



SUPPLEMENT
TO
The London Gazette

Of TUESDAY, the 12th of AUGUST, 1947

Published by Authority

Registered as a newspaper

THURSDAY, 14 AUGUST, 1947

THE DIEPPE RAID.

The following despatch was submitted to the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, on the 30th August, 1942, by Captain J. HUGHES-HALLETT, R.N., Naval Force Commander.

Portsmouth Combined Headquarters,
Fort Southwick.
30th August, 1942.

I have the honour to submit the accompanying report of proceedings for Operation "Jubilee" which was carried out on 18th/19th August, 1942.

2. Generally speaking I consider that the Naval Forces engaged in the operation carried out their role as well as was possible under conditions which became increasingly difficult as the operation proceeded. A number of minor mistakes were made, chiefly by myself, and find their place in the narrative. Fortunately none of these had any vital influence on the operation as a whole.

3. I am glad to be able to report that almost without exception the conduct of all Naval personnel was exemplary, and in accordance with the traditions of the Service. Recommendations for honours and awards are forwarded separately, but I have no doubt that many unrecorded acts of heroism must have occurred off the beaches and in vessels which were lost.

4. The fighter cover afforded by No. 11 Group was magnificent and the fact that a number of bombers got through was to be expected. It is considered that the loss of only one ship from bombing should be regarded as an unusually fortunate result.

5. I wish respectfully to pay a tribute to the Military Force Commander. No one could have been more helpful than Major-General J. H. Roberts. All our major decisions were jointly made in complete agreement.

6. I wish also to draw your particular attention to Major P. Young of No. 3 Commando, who with the troops from a single L.C.P. effectively diverted the attention of the coast defence battery at Berneval during an important part of the operation, thereby averting the exceedingly serious consequences which might have resulted from the failure of the Yellow Beach landings. In my judgment this was perhaps the most outstanding incident of the operation.

7. Operation "Jubilee" differed fundamentally from any other Combined Operation that has been carried out by this country in modern times, inasmuch as it amounted to a direct daylight assault upon an important objective strongly held by the first army of Europe. From the point of view of its perspective in the war as a whole, it may perhaps be compared to the British offensives on the Western front during 1915. Although from purely a military point of view the results achieved were disappointing, and the heavy casualties sustained regrettable, it is considered that the operation was well worth while provided its lessons are carefully applied when the time comes to re-enter France on a large scale. The principal lesson appears to be, firstly, that much stronger military forces are required to break through the German coastal defences in any important area; secondly, that a very much higher proportion of the military force should be held in reserve until the progress made in the initial assaults is known, and that this reserve should then be employed in exploiting success. Unless this is done there is no guarantee that any of the beaches will be properly secured, and this is an absolute prerequisite of success whether the subsequent phases of the operation are to take the form of a withdrawal or a further follow-up.

8. A further point which was very clearly shown, is the strength of the German defensive system in the coastal regions, which confronts assaulting troops with the problem not dissimilar to that of the Western Front in the last war. Arising out of this is the need for far more effective methods of supporting the troops, unless it is quite certain that defences which dominate the landing places can be overrun by a surprise night assault. The methods whereby effective support can be given are not considered to include night bombing.

9. From the purely naval point of view the operation has taught us less, if only because the passage and landings went very largely according to plan. Although this was so, it is considered that the liberties that were taken in dispersing the force so widely on passage with so small a covering force, could not prudently be repeated. For example, the groups which sailed from Newhaven were vulnerable to attack from the east, and the L.S.Is. (Infantry Assault Ships) were exposed to a considerable risk from the time that they stopped to lower their boats until they returned to the English side of the Channel. The conclusion is that a substantially larger covering force should be employed in the future, because the enemy is less likely to be surprised again.

10. The Naval Forces were fortunate in as much as they sustained no damage from mines and no serious damage from coastal batteries. Until more experience is gained, however, it would be most unsafe to draw too firm a deduction from this for future operations.

11. The operation was interesting also as being perhaps the first occasion on which light naval forces (i.e., coastal craft and landing craft) manned almost entirely by the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, have been employed on a large scale and under conditions of extreme difficulty. They acquitted themselves well, but the small leavening of experienced officers of the Royal Navy who were employed in positions of control was an important factor in the results achieved.

