ANAKIM Marks Time
All things considered, Stilwell was rather relieved by the Generalissimo's refusal to cross the Salween River into Burma. Stilwell's memorandums to Soong had been eloquent in their description of Chinese unreadiness and, as Stilwell believed, unwillingness, so the months ahead could be used to good advantage. Up to the present, Stilwell had enjoyed a good measure of support from his government, and by January 1943 it was plain that he would need it if China were to be rearmed. True, the President at Currie's suggestion had refused to ask anything of the Chinese in return for lend-lease, but on the other hand, and apparently more important to Stilwell, the shrewd and well-informed Soong regarded Stilwell worthy of collaboration. So long as Soong, and such Chinese as thought like Soong, regarded Stilwell as commanding predominant influence in Washington, then Stilwell could apply himself to reform of the Chinese Army without worrying about his position.
The Generalissimo's action could even be made to support the cause of Army reform, so long as Stilwell's superiors appeared to attach importance to his projects. Unity and coherence among American personalities and agencies would be vital in dealing with the Chinese. With unity and coherence, with American technical skill to draw on, the most daringly conceived projects might perhaps succeed despite all that could be urged against them, but "if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?"
Talks About Reform Continue
Stilwell's initial and personal reaction to the Generalissimo's withdrawal from the projected March 1943 offensive was an indignant one, but, after he had surveyed the new situation and mapped out his course of action, he wrote in his diary on 18 January 1943 that it was a "damn good thing March 1 is off. We'd have been hung."1 There must have been encouragement for him in a letter from Stimson that he received about this time, even though the Secretary of War wrote it before the Generalissimo's refusal to cross the Salween was known in Washington.
Although I have not written you as often as I should have liked to, I have been following your negotiations and actions with the deepest interest and confidence. There is hardly a step you take that is not talked over by Marshall and myself and I know that our feelings for you are similar and deep. You have been sorely tried and I hope you realize how thoroughly we appreciate what you have been through. It is a very real source of gratification to us both that you seem now to be successful in conquering all of the difficulties which have been thrown in your path.
Wherever it is possible, we have tried to smooth your way for we believe in the soundness of your judgment and the correctness of your strategic decisions. We realize the dangers and difficulties of the North Burma campaign which have apparently so disheartened Wavell and his staff, but we agree with you in thinking that it is a necessary prerequisite to any thoroughly satisfactory line of communications to China. We hope that you will be successful in conquering the difficulties of the terrain and the dangers of malaria.
When I offered you this China mission I knew it would be a tough one but I confess I did not realize how very tough it would be; and I wish you to feel now my sympathy and congratulations for the surpassing fortitude, skill, and courage which you have shown in carrying through. I hope that the New Year will give you a full measure of success and the satisfaction that will go with it.
Very sincerely your friend,
HENRY L. STIMSON2
In private conversations with the Chinese immediately after the Generalissimo withdrew from the Burma operation, Stilwell adopted the tactics of indicating his extreme disappointment and of prophesying a radical change in U.S. public opinion unless the Chinese took immediate steps to make amends.3 Stilwell believed the Chinese very likely would try to compensate for their withdrawal and laid his plans accordingly:
If I can report full cooperation on the first 30-division plan and a determination to use this force offensively, I will have a basis for demanding [from the War Department] the equipment for the second 30 divisions and additional personnel for training. If the delays experienced to date are to continue, then it is certainly not too early to start on the second group. These units would not have to be moved for some time. They could, however, be reorganized and groups of instructors sent out to them to begin their training. Much could be done without any new equipment--tactical training particularly--and a great deal of time could be saved. The economy and efficiency in a small, well-equipped, well-trained, mobile force compared with a large, ill-equipped, untrained, immobile one is obvious. With 60 divisions in being, China will have nothing to fear from the Japs.4
Stilwell, therefore, drafted an agreement to be presented to the Chinese if they seemed willing to admit a desire to repair the damage that Stilwell expected the Generalissimo's action would have inflicted on Sino-American relations. He hewed to the line of his 27 December 1942 note to Soong and therefore included his now-familiar proposals for reorganization and concentration
of the Chinese Army, service schools, and an efficient SOS. The text of the draft agreement read:
At Ramgarh. a. Continue the combat training of the New 1st Army [22d and 38th divs.]. b. Augment the force by one division, c. Set up an armored force school, d. Set up a CWS school, e. Continue and amplify instruction in artillery, infantry weapons, motor transport, anti-aircraft, signal, engineer, medical, and QM branches. Organize six additional 75-mm. pack howitzer battalions. Continue officers' school.
At the base at Ledo. Prepare the base, with medical, motor transport, engineer, and supply facilities. Stock it. Work on the road.
In Yunnan. a. Concentrate, re-organize, equip, and train the units to participate. b. Build up stocks of supplies. c. Establish in the Kunming area officers' schools for infantry, artillery, and air-ground liaison. Feed instructors from these schools to the armies in Yunnan. d. Thoroughly organize the SOS and all its services--engineer, medical, signal, motor transport, depots, etc. e. Repair and develop the Burma Road, and prepare the communications to the east.
Elsewhere in China. a. Designate the units for the second 30 division plan. Begin re-organization. Send selected officers to the Kunming schools. b. Reorganize the Chinese Air Force.5
The proposed agreement had three significant new points. On 6 January Soong had formally asked on behalf of the Chinese Government that the United States assist in the reorganization, training, and future planning of the Chinese Air Force, with "quite a few [U.S. airmen] in order to stiffen the whole force," and for operations under Chennault's control. Stilwell therefore included this major point. The draft also invited attention to the importance of developing a line of communications from the terminus of the Burma Road to east China and made the important proposal that designation and reorganization of the second Thirty Divisions begin at once.6 Obviously Stilwell felt the time had come to raise the major issue of a second Thirty Divisions.
