| |
Page |
| Editor's Preface |
xi |
| Introduction |
xiii |
| Chapter |
|
| I. |
Strategy and Supply in the Autumn of 1943 |
|
| |
i. |
Outline of Strategy |
1 |
| |
ii. |
Outline of Command |
15 |
| |
iii. |
Supply |
25 |
| |
iv. |
Data for an Offensive Strategy |
49 |
| II. |
OVERLORD and the Mediterranean,
August-November 1943 |
|
| |
i. |
The Conditions for OVERLORD |
53 |
| |
ii. |
The Rôle of the Italian Campaign |
58 |
| |
iii. |
The Consequences in the Eastern Mediterranean |
75 |
| |
iv. |
The British and American Strategies |
105 |
| III. |
British Strategy in the Far East,
and the Formation of the South-East Asia Command, August-November 1943 |
|
| |
i. |
The Strategic Conditions |
123 |
| |
ii. |
The Formation of the South-East Asia Command |
135 |
| |
iii. |
A Strategy for Burma |
148 |
| IV. |
The Decisions for 1944: I, Cairo and Teheran,
November-December 1943 |
|
| |
i. |
Cairo: The Problems Considered |
155 |
| |
ii. |
Teheran: The Decisions Taken |
173 |
| |
iii. |
Cairo: The Details Reconsidered |
183 |
| V. |
The Decisions for 1944: II, Epilogue to Cairo,
December 1943-January 1944 |
|
| |
i. |
The Settlement of the European Commands |
203 |
| |
ii. |
Unsettlement in the Mediterranean and South-East Asia |
207 |
| VI. |
OVERLORD and the Mediterranean,
January-March 1944 |
|
| |
i. |
The Attacks on Anzio and Cassino |
225 |
| |
ii. |
New Demands from OVERLORD and from Italy |
231 |
| |
iii. |
The Postponement of ANVIL |
243 |
| VII. |
OVERLORD and the Mediterranean,
April-June 1944 |
|
| |
i. |
The Debate on ANVIL Continued |
249 |
| |
ii. |
The Capture of Rome and its Implications |
259 |
| |
iii. |
Developments in Yugoslavia |
270 |
| VIII. |
Preparation for OVERLORD,
January-June 1944 |
|
| |
i. |
The Revised Plan |
279 |
| |
ii. |
The Rôle of the Air: POINTBLANK and the Transportation Plan |
286 |
| |
iii. |
The Rôle of the Air: CROSSBOW |
305 |
| |
iv. |
Deception, Security and the French |
315 |
| |
v. |
The Last Weeks |
332 |
| IX. |
Advance on Three Fronts, June-September 1944 |
|
| |
i. |
The Two Great Offensives |
337 |
| |
ii. |
The Consequences for the Mediterranean |
345 |
| |
iii. |
Relations with the Russians |
367 |
| |
iv. |
Victory in Europe in 1944? |
377 |
| X. |
The Campaign in Burma, January-June 1944 |
|
| |
i. |
Arakan and the Central Front |
405 |
| |
ii. |
The Northern Front |
415 |
| XI. |
The Strategy for the Pacific & South-East Asia,
January-April 1944 |
|
| |
i. |
Growth of a British Strategy for the Pacific |
421 |
| |
ii. |
The Americans' Positions |
450 |
| |
iii. |
The Pursuit of Facts |
456 |
| XII. |
The Strategy for the Pacific & South-East Asia,
April-August 1944 |
|
| |
i. |
The Middle Strategy and Its Implications |
459 |
| |
ii. |
The Middle Strategy Discussed |
478 |
| |
iii. |
Developments in South-East Asia |
486 |
| |
iv. |
The Final British Proposals |
493 |
| XIII. |
The Second Quebec Conference and the Aftermath,
September 1944 |
|
| |
i. |
The Conference |
505 |
| |
ii. |
Arnhem, the Gothic Line and the Consequences |
524 |
| Index |
621 |