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\*George Laurence, the pioneer atomic scientist from the National Research Council, had been with it from the earliest Montreal days, as had Dr. George Volkoff of the University of British Columbia. In addition to the work done at Montreal, associated groups worked at the University of Toronto under Professors F. E. Beamish and L. M. Pidgeon; at McMaster University under Professor H. G. Thode; and at the Fuel and Ore Laboratory of the Department of Mines and Resources, under Dr. G. S. Farnham.<sup>170</sup>

On 12 July 1944 the site for the atomic pile was chosen, at Chalk River above Pembroke on the Ottawa; the townsite for the project was fixed at Indian Point (renamed Deep River) some distance away. The engineering designing was entrusted to Defence Industries Limited, a subsidiary of Canadian Industries Limited. Work on the site began late in August 1944.<sup>172</sup>

From the beginning progress was slower than had been hoped for. Chadwick and Cockcroft in the spring of 1944 had thought, very optimistically, that the pilot pile would be in operation by the end of the year.<sup>173</sup> In fact the main pile, known as NRX, did not "go critical" until 22 July 1947; while a much smaller "low energy pile" (ZEEP), which it had been decided to build as a useful preliminary, came into operation only on 5 September 1945.<sup>174</sup> Japan had formally surrendered three days before. ZEEP was the first nuclear reactor to operate outside the United States. Both reactors performed admirably; and as we have already said the Chalk River establishment launched both Britain and Canada successfully into the atomic age. Few Canadians are likely to regret that it was too late to contribute to the bombs that went down on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX "A"

#### PERSONS HOLDING PRINCIPAL APPOINTMENTS — DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE AND THE MILITARY FORCES OF CANADA 1939 — 1945

The list of appointments for the Canadian Forces overseas ends with the cessation of hostilities against Germany; that of appointments in North America continues until the signing of the surrender with Japan.

Individuals are shown with rank and decorations as of the day on which they relinquished the appointment concerned. Names of officers who held acting appointments or were detailed temporarily to command are not shown unless they were subsequently confirmed in the appointment. No distinction is made between acting and confirmed rank.

#### APPOINTMENTS IN NORTH AMERICA (to 2 Sep. 45)

<i>Minister of National Defence</i>	
Hon. Ian A. Mackenzie .....	23 Oct. 35 — 19 Sep. 39
Hon. Norman McL. Rogers.....	19 Sep. 39 — 10 Jun. 40
Col. the Hon. J. L. Ralston, C.M.G., D.S.O., E.D.....	5 Jul. 40 — 2 Nov. 44
Gen. the Hon. A. G. L. McNaughton, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O. ....	2 Nov. 44 — 21 Aug. 45
Hon. D. C. Abbott* .....	21 Aug. 45 — 12 Dec. 46
<i>Minister of National Defence for Naval Services</i>	
Hon. Angus L. Macdonald.....	12 Jul. 40 — 27 NOV. 44
Hon. D. C. Abbott* .....	18 Apr. 45 — 12 Dec. 46
<i>Minister of National Defence for Air</i>	
Hon. C. G. Power, M.C.*.....	23 May 40 — 27 Nov. 44
Col. the Hon. C. W. G. Gibson, M.C., V.D.....	18 Mar. 45 — 12 Dec. 46
<i>Associate Minister of National Defence</i>	
Hon. C. G. Power, M.C.*.....	12 Jul. 40 — 27 Nov. 44
<i>Deputy Minister†</i>	
Maj.-Gen. L. R. La Flèche, D.S.O. ....	3 Nov. 32 — 16 Oct. 40
<i>Deputy Minister (Navy and Air)</i>	
Lt.-Col. K. S. Maclachlan .....	8 Sep. 39 — 10 Apr. 40
<i>Deputy Minister (Navy)</i>	
Lt.-Col. K. S. Maclachlan .....	10 Apr. 40 — 3 Nov. 41
Mr. W. G. Mills, C.M.G. ....	4 Nov. 41 — 12 Mar. 47
<i>Deputy Minister (Army)</i>	
Lt.-Col. H. S. DesRosiers, D.S.O., V.D.....	8 Sep. 39 — 31 Aug. 42
Lt.-Col. G. S. Currie, D.S.O., M.C.....	1 Sep. 42 — 30 Sep. 44
Mr. A. Ross, C.M.G.....	22 Apr. 44 — 12 Mar. 47

\*Dual Appointment.

†When war was declared the Department of National Defence had a single Deputy Minister — Major General La Flèche. Although not actively employed (sick leave) as such from 8 September 1939 he continued to hold the appointment until 16 October 1940. With the growth of the armed forces during the war the Deputy Minister's appointment was gradually expanded until at war's end there was a separate Deputy Minister for both Navy and Air and two Deputy Ministers charged with army commitments.

*Deputy Minister (Air)*

Mr . J . S . Duncan .....	11 Apr . 40 — 2 Feb . 41
Mr . S . L . DeCarteret, C.M.G. ....	3 Feb . 41 — 21 Apr . 44
Mr . H . F . Gordon, C.M.G. ....	15 Jan . 44 — 12 Mar . 47

## NAVY

*Chief of the Naval Staff*

Vice Admiral P . W . Nelles, C.B. ....	8 Sep . 34 — 14 Jan . 44
Vice Admiral G . C . Jones, C.B. ....	15 Jan . 44 — 8 Feb . 46

*Naval Member, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington*

Rear Admiral V . G . Brodeur, C.B.E. ....	4 Aug . 42 — 9 Aug . 43
Capt . V . S . Godfrey.....	10 Aug . 43 — 30 Nov . 43
Rear Admiral H . E . Reid, C.B. ....	1 Dec . 43 — 14 Mar . 46

*Naval Attaché, Washington*

Rear Admiral V . G . Brodeur .....	4 Sep . 40 — 3 Aug . 42
Cmdr . H . G . Nares .....	4 Aug . 42 — 31 Jan . 43
Capt . E . C . Sherwood.....	1 Feb . 43 — 10 Jun . 45
Cmdr . J . D . Pemberton.....	11 Jun . 45 — 1 May 48

## ARMY

*Chief of the General Staff*

Maj.-Gen. T . V . Anderson, D.S.O. ....	21 Nov . 38 — 21 Jul . 40
Lt.-Gen. H . D . G . Crerar, D.S.O. ....	22 Jul 40 — 23 Dec . 41
Lt.-Gen. K . Stuart, C.B., D.S.O., M.C. ....	24 Dec . 41 — 26 Dec . 43
Lt.-Gen. J . C . Murchie, C.B., C.B.E. ....	3 May 44 — 20 Aug . 45
Lt.-Gen. C . Foulkes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D. ....	21 Aug . 45 — 31 Jan . 51

*Representative of War Committee of Cabinet in Washington*

Maj.-Gen. M . A . Pope, M.C. ....	15 Feb . 42 — 7 Jun . 42
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*Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington*

Maj.-Gen. M . A . Pope, C.B., M.C. ....	8 Jun . 42 — 30 Sep . 44
Maj.-Gen. H . F . G . Letson, C.B.E., M.C., E.D. ....	1 Oct . 44 — 19 Mar . 46

*Military Attaché, Washington*

Brig . H . F . G . Letson, M.C., E.D. ....	19 Aug . 40 — 1 Feb . 42
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## AIR FORCE

*Chief of the Air Staff*

Air Vice Marshal G . M . Croil, A.F.C. ....	15 Dec . 38 — 28 May 40
Air Marshal L . S . Breadner, C.B., D.S.C. ....	29 May 40 — 31 Dec . 43
Air Marshal R . Leckie, C.B., D.S.O., D.S.C., D.F.C. ....	1 Jan: 44 — 31 Aug . 47

*Air Member, Canadian Joint Staff, Washington*

Air Vice Marshal G . V . Walsh, C.B.E. ....	3 Jul . 42 — 7 Aug . 45
Air Vice Marshal G . E . Wait, C.B.E. ....	8 Aug . 45 — 29 Mar . 47

*Air Attaché Washington*

Air Commodore W . R . Kenny, D.F.C. ....	18 Jan . 40 — 3 Nov . 41
Air Vice Marshal G . V . Walsh, M.B.E. ....	4 Nov . 41 — 2 Jul . 42

## APPOINTMENTS OVERSEAS

(to 8 May 45)

## NAVY

*Senior Canadian Flag Officer and Head Canadian Naval Mission Overseas*

Vice Admiral P . W . Nelles, C.B. ....	15 May 44 — 6 Jan . 45
Capt . F . L . Houghton, C.B.E. ....	7 Jan . 45 — 31 Aug . 45

<i>Commodore Commanding Canadian Ships and Establishments in United Kingdom Waters*</i>	
Cmdr. 1st cl. L. W. Murray .....	12 Feb 41 — 27 May 41
<i>Captain Commanding Canadian Ships and Establishments in United Kingdom Waters*</i>	
Capt. C. R. H. Taylor .....	28 May 41 — 31 Jan . 42
Capt. I. R. Agnew .....	1 Feb . 42 — 19 Apr . 43
Cmdr. F. A. Price .....	20 Apr . 43 — 14 Jun . 43
<i>Senior Canadian Naval Officer (London)*</i>	
Cmdr. F. A. Price .....	15 Jun . 43 — 29 Oct . 43
Capt. F. L. Houghton, C.B.E. ....	30 Oct . 43 — 6 Jan . 45
ARMY	
<i>Senior Combatant Officer, Canadian Military Headquarters, London</i>	
Maj.-Gen. H. D. G. Crerar, D.S.O.† .....	17 Oct . 39 — 5 Jul . 40
Maj.-Gen. the Hon. P. J. Montague, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., V.D. ....	6 Jul . 40 — 26 Dec . 43
<i>Chief of Staff, Canadian Military Headquarters, London</i>	
Lt.-Gen. K. Stuart, C.B., D.S.O., M.C. ....	27 Dec . 43 — 11 Nov . 44
Lt.-Gen. the Hon. P. J. Montague, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., V.D. ....	22 Nov . 44 — 17 Sep . 45
<i>Major-General in Charge of Administration, Canadian Military Headquarters, London</i>	
Maj.-Gen. the Hon. P. J. Montague, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., M.C., V.D. ....	27 Dec . 43 — 21 Nov . 44
Maj.-Gen. E. G. Weeks, C.B.E., M.C., M.M. ....	30 Nov . 44 — 15 Oct . 45
<i>Military Attaché Paris, France</i>	
Maj.-Gen. L. R. La Flèche, D.S.O. ....	18 Jan . 40 — 17 Oct . 40
AIR FORCE	
<i>R.C.A.F. Liaison Officer (United Kingdom)</i>	
Wing Commander F. V. Heakes .....	15 Jul . 37 — 31 Dec . 39
<i>Officer Commanding, R.C.A.F. in Great Britain</i>	
Wing Commander F. V. Heakes .....	1 Jan . 40 — 6 Mar . 40
G/C. G. V. Walsh, M.B.E. ....	7 Mar . 40 — 3 Jun . 40
<i>Air Officer Commanding, R.C.A.F. in Great Britain</i>	
Air Commodore G. V. Walsh, M.B.E. ....	4 Jun . 40 — 15 Oct . 40
Air Vice Marshal L. F. Stevenson .....	16 Oct . 40 — 6 Nov . 41
<i>Air Officer in Chief, R.C.A.F. Overseas</i>	
Air Vice Marshal L. F. Stevenson .....	7 Nov . 41 — 23 Nov . 41
Air Marshal H. Edwards .....	24 Nov . 41 — 15 Jul . 42
<i>Air Officer Commanding in Chief, R.C.A.F. Overseas</i>	
Air Marshal H. Edwards, C.B. ....	16 Jul . 42 — 4 Feb . 43
<i>Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Headquarters, Royal Canadian Air Force Overseas</i>	
Air Marshal H. Edwards, C.B. ....	5 Feb . 43 — 31 Dec . 43
Air Marshal L. S. Breadner, C.B., D.S.C. ....	1 Jan . 44 — 31 Mar . 45
Air Marshal G. O. Johnson, C.B., M.C. ....	1 Apr . 45 — 22 Jul . 46

\*Appointment redesignated. Commencing with the rank of Commodore. it was reduced to the rank of Captain and finally became Senior Canadian Naval Officer (London).

†Gen. Crerar was first appointed to Canadian Military Headquarters as "Brigadier. General Staff".

## APPENDIX "B"

## CANADIAN GOVERNMENT WAR EXPENDITURE, 1939-1950

Statistics used here are taken from the annual *Reports of the Auditor General*, and *Public Accounts* for the fiscal years ending 31 March 1940 to 31 March 1950. War expenditure did not stop when the fighting ceased and there was a considerable expenditure for demobilization and the reconversion of government departments and agencies; this continued until the end of the fiscal year 1949-1950. The following *Table 1* shows war, other, and total Canadian Government expenditure for each of these fiscal years, as well as the total expenditures for the whole period.

TABLE 1

Fiscal Year	Expenditure		Total
	War	Other	
1939-1940	\$ 118,291,021.64	\$ 562,502,770.66	\$ 680,793,792.30
1940-1941	752,045,326.06	497,556,120.38	1,249,601,446.44
1941-1942	1,339,674,152.42	545,391,902.79	1,885,066,055.21
1942-1943	3,724,248,890.27	662,875,227.32	4,387,124,117.59
1943-1944	4,587,023,093.85	735,230,411.42	5,322,253,505.27
1944-1945	4,418,446,315.21	827,165,608.79	5,245,611,924.00
1945-1946	4,002,949,197.25	1,133,279,308.57	5,136,228,505.82
1946-1947	1,314,798,107.16	1,319,429,305.22	2,634,227,412.38
1947-1948	634,421,025.59	1,561,205,428.30	2,195,626,453.89
1948-1949	425,573,782.37	1,750,318,551.86	2,175,892,334.23
1949-1950	468,606,607.30	1,980,009,054.77	2,448,615,662.07
TOTAL	21,786,077,519.12	11,574,963,690.08	33,361,041,209.20

The Second World War, however, will cost Canadian taxpayers much more than the \$21,786, - 077,519.12 shown above. Even for the fiscal year 1949-1950, a further \$50,872,629.53 was paid as pensions to disabled veterans and widows of ex-servicemen. The cost of pensions has since increased and will continue to do so, because of the need to offset declining purchasing power of the dollar and the fact that many disabilities will progress as veterans grow older. The cost of hospitalizing veterans will also become an increasing charge. Pensions and hospitalization for veterans will continue well into the 21st Century, at an unpredictable cost. Nor is there any way of estimating what may be the total cost of retiring that portion of Canada's national debt incurred for the Second World War.

The Tables on the following pages are self-explanatory. The figures used in every case, however, are correct only to the nearest dollar and therefore it is impossible to add them either vertically or horizontally and get the totals shown in *Table 1*.

## APPENDIX "B"

## CANADIAN GOVERNMENT WAR EXPENDITURE

TABLE 2 — EXPENDITURE BY DEPARTMENTS, 1939-1946

Department	1939-1940	1940-1941	1941-1942	1942-1943	1943-1944	1944-1945	1945-1946	TOTAL
	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$
Agriculture .....	1,375,559	4,490,354	27,387,361	19,980,219	64,292,781	88,053,717	82,977,794	288,557,785
Canadian Mutual Air Board.....					912,603,220	853,544,473	801,380,053	2,567,527,746
Civil Service Commission.....	5,788	108,907	235,734	446,138	496,333	526,845	639,534	2,459,279
External Affairs.....	76,107	319,924	384,224	453,961	639,809	295,798	383,050	2,552,879
Finance .....	571,475	1,692,395	16,725,076	1,084,662,777	128,460,804	176,519,342	144,271,387	1,552,903,256
Fisheries.....		174,312	106,097	176,579	234,293	407,300	254,307	1,352,888
Labour .....	55,117	1,896,555	6,554,332	16,826,564	19,638,438	19,664,332	22,859,120	87,494,458
Mines and Resources.....	18,400	292,331	759,066	6,277,292	9,404,869	5,813,737	3,475,267	26,040,962*
Munitions and Supply .....		79,953,682	252,691,124	679,132,236	687,761,095	215,844,257		1,915,382,394
National Defence.....	112,352,437	647,676,557	1,011,185,616	1,865,207,486	2,629,026,619	2,938,309,630	2,140,667,021	11,344,425,366
National Health and Welfare.....						1,340,439	11,237,537	12,577,976
National War Services.....		2,369,859	3,218,232	8,645,038	15,186,971	25,981,838	14,244,840	69,646,778
Pensions and National Health .....	899,887	3,370,018	5,612,992	14,320,276	17,952,084			42,155,257
Post office.....	69,527	233,224	492,460	209,615	280,530	1,300,043	184,770	2,770,169
Public Works .....	829,298	4,917,102	4,496,944	6,880,479	6,466,696	6,500,142	6,204,871	36,295,532
Reconstruction and Supply .....						2,931,924	278,807,476	281,739,400
Royal Canadian Mounted Police.....	1,401,376	2,385,409	3,001,370	3,869,508	4,267,290	3,708,927	4,775,388	23,409,268
Trade and Commerce .....	124,165	439,790	1,204,806	9,455,020	12,182,958	7,419,316	144,623,886	175,449,941
Transport .....	313,012	1,214,649	3,580,427	5,761,680	76,541,186	35,094,425	15,012,846	137,518,225
Veterans Affairs .....						32,758,551	328,359,040	361,117,591
Other†.....	198,872	510,259	2,038,292	1,944,017	1,587,118	2,187,558	2,591,011	11,300,848
TOTAL.....	118,291,020	752,045,327	1,339,674,153	3,724,248,891	4,587,023,094	4,418,446,315	4,002,949,315	18,942,677,998

\*Reorganized as Mines and Surveys.

†Includes Auditor General's Office, Justice, Legislation, National Harbours Board, National Revenue, Prime Minister's Office, Privy Council Office, Secretary of State, and Soldier Settlement of Canada.

## APPENDIX "B"

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE WAR EXPENDITURE  
BY SERVICE

TABLE 3

	1939-1940	1940-1941	1941-1942	1942-1943	1943-1944	1944-1945	1945-1946	TOTAL
	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$
ARMY:								
Pay and Allowances .....	37,260,278	150,253,710	238,027,309	366,496,403	495,142,584	509,642,531	497,787,701	2,294,610,516
Mechanical Transport (and operating costs) .....	1,633,550	53,251,318	81,199,552	223,971,832	173,167,487	108,439,409	89,677,361	731,340,509
Food; medical and dental Stores; clothing, etc. ....	10,773,165	87,160,730	84,867,405	143,728,381	121,511,599	80,428,142	77,282,235	605,751,657
Armament and ammunition .....	1,987,016	6,369,602	21,138,208	100,100,749	73,431,442	46,952,880	39,150,928	289,130,825
Construction and maintenance .....	8,657,013	49,686,441	37,389,635	84,197,916	65,714,018	34,256,453	40,808,754	320,710,230
Transportation .....	2,752,855	13,468,247	26,839,583	48,542,516	65,188,976	51,620,402	62,917,541	271,330,120
Signal stores .....	151,119	1,076,453	3,357,771	19,050,689	24,778,584	11,118,695	8,725,816	68,259,127
Other expenditure* .....	4,977,598	21,968,089	18,349,785	51,701,920	309,870,108	419,296,374	133,227,877	959,369,473
Army total .....	68,192,594	383,234,590	511,169,248	1,037,790,406	1,328,804,798	1,261,754,886	949,578,213	5,540,532,457
NAVY:								
Pay and administration .....	3,951,557	15,633,337	33,181,524	62,362,780	100,215,611	130,133,928	103,596,444	449,075,181
Shore establishment .....	482,322	1,204,975	7,594,100	32,485,299	36,006,811	27,578,478	26,175,724	131,527,709
Ships .....	2,608,989	53,159,338	56,672,685	59,118,795	136,595,329	97,149,289	26,475,700	431,780,125
Stores and equipment .....	2,908,432	15,628,848	25,381,242	53,738,875	94,119,733	158,561,460	74,008,701	424,347,291
Other expenditure .....	1,390,159	2,536,014	6,538,081	2,468,964	2,618,529	3,675,728	11,502,453	30,729,928
Navy total .....	11,341,459	88,162,512	129,367,632	210,182,445	369,556,013	417,098,883	241,759,022	1,467,460,234
AIR:								
Administration .....			113,079	121,674	123,588	102,744	96,784	557,869
R.C.A.F. in Canada .....	28,561,303	49,415,466	109,820,472	226,550,150	312,760,999	227,941,625	327,157,081	1,282,207,096
R.C.A.F. Overseas .....		5,362,067	13,332,629	23,665,980	383,888,079	759,069,687	197,075,931	1,382,394,373
B.C.A.T.P. ....	4,257,081	121,501,922	247,382,556	366,896,831	233,893,142	272,341,805	425,000,000†	1,671,273,337
Air total .....	32,818,384	176,279,455	370,648,736	617,234,635	930,665,808	1,259,455,861	949,329,796	4,336,432,675
GRAND TOTAL‡ .....	112,352,437	647,676,557	1,011,185,616	1,865,207,486	2,629,026,619	2,938,309,630	2,140,667,021	11,344,425,366

\*Mostly advance payments to United Kingdom and United States of America.

†Write down of Active Assets — The United Kingdom Financial Agreement Act, c. 12, 1946.

‡Expenditures not attributable to the war effort are not included, e.g. Minister's salary.

## APPENDIX "B"

CANADIAN GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE  
FOR DEMOBILIZATION AND RECONVERSION. 1946-1950

TABLE 4

Department	1946-1947	1947-1948	1948-1949	1949-1950	TOTAL
	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$
Agriculture.....	71,115,802	33,232,578	23,177,773	22,211,493	149,737,646
Civil Service Commission.....	802,557	606,739	593,342		2,002,638
External Affairs.....	837,366	22,399,823	5,838,602	6,959,021	36,034,812
Finance.....	136,875,083	59,200,021	30,688,849	3,059,041	229,822,994
Labour.....	32,653,553	11,391,600	5,238,829	3,570,488	52,854,470
Mines and Resources.....	2,497,956	1,812,374	988,854	1,354,816*	6,654,000
National Defence:					
General Services.....		2,548,886	2,171,560	2,459,561	7,180,007
Army Services.....	219,124,481	84,825,490	101,873,597	135,806,901	541,630,469
Naval Services.....	64,873,122	43,727,795	44,661,323	73,401,432	226,663,671
Air Services.....	99,271,090	58,257,956	90,208,361	136,381,998	384,119,405
Defence Research.....	4,089,868	6,024,020	16,032,519	22,388,829	48,535,236
National Health and Welfare.....	9,673,738	1,102,674	30,930		10,807,342
Public Works.....	3,650,790	1,241,891			4,892,681
Reconstruction and Supply.....	147,140,105	62,333,441	1,377,436	355,689†	211,206,671
R.C.M.P. ....	1,895,780	1,626,760			3,522,540
Trade and Commerce.....	681,998	126,012	13,804,403	6,473,148	21,085,561
Transport.....	9,722,761	6,387,081	1,637,253	1,260,439	19,007,534
Veterans Affairs.....	508,438,547	237,368,139	87,250,153	52,881,721	885,938,560
Other‡.....	1,453,509	207,747		42,030	1,703,286
TOTAL.....	1,314,798,106	634,421,027	425,573,783	468,606,607	2,843,399,523

\*Now Mines and Technical Surveys .

†Now Resources and Development .

‡Includes Auditor General's Office, Canadian Mutual Air Board, Fisheries, Justice, National Revenue, National War Services, Post Office, and Privy Council Office.