12. I consider that the chief lessons of the operation are:—

(i) It was shown still to be possible to achieve tactical surprise in a cross-channel operation of some magnitude.

(ii) The comparatively small naval forces which took part in the operation sufficed to prevent the enemy from offering any surface opposition whatever, apart from that resulting from the chance encounter of Number 5 Group with German armed trawlers.

(iii) If it should be necessary to attempt a frontal attack on strongly defended enemy positions again, it will be essential to provide far more effective means of supporting the troops. In this particular operation I am satisfied that a capital ship could have been operated in the Dieppe area during the first two or three hours of the operation without undue risk.

(iv) The enormous possibilities of this type of operation for bringing about a decisive air battle were demonstrated.

13. Finally I venture to submit that, should it be decided to undertake further operations of this nature in the near future, my Staff and I may be afforded the opportunity to carry them out. While realising the force of the arguments in favour of giving other groups of officers a

turn, I feel that in time of war the overriding requirement is to get results, and this is more likely to be achieved by those who have gained first-hand experience. While every effort has been made to record the lessons we have learned, there is so much which cannot be set forth on paper and which can only be properly grasped by those who have had the advantage of direct personal experience.

(Sgd.) J. H. HALLETT.

Captain, Royal Navy.

NAVAL FORCE COMMANDER.

OPERATION "JUBILEE."

NAVAL FORCE COMMANDER'S NARRATIVE.

The Passage.

1. Generally speaking the assembly of the force and the passage were carried out in accordance with the plan and without any major incident. After clearing the gate H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA (Captain G. L. D. Gibbs, D.S.O., R.N.(Ret.)) leading Groups 1, 2 and 3, appeared to me to be proceeding at an excessive speed, and H.M.S. CALPE (Lieut.-Commander J. H. Wallace, R.N.) and the destroyers had some difficulty in taking station ahead. At 0016 when H.M.S. CALPE was abeam of H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA a signal was made informing her that she was ahead of station and instructing her to reduce to 18 knots. After this the destroyers formed ahead, and shortly afterwards altered course for the Western passage through the minefield. The Dan Buoys and the M.L. marking the entrance to this channel were only sighted about 2 minutes before H.M.S. CALPE entered the channel, no signals from the type 78 Beacon being received on account of a breakdown of H.M.S. CALPE'S R.D.F.* However, H.M.S. CALPE and the destroyers of the 2nd Division successfully passed through the Western channel, but H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA with Groups 1, 2 and 3 in company, lost touch with the destroyers and passed through the Eastern channel, overtaking H.M.S. FERNIE (Lieut. W. B. Willett, R.N.) and certain groups of L.C.Ts.† and L.C.Ps.† but fortunately without any collisions.

2. A word of praise is due to the 9th and 13th Minesweeping Flotillas (Commander H. T. Rust, R.N. and Commander L. S. J. Ede, D.S.O., R.N.) who carried out the task allotted to them with efficiency and precision.

3. After passing through the minefield H.M.S. CALPE stopped in accordance with the plan, and subsequently signalled her position to H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA, H.M.S. PRINCE ALBERT (Lieut.-Commander H. B. Peate, R.N.R.) and H.M.S. GLENGYLE (Captain D. S. McGrath, R.N.), as these vessels respectively came in sight. H.M.S. CALPE then proceeded and stopped about one mile to seaward of the position in which H.M.S. GLENGYLE with Group 4 had stopped to lower their boats.

4. At about 0350 gun fire was observed to the E.S.E. which it was realised must be in the immediate vicinity of Group 5. At the time I considered this might be caused by an E-boat attack, but with the knowledge that

* Admiralty footnote:—R.D.F.—Radar.

† Admiralty footnote:—L.C.T. = Landing Craft Tanks. L.C.P. = Landing Craft Personnel.

Polish Ship SLAZAK (R. Tyminski, Kmdr.-Ppov.) and H.M.S. BROCKLESBY (Lieut.-Commander E. N. Pumphrey, D.S.O., D.S.C., R.N.) were within about 4 miles of Group 5 and that H.M.S. CALPE was the only ship in the immediate vicinity of H.M.S. GLENGYLE and Group 4, it was decided to keep Group 4 in sight.

