REPORT NO. 121
HISTORICAL OFFICER
CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

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Canadian Operations in the LIRI Valley (Italy)
May - June 1944
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8 Aug 44

## HISTORICAL OFFICER

## CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

Canadian Operations in the LIRI Valley (Italy)

May - June, 1944

1. The present report is a preliminary account of the part played by

Canadian Military Forces in the large scale operations in the Italian theatre of war in the early summer of 1944. A complete narrative of the Canadian share in these operations will be prepared in due course, and the present one must be regarded as a provisional outline only. It is based upon a narrative prepared for the use of No. 10 Intermediate Canadian War Staff Course. At the time when that narrative was prepared, the report of $H . Q .1$ Cdn Corps on the operations was not yet available. This report has now been received and information from it has been incorporated in the account which follows.
2. The victorious operations which are described in part in this report have resulted in the liberation from the Germans of a large portion of Italy, including the city of ROME. The Allied offensive, directed by General Sir Harold Alexander as C.-in-C., Allied Armies in Italy, began on 11 May 44. Canadian troops were engaged in it from that date until 4 Jun, on which day the Fifth Army occupied ROME. At the beginning of the offensive, the Allied Armies were in position on the GARIGLIANO, roughly 80 miles from ROME; at the
moment of writing (1 Aug 44) they are in the outskirts of FLORENCE, having advanced more than 200 miles up the peninsula in considerably less than two months.
3. Although H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps and 5 Cdn Armd Div proceeded to the Mediterranean from the United Kingdom in the autumn of 1943, and although H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps took responsibility for a sector of the static Adriatic front for some weeks during the winter, these were the first important operations in which 1 Cdn Corps operated as a Corps and 5 Cdn Armd Div as a Division. 1 Cdn Inf Div, which has been in the Mediterranean theatre since the assault on Sicily (10 Jul 43) was under command 1 Cdn Corps during the operations. 1 Cdn Armd Bde also participated, but under British command.

## PRELIMINARIES OF THE OPERATIONS

4. Throughout the winter and early spring months of 1944 the Allied Forces in Italy had been held up by bad weather and strong enemy positions along a line from just North of ORTONA on the ADRIATIC to the mouth of the GARIGLIANO River on the TYRRHENIAN coast. Due to the mountainous nature of most of this front the entrance to the LIRI Valley, guarded by CASSINO and its Monastery Hill, was the scene of the main Allied attempts at a breakthrough. Fierce attacks were made by American and French troops in this sector late in January and temporary bridgeheads secured across the RAPIDO River. The heavy fighting continued into February with Imperial troops taking over the attack. On 15 Feb the much talked of air attack on the famous Monastery on MONTE CASSINO took place, but the Allies failed to take the hill. In the middle of March a
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second big offensive was introduced by a 2,000 ton air raid on the town of
CASSINO. The RAPIDO river was again crossed and entrance into the town
effected by New Zealand troops, but after very heavy fighting the attack
failed. (War Office Weekly Intelligence Reviews.)
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5. Throughout April and early May there was little change on this or any
other part of the Italian front. However, plans were being made for a large-
scale offensive which was to involve many of the Eighth Army formations from
the relatively dormant Northern sector of the line.
6. 1 Cdn Corps and 1 Cdn Armd Bde were among the formation assigned to take
in this offensive, but the latter was slated to operated with 13 Corps.
7. 1 Cdn Inf Div ended its long period of duty on the ADRIATIC coast under 5 Corps on 21 Apr 44 when it was relieved by 10 Ind Inf Div. The Canadian division moved South to the CAMPOBASSO area, setting up its new Headquarters at VINCHIATURO. Following a 48-hour rest it entered upon a period of refitting and special training. Each brigade in turn moved into the rolling country between LUCERA and TROIA for special infantry-cum-tank training with 25 (Brit) Army Tk Bde. 1 Cdn Armd Bde carried out similar training with 8 Ind Inf Div. 5 Cdn Armd Div had been in training in a reserve area for a considerably longer period. (Summary of Operations 1 Cdn Inf Div, 1-15 may 44; Narrative of the Operations of 1 Cdn Armd Bde, $11-16$ May 44, as given to Hist Offr 1 Cdn Corps by Brig. W.C. Murphy, 24 May 44.)
8. The movement of all the formations into their concentration areas prior to their going into action was successfully concealed from the enemy by the carrying out of a very carefully prepared camouflage plan. The extent to which the enemy were deceived may be judged by reading the following extract from 1 Cdn Corps Intelligence Summary No. 80:


#### Abstract

It will be seen that the picture presented to the enemy command was very faulty and correspondence exactly to what the Allied command wanted him to believe. He underestimated our strength in the area of our main attack by no less than seven divs. As a result he credited us with having much larger reserves in the back areas and in view of this and the fact that he believed at least three of these divs to be on or near the coast, where landing exercises were going on, he appreciated that our frontal attack was only a diversion and that we intended to carry out another landing in his rear. His dispositions on 11 May were clearly based on this belief; he had the minimum number of tps in the line and his reserve divs were disposed along the WEST coast to meet the landing which he confidently expected. As a result our attack was made in much greater strength that he expected (in the FEC sector, for instance, in more than four times the strength he expected) which greatly assisted our initial success. All German divs in reserve were either grouped round the ANZIO Beachhead or strung out along the Western coast, and by the time the enemy had decided his fears of a landing were groundless, these reserves were so slow in reaching the scene of battle that they were drawn in and destroyed piecemeal.


(Extract from 1 Cdn Corps Intelligence Summary No. 80, 3 Jun 44 (Based on the captured intelligence files of the German Fourteenth Army.)

## GERMAN DEFENCE SYSTEM IN THE LIRI VALLEY

9. The LIRI Valley is a level stretch of land some three to five miles wide running from South-East to North-West and flanked on either side by parallel mountain ranges. The mountains are studded with occasional hill villages, and to the South-West are traversed by a fair number of tracks and passable trails. The North-Eastern range terminates abruptly at CASSINO and is of a higher average height than the Western range. MONTE CASSINO (Monastery Hill), some 1500 feet above sea level, lies directly West of the town, while MOUNT CAIRO (5000 ft) is six miles to the North-West. The LIRI River, which runs Eastwards along the Southern side of the Valley joins the GARI (RAPIDO) some six miles South of CASSINO, and then turning South becomes the GARIGLIANO ${ }^{1}$. North-West from the GARI River the LIRI Valley is very flat and open for the first few miles, gradually becoming more rolling and fairly heavily wooded. Six or seven miles from the beginning of the Valley a series of transverse gulleys run South-West towards the LIRI River. The whole area was under intense cultivation and there was considerable standing grain. ("1 Cdn Inf Bde in the LIRI Valley Battle" by Coma 1 Cdn Inf Bde: Maps Italy 1:50,000, Sheets 160, I, II, III, 159, IV, 151, II, III.)

1 The River, which is called the RAPIDO in the vicinity of CASSINO, becomes the GARI lower down before its junction with the LIRI.
10. The GUSTAV LINE was a strongly defended zone running South from CASSINO along the West bank of the RAPIDO (GARI) River, while the ADOLF HITLER LINE was built as a still more formidable alternative, pivoting on M. Cairo. The latter was built over a period of five months but, perhaps because of the earlier German success on the GUSTAV Front, was never quite completed. It ran across the LIRI Valley roughly North to South, PIEDIMONTE - AQUINO PONTECORVO - S. OLIVA, and had a depth of 700 - 900 yards. After the battle 1 Cdn Inf Div made a detailed report on the sector of the line between AQUINO - PONTECORVO, through which they attacked on 23 May. Their general description of the line was in part as follows:
a. ...In front of the line was a 1000 yds of flat ground with thick abundant crops, which limited observation from both the high ground of the HITLER LINE and our own posns. Although the enemy, because of time and disorganization, had failed to establish any outposts on this flat, any movement on it was subjected to intense mortaring, arty and nobelwerfer fire.
b. The only natural inf obstacle was along our right flank - the FORME D'AQUINO. Wire was continuous across the front with small 10 foot gaps covered by fire. A few anti-personnel mines were scattered among the wire behind. Tank going across the whole front was good in certain places, only there being an anti-tank ditch 2000 yds along cutting off the approach to PONTECORVO on the main road PIGNATARO - PONTECORVO. Teller mines had been hurriedly

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laid in front of this ditch and within range of Anti-Tank gun
fire. Also laid among the Tellers were wooden box mines.
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c. The main def of the HITLER LINE was $A T k$ and these defs had
received priority in construction. Nine $M k V$ tank turrets on
well-built concrete bases, with living quarters below ground, were
the A Tk nodal points. ${ }^{2}$ Grouped around these in every case were
two to three towed 75 and $50 \mathrm{~mm} A \mathrm{Tk}$ guns; these guns were however
not dug in. Inf posns were divided between two-man LMG pillboxes
and the conventional slit trench. The majority of the posns were
in simple earthworks. A few inf posns at the back of the line
were found in uncompleted concrete bases prepared for the Mk V
turrets, and TOBRUK STELLUNGS; most demolished houses hid
MG's.....
("Report HITLER LINE Defences" by G.S. 1 Cdn Inf Div, Italy,
June 1944, Pol; 1 Cdn Corps Intelligence Summaries, 1 May -
24 May 44.)

## THE ATTACK OPENS - 1 CDN ARMED BDE, 11-16 MAY

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11. The offensive, which was to open on the night 11/12 May, involved
considerable regrouping of both Eighth and fifth Armies. The Eighth Army took
over the sector from the junction of the RAPIDO and LIRI Rivers Northward.
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## 2 These emplacements were fitted with 75 mm pak 42 guns.

The attack was to be made all the way from the TYRRHENIAN Sea on the left to North of CASSINO on the right with the LIRI River as the boundary between the two Armies. Thus the Eighth Army was attacking only on a short sector of the long front from the LIRI River to the ADRIATIC (5 Corps had been detached from Eighth Army for the purpose of holding the dormant ADRIATIC sector). A separate attack was to be launched from the ANXIO Beachhead (established in the previous January), the time and direction being dependent on the course of the main battle. 13 Corps facing CASSINO and the LIRI Valley was to make the major attack on the English Army front, while on their right the Polish Corps (Pol-corps) was to attack through the mountains and cut off CASSINO and the Monastery. 10 Corps on the right of Polcorps was to hold, but prior to the attack every effort was made to deceive the enemy into believing that the main attack was to be delivered on that sector. The intention was to pinch out CASSINO and advance up the LIRI Valley North of the river to pierce the HITLER LINE astride Highway No. 6. The French Expeditionary Corps (F.E.C.) of the Fifth Army on the left flank of 13 Corps. 13 Corps was to open its attack South of CASSINO with 8 Ind Inf Div on the left and 4 (Brit) Inf Div on the right (C.M.H.Q. File 4/Gen Apprec/3; General Notes on Operations issued by A.C.I.G.S. (Ops), W.O., May 1944; cable FHGCT F46748, Linrep 152 dated 16 May, 44; "Report of C.C.R.A. 1 Cdn Corps on Operations of Canadian Artillery in Italy, May - June 1944").
12. The attack opened along the whole front at 2300 hours on 11 May with a heavy artillery barrage in which 1 Cdn A.G.R.A. and R.C.A. 1 Cdn Inf Div took part. This account will confine itself so that sector of the front in which Canadian troops participated in the attack.
13. 8 Ind Inf Div supported by 1 Cdn Armd Bde effected crossings of the GARI (RAPIDO) South of the village of S . ANGELO, square 8614. The infantry assault went in at 2345 hours with three troops of tanks deployed on the river-bank to help cover the crossings. It was "an unorthodox use of tanks" but, according to the commander of 17 Ind Inf Bde, their assistance was invaluable. Another idea developed by the Canadian Brigade was the launching of the Bailey bridge by tanks. Two tanks were employed, both specially fitted, one having the turret and gun removed. This operation was actually carried out during the assault and the bridge safely launched in the face of the enemy holding the far bank. It would have been impossible to have built a normal Bailey bridge at this point. This bridge was successfully completed by 0830 hours 12 May: one of the three other bridges attempted had been completed as early as 0730 hours, by gallant work on the part of Indian snappers. (Narrative of Brig. Murphy.)
14. As soon as the bridges were completed two squadrons of tanks from 11 and 14 Cdn Armd Regts proceeded across the river to support the infantry who were pinned down on the flat ground on the other side by very heavy enemy fire. Of the tanks that got across during the course of the day some 15 became bogged down in the soft ground on the far side, but all were extricated by gallant work of the Brigade R.E.M.E. under enemy fire. During the day the infantry were only able to penetrate a few hundred yards beyond the river but one squadron of tanks relieved pressure by pressing forward a thousand yards on its own through difficult and close country to a point at 849141 which was known by the code name HIGHGATE. Several anti-tank and self-propelled guns
and a Pz Kw IV were knocked out by this squadron, and many German infantry were killed. (Ibid.).
15. On the right, 4 Div had managed to cross the river but were in an even more difficult position since they had been unable to complete any bridges. On 13 May, there was hard and bitter fighting to expand the bridgeheads. S. ANGELO fell during the afternoon. 14 Cdn Armed Regt and one of the Indian Brigades pushed forward during the day and made firm their line in the vicinity of HIGHGATE, capturing PANACCIONI (851137) in the evening. The remaining armoured regiment and infantry brigade crossed the river that night. Supply of petrol and ammunition over the bridges under almost constant shellfire was a problem - but by the night of 13/14 May by working without rest and regardless of fire, the Echelon personnel of the three Armoured Regiments, using cut-down Stuart tanks, had succeeded in building up a sufficient dump to eliminate worries on that score. (Ibid).
16. On the right the situation was eased when 4 Div got two bridges over and thrust forward for some 1500 yards. During the night $13 / 14$ May and the following day 78 (Brit) Inf Div crossed the river in the rear of the Indian Division and swung North to cut Highway No. 6 and isolate CASSINO and the Monastery. (Ibid.).
17. On the 14 th a squadron of 15 Cdn Armed Regt and 21 Ind Inf Bde attacked to cut the road CASSINO-PIGNATARO. Again very heavy fighting ensued, the Germans being strong in machine-guns and anti-tank weapons. On three occasions Canadian tanks fought their way forward alone for over a thousand
yards. Snippers, overlooked in the close country by the tanks, prevented the infantry from getting forward and the tanks had to return. By nightfall they had reached MASSA EVANGELISTA (8314). (Ibid.).
18. On the morning of 15 May the remaining uncommitted squadron of 12 Cdn Armd Regt and the remaining uncommitted battalion of 21 Ind Inf Bde fought their way slowly but surely to the cross-roads, 827159, to cut the CASSINOPIGNATARO road. Meanwhile 11 Cdn Armd Regt and its brigade had advanced to link up with them. 14 Cdn Armd Regt and the remaining Indian Brigade drove directly West and had some very heavy fighting. Just as night fell they burst into PIGNATARO, capturing or killing the entire garrison. There was now no question of the attacking forces being driven back over the GARI and a firm base had been secured for a drive against the HITLER LINE. (Ibid.).
19. The complete absence of mines and the fact that the anti-tank gun screen was not effective had made it apparent that the Germans never expected tanks to get into the LIRI Valley. (Ibid.).

## 1st CANADIAN INFANTRY DIVISION, 15-28 MAY

20. On 16 May, 1 Cdn Corps, from reserve, took over the Southern sector of the 13 Corps front. The Corps Commander, Lt.-Gen. E.L.M. Burns, O.B.E., M.C.. planned to send his infantry division forward first to break through the HITLER LINE and to follow through with his armoured division. On 15 May, 1 Cdn Corps issued an Operation Instruction detailing the takeover by 1 Cdn Inf Div. On 14 and 15 May, Major-General C. Vokes, D.S.O., G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf

Div, visited the G.O.C. 8 Ind Inf Div, and made detailed arrangements for the takeover. 1 Cdn Inf Bde Gp was to cross and relieve 19 Ind Inf Bde during the night $15 / 16$ May on the line PIGNATARO South to the LIRI, while 3 Cdn Inf Bde Gp was to cross over and relieve 21 Ind Inf Bde on the following night. 1 Cdn Armd Bde went into reserve, but 12 Cdn Armd Regt remained with 1 Cdn Corps to support 3 Cdn Inf Bde. General Vokes assumed command of the sector at 2215 hours, 16 May. ("The LIRI Valley Battle, 1 Cdn Corps Narrative of Events"; Report of G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div.)
21. During 17 and 18 May, 1 and 3 Cdn Inf Bdes advanced simultaneously toward the HITLER LINE, right and left respectively, meeting enemy resistance. They reached the FORME D'AQUINO where they consolidated for the night of the 18th and patrolled strongly. 1 and 4 Fd Coys, R.C.E., constructed one D.S. and two S.S. Bailey bridges across the FORME D'AQUINO at 783133, 774177 and 773174 by 1800 hours; three further bridges were constructed on 19 May. There was a bad traffic-jam with a column of vehicles of 6 (Brit) Armed Div, far across their Corps boundary, before 3 Cdn Inf Bde succeeded in getting all its transport across. 2 Cdn Inf Bde remained in the reserve area East of PIGNATARO. ("Advance to and Breaching of the ADOLF HITLER LINE by 3 Cdn Inf Bde"; "History of the Royal Canadian Engineers, 1 Canadian Corps Operations in Italy, May - June 1944".)
22. On the night of 17 May 1 Cdn Corps issued an Operation Instruction ordering the breach of the HITLER LINE and exploitation through the FROSINONE. 11 Cdn Inf Bde Gp moved into the area East of the FORME D'AQUINO and came under command of 1 Cdn Inf Div. (Report of 1 Cdn Corps.)
23. By this time 306 Prisoners of War had been taken and an estimated 400 other casualties inflicted on the enemy since the time when contact was made. Less than 500 Germans, it was estimated, managed to withdraw to the HITLER LINE defences, there to join an heterogeneous assortment of troops who had been in the line no longer than 48 hours. The Corps Inteligence Summary of 20 May estimated the enemy strength from MONTE CAIRO to the LIRI River on 18 May, as 8300. The 1 Cdn Inf Div Report on the HITLER LINE listed the enemy troops under command of 90 P.G. Div, 19-24 May, on the 1 Cdn Inf Div front as 1085 infantry (mostly from 361 and 576 Gren Regts) and a miscellaneous assortment of artillery, engineer, tank and signal units in support. This force was very disorganized due to the heavy losses suffered and the rapid advance of the Canadians. This disorganization extended not only to the committing of mechanized battle-groups of various units and even arms, but to a break-down in enemy communications. ("The Enemy on the ADOLF HITLER LINE, May 1944, GS. I, H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div G.M.F."; "Report HITLER LINE Defences by G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div.)
24. On 19 May, 1 and 3 Cdn Inf Bdes made contact with the defences of the ADOLF HITLER LINE and began intensive reconnaissance and patrolling to discover or to confirm what was already known about the defences and determine whether the enemy intended to hold the line. The Royal $22 e$ Regiment attacked in square 7419 but the enemy reacted strongly with heavy machine-gun mortar and artillery fire from prepared positions. It was evident that he intended to fight for the HITLER LINE and that a properly "teed-up" attack with strong artillery support would be necessary. Therefore the R. $22 e \mathrm{R}$. were withdrawn
to their original positions. (Reports by G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div and by 3 Cdn Bde.)
25. The next three days were spent in elaborate preparations for the main drive through the line. During this short interval the artillery was to apply a continuous systematic softening-up process against the defences. The bombardment was to commence at once and grow in volume as more guns could be brought to bear. Approximately 400 guns were employed from resources of 1 and 5 Cdn Divs, 1 Cdn A.G.R.A., F.E.C. and 13 F.A. Bde. (The artillery of the French Corps on the left who were most anxious to cooperate, was of great assistance.) The plan was in full swing before midnight 19/20 May to the extent of approximately 1000 rounds per gun on known enemy strong points. (Report of G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div; "Artillery 1 Cdn Inf Div in the LIRI Valley Battle", by C.R.A. 1 Cdn Inf Div.)
26. The general tactical situation across the front by the night 20/21 May was as follows. On the right 4 Div had taken CASSINO on 18 May, while the Polish Corps had taken Monastery Hill on the same day and had pushed along the spine of M. CAIRO almost to PIEDIMONTE finally breaking the resistance of 1 para Div in this sector which had so long provided a hinge for the defence of the LIRI Valley. In the valley below, 6 (Brit) Armd Div had reached AQUINO, from which however they had been forced to withdraw to an area near the airfield to the East. On their left elements of 78 Div had reached the HITLER LINE and were in position before it. 1 Cdn Inf Div sector extended from exclusive AQUINO to the LIRI River. On the left the French had had perhaps the greatest success, beginning a turning movement on the Western

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flank of the ADOLF HITLER LINE. After taking S. OLIVA on 17 May, they
succeeded in rolling up the line as far as a suburb of PONTECORVO on the West
bank of the LIRI River. At the same time they had captured M. LEUCIO (6717)
three miles West from PONTECORVO and thus turned the enemy's main line of
advance and obtained observation over the main approaches of his forward
positions. The HITLER LINE itself, as we have seen, was lightly held.
(Report of 1 Cdn Corps - "Lessons from the Breakthrough of the HITLER LINE" by
Lt.-Gen. Burns; Was Office Weekly Intelligence Review, 31 May 44.)
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27. The German position was so compromised that it was hoped that he could be turned out of the HITLER LINE by pressure on both flanks thus avoiding a costly frontal attack. However, since the object of the operations was to destroy the enemy forces, or at least to exert sufficient pressure to ensure the success of the breakthrough from the ANZIO bridgehead, it was important to bring him to battle and strike him an effective blow. (Report of 1 Cdn Corps - Lessons.)
28. On 20 May 1 Cdn Corps issued Operation Instruction No. 10 which was slightly changed when Corps orders were issued verbally at a conference that afternoon. These were confirmed in the form of 1 Cdn Corps Operation Order No. 1 (see Appendix "A").

