Biennial Reports
of the Chief of Staff of the
United States Army
July 1, 1939, to June 30, 1941 to the
Secretary of War

Dear Mr. Secretary:

With the Nation in a state of unlimited emergency, the undersigned submits the attached report covering the period from his assignment as Chief of Staff on September 1, 1939, to July 1, 1941.

In reviewing the events of the past 2 years, the extent of this Nation's military preparation may roughly be divided into two distinct phases, each coincident with decisive events in the European war. The first phase, commencing with the beginning of the current conflict and extending until the late spring of 1940, was a period of uncertainty as to its influence on the United States. The General Staff, aware of the possibilities of the situation, particularly with regard to the time factor, directed its attention to the urgency of creating and equipping an Army capable of operating under exacting conditions of modern warfare. Upon the part of the American people this period was marked by a slow awakening to the necessity of augmenting our armed forces.

In a democracy such as ours the War Department is limited in its actions by the appropriations approved by the President and provided by the Congress. These agencies are in turn motivated by the will of the people. Consequently the outstanding characteristic of the first phase was an increasing interest in national defense, but an interest still insufficient to prevent reductions in military appropriations which the War Department had requested as necessary to carry out certain objectives. This phase terminated with the decisive successes of the German Army in Western Europe in May 1940.

The second phase, which covers approximately the fiscal year 1941, was marked by a growing national consciousness of the seriousness of the international situation, and by the ready appropriation of billions of dollars for national defense. it witnessed the peacetime mobilization of a citizen Army upon a wartime scale, and the establishment of scores of great military camps in large training areas. It required the reorientation of national industry to an unprecedented peacetime production rate. It involved, in effect, a great experiment in democracy, a test of the ability of a Government such as ours to prepare itself in time of peace against the ruthless and arbitrary action of other governments whose leaders take such measures as they see fit, and strike when and where they will with sudden and terrific violence.

State of the Armed Forces, July 1, 1939

The undersigned became Acting Chief of Staff on July 1, 1939, and Chief of Staff September 1, 1939. On July the active Army of the United States consisted of approximately 174,000 enlisted men scattered over 130 posts, camps, and stations. A schematic view of the organization of the active Army at this time is given by chart 1.

Within the United States we had no field army. There existed the mere framework of about 31/2 square divisions approximately 50 percent complete as to personnel and scattered among a number of Army posts. There was such a shortage in motor transportation that divisional training was impracticable. There were virtually no corps troops, almost no Army troops or GHQ special troop units, which are necessary for the functioning of the larger tactical units. The Air Corps consisted of but 62 tactical squadrons. The funds which were authorized for training were less than 5 percent of the annual War Department appropriations. As an army we were ineffective. Our equipment, modern at the conclusion of the World War, was now in a large measure obsolescent. in fact, during the post-war period, continuous paring of appropriations had reduced the Army virtually to the status of that of a third-rate power.

In February 1939, while Deputy Chief of Staff, my statement to the Senate Military Affairs Committee included this summary of the situation, that it was of vital importance that we have modern equipment for the Regular Army and National Guard; that we modernize our artillery; that we replace our 34-year-old rifles with more modern weapons; that we have the antitank and antiaircraft matériel in the actual hands of the troops; that we have the necessary reserves of ammunition; and that these matters be emphatically regarded as fundamental to the entire proposition of national defense. During the post-war period the encouraging moves in national-defense preparations, had been the augmentation of the Air Corps to an authorized 5,500-plane program, including an increase on July 1, 1939, of the strength of the Army from 174,000 to 210,000 men, and an appropriation of $116,000,000 for matériel and seacoast defenses. The increase in manpower was entirely devoted to the garrison in Panama and to the increase of the Air Corps.


Chart I: Enlisted Personnel of the Active Army, July 1, 1939

The President's Emergency Proclamation September 8, 1939

At the outbreak of the European war the President issued a limited emergency proclamation, in which he authorized an expansion of the active army from 210,000 to 227,000 men, and an increase of the National Guard to 235,000 men. The War Department was also authorized to create certain deficiencies, including the purchase of approximately twelve million dollars' worth of motor transportation. This small increase of 17,000 men to the Regular Army permitted the reorganization of our pathetically incomplete square divisions into five new type triangular divisions, and also permitted the assembly of those divisions, along with other units, in the field for the winter. It enabled us to establish the peace complement of corps troops for one army corps. The limited emergency permitted the number of armory drills of the National Guard to be increased from 48 to 60 per year and an additional week of field training to be conducted that fall supplementary to the 2 weeks of summer camp and to provide for the training of the recently recruited men.

The urgent necessity for Army maneuvers involving large units was manifest. For the past 5 years field training had been limited to the assembly of the four paper organizations, called field armies, once every 4 years, and then only for a 2-week period, of which about 5 days could be devoted t very limited action due to lack of motor transportation and the unseasoned state of the National Guard personnel. This system, together with a general lack of corps troops, heavy artillery, engineers, medical regiments, signal battalions, quartermaster truck trains, and a complete lack of corps headquarters and experienced higher


Chart 2: Enlisted Personnel of the Active Army, January 31, 1940--227,000

commanders, made it virtually impossible for the mobile combat troops of the regular Army to be prepared as an immediately available combat force, experienced in the technique of large-scale field operations.l It was essential that the higher commanders and staffs be given opportunities for training in the technique, tactics, and teamwork involved; that the troops be accustomed to operating in large groups. The authorized deficiencies and later appropriations for this purpose permitted the assembly, in the late spring of 1940, of some 70,000 Regular Army troops for the girst genuine corps and army maneuvers in the history of this Nation.

The organization of the Army on January 31, 1940, as a result of these changes, may be seen by referring to chart 2.

During this period the war in Europe was in a quiescent state. Poland had been conquered, but the situation in Western Europe was to all intents stabilized. There was a feeling by many that the field fortifications established in France and Belgium furnished ample security to those nations. Requests for further increases in the armed forces of the United States were regarded in many quarters as mere warmongering. on February 23, 1940, I stated to the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives that if Europe blazed in the late spring or summer we must put our house in order before the sparks reached the Western Hemisphere. It was urged that definite measures should be taken step by step to prepare the Nation against the possibility fo chaotic world conditions. Opposed to ]plunging into a sudden expansion of personnel in such a manner that our small nucleus of trained troops would be fatally diluted, but yet conscious of the importance of the time factor, the General Staff was equally opposed to the


policy of waiting until the last moment and then attempting the impossible. With respect to the time factor, a grave feature was the matter of critical munitions which required a long time to produce, and it was felt that there could be no longer delay in obtaining the deficiencies in equipment for the initial issue to the Regular Army and the National Guard. The Army was almost completely lacking in clothing for prospective increases of the Regular Army or the National Guard from a small peace strength organization status to full strength. The fundamental obstacle at the time was the fact that the American people were unable to visualize the dangerous possibilities of the situation. For example, as late as March of 1940 War Department estimates for a small number of replacement airplanes were cut by the House of Representative to 57 planes. An estimate of $12,000,000 for the development of a defensive force in Alaska was refused.

During May and June of 1940 the German avalanche completely upset the equilibrium of the European continent. France was eliminated as a world power and the British Army lost most of its heavy equipment. To many the invasion of Great Britain appeared imminent. The precariousness of the situation and its threat to the security of the United States became suddenly apparent to our people, and the pendulum of public opinion reversed itself, swinging violently to the other extreme, in an urgent demand for enormous and immediate increase in modern equipment and of the armed forces. it was at this time that the second phase of the period of the current emergency commenced.

The President's Message of May 16 and May 31, 1940

On May 16, 1940, in a special message to Congress, the President recommended the appropriation of approximately $1,000,000,000, of which $732,000,000 was for equipment and to increase the Army by 28,000 men, including 13,000 for the Air Corps. On May 31 in a second defense message to Congress the President recommended an additional appropriation of approximately $1,000,000,000.

Supplementary to the amounts recommended by the President in his messages of May 16 and May 31, two additions made by committees of Congress were of inestimable assistance to the War Department in carrying out its program. On May 20, four days following the President's message of May 16, the Senate Appropriations Committee inserted into the bill under consideration an additional appropriation of $50,000,000 for a further personnel increase of 25,000 men, bringing the Army to an authorized strength of 255,000 men. A few days following the President's message of May 31, the House Appropriations Committee added $322,000,000 to the bill under consideration which permitted an increase in strength of the Army of 95,000 men, bringing it to a total authorized strength of 375,000. Although these sums of money and increases in personnel, which the committees of Congress added, do not seem especially significant today in the light of the billions recently appropriated, they enabled the War Department to take a preliminary step of vast importance to the great expansion soon to come. Skeleton units could be organized and manufacturers started to work on clothing and equipment which had to be available by October. It was largely for this reason that the induction of the National Guard and the first of the selectees was made possible.

