Plans for Breaking the Blockade of China
(May 1942-March 1943)
Stillwell's Mission Interrupted by an Ultimatum
General Stilwell arrived in New Delhi on 24 May. The march out had been grueling, but Stilwell lost no time in preparing his proposals for Stimson, Marshall, and the Generalissimo. Those to his American superiors were a logical development of the 27 April 1942 proposals to the Generalissimo. The ones he sent the Generalissimo were the first of their series.
Stilwell asked Marshall and Stimson to send him one or more U.S. divisions for a major Allied operation toward the South China Sea. If American combat troops were sent to India, he would add them to the retrained and re-equipped Chinese veterans of Burma. With that force he would retake Burma and drive the Japanese from Thailand, and then from within China he would force an entry into the triangle Hanoi-Hainan-Canton. A foothold there would permit attack on major Japanese sea and air routes. Moreover, U.S. troops in India, as both token and example, were the surest way to keep the Chinese co-operative.
As for the Chinese Army, Stilwell told Stimson and Marshall that it was weak because its matÈriel was thinly spread over its 300-odd divisions. These supplies should be pooled and redistributed to a smaller number of divisions to make them an effective fighting force. A purge of the higher-ranking Chinese officers was required. They were physically brave, but they had no moral courage, never went to the front, never reconnoitered, and never supervised their troops. The Generalissimo should choose a man in whom he had confidence (Stilwell did not suggest that he be the man) and give him the field command with full responsibility, untrammeled by wires and letters from Chungking. Supply, communication, and medical services all needed revitalization. In a private letter to Stimson, Stilwell surveyed the defeat in Burma. Stilwell did not place the blame for the debacle on any one individual or set of circumstances. In the letter he mentioned that he had recommended the Chinese execute the commanders of the 6th Army, of the Temporary-55th and 96th Divisions, and one regimental commander of the 28th Division.1
General Marshall sent Stilwell's plea for American troops to the President
but with the comment that the personnel and shipping situation would not permit an affirmative answer. Instead, Marshall suggested a plan submitted by the Operations Division (OPD) of the War Department on 26 May 1942 with the significant title, Keeping China in the War. OPD told Marshall that the airfreight line could never deliver enough supplies to China and that the Burma Road would have to be reopened. Because India and Burma were in the British sphere of strategic responsibility, the action to reopen the Burma Road, OPD went on, had to be primarily British, assisted by the U.S. means at hand, which were the Tenth Air Force and Chinese lend-lease. This would go far to arm 250,000 Indian troops, who would then descend on Burma. The Generalissimo's approval of this transfer of Chinese lend-lease was of course required, and Marshall proposed to the President that Stilwell be asked to obtain it. Stilwell's role in the command or direction of this Allied attempt to reoccupy Burma could be determined after he had reported on his success with the Generalissimo.2
The President approved Marshall's suggestion, and the radio went to Stilwell for comment. Stilwell in reply urged Marshall to make no final decision until the proposal to train Chinese troops in India had been worked out. Moreover, both he and the Chinese believed that though General Headquarters (India), Wavell's headquarters for India Command, was contemplating the reconquest of Burma, no plans had been made and no date set. The Chinese would not give arms to an enterprise that to them appeared so indefinite.3
In a cordial radio on 16 June Stimson and Marshall reaffirmed their faith in Stilwell and told him they were trying to get the Generalissimo's consent to conditions which would make Stilwell's task easier. If they failed in this, they would send him to another theater where his talents might be applied. Thus, Stilwell's first approach to the War Department for tools to do the job had run hard aground on the rocks of the troop and shipping shortage.4
Stilwell's Proposals To Reform the Chinese Army
From New Delhi Stilwell flew to Chungking, arriving there on 3 June, the brief delay caused largely by bad weather. The general was ill. Defective yellow fever serum brought on a debilitating attack of yellow jaundice, which made it very hard for Stilwell to be up and about. Despite this, the day after his arrival he forced himself to keep an appointment with the Generalissimo
and Madame Chiang at which he "gave them the full story [of Burma], pulling no punches, and naming names."5 He also presented his proposals for the reform of the Chinese Army:
MAY 26, 1942.
NOTES FOR THE GENERALISSIMO
The Chinese Army is weak partly because of lack of equipment, but mostly for other reasons. It is too large to equip properly with the matÈriel now available, but a reduced number of divisions could be furnished with suitable weapons, including artillery, if a determined effort were made to get it together. A reorganization should be commenced at once with this end in view. A few dependable, well-equipped, well-supported divisions would be worth far more than double the number of the present average. The lack of artillery, A.A. guns, tanks, and planes has been evident for a long time. There is no use in continuing this complaint. The question is what can be done now with what we have.
(1) I recommend the merging of divisions to bring all units up to full strength, and the assignment of all available weapons to these divisions as far as they will go. Our available striking force will then be concentrated, and usable, as it is not now.
The average of the rank and file is willing, disciplined, inured to hardship, and responsive to leadership. The junior officers respond readily to direction. Battalion and regimental commanders show considerable variation, but there are many good ones. It would be easy to sift out the inefficient in these grades, and the resulting promotion would have a good effect on morale. Division and Army commanders are a great problem. Very few of them are efficient. They seldom get up to the front and they very rarely supervise the execution of their orders. Reports from the front are accepted without check, and very often prove exaggerated or entirely false. The vital necessity of continuous reconnaissance and security is commonly ignored, often with fatal consequences. The average division commander seems to feel that issuing an order from a point sometimes 50 miles from the front is all that is required of him. Many of these officers are personally brave, but most of them lack moral courage.
(2) I recommend a rigid purge of inefficient high commanders. This could be accomplished partly by the training section, which could require field tests, and partly on recommendations from officers in whom the Generalissimo has the highest confidence. Without a clearing out of the inefficient, the Army will continue to go down hill, no matter how much matÈriel is supplied for it.
The system of command must be clarified and unity of command insisted upon. The Generalissimo must pick some one man in whom he has confidence, give him a general directive, and then let him handle the troops without interference from anyone whomsoever. This man must not only control the tactical direction of the troops, but also their transport, supply, communications, and medical service. During the Burma campaign letters and instructions from various sources reached various commanders who as a result were
confused as to their action. The Generalissimo himself writes to various commanders making suggestions based on his knowledge of the situation, and giving advice as to courses of action in certain contingencies. These commanders, in their high regard for the Generalissimo's experience and ability, invariably interpret these suggestions and this advice as orders and act on them as such. (The Generalissimo gets unquestioned loyalty from his officers.)
(3) I recommend that in future operations one man be chosen with complete authority to direct the action with complete control over the services, and with no staff other than his own present. Liaison officers from the War Ministry can check all his orders and actions, as well as his reports, but his absolute control of the troops must not be infringed upon.
The above recommendations cover the main points which observation convinces me are essential if the Chinese Army is to remain an efficient fighting force. There are other things that must be attended to. A better system of supply and transport must be set up. Communications must be improved. The medical service must be organized in units that can move at once to serve any theater of operations. Rewards for gallant conduct should be made promptly. Punishment must be prompt and ruthless, no matter what the rank of the offender. The situation looks dark, but it can be saved by a vigorous and immediate overhaul of the entire organization. The Army will be smaller, but it will be far more efficient and easier to supply and handle. China can even now produce, with the meager resources available, a striking force that can hold the Japs off until the growing offensive powers of the Allies turns [sic] the scales toward complete victory.6
Glancing quickly at the paper, Madame Chiang remarked that this was what his German advisers had told the Generalissimo. Twenty days later at another conference she said that the drastic measures advocated by General Stilwell could not be taken. It was necessary to be "realistic," Madame Chiang went on, "heads cannot be lopped off otherwise nothing would be left."7 This was the only Chinese reaction to Stilwell's proposals of 26 May. In his files Stilwell kept an envelope with his memoranda to the Generalissimo for the period 26 May-1 August 1942. On the cover he tabulated and summarized them by date, and after each he gave the Chinese reaction. For ten of the thirteen memoranda, including his 26 May proposal, he gave the Chinese response as, simply, "No answer."8
Stilwell's jaundice greatly restricted his activities until late June but he was able to meet twice with the Generalissimo. At the first conference on 15 June the Generalissimo scoffed at any suggestion that the British might drive back into Southeast Asia. He revealed his belief that masses of the latest and best
Notes for the G-mo
matÈriel would win the war. Stilwell retorted that the only way was to reorganize thoroughly the Chinese Army. His point then, and later, was that it was fatuous to give a medium tank or a howitzer to a peasant soldier who had never seen anything more complex than his father's wheelbarrow; that the Chinese Army had to be trained and reorganized before it could profitably be given new equipment. To this belief the Chinese never subscribed. Madame Chiang's comment to Stilwell's retort was that the Generalissimo had to consider "certain influences."9
The conferences of 24 June revealed that Madame Chiang wanted General Tu to command the Chinese troops in India, who were simply to rest there and not undergo training. Then the Generalissimo entered and stated (according to the Chinese minutes) that the Chinese in India were to be trained. After two hours Madame Chiang herself raised the command point again, and this time the Chinese agreed that Tu would be relieved and that Lo Cho-ying would command, though Stilwell would have preferred either an American, General
Sun (38th Division), or Maj. Gen. Liao Yao-shiang (22d Division), in that order.10
When the Generalissimo was present at the conference, Stilwell was able to raise the question of the joint staff. This body, which was to have been set up in March, was still not created in June.11 Proposals had been exchanged, though it seemed to the Americans that General Ho, the Chinese Chief of Staff and Minister of War, had not read those sent by the Chinese staff to Stilwell. General Ho, however, shared his subordinates' belief that the joint staff should be under the Chinese General Staff.12 This would produce an arrangement similar to that which would have obtained if General Eisenhower and his Allied staff in England had been placed under the British Imperial General Staff. In the discussion it appeared that the Generalissimo's views on the joint staff agreed exactly with Stilwell's; that the Generalissimo as Supreme Commander, China Theater, should issue orders to Stilwell, his Allied chief of staff. The joint staff would then prepare orders accordingly, whose execution would be through the Chinese General Staff for the Chinese Army, and through General Stilwell for Allied Forces in China Theater. It appeared to Stilwell that the Generalissimo also had not seen the Chinese proposals.13
The Generalissimo went on to say, at the 24 June conference, that a headquarters for China Theater should be established and a comprehensive plan drawn up. This plan should have two phases--the first being to maintain the status quo in China, the second to prepare for the counteroffensive. As theaters for the counterblow the Generalissimo mentioned Burma, Thailand, Indochina, and China itself. Stilwell replied that his plan would be ready either that day or the next. The Generalissimo then turned to lend-lease equipment and aircraft, saying that once a plan had been made to bring in 5,000 tons of supplies a month and to maintain 500 aircraft in China, then attention could be directed to training troops.
Coming back to command problems, the Generalissimo explained his system:
. . . I cannot overemphasize the need of a general plan for the whole of the China Theater of War. It will have a great effect upon the morale of not only the army but also the people of China. I can send representatives from various military organizations to your office once it comes into existence thereby increasing the effectiveness of the work. I want you to be very close to me and to serve as an important member of the brain trust. I want you to know what is going on and to see me very frequently.
There is a secret for the direction of Chinese troops unlike the direction of foreign troops. I am well aware of the fact that our senior officers do not possess enough education and sufficient
capacity for work. Anticipating them to make mistakes, I often write to them personally so that timely warned they might avoid them. Knowing their limited capacity I plan ahead for them. We have been carrying on the war of resistance for five years in such conditions.
At the outbreak of the war, Japan announced that in three months the war would be over and friends of China believed this, but we are still able to continue it, because of the understanding of the limitations of our senior officers and the resort to timely warnings. In other words prevention is better than cure. The German officers who had been employed by China for their training were unable to get along with Chinese officers. It would be necessary to think in terms of their mentality. If you are with me closely for a few months, you will understand the psychology of Chinese officers, and I will tell you more about their peculiarities. . . .14
Stilwell's proposed plan for China Theater, as requested by the Generalissimo, was then in course of preparation. Phase I of the plan has not survived, but Phase II, the Counteroffensive, a study of an operation to seize the Hankow area, shows his attempt to comply with the orders of the Supreme Commander, China Theater.15 Before these plans could be presented, word came of a crisis in the Middle East that left Stilwell writing: "Now what can I say to the G-mo? We fail in all our commitments and blithely tell him to just carry on, old top."16
Beginnings of Trouble
On 23 June the War Department notified Stilwell that Brereton was to take the Tenth's heavy bombers and a number of the Assam-Burma-China airline's transport aircraft, with necessary personnel, and go to the Middle East.17 The British forces in that area had been severely shaken and driven from Cyrenaica into Egypt by Italo-German forces under the leadership of Gen. Erwin Rommel. The Suez Canal, the Middle East, and the lines of communication to India and China via the Cape of Good Hope all seemed in danger, and help had to be sent. In June 1942 Churchill was present in Washington to discuss strategy with Roosevelt and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
News of the Axis successes in North Africa, which included the stunning surprise of Tobruk's fall on 21 June, made Churchill favor an attack on North Africa to relieve the pressure in the Middle East.18 This attack might have meant the end of preparations for the cross-Channel assault by the Anglo-American forces on northern France (code name, BOLERO). However, as a result of a series of compromises the basic plan for BOLERO was preserved. To achieve the plan the United States made certain concessions, among which was
the transfer of General Brereton with all of his available aircraft from India to the Middle East and the halting in Africa of a shipment of Lockheed Hudson (A-29) bombers intended for China. The immediate result of Brereton's transfer was, as Marshall recognized, serious trouble with the Generalissimo.19
But Marshall pointed out only the proximate cause of American difficulties with the Generalissimo, because trouble had been brewing for months. Three important points were vexing the Chinese: China was not admitted to membership in the Combined Chiefs of Staff; since January 1942 the Generalissimo's Foreign Minister had been sending him inflammatory reports about the way lend-lease was being administered by the Americans; and the several aviation projects for China were very slow in materializing.