> The op was to be called "CHESTERFIELD" and would be carried out in two phases. In the first phase 1 Cdn Inf Div were to breach through the HITLER LINE and secure the high ground approx 1000 yds beyond, with a view to fanning outwards to destroy the enemy. In phase two, 5 Cdn

Armed Div would pass through 1 Cdn Inf Div and seize crossings over the R MELFA with a view to exploiting towards CEPRANO. It was decided snakes would NOT be used. H-hr was set for 0600 hrs on 23 May.

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(1 Cdn Corps Report, page 2.)
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29. The same afternoon the G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div outlined his plan, which was later slightly amended by the Army Commander. H-hour for the attack was set at 0600 hours, 23 May. 2 Cdn Inf Bde (right), and 3 Cdn Inf Bde less one battalion (left), were to assault at H-hour. These brigades were to attack the line on a 2000-yard front midway between PONTECORVO and AQUINO, with the road PONTECORVO-AQUINO as their intermediate and the road PONTECORVO-Highway No. 6 as their final objective. (Report of G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div; see Appendix "B" for text of the Order.)

1 Cdn Inf Bde and 4 Cdn Recce Regt were to carry out aggressive offensive tactics to the south of the main offensive and get forward into the enemy defence positions as opportunity offered. 12 Cdn Armd Regt of 1 Cdn Armd Bde, which had remained wit the 1st Canadian Infantry Division when it took over from the Indian Division, was to form a Divisional reserve along with R. 22e R. (Ibid.).
31. The support fire plan called for heavy counter preparation fire on forward defences on the front of 13 Corps on the RIGHT flank. This fire was designed to confuse the enemy as to the actual frontage of the attack and to get his gunners to man their guns. It was tied in with the subsidiary attack
by 1 Cdn Inf Bde. The counter preparation fire was to come down from minus 55 to minus 45 and was to be followed by a counter-battery programme, using the total resources available (exclusive of Field Artillery), from minus 45 to minus 3 and limited resources from minus 3 to the end of the fire plan. A barrage, concentrations and smoke screens were to start at minus 3 and to continue until the end of the fire plan (approximately three hours). A counter-mortar programme was to start at minus 30 and continue until the end of the fire plan. Pre-arranged D.F. tasks were to be laid down for each objective. Artillery resources available for this plan totalled 810 guns of all types from 1 and 5 Cdn Divs, 1 Cdn A.G.R.A., 78 Div, 8 Ind Div,

6 A.G.R.A., 13 F.A. Bde, 4 Div, Polcorps, 12 A.A. Bde, and 1 D. M.T. (1 Division Motorisée d'Infantrie). Of these, 76 medium and heavy guns were set aside for exclusive counter-battery and 52 guns and mortars for exclusive counter-mortar use. Thus 682 guns of all types were available for the Divisional supporting fire plan. (Report of C.R.A. 1 Cdn Inf Div.)
32. During the night $20 / 21$ May, 4 Cdn Recce Regt (4th Princess Louise Dragoon Guards) entered the line South of the road PIGNATARO = PONTECORVO and contact 44 Ersatz Battalion which showed little stomach for fighting. During the following morning, 21 May, this Regiment had considerable success, killing many Germans and taking 22 prisoners. Since it was evident that this line on the enemy right flank was weakly held, and since the French to the south had made good headway and dominated PONTECORVO from M. MORONE and M. LEUCIO the G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div sent the Commander of 1 Cdn Inf Bde to liaise with the French and investigate the possibility of sending a battalion across the LIRI in the vicinity of PONTECORVO. On his return, however, Brig. Spry reported
that he did not consider the operation practical, so General Vokes ordered him to attack on his present front the following morning with 73 EASTING as the axis. (Reports of G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div and of 1 Cdn Corps.)
33. On 22 May, 4 P.L.D.G. with the support of two troops of Sherman tanks from 142 R.T.R. continued their successful offensive, on the left flank of 1 Cdn Inf Bde. The 1 Cdn Inf Bde attack opened at 1030 hours with a successful forcing of a gap through the enemy wire. Soon, however, an unsuspected minefield held up the supporting tanks, while the infantry came under very heavy nobelwerfer, artillery and small arms fire. 1 Fd Coy, R.C.E.., cleared two routes of mines, one to within 400 yards of PONTECORVO. The attack of 1 Cdn Inf Bde made considerable process into the enemy defences, but he breach was not sufficient to justify changing the entire CHESTERFIELD plan. Therefore during the evening 2 and 3 Cdn Inf Bdes and 25 Army Tk Bde commenced regrouping for the main offensive on the following morning. (Reports of G.O.C., C.R.E. and C.R.A., 1 Cdn Inf Div and Coma 1 Cdn Inf Bde.)
34. The G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div established his tactical Headquarters well forward and in a central location (768168), the same evening. Tactical Headquarters of 2 and 3 Cdn Inf Bdes and 25 Army Tk Bde were all within five minutes' walk. A Signal Plan had been drawn up to provide line communications for the assault with sufficient alternatives to provide some channel at all times from "Tac Div" to "Tac Bdes" and "Main Div". Utmost difficulty was experienced maintaining the line because of the large number of tanks and transport in the area and because the laterals from "Main Div" to the right flank were along a forward slope subject to spasmodic enemy fire. However,
when the attack commenced all lines and wireless were working except one line to "Main Div" which was repaired by 0630 hours. Indeed, during the day 23 May, no line was out for more than 30 minutes and line communications were available to all formations at all times. (Reports of G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div and Coma 1 Cdn Inf Div Sigs.)
35. At 0600 hours, 23 May 44, the attack on the ADOLF HITLER LINE commenced. The artillery barrage had a frontage of 3200 yards, allowing for 500 yards overlap on either side of the frontage of attack. and was 3000 yards deep. The rate of advance were 100 yards in five minutes, later diminishing to 100 yards in three minutes. The fire-power available was sufficient to allow for a depth of fire of 600 yards throughout, including pauses. Concentration as originally planned were 32 in number, but this was considerably exceeded, due to a freeing of artillery support from 1 Cdn Inf Bde front. Four of these tasks were smoke screens. Many of the concentrations were superimposed over the barrage to neutralize the thickest enemy defences. (Report of C.R.A. 1 Cdn Inf Div.)
36. 2 Cdn Inf Bde started attack with Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry on the right and Seaforth Highlanders of Canada on the left, supported by tanks of North Irish Horse. After the first objective had been gained, Loyal Edmonton Regiment was to pass through P.P.C.L.I. and advance with the Seaforths to the final objective. ("2 Cdn Inf Bde in the LIRI Valley Battle" by Coma 2 Cdn Inf Bde.)
37. Progress at first appeared satisfactory: but the tanks with both battalions were held up by mines and, despite the effort of sappers working under heavy fire, could make little progress. Mist, smoke and the dust of the barrage added to the natural screen of woods, vegetation and tall grain made control difficult. (Ibid.)
38. Late in the morning at the cost of very heavy casualties the Seaforth of C. reached and consolidated their first objective. P.P.C.L.I. after some progress were held up with equally heavy casualties. Both battalions were unable to get supporting arms, tanks or anti-tank guns forward. L. Edmn R. attempted to pass through P.P.C.L.I. but were held up by the wire and suffered very heavy casualties by mines and fire. Numerous supporting tanks were knocked out by mines and anti-tank guns. (Ibid.)
39. 3 Cdn Inf Bde on the left flank had rather more success. Carleton and York Regiment and 51 R.T.R. gained their first objectives by 0700 hours. Enemy tanks and self-propelled guns came into action against the British tanks, as did anti-tank guns from the steel-and-concrete pillboxes of the HITLER LINE. A desperate tank battle was won only after the British tanks and suffered considerable losses. At about 1000 hours they overcame the anti-tank defence, destroying some enemy tanks and forcing the remainder to withdraw. West Nova Scotia Regiment in the meantime had positioned themselves behind Carlt \& York R. on the first objective and were waiting for phase two to commence. Both battalions had dug in under heavy and continuous shelling and mortaring. (Report of 3 Cdn Inf Bde.)
40. Several enemy counter-attacks had developed from the direction of AQUINO but were beaten off by artillery fire and fire from a squadron of 12 Cdn Armd Regt. (Report of G.O.C. Cdn Inf Div.)
41. By 1300 hours it was obvious that the attack of 2 Cdn Inf Bde was unlikely to succeed. According the G.O.C. with the concurrence of the Corps Commander decided to reinforce the success of 3 Cdn Inf Bde. He therefore turned over the divisional reserve of R .22 e . and 12 Cdn Armd Regt (less one squadron) to the Coma 3 Cdn Inf Bde and ordered the latter to lanch an attack, wit the West N.S.R. on the left and R. 22 e R. on the right, to capture objectives on the far side of the enemy line, one and two miles North-East of PONTECORVO. (Squares 7218, 7319.) (Ibid.)
42. At 1650 hours the second phase commenced and was completely successful. Enemy reserves were caught in the open as they were about to counter-attack and completely demoralized. Although fierce resistance from surviving enemy elements was met it was overcome by West N.S.R. who were soon on their objectives and consolidating. R. 22e R. followed forward, turned right, and after fierce fighting seized the high ground in area 7319. By nightfall both units were firmly in their new positions and the breach had been established. (Ibid., Report of 3 Cdn Inf Bde.)
43. During the day 4 P.L.D.G. and 1 Cdn Inf Bde had slowly forged ahead on their fronts, both tanks and infantry suffering heavily. The 48th Highlanders with all effective supporting tanks out of operation, were brought to a stand still during the morning. Shortly after noon, however, they commenced to make
progress forward again. The Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment came to their assistance by attacking on their right. Two platoons made a direct assault on enemy machine-gun positions and carried them with some bitter hand-to-hand fighting and the company became firmly established on the high ground beyond the gap, making contact with the 48th. With the close cooperation of the supporting tanks another company of Hast \& P.E.R. quickly broke through and consolidated on the junction at 738171. The remainder of the battalion was at once pushed forward with the balance of the supporting tanks and a troop of self-propelled guns, and the high ground at point 106 (733174) was occupied. The Royal Canadian Regiment and the 48 th Highlanders went through the line and consolidated, although mopping up was not completed until noon the next day. R.C.R. were established in PONTECORVO by first light on 24 May, and the whole line Northward to AQUINO was cleared of the enemy. (Report of 1 Cdn Inf Bde.)
44. Enemy casualties, in proportion to the number holding the line, were very heavy. By first light 24 May, 15 officers and 525 other ranks had been taken prisoners since the attack opened the previous morning, and this total, together with a large number of enemy killed, accounted for the majority of 361 and 576 Gren Regts and all the various sub-units under their command. The cost to our own forces, however, had been high, especially to 2 Cdn Inf Bde which appears to have struck the strongest sector of the line. At later date, Corps Headquarters stated that the total casualties for 1 Cdn Inf Div on 23 May were 18 officers and 495 other ranks (see approx "D"). (1 Cdn Corps Intelligence Summary No. 63, 25 May 44.)

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45. The Artillery programme for the battle was well carried out, with some
necessary alterations as the fighting progressed. One "WILLIAM" target (all
available guns) was successfully fired on AQUINO by over 600 guns. T.O.T.
(time on target) was }30\mathrm{ minutes after the request had been passed to C.C.R.A.
from the Divisional Artillery Headquarters. During the evening 14 "UNCLE"
targets (divisional concentrations) many "MIKE" targets (regimental
concentrations) were engaged by Forward Observation officers, commanding
officers' representatives and Air Observation Posts. Throughout the day the
divisional artillery regiments fired approximately 500 rounds per gun.
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46. Although this programme was undoubtedly impressive, and very valuable,
the Corps commander subsequently made certain comments regarding the limited
effectiveness of the counter-mortar work, the failure to blind the enemy's
observation, and the timing of the opening barrage prior to H-Hour. Regarding
destructive shoots, he wrote:
Examination of the results of the bombardment of the HITLER LINE do not
indicate any effectual destruction of works in spite of the general
accuracy of the placing of the concentrations. The results obtained
were that the enemy's heads were kept down, but this is necessary while
the infantry are advancing not before.

He thought that nothing less than 7.2 inch Howitzers would be effective against such emplacements as were found in this line (report of 1 Cdn Corps Lessons).
47. Summing up the day's fighting, it may be said that at considerable cost the 1st Canadian Infantry Division had broken through the much-vaunted ADOLF HITLER LINE and completely routed the enemy troops in that sector. The Corps Commander in commenting on the battle attributed the high casualties to two main causes:
a. 2 Cdn Inf Bde moved into their sector too late to carry out the necessary recces and patrolling which had done so much ensure the success of 3 Cdn Inf Bde; and
b. 2000 yards was too narrow a frontage for a three-battalion attack since a narrow frontage, of course, allowed the enemy to concentrate his artillery and mortar fire which caused the bulk of 1 Cdn Inf Div's casualties. However, as General Burns concluded, the results must justify the general conduct of the operations. (Ibid.)
48. Following the battle for the HITLER LINE the Canadian Corps Commander received warm messages of congratulation on the fine performance of 1 Cdn Inf Div from the Army Commander (General Leese) and from General Juin (commanding the F.E.C.) (W.D., G.S., H.Q. Cdn Inf Div, May 44, Appendices 38 and 42).