Further authorizations included in the legislation at this time consisted of a substantial increase in the number of aircraft and funds for additional pilot training together with the inclusion of civilian schools to assist in this training; additional money for field exercises, and increase in seacoast defenses, funds for modernization of existing planes, establishment of ordnance munitions plants and the additional purchase of critical items of equipment. The Air Corps was authorized to be increased to 54 combat groups, and funds for the organization of an armored force were included. The tangible influence of these events on the organization of the Army is indicated in chart 3.

At this time the President referred to the desirability of authorizing him to call out the National Guard. Although sadly lacking in modern equipment and at less than 40 percent of its full strength, the Guard represented one of the few organized defense assets, and its federalization therefore became a matter of pressing importance. Another significant development of the phase which we were entering was the changing attitude of our industrialists regarding their production capacities and rates of deliveries with respect to airplane engines and other items of heavy ordnance. As the crisis abroad developed, they grew increasingly willing to undertake production schedules that had previously been regarded as out of the question.

The expansion of the Army during the summer of 1940 in general followed the long-standing protective mobilization plan, but the violent change in the international situation as to the French fleet and the peril of England necessitated an immediate reorientation regarding the means at our disposal. The possible loss of the British Navy introduced a new time factor for our defensive preparations, and immediately imposed an urgent and tremendous demand for the manufacture of time-consuming critical items of equipment.

In weighing the problems of the time factor against the possibilities of the situation, two aspects of the


Chart 3: Enlisted Personnel of the Active Army, August 15, 1940--280,000

matter had to be considered. One related to the possible dangers of the situation within the next 6 months. The other related to what should be done over a period of years. It was considered that for the time being the first issue was of dominant importance. Ordnance, ammunition, and other critical items of equipment could not be produced overnight, but the other requisite for an armed force, that is, personnel, was available and could be conditioned, disciplined, and trained with th eold World War material available and the new matériel then under manufacture. It was not believed that the men necessary to form an Army of the size required to meet the contingencies of the situation could be obtained by voluntary enlistment. The alternative was a selective service system which would furnish sufficient personnel to bring the National Guard and the Regular Army to full strength in the shortest possible time, and to do this in a controlled and therefore efficient manner, in contrast to the piecemeal, unbalanced basis of voluntary enlistments. It was suggested by members of Congress that the Regular Army be tremendously increased. However, this would have been a futile procedure unless the necessary equipment could be made available, and this could have been arranged only by subverting the National Guard and making a fundamental change in the existing military policy of the Government. The decision was made to call the National Guard into the Federal service and utilize its personnel and equipment with that of the Regular Army to train the first contingent of the thousands of men necessary for the defense of the country.

The federalization of the National Guard and the speedy enactment of selective-service legislation at once became matters of urgent importance to the War Department in the summer of 1940. The original request for the federalization of the National Guard


occurred in May with the purpose of utilizing summer camps while preparing the cantonments for the expanded Army, so that when cold weather set in, the necessary semipermanent preparations would have been completed for the first increment and construction well under way for the remainder. The democratic process of legislation resulted in a prolonged debate on these two measures, which continued throughout the summer.

In my testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee on August 5, the following statements were made:

Shelter is a serious problem at the present moment. We thought that Congress would settle the question of authority to order out the National Guard, and the matter of compulsory training by the first of August. On that basis, the Guard was to be brought into the Federal service during September and the first induction of men under the Selective Service Act during October. What has happened is that the weeks have been passing and we have no authority to enter into contracts to provide the additional shelter required.

We have been trying to find some manner, some means for getting started. We want to proceed in an orderly and businesslike manner. We know exactly what we want to do and exactly where we want to do it, but we have neither the authority nor the funds and time is fleeting. So far as construction in concerned the winter is upon us, because it requires from 3 to 4 months to provide proper shelter. We had hopes at first to gain time by providing a progressive mobilization of the National Guard during the summer. We planned to put troops in tent camps, while better shelter was being prepared in the climates that demand special protection against the winter. However, weeks have come and have gone and we have been unable to make a start. The present uncertainties make a businesslike procedure almost impossible. We must make a start toward getting water lines laid; a start on the sewage-disposal systems; a start on the temporary roads and certainly the walks to keep our people out of the mud; and we must get under way the start of construction of temporary hospital facilities. These are fundamental necessities and take time to develop.

One factor of assistance in this dilemma was the $29,5000,000 which the President authorized from his emergency fund o August 2, 1940. The availability of this sum permitted the initiation of construction of basic utilities, hospitals, and warehouses in twelve National Guard camps and also a divisional cantonment at Fort Dix, N.J.

The problems of funds were further complicated by the concurrent consideration of authority to call the National Guard and selective-service legislation. Authorization for the National Guard to be called into Federal service was finally given on August 27, 1940, but the $128,000,000 necessary for initial construction was not appropriated until September 9. The first Guard units were inducted on September 16, the same day that the Selective Service Act was signed by the President. Incidentally, the department would have preferred to delay these inductions for about a month or at least for 2 weeks in order to put the money just appropriated to work. This action was precluded by the advice that the announcement of such s would probably defeat the passage of the Selective Service Act. Money for selective service construction became available September 24, as the leaves were beginning to fall.

Progress During the Winter of 1940-41

The expansion of our armed forces from 172,000 to approximately one and one-half million men in a relatively short time imposed a tremendous responsibility on the War Department. A basic requirement was the establishment of shelter, hospital facilities, and training areas in strategic and favorable training localities throughout the United States. With winter upon us, the problems of construction incident to unusually bad weather--snow, rain, and mud--added further complications. it was highly important to provide recreational facilities and to make suitable provisions for the spiritual welfare of our citizen soldiers. The problems of acquiring land were complicated by the fact that in some areas selected as camp sites the local population viewed the projects with disfavor. In other instances the War Department was bombarded with requests from local business bureaus and political delegations. Errors were made in the tremendous program which the Army undertook during the winter of 1940-41, but viewed in the light of the actual achievement, it would appear that the task was credibly performed.

The passage of the Selective Service Act in effect authorized the Army of the United States to consist of 1,400,000 men, of which 500,000 were to be in the Regular Army, 270,000 in the National Guard, and 630,000 selectees. A graphical picture of the active army on June 30, 1941, is indicated by chart 4, and its tactical organization by chart 5.

Special Problems Incident to the Expansion

The training of this large force required a tremendous broadening of our Regular Army activities. The continuous formation of training cadres, for new units or schools, resulted in a succession of drafts on the rapidly expanding Regular Army units for experienced officers and noncommissioned officers. This was a disheartening process for the commanders concerned, air and ground, who, while struggling to merge large increments of untrained men into efficient combat teams, were called upon time after time to give up their best leaders in all grades, and compelled by circumstances to drive ahead in their training program while developing new leaders and training new recruits to replace the losses. The National Guard units were spared this demoralizing process in order to give them the fullest opportunity to perfect their


Chart 4: Enlisted Personnel of the Active Army, June 30, 1941--1,418,097

organization. Profiting from events in the European war, new organizations, new methods of employment, and new types of equipment became a constant matter of reexamination and experiment. The tempo of the school system was rapidly increased, and courses were quickly established to graduate about 600 officers every 5 weeks.

The procurement of suitable officer personnel was fortunately solved by the fact that during the lean, post-war years over 100,000 Reserve officers had been continuously trained, largely the product of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps. These Reserve officers constituted the principal available asset which we possessed at this time. Without their assistance the program could not have been carried out except in a superficial manner, as is evidenced by the fact that today they constitute 75 to 90 percent of the officer strength with Regular Army units.

For the induction of selectees, we established 29 large reception centers throughout the United States, where thousands of men could be classified, uniformed, and routed to the replacement training centers where they would receive their basic training. The locations and capacities of the reception centers are indicated by chart 6.

For the basic training of recruits, 21 replacement training centers were established where each arm and service of the Army could give individualized basic training in the fundamentals of a soldier. Each soldier entering the Army receives 13 weeks of basic training, after which he is assigned to a tactical unit ready to participate in the tactical training of those units. These establishments were constructed and placed into operation during the winter and spring of 1940-41, despite seriously adverse weather conditions, bottlenecks of material, and shortage of facilities. Their location and capacities are indicated on chart 7.

The establishment of these centers marked our arrival at a normal method of maintaining an Army, and yet they constituted a fundamental departure from past practices. No phase of the development of the present field Army has been so gratifying and impressive as the product of the training centers, both in quality of selectees and in the amazing amount of instruction they have absorbed in the short period of 13 weeks. From now on our regiments and divisions can steadily advance with their combat training, unburdened by the necessity of training recruits or delaying their work in order to conduct individual instruction in weapons or similar matters.


