Canadian Soldiers in Many Roles, 1939-1945
We have told, very briefly, the story of the two great Canadian campaigns; we have outlined the growth of the Canadian Army Overseas and its miscellaneous operations previous to 1943; and we have related also those incidents of the Pacific War in which the Army played a part.
These topics are far from exhausting the story of the Army in the Second Great War, and indeed, as we have already said, that story cannot be exhausted in this relatively small volume. Only an encyclopaedic work could cover the whole of the skilful, devoted and industrious effort that the men' and women of the Canadian Army put into the task of defeating the enemies of freedom. We have no space here, for instance, to describe the essential activities of Training Centres and similar establishments across Canada; in a later volume at least a summary of this must be given. Nor can we tell of the contributions made by those who manned the coast defences, guarded the internment camps, staffed the static headquarters and did many other indispensable if sometimes unexciting jobs in wartime Canada.
We have apologized to those arms and services of the overseas Army to which it has not been possible to do justice individually. Our aim has been to tell the story of the Canadian Army as a whole, and we could not describe the work of, shall we say, the Royal'Canadian Corps of Signals (to mention one technical combatant arm) or the Royal Canadian Army Pay Corps (to mention one administrative service) without breaking the thread of the story and rendering it too detailed and technical. Yet without these corps, and a dozen others, the Army could not have operated in the field for twentyfour hours.
We must, however, mention here, however briefly, certain Canadians overseas who performed special tasks, all of them important to the cause and some of them most perilous, outside the Canadian field army.
Canadian Officers in the British Army
At various times in the course of the war Canadian soldiers fought in the Armies of Canada's Allies. We have seen, for instance, Canadians gaining battle experience with the British Army in North Africa, and serving with United States and other forces in the Pacific as preparation for a final campaign against Japan which was fated never to take place. In addition, a large group of Canadian officers were lent to the British
Army and fought with distinction in various British regiments during the final campaigns.
This "Canloan" scheme, as it came to be called, had its origin in discussions held by Major-General H. F. G. Letson, the Canadian Adjutant General, during a visit to England in October 1943. At this time the British Army was seriously short of junior officers (especially infantry officers) for the impending campaign in North-West Europe, and the suggestion was made that Canada could help meet this situation. Partly as a result of the disbandment of two Home Defence divisions, she had some officers to spare, and in the end she provided 622 infantry officers and (in accordance with a special request) 51 officers for the Royal Army Ordnance Corps--673 "Canloan" officers in all. By agreement between the two countries, the officers continued to be paid by the Canadian Government at Canadian rates. When in battledress they wore all the badges of their respective British units, plus "Canada" badges; when in "service dress they were permitted to wear Canadian uniforms and badges.
The officers volunteering for this duty were carefully "screened" in Canada by Selection Boards. Those approved received a special four-week course designed to bring them up to the standard of officers leaving the Canadian Reinforcement Units in the United Kingdom. The first group of Canloan officers arrived in Britain on 7 April 1944, and the remainder followed during the next few months. The great majority were lieutenants, but a few captains were included.
The Canadians were immediately posted to British units; wherever possible, to the regiment, if any, with which the officer's Canadian unit was allied. Many of them were in action on the Normandy beaches on D Day, and virtually all of them saw very active service during the weeks that followed. There is no doubt that in general they acquitted themselves extremely well; this is attested by the reports made on individuals as well as by statistics for the group as a whole.
The Canloan officers suffered heavy casualties. The total in all categories amounted to 465, including 101 killed in action, five presumed killed, 20 died of wounds, one died of sickness and one from accident, and 310 wounded, while 27 became prisoners of war. One hundred and twenty-six fatal battle casualties out of 673 officers was a high proportion, but not exceptionally high for a group almost all of whom were junior officers in fighting infantry battalions. The excellence of the service rendered by the Canloan officers is witnessed not only by the losses they suffered but also by the honours they won, which include 41 Military Crosses and one bar. Although they were originally lent only for service in North-West Europe or the Mediterranean, authority was ultimately granted for them to volunteer for other theatres, and a number
offered themselves for duty in South-East Asia.
The Canloan scheme may be accounted decidedly successful; the gallant young officers lent to the British forces under its terms did their country credit and made a distinguished and significant contribution to the military effort of the Commonwealth and the winning of the war.
