COS 6/71
Special Distribution
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
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SALE OF ARMS TO SOUTH AFRICA - PROTECTION/INTERVENTION CONTINGENCY PLANNING
Note by the Secretary
1. The Chiefs of Staff have approved (1) the note (2) as amended at Annex A.
2. In approving the note, the Chiefs of Staff agreed:
P J BAYNE
Commodore
Secretary
Chiefs of Staff Committee
Annex:
Notes:Ministry of Defence
Main Building
Whitehall, SW1
13 January 1971
SALE OF ARMS TO SOUTH AFRICA - PROTECTION/INTERVENTION CONTINGENCY PLANNING
INTRODUCTION
1. We have concurrently a study (1) on Services-assisted evacuation of Commonwealth African countries, related to the issue of arms sales to South Africa. However, at the request of the Secretary of State we have carried out a study of the military action, additional to evacuation, that might be called for to provide.
DETERRENT ACTION
Military Measures
2. Military measures for providing a show of force with the aim of deterring possible action against British citizens or property fall into 2 categories. Firstly, measures which are entirely psychological and which would be reported by news media or by diplomatic means. These would include the open alerting of ships and forces and their intended deployment nearer Africa, all with the maximum publicity; the intended deployment of ships offshore could be announced after they had been sailed without initially revealing their deployment. The second possibility is a show of force either within view of the coast by HM ships or by overflying the country in fixed wing aircraft or helicopters. The aim of this would be to provide a visible show of force in order to intimidate the locals and make them believe that should they interfere with British citizens or property they would be firmly dealt with; it should be noted however that providing a show of force by overflying would infringe national airspace and might provoke other countries.
3. Measures that could be taken by the Services, with the maximum of publicity, could include the following:
Note:
Possibilities and Limitations of a Show of Force
4. Although the above military measure are physically possible it is extremely unlikely that they would deter any locals who intended to cause trouble. It has been represented that ships might have a deterrent effect. Nevertheless we are advised by the FCO that a show of force would probably have the reverse effect, as
well as probably provoking wider international repercussions. Furthermore, all these measures are overt; trouble is most likely to occur immediately an announcement is made and to stand any chance of these measures being effective, they would have to be taken prior to an announcement. This would inevitably prejudice security except that certain ships could be sailed with little risk of speculation.
5. For a show of force to be effective, an intervention force should be readily available to back up the threat should its putative deterrent fail. The possibilities and limitations of such intervention are discussed below.
BRITISH MILITARY INTERVENTION
Current Plans
6. Plans exist for military intervention with forces of up to a brigade group to protect UK citizens in Zambia, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi and Kenya. The Evacuation Plan for Nigeria also includes an intervention force of up to a brigade. These Plans were written on the assumption that there would be no organised resistance to our intervention, although minor sporadic opposition was allowed for. However, it has been considered for some time in the MOD and we are advised that, in the political and military circumstances that are likely to prevail, these Protection Plans are unrealistic.
Possible Situations
7. It is possible that agitation against a British intention or decision to sell arms to South Africa could lead to the lives of UK citizens being jeopardised or lost. This could happen simultaneously in several countries, the highest risks being in Zambia and Uganda. Alternatively, one country only could be involved, and the incidents could be isolated. However, in any of these situations it is inconceivable that the local governments would permit British forces to intervene to redress the situation, even if it was clearly beyond the power of the local government to contain. An opposed entry must therefore be allowed for. To given any plan the best chance of succeeding, there would need to be detailed planning and the prepositioning of forces. However we have discounted the latter in paragraph 6 as being dangerously counter-productive. We now examine the kind of military intervention that might be possible.
Tasks for an Intervention Force
8. The task that an intervention force might need to carry out include:
9. Follow up airlanded forces would need to be at least of brigade size, even against sporadic opposition, and very much more than this if, as seems likely, the opposition is more serious than 'sporadic'. It is very likely that unless tactical surprise were achieved the opposition that could be offered from the ground and perhaps in the air to our transport aircraft could constitute a sufficient risk as to require ground attack aircraft support. Ground attack aircraft support could initially be provided by a CVA in a selected area off West Africa. Apart from this the provision of ground attack aircraft would require a large scale mounting operation and the selection of a suitable operating base would be extremely difficult. In flight refuelling would be needed for operations in Zambia and Uganda from bases in South Africa and Portuguese East Africa.
10. The operations would be able to do little or nothing for British Nationals in isolated communities whose lives would be put at increased risk.
Availability of Forces
Land Forces could be available as follows:
Warned 12 Jan |
Warned 18 Jan |
||
HMS EAGLE (W. Coast) |
10 Vixen 10 Buccaneer 6 Sea King 10 Wessex 5 4 Gannet AEW |
27 Jan |
27 Jan |
HMS ALBION (W. Coast) |
41 Commando could be embarked 18 Wessex 5 |
31 Jan |
5 Feb |
HMS INTREPID (E. Coast) |
Elements of 3 Cdo Brigade could embark, and up to 8 Wessex 5 between both ships | 24 Jan |
27 Jan |
HMS TRIUMPH (E. Coast) |
24 Jan |
29 Jan |
Para Bn Gp landed |
G +6 days |
Inf Bde Gp landed |
G + 13 days |
Follow up Inf Bde Gp landed |
G + 25 days |
Routes
12. North African and Black African air routes would certainly be denied to us and overflying without permission would not be free of risk even if politically acceptable. The CENTO route, Portuguese and South African facilities would most probably be available.
Implications of Intervention
13. There would be a number of major implications involved in mounting an intervention operation in Black African country. There include:
CONCLUSIONS