For a brief period after Pearl Harbor things had gone very well on the diplomatic front. After the ARCADIA Conference Roosevelt had insisted that China be treated as a Great Power. The Generalissimo had become Supreme Commander of China Theater. He had convened an Allied military council in Chungking; he had accepted an American as his Allied chief of staff; he had sent three armies and the American Volunteer Group to the defense of Burma. Possibly impressed by China's new status as a Great Power (certainly a triumph for Chinese diplomacy and propaganda), the Generalissimo had been late in seeking a place for China with the emerging Combined Chiefs of Staff and their subordinate body, the Munitions Assignments Board.
Not until 19 April 1942 did the Generalissimo bid for CCS membership for China.20 A negative reply was sent on 13 June 1942; it politely recognized China's importance in the war, but it was still a refusal. One reason behind the refusal lay in the fact that CCS membership would have entailed membership in the Munitions Assignments Board, whose function was to allocate the pooled exportable Anglo-American munitions production. China could contribute nothing to such a pool and would only make demands for a greater share in it.21
The strength of the Generalissimo's feelings had been shown by his quoting the Indian nationalist leader, Mohandas K. Gandhi: "Why, they [the British and the Americans] do not even admit your country to their staff talks!" The Generalissimo had gone on to tell T. V. Soong: "If we are treated thus during the stress of war, what becomes of our position at the peace conference? You
must insist that we have our own stand, and we have our own independent position to uphold."22
China's share in lend-lease had been shrinking. When actual war broke out between the United States and the Axis powers, every weapon and every pound of supplies had to be used. By late spring 1942 the Chinese had accumulated 149,000 tons of lend-lease in the United States and 45,000 tons in India, for which prospects of delivery after the loss of Burma were dim indeed. Strongly and eloquently opposed by Soong and his associates, the Munitions Assignments Board of the Combined Chiefs of Staff moved steadily toward repossessing the Chinese stockpiles and cutting new allocations of Chinese lend-lease to what might be expected to be flown to China in the near future. As the War Department's representative in Chungking, charged with supervising and controlling China's lend-lease, Stilwell was inevitably brought into this delicate and, for the Chinese, irritating situation.
Asked by Dr. Currie in March for his opinions on the then billion-and-a-half-dollar Chinese lend-lease program, Stilwell agreed with Currie to reduce it to arms for thirty divisions, aircraft for the 500-plane air force, and roadbuilding machinery.23 Consistent with this, Stilwell recommended that the War Department procure and ship arms for the Thirty Divisions and the Chinese Air Force.24 That Stilwell should comment on Chinese bids for lend-lease aid, as he was obliged by his orders to do, soon angered the Generalissimo.
Before Pearl Harbor lend-lease had been allocated among the several sovereign Allied states on a quasi-diplomatic basis. After Pearl Harbor the Munitions Assignments Board allocated it among theaters of operations in accordance with CCS strategic concepts. The Generalissimo's China Theater was not under the Combined Chiefs, but his share of lend-lease after Pearl Harbor was set by the Munitions Assignments Board, which was under the CCS. Ultimately, the Generalissimo realized that the only way he could increase his share was to appeal directly to the President.25
At the end of April, the War Department suggested that Stilwell and the Generalissimo agree on China's lend-lease, then forward a series of periodic
agreed-on requisitions. Magruder answered for Stilwell, who was at that moment on the ox roads toward Myitkyina. Magruder dismissed the suggestion as nothing but a treatment for symptoms and proposed the quid pro quo policy which was to dominate the War Department's views for months to come. Magruder acknowledged that the Chinese had been led to expect more lend-lease than they could ever receive. He recommended for a first step to get the Generalissimo to agree to a specific and limited organization of ground and air forces which could be supplied partly by lend-lease.26
The trend toward greater control over Chinese lend-lease by the Munitions Assignments Board was dramatically highlighted in May by the repossession of the 149,000-ton stockpile at Newport News, Virginia, to which Soong reluctantly assented.27 Moreover at this same time, in response to a request from its Ground Committee, the Munitions Assignments Board studied a new lend-lease program for China. On 8 May a China Defense Supplies official had given Brig. Gen. Henry S. Aurand, Chairman of the Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground), an emergency air transport program, which the official said was the result of a White House conference. The China Defense Supplies official also said that Soong considered the program as an ultimatum. The Chinese program called for the air delivery of 7,500 tons a month. The Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground) selected a figure which was approximately half of the Chinese demand. Concurrently, the Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground) requested a decision from the Munitions Assignments Board on a tonnage figure to be used as a basis for assignment and asked for authority to negotiate a six months' program (May to October) and to recommend assignments for May and June. The Munitions Assignments Board assigned 3,500 tons (items for the Chinese Army) for May and June respectively and projected a program for July through October 1942. (Table 4) Mindful of putting more air power in China, the Munitions Assignments Board set aside an additional 1,500 tons a month for Chennault on the same basis as the 3,500-ton program for the Chinese Army. During the duration of the emergency air transport program, the board named Stilwell as its agent to receive the lend-lease in India for China and to name the time and place for delivery to China.28
In June this prospect of 5,000 tons, already drab beside the transferred 149,000 tons, grew even more so as Soong learned that the War Department
Actual and Projected Deliveries of Lend-Lease Equipment Under the Chinese Emergency Air Transport Program: May-October 1942a
[In Long Tons]
Type of Equipment Actualb Projectedc May June July August September October Total 3,500 3,500 3,506 3,522 3,489 3,458 Ordnance 2,865 2,744 3,168 3,130 2,570 2,943 Signal 200 321 188 242 169 165 Medical 235 235 150 150 150 150 Motor Transport 200 200 0 0 600 200
a Exclusive of air corps fuel.
b Lend-Lease commitment to China as of 19 May 42.
c For planning purposes only, July through October.
Source: Min. MAC(G) 28th Mtg, 14 May 42, Tab B; Min, MAC(G) 29th Mtg, 18 May 42, Tab B. CCS 334.8 MAB (5-15-42).
regarded only the May and June 3,500-ton allotments as a firm commitment. Soong learned further that Stilwell was now the Munitions Assignments Board's agent in setting the date and place at which lend-lease titles passed to Chinese hands, a response to the Tulsa incident. It is worthy of note that not then or ever was Stilwell given power to say how much lend-lease China should receive. He might propose, but the Munitions Assignments Board disposed. Unfortunately, Soong did not tell the Generalissimo about Stilwell's new powers. For his part, Stilwell quickly saw that he had received lend-lease duties of baffling complexity. In the light of the events described above it would seem that the Chinese failure to grapple realistically with the transportation of lend-lease matériel and their preoccupation with simply staking out a claim to large portions of American production, both military and commercial, and then defending it tooth and nail were responsible for this development.29
Besides the difficulties over lend-lease supplies and China's lack of CCS membership there were others on the handling of U.S. air power in China, Burma, and India.30 On 2 April the Generalissimo agreed to dissolve the AVG in exchange for Stilwell's promise of a complete U.S. fighter group (the 23d Pursuit Group) by 4 July when most AVG pilots' contracts with Pawley's company would expire.31 The bitterness of AVG personnel, which caused the
mutiny described in Chapter III, was not diminished by Brig. Gen. Clayton L. Bissell's lack of success in handling the problem of induction, and only five pilots agreed to accept Army Air Forces commissions.32 Though Bissell repeatedly urged the War Department to send the men and the aircraft needed for the new fighter group and for added bomber and fighter strength, as 4 July drew near, it was ever more apparent they would not be on hand.33
Despite Stilwell's directives, Headquarters, Tenth Air Force, gave him little aid in his attempts to cope with the problems of establishing U.S. air power in China. The Tenth's attention was centered on India. The burden of negotiations with the Chinese and of making arrangements for basing more U.S. aircraft in China fell on Stilwell, who necessarily delegated the task to his air officer, Bissell. To Stilwell, the slowness with which the Tenth moved men and aircraft to China contrasted unfavorably with the speed with which the Tenth sent its heavy bombers, transports, and key staff personnel to Egypt. The failure of Headquarters, Tenth Air Force, to issue a directive to Chennault for China operations forced that task on Bissell. Bissell also had to "make all arrangements for receiving, housing, and feeding 10th Air Force [in China]."34 All this embarrassed Stilwell in his relations with the Generalissimo and Chennault, who mistakenly believed that Stilwell was indifferent to the possibilities of China-based air power.35
A further complication was created by the Chinese agreement to furnish ground facilities plus fuel and bombs from their meager stores to the new 23d Pursuit Group on the understanding that the United States would replace them. The Chinese were manifestly living up to their promise. These arrangements had of course been made without foreknowledge of the Middle East crisis, which transformed what had been an amicable arrangement into what the Generalissimo probably thought one more failure to make good on a U.S. promise.36
To the irritating AVG problem was added the Doolittle raid on Tokyo. Bombers surviving the raid were expected to land in China, where they would join Chennault. The Generalissimo did not want the B-25's landing in China after bombing Tokyo, for he feared a violent Japanese reaction. He had only been apprised of the project at the last minute, and his wishes were in effect
overruled.37 Marshall apologized to the Generalissimo for the failure to consult him.38
As the Generalissimo had feared, fifty-three Japanese battalions drove through Chekiang Province, whose people had received the wrecked American crews. Issued 30 April 1942, the orders of Imperial General Headquarters to China Expeditionary Forces were to "thwart the enemy's plans to carry out air raids on the homeland of JAPAN from the Chekiang Province area. To accomplish this mission he [the Commander-in-Chief, China Expeditionary Forces] will annihilate enemy forces in said area and destroy the area's principal air bases." Thus was plainly evidenced the extreme sensitivity of the Japanese to any American move which threatened aerial bombardment of Japan proper, and in moving through Chekiang the Japanese did what ingenuity and malice suggested to persuade the hapless peasants that hospitality to Americans was inadvisable. To the eternal credit of the Chinese, they spurned both the lesson and its teacher.39
The Japanese sweep through Chekiang Province ended still another air project. The plan to bomb Japan with China-based B-24's, HALPRO, in which the Generalissimo had been greatly interested, was canceled and the B-24's stopped in Egypt because Stilwell felt that the loss of the Chekiang bases and the lack of transports made the effort impossible.40
Air Transport Disappoints the Chinese
Activated on 21 March with Pan American Airways' twenty-five transports, the Assam-Burma-China Ferry Command hardly began operations before it was forced to take its aircraft off the run to China in order to drop supplies to the soldiers and refugees streaming out of Burma. In mid-May came the monsoon, causing round trips to China to average only fifty-seven each in May and June. Twenty-one flying days were lost to the rains. As a result, only a few score tons were flown into China.41
The United States in spring and summer 1942 did not have transport aircraft to spare for the airline to China. In April 1942 first priority for transports went to aircraft for the airborne components of the projected cross-Channel
assault; second priority to the Air Ferry Command of the AAF, which was charged with flying men and supplies to the different war fronts; and third priority, to Stilwell's China-Burma-India (CBI) command. The value of the Ferry Command's second priority may be judged by the number of aircraft on its roster in April 1942--57. Stilwell's command was allotted 75 aircraft, of which 34 were en route. A week later at the next CCS meeting it was announced that CBI would be cut to 57 aircraft, including those of China National Aviation Corporation. For the present no more were available.42
The most common Washington estimate was the erroneous one that seventy-five aircraft could fly 5,000 tons a month to China, which would provide 3,500 tons of lend-lease matériel and 1,500 tons of supplies for a U.S. air force in China. The Chinese applied the heaviest diplomatic pressure to have this tonnage reached; the President in turn interested himself directly in the Ferry Command's operations and equipment. He told General Arnold on 5 May:
I gather that the air ferry route to China is seriously endangered [by the loss of Burma]. The only way we can get certain supplies into China is by air. I wish you and Mr. Lovett would confer immediately with Dr. Soong and General Shen on alternative air routes. I want you to explore every possibility, both as to airplanes and routes. It is essential that our route be kept open, no matter how difficult.43
With the Chinese and the President both demanding action, Arnold suggested that fifty B-24's be converted to transports and based on Allahabad in India, far from the vulnerable airfield in Assam from which aircraft were then flying to China. OPD argued that converting fifty B-24's would be a heavy drain on BOLERO. OPD thought the airline to China merely a token operation, not worth a heavy commitment. In the light of the OPD comments Arnold then recommended, and the President agreed, that the airline should be kept open as long as possible with commercial types only. Stilwell did not participate in this correspondence, but the Chinese blamed him for the War Department's stand.44
Unable to get the B-24's, the Chinese then wanted four-motored transports. The Generalissimo personally appealed to Roosevelt. When consulted by Hopkins, the Army replied that only twenty-seven C-54's would be produced in 1942 and that they could not be supported in India.45
Inability to support more transports in India was the other half of the Army's problems in expanding air tonnage into China, the first being the world-wide shortage of transports and crews. Since 4 May the War Department and the White House had been aware of the logistical problem in India. The only Assam field for the air ferry was Dinjan. Shared by the transports, AAF and RAF fighters, and transient craft, it was saturated. Worse yet, Dinjan had no warning net, and lack of spare parts grounded ten of the thirty-five transports available in July. A further obstacle to flying lend-lease tonnage into China was the priority of Chennault's air force on whatever was flown into China. Therefore, Stilwell warned that for months to come not more than 5 or 10 percent of the monthly allotments of lend-lease material the War Department was discussing with the Chinese would be airlifted. It was a grave error, he wrote, to build Chinese hopes with promises that could not be fulfilled.46
Even War Department efforts to bring the Chinese to a more realistic appraisal of the airline's problems were useless, for the Chinese answer to objections and arguments was always simply: "More aircraft!" They told the President and Hopkins that four-motored aircraft were much more airworthy than twin-engined, able to fly when the twin-engined could not, and therefore the answer to the problem of monsoon weather.
