Stilwell Begins His Mission
When General Stilwell landed in India, he stepped upon a stage whose dimensions were gigantic. The area of China, Burma, and India was about equal to that of the United States, but its population of nearly 900,000,000 was almost seven times that of Stilwell's nation. The human scene in China, Burma, and India was as complex as the geographic. Here were two of the world's oldest and greatest civilizations, the Indian and the Chinese. Politically, Chinese nationalism was triumphant and Indian nationalism was growing ever stronger. India was part of the British Commonwealth and British administrators and soldiers had to consider grave problems of imperial policy. In China, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek had to take the long view, had to make momentous decisions. No statesman in Asia could think that simple victory was the goal of war. Asia and its problems had been in the world for a long time. The day after the war ended the problems would still be there.
Two spurs of the Himalaya Mountains sharply divide the three nations of India, Burma, and China. Between India and Burma are the Naga Hills, Chin Hills, and the Arakan Yoma, some of them as high as 10,000 feet. They curve in a great arc from near Tibet down to the Bay of Bengal. In early 1942 this barrier was crossed by nothing more than jungle trails, though the Governments of India and Burma were hard at work on a road linking the two states. The hills and valleys are covered with tropical forest, and in many areas pestilence is endemic. Between Burma and China is another rampart behind which lies an immense plateau on the China side. This mountain barrier, too, comes very near the sea so that Burma, lying as it does among the mountains, is something like a long blind alley, most easily reached by sea.
Communications in China, Burma, and India were poor. China had been isolated by a Japanese blockade. She had few trucks, for a nation of 400,000,000, and the Japanese in China had been at pains to take the few key rail centers in China's simple rail net. The Chinese were amazingly ingenious at maintaining wire and radio communication, but the net was not adequate for heavy traffic. The Indian rail system was very heavily burdened by the demands of war, production, and the growing Indian economy, as India was the arsenal for the Allied effort in the Middle East. Indian telephone and telegraph communications seemed rather inefficient to those Americans who used them.
To make matters still more difficult for Stilwell, Indian ports were 12,000 miles from the United States, so that it took a cargo ship almost two months to make the voyage. For a final complicating factor, there was the sheer physical problem of exerting effort in a subtropical climate where malaria and intestinal diseases were endemic.1
The theater of military operations, Burma, was 261,610 square miles in area, about as big as Texas. Within Burma, three great rivers run north and south, their valleys dividing the land into corridors. (Map 2) From east to west, these are the Salween, Sittang, and Irrawaddy. With its mouth at Moulmein, the Salween River descends from the mountain mass along the Sino-Burmese border, where it flows through a mighty gorge. The Sittang and Irrawaddy Rivers are separated by the Pegu Yoma which, save for an isolated peak to the north, rarely rises above 2,000 feet in height and is often dissected by river valleys. Nevertheless, these hills effectively divide lower Burma into the Irrawaddy and Sittang valleys. If a defender of Burma falls back from the sea coast to the north, he finds the Irrawaddy valley grows wider because the arc of the Arakan Yoma and the Chin Hills (Burma's western wall) swings towards the west and India; then as he falls back still farther north the defender finds himself in the plain of central Burma as the Pegu Yoma ends.
The climate of Burma is an important military feature, for during the rainy season fighting is almost impossible. Burma lies in the monsoon belt. The rains come in mid-May and last till mid-October. In all sections of Burma, saving only the dry zone of the Irrawaddy from Prome to Mandalay, the rainfall is extremely heavy, averaging about two hundred inches a year along the frontiers and in the north. In the dry zone, but thirty inches of rain fall in the year. The best of the year in Burma is said to be the cool, dry season from November to February.
The principal lines of communications were the rivers and the Burma Railways. The great Irrawaddy River is navigable for 900 miles, its tributary, the Chindwin, for 350 miles, and fleets of river steamers carried tons of cargo from Rangoon to Bhamo, which lies almost on the Chinese border. The Salween River, because of its rapids, is only navigable for short stretches, and a tidal bore in the Sittang limits the river's use to small craft.
The military situation which Stilwell faced in China and Burma was a somber one. Thirty days before Stilwell's arrival, General Magruder described the Chinese situation of February 1942 in blunt terms. He told the War Department that Chinese and Sinophile propagandists had painted a grossly misleading picture of China's war effort, which if accepted at face value would
Japanese Advance in Burma
20 January-19 March 1942
DR. GORDON SEAGRAVE and a Burmese nurse examine a wounded Chinese soldier. (Photograph taken after Seagrave was commissioned in the U.S. Army.)
gravely impair future American planning. Magruder recommended credits and lend-lease aid to China, not because they would increase China's potential offensive strength, but because they would keep the Generalissimo in power, prevent the end of China's passive resistance, and retain the possibility of using Chinese territory to base air attacks on Japan. Offensives in China, said Magruder, would have to be made by foreign units while Chinese manpower simply flowed into the military vacuum that might thus be created (as the Japanese massed their garrisons to meet the threat). The Japanese forces allegedly contained by the Chinese numbered twenty-eight inferior divisions, many of them really held by fear of the Soviet Union. The Chinese had no intention of taking offensive action, which would inevitably dissipate the economic and political value of their troops.2
Dealing with Chinese officials was extremely difficult, Magruder went on, because of their utter disregard for logistics. They had no idea of the capabilities of sea and air transport, and they made extravagant demands which they wanted fulfilled immediately. Their pet strategic cure-all was air power, and they were unmoved by the fact that their transport system would not support a tenth of the aircraft that they wanted to have in China. Magruder was convinced that some plain, blunt speaking would be necessary in dealing with the Generalissimo. He was a great man, Magruder conceded; he held China's factions and provinces in the semblance of nationality, but the fact had to be driven home to him that China was making a minimum effort though it stood to lose everything if the United Nations failed. In reply the War Department stated that it was aware of the situation within China and that Magruder's remarks confirmed its opinions. Steps were being taken to curb the propaganda extravagances of which Magruder complained.3
The First Burma Campaign began when the Japanese attacked southern Burma from Siam on 20 January 1942 with about 18,000 men. (Maps 2 and 3) Their purpose in occupying Burma was to cut the line of communications from Rangoon to Kunming and then to hold Burma as the southwestern anchor of a great defense perimeter swinging from Southeast Asia through the Southwest and Central Pacific Areas.4 Moving almost straight across south Burma from east to west toward Rangoon, the Japanese 55th and 33d Divisions, of two regiments each, had gone from victory to victory over Indian, British, and Burmese troops, who were inexperienced, untrained in jungle warfare, and overly dependent on motor transport. The Japanese successes had been crowned by the Battle of the Sittang Bridge on 22-23 February, when the Japanese succeeded in ambushing two Indian infantry brigades of the 17th
Indian Division on the east bank of the Sittang River. The two brigades were cut to pieces. On 2 March the Japanese crossed the Sittang River, moved past Pegu, and swung south on Rangoon.5
When after the Battle of the Sittang Bridge the menace to Rangoon became obvious and imminent, the AMMISCA personnel in Rangoon on Magruder's orders destroyed all movable lend-lease stores. Much equipment had been sent north, the rate hitting 1,000 tons a day as disaster neared, but it was necessary to burn 972 trucks in various stages of assembly, 5,000 tires, 1,000 blankets and sheeting, and a ton of odds and ends. A great deal of lend-lease was transferred to the imperial forces in Burma: 300 Bren guns with 3,200,000 rounds, 1,000 submachine guns with 180,000 rounds of ammunition, 260 jeeps, 683 trucks, and 100 field telephones.6
The Japanese took Rangoon on 6 March, while the 17th Indian Division fought its way out of a possible Japanese encirclement and fell back north up the Irrawaddy valley. The Japanese 33d Division began to follow the 17th Indian Division up the Irrawaddy valley. The 55th Division in the Sittang valley was facing the 1st Burma Division, which latter had not been engaged as a unit. The orders from General Wavell to the British defenders were to hold upper Burma as long as possible to cover the oil fields at Yenangyaung, to keep contact with the Chinese, and to protect the road being hastily built from Assam to Burma.7
As of early March, the Japanese plans for the next phase of the Burma campaign seem to have been elastic, and still in process of formulation. They suggest an intention to make the main Japanese effort via Rangoon-Toungoo-Mandalay, which if successful would isolate Burma from China and thus cut off any Chinese troops who might come to the aid of Burma's defenders. Japanese reinforcements arriving through Rangoon would be committed to the Japanese right.8
The most hopeful note in the Burma military situation was that Chinese troops were moving in, in force. Shortly after the "qualified acceptance" of Chinese reinforcements and the injury to Chinese pride caused by the Tulsa incident it became necessary for the British to ask China's aid in defending Burma. It was then apparent to them that the "violence, fury, skill, and might
of Japan has far exceeded anything we had been led to expect."9 The original deployment in Burma, which was effected before hostilities began, was based on the prospect of a Japanese drive through the Southern Shan States via an existing and presumably inviting road. Subsequent events in Malaya, however, showed that the mobility of the Japanese forces had been underestimated. The Malaya operations revealed that the enemy were not tied to roads, and might, therefore, be capable of moving directly across south Burma on Rangoon. Therefore British and Indian battalions had to move from the Shan States and Mandalay to around Moulmein and were replaced with the Chinese 5th and 6th Armies.10
Since transport was scarce, troop movements were made slowly. Moving the balance of the Chinese 93d Division (6th Army) into Burma was agreed to by General Wavell on request from Burma Army headquarters on 19 January. Two days later he agreed to the 49th Division. The Chinese Ministry of War issued orders to move the last of the 6th Army's three divisions on 3 February. The General Officer Commanding, Burma, Lt. Gen. T. J. Hutton, discussed the matter with the Generalissimo when the latter visited India and reached an understanding. On 31 January Hutton asked Wavell's permission to admit the 5th Army, the Generalissimo concurred on 3 February, and movement began on 28 February. General Wavell's action preceded the intervention of Churchill and Roosevelt. Prompted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who thought no political or administrative difficulties should be allowed to prevent the Chinese from joining in the defense of Burma, Roosevelt had personally raised the matter with Churchill.11
So began China's share in the First Burma Campaign. There was no difficulty in supplying the 93d Division because its arrival had been anticipated. The 49th Division was something of a problem, but by mid-March it was comfortably settled in huts. The Temporary-55th Division was the last of the 6th Army to arrive--a new unit, badly led, meagerly equipped, and poorly trained.12
The Command Situation, China-Burma-India, March 1942
The rapid Japanese successes were forcing an alteration in the system of unified Anglo-American command set up at ARCADIA. Possibly foreshadowed by Churchill's comment of 10 February that he clearly understood the President would have the primary responsibility in dealing with China in all cases, and following soon after Wavell's ABDACOM was dissolved on 25 February, a CCS proposal of 8 March 1942 suggested a triple division of strategic responsibility. The whole Pacific, including China, would be under American direction though local operational control in China would be with the Generalissimo. The United States would make decisions on broad strategy, which would include offensives in a northwesterly direction from the main U.S. bases and attacks on Japan proper from China. From Singapore to and including the Middle East would be the British sphere of responsibility though the United States would continue lend-lease support. The Atlantic theater would be an area of combined responsibility. Co-ordinating operations between the areas would remain the subject of study and recommendation by the CCS. In accepting the CCS's proposal, Churchill assumed that any large-scale operations to seize the initiative would be discussed by the CCS in Washington and not ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) unilaterally.13
In compliance with this arrangement, Stilwell was told by the War Department on 15 March that Wavell was now "Supreme Commander, India," that the CCS had made Wavell responsible for operations in Burma, and was reminded that any of his forces operating in India or Burma would be under Wavell's command.14
There were many implications in this division of responsibility as regarded Burma, all containing seeds of future trouble. The Generalissimo's concurrence was not invited, which angered him.15 Nor was it suggested to him that he was exercising "local operational command" under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A major campaign was under way in Burma, which lay on the border between
the Middle Eastern and Pacific spheres of responsibility. Any Sino-British operation in Burma would thus be based on two separate areas of strategic responsibility. Moreover, according to the CCS proposal, a British subject commanded in Burma. Six Chinese divisions, as against two British, would shortly be in that area. What would happen if the Generalissimo insisted that, as China supplied the men, it should also supply the commander? General Stilwell had been sent to Asia with the thought, among others, that he would command in Burma, but this was now impossible. (Chart 1)
Below the CCS level, but independent of its direction, came the Generalissimo's China Theater, as created at ARCADIA. There were five elements in the command structure at Chungking: the Generalissimo, the Chinese Army, the Joint Military Council, AMMISCA, and Stilwell as chief of the Generalissimo's joint staff. Because of the decisions of ARCADIA, the Generalissimo had a dual status, as the Chinese leader and as an Allied commander. The Generalissimo was Commander in Chief of the Chinese Forces and Chairman of the Supreme National Defense Council, a post like that of Prime Minister. As Supreme Allied Commander, he was in command of all Allied forces in China, precisely as MacArthur and Eisenhower were to be in their theaters. They, however, were under the CCS, whose task it was to reconcile national differences and recommend directives in the common interest, whereas the Generalissimo was accountable to himself alone, free to act as he thought China's interest might require, and free to order his two chiefs of staff, Stilwell and Ho Ying-chin, accordingly. When the Generalissimo's co-operation was desired by the United States, it had to be obtained by diplomatic processes.