## PENETRATION BEYOND THE MELFA BY 5TH CANADIAN ARMOURED DIVISION

49. At 1730 hours, 23 May, verbal orders were issued to 5 Cdn Inf Div to pass through the gap made by Cdn Inf Div, but rain and difficult tracks prevented an advance that night. Major-General B.M. Hoffmeister, D.S.O., G.S.O. 5 Cdn Inf Div, issued orders that 5 Cdn Inf Bde Gp would advance to the River MELFA and secure crossings and a covering position for the passage of 11 Cdn Inf Bde over the river. The Irish Regiment of Canada was placed under command of 5 Cdn Inf Bde for this opening phase, while most of the divisional artillery and engineer resources, plus all the corps artillery in support of the division, were placed in support of the brigade. (Report of 1 Cdn Corps; "Report on Ops 23-31 May 44, 5 Cdn Inf Div"; "Crossing of the MELFA and the Securing of a Bridgehead by 5 Cdn Inf Bde Gp".)
50. Since is was uncertain what would happen on that portion of the HITLER LINE north of AQUINO a firm base had to be established between the HITLER LINE and the MELFA in order that enemy positions in any direction could be dealt with. The plan had to be very flexible since it was uncertain where and when 1 Cdn Inf Div might succeed in breaking through. The 5 Cdn Inf Bde plan was as follows. British Columbia Dragoons (9 Cdn Armd Regt) with Irish Regiment of Canada and one battery of self-propelled anti-tank guns in support were to move through the gap and secure a firm base in the general area MANCINI, square 7122. Lord Strathcona's Horse (2 Cdn Armd Regt) with one company of the Westminster Regiment (Motor) plus two scout platoons, one battery of selfpropelled anti-tank guns and one battery self-propelled field artillery in support were to pass through and cross the River MELFA at 688243. The
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remainder of the Westminster Regiment were to be ready to go forward and
enlarge the bridgehead. The 8th New Brunswick Hussara (5 Cdn Armd Regt) were
to be prepared to cross the River MELFA through the bridgehead if a suitable
crossing was found and exploit in the general direction of CEPRANO. Two
squadrons of Governor General's Horse Guard (3 Cdn Armd Recce Regt) were to
cover the left and right flanks of the advance. (Ibid.)
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51. ON 23 May, the force grouped as above in the area East of the FORME D'AQUINO in the general area 7917 and during the night $23 / 24$ May moved into the forward assembly area in rear of 3 Cdn Inf Bde. The move was delayed by the congestion on the roads and by a necessary last minute change in assembly areas. As a result the leading tanks did not get across the start line until 0800 hours, two hours later than planned. The B.C.D. supported by two companies of infantry experienced heavy fire from the front and from their right rear in the general area of AQUINO. They reached their objective at 1220 hours going through intense heavy shelling and engaging enemy PANTHER tanks and self-propelled 88 mm guns. The second group was then sent on through, the Recce Troop proceeding as fast as possible to the line of the River MELFA which they reached at 1500 hours. The main force (Ld S.H.) found it heavy going through sunken roads and cross-tracks and encountered approximately a squadron of PANTHER tanks and self-propelled guns in the general areas 6924 which were supported by further enemy tanks on the other side of the river. A tank battle ensued and the enemy tanks and selfpropelled guns were finally destroyed or put to flight. Following the battle the Ld S.H. were positioned with one squadron in the general area 693242 covering the approach to the crossing, one covering Highway No. 6 on the right
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flank and one covering the open ground to the south-West of the crossing
place. Meanwhile, the Recce Troop had managed to get three Stuart tanks
across the river at }1520\mathrm{ hours followed by the leading sections of "A" Company
of Westmr R. (M) at }1530\mathrm{ hours. An attempt was made to get the main body of
Ld S.H. across the river but the steepness of the river bank and the presence
of enemy anti-tank guns on the opposite side made this impossible. The
remainder of the Westmr R. (M) however managed to cross the river before dark.
"A" Company had been subjected to counter-attacks supported by tanks and had
suffered heavy casualties amounting the fifty percent of those taking part.
However, they had killed 15 Germans taking nearly 50 prisoners, three self-
propelled guns and one PANTHER tank. Major J.K. Mahony, commanding "A"
Company, later received the V.C. for his gallant leading of his Company in
this action. "B" Company, which had crossed further up the river in the
vicinity of 695245, ran into considerable opposition and after several hours'
fighting was ordered to withdraw. It was impossible to get anti-tank guns or
self-propelled equipment across until after midnight. (Ibid., and Hist Offr
Report on Operations of Westmr R. 24-30 May.)
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52. Meanwhile, the G.G.H.G. had been carrying out their task of protecting the flanks with vigour and by 1630 hours had cut Highway No. 6 at the 72 grid line. All three squadrons fought almost continuously throughout the day undergoing very severe shell and mortar fire. They estimated that they had knocked out of action approximately five to seven self-propelled guns, killed 100 to 150 Germans and captured as many more which were turned over to the infantry units in the vicinity. (Report of 3 Cdn Armd Recce Regt, 2 Jun 44.$)$
53. The total of prisoners of war taken by 5 Cdn Inf Div on 24 May was 350 with approximately the same number of Germans killed. Many enemy tanks had been engaged during the day by accurate divisional artillery fire directed by Air Observation Posts. (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 5 Cdn Inf Div, 24 May 44.)
54. Although 5 Cdn Armd Div passed through on 24 May, part of 2 Cdn Inf Div continued to advance on the left flank. The G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div detailed a task force consisting of 4 P.L.D.G., two squadrons Royal Canadian Dragoons (1 Cdn Armd C. Regt), one squadron 12 Cdn Armd Regt and Carlt \& York R., all under command of Lt.-Col. Adams, 4 P.L.D.G., to advance along the LIRI on the left flank of the main attack by 5 Cdn Inf Div and capture a bridgehead over the MELFA River. Throughout the day (24 May) this force engaged the enemy in a running fight. The Recce Regt advanced along the road just North of the LIRI River from PONTECORVO to the MELFA, and succeeded in reaching the river by midnight $24 / 25$ May. (Reports of G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div and 3 Cdn Inf Bde.)
55. At 1800 hours 24 May 1 Cdn Corps issued Operation Instruction No. 11 which ordered 1 Cdn Inf Div to press on across the MELFA and mop up. 5 Cdn Armd Div was to organize a strong bridgehead on the night of $24 / 25$ May in order to move on CEPRANO the following day and to block as many crossings over the river and prevent the escape of as many enemy as possible. (Report of 1 Cdn Corps.)
56. On the morning of 25 May, the balance of 3 Cdn Inf Bde moved forward, the West N.S.R. on the left along the axis PONTECORVO - road-junction 698187 666210, and R. 22e R. along the axis road-junction 717180 - road-junction
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696196. The Carlt & York R. encountered considerable opposition but it was
overcome by artillery and infantry fire and a crossing achieved. This
battalion consolidated in the area }664233\mathrm{ while the West R.S.R. also crossed
the river and seized objectives in square 6423. (Reports of G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf
Div and of 3 Cdn Inf Bde; W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, May 44.)
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57. The 5 Cdn Armd Bde bridgehead position was precarious so it was decided to attack next morning with a view to getting at least a two-battalion bridgehead. The Irish Regiment were brought up to the East bank of the river to the left of the original crossing. They attacked at 0600 hours the following morning and by 1235 hours 25 May the bridgehead was firmly established on a two-battalion front. 5 Cdn Inf Div and 1 Cdn Inf Div each completed a bridge across the MELFA the same morning. (Reports of Coma 5 Cdn Armd Bde and of 2 Cdn Corps.)
58. From the time the leading troops, 5 Cdn Armd Bde, hit the River MELFA at 1500 hours on 24 May until 1230 hours 25 May, the general area of the crossing had been subjected to exceptionally heavy shelling and mortaring which continued without pause throughout this period. Although the enemy had not intended to stand and fight in this position, it was obvious that he intended to delay the Canadian advance across the river as long as possible. During the day, 25 May, some 54 of his tanks and vehicles were seen withdrawing to the West and were engaged by 5 Cdn Inf Div's artillery. (Report of Coma 5 Cdn Armd Bde; W.D., G.S., H.Q. 5 Cdn Inf Div, 25 May.)
59. Later on 25 May, 11 Cdn Inf Bde passed through the MELFA bridgehead that had been secured by 5 Cdn Armd Bde. The Cape Breton Highlanders supported by 8 N.B.H. crossed the MELFA under heavy mortar fire, followed by the Perth R. The Ir R.C. which had crossed previously under command of 5 Cdn Armd Bde now reverted to is own brigade. The original plan required the infantry brigade to pass through the bridgehead at 1200 hours and exploit to the LIRI, but this plan was held up due to excessive traffic. The 5 Cdn Inf Div report refers not only to the lack of roads and bridges but also to interference from 1 Cdn Inf Div and 6 (Brit) Armd Div. By last light the whole Brigade was consolidated with the C.B. Highrs in the area 663245-660251-678249672247, the Perth Regiment on the left flank, area 665233, and the Ir R.C. on the right. By midnight orders were issued for a further advance at 0630 hours the following morning, 26 May, to CEPRANO with C.B. Highrs on the right and the Perth R. on the left, each supported by a squadron of tanks from 8 N.B.H. (Reports from Hist Offr 5 Cdn Armd Div on Operations of C.B. Highrs, Perth R., and 8 N.B.H. in the LIRI Valley; Report of 5 Cdn Armd Div.)
60. Opposition from 88 mm guns was disposed of by fire from the Divisional Artillery, with Air Observation Posts doing excellent work. Mines, however, slowed up the advance to a certain extent. Very heavy machine-gun fire and sniping from the high ground North of the railway caused some casualties to C.B. Highrs. This unit attacked successfully across the railway, supported by artillery concentrations and overhead fire from the tank machine-guns. Meanwhile, the Perth R. had reached their objective, 623265, after brushing with the enemy in square 6323. The progress of the supporting tanks was slowed up throughout the day by the scrubby close country, and enemy mines,


#### Abstract

mortars and anti-tank guns. The advance of the C.B. Highrs was ordered to be continued at 1830 hours to the cross roads 6227 near CEPRANI. The Brigade failed to reach CEPRANO as expected and look up strong positions for the night along a line 623281 - 618270 - 619260 - 620257, but with its right flank left open since 78 Div on the right had not yet crossed the MELFA and since the 1 Cdn Inf Div force on the left had not yet come up in line. Earlier in the day a troop of G.G.H.G. had penetrated to M. PICCOLO and M. GRANDE, squares 6529, but had been forced to withdraw. (Ibid, Report of 1 Cdn Corps; W.D., G.S., H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, May 44.)


61. At 1125 hours, 26 May, 1 Cdn Corps issued Operation Instruction No. 12, ordering the continuance of the advance on the general axis CEPRANO-POFIFROSINONE and the destruction of as many enemy as possible. The first objective was to be the lateral road CEPRANO STAZ DI CEPRANO, 6024, and the second objective the road POFI-STAZ POFI-CASTRO 5025. 1 Cdn Inf Div was to go into reserve when the first objective had been reached and 5 Cdn Inf Div to continue the advance. (Report of 1 Cdn Corps.)
62. Elements of 1 Cdn Inf Div pushed forward on foot and marched to establish a bridgehead across the Rive SACCO, South of CEPRANO on the night 26/27 May. The bridge was completed across the river on the following night and the division remained in that area. (Ibid.)
63. During the night the Irish pushed forward to 612265 and sent a recce patrol across the LIRI River into CEPRANO which was reported empty. The following morning, 27 May, the Perth R. crossed the river by stretching a rope
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across it and pulling a single boat back and forth in a shuttle service. This
was done under heavy shellfire mostly from the East. Across the river they
came under heavy fire of all sorts from West and North-West of CEPRANO. The
town itself was entered and cleared about 0930 hours. Considerable opposition
was encountered some 600 yards South-West of the town which was successfully
dealt with by artillery fire. The C.B. Highrs followed up during he evening
crossing the river at 602262 under a heavy concentration of enemy shelling.
They consolidated on the line of the lateral road beyond the river by 2350
hours. Spasmodic enemy mortaring and shelling throughout the day were dealt
with by effective counter battery work from the Divisional Artillery.
(Reports 5 Cdn Inf Div, Perth R., C.B. Highrs, etc.; W.D., G.S., G.H. 5 Cdn
Inf Div, May 44.)
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64. Meanwhile, to the South the F.E.C. had occupied S. GIOVANNI and the Americans on the coastal sector had captured TERRACINA and contacted the ANZIO bridgehead force near LITTORIA. On the right 6 (Brit) Armd Div had come within $3 / 4$ mile of ARGE astride Highway No. 6 while Indian troops has taken ROCCASECCA North of the Highway, and the Polish forces the hitherto unassailable peak of M. CAIROA. (War Office Weekly Intelligence Review 31 May 44.)
65. Early on 28 May, H.Q. 5 Cdn Inf Div issued an Operation Order for Exercise "CHESTERFIELD" which was to comprise the final phase of the division's advance. 78 Div were advancing on the right along the line of 27 "NORTHING" toward CEPRANO while the F.E.C. were advancing toward CESANO, 4429, with their right flank on the River SACCO. 1 Cdn Inf Div had secured a
bridgehead across the SACCO in the area 6023 and were to assist 5 Cdn Inf Div if necessary. 5 Cdn Inf Div's intention was to advance and secure the Line TATLER running approximately North to South along 50 "EASTING" between POFI and ARNARA. 11 Cdn Inf Bde was to extend its bridgehead West of CEPRANO that same night and 5 Cdn Inf Bde Gp was to pass through at 1200 hours on the 28 th securing the TATLER Line. The Armoured Regiments were to start crossing the river at 0500 hours. The supporting Air Force was to bomb RIPI, POFI, TORRICE, ARNARA, FROSINONE, and CECCANO. (W.D., G.S., H.A. 5 Cdn Armd Div, May 44, Appx 47.)
66. 11 Cdn Inf Bde had continued its advance early that morning with Perth R. on the right and C.B. Highrs on the left while the Ir R.C. were to occupy the town of CEPRANO in reserve. The C.B. Highrs secured their objectives in squares 5726 and 5826 by 1140 hours and made contact with Perth R. on their right who straddled Highway No. 6 at 580279. (Reports of C.B. Highrs and Perth R.)
67. During the day enemy withdrawing along Highway 6 were successfully engaged by Kittyhawks at 510360. To the South the French continued their spectacular advance, reaching CECCANO. (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, May 44.)
68. The 5 Cdn Armd Bde's crossing was delayed by the Engineers' failure to get a bridge across the river near CEPRANO until the evening of the 28 th . By that time 78 Div had received priority on this bridge and part of the Canadian force was routed around to the South of the reservoir 6323 and up the East
side of the LIRI. The balance were given the use of the bridge the following morning. Since the ground beyond CEPRANO was practically impassable for tanks, consisting of a series of razor-back hills running at right angles to the line of advance, the B.C.D., the advanced armoured regiment, with two companies of motor patrols (Westmr R.) and with two batteries of selfpropelled guns, were ordered to advance on two centre lines, the right hand centre line running parallel to Highway No. 6 and passing North of POFI, the left centre line running South-west from CEPRANO parallel to the line of the railway for approximately two miles and then swinging North-West towards ARNARA, passing south of POFI. The objective was the high ground running approximately North and South 1000 yards East of ARNARA. The remainder of the Brigade was to follow as ordered by Brigade Headquarters. The B.C.D. met little enemy opposition except for shellfire until reaching the general area of the Rivers FORNELLI, 5527, and MALINGO, 5525, which proved serious obstacles until Scissors bridges were erected. From here on the going was very difficult. The motor companies on the right came under very intense shellfire from the vicinity of POFI, while mines and self-propelled anti-tank guns sited North and North-West of Highway No. 6 inflicted casualties on G.G.H.G. The force eventually reached its objectives by 1930 hours. The Westmr R. were sent forward and consolidated in the area 4928. 8 N.B.H. moved forward to the general area 5227 and Ld S.H. to the general area 5428 with Brigade Headquarters at 545257.3 (Report of 5 Cdn Armd Bde and B.C.D.)

3 The divisional report gives positions rather further forward for 2015 hours as follows: B.C.D. area 5031, 8 N.B.H. area 516280, Ld S.H. 534263.
69. Early on the same day, 29 May, 1 Cdn Corps had issued Operation Instruction No. 14. Information indicated that the enemy would continue to withdraw North-West on FROSINONE; resistance was likely to be light but with demolitions on a large scale. 5 Cdn Armd Div was to press forward vigorously and regain contact with the enemy, on an axis 4734-4430-1ateral FROSINONETOMAGELLA, 4134. A brigade group from 1 Cdn Inf Div was to come under command in the evening 29 May relieving 11 Cdn Inf Bde. The following evening a second brigade group from 1 Cdn Inf Div was to move forward and command of the sector was to pass to 1 Cdn Inf Div on the night $30 / 31$ May. The latter were to continue advancing beyond FROSINONE on the axis of Highway No. 6 (Report of 1 Cdn Corps, Appx "H").
70. During the afternoon of the 29th, 11 Cdn Inf Bde had also been instructed to move on to POFI. The Perth R. were to take the high ground South-East of ARNARA centred on 498307 and push one company into ARNARA while the C.B. Highrs were to occupy POFI and the high ground 507301 to the North. The Ir R.C. were to take the high ground cantered on 495294 to the West of POFI. The Perth R. took POFI after dark, experiencing considerable difficulty climbing the steep hill on which the town was built in face of shellfire and sniping. By 0100 hours they had consolidated a position in the area 5030 and proceeded to ARNARA which they occupied the following morning. The C.B. Highrs and the Ir R.C. secured their objectives during the night. Late in the afternoon of 29 May, 2 Cdn Inf Bde commenced to move forward to the area of POFI. (Reports of 11 Cdn Inf Bde, Perth R., C.B. Highrs and Ir R.C.)
71. Both brigades of 5 Cdn Inf Div continued to advance on the 30 th. The Divisional plan was for the armour to push ahead and capture three objectives - "TOM" (488333), "DICK" (464323), and "HARRY" (475355), thus forming firm bases through which 2 Cdn Inf Bde would move forward to the line PROSINONEFROSINONE Station. (Reports of 1 Cdn Corps and 5 Cdn Armd Bde.)
72. The close country and the presence of mines held up the tanks which were consequently unable to keep pace with the infantry. The C.B. Highrs and the Ir R.C. pushed ahead and reported their objectives, "TOM" and "DICK" respectively, secured by 1030 hours. The former underwent some enemy shelling while the latter had some minor encounters with the enemy. (Reports of 5 Cdn Armd Div, 5 Cdn Armd Bde and 11 Cdn Armd Bde.)
73. At 1000 hours enemy infantry, tanks and vehicles were observed on the ground rising to the North from Highway 6 in the direction of RIPI and TORRICE, and the Ld S.H. were ordered to move to the area 498349 in order to cut Highway No. 6 and take on the enemy armour. During the afternoon they engaged the enemy in square 4835, inflicting and suffering tank losses. This regiment remained in a position dominating the Highway during the night. Meanwhile the 8 N.B.H. had been diverted on instructions from Division to the general area 4331 where they made contact with the F.E.C. Here again the going was confined to a single road which was heavily mined. At last light they were forced to withdraw to a Laager in the general area 459293. (Ibid.)
74. In spite of the difficulty of getting guns forward the artillery supported all operations throughout the day, bringing down a large number of

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concentrations on targets located by the forward troops and by air observation
posts. As usual the divisional engineers worked unceasingly, improving roads,
creating diversions and clearing mines. (Report of 5 Cdn Armd Div.)
75. During the afternoon, 30 May, 2 Cdn Armd Bde started to pass through and
by 1905 hours they were disposed as follows: P.P.C.L.I. 472314, Seaforth of
C. 522288, L. Edmn R. 491321. 2 Cdn Armd Bde took over from 11 Cdn Armd Bde
at 2010 hours, while command passed from 5 Cdn Armd Div to 1 Cdn Armd Div at
0 6 1 5 \text { hours the following morning. (Report of 5 Cdn Armd Div.)}
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## CONTINUATION OF THE ADVANCE THROUGH PROSINONE BY 1st CANADIAN INFANTRY DIVISION