There was a price attached to assignment of transport aircraft to the CBI, for they were in great demand in other theaters, a factor sometimes overlooked in the heat of controversy. If the choices before the War Department had been only two, either to place transports and crews on the Hump or to use them on domestic airlines, then there could have been no further argument. But this was not the case. The CCS, the President, and the Prime Minister were now on record that the main effort should be made in Europe. Airborne operations could, and did, play a great role in the projected cross-Channel assault. Every transport sent to the CBI area was a diversion from the main effort, and the War Department so regarded the matter all during the war.
In June 1942 Stilwell and Arnold joined to ask that 75 transports be placed in service (as against the 100 projected) on the airline to China, or Hump, as it was coming to be called from the massive hump of mountains crossed by the transports on their way to China. Stilwell wanted the 75 transports by August 1942, but OPD again pointed out the diversion from BOLERO, and so the target date was deferred to March 1943.47
SNOW-CAPPEDMOUNTAIN PEAKS OF THE HIMALAYAS on the airline to China. Photograph, taken in 1944, shows a C-46 transport plane flying over the Hump.
As a result of these difficulties, plus some administrative ineptitude, the Ferry Command flew 80 tons to China in May, 106 in June, and 73 in July. Chinese dissatisfaction was unconcealed. Stilwell was very critical, writing:
Tents, tent-pins, GI cans, and field ranges coming in to Kunming via transport plane.
No attention to capacity. CNAC [China National Aviation Corporation] 4,700 lbs, USA, 3,500 lbs.
Many incomplete loads in and out. Crew chiefs riding. Why not group them for maintenance on the ground?
Pilfering going on along the line.
CNAC flying regularly when weather keeps us [AAF] grounded. . . .48
The hardening U.S. attitude on lend-lease, coming as it did during the disastrous Burma campaign and at the start of the Japanese Chekiang drive, disturbed the Chinese. As a remedy the Chinese asked that Hopkins, who was head of the Munitions Assignments Board and a good friend of China, fly to Chungking to review Sino-American relations. Hopkins' health and his great responsibilities would not permit him to go, and the President decided to send Dr. Currie instead. Currie began his preparations for the long trip.49
On 20 June Stilwell reported to the War Department that the air ferry line could not bring a tenth of what the Chinese expected to China. He was not complacent about it, for when a garbled radio two days before had distorted his position and said he wanted only "10" transports on the Hump, he hastened to clarify it by telling General Arnold that he understood 100 transports were to be available for ferry service, that this number would be "sufficient under present conditions."50
The Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground) knew that there were 45,000 tons of Chinese lend-lease stockpiled in India and that the May and June shipments would add another 7,000 tons. In the light of this, and knowing that only a few hundred tons would be flown to China in the next few months, the committee contemplated releasing but 400 tons as the July assignment. On 22 June General Aurand, Chairman of the Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground), recommended that no assignment to China be made for July. The OPD member of the committee, Brig. Gen. Thomas T. Handy, objected on the ground that Stilwell's position in getting the Generalissimo to place Chinese
troops in India would be compromised by Aurand's recommendation. The case was referred to the Munitions Assignments Board and the CCS. Meanwhile, Soong somehow managed to keep informed of the U.S. attitude and action on China's July assignment.51
Soong's understanding of what Stilwell was telling his American superiors is given in a radio from him to Stilwell on 17 June 1942:
Following message for General Stilwell through Madame Chiang Kai-shek from Minister T. V. Soong:
Have been following with admiration your valiant exertion. Trust you are recovering rapidly from arduous trip. We have been much encouraged by your advocating of rearmament plan for thirty divisions and wish to thank you. I have put up to the President most effectively [sic] immediate aids to China are:
American air force unit operating in China.
Large scale air transport from India to China.
In this connection I wish to observe that American production of combat and transport airplanes has amazingly increased since your departure for China. U.S. War Department is acting on our request but in the absence of supporting telegram from you rather slowly. You must realize miraculous hold you have in this country from President, Secretary, and Chief of Staff downward and that any request from you will be supported even including the despatch of American division to India for the recovery of Burma. Kindest regards.52
On learning of the Munitions Assignments Committee's attitude toward the July assignment, Soong sent scathing memorandums to Hopkins and McCloy, in which he charged that Stilwell inspired the committee's viewpoint.53 Ignoring the Indian stockpile, Soong stated that China wanted 3,500 tons a month assigned to her or nothing at all, an implied threat to abolish the China Theater. On 20 June Soong pleaded his case in a note to the President and Prime Minister, then meeting in Washington. Reminding them through Hopkins of past commitments to China, Soong delivered his démarche, the prediction that inter-Allied co-operation in the form of China Theater would cease if the United States abrogated the 3,500-ton emergency air transport program.54
Telephone calls, reassuring letters, and friendly conversation from American officials during the next few days were only mild sedatives for the angered Soong, who for weeks had been reporting every adverse development to his
government.55 Then came the climax. As early as 17 June American observers in Cairo had warned that the Allied position in the Middle East was deteriorating, that reinforcements were needed if Egypt and the Suez Canal were to be held. There was especial need of heavy bombers to cut the Axis supply route from Italy to Africa. Heeding these warnings, Marshall asked Stilwell to survey the B-17 position in India. On 23 June came the order sending Brereton, the B-17's, and the transports to Egypt. Brereton's removal was called a temporary diversion after which the aircraft would return to Stilwell's command. Simultaneously, Stilwell was told that a flight of A-29's en route to China would be held up at Khartoum, Egypt.56
The decision to move Brereton and to hold the A-29's was made at a White House conference, and the decision's possible consequences had been considered. Afterward, it was conceded in OPD that the Chinese, both in Washington and in Chungking, had not been approached tactfully, nor had Stilwell been brought into the situation in a manner appropriate to his delicate and complex position. Though Marshall said that sending Brereton to Egypt caused difficulty with the Generalissimo, in retrospect it appears as merely the last of a long series of irritants and disappointments.57
The Generalissimo's Anger
Stilwell now had the painful duty of presenting the bad news of Brereton's transfer and the A-29 situation to the Generalissimo. The Chinese minutes record:
The Generalissimo saw General Stilwell at 11 a. m. on June 26th, 1942. Present were Madame Chiang, General Grober [sic, Gruber] and General Bissel [sic]. Following is the gist of the conversation:
STILWELL: I greatly regret that I have to report some bad news, though it is of temporary nature. General Brereton has been ordered by Washington to proceed to Egypt immediately with the heavy bombers from India. He would be given all transport planes which he needs for the transportation of the personnel and outfit for the bombers. This would reduce the tonnage of material sent from India to China.
GISSIMO: What is the number of heavy bombers sent from India to Egypt, and what is the number of transport planes required for carrying the personnel and outfit?
STILWELL: I have received no information concerning the number of heavy bombers that are being sent to Egypt. The number of transport planes to be required will depend upon the number of heavy bombers to be sent. I have still another bad news to report. A squadron of light bombers, A-29, which were on their way from America to China, have been diverted at Kaharitum [sic, Khartoum], south of Cairo, for use in Egypt. I believe that the situation in the Near East must be very critical.
GISSIMO: How many of the A-29 light bombers have been so diverted?
STILWELL: I do not know. However I do know that the number of A-29 bombers being sent by America to China is 33. I am unable to tell how many of them have been diverted for use in Egypt. The telegram from Washington did not mention whether there would be replacements for them or whether those A-29 bombers which would arrive in Egypt later would continue their journey to China. I do not like this news. The third matter which I wish to report concerns a telegram received from New Dehli [sic] in which General Wavell inquired whether you would approve of Ramga [sic, Ramgarh] as the site for the quartering of Chinese troops in India, and if you should approve of this site, he would assign it to the Chinese troops. In my opinion Ramga is the best place to quarter the Chinese troops. The climate there is good.
GENERALISSIMO: Exactly what is the status of the 10th U.S. Air Force in India from which heavy bombers are being detached for use in Egypt.
STILWELL: The 10th U.S. Air Force has been assigned for use in the China Theater of War and Burma and placed under my command.
GENERALISSIMO: Since you are my chief of staff, my approval should be secured of the disposition of the 10th U.S. Air Force.
STILWELL: You are right. I have made repeated efforts to bring the 10th U.S. Air Force to China as early as possible. [The American minutes do not record Stilwell's agreeing or even responding to the Generalissimo's observation.]
GENERALISSIMO: President Roosevelt in his telegram to me stated that he had ordered the transfer of the 10th U.S. Air Force from India to China for use. His order cannot be lightly changed. If it were contended that the situation in Egypt is grave, I must point out that the Chinese situation in Chekiang and Kiangsi is no less critical.
MADAME: Every time when the British suffered a defeat, they took away our war equipment or that which had been promised to us. Such being the case there is no need for China to continue the war.
STILWELL: I myself have objected to this diversion of war material from China. At one time, when Washington intended to assign the 10th U.S. Air Force to General Wavell for control, I raised strong objection and made it clear that if I could not get back the air force for use in China I prefer to be relieved of my duties in this country. What has now happened is a great surprise to you as well as to me [sic].
MADAME: What are we going to do about this? Can we stop the movement of heavy bombers to Egypt?
STILWELL: The bombers are already on their way to Egypt and I do not think their movement can now be stopped. The news about the sending of heavy bombers to Egypt is bad enough, but what is even worse in the diversion of A-29 light bombers from China. Heavy bombers are not suitable for the Libya campaign. All the pursuit planes and medium bombers of the 10th U.S. Air Force however remain in India.
GENERALISSIMO: I am unhappy about this development. The China Theater of War is lightly regarded. Naturally I wish to know whether America and Britain consider it as one of the Allied Theaters.
MADAME: You should send some important member of your mission to Washington and place the matter before the high authorities there.
STILWELL: I am sending General Grobel [sic] to Washington on such a mission.
GENERALISSIMO: All I wish to know is whether they don't care about the China Theater
of War. I would like you to get a clear-cut answer on this point. In the past China has done her very best in upholding the Allied cause, and has fulfilled her obligations faithfully. For five years she has fought not only for herself but also for the Allies. If America and Britain felt the need of maintaining her strength for resistance, they should not continuously pay scant attention to her. The way China is now being treated shows that she is out of the picture altogether.
STILWELL: This is not so. We attach much importance to the China Theater of War. What has been done is out of ignorance on the part of American officers in Washington concerning the situation in China.
GENERALISSIMO: Since President Roosevelt in his telegram promised to supply China with planes and war materials she needs, what is being done amounts to disobedience of his orders. I do not suppose that President would approve of all this change. Less than ten per cent of what he had agreed to give to China has been supplied. I do not entertain any doubt that the President is sincere. What has been done is perhaps without his consent or knowledge. As chief of staff to me, you are responsible for seeing to it that the promised material is forthcoming.
STILWELL: I have tried my very best in getting the people in Washington to supply China with more planes, ground troops, more war material, and even with one American division. All that Washington replied is that there is a great lack of shipping space for sending them to China.
GENERALISSIMO: Telegrams which I have received from Dr. T. V. Soong stated that the War Department told him that they are waiting for your recommendations which have not yet been sent by you.
STILWELL: It is absurd. This is not the case. The War Department has a list of priorities to supply.
MADAME: Another telegram from Dr. Soong states that replying to the War Department's inquiry whether you needed more transport planes, you said that you do not need any more.
STILWELL: In regard to this, I remembered having wired that for the present we can make use of 100 transport planes although as a matter of fact the fields here in China can accommodate only 50 planes.
GENERALISSIMO: In one of his telegrams to me President Roosevelt mentioned that he had already handed over 425 or 440 planes (I cannot remember the exact figure), but I do not know where they are.
STILWELL: These planes must be between America and India.
MADAME: Have any of them been diverted?
BISSELL: I understand we have 20 B-17, or Flying Fortresses, in India, which either wholly or partially are being sent to Egypt.
The Chinese minutes end here; the American version of the conference closes on a dramatic note supplied by Madame Chiang Kai-shek:
The Generalissimo must make a speech at the end of the fifth year [of the Chinese war] on 7 July. He must tell the Chinese people the truth at that time. The pro-Japanese element is very active. The Generalissimo wants a yes or no answer to whether the Allies consider this theater necessary and will support it.58
The contrast between Soong's 17 June radio, with its acknowledgment of Stilwell's recommending arms for the Thirty Divisions, and the Generalissimo's statement that Soong was charging Stilwell had sent no recommendations and desired no more transports for the Hump, implanted in Stilwell an immediate distrust of the Chinese Foreign Minister that he never quite lost.59
Stilwell quickly advised Marshall of this virtual ultimatum from the Chinese.60 Appraising the situation to himself, Stilwell concluded that the crisis was simply a larger version of the tense period following the diversion of the Tenth Air Force to Wavell's support in April. Stilwell believed that because of the President's reaction to the Generalissimo's message the Chinese had concluded that "violent protests" would give them the "upper hand" where the allocation of U.S. resources was concerned.61
Stilwell's radio to Marshall stirred official Washington, and Currie's trip to China was expedited.62 When the President's reply was sent on 27 June, it was, as Stilwell noted, "quiet and dignified and promised nothing."63
Stilwell received an appointment with the Generalissimo and met with him and Madame Chiang on 29 June. The President's message was delivered, and Stilwell received from the Generalissimo the "three minimum requirements essential for the maintenance of the China Theater of War." They were:
Three American divisions should arrive in India between August and September to co-operate with the Chinese Forces in restoring the line of communication through Burma.