The Canadian-American Special Service Force
We have told in outline the story of the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion, which fought in the campaign in North-West Europe as part of the 6th British Airborne Division. We must make some reference here to another distinctive unit, the 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion. This was the Canadian component of the First Special Service Force, whose personnel was drawn partly from the Canadian and partly from the United States Army.
This unique international undertaking had its origin early in 1942, when those directing Allied strategy were considering what was known as Operation PLOUGH--a scheme for operations during the winter of 1942-43 in the snow-covered areas of Europe, the chief objective being power-stations in Northern Norway. This involved the provision and training of a special force, and the development of special equipment. In the latter connection, much attention was given in Canada, by agencies of the Department of Munitions and Supply, to the design of snowmobiles, and an effective vehicle was actually produced.1 At the same time the suggestion was made that the military force for the projected operation might be provided jointly by Canada, Norway and the United States. The Norwegian component, as it turned out, was not available; but in July 1942 authority was given for the employment in this enterprise of about 700 Canadian officers and soldiers. Partly with a view to avoiding undesirable publicity, the Canadian part of the Special Service Force was raised under the name "2nd Canadian Parachute Battalion", which it retained until redesignated "1st Canadian Special Service Battalion" in May 1943. Lt.-Col. J. G. McQueen returned from overseas to take command of the Battalion; the bulk of the personnel was selected on a voluntary basis from the Army in Canada, the junior officers being in the main recent graduates of the Officers Training Centre at Brockville, Ontario. All men accepted were required to be fully trained soldiers, and to volunteer for duty as parachute troops.
The First Special Service Force as organized consisted of a Combat Force and a Base Echelon or Service Battalion. Canada provided no
men for the Service Battalion, but supplied, as already noted, about 700 all ranks for the Combat Force. Under the original "table of organization" this would have been about half the latter's strength; but in practice the Force was always larger, and the Canadian component amounted to a little more than one-third of the Combat Force and a little more than one-quarter of the Force as a whole.2 The Commander of the. First Special Service Force from the beginning was Colonel Robert T. Frederick, U.S. Army. Lt.-Col. McQueen was appointed Second-in-Command of the Force. The Combat Force was organized in three "regiments" each of two battalions. Canadian and American soldiers alike were distributed throughout these regiments, not segregated in separate units. The let Canadian Special Service Battalion was thus never a "tactical" unit; this title was simply a convenient administrative label for the Canadian portion of the international force.
The Canadians joined the Special Service Force at Fort William Henry Harrison (Helena, Montana) in August 1942, and parachute training was undertaken at once. During this training Lt.-Col. McQueen was injured and Lt.-Col. D. D. Williamson became the Force's senior Canadian officer. When all members had qualified as parachutists, intensive ground training followed, and with the cold weather came training in winter warfare, under the advice of Norwegian instructors.
By this time, however, Operation PLOUGH had been cancelled. Allied planners had decided on less ambitious schemes for sabotaging Norwegian power installations, and the Norwegian Government was rather unwilling to countenance a general attack on such establishments; while the number of aircraft required for transporting the snowmobiles for the proposed operation was considered prohibitive. (Existing American types were unsuitable, and the Chief of the Air Staff in England was decidedly unwilling to divert 750 Lancaster bombers from the assault on Germany for this purpose.) The question of the future of the Special Service Force thus arose. The United States expressed a desire to keep it in existence for use in other operations, and in November 1942 the War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet authorized the continuance of the Canadian participation. The following spring the Force underwent amphibious training in Virginia.
In August 1943 it took part, as.we have already seen, in the operations against Kiska in the Aleutians. The Japanese having cleared out before the attack, the Canadians of the Force, like those of the 13th Infantry Brigade Group, which was also involved, saw no fighting. The Force was immediately returned to the United States, for a decision had
been taken to employ it in the Mediterranean Theatre. It moved by way of North Africa and entered the line north of Naples in November as part of the Fifth United States Army.
Early in December, while the 1st Canadian Division was battling towards Ortona, the Special Service Force was likewise heavily engaged on the other side of Italy. In fighting around Monte la Difensa and Monte la Remetanea it lost heavily. Canadian casualties during this phase (the Force was relieved on 9 December) were reported as totalling 113; 27 men were killed or missing. The Force went into action again on Christmas Day east of Cassino. In the bitter mountain battles that followed frostbite and exposure caused as many casualties as the enemy.