76. 2 Cdn Armd Bde had experienced considerable difficulty in passing through 11 Cdn Armd Bde because of traffic jams on the road and because units of 11 Cdn Armd Bde were still engaged in fighting. During the night of 30 May the L. Edmn R., which had taken over objective "TOM" from the C.B. Highrs earlier that evening, launched an attack supported by one squadron of Ld S.H. Dawn 31 May saw L. Edmn R. firm on their objective 468354 to 477354 light opposition was encountered and dealt with. A small patrol penetrated to FROSINONE but did not return. The same night the P.P.C.L.I. had taken over objective "DICK" from the Ir R.C. and patrolled to the line of the road 452364. Casualties were suffered and inflicted. The Seaforth of C. were brought up to ARNARA by motor transport and ordered to pass through the forward battalions and cut in behind FROSINONE from the left flank to secure the area of the cross roads 456381. (Report of 2 Cdn Armd Bde.)
77. At 1140 hours, 31 May, 1 Cdn Corps issued Operation Instruction No. 15, ordering 1 Cdn Armd Div to secure the line FOSINONE 4637 - TOMACELLA 4034 and to continue the advance toward VALMONTONE on the axis of Highway No. 65 Cdn Armd Div remained in reserve while one infantry brigade group of the 6th South African Armoured Division with a regiment of tanks, was to move forward on 1 Jun and come under command of 1 Cdn Armd Div. A second brigade group, also with an armoured regiment, was to move forward on 3 Jun at which time command was to pass to 6 S.A. Armd Div. (Report of 1 Cdn Corps.)
78. Since 78 Div was encountering opposition at RIPI and TORRICE, L. Edmn R. were sent on into FROSINONE which they reported clear by 1500 hours. Enemy infantry detachments and self-propelled guns however, were still engaging P.P.C.L.I. and Seaforth of C. beyond the town. By 0100 hours, 1 Jun, the Seaforths reported themselves completely consolidated on their objective with Battalion Headquarters at 453376. P.P.C.L.I. sent a strong standing patrol of 2200 hours to the area 444363 and the remainder of the battalion moved over approximately 1000 yards to the West at 0700 hours, 1 Jun. During the night 31 May/1 Jun, N.I.H. tank squadrons, 90 Cdn A.Tk Bty and unit anti-tank guns which had hitherto been held back by the nature of the country, began to move up and join their respective units. Demolitions had to be cleared, routes recced, mines swept and traffic navigated but by first light 1 Jun this movement was completed and the brigade firmly established covering FROSINONE. (Report of 2 Cdn Armd Bde.)
79. 78 Div was by this time pouring through the town from Highway 6 and moving North towards ALATRI. The brigade patrolled actively during the night
but located no enemy. Contact was established with 78 Div on the right and with R.C.R. of 1 Cdn Armd Bde on the left. 4 P.L.D.G. and 1 Cdn Armd Bde had been advancing South of Highway No. 6 in the direction of FERENTINO, bypassing FROSINONE on 1 Jun. (Ibid).
80. Early on 1 Jun the G.O.C. 1 Cdn Armd Div ordered 2 Cdn Armd Bde to occupy M. RADICINO (square 4142) to secure the right flank of 1 Cdn Armd Bde in their advance of FERENTINO. L. Edmn R. was sent forward along Highway No. 6 and by 1440 hours reached the line 415404 to 443414 . There was stiff opposition at 433427 but by 0010 hours, 2 Jun, the hill feature here was completely cleared. (Ibid).
81. 1 Cdn Armd Bde had some difficulty in getting forward due to heavy mortaring and mining of the roads and tracks, but by noon 2 Jun they were well established with the R.C.R. in FERENTINO, 48 Highrs in square 3743, and Hast \& P.E.R. in squares 3742 -3841. (Report of 1 Cdn Corps.)
82. During these operations the SACCO Valley was seething with all forms of transport, especially on the roads South of and parallel to Highway No. 6. This congestion was aggravated by the arrival of 25 Army Tk Bde which had been brought forward from the PONTECORVO area to support 1 Cdn Armd Div. Barely had this movement been completed when the armour of 6 S.A. Armd Div began to pour Westward up the Valley to take over the pursuit from 1 Cdn Corps. The traffic situation was further complicated by the fact that Highway No. 6 was placed in the area inclusive to 13 Corps as soon as the immediate operational
needs of 1 Cdn Corps had been satisfied. ("Summary of Operations of 1 Cdn Armd Div, 1 Jun to 15 Jun 44 " by Hist Offr, 1 Cdn Armd Div.)
83. So serious had the situation become that on 1 Jun the D'.A. \& Q.M.G., a Cdn Corps issued an order to the A.Q.M.G. organizing a Traffic Control Office. The order was in part as follows:

> Since 1 Cdn Corps broke through the Hitler Line, one of the greatest problems facing all concerned has been the movement of fmns and the traffic control required to see that this movement proceeded with the least possible hindrance. After the experience of the past week or ten days, it has become obvious that a specially organized Traffic Control Office, headed up by a first grade Staff Offrs, is necessary at Main Corps. This office therefore will be set up immediately with yourself in control. This will be your sole job until the traffic situation eases.
(Instruction on Traffic Control issued by D.A. \& Q.M.G., 1 Cdn Corps, 1 Jun 44, reproduced in CANADIAN OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AREA Extracts from Memoranda, Series 21, May 1944; See also appx "D".)
84. At 2210 Hours 2 Jun 441 Cdn Corps issued Operation Order No. 2. The Corps was to continue to attack the enemy and press on to the North-West. 1 Cdn Armd Bde was to capture the high ground about ANAGNI 2949 and establish a firm base, while 4 Cdn Recce Regt (4 P.L.D.G.) was to secure the stream crossing 264481 , one battalion of 2 Cdn Armd Bde was to move to FERENTINO 3743
and patrol towards FUMONE 4147. A brigade group of 6 S.A. Armd Div were to pass through 1 Cdn Armd Bde on axis FERENTINO - road-junction 336463 - ACUTO 3154 - PIGLIO 2958 and patrol to FIUGGI 3555. One battalion group were to advance through ANAGNI towards PALIANO 2156, and contact patrols were to be made with the F.E.C. on the left flank by Cdn Armd C. Regt (R.C.D.), a squadron of which was to be under command of 6 S.A. Armd Div. (Ibid).
85. 1 Cdn Armd Bde Gp pushed forward towards ANAGNI and by noon 3 Jun were established at the limit of their advance during these operations as follows:

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    4 P.L.D.G. 2348-2847-3346-2649
    48 Highrs 3148 - 3149
    Hast & P.E.R. 2847-2948-2947
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        (Ibid).
    86. On 3 Jun a brigade of 6 S.A. Armd Div passed through 1 Cdn Armd Bde in the ANAGNI area and advanced to 268507 where a clown bridge halted the column and the enemy was again contacted. Early on 4 Jun, 12 S.A. Bde reported the capture of PALLANO 2156. Later that day, 1 Cdn Corps issued Operation Instruction No. 16 ordering all formations and units of 1 Cdn Corps to stand fast in their present positions and providing for 6 S.A. Armd Div to pass form under command 1 Cdn Corps to 13 Corps. The Corps then came into Army reserve and took no further part in the fighting.

| 87. By the time the Canadians were withdrawn the success of the whole |
| :---: |
| heavy fighting the americans advancing from the ANZIO area had taken |
| VALMONTONE on Highway 6 about 12 miles West of ANAGNI and on the following day |
| contacted the F.E.C. near PIOMBINARA between these two places. The Germans |
| were now in full retreat to the North and early on 4 Jun American |
| reconnaissance elements entered ROME, thus ending an important phase of the |
| Italian campaign (War Office Weekly Intelligence Review, 7 Jun 44). |
| 88. During the following week the Canadian Corps withdrew some 80 miles back |
| to the VOLTURNO Valley for a lengthy period of rest and training. When it |
| became certain that they would remain withdrawn from operations for a |
| bstantial period, leave arrangements were completed which proved to be |
| tensive and generous. Rest areas in BARI, SALFRNO and AMALFI were made |
| available to Canadian troops and seven day leaves initiated. In addition to |
| is, a section of the beach in the MINTURNO area was set aside for 48-hour |
| visits by units. Special leaves up to five days were authorized to enable the |
| troops to visit ROME, thus removing a sense of grievance which had resulted |
| from fighting for ROME and not seeing it. ("Summary of Operations of 1 Cdn |
| Div - 16 Jun to 30 Jun 44" by Hist Offr, 1 Cdn Armd Div.) |


#### Abstract

89. The nature of this report has prevented it from doing justice to many of the more technical aspects of the story, especially the work of the artillery, engineers, signals, and the administrative services, although the artillery's role in the actual breaching of the HITLER LINE was described because of its special significance. Detailed accounts of most of these other aspects, however, will be found in the voluminous report produced by 1 Cdn Corps after the operation. The Official Historian will no lack historical material on the LIRI Valley Offensive; indeed he is more likely to be embarrassed by the wealth of it. The Corps Report includes detailed reports from both divisions which in turn include reports from the brigades, the artillery and many of the regiments. There are also reports from the C.C.R.A. 1 Corps and from R.C.E. 1 Cdn Corps and a special report on the HITLER LINE defences from G.S. 1 Cdn Armd Div. These reports contain many valuable marked maps and traces, especially the reports of the G.Os.U. 1 Cdn Inf Div and 5 Cdn Armd Div and that of R.C.E. 1 Cdn Corps. The latter shows all the routes used by 1 Cdn Corps throughout the advance. The report on the HITLER LINE defences contains a trace giving a very complete lay out of all the defence positions.


90. A few matters not specifically dealt with by these reports but which should not be left out of the picture are included in Appendix "D".
91. This report was drafted by Lieut. J.B. Conacher, R.C. Sigs.
(C.O. Stacey) Lt.-Col.,

Historical Officer, CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

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APPENDIX "B"
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HQ 1 Cdn Inf Div
$1 \mathrm{CD} / 1 / \mathrm{G}$

22 May 44

## OPERATION - CHESTERFIELD

(Verbal orders by GOC 1 Cdb Inf Div at final co-ordinating conference, HQ 1 Cdn Div, 0800 hrs 22 May 44)

## INTENTION

1. 1 Cdn Inf Div and attached tps will breach the HITLER LINE on 23 May 44 forming a bridge head for the passage through of Cdn Armd Div.

METHOD
2. 2 and 3 Cdn Inf Bde respectively right and left will assault at h hour and capture the objectives shown on trace. Bndys and start line as shown on trace.
3. The attack will be in two phases:-
a. Phase 1 - Capture of first objective and mopping up. Rate of adv, 100 yds in 5 mins.
b. Phase II - Capture of 2nd objective Rate of adv, 100 yds in 3 mins.
4. 2 Cdn Inf Bde will attack on a two-bn frontage, supported by NIH and one Sqn 51 RTR and 111 Bty $S P$ a Tk Regt.
5. 3 Cdn Inf Bde (less $R 22 e \mathrm{R}$ ) will attack on one-bn frontage supported by 51 RTR (less one sqn) and 15 Bty $S P$ a $T k$ Regt (less one tp).
6. 1 Cdn Inf Bde will carry out aggressive offensive tactics from h hour.
7. 4 Cdn Recce Regt (4 PLDG) will carry out aggressive offensive tactics from H hour.
8. 12 CTR of 1 Cdn Armd Bde will be placed under coma. This unit will be held in div reserve together with $R 22 e \mathrm{R}$.

## ASSEMBLY

9. Movement of 2 Cdn Inf Bde and supporting Tks both 2 and 3 Bdes to assembly area shown on trace will commence at 1700 hrs 22 May. Order of March 2 Cdn Inf Bde followed by armour of 25 Tk Bde starting at $2300 \mathrm{hrs}$. Route fwd from this flank as shown on trace will be closed to all outside traffic between 1700 hrs and first light. 2 Cdn Inf Bde will relieve right fwd and res on of 3 Cdn Inf Bde tonight later moving into new assembly area.
10. All tk movement preparatory to adv will be completed by 2400 hrs night 22/23 May.

## RECEPTION:

a. Tks of 26 Armd Bde requested to simulate movement large numbers tks between 2400 hrs and 0500 hrs night $21 / 22$ and $22 / 23$, agreed.
b. PLDG will create diversion by organizing smoke pts on LIRI sector - Corps rep to arrange.
12. Timings APPROX only.
a. FIRST OBJECTIVE captured H plus 75 (100 yds in 5 mins).
b. Start of second phase (unless delayed) H plus 135.
c. SECOND OBJECTIVE captured H plus 185 (100 yds in 3 mins).
13. Fire Plan:
a. Counter preparations as previously arranged.
b. Pre-arranged tasks to bombard enemy def 13 Corps sector on wide front $H-55 \mathrm{H}-45$. Then pre-arranged concs from $H$ hour.
c. Arty to bombard enemy def from $H$ hour. Tasks as outlined to CRA.
d. $\quad \mathrm{C}$ B - H-45 until capture final objective.
e. C M - 4.2 inch mortars grouped under CMO for counter mortar tasks until capture final objective when coys will revert to respective bdes. CRA to coordinate tasks.
f. Barrage:
i. Limits as shown on trace.
ii. Phase I - $R$ of $M 100$ yds in 5 mins.

Phase II - R of M 100 yds in 3 mins.
iii. guns will register opening line on 22 May.
iv. for timings etc see Arty trace and programme.
g. Smoke:
i. Light arty smoke to obscure vision on AQUINO and PONTECORVO during the attack.
ii. $\quad 1$ Bde will smoke enemy def their front with 3 inch mortars.
iii. See previous arrangements for smoke deception - PLDG using canister smoke.
iv. Smoke on frontage of attack will be provided by tks and attacking inf as required.
h. DF tasks on objectives - pre-arranged pending adjustment - see arty trace.
14. Breaching Minefields and Wire:
a. General - Recces of approaches fwd of $S L$. and pts selected for
gaps through minefields and wire will be made on 21 May and night
$21 / 22$ May.
b. Minefields:
i. $\quad 6$ gaps will be constructed by RCE taped and routes fwd under cover of darkness night 22/23.
ii. 2 and 3 Bdes will provide covering parties for the gapping parties.
iii. mine clearance parties will accompany the assault.
c. Wire Cutting:

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            i. Inf dem parties with bangalores accompany the assaulting
```

                inf.
    15. SAA: Each tk to carry res amn for inf.
16. TAC HQ: Tac HQs of 2 Cdn Inf Div, 2 Bde, 3 Bde and 25 Tk Bde will be located in same general area, vicinity 767167, to be dug in and connected by telephone. Direct line will be laid to MAIN DIV.
17. H HOUR: 0600 hrs 23 May 44.
18. Traffic:
a. All drivers will observe strictly all route signs and instrs by provost.
b. All vehs not ordered to move fwd will remain clear of tracks. Whenever vehs halt they will clear tracks.
c. Provost will organize TCPs at all rd juncs especially at juncs of lateral tracks with main "up" and "down" routes. All track juncs will be sign posted with a six figure map coordinate.
d. HEART route will be reserved to 5 Cdn Inf Div after bridge head complete.
e. Bdes will organize parties to mark their main axis fwd as attack processes.
f. Provost will mark main "Heart" route fwd behind 2 Cdn Inf Bde, but will be prepared to switch to a fwd route behind 3 Cdn Inf Bde.
g Vehs breaking down on tracks or rds will be pushed out of the way until recovered.
h. Provost 5 Cdn Inf Div are to assist control on "Heart" route.
19. Adv of 5 Cdn Armd Div:
a. Adv will commence when final objective captured and consolidation is commenced.
b. Order of March - Special task force followed by remainder of Div.
c. GOC 1 Cdn Inf Div will inform Corps Coma when the breach has been made and latter will give order for 7 Armd Div to adv.

Code Names:

INF START LINE
--- ALOUTTE

FIRST OBJECTIVE
--- ABOUKIR

```
REPORT LINE
SECOND OBJECTIVE --- CAPORETTO
PHASE 1 BARRAGE
PHASE II BARRAGE --- BLACKWOODS
HOLD BARRAGE --- GAZA
Guns to fire on pause LINE --- NEW YORKER
RECOMMENCE BARRAGE --- JENA
H HOUR --- LIBETY
CONSOLIDATION Complete
    --- COSMOPOLITAN
Move of 5 Div to commence --- PUNCH
```

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APPENDIX "C"
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(Approx 60 to W.D. 5 Cdn Armd Div, G Branch H.Q., May 1944)

## NOTES TAKEN TO "0" GP

## 16 May 44

INFM

Own Tps

Poles are still in same locality. No change in Polish posn, still hold pt 953, maintaining attack.

78 Div secured

Div pushing on from general area PIGNATARO, cut line and have pushed from 300 to 400 yds WEST and the rd. WEST of PIGNATARO a little more sticky.

French still satisfactory. Managed to capture a tremendous amount of ground, taken a great number of prisoners. Necessary for them to pause, mop up thoroughly before cracking on. They will now have cleaned up bit of resistance in SAN GEORGIA. Everything up to this point well under control. Have CASTELFORTE, pushed down rd about 2000 yds. SAN LUCIA feature also in their hands. Report ASPERIA captured in error.

INTENTION (ARMY COMA)

To have 78 Div crack on here to about the 80 grid line, dominate highway 6, and be thus in a posn where they can link up satisfactory with the POLES on right flank. The capture of PHANTOM ridge. Establish junction with 78 Div making continuous line completely isolating people in CASSINO and MONASTERY. All out assault on MONASTERY. GDs Bde mop up CASSINO. Gde Bde to probe to find out whether CASSINO is held by 2 or 2000 Germane.

1 Cdn Corps - carry on a PONTECORVO. Idea of establishing contact with ADOLPH HITLER LINE. Be prepared to crack fwd with open flank in order to push wedge.

French to carry on in direction of ASPERIA. Very worried about line of comn. Rd SOUTH of LIRI only one to use. Until 1 Cdn Div crack fwd, French are going to have bit of trouble administering their people.

## INTENTION OF 1 CDN CORPS

To have 1 Cdn Inf Div continue through in direction of ADOLPH HITLER line supported by tks and full weight of 1 Div Arty.

5 Cdn Armd Div to move one bde gp up into area PIGNANO tonight, balance of the div to be moved fwd as soon as areas in this fwd area become available with every intention of putting 5 Cdn Inf Div on the right of 1 Cdn Inf Div.

```
Command of this sector formerly held by 8 Ind Div changed from coma of Gen
Russell to Gen Burns??
```

INTENTION 5 CDN ARMD DIV
To move on bde gp into the area PIGNANO prior to moving fwd across R.
RAPIDO, balance of the Div to remain in present area.
METHOD

11 Cdn Inf Bde, with under coma 9 Cdn Armd Regt (BCD), one bty M10s, one bty LAA, 24 Fd Amb RCAMC plus one sec 7 Lt Fd Amd RCAMC, two secs 5 Pro Coy and in sp a Fd Sqn RCE -- will move by MT to area PIGNANO.

## RECCE PARTIES

```
    Recce parties have already been despatched to area and are at present
carrying out detailed recce.
```

ROUTE

Highway 6, Highway 7 to DP, which will be COXES CORNER, Square 9811. This DP subject to confirmation.

SP - PIGNATARO TOP which is june of Highway 6 and the rd running right along base of mtns just beyond the tip of the GGHG area.

SPEED

Tracks 8 m 1 h Wheels 15 m 1 h

## DENSITY

Tracks 30 vtm Wheels 20 vtm.

ORDER OF MARCH

Tracked vehs, wh vehs. Details of the Order of March to be laid down by Bde Coma.

Head of tracks pass SP 0300 hrs

Head of wheels pass SP 0500 hrs

Wheels move in blocks of 100 vehs every hr.

Lights - normal. Only necessary with tracks.

CAM

Every care will be taken to cam the posns carefully once your get up there. There have been a tremendous number of vehs int here. There will be a great number of tracks.

Personnel will be confined to the areas of their respective units and will be on 2 hrs notice to move. State of readiness may be shortened depending on the situation.

ADM

Composite Inf Bde Coy RCASC with increment added for other units going fwd.

Amn - normal will be taken.

Rations - 24 hr 8 man pack, which was notified at Q conference will be available when and if required.

Tks - 7 day's rations being issued. will not be started on until necessary.
POL - Tks (9 Cdn Armd Regt (BCD) carrying sufficient pat to "Top-up" in
new area. Other units will "Top-up" on arrival and refill from the Inf Bde
Coy.

TC - Tk diversions will be marked. Actual traffic pointsmen on route -Army Traffic Control. Any Pts NOT covered by them will be covered by our own Pro.

TCVs - Will probably return to this area. Depends on Corps Tp from the Armed Delivery Sqn will be moving fwd.

## INTERCOMN

Div HQ will move from present area - closing here about 1400 hrs tomorrow and opening somewhere in FIGNANO area.

Report Centre at COXES CORNER until actual location known. Wireless silence until authority for breaking issued by this $H Q$.

Time by BBC.

This Bde Gp will move up in last area, which will call Rear Assembly Area. As soon as suitable area is available, cross RAPIDO. This Bde Gp will move fwd by either route DIAMOND, DIAMOND BAR or CLUB into its fwd Assembly Area. From there move up, possibly this sort of CL, and eventually passing through the right fwd bde of 1 Cdn Inf Div and fanning out on right flank. split the Corps from 3 ways.

17 Fd Regt RCA will in all probability remain in this area until satisfactory gun posns have been allotted across the RAPIDO. There isn't sufficient room in the PIGNANO area at present. Useless to put them up into

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fwd area where they haven't got range to sp anything we do. Further allotment
arty later.
DRESS
When we go fwd from our Rear Assembly Area to Fwd Assembly Area, go fwd with very minimum number of vehs. Going to be necessary for every individual to be in long trousers. I suggest every man have woolen Khaki shirt. Gives him better change from pt view of concealment. It is a hell of lot more comfortable when evening get cool.-- long trousers and Khaki sweater.
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Tk crews -- left to Bde Coma.
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## DISCIPLINE

Bound to be quite a bit of other traffic. Hard to maintain intervals. Don't want to see any of our dvrs driving at ridiculous rates of speed to overtake. All people to be familiar with Standing Orders removes.

In the movement of some fmn this morning, GOC noticed great number of men hanging on TCVs and laying across top on supports, some of them stripped to the waist. DON'T WANT TO SEE ANY OF THAT IN THIS DIV.

5 Div on Right -- Purpose -- on right to lead on Highway 6 to ROME.