**APPENDIX "B"****CANADIAN GOVERNMENT WAR EXPENDITURE  
SECOND WORLD WAR PENSION STATISTICS, 1941-1966****TABLE 5**

Year ended March 31	Disability		Dependent		Total	
	Pensions In Force	Annual Liability	Pensions In Force	Annual Liability	Pensions In Force	Annual Liability
		\$		\$		\$
1941	316	76,268	314	258,304	630	334,572
1942	1,288	408,202	910	689,892	2,198	1,098,094
1943	3,917	1,362,110	2,748	1,949,128	6,665	3,311,238
1944	7,231	2,693,855	5,332	3,794,258	12,563	6,488,113
1945	15,506	5,382,842	11,418	8,333,406	26,924	13,716,248
1946	36,454	11,402,255	16,839	11,982,717	53,293	23,384,972
1947	70,633	20,676,689	17,600	12,027,726	88,233	32,704,415
1948	86,309	25,316,487	17,654	11,564,311	102,963	36,880,798
1949	90,838	34,325,935	17,693	13,129,054	108,531	47,454,989
1950	94,117	36,609,101	17,989	12,969,823	112,106	49,578,924
1951	95,650	38,004,147	17,868	12,718,498	113,518	50,722,645
1952	96,363	50,607,754	17,797	15,847,098	114,160	66,454,852
1953	97,427	51,638,491	17,915	16,764,567	115,342	68,403,058
1954	98,761	52,982,563	18,108	16,814,712	116,869	69,797,275
1955	100,256	54,341,994	18,250	16,860,819	118,506	71,202,813
1956	101,723	55,697,788	18,317	17,143,924	120,040	72,841,712
1957	102,514	56,619,776	18,199	17,219,087	120,713	73,838,863
1958	103,082	66,403,510	17,982	19,712,382	121,064	86,115,892
1959	104,083	67,570,135	17,925	19,687,627	122,008	87,257,762
1960	104,911	68,546,893	17,546	19,336,214	122,457	87,883,107
1961	105,338	81,852,215	17,301	22,085,056	122,639	103,937,271
1962	105,951	84,760,258	17,088	23,052,834	123,039	107,813,092
1963	106,437	85,108,329	16,805	22,948,310	123,242	108,056,639
1964	106,628	85,185,789	16,581	22,690,962	123,209	107,876,751
1965	106,619	94,043,416	16,236	24,345,192	122,855	118,388,608
1966	106,191	93,727,190	15,886	24,198,376	122,077	117,925,566
					<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,613,468,269</b>

## APPENDIX "C"

TELEGRAM FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT  
ON WAR MEASURES, 6 SEP 1939

## TELEGRAM

From THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS  
To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

*Immediate . . . . .* London, September 6th, 1939

No. 59. Secret. Following for your Prime Minister, Begins:

I am very grateful for your message and for information as to the defence and precautionary measures which the Canadian Government are taking or considering.

2. We realize that, as regards military activities, the immediate task of the Canadian Government will be the defence of Canada. As regards concerted measures, we are most grateful for your offer of assistance, so far as is necessary and possible, in the western Atlantic region. Participation in protection of Newfoundland will be of special value in view of the importance of the Bell Island iron ore mines.

3. As regards further military cooperation, our appreciation of the probable theatre of war and the character of main British and Allied military operations will be communicated separately as soon as possible.

4. Generally, so far as immediate steps are concerned, provision of naval vessels and facilities and of air force personnel would be of most assistance, and in particular at present time supply of any pilots and aircraft crews available is a capital requirement. As regards land forces, policy here is to avoid a rush of volunteers such as occurred in the last war and to expand by means of a controlled intake. The chief requirement is for certain technical personnel.

5. As regards supplies, there will undoubtedly be large requirements of Canadian dollars. According to Canadian balance of payments figures, Canada had an "active" balance with United Kingdom of about 175 million dollars a year over the years 1935 to 1937. United Kingdom purchases of some commodities obtained during those years in Canada will necessarily be curtailed, but purchases of other essential commodities are likely to be largely increased if necessary finances can be found.

6. It follows that the net balance of payments in favour of Canada may be substantially higher in war than in peace-time. For instance, if dollars are available for food defence department would like to increase our normal food imports from Canada by a very large amount, perhaps 100 million dollars, Ministry of Supply wish to purchase large supplies of various raw materials, in particular, copper, aluminium, nickel, and perhaps timber. Moreover, Air Ministry in addition to their outstanding commitments, would like to place very substantial further orders for aircraft and accessories. (The technical mission which as you know is now on its way to Canada has full particulars.) All of these supplies are needed for the efficient prosecution of the war and the feeding of the civilian population. Figures which could be given at the present stage would not be exact enough to be of much value but we must reckon on our needs of Canadian dollars in war time greatly exceeding our peace time needs, perhaps by 200 and nearer 300 million dollars a year.

7. In the circumstances perhaps the most valuable immediate assistance which Canada could give in this field would be any steps which are possible to assist us in the financing of desired purchases. Ends.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DOMINION AFFAIRS.

## MEMORANDUM

*Secret and Immediate*

(a) Navy.

1. The six destroyers of the Royal Canadian Navy to be placed under Admiralty orders (unless it is necessary from the Canadian point of view to retain two destroyers on the west coast the Admiralty would prefer to employ them on the east coast).
2. The completion of the fitting of Asdic equipment to "Saguenay" and "Skeena" and 14 minesweepers.

3. Naval bases at Halifax and Esquimalt, especially the former, to be placed in complete readiness including Anti Submarine boom and to be available for Royal Navy.
  4. 8 Minesweeping vessels to be taken up and fitted out at 'Sydney Cape Breton and 6 Minesweeping and three Anti Submarine at St. John's, Newfoundland.
  5. Provision for the maintenance of a reserve of 30 thousand tons of naval fuel oil at Halifax.
  6. Small craft for Anti Submarine and Minesweeping duties to assist the Commander-in-Chief, America and West Indies Station, in West Indian local defence.
  7. Provision of aircraft for seaward reconnaissance at the convoy assembly port of Halifax.
  8. Fleet air arm. Aerodrome facilities for the operation of 6 aircraft and accommodation at Esquimalt for 3 aircraft and 8 reserve aircraft. Accommodation at Halifax for 1 officer 13 Chief Petty Officers and 28 men and at Esquimalt for 1 officer 5 Chief Petty officers, and 11 men. The maintenance at Halifax of 500 tons D.T.D. 230 aviation spirit and 30 tons aero lubricating oil D.T.D. 109.
  9. Fitting out "Letitia", at present at Quebec. as a Merchant Cruiser at an east coast port. Fitting out as Merchant Cruisers at Esquimalt of Monowai and Rajputana at present in Australia and China respectively, to be capitalized later.
  10. Canadian Government to proceed with arming of Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships. If convenient, the majority of equipments at Esquimalt to be transferred to the east coast. Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships instructional staff mainly required at Canadian ports (appendix C.B.C. 1764/39) and gunlayers in Defensively Equipped Merchant Ships to be provided from Canadian sources, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom regret that trained personnel from the United Kingdom cannot at present be made available.
  11. 2 trained officers will be sent for duty at the convoy assembly port at Halifax to assist in organizing convoy service. Additional personnel required for this staff and for naval control service staffs at Sydney Cape Breton Quebec and Vancouver to be supplied from Canada.
  12. Naval reserves surplus to Canadian requirements to be made available for Royal Navy.
  13. Recruitment from civilian life of officers and technicians with specialist. qualifications, viz. trained civilian pilots for service in the fleet air arm, yachtsmen or ex-mercantile marine officers suitable for Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve commissions, telegraphists and signalmen, artificers, scientists, electrical and wireless telegraphy and skilled electrical workmen.
  14. Examination of possibility of building vessels, escorts "Black Swan" type, small mine sweepers and anti submarine trawlers for Royal Navy.
- (b) Army.
15. While it is hoped that Canada would exert her full national effort as in the last war, even to the extent of the eventual, despatch of an expeditionary force, it is realised that no statement of policy on these lines is likely to be possible at the moment Would it be, possible, however, to consider as an immediate programme
    - (a) the despatch of a small Canadian unit which would take its place along side the United Kingdom troops.
    - (b) the provision of technical units, particularly signal, royal engineers, ordnance, medical, transportation (particularly railway construction and operating) units for attachment to United Kingdom formation.
    - (c) technical personnel for enlistment in United Kingdom units, particularly fitters, electricians, mechanics, instrument mechanics, alternatively motor transport drivers, and officers with similar qualifications.
- (c) Air Force
16. A general reconnaissance squadron of eastern air command to co-operate with forces at Halifax. (*see paragraph 7 above*)
  17. The United Kingdom authorities anticipate real difficulty in meeting personnel requirements if, as seems likely, intensive air operations develop in Western Europe. It is suggested therefore that the best way in which Canada could assist would be to concentrate first on the individual training of pilots, observers, and particularly air gunners

and W/T operators, rather than by forming and training complete units for despatch to Europe (Canadian expeditionary units excepted). When sufficient officers and personnel were available in England and France the aim would be to form a Royal Canadian Air Force contingent.

18. If this suggestion is acceptable the first step would be to adopt an intensified war training scheme with existing resources with a view to an immediate increase in existing output of 120 pilots a year.
19. Further steps:
  - (a) the rapid expansion of present training facilities using civil aerodromes with the aim of 2,000 pilots a year.
  - (b) the immediate enlistment of skilled mechanics both for Canadian expansion and for Royal Air Force.
  - (c) The training of as many observers and air gunners as possible perhaps by using existing service squadrons.
  - (d) at a later stage it may be desirable if possible to transfer at least 4 Royal Air Force flying training schools to sites in Canada.
20. Supplies. The technical mission from the United Kingdom now on its way to Canada (some members of which left September 2nd) has full details.  
The most important items are aero-engines and alloys.

Generally speaking, and where points contained in this memorandum are acceptable to the Canadian authorities, Departments in the United Kingdom would like to get into direct touch with Canadian services as regards further details.

## APPENDIX "D"

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AIR TRAINING PLAN  
AGREEMENT, 17 DEC 1939*Secret*

1. It is agreed between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand that there shall be set up in Canada a co-operative air training scheme as set out in this Agreement, and that the personnel so trained shall be allocated in accordance with Articles 14 and 15.

2. This Agreement shall become operative at once and shall remain in force until 31<sup>st</sup> March, 1943; unless, by agreement between the Governments concerned, it be extended or terminated at an earlier date.

3. The Government of Canada will act as administrator of the scheme for itself and the other Governments concerned, as hereinafter provided, and it is understood that the undertakings given herein by the Government of Canada to the other Governments concerned are respectively subject to the due performance on the part of such Governments of their several undertakings given herein in support of the scheme;

4. The Government of Canada, acting as administrator as aforesaid, will take the measures it considers necessary for the setting up of an organization which, when fully developed, will be capable of completing the training of the following numbers every four weeks:—

Pilots (elementary flying training).....	520
Pilots (service flying training).....	544
Observers .....	340
Wireless operator-air gunners .....	580

The Government of Canada will, moreover, endeavour to complete the organization it considers necessary to give the above outputs so as to accord as nearly as may be found practicable with the programme of development set out in Appendix I.

5. (a) The Governments of Australia and New Zealand will endeavour to send from time to time enough pupils for training to Canada to keep filled the following proportions of places in the appropriate training schools as shown in Tables A, B and C of Appendix I. which proportions will be allotted to them for this purpose:—

<i>Australia</i>	
Pilots (service flying training).....	2/16ths
Observers .....	1/10th
Wireless operator-air gunners .....	1/10th
<i>New Zealand</i>	
Pilots (service flying training).....	1/16th
Observers .....	1/10th
Wireless operator-air gunners .....	1/10th

(b) The Government of Canada will endeavour to provide from time to time enough pupils for training in Canada to keep filled the following proportions of places in the appropriate training schools as shown in Tables A, B and C of Appendix I, less the ten per cent or portion thereof supplied by the Government of the United Kingdom under the provisions of clause (c) hereof:—

pilots (elementary flying training).....	The whole.
pilots (service flying training).....	13/16ths
Observers .....	8/10ths
Wireless operator-air gunners .....	8/10ths

(c) The Government of the United Kingdom may send and the Government of Canada, as administrator of the scheme, undertakes to receive pupils for pilot and observer training in Canada in numbers not exceeding ten per cent of the intake of the elementary flying training schools and air observer schools in Canada; and in addition the Government of the United Kingdom will endeavour to send and the Government of Canada, as administrator of the scheme, undertakes to receive pupils for training in Canada in sufficient numbers to keep filled any deficiency in the supply of such pupils from Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The numbers sent by the Government of the United Kingdom may also include pupils from Newfoundland.

(d) The numbers, and the categories of pupils sent, may be varied from time to time by agreement between the Governments concerned.

(e) It is agreed that if the Governments of Canada, Australia and New Zealand fail to keep filled the training places allotted to them respectively they will nevertheless bear their full respective shares of the costs and expenses as provided for in Article 10.

6. Pupils sent for training in Canada under the provisions of Article 5 will receive pay, allowances and other emoluments in accordance with the provisions set out in Appendix II to this Agreement.

7. The training to be given shall be in accordance with the syllabus of instruction laid down for each similar course of training in the United Kingdom.

8. To assist in the carrying out of the training scheme, the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand will lend personnel in such ranks and in such numbers as may be agreed upon with the Government of Canada as administrator of the scheme.

9. The share of the cost of the scheme to be borne by the Government of the United Kingdom will take the form of contributions in kind, to be delivered at such times and in such numbers as may be required for the efficient carrying out of the scheme in accordance with the programme of development set out in Appendix I as follows:—

- (a) Engines for Moth airframes manufactured in Canada up to a maximum of 50 per cent of the total number of aircraft required for the initial equipment and immediate reserve establishments for the full training capacity, in accordance with Appendix I, of the elementary flying training schools.
- (b) All the Anson aircraft (without wings) that may be required for the initial equipment and immediate reserve establishments for the full training capacity, in accordance with Appendix I, of the service flying training schools, the air observer schools and the air navigation schools.
- (c) All the Battle aircraft that may be required for the initial equipment and immediate reserve establishments for the full training capacity, in accordance with Appendix I, of the bombing and gunnery schools and the air armament school.
- (d) The appropriate initial stock of spare parts for the airframes and engines to be supplied under the provisions of clauses (a), (b) and (c).
- (e) Such numbers of airframes and engines as may be required from time to time to replace the wastage resulting from loss or damage beyond economical repair of the airframes and engines to be supplied under the provisions of clauses (a), (b) and (c).
- (f) An appropriate stock of spare parts for the running maintenance of the airframes and engines to be supplied under the provisions of clauses (a), (b) and (c).
- (g) 533 Harvard airframes, 666 Wasp engines and the appropriate share of the stock of spare parts, which have already been ordered for use in service flying schools.

In addition, the Government of the United Kingdom will bear the cost of packing, loading and transporting to Canada the airframes, engines and equipment to be supplied under the provisions of clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f) and (g) above. The cost of unloading and of transportation in Canada will be borne by the Government of Canada, as administrator of the scheme.

The types of aircraft and aircraft engines and spare parts to be supplied by the United Kingdom Government under the foregoing arrangements may be varied from time to time by agreement between the Governments concerned.

10. The Governments of Canada, Australia and New Zealand agree that costs and expenses paid or incurred by the Government of Canada as administrator of the scheme (exclusive of the contribution in kind and expenses to be made and borne by the Government of the United Kingdom as provided for in Article 9) shall be apportioned between them as follows:—

- (a) The Government of Canada will bear the whole costs and expenses of the Initial Training and Elementary Flying Training.
- (b) The costs and expenses remaining will be apportioned in the following percentages:—

Canada.....	80.64
Australia.....	11.28
New Zealand.....	8.08

The foregoing percentages are based on the allocations of training places mentioned in Article 5; and it is agreed that if any substantial changes in these allocations are made by mutual agreement between the Governments concerned the percentages will be reviewed.

11. (a) Except for any advances made by the other Governments concerned, as provided for in clause (b) of this Article, the Government of Canada, as administrator of the scheme,

will in the first instance advance all the costs and expenses incurred as such administrator under the provisions of this Agreement, and the Governments of Australia and New Zealand will repay to the Government of Canada, as herein provided for, in Canadian dollars, their share of the amounts so advanced, in the proportions specified in Article 10.

- (b) The Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand will make advance payments necessary for pay and allowances, transportation charges, and other expenses during the journey to Canada in respect of pupils sent to Canada by such Governments for training, and for such other costs and expenses as may be agreed to from time to time; and the Governments of the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand will, immediately after the end of each month, notify the Government of Canada, as administrator of the scheme, of the amounts of any advance payments made by them during such month, and will, as soon as possible thereafter, send to the Government of Canada a detailed statement in respect of such advance payments.
- (c) In connection with the repayments to be made by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, as provided for in clause (a), due allowance will be made for any advance payments made and notified by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, under the provisions of clause (b).
- (d) The Government of Canada, as administrator of the scheme, will refund to the Government of the United Kingdom any advance payments made by that Government under the provisions of clause (b), and the amount of such refunds shall be included in the costs and expenses of the scheme to be apportioned between the Governments of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, as provided for in clause (a) and in Article 10.
- (e) In this Agreement the term "costs and expenses" shall mean all expenditures, costs, charges and liabilities made or incurred by the Government of Canada, as administrator of the scheme, and without restricting the generality of the foregoing shall include:
  - (i) Pay, allowances, and other expenses of the personnel lent under the provisions of Article 8 and a cash contribution (computed in accordance with recognized practice as between Governments in such cases) towards the future noneffective benefits of such personnel.
  - (ii) Pay, allowances, transportation charges, and other expenses connected with the training of Canadian pupils in Canada from the dates of their enlistment to the dates of their embarkation in Canada under the provisions of Article 16; or, in case of Canadian pupils taken to fill vacancies in the Home Defence Squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force, as provided for in Article 14, to the dates of their being so taken.
  - (iii) Pay, allowances, transportation charges, and other expenses connected with the training of pupils in Canada from the dates of their leaving the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand or Newfoundland for the purpose of taking up training in Canada to the dates of their embarkation in Canada under the provisions of Article 16.

But the term "costs and expenses" shall not include:—

- (iv) The contribution in kind and expenses to be made and borne by the Government of the United Kingdom as provided for in Article 9.
- (v) Costs and expenses of clothing and personal equipment of pupils other than such replacements as may be necessary during the period of training and other than flying clothing and equipment.
- (vi) Pensions or allowances to personnel lent under the provisions of Article 8 and to pupils or their dependents in respect of disability or death.

The costs and expenses mentioned in (v) and (vi) above will be borne by the Governments lending the personnel and sending the pupils in respect of whom such costs, expenses, pensions or allowances are incurred.

12. The Governments of Australia and New Zealand will from time to time, within one month after a summarized statement of accounts has been presented to them (showing the payments made during the preceding month by the Government of Canada; as administrator of the scheme, and taking account of any receipts, and of any advance payments made and notified, as provided for in Article 11 (b), by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, and also of any adjustments in respect of previous months) pay or cause to be paid to the Government of Canada their due proportion as agreed upon in Article 10 of the costs and expenses of the scheme as shown by such statement.

These monthly payments will be regarded as advances on account, and the costs and expenses of the scheme as at the end of each financial year will be finally adjusted and paid when the accounts for such year have been audited.

13. (a) The Government of Canada will, in consultation with the other Governments concerned, appoint an officer to act as its Financial Adviser in carrying out its functions as administrator of the scheme. Such proposals for expenditure as the said Financial Adviser may require shall be referred to him for approval, and no expenditure on such proposals shall be incurred until his approval has been given. Any proposal disapproved by the Financial Adviser may, at the instance of the officers responsible therefor, be referred to the Minister of National Defence for final decision. Any reports made by the Financial Adviser shall be made available by the Government of Canada to all the other Governments concerned, and these latter shall be entitled to obtain from the Financial Adviser information on all matters affecting the cost of the scheme and their participation in it.

(b) Monthly financial statements shall be furnished by the Government of Canada to the Governments of Australia and New Zealand.

(c) A record of all expenditure and all sums received in connection with the training of pupils in Canada under this scheme will be maintained by the Comptroller of the Treasury of the Government of Canada, and will be audited by the Auditor General of Canada. This record will be made available after audit for examination by representatives of the Governments concerned.

(d) The Government of Canada shall make available to the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, as early as possible after the close of each financial year ending the 31st March, a statement, accompanied by a certificate of the Auditor General, of the receipts and payments in connection with the scheme showing the expenditure under appropriate heads.

14. It is agreed that the Government of Canada may, out of the Canadian pupils who complete their training under this scheme, fill vacancies which occur in the Home Defence Squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force, provided, however, that the numbers so disposed of shall not exceed the following:—

Pilots .....	136 a year
Air observers.....	34 a year
Wireless operator-air gunners .....	58 a year

All the other pupils, on completion of their training, will be placed at the disposal of the Government of the United Kingdom, subject to that Government's making the arrangements indicated in Article 15, and bearing liability as provided for in Articles 16 and 17 of this Agreement.

15. The United Kingdom Government undertakes that pupils of Canada, Australia and New Zealand shall, after training is completed, be identified with their respective Dominions, either by the method of organizing Dominion units and formations or in some other way, such methods to be agreed upon with the respective Dominion Governments concerned. The United Kingdom Government will initiate inter-governmental discussions to this end.

16. The Government of the United Kingdom will, subject to the provisions of Article 17, provide the pay, allowances, pensions and other non-effective benefits, maintenance and other expenses of the pilots and aircraft crews who are trained in Canada (other than those made available for service with the Royal Canadian Air Force in accordance with the provisions of Article 14) with effect from the dates of their embarkation in Canada for service with, or in conjunction with, the Royal Air Force. The Government of the United Kingdom also undertakes to arrange for those pupils who are made available for service with, or in conjunction with, the Royal Air Force to be embarked as speedily as possible after the completion of their training, and to defray the cost of their passages to the stations to which they are appointed on leaving Canada.

17. The pay, allowances, pensions and other non-effective benefits, maintenance and other expenses, for which the Government of the United Kingdom undertakes liability under the provisions of Article 16, will be as laid down in Royal Air Force regulations. If it should be decided by the Government of Canada, the Government of Australia, or the Government of New Zealand to supplement the amounts so issued, any such supplement will be borne by the Government concerned.

18. The Government of Canada, as administrator of the scheme, will have charge of the assets acquired for the purposes of the scheme. On the termination of this Agreement such of

the said assets as have been acquired and paid for as part of the cost of the scheme will be disposed of as follows:—

- (a) Any land, but not buildings, structures or fixtures thereon, acquired or improved for the purpose of the scheme will become the property of the Government of Canada.
- (b) The assets acquired for the purposes of the Initial Training Schools and the Elementary Flying Training Schools will become the property of the Government of Canada.
- (c) All other assets, except those contributed in kind by the Government of the United Kingdom, will be shared between the Governments of Canada, Australia and New Zealand in the same proportions as are laid down in Article 10 for the apportionment of the costs.
- (d) Any of the assets contributed by the Government of the United Kingdom which remain will revert to that Government.

The distribution of the assets under the above arrangements may be made in kind or otherwise, as may be agreed upon.

19. Arrangements will be made between the Governments concerned to facilitate communications between them under this Agreement or otherwise in connection with the scheme, either by means of cable or through representatives in Canada to be named by them.

Done in quintuplicate, at Ottawa, this 17th day of December, 1939.

On behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom

RIVERDALE.

On behalf of the Government of Canada

W. L. MACKENZIE KING.

On behalf of the Government of Australia

S. M. BRUCE.

On behalf of the Government of New Zealand

W. J. JORDAN

**Appendix I****PROGRAMME OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRAINING SCHEME IN CANADA**

1. To produce the output given in Article 4 of the Agreement the following schools will be necessary in Canada:

Initial Training Schools .....	3
Elementary Flying Training Schools .....	13
Service Flying Training Schools .....	16
Air Observer Schools .....	10
Bombing and Gunnery Schools .....	10
Air Navigation Schools .....	2
Wireless Schools .....	4

2. The organization of these schools is shown on Tables A to C attached to this Appendix. A target programme showing dates of opening of the schools is attached at Table D.