Chart 5: Tactical Organization of the United States Army


Chart 6: Approved Reception Centers


Chart 7: Replacement Training Centers


During the spring of 1941, the program of expansion continued. In March, further increases in the Air Corps were authorized and plans undertaken to train 30,000 pilots and 100,000 mechanics annually. Steps were taken toward the occupation of the new bases in the Atlantic leased from the British Government. The augmentation of the garrisons in our foreign possessions and in Alaska continued. Closely interrelated with the problems of procurement incident to a colossal expansion of our defense forces were national commitments to furnish great quantities of critical munitions to sister democracies. Though short of equipment ourselves, the international situation demanded that we furnish equipment to others. This situation introduces the most difficult problem of coordination and direction imposed on the War Department in the present emergency. It represents a complete reversal of the situation in 1917-18 when our Allies provided us with practically all of our munitions. The passage of the Lease-Loan bill in March 1941 permitted the coordination of the entire matter of placing contracts, the types of matériel to be manufactured, and the inspection service to be carried on during this period of production. Increased production due to the authorization of the necessary funds should add to our own strength rather than diminish our resources.

To provide additional officer personnel, to offer a fair opportunity to the man in the ranks, and most important of all, to utilize a rare opportunity for securing outstanding leaders, the War Department has established a series of officers' candidate schools, the students for which are selected from enlisted men of the Army who have given positive evidence of marked capacity as leaders. In a series of 3-month courses these schools will produce a minimum of 10,000 officers a year and are capable of rapid expansion if the situation demands. The location and type of training given at the various officers' candidate schools are indicated on chart 8.

Reorganization of Command and Staff

In the gradual merging of the Army from a peacetime basis into an organization for possible action, the following additional changes have taken place:

General Headquarters of the field forces was set up at the Army War College last July to direct and supervise the training of the troops. More recently it was placed on an operating basis by the addition of a portion of the War Plans Division of the War Department General Staff. By this arrangement, General Headquarters not only supervises training throughout the Army but is being prepared to perform its normal theater of operations functions if required.

To enable the field forces to concentrate on training, the zone of interior functions pertaining to administration and supply have been taken over by the nine corps areas distributed geographically over the United States. Under these corps areas, service commands have been established and are performing the necessary overhead duties, freeing the field forces from obligations of this nature.

For purposes of air defense, the United States has been divided into four air-defense areas where the coordination of aviation, antiaircraft, aircraft warning, and balloon barrage defense has been placed in the hands of the respective Air Force commanders, under the commander of the GHQ Air Force, now the Air Force Combat Command.

To insure unity of command in the entire Caribbean area, Puerto Rico, Panama, and all the newly acquired leased bases in that region have been organized into the Caribbean Defense Command and placed under one commander. The strategic location of Newfoundland has required the development and occupation of this base by air and ground forces, all of which have been placed under the command of an Air Force officer.

The port of embarkation facilities in New York, Charleston, New Orleans, San Francisco, and Seattle have been expanded tremendously throughout the emergency incident to the movements of troops and supplies to oversea garrisons, and the reception and redistribution of certain supplies in continental United States. For some time the New York base alone has been handling a volume of tonnage comparable to that handled during the World War.

Incident to the tremendous amount of business handled by the General Staff during this current expansion, it has been found necessary to increase the number of Deputy Chiefs of Staff from one to three. One of these Deputies is charged solely with all matter pertaining to the Air Force. Another is charged with matters pertaining to supply, equipment, construction, and the Armored Force. The other Deputy handles all other matters incident to General Staff business.

State of the Armed Forces, July 1, 1941

Today the Army has been increased eightfold and consists of approximately 1,400,000 men. The ground forces in the continental United States form four armies of nine army corps and twenty-nine divisions, and an Armored Force of four divisions, soon to be increased to six. The Air Force includes 54 combat groups, and the initial equipment requirements of these forces will be met with the stocks now on hand and under manufacture, plus those to be produced from funds set up in current estimates.


Chart 8: Officers' Candidate Schools


The strength of the Army is now allocated approximately as follows: 456,000 men to the 29 divisions of the field armies; 43,000 men to the Armored Force; 308,000 en to some 215 regiments or similar units of field and antiaircraft artillery, engineers, signal troops, etc., who form the corps, army, and GHQ troops to support the divisions; 167,000 men in the Air Corps; 46,000 men manning our harbor defenses; 120,000 men in oversea garrisons including Alaska and Newfoundland; and 160,000 men who provide the overhead to maintain and operate some 550 posts or stations, the supply depots, and the ports of embarkation; and finally from 100,000 to 200,000 selectees under recruit training in the replacement training centers. Our long coast lines and numerous oversea bases involve the employment of a large number of men not related to the field forces now being developed in continental United States.

The organization of the Air Force has been revised to insure its most efficient employment for the welfare of the Nation. Among the units formed or expanded, as necessity dictated, are armored divisions, parachute troops, ski troops, antitank units, antiaircraft units, mountain troops, motorized units, and a great number of service maintenance units essential to the existence of a modern army which must be prepared to operate in any one of a varied number of climates or terrains. The members of our armed forces have passed through a winter of rigorous training and are in splendid physical condition. The training and welfare agencies have produced a gratifying state of morale. Although sufficient equipment exists for training purposes, the necessary amount of critical items is still far short of requirements, and only a small portion of the field Army is at present equipped for extended active operations under conditions of modern warfare. however, quantity production has been getting under way for an increasing number of items, and the next 4 months should greatly improve the situation.

Small as it was, the Regular Army personnel has been the invaluable leaven of the present forces without which developments to date would have been impossible except in rather superficial results to measured principally in numbers. The progress made has proved the soundness of the plans laboriously prepared throughout the years by the General Staff, despite the lack of opportunity to work with large bodies of troops or, for that matter, with a complete organization of any kind in continental United States. The elaborate school system of the Army maintained since 1920 has declared a huge dividend. Our experienced officers and noncommissioned officers have been ready in technical knowledge, in skill as instructors and ability as leaders to unify the various elements of our professional and citizen soldiers into a great Army of the United States.

Recommendations for the Elimination of Certain Legal Limitations and Restrictions

The foregoing has been largely a recital of problems and progress during the past 2 years. An effort has been made to indicate some of the complications involved in the rapid creation of a large Army under peacetime conditions. As this report is submitted the possibilities of a year ago have become dangerously near probabilities today, and it is vital to the security of the Nation that the hazards of the present crisis be fully recognized.

What has happened is history. Of grave concern today are the contingencies of the present and the future. There are legal restrictions on the use of the armed forces which should removed without delay. Events of the past 2 months are convincing proof of the terrific striking power possessed by a nation administered purely on a military basis. Events of the past few days are even more forcible indications of the suddenness with which armed conflict can spread to areas hitherto considered free from attack.

It is, therefore, urgently recommended that the War Department be given authority to extend the period of service of the selective-service men, the officers of the Reserve Corps, and the units of the National Guard.

It is the purpose of the War Department to proceed with the military training of annual increments of selectees, replacing those now in active service as soon as the situation permits, especially the older men. In general, the same intention pertains to the Reserve officers whom we wish gradually to replace with others who have not yet been brought into active service. however, a fixed rule cannot be applied at this time, in our opinion. Some are in Hawaii, some in the Aleutian Islands, others in units to be dispatched to oversea bases, and still others are in organizations to be trained as task forces for possible special operations.

In the light of the situation it is believed that our interests are imperiled and that a grave national emergency exists. Whatever we do for the national defense should be done in the most efficient manner. Differences of views regarding national policy should not, it seems to me, be permitted to obscure the facts relating to the preparation of the armed forces for service, which has been the purpose of our vast program of the past 12 months. When and where these forces are to serve are questions to be determined by their Commander in Chief and the Congress, and should not be confused with the problem of their readiness for service. All, it is believed, will admit that the time factor has been of dominant importance in the march of events since September 1939, in the availability of matériel, in the effect of the complete readiness of


huge, highly trained units for employment in chosen theaters. The matériel phase of our task is generally understood. The personnel phase is not, and it is here that legal limitations, acceptable at the time of their passage, now hamstring the development of the Army into a force immediately available for whatever defensive measures may be necessary.

To illustrate: In accordance with plans of long standing we have reached the point of availability of troops and matériel, where we now can and urgently should organize and train certain task forces against the possibility of the necessity arising for their use. What it the status of these troops? The Regular Army divisions contain from 75 to 90 percent Reserve officers whose term of service is legally limited to 12 months. In other words, some 600 officers in a division under the law would soon be entitled to drop their present duties and return to their homes. The 12 months' service period of many, if not most of the officers in the first priority divisions, is now nearly completed. Must we replace most of the trained officer personnel of a division--the leaders--at the moment of departure for strategic localities? In two of the Regular divisions we have restricted the enlisted personnel to 3-year men, but in other, of necessity, the number of selectees various from 25 to 50 percent. The problem here is the same as for the reserve officer personnel. The National Guard units involve three distinct limitations as to personnel--that for the National Guard unit, that for the 10 percent Reserve officers in their regiments and now being increased, and that pertaining to selectees who comprise more than 50 percent of the men in the ranks. Furthermore, a task force involves all components. While we may select regular units as the divisional components for task forces, we must utilize National Guard organizations for the special supporting units--antiaircraft, heavy artillery, engineers, etc. So we have become involved in a complete confusion of restrictive details regarding personnel. Add to this problem the fact that plans for large units must cover every conceivable contingency, based on the means available; that time is required to prepare such a force; and that under present conditions we must submit these plans to the time-consuming business of public investigation and debate--along with the advertisement of such plans to the world at large, and I submit that the limitations referred to should be removed as quickly as possible if we are to have a fair opportunity to protect ourselves against the coldly calculated, secret, and sudden action that might be directed against us. Incidentally, our history includes some unfortunate incidents resulting from quite similar legal difficulties, which compromised a battle or possibly a campaign. In the present crisis the risks to the Nation are far more serious.

