1. See Vol. I, p. 454, regarding the transfer of the American coast guard cutters to the Royal Navy. Full details of our Escort Vessel strength and dispositions on 1st January 1942, 1st August 1942, and 1st January 1943 are given in Appendix G. 2. See Appendix F for particulars of the code letters allocated to all convoys. 3. See Vol. I, pp. 456-457. 4. Churchill, Vol. IV, pp. 510-13 and 586-91, and Morison, Vol. IX, pp. 8-9. 5. See Vol. I, p. 472. 6. See Vol. I, p. 348. 7. See Vol. I, pp. 474-475. 8. See Morison, Vol. I, p. 125 et seq. 9. See Map 10 (opp. p. 97) for the limits of the U.S. Navy's command areas. 10. See Vol. I, pp. 347-348 and 471-473. 11. Morison, Vol. I, p. 131. 12. Churchill, Vol. IV, p. 103. 13. See Vol. I, pp. 10 357 and 481. 14. Morison, Vol. I, p. 286. For British experience with 'Q Ships' see this author's Vol. I, pp. 136-137. 15. The method of sweeping the British magnetic mine was the only subject which the Board of Admiralty specifically ordered should not be given to the American Mission. 16. Morison, Vol. I, p. 41. 17. Morison, Vol. I, pp. 200-201. 'This writer can not avoid the conclusion that the U.S. Navy was woefully unprepared, materially and mentally for the U-boat blitz on the Atlantic coast. He further believes that . . . this unpreparedness was largely the Navy's own fault . . . [Furthermore, the ultimate victory] does not alter the fact that it had no plans ready for a reasonable protection to shipping . . . , and was unable to improvise them for several months'. 18. See Map 11 (opp. p. 105). 19. See Vol. I, p. 470. 20. Churchill, Vol. IV, pp. 288-291, 312-316 and 510. 21. See Vol. I, pp. 364-365. 22. See Map 11 (opp. p. 105). 23. See Map 11 (opp. P. 105). 24. See pp. 131-132. 25. See pp. 134-145. 26. See Appendix K. 27. Appendix O shows the total shipping losses suffered. 28. See Map 11. 29. See Vol. I, pp. 380-381. 30. See Map 11 (opp. p. 105). The offices of Chief of Naval Operations (C.N.O.) and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet (Cominch) were combined on 12th March 1942. From 26th March Admiral King filled both positions. On 15th May the Convoy and Routing Section, which had been formed under C.N.O. in June 1941, became a part of his headquarters as 'Cominch'. (Information from U.S. Navy's Office of Naval History.) 31. See Appendix K. 32. Although the average number of HX/ON and SC/ONS convoys totalled about twelve per month, it was usual for troop convoys and other special movements of shipping to increase the monthly total of convoys run between North America and Britain to about fifteen. 33. See Map 11 (opp. p. 105). 34. See Vol. I, p. 459, and Map 20 (opp. p. 205) in this volume. 35. Morison, Vol. 1, pp. 237-247. 36. Ibid., pp. 245-246. 37. See Vol. I, pp. 461-462. 38. See Vol. I, pp. 471-472. 39. See Map 10 (opp. p. 97). 40. See Vol. I, p. 358. 41. See p. 205. 42. See Appendix J for particulars of these U-boat sinkings.
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