5. Actually Group 5 had made a chance encounter with some armed trawlers, and although Commander D. B. Wyburd, R.N., in S.G.B.5 (Lieut. G. H. Hummel, R.N.R.) maintained a steady course and speed in order that his L.C.Ps. should remain in company, S.G.B.5 was soon disabled, and the L.C.Ps. disorganised. Commander Wyburd's persistence in remaining the guide of the slow L.C.Ps. while himself under heavy fire, showed great gallantry and determination. Nevertheless, I am of opinion that he would have done better to use the speed and smoke-laying capabilities of S.G.Bs.* in order to protect the L.C.Ps. L.C.F.(L) 1* (Lieut. I. M. Foggitt, R.A.N.V.R.) also in company with Group 5, successfully engaged the German vessels, setting one on fire and claiming to have sunk a second. In the course of this engagement her fire control was unfortunately put out of action.

6. During the action O.R.P. SLAZAK with H.M.S. BROCKLESBY in company was approximately four miles to the N.N.E. but did not intervene. The Commanding Officer of O.R.P. SLAZAK has since informed me that he considered the firing came from the shore and therefore thought it best to continue with his patrol.

7. It will be convenient at this stage to complete the story of the Yellow Beach landings, which were frustrated by this encounter.

8. Five L.C.Ps. effected a delayed landing on Yellow I Beach.† Heavy opposition was encountered and the troops made no progress. Subsequent attempts were made by the L.C.Ps. to withdraw them but it proved impossible to close the beach on account of machine gun fire, and eventually only the Naval Beach Party who swam off to the boats were taken off. During this period, a small German tanker was set on fire and driven ashore by M.L. 346 (Lieut. A. D. Fear, R.N.V.R.) whose conduct throughout the operation was outstanding.

9. One L.C.P. effected an unopposed landing at Yellow II Beach.† The troops on board, under the command of Major P. Young, M.C., succeeded in approaching the coast defence battery at Berneval and in sniping it for about two hours. Subsequently they were successfully withdrawn. I have little doubt that the failure of the coast defence battery at Berneval to play an effective part in the operation was largely due to the action of Major Young.

10. Subsequently on the extreme western flank, the PRINCE ALBERT's Landing Craft, carrying No. 4 Commando, were successfully landed according to plan. This part of the operation, which was under the joint command of Lieut.-Commander H. H. H. Mulleneux,

R.N., and Lieut.-Colonel the Lord Lovat, M.C., M.P., went through without a hitch from beginning to end. The troops were very fortunate in that they blew up an ammunition dump at their objective by a chance mortar hit early in their attack. They were subsequently withdrawn at approximately 0815 and returned to England without incident.

11. Reverting to the main landings, that at Green Beach* took place punctually and according to plan, and only encountered slight initial opposition. Subsequently Group 6, under the command of Commander H. V. P. McClintock, R.N., and carrying the Camerons of Canada, effected a landing at Green Beach according to plan but about 30 minutes late. The reason for the delay lay partly in the anxiety of the Senior Military Officer not to be landed ahead of time, and partly due to navigational difficulties occasioned by smoke during the final approach. This landing met with a certain amount of opposition, but the troops were successfully put ashore. It is interesting to note that at this stage the enemy fire on the approaches to Green Beach was slight, but steadily increased throughout the operation, and resulted in very heavy casualties being suffered during the eventual withdrawal. This was because the force landed did not succeed in occupying the high ground east of the beach.

12. The landing on Blue Beach* was delayed for 15 minutes, on account of time lost when the boats were forming up. This was due to M.G.B. 315 (Lieut. J. I. Lloyd, R.N.V.R.) (whose role was to remain with H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA and escort her back) going ahead and getting mixed up with the Landing Craft from H.M.S. PRINCESS ASTRID, who mistook her for M.G.B. 316 (Act. Temp. Lieut.-Commander T. N. Cartwright, R.N.V.R.) whose role it was to lead in these landing craft. Although the landing subsequently took place according to plan, I fear that the 15 minutes' delay must have been partly responsible for the very heavy opposition which the troops immediately encountered after landing, and which apparently pinned them down on the beach area throughout the day. Subsequently H.M.S. DUKE OF WELLINGTON'S Flotilla of L.C.As.† landed additional troops on this beach according to plan. This landing took place at about 0545 and encountered no abnormal opposition. At about 0530 I was informed that a signal had been received stating that no landing had taken place on Blue Beach, and I reported this in my situation report made at 0612. Actually there is some reason to suppose that this report was of German origin but the whole of the events that took place ashore at Blue Beach were obscure, although it was clear from the very outset that the troops were held up. There is little doubt that this was the chief cause of the failure of the Military plan, and in view of the uncertainty about what really happened, I have since requested the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. QUEEN EMMA to conduct a close enquiry with all the boat officers concerned. The resulting report has been forwarded separately.