Beginning from August the Air Force in the China Theater of War should consist of 500 planes continuously fighting at the front. This strength must be maintained without interruption by necessary replacements.
Beginning from August, the monthly aerial transportation should be 5,000 tons.64
In the conference the Chiangs made it abundantly clear that the 28 June note was an ultimatum. Indeed, Madame Chiang made delivery of the A-29's the test of whether the Allies wanted China Theater.
These were what came to be called, simply, the Three Demands. The second and third were already familiar, and Stilwell had previously urged that
the War Department provide them, plus one or more American divisions, though with a great deal more thought to their logistic implications. Consistent with his previous practice, the Generalissimo had not mentioned what his matching contributions to China Theater would be. Though Stilwell could not concur in the time limits the Generalissimo had set, he was convinced the War Department should adopt the Three Demands as a goal to be met when the air ferry was fully operational. The Three Demands went to Washington, which began to weigh them and prepare an answer.65
Stilwell's Staff and Command Roles Upheld
Having tried to test the U.S. attitude toward China with the Three Demands, the Chinese moved on to test Stilwell's authority. They asked Stilwell if two lend-lease transports operating for China National Aviation Corporation could be reassigned to the Generalissimo.66 "Feeler," wrote Stilwell, "I can't duck that one."67 He met it by answering that while the Generalissimo might have the transports as lend-lease essential for the prosecution of the war, he could not obtain U.S. munitions by ordering Stilwell as his chief of staff to procure them.68 Then, to avoid future misunderstandings and attempts at the extension of the Generalissimo's powers, such as the Chinese leader's belief that he controlled the Tenth Air Force, Stilwell spelled out his several roles:
I am the United States Government representative on any war council held in China. . . . I present and maintain the policy of the United States as it is communicated to me. . . .69
I am in command of U.S. Forces in CBI and therefore have the responsibility beyond the limits of China Theater. Since Burma and India are not in the China war theater, I have to co-operate with the British in those areas. In China . . . the Generalissimo is Supreme and commands all forces that operate there.70
I am charged with the supervision and control of lend-lease material and am to decide the place and time that title passes. After title passes, the Generalissimo controls the disposition of material. I was given to understand that lend-lease equipment would be employed in the effective prosecution of the war and in such matters I act as the representative of the President who can under law recall lend-lease materials at any time prior to delivery.71
I am Chief of Staff of the Generalissimo's Joint Staff which functions when forces of the Allies carry on operations in China war theater in connection with the Chinese Army. As Chief of Staff my duties are concerned with planning, organization, training, and operation in the field and do not extend to procurement of materials. I prepare plans as directed by the Generalissimo and when they are approved by him transmit them to various contingents for execution.72
And intrinsically I have my basic status as an officer of the United States Army sworn to uphold the interests of the United States.
Within the above limitations my only objective is the effective prosecution of the war. . . .73
Pondering the techniques of negotiation he met, Stilwell wrote:
Next thing will be: "Can the G-mo order transports off the freight line?" We'll have to stop him there, and claim it's an SOS function, so Wheeler, who has the responsibility for delivery, must also have undivided authority. Same old story--edge in on one thing at a time, and every time you get it ask for the next one. Never by any chance say "thank you." For instance, we charter the CNAC at big prices to get [personnel for two squadrons of] the 10th AF moved. They listen without a word and pass to something else.74
The Generalissimo's strong reaction to Stilwell's note of explanation of his staff and command roles suggested he was testing not only Stilwell's position but the whole fabric of U.S. lend-lease policy. He at once protested to the President about the two transports, complaining that Stilwell had forced the Supreme Commander of the China Theater to "beg" for lend-lease supplies already delivered to China. He claimed, "Clearly . . . this could not have been the original intention of the U.S. Government." If it was, the Generalissimo asked that Stilwell's dual responsibility to the American and Chinese Governments be ended; "otherwise both military and political relations will be adversely affected. . . ."75
Obviously, the Generalissimo's anger and bitterness over the events of the past four months were now focused on Stilwell, who could only comment that he was the executor of U.S. policy toward China, not its author. From this time forward it was clear that Stilwell's recall would please the Generalissimo. For his part, Stilwell wrote presciently that the Generalissimo risked two things by persisting in his complaints and importunities: "(1) The definite loss of all supplies he was counting on from the U.S. and the big money that would be withdrawn, and (2) the loss of the sympathy of the American people, who are with him while he fights, but who won't back a quitter."76
The official position Stilwell took was that "it's [the Three Demands] still an ultimatum from the Generalissimo to the President, and so beyond my
province"--an obvious attempt to preserve his future usefulness by relegating discussions of Sino-American relations to those who controlled them, the President and the Generalissimo.77 Since Stilwell took that stand, there was every reason why he should emphasize his position outside the conflict of policy by acting as the Generalissimo's chief of staff. So he continued, in early July, to send memorandums to the Generalissimo.
Having received the Generalissimo's challenge to Stilwell's lend-lease authority, the President asked Marshall to draft a reply. Approved by the President, Marshall's answer to the Generalissimo was given to Soong on 14 July. The sum of it was that even though Stilwell might be recalled, any successor would have exactly the same powers over lend-lease arms to which the Generalissimo objected in Stilwell and the same primary responsibility to the United States. Soong did not transmit this vital message in full but gave the Generalissimo his own expurgated version, plus the gist of a conversation with the President. Marshall sent Stilwell an information copy of the President's message to the Generalissimo, which Stilwell delivered to the Chinese leader. The correct text of the President's reply was displeasing to the Generalissimo, who retorted that if the President intended to send such a message, China Theater would go. Immediately, Soong was called to the White House and told that Stilwell's dual roles would be unaltered.78
The memorandums Stilwell sent to the Generalissimo in early July illustrate his attempt to function as the chief of staff of China Theater, despite the Three Demands crisis. In the first, he surveyed the military situation in China, estimated Japanese capabilities in every major sector, and concluded that Kunming was the logical target of the next Japanese effort and so should be more heavily protected by Chinese reinforcements.79 Five days later he warned that an attack on Kunming airport by Japanese paratroops could disrupt the air transport line and Chennault's air operations. He asked that a Chinese regiment be stationed in Kunming to guard against such a thrust.
He sent the Generalissimo comments on the belief among Chinese officers that "If China had enough planes and tanks and guns, it would be a simple matter to defeat the Japanese." First, Stilwell gave his views on the potentialities of air power:
. . . In every case [Stilwell listed China, Britain, Germany, Malta], the damage has been severe, but no decision has been gained. This is because of the limitations of the airplane; it can do a great deal of damage, but it is still only an auxiliary of the ground forces, indispensable if a decision is to be reached, but incapable of reaching that decision by itself. The great limitation is that although it can neutralize an area, or deny it to the enemy for a time, it cannot hold ground. Only the troops on the ground can do that, and only by so doing can a decision be reached.
Then, after discussing the capabilities of artillery and armor, Stilwell gave his analysis of German successes, 1939-42:
All the foreign powers have come to the conclusion that the German successes so far are due mainly to three very fundamental things. These are:
Excellent physical training. Basic stamina.
The ability to use their weapons intelligently and efficiently under any circumstances.
Excellent tactical instruction in the small units.
These three things are placed first, ahead of special provision in the way of big guns, tanks, dive bombers, flame-throwers, and all the mechanical contrivances that the Germans have produced. They are even put ahead of the excellent German organization, system of command, the wide initiative allowed subordinates, and mere numbers. It is an illuminating commentary on the tremendous value of a solid foundation, on which an immense organization can be built and operated successfully.
What did all this mean to China? Stilwell asked.
China has in the field some 300 divisions. They cannot possibly be supported in the air by the proportion of planes considered necessary in Europe. Instead of 10,000 planes, we should be glad to have 500 available for combat. Neither is it possible to deliver or maintain the mass of tanks that a European army would consider necessary. Neither is the artillery available in types or numbers that would be considered necessary for such a force. But there does exist a large reservoir of man power, armed fairly well with rifles, machine guns, and mortars. If the number of divisions could be reduced by 50 percent, the weapons available would go far toward fully equipping them, and the undesirable and physically unsuitable soldiers would be weeded out. By combining the available artillery, a large number of these divisions could be given effective fire support, and in action, the infantry of a division could be relieved, leaving its artillery in to support the new one. Artillery losses being small in proportion to infantry casualties, this doubling of artillery duty has been frequently practiced.
This reduction of the total number of divisions, and amalgamation into complete units, with a normal complement of rifles, machine guns, and mortars, plus the improved artillery support contemplated would in my opinion greatly increase the combat strength of the Army. Much of the reorganization could be accomplished within the war zones where the troops are stationed, without too much displacement of units. It could be done progressively and quietly. A course of field training for small units could be carried out at the same time, and when completed the Generalissimo would have a well-equipped, mobile force in every war zone, ready to move at short notice, easily handled, and of far greater combat strength than before.
I realize and appreciate the objections that are raised when changes in command are advocated. The Generalissimo alone can decide whether changes are worth while, and since I have already brought up the subject, I will not repeat it here, except to reiterate that an efficient unit deserves to have an efficient and capable commander.
With no chance to train a relatively large force in India, where we have access to stocks of weapons and munitions, and with supplies in China reduced to the point where they must
be conserved, the above procedure is strongly recommended as the most workable plan by which the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army can be raised to the point where it can meet successfully any crisis that may confront it.80
A memorandum from Stilwell on the joint staff for the China Theater of war told the Generalissimo that the proposal passed between the War Ministry and Stilwell "seems to be acceptable in general outline. . . . There is close enough agreement on the general plan to proceed with it."81 The only major point not clarified by the plan was the circumstances under which it would come into operation. On this, however, Stilwell believed himself in agreement with the Generalissimo, so he suggested the Generalissimo proceed to designate the Chinese officers to serve on the staff.
To these memorandums, the Chinese made no answer.82
Moving Toward a Compromise
While waiting for Washington's reply to the Three Demands, Stilwell did what he could in China to lay the groundwork for a solution. He was convinced that the Generalissimo's hints of a separate peace were simply diplomatic maneuverings, a belief shared by Ambassador Gauss.83
On the sensitive question of lend-lease, Stilwell had, as he told the Generalissimo, sent General Gruber back to the United States in haste. Gruber was ordered to plead for the restoration of the 3,500-ton emergency air transport program, with the argument that the saving to American arms supplies resulting from cutting this program was insignificant compared to the resulting damage to Sino-American relations. Before Gruber reached Washington, Anglo-American differences on the July assignment of 3,500 tons to China had been resolved. The CCS continued the program only through July. So small a share of lend-lease was not in line with Stilwell's attitude as reflected in this diary entry: ". . . How can China do it alone? We are reduced to holding Yunnan and playing it out with the Tenth Air Force, and a trickle of 3,500 tons a month kept up only by my screaming. I can have this much as long as it strengthens my hand, but otherwise they'll cut even this dribble off."84
Working to find a solution of the Three Demands on which he, the Generalissimo, and the CCS might agree, Stilwell surveyed the future of China Theater. Because of the shipping situation, he did not expect U.S. infantry in CBI before summer 1943. If the War Department and the CCS intended China Theater ultimately to be developed, then Stilwell and his staff could continue
as before, coaxing and persuading the Chinese into going on another year. On the other hand, he feared that the War Department might not have any serious plans for China Theater. Once the Chinese learned this, Stilwell's usefulness was gone. There was only one way out which did not depend on large resources obtained from the United States. The solution was to persuade the British and Chinese to join in retaking Burma. This might be done if the situations in North Africa, then menaced by the Axis, and in Yunnan, then threatened by the Japanese from Burma and Indochina, were cleared up. Once Rangoon was reopened, thought Stilwell, surely some shipping would be assigned to CBI and lend-lease would again flow into China. "Under the circumstances that prevail at present, this is the first step towards a sustained counter-offensive, and only when the Yunnan threat is removed and the African crisis passed can it be set up."85
Having analyzed the situation in China Theater, and having concluded that reopening the line of communications from Rangoon to Kunming was the essential preliminary to a solution of strategic problems in China, Stilwell proceeded to prepare a detailed memorandum on operations to reoccupy Burma. The memorandum he drafted 10 July, therefore, followed several days of intense intellectual effort in which Stilwell considered every aspect of his problems in attempting to support China. Stilwell's approach was objective and coldly professional, with nothing to suggest he was obsessed by a spirit of revenge for the defeat in Burma.86
Acting as chief of staff to the Generalissimo, Stilwell submitted his memorandum to the Supreme Commander, China Theater, on 19 July. In so doing, he had two motives: to afford the Generalissimo a dignified solution to the Three Demands crisis, and to commit the Chinese to a course of action. If the Generalissimo displayed a willingness to engage the enemy, Stilwell reasoned, the War Department could hardly refuse him the means. With respect to the Chinese, the plan gave Stilwell a way to secure from them an indication of what they would do with the lend-lease they so eagerly sought. The plan also gave the War Department a chance to bargain with the Chinese, to propose that if the Chinese reformed a number of divisions to Stilwell's satisfaction, the United States would then arm them.87
In his black book Stilwell outlined the basis of his action:
The only way I see now is to force the W.D.'s hand--(Burma)--and then get them to force CKS' hand, by making conditions for the help they would supply. I would ask for three Chinese divisions that I would pick, for each U.S. division supplied; complete command of the mixed force, with power to punish and reward, promote and demote, and progressively increased authority and control of added units in case of success--five for one
if we could get Burma back, ten for one if we took Hankow; twenty for one if we took Hsuchow. Then we would have something.88
He also explained his motives to the War Department:
In order to carry out my mission of increasing the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army, trading must be the basis of action. Logic and reason, or personal influence, will not produce satisfactory results. Pressure and bargaining are the means that must be relied on. . . . If it is considered important to keep pressure on the Japanese, in spite of tremendous demands on our resources in other theaters, the War Department should know what the Chinese are prepared to contribute to the effort. The only way to be sure is to propose a plan under which they would have to commit themselves.89
Distinctly foreshadowed by Stilwell's April 1942 proposals, and reminiscent of the Generalissimo's 23 December 1941 paper, the 18 July memorandum called for Allied co-operation in retaking Burma.