3. The flying training and air observer schools will be developed at rates which will provide for their peak capacity for training pupils being reached by the following number of weeks after the date of opening:—

Elementary Flying Training Schools .....	4 weeks
Service Flying Training Schools .....	12 weeks
Air Observer Schools .....	6 weeks

The remaining schools will open at full capacity.

4. It will also be necessary to establish:—

- (i) Schools for the training of the staffs of the schools given in paragraph 1, and for the organization at (ii) below.
- (ii) An appropriate command, recruiting and maintenance organization.

These will include—

(iii) Air Armament School .....	1
(iv) School of Aeronautical Engineering .....	1
(v) School of Administration .....	1
(vi) Equipment and Accountant School .....	1
(vii) Flying Instructors School .....	1
(viii) Recruit Depots .....	2
(ix) Technical Training Schools .....	2
(x) Repair Depots .....	3
(xi) Equipment Depots .....	3
(xii) Record Office .....	1 (or enlargement of existing organization).

The dates of formation and rate of development of these units will be governed by the dates of opening of the pilot and air training schools. (iii) to (ix) will cease to function, or will be reduced to the size necessary to meet wastage, as the scheme develops.

5. Tables E and F show the requirements in aircraft and personnel when the scheme is in operation.

TABLE "A"

## PILOT TRAINING

Initial Training Weeks (Cumulative)	Elementary Training			
	4	12	28	
Initial Training Schools in Canada or United Kingdom.	No. 1 E.F.T.S.	No. 1 S.F.T.S. (Canada)		
	No. 2 E.F.T.S.	No. 2 S.F.T.S. (Canada)		
	No. 3 E.F.T.S.	No. 3 S.F.T.S. (Canada)		
	No. 4 E.F.T.S.	No. 4 S.F.T.S. (Canada)		
	No. 5 E.F.T.S.	No. 5 S.F.T.S. (Canada)		
	No. 6 E.F.T.S.	No. 6 S.F.T.S. (Canada)		
	No. 7 E.F.T.S.	No. 7 S.F.T.S. (Canada)		
	No. 8 E.F.T.S.	No. 8 S.F.T.S. (Canada)		
	No. 9 E.F.T.S.	No. 9 S.F.T.S. (Canada)		
	No. 10 E.F.T.S.	No. 10 S.F.T.S. (Canada)		
	No. 11 E.F.T.S.	No. 11 S.F.T.S. (Canada)		
	No. 12 E.F.T.S.	No. 12 S.F.T.S. (Canada)		
	No. 13 E.F.T.S.	No. 13 S.F.T.S. (Canada)		
The initial training and elementary flying training of pupils for No. 14 S.F.T.S. will be carried out in New Zealand, and that for Nos. 17 and 18 S.F.T.S.s in Australia .....		No. 14 S.F.T.S. (Canada)	No. 17 S.F.T.S. (Canada)	
			No. 18 S.F.T.S. (Canada)	
	Intake	Output	Intake	Output
Per school per four weeks .....	48	40	40	34
Total all schools in Canada .....	624	520	640	544
Wastage .....	16½%		15%	
	~~~~~			
	29% on original elementary school intake			

TABLE "B"

AIR OBSERVER TRAINING

Weeks (Cumulative)	4	16		22		26	
Initial Training Schools in Canada (or U.K. for air Observers from U.K.)	No. 1 Observer School (Canada)	No. 1 B.G.S. (Canada)					
	No. 2 Observer School	No. 2 B.G.S.					
	No. 3 Observer School	No. 3 B.G.S.				No. 1 A.N.S. (Canada)	
	No. 4 Observer School	No. 4 B.G.S.					
	No. 5 Observer School	No. 5 B.G.S.					
	No. 6 Observer School	No. 6 B.G.S.					
	No. 7 Observer School	No. 7 B.G.S.					
	No. 8 Observer School	No. 8 B.G.S.				No. 2 A.N.S. (Canada)	
The initial training of pupils for these schools will be carried out in Australia or New Zealand.	No. 9 Observer School	No. 9 B.G.S.					
	No. 10 Observer School	No. 10 B.G.S.					
		Intake	Output	Intake	Output	Intake	Output
Per school per four weeks .....	42	35	35	34	170	170	
Total per four weeks for Schools in Canada.....	420	350	350	340	340	340	
Wastage .....		16 $\frac{2}{3}$ %		3%		Nil	
				19%			

TABLE "C"

## WIRELESS OPERATOR—AIR GUNNER TRAINING

Weeks (Cumulative)	4	20	24	
Initial Training Schools in Canada	Wireless School (Canada)	No. 1 B.G.S. (Canada)		
		No. 2 B.G.S. (Canada)		
		No. 3 B.G.S. (Canada)		
		No. 4 B.G.S. (Canada)		
		No. 5 B.G.S. (Canada)		
		No. 6 B.G.S. (Canada)		
		No. 7 B.G.S. (Canada)		
		No. 8 B.G.S. (Canada)		
		No. 9 B.G.S. (Canada)		
		No. 10 B.G.S. (Canada)		
The initial training of pupils for these schools will be carried out in Australia or New Zealand				
	Intake	Output	Intake	Output
Per school per four weeks .....	720	600	60	58
Total per four weeks .....	720	600	600	580
		~~~~~	~~~~~	
		16⅔%	3⅓%	
Wastage .....		~~~~~	~~~~~	
			19½%	

TABLE "D"

## PROGRAMME SHOWING DATES OF OPENING OF PILOT AND AIR CREW TRAINING SCHOOLS

Date	Initial Trainin g School	Element- Ary Flying Training School	Service Flying Training School	Air Observer School	Bombing And Gunnery School	Wireless School	Air Navi- gation School
1940							
April	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
May	1	1	—	1	—	1	—
June .....	—	1	—	—	—	—	—
July .....	—	—	1	1	—	—	—
August .....	—	1	1	—	1	—	—
September .....	1	—	1	1	—	—	—
October .....	—	1	1	—	1	—	1
November .....	—	—	—	1	—	1	—
December .....	—	1	1	—	1	—	—
1941							
January .....	—	—	1	1	—	—	—
February .....	—	1	1	—	1	—	—
March .....	—	1	—	1	—	—	—
April .....	—	1	2	1	1	1	—
May .....	—	—	1	—	1	—	—
June .....	—	1	1	—	—	—	—
July .....	1	—	—	—	1	—	1
August .....	—	1	1	1	—	—	—
September .....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
October .....	—	1	1	1	—	—	—
November .....	—	—	—	—	1	1	—
December .....	—	1	1	1	—	—	—
1942							
January .....	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
February .....	—	1	1	—	—	—	—
March .....	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
April .....	—	—	1	—	—	—	—
Totals .....	3	13	16	10	10	4	2

TABLE "E"

## AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS

THE AIRFRAMES AND ENGINES REQUIRED FOR THE INITIAL EQUIPMENT AND IMMEDIATE RESERVE OF THE SCHOOLS IN CANADA WHEN THE SCHEME IS IN FULL OPERATION ARE AS UNDER

Type and Purpose	AIRFRAMES (includes 50% immediate reserve)	ENGINES (includes 100% immediate reserve)
CANADA		
Moths and/or Fleets for Elementary Flying Training Schools .....	702	936
Harvards for Service Flying Training Schools .....	720	960
Ansons for Service Flying Training Schools, Observer Schools, and Air Navigation Schools .....	1,368	3,648
Battles for Bombing and Gunnery Schools.....	750	1,000

NOTE:—Aircraft required for the flying Instructors School, the Air Armament School and the instructors sections of the Air Navigation Schools are not included in the above. These schools and sections are disbanded as the scheme approaches completion, and the aircraft used by them in the early stages are absorbed into other units.

TABLE "F"

## PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

THE PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO MAN THE SCHOOLS, ETC. IN CANADA WHEN THE SCHEME IS IN FULL OPERATION IS AS UNDER

	Officers	Airmen	Civilians	Works Main- tenance Personnel
Commands and Groups, and Extra Headquarters				
Organization .....	288	603	134	—
Initial Training Schools .....	39	393	—	36
Service Flying Training Schools .....	752	11,376	64	320
Air Observer Schools .....	250	2,470	—	100
Bombing and Gunnery Schools.....	450	6,920	—	150
Elementary Flying Training Schools.....	351	4,134	—	130
Wireless Schools .....	96	1,284	—	80
Air Navigation Schools .....	126	1,278	—	40
Repair Depots .....	51	141	1,308	36
Equipment Depots .....	66	228	3,318	60
Technical Training Schools.....	41	627	—	30
Records Office.....	14	277	—	—
Recruit Depots .....	28	424	—	40
Recruiting Organization .....	134	211	105	—
Totals .....	2,686	30,366	4,929	1,022

(a) Civilians may replace a proportion of the airmen in certain units.

(b) The above table does not include schools, etc., which close as the scheme approaches completion; the personnel from these schools will be absorbed into other units.

(c) Some, or all, of the Elementary Flying Training Schools and Air Observer Schools may be organized on a civilian basis.

**Appendix II**

## CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF PILOTS AND AIRCRAFT CREWS

## (a) PUPILS FROM CANADA.

*Enlistment.*

Pupils will be enlisted in the Royal Canadian Air Force as Aircraftmen Class II (standard group) .

*Rank during Training in Canada.*

<i>Course</i>	<i>Rank</i>	
Initial ground training .....	Aircraftman, Class II	(standard group)
Pilot.....	Leading Aircraftman	(standard group)
Observer.....	Leading Aircraftman	(standard group)
Wireless operator (air crew).....	Aircraftman, Class II	(standard group)
Air gunner.....	Aircraftman, Class II	(standard group)

*Rank on completion of Training.*

<i>Duty</i>	<i>Rank</i>	
Pilot..... *	Sergeant (Group B)	
Observer..... *{	Acting Sergeant (group C)	
	Sergeant (Group B)	
Wireless operator (air crew)..... {	L.A.C., A.C. I or A.C. II (group B),	
	according to percentage of marks	
	obtained on passing out of training.	
Air gunner..... {	L.A.C., A.C. I or A.C. II (standard group),	
	according to percentage of marks obtained	
	on passing out of training.	

Pay and additional pay will be at the rates and subject to the conditions laid down from time to time in Financial Regulations and Instructions for the Royal Canadian Air Force on Active Service.

During service in Canada, allowances, etc., will be admissible under the conditions laid down in Financial Regulations and Instructions for the Royal Canadian Air Force on Active Service.

*Pay, allowances, etc., during service with, or in conjunction with, the Royal Air Force.*

On embarkation for service with, or in conjunction with, the Royal Air Force, officers and airmen will, subject to the conditions laid down in King's Regulations and Air Council Instructions, receive from the appropriate Royal Air Force paying authority the pay, allowances, etc., of the rank and branch (or group) in the Royal Air Force corresponding to that held in the Royal Canadian Air Force, except that the following special arrangements will be made in regard to the issue of allowances to dependents in Canada.

The allowances and compulsory allotment from pay in respect of family or other dependents which may be payable under Royal Air Force regulations will, if the family or other dependents reside in Canada, be credited to the Government of Canada, as administrator of the scheme, who will issue to the family or other dependents the allowance and assigned pay which may be payable under Royal Canadian Air Force regulations.

If the pay and allowances admissible under Royal Canadian Air Force regulations should exceed those admissible under Royal Air Force regulations, the difference (after taking into account the payment made under the preceding paragraph) will be issued by the Government of Canada as deferred pay, either on termination of service or otherwise in special circumstances.

\*A number of pilots and observers will be selected, on passing out of training, for commissioned rank in the Royal Canadian Air Force (General List). Observers will be on probation as acting observer for a period (normally six months) after passing out of training.

Personnel will not be insured under United Kingdom insurance schemes, and any insurance contributions (employers' and employees' shares) necessary to ensure benefits under Canadian schemes will be paid by the Government of Canada, as administrator of the scheme, who will arrange with the Government of the United Kingdom to recover from pay any employees' shares of such contributions so recoverable.

(b) PUPILS OTHER THAN THOSE ENLISTED IN THE ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE,  
THE ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE AND THE ROYAL NEW ZEALAND AIR FORCE.

Pupils other than those enlisted in the Royal Canadian Air Force, the Royal Australian Air Force and the Royal New Zealand Air Force will be enlisted in the Royal Air Force.

For the period of the journey to Canada, airmen of the Royal Air Force will receive pay, allowances, etc., at the rates and subject to the conditions laid down from time to time in King's Regulations and Air Council Instructions for the Royal Air Force.

During service in Canada, airmen of the Royal Air Force will be attached to the Royal Canadian Air Force, and, subject to the conditions laid down in Financial Regulations and Instructions for the Royal Canadian Air Force on Active Service, they will receive from the appropriate Royal Canadian Air Force paying officer the pay, allowances, etc., of the rank and group in the Royal Canadian Air Force, as appropriate under (a) above, except that the following special arrangements will be made in regard to the issue of allowances to family or other dependents outside Canada.

The allowances and compulsory allotment from pay in respect of family or other dependents which would be appropriate under Royal Air Force regulations will, if the family or other dependent reside outside Canada, be issued by the Government of the United Kingdom, who will reclaim from the Government of Canada, as administrator of the scheme, the amount so issued. The Royal Canadian Air Force officer paying the airman will deduct from the airman's pay the amount of the assigned pay under Royal Canadian Air Force regulations.

Airmen will not be insured under Canadian insurance schemes and any insurance contributions (employers' and employees' shares) necessary to ensure benefits for United Kingdom airmen under United Kingdom schemes will be paid by the Government of the United Kingdom, who will arrange with the Government of Canada, as administrator of the scheme, for the recovery from pay of any employees' shares of such contributions so recoverable.

(c) PUPILS SENT BY AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

Pupils sent by Australia and New Zealand will be enlisted in the Royal Australian Air Force and in the Royal New Zealand Air Force, respectively.

*Pay, allowances, etc., for the period of journey to Canada.*

For the period of the journey to Canada, airmen of the Royal Australian Air Force and of the Royal New Zealand Air Force will receive pay, allowances, etc., at the rates and subject to the conditions laid down from time to time in the Regulations for the Royal Australian Air Force and the Royal New Zealand Air Force, respectively.

*Pay, allowances, etc., during service in Canada.*

During service in Canada, airmen of the Royal Australian Air Force and of the Royal New Zealand Air Force will be attached to the Royal Canadian Air Force, and, subject to the conditions laid down in Financial Regulations and Instructions for the Royal Canadian Air Force on Active Service, they will receive from the appropriate Royal Canadian Air Force paying officer the pay, allowances, etc., of the rank and group in the Royal Canadian Air Force, as appropriate under (a) above, except that the following special arrangements will be made in regard to the issue of allowances to family or other dependents outside Canada.

The allowances and compulsory allotment from pay in respect of family or other dependents, which would be appropriate under Royal Australian Air Force or Royal New Zealand Air Force regulations will, if the family or other dependents reside outside Canada, be issued by the Government of Australia or the Government of New Zealand, who will reclaim from the Government of Canada, as administrator of the scheme, the amount so issued. The Royal Canadian Air Force officer paying the airman will deduct from the airman's pay the amount of the assigned pay chargeable under Royal Canadian Air Force regulations.

Airmen will not be insured under Canadian insurance schemes, and any insurance contributions (employers' and employees' shares) necessary to ensure benefits for Australian or New Zealand airmen under Australian or New Zealand schemes will be paid by the Government of Australia or the Government of New Zealand, who will arrange with the Government of Canada,

as administrator of the scheme, for the recovery from pay of any employees' shares of such contributions so recoverable.

*Pay, allowances, etc., during service with the Royal Air Force.*

On embarkation for service with the Royal Air Force, officers and airmen will be attached to that force, and, subject to the conditions laid down in King's Regulations and Air Council Instructions, they will receive from the appropriate Royal Air Force paying authority the pay, allowances, etc., of the rank and branch (or group) in the Royal Air Force corresponding to that held in the Royal Australian Air Force or in the Royal New Zealand Air Force, except that the following special arrangements will be made in regard to the issue of allowances to family or other dependents in Australia or New Zealand.

The allowances and compulsory allotment from pay in respect of family or other dependents which may be payable under Royal Air Force regulations will, if the family or other dependents reside in Australia or New Zealand, be credited to the Government of Australia or to the Government of New Zealand, who will issue to the family or other dependents the allowance and compulsory allotment from pay which may be payable under Royal Australian Air Force or Royal New Zealand Air Force regulations.

If the pay and allowances admissible under Royal Australian Air Force or Royal New Zealand Air Force regulations exceed those admissible under Royal Air Force regulations, and the Government of Australia or the Government of New Zealand decide that this difference is to be credited to the officer or airman, the difference (after taking into account the payment made under the preceding paragraph) will be issued by the Government of Australia or the Government of New Zealand as deferred pay, either on termination of service or otherwise in special circumstances.

Personnel will not be insured under United Kingdom insurance schemes, and any insurance contributions (employers' and employees' shares) necessary to ensure benefits under Australian or New Zealand schemes will be paid by the Government of Australia or the Government of New Zealand, who will arrange with the Government of the United Kingdom to recover from pay any employees' shares of such contributions so recoverable.

**APPENDIX "E"****CANADIAN SERVICES REPRESENTATION IN WASHINGTON  
(Report by Canadian Joint Staff, 30 Jul 1942)**

1. Pursuant to the instructions of the Chiefs of Staff we beg to submit hereunder a report by the Canadian Joint Staff, on the Representation of the Canadian Services in Washington.

2. In order to make a comprehensive survey of the nature of the representation required by the Canadian Services in Washington with respect to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, it is we suggest desirable first to describe how that body applies itself (in accordance with the decisions reached by the heads of the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom) to its task of directing the conduct of the war as a whole.

3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been given offices in the Public Health Building on Constitution Avenue, immediately opposite the War and Navy Departments. In this building are housed the more important elements (from the operational aspect) of the British Joint Staff Mission. The Supply and Technical branches are accommodated in other office buildings in Washington. The Mission is composed of the British Admiralty Delegation, the British Army Staff and the British Air Staff.

4. The British Joint Staff Mission is presided over by Field Marshal Sir John Dill who represents the British Chiefs of Staff in their corporate capacity. The Commander or head of each of the three British Service Staffs represents his respective Chief of Staff.

5. On the United States side only the Secretariat and officers of certain full-time sub-committees are permanently located in the Combined Chiefs of Staff offices. The United States Chiefs of Staff and their principal assistants, all of whom hold appointments in the War and Navy Departments respectively, as a rule repair to the Public Health Building only for the purpose of attending joint or combined meetings.

6. Broadly speaking the Combined Chiefs of Staff control major strategy. They are responsible for the broad programme of war requirements based on strategic policy and the allocation of resources as between theatres. The British Chiefs of Staff in London and the United States Chiefs of Staff in Washington each control minor strategy and operations inside the theatres of war lying within their own spheres of strategic responsibility. It will thus be seen that the Combined Chiefs of Staff are a strategical body as opposed to one concerned with the actual conduct of operations.

7. The Combined Chiefs of Staff meet each Thursday for the consideration of such items as have been included in the Agenda. Their deliberations cover a wide range of subjects as will be seen from the list given hereunder taken from the Minutes of the Meeting held on 16th July, 1942.

- (a) Strategic Policy and Deployment of United States and British Forces. Dominion Air Forces.
- (b) Shipping Implications of Proposed Air Force Deployment.
- (c) Requisition of Material for Southwest Pacific Area.
- (d) July Assignments for China.
- (e) Combined Communications Board.
- (f) Form of Agreement between the United Kingdom and the United States Regarding the Defence of Fiji and Tonga.
- (g) Steel Plate.

8. As will be readily understood the Combined Chiefs of Staff when sitting in committee do not consider the matters laid before them in any great detail. On the contrary, both sides usually take the line they have respectively decided upon in Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting and, as a general rule, they either accept the proposal made or ask for postponement of the question so as to enable them to give the matter further study. Now and then amendments to a paper are made in committee, but not often.

9. From the foregoing it follows that the bulk if not all the actual work of the United Kingdom-United States staff organization in Washington is done in subordinate committees. Generally speaking, in their collective capacity the Combined Chiefs of Staff issue directives to these bodies and formally assume responsibility for and accept the conclusions they reach. The more important of the committees are:

- (a) Combined Staff Planners.
- (b) Combined Transportation Committee.

- (c) Combined Munitions Assignment Board.
- (d) Combined Communications Board.
- (e) Combined Intelligence Committee.

10. The number of questions dealt with by the Combined Chiefs of Staff which directly affect Canada are few. Indeed, during the last four and half months the only items coming under this head have been the Arnold-Portal-Towers Memorandum of Agreement with its implications on the Canadian figures in the strategic deployment table and the North Atlantic Ferry Project. And in respect of the latter item its effect on Canada, so far as its discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff was concerned, could well be held to be indirect. In these circumstances, the prospect of Canadian officers being appointed to full or perhaps even associate membership of the above-mentioned committees (with the exception of the Combined Communications Board) is not encouraging. In this connection our information is that of recent weeks China, which constitutes a very important theatre, has exerted a good deal of pressure to obtain a greater share in the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization, but without success.

11. On the other hand, the Combined Chiefs of Staff are prepared to permit a Canadian representative (and in certain circumstances, representatives) to appear before them to express a Canadian view when the question they are considering has a direct bearing on Canadian affairs. And in recent weeks a precedent has been established whereby Canadian and other Dominion representatives have sat in both with the Combined Staff Planners, and the United States Joint Planners for the consideration of the strength of Dominion Air Forces.

12. In the light of the foregoing, it follows that possibly the only effective way of safe-guarding Canadian interests is by keeping as close contact as possible with the work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization, particularly in the early stages. And this we are endeavouring to do. We have been provided with offices in the Public Health Building, and arrangements have been made with the British side of the Secretariat whereby a docket of papers are made available to us for perusal each day. A number of these are situation reports from the various theatres, most of which, by one means or another, regularly find their way either to the Department of External Affairs, or to the Service Departments. Others reflect discussions being conducted by the British Joint Staff Mission with the Chiefs of Staff in London. This category of message is not circulated to the United States side. The remainder and not least in importance, are Combined Chiefs of Staff papers which obviously are common to both sides.

13. From our daily reading of these papers, we are able to keep in pretty close touch with what is going on, though by this statement it is not to be inferred that we are shown all papers going through the office. We think, however, that a real effort is made by the British side of the Secretariat to put us in possession of all the information to which we can reasonably hold ourselves to be entitled. (The recent Arnold-Towers-Portal Memorandum of Agreement constituted a glaring exception to the general rule but these negotiations were separately negotiated.) Thus, as occasionally happens, a paper comes before us some point in which has a bearing on the Canadian position. The point is then taken up either with the British or United States members of the Secretariat, or with the subordinate committee dealing with the question, further information is elicited and the necessary representations made while the paper in question is yet in an early stage. Concurrently we endeavour to keep our Chiefs of Staff as well informed as to what is going on, particularly in respect of matters having a direct Canadian concern, as we possibly can.

14. It is not in the least our desire to convey the impression that all is as well as it can be in respect of Canadian representation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. We have, however, endeavoured to point out that we have been afforded a number of facilities and courtesies in the discharge of our duties; that these duties can best be discharged by establishing friendly contact with every link of the organization useful to our purposes and by gradually building up that measure of confidence in the minds of both British and United States officers without which we could accomplish little. This with our direct representation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in formal session and the development of the precedent already established of being invited to state our views to the subordinate committees will, we think, as time goes on, provide Canada with an effective measure of Service representation in Washington.