```
    Phs to be made available down to level Tp Comds. Fmns so far have used
gridded phs entirely for passing back sitreps.
Question - Carriers considered tracks, or wheels
Answer - Carriers to move with 11 Cdn Inf Bde.
    Tracks - Tks, M10s and any cut-down tks
    Policy - Tracks does NOT incl carriers.
Question (Sigs) - Necessary to leave came up here?
Answer No.
Question \(R e\) pack for SPs.
Answer Some as for tks
All infm to be passed down to every last individual man \(T p s\) keen to know how war is going. Wonderful booster. BOOME have had traffic cas. Whole situation going most satisfactory. Question of getting people in right place and then cracking it.
```

If 26 Pz and 29 Pz come down -- so much the better.

```
    The more he counter-attacks, the more we kill. Counter-attacks have
been fought off very successfully after fundamentals have been observed --
instant re-org. anti tk guns up, tks remaining on objective until thing is
consolidated.
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Damn good show.

Under Coma 1800 hrs this evening.

1. Enemy unchanged.
2. Own Tps:
a. 38 Bde of 78 Div are adv on RIGHT along line of 27 NORTHING to CEPRANO and then along highway No 6.
b. 1 Cdn Div have secured brhead across $R$ SACCO as shown on Appx A. (General area 6023, 6024), 4 PLDG in brhead are prepared to assist 5 Cdn Armd Div if necessary. 1 Cdn Div are also prepared to
```
assist with inf. If such assistance is unnecessary 1 Cdn Div will
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remain in present posns.
C. FFC are adv toward CECCANO 4429 with their RIGHT on the R SACCO. They no occupy:

3 DIA - High Ground 588228 585232

M NERO 5423

2 DIM - Area 518226

4 DMM - Has foothold on M MONACO 467234
3. Additional Tps:

2 Med Regt RCA

## INTENTION

4. 5 Cdn Armd Div will adv and secure bound TATLER (502320 - 498300 510273).

METHOD
5. 11 Cdn Inf Bde will extend brhead to area shown on approx "A" night
$27 / 28$ May (597274-592264-601256).
6. 5 Cdn Armd Bde

With under com:

8 Fd Regt RCA (SP) - Time to be arranged by CRA and
one sqn 3 Cdn Armd Recce Regt (GGHG)
one fd sqn RCE
one SP A Tk Bty (M10)
two SP tps 5 LAA Reft RCA from 272359B Hrs
and with in $s p$
Div Arty plus 2 Med Regt RCA less 8 Fd Regt RCA (SP)

Will adv along Div CL and secure bound TATLER.
7. Assembly Areas

Area "A" or "B" as shown on trace. ("A" general area 6125, 6126; "B" general area 6024, 6124, 6025). Area selected will be notified by 280400B hrs.
8. SL - ESQUIRE (see Approx "A"). (599274-597264 - 601250).
9. Bounds and Report Lines (see Approx "A").
10. CL BLUE (see Approx "A") 595272-544271-534290-600312).
11. Start Time NOT later than 281200B hrs.
12. Timings - Armd Regts will start to cross MELFA at 280500 B hrs.
13. Air:

HE Bombing on
a. RIPI 5234
b. POFI 5129
c. TORRICE 4936
d ARNARA 4931
e. FRISUBIBE 4637
f. ceccan 04429
14. "H" hr
a. 28100 B hrs - GALLIPOLI
b. "H" hr GALLIPOLI plus or minus
15. a. Normal.
b. Moves of HQ 5 Cdn Armd Div will be notified.

ACK
(H Angle) Lt-Col
GS 5 Cdn Armd Div

Method of Issue $\quad$ SDR

Time of Signature 28023 Hrs DISTRIBUTION: List "A" Serials 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 39 plus AA\&QMG. (Incls 00 and Approx "A")

NOTE: Since the trace referred to in the text of this order has not been reproduced, appropriate map references taken from it have been introduced into the text in brackets.

The $R$ MELFA referred to in para 12 is doubtless a misprint for LIRI.

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APPENDIX "D"
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The following subjects concerning the operations on the LIRI Valley Offensive but which have not been dealt with in the above report are of interest:
I. Factors Slowing the Advance - Lt.-Col, Lord Tweedsmuir in a report to the Commander of the Eighth Army on "The factors which Slowed up the Eighth's Army Offensive in the LIRI Valley" stressed the fact that traffic congestion was the greatest cause of delay. Among avoidable mistakes he listed:
a. Failure to pass information to the Engineers;
b. Failure by Divisions to develop routes laid down by Corps;
c. Inexperience of provost personnel;
d. Failure to prevent casual traffic;
e. Putting more traffic on the roads than they could stand.

Among other causes of delay he listed:
a. Misinterpretation of maps and aerial photographs;

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    b. Failure to maintain direction in close country;
    c. Failure of the infantry to continue advancing when their
        supporting tanks were held up by ground;
    d. Unwillingness of the infantry to advance without supporting
        weapons;
    e. Demolitions - failure to keep the Engineers informed and general
        attitude of "leave it to the Sappers";
    f. Uncertainty re the situation on flank (e.g., a day was lost due to
        a misunderstanding between the Canadian and French Corps);
    g. Difficulty in the use of code names;
    h. Failure to pass back information.
The report concluded by say that a good deal of avoidable delay enabled the
enemy "to withdraw in his own time and even break off contact".
II. Air Support - A report on air operations in support of 1 Cdn Corps
indicates the important part of Air Force played in this offensive. The
following extract from it sums up the story:
```

The complete resources of 239 (Fighter-Bomber) Wing, D.A.F., provided direct air support for Eighth Army during the period under review. In addition to attacking gun and mortar positions, defended localities, tank and troop concentrations and H.Q.s. in the immediate battle area. 239 Wing concentrated a considerable effort on the isolation of the battle area and the disorganization of the enemy's rear areas byroadblocking, rail-cutting and bridge-breaking. Their greatest success however, was obtained by armed recce against the enemy's retreating transport and guns of all types on the roads leading out of the battle area. (See copy of "Canadian Operations - Mediterranean Ara, Report on Air Operations in Support of 1 Cdn Corps, 11 May - 4 Jun 44".)
III. Statistics of Casualties and Prisoners of War - It is very difficult to give the exact figures for the casualties suffered by the Canadian forces engaged in these operations. The Corps Commander reported that the total killed, wounded and missing of 1 Cdn Corps were 2231. Detailed figures supplied by Corps Headquarters are as follows:


| 28 | May. | 1 | 8 | 8 | 63 | 1 | 5 | 10 | 76 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 29 | May. | 1 | 7 | 4 | 22 | 0 | 6 | 5 | 35 |
| 30 | May . | 0 | 22 | 4 | 38 | 1 | 7 | 5 | 67 |
| 31 | May. | 0 | 17 | 4 | 23 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 45 |
| 1 | Jun. | 0 | 37 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 42 |
| 2 | Jun. | 2 | 11 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 19 |
| 3 | Jun. | 3 | 20 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 26 |
| 4 | Jun. | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 7 |
|  |  |  | Total all ranks 21 May - 4 Jun 1914 <br> Total all ranks 13 May - 20 May 301 |  |  |  |  | 121 <br> Total | $\begin{aligned} & 1793 \\ & 2215 \end{aligned}$ |

(Report of 1 Cdn Corps - Lessons; Statistics of 1 Cdn Corps Ops 16 May 3 Jun 44 in Hist Sec File.)
C.M.H.Q. Reports Office give a considerably higher figure for casualties. For the four weeks 14 May to 10 Jun they were 258 officers and 3539 ORs broken down as follows:

| Killed, Preaumed Killed, Died of Wounds | Offrs | $\underline{\text { Ors }}$ |
| :--- | ---: | :---: |
| Wounded | 60 | 373 |
| Missing and Prisoners of War | 181 | 2650 |

> (C.M.H.Q. Records Office - Statistic Report of Casualties "EA", Appx to "A" Lists $434-452$ and POW $95-97$ from 1001 hours 14 May 44 to 2359 hours 10 Jun 44.)

```
The discrepancy in these figures can at least partly be accounted for by three
```

facts,
(i) that the Records figures include various Canadian units and
formations such as 1 Cdn Armd Bde and 1 Canadian Special Service
Battalion, no in 1 Cdn Corps;
(ii) that the Records figures include slightly wounded casualties who returned to duty;
(iii) that the Corps figures do not include casualties cleared through British medical installations. The Records figures would also include a few casualties incurred before 14 May, but those would not be numerous since most Canadian troops were out of line in the proceeding weeks. Most casualties were listed by Records within three or four days of their occurrence.

```
The severity of the fighting may be gauged from the fact that the total of
3 7 9 7 \text { casualties for 14 May to 10 Jun was 28.7 percent of the total casualties}
for the whole Italian campaign up to 10 Jun, which were 878 officers and
12,351 other ranks.4
```

The Corps Commander estimated that losses inflicted upon the enemy were
considerably greater. A total of 1421 prisoners of war were taken by 1 Cdn

4 From the invasion of SICILY, 10 Jul 1944.

Corps between 17 May and 6 Jun. The statistics supplied by Corps Headquarters break these down as follows:

|  | DATE | OFFRS \& ORS | DATE | OFFRS \& ORS |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 17 | May | 103 | 28 May | 10 |
| 18 | May | 162 | 29 May | -- |
| 19 | May | 17 | 30 May | 6 |
| 20 | May | 7 | 31 May | 32 |
| 21 | May | -- | 1 Jun | 25 |
| 22 | May | 13 | 2 Jun | 12 |
| 23 | May | 151 | 3 Jun | 11 |
| 24 | May | 462 | 4 Jun | 41 |
|  | May | 262 | 5 Jun | 14 |
|  | May | 76 | 6 Jun | 6 |
|  | May | 11 | 6 Jun | 6 |
|  |  |  | TOTAL | 1421 |
| TOTAL OFFRS - 26 |  |  |  |  |
| TOTAL ORs -1395 |  |  |  |  |

```
    In addition 310 civilians were admitted to FW cage. These PW figures
were obtained by APM through "A" Branch Rear HQ 1 Cdn Corps. The figures
obtained direct from PW cage differ slightly and are as follows:
```

```
OFFRS - }2
```

OFFRS - }2
ORs - 1401
ORs - 1401
Civilians - }32
Civilians - }32
(Report of 1 Cdn Corps - Lessons; Statistics of 1 Cdn Corps Ops 16 May
(Report of 1 Cdn Corps - Lessons; Statistics of 1 Cdn Corps Ops 16 May
to 3 Jun 44.)

```
to 3 Jun 44.)
```


## 1 CDN CORPS

## Ops 16 May - 3 Jun 44

## Approx - figures

| FMN | $\begin{array}{r} \text { D } \\ \text { Committed } \end{array}$ | T E <br> No longer Committed | Elapsed <br> Time <br> (hrs) | Offensive continued by: | $\begin{gathered} \text { Progress } \\ \text { (yds) } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 CIB | 160700 | 251700 | 226. | 11 CIB | 17,600 |
| 3 CIB | 162300 | 262100 | 238 | 11 CIB | 20,400 |
| 2 CIB | 230600 | 251700 | 59 | 11 CIB | 5,300 |
| 5 Cdn Armd Bde | 240800 | 251400 | 30 | 11 CIB | 7,500 |
| 11 CIB | 251400 | 280500 | 63 | 5 Cdn Armd Bde | 9,700 |
| 5 Cdn Armd Bde | 280500 | 282400 | 19 |  | 14,000 |
| 11 CIB | 290500 | 301600* | 35 | 2 CIB | 7,100 |
| 5 Cdn Armd Bde | 290500 | 301600* | 35 | 2 CIB | 7,100 |
| 1 CIB | 010600 | 031200 | 54 | 6 SA Armd Div | 20,400 |
| 2 CIB | 301600 | 021500 | 47.... | 6 SA Armd Div | 22,900 |

*NOTE: Not actually relieved until PM 31 May.
Average time between commitments and relief - 80.6 hrs. Average distance gained between commitment and relief 13,200 yds.

| PRISONERS-OF-WAR |  |  |  |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| DATE | OFFRS \& ORs | DATE | OFFRS \& ORS |
| 17 May | 103 | 28 May | 10 |
| 18 May | 163 | 29 May | - |
| 19 May | 17 | 30 May | 6 |
| 20 May | 7 | 31 May | 32 |
| 21 May | - | 1 Jun | 25 |
| 22 May | 13 | 2 Jun | 12 |
| 23 May | 151 | Jun | 11 |
| 24 May | 462 | 4 Jun | 41 |
| 25 May | 262 | 5 Jun | 14 |
| 26 May | 76 | 6 Jun | -1 |

```
    TOTAL OFFRS = 26
        TOTAL ORs = 1395
        In addition 310 civilians were admitted to PW cage. These PW figures
        were obtained by APM through "A" Branch Rear HQ 1 Cdn Corps. The figures
        obtained direct from PW cage differ slightly and are as follows:
            OFFRs - 26
Ors - }140
Civilians - 326
```

CASUALTIES

| Date | 1 Cdn Offrs | $\begin{gathered} \text { Inf Div } \\ \text { OR } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 5 \mathrm{Cdn} \\ & \text { Offrs } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Armd Div } \\ \text { OR } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Corps } \\ & \text { Offr } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} \mathrm{Tps} \\ \mathrm{OR} \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | Total <br> Offr | OR |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 13-20 May* | Total | all | ranks | - | ----- | ---- | - | 301 |
| 21 May | 1 | 20 | 0 | 48 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 72 |
| 22 May | 4 | 88 | 2 | 35 | 0 | 11 | 6 | 134 |
| 23 May | 18 | 495 | 2 | 36 | 0 | 7 | 20 | 538 |
| 24 May | 7 | 133 | 1 | 72 | 1 | 5 | 9 | 210 |
| 25 May | 6 | 61 | 28 | 243 | 0 | 10 | 34 | 314 |
| 26 May | 1 | 11 | 10 | 95 | 0 | 6 | 11 | 112 |
| 27 May | 3 | 15 | 4 | 75 | 0 | 6 | 7 | 96 |
| 28 May | 1 | 8 | 8 | 63 | 1 | 5 | 10 | 76 |
| 29 May | 1 | 7 | 4 | 22 | 0 | 6 | 5 | 35 |
| 30 May | 0 | 22 | 4 | 38 | 1 | 7 | 5 | 67 |
| 31 May | 0 | 17 | 4 | 23 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 45 |
| 1 Jun | 0 | 37 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 42 |
| 2 Jun | 2 | 11 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 19 |
| 3 Jun | 3 | 20 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 26 |
| 4 Jun | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 7 |
|  |  |  | $\begin{array}{cccccrcr} \text { Total all ranks } & 21 \text { May }- & 4 & \text { Jun } & 1914 \\ " & " & " & 13 & \text { May - } 20 & \text { May } & 301 \end{array}$ |  |  |  | $\begin{gathered} 121 \\ \text { Total } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1793 \\ & 2215 \end{aligned}$ |

This does NOT incl cas cleared through BRIT med Installations. It does incl all direct admittance to Fd Ambs.

* This takes in a few days before ops commenced. The figure will be broken down as soon as possible.