If the Japanese make no attempt to invade Yunnan this summer, a plan should be set up to retake Burma. Unless some preparations are made, the fall months will be lost and the arrival of material will be further delayed. It is of the utmost importance to again start a flow of munitions through Rangoon into China.
The plan depends on the decision of the War Department. If shipping can be allotted to bring into Rangoon 30,000 tons a month for six months, the situation will be eased materially. (This supply will be principally artillery and small arms ammunition, bombs, guns, gasoline, trucks, tanks, etc.)
Without British help, the project is not practicable. Washington should be asked to use its influence to get them to cooperate, and the value of a U.S. ground unit in India should be emphasized. If Chinese and American units are ready to move, the British could hardly fail to act to regain their own territory.
The Chinese approach should be a statement of the case, and an offer to furnish an army of twenty picked divisions well backed up by artillery, if London and Washington will cooperate. The British should (a) put enough naval strength in the Bay of Bengal to control it, (b) invade Burma via the Chindwin toward Shwebo and Mandalay, and (c) make a landing at Rangoon. The Chinese should attack towards Lashio, and from there towards Loilem and Mandalay. If U.S. units are available, they should either come in with the British along the Chindwin, or join in seizing Rangoon. The attacks toward Shwebo and Mandalay should get well under way before the attempt on Rangoon is made, and the Andamans should be occupied immediately before the attack at Rangoon. Enough aviation should be built up in India to cover these operations strongly. A parachute unit should be made available for the Rangoon operation.
Unless positive action is taken to re-open Burma, the offer of U.S. help to China is meaningless. If the Chinese show a desire to do their part fully, the War Department can hardly disregard the request. . . .90
There were indications from the Chinese side that the Generalissimo was not averse to compromise and reconciliation. The most encouraging sign was the appointment of Stilwell as commander in chief of the Chinese Army in India, with Lo Cho-ying as his deputy. Stilwell's power was limited to reorganization,
training, and "directing."91 But the picture was not growing uniformly brighter for on 10 July one of the ablest Chinese officers told Stilwell that the Generalissimo had ordered his war area commanders to "conserve their strength."92
The Generalissimo Modifies His Demands
Therefore, when Dr. Currie arrived on 20 July he found considerable progress had already been made toward a solution of the Three Demands. By summer 1942 Currie had had a year of dealing with the Chinese and was conversant with their methods and attitudes. He was therefore not unprepared for what he saw in Chungking though he had not been thoroughly briefed beforehand on the local command situation. Currie attacked his problems vigorously, talking with Stilwell and the Chinese. In the course of these exchanges the fact emerged that Soong had not presented the President's 12 July message to the Generalissimo but only his own highly expurgated version. Moreover, the Chinese claimed Soong had never explained the Soong-Stimson accord of 23-30 January 1942 to his government. Currie immediately realized the effect of Soong's actions on Stilwell's and the President's relations with the Generalissimo.93 Currie also found the First Burma Campaign embittering Stilwell's relationship with the Generalissimo. Currie considered that Stilwell was at "no particular pains" to hide his resentment at having been handicapped by the Generalissimo's letters to the Chinese commanders, while the Generalissimo resented what he considered Stilwell's failure to obey his orders. In analyzing this situation, Currie made no mention of General Alexander, the Supreme Allied Commander in Burma, but described Stilwell as "Commander-in-chief in the field," reported the issue as lying between Stilwell and the Generalissimo, and expressed his opinion that Stilwell had "illusions" about his ability to command Chinese troops.94
Weighing his observations of Stilwell and the Chinese, Currie decided to back Stilwell's conceptions. He recommended the full restoration of the 3,500-ton emergency air transport program, subject to Stilwell's periodic reviews. He also urged that the President give Stilwell a copy of every presidential message to the Chinese. The President agreed. The War Department helped with the news that China's lend-lease requisitions would be fitted into the 3,500-ton program, which might even be increased.95
In one phase of the negotiations Currie attempted to clear up the confusion
caused by Soong's alleged failure to explain Stilwell's status to the Chinese Government along the lines of the Soong-Stimson accord of January 1942. While so engaged Currie told General Ho that, because no Allied staff had yet been set up for China Theater, Stilwell's role as Chief of Staff, China Theater, was confined to those sections of China Theater which lay outside the territorial boundaries of the Republic of China. Since, as of July 1942, the boundaries of China Theater and the Republic of China coincided exactly, Stilwell's role inside China thus appeared to be eliminated.96
The Chinese quickly saw the difference between Stilwell's and Currie's description of Stilwell's powers, and Soong at once brought the matter to Marshall's attention. McCloy answered for the War Department:
It is our understanding that General Stilwell is the Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo's Joint Staff which functions when forces of the Allies carry on operations anywhere in China Theater. As Chief of Staff his duties are concerned with planning, organization, training, and operations in the field. He prepares plans as directed by the Generalissimo and when they are approved by him transmits them to various contingents for execution.97
Responding to Currie's visit, the Generalissimo gave concrete indication of conciliatory feelings by agreeing orally on 27 July to Stilwell's 18 July proposals for a Burma campaign.98 Stilwell immediately submitted to the Generalissimo on 29 July an ambitious proposal for a general Pacific offensive in which the now-approved Burma operation took its proper place. If the Generalissimo approved, the Chinese leader could then send this Pacific Front plan to the President and Prime Minister as China's suggestion for Allied operations in the Pacific. In a covering letter Stilwell made it clear that his proposal was in the nature of a suggestion for possible future planning. Stilwell explained he was in no position to commit the United States to any course of action.99
The formal approval of Stilwell's 18 July memorandum came from the Chinese on 1 August. It modified the Three Demands in that one U.S. division, 500 planes, and 5,000 tons would be acceptable to the Chinese without specifying a deadline for fulfillment. The Generalissimo clearly described China's contribution to a future Burma operation. The memorandum read:
In acknowledging the receipt of your Memorandum, dated July 18th, the Generalissimo directs me to inform you that the Chinese Government is in full agreement with your proposed plan to retake Burma and appreciates its significance both from the political and military points of view. But in order to insure that the campaign will be successfully carried out, your attention is particularly invited to the following three points:
The occupation of the Andamans, the giving of support to the armed forces to land at Rangoon and, later on, the controlling of the Bay of Bengal, as well as the giving of support to transports to unload supplies at Rangoon;--the accomplishment of all these depends on the British Navy and Royal Air Force in making their greatest effort. Whether Great Britain can really make such an effort, only the British Government is in a position to say. It is therefore deemed necessary that the attitude of Great Britain in this case should first be ascertained and that she be urged to act.
Regarding the suggestion that one to three divisions of U.S. ground units should assist the British to attack Shwebo and Mandalay via the Chindwin, it is imperative that the time required for the building of the road between India and Burma should be figured out well in advance and road construction be pushed with all speed. Otherwise, to launch an attack merely with light arms will have little chance of success.
China is able with effort to concentrate in Western and Southern Yunnan an army of twenty picked divisions backed up with necessary artillery . . . (there are at present 36D, 87D and 88D of 71A; 49D, 93D and N28D [New 28th Division] of 6A; 82D, 139D and 141D of 32A; and 2RD [2d Reserve Division]; to which may be later added 9D, 76D and N33D of 2A; 24D, 196D and T57D [Temporary-57th Division] of 76A; and also 54A when necessary) . . . and to attack from Lashio. Judging from our equipments and experiences in the past, the Chinese troops can be expected to hold up the enemy's main force in Burma and eventually to deal him a decisive blow. But to attain the military objective of storming the enemy's strongholds and capturing strategic points, no success can be achieved without the effective assistance of the air force. This is not possible with the minimum of air force that has recently been decided upon to be put into operation in the front. Furthermore, the concentration of armed units, the establishment of supply depots and the transportation of supplies are also difficult problems which must be satisfactorily solved in order to meet the exigencies of war.100
Accepting Stilwell's Pacific Front proposals of 29 July, the Generalissimo asked Currie to bring them before the President and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Map 5) The Pacific Front plan called for the retaking of Burma by 12 divisions from Yunnan, and 1 U.S. and 3 British divisions, with the 2 divisions of the Chinese Army in India driving from Manipur State. These Allied forces would converge above Mandalay, then fan out across south Burma, Thailand, and to the coast of Indochina. The Allied advances from India called for no grandiose road construction since the Imphal-Tamu-Kalewa-Shwebo roads could be used. In Yunnan, the Chinese would establish a troop reserve at Kunming and would use 9 divisions along the Indochina border for offensives aimed at Hanoi and Haiphong or at Canton and Hong Kong, or eventually at both areas. Outside the Asiatic theater, there would be an Allied offensive north from Australia, and the U.S. Navy would make an all-out attack on Japanese communications.
On 4 August Stilwell's artillery officer, Colonel Dorn, sent an outline of the Pacific Front plan to the War Department and added a personal note for General Handy of OPD:
We all believe that the Generalissimo must be handled on an "ultimatum basis"; be told in plain language what he must do and be given a very short time in which to decide and
Stilwell's Plan, July 1942
reply. If he threatens to make peace with Japan, tell him to go ahead. In all probability the Japanese would laugh at him now. Besides there exists what amounts to an undeclared peace anyway, with mail and a considerable trade going back and forth between occupied and unoccupied China. That is why tungsten shipments have not been as large as had been expected. The Japs pay a little better price. . . .
Until we re-take Burma, and re-open the port of Rangoon, all talk and planning to aid China are utterly meaningless. But all aid to China must have a string which demands action from them, or Rangoon or not, the present regime will do nothing but hoard the matériel in order to perpetuate itself after the war. It is short-sighted, but the regime itself is shortsighted or it would not need to worry about its own position in China after the war. In other words they expect an upheaval or revolution or some kind. In fact T. V. Soong in Washington expressed the opinion that the present regime would be out of a job six months after the war was over. He ought to know. . . .101
On 6 August Currie left Chungking to lay the Pacific Front plan (also called the Generalissimo's plan) before the President and the CCS.102
Seeking to take advantage of the more aggressive Chinese attitude, Stilwell immediately submitted a suggestion that the Chinese raid Indochina to "determine the intentions of the Japanese in that vital area," from which an attack might easily be launched on Kunming. He suggested that two divisions then in south Yunnan make the attack. ". . . If the enemy is contemplating an action in this area, such an attack would begin it under very favorable conditions for us. The Japanese would have lost the initiative, and the Chinese would be farther forward on ground favorable for defense in case the enemy is strong there. If he is weak, reserves could follow immediately to exploit any success that might be obtained."103 No answer or comment was ever received from the Chinese.
Giving tangible proof of interest in the project for retaking Burma, the Generalissimo ordered the National Military Council to discuss the assembling, training, and equipping of the Thirty Divisions (twenty of them were designated on 1 August) with Stilwell, eighteen months after Soong first requested U.S. arms for them. The Generalissimo had given a tentative list of the thirty in March, then withdrawn his support from the plan as the Burma campaign grew steadily worse for the Allies. The Generalissimo also ordered, in the same first week of August, that the highest Chinese staff echelon, the National Military Council, should inform Stilwell of the Chinese order of battle, the various fronts in China Theater, and what the Chinese strategic concepts were in each war area. Within a fortnight all these were revealed to Stilwell's staff. Passive defense was the order of the day in each war area from Sian to Indochina. Even the sixteen armies charged with preventing the Chinese Communists from taking Sian were awaiting the end of the Pacific war. No offensive against the Japanese was contemplated, not even guerrilla action.104
For their part, the Japanese made an unwitting contribution to Sino-American amity by ending the Chekiang expedition on 28 July, thus removing pressure on the Generalissimo to seek immediate, massive U.S. help.105 Examination of the Japanese supply plan for 1942, which Imperial General Headquarters issued 20 March 1942, suggests the Japanese were quite content to let the status quo prevail in China. For example, but 5,000 rounds of 150-mm. high explosive would be shipped to China from the homeland. Approximately 60,000,000 rounds of type 38 rifle ammunition would be kept on hand in China; if less were needed, even that modest stock would be reduced. As replenishment, 20,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition would be shipped to North China Area Army, and them alone. For the whole Japanese establishment in China, there would be shipped 10,900,000 rounds of practice
ball ammunition, and 6,200,000 blank cartridges. Food would be procured in China. The picture painted by the Japanese supply arrangements is of an army of occupation, with training duties, living off the country, and launching occasional punitive expeditions.106
On 29 August Stilwell asked the War Department to provide weapons for the American portion of the Thirty Divisions, stressing artillery, automatic weapons, and ammunition. The War Department answer was favorable.107
Stilwell responded to the Generalissimo's more co-operative attitude by encouraging the Chinese in regard to the Hump:
Information has just been received that the War Department will furnish up to the 75 army transports and the total of 25 transports for CNAC as fast as airplanes are available.