As Supreme Commander of the China Theater, the Generalissimo was responsible for operations carried on in it. It was the Generalissimo's responsibility to make decisions and to lay down the broad lines of policy he desired to have followed. Both as Supreme Commander and as Generalissimo he had to supervise the training, equipping, and supplying of his troops, and the performance of duty by his subordinates. His chiefs of staff were advisers only, not executive officers.
Stilwell, as the Generalissimo's chief of joint staff, was placed in a difficult position from the beginning. He was sent to China to aid the Generalissimo in discharging the duties of Supreme Commander of an Allied theater. In this role he was assistant to a commander who was a free agent and whose conceptions of China's interests did not always agree with those of the CCS. But Stilwell had three other roles. He was commanding general of the American forces in India and Burma as well as in China; he was the military representative of the President of the United States in Chungking; and he was dispenser of lend-lease matériel for the United States. His roles would be workable while the Republic of China and the United States agreed. When they disagreed or when they were seeking an agreement, Stilwell was automatically placed in a dilemma, uncertain whether to comply with the wishes of the man who was
Division of Allied Command Responsibilities in Southeast Asia
his immediate superior and Allied theater commander or to follow the directives of the Joint and Combined Chiefs. Ideally, his Chinese and American superiors should have agreed on and issued him a combined directive. In practice, Stilwell's American superiors would order him to secure the assent of his Chinese superiors, a process vexing to the Chinese, who would have greatly preferred the reverse. Stilwell recognized his predicament and, as will be noted, offered several solutions to those in authority, which they did not accept.
Stilwell's plight would have been eased had the Generalissimo's joint staff--representing the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Netherlands--ever been organized. The Joint Military Council in Chungking was in existence when he arrived and offered the possibility of being elevated into a joint staff by a few changes in assignment and terminology. Organized on 31 December 1941, the council had never grown in stature and authority because the governments represented thereon had never acquiesced in, if indeed they were fully aware of, its possibilities. After the first fortnight, Magruder's membership on the council was overshadowed by the general knowledge that another and senior American officer was coming to China. China's representative, General Ho, could do nothing without consulting the Generalissimo, while the British apparently were content to let the Chinese and Americans offer a lead. The Netherlands' member, added later, soon represented only a government in exile but distinguished himself on one occasion by an outburst of frank and excellent advice. On 24 April he pleaded for an Allied staff and some kind of co-ordinated strategy. That night Magruder's chief of staff wrote in his diary that if an Allied plan for the Pacific existed, AMMISCA knew nothing of it and the same might be said for the Generalissimo.
The council recommended the construction of the Ledo and Imphal Roads and the transfer of lend-lease matériel to the British (13 January), but its sessions usually appeared futile to Cols. Harry S. Aldrich and Edward E. MacMorland, who often served as U.S. representatives.16 The key to this innocuous desuetude probably lies in the rapid emergence of the Combined Chiefs of Staff as the principal agency for the direction of the Anglo-American war effort. The Combined Chiefs of Staff were the superiors of the British and American representatives on the council, who could hardly advocate views of which their superiors disapproved or supervise the execution of policies for which their superiors would not provide resources. Consequently, the Chinese found it more convenient to deal with higher authority in London and Washington.
The Chinese Army and its Chief of Staff, General Ho, contributed more complexities. As has been noted, the Chinese Army was a coalition of armed factions and provincial levies, whose loyalties were local and personal rather than national, plus a hard core of about thirty divisions personally loyal to the
Generalissimo. This situation created many delicate problems of domestic politics for the Generalissimo, which he was not disposed to brush aside. Rather, he often seemed preoccupied with them.17 For Stilwell to persuade the Generalissimo to commit the Chinese Army or any major portion of it to offensive action was not easy. "It would be naive in the extreme to suggest that all [Stilwell] had to do to make China an aggressive factor in the war against Japan was to place lend-lease arms in Chinese hands and, in consultation with the Generalissimo, issue orders for the attack."18 General Ho's actions soon suggested to Stilwell that he saw in the arrival of an American as chief of staff of the Generalissimo's joint staff the introduction of a rival center of power and influence and a direct challenge to his own position. This rivalry, tempered by the requirements of the military situation, produced a state of affairs in which Ho and Stilwell sometimes co-operated amicably and sometimes sought each other's removal.19
AMMISCA might have acted as an energizing and unifying force but, though it had been given very broad powers, it never had a clear indication as to what the War Department wanted done with those powers.20 As has been noted, the Department was attacking the China problem, but the process of solving it took time.21 After 9 February, when Colonel Aldrich had a secret interview with the Generalissimo's military secretary, the Chinese were formally aware that Stilwell was coming.22
Early U.S. Logistical and Administrative Problems
General Magruder's wartime directives ordered him to persuade the Chinese to contain as many Japanese forces as possible and to speed the flow of arms through Burma to China. Repeated attempts to persuade the Chinese to action had brought no results.23 As for increasing the quantity of lend-lease aid moving through Burma, AMMISCA reconnoitered alternative routes across Burma to India, one of its officers driving by jeep from Lashio to Calcutta across the 8,000-foot Chin Hills on the trace of the Imphal Road.24 AMMISCA sent its officers to Burma to fight the administrative ineptitude and confusion that slowed traffic there. One of them, Maj. James Wilson, rendered distinguished
service in moving lend-lease equipment north from Rangoon and died in the bombing of Mandalay by the Japanese.25
AMMISCA was authorized immediately after Pearl Harbor to induct the AVG into U.S. service if the Chinese agreed, but AMMISCA found the Chinese determined to bargain and Chennault "vigorously opposed." The Chinese agreed in principle but found endless reasons to delay induction. On one occasion they demanded a greatly increased allotment of lend-lease arms as a precondition; on another, that all U.S. air units in China be placed under Chinese command and that Chinese citizens be allowed to join any such unit sent there. When, on 1 January 1942, the question of induction had seemed settled on every point but one, Hollington Tong, Vice-Minister of Information, brought forth a fresh set of demands from the Generalissimo.26
The proposal for an international guerrilla force in China, mentioned in the Notes on China which Drum had been given and included in directives to AMMISCA, was quietly forgotten. No Americans, therefore, shared the heartbreaking experiences of those British commandos who came to China to destroy bridges and to harass the Japanese in the guerrilla manner so colorfully described in the press, only to find that the last thing the Chinese desired was to provoke the Japanese into reprisal raids.27
AMMISCA had tried to improve the Chinese Air Force and Chinese Army. After a careful study based on the work of earlier U.S. missions, Magruder gave the Generalissimo a plan to reorganize the Chinese Air Force. The Generalissimo approved it and issued orders to place it in effect, but nothing happened. Colonel Sliney, Magruder's artillery specialist, instructed Chinese artillerymen in the use of 75-mm. pack howitzers that arrived from Burma. Colonel MacMorland suggested that AMMISCA personnel go to Burma as liaison officers with the Chinese 5th and 6th Armies, but General Magruder demurred, saying no one was available.28
The command situation in China as of Stilwell's arrival was therefore very different from that contemplated when his orders were issued. There was no joint staff of which he might at once become chief, and circumstances suggested that there never would be one. For several reasons AMMISCA had not created a smoothly running organization which he might take over. The War Department had not made its desires clear. The reluctance of the Chinese to let the AVG be inducted as the 23d Pursuit Group until China had gained
every possible diplomatic advantage from the situation kept the most effective Allied air unit in Southeast Asia from the control of the potential U.S. theater headquarters, AMMISCA. Operating the line of communications through Burma was another major task for a theater headquarters, but the Japanese cut that line with their capture of Rangoon.
In India the picture was more hopeful; present there were the beginnings of the Tenth Air Force and of the airline from India to China (though a Services of Supply did not begin work until April). The real growth of the Tenth Air Force began with initiatives by Generals Marshall and Brett. Recognizing the strategic implications of the probable loss of Java to the Japanese, on 11 February Marshall suggested to Wavell that the 19th Bombardment Group (H) be sent from ABDACOM to Burma, assuring him further that fighter cover for Burma was en route.29
Independently, General Brett had arrived at similar conclusions. He hoped ultimately to establish a force of U.S. heavy bombers in the general area of Akyab-Calcutta. The first essential was fighter cover, so, going from Burma to join Wavell's command in the Netherlands Indies, Brett had diverted a convoy from Australia to India for Burma duty. In it was the old carrier USS Langley, with thirty-two P-40's set up on deck and plenty of pilots and ground personnel. A few days later Wavell overruled him and decided to send the USS Langley to Java after all. She was sunk en route and all that reached India from the convoy in the way of air power was the ground echelon of the 7th Bombardment Group (H), 51st Air Base Group, personnel of the 51st Pursuit Group, and ten P-40's.30 Also present were seven radio teams and Detachment, Company B, 52d Signal Battalion, originally intended to provide communications in Java.31
In accordance with the War Department directives of February 1942, on 5 March, General Brereton, as Commanding General, Tenth Air Force, assumed command of this effort to put U.S. air power in India. General Stilwell was told by the War Department that the Tenth would operate offensively in China under his direction. In addition to the 10 surviving P-40's, 51 fighters and 12 B-17's for the American Volunteer Group were en route and 33 more heavies would be allocated as soon as possible. A further increment would be 37 B-24's for the express mission of bombing Japan from Chinese bases, the HALPRO project.32
Organization of the airline to China was under way concurrently with Stilwell's first surveys of his new position. In January and February 1942 Chinese and American authorities contemplated an airlift from Assam, India, to Myitkyina in north Burma, a barge line from Myitkyina to Bhamo, and a truck haul from Bhamo to China. Stilwell was told of the project before he left Washington, and on 21 March the President ordered activation of the Assam-Burma-China Ferry Command. General Naiden, chief of staff of the Tenth Air Force, surveyed the projected air route and concluded that the normal run should be from the Royal Air Force base at Dinjan to Myitkyina. To meet the complex inadequacies of the Indian transport net, Naiden also proposed another airline connecting the seaport of Karachi with Dinjan. To fly these routes, twenty-five aircraft were diverted from commercial airlines in the United States, and ten came from Pan American Airways' trans-African line. The latter began the service, arriving at Karachi on 5 April.33
Stilwell's First Problems