APPENDIX "F"

G Int 7/1 Corps/1/4

3 Jun 44

# EXTRACT FROM 1 CDN CORPS 

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY NO. 80

## Appendix "A", Para 4

(Based on the captured intelligence files at the German Fourteenth Army)

It will be seen that the picture presented to the enemy command was very faulty and corresponded exactly to what the Allied command wanted him to believe. He underestimated our strength in the area of our main attack by no less than seven divs. As a result he credited us with having much larger reserves in the back areas and in view of this and the fact that he believed at least three of these divs to been or near the coast, where landing exercises were going on, he appreciated that our frontal attack was only a diversion and that we intended to carry out another landing in his rear. His dispositions on 11 May were clearly based on this belief; he had the minimum number of tps in the line and his reserve divs were disposed along the WEST coast to meet the landing which he confidently expected. As a result our attack was made in much greater strength than he expected (in the FEC sector,

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for instance, in more than four times the strength he expected) which greatly
assisted our initial success. All German divs in reserve were either grouped
round the ANZIO Beachhead or strung out along the Western coast, and by the
time the enemy had decided his fears of a landing were groundless, these
reserves were so slow in reaching the scene of battle that they were drawn in
and destroyed piecemeal.
```

APPENDIX G

22 May 44

Copy No $\qquad$

1 CANADIAN CORPS OPERATION ORDER NO. 1

INFM

1. Enemy. See 1 Cdn Corps Int Summaries.
2. Own Tps. See 1 Cdn Corps and flanking fmns sitreps.
3. Action - Flanking Fmns:
a. 13 Corps is NOT to attack the HITLER LINE but is to deceive the enemy into thinking main attack will be directed along HIGHWAY 6. After the HITLER LINE has been breached the adv will be resumed on a two corps front with right 13 Corps and left 1 Cdn Corps.
b. 2 Polish Corps is to maintain contact with the enemy and to make preparations to simulate a full scale attack on PASSO CORNO and PIPDIMONTE $=$ No attack is to be made.
4. Additional Tps under Coma 1 Cdn Corps:
a. One Armd Regt of 1 Cdn Armd Bde.
b. Arty - See Order of Battle 1 Cdn Corps Arty att as Appx "A".*
c. $\quad \mathrm{S} \& \mathrm{~T}-\mathrm{RASC}$ br and assault pls allotted as in para 11 b . below.
5. Bdys. Bdys between 13 Corps on the Right and FEC on the Left - See trace at Appx "B".

INTENTION
6. 1 Cdn Corps will break through the HITLER LINE and exploit towards CRPRANO.

METHOD
7. The op to be known as operation CHESTERFIELD will be carried out in two phases:

Phase One. 1 Cdn Inf Div will break through the HITLER LINE and secure the high ground approx 1000 yds beyond the HITLER LINE, with a view to fanning outwards to destroy the enemy.

Phase Two. 5 Cdn Armd Div will pass through the 1 Cdn Inf Div and seize the crossings over the $R$ MELFA, with a view to exploiting towards CRPRANO.
8. Phase One - 1 Cdn Inf Div:

```
        a. Under coma 1 Cdn Inf Div: 25 Tk Bde
                            One Armd Regt of 1 Cdn Armd Bde
* Omitted
    b. Axis of Adv. See trace Appx "B".
    c. H - Hour - As desired by Coma 1 Cdn Inf Div.
    a. Positioning. Prior to commencement of Phase One, 5 Cdn Armd Div
    will be so positioned as to sp and subsequently pass through 1 Cdn
    Inf Div - areas as mutually arranged between Div Comds.
    b. Axis of adv. See Trace Appx "B".
    c. Coma 1 Cdn Corps will notify Coma 5 Cdn Armd Div when he is to
    commence move fwd to pass through 1 Cdn Inf Div. Codeword -
        "PUNCH".
10. Arty:
    a. Allotment and Control:
```

(1) Order of Battle 1 Cdn Corps Arty to be effective 0600 hrs 22 May 44, is att as Appx "A".
(2) Arty of 1 Cdn Corps, 13 Corps and such arty from POLCORPS and CFF as are within reach will sp 1 Cdn Corps. Arty from 10 Corps will assist by carrying on $C B$ on the ATINA gun gp during the attack.
(3) Att at Appx "C"* is a table setting out the grouping of arty, and the arty which will be available for $C B$, to sp 1 Cdn Inf Div, and to sp 5 Cdn Armd Div.
b. General Action of Arty:
(1) Pre zero preparatory fire - hy arty will come on the defs of the HITLER LINE on both Cdn Corps and 13 Corps fronts.
(2) Prior to $C B$ programme there will be a hy pre zero preparatory fire on 13 Corps front to deceive the enemy as to the place of attack and to have the enemy man his gun.
(3) Prior to $H$ Hour there will be a CB programme.
(4) CB will continue throughout the attack.
c. Phase I of Attack. Responsibility for fire plan in sp 1 Cdn Inf Div - CRA 1 Cdn Inf Div.
(1) Responsibility for CB Plan - Coma 1 Cdn AGRA.
d. Phase II of Attack. Responsibility for fire plan in op 5 Cdn Armd Div - CRA 5 Cdn Armd Div.
e. Air Photos and V Tgts:
(1) $1 / 15,000$ photos used for GUSTAV LINE are cancelled.

* Omitted
(2) $1 / 25,000$ gridded photos have been issued on a scale for distribution down to coys of $\operatorname{Inf}$ and tps of arty for units under coma 1 Cdn Corps, and arty under coma 13 Corps.
(3) A list of $V$ tgts will be issued from 1 Cdn Corps on a scale down to inf coys and arty tps. These refs are map refs and are similar to photo refs with this set of photos.
(4) It will be the responsibility of inf and arty units of putting these refs on the photos.

11. Engrs:
(1) Attn is directed to 1 Cdn Corps Op Instr No. 10 as amended 21 May regarding Engr responsibilities, and to Appx "A" to 1 Cdn Corps Adm Instr No. 36 (Traffic).
(2) By WEST of CASSINO will NOT be used as a rd unless operationally necessary.
(3) Following breakthrough, 1 Cdn Inf Div will take over route maint on routes used by 5 Cdn Armd Div when requested by 5 Cdn Armd Div.

1 Cdn Corps will take over maint of all routes WEST of FORME D'AQUINO from 1 Cdn Inf Div when requested by that fmn.
b. $\quad \mathrm{Br}$ :
(1) Under coma 1 Cdn Inf Div - 1803 Bailey Pl RASC.
(2) Under coma 5 Cdn Armd Div - C pl 345 Gen Tpt Coy (for Bailey), 36 Assault boats and 4 Class 2 rafts.
(3) Under coma 1 Cdn Corps - HQ 236 Br Coy RASC One pl 345 Gen Tpt Coy (for Bailey), 1821 FBE Pl, 1812 Pontoon Pl and 1802 Assault Pl (less one sec),
(4) All Bailey Pls refill at 1 Cdn Corps Br Dump (HQ 236 Br Coy RASC at G817134).
c. Mech Eqpt:

Under coma each div - one D6/D7 Bulldozer one auto patrol from 26 Mech Eqpt Sec RE.
12. Air:
a. $\quad 1$ Cdn Corps has priority on all available air resources.
b. "CABRANK" will be full immediately after first light and will be refilled on request to GSO 2 (Air) 1 Cdn Corps on two hrs notice.

ADM:
13. 1 Cdn Corps Adm Instrs Nos. 36 and 37 of 21 May issued separately.

ACK
(Signed)

WGMR/GBG

DISTRIBUTION: Page 4 Time of Signature .0055...hrs

ELS/SDR/LO/HAND

# APPENDIX "H" 

1/Ops/4/3

2 Jun 44

1 CANADIAN CORPS OPERATION ORDER NO. 2

Refs Maps $1 / 50,000$ Sheets 151 I, II, III, IV,
159 I, IV.

INFM

1. Own Tps:
a. Right 13 Corps 78 Div elements 56 Recce and 36 Bde in contact with 1 Cdn Inf Div area FROSINONE 4537. 78 Div surround ALATRI 4546. 8 Ind Div 19 Ind Bde VEROLI 5142 M CASTELLONE 5054. 17 Ind Bde moving on VICO NEL LAZIO 4552, 13 Corps moving bde of 6 (Brit) Armd Div to posn on right of 78 Div.
b. 1 Cdn Corps with: Right 1 Cdn Inf Div 1 Cdn Inf Bde area FPRENTINO 3743 and to NORTH and WEST. 2 Cdn Inf Bde ROSINONE 4537

- M RADICINO 4142. 343380 .
c. Left FBC 2 DIM on gen line MOROLO 3337 - SUPINO 3533 - PATRICA 3632 - TOMACELLA 4034 with leading elements 270412 - 2992428 327426. FBC reported to have made contact with Fifth Army COLLEFERRO 1748.

2. Enemy. See 1 Cdn Corps Int Summary No. 69 dated 012359.

## INTENTION

3. 1 Cdn Corps will continue to attack the enemy and press on towards the NW .

METHOD (See Truce "A" att)
4. 1 Cdn Inf Div will operate as follows:
a. 1 Cdn Inf Bde Gp will capture the high ground about ANAGNI 2949 and est a firm base.
b. 4 Cdn Recce Regt (4 PLDG) will secure stream crossing 264481 and exploit NORTH and WEST.
c. One on 2 Cdn Inf Bde will move to FLRENTINO 3743 as soon as 1 Cdn Inf Bde is clear and patrol towards FUMONE 4147.
5. 6 SA Armd Div will operate as follows on 3 Jun 44:
a. 24 Gds Bde Gp will pass through 1 Cdn Inf Bde on axis FERINTINO rd junc 336463 - ACUTO 3154 - PIGLIO 2858 and patrol to FIUGGI 3555.
b. One bn gp will adv through ANAGNI towards PALIANO 2156.
c. One sqn 1 Cdn Armd C Regt will come under coma 6 SA Armd Div from 2200 hrs 2 Jun 44 for contact patrols with FDC on left flank 6 SA Armd Div.
6. Change of Coma. Coma of the sector will pass from 1 Cdn Inf Div to 6 SA Armd Div at a time to be agreed between comds concerned. Codeword for change of coma PLASSEY, which will be reported to $H Q 1$ Cdn Corps by quickest means by 6 SA Armd Div as soon as accomplished.
7. Report Lines. See Trace A.
8. 1 Cdn Armd C Regt less two sqns will revert to coma HQ 1 Cdn Corps 2400 hrs 2 Jun 44 and concentrate in an area WEST of FERENTINO under arrangements 1 Cdn Inf Div. 1 Cdn Inf Div will advise $H Q 1$ Cdn Corps as to the area selected.
9. Arty. Separate instrs, already issued.
10. Engrs:
a. RCE 1 Cdn Inf Div and 5 Cdn Armd Div will be employed under coma CE 1 Cdn Corps.
b. Route responsibilities will be defined in separate instr.
11. Air. One tentacle will be transferred to 6 SA Armd Div from and by 1 Cdn Inf Div on change of coma of sector from 1 Cdn Inf Div to 6 SA Armd Div.

INTERCOMN
12. Wireless silence will be lifted by 6 SA Armd Div at 2200 hrs 2 Jun 44 .
13. One ACV with 4332 set and crew will be loaned by 5 Cdn Armd Div to 6 SA Armd Div. Separate instrs to 5 Cdn Armd Div.
14. HQ 1 Cdn Corps closes present loan 1000 hrs 3 Jun 44 and opens same time G446332.
15. Liaison. 6 SA Armd Div will ensure that closet liaison is maintained with flanking fmns of 13 Corps and FEC.
16. Code Names. Geographical code names in use are given in Appx "B".

ADM
17. Separate instr.
18. ACK.

# (Sgd) (G.A. McCarter) Brig GS 1 Cdn Corps 

SDR/HLS/HAND/LO

Time of signature, 2210 hrs.

## CANADIAN OPERATIONS IN THE LIRI VALLEY, MAY - JUNE 1944

1. Throughout the winter and early spring months of 1944 the Allied forces in Italy had been held up by bad weather and strong enemy positions along a line from just North of ORTONA on the ADRIATIC to the mouth of the GARIGLIANO $R$ on the TYRRHENIAN coast. Due to the mountainous nature of most of this front the entrance to the LIRI Valley guarded by CASSINO and its Monastery Hill was the theatre of the main Allied attempts at a break through. Fierce attacks were made by American and French troops in this sector late in January and temporary bridgeheads secured across the RAPIDO River. The heavy fighting continued into February with Imperial troops taking over the attack on 15 Feb the much talked of air attack on the famous Monastery on MONTE CASSINO took place, but the Allies failed to take the hill. In the middle of March a second big offensive was introduced by a 2,000 -ton air raid on the town of CASSINO. The RAPIDO River was again crossed and entrance into the town effected by New Zealand troops, but after very heavy fighting the attack failed.
2. Throughout April and early March there was little change on this or any other part of the Italian front. However, plans were being made for a largescale offensive which was to involve many of the Eighth Army formations from the relatively dormant northern sector of the line.
3. 1 Cdn Corps and 1 Cdn Armd Bde were among the formations assigned to take part in this offensive but the latter was slated to operate with the 13th Corps. This was the first major operation in which 1 Cdn Corps
```
participated as a whole and the first in which 5 Cdn Armd Div operated as an
armoured division.
```

4. 1 Cdn Inf Div ended its long period of duty on the ADRIATIC coast under 5th Corps on 21 April when it was relieved by 10 Ind Inf Div. The Canadian division moved South to the CAMPOBASSO area setting up its new Headquarters at VINCHIATURO. Following a forty-eight hour rest they entered upon a period of refitting and special training. Each Brigade in turn then moved into the rolling country between LUCERA and TROIA for special infantry-cum-tank training with 25 Army Tk Bde ( Br ). 1 Cdn Armd Bde carried out similar training with 8 Ind Inf Div. 5 Cdr Armd Div had been in training in a reserve area for a considerably longer period.
5. The movement of all the Canadian formations into their concentration areas prior to their going into action was successfully concealed from the enemy by the carrying out of a very carefully prepared camouflage plan. The extent to which the enemy were deceived may be judged by reading the extract from 1 Cdn Corps Intelligence Summary No. 80 cited in Appendix "F". (cf. "CANADIAN OPERATIONS - MEDITERRANEAN AREA, Extracts from War Diaries and Memoranda (Series 19)" of 8 Jun 44, containing a report by G.S.O. III (Cam), 1 Cdn Corps, on "Use of Camouflage to Conceal Concentration in Front of the GUSTAV LINE".)

GERMAN DEFENCE SYSTEM IN THE LIRI VALLEY

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6. The LIRI Valley is a level stretch of land some three to five miles wide
running from South East to North West and flanked on either side by parallel
mountain ranges. The mountains are studded with occasional hill villages, and
to the south West are traversed by a fair number of tracks and passable
trails. The North Eastern range terminates abruptly at CASSINO and is of a
higher average height than the Western range. MONTE CASSINO (Monastery Hill),
some 1500 feet above sea level, lies directly west of the town, while the 5000
ft Mount Cairo is six miles to the North West. The LIRI River which runs
Eastwards along the Southern side of the Valley joins the GARI (RAPIDO) some
six miles South of CASSINO, and then turning south becomes the GARIGLIANO5
7. North West from the GARI River the LIRI Valley is very flat and open for
the first few miles, gradually becoming more rolling and fairly heavily
wooded. Six or seven miles from the beginning of the Valley a series of
transverse gulleys run South West towards the LIRI R. The whole area was
under intense cultivation and there was considerable standing grain.
8. The GUSTAV LINE was a strongly defended zone running South from CASSINO
along the West bank of the RAPIDO (GARI) River, while the ADOLF HITLER LINE
was built as a still more formidable alternative, pivoting on M CAIRO. The
latter was built over a period of five months but, perhaps because of the
earlier German success on the GUSTAV Front, was never quite completed. It can
across the LIRI Valley roughly North to South, PIEDIMONTE - AQUINO -
```

5 The River which is called the RAPIDO in the vicinity of CASSINO becomes the GARI lower down before its junction with the LIRI.