I have requested that 2½ full crews for each transport airplane be provided to secure the maximum hours flying from each transport and have been informed that beginning the first of October additional pilots will be provided at the rate of 30 each month.
On my recommendation the War Department has directed General Brereton to return to India any transports not urgently needed in the Middle East. . . .108
While his superiors pondered their next moves, Stilwell spent a week in India. He visited Ramgarh and ordered officers to get supplies moving from Karachi to the Chinese troops that had withdrawn from Burma. He also talked with Wavell and informed him that the Generalissimo was contemplating a major operation for retaking Burma.109
Stilwell's suggestion that the United States reach a clear understanding with the Chinese on what they would do with the lend-lease they received was not accepted by Currie. Adhering to the views he had expressed in the fall of 1941, Currie thought it unwise to put any pressure on the Chinese since the United States was not planning to meet the Three Demands in full. The President approved and adopted this line in framing his final reply to the Three Demands note.110
On his return to Washington Currie supported Stilwell's projects but suggested that Stilwell be sent to another theater.111 Marshall could see that the Generalissimo had convinced Currie of Stilwell's unpopularity with the regime, but even a presidential query about moving Stilwell to another theater did not persuade Stimson and Marshall to do so.112 Upon his return Currie asked Marshall to consider Stilwell's transfer. Marshall desired to know if Currie was acting on the President's behalf. When the negative reply came, Marshall dismissed the topic from their conference.113 Not pressing the issue, Roosevelt for the moment gave Stilwell his support, but not to the extent of requiring reform of the Chinese Army in exchange for lend-lease aid.114 This policy was in accord with the recommendation Currie made to the President in his report on his trip to Chungking: "I do not think we need to lay down any conditions or tie any strings to our support."
Before supporting Stilwell so firmly, Marshall had consulted him. The Chief of Staff told Stilwell that he was fully aware of Soong's attitude and activities and of the effect of Soong's actions on Sino-American relations and on Stilwell's position. He added that Stimson and he were disturbed over Stilwell's delicate situation and knew they had been able to give Stilwell but little support. The issue was becoming more acute because the Combined Chiefs of Staff were considering the reoccupation of Burma after the monsoon rains. Marshall asked what the prospects for a combined Sino-British effort in Burma were and whether the Generalissimo's attitude toward Stilwell would permit the latter's taking a leading role in such a venture.115
In reply Stilwell summarized the progress he had made in plans to retake Burma but cautioned that the Chinese showed a clear disposition to coast and to let others finish the war. He repeated the AMMISCA warning--that the Chinese wanted to finish the war with their arsenals stocked and their armies well equipped, by implication, to handle domestic disturbances. He was not concerned about his relations with the Generalissimo and did not understand Currie's references to "strongly antagonistic feelings." Stilwell believed that the Generalissimo knew what had happened in Burma as well as he did, that any feeling on the Generalissimo's part about Stilwell's status in China could
be traced to Soong. Stilwell's last meetings with the Generalissimo had been pleasant and he hoped something could be done. Stilwell closed his reply by offering an acid test of Chinese intentions--progress on the Thirty Division scheme. If the Chinese had any thought of taking an active part in the war, they would certainly want to rebuild their armies. If they wanted to be only formally belligerent, then the Thirty Division scheme would continue to creep forward.116
Planning the Air War in China Theater
Immediately after Currie's departure, Stilwell pressed his air officer to study the immediate use of American air power in China. One may surmise that, by preparing a suitable plan, Stilwell desired to commit the Generalissimo as Supreme Commander, China Theater, to making defense of the Hump air terminal the primary mission of China-based air power, thus precluding development of a China Theater in which U.S. air power did the work and the Chinese reaped the benefits. Stilwell also desired a program in which requirements in Hump tonnage would balance 3,500 tons of air cargo a month for the Thirty Division build-up with tonnage to support the China Air Task Force.117
In compliance with Stilwell's wishes his staff submitted their study, the China Air War Plan, on 8 September. The paper divided the major tasks between the China Air Task Force and the Chinese Air Force. The former was charged with protecting the air ferry line; the latter, Chungking and the Yangtze valley. Of the two missions given above, the China Air Task Force's mission defending the air transport route was rated as the first objective of the China Air War Plan.
The study proposed to accomplish the defense of the airline and of Chungking by offensive operations against hostile air concentrations. These offensive operations would be mounted from a perimeter line of bases from Heng-yang to Meng-tzu. After defense of the airline and China's capital came missions against "targets of opportunity and war industries within the radius of action of our air force." Among these, shipping had highest priority. As for ground operations, these were covered with the provision, "The Chinese Air Force and the American Air Force will afford support to ground operations of the Chinese Army when sufficient strength is available after accomplishment of the primary mission of these air forces (defense of the air ferry route)."118
This plan was formulated after submission of General Chennault's views which had been placed before Stilwell in July. Activated on 6 July, the China
Air Task Force had continued the AVG's successes.119 Contemplating the potentialities of China-based air power, Chennault told Stilwell that if he were given 100 of the then new P-51 fighters and 30 B-25 medium bombers he would accept "responsibility" for:
Destruction of Japanese aircraft in much greater number than CATF's entire strength.
Destruction of enemy military and naval establishments in China to encourage Chinese resistance.
Disruption of Japanese shipping in the interior of China and off the coasts of China.
Interdiction of Japanese air concentrations being ferried from Chinese bases across Indochina and Thailand into Burma.
Destruction of Japanese air force morale by destroying its rear depots and production facilities.120
The whole bent of Chennault's plan was aggressive. Stilwell modified it to the extent that he desired Chennault to make defense of the Hump his primary mission.
Stilwell sent to the Generalissimo on 13 September a second plan for operations of the China Air Task Force alone:
The primary mission of the United States China Air Task Force is to defend the ferry route from India to China. The secondary mission is to conduct operations to destroy hostile aircraft, shipping, and installations in other areas when such operations do not jeopardize the primary mission and when munitions are available for such operations.
The plan to accomplish the mission of the United States China Air Task Force contemplates offensive operations for the destruction of aircraft and installations on hostile airdromes within striking distance of the air freight route; the destruction of hostile aircraft operating against air transports or the terminal facilities of the air route, and the attack on communications necessary for the support of such hostile air operations. In addition occasional air attacks on favorable targets of opportunity are envisioned.
Your approval of the above for future planning and execution is requested.121
For whatever reason, the plan of the China Air Task Force's commander for his unit's operations was submitted three days later, but it was consistent with the above. As did his July paper, Chennault's September proposals stressed aggressive action against Japanese shipping, but he accepted Stilwell's views by suggesting Hump defense as his primary mission. Chennault also proposed the most vigorous action against Japanese air power, which was also in line with Stilwell's thinking. Significantly, Chennault asked that his command become independent of Bissell's Tenth Air Force and operate directly under Stilwell. For his operations, Chennault requested 1,986 tons a month. There was a serious flaw in his logistical planning. His study placed on the Tenth's Air Service Command the responsibility of supplying and supporting the
BRIG. GEN. CLAIRE L. CHENNAULT
China Air Task Force at its forward fields. To discharge this responsibility, the Air Service Command in China would require a certain amount of Hump tonnage to support either trucks or transport aircraft. Yet Chennault was asking every ton of Hump tonnage for tactical operations of the China Air Task Force. This posed a dilemma for Stilwell's headquarters. Stilwell approved Chennault's September proposals, save the paragraph on command, yet until ways were found to bring more tonnage over the Hump and then move it forward to Chennault's fields, such approval was academic.122
As his memorandum of 7 July 1942123 to the Generalissimo made clear, Stilwell was far from underestimating the potentialities of China-based air power. His diaries for September and October faithfully record the box score of every air engagement with the Japanese and reveal that he prodded Bissell and Chennault to seize opportunities for aggressive air action against major
Japanese targets. There is no suggestion in the diaries that he sought to hamper Chennault or felt hostility toward him or his views. Stilwell told Marshall he felt it necessary to avoid provoking a Japanese reaction until gasoline stocks for Chennault's air force had been built up.124
In late September, speaking on the larger aspects of China Theater, he warned Marshall that the Chinese wanted the China Air Task Force strengthened to a point where it could fight the Japanese by itself, leaving the Chinese free to rest on their oars until their Allies defeated the Japanese. He reported that the Chinese ignored the ground aspects of war in China. The Thirty Division plan, Stilwell remarked, was the real reason for the existence of the airline to China. He told Marshall that even though it was now impossible to fly in all the American weapons originally contemplated, great progress toward a better Chinese Army still could be made by reorganization, filling the Thirty Divisions to full strength, equipping them with the weapons available in China, and concentrating them in strategic positions. He reported that the Chinese were doing nothing to accomplish the Thirty Division plan, and that American pressure was needed. The Chinese were meeting all of Stilwell's arguments, he told Marshall, with demands for more transports on the Hump.125
June and July saw a false start toward carrying out Stilwell's mission to support China and reform its Army. Immediately after Stilwell had presented his proposals to the Generalissimo his mission was gravely compromised by the order to move Brereton's B-17's to the Middle East. Following a number of disappointments in regard to lend-lease, aviation projects, and diplomatic status, the step angered the Chinese. Since it was diplomatically inadvisable for the Chinese to blame Stilwell's superiors, their disappointments were thereafter charged to Stilwell, as though he were a free agent.
After the U.S. Government reacted coolly to Chinese hints of a separate peace, the expressions of the Chinese moderated, and in succeeding weeks it was possible for Stilwell and the presidential emissary, Mr. Currie, to prepare the way for Chinese acceptance of something less than full compliance with the Three Demands.
Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter (4) * Next Chapter (6)
1. (1) CM-IN 7037, Stilwell to Marshall, 25 May 42. (2) Ltr, Stilwell to Stimson, 25 May 42. Stimson Papers. (See Bibliographical Note.)
2. (1) Memo, Gen Crawford, Actg ACofS OPD, 26 May 42, sub: Keeping China in War. OPD 381 CTO (5-26-42), A47-30. OPD was the wartime successor to War Plans Division (WPD). (2) Memo, Marshall for President, 28 May 42. WDCSA (China), A45-466.
3. (1) CM-IN 1878, Stilwell to Marshall, 6 Jun 42. (2) Min, War Council Mtg, 8 Jun 42. WDCSA, Notes on War Council, A48-139. (3) Stilwell was unaware that in June 1942 Wavell had submitted outline plans for Burma's reconquest to the British Chiefs of Staff. Wavell Despatch, March 1942 to December 31, 1942, Supplement to The London Gazette, pars. 27-30.
4. CM-OUT 3751, Stimson to Stilwell, 16 Jun 42.
5. The Stilwell Papers, pp. 110-13.
6. (1) Notes for Generalissimo, 26 May 42. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. (2) Stilwell summarized these proposals for Marshall in CM-IN 5665, Stilwell to Marshall, 18 Jun 42.
7. (1) The Stilwell Papers, p. 113. (2) Min (Chinese and American versions), Conf, Stilwell, Generalissimo, and Mme. Chiang, 24 Jun 42. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. Stilwell and Mme. Chiang started their conference at 5:00 P.M. and their talks ended at 7:00 P.M. The Generalissimo was present from 5:30 to 6:30 P.M. Nowhere in the public or private papers of General Stilwell could there be found a proposal "that all Chinese Armies be reorganized with American officers holding all posts of colonel and above." From Way of a Fighter, p. 167, by Claire L. Chennault. Copyright, 1949, by Claire Lee Chennault. Courtesy of G. P. Putnam's Sons.
8. See illustration on opposite page.
9. (1) The Stilwell Papers, p. 115. (2) CM-IN 5665, Stilwell to Marshall, 18 Jun 42.
10. Min (Chinese version), Conf, Stilwell, Generalissimo, and Mme. Chiang, 24 Jun 42. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
11. Ch. III, pp. 87-89, 94-96, above.
12. (1) Stilwell Diary, 15, 16, 24 Jun 42. (2) Min (Chinese and American versions), Conf, Stilwell, Generalissimo, and Mme. Chiang, 24 Jun 42. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
13. Memo 161, Stilwell for Shang Chen, 27 Jun 42. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
14. Min (Chinese and American versions), Conf, Stilwell and Generalissimo, 24 Jun 42. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. Quotation from the Chinese version.
15. (1) Preliminary Estimate, II, The Counteroffensive. SNF-14. (2) Gen Hearn, A Critique of the Hankow Operation. SNF-14.
16. The Stilwell Papers, p. 119.
17. CM-OUT 5699, OPD to Stilwell, 23 Jun 42.
18. (1) CM-IN 6008, Col Bonner F. Fellers, Cairo, to AGWAR, 17 Jun 42. (2) CM-IN 6491, Fellers to WD, 19 Jun 42. (3) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 590-99.
19. Statement of Marshall, Notes on War Council Mtg, 29 Jun 42. WDCSA, Notes on War Council, A48-139. Also notes of 22 June 1942. Same file.
20. (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 515-16. (2) Telg, Chiang to Soong, 19 Apr 42; Ltr, Soong to Hopkins, 20 Apr 42. Bk VI, Hopkins Papers.
21. (1) Ltr, Field Marshal Dill, Gen Marshall, and Admiral Ernest J. King, CinC, U.S. Fleet, to Lt Gen Hsiung Shih-fei, Chief, Chinese Mil Mission to U.S., 13 Jun 42. ABC 384 (China), 29 May 42, A48-224. (2) CCS 74, 29 May 42, sub: Chinese Concept of Conduct of Present War. (3) JCS 17th Mtg, Notes (Tab A), 1 Jun 42. ABC 384 (China), 29 May 42, A48-224. (4) CCS 22d Mtg, 2 Jun 42. (5) Ltr, Hsiung to CCS, 26 Jun 42. ABC 336 (China), 26 Jan 42, Sec 1A, A48-224.
