The original sources used in the preparation of this study were drawn almost exclusively from the large store of German military records presently in the custody of The Adjutant General. These sources included the daily reports of OKW and the situation maps of OKH for the period of the campaign, the headquarters journals of the two army groups and five armies committed to operations, and such afteraction reports and observations of the corps and divisions as were available. Other primary sources included the Army mobilization plans for the years 1937-40, the consolidated intelligence study on Poland prepared by OKW, the diaries of Generals von Bock and Haider, and the naval operations journal for August and September, 1939.

Secondary sources used in the writing of the study consisted of two brief histories prepared by OKH immediately following the campaign in Poland, a number of monographs prepared by former German officers at the end of the World War II, and a wide selection of published German material. Other secondary sources consisted of the comments of the former German officers, whose assistance is acknowledged in the foreword of this study, and the three-volume work in Polish published by the semiofficial Sikorski Institute in London.

General background information on the German Armed Forces of the prewar period was obtained from H. Franke's Neuzeitliche Wehrwissenschaften (Modern Military Science); General Mueller-Hillebrand's Das Heer, 1939-46 {The Army, 1939-45); Werner Baumbach's history of the Luftwaffe, Zu Spaet (Too Late); the German Navy's classified official history of naval rearmament during the period 1919-35, as reproduced in the International Military Tribunal's series of Nuernberg trial documents; Bredt's semiofficial Taschenbuch der Kriegsflotten (Handbook of the Navies); and available field and technical manuals, training publications, and other printed matter used by the Wehrmacht.

The material on German planning was obtained from such records as were kept of Hitler's conferences; the diary of General Haider (for OKH); the diary of General Bock (for Army Group North); the records of Arbeitsstdb Rundstedt (for Army Group South); the


naval orders of 16 May 1939 and 21 August 1939, as reproduced in the Nuernberg trial documents; and an account of the Luftwaffe's part as written by a group of captured German Air Force officers in 1946, under the title Die Planung und Vorbereitung des Luftkrieges Gegen Polen, 1939 {Planning and Preparations for the Air War Against Poland, 1939).

The operations narrative is based on the headquarters journals of the army groups and armies, and such corps and division journals as were available. These records were supplemented by the Bock and Haider diaries; the Eighth Army report of operations against Warsaw; General Lanz's Gebirgsjaeger (Mountain Trooper), the history of the 1st Mountain Division; and several monographs prepared for the Office of Military History by former German Army and Air Force officers. The lessons learned by the Wehrmacht as a result of the campaign were drawn from the same sources.


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