15. Apart from the foregoing there is another aspect to our work, namely direct contact with the United States Service Departments in the day-to-day matter of North American defence. The Services of the two countries are carrying out the tasks assigned to them in Defence Plan known as A.B.C.-22. Questions under this head constantly arise and these are taken up direct with the appropriate officers of the War and Navy Departments. In addition, there are other duties either common to all three Services or special to one. Under this head fall such matters

as munitions assignment, technical information, intelligence, operational or otherwise, dispositions of our own or allied forces, communications, training and so on. All these are being taken care of now, or will be as time goes on. The needs in the way of staffs for the discharge of these duties. vary with each Service and consequently we propose separately to report on this aspect to our respective Chiefs of Staff.

16. We trust, however, that in the foregoing report we have succeeded in giving a reasonably full picture of the question of the representation of the Canadian Services in Washington, of how we have endeavoured to carry on to date and how, with the approval of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, we propose to carry on in future. We would add that while we work closely with the British Joint Staff Mission, we enjoy free contact with our United States colleagues and that the separate nature of our identity as a Canadian Joint Staff is well maintained.

[War Diary, Maj.-Gen. M. A. Pope, July 1942.]

**APPENDIX "F"**

**INFORMATION FURNISHED CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER  
ON THE CASABLANCA CONFERENCE**  
[Prime-Minister-to-Prime-Minister telegrams]

*Immediate*

Office of the High Commissioner  
for the United Kingdom,  
Earncliffe, Ottawa.  
30th January, 1943.

*Most Secret and Personal*

My dear Prime Minister,

In a telegram from the Dominions Office I have been asked to give you the enclosed most secret and personal message from Mr. Churchill, who is now at Cairo.

With this message I include also one from the Deputy Prime Minister summarising the principal conclusions reached at Casablanca.

Yours sincerely,  
(Sgd) PATRICK DUFF

The Right Honourable W. L. Mackenzie King, M.P.,  
Secretary of State for External Affairs,  
Ottawa.

*Most Secret and Personal*

MESSAGE FROM THE PRIME MINISTER

I have asked the Deputy Prime Minister to send you an account of the principal conclusions reached at our thorough and comprehensive conference with the Americans at Casablanca. We have sought to make the best distribution of our forces possible both in time and place. It is most important that exact targets and dates should not be known until nearer the time, but I hope that the account enclosed will show you not only the full scope of the proposed activities, but to a very considerable extent their emphasis and priority. You should note the very definite assurances which I have given in the name of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland about continuing the war at full blast against Japan in the event of a German collapse until unconditional surrender is forced upon the enemy. I earnestly hope you will feel that we have acted wisely in holding this conference and that its general conclusions will commend themselves to you.

2. I agreed with President Roosevelt that while he took the lead in China and North Africa the British Government should play the hand with Turkey. Accordingly, with the approval of my colleagues I proposed a meeting with either the Turkish President or Prime Minister, and also between the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and Marshal Chakmak, in Cyprus. We were all rather doubtful about whether the Turks would not be shy. It is therefore most gratifying that they have responded with the utmost alacrity. The Turkish President would even have received me officially in [Angora]. However — it is thought better at this stage that I should meet him at some out of the way spot within the frontiers of Turkey: and I start with a powerful delegation almost immediately. The object assigned to this conference is to promote "the general strength of Turkey". I have not wished to press them into war immediately. They must first be kitted up. But the time will come in the summer when they may feel able to take an even more forthright view than it is evident that they are now adopting. You will see how vital it is to the whole Mediterranean combination that this additional voice should be thrown in when the climax is reached and also how important that we should be able to plaster Ploesti oilfield with our bombs.

3. In the matter of command the Americans have been most generous and broadminded, as you will see from my account.

4. Without wishing to indulge in any complacency I cannot help feeling that things are quite definitely better than when I was last in Cairo, when enemy was less than 70 miles away. If we should succeed in retaining the initiative on all theatres, as does not seem impossible, and if we

can sincerely feel we have brought every possible division of soldiers or fighting unit of our forces into closest and most continuous contact with the enemy from now on, we might well regard the world situation as by no means devoid of favourable features. Without the cohesion and unity of advance of the British Empire and Commonwealth of Nations through periods of desperate peril and forlorn outlook, the freedom and decencies of civilised mankind might well have sunk for ever into the abyss.

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*Most Secret and Personal*

MESSAGE FROM THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER  
SUMMARISING THE PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS  
REACHED AT CASABLANCA

1. I am now in a position to give you at the request of the Prime Minister a summary of the important decisions which have been taken at Casablanca.

2. Defeat of the U-boats must remain the first charge on resources of the United Nations.

This will be achieved by

- (a) Intensified bombing of U-boat Trans-Atlantic bases and constructional yards,
- (b) Allocating as much new construction as possible both United States and British, or vessels released by new construction, to convoy protection,
- (c) Providing auxiliary escort carriers for working with Atlantic convoys as soon as possible,
- (d) Providing long-distance shore-based air cover as a matter of urgency over the Atlantic and West African convoy routes.

3. The Soviet forces must be sustained by the greatest volume of supplies that can be transported to Russia without prohibitive cost in shipping. Provided the anticipated losses are not excessive, the full United States and British commitment to Russia will be met by the end of 1943.

4. Operations in the Mediterranean with the object of forcing Italy out of the war and imposing greatest possible dispersal of German forces will include

- (a) clearance of Axis forces out of North Africa at the earliest possible moment,
- (b) in due course further amphibious offensive operations on a large scale,
- (c) bomber offensive from North Africa.

5. Meanwhile operations will be carried on from the United Kingdom so as to make the best use of United States and British forces as follows:

- (a) heavy bomber offensive directed against German U-boat construction yards, aircraft industry, transportation, oil plants and other targets in enemy war industry. Further targets of great importance which must be attacked when conditions are suitable include Berlin and U-boat operating bases on the Biscay coast. For such operations United States heavy bombardment units in the United Kingdom will operate under the strategic direction of the British Chief of Air Staff,
- (b) maximum building up of United States forces in the United Kingdom in order to be ready for the first favourable opportunity to reenter the continent of Europe.
- (c) amphibious operations ranging from raids to invasion according to the strength and state of morale of the German forces.

For the planning of these operations a combined staff under a British Chief of Staff will be set up forthwith. A British supreme commander will be appointed in due course.

6. The Prime Minister gave the fullest possible assurance to the President that after the defeat of Germany, Great Britain would pursue the war against Japan with the maximum available resources by land, sea and air. Prime Minister has repeated this assurance to Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-Shek.

Operations in the Pacific theatre will continue with the object of maintaining the pressure on Japan, retaining the initiative and attaining a position of readiness for a full scale offensive by the United Nations as soon as Germany is defeated. These operations will meanwhile be kept within such limits as will not prejudice the capacity of the United Nations to take advantage of any favourable opportunity for decisively defeating Germany in 1943. Subject to this reservation they will include limited offensives in Burma preparatory to the reconquest of that country, the building up of United States air forces in China and the continuance of United States Operations in South-West Pacific to greatest possible extent.

7. Important agreements have been reached on command:

- (a) for operations in the Central Mediterranean theatre General Eisenhower will be in supreme command with commanders under him

- (1) Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham as naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean;
  - (2) General Alexander as Deputy Commander-in-Chief with primary task to command Allied forces on Tunisian front and subsequently to plan further offensive operations in this theatre;
  - (3) Air Chief Marshal Tedder as Air Commander-in-Chief of whole Mediterranean theatre.
- (b) (1) West African coast from Cape Bogador (Rio d'Oro) southwards will be under the command of British naval and air officers for naval operations and air operations in collaboration with naval forces.
- (2) Subject to ( 1) above the coast from Cape Bogador to the western boundary of Sierra Leone will be a French sub-area, and all forces operating therein will be under French command.
8. A separate message is being sent regarding discussions between General de Gaulle and General Giraud.
9. I need not impress on you the vital necessity of treating the foregoing with utmost secrecy.

[Records of Department of External Affairs]

**APPENDIX "G"**  
**ORDERS OF DETAIL UNDER THE VISITING FORCES ACT PLACING**  
**CANADIAN FORCES "IN COMBINATION" WITH BRITISH FORCES**

This list includes only orders relating to the Canadian Army field force overseas. It does not include orders relating to units under Canadian Military Headquarters, London, or orders relating to R.C.A.F. squadrons; there were numerous orders in both these categories. All the orders here listed were issued by the senior Canadian Army field commander overseas (until December 1943, General McNaughton) except where otherwise noted. On the Visiting Forces Act and the Orders of Detail issued under it, see above, pages 211-13, 218, 248-49, and 254.

Number	Date	Canadian Forces Affected	Circumstances	Remarks
1	Feb 40	Anti-aircraft Lewis gun Teams	Protection of trawlers and minesweepers	No actual order found
2	17 Apr 40	Two battalions and attached units	For Norwegian campaign (Trondheim)	Operation cancelled
3	1 Jun 40	1 <sup>st</sup> Cdn Div and attached units	For "Second B.E.F." (France)	
4	19 Jun 40	"Canadian Force" (1 <sup>st</sup> Cdn Div and attached units)	Force in G.H.Q. Reserve (England)	
5	19 Aug 40	All units under Gen. McNaughton	New designation by Minister of National Defence under Visiting Forces Act	
6	6 Apr 42	1 <sup>st</sup> Cdn Corps	Corps under South Eastern Command (in Sussex)	H.Q. First Cdn Army set up on this day
7	19 Jun 43	1 <sup>st</sup> Cdn Div, 1 <sup>st</sup> Cdn Army Tk Bde, etc.	For Sicilian campaign	
7A	17 Aug 43	Additional minor units	For Sicilian campaign	
8	20 Oct 43	1 <sup>st</sup> Cdn Corps	For Italian campaign	
9	7 Jan 44	First Cdn Army	Preparatory to N.-W. Europe campaign	Issued by Acting Army Commander (Lt.-Gen. Stuart)
10	20 Mar 44	First Cdn Army and other units in 21 <sup>st</sup> Army Group	Preparatory to N.-W. Europe campaign	Issued jointly by Army Commander (Lt.-Gen. Crerar) and Chief of Staff C.M.H.Q. (Lt.-Gen. Stuart)
11*	1 Feb 44	Units not under First Cdn Army embarking for Mediterranean theatre		Issued by Chief of Staff C.M.H.Q.
12	9 Jul 45	Canadian Army Occupation Force	To act in combination with United Kingdom occupation forces	Issued jointly by Army Commander (Gen. Crerar) and Chief of Staff C.M.H.Q. (Lt.-Gen. Montague)

\*Order No. 11 is earlier in date than No. 10.

**APPENDIX "H"**

**ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF CANADIAN FORCES OVERSEAS  
(Directive for General McNaughton, 7 Dec 1939)**

*Confidential*

*MEMORANDUM*

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF  
CANADIAN FORCES OVERSEAS

1. The control of the organization and administration of Canadian Forces Overseas, both in Great Britain and in the theatre of operations, will be exercised by the Minister of National Defence and the normal channel of communication between him and Commanders, whether in Great Britain or in the theatre of operations, will be through the Chief of the General Staff. In view of the practical difficulties of maintaining direct telegraphic touch with the Commander in the Field, communication for the present will be carried out through the High Commissioner for Canada in Great Britain and the Chief of the General Staff.

2. All matters concerning military operations and discipline in the Field, being the direct responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in the theatre of operations, will be dealt with by the General Officer Commanding, Canadian Forces in the Field, through the Commander-in-Chief, whose powers in this regard are exercisable within the limitations laid down in the Visiting Forces Acts (Canada and United Kingdom).

3. Non-divisional units sent abroad to provide the 1st Canadian Division with requisite Canadian ancillary arms and services will, it is hoped, normally be employed with the 1st Canadian Division. While the employment of these units in the Field will usually come directly under the Headquarters of the Army Corps to which the 1st Canadian Division is attached, the channel of authority for training and administration of personnel, including such matters as all questions relating to commissions, promotions, appointments, transfers, exchanges, recalls and demands for officers, will pass through the G.O.C., 1st Canadian Division, to the Canadian Government through the channels referred to in para. 1 above.

4. Non-divisional units and details of the C.A.S.F. attached to the 1st Canadian Division in Great Britain will be under the command of the G.O.C., 1st Canadian Division, for all purposes. Upon departure from Great Britain of Headquarters, 1st Canadian Division, they will pass to the command of the senior combatant officer of Canadian Military Headquarters in Great Britain who will command all Canadian troops in Great Britain other than those of the 1st Canadian Division and troops attached thereto.

5. In matters of policy the Canadian Military Headquarters in Great Britain will communicate with the Chief of the General Staff, Canada, through the High Commissioner and in matters of detail it will communicate direct with the Chief of the General Staff.

6. While the High Commissioner will not make decisions on matters of policy, he may, however, desire information on military questions as they arise; it will be one of the duties of the Canadian Military Headquarters in Great Britain to inform the High Commissioner in this respect as required.

7. As regards the relationship between the Canadian Military Headquarters in England and the 1st Canadian Division, the former will exercise no command over the latter, even while the Division is in England. On the other hand, it is essential that the closest liaison be maintained. In matters of policy the G.O.C., 1st Canadian Division, will deal with Canada through the High Commissioner. While he will not deal with the Canadian Military Headquarters on policy he will deal with it direct and vice versa in matters of mutual concern and in regard to details.

8. The relationship between the Canadian Military Headquarters in England and the War Office will be one of close liaison, but the former will be in no way under the latter. Details will be taken up direct between the two, but if questions of policy arise the channel of communication will be through the High Commissioner to or from the Department of National Defence.

*Sgd. T. V. ANDERSON  
Major-General  
C.G.S.*

7 December, 1939.

**THE RALSTON-SINCLAIR AGREEMENT**  
**on squadrons to be formed under the**  
**British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, 7 Jan 1941**

*Secret*

*MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT*

between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada as to the arrangements to be made under Article 15 of the British Commonwealth Air Training Agreement and the letter of 16<sup>th</sup> December, 1939, from Lord Riverdale to the Canadian Minister of National Defence.

It is agreed that the arrangements referred to in Article 15 of the Air Training Agreement for identifying with Canada the Canadian pilots and air crews trained under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan shall be on the following lines:—

1. These pilots and air crews will be incorporated into squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force up to the number of twenty-five, in addition to the three already serving in the United Kingdom.

2. The exact rate of formation cannot be guaranteed since it depends on the rate at which the projected Air Force expansion can be achieved; nevertheless the endeavour will be to form these twenty-five squadrons within the next eighteen months in accordance with the following schedule:—

By March, 1941 .....	3 squadrons to be formed.
By June, 1941 .....	7 squadrons to be formed.
By September, 1941 .....	12 squadrons to be formed.
By December, 1941 .....	17 squadrons to be formed.
By March, 1942 .....	22 squadrons to be formed.
By April or May, 1942.....	25 squadrons to be formed.

3. To facilitate arrangements for posting Canadian pilots and air crews, there will be established a Central Posting Organisation and a Central Record Office, the staff of which will include Royal Canadian Air Force personnel.

4. All Canadian pilots and air crews from the Air Training Plan not in Royal Canadian Air Force units or formations will continue to wear Royal Canadian Air Force uniform.

5. The working out of the foregoing arrangements shall be reviewed in September, 1941, in order to determine whether the schedule in paragraph 2 can be maintained or accelerated and to consider the position and organisation of Canadian pilots and air crews in excess of those who may be absorbed in Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons under these arrangements.

6. Under the Air Training Plan and at the request of the United Kingdom Government, the Royal Canadian Air Force has concentrated on the production of pilots and air crews. This has necessitated the provision and employment in Canada of ground personnel who would otherwise have been available for service with Royal Canadian Air Force squadrons overseas. It is recognised, however, as desirable, so far as it may mutually be considered practicable, that the United Kingdom ground personnel who, for the reason stated above, will be required for the squadrons referred to in paragraph 2 should gradually be exchanged for Royal Canadian Air Force ground personnel employed on the Air Training Plan, with a view to achieving homogeneity of personnel in these squadrons.

7. The concentration of the Royal Canadian Air Force on the Air Training Plan may also, at the outset, result in a shortage of Royal Canadian Air Force officers with the necessary qualifications to fill posts as Squadron Commanders, Station Commanders, etc. It is recognised that, if enough Royal Canadian Air Force officers with these qualifications are not immediately available, some of these posts may require to be filled by Royal Air Force officers. The replacement of these Royal Air Force officers will be effected progressively as soon as qualified Royal Canadian Air Force officers become available for that purpose.

8. Nothing in these arrangements to implement Article 15 affects the financial responsibilities of the two Governments under the Air Training Agreement, it being understood that the cost of the twenty-five squadrons referred to in paragraph 1 above will be borne by the United Kingdom Government, except that the pay, allowances, and non-effective benefits of Royal

Canadian Air Force personnel who serve in the new squadrons will be borne by the United Kingdom Government only to the extent provided for in Article 17 of the Air Training Agreement.

9. The Air Officer Commanding the Royal Canadian Air Force Overseas Headquarters, or a senior officer designated by the Canadian Government for the purpose, will at all times have access to Commanders of Stations and Groups and to Commanders-in-Chief of Commands in which Royal Canadian Air Force personnel are serving, and will be furnished by them with such information as he may desire. He will also have access to the Chief of the Air Staff. He will be furnished with advance information about any major questions which arise from time to time affecting the employment of Royal Canadian Air Force personnel and squadrons. He will be at liberty to make representations to the Air Ministry on any of the above matters.

10. The arrangements in the preceding paragraph will not affect the existing procedure for consultation between the two Governments on major questions affecting the employment of the Royal Canadian Air Force personnel and squadrons overseas.

Done in duplicate, at London, England, this 7th day of January, 1941.

On behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom

(Signed) ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR

On behalf of the Government of Canada

(Signed) J. L. RALSTON

**APPENDIX "J"****NEW AGREEMENT CONCERNING BRITISH COMMONWEALTH  
AIR TRAINING PLAN, 5 JUN 1942***Secret*

1. The Memorandum of Agreement, dated 17th December, 1939, between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand about the training of aircrews in Canada and their subsequent service, and the supplementary Agreement, dated 7th January, 1941, between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada (hereinafter referred to as the 1939 and 1941 Agreements, respectively) shall be terminated and, in order to meet changes and developments in air training, a new agreement as set out hereunder shall be substituted therefor.

2. The 1939 and 1941 Agreements shall be terminated on 1st July, 1942, and the new agreement shall become operative on that date and shall remain in force until 31st March, 1945, unless by agreement between the Governments concerned it be extended or terminated at an earlier date.

3. As hereinafter provided the Government of Canada will act for itself and the other Governments concerned, as administrator of the air training plan set up under the 1939 Agreement and continued hereunder and of any additional schools which, by agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada, have been or may be brought within the scope of that Plan.

4. (a) Subject to such variation as may be agreed from time to time between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada, the Plan will comprise the number and categories of schools and units set out in Appendix I.

(b) Any additional air training schools or units which may be formed in Canada at the request of any of the parties to this Agreement will be treated in all respects as R.C.A.F. schools under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan unless it is specially agreed otherwise by the Government of Canada.

5. The Government of Canada will, in accordance with Appendix II, also undertake the administration and control of the units set out in that Appendix and known as the R.A.F. units in Canada.

6. The Government of Canada will also maintain such supervisory and ancillary units as may be necessary for the control, administration and maintenance of the combined training organization covered by this Agreement.

7. The words "combined training organization" in this Agreement include all the schools and other units referred to in Articles 4, 5 and 6.

8. The number of pupils to be trained in each category of school and unit will be as agreed from time to time between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada.

9. (a) The Government of the United Kingdom undertakes to send from time to time enough pupils for training in Canada to keep filled not less than 40 per cent of the training capacity provided in the combined training organization, for each of the following types of schools and units:—

Elementary Flying Training Schools.

Service Flying Training Schools.

Air Observer Schools (for observers, navigators and air bombers).

Bombing and Gunnery Schools (for observers, air bombers and air gunners).

General Reconnaissance Schools.

Operational Training Units.

(b) By agreement with the Government of Canada, the Government of the United Kingdom may send additional pupils for training in Canada.

(c) The Government of Canada, as administrator of the combined training organization, agrees to allot the number of places to be filled in accordance with clauses (a) and (b) above.

(d) The number of pupils sent by the Government of the United Kingdom may include pupils from any part of the British Commonwealth other than Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and also pupils of Allied Countries.

(e) The number and categories of the pupils sent may be varied from time to time by agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada.

(f) The percentage of the training capacity in general reconnaissance schools and operational training units allotted under clauses (a) and (c) of this Article may

be varied from time to time to meet operational requirements by agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada.

10. (a) The Governments of Australia and New Zealand will endeavour to send to Canada for training in each year the following numbers of pupils for whom places will be allotted:—

<i>Australia</i>	
Pilots trained to Elementary Flying Training School standard.....	1,300
Observers trained to Initial Training School standard.....	676
Wireless Operator-Air Gunners trained to Initial Training School standard.....	936

*New Zealand*

Pilots trained to Elementary Flying Training School standard.....	450*
Observers trained to Initial Training School standard.....	676
Wireless Operator-Air Gunners trained to Initial Training School standard.....	715

- (b) The number and categories of the pupils sent may be varied from time to time by agreement between the Governments directly concerned.
- (c) Any deficiency in the supply of pupils by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand may be made good by the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada.

11. The training to be given shall be in accordance with the syllabi of instruction agreed from time to time between the Government of the United Kingdom and the other Governments concerned.

12. Pupils sent for training in Canada under the provision of Articles 9 and 10 will receive pay, allowances and other emoluments in accordance with the provisions set out in Appendix III to this Agreement.

13. To help in the carrying out of training the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand will lend personnel in such ranks and in such numbers as may be agreed upon with the Government of Canada, as administrator of the combined training organization.

14. (a) Subject to the provisions of clauses (b), (c) and (d) below, the Government of the United Kingdom agrees that it will assume as its share of the cost of the combined training organization, for the period from 1st July, 1942, to 31st March, 1945, a liability for the sum of seven hundred and twenty-three million dollars Canadian (which sum is approximately one-half of the estimated cost thereof to be incurred during the aforementioned period), less payments received by the Government of Canada from the Governments of Australia and New Zealand in respect of training for the period from 1st July, 1942, to 31st March, 1945, under the provisions of Article 20. Should this Agreement be terminated before 31st March, 1945, the liability of the Government of the United Kingdom will be for a sum of Canadian dollars equivalent to one-half of the estimated cost of the combined training organization, as determined by the Government of Canada, as administrator of the organization, and agreed by the Government of the United Kingdom, for the period from 1st July, 1942, to the date of termination, and less payments received by the Government of Canada from the Governments of Australia and New Zealand in respect of training for such period.
- (b) So far as practicable, the share of the cost of the combined training organization to be borne by the Government of the United Kingdom, as provided by clause (a) above and after deducting the payment to be made under clause (c), will take the form of contributions in kind to be delivered in Canada by the Government of the United Kingdom at such times and in such quantities as may be required by the Government of Canada, as administrator of the combined training organization, for the efficient operation of the organization. Such contributions in kind shall consist of the items which are enumerated in Appendix VI and which may be generally described as follows:—
- (i) aircraft, engines, spare parts, technical equipment, bombs and ammunition, other than of United Kingdom or Canadian types manufactured in Canada;
  - (ii) gasoline and oil other than supplies derived from Canadian oil wells.

\*This figure will be increased on resumption of eight-week course.