General Stilwell's aircraft touched Indian soil at Karachi on 24 February 1942. The next day he and his staff were in New Delhi, India's capital, to confer with General Headquarters (India). There he learned that only one Indian infantry brigade could be spared to reinforce Burma.34 From India he went to Lashio in Burma where he was introduced to the Generalissimo and to Colonel Chennault. Chennault was now a world figure in his own right. His skillful and prescient training of the American Volunteer Group, the devoted leadership of the squadron commanders, and the skill and courage of the pilots and ground crew had resulted in an imposing number of Japanese aircraft shot down in Burma. The Japanese had been kept from closing the port of Rangoon by air action, and Chennault's Flying Tigers for many weeks had supplied the Allied public with the only good news from the Far East. Chennault and Stilwell spoke together at Kunming on 4 March, where Chennault agreed to serve under Stilwell and further consented to induction of the American Volunteer Group into the Army Air Forces (AAF). "A big relief," wrote Stilwell, who had feared Chennault might object on both points.35
When Stilwell arrived in China, the question of AMMISCA's command relation to him arose at once. The War Department solved it by superseding Magruder's directive and placing all AMMISCA personnel at Stilwell's disposal. Using AMMISCA's officers and men, together with the personnel arriving in the China-Burma-India area, for his United States Task Force in China, Stilwell integrated all into a Headquarters, American Army Forces, China, Burma and
India. This headquarters was established at Chungking on 4 March 1942. Significant of the approach General Marshall had desired, the new title excluded the word theater.36
The first conference between Stilwell, the Generalissimo, and Madame Chiang was held on 6 March 1942 in Chungking. Stilwell delivered the President's oral message,37 explained the orders under which he was to operate, and described the help en route to China. The Generalissimo was concerned about command in Burma and about Sino-British relations. His comment on Stilwell's status was: "I told those Army commanders [in Burma] not to take orders from anybody but you and to wait until you came."38 That was good news to Stilwell, for it seemed a clear indication that Stilwell would command the Chinese troops in Burma. The Generalissimo showed no hesitation over the proposed joint staff which Stilwell was to lead and assured him it would be set up the next day. The one problem seemed to be Sino-British relations, for the Generalissimo strongly objected to British command in Burma.39
When the Chinese staff proposals came on the 9th, they were a subtle repudiation of the Soong-Stimson agreements of January. The understanding reached by the two governments through Soong and Stimson had been that Stilwell would be chief of staff of the combined Sino-British-American forces in the China Theater, an Allied chief of staff under a Supreme Allied Commander. The Chinese proposed to make Stilwell chief of staff of the Allied (i.e., Anglo-American) forces only, which were then the American and British military missions, together with Stilwell's task force in China--perhaps 300 men and nothing more. By writing in one of his copybooks, "At least Chiang Kai-shek is sticking to one part of the agreement [command]," Stilwell implied his awareness that the Chinese had already defaulted on the other, a joint staff for China Theater.40 However, that same night, 9 March, the Generalissimo talked with Stilwell until midnight and said he was radioing Washington that Stilwell should command both British and Chinese in Burma.41
Since the Generalissimo had earlier promised to place the Chinese 5th and 6th Armies under British command, AMMISCA personnel were dismayed
when they learned that the Generalissimo now objected to British command in Burma. He announced that he distrusted them after their recent setbacks, while Madame Chiang was violently anti-British in talking to MacMorland, AMMISCA's chief of staff.42
The Chinese radioed Washington in strong terms that Stilwell should lead in Burma. They seemed quite serious in their insistence, telling Stilwell that if the British tried to give orders, the Chinese would withdraw from Burma.43 Certainly this was consistent with their earliest utterances; on 16 December 1941, General Ho told the British military attaché that if the Chinese were to be effective in Burma, they would have to operate independently in their own assigned sector.44 In replying on 10 March, the President temporized, saying he hoped that Stilwell would be allowed to work out the very difficult and involved command problem on the spot without the need of placing it formally before the British. The Generalissimo read the President's reply, then turned to Magruder and MacMorland, who delivered the message on 13 March, and said that there must be unified command in Burma, either under the Chinese or the British. He preferred Stilwell, because he did not trust the British in the light of their Far Eastern record.45
The British were not pleased with Stilwell's presence in Burma, because their Gen. Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander (now commanding Burma Army) had expected to command the Chinese, and because Stilwell had neither a staff nor knowledge of the local situation. Churchill added that the British had prepared a supply service for the Chinese, together with a liaison net down to the division level. He suggested to the President that Stilwell be under Alexander's command.46 The President and Marshall answered much as they had to the Generalissimo. They assured Churchill that Stilwell wanted to solve the command problem by co-operating with Alexander until the Chinese came into line. They described Stilwell as immensely resourceful and capable, informed on Chinese matters, and devoid of thoughts of personal aggrandizement. Though ordered by the Generalissimo to take no orders from the British, he could co-operate if the Generalissimo was pleased with the supply arrangements that the British made for his troops. The President and Chief of Staff
added the very pointed comment that a Chinese commander might make things impossible for Alexander.47
Meanwhile, in Chungking Stilwell was trying to solve the command problem and free himself of the tactical and personnel restrictions imposed by the Generalissimo. For a short-term solution of the Sino-British impasse Stilwell favored co-operation, and for the long run he had no objections to serving under Alexander; indeed, when on one occasion a translator's error made it appear for a while that, at Stilwell's urging, the Chinese had accepted British command, he wrote in his diary: "Suddenly the sun breaks through."48 Stilwell worked earnestly to smooth over the situation, for two divisions of the 5th Army were being held at the Burmese border until the command and supply questions were settled to the Generalissimo's satisfaction. Stilwell knew that the Chinese reinforcements were needed in Burma and had suggested sending in still another Chinese army. He was satisfied with British handling of the supply question, and Alexander and he had agreed to handle the command question for the present by close co-operation.49 On 27 March, after Alexander visited Chungking and saw the Generalissimo, the Chinese reversed themselves again on the command question. Madame Chiang sent a casual little note to Stilwell, saying, "At your suggestion, pending further developments from Washington, the High Command of Burma will rest in General Alexander's hands. . . ."50 The concession proved meaningless, and in his report on the campaign Alexander called his command nominal.51
Stilwell's own command position was settled on 11 March after the Chinese gave many hints, which Stilwell recorded with care:
Chinese fa tzu [method]--they don't say to me--"you will command the 5th and 6th Armies under such and such conditions." Instead, it sort of slips out after a lot of talk. Of course, I couldn't ask outright. "I told them to take orders from the British until you get there"; "when you go down to Burma"; "Gen. Shang Chen will introduce you"; "I don't ask for a Chinese commander; I just want them to include the British in your command."52
When the Generalissimo finally gave the word he was quite clear:
I wish to inform you that this morning I issued orders to place the 5th and 6th armies under your command. . . . General Ling Wen-wei has his headquarters at Lashio, and in the rear you can use his. I have ordered him to give you all assistance, and you can use his staff officers, and in the rear he can act as your chief of staff. Generals Ling, Tu, and Kan (commanders-in-chief of the 5th and 6th army [sic]) have been ordered to take orders from you absolutely. . . .53
The restrictions which the Generalissimo now proceeded to place upon Stilwell's use of his new command were hard on an aggressive soldier. Stilwell tried to have them lifted and thought he succeeded, only to conclude in time that the Chinese concessions on strategy as on command were purely formal. In the initial conference of 6 March the Generalissimo stated accurately that there was no plan for the campaign in Burma. In succeeding talks he tried to make his views clear to Stilwell. These discussions revealed the Generalissimo's belief that his 5th and 6th Armies were the best he had, that they should not attack the Japanese, but that, if the Japanese attacked them and were repulsed, then they might attack. He expressed extreme distrust of the British. More specifically, the Generalissimo stated: "My idea ultimately is to hold a line east and west through Thazi if the Chinese troops are to defend Mandalay. In that case, should the British troops at Prome retreat, then we hold a slanting line with Mandalay as the pivot point in order to protect Myitkyina and Lashio, our railway and highways in order to keep communications between China and India uninterrupted."54 A day later he remarked, "As long as the British hold Prome, we hold Toungoo."55
When it came to tactics, the Generalissimo severely restricted Stilwell. The latter was to put his forces in a column of divisions about fifty miles apart. The 200th Division of the 5th Army was to stay at Toungoo as long as the British held Prome. The 6th Army was to hold fast in the Shan States. The remaining two divisions of the 5th Army were to enter Burma when supplies were satisfactorily arranged and then advance as far as Mandalay. Caution and the defensive were enjoined over and over again though Stilwell suggested an offensive to retake Rangoon.56
Three things fitted together in Stilwell's mind: the Generalissimo's injunction to hold north Burma in order to cover the route to India; the approach of the monsoon rains which would probably begin about 15 May; and the terrain of Burma from Mandalay and above, with a steep escarpment rising dramatically from the plain just east of Mandalay. Stilwell's intentions for the campaign in Burma were to work toward the recapture of Rangoon because he thought that the Japanese might be weak and that boldness might pay big dividends. If this plan failed then the Chinese would fall back toward the north and, from positions on the high ground east of Mandalay, offer a flanking threat to any Japanese drive northward. The monsoon rains were expected to complicate the Japanese task enormously.57
Stilwell's larger plans were:
General Plan: (1) Complete communications with India, and operate against the Japs at Rangoon. Whether or not we use the port, it must be denied to the Japs for use as a base. Reinforce the 5th and 6th Chun [armies], first with the 71st. Move other units into the Kunming area, where they can train, as a preliminary to moving them into Burma. After making Rangoon safe, concentrate at Kunming-Kweiyang for an offensive to Hanoi (1), or to clear the Hankow area (2).
(1) The Hanoi plan would give us a base for aviation to work on the Jap communications, but it would not decide anything. The Japs would by-pass it. Hankow would have to be taken, anyway. (2) Clearing the Hankow area would put us within striking distance of Japan. The Japs would be backed up to Nanking and Suchow, and a push north through Kaifeng would force the evacuation of South Shansi and the Chengchow area. By this time aviation should be available to support all ground operations.
Hankow could be isolated by a holding attack in West Hupeh and a double envelopment--through Sinyang and north of the Tai Pieh Shan and from the Changsha-Hengyang area on Nanchang and Kiukiang.
The 30 divisions to be equipped and armed should be designated at once [in the 9 March conference, the Generalissimo said it would be easy to designate them when the arrival date of the lend-lease was known] and brought to the Kweiyang-Kunming area for training and as a preliminary concentration for possible use in Siam and Indo-China. Thought should be given to the use of guerrillas there; it would be helpful to have them established well inside the borders before troops move in. They should take the attitude that the Chinese are liberating the natives and establish friendly relations if possible.
Everywhere in occupied China, regular forces and guerrillas should increase their activity, and at the very least, constantly harass the Japs and keep them from mutual support. The weak points will be disclosed and we will know what, if any, air strength can be pushed in to help them.
Work on all roads should be pushed. Sooner or later they will be needed for heavy motor traffic. Work should be pushed on all airfields that need it.