* Admiralty footnote:—S.G.B. = Steam Gunboat. L.C.F. (L) = A converted Landing Craft mounting anti-aircraft armament.

† Admiralty footnote:—Yellow I Beach—East of Dieppe, opposite Berneval. Yellow II Beach—East of Dieppe at Belleville-sur-Mer

* Admiralty footnote:—Green Beach—West of Dieppe, at Pourville. Blue Beach—East of Dieppe, at Puits.

† Admiralty footnote:—L.C.A. = Landing Craft Assault.

13. Meanwhile the main landings on Red and White Beaches* took place punctually and according to plan, with the exception that the leading wave of three L.C.Ts. approached from too far to the westward and were about 10 to 15 minutes late in touching down.

14. The air support, and the smoke-making aircraft on the East cliff, were accurately synchronised, and the destroyer's fire, both on the houses along the front while the boats were going in, and subsequently on the East and West Cliffs, appeared to be as effective as could be expected. No losses of landing craft took place during the initial landing, but it did not appear to officer in charge that the troops were able to capture the strong points along the front after landing. However, the L.C.T's. on going in encountered very heavy opposition, and I consider that theirs was a notable achievement in landing 28 out of 30 tanks dry-shod. The heavy damage and casualties in the L.C.T's. were undoubtedly due in a large measure to the relatively long periods they remained on the beach, waiting for the miscellaneous troops that they were carrying in addition to the tanks, to disembark.

15. The work of L.C.F.(L) 2 (Lieut. E. L. Graham, R.N.V.R.) in supporting the main landing, calls for special mention. This vessel closed in to provide point blank range, and gave most effective support. She was soon disabled, and her captain killed, but her guns were fought until one by one they were put out of action, and the ship herself was finally sunk.

16. Lieut.-Commander J. H. Dathan, R.N. (Senior Officer of Group 7) carrying reserve troops in L.C.Ps., reported on board H.M.S. CALPE within 5 minutes of the time laid down in the plan. At the request of Major-General Roberts, I instructed him to land his force on Red Beach, and the landing was successfully effected by 0700. This landing, which was shielded by smoke until the last moment, encountered very heavy fire just off the beaches, but all boats effected a landing, although in most cases the troops sustained heavy casualties immediately afterwards. Two out of the 26 boats were destroyed.

17. Up to this point the Naval part of the plan had proceeded very much as was intended, with the exception of the frustration of the Yellow Beach landing. Furthermore, there had been remarkably little opposition from shore batteries, and apparently none from enemy aircraft. Nevertheless it was clear that the military operations were not proceeding according to plan, and that the opposition ashore was considerably greater than had been expected. In view of the failure of the Blue Beach landing and hence of the plan to capture the East Cliff I felt doubtful whether H.M.S. LOCUST'S proposed entry into the harbour would be either practicable or profitable. Commander R. E. D. Ryder, V.C., R.N., who was signalled to come on board H.M.S. CALPE at about 0645, shared this view, and informed me that H.M.S. LOCUST had already suffered damage and casualties whilst closing the East Cliff earlier on. Major-General Roberts was consulted and agreed that

no attempt should be made to enter the harbour. It was decided instead to transfer the Royal Marine Commando to armoured landing craft and to land them as reinforcements. The General asked that they should be sent to White Beach, and this operation was entrusted to Commander Ryder, all L.C.F.(L)s. being ordered to close H.M.S. LOCUST and give support. Actually, owing to communication difficulties, only 2 L.C.F.(L)s. responded, but all the Chasseurs* backed them up and gave good support. The landing was effected in face of very heavy opposition at about 0840. Judging from the reports of the landing craft who took part it is doubtful whether the Royal Marines were able to achieve anything.

18. About this time Commander Wyburd came aboard H.M.S. CALPE and informed me of what had occurred to the best of his knowledge to Group 5. He was instructed to embark in M.G.B.317 and to proceed to the vicinity of Yellow Beaches to round up what L.C.Ps. he could find.