Completing his personal preparations for further talks with the Chinese, Stilwell listed every proposed step in detail for Marshall's approval, together with his prophecy of a great change in U.S. opinion. Marshall's complete approval came at once on 16 January, and Stilwell prepared to resume discussions and await the opportune moment to give the proposed agreement to the Generalissimo.7
For their part, Soong and Chen Cheng continued the discussions with no indication that the Generalissimo's 8 January note represented a change in Chinese policy. The talks covered every aspect of the projected fall 1943 campaign,
and Stilwell's staff had a study at hand for every major point. Soong asked for a list of "outstanding differences, misunderstandings, or difficulties," plus a detailed plan for Y-Force preparations.8 He also promised to do something about relieving Generals Tu Yu-ming and Ho Ying-chin.9 Stilwell reported to Washington that he, General Ho, and the local representative of the Chinese supply agencies in Washington had agreed on a 1943 program to procure lend-lease for sixty Chinese divisions, on the basis of completing the equipment of the first thirty and initiating procurement for the second thirty. Within a few days Stilwell and his Chinese colleagues agreed that Chinese requests for 1943 lend-lease supplies would be presented to Stilwell for prior comment.10
By 24 January Chen was of the opinion that there were four matters left to be presented to the Generalissimo: (1) Was Chen to have complete authority over the Y-Force? (2) Did the Generalissimo intend to order immediate concentration of the Y-Force and an immediate start on training? (3) When could the concentration be completed? (4) Was everything about the Chinese SOS settled? All other matters, said Chen, could be settled between him and Stilwell "as they were in complete agreement on all main points."11
Chen's questions cut to the heart of the matter, for in surveying his position on 20 January and listing an imposing series of his proposals that the Chinese had accepted in preparation for a Burma offensive, Stilwell noted: "BUT no action. Orders delayed and not obeyed. 3 armies exempted from amalgamation. 8th, 93rd, 37th, and 74th not moved. Obstruction in getting schools. Chen Cheng absent [from Yunnan]. Money not appropriated. Lung Yun not controlled."12
The area of uncertainty was apparently well defined by Chen, for when a few days later Soong, Chen, and Stilwell met again it was agreed that some points were still unsettled, among them, the central one--when would the orders for the troops to move to Yunnan actually be issued? Chen's command status was still in doubt, but it may have seemed subordinate to the question of whether the Chinese Government would take action.13
The Soong-Chen discussions were one of the high points of Stilwell's Mission to China. Stilwell's mood was hopeful because Marshall and Stimson
were supporting him strongly; Soong was co-operating closely, and Ho Ying-chin, while still a disturbing factor, seemed to be on the way out. Word that Madame Chiang needed Soong in Washington did not upset Stilwell. Pleased with Soong's help, Stilwell wrote him, "Mr. Stimson and General Marshall have been informed of the great assistance you have furnished me in carrying out my orders for the best and most efficient aid to China. Please accept my personal thanks for your service."14
Just before Soong's departure for Washington, Stilwell gave the Generalissimo the finished product of his discussions with Chen and Soong, and his exchange with Marshall, a memorandum dated 28 January 1943:
This is our opportunity to equip and train a force that will make China strong and safe. The opportunity must be seized while the supply of weapons is available. If the first 30-Division Plan is carried out and the force used offensively, I will have a basis for demanding the equipment for another thirty divisions. I have already recommended the procurement of this matériel, and if a plan is produced to equip and train them, I can ask for instructors to assist in their training.
I recommend that the program for the Y-Force be pushed; that the concentration of the troops be expedited; that General Ch'en Ch'eng be relieved of all other duties at once; that any necessary changes in Armies for the Y-Force be made at once; that financial arrangements be authorized; and that the training program be approved. Also that the units of the second 30-Division Plan be designated; that their re-organization and re-equipping be started at an early date; and that a plan of training similar to that proposed for the first thirty divisions be adopted.
If these things are done now, by next fall the first thirty divisions should be an efficient field force, and the second thirty divisions should be well advanced in tactical training. With a supply line open, both groups could be equipped promptly with their weapons, and from then on China would have nothing to fear from the Japanese. Without such a definite plan, there will be difficulty in continuing the present flow of supplies from the United States, let alone increasing it materially; as I am trying to do at present.
To me this matter seems of such extreme importance to the future of China, that I bring it again to the attention of the Generalissimo, and hope that he will give it particular consideration. The Generalissimo may depend on all American personnel to exert their best efforts to make the program a success.15
Administrative Changes for U.S. Forces
Presumably since no offensive would begin until fall 1943, thus allowing time for extended and elaborate preparations, Stilwell decided in early January to move toward an expanded American organization in CBI Theater. The original 1942 War Department concept had been of a mission, to reassure the Generalissimo of American support. In the next stage, so many projects accumulated that Stilwell formed a task force. Finally, in July 1942 Stilwell set up a theater headquarters. The bent of his thought, though, lay toward the concept
of an American Mission to China, which term he used to describe his organization in a memorandum to Soong on 3 January 1943. Indeed, the terms American Mission and Stilwell Mission lingered for a long time in CBI. Late in January 1943 Stilwell took the next hurdle and told his chief of staff that he was thinking of greater American activity organized on a basis that lent itself to expansion. General Hearn passed the word to Wheeler, telling him to submit requirements for an expanded SOS.16
American troop strength in CBI as of 31 December 1942 was:17
Type China India-Burma Total Air Force 812 9,664 10,476 Services of Supply 152 4,470 4,622 Ground Forces 96 298 394 Air Transport Command 195 1,404 1,599 Total 1,255 15,836 17,091
Stilwell's force was thus about the size of an infantry division.
Given the green light from Stilwell's headquarters, Wheeler began preparing to discuss his requirements with the Commanding General, Services of Supply (Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell), whose presence in CBI was expected shortly. Stilwell's action was timely, for according to a report from The Inspector General, SOS in CBI was understaffed and undermanned. In order to permit the functioning of SOS offices, officers had been borrowed from troop units, Tenth Air Force, and Stilwell's headquarters.18
In contemplating greater American effort in CBI, Stilwell was no longer required to think of the airlift to China as his direct command responsibility. On 1 December 1942, the airlift had become part of the world-wide Air Transport Command (ATC). This step had been directed by the War Department in late October. In that month, Stilwell had set 5,000 tons per month over the Hump as the goal for February 1943 and had accepted the logistical requirements of the target that Bissell and Stilwell's air officer, Lt. Col. Edward H. Alexander, stipulated in July 1942. At that time Washington officialdom had accepted seventy-five as the number of transports needed to reach the 5,000-ton goal.19
Stilwell, Bissell, and Alexander stated that 5,000 tons a month meant 140 aircraft (C-47 [DC-3]) on the Hump during good weather and 300 during the monsoon; 280 crews during the monsoon, and 234 at other times, plus spares and gasoline. In October 1942 Stilwell asked the War Department to provide these aircraft in time to hit the 5,000-ton goal by February. His next communication from Marshall crossed this radio and was not in answer to it.
Marshall's radio took the aircraft and men of the airline to China from Stilwell's command and placed the airline under the Air Transport Command. Henceforth, the airline to China was a semiautonomous organization within the CBI Theater, which theater headquarters had to support but which it could not command. Semiautonomous is an awkward word, but it seems to approach the realities of the situation more closely than to say ATC in CBI was actually independent of theater headquarters. Several factors made for this. Item, Stilwell was theater commander; if he expressed a wish, would ATC be politic to refuse? Item, ATC depended on Stilwell for its logistical support, and any wise commander stays on good terms with those from whom he draws his beans and bullets. Thus, when Stilwell learned that food and living conditions in one ATC mess were intolerable, he stepped in with direct orders to ATC to straighten up the place. ATC complied forthwith.
Marshall explained that the step was taken because of accumulating evidence that the transports in India were not being used as well as were those of the ATC in other parts of the world. Marshall believed that diversion of aircraft from the Hump for intra-India transport might have a part in this. He reminded Stilwell of the heavy pressure from the White House to increase deliveries to China.