A general plan for location of dumps, etc., should be prepared, based on a basic plan for future operations.58
Immediately after the Generalissimo stated on 11 March that Stilwell would command in Burma, Stilwell left to meet with his new subordinates, Lt. Gen. Tu Yu-ming (5th Army), Lt. Gen. Kan Li-chu (6th Army), and Lt. Gen. Lin Wei (the Ling Wen-wei of the conference minutes, Chinese General Staff Mission). They all agreed with Stilwell that the way to defend north Burma was to stand at Toungoo; Lin Wei and Tu agreed to start the two remaining divisions of the 5th Army to Burma. Then Stilwell went back to Chungking to see if the rest of the Army hierarchy would join him in asking the Generalissimo's consent to Stilwell's orders for a concentration around Toungoo. Stilwell felt optimistic; Tu and Kan made a good impression on him and he felt the Chinese accepted him.59 The War Department was told that there were restrictions on him but that he hoped to do something if the Japanese were not reinforced.60
Under Stilwell's persuading, the Generalissimo somewhat relaxed his restrictions on tactics. In an emergency the 22d Division, 5th Army, might help the 200th Division, 5th Army, at Toungoo, but the 96th Division, 5th Army, was to stay in Mandalay. The attitude was to be strictly defensive, and General Alexander was to be helped only in an emergency. Three more divisions (66th Army) were promised, one of them to Mandalay, two to stay on the border. The Generalissimo observed that three Chinese divisions were needed to match one Japanese division and odds of five to one for an attack.61
Darkening Prospects for Burma's Defenders
Far to the south of Chungking, Mandalay, and Toungoo, a series of naval disasters in the Indian Ocean left Burma's defenders without British or American reinforcements in the closing days of the campaign because they aroused the gravest apprehensions for the safety of India. Even before action was fairly joined in the Far East, the loss or disabling in November-December of 4 Royal Navy battleships, 1 battle cruiser, and 1 aircraft carrier severely handicapped the Royal Navy. In March 1942 the Admiralty was able to spare for operations in the Indian Ocean 5 old battleships, 3 carriers, 14 cruisers, and 16 destroyers. Their commander, Admiral James Somerville, R.N., expected the Japanese to appear with a few carriers supported by three of the ubiquitous Kongo-class battle cruisers, a force he could meet with reasonable chance of success. When the Japanese were sighted, Somerville decided to try for a night air strike, like that which had been so successful at Taranto. In the maneuverings preliminary to that attempt, he lost two heavy cruisers, a destroyer, and an auxiliary cruiser to the Japanese carrier aircraft, which also raided Ceylon. There was a large-scale flight of refugees from Ceylon, and essential services were dislocated.62
Somerville missed his attempt at a night contact and, as he now believed the Japanese carrier force was present in strength, he did not risk a daylight encounter but withdrew his carrier division plus the Warspite to Bombay and sent the battleships to Kilindini on the African coast, thus acknowledging that for the time at least Japan controlled the Bay of Bengal. Sweeping the bay, the Japanese sank the old light carrier H.M.S. Hermes, a destroyer, and a corvette. Then they sank 100,000 tons of merchant shipping, and withdrew to the east on the long voyage that ended at Midway. Somerville was justified in his apprehensions; present were six Japanese carriers plus four Kongo's with
cruisers and destroyers. It was the Japanese naval air arm in the days of its greatest power.63
These successes suggested that Japan and Germany might be on the way to linking their forces in the Middle East, leading inevitably to the loss of India and China, a most alarming prospect to American leadership. Faced with the grave concern that the British Chiefs of Staff felt for India, General Marshall stated that American air power in India64 would support General Wavell. There were no AAF aircraft available to reinforce India, but with British consent a considerable number of U.S. aircraft earmarked for the RAF were released to American use and sent to India. To the Prime Minister's appeal for naval aid Roosevelt replied that a major Anglo-American concentration off Ceylon was not as workable a solution as the replacement of the Royal Navy's Home Fleet units by American ships, thus releasing British craft for service in a homogeneous British Eastern Fleet. This was speedily done, and the British accelerated long-standing arrangements for the occupation of Madagascar to prevent an expected Japanese landing. Operations began on 5 May and firmly established Allied power on that island, which lay athwart the principal Allied line of communications to the Middle East.65
Fears for India's safety had their effect on the defense of Burma. In spring 1942 India had 984,514 men under arms. Eight brigades (2 divisions) were lost in Malaya; 5 Indian brigades were in Burma. Six divisions were in the Middle East. That left 4 in India, 1 in Ceylon--all of them new with far less training than the units lost in Malaya. Establishments in India had been drawn on heavily to equip the Middle East and, to a lesser degree, Malaya. With the needs of defense against the turbulent tribes of the Northwest Frontier Province, this left one brigade which was marching in overland when the end came. On 7 March General Wavell told the British Chiefs of Staff his "grave doubts" of his ability to hold Burma and urged a concentration in northeast India. The War Cabinet ruled that Ceylon should receive reinforcements rather than northeast India, so air and land reinforcements from India went to Ceylon rather than to Burma. Within India, Madras, Bengal, and Orissa had to be garrisoned against Japanese attacks, and in mid-March the first two were held
by two Indian divisions. The British 70th Division (less one brigade) was in Orissa and was expected to be reinforced in the summer by the British 5th Division and two Indian armored brigades. Ceylon was garrisoned by the 16th and 17th Australian Brigade Groups, the 34th Indian Division, and the 16th Brigade Group, 70th Division, supported by 3 fighter squadrons, 1 light bomber squadron, and 1 torpedo squadron. Surveying the Indian strategic picture in the House of Commons, Churchill remarked that General Wavell "is not therefore at present in a position to denude himself to any large extent and he must not cast away his resources."66 With naval control of the Bay of Bengal lost to the Japanese, with grave concern felt that the Japanese might bypass Burma and land on the Bengal coast, other considerations had to yield. That Burma was written off is implied by Churchill's admission on 18 April that he did not know of anything more to be done for Alexander.67
German naval records reveal that on several occasions the Japanese gave their allies reason to think they were contemplating a move toward the Suez Canal. In conversations between German and Japanese officers in the spring of 1942, India was rarely mentioned. On one occasion the Japanese told the Germans they planned to take Madagascar, and on another asked for information on the beaches of Ceylon. On 19 April the Japanese Foreign Minister told the German Ambassador that Japanese actions would eventually extend to the western part of the Indian Ocean. Unhappily for those members of the Operations Division of the German Naval Staff who favored operations in the Mediterranean toward the Middle East, on 15 May the Japanese finally told the German Naval Staff that their next major effort would be made east, toward Hawaii and Midway, rather than west toward Suez. On the German side there were differences of opinion about a drive toward Suez and the naval operations staff could never persuade higher authority to give its views the necessary support that might have led to serious discussions with the Japanese. Axis unity was not what it appeared to be, for probably as early as January 1942 Japanese Imperial General Headquarters had decided to make the next major effort in the Pacific.68
Whatever the Japanese intended to do in the Pacific, they were far from idle in Burma. Exploiting the advantages of sea power to the utmost, they were reinforcing faster than the Allies. Originally they had planned to take Burma with four regiments, but the fear of heavy Chinese reinforcements made added strength seem desirable, while the fall of Singapore on 15 February made it available. The 18th and 56th Divisions (less the 146th Regiment of the 56th), the 213th Regiment of the 33d Division, plus the 1st and 14th Tank Regiments, arrived at Rangoon by sea during March and April. The 18th and 56th went to the Sittang valley, while the 213th rejoined its division.69
1 BURMA CORPS70
(Lt. Gen. William J. Slim)
JAPANESE 15TH ARMY
(Lt. Gen. Shojiro Iido)
7th Armored Brigade Group
1st Burma Division (Maj. Gen. J. Bruce Scott): 1st Burma Brigade, 2d Burma Brigade, and 13th Indian Infantry Brigade
17th Indian Division (Maj. Gen. David Cowan): 16th, 48th, and 63d Indian Infantry Brigades
CHINESE EXPEDITIONARY ARMY IN BURMA71
(Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell)
5th Army (Lt. Gen. Tu Yu-ming): 22d, 96th, and 200th Divisions
6th Army (Lt. Gen. Kan Li-chu): 49th, Temporary-55th, and 93d Divisions
66th Army (Lt. Gen. Chang Chen): 28th, 29th, and 38th Divisions
33d Division (Lt. Gen. Genzo Yanagida)
18th Division (Lt. Gen. Renya Mutaguchi)
55th Division (Lt. Gen. Yutaka Takeuchi)
56th Division (Lt. Gen. Sukezo Matsuyama)
146th Regiment (Arrived May 1942)
Burma's defenders, badly handicapped throughout the six-month campaign by utterly inadequate information on the enemy, did not know that the Japanese strength had almost doubled. The G-2 journal of Stilwell's headquarters quoted a British report that forty Japanese transports landed troops at Rangoon on 12 April. The official theater history of the campaign, prepared after its close, put the 33d and 55th Divisions in Burma and the 17th and 18th in northern Thailand as of March-April 1942. Actually, northern Thailand was empty of Japanese, while there were four divisions in Burma proper, three of them in the Sittang valley.72
The Japanese headquarters, 15th Army, planned to complete the campaign by late May by surrounding and annihilating the British and Chinese force in the vicinity of Mandalay. The 33d Division would drive north up the Irrawaddy valley through Prome and Yenangyaung; the 55th, up the Rangoon-Mandalay Road through Meiktila; the 56th, wide to the east through Taunggyi and then northward. The 18th would be in reserve in the Sittang valley.73
The Chinese Expeditionary Force
The Chinese divisions entering Burma, though with one exception fairly representative of the better Nationalist divisions, still had weaknesses that put heavy burdens on the skill of their leaders and the devotion of their troops. They varied greatly in size. The 200th Division began with about 8,500 men. It was fully motorized and had a small armored component. The other two divisions of the 5th Army, the 96th and 22d, had about 6,000 men each. The 6th Army divisions averaged 5,700 in strength. These were not all combat troops by any means; each division included coolie labor units for transport and replacements.74
The 5th Army originally had twelve 75-mm. pieces, some of which were lend-lease howitzers. By 5 April, twenty-four lend-lease 75-mm. howitzers had been added to that modest store. A motorized battalion of 105-mm. howitzers was present during the campaign. Medical supplies were almost nil, and the Chinese medical organization was largely on paper. Very valuable aid was given by Dr. Gordon Seagrave, an American medical missionary later famous as the Burma Surgeon, his few doctors, American and British ambulance
drivers, Burmese nurses, and British medical units supplied by Alexander from his own meager resources. Commissioned as a major in the Medical Corps, Seagrave was aided by Capt. John H. Grindley, and Capt. Donald M. O'Hara. Though a dental surgeon, Captain O'Hara tirelessly assisted in the treatment of Chinese wounded. The bulk of medical supplies came from the American Red Cross stocks at Lashio.75
Logistics was a source of concern, though the supply and maintenance of the Chinese were assumed by the British. Southward movement of Chinese troops and supplies, on the Chinese side, was the responsibility of that same General Yu Fei-peng with whom Colonel Twitty had attempted to deal. Yu was also charged with moving Chinese Ministries' and China Defense Supplies' stocks to China. The opportunities of commercial profit from transporting rice, gasoline, and consumer goods to China were enormous, and many Americans who dealt with Yu believed he was diverting trucks and fuel from military movements to take the fullest advantage of these commercial opportunities.76
Officials of the Government of Burma and Army in Burma headquarters were well aware of this and resolved that their resources should not be used by the Chinese to compensate for, or to expedite, Yu's transactions. Consequently, even legitimate Chinese requests for supplies and trucks were met with suspicion. These bickerings tended to distract attention from the real needs of the front. Nor was the Government of Burma helpful. All Chinese troops moving to the Sittang and Irrawaddy fronts had to pass through Mandalay, and the Government of Burma ruled that only one Chinese division at a time could be in that city. Therefore, each division in turn had to clear Mandalay completely before the next entered. Concentration was hampered by this and, because the 38th Division was several weeks in clearing the Mandalay area, the final collapse found the other two divisions of the 66th Army hopelessly strung out along the road from China.
The Burma Railways were poorly managed by the Government of Burma, and they were not at their best under Japanese bombing. They were not militarized until late in the campaign. Efforts to stiffen their personnel--many of whom deserted their posts--with veteran Chinese railway men, as requested by the British military attaché in China, were temporarily defeated by the railway management with the statement that nothing was known in Burma of such arrangements. Many of the Americans concluded that the Government of
Burma would not recognize the existence of an emergency but adhered to the leisurely, settled routines of peace, regardless of consequences.77
The command technique Stilwell used in Burma is revealed by passages in his writings, in addition to the procedures he followed. To help him command the 5th and 6th Armies through Chinese channels Stilwell used a personal staff and a liaison system. This staff, plus senior Chinese officers, aided him in preparing plans, staff studies, and orders. Orders went to the Chinese General Staff Mission to Burma, which translated them into Chinese and arranged them in the accepted form. The General Staff Mission passed the orders through Chinese channels to the Army commanders concerned. Stilwell's American liaison officers informed him of the execution of the orders in the field. Stilwell expected the main burden of command to be borne by the Chinese themselves. Their commanders were men of long experience in fighting the Japanese; the troops, though lightly equipped, were many and were veterans. Stilwell could not be on every front and expected the Chinese commanders to show a degree of initiative.78
The American personal staff and liaison system had its headquarters at Maymyo. Brig. Gen. Thomas G. Hearn was chief of staff; Lt. Col. Frank N. Roberts, G-2; Col. Frederick McCabe, G-3; Col. Benjamin G. Ferris, G-4. Stilwell's aide was Lt. Col. Frank Dorn. The forward command post, under Maj. Gen. Franklin C. Sibert, assisted by Lt. Col. Willard G. Wyman, was initially near General Tu's headquarters. General Sibert doubled as liaison officer with Tu's 5th Army and as tactical adviser to the Chinese. Colonel Sliney was artillery adviser to the 5th Army. Colonel McCabe was also liaison officer with the Chinese 6th Army, as was Colonel Aldrich of AMMISCA. Maj. Frank D. Merrill, who had come to Burma from the Philippines prior to the outbreak of the war to join AMMISCA and who had been with the British during the opening phases of the campaign, was liaison officer with the British. Capt. Paul L. Jones acted as transportation officer and cut across command channels and red tape in the attempt to move supplies forward. Supply officer and headquarters commandant for Stilwell's modest establishment was Maj. Felix Nowakowski.79
The Chinese Begin Their Fight
The concentration of the 200th Division about Toungoo in the Sittang valley was covered by the 1st Burma Division. On 1 March this formation
scored one of the rare Allied tactical successes of the campaign by recovering two Burmese villages from the Japanese in an attempt to close on the 17th Indian Division. Then it halted, for the decision had been reached to mass the British (or imperial forces, as they will be called henceforth, because most of them were Indian and Burmese) in the Irrawaddy valley while the Chinese gathered around Toungoo.80 On the 15th, Alexander promised Stilwell that the Burma Division would hold its position below Toungoo until Stilwell could move up another Chinese division to support the 200th.81 Before that stage was reached, General Tu asked General Alexander to move the Burma Division "out of his way." Alexander was willing, for he was concerned about the Irrawaddy valley and wanted to hasten his concentration there. At this point, Stilwell intervened through Major Merrill and, reminding Alexander of his promise, secured a delay in the Burma Division's withdrawal. The 5th Army's concentration was still incomplete when the Japanese began to drive north. The Burma Division fought several rear guard actions before it passed through the Chinese lines and began to entrain for its trip to the Irrawaddy.82
After Stilwell established himself in Burma on 21 March, he sent out Battle Order 0001, through the Chinese General Staff Mission to Burma, to Headquarters, Chinese Expeditionary Force, thus proclaiming his intention of using the normal Chinese command channels. The chief of the mission, General Lin Wei, reported the order had gone at once to Generals Kan and Tu and should reach them on the 22d. Further, added Lin, he had alerted Tu by telephone, so that the 5th Army could go to work at once. The order attached the Temporary-55th Division of the 6th Army to the 200th Division and directed the 55th to close on the 200th. Both forces were to be under General Tu, who was made responsible for Toungoo's defense. The 22d Division, under Stilwells control, was to move to Taungdwingyi, at the rear and center of the Allied line from Prome to Toungoo, and be prepared to assist the British in the Prome area. The 96th Division, also in army reserve, would move to Mandalay.83
This attempt to do China's share in holding the line Toungoo-Prome, as the Generalissimo had directed, resulted in the stubborn twelve days' defense of Toungoo by the 200th Division against repeated attacks by the 55th Division. The walled town of Toungoo was a railroad station and road junction on the Mandalay-Rangoon road, and from it there was a road east into the Shan
States that connected with the several roads from south to north that ultimately joined the Burma Road. There was an airfield adjacent to Toungoo, where the AVG trained before the war. The town itself was one of the larger population centers in the area. Almost due west of it on the Irrawaddy River was Prome, a rail terminus and river port. Prome was held by elements of 1 Burma Corps (17th Indian Division, 1st Burma Division, 7th Armored Brigade Group) under Lt. Gen. William J. Slim. Slim's men faced the Japanese 33d Division (213th, 214th, 215th Regiments).84
There was no line in the sense of a continuous fortified position, for the smallness of the force, the distance, and the intervening hill mass prevented that, but if either partner fell back the other would be concerned about his exposed flank, so each anxiously eyed the other. Toungoo's garrison, the 200th Division, was led by Maj. Gen. Tai An-lan, a man of "ability and force, and considerable courage."85 General Tai had two regiments in Toungoo, less detachments on an outpost line to the south, with his third regiment guarding the airfield to his rear.