19. Lieutenant-Commander H. W. Goulding, D.S.O., R.N.R., also came on board about this time and informed me of the landing at Blue Beach, an account of which is given earlier. He was instructed to proceed to Blue Beach with 4 L.C.As. to endeavour to withdraw any troops which were there. Lieutenant-Commander C. W. McMullen, R.N., in an M.L. proceeded with him to provide support. I received a report later to the effect that Lieutenant-Commander Goulding was unable to close the Blue Beach owing to heavy opposition and that no one could be seen on the beach.

20. Commander McClintock also reported on board H.M.S. CALPE and I instructed him to proceed to investigate Green Beach and inform the Beachmaster that he should not evacuate the beach as it might be necessary to withdraw all the troops from Green Beach. Commander McClintock was unable to approach close to Green Beach owing to heavy and well directed fire of the enemy.

21. At about 0750 I received information that 10 E-boats were approaching from Boulogne. Accordingly O.R.P. SLAZAK, H.M. Ships BROCKLESBY and BLEASDALE were ordered to proceed to the north eastward, and all available M.G.Bs. were also ordered to patrol to the eastward. (My signals timed 0752 and 0816 refer). Nothing more was heard of the E-boats, and it is remarkable that at no time during the entire operation was there any organised opposition from German naval forces. While detached on this service, O.R.P. SLAZAK was damaged by near misses, and later had to return to England.

22. Throughout the period which followed, enemy fire from the shore steadily increased, and the destroyers were forced constantly to shift their positions in order to avoid damage and keep under cover of smoke. Periodically requests were received from the shore for supporting fire against strong points but in no cases was an F.O.O.† in a position to observe this fire. The requests were met by detailing destroyers in succession, but I felt very doubtful

* Admiralty footnote.—Red Beach—Eastern portion of Dieppe Sea Front, immediately to west of harbour entrance. White Beach—Western portion of Dieppe Sea Front.

* Admiralty footnote.—Chasseurs—Free French Navy small A.A. escort craft, six of which were employed in this operation.

† Admiralty footnote.—F.O.O. = Forward Observer Officer.

of the efficacy of their support under the conditions which prevailed.

23. H.M.S. CALPE'S appearance during most of this period must have resembled that of a Fleet Flagship on regatta day, as there were seldom less than from six to ten craft alongside. They came to transfer wounded, bring reports, or seek instructions, and their presence was rather an embarrassment to the Commanding Officer when he wished to manoeuvre to avoid gun fire. Lieutenant-Commander J. H. Wallace, R.N. remained imperturbable, however, throughout the operation, and by his coolness set an excellent example.

24. My general impression during this phase of the operation from the Naval point of view, was a feeling of inability to give the troops effective support. The military situation was completely obscure, and the large quantities of smoke drifting inshore made it impossible to see what was happening. On the other hand, had it not been for the smoke, it would have been impossible for the destroyers and landing craft to remain as close inshore as they did.

25. Immediately after the landings, the landing craft had withdrawn to seaward of the destroyers. This was in accordance with the instructions they had received in the event of their finding that the approaches to the beaches remained under heavy fire. It was this fact, more than anything else, that indicated to me from the outset that things ashore were not going according to plan.

At about 0900 H.M.S. GARTH reported that her ammunition was nearly exhausted. I accordingly ordered her to escort H.M.S. ALRESFORD who had a damaged L.C.T. in tow, and Nos. 10 and 11 Groups, whose tanks and troops the General had decided not to land, back to England. (My signal 0903 refers.)

26. By 0900 it had become clear to me that the troops ashore were in difficulties and were unlikely to gain possession of the East and West cliffs which dominated the main beaches. I learned later that even some of the buildings on the front were still in enemy hands. It was obvious therefore that the military situation was serious, and that it was becoming steadily more difficult for ships and craft to close the beaches. Accordingly I advised the General that the withdrawal should take place with as little further delay as possible, and should be confined to personnel. I considered that 1030 would be the earliest practicable time, as it was necessary to warn the Air Officer Commanding 11 Group and to pass instructions to the landing craft. The General agreed subject to confirmation nearer to time.