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PONTECORVO - S OLIVA, and had a depth of }700\mathrm{ yards. Its main emplacements
consisted of three types of pillbox:
```

a. A large and elaborate pillbox of very thick concrete and steel construction sunk well into the ground, or with the earth piled in a gently grassy slope all around, and fitted with the turret of a Mk V "PANTHER" tank with a 7.5 cm RWK 42. (Many of these turrets however had not been installed when the Line was broken.)
b. A mobile and heavily armoured pillbox of the "CRAB" type, sunk almost flush with the ground and impervious to anything except direct hits from A Tk projectiles or heavy artillery fire.
c. A series of pre-fabricated armour-plated dugouts, some three inches thick, built 20 ft under ground and covered with concrete. These were said to be impervious to direct hits from 1,000-lb bombs, and served as nodal points for M.G. positions which were reached by concrete tunnels.

A $T k$ ditches had been dug across all favourable approaches, and thorough mining and wiring of these obstacles had been completed. Further a Tk and A.P. mines, network of normal fire trenches completed the Line. A line of barbed wire extended almost unbroken in front of the whole line except in the vicinity of PIEDIMONTE. The infantry trance system however was not completed and the crops which in some cases obstructed the German field of fire had not been cleared.

## THE ATTACK OPENS - 1 CDN ARMD BDR, 11-16 MAY

9. The offensive, which was to open on the night $11 / 12$ May, involved considerable regrouping of both Eighth and Fifth Armies. The Eighth Army took over the sector from the junction of RAPIDO and LIRI Rivers Northward. The attack was to be made all the way from the TYRRHENIAN Sea on the left to North of CASSINO on the right with the LIRI River as the boundary between the two armies. Thus the Eighth Army was attacking only on a short sector of its long front from the LIRI $R$ to the ADRIATIC. The attack was to be made on a twoCorps front, with 13 Corps on the left, 1 Polish Corps (Polcorps) on the right and 1 Cdn Corps in reserve. The French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) of the Fifth Army was to advance to the mountains South West of the LIRI $R$ on the left flank of 13 Corps. 13 Corps was to open its attack south of CASSINO with 8 Ind Inf Div on the left and 4 Inf Div on the right while the Polish Corps was to penetrate toward M Cairo North of CASSINO.
10. The attack opened along the whole front at 2300 hours on 11 May with a heavy artillery barrage in which 1 Canadian AGRA and R.C.A. 1 Cdn Inf Div took part. This account, however, will confine itself to that sector of the front in which Canadian troops participated.
11. 8 Ind Inf Div supported by 1 Cdn Armd Bde affected crossings of the GARI (RAPIDO) South of the village of $S$ ANGELO, square 8614. The infantry assault went in at 2345 hours with three troops of tanks deployed on the river-bank to help cover the crossings. It was "an unorthodox use of tanks" but, according to the commander of 17 Ind Inf Bde, their assistance was invaluable. Another
idea developed by the Canadian Brigade was the launching of the Bailey bridge by tanks. Two tanks were employed, both specially fitted, one having the turret and gun removed. This operation was actually carried out during the assault and the bridge safely launched in the face of the enemy holding the far bank. It would have been impossible to have built a normal Bailey bridge at his point. This bridge was successfully completed by 0830 hours 12 May; one of the three other bridges attempted had been completed as early as 730 hours, by gallant work on the part of Indian sappers.
12. As soon as the bridges were completed tow squadrons of tanks from 11 and 14 Armd Regts proceeded across the river to support the infantry who were pinned down on the flat ground on the other side by very heavy enemy fire. Of the tanks that got across during the course of the day some 15 became bogged down in the soft ground on the far side, but all were extracted by gallant work of the Brigade R.E.M.E. under enemy fire. During the day the infantry were only able to penetrate a few hundred yards beyond the river but one squadron of tank relieved pressure by pressing forward a thousand yards on its own through difficult and close country to point 849141 which was known by the code name HIGHGRADE. Several A Tk and S.P. guns and a Fz Kw IV were knocked out by this squadron, and many German infantry were killed.
13. On the right 4 Div had managed to cross the river but were in an even more difficult position since they had been unable to complete any bridges. On 13 May, there was hard and bitter fighting to expand the bridgeheads. S ANGELO fell during the afternoon. 14 Cdn Armd Regt and one of the Indian Brigades pushed forward during he day and made firm their line in the vicinity
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of HIGHGATE, capturing PANACCIONI (851137) in the evening. The remaining
armoured regiment and infantry brigade crossed the river that night. Supply
of petrol and ammunition over the bridges under almost constant shellfire was
a problem, but by the night of 13/14 May by working without rest and
regardless of fire, the Echelon personnel of the three Armoured Regiments
using cut-down Stuart tanks, had succeeded in building up a sufficient dump to
eliminate worries on that score.
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14. On the right the situation was eased when 4 Div got two bridges over and
thrust forward for some 1500 yards. During the night 13/14 May and the
following day 78 Div crossed the river in the rear of the Indian Div and swung
North to cut Highway No. 6 and isolate CASSINO and the Monastery.
15. On the 14th a squadron of 15 Cdn Armd Regt and 21 Ind Inf Bde attacked to cut the road CASSINO-PIGNATARO. Again very heavy fighting ensued, the Germans being strong in M.Gs. and A Tk weapons. On three occasions Canadian tanks fought their way forward alone for over a thousand yards. Snipers, overlooked in the close country by the tanks, prevented the infantry from getting forward and the tanks had to return. By nightfall they had reached MASSA EVANGELISTA (8314).
16. On the morning of 15 May the remaining uncommitted squadron of 12 Cdn Armd Regt and the remaining uncommitted regiment of 21 Ind Inf Bde fought their way slowly but surely to the cross-roads, 827159, to cut the CASSINOPIGNATARO road. Meanwhile 11 Cdn Armd Regt and its brigade had advanced to link up with them. 14 Cdn Armd Regt and the remaining Indian Brigade drove
directly West and had some very heavy fighting. Just as night fell they burst into PIGNATARO, capturing or killing the entire garrison. There was now no question of the attacking forces being driven back over the GARI and a firm base had been secured for a drive against the HITLER LINE.
17. The complete absence of mines and the fact that the $A T k$ gun screen was not effective and made it apparent that the Germans never expected tanks to get into the LIRI Valley.

## 1st CANADIAN INFANTRY DIVISION, 15-28 MAY

18. On 16 May 11 Cdn Corps, from reserve, took over the southern sector of the 13 Corps front. The Corps plan envisaged an operation to be carried out in two phases:


#### Abstract

PHASE I. 1 Cdn Inf Div was to pass through 8 Ind Inf Div, advance to and break through the HITLER LINE and secure the high ground approximately 3000 yards beyond, with a view to fanning out and destroying the enemy.


PHASE II. 5 Cdn Armd Div was to pass through 1 Cdn Inf Div and seize the crossings over the River MELFA.
19. As 5 Cdn Armd Div cleared the gap, 1 Cdn Inf Div was to conform, moving with its left flank on the LIRI, crossing the MELFA Near it confluence with the LIRI and, passing to the West of OEPRANO Reservoir, gain a bridgehead over
the River SACCO South of CEPRANO Station. Meanwhile 13 Corps on the right was to deceive the enemy into thinking that the main attack would be directed along Highway No. 6, but the Corps would withhold its efforts until the breach had been made by the Canadians on the LIRI flank. Thereafter the advance would be resumed on a two Corps front.
20. On 14 end 15 May Major-General Vokes, G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div, visited the G.O.C. 8 Cdn Inf Div, and made detailed arrangements for the takeover. 1 Cdn Inf Bde Gp was to cross and relieve 10 Cdn Inf Bde during the night 15/16 May on the line PIGNATARO South to the LIRI while 3 Cdn Inf Bde Gp was to cross over and relieve 21 Cdn Inf Bde on the following night. General Vokes assumed command of the sector at 2215 hours, 16 May.
21. During 17 and 18 May, 1 and 3 Cdn Inf Bdes advanced simultaneously toward the HITLER LINE, right and left respectively. They reached the FORME D'AQUINO where they consolidated for the night of the 18 th patrolled strongly. 4 Fd Coy supporting 3 Brigade, constructed a 30 foot $S$ S Bailey bridge across the FORME D'AQUINO, ut there was a bad traffic jam with a column of vehicles of 6 Armd Div (Br), far across their Corps boundary, before the Brigade succeeded in getting all the transport across. 2 Cdn Inf Bde remained in the reserve area past of PIGNATARO.
22. By this time 306 Prisoners of War had been taken and an estimated 400 casualties inflicted on the enemy since contract had been made. Less than 500 Germans, it was estimated, managed to withdraw to the HITLER LINE defences, there to join an heterogeneous assortment of troops who had been in the line

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no longer than 48 hours. The Corps Intelligence Summary of 20 May estimated
the enemy strength from MONTE CAIRO to the LIRI R, on 18 May, as 8300, divided
as follows:
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Mt. Troops, North of Route G (Polcorps Front) 1150
1 Para Div (13 Corps Front) 3950
3 6 1 ~ G r e n ~ R e g t ~ B a t t l e ~ G p ~ ( 9 0 ~ P . C . ~ D i v ) ~ 1 2 3 5 ~
5 7 6 \text { Gren Regt Battle Gp (505) Inf Div) 1965}
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Some other miscellaneous units were later identified in the HITLER LINE. The 361 Gren Regt Battle Gp which faced the main Canadian attack had just come into the line below strength and disorganized from the start due to the circumstances under which they took over.
23. On 19 May, 1 and Cdn Inf Bdes made contact with the defences of the ADOLF HITLER LINE and began intensive recce and patrolling to discover or to confirm what was already known about the defences, and determine whether the enemy intended to hold the line. The R. 22e R. attacked in square 7419 but the enemy reacted strongly with heavy M.C., mortar and artillery fire from prepared positions. It was evident that he intended to fight for the HITLER LINE and that a properly tied up attack with strong artillery support would be necessary. Therefore the R. 22e R. were withdrawn to their original positions.
24. The next three days were spent in elaborate preparations for the main drive through the line. During the short interval the Artillery was to apply
a continuous systematic softening up process against the defences. The bombardment was to commence at once and grow in volume as more guns could be brought to bear. Approximately 400 guns were employed from the resources of land 5 Cdn Divs, 1 Cdn A.G.R.A., F.E.C. and 13 F.A. Bde. (The Artillery of the French Corps on the left, who were most anxious to cooperate, wee of great assistance.) The plan was in full swing before midnight 19/20 May to the extent of approximately 1000 rounds per gun on known enemy strong points.
25. The general tactical situation across the front by the night $20 / 21$ May was as follows. On the right the 4 th British Division had taken CASSINO on 18 May while the Polish Corps had taken Monastery Hill on the same day and had pushed along the spine of $M$ CAIRO almost to PIEDIMONTE. In the valley below 6 Armd Div (Br) had reached AQUINO whence they had been forced to withdraw to an area near the airfield to the East. On their left elements of 78 Div ( Br ) had reached the HITLER LINE and were in position before it. 1 Cdn Inf Div sector extended from exclusive AQUINO to the LIRI R. On the left the French had had perhaps the greatest success, beginning a turning movement on the Western flank of the ADOLF HITLER Line. After taking $S$ OLIVA on 17 May they succeeded in rolling up the line as far as PONTECIRVO where they halted on the West bank of the LIRI R. At the same time they had captured M LEUCIO, 6717, and thus obtained observation over the main approaches of the forward enemy positions.
26. On 20 May, General Vokes attended a conference at H.Q., 1 Cdn Corps, at which the Corps Commander issued his preliminary orders for the operation which was to be known by the code word "CHESTERFIELD". General Vokes outlined
his plan, which was later slightly amended by the Army Commander. H-Hour for the attack was set at 0600 hours, 23 May. 2 Cdn Inf Bde (right), and 3 Cdn Inf Bde less one Battalion (left), were to assault at H-hour. These Brigades were to attack the line on a 2000-yard front midway between PONTECORVO and AQUINO, with the road PONTECORVO-AQUINO as their intermediate and the road PONTECORVO-Highway 6 as their final objective.
27. 1 Cdn Inf Bde and 1 Cdn Recce Regt were to carry out aggressive offensive tactics to the south of the main offensive and get forward into the enemy defence positions as opportunity offered. 12 Cdn Armd Regt of 1 Cdn Inf Bde which had remained with 1st Canadian Division when it took over from the Indian Division was to form a Divisional reserve along with R. 22e R. (See Appendix "A", Verbal Orders for Operation CHESTERFIELD and Sketch).
28. The support fire plan called for heavy counter preparation fire on forward defences on the front of 13 Corps on the RIGHT flank. This fire was designed to confuse the enemy as to the actual frontage of the attack and to get his gunners to man their guns. It was tied in with the subsidiary attack by 1 Cdn Inf Bde. The counter preparation fire was to come down from minus 55 to minus 45 and was to be followed by a counter-battery programme, using the total resources available (exclusive Field Artillery), from minus 45 to minus 3 and limited resources from minus 3 to the end of the fire plan. A barrage, concentrations and smoke screens were to start at minus 3 and to continue until the end of the fire plan (approximately three hours). A counter-mortar programme was to start at minus 30 and continue until the end of the fire plan. Pre-arranged D.F. tasks were to be laid down for each
objective. Artillery resources available for this plan totalled 810 guns of all types from 1 to 5 Cdn Divs., 1 Cdn A.G.R.A. 78 Brit Div, 8 Ind Div, 6 A.G.R.A., 13 F.A. Bde, 4 Brit Div, Polcorps, 12 A.A. Bde, 1 D.M.T. of these, 76 medium and heavy guns were set aside for exclusive use of counter battery and 52 guns and mortars were to be used exclusively for counter-mortar. Thus 682 guns of all types were available for the divisional supporting fire plan.
29. During the night $20 / 21$ May 4 Cdn Recce Regt ( 4 P.L.D.G.) entered the line South of the road PIGNATARO - PONTECORVO and contacted an Erasatz Battalion who showed little stomach for fighting. During the following morning, 21 May, this Regiment had considerable success, killing many Germans and taking 22 prisoners. since it was evident that this line on the enemy right flank was weakly held, and since the French to the south had made good headway and dominated PONTECORVO from M MORONE and M LEUCIO the G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div ordered 1 Cdn Inf Bde to attack in that area the following morning.
30. On 22 May P.L.D.G. with the support of two troops of Sherman tanks from 142 R.T.R. continued their successful offensive. The 1 Cdn Inf Bde attack opened at 1030 hours with a successful forcing of a gap through the enemy wire. Soon, however, an unsuspected minefield held up the supporting tanks, while the infantry came under very heavy nobelwerfer, artillery and small arms fire. 1 Fd Coy, R.C.E., cleared two routes of mines, one to within 400 yards of PONTECORVO. The attack of 1 Cdn Inf Bde made considerable progress into the enemy defences, but the break was to sufficient to justify changing the entire CHESTERFIELD plan. Therefore during the evening 2 and 3 Cdn Inf Bdes and 25 Army Tk Bde commenced regrouping for the main offensive on the morrow.
31. The G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div established his tactical Headquarters well forward and in a central location (768168), the same evening. Tactical Headquarters of 2 and 3 Cdn Inf Bdes and 26 Army Tk Bde were all within 5 minutes walk. A Signal Plan had been drawn up to provide line communications for the assault with sufficient alternatives to provide some channel at all times from Tac Div to Tac Bdes and main Div. Utmost difficulty was experienced maintaining the lines because of the large number of tanks and transport in the area and because the laterals from main Div to the right flank were along a forward slope subject to spasmodic enemy fire. However, when the attack commenced all lines and wireless were working except one line to main Div which was repaired by 0630 hours. Indeed during the day, 23 May, no line was out for more than 30 minutes and line communications were available to all formations at all times.
32. At 0600 hours, 23 May 44, the attack on the ADOLF HITLER LINE commenced. The artillery barrage had a frontage of 3200 yds, allowing for 500 yds overlap on either side of the frontage of attack, and was 3000 yds deep. The rate of advance was 100 yards in five minutes alter diminishing to 100 yards in three minutes. The fire power available was sufficient to allow for a depth of fire for 600 yards throughout, including pauses. Concentrations as originally planned were 32 in number, but this was considerably exceeded, due to a freeing of artillery support from 1 Cdn Inf Bde front. Four of these tasks were smoke screens. Many of the concentrations were superimposed over the barrage to neutralize the thickest enemy defences. 2 Cdn Inf Bde started their attack with P.P.C.L.I. on the right and Seaforth of $C$. on the left supported by tanks of North Irish Horse. After the first objective had been
gained, L. Edmn R. was to pass though P.P.C.L.I. and advance with the Seaforths to the final objective.
33. Progress at first appeared satisfactory: but the tanks with both battalions were held up by mines and despite the effect of sappers working under heavy fire could make little progress. Mist, smoke and the dust of the barrage added to the natural screen of woods, vegetation and tall grain made control difficult.
34. Late in the morning at the cost of very heavy casualties the Seaforth of C. reached and consolidated on their first objective. The P.P.C.L.I. after some progress were held up with equally heavy casualties. Both battalions were unable to get supporting arms, tanks or A Tk guns forward. The L. Edmn R. attempted to pass through the P.P.C.L.I. but were held up by the wire and suffered very heavy casualties by mines and fire. Numerous supporting tanks were knocked out by mines and $A T k$ guns.
35. 3 Cdn Inf Bde on the left flank had rather more success. Their first objectives were gained by Carlt \& York R. and b1 R.T.R. by 0700 hours. Enemy tanks and S.P. guns from the steel and concrete pillboxes of the HITLER LINE. A desperate tank battle was won only after the British tanks had suffered considerable losses. At about 1000 hours they overcame the A Tk defence, destroying some enemy tanks and forcing the remainder to withdraw. West N.S.R. in the meantime had positioned themselves behind Carlt \& York R. on the first objective and were waiting for phase two to commence. Both battalions had dug in under heavy and continuous shelling and mortaring.
36. Several enemy counter-attacks had developed from the direction of AQUINO but were beaten off by artillery fire and fire from a squadron of 12 Cdn Armd Regt.
37. By 1300 hours it was obvious that the attack of 2 Cdn Inf Bde was unlikely to succeed. Accordingly the G.O.C. with the concurrence of the Corps Commander decided to reinforce the success of 3 Cdn Inf Bde. He therefore turned over the divisional reserve of $R$. $22 e \mathrm{R}$. and 12 Cdn Armd Regt (less one squadron) to the Coma 3 Cdn Inf Bde and ordered the latter to launch an attack with the West N.S.R. on the left and R. 22e R. on the right to capture objectives on the far side of the enemy line, one and two miles North East of PONTECORVO. (Squares 7218, 7319.)
38. At 1650 hours the second phase commenced and was completely successful. Enemy reserves were caught in the open as they were about to counter-attack and completely demoralized. Although fierce resistance from surviving enemy elements was met with it was overcome by West N.S.R. who were soon on their objectives and consolidating. R. 22e R. followed forward, turned right, and after fierce fighting seized the high ground in area 7319. By nightfall both units were firmly in their new positions and the breach had been established.
39. During the day P.L.D.G. and 1 Cdn Inf Bde had slowly forged ahead on their fronts, both tanks and infantry suffering heavily. 48 Highrs with all effective supporting tanks out of operation were brought to a standstill during the morning. Shortly after noon, however, they commenced to make progress forward again. Hast \& P.E.R. came to their assistance by attacking
on their right. Two platoons made a direct assault on enemy M.G. positions and carried them with some bitter hand to hand fighting and the company became firmly established on the high ground beyond the gap making contact with the 48th. With the close cooperation of the supporting tanks another company of Hast \& P.E.R. quickly broke through and consolidated on the junior at 738171. The remainder of the battalion was at once pushed forward with a balance of supporting tanks and a troop of S.P. guns, and the high ground at point 106 was occupied. The R.C.R. and the 48 th Highlanders went through the line and consolidated, although mopping up was not completed until noon the next day. Our troops were established in PONTECORVO by first light on 24 May, and the whole line northward to AQUINO was cleared of the enemy.
40. Enemy casualties in proportion to the number holding the line were very heavy. By first light 24 May 15 officers and 525 other ranks had been taken prisoner since the attack opened the previous morning, and this total, together with a large number of enemy killed, accounted for the majority of 361 Gren Regt and 576 Gren Regt and all the various sub-units under their command. The coat to our own forces, however, had been high especially to 2 Cdn Inf Bde which appear to have struck the strongest sector of the line. At a later date Corps Headquarters stated that the total casualties for 1 Cdn Div on 23 May were 18 officers and 495 other ranks. (See Appx E.)
41. The Artillery programme for the battle was well carried out, with some necessary alterations as the fighting progressed. One "WILLIAM" target was successfully fired on AQUINO by over 600 guns. TOT was 30 minutes after the request had been passed to C.C.R.A. from the Divisional Artillery

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Headquarters. During the evening 14 "UNCLE" targets and many "MIKE" targets
were engaged by FOOs, Reps and Air OPs. Throughout the day the Divisional
Artillery regiments fired approximately 500 rounds per gun.
42. Summing up the day's fighting it may be said that at considerable cost
the lst Canadian Division had broken through the much-vaunted ADOLF HITLER
LINE and completely routed the enemy troops in that sector. The Commander of
the Division attributed its success to four reasons:
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a. The physical and mental fitness of the Infrantry.
b. The superlative Artillery support.
c. The Infantry-Tank cooperation which reached a perfection never hitherto enjoyed.
d. The success of the French Corps in gaining the high ground M MORRONE and M LEUCIO on the left flank; the speed with which they passed Artillery and air targets to the Canadians and their eagerness to engage targets on the Canadian front.