The Japanese wanted to take the airfield and also uncover the road to Taunggyi. Orders for an attack by the 55th Division with two regiments were issued on 12 March, and the operation began on the 19th when the 112th Regiment hit Tai's outposts. The Chinese held stoutly south of Toungoo on the five succeeding days, and the Japanese decided to try encirclement, sending their 143d Regiment around the Chinese west flank. The 143d surprised the airfield garrison about 0700 on 24 March and cut the road and rail line to the north.86
With the Chinese regiment holding the airfield were a mountain battery and some mounted infantry of the Burma Division en route to the Irrawaddy front. There must have been some choice as to a line of retreat, for the imperial units managed to make their way to the Irrawaddy, while the Chinese fell back on Toungoo. The town was then besieged, though it was incompletely encircled and open to the east. Fortunately, the Chinese had prepared it for all-around defense, with brick pillboxes and carefully arranged fields of fire.
Stilwell arrived at the front on 22 March. Over the next two days he and Tu reached a tentative agreement to bring the 22d Division as near as possible to Toungoo and prepare to counterattack with it in support of the 200th.87 The Temporary-55th Division would be in reserve near by. On the 25th, the Chinese 1st and 2d Reserve Regiments arrived north of the city, were ordered to retake the airfield, but failed to move. To the south the 112th Regiment launched one strong attack after another into Toungoo, broke into it, and by the evening of the 26th held it to the line of the railroad. The valor of the
Chinese soldiery, stubborn and tenacious in defense, asserted itself in those close quarters, and for three days the struggle rocked back and forth within the walls. Though Stilwell's command post believed it had identified all three of the 55th's regiments in action at Toungoo, which would make the Japanese force a powerful one, Stilwell nevertheless thought the situation hopeful.88
The Government of Burma, whose attitude toward the southward movement of the Chinese troops seemed to Stilwell's staff to lie somewhere between the apathetic and the hostile, was shocked by the encirclement of Toungoo and bestirred itself to speed the 5th Army's concentration.89 The 22d Division was in place and ready to attack south to relieve the 200th Division, an attack which would have caught the 143d Regiment between two fires and confronted two Japanese regiments with two divisions plus two regiments of the Generalissimo's best troops. "Here's our chance," wrote Stilwell on 26 March.90
The next day Stilwell began to learn that, despite the Generalissimo's statements in Chungking and the seeming acquiescence of the Chinese headquarters and the Chinese General Staff Mission to Burma, he did not command. The 22d Division failed to move, and Tu was prolific with excuses as to why an attack was impossible. On the 28th, Tu again agreed to move, as the chief of the Chinese military delegation to India and Burma told Stilwell, "I have just received a telegram from Lt. Gen. Tu Yu-ming, Vice-commander, CEF [Chinese Expeditionary Force] in Burma, which states: 'Your order dated 28 March 1942 has been received. I had circulated it [sic] to all the troops under my command. I feel, sir, I have the honor to transmit it to you.' "91
Stilwell now began to fear that the Japanese were reinforcing on his front with troops from the Irrawaddy and so on 28 March he asked Alexander to attack. Next day Major Merrill and Lt. Kenneth G. Haymaker left for Prome to seek Alexander's and Slim's co-operation. Though Alexander thought nothing useful could be accomplished by the operation he agreed and the attack was delivered as promised. On the Sittang front the 22d Division again did nothing, so on 30 March Stilwell faced the command issue squarely and resolved to confront the Generalissimo with the facts.92
While Stilwell was arguing and pleading with Tu Yu-ming to attack one Japanese regiment with five Chinese regiments, the Japanese were vigorously at work in Toungoo, and on 30 March the 200th Division began to retire. The withdrawal was well handled, and the 200th Division got away intact. The stubborn defense of Toungoo by the 200th Division was the longest defensive stand made by any of Burma's defenders and reflected great credit on the
division and its commander. Five years after, the Japanese looked back on it as the hardest fighting of the campaign.93
Merrill and Haymaker returned from their trip to Slim's headquarters to report that Slim had ordered one armored and two infantry brigades to attack the Japanese flank on the Irrawaddy. "In case of a breakthrough," they added, "objective is Rangoon."94
Alexander greatly restricted the number of troops to be used in the attack. The Burma Division, now reduced to seven battalions, was not drawn on. For the first phase a task force of three battalions plus one company of infantry, a tank battalion, a battery of artillery, and a company of sappers and miners was assembled. A reinforced battalion was ordered to protect the flank on the Irrawaddy.
The operation began the evening of 28 March, sorely hampered by the lack of air reconnaissance. Next day the British task force found the Japanese active on its eastern flank and became involved in a struggle with road blocks in trying to cope with this situation. Word then came that the Japanese (215th Regiment) were in Shwedaung, behind the task force. The British commander elected to cut his way out through the town, having already tried and failed to budge the Japanese on his eastern flank. The fighting on the outskirts of Shwedaung that afternoon and night was heavy, for the Japanese were continually reinforced from across the Irrawaddy. The detachment placed to guard against this had been ambushed and overwhelmed. The task force fought its way into Shwedaung during the day but could not get its vehicles through the town. They were abandoned at 1800 hours and the men retreated on foot. Ten tanks were lost, and units for which figures were available in 1943 reported 371 casualties. As a result of this action, the general fatigue of the troops, and the nature of the terrain, Wavell and Alexander agreed that a retreat of some fifty miles should begin "forthwith."95
The Loss of Air Cover
Having been driven from the Irrawaddy valley on 21 and 22 March, the Allied air units were unable to influence the campaign. Shortly before the loss of Rangoon the RAF and AVG withdrew to Magwe. For an air-warning net that field depended on two lines of Observer Corps telephones down the Sittang and Irrawaddy valleys. Nothing had been done to give the field accommodations, revetments, or dispersal facilities. The Japanese 5th Air Division,
the Japanese air headquarters in Burma, surmised the existence of another Allied air base in the Irrawaddy valley after Rangoon's fall and began the search. The find was actually made by the 33d Division on 9 March, probably by agents attached to that unit.
With the completion of the Japanese campaign in Java the arrival of six more Japanese air regiments was expected by 5th Air Division, and the blow on Magwe was held back till their arrival.96 Meanwhile, discovering some fifty Japanese aircraft on Mingaladon field near Rangoon, the RAF mustered 9 Blenheim light bombers and 10 Hurricane fighters for a profitable attack on 21 March. While these aircraft were refueling and rearming in leisurely fashion that afternoon, the Japanese retaliated with the full weight of ten air regiments, perhaps 200 aircraft, all they had in Burma. Two more heavy attacks were made on the 22d.97 When the Japanese finished, 9 Blenheims and 3 P-40's were counted as destroyed on the ground; 3 Hurricanes destroyed in the air; 5 Blenheims left unserviceable. As a result of this crippling blow the RAF aircraft withdrew to Akyab on the Arakan coast, while the ground personnel went to Lashio. Japanese bombings on 23, 24, and 27 March made Akyab untenable, and the few RAF surviving aircraft went to India from where they made some fifty-eight attacks in support of Alexander's withdrawal. The AVG displaced to Kunming to refit and reorganize.
Having forced the Allied air arm beyond the borders of Burma, the methodical Japanese now turned to the bombardment of the Burmese cities. They were largely unopposed, and their attacks usually ended the normal life of whatever town they chose to assault--Prome, Meiktila, Mandalay, Thazi, Pyinmana, Maymyo, Lashio, and Taunggyi.98
At Magwe the tactical results of the disaster were serious. There was no fighter cover for Allied troop movements. Allied commanders had only sporadic and inexpert air reconnaissance. The Japanese exploited the advantages of air reconnaissance to the utmost. The absence of air cover and reconnaissance on the Allied side was further aggravated by the sentiments of the Burmans. The countryside was now passively hostile, occasionally flaring into overt violence. Thanks to sympathetic Burmans, Japanese knowledge of the dispositions and movements of the Allies was detailed and exact, while the Japanese themselves seemed to melt into the background. Bullock-cart transport and native dress aided greatly in this. The Allies felt themselves constantly observed, while their stragglers were sniped or butchered, their wounded mutilated, and their buildings burned. There is no evidence that this guerrilla activity affected the course of the campaign or could not have been disregarded by a vigorous commander who took routine precautions, but it weighed on the spirits of the Chinese, Indian, and British soldiers.
SURVIVORS OF JAPANESE AIR ATTACK are helped from collapsed shelters in Maymyo, Burma, April 1942.
Many high functionaries of the Burman independence movement visited Japan in 1940-41, and the Japanese later stated that information was received from them. Very probably arrangements were made then to arm and train Burmese patriots when the Japanese attacked. Such an "army," perhaps 1,000 strong, was actually organized during the campaign. In addition to volunteer informants, the Japanese made good use of aerial reconnaissance and information patiently gathered from commercial sources.99
Stilwell's G-2, Colonel Roberts, had no means to cope with such a situation.
His G-2 Section was simply himself, with occasional aid in translation from Merrill, who had been a language student and lived with the Japanese Army. In Roberts' opinion, the British tended to concentrate on a network of informants and to neglect ground reconnaissance, so that only rarely did they know where the Japanese were prior to the next Japanese attack. Their interest was directed toward material of value to the War Office. The Chinese, though willing to help Roberts, seemed to him not very interested in military intelligence, and their combat reports were unreliable. The result was that Burma's defenders did not know the strength or disposition of the Japanese and were "practically blind." Searching for some remedy, Roberts persuaded Chennault to assign two fighters a day to reconnaissance, for he could not obtain such help from the Royal Air Force. The effect of these dangerous and seemingly futile missions was very bad on pilot morale.100
The AVG Keeps Up the Fight
From the Chinese side of the fighting in Burma, Chennault retaliated swiftly for the attack on Magwe. Flights of the 1st and 2d AVG Squadrons were staged through forward airstrips to attack the Chiang Mai airfields on 24 March. The 2d Squadron attacked successfully, but the strike was marred by the loss of two pilots, one of them Jack Newkirk, of Scarsdale, N. Y., who with ten and a half victories was one of the leading American aces of the war's early days. On 10 April Chennault personally led twelve fighters to Loiwing, just over the border from Burma, and resumed operations from there. He had a grand total of 35 fighters in commission (including 13 new P-40E's) and 20 deadlined. To receive P-40E's the AVG had had to detach some of its pilots and send them to Takoradi in Africa to ferry them back to China. Twenty-six were on hand there by 23 April.101 With their better equipment and performance they were a godsend to the AVG. Medium bombers would have been extremely useful to Chennault. He understood there were some in India and in April tried to obtain them from Brereton and Bissell, but none could be made available until June, long after the campaign was over. If the B-25's led by Lt. Col. James H. Doolittle in the first air attack on Tokyo on 18 April had made good their landing in China, they would have joined Chennault, but bad weather and poor communications, plus a flight longer than planned, resulted in the loss of all sixteen.102
Most of the AVG missions flown in April were patrol and reconnaissance, many of them low-level, three-ship flights over the Chinese lines to "show the flag" and "build morale." These latter missions were heartily disliked by the pilots, who considered themselves entirely vulnerable to the Japanese. Because they reported negative information on Japanese troop movements, they came to feel that their lives were being needlessly risked on futile reconnaissance missions. Actually, the information was useful to Stilwell, because it established the fact that there was no threat to Meiktila from a Japanese flanking movement as was feared for a time.