27. Accordingly Commander McClintock was summoned on board H.M.S. CALPE and it was decided that all A.L.Cs.* and M.L.Cs.* should be instructed to proceed into the same beaches as those on which they had originally landed and should ferry troops off on to L.C.Ts. who should remain about 1 mile from the shore. All possible support was to be given by destroyers and L.C.F.(L)s. (I considered it out of the question to send L.C.Ps. or L.C.Ts. inshore in view of the volume of enemy fire.)

28. To give effect to this plan, Commander McClintock proceeded in M.L. 187 and gave

necessary instructions to the landing craft, and a signal, similar to that later sent at 0950, save that the time for the withdrawal was given as 1030, was coded and prepared for despatch. Later on, however, the General informed me that he would prefer to wait until 1100. The signal thus amended was then despatched and Commander McClintock was informed of the later time. At about 1022, the destroyers were ordered to form on a line to bear 070° to 250° and to follow the landing craft in. All vessels suitably placed were instructed to make smoke. The wind was onshore and slightly from the west, and an effective screen of smoke prevented the landing craft from being fired upon until they were close inshore. Unfortunately the smoke also hid the beaches from the destroyers and it was very difficult to see what was going on, or to offer effective support by gun fire. Nevertheless, without the smoke it is doubtful whether any withdrawal would have been possible.

29. During these events, H.M.S. CALPE steered for the western end of Green Beach, as it was thought that no supporting fire would be necessary in this area, and both the Military Force Commander and the Air Liaison Officer were extremely averse to H.M.S. CALPE'S guns being fired on account of the risk to the special wireless apparatus that had been installed. Actually, however, it soon became apparent that the western cliff at the end of Green Beach was held by the enemy, and H.M.S. CALPE came under small arms and machine gun fire necessitating her opening the range. It is interesting to record that when subsequently both H.M.S. CALPE and H.M.S. FERNIE were obliged to open fire with their main armament, much of the wireless apparatus remained intact.

30. It soon became virtually impossible to know how the withdrawal was proceeding, but at about 1130 H.M.S. CALPE embarked two landing craft loads of troops, mostly wounded, from whom it was learned that there were still men waiting to come off at Green Beach. At about the same time the General asked for the ship to proceed to the main beaches and ascertain the position there. Accordingly M.L. 194 (Act. Lieut.-Commander W. Whitfield, R.N.R.) was hailed and instructed to round up the landing craft in the area and send them in again. At about the same time, a signal, originator unknown, was received to the effect that there were no more troops on Green Beach, and was immediately contradicted by my signal timed 1147. H.M.S. CALPE then proceeded off the main beaches and closed L.C.T. 9, to whom troops were then being transferred by landing craft. Some of these troops were embarked in H.M.S. CALPE in order to save time. Slightly later I closed A.L.Cs. 185 and 188, who had just come off from the main beach. Both gave it as their opinion that the conditions ashore precluded further evacuation.

31. At about 1220 a signal was received from Commander McClintock indicating that no further evacuation was feasible. However, the Military Force Commander asked that a further effort should be made and although I felt that this might well result in greater losses to troops already embarked, than in the embarkation of additional troops, I decided to give Commander McClintock discretion whether to make a further

* Admiralty footnote.—A.L.C. = Landing craft for assaulting troops. M.L.C. = Landing craft for mechanised vehicles.

effort. Accordingly the following signal was made:—

“ If no further evacuation possible withdraw.”

Actually the signal as reported to Commander McClintock omitted the word “ if ” and from that time onwards H.M.S. CALPE was unable to get into touch with him. I supposed at the time that his M.L. must have been sunk, but actually he was able to order the withdrawal of all landing craft, to a pre-arranged position, 4 miles 330° from Dieppe. Consequently A.L.Cs. 185 and 188, with H.M.S. CALPE were soon the only craft left close inshore, but owing to the low visibility, I was not aware of this at the time.

32. Throughout the whole operation, Commander H. V. P. McClintock, R.N., was of the greatest service in his capacity of “ Boat Pool Officer.” He was ably seconded by Lieut.-Commander J. H. Dathan, R.N., and Lieut.-Commander C. W. McMullen, R.N. The fact that over a thousand troops were evacuated under conditions which can seldom have been equalled, must be attributed largely to the work of these officers.