22. (1) Telg, Chiang to Soong, 19 Apr 42. Bk VI, Hopkins Papers. (2) China sought representation on the CCS until V-J Day. Ltr, Shang Chen, Chief, Chinese Mil Mission to U.S., to CCS, 3 Jul 45, Incl to JCS 1407, 5 Jul 45, sub: Chinese Representation on CCS.
23. Rad AMMISCA 261, Currie to Stilwell, 7 Mar 42. AMMISCA Radio File, Job-11.
24. Stilwell recommended that the prewar communication projects be cut, but he asked the War Department to fill Chinese lend-lease requisitions on the basis of a new Chinese Table of Organization and Equipment that was handed to him on 9 March 1942. The request was granted. (1) Stilwell Diary, 9 Mar 42. (2) Rad AMMISCA 345, Stilwell to AGWAR, 10 Mar 42. AMMISCA Radio File, Job-11. (3) Memo, Eisenhower for Aurand, 15 Mar 42, sub: Priorities to China. OPD 400.3295 (China), 11 Mar 42, A47-30. (4) Memo, Eisenhower for McCloy, 31 Mar 42. Same file.
25. (1) CCS 50/2, 23 Mar 42. (2) Leighton and Coakley, Logistics of Global Warfare: 1941-43. (3) Memo, Soong for Hopkins, 22 Apr 42; Ltr, Burns to Hopkins, 22 Apr 42, sub: Shipts to China; Memo, Soong for Hopkins, 1 May 42; Memo, Hopkins for Malony, 30 Apr 42, and Malony's reply, same date; Memo, Soong for Hopkins, 1 May 42. Bk V, Hopkins Papers.
26. (1) Memo, Aurand for McCloy, 27 Apr 42. ASW 400.366 (China). (2) CM-OUT 5680, Marshall to Stilwell, 29 Apr 42. (3) CM-IN 0513, Magruder for Stilwell to AGWAR, 2 May 42. (4) Memo, Magruder for Stilwell, 18 May 42, sub: Some Observations on Present Situation in China. AMMISCA Folder 7.
27. (1) The battle over the lend-lease stockpile at Newport News and at other depots in the United States is contained in a series of letters between McCloy and Soong from 19 to 21 May 1942. ASW 400.336 (China). (2) One hundred thousand tons of the Chinese lend-lease stocks were War Department procured and the remainder were Treasury stocks. This 149,000 tons excluded 10,317 carloads of steel rails and accessories for the Yunnan-Burma Railway. See Ch. I, above. Memo for Record. ASW 400.336 (China).
28. (1) Min, MAC(G) 27th Mtg, 11 May 42. (2) Min, MAB 15th Mtg, 15 May 42, Item 6.
29. (1) CM-OUT 6222, Somervell to Stilwell, 29 May 42. (2) Ltr, MAC(G) to CDS, 16 Jun 42, sub: Chinese Emergency Air Transport Program. Folder, China Requirements, ASF (DAD) ID, A46-299. (3) Rad, Marshall to Stilwell, 9 Jun 42. (4) The Stilwell Papers, pp. 126-27, 130-31. (5) CM-IN 1942, Stilwell to AGWAR, 5 Jun 42. (6) History of CBI, Sec. II, Ch. XI.
30. See Ch. II, above.
31. (1) CM-IN 0629, Stilwell to AGWAR, 2 Apr 42. (2) Chennault, Way of a Fighter, pp. 170-72. (3) See Ch. I, p. 18, above. (4) AVG contracts would start expiring by 4 July 1942, since the first pilots had reached the Far East on 3 July 1941 to begin their one-year contract with Pawley's company. AVG Contract Folder, Pawley Papers.
32. See Ch. III, pp. 112-13, above.
33. (1) CM-IN 1226, Bissell to AGWAR, 5 May 42. (2) CM-OUT 2275, Marshall to Stilwell, 12 May 42. (3) CM-IN 5194, Bissell to AGWAR, 19 May 42. (4) CM-IN 8047, Stilwell to AGWAR, 28 May 42.
34. (1) Stilwell denounced Headquarters, Tenth Air Force, on eighteen separate counts. Documents entitled Case, Obstacles. SNF-12. (2) The Stilwell Papers, pp. 139-40.
35. Chennault, Way of a Fighter, Ch. 12.
36. (1) Ltr, Bissell to Maj Gen Chou Chih-jou, Dir Commission of Aeronautical Affairs, NMC, 10 Jun 42. Item 128, Corresp Folder (Jul 42-Nov 43), CT 23, Dr 2, KCRC. (2) CM-IN 9114, Stilwell to Marshall, 27 Jun 42. (3) Memo 24, Bissell for Generalissimo, 23 Jun 42. Corresp Folder, Memos for Mme. Chiang (May-Sep 42), CT 23, Dr 2, KCRC. (4) Rpt of Conf with Mme. Chiang, 24 Jun 42, sub: Opns of American Aviation in China. Corresp Folder (May-Sep 42), CT 23, Dr 2, KCRC.
37. (1) Rad AF3/294, Arnold to Stilwell, 18 Mar 42. (2) CM-IN 3130, AMMISCA to AGWAR, 11 Apr 42. (3) Memo 3, Bissell for Generalissimo, 16 Apr 42. Ltrs to Generalissimo (Apr 42-Apr 44), CT 23, Dr 2, KCRC. (4) Memo, Gen McNarney, DCofS, for Roosevelt, 16 Apr 42, sub: First Sp Bombing Mission (China). AG 381 (16 Apr 42).
38. Marshall's apologies were conveyed to the Generalissimo by Bissell in Memo 5, Bissell tor Generalissimo, 19 Apr 42. Ltrs to Generalissimo (Apr 42-Apr 44), CT 23, Dr 2, KCRC.
39. (1) Imperial General Headquarters, Army Order 621, 30 Apr 42, GHQ, Far East Comd, Mil Hist Div, Imperial General Headquarters Army Orders, Vol. II. Gen Ref Br, OCMH. (2) Japanese Study 77.
40. (1) CM-OUT 1929, Arnold to Stilwell, 9 May 42. (2) Memo 14, Bissell for Generalissimo, 11 May 42, sub: Second Sp Aviation Project; Memo 17, Bissell for Generalissimo, 26 May 42. Ltrs to Generalissimo (Apr 42-Apr 44), CT 23, Dr 2, KCRC.
41. (1) History of the India-China Ferry under the Tenth Air Force. USAF Hist Div. (2) Craven and Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces, I, pp. 497-502. (3) See Ch. III, p. 93, above.
42. (1) CCS 17th Mtg, 28 Apr 42, par. 1. (2) CCS 18th Mtg, 5 May 42, par. 1.
43. (1) Ltr with Incl, McCloy to Hopkins, 4 May 42, Bk V, Hopkins Papers. (2) Ltr, President to Arnold, 5 May 42. Bk V, Hopkins Papers. (3) Memo, Col Deane for Marshall, 27 Jul 42. WDCSA, Notes on War Council, A48-139. (4) Rad, Stilwell to Marshall, 28 Sep 42. Item 41, Bk 1, JWS Personal File, A48-102, Record Group 800, HRS DRB AGO. (See Bibliographical Note.)
44. (1) Ltr, Arnold to DCofS, 12 May 42, sub: India-China Ferry Route; Memo, Eisenhower, ACofS, for DCofS, 14 May 42; Notes for Record on Memo, McNarney for Arnold, 18 May 42. WDCSA (China), A45-466. (2) The Stilwell Papers, p. 120. (3) Rpt, Currie to Roosevelt, 24 Aug. 42, sub: Rpt on Visit to China. OPD 336 China (24 Aug 42), A47-30.
45. (1) Telg, Chiang to Roosevelt, 1 Jun 42; Ltr, Malony to Hopkins, 13 Jun 42. Bk V, Hopkins Papers.
46. (1) History cited n. 41(1). (2) Ltr, McCloy to Hopkins, 4 May 42. Bk V, Hopkins Papers. (3) CM-IN 6354, Chungking to AGWAR, 18 Jun 42. (4) CM-IN 6551, Karachi to AGWAR, 19 Jun 42. (5) CM-IN 2686, Maiden to Marshall, 7 Jul 42.
47. (1) Ltr, Soong to Hopkins, 15 Jun 42; Ltr, Hopkins to Arnold, 15 Jun 42; Ltr, Roosevelt to Arnold, 15 Jun 42; Memo, Arnold for Hopkins, 18 Jun 42. Bk V, Hopkins Papers. (2) Memo, Handy for Marshall, 14 Aug 42, sub: Three Minimum Reqmts for China Theater Submitted by Generalissimo. WDCSA (China), A45-466. (3) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 538. (4) Rad, Stilwell to Marshall, 28 Sep 42. Item 41, Bk 1, JWS Personal File. (5) JCS 30th Mtg, 25 Aug 42, par. 7.
48. (1) SNF-12. (2) History cited n. 41(1). (3) MS, History of the India Burma Theater, 24 Jun 45-31 May 46, Chart facing p. 300. Gen Ref Br, OCMH.
49. Rad, Chiang to Roosevelt, 27 May 42, including Note from Soong to Hopkins, 1 Jun 42; Memo, Currie for Hopkins, 1 Jun 42, including Msg from Mme. Chiang to Currie, 31 May 42. Bk V, Hopkins Papers.
50. (1) Memo, Wheeler for Sibert, 4 Jun 42, sub: Emergency Air Transport Program for China; 1st Ind, Naiden to Stilwell, 7 Jun 42. Item 159, Corresp Folder (Jul 42-Nov 43), CT 23, Dr 2, KCRC. Naiden said delivery of 150 tons a day for the next six months was an impossibility. (2) Rad AD 122, Stilwell to Arnold, 18 Jun 42. SNF-12. (3) CM-IN 6354, Stilwell to Marshall, 20 Jun 42.
51. (1) Ltr, Soong to McCloy, 18 Jun 42. ASW 400.336 (China). (2) Min, entry 515, MAC(G) 35th Mtg, 22 Jun 42. (3) Min, MAB 21st Mtg, 24 Jun 42.
52. Rad, Soong to Mme. Chiang for Stilwell, 17 Jun 42. SNF-12.
53. (1) Ltr cited n. 29(2). (2) Ltr, Soong to McCloy, 18 Jun 42. ASW 400.336 (China). (3) Ltr, Soong to Hopkins, 20 Jun 42. Bk V, Hopkins Papers.
54. Ltr, with Memo, Soong to Hopkins, 20 Jun 42; Ltr, Soong to Hopkins, 23 Jun 42; Ltr, Currie to Hopkins, 23 Jun 42, with atchd Msg from T. Franklin Ray, Jr., Office of Lend-Lease Administration, 21 Jun 42, on status of Chinese lend-lease stockpile in India; Note, Hopkins to Currie, 24 Jun 42, in which Hopkins said that he was taking immediate steps to halt the Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground) recommendation to stop the July assignment; Memo, Hopkins for Burns, 24 Jun 42; Memo, Burns for Hopkins, 25 Jun 42, sub: Mun to China; Memo, Soong for Hopkins, 25 Jun 42. Bk V, Hopkins Papers.
55. (1) Memo, Brig Gen St. Clair Streett for Gen Handy, 29 Jun 42, sub: Restrictions on Movement of Dawson Mission [A-29]. OPD 452.1 (Middle East) Sec 2, A47-30. (2) The Generalissimo mentioned Soong's reports to Stilwell on 26 June 1942. Min, Conf, Stilwell and Generalissimo, 26 Jun 42. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. (3) Burns called Soong to reassure him that the Munitions Assignments Committee (Ground) decision was being altered. Memo, Burns for Hopkins, 25 Jun 42. Bk V, Hopkins Papers. (4) In a telephone conversation with Brig. Gen. Walter B. Smith, General Handy explained that it had been difficult to contact Soong and members of the Chinese Embassy staff in Washington. Tp Conv record, Handy with Smith, 29 Jun 42. Bk 6, OPD Exec 8.
56. (1) CM-IN's cited n. 18. (2) CM-IN 6689, AQUILA to AGWAR, 20 Jun 42. (3) CM-OUT 5699, OPD to Stilwell, 24 Jun 42. (4) CM-IN 7816, Stilwell to AGWAR, 24 Jun 42. (5) CM-OUT 6075, AGWAR to Stilwell, 24 Jun 42.
57. (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 598-99. (2) Memo cited n. 55(1). (3) Tp Conv record cited n. 55(4). (4) The Brereton Diaries, 9 Aug 42, p. 145.
58. (1) Min (Chinese version), Conf, Stilwell and Generalissimo, 1100, 26 Jun 42. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. (2) Memo of Conf at 1100, 26 Jun 42, Bissell, recorder, for Stilwell and Mme. Chiang. Memoranda for Mme. CKS Folder (May-Sep 42), CT 23, Dr 2, KCRC. (3) The Generalissimo's frequent references to telegrams from the President cannot be documented from War Department files. These assurances of support possibly could have been transmitted to Chungking via Navy or State Department channels and not communicated to Stilwell. It is more probable that the Generalissimo is referring to radios received from Soong's transmitter in Washington, allegedly quoting the President. Thus, on 1 July 1942 Madame Chiang stated that "she had received, under date of June 18th, from Soong, a statement that the President had made available for the Generalissimo the 10th Air Force for employment in China." Memo of Mtg, Stilwell and Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, 1 Jul 42. Memoranda for Mme. CKS Folder (May-Sep 42), CT 23, Dr 2, KCRC. No communication to that effect was ever received by Stilwell from higher authority. Soong's statement is completely inconsistent with the White House decision to send the Tenth's B-17's to Egypt.