Two Japanese attempts to destroy the AVG at Loiwing resulted in the damage of 9 parked aircraft, while the Japanese lost 11. After the second Japanese raid on 10 April there was no major aerial combat until the 28th, when 14 or 15 P-40's met a force of escorted bombers near Lashio. Calculating that the Japanese would try to make a burnt offering of the AVG for the Emperor's birthday, Chennault emptied the Loiwing field and disposed his fighters to intercept. Thirteen Japanese fighters were downed for one AVG fighter damaged in landing.103 On the basis of statistics April was a good month. The AVG tallied 33 Japanese aircraft as certain and 10 probable, for the loss of 1 aircraft destroyed and 9 damaged by strafing, with one pilot wounded.104
The type of mission flown, the cumulative strain of months of combat against heavy odds, the mounting discontent over the lack of aircraft and pilot replacements, the feeling of isolation and sacrifice, finally took concrete form among members of the AVG in a refusal to obey orders. A plan to fly escort for RAF Blenheims after the RAF had failed to keep an earlier rendezvous lit the fuse. Three or four pilots assigned to the mission refused to go. A group meeting only increased the tension and twenty-four pilots, the overwhelming majority of those present, offered their resignations. This crisis was met when Chennault told his pilots their action would be considered desertion. All but a few took back their resignations and the affair was smoothed over.105
Knowing the causes of the outbreak, Chennault tried to remove them. He suggested four immediate steps to Colonel Bissell of Stilwell's staff, who was also Army Air Forces representative at Chungking. These were: an appeal from the President to the AVG to stay in action; the immediate transfer of 30 fighter pilots and 50 to 100 crewmen from those then present at Karachi; early transfer of increments of the 23d Pursuit Group so the AVG could be reconstituted as a U.S. fighter group under that unit designation; relief from low-level, ground-support missions. A message from Roosevelt to the group was speedily sent. The progress of the campaign soon made it impossible to fly
the sort of missions objected to. The other suggestions were not acted on. Loiwing was evacuated on 4 May with the approach of the Japanese Army.106
The Attempts To Reinforce
Though these events meant the loss of air cover in Burma, the failure to remedy the situation did not mean lack of interest at the highest level. President Roosevelt, General Marshall, and Dr. Currie resembled men frantically working at a fire engine who see only a few drops of water trickle out at the end of a very long and leaky hose. Aircraft and pilots were allocated in quantity to Stilwell's air force, but nothing seemed to emerge in the Burmese skies.
Presumably, there were very considerable reinforcements for the AVG on the way. Marshall heard a month later that fifty-five pilots were set up for the 23d Pursuit Group on the assumption that the AVG would be inducted and redesignated as the 23d Group. Thirty-three of them were to fly over in A-29's for the Chinese Air Force; the other twenty-two pilots were designated already. The situation looked even brighter with regard to aircraft for the AVG and Chinese Air Force. There were 13 P-40E's east of Karachi, 6 there, and 29 on the way; 34 P-66's were on ship; 30 P-43's at Karachi, 57 at sea, and 21 in the United States ready to go.107 On paper this seemed an imposing aggregation, and so Stilwell was asked by the War Department to find out if the Generalissimo would part with any of them for Brereton's use since no other fighters were readily available.108
The proposal came at a singularly poor time. The Generalissimo had complained to the President of the poor support China was receiving. Shortly after, there came a reply over Roosevelt's signature saying that the United States was stretched to the utmost. The menace to India, and so to the life line to China, was very grave, and immediate support had to be given to the British. This would have to come from the aircraft intended for the AVG, so after that unit had been brought back to strength the difference would go to Brereton for the defense of India. Coming only a few days after Stilwell's Chungking headquarters had promised that no aircraft would be diverted without the Generalissimo's consent, this was too much for the Chinese. The Generalissimo was "angry and excited." He told Bissell the action was a breach of faith which would adversely affect the good relations between China and the United States. Madame Chiang sent a very strong message to the President, bitterly protesting any such diversion from China's meager allocations. Plainly there had been administrative confusion in Washington, and Currie rushed off a cable, reaffirming
FIGHTER PLANES, P-43's, receiving line service at an airfield in China, 1942.
the old policy of making no diversions without China's consent. The Generalissimo was told that 456 aircraft were definitely allotted to China and would be sent in haste. The War Department query on the possibility of diverting Chinese aircraft was promptly shelved by Stilwell's headquarters.109
But there was no relief for the AVG in any of this, either with regard to personnel or matériel. Without informing Stilwell or Chennault, the Air Ferry Command canceled the forward movement of the replacements, so that two months after the first P-40's landed at Karachi, Chennault received only thirty-two aircraft and no personnel replacements.110 No pilots reached him before the loss of Burma. Of the lend-lease fighter aircraft over which the Chinese were so concerned, ten P-43's were borrowed by Chennault from the Chinese Air Force and used in the summer of 1942. The remainder of those ferried to China were never used in combat. Those in India were, with Chinese consent, returned to U.S. custody in July and salvaged, for after the Chinese had insisted on receiving them and accepted delivery they then stated the P-43's
were unfit for combat.111 In India, Brereton was struggling to assemble his Tenth Air Force with plenty of fuel and pilots but no aircraft. The Chinese would not consent to his having "their" fighters, while the B-17's were helplessly strung out over the long ferry route from Miami, victims of a spare parts shortage and poor maintenance. Four months of unremitting effort from March to June 1942 brought no increase whatever in the size of Brereton's force.112
Brereton was more than willing to use what he could against the Japanese. This was 8 heavy bombers--6 of them from Java and 2 that had struggled across Africa--none in good condition. Conferring with Stilwell in Burma on 24 March, Brereton set 1 May as the approximate date that the Tenth could go into action. When he returned to Delhi three days later, Wavell told him that there was a strong possibility of a "combined sea-air attack in the near future on Calcutta or Colombo, possibly both," because the Japanese were accumulating shipping at Rangoon and at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands, which they had occupied shortly before. This and a "query from Wavell" led Brereton to rush preparations and attack Rangoon and Port Blair. The Rangoon mission was a failure, but eight tons of bombs were laid on Port Blair. Stilwell was surprised and angered, for he wanted the heavy bombers used against hostile aviation in Burma, and Brereton appeared close to disobedience.113
Brereton, however, as Stilwell soon learned, was acting in accord with the wishes of the President and Chief of Staff. The Tenth's commander also sent Stilwell a detailed, candid explanation of his problems and his actions, which revealed he had 7 B-17's, 1 B-24, 1 B-24D, and 7 P-40E's. His bombers could not operate in daylight, because the gunners were not trained and would not be so for another fortnight. The readiness of more squadrons depended on the receipt of aircraft, a matter over which he had no control and little information. His bombing missions had been flown on moonlit nights which was a good way to train raw crews. To operate in Burma he needed fighter cover and air-warning services, which were not then available.114
In answer, Stilwell expressed complete faith in Brereton as a commander and as a fighter. He added that he knew crossed radios and poor communications might cause misunderstandings. He wanted his U.S. forces to work as a team, and of his subordinates he asked only a prior look at major matters of policy and enough advance warning to co-ordinate the American effort. The tone was cordial and suggested that Stilwell regarded the incident as closed.115
On 15 April the War Department told Stilwell that until further notice, the Tenth Air Force would support Wavell and the defense of India. The B-17's struck the Rangoon docks on 16 and 29 April.116
March closed with Stilwell's central problem clear to him and the importance of its solution growing more urgent by the day. The military situation was bad enough, with the Toungoo-Prome line falling and air support lost. The only possible American contribution was more air support, and that was failing to arrive. These circumstances Stilwell apparently saw as subordinate to the one great question of command. He saw three possible courses open to him: (1) to accept his situation and do nothing about it; (2) to resign his command; and (3) to demand complete freedom of action in Burma with a force of Chinese under his command. He decided to proceed to Chungking, describe the situation to the Generalissimo, and then suggest that the Generalissimo either relieve him or give him independent command. With this resolve Stilwell left Burma for Chungking on 31 March 1942.117
Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter (2) * Next Chapter (4)
1. History of Services of Supply, China, India, Burma Theater, 28 February 1942-24 October 1944, pp. 2-7. Gen Ref Br, OCMH.
2. Rad AMMISCA 256, Magruder to Marshall, 8 Feb 42. AMMISCA Radio File, Job-11.
3. (1) Ibid. (2) Rad AMMISCA 192, Marshall to Magruder, 15 Feb 42. AMMISCA Radio File, Job-11.
4. USSBS, Naval Analysis Div, The Campaigns of the Pacific War (Washington, 1946), pp. 3, 43.
5. (1) Japanese Study 88. (2) Interrogs, Lt Col Minoru Kouchi, Lt Gen Yutaka Takeuchi. Gen Ref Br, OCMH. (See Bibliographical Note.) General Takeuchi places the Japanese strength at 16,000.
6. There were, however, 19,052 tons of lend-lease materials in dead storage which were left behind: "miscellaneous light loads for dead storage, 903 tons; industrial machinery, 3,030½ tons; electrical equipment, 686 tons; and construction materials, 14,432½ tons." Rpt, St. John to Stilwell, 10 Mar 42, sub: Rpt on Rangoon Opn from 1 Jan 42 to Evacuation Date. Item 47, Port of Rangoon Folder, CT 42, Dr 4, KCRC.
7. (1) "Report by General the Honourable Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, K.C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., M.C., on Operations in Burma from 5th March, 1942, to 20th May, 1942," Supplement to The London Gazette, March 11, 1948, pars. 3, 15, 16. (2) Japanese Study 88.
8. Japanese Study 88.
9. Reprinted from Winston S. Churchill, Secret Session Speeches, compiled with introductory notes by Charles Eade (New York, 1946), p. 54. Copyright, 1946, by Simon and Schuster, Inc.
10. (1) Col E. C. V. Foucar, M. C., Draft Narrative of the First Burma Campaign (December 1941-May 1942), 23 Sep 43, pp. 38, 48. Gen Ref Br, OCMH. (Hereafter, Foucar.) (2) Ltr and Incl, Maj Gen S. W. Kirby, Cabinet Office, Hist Sec, London, to Sunderland, 21 Nov 51, HIS 330.14 CBI 1951.
11. (1) Foucar, pp. 131-32. (2) Rad, MA London, 19 Feb 42. Item 1377, Msg File of Feb 11-20, 1942, A47-36. (3) "Report by Lieut.-General T. J. Hutton, C.B., M.C., on Operations in Burma from 27th December, 1941, to 5th March, 1942," Supplement to The London Gazette, March 11, 1948, pars. 21-24. (4) Memo, Gerow for U.S. Secy for Collaboration, 20 Jan 42. ABC 336 China (26 Jan 42) Sec 1A, A48-224. (5) JCS 1, 31 Jan 42, sub: Co-operation with Chiang Kai-shek. (6) CCS 22, 2 Feb 42, sub: Co-operation with Chiang Kai-shek. (7) Memo, Gerow for TAG, 22 Jan 42, sub: Far Eastern Situation. AG 381 (11-27-41) Sec 1. (8) Rad, Churchill to POTUS (President Roosevelt), 7 Feb 42. Bk VI, Sec 3, Hopkins Papers.
12. Brig John F. Bowerman, British Ln Off with 6th Army, Notes on Duties with Chinese Expeditionary Force, Combat Rpts and Misc Ln Off's Rpts. ALBACORE Hist File, Northern Combat Area Command Files, KCRC.
13. (1) On 2 February 1942 the Joint Staff Planners of the JCS could state academically that agreed Anglo-American strategy was to hold the areas from which future offensives might be launched. Twelve days of Japanese advances forced revision of this paper. JPS 4, 2 Feb 42, sub: Agreed Concepts of Grand Strategy. (2) Japanese success was directly responsible for its successor, JPS 4-A, 14 Feb 42, sub: Agreed concepts of Grand Strategy. (3) Memo for Record, signed HLH, on telephone talk with Churchill, 1 Feb 42; Cable 527, Hopkins to Churchill, 11 Feb 42; Rad 28, London to POTUS, 12 Feb 42. Hopkins Papers. The point at issue was the Chinese sitting with the Pacific War Council in London, but the adjective "all" in the phrase "dealing with China in all cases" seems governing. (4) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 502. (5) Cable, Roosevelt to Hopkins, 16 Feb 42, Roosevelt and Hopkins MS, VI, 87. (6) Cable 115, Roosevelt to Churchill, 8 Mar 42. Bk V, Hopkins Papers. (7) The proposal was carefully worked out by the CCS machinery and drafted by Eisenhower. At the 3 March 1942 meeting the CCS agreed to an Anglo-American operational boundary roughly along the line of the Malay Barrier. CCS 9th Mtg, 3 Mar 42. (8) Cable 46, Churchill to Roosevelt, 18 Mar 42. WDCSA 381, A46-523.
