1. See Vol. I, p. 487. 2. See Vol. 1, p. 514, and this volume, pp. 100-101. 3. See Vol. I, pp. 373, 395 and 484. 4. Churchill, Vol. IV, p. 98. 5. See pp. 153, 156 and 160. 6. See Map 37. 7. See Map 37. 8. See Map 12. 9. See Map 12. Phase 1. 10. See Map 12. Phase 1. 11. See Map 12. Phase 2. 12. See Map 12. Phase 2. 13. See Vol. I, pp. 165-6 and Map 14 of this volume. 14. See Vol. I, pp. 413-415. 15. Cf. experience of Ark Royal's aircrews in the action off Cape Spartivento, 27th November 1940 (Vol. I, pp. 302-303) 16. See Map 12. Phase 2. 17. For a valuable account of the influence of the enemy battleship on Allied maritime strategy and naval dispositions see Tirpitz by David Woodward (William Kimber, London, 1953). 18. See Vol. 1, pp. 57 and 368. Actually work on the Graf Zeppelin was never seriously proceeded with, and in the spring of 1943 it was again suspended. 19. See Vol. I, pp. 26-7 and 201-203. 20. See Vol. I, pp. 201-203. 21. See Vol. I, p. 391. 22. The four British destroyers remaining after the Amazon had been damaged only mounted six 4.7-inch and three 4-inch guns between them, against the three German ships' ten 5.9-inch and five 5-inch. The gun armaments of many British destroyers had recently been reduced by half to enable more anti-submarine equipment to be fitted for the Atlantic battle. 23. Churchill, Vol. IV, pp. 230-234. 24. See Vol. I, p. 477, regarding C.A.M. ships and the demands made on the pilots of their Hurricane fighters. 25. The ships of PQ 16 carried 125,000 tons of cargo. Included in it were:
468 Tanks of which 147 were lost.
201 Aircraft of which 77 were lost.
3,277 Vehicles of which 770 were lost.
The total tonnage lost was 32,400.
The total air strength deployed by the enemy on the airfields around North Cape was at this time as follows: Ju-88 Long-range bombers 103 He-111 Torpedo-bombers 42 He-115 Torpedo float-planes 15 Ju-87 Dive-bombers 30 Long-range reconnaissance planes (F.W-200, Ju-88 and B.V-138) 74
264 27. See Vol. I, pp. 488-489. 28. See p. 127. 29. Coastal Command had only two fully-trained torpedo-bomber squadrons (Nos. 68 and 415) at this time. The Admiralty would not agree to the command's entire striking power being sent to North Russia. 30. See pp. 63-67 for the story of Operation 'HARPOON'. 31. Churchill, Vol. IV, p. 236. 32. See Map 13. 33. See Map 13. 34. To repair the damage sustained in grounding, the Lützow sailed for Germany on the 9th of August. She entered Kiel dockyard on the 21st and remained there until the 5th of November. See p. 290 for her return to Norway in December 1942. 35. Compare Mr. Churchill's account (The Second World War, Vol. IV, p. 236). 36. Convoy instructions laid down that 'to disperse' meant that ships would break formation and proceed to their destinations; they would therefore remain close together for some time. To 'scatter' ordered them to start out in different directions according to a pre-arranged scheme. 37. A note of humour was introduced even at this tense moment. One of the submarines signalled to Broome that he intended to remain on the surface as long as possible. To this the latter replied from the destroyer Keppel 'So do I'. 38. See Map 13. 39. See, for example, PQ 17 by Godfrey Winn (Hutchinson, 1947), the author of which made the journey in the Pozarica. 40. See Map 14. 41. 130 Ju-88s, 43 He-111s and 29 He-115s. 42. Churchill, Vol. IV, p, 236. 43. The Prime Minister left London for Cairo and Moscow on the day after this Cabinet meeting (see Churchill, Vol. IV, p. 411), and was away from London for more than three weeks. 44. See Vol. I, pp. 288-289. 45. See Vol. I, pp. 291-292 and 372. 46. See Vol. I, pp. 374-376. 47. When the Glowworm damaged the Hipper by ramming and when the Acasta torpedoed the Scharnhorst (see Vol. I, pp. 158 and 195-196 respectively) the British destroyers attacked in broad daylight through smoke. It can easily be understood how such incidents could have affected German tactics in later engagements. 48. See Vol. I, p. 27. 49. See Vol. I, p. 202.
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