33. At about 1250 I decided to close the beach again for a final personal view and keeping A.L.C.s. 185 and 188 on either bow, H.M.S. CALPE steered for the eastern end of Red Beach at the same time opening fire from the foremost guns on the breakwaters, on which machine gun posts were reported to be preventing the troops on Red Beach from reaching the water. When about 9 cables from the beach, H.M.S. CALPE came under heavy fire, and no sign of troops or landing craft other than derelicts could be seen on the beach. Accordingly, H.M.S. CALPE manoeuvred to gain the cover of smoke, and I felt convinced that any further attempt to take off troops would be unlikely to succeed. Before finally giving up, however, I proceeded to seaward to close H.M.S. LOCUST and ascertain Commander Ryder's views, as it seemed possible that with H.M.S. LOCUST'S shallow draught, he might be more aware of the situation on the beaches. Whilst this interchange of signals was in progress, however, the General informed me that the larger body of the troops on the beach had surrendered. At almost exactly the same time H.M.S. BERKELEY (Lieut. J. J. S. Yorke, R.N.) received a direct hit with a heavy bomb. The ship's back was broken, her fore-castle awash, and the engine and boiler rooms were flooding. Fortunately the loss of life was small, partly owing to the promptitude with which S.G.B.8 proceeded alongside to take off her crew and partly owing to the presence of A.L.C.s. 185 and 188, who were able to pick up survivors in the water. I instructed H.M.S. ALBRIGHTON to sink her, which she did by torpedo fire.

At much the same time a fighter attack was made on H.M.S. CALPE'S bridge, causing several casualties, including Air Commodore A. Cole, C.B.E., M.C., D.F.C., R.A.A.F., who was severely wounded. The destroyers in the vicinity of H.M.S. BERKELEY then proceeded to seaward to join the main convoy of landing craft and coastal craft who had formed up in accordance with instructions, approximately 4 miles to seaward of Dieppe and were now heading slowly north.

34. H.M.S. FERNIE was instructed to take Guide, and shortly afterwards I unwisely instructed H.M.S. CALPE to proceed to the eastward to pick up a British pilot who was reported in the water. This resulted in 2 bombing attacks, by dive bombers, on H.M.S. CALPE, both of which secured near misses causing damage and casualties.

35. Subsequently H.M.S. CALPE rejoined the convoy which proceeded without incident, other than some ineffectual air attacks, through the Western swept channel, and to a position approximately .20 miles from Newhaven. At this point I was joined by Captain (D) 16 with H.M.S. MACKAY and H.M.S. BLENCATHRA and I requested him to escort the small craft into Newhaven, thus releasing H.M.S. CALPE and the other destroyers and H.M.S. LOCUST to proceed direct to Portsmouth with their wounded, who totalled over 500. The coastal craft and landing craft reached Newhaven without further incident, and the destroyers and H.M.S. LOCUST berthed alongside at Portsmouth shortly after midnight.

36. Before closing this narrative, a word of praise is due to the medical officers with the force. An exceptional strain was thrown upon them, partly by the very large proportion of casualties among the troops and partly because the organisation carefully prepared by Surgeon Commander W. B. D. Miller, D.S.C., M.B., Ch.B., R.N.V.R., was upset by the turning back of Group 12. This group, comprising four spare L.C.Ts., carried an important proportion of the available medical parties. It was a mistake on my part not to bring them on, despite the fact that they were no longer required for an evacuation as originally planned.

37. A detailed account of the work of the medical parties is reported separately, but the services performed by Surgeon Lieut. M. P. Martin, M.R.C.S., L.R.C.P., R.N.V.R., deserve special mention. This officer was embarked in L.C.F.(L) 2, and took charge of her when her other officers became casualties. Subsequently he was rescued from the water, after L.C.F.(L) 2 had sunk, and transferred to H.M.S. CALPE. Although himself injured, he was untiring in helping H.M.S. CALPE'S doctor, who had to compete with casualties to over a quarter of the crew plus 278 wounded soldiers.

LONDON

PRINTED AND PUBLISHED BY HIS MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE

To be purchased directly from H.M. Stationery Office at the following addresses:

York House, Kingsway, London, W.C.2; 13a Castle Street, Edinburgh, 2;

39-41 King Street, Manchester, 2; 1 St. Andrew's Crescent, Cardiff;

Tower Lane, Bristol, 1; 80 Chichester Street, Belfast

OR THROUGH ANY BOOKSELLER

1947

Price Sixpence net

S.O. Code No 65-38045