14. Rad AMMISCA 247, Marshall to Stilwell, 15 Mar 42. SNF-56.
15. History of CBI, Sec. III, Ch. IV, The First Campaign in Burma, p. 10. (Hereafter, The Campaign in Burma.)
16. (1) Aldrich Diary, 31 Dec 41, 2, 8, 9, 13 Jan 42. (2) MacMorland Diary, 1, 6, 13 Jan, 17 Feb, 24 Apr 42.
17. See Ch. I, pp. 32ff., above.
18. History of CBI, p. 94.
19. For an attempt at removal see Memo, Stilwell for Soong, 27 Dec 42. This memorandum bears Stilwell's note: "Gist to T. V. verbally." Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
20. MacMorland Diary, 3 Jan 42.
21. See Ch. II, pp. 63-70, above.
22. The urgent secrecy of this meeting was rather spoiled when a suddenly drawn portiere revealed four Chinese servants eavesdropping. Aldrich Diary, 9 Feb 42.
23. Rad AMMISCA 94, Magruder to AGWAR, 11 Dec 41; Rad AMMISCA 95, Magruder to AGWAR, 11 Dec 41; Rad AMMISCA 140, Magruder to SW and AGWAR, 31 Dec 41; Rad AMMISCA 84, Gerow to Magruder, 4 Jan 42. AMMISCA Radio File, Job-11.
24. AG (AMMISCA) 611.
25. MacMorland Diary, 25 Jan 42.
26. (1) MacMorland Diary, 29 Dec 41, 1, 7 Jan 42. (2) Aldrich Diary, 1 Jan 42. (3) Chennault, Way of a Fighter, p. 170. (4) Ltr and Notes, Aldrich to Sunderland, 18 Feb 50. HIS 330.14 CBI 1950. (5) The proposal for integrated Sino-American units, which would pose baffling problems in command assuming that the language barrier could somehow be surmounted, was Madame Chiang's. Rad AMMISCA 140, Magruder to AGWAR, 31 Dec 41. WPD 4389-64.
27. (1) Morris, China Changed My Mind, pp. 109-10. (2) In the AMMISCA files, Job-11, is a ballad written by a member of this unit describing his Chinese experience in blunt soldier language. (3) History of CBI, p. 92.
28. MacMorland Diary, 4, 11 Mar 42.
29. Rad, Marshall to Wavell, 11 Feb 42. AG 381 (11-27-41) Sec 2B.
30. Rad ABDA 395, Brett to AGWAR, 17 Feb 42; Rad, Brett to AGWAR, 20 Feb 42; Rad ABDA 492, Brett to AGWAR, 21 Feb 42; Rad ABDA 530, Brett to Arnold, 23 Feb 42. AG 381 (11-27-41) Sec 2B, Sec 2C.
31. Sgts John and Ward Hawkins, History of the 835th Signal Service Battalion, pp. 1-4. Gen Ref Br, OCMH.
32. (1) Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II: I, Plans and Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942 (Chicago, 1948), p. 484. (2) Rad WAR 239, Marshall to Stilwell, 1 Mar 42. Item 3, Bk 1, JWS Personal File, A48-102. (See Bibliographical Note.) (3) Dispatch 308, Eisenhower to Stilwell, 21 Mar 42. Item 21, OPD Exec 10.
33. MS, History of the India-China Ferry under the Tenth Air Force. USAF Hist Div, Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.
34. The Stilwell Papers, pp. 45-47.
35. Stilwell B&W, 4 Mar 42.
36. (1) Rad AMMISCA 355, AGWAR to AMMISCA, 11 Mar 42. AG 400.3295. (2) Stilwell's task force staff formed the nucleus of Headquarters, American Army Forces, China, Burma and India. Nevertheless, staff assignments in the new headquarters on 15 March 1942 did not suggest that this staff would channel Stilwell's orders to a theater-wide organization. At this time most of the personnel in Stilwell's task force were not in Chungking. They were either waiting assignments in India for duty in Burma or were en route to the Far East. SO 1, Hq, American Army Forces, CBI, 4 Mar 42; SO 2, Hq, American Army Forces, CBI, 15 Mar 42. (3) MacMorland Diary, 20 Mar 42.
37. Ch. II, p. 78, above.
38. Stilwell Diary, 6 Mar 42. Gen. Shang Chen, Director of the Foreign Affairs Bureau, National Military Council, told Stilwell that he was now "No. 2 in China."
39. The Stilwell Papers, pp. 50-51.
40. (1) Stilwell B&W, 9 Mar 42. (2) Stilwell Diary, 9 Mar 42. The diary entry is: "Shang came in with the diagrams for the staff. Just stooge stuff." (3) The Stilwell Papers, p. 55.
41. (1) Stilwell Diary, 9 Mar 42. (2) Min (Chinese version), Conf, Stilwell and Generalissimo, 9 Mar 42. Folder 2, Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
42. (1) The Stilwell Papers, p. 53. (2) MacMorland Diary, 9 Mar 42.
43. (1) Rad, Chiang Kai-sek to Soong, for Roosevelt, 10 Mar 42. Item 19A, OPD Exec 10. (2) Rad AMMISCA 349, Stilwell to AGWAR, 11 Mar 42; Rad AMMISCA 342, AGWAR to AMMISCA, 1 Apr 42. AMMISCA Radio File, Job-11.
44. (1) Memo, Confs with Generalissimo, 8, 15 Dec 41; Memo, Conf with Chinese Minister of War, Gen Ho, MacMorland, recorder, 10 Dec 41. AMMISCA Folder 7. (2) MacMorland Diary, 15 Dec 41.
45. (1) Memo, Eisenhower for Marshall, 11 Mar 42. Item 19A, OPD Exec 10. When Eisenhower gave the draft memorandum to the President he explained that it was just a temporizing measure. Roosevelt included this passage in his message: "I realize the above sounds like temporizing . . . ." (2) Memo, Magruder for Stilwell, 13 Mar 42, sub: Views of Generalissimo on Comd in Burma. SNF-56. This memorandum repeats the Generalissimo's proclaimed desire that Stilwell command all Allied forces in Burma.
46. Rad, Churchill to Roosevelt, 17 Mar 42. ABC 311.5 (1-30-42), A48-224.
47. Memo, Marshall for Field Marshal Sir John Dill, JSM, 19 Mar 42. Item 62, OPD Exec 10. Marshall's description of Stilwell was: "an immensely capable and remarkably resourceful individual, but he is not in any degree a 'pusher' for himself and he possibly understands more of how to do business with the Chinese, particularly in regard to military matters, than any other individual in this country."
48. Stilwell Diary, 11 Mar 42. (2) Stilwell B&W, 11 Mar 42.
49. History of CBI, Sec. III, Ch. IV, pp. 9-10.
50. Handwritten Ltr, Mayling Soong Chiang (Mme. Chiang) to Stilwell, 27 Mar 42. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
51. Alexander Report, Supplement to The London Gazette, pars. 19, 22.
52. Stilwell B&W, 10 Mar 42.
53. (1) Min (Chinese version), Conf, Stilwell and Generalissimo, 11 Mar 42. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. (2) Stilwell B&W, 11 Mar 42.
54. Min (Chinese version), Conf, Stilwell and Generalissimo, 9 Mar 42. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
55. Min (Chinese version), Conf, Stilwell and Generalissimo, 10 Mar 42. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
56. (1) Ibid. (2) Min, Conf, Stilwell and Generalissimo, 9 Mar 42. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
57. (1) Interv with Col Frank Dorn, 2 Oct 47, at Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Interview Folder, Gen Ref Br, OCMH. (2) Min, Confs, Stilwell and Generalissimo, 9, 10 Mar 42. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. (3) Handwritten Paper by Stilwell, sub: General Plan. SNF-56.
58. Paper cited n. 57(3).
59. The Stilwell Papers, pp. 62-64.
60. (1) Rad AMMISCA 377, Stilwell to AGWAR, 18 Mar 42; Rad AMMISCA 379, Stilwell to AGWAR, 19 Mar 42. AG 381 (12-19-41).
61. Stilwell Diary, 19 Mar 42.
62. (1) Churchill, Secret Session Speeches, pp. 57-58, 74-75. (2) Lt. Col. Frank Owen, The Campaign in Burma (London, 1946), pp. 167-72. (3) Admiral Sir William James, The British Navies in the Second World War (New York, London, 1946), pp. 149-51. (4) Ltr, CinC, Colombo, to CinC, India, information copy to SEAC, 22 Nov 43. SEAC War Diary, A46-217. (See Bibliographical Note.) (5) Ltr cited n. 10(2).
63. USSBS, Campaigns of the Pacific War, pp. 31, 36.
64. See Ch. II, above.
65. (1) Memo, Marshall for Roosevelt, 18 Mar 42. Attached to the original, according to a note at the bottom, were a memorandum from roving Ambassador William C. Bullitt, Proposal for Establishment of U.S. Air Units in Cairo, and a memorandum from the President to Marshall. AG 381 (2-24-42) Sec 2. (2) Eisenhower called defense of the India-Middle East area the most important problem demanding immediate solution by the CCS. Memo, Eisenhower for Marshall, Apr 42, sub: Strategic Conceptions and Their Application to Southwest Pacific. ABC 381 (9-25-41) Sec 1, A48-224. (3) The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), Vol. II, p. 1,482. (4) DO (42), 10th Mtg, Minutes of Meeting Held on Tuesday, 14th April (42), at 10:00 P.M. WDCSA 381, File I, A46-523. (5) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 523-38. (6) Samuel E. Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific: 1931-April 1942 (Boston, 1948), p. 167. (7) Rad, Churchill to Roosevelt, 7 Feb 42. Bk VI, Sec 3, Hopkins Papers. (8) Rad 134, Roosevelt to Churchill. Hopkins Papers. (9) Rad, Roosevelt to Hopkins, for Churchill, 14 Apr 43. Bk VII, Sec 1, Hopkins Papers. (10) Rad 320, Maj Gen Joseph T. McNarney to Marshall, 14 Apr 42. WDCSA 381 (Middle East), A46-523.
66. (1) Field Marshal Viscount Wavell, "Operations in Eastern Theatre, Based on India, from March 1942 to December 31, 1942," Supplement to The London Gazette, September 18, 1946. (2) Churchill, Secret Session Speeches, pp. 68-70. (3) Because of the dissolution of ABDACOM, Burma was back under General Headquarters (India). Rads DBA 17; TOO 1927Q/17; DBA 20; ABDACOM 01623, 19 Feb 42; DBA 21; ABDACOM 02397, 25 Feb 42. Earliest Messages Folder, A48-179. (4) Rad New Delhi 47, 2 Apr 42. Item 1461, Folder 9, A47-136. (5) Hist Sec (India), India at War, 1939-1943, pp. 10, 11, 27, 34, 39, 44-45, 59, 64, 137. Gen Ref Br, OCMH. (6) Ltr (copy 1787/H), Brig W. E. H. Condon, Combined Inter-services Hist Sec (India), to Col the Nawabzada Mohammed Sher Ali Khan, Indian Embassy, Washington, 1 Feb 47, sub: Hist Information on Indian Army. HIS 330.14 CBI 1947.
67. Rad, Churchill to Roosevelt, 18 Apr 42. ABC 381, Burma (3-10-42), A48-224.
68. (1) Office of Naval Intelligence, War Diary of the German Naval Staff, Operations Division. Pt. A, Vol. 28, entries of 19, 21, 22 Dec 41; Pt. A, Vol. 29, p. 117, entry of 13 Jan 42; Pt. A, Vol. 30, p. 175, entry of 17 Feb 42, p. 218, entry of 20 Feb 42, p. 221, entry of 21 Feb 42, p. 172, entry of 17 Feb 42, p. 240, entry of 23 Feb 42; Pt. A, Vol. 32, p. 70, entry of 3 Apr 42; Pt. A, Vol. 33, p. 24, entry of 2 May 42, p. 120, entry of 9 May 42, p. 195, entry of 15 May 42. (2) Japanese Study 72, History of the Army Section, Imperial General Headquarters.