On 22 January 1944 came the Allied landing at Anzio, south of Rome (above, page 129); and at the beginning of February the Special Service Force was put into the bridgehead there. Its Canadian component was the only Canadian unit to share the gruelling Anzio experience. The Force took over a portion of the line, along the Mussolini Canal on the right of the bridgehead, on the night of 2-3 February 1944. It remained in position there, digging, fighting off counter-attacks, and being pounded by the German guns on the high ground overlooking our level and exposed positions, for fourteen weeks. It was finally relieved on 9 May.
About this time the Canadian Battalion received its first reinforcements since the beginning of the Mediterranean operations. Its effective fighting strength had fallen below 400 all ranks, and the 255 Canadian officers and men who now joined were most welcome, especially as further action was in immediate prospect. The Special Service Force had particularly fierce fighting during the break-out from the bridgehead beginning on 23 May and was also heavily engaged during the subsequent advance to Rome. This was the period of its heaviest Canadian losses; from 1 May to 7 June casualties amounted to 18 officers and 194 other ranks. Additional reinforcements arrived later in June.
After a further period of amphibious training, the Special Service Force took part in August in Operation DRAGOON, the great assault of the Seventh Army on the south coast of France. Here again the Special Service Battalion was the only Canadian Army unit to take part in the operation, although the Royal Canadian Navy was well represented. The Force fought in a Commando role, landing in the early hours of 15 August on the islands of Port Cros and Levant east of Toulon. Its task was carried out with complete success in the face of fairly stiff opposition. Thereafter it took part in the rapid exploitation inland and early in September was close to the fortified Italian boundary. Here the Force halted and remained covering the Allied right flank until 28 November, when it was withdrawn.
The First Special Service Force was now disbanded, on the
suggestion of the United States authorities, to which Canada agreed. A farewell parade was held on 5 December 1944; the Canadians parted from their American comrades amid mutual good wishes, and returned to Italy. Those men not trained as parachutists were used as infantry reinforcements for the Canadian force in that country. The balance of the personnel were sent back to the United Kingdom, where they became reinforcements for the 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion. The 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion officially ceased to exist on 10 January 1945.3 Thus ended a remarkable international experiment. The mixed composition of the Force had not prevented it from attaining an extraordinary regimental spirit; perhaps, indeed, it was in great part responsible for that spirit. Canadians and Americans have never found it hard to co-operate, and in the First Special Service Force they worked and fought together in a relationship which helped to make the Force the splendid fighting unit it was.
Canadians In the Underground War
One of the most remarkable features of the War of 1939-45 was the extent and importance of the clandestine operations carried out by the Allied Nations on all fronts. Though always subordinate to the regular operations of the armies in the field, this shadowy, furtive war of the agent and the saboteur, of "undergrounds" and resistance groups, constantly reflected the larger open war, and on many occasions had a considerable influence upon the course of military events. In these underground hostilities officers and soldiers of the Canadian Army, as well as other Canadians recruited outside the forces, ultimately played parts of some importance. The service was one of extraordinary peril. An agent working in enemy territory in disguise is liable under international law to suffer death if apprehended; but in addition tortures countenanced by no law were likely to be the lot of an agent who fell into the hands of the German Gestapo or the Japanese Kempetai.
No Canadian authority was directly concerned with the management of this secret war; but the Canadian Government permitted and encouraged the employment of individual Canadians by three British agencies. The first and largest of these was the "Special Force" (S.F.), an organization which at the time of its inception in 1940 was primarily concerned with sabotage in enemy-occupied countries, but which later devoted itself increasingly to assistance and guidance to the national resistance movements in those countries. The S.F. agent now "ceased to be merely a saboteur and became in addition a liaison officer and an
expert in weapon training, in supply, in tactics and in leadership". The second organization was concerned with organizing the escape of Allied aircrews who had managed to make safe landings from aircraft lost over the Continent, and any other "evaders or escapers" such as escaped Allied prisoners of war. Thirdly, a small number of Canadians was employed by and worked under the direction of the British Foreign Office. Under these three agencies Canadians served, again, in three geographical areas: France, the Mediterranean and the Far East.