A year ago last July the Army was confronted with a problem very similar to that of this July so far as the time factor and an efficient basis for procedure are concerned. Then we desired authority to put the first increment of the National Guard into summer camps to commence its training, and we wished to be given the money so that we could proceed immediately under favorable weather conditions with the construction of cantonments suitable for occupancy in the winter season. The summer had passed before we were able to proceed in this matter.

Another limitation at the present involves leadership. There has been submitted to the Congress within the past few days the draft of a joint resolution designed to vitalize the leadership in the Army.

The purpose of this legislation is to remove from the active list a few officers who slow down the development of our emergency Army through lack of qualities of vigor, and intelligent, aggressive leadership. Under existing law the commissions of officers of the Reserve Corps may be revoked at the discretion of the President, and the Federal recognition of officers of the National Guard may be withdrawn upon the recommendation of a board of officers appointed by the Secretary of War. In the case of officers of the Regular Army, however, the law governing their removal from the active list requires a procedure so cumbersome as to make it totally ineffective during a national emergency. In brief, the War Department desires authority to correct deficiencies in the Regular Army as it is now able to do for the National Guard and the Officers' Reserve Corps.

So far as temporary promotions are concerned, the War Department has recently established a mechanism to improve leadership. A system of promotion by selection to the grade of colonel has been instituted, and to date 286 lieutenant colonels have been selected for advancement. It is intended that this procedure will be carried progressively into the lower grades. In all these matters the interests of the soldier and the Nation, rather than that of the individual officer, have governed.

These proposals which the War Department recommends for action by Congress have but one purpose: the security of the American people; to permit the development of the national defense on the orderly and businesslike basis necessary if the dangers of the present situation are to be met. Such a purpose does not admit of delay.

General Comments

Whiled all branches of the service have had to carry a rapidly increasing burden in the expansion program, I do no think the public generally appreciates the vastness of the undertaking which has been imposed upon the Air Corps in both personnel and matériel, the Ordnance Department in production of arms and ammunition, the Quartermaster Corps in construction, supplies, and motor transportation, and the Corps of Engineers in the organization of new units and the sudden


undertaking of a construction program for the Air Corps and for the leased bases. The creation and development of the Armored Force has been an enormous task, and is being accomplished with the utmost speed and with remarkable efficiency.

The merging of the three components of our Military Establishment into a unified Army of the United States has been accomplished with high morale and a generous spirit of cooperation throughout. The men in the ranks have worked hard and uncomplainingly in good weather and bad and throughout a difficult winter. Probably the most gratifying feature of the past year has been the quality and the attitude of the men drawn into the Army under the Selective Service Act. They have been a fine example of men cheerfully and earnestly performing the duties to which they have been called as citizens for the security of their Government. This particularly applies to the older men for whom this service has imposed the greatest sacrifice and the heaviest physical ordeal.

The dealings of the War Department with the Bureau of the Budget and with the Committees of Congress during the past year have been without precedent in the evident desire of those officials to lend every possible aid to the Department in meeting the situation.

In closing this report it should be stated that the progress achieved during the past 2 years could not have been made without the highly efficient cooperation of the War Department staff and the commanders and staffs in the field. Their cheerful acceptance of the tremendous burdens of responsibility has furnished a reassurance which cannot be measured in words of thanks.

G.C. Marshall,
General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

Washington, D.C., July 1, 1941.







Military operations abroad constitute a great laboratory and proving ground for the development and testing of organization and matériel. These operations have been characterized by increasing use and importance of armored, motorized, and other specialized divisions and by concurrent effort for development of means to counter armored (tank) divisions operating in close coordination with air and motorized units from mobile striking forces of great speed and power which so far have been uniformly successful in their operations. We have given careful consideration to foreign military development and, as a result, our own organization is undergoing constant change and development. We do not minimize the enormous power of armored units used in conjunction with accompanying air power; but we do not overlook the fact that the Army of the United States differs in one important characteristic from the armies of Europe. Ours must be an all-purpose Army as we are in an entirely different position from a European nation which knows its traditional or potential enemies and the terrain over which it will have to fight. We must be prepared to operate in the Arctic or in the Tropics, in deserts or mountains, and the elements of our ground forces must be properly balanced to meet any contingencies. Our organization must be a balanced one with armored, air, and foot elements in proper proportion to provide the maximum flexibility.

After 3 years of careful study and tests an organization for a triangular infantry division was approved and placed in effect in the Regular Army during the fiscal year 1940. The square division, adopted during the World War and modified several times since, has been retained in the National Guard.

The organization of the horse cavalry regiment was revised as a first step in the reorganization of the horse cavalry division. New organizations adopted included the horse-mechanized cavalry regiment designed as the reconnaissance unit of a corps, the antitank battalion, and the corps topographic company. In addition, approximately 100 Tables of Organization for other units were reviewed and brought up to date without any essential changes in organization.

Six Regular Army infantry divisions and two sets of corps troops were formed during the report period, partly by consolidations or conversions of existing units and partly by utilization of increased personnel made available by augmentations to the Army. In addition to these large units, a number of small units were organized. These were used to complete battalions and regiments and to provide service elements, previously lacking. The organization of these units not only materially increased the field efficiency of the Army, but greatly facilitated the greater expansion soon to come. The new organizations were tested in division, corps, and army maneuvers in the winter and spring of 1939-1940. These maneuvers formed a sound basis for future planning, revision, and further tests.

Continuing study is given our own and foreign organizations to take full advantage of developments in weapons, transportation, equipment, and technique. In general, our organizations are sound and well balanced and fully adaptable to modern warfare. Because we have no definite theater of operations, most divisions are necessarily general purpose and are not specialized. A new type motorized division organization which is intended primarily to complement armored units has been approved. Current study is being given to the organization of a division designed primarily for operation in mountainous country; and of other special units which have only a restricted use.

There are 33 divisions now in active service as follows:

26 infantry divisions, including 18 National Guard (square) and 8 Regular Army (triangular);
1 motorized vision (triangular);
4 armored divisions;
2 horse cavalry divisions, one partly complete.

There are also enough service and reinforcing troops to complete a balanced field force to two armies, totaling four army corps. The two remaining armies, totaling five army corps, are incomplete.

Present trends in organization are in the direction of increasing the proportion of armored, motorized, and antimechanized units.


A War Department directive dated July 10, 1940, created for service test an Armored Force to include all armored corps and GHQ reserve tank units. It also prescribed the duties of the Chief of the Armored Force, combining the command functions of a commander of a large tactical unit and many of the responsibilities of the chief of a combatant arm. This included


the development of tactical and training doctrines for all units of the Armored Force and research and advisory functions pertaining to development and procurement of all special transportation, armament, and equipment used primarily by armored units.

Regular Army personnel, consisting of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (mechanized), the 66th Infantry (light tanks), and a few scattered infantry tank units, were the nucleus for the initial organization of the Armored Force. This organization consisted of the 1st Armored Corps, the 1st and 2d armored Divisions, one GHQ reserve tank battalion (70th), and the Armored Force Board. The station of the 1st Corps, the 1st Armored Division, and the Board was at Fort Know, Kentucky. The 2d Armored Division was organized at Fort Benning, and the 70th Tank Battalion at Fort Meade, Maryland.

In November 1940 the Armored Force School was activated at Fort Know, Kentucky. The overhead for this unit consisted of about 182 officers and 1,847 enlisted men. This school has a capacity of over 6,000 students at any one time or a graduating capacity of about 26,000 students per year.

During the months of November and December 1940 and January 1941, four National Guard reserve tank battalions were activated and brought into the Federal service. These were the 191st at Fort Meade, Md., the 192d at Fort Know, Ky., the 193d at Fort Benning, Ga., and the 194th at Fort Lewis, Wash.

In February 1941 the 1st GHQ Reserve Tank Group Headquarters was activated at Fort Knox, Ky. All GHQ reserve tank battalions in existence at that time were placed under this headquarters.

Early in march the Armored Force Replacement Center was activated with an overhead of 240 officers and 1,241 enlisted men. The capacity of the replacement center was 9,000. It was filled up with selectees in March; these selectees were used later for newly activated Armored Force units.

On April 15, 1941, the 3d Armored Division was activated at Camp Beauregard, La., and the 4th Armored Division was activated at Pine Camp, N.Y.

The Armored Force Headquarters and Headquarters Company was activated in May 1941 with headquarters at Fort Knox, Ky.

In early June, five light and five medium GHQ reserve tank battalions were activated. The cadres for this activation came from the 1st and 2d Armored Division, and the fillers came from the replacement training center.

Critical and controlled items of equipment have been available in sufficient quantities for minimum training only. This condition will continue until about September 1941.