43. Although 5 Cdn Armd Div took over the lead on 24 May, part of 1 Cdn Inf Div remained in the van of the advance following the breaking of the HITLER LINE. The G.O.C. detailed a task force consisting of 4 P.L.D.G., two squadrons R.C.D., one squadron 12 Cdn Armd Regt and Carlt \& York R., all under command of Lt.-Col. Adams, 4 P.L.D.G. to advance along the LIRI on the left
flank of the main attack by 5 Cdn Armd Div and capture a bridgehead over the MELFA in square 6615. Throughout the day (24 May) this force engaged the enemy in a running fight. The Recce Regt advanced along the road just North of the LIRI $R$ from PONTECORVO to the MELFA, and succeeded in reaching the river by midnight $24 / 25$ May.
44. On the morning of the 25 May, the balance of 3 Cdn Inf Bde moved forward, the West N.S.R. on the left along the axis PONTECORVO - road junction 698187 - 666210, and R. 22e R. along the axis road junction 717180 - road junction 696196. The Carlt \& York R. encountered considerable opposition but it was overcome by artillery and infantry fire and a crossing achieved. This battalion consolidated in the area 664233 while the West N.S.R. also crossed the river and seized objectives in square 6423. Meanwhile, the success of 5 Cdn Armd Div on the right and of the Recce Regt on the left completely disorganized enemy defences and resistance practically ceased. The Recce Regt headed for $S$ GIOVANNI but were beaten to the goal by the French Corps. As 5 Cdn Armd Div had passed the reservoir to the North, 3 Cdn Inf Bde was practically pinched out of further action, but on the 27 th, 4 P.L.D.G. crossed the SACCO South of CEPRANO which was taken by the French.

## PENETRATION BEYOND THE MELFA BY 5 CANADIAN ARMOURED DIVISION

45. 5 Cdn Armd Div immediately followed through the gap broken by 1 Cdn Inf Div according to plan. Major-General Hoffmeister, G.O.C. 5 Cdn Armd Div, issued orders that 5 Cdn Armd Bde Gp would advance to the River MELFA and secure crossings and a covering position for the passage of 11 Cdn Inf Bde
over the river. The Irish Regiment of Canada was placed under command of 5 Cdn Armd Bde for this opening phase, while most of the divisional artillery engineer resources plus all the corps artillery in support of the division were placed in support of the brigade.
46. Since it was uncertain what would happen on that portion of the HITLER LINE North of AQUINO a firm base had to be established between the HITLER LINE and the MELFA in order that enemy positions in any direction could be dealt with. The plan had to be very flexible since it was uncertain where and when the 1st Division might succeed in breaking through. The 5 Cdn Armd Bde plan was as follows. The B.C.D. (9 Cdn Armd Regt) with the Ir B. C. and one bty S.P. A Tk guns in support were to move through the gap and secure a firm base in the general area MANCINI, square 7122. The Ld S.H. (2 Cdn Armd Regt) with one company of the Westmr R. (M) plus two scout platoons, one battery of S.P. A Tk guns and one battery S.P. fd arty in support were to pass through and cross the River MELFA at 688243. The remainder of the Westmr $R$. were to be ready to go forward and enlarge the bridgehead. The 8 N.B.H. (5 Cdn Armd Regt) were to be prepared to cross the River MELFA through the bridgehead if a suitable crossing was found and exploit in the general direction of CEPRANO. Two squadrons of G.G.H.G. ( 3 Cdn Armd Recce Regt) were to cover the left and right flanks of the advance.
47. On 23 May the force grouped as above in the area East of the FORME d'AQUINO in the general area 7917 and during the night $23 / 24$ May moved into the forward assembly area in rear of 3 Cdn Inf Bde. The move was delayed by the congestion on the roads and by a necessary last minute change in assembly
areas. As a result the leading tanks did not get across the start line until 0800 hours, two hours later than planned. The B.C.D. supported by two companies of infantry experienced heavy fire from the front and from their right area in the general area of AQUINO. They reached their objective at 1220 hours going through intense heavy shelling and engaging enemy PANTHER tanks and S.P. 88 mm guns. The second group was then sent on through, the Recce $T p$ proceeding as fast as possible to the line of the River MELFA which they had reached at 1500 hours. The main force (Ld S.H.) found it heavy going through sunken roads and cross-tracks and encountered approximately a squadron of PANTHER tanks and S.P. guns in the general area 6924 which were supported by further enemy tanks and S.P. guns on the other side of the river. A tank battle ensued and the enemy tanks and S.P. guns were finally destroyed or put to flight. Following the battle the Ld S.H. were positioned with one squadron in the general area 693242 covering the approach to the crossing, one covering Highway No. 6 on the right flank and one covering the open ground to the Southwest of the crossing place. Meanwhile, the Recce Tp had managed to get three Stuart tanks across the river followed by the leading sections of "A" Company of Westmr R. (M). An attempt was made to get the main body of Ld $S . H$. across the river but the steepness of the river bank and the presence of enemy A Tk guns on the opposite side made this impossible. The remainder of the Westmr R. (M) however managed to cross the river before dark. "A" Company had been subjected to counter-attacks supported by tanks and had suffered heavy casualties amounting to fifty percent of those taking part. However, they had killed 15 Germans taking nearly 50 prisoners, three S.P. guns and one PANTHER tank. Major Mahony, "A" Company Commander later received the V.C. for his gallant leading of his company in this action. "B" Company which had crossed
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further up the river in the vicinity of 695245 ran into considerable
opposition and after several hours fighting was ordered to withdraw. It was
impossible to get A Tk guns or S.P. equipment across until after midnight.
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48. Meanwhile, the G.C.H.G. had been carrying out their task of protecting
the flanks with vigour and by 1630 hours had cut Highway 6 at the 72 grid
line. All three squadrons fought almost continuously throughout the day
undergoing very severe shell and mortar fire. They estimated that they had
knocked out of action approximately five to seven S.P. guns, killed 100 to 150
Germans and captured as many more which were turned over to the infantry units
in the vicinity.
49. The total Ps.W. taken by the Division on 24 May was 350 with approximately the same number of Germans killed. Many enemy tanks had been engaged during the day be accurate divisional artillery fire directed by Air O.Ps.
50. The bridgehead position was precarious so it was decided to attack next morning with a view to getting at least a two-battalion bridgehead. The Irish Regiment were brought up to the East bank of the river to the left of the original crossing. They attacked at 0600 hours the following morning and by 1235 hours 25 May the bridgehead was firmly established on a two-battalion front.
51. From the time the leading troops hit the River MELFA at 1500 hours on 24 May, the general area of the crossing had been subjected to exceptionally
heavy shelling and mortaring which continued without pause throughout this period. Although the enemy had not intended to stand and fight in this position, it was obvious that he intended to delay the Canadian advance across the river as long as possible. During the day some 54 of his tanks and vehicles were seen withdrawing to the West and were engaged by the 5th Division's artillery.
52. Later on 25 May, 11 Cdn Inf Bde passed through the MELFA bridgehead that had been secured by 5 Cdn Armd Bde. The Cape Breton Highlanders supported by 8 N.B.H. crossed the MELFA under heavy mortar fire, followed by the Perth R. The Ir R.C. which had crossed previously under command of 5 Cdn Armd Bde now reverted to its own brigade. By last light the whole Brigade was consolidated with the C.B. Highrs in the area 663245-660251-678249-672247, the Perth R. on the left flank, area 665233, and the Ir R.C. on the right. By midnight orders were issued for a further advance at 0630 hours the following morning, 26 May, to CEPRANO with C.B. Highrs on the right and the Perth R . on the left, each supported by a squadron of tanks from 8 N.B.H.
53. Opposition from 88 mm guns was disposed of by fire from the Divisional Artillery. Mines, however, slowed up the advance to a certain extent. Very heavy M.G. fire and shipping from the high ground North of the railway caused some casualties to C.B. Highrs. This unit attacked successfully across the railway, supported by artillery concentrations and overhead fire from the tank M.Gs. Meanwhile, the Perth R. had reached their objective, 623265, after brushing with the enemy in square 6323. The progress of the supporting tanks was slowed up throughout the day by the scrubby close country, and enemy
mines, mortars and $A$ Tk guns. The advance of the C.B. Highrs was ordered to be continued at 1830 hours to the cross roads 6227 near CEPRANO. The Brigade took up strong positions for the night but with its flanks left open since 76 Div on the right had not yet crossed the MELFA and since the 1 Cdn Inf Div force on the left had not yet come up in line.
54. During the night the Irish pushed forward to 612265 and sent a recce patrol across the LIRI River into CEPRANO which was reported empty. The following morning, 27 May, the Perth R. crossed the river by stretching a rope across it and pulling a single boat back and forth in a shuttle service. This was done under heavy shellfire mostly from the East. Across the river they came under heavy fire of all sorts from West and Northwest of CEPRANO. The town itself was entered and cleared about 0930 hours. Considerable opposition was encountered some 600 yards South West of the town which was successfully dealt with by artillery fire. The C.B. Highrs followed up during the evening crossing the river at 602262 under a heavy concentration of enemy shelling. They consolidated on the line of the lateral road beyond the river including point 119 at 596258 by 2350 hours. Spasmodic enemy mortaring and shelling throughout the day were dealt with by effective counter battery work from the Divisional Artillery. Meanwhile the FEC had occupied S GIOVANNI to the South.
55. Early on 28 May, Divisional Headquarters issued an Operation Order for Exercise "CHESTERFIELD" which was to comprise the final phase of 5 Cdn Armd Div's advance. 78 Div were advancing on the right along the line of 27 "NORTHING" toward CEPRANO while the FEC were advancing toward CEPRANO, 4429, with their right on the $R$ SACCO. 1 Cdn Inf Div had secured a bridgehead


#### Abstract

across the ACCO in the area 6023 and were to assist 5 Cdn Armd Div if necessary. 5 Cdn Armd Div's intentional was to advance and secure the Line TATLER running approximately North to South along 50 "EASTING" between POFI and ARNARA. 11 Cdn Inf Bde was to extend its bridgehead West of CEPRANO that same night and 5 Cdn Armd Bde Gp to pass through at 1200 hours on the $28 t h$ securing the TATLER Line. The Armoured Regiments were to start crossing the river at 0500 hours. The supporting Air Force was to bomb REPI, POFI, TORRICE, ARNARA, FROSINONE and CECCANO.


56. 11 Cdn Inf Bde had continued its advance early that morning with Perth R. on the right and C.B. Highrs on the left while the Ir R.C. were to occupy the town of CEPRANO in reserve. The C.B. Highrs secured their objectives in squares 5726 by 1140 hours and made contact with Perth R. on their right who straddled Highway 6 at 580279.
57. During the day enemy withdrawing along Highway 6 were successfully engaged by Kittyhawks at 510630. To the South the French continued their spectacular advance reaching CECCANO.
58. The 5 Cdn Armd Bde's crossing was delayed by the Engineers' failure to get a bridge across the river near CEPRANO until the evening of the 28 th. By that time 78 Div had received priority on this bridge and part of the Canadian force was routed around to the South of the reservoir 6323 and up the East side of the LIRI. The balance were given the use of the bridge the following morning. Since the ground beyond CEPRANO was practically impassable for tanks, consisting of a series of razor-back hills running at right angles to
the line of advance, the B.C.D., the advanced Armoured Regiment, with two companies of motor patrols (Westmr R.) and with two batteries of S.P. guns, were ordered to advance on two C.Ls., the right hand C.L. running parallel to Highway 6 and passing North of POFI, the left C.L. running Southwest from CFPRANO parallel to the line of the railway for approximately two miles and then swinging Northwest towards ARNARA, passing South of POPI. The objective was the high ground running approximately North and South 1000 yards East of ARNARA. The remainder of the Brigade was to follow as ordered by Brigade Headquarters. The B.C.D. met little enemy opposition except for shellfire until reaching the general area of the Rivers PORNELLI, 5527, and MALINGO, 5525, which proved serious obstacles until Scissors bridges were erected. From here on the going was very difficult. The motor companies on the right came under very intense shellfire from the vicinity of POFI, while mines and S.P. A Tk guns sited North and Northwest of Highway 6 inflicted casualties on G.G.H.G. The Westmr R. were sent forward and consolidated on the objective. 8 N.B.H. moved forward to the general area 5527 and Ld S.H. to the general area 5428 with Brigade Headquarters at 545257 .
59. On 29 May, 1 Cdn Corps issued Operation Instruction No. 14. Information indicated that the enemy would continue to withdraw Northwest on FROSINONE; resistance was likely to be light but with demolitions on a large scale. 5 Cdn Armd Div was to press forward vigorously and regain contact with the enemy, on an axis 4734-4430 - lateral FROSINONE - TOMACELLA, 4134. A brigade group from 1 Cdn Inf Div was to come under command in the evening 29 May relieving 11 Cdn Inf Bde. The following evening a second brigade group from 1 Cdn Div was to move forward and command of the sector was to pass to

1 Cdn Inf Div on the night $30 / 31$ May. The latter were to continue advancing on the axis of Highway 6.
60. During the afternoon of the $29 t h, 11 \mathrm{Cdn}$ Inf Bde was instructed to move on to POFI. The Perth R. was to take the high ground South of ARNARA and push one company into ARNARA while the C.B. Highrs were to occupy POFI and the high ground immediately to the North. The Ir R.C. were to take the high ground to the Southwest of POFI. The Perth R. took POFI about 1630 hours, and immediately proceeded on to occupy ARNARA by 0430 hours 30 May. The C.B. Highrs and the Irish had occupied their objectives by the same time.
61. Both brigades of 5 Cdn Armd Div continued to advance on the 30 th. The Divisional plan was that one infantry battalion and one armoured regiment would move to the high ground in the general area 4833 while another armoured regiment and an infantry battalion moved to the general area high ground 4532 thus forming two firm bases through which 2 Cdn Inf Bde would move forward to the line FROSINONE - FROSINONE Station.
62. At 0500 hours the Ld S.H. moved forward towards the right firm base area and 8 N.B.H. to the left. Both regiments experienced great difficulty due to the very close country and the presence of mines. The Ld S.H. both suffered and inflicted tank casualties. The 8 N.B.H. were diverted on instructions from Division to the general area 4351 where they made contact with the FEC. Here again the going was confined to a single road which was heavily mined. At last light they were forced to withdraw to a Laager in the general area 459293.
63. Meanwhile, the C.B. Highrs had consolidated objective "TOM" (4833) and the Irish objective "DICK" (4582). ${ }^{6}$ The Ld S.H. subsequently reached the former point. The Irish had some brushes with the enemy during the day and the C.B. Highrs experienced some enemy shelling but suffered almost no casualties from the time they had left CERRANO.
64. At 1800 hours 2 Cdn Inf Bde started to pass through.

CONTINUATION OF THE ADVANCE THROUGH FROSINONE BY 1st CANADIAN INFANTRY DIVISION
65. 2 Cdn Inf Bde had experienced considerable difficulty in passing through 11 Cdn Inf Bde because of traffic jams on the road and since units of 11 Cdn Inf Bde were still engaged in fighting. During the night of 30 May the L. Fdmn R. which had taken over objective "TOM" from the C.B. Highrs earlier that evening launched an attack supported by one squadron of Ld S.H. Dawn 31 May saw L. Edmn R. firm on their objective 468354 to 477354 ; light opposition was encountered and dealt with. A small patrol penetrated to FROSINONE but did not return. The same night the P.P.C.L.I. had taken over objective "DICK" from the Ir R.C. and patrolled to the line of the road 452364. Casualties were suffered and inflicted.
${ }^{6}$ This map reference differs in several accounts; other references given are squares 4531 and 4528.
66. The Seaforth of $C$. were brought up to ARNARA by M.T. and ordered to pass through the forward battalions and cut in behind FROSINONE from the left flank to secure the area of the cross roads 456381.
67. Since 78 Div was encountering opposition at RUPI and TORRICE, L. Edmn R. were sent on into FROSINONE which they reported clear by 1500 hours. Enemy infantry detachments and S.P. guns however were still engaging P.P.C.L.I. and Seaforth of C. beyond the town. By 0100 hours, 1 Jun, the Seaforths reported themselves completely consolidated on their objective with Battalion Headquarters at 453376. P.P.C.L.I. sent a strong standing patrol at 2200 hours to the area 444363 and the remainder of the battalion moved over approximately 1000 yards to the West at 0700 hours, 1 Jun. During the night, 31 Mar/1 Jun, N.I.H. tank squadrons, 90 Cdn A Tk Bty and unit A Tk guns which had hitherto been held back by the nature of the country, began to move up and join their respective units. Demolitions had to be cleared, routes recced, mines swept and traffic navigated but by first light 1 Jun this movement was completed and the brigade firmly established covering FROSINONE.
68. 78 Div was by this time pouring through the town from Highway 6 moving North towards ALATRI. The brigade patrolled actively during the night but located no enemy. Contact was established with 78 Div on the right and with R.C.R. of 1 Cdn inf Bde on the left, P.L.D.G. and 1 Cdn Inf Bde had been advancing South of Highway 6 in the direction of FROSINONE, by passing FROSINONE on 1 Jun.
69. Early on 1 Jun the G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div ordered 2 Cdn Inf Bde to occupy M RADICINO (square 4142) to secure the right flank of 1 Cdn Inf Bde in their advance on FROSINSONE L. Edmn R. was sent forward along Highway 6 and by 1440 hours reached the line 415404 to 443414 . There was staff opposition at 433427 but by 0010 hours, 2 Jun, the hill feature here was completely cleared.
70. 1 Cdn Inf Bde had some difficulty in getting forward due to heavy mortaring and mining of the roads and tracks, but by noon 2 Jun they were well established with the R.C.R. in FERENTINO, 48 Highrs in squares 3843 - 3743, and Hast \& P.E.R. in squares 3742 - 3841.
71. At 2210 hours 2 Jun 441 Cdn Corps issued Operation Order No. 2 (see Appendix "H"). 1 Cdn Inf Bde was to capture the high ground about ANAGNI 2949 and establish a firm base, while 4 Cdn Recce Regt (4 P.L.D.G.) was to secure the stream crossing 264491, one battalion of $2 C d n$ Inf Bde was to move to FERENTINO 3743 and patrol towards FUMONE 4147. A brigade group of 6 SA Armd Div were to pass through 1 Cdn Inf Bde on axis FERENTINO - road junction 336463 - ACUTO 3154 - PIGLIO 2858 and patrol to FIUGGI 3555. One battalion group were to advance through ANAGNI towards PALIANO 2156, and contact patrols were to be made with the FEC on the left flank by 1 Cdn Armd C. Regt (R.C.D.), a squadron of which was to be under command of 6 SA Armd Div.
72. 1 Cdn Inf Bde Gp pushed forward towards ANAGNI and by noon 3 Jun were established at the limit of their advance as follows:

$$
4 \text { P.L.D.G. } 2348-2847-3346-2649
$$

48 Highrs 3148 - 3149
Hast \& P.E.R. - 2847 - 2940 - 2947
73. On 3 Jun a brigade of 6 SA Armd Div passed through 1 Cdn Inf Bde int he ANAGNI area and advanced to 268507 where a blown bridge halted the column and the enemy was again contacted. Early on 4 Jun, 12 SA Bde reported the capture of PALIANO 2156. Later that day, 1 Cdn Corps issued Operation Instruction No. 16 ordering all formations and units of 1 Cdn Corps to stand fast in their present positions and providing for 6 SA Armd Div to pass from under command 1 Cdn Corps to 13 Corps. The Corps then came into Army reserve and took no further part in the fighting.

## CONCLUSION

74. The above is not a definitive account of these operations of 1 Cdn Corps since it has been prepared hurriedly and before all the relevant reports and war diaries have been received. A number of documents are included as Appendices. Reference is here made to several matters concerning the operations which have not been dealt with in the course of the narrative.
a. Factors Slowing the Advance. Lt.-Col. Lord Tweedsmuir in a report to the Commander of the Eighth Army on "The Factors which slowed up the Eligth's Army on "The Factors which Slowed up the Eighth's Army Offensive in the LIRI Valley" stressed the fact that traffic congestion was the greatest cause of delay. Among avoidable mistakes he listed.
(1) Failure to pass information to the Engrs.
(2) Failure by Divisions to develop routes laid down by Corps.
(3) Inexperience of provost personnel.
(4) Failure to prevent casual traffic.
(5) Putting more traffic on the roads than they could stand.

Among other causes of delay he listed:
(1) Misinterpretation of maps and serial photographs.
(2) Failure to maintain direction in close country.
(3) Failure of the infantry to continue advancing when their supporting tanks were held up by ground.
(4) Unwillingness of the infantry to advance without supporting weapons.
(5) Demolitions - failure to keep the Engineers informed and general attitude of "leave it to the Sappers".
Uncertainty re the situation on flanks (e.g., a day was lost due to a misunderstanding between the Canadian and French Corps).
(7) Difficulty in the use of code names.

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Failure to pass back information.
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The report concluded by saying that a good deal of avoidable delay enabled the enemy "to withdraw in his own time and even break off contract".
b. Air Support. A report on air operations in support of 1 Cdn Corps indicates the important part the Air Force played in this offensive.
(1) The complete resources of 239 (Fighter-Bomber) Wing, D.A.F., provided direct air support for Eighth Army during the period under review. In addition to attacking gun and mortar positions, defended localities, tank and troop concentrations and H.Q.s in the immediate battle area, 239 Wing concentrated a considerable effort on the isolation of the battle area and the disorganization of the enemy's rear areas by road-blocking, rail-cutting and bridgebreaking. Their greatest success however, was obtained by armed recce against the enemy's retreating transport and guns of all types on the roads leading of the battle area.
(See copy of "Canadian Operations - Mediterranean Area, Report on Air Operations in Support of 1 Cdn Corps, 11 May4 Jun 44", forwarded to N.D.H.Q., (D.M.T.), 7 Jul 44, (24/AAI/1/4 (Hist).)
c. Intelligence. In contrast to the excellent intelligence available to the Allied Armies prior to the attack, the enemy's information regarding our dispositions and plans was very inadequate. (See excerpt from 1 Cdn Corps Intelligence Summary No. 80 attached as Appendix "F".) This may be considered a tribute to the effectiveness of the arrangements for concealing our concentration in front of the GUSTAV Line (above, para 5).
d. Statistics. Some statistics regarding the 1 Cdn Corps operations in the LIRI Valley will be found in Appendix "F".