One reason for the prominence of Canadians in the underground war was the availability in the country's population of representatives of many races and languages. In Canada it was possible to recruit men speaking the languages of the occupied countries and at the same time unquestionably loyal to the Allied cause. In this respect, pride of place went naturally and properly to the Canadians of French origin, who were able to make a most notable contribution to the organization of resistance in France and to the ultimate liberation of the country of their ancestors. But almost every racial strain represented in Canada had some share in this dangerous work. Yugoslav Canadians, Italian Canadians, Hungarian Canadians, Rumanian Canadians, Bulgarian Canadians, Chinese and Japanese Canadians (and, it may be added, some also of British race) were all involved in it.
Although individual Canadians had been used by British agencies at earlier dates (the first, actually, were a group of men of Yugoslav origin enlisted late in 1941), the Canadian Army as such began to contribute to the work only in 1942. The earliest recruit was Captain (later Major) G. D. A. Bieler of Le Régiment de Maisonneuve, a Canadian of Swiss origin and French birth. He was dropped into the Montargis area of France by parachute on 25 November 1942, and although seriously hurt in landing he persisted in carrying out his mission. Defying the pain of his injury, he made his way northward and worked very effectively for many months in the area below the Belgian frontier. His "circuit" did great damage to railways serving the Germans in Northern France; and he continued to direct its operations until 14 January 1944, when with a large number of other members of it he was arrested by the Gestapo at a café just outside St. Quentin which had served as his headquarters.
Major Bieler was taken by the Germans to Paris. It is known that he was repeatedly tortured, and it is also known that he revealed no information. After a period of imprisonment at Fresnes, he was taken in April with other captured British agents to the concentration camp at Flossenberg, Germany. Here he was confined in "Cell 23, a concrete box 1.20 metres wide, 3.80 metres long and 2.75 metres high". The British prisoners were kept in solitary confinement and were denied exercise, writing materials or reading matter; the prison diet comprised
a cup of black ersatz coffee for breakfast, a bowl of soup at midday, and 200 grams of bread and another cup of coffee at night. From this existence Major Bieler was delivered early in July by execution before a firing squad in the courtyard of the prison.4
About the time that Major Bieler was beginning his active work, three French-Canadian soldiers of Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, who had been captured at Dieppe and succeeded in getting back to England, volunteered for duty with the escaping organization above referred to. (A person who has arranged his. own escape will obviously be a good man to organize escapes for other people.) All three, commissioned as officers (as most agents were), served for long periods in occupied France with remarkable boldness, efficiency and success; and all three survived.
In all, twenty-eight Canadians actually saw service as special agents in France during 1942-44. Of these a large number were qualified French-Canadian wireless operators from the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals. This Corps provided more men for the work than any other corps or unit of the Canadian Army. Eight of these twenty-eight valiant spirits lost their lives in the service, in several cases after savage torture. Several agents dropped in the early months of 1944 were apprehended very soon after reaching France. The reason for the difficulties of this period is clear enough. Our invasion was impending, and the German counter-espionage had received orders to liquidate the resistance in France at any cost. In certain instances the Gestapo had succeeded in "controlling" a resistance circuit; that is to say, after arresting its members, the Germans continued to send back false messages to London in the proper code. As a result of such a deception, at least two Canadians parachuted straight into the arms of the Gestapo in March 1944. On the other hand, several who were dropped into France during the weeks immediately before or after D Day were able to operate effectively and return safe and sound, for now the Resistance had taken the field in strength and the Gestapo was fighting a defensive battle. During these inspiring days more than one Canadian commanded an active Maquis force of strength equivalent to a brigade.
Of Canadian clandestine activities in the Mediterranean area we can say little here; they were chiefly concerned with subsidiary operations in the Balkans, and with tasks undertaken for the Foreign Office in North Africa and the Dodecanese Islands. It was in the Balkans that the Canadian Yugoslavs and Hungarians played their part, assisting in organizing and encouraging the Partisan resistance and
arranging escapes of Allied airmen.
In the Far East, the story of Canadian participation in special operations falls substantially into two parts. One relates to a small group of operational agents organized in the first half of 1945 around a hard core of French-Canadian S.F. veterans who had already seen service in France and now volunteered for work against the Japanese. There was also a large contingent of linguists, consisting mainly of Canadian-born Chinese and Japanese recruited in Canada itself. Some of these linguists operated as agents in the field. The FrenchCanadian agents did excellent work in advance of the Fourteenth Army in the area about the border between Burma and Siam, harassing Japanese supply convoys on the jungle trails. One of these officers was killed by the accidental explosion of his demolition charges. Some of the same agents, and others, later performed equally good service in Malaya.