69. (1) SEATIC Bulls 244, 245. MID Library. (2) Japanese Study 88, Ch. IV.
70. Following the Battle of the Sittang Bridge, 23 February, 46th Indian Infantry Brigade was broken up to provide replacements. During the campaign, the Army in Burma had a total of 30 battalions, Burmese, Indian, and British. These were attached to and detached from brigades as the tactical and administrative situation required. Only those battalions of the Burma Rifles which engaged in combat are included in this total. Present in Burma were a number of paramilitary formations such as the 6 battalions of the Burma Frontier Force, the 5 battalions of the Burma Auxiliary Force, and 5 100-man columns of mounted infantry. These five columns gave good service, but the Burma Frontier Force and Burma Auxiliary Force did not have such capabilities as would justify listing them in an order of battle. There were also four more battalions of Burma Rifles (11th, 12th, 13th, 14th) of which the first two were employed chiefly on interior guard duty and the latter two proved unreliable and never entered combat.
71. The numbered designations of the three regiments in a Chinese division can be determined by multiplying the division's designation by three. The product is the number of the third regiment. Thus, the regiments of the 22d Division are 64th, 65th, and 66th.
Information on Burmese, Chinese, and Japanese forces from:
(1) Foucar. (2) Japanese Study 88. (3) SEATIC Bulls 244, 245. MID Library. (4) The Campaign in Burma.
72. (1) MA Rpt IG 6910, in Opns Jour, Burma, 16 Mar-2 May 42, Col Frank N. Roberts, G-2, p. 18. MID Library. This report contains daily G-2 information of Stilwell's headquarters. (2) Notes by Colonel Roberts, as collated by Capt. John LeR. Christian. MIS Folder, Burma Campaign, MID Library.
73. Japanese Study 88, Ch. IV.
74. (1) Memo, sub: Chinese Organization. MIS Folder, Burma Campaign, MID Library. (2) Memo, Col Rufus S. Bratton, Chief, Int Gp, WDGS, for Chief, Strategy Sec, OPD, sub: The Recent Campaign in Burma. MID Library. (3) Memo of Conf with Minister of War, 23 Dec 41, AMMISCA Folder 7. (4) Foucar, pp. 133, 164. (5) Aldrich Diary, 11 Jan 42. (6) The Campaign in Burma, p. 25. (7) Rad AMMISCA 256, Magruder to AGWAR, 13 Feb 42. AG 400.3295 (4-14-41) Sec 1A.
75. (1) Foucar, App. (2) Memo cited n. 74(1). (3) The Campaign in Burma, p. 24. (4) First Burma Campaign, a diary of the campaign kept by Col. Willard G. Wyman, 5 April 1942. Gen Ref Br, OCMH. (5) Ltr, Boatner to authors, 4 Apr 50. HIS 330.14 CBI 1950. (6) Captain O'Hara's service was rendered under a peculiar physiological difficulty--he was allergic to rice. Ltr, Lt Col Felix Nowakowski, Records Administration Center, St. Louis, Mo., to Sunderland, 13 Feb 50. HIS 330.14 CBI 1950.
76. (1) See Ch. II, pp. 57-60, above. (2) The Campaign in Burma, pp. 12-13. (3) Ltr, Boatner to Chief, HD SSUSA, 14 Nov 47. HIS 330.14 CBI 1947. (4) Ltr, Boatner to Stilwell, 13 May 42, sub: Anglo-Chinese Relations at Lashio. SNF-21. Boatner, then a lieutenant colonel, commanded Stilwell's rear echelon at Lashio.
77. (1) Ltr cited n. 76(4). (2) Hutton Report, Supplement to The London Gazette, par. 44. (3) The Campaign in Burma, p. 13. (4) Notes on First Burma Campaign by Maj. Frank D. Merrill. Gen Ref Br, OCMH.
78. Stilwell's liaison system in Burma in 1942 was very similar to the one the French used during World War I. By their system, General Headquarters (Grand Quartier Général) continuously and swiftly was informed of events in the field. Stilwell's knowledge of the French system came from a volume by Edward L. Spears, Liaison, 1914: A Narrative of the Great Retreat (Garden City, N. Y., 1931), in his Carmel, Calif., library.
79. Ltr, Merrill to Maj Gen Harry J. Malony, Chief, HD SSUSA, 10 Jul 47, p. 6; Ltr, Maj Gen W. G. Wyman to Malony, 27 Jun 47; Ltr, Nowakowski to Sunderland, 13 Feb 50. HIS 330.14 CBI 1947, 1950.
80. Foucar, pp. 96, 109-12, 125-26.
81. Stilwell Diary, 15 Mar 42.
82. (1) Diary, 18 Mar 42, cited n. 75(4). (2) Ltr, Col Frank D. Merrill, Notes on Burma Campaign. History of CBI, Sec. III, Ch. V. (3) History of CBI, Sec. III, Ch. IV. (4) The Campaign in Burma, pp. 10-11. (5) Rad MA London, 13 Mar 42. Item 1469, Folder II, A47-136. (6) Foucar, pp. 125-30. (7) Burmarmy Sitrep, 23 Mar 42. All Burmarmy Sitreps are in Operations Information Telegrams, A48-179. (8) Memo, Merrill for Stilwell, 20 Mar 42. SNF-56.
83. (1) Battle Order 0001, 21 Mar 42, Lashio, Gen Stf Mission to Burma, NMC of Republic of China, Hq, Chinese Expeditionary Force, to Lt Gen Y. M. Tu, CO 5th Army, and to Lt Gen L. T. Kang [sic], signed Joseph W. Stilwell, Lt Gen, USA, Commanding; Ltr, Lin Wei to Stilwell, 21 Mar 42. Stilwell Misc Papers, 1942. (See Bibliographical Note.)
84. (1) Rad AMMISCA 371, Stilwell to AGWAR, 18 Mar 42. AG 400.3295 (4-14-41) Sec 1A. (2) Japanese Study 88, Ch. IV.
85. The Campaign in Burma, p. 93.
86. Japanese Document 3562, Vestiges of War, a history of the 55th Division, pp. 6-9. Gen Ref Br, OCMH.
87. The Stilwell Papers, p. 69.
88. (1) The Stilwell Papers, pp. 69-71. (2) Ltr, Boatner to Chief, HD SSUSA, 30 Jul 47, p. 20. HIS 330.14 CBI 1947.
89. Ltr cited n. 76(4).
90. Stilwell Diary, 26 Mar 42.
91. Ltr, Fisher T. Hou, Chief, Chinese Mil Delegation to India and Burma, to Stilwell, 31 Mar 42. SNF-56.
92. The Stilwell Papers, pp. 74-75.
93. (1) Japanese Study 88. (2) CM-IN 0262, Stilwell to AGWAR, 1 Apr 42. (3) Ltr, 10 Jul 47, pp. 23-24, cited n. 79. (4) The Campaign in Burma, pp. 15-23. (5) Jour, pp. 3-9, cited n. 72(1). (6) Diary, 28 Mar 42, cited n. 75(4). (7) Jack Belden, Retreat with Stilwell (New York, 1943), p. 43. (8) Interrog, Colonel Kouchi, Stf Off, 15th Army, 8 Jan 48. Gen Ref Br, OCMH.
94. Diary, 29 Mar 42, cited n. 75(4).
95. (1) Foucar, pp. 112-23, 138. (2) Burmarmy Sitreps, 31 Mar, 1 Apr 42. (3) Alexander Report, Supplement to The London Gazette, par. 29.
96. (1) Foucar, pp. 219-21. (2) Japanese Study 94, Ch. VI.
97. (1) Jour, p. 3, cited n. 72(1). (2) The Campaign in Burma, pp. 15-16. (3) Japanese Study 94, Ch. VI.
98. Alexander Report, Supplement to The London Gazette, par. 26.
99. (1) Wavell Despatch, December 15, 1944, to May 20, 1942, Supplement to The London Gazette, par. 32. (2) Hutton Report, Supplement to The London Gazette, par. 55. (3) Alexander Report, Supplement to The London Gazette, par. 31. (4) Interrog of Lt Gen Shinichi Tanaka, 13 Jan 48. Gen Ref Br, OCMH. General Tanaka was chief of operations of the General Staff in Tokyo; with Headquarters, Southern Army, in Singapore; commanded the 18th Division in the North Burma Campaign (1943-44); and ended the war as chief of staff of the Burma Area Army. (5) Interrog cited n. 93(8). (6) Interrog, Lt Col Masahiko Takeshita, Stf Off, 15th Army, 8 Jan 48. Gen Ref Br, OCMH. Colonel Takeshita claimed that the Japanese had not had a very exact knowledge of Burma's terrain before the war, and so spent one month in intensive study of material captured at Rangoon. He also referred to the services of Japanese living in Burma.
100. Ltr, Roberts to Malony, 21 Jul 47. HIS 330.14 CBI 1947.
101. (1) Robert B. Hotz, With General Chennault (New York, 1943), pp. 199-200. (2) Chennault was ordered to active duty (he was until then a retired officer) on 9 April 1942 as a colonel and almost immediately afterward was promoted to brigadier general. (3) Memo 2, Bissell for Generalissimo, 14 Apr 42, sub: AVG; Ltr to CO, First AVG, 23 Apr 42. Ltrs to Generalissimo (Apr 42-Apr 44), CT 23, Dr 1, KCRC.
102. (1) Ltr, Chennault to Bissell, 21 Apr 42; Ltr, Chennault to Brereton, 23 Apr 42, sub: Employment of B-25's. AVG File, Gen Ref Br, OCMH. (2) Craven and Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces, I, pp. 438-44.
103. Ltr, 10 Jul 47, cited n. 79.
104. (1) Chennault, Way of a Fighter, pp. 149-50. (2) Hotz, With General Chennault, pp. 201-06. (3) Int Summary, AVG Activities for Apr 42, Hq AVG. AVG File, Gen Ref Br, OCMH.
105. (1) Hotz, With General Chennault, pp. 207-16. (2) Ltr, Chennault to Bissell, 19 Apr 42. AVG File, Gen Ref Br, OCMH.
106. (1) Ibid. (2) Memo, Col John R. Deane, Secy, WDGS, for President, for CofS, 23 Apr 42. WDCSA (China), A45-466. (3) Chennault, Way of a Fighter, Chapter XI, gives Chennault's side of the story. The Air Forces' attitude is given in The Stilwell Papers, page 37.
107. Memo, Brig Gen John H. Hilldring for CofS, 3 Apr 42, sub: Induction of AVG; Tab C, sub: Matériel and Personnel Status of AVG Replacements. WDCSA (China), A45-466.
108. CM-OUT 2348, Arnold to Stilwell, 14 Apr 42.
109. (1) Memo 4, Col Bissell for Generalissimo, 18 Apr 42. Ltrs to Generalissimo (Apr 42-Apr 44), CT 23, Dr 1, KCRC. (2) Memo, Marshall for President, 22 Apr 42, sub: Airplanes for China. WDCSA (China), A45-466. (3) Rad, Marshall to AMMISCA, 15 Apr 42. AG 381 (12-19-41). This radio put Brereton under British command for the time being and repeated that all aircraft over the authorized strength of the AVG would go to him. (4) Rad, personal from President to Generalissimo, 21 Apr 42. Bk V, Hopkins Papers.
110. CM-IN 0955, Stilwell to AGWAR, 4 May 42.
111. (1) Chennault, Way of a Fighter, p. 178. (2) Memo 26, Bissell for Generalissimo, 2 Jul 42. Ltrs to Generalissimo (Apr 42-Apr 44), CT 23, Dr 1, KCRC. (3) CM-IN 05412, Stilwell to Arnold, 13 Oct 42.
112. Craven and Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces, I, pp. 494-95.
113. Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries (New York, 1946), pp. 113, 116-17. (2) Wavell Despatch, December 15, 1941, to May 20, 1942, Supplement to The London Gazette, par. 24. (3) Rad cited n. 109(3). (4) Rad AMMISCA 463, Stilwell to Brereton, 5 Apr 42. Item 6, Bk 1, JWS Personal File.
114. Rad 21, Brereton to Stilwell, 9 Apr 42. Stilwell Misc Papers, 1942.
115. Rad, Stilwell to Brereton. Stilwell Misc Papers, 1942.
116. (1) CM-OUT 2708, Marshall to Stilwell, 15 Apr 42. (2) Rad 134, President to Former Naval Person. Hopkins Papers. (3) Craven and Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces, I, p. 501.
117. (1) Stilwell Diary, 1 Apr 42. (2) The Stilwell Papers, pp. 75-78.