Training tests of armored units have indicated that these units have met their training requirement. Due, however, to the tremendous expansion involved, armored units have not reached their ultimate efficiency.


Trained, disciplined manpower is the fundamental requirement of any army. Our training program has been designed to build a seasoned body of men who have the basic knowledge and skill to handle any job that may be assigned to them. Its purpose is to build soldiers and leaders--men who, when they have completed their basic training, can take their places in planes or in tanks or behind guns or in the operation of technical equipment with only the final detailed instruction necessary ot cover the mechanism which they are to use. Regardless of other matériel shortages, we have the equipment to give this basic training, and our purpose has been to complete it while the production of modern weapons in catching up with our development of modern manpower. The soldier of today has devoted only 20 hours to close order drill out of a total of 572 hours of his basic training period. he has spent his time in learning the things that make a man efficient in combat; that cause him to act intelligently in an emergency; and that toughen him physically to withstand the rigors of modern warfare. Basic training culminates in field maneuvers designed to weld individuals into seasoned, efficient combat teams and to develop the command leadership and staff technique necessary for the handling of large units on the modern battlefield. The comprehensive training program carried out during the fiscal year 1940 was made possible through the appropriation for additional special field exercises as a result of the unlimited emergency and the increasing importance of national defense.

By early September 1939 the following had been completed: the First Army maneuvers in new York and Virginia, training about 100,000 officers and men of the Regular Army, National Guard, and Organized Reservers; the Fourth Army command post exercise, held at the Presidio of San Francisco and training about 700 officers of all components.

Further intensive training for all individuals and units of the Regular Army was initiated in September and October 1939 and continued throughout the year. Armory drills for National Guard units were increased by twelve, and seven additional days of field training away from home armories were given all units. Five complete Regular Army infantry divisions and one cavalry division were assembled in divisional camps or cantonments for intensive training as divisions in the field. Corps area commanders assembled their nondivisional troops for intensive field training. Troops of the oversea garrisons conducted special field training and field exercises pertinent to their assigned missions.

The training of pilots and mechanics for the augmented Air Corps was successfully expanded by use of civilian schools in addition to full capacity of expanded Air Corps training agencies. Procurement of


missing equipment was pushed to the utmost in order to provide a sufficient amount for best training results. Several thousand Reserve officers were ordered to active duty for varying periods to assist in and benefit from the intensified training.

The 3d Division assembled at Fort Lewis, Wash., and underwent preliminary training there. In January 1940 it moved by transport to join the Fleet in the Pacific and to participate in landing exercises in the vicinity of Monterey, Calif. After these exercises, the division was given intensive field training at Fort Ord, Calif.

The assembly and divisional training of the 1st, 5th, and 6th Division, together with Fourth Corps troops and nondivisional units culminated in April 1940 with 3 weeks of corps maneuvers at Fort Benning, Ga. During this time the 2d Division and 1st Cavalry Division and corps troops maneuvered in eastern Texas. This was followed by 3 weeks of corps versus corps maneuvers between these two forces, plus the 7th Cavalry Mechanized Brigade, in the Sabine area of Louisiana.

During major divisional and corps field exercises, the division commander and staff of each National Guard division was given a 3-day period of training in actual command and handling of one of the Regular Army divisions. During the large maneuvers in the Sabine area, any National Guard State adjutant general and any National Guard division commander who had not participated as a division commander in a corps exercise was invited to attend the maneuvers as observer.

Throughout the fiscal year 1940, practical training in the field for officers of all grades was stressed. Courses at the Command and General Staff School and the special service schools of the arms and services were suspended February 1, 1940, and officers on duty there were sent to units of the Army undergoing field training.

In order to disseminate to officers and men of the Army the lessons gained from the current war in Europe, steps were taken to facilitate the revision of our training literature and revision of all mobilization training programs. Increased appropriations by Congress for this purpose have made this possible.

During the fiscal year 1941, the Army extended its training activity on a scale never before attempted in peacetime. The primary training objective was the preparation of units to take the field on short notice at existing strength ready to function effectively in combat.

Taking advantage of the lessons learned in the exercises conducted by Regular Army units during the preceding winter and spring, all four armies carried out maneuvers in the summer and fall of 1940, involving all continental Regular Army and National Guard mobile forces. Progress attained was marked, but the exercises demonstrated the necessity of continuing intensive training.

To assist the Chief of Staff in his capacity as Commanding General of the Field Forces, a nucleus of General Headquarters was created and charged initially with the direction of training of all harbor defense and mobile troops within the continental United States and General Headquarters aviation.

The passage of the Selective Service Act, the induction of the National Guard into Federal service for a period of 1 year, and the expansion of the Regular Army created a training problem of vast proportions which necessitated adjustment in the program.

The War Department instituted its planned mobilization training program, modified to meet these new conditions. Troop units generally were stationed at large posts and camps to facilitate training and to develop teamwork. Most of the large posts are in localities which permit year-round training, although enough are in other parts of the country to insure training and experimentation in all types f terrain and in various climates. The year of training prescribed was divided into three 4-month periods; the first devoted to individual and small unit training; the second to progressive combined arms training; and the third to corps and army training including field maneuvers. The climax of this period will come during the summer and fall of 1941 when the four armies, the General Headquarters Air Force, the Armored Force, and parachute troops will participate in maneuvers involving more than half a million men.

To provide means for the training of selectees, those inducted early were assigned to Regular Army and National Guard units. The replacement training center program of the Army mobilization plan was initiated, and as fast as construction was completed, 21 centers were opened. The majority began operating in March and April, and by June were functioning at maximum capacity receiving selectees from reception centers. At replacement training centers, selectees and recruits are given basic training in their arm or service for a period of 13 weeks and then are assigned to units. The maximum trainee capacity of these centers is now approximately 182,500. This system is greatly facilitating the training of the entire Army.

Training in special operations wa conducted by selected units. Two divisions trained in landing operations, two combat teams participated in joint exercises with the Navy in the Caribbean area, and units stationed in the snow belt specialized in winter warfare training and tests of special equipment.

Special attention has been given to air training. Tactical squadrons in continental United States and oversea stations have increased 500 percent from the 1939 total. This has required additional flying personnel, likewise has accounted for the original three schools operating in 1939, expanding to a total of 40 schools, 28 of which are conducted through civilian


contract arrangement. Additional flying training schools are authorized and likely by the end of the present calendar year will be in full operation. Twelve of the flying schools have been designated for the training of R.A.F. flying cadets.

Pilot training has been increased 700 percent from the output of graduates in 1939. It is estimated that at the close of the present fiscal year the production of pilots for this period will be approximately 3,400. Enlisted personnel has kept pace in the development, for its strength has increased six times over that existing in 1939. The present figure of 132,000 has been augmented by nearly 10,000 flying cadets, together with personnel from former National Guard squadrons now inducted into Federal service. To assure that sufficient technicians are available for combat crews and ground crews, the technical schools have stepped up their production of trained graduates 16 times over the output of 1939. The close of the current fiscal year will see 20,000 graduates return to squadrons where their services will be largely instrumental in the success of the Air Corps expansion program.

Evaluation of lessons learned from current operations abroad and numerous changes in our organization and equipment have necessitated a wide revision of training literature for the Army. Sixty Field Manuals and one hundred sixty Technical manuals were prepared and printed during the fiscal year. Complete revision of Army extension courses is in progress.

Supplemented by the facilities of the motion-picture industry, the Signal Corps is engaged in a comprehensive training film-production program. Some eighty training films, and ninety film strip subjects have already been competed and distributed throughout the service. These visual aids are proving of great value in the training of the new Army.


Regular Army

Officers.-- The authorized commissioned strength of the Regular Army at the close of the fiscal year 1940 was 13,637, and at the close of the fiscal year 1941 it was 14,,016. der the provisions of the act of April 3, 1939, the commissioned strength will increase to 14,490 in the fiscal year 1942, and continue to increase annually by approximately equal increments until the strength of 16,719 is reached on June 30, 1949. Present plans to not contemplate any additional increase in the Regular Army commissioned strength beyond that now authorized. Increased demands for commissioned personnel will continue to be met by bringing Reserve officers to extended active duty.

During the past fiscal year there has been a redistribution of Regular Army officers in an effort to maintain the greatest possible number on duty with the field forces and in the oversea garrisons. As new units have been activated and new installations have been created it has been necessary ot reassign Regular Army officers so as to provide a nucleus of experienced officer personnel with these new units and installations. The additional positions created throughout the Military Establishment which could not be filled by Regular Army officers have been filled by calling Reserve officers to extended active duty.

Enlisted men.-- At the beginning of the fiscal year 1940 the Regular Army was in the process of expanding from 174,000 to 210,00 enlisted men, in order to provide for the increased strength authorized for the Air Corps and for augmentation of the Panama garrison.

In the limited emergency proclamation of September 8, 1939, the President ordered that the enlisted strength of the Regular Army be increased to 227,000 enlisted men as rapidly as possible by means of voluntary enlistment. After an intensive recruiting drive this objective was reached in February 1940.