- (c) The Government of the United Kingdom will pay quarterly in Canadian dollars to the Government of Canada, as administrator of the combined training organization, lump sums representing the estimated total of R.A.F. pay (but not allowances) of all R.A.F. personnel, both staff and pupils, in the combined training organization.
- (d) Should changes in training arrangements occur, which, in the opinion of the Financial Adviser appointed in accordance with Article 21, materially affect the cost of the organization, the liabilities accepted by the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand will be adjusted accordingly.

15. In so far as defence articles supplied to the Government of the United Kingdom by the Government of the United States of America under the Lease-Lend Act are used for purposes of the combined training organization, the title to such articles will not be transferred to the Government of Canada.

16. The Government of the United Kingdom will be responsible for the packing, loading and transporting to Canada of aircraft and other equipment supplied as its contribution in kind. The cost of unloading and transportation in Canada will be borne by the Government of Canada, as administrator of the combined training organization.

17. Aircraft, aircraft engines and equipment to be supplied by the Government of the United Kingdom will be of such types as may be agreed with the Government of Canada, as administrator of the combined training organization.

18. The Government of Canada will accept financial liability for all costs and expenses of the combined training organization not otherwise provided for in this Agreement.

- 19. (a) Except for any advances made by other Governments concerned as provided for in clause (b) of this Article, the Government of Canada, as administrator of the combined training organization, will, in the first instance, advance all the costs and expenses incurred as such administrator under the provisions of this Agreement.
- (b) The Governments of Australia and New Zealand will make advance payments necessary for pay and allowances, transportation charges and other expenses during the journey to Canada in respect of pupils sent to Canada by such Governments for training and for such other costs and expenses as may be agreed to from time to time; and the Governments of Australia and New Zealand will immediately after the end of each month, notify the Government of Canada, as administrator of the combined training organization, of the amounts of any advance payments made by them during such month and will, as soon as possible thereafter, send to the Government of Canada, a detailed statement in respect of such advance payments.
- (c) In connection with the repayments to be made by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, as provided for under Article 20, due allowance will be made for any advance payments notified by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand under the provisions of clause (b).
- (d) In this Agreement the term "costs and expenses" shall mean all expenditures, costs, charges and liabilities made or incurred by the Government of Canada, as administrator of the combined training Organization, and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, shall include:
  - (i) Pay, allowances, transportation charges and other expenses connected with the training of R.C.A.F. pupils in Canada up to the date of their leaving Canada under the provisions of Article 22; or, in the case of R.C.A.F. pupils taken to fill vacancies in the Home Defence squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force as provided for in Article 22, to the date of their being so taken.
  - (ii) Pay, allowances, transportation charges and other expenses connected with the training in Canada of pupils sent by the Government of the United Kingdom, as from the date of their arrival in Canada up to the date of their leaving Canada.
  - (iii) Pay, allowances, transportation charges and other expenses connected with the training of pupils in Canada sent by the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, as from the date of their leaving Australia or New Zealand, respectively, for the purpose of taking up training in Canada to the date of their leaving Canada under the provisions of Article 22.

But the term "costs and expenses" shall not include:

- (iv) Costs and expenses of clothing and personal equipment of pupils other than such issues as may be necessary during the period of training and other than flying clothing and equipment.
- (v) Pensions and other non-effective benefits to, or in respect of, personnel on the staff of the combined training organization.
- (vi) Pensions and other non-effective benefits to, or in respect of, pupils.
- (vii) Allowances in respect of R.A.F. families and dependents residing outside Canada.

The costs and expenses excluded by (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) above will be borne by the Governments providing the staff and the pupils in respect of whom such costs and expenses are incurred.

20. (a) The Government of Australia will bear the cost of the training of its pupils received into the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan prior to 31st March, 1943, in accordance with the terms of the 1939 Agreement and the Agreement supplementary thereto, dated 1st June, 1942, in respect of its obligations up to and including 31st March, 1943, and, for pupils arriving in Canada from Australia after that date, will bear the cost of training on a basis to be determined in London by agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Australia, in conjunction with the discussions which are due to take place for the continuance after 31st March, 1943, of the air training scheme in Australia.
- (b) The Government of New Zealand will bear the cost of the training of its pupils received into the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan prior to 31<sup>st</sup> March, 1943, in accordance with the terms of the 1939 Agreement and the Agreement supplementary thereto, dated 1st June, 1942, in respect of its obligations up to and including 31st March, 1943, and, for pupils arriving in Canada from New Zealand after that date, will bear the cost of training on a basis to be determined in London by agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and New Zealand, in conjunction with the discussions which are due to take place for the continuance after 31st March, 1943, of the air training scheme in New Zealand.

21. The Government of Canada will, in consultation with the other Governments concerned, appoint an officer to act as its Financial Adviser in carrying out its functions as administrator of the combined training organization. Any reports made by the Financial Adviser shall be made available by the Government of Canada to all the other Governments concerned and the latter shall be entitled to obtain from the Financial Adviser information on all matters affecting the cost of the combined training organization and their participation in it.

22. The Governments of Canada, Australia and New Zealand may retain that proportion of the output of the combined training organization necessary to build up and maintain such Home Defence squadrons as it may be possible to form from agreed aircraft allocations. The remainder will be made available for service with, or in conjunction with, the Royal Air Force, subject as regards R.C.A.F. personnel, to the provisions of Appendices IV and V.

23. The Government of the United Kingdom undertakes that pupils of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, after training is completed, shall, so far as practicable, be identified with their respective Dominions. The arrangements in respect of Canada are set out in Appendix IV.

24. Subject to the provisions of Article 25, the Government of the United Kingdom will provide the pay, allowances, pensions and other non-effective benefits (excluding dependents' allowances payable in Canada and post war credits in respect of R.C.A.F. personnel), maintenance and other expenses of the aircrew who have been or may be trained in Canada (other than those made available for service with Dominion Home Defence squadrons, in accordance with the provisions of Article 22), with effect from the date of leaving Canada for service with, or in conjunction with, the Royal Air Force or, for personnel who join an R.A.F. unit in Canada outside the combined training organization, from the date of so joining. The Government of the United Kingdom also undertakes to arrange for those pupils who are made available for service with, or in conjunction with, the Royal Air Force to be embarked as speedily as possible after completion of their training and to defray the cost of their transportation to the stations to which they are appointed on leaving Canada.

25. The pay, allowances, pensions and other non-effective benefits, maintenance and other expenses for which the Government of the United Kingdom undertakes liability under the provisions of Article 24 will be as laid down in R.A.F. regulations. If it has been or should be decided

by the Governments of Canada, Australia or New Zealand to supplement the amount so issued, any such supplement will be borne by the Government concerned.

26. The Government of Canada, as administrator of the combined training organization, will have charge of the assets acquired for the purpose of the organization.

27. On termination of this Agreement, any obligations accruing in respect of the combined training organization, and any costs necessarily incurred in the process of winding up the organization, shall be shared by the Governments of Canada, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, as follows:—

	Per cent
Canada.....	50
United Kingdom.....	45
Australia.....	3
New Zealand.....	2

Residual assets, other than defence articles supplied to the Government of the United Kingdom by the Government of the United States of America under the Lease-Lend Act and other than land, will be apportioned on a similar basis.

28. The Supervisory Board, which was set up for the purpose of supervising the financial and general administrative arrangements of the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan shortly after it was inaugurated, will continue to operate and will cover the combined training organization.

29. Air Liaison Missions of the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand have been established in Ottawa for the purpose of facilitating communications on matters arising out of this Agreement.

Done in quintuplicate at Ottawa, this 5th day of June, 1942

On Behalf of the Government of the United Kingdom  
Harold BALFOUR.

On Behalf of the Government of Canada  
Charles G. POWER.

On Behalf of the Government of Australia  
T. W. GLASGOW.

On Behalf of the Government of New Zealand  
Frank LANGSTONE.

**Appendix I**SCHOOLS AND UNITS COMPRISING THE BRITISH  
COMMONWEALTH AIR TRAINING PLAN

The number and categories of schools and units comprised in the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan will be as follows:—

Initial Training Schools.....	7	
Elementary Flying Training Schools (Including 2 schools forming in 1943).....	16	(of which 12 will be double schools)
Service Flying Training Schools (Including 4 schools forming in 1943).....	20	
Air Observer and Air Navigator Schools (Including Central Navigation School).....	10	(of which 9 will be double schools)
Bombing and Gunnery Schools.....	10	
General Reconnaissance School.....	1	
Wireless Schools.....	4	
Operational Training Units.....	4	
Flying Instructors' Schools.....	3	
Central Flying School.....	1	{These two units
S.B.A. and Link Trainer School.....	1	{are at present accommodated on the same station as No. 1 F.I.S.

ROYAL AIR FORCE UNITS IN CANADA

1. *List of Units*

The R.A.F. units established in Canada are as follows:—

*Elementary Flying Training Schools—*

Nos. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 and 36.

*Service Flying Training Schools—*

Nos. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 41.

*Air Navigation Schools—*

Nos. 31, 32 and 33.

*Bombing and Gunnery School—*

No. 31.

*General Reconnaissance School—*

No. 31.

*Operational Training Units—*

Nos. 31, 32, 34 and 36.

*Radio School—*

No. 31.

*Personnel Depot—*

No. 31.

2. *Administration of Units*

- (a) The R.A.F. units in Canada will be administered by the Royal Canadian Air Force in the same manner as units constituted under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, provided that: —
- (i) they will preserve their R.A.F. identity.
  - (ii) existing arrangements concerning consultation with, and concurrence of, the United Kingdom Air Liaison Mission on personnel and administrative matters will remain. Such arrangements may be varied by agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada, as required by circumstances.
- (b) R.A.F. Elementary Flying Training Schools — now established in Canada — shall be civilianized on similar lines to elementary flying training schools under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, except that the flying instructional posts and certain specialist ground instructional posts will be filled by R.A.F. personnel in uniform, who will receive R.C.A.F. rates of pay. In all other respects, the conditions set out in clause (a) will apply equally to these schools.
- (c) R.A.F. personnel rendered redundant by the civilianization will be absorbed into the other R.A.F. units in Canada or as directed by the United Kingdom Air Ministry.

**Appendix III**CONDITIONS OF SERVICE OF AIRCREWS  
R.C.A.F. PUPILS1. *Commissioning*—

- (a) All pilots, observers, navigators and air bombers who are considered suitable according to the standards of the Government of Canada and who are recommended for commissions will be commissioned.
- (b) The percentages of commissions given at the date of this Agreement to wireless operator & gunners, namely 20 per cent of total graduates, divided 10 per cent on graduation and 10 per cent after service, and air gunners, namely 20 per cent of total graduates, divided 5 per cent on graduation and 15 per cent after service, will be maintained. Some flexibility will, however, be permitted to ensure that airmen in these categories who have the necessary qualifications are not excluded from commissions on account of the quota.

*Procedure*

- (c) Normally, the initiative in recommending an airman for a commission will rest with his commanding officer, but an airman may apply to be recommended, and, if his application is endorsed and forwarded by his commanding officer, it will receive the same consideration as if it had been initiated by the latter. An application for a commission by an airman of the Royal Canadian Air Force, even if it is not endorsed, will be forwarded through the usual channels to R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters. The Headquarters will be provided with all relevant documents and will arrange for the candidate to appear before a Selection Board convened by the Air Officer-in-Chief, R.C.A.F. Overseas.
- (d) To guard against the danger that frequent changes of posting may prejudice the recommendation of an airman for a commission, or when it is felt that the particular qualifications or circumstances of any airman warrant consideration and may have been overlooked, it will be open to the R.C.A.F. Liaison Officers in the R.A.F. Commands or at R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters to make representations to the commanding officer of the unit and to the Air Officer Commanding the group concerned, about that airman. Thereafter the procedure laid down in clause (c) above will be applicable.
- (e) Individuals who are to be commissioned at the sole instance of the R.C.A.F. authorities will be transferred to an R.C.A.F. squadron or be repatriated before such commissioning is put into effect.
- (f) A commission will take effect from the date of the original recommendation by the commanding officer of the unit or, if the recommendation has not been made by the commanding officer, from the date of the recommendation by R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters, even if the candidate has become a casualty by the time the recommendation is approved.
- (g) The R.A.F. authorities, in conjunction with R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters, will at once review the case of every airman in all aircrew categories who has been in an operational unit for more than two months.

2. *Pay and Allowances*—

- (a) Pay and additional pay will be at the rates and subject to the conditions laid down in Financial Regulations and Instructions for the Royal Canadian Air Force on Active Service.
- (b) During service in Canada, allowances, etc., will be admissible under the conditions laid down in Financial Regulations and Instructions for the Royal Canadian Air Force on Active Service.
- (c) As from the date of leaving Canada for service with, or in conjunction with, the Royal Air Force, or, for personnel who join an R.A.F. unit in Canada outside the combined training organization, from the date of so joining, officers and airmen will, subject to the conditions laid down in King's Regulations and Air Council Instructions for the Royal Air Force, receive from the R.A.F. paying authority the pay, allowances, etc., of the rank and branch (or group) appropriate to their service with, or in conjunction with, the Royal Air Force, except that the special arrangements mentioned under (d) below will be made for the issue of allowances in respect of families or other dependents.

- (d) The Government of Canada will issue to the families or other dependents the allowance and assigned pay which may be payable under R.C.A.F. regulations. Corresponding allowances payable under R.A.F. regulations will not be issued. Compulsory allotment under R.A.F. regulations will be deducted from pay and will be retained by the Government of the United Kingdom.
- (e) If the pay and allowances admissible under R.C.A.F. regulations should exceed those admissible under R.A.F. regulations, the difference (after taking into account the payment made under (d) above) will be issued by the Government of Canada as deferred pay, either on termination of service or otherwise in special circumstances.
- (f) Personnel will not be insured under United Kingdom insurance schemes, and any insurance contributions (employers' and employees' shares) necessary to ensure benefits under Canadian schemes will be paid by the Government of Canada, who will arrange with the Government of the United Kingdom to recover from pay any employees' shares of such contributions so recoverable.

#### R.A.F. PUPILS

##### 3. *Pay, Allowances, etc., for the Period of Journey to Canada.*

For the period of the journey to Canada, officers and airmen of the Royal Air Force will receive from the appropriate R.A.F. paying authority pay, allowances, etc., at the rates and subject to the conditions laid down in King's Regulations and Air Council Instructions for the Royal Air Force.

##### 4. *Pay, Allowances, etc., during Service in Canada.*

- (a) During service in Canada, officers and airmen of the Royal Air Force will, subject to the conditions laid down in Financial Regulations and Instructions for the Royal Canadian Air Force on Active Service, receive from the appropriate paying officer in Canada the pay, allowances, etc., of the rank and branch (or group) in the Royal Canadian Air Force corresponding with that held in the Royal Air Force, except that the special arrangements mentioned under (b) below will be made for the issue of allowances to families or other dependents outside Canada.
- (b) If the family or other dependent resides outside Canada, the Government of the United Kingdom will issue the allowances in respect of family or other dependent payable under R.A.F. regulations, together with assigned pay under R.C.A.F. regulations, which latter will be deducted from pay issued by the paying officer in Canada. The assigned pay so deducted will be included in quarterly lump sum payments to the Government of the United Kingdom covering deductions made from pay for the purpose of making payments in the United Kingdom.
- (c) Personnel will not be insured under Canadian insurance schemes and any insurance contributions (employers' and employees' shares) necessary to ensure benefits under United Kingdom schemes will be paid by the Government of the United Kingdom, who will arrange with the Government of Canada, as administrator of the combined training organization, for the recovery from pay of any employees' share of such contributions so recoverable.

#### R.A.A.F. AND R.N.Z.A.F. PUPILS

##### 5. *Pay, Allowances, etc., for the Period of Journey to Canada*

For the period of the journey to Canada, personnel of the Royal Australian Air Force and of the Royal New Zealand Air Force will receive from the appropriate paying officers pay, allowances, etc., at the rates and subject to the conditions laid down in the Regulations for the Royal Australian Air Force and Royal New Zealand Air Force, respectively.

##### 6. *Pay, Allowances, etc., during Service in Canada*

- (a) During service in Canada, officers and airmen of the Royal Australian Air Force and of the Royal New Zealand Air Force will, subject to the conditions laid down in Financial Regulations and Instructions for the Royal Canadian Air Force on Active Service, receive from the appropriate paying officer in Canada the pay, allowances, etc., of the rank and branch (or group) in the Royal Canadian Air Force corresponding with that held in the Royal Australian Air Force or the Royal New Zealand Air Force (as appropriate) except that the special arrangements mentioned under (b) below will be made in regard to the issue of allowances to families or other dependents outside Canada.

- (b) The allowances and compulsory allotment from pay in respect of family or other dependent, which would be appropriate under R.A.A.F. or R.N.Z.A.F. regulations will, if the family or other dependent resides outside Canada, be issued by the Government of Australia or the Government of New Zealand (as appropriate) who will reclaim from the Government of Canada, as administrator of the combined training organization, the amount so issued. The paying officer in Canada will deduct from pay the amount of assigned pay chargeable under R.C.A.F. regulations.
- (c) Personnel will not be insured under Canadian insurance schemes, and any insurance contributions (employers' and employees' shares) necessary to ensure benefits under Australian or New Zealand schemes will be paid by the Government of Australia or the Government of New Zealand (as appropriate), who will arrange with the Government of Canada, as administrator of the combined training organization, for the recovery from pay of any employees' share of such contributions so recoverable.

*7. Pay, Allowances, etc., during Service with the Royal Air Force*

- (a) As from the date of leaving Canada for service with, or in conjunction with, the Royal Air Force, or, for personnel who join an R.A.F. unit in Canada outside the combined training organization, from the date of so joining, officers and airmen will, subject to the conditions laid down in King's Regulations and Air Council Instructions for the Royal Air Force, receive from the R.A.F. paying authority the pay, allowances, etc., of the rank and branch (or group) appropriate to their service with, or in conjunction with, the Royal Air Force, except that the special arrangements mentioned under (b) below will be made for the issue of allowances to families or other dependents in Australia or New Zealand.
- (b) The allowances and compulsory allotment from pay in respect of family or other dependent which may be payable under R.A.F. regulations will, if the family or other dependent resides in Australia or New Zealand, be credited to the Government of Australia or to the Government of New Zealand (as appropriate) who will issue to the family or other dependent the allowance and compulsory allotment from pay which may be payable under the R.A.A.F. or R.N.Z.A.F. regulations.
- (c) If the pay and allowances admissible under R.A.A.F. or R.N.Z.A.F. regulations exceed those admissible under R.A.F. regulations, and the Government of Australia or the Government of New Zealand (as appropriate) decides that this difference is to be credited to the officer or airman, the difference (after taking into account the payment made under (b) above) will be issued by the Government of Australia or the Government of New Zealand (as appropriate) as deferred pay, either on termination of service or otherwise in special circumstances.
- (d) Personnel will not be insured under United Kingdom insurance schemes, and any insurance contributions (employers' and employees' shares) necessary to ensure benefits under Australian or New Zealand schemes will be paid by the Government of Australia or the Government of New Zealand (as appropriate) who will arrange with the Government of the United Kingdom to recover from pay any employees' shares of such contributions so recoverable.

**Appendix IV****CONTROL AND ADMINISTRATION OF R.C.A.F. OVERSEAS***Overseas Headquarters*

1. In order that R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters shall be fully informed as to the proposed employment of Canadian personnel and, as to changes of Air Ministry policy which immediately affect Canadian personnel, there shall be consultation before decisions are given on administrative matters affecting such personnel. Air Ministry departments will be so instructed. This does not mean that there will be prior consultation on day to day routine matters.

2. The Air Officer-in-Chief, R.C.A.F. Overseas, or a senior officer designated by the Government of Canada for the purpose, will at all times have access to Commanders of Stations and Groups and to Air Officers Commanding-in-Chief of Commands in which R.C.A.F. personnel are serving, and will be furnished by them with such information affecting R.C.A.F. personnel as he may desire. He will also have access to the Chief of the Air Staff. He will be furnished with advance information about any major questions which arise from time to time affecting the employment of R.C.A.F. personnel and squadrons. He will be at liberty to make representations to the Air Ministry on any of the above matters.

3. R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters will be given general supervision over R.C.A.F. personnel attached to the Royal Air Force and shall be entitled to inquire into and make direct representations to the Air Ministry about the well-being and necessities, either individually or collectively, of such personnel.

4. The responsibilities of R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters in respect of Courts-Martial on R.C.A.F. personnel will be as follows:—

- (i) District Courts-Martial on R.C.A.F. personnel shall be convened by the group concerned and unless circumstances render it impracticable, shall be predominantly composed of Canadian officers.
- (ii) General Courts-Martial on R.C.A.F. personnel shall be convened by the Command concerned and unless circumstances render it impracticable, shall be predominantly composed of Canadian officers selected in consultation with the Air Officer-in-Chief.
- (iii) Proceedings of District Courts-Martial shall be passed to R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters for review after promulgation. Proceedings of General Courts-Martial shall be passed to R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters for review prior to confirmation.

5. The present limitation requiring the approval by the Governor General of Canada in Council before confirmation of finding- and sentence will be continued where the following sentences are passed on R.C.A.F. personnel:—

<i>Officers</i>	<i>Airmen</i>
1. Death.	1. Death.
2. Penal Servitude.	2. Penal Servitude.
3. Imprisonment with or without hard labour.	
4. Cashiering.	
5. Dismissal from H.M. Service.	

*R.C.A.F. Personnel Reception Centre*

6. The R.C.A.F. Personnel Reception Centre in the United Kingdom will be controlled functionally by R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters, but will be under the appropriate R.A.F. Group for general administration and will conform with general R.A.F. training requirements. Any excess capacity in that Centre will be available to the personnel of other Dominion Air Forces, and to R.A.F. personnel as circumstances necessitate. Similarly, other excess local accommodation will be available to the Royal Canadian Air Force. The principle of common user of training and other facilities will also apply. The Officer Commanding R.C.A.F. Personnel Reception Centre will be responsible for the selection of R.C.A.F. personnel for posting from the Personnel Reception Centre to training and other units.

7. R.C.A.F. Personnel placed at the disposal of the Government of the United Kingdom will be attached to the Royal Air Force, The Royal Canadian Air Force reserves the right to recall any officer or airman so attached to serve with the Royal Canadian Air Force, subject to operational expediency. The final decision as to operational expediency rests with those responsible for the conduct of operations.

*R.C.A.F. Disposal Centre*

8. An R.C.A.F. Disposal Centre will be formed at a location mutually agreed upon between the Air Officer-in-Chief and the Air Ministry, to which R.C.A.F. personnel who have become non-effective for any cause will be posted for disposal. The cost of the Centre will be borne by the Government of the United Kingdom except that the pay, allowances, non-effective benefits and other expenses will be borne by the Government of the United Kingdom only to the same extent as is provided in Article 25 for other R.C.A.F. personnel.

*Attachment and Posting of R.C.A.F. Personnel*

9. Subject to the exigencies of operational needs, the concurrence of R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters will be obtained

- (i) in the selection of commanding officers for R.C.A.F. squadrons;
- (ii) in the posting of R.C.A.F. officers of the rank of wing commander and above.

10. To facilitate arrangements for posting R.C.A.F. aircrew, a central posting organization and a central record office, the staff of which will include R.C.A.F. personnel, will be established.

*Formation of R.C.A.F. Squadrons*

11. (a) In pursuance of the provision of Article 23 of the Agreement a number of R.C.A.F. squadrons will be formed, to which aircrew of the Royal Canadian Air Force will be posted. The aim will be to form thirty-five such squadrons, in addition to the three R.C.A.F. squadrons originally transferred from Canada. This objective will be subject to review at short intervals, the first review being made not later than September, 1942.