OPD added its explanation, which was more technical but which mentioned one very pertinent point: that various activities had pre-empted supplies from the ATC on their way across the Atlantic and Africa to the Hump airfields. Now that the Hump was part of the ATC family, thought OPD, it might expect better treatment. Since half of the Hump transports, by Stilwell's own estimate, were grounded for lack of spares, the point was well taken. Stilwell protested the War Department's action on the ground that any lack of efficiency simply reflected a lack of spares, which could not be remedied by simply adding another agency to the already complex CBI picture. His protest was set aside, and India-China Wing, ATC, took over on 1 December 1942, with forty-four aircraft and 866 men at its disposal.20
The Arnold-Somervell-Dill Mission
When the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed in August 1942 to lay Marshall's proposal for a Burma operation before their planners, in effect they placed Burma operations on their agenda. In retrospect, much of the difficulty which had attended the first attempt to plan a combined operation in Burma seems to be that the proposal to invade Burma in March 1943 was never an operation agreed on at the highest Allied levels. There was no CCS directive setting the scope and objectives of ANAKIM and binding Wavell and Stilwell to work in harmony. There was no JCS directive to Stilwell, who had to find support for his projects. As for the Chinese, they were outside the CCS machinery, and when the Generalissimo pledged himself to attack, he did so under circumstances of which he was the sole judge.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were now firmly behind operations to break the blockade of China, and so an offensive in Burma was high on the agenda of the next great Anglo-American conference, that of Casablanca, 14-23 January 1943. In preparing to take part in the conference, the JCS listed among desirable operations for 1943 one in Burma to re-open the line of communications to China in order to obtain "bases essential to eventual offensive operations against Japan proper." Here was stated the strategic goal: staging areas and airfields in north China.21
The strategic picture in the Pacific war as of January 1943, and indeed for many long and weary months thereafter, lent a peculiar emphasis to the strategic advantages which might be won in China. Along the whole vast arc of the Pacific and the Bay of Bengal the outer defenses of the Japanese kept Allied sea and air power in those sectors far from Japan's vitals. The two campaigns then under way, in the Solomons and in New Guinea, were proceeding slowly and were unsettled. Losses on both sides had been heavy and the Japanese had resisted with great determination. A major Japanese naval concentration just north of the Solomons suggested the Japanese might be preparing a major effort to decide the struggle for Guadalcanal.
But the great arc of Japanese defenses was incomplete. There was nothing comparable to it in China. In China, the Chinese armies lay within a few days' march of such points as Hong Kong. From airstrips in China, Allied bombers could reach Japan itself. Other aircraft could harass the great shipping lane that connected Japan with the Netherlands Indies, and the oil fields there. In China, therefore, it was possible for the Allies to take action that would force the Japanese to fight in defense of Japan itself, rather than for some stinking jungle in the far Southwest Pacific. The prize was so obvious that the Americans strained eagerly after it. The differences among them were over the timing and
sequence of the several courses of action, rather than over the desirability of attacking Japan from China.
As far as the Joint Chiefs of Staff were concerned, Admiral Ernest J. King expressed their view when he told the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 16 January:
In the European theater, Russia was most advantageously placed for dealing with Germany in view of her geographical position and manpower; in the Pacific, China bore a similar relation to the Japanese. It should be our basic policy to provide the manpower resources of Russia and China with the necessary equipment to enable them to fight.22
With this view the War Department heartily agreed, and therefore Stilwell was sent to "increase the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army."
To attack Japan from China on an effective scale required a very considerable establishment in China. Aircraft require spare parts, fuel, and ammunition, and ultimately replacements. Pilots become casualties or earn replacement. The airfields from which they operate must be guarded against a ground reaction by the enemy. Therefore, the professional service element in the American leadership conceived of a major effort to open an effective line of communications into China at the end of which really considerable air power could be sustained. This major effort would be a great left hook to the Japanese jaw, which would then be softened up for the crushing straight right coming across the Pacific.
In the course of the Casablanca Conference the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King, and General Marshall were most emphatic in expressing JCS support for ANAKIM. In effect serving notice on the British that the United States would not jeopardize its Pacific interests for anything less than complete Anglo-American concentration on an early and full-scale cross-Channel operation, Marshall on 17 January used strong language in arguing for ANAKIM:
He said that he is most anxious to open the Burma Road, not so much for the morale effect on China as for the need to provide air support to China for operations against Japan and Japanese shipping. He said the expensive operations in which we are now engaged in the South Pacific react on everything else the United Nations attempt to do whether it be in the Mediterranean, the United Kingdom, or elsewhere. He discussed the situation in the Pacific as being so critical as to make it appear at one time that Operation TORCH [occupation of French North Africa] would have to be called off. He also stated that unless Operation ANAKIM could be undertaken, he felt that a situation might arise in the Pacific at any time that would necessitate the United States regretfully withdrawing from the commitments in the European theatre.
General Marshall spoke of our commitments in the Pacific, of our responsibilities, with particular reference to the number of garrisons we have on small islands and the impossibility of letting any of them down. He insisted that the United States could not stand for another Bataan. He said that he is desirous of undertaking the Burma operation in order to reduce our hazards in the Pacific and thus undertake the campaign against Germany.23
The British Chiefs of Staff advanced the argument that if ANAKIM was undertaken at any time in the winter of 1943-1944 it would, because of its demands on landing craft for operations against the Andamans and Rangoon, seriously curtail the British share in any cross-Channel operations in spring 1944. A compromise was indicated and was made possible by the U.S. Navy. Admiral King stated that he was willing to release U.S. landing craft from the South Pacific for operations in the Bay of Bengal.24
On the basis of the above, the CCS reached the Casablanca decisions regarding ANAKIM:
(1) That all plans and preparations should be made to mount ANAKIM in 1943, target date 15 November; (2) that the actual decision to attack would be made by the CCS in summer 1943, not later than July; (3) that if ANAKIM was mounted in 1943, the United States would assist in making up deficiencies in landing craft and naval forces by diversion from the Pacific.25 The resources committed to Burma and the Pacific, the CCS advised the President and Prime Minister, should be adequate to contain the Japanese and minimize the need of having to rush support there to meet an emergency, but not on a scale so large as to prevent seizing a sudden opportunity to defeat Germany in 1943. The purpose of operations in Burma was to keep China in the war, maintain pressure on the Japanese in that area, and establish and operate air power from Chinese bases on Japanese shipping in Chinese and Indochinese ports and on the flank of Japanese sea communications along the China coast.26
After examining the CCS report, the President and Prime Minister replied that they approved it and wished to emphasize four points: (1) The desirability of finding means of running convoys to Russia even during the forthcoming Sicilian campaign, and (2) "The urgency of sending air reinforcements to General Chennault's forces in China and of finding personnel to make them fully operative." The third and fourth points bore on European matters.27
The Chinese had not been represented at Casablanca. Stilwell would have been pleased to see them in an institutionalized working relationship with the CCS. On 4 January he had suggested to Marshall that the CCS form a subcommittee for Pacific operations, with Chinese representation. This arrangement would place the Generalissimo in proper relation to the conduct of the war, for he would then operate on the Roosevelt-Churchill level. So situated, he might not be tempted to act as a field commander, directing campaigns from Chungking, while Stilwell would not have to play the diplomat to win
the Generalissimo's consent to decisions the latter must have regarded as so many faits accomplis. The proposal was not accepted by the JCS.28
The diplomatic device adopted after Casablanca was to send an imposing delegation to Chungking to win the Generalissimo's adherence to the Casablanca proposals for ANAKIM. Its members were General Arnold, commanding the Army Air Forces and ex officio a member of the JCS; General Somervell, commanding the Services of Supply, and so the principal supply man in the American war machine; and Field Marshal Dill of the British Joint Staff Mission, to represent the Commonwealth's great stake in ANAKIM. Before he left Casablanca, Arnold indicated to Hopkins his skepticism about the CCS decisions on ANAKIM and his support for Chennault:
Arnold feels that in spite of the plan to open the Burma Road which has been agreed upon here, he is very doubtful that this will be done, and thinks that the only intelligent move immediately is to strengthen Chennault's air force and get at the bombing of Japan as soon as possible. Arnold tells me that he cannot tell exactly how this can be done until he goes to China after this conference is over. He is sure, however, that it can be accomplished. He tells me that General Bissell, the Air Force commander in India, is very antagonistic to Chennault and that that complicates Chennault's supply line. Arnold is very confident, however, that the whole business can be worked out.29
Arnold, Somervell, and Dill with their staffs flew to New Delhi to confer there with representatives of Wavell's and Stilwell's staffs. Arnold had with him good news for China Theater: by 1 April 137 transports would be present in the CBI Theater, of which 124 aircraft were for the Hump, and the 308th Bomb Group (B-24) was coming to India.30 The purpose of the gathering was to prepare a detailed proposal for Burma operations based on the Casablanca decisions. The proposal could then be submitted to the Generalissimo. Since the actual decision to invade would be made later by higher authority, the conferees had no power to bind their governments and kept the record straight by reaching a decision without commitments.