Rapid expansion was still being effected at the outset of the fiscal year 1941. The annual appropriation act provided for an increase to the authorized strength of 280,000, which permitted the activation of three additional triangular divisions, certain coast-defense units, mechanized units, and certain corps, army, and GHQ troops. The First Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1941, furnished funds for increasing these forces by 95,000, brining the strength for which appropriations had been made to 375,000. This augmentation permitted the activation of two armored divisions, certain increases in triangular divisions previously authorized, as well as the implementation of organizations in the zone of the interior, such as reception centers. The Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1941, provided a total enlisted strength for the Regular Army and the National Guard, including selective-service trainees, of 1,418,000 by the end of fiscal year 1941.

Regular Army Reserve

In the beginning of fiscal year 1941 the strength of the Regular Army Reserve w 28,099. In February 1941 this component was ordered to active duty under the authority of Public Resolution No. 96, Seventy-sixth Congress. Discharges for dependency, in accordance with the above-mentioned resolution reduced the available number of Regular Army Reservists to 12,260.

Enlisted Reserve

The strength of the Enlisted Reserve Corps at the beginning of the fiscal year 1941 was 3,233. By March 31, 1941, this strength had increased to 4,568, of


which number 34 were on active duty. Enlistments in the Enlisted Reserve Corps were suspended except in case of men who had served 2 years in the Regular Army, and of members of the Air Corps Enlisted Reserve over selective-service age.

Selective Service

The Selective Training and Service Act, approved September 16, 1940, prescribed the registration of male citizens and aliens between the ages of 21 and 36, and authorized the call of no more than 900,000 registrants in any one year for a period of 12 consecutive months' training and service. Each such man, after the completion of this period of training, is to be transferred to a reserve component of the Army of the United States. Until he attains the age of 45 or until the expiration of a period of 10 years after such transfer, he is to be a member of such reserve component and shall be subject to such training and service as may be prescribed by law.


Appropriations authorized by the Seventy-sixth Congress and allotments from the WPA made available approximately $127,000,000 for permanent and temporary construction during the fiscal year 1940. The larger part of this sum was used for increasing the operating facilities at established air fields and for establishing two air bases and two air depots in the continental United States, one air base in Puerto Rico, one air base in Panama, and an air station at Fairbanks, Alaska.

In addition, three new posts were established in the Panama Canal Department. These provide accommodations for an increase of about 5,800 enlisted men of the coast artillery.

Temporary housing was provided at all posts, camps, and stations where garrisons were increased as a result of the Army's expansion to 227,000 enlisted men.

For the fiscal year 1941, funds in the amount of $1,633,133,355 have been appropriated by the Seventh-sixth Congress for construction necessary to accommodate the Army, as authorized by the Selective Service Act and the act calling the National Guard into Federal service for a period of 1 year.

Quartermaster Corps construction.-- This legislation imposed upon the Quartermaster Corps the tremendous task of housing approximately 1,400,000 men. As time was a major factor, construction was pushed vigorously throughout the winter of 1940-41. Progress was hampered by exceptionally unfavorable climatic conditions and shortages of labor and materials. However, construction necessary to house the above number of men has now been accomplished, and some 45 communities with populations ranging from 10,000 to 63,000 have been constructed. More than one-half of these communities have been erected at new camp sites, where initiation of construction was dependent upon land acquisition.

The development of the necessary services in a great many cases called for the installation of basic utilities at some distances from the centers of population. The established polity provided for tent camps for National Guard units in those sections where climatic conditions permitted such housing for the period of National Guard service, and for mobilization-type cantonment construction in other cases. The housing for well over half a ion men at new camps is approximately evenly divided between temporary cantonments and tent-camp construction. Housing constructed during the emergency at established, permanent Regular Army posts consists mostly of cantonment construction. Existing permanent facilities have been utilized wherever possible, and no new permanent housing has been authorized.

Hospitalization has been provided at the posts and camps by enlarging existing hospitals, converting permanent barracks into hospitals, or by the erection of new cantonment hospitals. The capacity of general hospitals has been increased approximately 10,000 beds by the construction of nine new general hospitals and by additions to existing hospitals.

In addition to the housing and hospitalization necessary to accommodate an army of 1,400,00 0men, recreation facilities, chapels, service clubs, hostess houses, railroad facilities necessary for their convenience and comfort have been provided.

Corps of Engineer construction.-- In order to distribute the load of construction and to assist in expediting the Air Corps construction program, the transfer from the Quartermaster Corps to the Corps of Engineers of all construction at Air Corps station, Panama excepted, and all construction in Alaska, was authorized on November 20, 1940. The authority for this transfer is contained in Section 102, public, No. 781, Seventy-sixth Congress, approved September 9, 1940. Seventy-two projects were transferred during the period December 1, 1940-March 1, 1941, and 15 additional projects were assigned directly to the Corps of Engineers.

During the early part of the fourth quarter of the fiscal year 1941, the Corps of Engineers was responsible for Air Corps construction work in the total amount of $624,465,000. The Corps of Engineers has been able to assume this additional construction load by making use of its decentralized organization of 11 divisions and 50 districts covering the entire continental United States, Alaska, and the insular possessions. In those


projects which were taken over from the Quartermaster Corps, the continued orderly progress of the work during the transition period was assured by absorbing in the organization of the Corps of Engineers a large part of the local personnel of the Quartermaster Corps.

Defense housing.-- As a result of appropriations made by the Seventy-sixth Congress in Public, Nos. 671, 781, and 849, the President has approved the construction of 21,893units of defense housing for the families of noncommissioned officers of the first three grades and permanently employed civilians of the War Department. This program is well along toward completion.

WPA projects.-- Under the terms of the "Emergency Relief Appropriations Act, fiscal year 1941," WPA projects totaling approximately $70,000,000 have been approved by the President for construction or improvement at War Department posts, camps, and stations.


Troop bases for a protective mobilization plan of approximately 1,400,000 men and an augmented force representing a ground Army of about 2,200,000 men, plus an air force and replacements, have been established. Funds provided during fiscal year 1941, plus stock on hand or under procurement, will, with some exceptions, provide modern equipment for the over-all requirements in critical and essential items for the protective mobilization plan and initial allowances in critical items for the augmented force. The exceptions mentioned comprise largely ammunition, combat maintenance in motor vehicles, completion of the modernized seacoast defense program, some chemical munitions, and combat reserve stocks of clothing and equipage. Financing of these shortages should be provided in subsequent estimates. a. Mechanization.-- The mounting experience and lessons learned from the present European conflict dictate a greater proportion of mechanized units in our Army. This has been accomplished by the provision in the protective mobilization plan and the augmented force of 6 and 8 armored visions, 9 light-tank battalions, 6 and 16 medium-tank battalions to be equipped with heavy tanks in these respective forces. From the appropriations provided during fiscal year 1941, procurement has been initiated to cover the various types of combat vehicles, such as light and medium tanks, scout cars, and cross-country personnel carriers, in quantities to meet the needs of our protective mobilization plan and, with minor exceptions, sufficient to supply the initial requirements of the augmented force. Development is well along on a new heavy tank. In addition, scout cars will be available to meet the needs of 2 cavalry divisions, the initial requirements of 27 triangular infantry divisions, and 11 mechanized cavalry regiments.

b. Antiaircraft.-- Considerable progress has been made in providing for critical items of modern antiaircraft equipment. Funds made available by appropriations for the fiscal year 1941, together with items previously provided for, will generally provide guns and automatic weapons, as well as the necessary searchlights and fire-control instruments for the 88 antiaircraft regiments, mobile and semimobile, and the 16 separate antiaircraft battalions included in the expanded force.

The only items f this type remaining to be financed to complete the requirements of the force of approximately 2,200,000 men are some caliber .50 machine guns and mounts, 37-mm automatic guns, the necessary fire-control equipment for these weapons, and some searchlight trucks.

The 90-mm antiaircraft gun has been standardized, and a large number of these guns are in production.

c. Seacoast defense.-- A modernization program was initiated in fiscal year 1941 to replace outmoded armament with equipment of the most modern type for all harbor defenses in the continental United States. The programs for augmentation of the seacoast defenses of Hawaii and the Panama Canal were substantially advanced in fiscal year 1941.

Funds made available by appropriations for the fiscal year 1941 will provide essential fire-control elements and some ordnance matériel for existing armament and installations. Shortages in equipment for the modernization program initiated in fiscal year 1941 must be financed by subsequent appropriations as construction on the various projects progresses.

d. Miscellaneous equipment.-- Modern small arms and artillery weapons have been financed by appropriations for the fiscal year 1941 in quantities sufficient to meet, with but few exceptions, the over-all requirements of the protective mobilization plan and the initial requirements of the augmented force. These modern weapons include 60-mm and 81-mm mortars, machine guns of various types, semiautomatic rifles, 37-mm tank and antitank guns, 105-m howitzers, and heavy artillery comprising 155-mm and 8-inch guns and 240-mm howitzers. About 900,000 semiautomatic rifles will have been provided upon the completion of the present program, which represents the approximate over-all requirements of the protective mobilization plan as well as the initial requirements of the augmented force.