Valuable contributions were made by Canadian-born Chinese volunteers, of whom ten were actually dropped on operations in Malaya prior to the Japanese surrender. In addition a group of Canadians of Japanese origin was collected and dispatched to the Far East. There was no intention of using these men as operational S.F. agents; the object was to use their linguistic knowledge for political warfare purposes. A number were in fact however employed as interpreters in forward areas and acquitted themselves with distinction. Mention should also be made of Canadian officers trained in Canada in the Japanese Language School, who were employed on a variety of "political warfare tasks" in India and Burma and, subsequently, in French Indo-China, Malaya and Hong Kong.
Civil Affairs Officers
Another special Canadian Army contribution to victory took the form of provision of officers to assist in the administration of "Civil Affairs" in theatres of operations and in occupied territory.
The service known in liberated territory as Civil Affairs, and in enemy territory as Military Government, was created to deal with the problems arising from the presence of civil populations in areas where fighting was going on. This service was a part of the Army and existed for its benefit; it was "an instrument of the will of the Commander-in-Chief". Its basic object was to facilitate military operations. It was designed to work for the benefit of the civil populations only in so far as the prevention of want, disease, fear and disorder among them were essential to such operations. It was thus not a "relief" organization, except as a matter of "first aid" to the most urgent needs. Relief and rehabilitation proper were the concern in liberated territory of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, to which Civil Affairs handed over these matters as soon as possible. Civil Affairs
worked through two categories of officers: first, staff officers at the headquarters of fighting formations, who moved with their formations and directed C.A. activities in their areas; and, secondly, Civil Affairs detachments who took charge of specific towns or districts and remained there.
For these purposes specially-trained men were required, and late in 1942 the suggestion was made by the British authorities that Canada might provide a quota of Civil Affairs officers. The suggestion was accepted, and Canadian officers were accordingly selected to attend courses at the Civil Affairs Staff Centre, Wimbledon. In December 1943 a Canadian Civil Affairs Staff Course opened at the Royal Military College, Kingston, and this course and those that succeeded it trained a total of 141 officers of the Canadian services. A few Canadians took courses at the American School of Military Government at Charlottesville, Virginia. The ultimate numerical contribution was considerable. In November 1944, in the midst of the North-West Europe campaign, a survey showed 349 Canadian Army and R.C.A.F. officers actually employed in Civil Affairs operations. Of these, 332 were from the Army. The first Canadians to be employed in Civil Affairs in the field were a group of the early Wimbledon graduates who were asked for by the War Office to assist in the work in the Mediterranean theatre. By the end of 1943 thirty Canadian officers were employed in Sicily and Italy. In the North-West Europe campaign, Canada provided C.A. staffs for her own formation headquarters, and also made a large contribution to the pool of C.A. officers for employment in localized detachments or otherwise. In November 1944, a total of 279 Canadian Army officers were listed as posted to the pool. These men were chiefly employed, in the early part of the campaign, in mixed British-American C.A. teams in which they were assigned to the functions for which they were best fitted. It is interesting to note the functions in which the Canadians seem to have excelled; those in which they filled more than their numerical proportion of the vacancies were the Administrative, Financial, Legal, Labour, Supply, Food and Engineering services. In such capacities Canadian officers served the Allied armies in Italy, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and subsequently Germany.
The Canadian Forestry Corps
During the First Great War a Canadian Forestry Corps was raised and did important work in the production of lumber for war purposes from the forests of the United Kingdom and the Continent. This experience was repeated during 1939-45, when Canadian foresters again made a valuable and characteristically Canadian contribution to victory in the European theatre.
This second Canadian Forestry Corps came into existence in the summer of 1940, as the result of a request from the British Government. The first suggestion was that as many as eighty companies might be raised for service in Britain and on the continent. The situation was soon materially altered by the collapse of France, but there was still an urgent need for foresters in the United Kingdom, where with Baltic supplies cut off there was a great gap between local supplies of lumber and essential requirements. An initial force of twenty companies was asked for, and it was pointed out that the military situation in Britain now made it important that these companies should have received an "appropriate scale of military training" before arriving there.