The command problem was attacked by proposing that Wavell command both the British forces and the Chinese Army in India until such time as Stilwell's Chinese met the Chinese from Yunnan. The Y-Force was to be commanded by the Generalissimo, who would assume command of all Chinese as soon as they made their juncture in north Burma. The post of deputy commander of operations based on India was reserved for an American. Another American was to command air operations, with a British deputy. Stilwell was not too pleased with the command proposal, for he feared that the deputy
CONFERENCE AT NEW DELHI, INDIA. Left to right, Field Marshal Sir Archibald P. Wavell, Lt. Gens. Stilwell, Henry H. Arnold, Brehon B. Somervell, and Field Marshal Sir John Dill.
ground force commander, a post likely to be his, would have only nominal powers.31
The consensus as to operations was that it was essential to take Burma in the period November 1943-May 1944. The preliminaries would include a submarine blockade of Rangoon, Chinese attempts to seize favorable jump-off positions in Yunnan, limited operations based on Ledo to cover the advance of the Ledo Road, an advance by two Indian divisions from Imphal to secure bridgeheads over the Chindwin, and the capture of Akyab and Ramree. In November 1943 a major effort would begin, with eleven Chinese divisions driving from Yunnan, the Ledo advance would become a two-division effort, and three Indian divisions would drive from Kalewa toward Mandalay. Landing operations at Taungup, Sandoway, and Bassein would follow in December, and in January 1944 would come the climax, direct assault on Rangoon.32
At the conferences, remarks by Bissell and Arnold illuminated the purpose of Burma operations. General Bissell said that all efforts should be looked at in the light of their contribution to the main purpose, which must be to get supplies to General Chennault, and thus make possible a direct attack from China on Japan and Japanese shipping and bases. General Arnold confirmed that it was with this end in view, and also to avoid a prolonged advance from island to island in the Pacific, that the Burma plan had been given priority; and he felt that it was now only necessary to state clearly what was required for the resources to be made available.33
The Conferences in Chungking and Calcutta
While Somervell remained in India to discuss CBI supply problems with Wheeler, Arnold and Dill went to Chungking to present the proposed operations to the Generalissimo. With him Arnold brought a personal letter from the President to the Generalissimo, which promised that something would be done about more U.S. aircraft for China Theater. This was very gratifying to the Generalissimo.34
The Generalissimo had good cause for wanting more American air power in his theater. He had become quite impatient over the lack of promised transports on the Hump. He had brought this to the President's attention in an increasing number of messages since the October 1942 answer to the Three Demands. Moreover, the Generalissimo faced varied excuses from his Chinese Air Force for not conducting their portion of the China Air War Plan.35 During the past six months, thanks to weather, the Chinese Air Force was relieved of the responsibility of defending Chungking. But during the same period neglect and incompetence had ruined the bulk of its lend-lease aircraft. The Chinese Air Force had failed in its training program and failed to carry out the Generalissimo's paper reforms. Chennault reported that the Chinese Air Force objected to operational control by a foreigner and flatly rejected advice to prepare for the day when the Japanese would return over Chungking with the fine spring weather.
In January Chennault was inquiring if the China Air Task Force was responsible for Chungking's defense. It must be surmised that he was fully aware of the deplorable state of the Chinese Air Force and would naturally conclude that the Generalissimo would demand protection for his capital when the bombers returned. And, since in March 1943 the Chinese Air Force formally informed Stilwell's headquarters that it could not defend Chungking, it may be assumed that in February the Generalissimo was aware that he would
have to provide some sort of protection for Chungking. Only a reinforced China Air Task Force could assume the mission. This meant the end of the China Air War Plan. Again, the demands on Hump tonnage that would be made by protecting Chungking with U.S. resources could not fail to affect plans to develop the Y-Force.36
In discussions with Arnold and Dill the Generalissimo again and again demanded more Hump tonnage, and at once; insisted that Chennault be independent of Stilwell; demanded that Bissell be recalled; and insisted that U.S. aircraft in great number be sent at once to China, without regard to the questions of ground establishment and gasoline supply. Arnold wrote, "The Generalissimo and Chennault glossed over these things with a wave of their hands. They could not, or would not, be bothered with logistics."37 Arnold reported to Marshall that supply problems made a separate air force in China impractical. Inspection had confirmed Stilwell's view that Chennault did not exercise the administrative and executive control of his force necessary to warrant its independence.38
The Generalissimo finally approved the ANAKIM operation on 6 February, and a banquet followed to mark the event. After dinner the Chinese again raised the question of immediately increasing the amount of tonnage being flown into China, and Arnold was again called on to explain and defend the ATC's performance. The next day Arnold was summoned for a private audience with the Generalissimo. The Chinese leader told him bluntly that the conferences had been a failure. The Generalissimo had asked for many things, and all he had received were excuses. Then the Chinese presented to Arnold for approval by the President an enlarged version of the Three Demands of June 1942, accompanied by hints of a separate peace. The Generalissimo now demanded: (a) an independent air force for China Theater, (b) ten thousand tons a month over the Hump, (c) five hundred aircraft in China by November 1943.
Arnold's answer was a blend of tact and firmness, for he had not been impressed by the Generalissimo as a soldier. Pointing out that he had already presented the Generalissimo with proposals to rebuild the Chinese Air Force which the Chinese leader had apparently failed to consider, Arnold added that
he was trying to increase the tonnage delivered to China, had given the necessary orders, but could not promise 10,000 tons by a fixed date because too many factors not under Arnold's control were involved. Tactfully, Arnold thus sought to persuade the Generalissimo that measures to satisfy his demands were under way and firmly told the Chinese leader that the principal question was whether or not China would join in efforts to retake Burma.