Procurement of sufficient 105-mm howitzers for the initial needs of the augmented force has been initiated for the purpose of replacing the 75-mm gun in the divisional light-artillery regiments. Upon completion of the program for the fiscal year 1941, there


will be sufficient 155-mm guns, comprising modernized (high-speed) and new M1 types, to cover the initial requirement of the expanded force. Further procurement of these weapons to meet requirements to cover maintenance has been held in abeyance pending conclusions on tests now in process relating to the adoption of a new 155-mm howitzer and 4.5-inch gun. These latter weapons are mounted on identical carriages. They present no production difficulties and appear to offer great promise. Special ordnance maintenance vehicles have been financed to meet the over-all requirements of the protective mobilization plan, and with but few exceptions, the needs of this force in signal, chemical, quartermaster, engineer, and medical items are being provided.

e. Motorization.-- Funds provided for procurement of motor vehicles during the fiscal year 1941, from both regular and supplemental appropriations, were adequate to complete the initial requirements of the protective mobilization plan and provided a limited amount for normal training replacement.

Tactical organizations are being completely equipped with new equipment, model 1939 and later, and the replaced vehicles made available for administrative use. Approximately 50 percent of the above requirements in motor vehicles will be filled by July 1, 1941, by actual deliveries of vehicles now under procurement. The delivery of 100 percent of the above requirements will be accomplished by about March 1942, provided none of the vehicles under procurement are diverted to other uses.

A marked improvement in cross-country mobility of tactical vehicles has resulted from development of the all-wheel drive.

f. Distribution.-- All Regular Army and National Guard organizations have been arranged on one priority list for the distribution of the more important items of equipment which are essential to combat or training. Individual National Guard and Regular Army units are placed on this list according to their probable employment in the event of an emergency and according to their training needs. All equipment and ammunition resources, whether procured from National Guard, Regular Army funds, or funds not specifically appropriated to either, have been pooled, and distribution is being made to both components in such a manner as best to meet the problems of the present emergency. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau has cooperated in every way in the establishment of policies affecting the diversion of equipment or funds to or from the National Guard.

Shortages of equipment exist in most organizations and, with but few exceptions, are being rapidly overcome. These shortages are primarily due to--

  1. The rapid, far-reaching expansion of the Army.

  2. The time lag between the availability of funds and delivery of supplies.

  3. Lack of modern or modernized depot stocks.

  4. Time required for overhaul or modernization of old equipment which has been stored since 1918.

g. Airplane procurement.-- A substantial number of airplanes of the most modern combat and training types are being provided from appropriations for the fiscal year 1941. These, along with present available resources, will provide the 54 combat and 6 transport groups of the Air Corps program with initial requirements and ample reserves. Some equipment for service units under the program has been deferred to the fiscal year 1942. Material progress has been made in the development and acquisition of combat aircraft which are equal or superior in performance and adaptability to any military plans in the world today.

Manufacturing plant space has been expanded 130 percent to facilitate production of aircraft and aircraft accessories. Actual production meanwhile was three times greater in the fiscal year 1941 than in the fiscal year 1939.


The National Guard has made more substantial gains in training, personnel, and equipment during the fiscal years 1940 and 1941 than during any similar peacetime period in its history. Upon induction it provided 20,006 officers, 216 warrant officers, and 282,805 enlisted men. The following comparative figures illustrate the steady increase in the total strength of the actual Guard:

June 30, 1939 199,491
June 30, 1940 241,612
June 30, 1941 303,027

For the fiscal year 1940, armory drill periods were increased from 48 hours to 60 hours, and 7 days were added to the normal period of field training at or near home stations. A resulting improvement in the combat efficiency of the Guard was noted during the maneuvers of the First Army in August 1939.

Plans had long been established for the entrance of the National Guard into the active military service of the United States in the event of a national emergency declared by Congress. Pressure of international events made it apparent that the National Guard would be used even though the specific emergency should not exist as legally contemplated.

Joint Resolution No. 96, approved August 27, 1940, authorized the President to order the National Guard into service for 12 consecutive months. Executive orders designated units to be inducted in successive increments commencing on September 16, 1940, with 4 infantry divisions, 18 coast artillery units, and 4 Air Corps squadrons, and continuing until the last division entered active service on March 5, 1941, and


Chart 9: Induction of National Guard into Federal Service


the last unit on June 23, 1941. By the end of the fiscal year, all of the National Guard was in active service except for 1 new infantry battalion and 8 newly organized observation squadrons. The induction dates and stations of National Guard units are indicated on chart 9.

While this induction was being planned and put into effect, other activities were initiated and continued to perfect the training and organization of the Guard for prospective tasks. Training was intensified. There was an attendance of 802 officers and 261 enlisted men at Army service schools and 733 officers and 402 enlisted men at temporary schools and camps of instruction. This attendance, which was approximately four times the normal quota, utilized the facilities at the various schools to capacity. For the fiscal year 1941 the annual field-training period was again increased from 15 to 21 days, and an additional period of 7 days wa authorized; the number of armory drills was again increased; there was Nation-wide participation in the maneuvers held by all four field armies during the summer of 1940.

To make the character of our forces conform to the new demands of modern war, many reorganizations, conversions, and increases were made prior to Federal induction. Four National Guard cavalry divisions were broken up. Seventeen cavalry regiments were converted into 7 horse-mechanized cavalry regiments, 7 field artillery regiments, 7 coast artillery regiments and separate battalions, and 1 antitank battalion. Eight infantry regiments were converted into 4 field artillery regiments, 8 coast artillery regiments, 1 antitank battalion, and 1 military police battalion. Tank companies were withdrawn from infantry divisions and formed into tank battalions. Antitank units were expanded and increased in number. Nine new observation squadrons were organized.

officer allotments were increased from maintenance strength to equal Regular Army peace strength. The increase in strength authorized by Executive Order of September 6, 1939, was virtually complete at the beginning of the fiscal year.

As a result of increases in officer strength, conversion of units, and officer losses for physical and other reasons, a great many appointments and promotions were made in the national Guard throughout the country. This necessitated examination and formal procedure for Federal recognition, and the magnitude of the task is indicated by the fact that the National Guard Bureau completed action on cases as follows:

July 1940 1089   November 1553   March 3090
August 1281   December 1314   April 1404
September 1500   January 1941 3521   May 573
October 1870   February 3142   June 415

Because there was no legislative provision for money allowances to dependents of enlisted men in Federal service, and because it was understood that draft boards would defer draftees with dependents, instructions were issued on July 23, 1940, that upon request, discharge would be granted enlisted men with persons dependent solely upon them for support. This process was initiated early in all units regardless of prospective induction dates, in order to give opportunity for filling vacancies by local enlistments. From the date of these instructions on June 30, 1941, it was reported that 51,501 enlisted men had been discharged on account of dependency. This loss would appear large, but it made the Guard conform in personnel to the other elements of the Army and it was rapidly remedied by enlistments.

Induction of the National Guard left the States without their normal forces for suppressing local disturbances. By act of Congress, approved October 21, 1940, a State is authorized to organize and maintain local defense forces so long as any part of its National Guard is in active Federal service. Under this authority, and by virtue of existing and new State legislation, these forces were created under such designations as State Guard, Defense Force, Reserve Militia, Active Militia, Reserve military Force, Home Guards, Protective Force, Home Defense Force, Defense Guard, State Defense Corps, Reserve Defense Corps. More that three-fourths of the States have raised such forces.

Rifles and bayonets have been made available for issue in quantities equal to 50 percent of the normal National Guard allotment to each State, and training literature has been issued. Ammunition, cartridge belts, mess kits, and other items of field equipment have been made available for sale to the States, while procurement of uniforms has been left to the States alone. By June 30, 1941 units had been organized with a total strength of 85,587.


The activities of this component show a marked increase throughout the 2 years covered by this report. never before has the Officers' Reserve Corps been afforded such splendid opportunities for training in peacetime.

During the fiscal year 1940, appropriations made possible the training of a greater number of officers for 14-day periods than previously. The number of students taking 3-month courses at service schools was three times greater than it had been the year before. In addition, about 2,500 officers were trained for 28-day periods with units of the Third Army during the spring of 1940.

During 1939-1940, opportunities for extended active duty for periods o 6 months or more with the Air Corps and other Regular Army units--including opportunities offered under the Thomason Act--were


expanded during the last half of the fiscal year, and on June 30, 1940, more than 2,700 reserve officers were on such duty.

Even greater strides were made during the fiscal year 1941. The passage of Public Resolution No. 96, Seventy-sixth Congress, which became effective August 27, 1940, permitted the ordering of Reserve officers to extended active duty, with or without their consent, for a period of 12 consecutive months. Pursuant to this authority the number of Reserve officers on active duty has steadily increased, and on June 30, 1941, approximately 55,000 Reserve officers, or about 55 percent of those eligible, were on active duty. These officers have been used to meet the need for additional officers in carrying out the current military expansion and wherever possible have been assigned as replacements, thereby making additional Regular Army officers available for troop duty.