(b) R.C.A.F. personnel serving with the Royal Air Force under the provisions of Article 22 will, on posting to an R.C.A.F. squadron, cease to be so serving with the Royal Air Force. R.A.F. personnel serving with R.C.A.F. squadrons will be attached to the Royal Canadian Air Force while so serving.

12. Under the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan and at the request of the Government of the United Kingdom, the Royal Canadian Air Force has concentrated on the production of aircrew personnel. This has necessitated the provision and employment in Canada of ground personnel who would otherwise have been available for service with R.C.A.F. squadrons overseas. It is recognized, however, that it is desirable, so far as practicable, that R.A.F. ground personnel who will be required for the squadrons referred to in para. 11 above should gradually be replaced by R.C.A.F. ground personnel employed in the combined training organization, with a view to achieving homogeneity of personnel in the squadrons. Similar considerations apply to the personnel required to man R.C.A.F. stations in the United Kingdom.

13. The concentration of the Royal Canadian Air Force on the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan may also result in a shortage of R.C.A.F. officers with the necessary qualifications to fill posts as squadron commanders, station commanders, etc. It is recognized that, if enough R.C.A.F. officers with these qualifications are not immediately available, some of these posts may require to be filled by R.A.F. officers. These R.A.F. officers will be replaced progressively as soon as qualified R.C.A.F. officers become available to replace them.

14. Nothing in these arrangements to give effect to Article 23 affects the financial responsibilities of the two Governments under this Agreement, it being understood that the cost of the thirty-five squadrons referred to in para. 11 above will be borne by the Government of the United Kingdom, except that the pay, allowances, non-effective benefits and other expenses of R.C.A.F. personnel who serve in these squadrons will be borne by the Government of the United Kingdom only to the same extent as is provided in Article 25 for other R.C.A.F. personnel.

*Bomber Squadrons*

15. A Canadian bomber group will be formed as soon as there are enough R.C.A.F. bomber squadrons in existence to make this an economic formation. As a first step, therefore, R.C.A.F. bomber squadrons already existing will be grouped together, in an existing group, and located in close proximity to one another. As provided in para. 13 above, the stations on which they are based will be commanded by R.C.A.F. station commanders as these become available. As far as possible, additional R.C.A.F. squadrons formed in the future will be bomber squadrons and will be attached to the same group as the existing R.C.A.F. bomber squadrons.

16. In preparation for the formation of the Canadian bomber group, a number of R.C.A.F. officers will be appointed as additional to posts at Group Headquarters in order that they may gain the necessary experience of group control, etc.

17. In order to keep the carrying out of this policy to form a Canadian bomber group under constant review, a Canadian Bomber Group Progress Committee will be set up by the Air Ministry. The Air Officer-in-Chief, R.C.A.F. Overseas, will be a member of this committee.

*Fighter Squadrons*

18. Operational requirements make it necessary that fighter squadrons shall remain under the control of the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, R.A.F. Fighter Command. Further fighter stations in the United Kingdom, in addition to that already existing, will be made R.C.A.F. stations. The Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command, will be informed that, when moving R.C.A.F. squadrons from time to time, he should endeavour, so far as possible, to move them to one or other of these R.C.A.F. stations.

*Army Co-operation Squadrons*

19. Any Army co-operation squadrons allotted to Canadian Army formations will be R.C.A.F. squadrons.

*R.C.A.F. Personnel Serving in R.A.F. Squadrons*

20. Instructions will be issued that, so far as operational exigencies permit, R.C.A.F. personnel are to be posted to squadrons in which Canadians are already serving.

*General*

21. (a) The arrangements in this Appendix, other than in para. 5 above, will be subject to change by mutual agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada, as circumstances necessitate.
- (b) The above arrangement will not affect the procedure already existing for consultation between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada on major questions affecting the employment of R.C.A.F. personnel and squadrons overseas as it was set out in para. 10 of the Sinclair-Ralston Agreement of 7th January, 1941.

**Appendix V**

## REPATRIATION POLICY

1. *Normal Tours of Duty Overseas*

- (a) *Ground Personnel.*—The normal tour for ground personnel is two years but the exigencies of the Service may require that it shall be extended in individual cases. It may also be extended at the request of the individual officer or airman concerned.
- (b) *Aircrews.*—It is the aim that, so soon as it becomes practicable, no aircrew personnel shall do two operational tours while there are available suitable trained personnel who have not done an operational tour; but for the time being it is not possible to achieve this aim. For the present, therefore, aircrew personnel, on completing an operational tour, must necessarily be employed in operational training units as instructors for about six months and then, if fit, must serve a second operational tour, after which they may be posted for a second tour as operational training unit instructors. Aircrew instructor posts in operational training units in Canada and U.S.A. will, however, be manned, so far as practicable, with R.C.A.F. personnel.

2. *Return to Canada for Compassionate or Health Reasons*

The Air Officer-in-Chief, R.C.A.F. Overseas, may authorize the repatriation of R.C.A.F. personnel:—

- (a) when he is satisfied that there are strong compassionate reasons for such repatriation; or
- (b) on account of prolonged illness and/or convalescence.

Personnel coming under (b) above will include:—

- (i) those requiring three months or more hospital treatment and/or convalescence;
- (ii) those whose medical category renders them unfit for overseas duties.

**Appendix VI****CONTRIBUTIONS IN KIND TO BE MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 14**

1. Subject to para. 2 below, the contributions in kind to be made available by the Government of the United Kingdom, in accordance with Article 14 of this Agreement, will be approximately as follows for the period 1st July, 1942, to 3 1st March, 1945:—

(a) *Aircraft fully equipped, complete with spare units and spare parts.*

2,500 Cornells  
1,100 Harvards  
400 Cranes  
200 Lysanders  
190 Oxfords  
637 combat types

(b) *Engines complete with spare parts.*

9,000 trainer types  
1,000 combat types

(c) *Miscellaneous Equipment.*

Air frame and engine spares (other than those included under (a) and (b) above), propellers, instruments, electrical and wireless equipment, bombs, ammunition, ground equipment and general items to the estimated value of \$125,000,000 Canadian.

(d) *Gasoline and Oil.*

Gasoline and oil, other than supplies derived from Canadian oil wells, to the estimated value of \$130,000,000 Canadian.

2. The types and quantities mentioned in para. 1 above may be varied by agreement between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada to meet the requirements of the combined training organization or on account of changes in the supply position. The Government of Canada, as administrator of the combined training organization, will not be restricted or limited in the provision of equipment required for the efficient operation of the organization, except that the United Kingdom Air Liaison Mission in Canada must be consulted before any provisioning action is taken which may materially affect the contribution to be made in kind by the Government of the United Kingdom.

**APPENDIX "K"**

**AIR MINISTRY LETTER ON "CANADIANIZATION"  
OF THE R.C.A.F. OVERSEAS, 19 FEB 1943**

Air Ministry,  
Aadal House,  
Kingsway,  
London, W.C. 2.

19th February, 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL

During a recent visit of Air Marshal Breadner, the C.A.S., R.C.A.F., to this country, the progress of "Canadianisation" was reviewed and although in general: it was regarded as satisfactory and the difficulties experienced were appreciated, it was felt that all concerned should be reminded once again of the views of both Services which are in complete agreement on this subject.

Canada is a Dominion and as such is no less entitled to a separate and autonomous Air Force than is the United Kingdom. This right she has temporarily surrendered in the interests of war efficiency, accepting the fact that unity of organization and of operational command is essential in the prosecution of total war.

The recognition by Canada of this need for unity has, however, placed upon us the responsibility of maintaining and encouraging the esprit de corps of that part of the R.C.A.F. which became part of the Imperial Air Forces in the United Kingdom. This responsibility (heavy enough in view of the fact that the R.C.A.F. personnel were scattered throughout the R.A.F.) was made more difficult by the rapid expansion of the R.C.A.F. during the war, which meant that a high proportion of their personnel had never served in the pre-war R.C.A.F.

The most recent acknowledgment of the right of the R.C.A.F. to some form of self-expression and of our responsibility towards the sister Air Force was at the Ottawa Conference in June 1942, when a target of 35 squadrons (in addition to the three squadrons originally transferred from Canada) to be manned and commanded by R.C.A.F. personnel was set up.

There is complete agreement between the two Air Forces on the importance of this policy. It is administratively sound, for the differences in discipline, pay, promotion and welfare which exist between the two present less difficulties when Canadians are grouped together in their own squadrons. Psychologically it is valuable, for however efficiently a mixed R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. crew may work together, the understanding bred of a common background and a common nationality is necessarily lacking.

The object of this letter is, therefore, to urge upon you once again the importance of sparing no effort to implement the formation of the Canadian Squadrons and the crewing together of R.C.A.F. personnel, and to ask you to encourage in any way you can the sense of esprit de corps in the Royal Canadian Air Force. It will make for greater efficiency amongst its members during the war and will help Canada in the post-war period to form as a separate Service, the forces which have done so well in the present war.

(Sgd) B. E. SUTTON  
Air Marshal  
*Air Member for Personnel*

To all A.Os. C-in-C and A. Os.C.

**APPENDIX "L"**

**AMENDMENT TO 1942 AGREEMENT CONCERNING BRITISH  
COMMONWEALTH AIR TRAINING PLAN, 16 FEB 1944  
("Balfour — Power Agreement")  
Amendments**

**1. Appendix III, para. 1.**

DELETE: sub-paras. (a) and (b).

INSERT: new sub-paras. (a) and (b) as follows:

1. *Commissioning*—

- (a) All R.C.A.F. aircrew considered suitable according to the standards of the Government of Canada, may be commissioned.
- (b) The Government of Canada will set up its own standards of commissioning for the various categories of aircrew and notify the United Kingdom Government of such standards and estimate the number in each category who will be commissioned.

**2. Appendix III, para. 1.**

DELETE: sub-para. (e)

INSERT: new sub-para. (e) as follows:

- (e) Individuals who are to be commissioned at the sole instance of the R.C.A.F. authorities will be placed at the disposal of the A.O.C.-in-C., R.C.A.F. Overseas, either for transfer to a R.C.A.F. squadron or for repatriation, before such commissioning is put into effect. R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters will notify to the United Kingdom Air Ministry the names of individuals proposed to be commissioned. A period not exceeding 2 months from the date of notification shall be allowed to the United Kingdom Air Ministry in order to arrange for a replacement. During this period, it shall be open to either R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters or the United Kingdom Air Ministry to bring to the notice of the other any new information, favourable or unfavourable, bearing on the proposal to commission.

**3. Appendix IV**

DELETE: para. 7

INSERT: new para. 7 as follows:

*R.C.A.F. Personnel at the Disposal of the United Kingdom*

7. (i) General policies in such matters as recall to their respective forces, repatriation, length of tour of duty and commissioning is determined by the respective Governments. However, in special circumstances arising out of the course of the war, representations may be made by either party leading to modification to these policies in the interest of the common war effort.

(ii) Any changes in general policy affecting R.C.A.F. and R.A.F. personnel serving with the other Service shall be notified by one Government to the other, and opportunity given, if necessary, for consideration on a ministerial level.

(iii) (a) R.C.A.F. personnel placed at the disposal of the Government of the United Kingdom will be attached to the Royal Air Force. The Royal Canadian Air Force reserves the right to recall any officer or airman so attached to serve with the Royal Canadian Air Force.

(b) A similar right is reserved to the Royal Air Force with respect to any Royal Air Force officer or airman attached to the Royal Canadian Air Force.

(c) R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters will notify the United Kingdom Air Ministry the names of individuals proposed to be recalled. Similarly, the Royal Air Force United Kingdom Liaison Mission in Canada will notify the Department of National Defence for Air the names of R.A.F. individuals proposed to be recalled.

(d) In the event of either party wishing to make representations as to the effect of such recall on their Force, a period not exceeding two months from the date of notification shall be allowed to the other party in order to arrange for a replacement.

(e) During this period, it shall be open to the R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters or the R.A.F. United Kingdom Liaison Mission to bring to the notice of the other any information bearing on the proposal to recall.

#### 4. Appendix IV.

DELETE: para. 9

INSERT: new sub-para. 9 as follows:

9. The concurrence of R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters will be obtained.

(i) In the selection of Commanding Officers for R.C.A.F. Squadrons

(ii) In posting of R.C.A.F. officers of the rank of Wing Commander and above,

except where this is impracticable owing to the necessity for immediate appointment. In such cases concurrence will be sought from R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters at the earliest opportunity.

#### 5. Appendix IV

DELETE: para. 20

INSERT: new para. 20 as follows:

20. Instructions will be issued that, to the maximum extent practicable, R.C.A.F. personnel are to be posted to squadrons designated for the concentration of Canadian personnel.

#### 6. Appendix V

DELETE: para. 1

INSERT: new para. 1 as follows:

##### 1. *Tours of Duty*

(a) *Operational*—A tour of operational duty presently expressed either as a number of sorties or as a number of operational hours flown will, irrespective of the theatre of war in which the tour is served, remain as at present constituted, subject to an over-riding time limitation of eighteen months or such shorter period as may be in effect in the Command concerned.

(b) *Non-Operational or Instructional Tour for Ex-Operational Personnel*—The duration of the instructional tour will be twelve months or such shorter period as may be in effect in the Command concerned. Any increase of time proposed will be dealt with according to the provisions of Paragraph 7, Sub-Paragraphs (i) and (ii), Appendix IV.

(c) *Flying Instructors and Staff Pilots Outside Canada*—The duration of a non-operational tour served prior to an operational tour will not exceed twelve months in the case of Staff Pilots, but may be eighteen months in the case of Flying Instructors, or in both categories, such shorter period as may be in effect in the Command concerned.

(d) *General*—The tour of duty overseas for R.C.A.F. aircrew personnel will not exceed three years reckoned from date of departure from Canada until embarkation upon relief.

(e) *R.D.F. Personnel*—The normal tour of duty overseas for R.D.F. personnel of the R.C.A.F. serving with the R.A.F. shall be three years, computed from the date of departure from Canada. Priority in repatriation, where possible, will be given to those R.D.F. personnel serving outside the United Kingdom. The R.C.A.F. will provide replacements for these tour-expired men. Double-banking, normally not to exceed two months, shall take place to enable incoming personnel effectively to replace those men who are being relieved.

#### 7. Appendix IV

ADD: new paras. 22 and 23 as follows:

22. *Disposal of R.C.A.F. Personnel who have Completed a Tour of Duty Overseas.*

(a) On completion of an operational tour, all R.C.A.F. personnel will be placed at the disposal of the A.O.C.-in-C. R.C.A.F. Overseas. The A.O.C.-in-C. will, in consultation with the Commander in Chief concerned, place at the disposal of the R.A.F. such personnel as are required for instructional duties at O.T.U.'s and H.C.U.'s or for any other specialized duties as may be agreed between R.C.A.F. Headquarters Overseas and the R.A.F.

- (b) The requirements of R.C.A.F. personnel for instructional duties in O.T.U.'s and H.C.U.'s shall be determined on the basis that the R.C.A.F. will fill the same proportion of the instructor establishment of O.T.U.'s and H.C.U.'s as the proportion of R.C.A.F. personnel in front-line squadrons.
- (c) On completion of the instructional tour these personnel will again be placed at the disposal of the A.O.C.-in-C., R.C.A.F. Overseas.
- (d) In both the above cases the A.O.C.-in-C. will undertake that sufficient personnel of the required aircrew categories and with the requisite type of operational experience will be made available after leave to fill Squadron and Flight Commander posts on the same proportionate basis as above.
- (e) Should aircrew of Operational experience, other than those needed to fill Squadron and Flight Commander posts, be required, such requirement will be dealt with according to the provisions of paragraph 7, subparagraph (1) of Appendix IV to the Agreement.
- (f) The R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. will fill the same proportion of the establishment for flying instructors and staff pilots in Basic Training Schools as the numbers of R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. pupils, respectively, bears to the total number of pupils under training, at each stage, in Canada, the United Kingdom and other areas in which Canadians are being trained. When such instructor or staff pilot personnel are required to carry out a non-operational tour overseas prior to an operational tour, on the completion of such a non-operational tour, R.C.A.F. personnel will be placed at the disposal of the A.O.C.-in-C., Overseas, who will, in turn, undertake that they are returned to the R.A.F. in order to undergo their operational training and proceed to operational units.

### 23. *Demobilization of R.C.A.F. Serving with R.A.F.*

#### *Joint Demobilization Committee*

- (1) It is agreed that methods and priorities of demobilization of its own nationals is a matter for the determination of each government.
- (2) It is desirable that there should be close consultation between the two governments with a view to achieving the greatest practicable measure of common practice in order that the demobilization of personnel from Air Forces of the United Kingdom and Canada shall be kept, as far as possible, in phase.
- (3) It is further agreed that a joint committee composed of representatives of the R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. shall be established with headquarters in London to discuss common problems and to exchange views and advise their respective Ministers on questions connected with demobilization of the Air Forces.
- (4) It is proposed that the committee will work within the following Terms of Reference :
- (a) What methods and procedure should be followed in order to enable the Canadian Government to proceed as rapidly and as efficiently as possible with R.C.A.F. repatriation and demobilization.
- (b) What steps can be taken now and generally during the period which shall precede the termination of the war against Germany to bring about a regrouping of R.C.A.F. personnel so that Canadian demobilization priorities may be made effective at the earliest possible date without injury to the common war effort.
- (c) What methods and procedure are to be followed so that R.C.A.F. personnel serving in R.A.F. Units may have an equal opportunity with R.C.A.F. personnel who are serving in Canada or in the R.C.A.F. Overseas to take advantage of Canadian Government plans for repatriation, demobilization and rehabilitation.
- (d) What methods and procedure should be followed in order to give to R.C.A.F. personnel attached to R.A.F. the benefits of pre-demobilization training and instruction to fit such personnel for civil life in Canada whilst they are still attached to the R.A.F.
- (5) The Committee in their deliberations shall be guided by the following agreed principles :
- (a) that there shall be no interference with the most effective prosecution of the war;

- (b) that the highest consideration be given to assuring to individual officers and airmen every possible opportunity for a successful post-war career;
- (c) that the process of demobilization shall be such as will assist to the greatest extent possible the effective recovery of the domestic economy of each country.

**APPENDIX "M"****AIR MINISTRY LETTER ON RELATIONSHIP  
BETWEEN R.A.F. AND R.C.A.F., 14 APR 1944**

Air Ministry,  
King Charles Street,  
Whitehall, S.W. 1.

S.100026/S.8.

14th April, 1944.

Sir,

I am commanded by the Air Council to inform you of the results of recent discussions in Ottawa between representatives of the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada.

2. The first subject discussed was the size of the aircrew training organisation in Canada. Agreement was reached on a progressive and substantial reduction and the result will be gradually to release large numbers of trained ground personnel for service with front-line squadrons.

3. The remainder of the discussion was taken up with a review of the relationships between the Royal Canadian Air Force and the Royal Air Force in the field.

4. The Canadian Government stressed their responsibility to their Parliament and to the public in Canada for the conditions under which Canadian nationals in the Royal Canadian Air Force were serving in all theatres. In pursuance of this responsibility, they felt bound to press for certain revisions of the conditions under which Royal Canadian Air Force personnel are employed with the Royal Air Force and for measures to secure that for the Japanese war there should be "a fully integrated Canadian Air Force available for service wherever the Canadian Government may decide that it can be most usefully employed in the interests of Canada, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations". Although the extent and nature of Canadian participation in the Japanese war will be a matter for discussion between the Governments concerned, the Government of Canada intend that, after the conclusion of hostilities with Germany, all Royal Canadian Air Force personnel shall be unconditionally at their disposal.

5. It will be recalled that when the Training Scheme in Canada was initiated in December, 1939, it was agreed that most of the Dominion pupils should, when trained, be placed at the disposal of the United Kingdom Government for service with or in conjunction with the Royal Air Force. Later, it was agreed to form a number of Dominion squadrons for service with the Royal Air Force and also to form a Canadian Bomber Group within the Metropolitan Air Force. The Royal Canadian Air Force units and formations were, so far as practicable, to be manned by Royal Canadian Air Force aircrew.

6. From time to time there have been further variations in the conditions under which Royal Canadian Air Force personnel serve with the Royal Air Force, and the present requests of the Canadian Government represent one more step in a logical progress towards the formation of a fully integrated Canadian Air Force. The number of Royal Canadian Air Force units is now such that the United Kingdom Government cannot but recognise — and has recognised — the soundness of the Canadian case, made as it is by a self-governing Dominion on behalf of its own nationals. Indeed, the requests might reasonably have been made at the beginning of the war when the employment of trained Royal Canadian Air Force personnel with the Royal Air Force was first mooted.

7. Attached to this letter are notes\* on the matters affecting Royal Canadian Air Force personnel which were dealt with during the recent discussions. These will be the subject of separate official instructions as necessary.

8. The Council appreciate that there may be administrative difficulties in putting the revised arrangements into practice, but they are confident of your full support in overcoming the difficulties and implementing the inter-Governmental agreements. Every effort must be made by all concerned to give prompt and careful attention to the instructions which will be issued and to observe them both in the letter and in the spirit. This is all the more important since the Canadian Government have represented that, in their view, there have been instances in the past of unreasonable delay in the application of agreed arrangements. No doubt there have been genuine misunderstandings, but no shadow of misunderstanding must be allowed to occur in the

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\*Omitted.

future which could possibly impair the excellent relations which have been established between the two Forces or the close ties subsisting between the two Governments and peoples.

9. Sufficient copies of this letter are being sent to you separately to enable you to circulate them to your Royal Air Force Group Commanders with such covering instructions as you may feel to be necessary.

I am, Sir,  
Your obedient Servant,  
[Arthur STREET]†

Distribution:—

- Air Commanders-in-Chief:—
  - Allied Expeditionary Air Force
  - R.A.F., Mediterranean and Middle East
  - Air Command, South East Asia
- Air Officers Commanding-in-Chief:—
  - Bomber Command
  - Coastal Command
  - Flying Training Command
  - Maintenance Command
  - Technical Training Command
  - Transport Command
  - Middle East Command
- Air Marshals Commanding:—
  - Air Defence of Great Britain
  - 2nd Tactical Air Force
- Air Officers Commanding:—
  - Balloon Command
  - R.A.F. in Northern Ireland
  - A.H.Q. Air Forces in India
  - A.H.Q. West Africa
  - Mediterranean Strategical Air Force
  - Mediterranean Tactical Air Force
  - Mediterranean Coastal Air Force
  - Desert Air Force
  - A.H.Q., Air Defences, Eastern Mediterranean
  - A.H.Q., Levant
  - A.H.Q., Iraq and Persia
  - A.H.Q., East Africa
  - A.H.Q., Malta
  - H.Q., British Forces, Aden
  - Eastern Air Command, South East Asia
  - 3rd Tactical Air Force
  - Liaison Officer-in-Chief, U.K.A.L.M. Ottawa
  - Head of R.A.F. Delegation, Washington.

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†Sir Arthur Street, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Air. With acknowledgement to Air Historical Branch, Ministry of Defence, London.