59. The Stilwell Papers, pp. 120, 123, 126, 130-31.
60. (1) CM-IN 8586, Stilwell to Marshall, 26 Jun 42. (2) CM-IN 8933, Stilwell to Marshall, 27 Jun 42.
61. (1) The diversion of the Tenth Air Force is in Chapter IV, above. (2) History of Blackmail, Stilwell B&W. Probably written on 22 July 1942, judging by dates on succeeding entries.
62. (1) Memo, Moore for Marshall, 27 Jun 42. WDCSA (China), A45-266. (2) Memo, Deane for Marshall, 28 Jun 42. Statement, Marshall before War Council, 6 Jul 42. WDCSA, Notes of War Council, A48-139.
63. (1) CM-OUT 7014, Roosevelt to Chiang, 27 Jun 42. Stilwell delivered this message in person on 29 June 1942. (2) Quotation from The Stilwell Papers, p. 121.
64. Ltr, Generalissimo to Stilwell, 28 Jun 42. SNF-12.
65. (1) CM-IN 0560, Stilwell to Marshall, 1 Jul 42. (2) CM-IN 2385, Stilwell to Marshall, 3 Jul 42.
66. (1) The Stilwell Papers, p. 121. (2) "The Madame (Chiang) also raised the question of the Generalissimo's authority to divert CNAC lend-lease planes to the Chinese Air Force. General Stilwell was requested to render an opinion on the Generalissimo's authority." Memo of Mtg, Stilwell with Mme. Chiang, 1 Jul 42. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
67. Stilwell B&W, 1 Jul 42.
68. Ltr, Hearn to authors, 12 Feb 50. HIS 330.14 CBI 1950. Hearn urged Stilwell and Bissell to adopt this answer to the Generalissimo's challenge.
69. See Soong-Stimson accord, 23-30 January 1942, Chapter II, above.
70. See 2 February 1942 presidential directive, and ARCADIA paper, ABC 4/9, Chapter II, above.
71. See Soong-Stimson accord, 23-30 January 1942, MAB Directive, 14 May 1942, and McCloy letter to Soong, June 1942, Chapters II and V, above.
72. See Soong-Stimson accord, 23-30 January 1942, Chapter II, above.
73. (1) Memo, Stilwell for Generalissimo, 2 Jul 42. Item 19, OPD Exec 10. (2) The Stilwell Papers, p. 121.
74. Stilwell B&W, 1 Jul 42.
75. Soong delivered the Generalissimo's message to President Roosevelt on 5 July 1942. Memo, Chiang for Roosevelt, 5 Jul 42. Item 19, OPD Exec 10.
76. (1) Quotation from The Stilwell Papers, pp. 125-26. (2) CM-IN 7340, Stilwell to Marshall, 21 Jul 42. (3) CM-IN 9072, Stilwell to Marshall, 24 Jul 42.
77. The Stilwell Papers, p. 121.
78. (1) Memo, Hopkins for Marshall, 9 Jul 42. Item 19, OPD Exec 10. (2) Memos, Deane for Marshall, 13, 19 Jul 42. WDCSA, Notes of War Council, A48-139. (3) CM-OUT 4444, OPD to Stilwell, 16 Jul 42. (4) CM-OUT 6863, Marshall to Stilwell, 24 Jul 42. (5) Memo, McCloy for McNarney, 27 Jul 42. Item 19, OPD Exec 10. (6) CM-OUT 8454, Marshall to Stilwell, 29 Jul 42. (7) This incident did not mark an end to the Chinese practice of altering the President's messages to the Generalissimo to make them read more agreeably to their recipient. It was to continue until the President ordered in May 1944 that notes to the Generalissimo be delivered personally by the senior U.S. officer in Chungking. Memo, Roosevelt for Marshall, 3 May 44. Folder 1, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek (GMO CKS), Item 58, OPD Exec 10.
79. Memo, Stilwell for Generalissimo, 2 Jul 42, sub: Prelim Estimate of Status Quo in China. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
80. Memo, Stilwell for Generalissimo, 7 Jul 42. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
81. A second Memo, Stilwell for Generalissimo, 7 Jul 42. Same file.
82. See Illustration, p. 155.
83. The Stilwell Papers, p. 126.
84. (1) CCS 90, 90/1, 2, 10 Jul 42, sub: Jul Asgmt for China. (2) CCS 31st Mtg, 16 Jul 42, Item 4. (3) CM-OUT 5475, Marshall to Stilwell, 18 Jul 42. (4) Quotation from Stilwell Diary, 23 Jul 42.
85. Memo, Stilwell, 10 Jul 42, sub: What is Future of China War Theater? SNF-12.
86. (1) Memo, Stilwell, 10 Jul 42, sub: Plan for Retaking Burma. SNF-12. (2) For another view of Stilwell's motivation, see Chennault, Way of a Fighter, pp. 210, 270-76.
87. (1) Stilwell B&W, 20 Jul 42. (2) Memo, Stilwell for Marshall, 30 Jul 42. CCS 381, Burma (8-25-42), Sec 1. (3) CM-IN 0789, Stilwell to Marshall, 2 Aug 42.
88. Stilwell B&W, 20 Jul 42.
89. Memo cited n. 87(2).
90. (1) Memo with Incl, Stilwell for Generalissimo, 18 Jul 42, sub: Suggested Ltr from Generalissimo to President. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. (2) Ch. II, pp. 56-57, Ch. IV, pp. 135-36, above.
91. (1) Memo, FAB/NMC 60, Shang Chen for Stilwell, 2 Jul 42. SNF-12. (2) Translation of Ltr O, Chiang to Stilwell, 14 Jul 42. SNF-77 Generals Liao, Sun, and Lo were placed under Stilwell.
92. Stilwell Black Book, 10 Jul 42.
93. (1) The Stilwell Papers, pp. 128-31. (2) Stilwell Diary, 25, 27, 31 Jul 42. (3) CM-IN 9776, Currie to Roosevelt, 28 Jul 42. (4) Rpt, Currie to Roosevelt, 24 Aug 42, sub: Rpt on Visit to China. OPD 336 China (24 Aug 42), A47-30.
94. Rpt cited n. 93(4).
95. (1) CM-OUT 8122, Gruber to Stilwell, 28 Jul 42. (2) CM-IN 9776, Currie to Roosevelt, 28 Jul 42. (3) CM-OUT 8454, Marshall to Stilwell, 29 Jul 42.
96. CM-IN 9776, Currie to Roosevelt, 28 Jul 42.
97. (1) Ltr, McCloy to Soong, 18 Aug 42. ASW 400.336 (China). (2) CM-OUT 5982, Marshall to Stilwell, 19 Aug 42. (3) See p. 156, above.
98. Stilwell Diary, 27 Jul 42.
99. (1) Memo, Stilwell for Generalissimo, 29 Jul 42, sub: Pacific Front Proposal. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. (2) After Currie's return the Stilwell proposal became CCS 104, 29 Aug 42, sub: Pacific Front Plan Presented by Generalissimo. (3) Memo, Stilwell for Marshall, 30 Jul 42, with Incl A, Memo, U.S. Secy, CPS, for Brig Gen Albert C. Wedemeyer, JPS, 16 Mar 43, sub: Plan for Retaking Burma. ABC 384, Burma (8-25-42), Sec 2, A48-224.
100. Ltr, FAB/NMC 82, Shang Chen to Stilwell, 1 Aug 42. SNF-73.
101. Ltr, Dorn to Handy, 4 Aug 42. OPD 381 CTO, Sec 3, A47-30.
102. (1) Memo, Stilwell for Generalissimo, 29 Jul 42, sub: Pacific Front Proposal. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. (2) The Stilwell Papers, pp. 131-33.
103. (1) Memo, Stilwell for Generalissimo, 1 Aug 42, sub: Proposed Raid Into Indochina. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. (2) Stilwell B&W, 1 Aug 42.
104. Notes of Mtg with NMC, Aldrich, recorder, 20 Aug 42. Item 225, Corresp Folder (May-Dec 42), CT 23, Dr 2. KCRC.
105. (1) Japanese Study 77. (2) See p. 163, above.
106. The Japanese stocks in China were kept at a level estimated as enough for one battle; the resupply factor for rifle ammunition was 0.3. See Imperial General Headquarters Army Directive 1122, 20 Mar 42, GHQ, Far East Comd, Mil Hist Div, Imperial General Headquarters Army Directives, Vol. II. Gen Ref Br, OCMH.
107. (1) CM-IN 11061, Stilwell to Gruber, 29 Aug 42. (2) CM-IN 11380, Stilwell to Marshall, 29 Aug 42. (3) CM-OUT 5287, Marshall to Stilwell, 17 Aug 42. (4) CM-OUT 2055, Marshall to Stilwell, 6 Sep 42. (5) CM-OUT 1047, Marshall to Stilwell, 3 Oct 42.
108. Memo, Stilwell for Generalissimo, 6 Aug 42, sub: Opn of Transport Airplanes. SNF-21.
109. (1) The Stilwell Papers, p. 139. (2) Stilwell B&W, 10 Nov 42.
110. (1) Memo, Stilwell for Currie, 1 Aug 42, sub: Gen View of Chinese Situation. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. (2) CM-IN 0433, CM-IN 0789. Stilwell to AGWAR, 2 Aug 42. (3) Currie's view on Chinese co-operation is in Chapter I, page 41, above. (4) As early as 4 September 1942, at the President's request relayed through Marshall, OPD drafted a message for the President to send to the Generalissimo, informing him of the U.S. answer to the Three Demands and asking in return for the development of the Thirty Division Program and the reorganization of his army with Stilwell as adviser. Currie objected to the draft reply. It was modified before being sent to Stilwell for comment. Memo, Handy for Marshall, 4 Sep 42, sub: Support of China, with Incl, Memo, Marshall for President, 11 Sep 42, sub: Support of China. OPD 381 CTO, Sec 2, A47-30. (5) Memo, Currie for Marshall, 12 Sep 42, sub: Cable from You to Generalissimo. WDCSA 381, File I, A46-523. (6) Ltr, Currie to Marshall, 14 Sep 42. Item 22, OPD Exec 10.
111. (1) On 24 August Currie recommended to the President that Soong, Gauss, and Stilwell be replaced. He argued that Stilwell and the Generalissimo had had a basic misunderstanding over the chief of staff role since January 1942. Rpt cited n. 93(4). (2) Memo and Ltr cited n. 110(5), (6).
112. (1) Interv with Marshall, 6 Jul 49. (2) Memo, Roosevelt for Marshall, 3 Oct 42. Marshall discussed Stilwell's transfer with Stimson. They agreed that no one could be found to replace Stilwell. Ltr, Marshall to Roosevelt, 6 Oct 42, sub: Situation Relative to Stilwell. OPD 381 CTO, Sec 2, A47-30.
113. Interv cited n. 112(1).
114. (1) Rpt cited n. 93(4). (2) Memo, Marshall for Roosevelt, 2 Oct 42, sub: Support of China. The President approved this memorandum on 10 October 1942 and it went to Stilwell as WAR 1469, Marshall for Stilwell, 12 Oct 42. OPD 381 CTO, Sec 2, A47-30. (3) Item 54, OPD Exec 10. (4) Memo, Roosevelt for Chiang, 12 Oct 42. Item 71, Bk 1, JWS Personal File.
115. Rad, Marshall to Stilwell, 1 Sep 42. WDCSA 381, File I, A46-523.
116. Rad, Stilwell to Marshall, 4 Sep 42. Item 35, Bk 1, JWS Personal File.
117. (1) The inference is based on Stilwell's August-September radios, warning Marshall that the Chinese wanted U.S. air power to assume the major burdens in China Theater. (2) Memo, Col Edward H. Alexander for Stilwell, 8 Sep 42, sub: China Air War Plan. Item 15, Bissell Corresp Folder (Jul-Sep 42), CT 23, Dr 2, KCRC.
118. Memo cited n. 117(2).
119. At midnight on 4 July 1942 the AVG had become a legend. On 6 July the China Air Task Force was activated. On 8 July Chennault assumed command of the CATF. History of the CATF, 1942-43. File 830.01, USAF Hist Div.
120. Memo, Chennault for Stilwell, 16 Jul 42. Item 23, Corresp Folder (Jul 42-Jan 43), CT 23, Dr 2, KCRC.
121. Memo, Stilwell for Generalissimo, 13 Sep 42, sub: Employment of U.S. CATF. SNF-53.
122. Memo, Chennault for Bissell, 16 Sep 42, sub: Plan for Employment of CATF and Atchd Servs; 1st Ind, Bissell for Stilwell, 17 Sep 42 (approved); 2d Ind, Stilwell for Bissell, 21 Sep 42 (approved); Memo, Chennault for Bissell, 22 Sep 42, sub: Plan for Tactical Employment of CATF; 4th Ind, Stilwell for Chennault, 3 Oct 42 (approved). Item 304, U.S. Opns in China Folder (Sep 42-Jul 43), CT 23, Dr 2, KCRC.
123. See pp. 175-77, above.
124. (1) Stilwell Diary, 10-12 Oct 42. (2) CM-IN 10959, Stilwell to Marshall, 24 Sep 42.
125. CM-IN 12306, Stilwell to Marshall, 28 Sep 42.