Fourteen-day training was discontinued, except in isolated cases, as the opportunities for bringing reserve officers to duty for extended periods eliminated the need for this type of training.

Although the eligible strength showed no material increase during either of the fiscal years, greater effectiveness of the Officers' Reserve Corps has been attained through improved training opportunities and physical standards. An increase of approximately 10 percent over previous years in original appointments from the Reserve Officers' Training Corps was a contributing factor. This increase was offset by a corresponding decrease of appointments from civil life as a result of a general suspension of appointments from this source imposed at the close of the calendar year 1939 In addition, a classification system, which was set up during the past year, has made readily available detailed information pertaining to the Officers' Reserve Corps along such lines as civil pursuits of the individual, progress of training, and other statistical data.

Voluntary training performed through the pursuit of courses of instruction of the Army extension courses and attendance at troop schools was increased, resulting in a better preparation of the individual for entering upon a tour of extended active duty. Improvement in all phases was satisfactory with possibilities of further progress as the available facilities are augmented.


Legislation for the fiscal years 1937 and 1938 appropriated funds for the acquisition of approximately 6,068 acres of land. Of this amount, the War Department has acquired title to 2,533 acres. At the end of the fiscal year 1941, the remaining land--approximately 3,535 acres--was in process of acquisition by condemnation proceedings through the Department of Justice, and it was expected that the greater part of this land would be secured before January 1, 1942.


The applications for new R.O.T.C. units in both the junior and senior divisions were extensive during the fiscal year 1940. Estimates indicated that if the applications for junior units were approved, the enrollment would be increased by 200,000. Because of the requirements of the Army itself and the consequent lack of suitable personnel for the proper operation of new R.O.T.C. units, however, none has been established since August 1937.

During the school year 1939-1940, approximately 7,623 Reserve officers were commissioned from the R.O.T.C. The 9.000 Reserve officers which it is planned to produce annually in the future are expected to meet anticipated requirements without the establishment of additional units.

Strength at the end of the fiscal year 1940 was as follows:

Senior division (226 units):
  Advanced course 17,387
  Basic course 86,431
    Total 103,818
Junior division (139 units) 66,134
55c units (35) 10,628

During the fiscal year 1941, for the first time since the establishment of the R.O.T.C., large numbers of Reserve officers have been called to extended active duty. By the end of the fiscal year the figure had reached approximately 56,000, mostly officers of company grade, a large percentage of whom are recent graduates of R.O.T.C. units. This has afforded the first real opportunity to make a practical appraisal of its product. The success already attained by these officers indicates the importance of the role of the R.O.T.C., especially the senior division, in our national defense. Without officers the successful rapid expansion of our Army during the past year would have been impossible. Reserve officer production from R.O.T.C. has met immediate requirements from that source. Nearly 8,500 graduates were commissioned in June and ordered to active duty.

Demands for expanding R.O.T.C. training have continued. An increase of 1,000 enrollments in the advanced course was authorized for the school year 1940-41. In order to meet special requirements three


new units have been established as follows: University of Alaska, Tuskegee Institute (colored), and the Harvard School of Business Administration. The number of active Regular Army officers on R.O.T.C. duty has been reduced by approximately two-thirds. Officers thus relieved have been replaced by retired and Reserve officers with very satisfactory results. Other than for the foregoing, the R.O.T.C. establishment has, in general, remained unchanged.

Training programs have been revised to bring text references in line with the latest Training Manuals. Since students are to be ordered to active duty shortly after graduation, greater emphasis has been placed on practical training, including methods of instruction, in order to prepare the graduate for the immediate command and instruction of small units.


62,587 applications for this training were received; 37.152 were enrolled; and 36,151 completed the month of training offered during the fiscal year 1941. These totals are approximately the same as for the previous year.

In order to concentrate all available means and facilities on the vitally important and immediate task of training the combatant forces, C.M.T. Camps have been suspended for the fiscal year 1942.


During the period covered by this report, the War Department continued to carry on its assigned missions pertaining to the administration and supply of the Civilian Conservation Corps. These diversified activities have been accomplished promptly and efficiently.

The authorized enrolled strength of the Corps was 300,000, composed of 272,800 juniors and 27,200 veterans. These enrollees were allocated among 1,500 companies, 1,364 of which were made up of juniors and 136 of veterans. The 1,500 camps, each having a capacity of 200 enrollees, were distributed throughout the United States, with some located in every State as well as in the District of Columbia; in addition, two companies were assigned to Annette Island, Alaska.

The Civilian Conservation Corps has been assisting in the expanding national defense program. CCC companies have been allocated to military reservations for the purpose of clearing and developing maneuver and training areas.


The problems incident to the maintenance of a high state of morale in our expanded Army have been of primary importance during the past 2 fiscal years. The introduction of selective service, the induction of the National Guard, and the calling to active duty of a large number of Reserve officers have brought many diverse elements into the Army. This rapid expansion, coupled with the difficulties encountered in housing, clothing, feeding, and training the new Army produced many new problems in the field of morale. These special problems were recognized early in the expansion, and steps were taken immediately to solve them. As a result of these timely measures, it can be reported that a high state of morale is now clearly evident throughout our Army.

One of the outstanding indications of improvement in morale has been the continuous diminution of court-martial rates. During the fiscal year 1940, the general court-martial rate per thousand enlisted men fell from 11 to 9; the special court-martial rate, from 23 to 21; and the summary court-martial rate, from 56 to 48.

A growing consciousness of the importance of morale activities lied to the creation, on March 14, 1941, of a separate branch for military morale with a general officer as chief of branch. The functions previously exercised by the Morale Division of the A.G.O. were transferred to the Morale Branch, which thereafter functioned under the supervision and control of the Chief of Staff.

A new impetus was imparted to morale activity both on the part of the War Department and of commanders in the field. The CHief of the Morale Branch was charged with the development of methods and procedures to enable him at all times to know the state of morale of the Army. There was no disturbance of the conception that morale and leadership are inseparable. That conception was strengthened by increased latitude permitted to regional and tactical commanders by the grant of authority to conduct conferences of morale officers and the authorization of a special staff officer, without additional duty, for moral purposes.

The appointment by the President of the Federal Security Administrator as Coordinator of Health, Welfare, Recreation, Education, Nutrition, and all other activities related to the defense program permitted a normal division of responsibility for morale activities. Under this arrangement, the War Department assumes full responsibility for morale activity within the borders of military reservations, and other Federal agencies assume the responsibility for morale work outside military boundaries.

Within the borders of a military reservation, the commander is held accountable for the state of morale. The Morale Branch exists to coordinate, stimulate, and


influence morale activities and to act as consultants and advisers on morale. Athletic equipment has been made available by reasonable allotments of funds for that purpose, and inclement weather problems are being solved by the erection of field houses which permit continuity of athletic programs in winter months. The primary source of entertainment has been, and will continue to be, motion-picture programs. To date 185 posts and camps have been provided with facilities for showing pictures to approximately 214,000 men at a single showing. Amateur theatricals have been encouraged and have proved highly successful. A system of mobile units has been inaugurated to provide entertainment with volunteer professional talent. The social life within military camps has been the subject of extensive thought and preparation. The outstanding need of a place to gather, to read, to hold dances and entertain friends has been met by the construction of 113 service clubs, the great majority with a library and a cafeteria. Provision in the form of 97 guest houses has been made to furnish simple overnight accommodations to families and friends who may visit the soldier in camp. Due recognition has been given the need of feminine influence in the guidance of morale activities by the employment of 297 hostesses and 96 librarians.

A new problem arose with camps far removed from communities of sufficient size to meet the recreation needs of a large military population. A solution has been found by the construction of tent camps in the nearest sizable communities where recreational facilities are already in existence. Currently 26 such camps have been authorized which will accommodate 15,000 men each weekend. The basic consideration in the establishment of a recreational camp has been ot provide soldiers at nominal cost with a place to spend a full weekend in enjoying the normal pleasures available in an average American community.

Another important step in our morale program was the establishment in December 1940 of a civilian committee which subsequently became known as the Joint Army and Navy Committee on Recreation and Welfare. The function of this committee is to coordinate welfare activities between the War Department and other Government department and to develop closer relationship between civilian communities and military garrisons in order to provide a wholesome, leisure-time atmosphere for the enlisted men. The work of the committee has been of great value in developing public morale and in directing civilian effort into channels which will best serve to increase the morale of the Army.

Because of the intimate relationship to morale, the supervision of the post-exchange system has been charged to the Chief of the Morale Branch. Modernization of post-exchange methods is in progress and within a short time a centralized Army Exchange Service will be announced.

While the physical comforts and recreational needs will remain in the spotlight of attention, it is recognized that everything physical and psychological affects human conduct. The Morale Branch is constantly engaged in the study of all factors which contribute and adversely affect morale and the advance planning for morale work in the event of a movement of theaters of operation.


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