Twenty Forestry Companies (each with a strength of about 200 men) were accordingly mobilized in Canada, trained as soldiers, and dispatched overseas. The Corps was commanded by BrigadierGeneral J. B. White, who had played an important part in the work of the Forestry Corps of 1914-18. Under a financial agreement between the two Governments, Canada bore the cost of pay and allowances for the Corps, transport to and from the United Kingdom, and certain other items, while the British Government paid "all other expenses connected with equipment, work or maintenance".
An advance party arrived in Britain in October 1940; the Corps Headquarters and the first complete company landed at Christmas. Work began at once in the assigned timber areas of Scotland. The full twenty companies had reached the United Kingdom by July of 1941. In that year the British Government, pointing out that the effects of the Battle of the Atlantic and heavy demands on shipping for various theatres of war had compelled progressive reductions in the tonnage that could be allocated to bringing timber to the United Kingdom, asked for more companies. The matter required careful consideration, in the light of the manpower involved; but ten additional companies were ultimately provided and were all at work in Scotland by October 1942. The overseas strength of the Corps was now above. 6000 all ranks.
Throughout the war the Highland hills rang to the crash of falling timber and the scream of Canadian saws. Each company worked, as a rule, in two sections, one cutting "in the bush" and bringing out the timber, the other sawing it into lumber with the aid of Canadian mechanical equipment in the company mill. Visitors from Canada noted how each company tended to maintain the lumbering practices of the part of the Dominion where it was raised: a British Columbia unit, for instance, could usually be identified by its fondness for "high rigging" techniques and the use of wire rope. Each unit was a selfcontained community, including men capable of turning their hands to almost any task; and the Corps performed in fact an endless variety of tasks, from miscellaneous building to snow clearance on the Highland roads. Military training was never neglected,
the companies devoting a regular proportion of time to it and studying the part they would play in the defence of their areas if invasion came.
As our own invasion of North-West Europe approached, it was considered desirable to have forestry troops available to exploit the timber resources of that area for Allied benefit. Accordingly five, and ultimately ten, forestry companies, under Headquarters No. 1 Canadian Forestry Group, commanded by Col. C. E. F. Jones, were allocated to this duty. The first five began moving to France late in July 1944 and commenced work in the forests of Normandy. In the autumn they moved up into Belgium and cutting began in the Ardennes Forest. At the same time the other five companies crossed the Channel to Belgium. When in the following December the Germans launched their Ardennes counter-offensive, the Canadian foresters here found themselves for a moment in the front line and were in fact called on to do combatant duty. The six companies working in the Ardennes had to leave much equipment behind when they withdrew.
The Forestry Corps had supported the early operations on the continent in another way. The planners of the Normandy invasion could spare no shipping for moving timber across the Channel to the bridgehead, yet timber would be urgently required. The Canadian. Forestry Corps was accordingly called upon to build timber rafts suitable for cross-Channel towing. Active work on the rafts began at Southampton and Barry in April 1944 and ended only in August, by which time it was practicable and more economical to cut timber on the Continent. The Canadians constructed in all 77 square timber and 54 round timber rafts. It was found that these could be towed across the Channel in safety even in comparatively rough weather.
In 1945 our troops had barely cleared the Reichswald and Hochwald Forests of Western Germany when the Forestry Corps began work there, preparing lumber and timber for use in the Rhine crossings; and after the end of hostilities the whole Group was cutting for a time in German forests. Canadian timber operations on the Continent ended on 23 November 1945. Actual production figures recorded for the whole period of work in North-West Europe included about 47,700,000 F.B.M. of sawn lumber.
The overseas strength of the Canadian Forestry Corps had been reduced by ten companies in the autumn of 1943. Ten others remained at work in Scotland, however, during 1944 and the first months of 1945. Timber operations ceased entirely here in June 1945. The production figures for four and a half years of work in the Scottish forests are impressive; they are headed by about 394,400,000 F.B.M. of sawn lumber. The remaining units of the C.F.Cn in the United Kingdom were disbanded at the end of August 1945, and the Corps Headquarters ceased to operate on 1 September. The disbandment of the Headquarters of the Forestry Group on the Continent, on 3 December 1945, marked the final conclusion of a job well done.
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