**APPENDIX "N"**  
**CHANGES IN REGULATIONS CONCERNING MEN CALLED UP UNDER NATIONAL RESOURCES MOBILIZATION ACT,**  
**1940 - 1944**

Date of Proclamation	Order in Council Authorizing Proclamation		Age Classes Affected		Marital Status (on July 15, 1940)	Changes Made to the Pool of Manpower	Pool of Designated Manpower Cumulative Total
	Date	No. P.C.	By Age (a) as at July 15/40	By year of Birth (a)			
September 11, 1940	Sept. 11, 1940	4671	(b) 21-24		Single	382,021	382,021*
February 20, 1941	Feb. 20, 1941	1281	(b) 21		Single	211,188	170,833
June 27, 1941	June 27, 1941	4644	(b) 21-24		Single	211,188	382,021
March 21, 1942	March 21, 1942	2192		(c) 1921-1912	Single	302,565	684,586
June 16, 1942	June 16, 1942	5110		(c) 1921-1907	Single	141,891	826,477
July 7, 1942	July 7, 1942	5841		(d) 1922-1902	Single	195,153	1,021,630
September 30, 1942	Sept. 30, 1942	8919		(e) 1923-1902	Single	109,574	1,131,204
December 15, 1942	Dec. 15, 1942	11326		(e) 1923-1917 1916-1902	M. & S. (j) Single	39,680	1,170,884
February 1, 1943	Feb. 1, 1943	809		(f) 1924-1917 1916-1902	M. & S. Single	120,680	1,291,260
April 7, 1943	April 19, 1943	3131		(g) 1924-1917 1916-1902	M. & S. Single	No change	1,291,260
August 9, 1943	Aug. 9, 1943	5708		(h) 1925-1913 1912-1902	M. & S. Single	236,346	1,527,606
June 16, 1944	June 16, 1944	4238		(i) 1926-1913 1912-1902	M. & S. Single	111,283	1,638,889

(a) Upper and lower limits are both inclusive.

(b) Men upon attaining 21 years of age were likewise affected.

(c) Men born in 1921 were called upon attaining 21 years of age.

(d) Men born in 1922 were called upon attaining 20 years of age.

(e) Men born in 1923 were called upon attaining 19 years of age.

(f) Men born in 1924 were called upon attaining 19 years of age.

(g) Designated judicially separated men on July 15, 1940 born in the year 1916 to 1902 inclusive — number unknown.

(h) Men born in 1925 were called upon attaining 18 years and 6 months of age.

(i) Men born in 1926 were called upon attaining 18 years and 6 months of age.

(j) M. & S. — married and single.

\*Call-up authorized for 30 days only.

## APPENDIX "O"

**DISTRIBUTION OF "POWER IN AGE CLASSES  
LIABLE FOR MILITARY SERVICE, 7 MAY 1945**

	Number	Per Cent
Armed Forces .....	769,764	42.37
Men applying and on Postponement .....	280,926	15.46
Medically Unfit for Military Service .....	607,782	33.45
Net Yet Sent "Order — Military Training" .....	4,849	0.27
Not Yet Sent "Order — Medical Examination" .....	695	0.04
Sent Orders -Time Limit not Expired .....	19,401	1.07
Not Yet 18½ years of Age but born in 1926 .....	19,146	1.05
Not Available, i.e.: Outside Canada, Unacceptable to Army, Deceased, in Jail, Members of Reserve Army, etc. ....	32,880	1.81
Statutory Exceptions, i.e.: Clergy, Police, Enemy Aliens, etc. ....	25,004	1.38
Over Age .....	35,794	1.97
Not Accounted For .....	20,591	1.13
	1,816,868	100.00

SOURCE: Report dated June 8, 1945, prepared by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Chartered Accountants, Montreal for the Minister of Labour.

**APPENDIX "P"****POSTPONEMENTS OF COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING IN EFFECT, BY DATE AND BY TYPE**

Date	Farming	Fishing	Lumbering	Mining	Essential Industries	Students	Consci-Entious Objectors	Merchant Marine	Compassionate	Other	Total
As at January 31, 1943	142,400	2,107	4,770	1,161	52,726	13,302	7,854	2,327	2,182	16,804	246,133
As at May 31, 1944	145,959	2,405	4,739	2,539	48,441	14,248	8,745	2,982	2,423	14,473	246,938
As at May 31, 1945	170,730	2,257	4,611	4,968	32,195	14,729	10,843	4,751	6,295	16,089	267,468

SOURCE: Mobilization Division, Department of Labour.

## APPENDIX "Q"

POSTPONEMENTS OF COMPULSORY MILITARY TRAINING  
REQUESTED AND GRANTED, 20 MAR 1941 - 7 MAY 1945

Administrative Divisions	Number up to May 7, 1945		Number of men on postponement on and as from May 7, 1945 (2)
	Requested (1)	Granted (1)	
"A"			
London.....	86,629	81,542	17,687
"B"			
Toronto.....	146,827	128,872	31,354
"C"			
Kingston.....	44,386	42,002	19,543
"D"			
Port Arthur.....	5,959	5,388	1,043
"E"			
Montreal.....	130,918	117,904	46,595
"F"			
Quebec.....	76,232	62,883	32,026
"G"			
Halifax.....	25,226	20,649	11,225
"H"			
Saint John.....	20,234	18,375	11,857
"I"			
Charlottetown.....	5,246	4,515	2,900
"J"			
Winnipeg.....	37,457	33,236	17,318
"K"			
Vancouver.....	49,176	42,669	13,985
"M"			
Regina.....	69,183	59,153	31,937
"N"			
Edmonton.....	49,005	47,337	25,164
CANADA:	746,478	664,525	262,634

*Source of Data:* Mobilization Division, Department of Labour.

- (1) The following figures include all original requests for postponement and all subsequent requests for one or more extensions.
- (2) Non-cumulative figures. Does not include a number of requests for postponement under consideration by Boards.

## APPENDIX "R"

## INTAKE INTO THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES, SECOND WORLD WAR (BY PROVINCES)

Officers, Other Ranks and Ratings  
Excluding WRCNS, CWAC and RCAF (WD)

Place of Permanent Residence on Enrolment	Male <sup>(1)</sup> Population 18 to 45	RCN	Army <sup>(2)</sup>			RCAF	Total three services	Percentage of Total Intake to Male Population 18 to 45
			GS <sup>(3)</sup>	NRMA	Total			
Prince Edward Island.....	19,000	1,448	5,961	372	6,333	1,528	9,309	48.18
Nova Scotia.....	123,000	6,837	42,462	2,558	45,020	7,498	59,355	48.31
New Brunswick .....	94,000	2,737	32,326	3,621	35,947	6,453	45,137	48.17
Quebec .....	699,000	12,404	94,446	43,823	138,269	24,768	175,441	25.69
Ontario .....	830,000	40,353	243,615	23,322	266,937	90,518	397,808	47.77
Manitoba.....	159,000	7,782	42,627	5,915	48,542	20,120	76,444	48.12
Saskatchewan.....	191,000	6,472	44,213 <sup>(4)</sup>	8,093 <sup>(4)</sup>	52,306	21,827	80,605	42.38
Alberta .....	178,000	7,360	44,775	6,069	50,844	19,499	77,703	43.11
British Columbia .....	181,000	11,925	52,620 <sup>(5)</sup>	5,626 <sup>(5)</sup>	58,246	20,805 <sup>(6)</sup>	90,976	50.47
Outside Canada.....		893	5,892	8	5,900	9,485	16,278	
Not stated.....		263	191		191		454	
Total .....	2,474,000	98,474	609,128	99,407	708,535	222,501	1,029,510	41.15

## Notes:

- (1) Estimates from summaries 1941 Census.
- (2) 22,046 GS & NRMA members transferred to the RCN or RCAF, and are included with the Army intake.
- (3) 58,434 NRMA members volunteered for GS; they are included with GS, and not with NRMA.
- (4) Including N.W.T.
- (5) Including Yukon.
- (6) Including N.W.T. and Yukon.

## APPENDIX "S"

**BRIGADIER W. H. S. MACKLIN'S REPORT ON THE  
MOBILIZATION OF 13TH INFANTRY BRIGADE ON AN ACTIVE BASIS**

[NOTE: This very long report has been shortened by deleting passages of less importance and omitting the appendices, consisting of supporting reports by subordinate officers, and the references to these appendices in the text. Some obvious clerical errors have been corrected.]

HQ 13 Cdn Inf Bde  
Vernon BC  
2 May 44

GOC in C, Pac Comd  
Jericho Beach  
Vancouver, BC

*MOBILIZATION OF 13 BDE ON AN ACTIVE BASIS*

1. Before going into details of the mobilization of 13 Bde on an active basis a brief review of its previous history seems desirable.

2. The Bde was completely re-organized and mobilized during June and early July 1943 as a composite Bde Gp of all arms, and sailed for the Aleutians on 10 July 43. It participated in the landing at Kiska in Aug 43, and remained in occupation until its return to Canada in December and January. . . .

5. There were many changes of command and staff between the landing at Kiska and the decision to mobilize on an active basis. A few of the more important are listed below:—

(a) *Bde Comd*

(i) Brig HW Foster commanded until he left Kiska in Sept. He never returned to the Bde and went overseas soon after the New Year. . . .

(iv) Brig WHS Macklin assumed comd with effect 9 Feb 44. . . .

6. Personnel of the Bde all got 30 days disembarkation leave on their return, and the last of this leave did not expire until almost the end of Feb.

7. As a result of all these changes in comd and staff, and of the long leave period, the formation passed through a stage of some disorganization, and the administration undoubtedly left something to be desired. This was the condition when I returned from Pac Comd study week and assumed active comd on 22 Feb 44. . . .

11. There were a number of men who failed to return from disembarkation leave, and were struck off strength as deserters. The numbers varied from a handful of 6 or 8 in R M Rang to about 20 in Cdn Fus and over 60 in R de Hull, or about 8% in this last mentioned unit. So far only two or three of these deserters have been returned for trial, a fact which bespeaks the almost total collapse of the present system of apprehending deserters. I shall remark on this point later.

12. Morale reports in March showed that morale had slumped considerably after the return from leave. Major Jacques, and afterwards Lt. Col. St. Laurent, mentioned this to me two or three times as a source of worry to them in Le Regt de Hull. The burden of all these reports was much the same, and was to the effect that the lowering of morale was not due to bad quarters, bad food, bad clothing or lack of amusement. It was almost entirely due to deep rooted belief among other ranks that they would never be sent to fight, and their intense desire to get out of the army and get back home to the farm or the factory. One padre said, accurately enough, that it was due to a complete absence of any spiritual or moral driving force.

13. Units began to receive applications for extended farm leave in numbers which finally totalled hundreds in the Bde Gp. Each was accompanied by its bundle of forms, affidavits, and certificates stating the urgent need for the man to return to the farm. There was practically no possibility of distinguishing the real relative merits of these cases. I shall return to this point also later on. . . .

20. On Friday 28 March I attended a conference at Headquarters, Pacific Command, and was informed by AG and GOC in C [Major-General G. R. Pearkes, V.C.] that a decision had been taken to despatch Headquarters 13 Brigade, Defence Platoon, Signal Section and the four Infantry Battalions overseas as units, provided enough volunteers could be obtained. The matter was discussed at some length and I stated that, while the problem was a psychological one of great complexity, I believed enough men would follow their officers and N.C.O.'s, if they were assured

that the units would proceed as such. I added that I thought R de Hull would be a special problem and that I had doubts of success in that unit.

21. At a further meeting on 29 March, attended by GOC 6 Division and Commanders 14 and 15 Brigades as well as other officers, GOC in C stated that the whole resources of Pacific Command would be put behind the scheme to ensure success, but that naturally the main effort would have to be made by 13 Canadian Infantry Brigade. . . .

23. Arrangements were made for units to be reinforced as follows:—

Rocky Mountain Rangers by Prince Edward Island Highlanders  
and Royal Rifles of Canada.

Canadian Fusiliers by Oxford Rifles and Prince of Wales Rangers.

Winnipeg Grenadiers by Winnipeg Light Infantry and Prince Albert Volunteers.

Regiment de Hull by Fusiliers du St. Laurent and Fusiliers de Sherbrooke.

Reinforcements from R.C.A., R.C.E. and 31 Alta. Recce. Regt would be distributed according to qualifications and requirements. They would not include tradesmen, or specialists in their arms.

24. On Sunday night I returned to Vernon, arriving at 0905 Monday. I at once called a conference of all Commanding Officers. . . . I informed them of the plan and said that I would speak to officers and later to NCOs, the officers and NCOs would inform the men and then I would speak to the troops. Commanding Officers were enthusiastic, and reasonably confident that they could swing enough troops behind them to make the plans succeed. As agreed by National Defence Headquarters security was neglected to the extent that all troops were to be told in outline what it was intended to do.

25. As arranged, I spoke during the early afternoon to the officers of all three battalions and to the senior NCOs of Rocky Mountain Rangers and Canadian Fusiliers. After an interval, during which officers and NCOs told their men, I spoke to the men of these two units on parade 'in their respective drill halls, I reminded them of their excellent records at Kiska, and called upon them to follow their officers and enlist.

26. After discussion with Officer Commanding Régiment de Hull I decided that it would be sounder for him to speak to his own NCOs and men in their own language.

27. The response of all officers and of the active NCOs and the very few active men in the brigade was immediate, and enthusiastic to a degree. Their spirits rose, and I have never seen any announcement greeted with greater eagerness.

28. On the other hand the response of the NRMA men, and of a large proportion of the NRMA NCOs was very disappointing. There was no great rush to enlist, and although officers at once began to interview their companies and platoons, by evening less than 100 had enlisted from each of the two English-speaking battalions in. Vernon. Figures received from the Winnipeg Grenadiers indicated about the same result.

29. In Le Régiment de Hull matters were even worse. This unit had, to begin with, no more than a mere handful of active personnel, probably not more than a dozen among its other ranks. Practically all the NCOs, and even two acting CSMs, were NRMA men. These Warrant Officers and NCOs gave little or no support of any kind to their Commanding Officer, and not more than a handful of soldiers enlisted after the Commanding Officer's appeal.

30. On Tuesday 4 April Lieut.-Col. Schimnowski senior R.C. Chaplain, Pacific Command visited Vernon. He stayed two days, and returned again for four days after the Easter week-end. Col. Schimnowski speaks several languages, and he personally interviewed large numbers of R.C. personnel of all units, and brought in a number of recruits. His influence was of great help and I cannot speak too highly of his efforts. He informed me that the resistance of the NRMA soldiers to enlistment was amazingly strong, and that he had reduced more than one man to tears without succeeding in persuading the man to enlist.

31. The Protestant Chaplain H/Capt. Birch also worked diligently among his men. The chaplain of Le Régiment de Hull, Father Tessier, whose influence was strong during the Kiska operation, did not seem to be able to accomplish very much in this case, though he did his utmost.

32. H.Q. Pacific Command sent up Lieut.-Col. J. MacGregor, V.C. formerly Officer Commanding 2 Canadian Scottish. He went among the men on training for several days and told them-of his experiences in England. He also was of great help.

33. Enlistments continued gradually all week in the English-speaking battalions, but at a low rate, averaging perhaps ten to fifteen per battalion per day. On Tuesday night 4 April I

left for Gordon Head and on Thursday 6 April attended G.O.C. in C.'s inspection of Winnipeg Grenadiers, when he addressed the men on parade. I arrived back in Vernon on Friday 7 April which was a holiday (Good Friday). ...

35. Commanding Officers were unanimous in the opinion that it would be sound to remove from each unit 40 or 50 men known to be dissuading others from enlisting. To obtain enough concrete evidence to court-martial any of these proved to be impracticable. G.O.C. in C. was anxious that no men should actually be removed from Vernon area, but as it was clear that accommodation would be overcrowded due to incoming drafts, a tented camp was pitched. Early in the week of 10 April I moved some 200 men into this camp, including a detachment from each unit. Lieut.-Col. MacGregor was placed in command of the camp, and units provided cadres of instructors to train them. Brigade Major drew up a syllabus of training. I spoke to these instructors and said that in this camp there would be strict discipline and hard training, but nothing resembling persecution. These orders were faithfully carried out.

36. On Tuesday 11 April Major Paul Triquet, V.C., arrived and spoke to the men of Le Régiment de Hull. All other French-speaking soldiers (mostly in Brigade H.Q.) were paraded as well. Triquet's speech was excellent, but the results were again disappointing. Only about two dozen men answered the appeal on the spot. However this was at least a start, and subsequent days showed that the solid resistance of this unit had been broken to some slight extent.

37. By this time it was clear that there were a number of NRMA NCOs who would not enlist. In this respect Le Régiment de Hull was of course, in a class by itself, as practically all its NCOs including two A/CSMs were NRMA. On the recommendation of the Commanding Officer these two CSMs were sent away to the depot in their permanent grades. I also reduced several sergeants and corporals in various units to the ranks as unsuitable, and a considerable number of others reverted at their own request.

38. All these measures stimulated recruiting for about 3 days. The arrival of several drafts of reinforcements from other units in the Command may have helped by convincing some doubters that the authorities really intended to send 13 Brigade Overseas as such. Each draft was met at the station with a band, and by officers of units concerned, and welcomed by its Commanding Officer. Every effort was made to absorb personnel in their proper employment.

39. Recruiting remained at a level of 30-50 per day in the Brigade until Saturday 15 April when it slumped badly and failed to recover after the week-end as I had, hoped. By mid-week only a handful per day were enlisting in spite of all efforts.

40. G.O.C. in C. arrived in Vernon on Wednesday morning 19 April and I discussed the entire situation with him at length, and he also talked it over with Commanding Officers. On Thursday 20 April I paraded the three infantry battalions and Headquarters details, and G.O.C. in C. addressed them, explaining the urgency of the need for men. At 1600 hours on this day the active strengths of the units concerned, excluding officers were:—

Brigade H.Q. ....	37
J Section Signals .....	77
Defence Platoon .....	24
Canadian Fusiliers .....	477
Rocky Mountain Rangers .....	579
Le Regt de Hull .....	295
The Winnipeg Grenadiers .....	484
	<hr/>
	1973
	<hr/>

This figure was made up as follows:

In 13 Brigade at 1 April.....	370
Enlisted by units of 13 Brigade since 1 April.....	676
Reinforcements from other Units .....	927
	<hr/>
	1973
	<hr/>

41. Again, however, there was little general response to the appeal of the G.O.C. in C. for volunteers. A few waverers, numbering not more than half a dozen came forward that afternoon. In Le Regt de Hull recruiting picked up a little on Friday 21 April and 17 men enlisted in that unit.

42. On Sunday 34 April two Roman Catholic Church parades were held, one French speaking and one English speaking, all Roman Catholics attended. Capt. Tessier, Le Regt de Hull, and Lt. Col. Schimnowski, Command Chaplain Roman Catholic, took these parades and spoke strongly to the men on their duty.

43. On Monday 24 April I removed, by arrangement with Pacific Command, 100 men from Camp. They were despatched, 25 to each Coast defence battalion, and in making up the drafts all trace of previous organization was broken up. These were selected men believed by their officers to be a bad influence on others, and not expected by anyone to enlist. I made one last strong speech to this party before it left but no one enlisted.

44. On Tuesday 25 April I had all remaining English-speaking NRMA men paraded by themselves in the drill halls. There were three groups, the first consisting of the remaining men in the tented camp and the others consisting of the remaining NRMA men in the lines of Canadian Fusiliers and Rocky Mountain Rangers. I spoke to these three groups in the strongest possible terms of their duty to Canada. As a result, perhaps, of this address there were a few more enlistments that afternoon and the next day though the number probably did not exceed twelve or fifteen. It was apparent that little more could be done immediately to influence the remainder. ...

46. G.O.C. in C. inspected the General Service personnel of the Winnipeg Grenadiers on Saturday 29 April. On Monday 1 May he inspected all the remainder of the Brigade in Vernon, only General Service men being on parade. I think it is fair to say that the bearing of the men on this parade was excellent.

47. As arrangements had been made for all overseas personnel to be sent on embarkation leave by 5 May it became essential to accelerate the despatch, to other units, of NRMA men who remained. To all intents, therefore, the parade of 1 May may be said to have ended the recruiting campaign. At 1600 hrs on 1 May the Active Other Ranks strengths of Units were:—

Brigade Headquarters.....	47
"J" Section Signals.....	79
Defence Platoon.....	29
Canadian Fusiliers.....	559
Rocky Mountain Rangers.....	645
Le Regt de Hull.....	473
The Winnipeg Grenadiers.....	600
	<hr/>
	2432
	<hr/>

These figures were made up as follows—

In 13 Brigade as at 1 April.....	370
Enlisted by units of 13 Brigade since 1 April.....	769
Reinforcements Received from other units.....	1293
	<hr/>
	2432
	<hr/>

A few more reinforcements were known to be en route but the above figures will not be substantially changed.

#### *CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS*

48. The mobilization of 13 Infantry Brigade on an active basis was a new experiment and may be regarded as a test case, The result may therefore give some indication of future possibilities along these lines.

49. It is a fact that 13 Infantry Brigade was the most experienced formation, and also probably it was the best trained formation in Canada on 1 April 1944. Its units had been mobilized for two full years or more. They had had substantially the same personnel for nine full months. The men had followed their officers through an arduous and dangerous amphibious operation against the Japanese. Except for actual combat they had had every experience that such an operation can afford. Generally speaking I think the men liked and respected their officers, and certainly the officers were proud of the men and confident that the majority would follow them anywhere. For these reasons no other formation in Canada had so good a chance of success in a recruiting experiment as had 13 Infantry Brigade. Doubtless this fact was responsible for its selection.

50. As for the other rank personnel they were, insofar as numbers went, overwhelmingly NRMA. In round numbers the percentages were roughly:—

Le Regt de Hull.....	95%	NRMA
Canadian Fusiliers.....	90%	NRMA
Winnipeg Grenadiers.....	90%	NRMA
Rocky Mountain Rangers.....	85%	NRMA
“J” Section Signals.....	75%	NRMA
Defence Platoon.....	90%	NRMA
Brigade Headquarters.....	60%	NRMA

51. Le Régiment de Hull actually had two NRMA acting warrant officers, and most of its sergeants were NRMA. Other units also had NRMA sergeants, corporals and Lance Corporals on strength. If there ever had been any outward distinction between the volunteer and the NRMA soldier in these units it had long since disappeared. I had hoped that it would not reappear but this hope was not fulfilled. The instant the announcement was made that 13 Infantry Brigade would mobilize on a volunteer basis the active personnel mentally ranged themselves in a body on one side and the NRMA ranged themselves on the other, and the gulf between them widened and deepened daily.

52. On the one hand we started with a cadre of officers and N.C.O.'s and a few men whose highest ambition was to get to grips with the enemy in the shortest possible time. The disappointment of this group at the obvious reluctance, not to say outright refusal, of the NRMA soldiers to enlist was intense. The feeling rapidly changed from disappointment to scorn, and even to anger, mingled with incredulity.

53. I feel sure that this feeling is strongest among the rank and file of the men themselves. It is not too much to say that the volunteer soldier in many cases literally despises the NRMA soldier. And it is an interesting psychological fact that when an NRMA man enlists he frequently changes his own attitude to his former comrades with startling and even amusing suddenness and completeness.

54. The volunteer feels himself a man quite apart from the NRMA man. He regards himself as a free man who had the courage to make a decision. He seldom takes the trouble to analyze the manifold reasons put forward by those who won't enlist. He lumps them all together as no more than feeble excuses masking cowardice, selfishness and bad citizenship. In many cases no doubt he is right. In others he may be wrong, but the fact remains that the antipathy between these two classes of soldiers starts right in the barrack room. The rift is there all the time. In 13 Infantry Brigade it had healed over at Kiska but the moment the pressure was put on, it opened up instantly, and widened progressively. It can be detected with ease in the attitude of the men. The volunteer is conscious of his position. He is proud of it. He is anxious to work. He salutes his officers and speaks to them with self confidence. The NRMA soldier slouches at his work. He tends to become sullen. He nurses his fancied grudge against "the Army". He hates "the Army". He has little self respect and therefore little respect for his officers.