A full dress meeting of the Allied leaders was then convened. At its close the Generalissimo's summary of the meeting's results was so equivocal that Stilwell, still with no answer to his 28 January memorandum, asked him point-blank if China would join in an attempt to retake Burma. The Generalissimo said yes, and confirmed it in a letter to the President: "Finally, I wish to assure you that in the combined plan of operation for the Burma Campaign which was prepared after joint consultation, the Chinese Army will be in readiness to perform its assigned task at the specified time without fail."39
From Chungking the discussions moved to Calcutta on 9 February "to ensure that the decisions reached at Casablanca and Chungking should be perfectly clear to all concerned."40 Present for China were Soong and Ho; for the United States, Arnold, Somervell, Bissell, and Stilwell; for the British Commonwealth, Dill and Wavell.
Invited to describe China's share in the offensive, Ho said that with a grand total of over 100,000 men the Chinese would make three main thrusts toward Myitkyina and Bhamo with seven divisions, and two subsidiary thrusts toward Lashio and Kengtung. If all went well, these would join with Stilwell's Ledo force, and the two subsidiary thrusts would head for Mandalay. Though Ho did not want to set a definite date for this offensive, he promised China would be ready to attack when the monsoon was over. The Chinese agreed with Stilwell that by late October 1943 the Yunnan roads would be dry enough.
Wavell said he would advance from the Chindwin with three divisions (45,000 men) to join the Chinese at Mandalay, plus one division in close support, another in the Arakan, and five divisions in general reserve.
The conference attempted to assay the potential Japanese opposition, which Wavell set at eight divisions, and Ho at ten. The discussion of Japanese air strength produced a varied reaction with Wavell suggesting 350 Japanese aircraft possible; the Chinese, 750. From talk of Japanese air strength the discussion turned to the Generalissimo's demand for 10,000 tons a month over the Hump by fall. Stilwell observed this would require additional facilities at both ends of the line. The Chinese, he said, could construct theirs; would the British be able to match them? It would involve not just additional airfields, but increased road, rail, and river capacity.
Wavell replied that he had not had time for a staff study of the problem, that his own troops were also dependent on the same line of communications that supported the airlift to China. However, he was confident that the line of communications could bring as much to the airfields as the aircraft could carry forward. The conference then moved to its conclusion: "Field Marshal Wavell summed up by saying that all were in agreement, and it remained only for all to press on with the greatest possible energy their preparations to start the battle immediately after the monsoon."41
The President Overrules Marshall and Stilwell
The Generalissimo's pledge to take part in Burma operations was the last paragraph of his letter to the President on 7 February 1943, the balance of which was devoted to the enlarged version of the Three Demands that he gave to Arnold in Chungking.42 The letter, though, made no threats of a separate peace for China. That the President inclined toward Chennault's and the Generalissimo's viewpoint had become apparent in December. In that month he had suggested Chennault be given a task force of 100 aircraft with which to attack Japanese shipping and that he be made independent of Stilwell. Marshall objected because Chennault's mission was to support the then forthcoming offensive in Burma, so that if the aircraft were available they too should be used there. The success of the Burma offensive, Marshall told Roosevelt, was the absolute and essential prerequisite for expansion of air operations in China, for not until an adequate line of communications had been opened could the air effort be expanded to the maximum.43
Arnold at that time considered the proposal to make Chennault an independent air force commander premature, but he did urge that the principle be accepted. The President hinted to Leahy that this was his wish and at Casablanca revealed his desire to double the strength of Chennault's task force and with it to bomb Japan proper "for psychological reasons."44
Weighing the indications from White House circles--the President desired Chennault independent, Hopkins was Chennault's strong backer, and Currie wanted Stilwell's recall--Marshall told Stilwell candidly that the problem in Washington had been to support Stilwell against constant pressure from almost everyone interested in China, pressure further increased by a press campaign, to accept the Chennault viewpoint. He wrote, "While such factors are not included in the course at Leavenworth they are pertinent to the conduct of operations
and particularly so in your theater."45 To everyone's surprise, Marshall went on, Stilwell had attained most of his goals with the Chinese. Chennault, then, might wisely be given his chance. Stilwell agreed amiably enough and stated that he was willing to be benched, as he put it, if at any time the pressure grew too heavy. It was always, he continued, his secret ambition to be a sergeant in a machine gun company.46
Then the Generalissimo's 7 February letter arrived in Washington with its requests, accompanied by a letter from Stilwell expounding again his quid pro quo or bargaining thesis. As he sent Stilwell's letter on to the President, Marshall might have recalled that a few weeks before he, Marshall, had approved Stilwell's telling the Chinese that the United States would resent the Generalissimo's failure to cross the Salween in spring 1943, that China must show signs of seriously intending to pull her weight in the struggle.
Arnold's and Somervell's trip has been very helpful. I am particularly pleased that Arnold had a look at the machinery of Chinese government and a glimpse of the personalities we have to deal with.
We are grateful for your assistance [the B-24's and transports], even if the Chinese are not. Chiang Kai-shek has been very irritable and hard to handle, upping his demands no matter what is given him, and this attitude will continue until he is talked to in sterner tones. For everything we do for him we should exact a commitment from him.
The next paragraph gave some details of progress on the Y-Force and concluded:
In general, unless other blocks develop, we will get some much-needed training done on the Yunnan force, in time to make it capable of a serious effort, (I hope, I hope).47
The issue (Marshall and Stilwell versus the Generalissimo and Chennault) was now before the President for action. His decision was to back the Generalissimo and Chennault. The President directed preparation of a radio to the Generalissimo stating that Chennault would be placed in command of his own air force, the Fourteenth; that this air force would be built up to 500 aircraft as rapidly as Chennault believed he could support them in China; that as facilities improved, the ATC would be built up until 10,000 tons a month were being flown into China. At this point the President acknowledged the views of his service advisers by telling the Chinese that the ATC could never bring in enough, that a road would have to be built. Nor did he accept the Generalissimo's request for a renovated Chinese Air Force supported by 5,000 tons a month. He did suggest Arnold's more cautious plan to rebuild the Chinese Air Force one squadron at a time as pilots and aircraft were available. Marshall on 19 February gave Stilwell advance notice of the radio to the Generalissimo.
Stilwell was directed to set up a separate air force for Chennault, the Fourteenth. Stilwell's superiors now contemplated that Chennault was to receive 1,500 tons a month of the 4,000 which the 124 transports were to bring over the Hump by the end of March 1943.48
To Marshall, Roosevelt explained his dismissal of the War Department's approach to the strategic problems of China Theater. In his explanation the President explicitly rejected the bargaining or quid pro quo technique of working with the Chinese, displayed a lack of interest in Stilwell's mission of reforming the Chinese Army, and referred to Stilwell's projects as nothing more than local preparations for a Burma campaign. The letter closed with the good-natured reminder that he had overruled the military before and now thought he had been right in doing so.
Thank you for letting me see the copy of Stilwell's letter of February ninth in regard to Arnold's and Somervell's trip. I have read this letter with a good deal of care and my first thought is that Stilwell has exactly the wrong approach in dealing with Generalissimo Chiang who, after all, cannot be expected, as a Chinese, to use the same methods that we do. When Stilwell speaks about the fact that the Generalissimo is very irritable and hard to handle, upping his demands, etc., he is, of course, correct; but when he speaks of talking to him in sterner tones, he goes about it just the wrong way.
All of us must remember that the Generalissimo came up the hard way to become the undisputed leader of four hundred million people--an enormously difficult job to attain any kind of unity from a diverse group of all kinds of leaders--military men, educators, scientists, public health people, engineers, all of them struggling for power and mastery, local or national, and to create in a very short time throughout China what it took us a couple of centuries to attain.
Besides that the Generalissimo finds it necessary to maintain his position of supremacy. You and I would do the same thing under the circumstances. He is the Chief Executive as well as the Commander-in-Chief, and one cannot speak sternly to a man like that or exact commitments from him the way we might do from the Sultan of Morocco.
The other matter relates to the complete omission by Stilwell of any mention of air action in China in 1943. He is thinking of the Burma end of things and he is thinking of the ground forces now being trained in China.
While I am hopeful of the Burma operation, I still believe that important emphasis [should?] be placed on the strategic value of Chennault's air operations in 1943. I am glad to see it being pushed.
I know you will see that the directives sent to Stilwell and Chennault are so clear about our air plans that there will be no misunderstanding of our intentions.
It is essential that Chennault get his share of the supplies, and I believe he should get all above 4,000 tons a month until he gets an amount that will really keep his force operating. I understand from Arnold that is something over 2,500 tons a month on an all-out basis.
The construction and improvement of airfields both in India and China should be pushed to the limit.
I am assuming that the big bomber group now en route will be directly under Chennault's command.
Of more importance is the assurance--the air policy having been fixed in China--that Chennault, with Stilwell's approval, will have complete control over his operations and tactics.
While I am sure the relationship of Stilwell and the Generalissimo has improved, I hope nothing will be done to prevent Chennault from discussing air operations with the Chinese in an appropriate manner.
Our relations with China are important and I wish you would impress on Stilwell and Chennault that they are our representatives over there in more senses than one. Compatible with their military duties, they may well turn out to be the best "Ambassadors" we have in China. I hope they will.
Above all, I am depending on you to see that Chennault gets his chance to do what he believes he can do.
I do not think that the Staff plans either in Casablanca or here have given sufficient weight to the attrition against Japan each week and each month, or that that attrition can be greatly accelerated through increasing air power in China, by the sinking of Japanese ships off the coast of China, the destruction of Japanese aircraft, and the occasional bombing of Japanese cities.
Just between ourselves, if I had not considered the European and African fields of action in their broadest geographic sense, you and I know we would not be in North Africa today--in fact, we would not have landed either in Africa or in Europe!49
In answering the President, Marshall raised the principal War Department objection to the timing of Chennault's proposals. It was the argument with which the War Department always replied to Chennault and his adherents. Marshall warned that as soon as Chennault's effort stung the Japanese they would retaliate by attacking Chennault's airfields with their Army. Such an attack would have to be met by the Chinese Army, still untrained and without lend-lease arms. He also warned the President that many influential Chinese wanted the United States to fight China's battles for her.
I have given a careful reading to your private memorandum of March 8th regarding the relations between the Generalissimo and Stilwell. I should like your permission to quote to him [Stilwell] the second and third paragraphs of your memorandum, omitting the direct reference to the Sultan of Morocco (memorandum is attached).
As to the air phase of the matter, Stilwell is cognizant of our planned air effort out of China which will take place immediately upon the establishment of bases. I will further impress upon him to assist Chennault to the maximum, giving Chennault wide latitude in his operations. In this connection, the planes of the heavy bombardment group have already arrived in India; the ground crews will be there in about three weeks.
The supply problem, affecting air operations from China in 1943, is a tremendous one. Chennault requires help in his logistical planning. To this end, we are sending General Glenn this weekend to be Chennault's Chief of Staff, with General Haddon as his Service Commander, together with a selected staff.
However, the problem which we will face later in continuous air operations is ground protection for the China airdromes we use, as well as for the air freight route. We must build for that now. Here is the most serious consideration [Marshall's italics]: as soon as our air effort hurts the Japs, they will move in on us, not only in the air but also on the ground. The air situation Chennault can take care of with his fighters, but the ground effort against our bases
must be met by men on the ground. Our "bomb Tokyo" bases in Chekiang Province have been destroyed as a result of Japanese ground action. These fields have not been repaired.
The present Japanese advance into north Burma, although not yet in strength, probably has for its purpose the capture of the air warning stations protecting our Assam Air Freight Terminal. One station has already been forced to retire. Stilwell has just ordered a second Chinese regiment from Ramgarh to oppose this Jap move.
The size of an air force that can operate from China is limited by the means that can be made available to Stilwell from the U.S. On the other hand, ground protection for our airdromes in China and the terminals of the air transport route must come from the Chinese Army.
General Stilwell, realizing this, has concentrated on his local problem of creating dependable units in the Chinese Army. His approach to this problem has been fundamentally sound; namely, to assemble into a field force selected units, officered by selected leaders; this force to be equipped with U.S. equipment and trained sufficiently to place dependence on them in combat.
Stilwell has had marked success in assembling a few units (Ramgarh Project) with selected leaders. However, he has met with considerable obstruction and delay in concentrating a larger force in Yunnan. Although recent reports indicate progress is being made, it will be an up-hill fight all the way. It is firmly established that Ho Ying-chin embodies a school of thought now existing in the Chinese Army, that a military "watch and wait" policy should be followed. This is manifested by constantly emphasizing a U.S. air effort against the Japs from China as a substitute for creating and training the necessary Chinese ground forces to make such air effort effective by opening a ground route of communications through Burma.
The comparatively small air effort possible from China in 1943, although of great strategic value, can be only a beginning. With a land supply route through Burma and dependable forces to secure our air bases in China, we can increase our air action against the Japs and really hurt them.
This means Burma must be recaptured. The part contemplated for the Chinese forces in this offensive is extremely important and the time remaining for their preparation is all too short. Accordingly, delay in organization and concentration for training is a serious obstacle to overcome.
At every turn General Stilwell has been faced with the "let the other fellow do it" attitude on the part of the Chinese leaders. This attitude, combined with the present low combat worth of the Chinese Army, must be reversed before we can fully realize the Chinese potential in this war. To correct this must be the primary objective of any representative dispatched to this theater to represent American interests.
General Stilwell has no doubt talked very plainly to the Generalissimo on many of these points in order to secure his assistance in creating conditions where our help would be effective against the Japanese. In doing this, there have been times when he has incurred the displeasure of the Generalissimo. This is unfortunate. However, I do not know of any other officer in our Army who combines Stilwell's knowledge of the Chinese and their language with his ability as a soldier and as an organizer. He is tough, but only such a man would have survived the Burma campaign, battered down British-Indian sluggish resistance to all our plans and made some headway with reorganization of the Chinese Forces. Conditions must be created in China and a land route established to make an all-out air effort continuous and effective.
I am confident that the relationship between Stilwell and Chennault is such that Chennault will be given every opportunity to use his uncanny skill in the air against the Japs (see attached message).
Stilwell radioed me yesterday the following from Kunming:
Chen Cheng is here and I am sticking to him to get a headquarters set-up established. He is our best bet and present indications are that he will go along with us. I hope to open Infantry and Artillery Training Centers here (Kunming) by end of month. Soong's remark about threat on several fronts is nonsense. Japs are foraging near Shasi [western Hupeh], elsewhere there is no activity. Generalissimo is entirely unconcerned about threats on any front.