55. I have seen this feeling developed to an amazing degree in 13 Infantry Brigade through the month of April, as men enlisted and new drafts of volunteers arrived. On 1 April the 13 Brigade was a unified formation even though Esprit-de-Corps and morale were none too high for the reasons given above. But three weeks later 13 Brigade was rent into two distinct bodies of men poles apart in feeling and outlook. By 1 May there were some 2600 active personnel of high morale, fine bearing and excellent spirit, and on the other hand there were about 1600 or 1700 NRMA soldiers discontented and unhappy; a solid mass of men who had resisted successfully every appeal to their manhood and citizenship, despised by their former comrades, and finally rejected even by their officers as hopeless material out of which to make a fighting force. These men take pride in only one thing: they have beaten "the army"; they have beaten "the government".

56. Turning to the reasons why men refuse to volunteer:— these as given by the men themselves, are many and varied and have been variously reported upon. In this connection I feel that the French-speaking portion of the army in many ways presents a separate and distinct problem. I shall therefore deal with it separately.

57. Le Régiment de Hull succeeded in enlisting only about 150 of its own men or rather less than 20%. This was not for lack of effort. The Commanding Officer, Lieut.-Col. L. J. St. Laurent did his best. I doubt if any other officer of my acquaintance could have done any better. ...

59. The conclusion reached by Lieut.-Col. St. Laurent is that it is highly improbable that any large numbers of NRMA French-speaking soldiers will ever be induced to volunteer. Time may tell but I would agree that, as he says, we cannot expect "a miracle overnight." It will be a process of education and my opinion is that it will be a long process.

60. As regards the English-speaking NRMA soldiers who refuse to volunteer they vary all the way from a large number who have no patriotism or national feeling whatever, to a few intelligent men who, I believe, honestly think that by holding out they will some day force the Government to adopt conscription which they feel is the only fair system.

61. The great majority are of non-British origin — German, Italian, and Slavic nationalities of origin probably predominating. Moreover most of them come from farms. They are of deplorably low education, know almost nothing of Canadian or British History and in fact are typical European peasants, with a passionate attachment for the land. A good many of them speak their native tongues much more fluently than they speak English and amongst them the ancient racial grudges and prejudices of Europe still persist. Here again the process of converting these men into free citizens of a free country willing to volunteer and die for their country will be a matter of education, and I think it will be slow. At present there is negligible national pride or patriotism among them. They are not like Cromwell's "Good soldier" who "knows what he fights for and loves what he knows". They do not know what they are fighting, for and they love nothing but themselves and their land. This fact must be recognized. . . .

64. To summarize all these reports, and many others I have had verbally or in writing, I think it is accurate to say that, quite apart from the lack of patriotism or the will to fight, there is a widespread feeling among these men that the present manpower policy is both weak and unfair.

65. At the beginning of this report I mentioned the collapse of the system of apprehending deserters. A recent official announcement said, if I recall correctly, that there are "over 10,000" unapprehended deserters loose in Canada. This fact is known to every soldier and has a most devastating effect on discipline and morale. About 60 men of Regt. de Hull never returned from their Kiska leave. Those who did return tell stories of encountering known deserters working unmolested for high wages. I submit that our failure to apprehend deserters has struck deep at the roots of morale and discipline in the Army. I recommend that a vigorous campaign to arrest and return deserters be initiated now, without delay. As it is clearly impracticable to court martial some 10,000 men it might be necessary to offer temporary amnesty from punishment to those surrendering, to be coupled with stiff sentences of imprisonment (not detention) for those failing to accept the offer. It seems to me that nothing less will meet the situation. The slacker in the Army is encouraged to slack because he well knows that these thousands of deserters have successfully broken the law.

66. Again, there is the question of extended leave of various sorts — farm leave, mining leave, logging leave etc. The policy followed in respect of this sort of leave also has worked adversely against the morale of the Army, and I do not for a moment doubt that it is responsible for many refusals to enlist. Almost every NRMA soldier firmly believes that he is entitled to extended leave if he wants it. He is encouraged in this belief by numerous statements from responsible officials, and by innumerable items in the press.

67. The pressure from outside sources to get men out of the army on leave is unending and relentless, and has a continuously unsettling effect. The volume of applications is so huge that any attempt to arbitrate between the deserving and the undeserving is utterly impossible. And the resentment of the undeserving when leave is refused equals that of the deserving.

68. Again, I would submit that this is a burden which should be removed from the back of the Army, I have watched this leave policy in operation in Pacific Command for 18 months. The applications are so numerous that it can only be said that if any substantial fraction of them are deserving cases, then it is manifest that the work of the NRMA call-up boards must have been unfair and inefficient to a degree, The only alternative possible conclusion is that the vast majority are not deserving cases.

69. As far as I know neither the Navy nor the RCAF have any comparable leave problem, and in the army the result has been uniformly bad to the spirit and morale of the soldier. I am convinced that thousands of NRMA soldiers will resolutely decline to enlist as long as the prospect of farm or other leave is dangled before them like a carrot before a donkey. It does not suffice that G.O.C. in C. Pacific Command announces Severe restrictions on leave as long as other responsible authorities continue to make contrary statements. A

recent example, the latest of many, was a statement by various Western meat packing interests that they mean to ask the army (not the Navy or the RCAF) to release men to relieve their labour shortage.

70. I consider that in respect of leave of any sort the NRMA soldier should now be officially and publicly placed on exactly the same basis as is the volunteer soldier overseas. In the army overseas compassionate leave is the only extended leave granted, and it is granted rarely indeed. Even in Canada as far as I am aware there is no general policy of granting extended farm or other leave to volunteers in training centres preparing to go overseas. The application of existing policy to the NRMA soldier convinces the latter and his relatives and friends alike that he is not really needed for the defence of Canada at all. He then blames his Commanding Officer, his Brigadier and his G.O.C. and "The Army" for refusing to let him go. It is my considered opinion that recruiting among NRMA soldiers will never be generally successful while the present confusion of policy remains as regards extended leave.

71. Another important factor is the existence of the NRMA NCO. Our experience in 13 Brigade has convinced me that in an army dependent on the volunteer system that NRMA NCO is an anomaly and a failure. Many of these NCOs in this Bde had high intelligence and proven courage. Nevertheless the "active" soldier resents them bitterly, and the "active" NCO resents them even more. I repeat: the volunteer regards himself as above, and apart from the NRMA soldier. Nothing the latter does or can do by way of physical courage or superior intellect can alter this fact. It might be likened to the scorn of the white man (even the "poor white") for the educated negro. He may be educated but he is still a "nigger". The tremendous upsurge in morale among the active NCOs of this Brigade when the last of the non-active NCOs were removed was amazing to see. These men acted as if a stigma had been taken from them.

72. I therefore consider that if any future recruiting campaigns such as this are to be undertaken in other units or formations a pre requisite will be the progressive removal of every NCO of whatever rank who declines to enlist. No matter what his merit in other respects may be he will never be able to carry out his duties effectively once recruiting starts. I would recommend that this process start at once and that young volunteer soldiers be brought in as NCOs, if necessary from outside the Command. The NRMA NCO is only of value in an overwhelmingly NRMA unit. He is utterly useless in a unit that is even half volunteer since he cannot lead men when he himself declines to be led.

73. In conclusion it must be said that the experience of mobilizing 13 Brigade on an active basis has been in many ways disappointing. With all the factors as much in our favour as they could be; with excellent Commanding Officers, and the keenest of officers; with outside aid from G.O.C. in C. and from such officers as Lieut.-Col. Schimnowski, Lieut.-Col. J. MacGregor, V.C. and Major P. Triquet, V.C.; we nevertheless succeeded in enlisting rather less than 800 men from the four battalions and the Brigade details. The percentages varied from about 38% for the Winnipeg Grenadiers down to rather less than 20% for Le Régiment de Hull. The rest of our present Strength was made up by drafts from other units in the Command. Many of these latter enlisted during the month. Many others were already "Active" before the campaign began. The conclusion seems inescapable that the resistance of the NRMA soldier in this Command to enlistment as a volunteer is very strong indeed.

74. I have tried to analyze some of the reasons behind their resistance in this report. . . . I think it boils down to this: If more of these men are to be induced to volunteer a stronger manpower policy is required insofar as the army is concerned, and it must stem from the top. The whole country must realize that men are needed; deserters must be rounded up and severely dealt with; the confusion of policy respecting farm, etc. leave should be clarified, and the endless efforts to get men out of the army should be stopped. No more NRMA NCOs should be created and those that exist should be required to enlist or be reverted and replaced. . . .

75. Finally, it will undoubtedly be said that coercion has been used by the officers of 13 Brigade including myself. This is not so. We have used every form of persuasion that could be thought of — interviews, discussions, sermons, films, speeches. We have appealed to their pride, to their manhood, to their patriotism and even to their self-interest. But we have NOT used threats or intimidation nor subjected these men to extra fatigues or menial duties. On the contrary they have been employed throughout in properly organized training — no more arduous than that carried on by divisions of the army overseas, for the past 3 or 4 years. As I personally told them the only discrimination has been that represented by the General Service badge on the arm of the volunteer, and all that badge implies.

76. The mental strain on the officers and NCOs of this brigade has been severe. It is a tribute to these officers and NCOs that there has not so far been one single instance of violence between the volunteers and the NRMA soldiers in this Brigade. All have done their duty.

(Signed)  
(W. H. S. MACKLIN) Brigadier,  
Commander 13 Cdn Inf Bde.

## APPENDIX "T"

## CANADIAN ARMY ENLISTMENT STATISTICS SECOND WORLD WAR

Table 1: GENERAL SERVICE APPOINTMENTS AND ENLISTMENTS  
BY MONTH AND YEAR

Month	1939	1940	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947
January.....	—	6874	6082	13158	13221	4901	8543	28	2
February.....	—	3986	7086	8989	10030	4110	7755	34	5
March.....	—	5122	7333	9770	9181	3835	7881	46	7
April.....	—	4672	8800	13363	7496	4829	6374	26	2
May.....	—	7347	10384	13454	7260	4808	2785	15	1
June.....	—	30617	15634	12338	6103	7062	1019	23	2
July.....	—	30543	13319	14949	5414	5106	942	19	—
August.....	—	16335	7120	16239	5625	6038	454	28	2
September.....	58341	7807	8190	11989	5739	5522	5	22	—
October.....	4567	5061	8239	10857	5060	5304	7	6	—
November.....	4077	3283	7274	12112	4850	7721	6	3	—
December.....	2465	3153	8171	8211	3084	5097	3	—	—
Total.....	69450	124800	107632	145429	83063	64333	35774	250	21

NOTE: This table includes men called up under the National Resources Mobilization Act who volunteered for General Service; see also below, Table 3. It also includes direct officer appointments and female personnel.

## APPENDIX "T"

## CANADIAN ARMY ENLISTMENT STATISTICS, SECOND WORLD WAR

Table 2: ENROLMENTS UNDER THE NATIONAL RESOURCES  
MOBILIZATION ACT BY MONTH AND YEAR

Month	1941	1942	1943	1944	1945	Total
January.....	—	7324	5820	2145	1081	
February.....	—	4931	3865	1916	778	
March.....	4665	5289	3831	1858	710	
April.....	4874	6733	3110	1581	650	
May.....	3778	6393	2830	1997	258	
June.....	2706	4779	2549	1528	31	
July.....	3287	6833	2433	1320	17	
August.....	4139	6741	2083	1262	6	
September.....	148	5080	1864	981	—	
October.....	4322	4159	2028	1119	—	
November.....	222	6249	2211	1245	—	
December.....	3812	5881	1631	758	—	
Total..	31953	70392	34255	17710	3531	157841

**APPENDIX "T"****CANADIAN ARMY ENLISTMENT STATISTICS. .SECOND WORLD WAR**

*Table 3:* DISPOSITION OF MEN ENROLLED UNDER THE NATIONAL RESOURCES MOBILIZATION ACT (DISCHARGES. DESERTIONS. ETC.) BY MONTH AND YEAR

Month And Year	To RCN	To RCAF	To Other Forces	To General Service	To Civilian Life	Deaths	Deserters	Total
1941								
March.....		1		5	8			14
April.....	3	19		93	61	1		177
May.....	36	101		305	145	2	1	590
June.....	65	220		1023	162	1	10	1481
July.....	70	854		1258	195		18	2395
August.....	57	809		858	187		41	1952
September.....	51	363		1260	232	1	54	1961
October.....	42	480	1	1097	231		47	1898
November.....	26	510		938	212		59	1745
December.....	26	368		1031	224	4	56	1709
Total 1941.....	376	3725	1	7868	1657	9	286	13922
1942								
January.....	29	306		1988	226		82	2631
February.....	34	180		1590	360	3	46	2213
March.....	42	167	1	1825	396	1	34	2466
April.....	47	168	2	1791	451	1	47	2507
May.....	59	158	1	2526	483	1	159	3387
June.....	8	38		1649	545	5	129	2374
July.....	6	17		1585	550	3	123	2284
August.....	6	5		1498	546	1	117	2173
September.....	5	6	1	1056	669		119	1856
October.....	3	11	1	1089	696	3	91	1894
November.....		10		938	613	2	90	1653
December.....	1	8	1	739	554	5	68	1376
Total 1942.....	240	1074	7	18274	6089	25	1105	26814
1943								
January.....	2	9		1003	442	3	61	1520
February.....	3	4		762	489	4	44	1306
March.....	1	8		667	620	5	49	1350
April.....	6	8		599	774	9	33	1429
May.....	4	12		725	659	6	35	1441
June.....	7	12	3	450	720	8	57	1257
July.....	7	11		433	587	18	70	1126
August.....	9	12	2	445	691	11	91	1261
September.....	6	12	1	392	735	11	69	1226
October.....	4	20	1	419	941	5	106	1496
November.....	5	47		370	1364	7	94	1887
December.....	1	54	1	295	1536	7	86	1980
Total 1943.....	55	209	8	6560	9558	94	795	17279

## APPENDIX "T"

## CANADIAN ARMY ENLISTMENT STATISTICS. SECOND WORLD WAR

Table 3 (Continued):

DISPOSITION OF MEN ENROLLED UNDER THE NATIONAL  
RESOURCES MOBILIZATION ACT (DISCHARGES, DESERTIONS, ETC.)  
BY MONTH AND YEAR

Month And Year	To RCN	To RCAF	To Other Forces	To General Service	To Civilian Life	Deaths	Deserters	Total
1944								
January.....	10	48		398	1344	5	93	1898
February.....	6	11	2	420	1303	10	62	1814
March.....	6	10	1	436	1372	7	90	1922
April.....	10	2	1	1736	1161	7	40	2957
May.....	11		1	1025	1075	15	57	2184
June.....	14	2		3259	1032	7	76	4390
July.....	7		1	1308	814	14	95	2239
August.....	3		1	1596	808	8	109	2525
September.....	1		1	1164	660	4	124	1954
October.....	3		1	967	614	8	102	1695
November.....			2	3294	704	2	141	4143
December.....	1		2	1879	580	3	252	2717
Total 1944.....	72	73	13	17482	11467	90	1241	30438
1945								
January.....	2		1	1692	544	4	1173	3416
February.....	1			2164	455	2	1079	3701
March.....				2130	472	10	525	3137
April.....				1288	500	59	257	2104
May.....	1		1	329	601	8	188	1128
June.....			1	242	628	8	105	984
July.....		1		154	1017	4	115	1291
August.....			1	66	1810	5	77	1959
September.....					2853	5	48	2906
October.....				1	2638	1	39	2679
November.....					2034	5	60	2099
December.....			1	2	1624	5	46	1678
Total 1945.....	4	1	5	8068	15176	116	3712	27082
1946								
January.....				15	4438	1	32	4486
February.....				18	7284		12	7314
March.....				34	8321	1	8	8364
April.....				19	8307	4	10	8340
May.....				8	4691	1	13	4713
June.....				15	2566	1	10	2592
July.....				13	2082	1	4	2100
August.....				16	1842		8	1866
September.....				14	1147		5	1166
October.....				6	466		4	476
November.....				3	275		1	279
December.....					143			143
Total 1946.....				161	41562	9	107	41839

## APPENDIX "T"

## CANADIAN ARMY ENLISTMENT STATISTICS, SECOND WORLD WAR

Table 3 (Continued):

DISPOSITION OF MEN ENROLLED UNDER THE NATIONAL  
RESOURCES MOBILIZATION ACT (DISCHARGES, DESERTIONS, ETC.)  
BY MONTH AND YEAR

Month And Year	To RCN	To RCAF	To Other Forces	To General Service	To Civilian Life	Deaths	Deserters	Total
1947								
January.....				2	79		1	82
February.....				5	89	1	7	102
March.....				7	184			191
April.....				2	23		1	26
May.....				1	10			11
June.....				2	4			6
July.....					12			12
August.....				2	23			25
September.....					11			11
Total 1947.....				21	435	1	9	466
1948								
November.....					1			1
Total 1948.....					1			1
GRAND TOTAL.....	747	5082	34	58434	85945	344	7255	157841

**ABBREVIATIONS**

A.A. & Q.M.G.	Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General
A/C.	Air Commodore
A.F.C.	Air Force Cross
A.I.	Air Interception
A.M.P.	Air Member for Personnel
A.O.C.	Air Officer Commanding
A.T.D.B.	Army Technical Development Board
B.	Bomber
B.A.T.M.	British Admiralty (Army) Technical Mission
B.C.A.T.P.	British Commonwealth Air Training Plan
Bde.	Brigade
B.E.F.	British Expeditionary Force
B-PFF.	Bomber Pathfinder Force
Brig.	Brigadier
C.A.O.F.	Canadian Army Occupation Force
Capt.	Captain
C.A.S.	Chief of the Air Staff
C.A.S.F.	Canadian Active Service Force
C.B.	Companion of the Order of the Bath
C.B.E.	Commander of the Order of the British Empire
C.C.F.	Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
C.D.	Canadian Forces Decoration
Cdn.	Canadian
C.E.F.	Canadian Expeditionary Force (1914-19)
CF.	Coastal Fighter
C.F.C.	Canadian Forestry Corps
C.G.S.	Chief of the General Staff
C.I.D.	Committee of Imperial Defence
C.-in-C.	Commander-in-Chief
C.J.S.M.	Canadian Joint Staff Mission
Cmdr. (Cdr)	Commander (Naval)
Cmdre.	Commodore
C.M.G.	Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George
C.M.H.Q.	Canadian Military Headquarters, London
C.N.S.	Chief of the Naval Staff
C.N.M.O.	Canadian Naval Mission Overseas
C.O.	Commanding Officer
Col.	Colonel
Comd.	Commander
C.P.R.B.	Combined Production and Resources Board
C.R.M.B.	Combined Raw Materials Board
C.R.U.	Canadian Reinforcement Units
C.S.C.	Chiefs of Staff Committee
C.S.M.	Company Sergeant-Major (Warrant Officer, Class II)
C.T.F.	Commander Task Force
C.W.A.C.	Canadian Women's Army Corps
D.A.G.	Deputy Adjutant General
Defensor	N.D.H.Q. (Address used in telegrams)
D.F.C.	Distinguished Flying Cross
D.J.A.F.	Deputy Judge Advocate of the Fleet
D.M.	Deputy Minister
D.M.O. & I.	Director(ate) of Military Operations and Intelligence
D.N.D.	Department of National Defence
D.O.C.	District Officer Commanding
D.S.C.	Distinguished Service Cross
D.S.O.	Companion of the Distinguished Service Order
D.V.A.	Department of Veterans Affairs

E.D.	Canadian Efficiency Decoration
F.	Fighter
F/B.	Fighter/Bomber
Fd.Amb.	Field Ambulance
F.F.C.	Field Force Contingent
FR.	Fighter Reconnaissance
Fus.	Fusiliers
G/C.	Group Captain
G.C.M.G.	Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Michael and St. George
Gen.	General
G.G.	Governor General
G.H.Q.	General Headquarters
G.O.C.	General Officer Commanding
G.O.C.-in-C.	General Officer Commanding-in-Chief
GR-FB.	General Reconnaissance-Flying Boat
G.S.	General Service (General Staff)
H.C.U.	Heavy Conversion Unit
H.M.	His Majesty's
H.M.C.S.	His Majesty's Canadian Ship
H.M.S.	His Majesty's Ship (Royal Navy)
Hon.	Honourable
H.Q.	Headquarters
I.C.I.	Imperial Chemical Industries
Int.	Intruder (Intelligence)
J.A.T.P.	Joint Air Training Plan
J.S.C.	Joint Staff Committee
L.M.A.B.	London Munitions Assignment Board
L.M.G.	Light Machine Gun
Lt.-Col.	Lieutenant-Colonel
Lt.-Gen.	Lieutenant-General
M.A.B.	Munitions Assignment Board
Maj.-Gen.	Major-General
M.B.E.	Member of the Order of the British Empire
M.C.	Military Cross
M.G.A.	Major General in Charge of Administration
M.G.O.	Master General of the Ordnance
M.M.	Military Medal
M.N.D.	Minister of National Defence
N.D.H.Q.	National Defence Headquarters
NF.	Night Fighter
N.P.A.M.	Non-Permanent Active Militia
N.R.C.	National Research Council
N.R.M.A.	National Resources Mobilization Act
N.S.H.Q.	Naval Service Headquarters
O.B.E.	Officer of the Order of the British Empire
O.M.	Order of Merit
O.M.F.C.	Overseas Military Forces of Canada (1914-19)
O.R.	Other Ranks
O.P.D.	Operations Division, War Department, General Staff
O.T.U.	Operational Training Unit
P.A.C.	Public Archives of Canada
P.A. Vols.	Prince Albert Volunteers
P.E.I. Highrs.	Prince Edward Island Highlanders
P.I.A.T.	Projector Infantry Anti-Tank

## *Abbreviations*

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P.J.B.D.	Permanent Joint Board on Defence
P.M.	Prime Minister
PR.	Photo Reconnaissance
P.S.O.C.	Principal Supply Officers Committee
Q.M.G.	Quartermaster-General
R.A.A.F.	Royal Australian Air Force
R.A.F.	Royal Air Force
R.C.A.	Royal Canadian Artillery
R.C.A.F.	Royal Canadian Air Force
R.C.A.F. (W.D.)	Royal Canadian Air Force (Women's Division)
R.C.A.M.C.	Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps
R.C.A.S.C.	Royal Canadian Army Service Corps
R.C.E.	Royal Canadian Engineers
R.C.E.M.E.	Corps of Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers
R.C.M.P.	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
R.C.N.	Royal Canadian Navy
R.C.N.V.R.	Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve
R.N.Z.A.F.	Royal New Zealand Air Force
R.C.O.C.	Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps
R.C. Sigs.	Royal Canadian Corps of Signals
R.D.F.	Radio Direction Finding (now called Radar)
Recce.	Reconnaissance
Regt.	Regiment
R.M.Rang.	Rocky Mountain Rangers
R.N.	Royal Navy
R.S.C.	Revised Statutes of Canada
R.S.M.	Regimental Sergeant Major
S.C.N.O.	Senior Canadian Naval Officer
S.H.A.E.F.	Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
S.M.G.	Sub Machine Gun
S.O.S.	Services of Supply
T.	Transport
T.A.F.	Tactical Air Force
U.N.R.R.A.	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
U.S.	United States
U.S.A.A.F.	United States Army Air Force
U.S.N.	United States Navy
U.S.S.R.	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
V.C.	Victoria Cross
V.C.G.S.	Vice Chief of the General Staff
V.D.	Colonial Auxiliary Forces Officers' Decoration
W/C.	Wing Commander
W.D.	War Diary
W.E.	War Establishment
W.R.C.N.S.	Women's Royal Canadian Naval Service

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## PART III

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## PART V

THE ORGANIZATION AND CONTROL OF CANADIAN FIGHTING FORCES:  
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