Chungking cannot or will not enforce its orders in this area [Yunnan]. Our presence threatens to affect the enormous smuggling racket here, and you may expect a campaign of vilification against me personally. I have already been accused of bad faith for keeping military supplies from racketeers. The continued publication of Chungking propaganda in the United States is an increasing handicap to my work. Utterly false impression has been created in United States public opinion. Army is generally in desperate condition, underfed, unpaid, untrained, neglected, and rotten with corruption. We can pull them out of this cesspool, but continued concessions have made the Generalissimo believe he has only to insist and we will yield.
If we can train and equip the Yunnan force, we can save the situation, but I may have to call for backing in case a showdown is necessary. You may think a year of this has had its effect on me. My opinion of the Chinese soldier and the Chinese people is unchanged. It is the gang of Army "leaders" that is the cause of all our grief. With best wishes and hoping for a better picture soon.50
On the same day that Marshall gave the President his comments on the Chennault Plan the Chief of Staff approved the award to Stilwell of the Legion of Merit in the degree of Chief Commander. In suggesting to General Marshall on 16 February 1943 that the Distinguished Service Medal be given Stilwell, Brig. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer of OPD had remarked: "General Stilwell, according to my personal observation, understands the situation in China- Burma-India Theater better than any of our allies. Nothing should be left undone to convince China that Gen. Stilwell enjoys full American confidence and that we look to him, in matters of importance concerning China, as the chief arbiter." The Operations Division concurred, but suggested the Legion of Merit as Stilwell already had the Distinguished Service Medal. As head of OPD, General Handy wrote to Marshall: "General Stilwell's constancy of purpose has been unfaltering, and events are proving the soundness of his judgment and the effectiveness of his forceful character."51
As General Marshall told Roosevelt, he sent the pertinent passages of the President's letter to Stilwell, who interpreted them as a Presidential rebuke.52 But the message was more than simply a rebuke; it was repudiation without recall. Since 1941 the senior American officers in China--first Magruder, then Stilwell--had worked out the bargaining or quid pro quo approach to China's
problems. Marshall and Stimson had approved it. Now the President announced that they had exactly the wrong approach. Without the President's support, Stilwell could not negotiate with the Generalissimo, and for about the next twelve months Stilwell was painfully aware that his position as Chief of Staff, China Theater, was largely formal.
After the war, as he looked back on the great argument over air power versus reform of the Chinese Army, the Army's Chief of Staff, General Marshall, commented that subsequent events had proved Stilwell to be right, but unfortunately much too outspoken and tactless. On still another occasion he observed that Stilwell had scorned attempts to counter the backstairs influence so damaging to his cause at the White House.53
After April 1943 Stilwell's exchange of memoranda and conferences with key Chinese officials dwindled sharply. Chennault was to have his chance, and results would speak for themselves. In seeking these results, Chennault would be under a handicap not apparent at first, for the President and Hopkins had been influenced by enthusiastic private letters from China. Chennault would have difficulty living up to the promises made for him.54
Moving Toward an Expanded Air Effort in China
Henceforth, preparations in China proceeded in two separate and often conflicting areas. Chennault worked to increase his air force and fly more missions with it. Stilwell sought to reform the Chinese Army and prepare for a campaign in Burma. Preparations for a greater air effort and a campaign in Burma each required Hump tonnage, and there Stilwell and Chennault began to clash ever more strongly in March and April 1943. Their differences revolved around a fractional number, one fourth of the Hump tonnage entering China, for each desired five eighths of Hump tonnage in any one month for his project. (Chart 6) Clashes between the two men over command and policy continued.
On 22 February Chennault presented a revised version of his plan to Stilwell, asking a little more in means and omitting the sweeping claims of the letter to Willkie. He stated that the Arnold-Somervell-Dill mission and Madame Chiang's appearance before Congress had probably warned the Japanese of forthcoming Allied offensive action, and that the Japanese were about to launch a major offensive to clear the Canton-Hong Kong line, drive the Chinese from the area between Nanchang and Changsha, and perhaps even go on to Wuchow and Kweilin, where lay some of the key east China airfields.
Could such a massive Japanese drive be stopped? Chennault stated: "It is believed that the Japanese cannot obtain their military objectives if opposed by
Hump Tonnage Carried by All Carriers in India-China: 1943
an effective Air Force. It is assumed that the Chinese Ground Armies will offer resistance similar to that offered in previous years and that, given support of an effective air force, they will be able to block the Japanese advances in the directions indicated."55 There was no suggestion that the Chinese Army needed lend-lease arms or training. Chennault then went on to say that given 150 fighters, 32 medium bombers, some more men, and 2,500 tons a month over the Hump (in February a total of 3,000 tons was flown in) he could not only protect the Hump air terminals but conduct consistent and effective operations in the central and coastal areas. In conclusion, he warned again that the Japanese were about to move and that early action was needed.
Chennault's proposals were approved by Stilwell's chief of staff and his air officer. While Chennault's letter was being considered by Stilwell's headquarters, word came from Marshall that Chennault was to be a major general commanding the new Fourteenth Air Force, which invested his proposals with the added significance that they would be his suggestions for the exercise of his new command. The Fourteenth Air Force was activated on 11 March 1943.56
At this delicate juncture the February 15 edition of Time magazine appeared in CBI, with an article stating that Chennault was willfully violating Stilwell's orders in an attempt to bring his case before higher authority, and further stating that opportunities to destroy key Japanese air bases were being lost through alleged obstructionism on the part of General Bissell. Chennault denounced the article as a complete fabrication and denied he had ever violated Stilwell's orders:
The implication of disrespect for your judgment in any military matters or in matters concerning the Chinese is a contortion of the truth. You are the only Regular Army General I know of who has long observed the Chinese, served with the Chinese Army, and in whom the Chinese have had sufficient confidence to entrust the command of their forces. . . . All the American Forces in China have got to work in closest harmony under the designated American Commander. Any officer who declines to do so should be summarily removed. In time of war, the greatest disservice that any soldier can do is to undermine in any way the relations of our Government with our allies.57
In this instance, Stilwell's indorsement to Chennault's 22 February proposals reflected his anger over Time's statements. Chennault was told that his primary mission was to protect the Hump airline and that he would get more supplies as circumstances permitted. The indorsement ended with a sarcastic appreciation of Chennault's interest in theater problems. To prevent Chennault's gaining command of both the Tenth and Fourteenth Air Forces and ultimately replacing him as theater commander, Stilwell suggested to Marshall that a theater air officer be brought in and set up over both Bissell and Chennault. Marshall replied that it would be impossible to put another air officer over Chennault; indeed, it might be better if Bissell went home. Stilwell objected strongly, for he feared that if the Chinese forced Bissell's recall there would be no end to such maneuvers.58
Stilwell received another shock when Chennault's new chief of staff, Brig. Gen. Edgar E. Glenn, reported on 31 March that Arnold had said Chennault "should" have complete control of the Hump and had asked that Stilwell be told of his "desires" in the matter. The language was curiously equivocal, and Stilwell promptly asked Marshall for confirmation. Marshall replied that there was no change of status and that Arnold had assured him that this was in accord with Arnold's statements to Glenn and Chennault.59
After cautioning Stilwell by inference against anything that might hinder Chennault or anger the Generalissimo, Marshall told him explicitly to support Chennault's operations and give Chennault free rein to see what he could do
with a firm allocation of 1,500 tons a month. Stilwell was also ordered to submit reports on the administrative planning and preparation for Chennault's air effort. Marshall's radio giving Chennault a priority on 1,500 tons a month centered attention on the Hump tonnage question.60
Stilwell's policy, announced on 1 March, was to allocate 1,000 tons a month for Chennault as a target, and to be willing to give Chennault another 1,500 tons a month, to a total of 2,500 tons a month, if Stilwell could also give 2,500 tons a month to the Chinese ground forces in lend-lease. In effect, Stilwell intended to split Hump tonnage evenly every month and try to give Chennault the 2,500 tons he wanted. If bad weather or a shortage of spare parts cut the amount flown in, then Stilwell intended that Chennault would still share equally with everyone else, regardless of what the shortage did to his air operations.61 Chennault's anger was aroused by this attitude, which he regarded as willful blindness to what might be done by air operations in China. He wanted a first priority on Hump tonnage, with enough transports put on the Hump to guarantee that every month he would get enough to fly and fight. His 1,000-ton allocation was in practice proving to be between 600 and 800 tons a month, not enough for his operations.62
Studying the problem of Hump tonnage distribution, Stilwell's chief of staff recommended that Stilwell give Chennault an absolute and fixed priority of 1,500 tons a month, so that the Fourteenth Air Force would be sure to have enough, even though other theater activities suffered. General Hearn warned that if this was not done, political pressure would increase in Chungking. The detailed allocation of Hump tonnage among American and Chinese activities as recommended by Hearn was:63
Tons Fourteenth Air Force, including Chinese Air Force 1,500 SOS, Kunming 50 Gas and oil for Kunming headquarters 46 Chungking headquarters 9 ATC at Kunming 200 Raw materials for Chinese arsenals 300 Passengers and baggage 25 Y-Force preparations 1,870 ------- 4,000
Stilwell did not accept this proposal. Noting that 1,500 was three eighths of 4,000, and fearing the effect on other activities in China if Chennault had an absolute priority, he asked Marshall if giving Chennault three eighths of
whatever came over the Hump would meet the President's wishes.64 No immediate answer came from Marshall, for the Stilwell-Chennault problem was again about to receive the President's attention.65
Reinforcements for Chennault and added cargo capacity on the Hump to support his operations had been under way since March. The 308th Bombardment Group (B-24) landed in India on 18 March. The concept behind it was that the group would carry its own supplies from India to China until it had accumulated enough for an operational sortie on targets in China, and then begin a process of periodically accumulating and expending its stocks. In agreeing to this plan for the 308th Group, the President had been under the impression that one bomber on one passage from India to China could carry gas and ammunition enough for four sorties. Having discovered his error he then asked Marshall to put thirty more transports on the Hump to support the 308th, which had been assigned to CBI on the premise that it would be self-supporting.
General Marshall argued against assigning these thirty transports. He pointed out that cargo planes were so few that these thirty aircraft could only come from those assigned to support the forthcoming invasion of Sicily, that there were then more transports assigned to the Hump than there were crews to use them to the full, and that adding thirty more to the Hump might jeopardize the success of the Sicilian operation and still not aid China. The President did not accept these views, and the transports were assigned.66
Roosevelt also asked that consideration be given to a coolie route across Burma to China. He had been advised by Chinese sources that such a route was practicable for men carrying fifty pounds each, that in some places man-drawn carts could be used, and that China could supply all the coolies needed. In answer, the War Department observed that Burma was currently occupied by the Japanese, which would force the coolies to march across the mountains of Tibet. The Tibetans were hostile to the Chinese, though the latter claimed suzerainty over Tibet, and might well object to such a project. Since no food depots were available in Tibet, the coolies would have to carry their own rations. The food requirements for a coolie trudging from India to China across Tibet were rather more than his carrying capacity, so the project did not appear practicable.67
The suggestion for the coolie route and the pressure for more and still more aircraft on the Hump came from Soong and his associates. The Chinese assured the President that the answer to all problems of Hump operations, and
indeed of strategy in Asia, lay in the simple assignment of more transports to the India-China Wing, ATC. Two messages from the Generalissimo to Roosevelt in March urged that more combat aircraft be assigned to Chennault and that Hump traffic be increased sharply. The President replied in full to each, listing what was being done to aid the Fourteenth and the Chinese Air Force and expressing the hope that the Hump would carry 6,000 tons a month by early summer.68
Within China, the Chinese were energetically building four airfields for Chennault's projected operations. Chennault's plans were to the Generalissimo's liking, so he received considerable co-operation from the Chinese. All plans for airfield construction were approved by the Generalissimo, and the Ministry of Communications was told to begin work on them. Liuchow was chosen as the air terminus in east China, and preliminary plans for it were submitted. Stilwell reported to Marshall that everything possible was being done to hasten operations, and that Chennault would not be restrained in any way unless what he proposed was obviously undesirable.69
Obstacles in Chennault's Path
In overruling Marshall and Stilwell and directing that Chennault have his way, the President directed that U.S. Army Forces, CBI, implement a strategy for which the logistical foundation had not been laid. Within theater headquarters' possible sphere of action were two major problems, only one of which was to receive corrective action in the near future. The first, which was left unsolved and indeed unapproached for months, was that of moving Chennault's supplies 880 miles from the Yunnan airfields to his bases in east China. (Map 6) There were two reasons why this problem was unsolved in 1943. These were the command structure of China Theater and the lack of American resources in China. For the first, the Generalissimo as Supreme Commander, China Theater, was the responsible officer for all operations in that theater. Stilwell as Chief of Staff, China Theater, was responsible for bringing problems and their suggested solutions to the Generalissimo's attention. Since the Chinese had been unwilling to set up a combined staff for China Theater there was no G-4 to give supply problems his continuing attention. In January 1943 Stilwell had called Soong's attention to the line of communications to east
China. His files reveal no further attempts in the first six months of 1943 to place the matter before Chinese authority.
As for the Generalissimo and Chennault, there is no indication in the first six months of 1943 that either felt any concern about the problem of moving supplies from Kunming to the air bases; indeed, in April 1943 the Generalissimo formally assured the President that "no obstacle" existed to putting the Chennault Plan into operation.70 Had an attempt to delegate responsibility to him been made, Stilwell would have been extremely embarrassed. Aside from Chennault's few thousand men, only a few hundred Americans, mostly Y-Force instructors, were in China Theater. Every ton of supplies coming over the Hump was divided between Chennault, the Chinese Government, and preparations for ANAKIM, to which last operation the Generalissimo's representatives had agreed at Calcutta in February 1943. Nothing was left for an American line of communications over the hundreds of miles between Kunming and the east China airfields. Therefore, the U.S. SOS at Kunming necessarily relied on Chinese Government agencies to transport supplies eastward to Chennault.71
The second problem lay in the fact that on the Indian side of the Hump the Assam airfields were not capable of supporting the aircraft now assigned to the ATC. To be sure, ATC efficiency still left much to be desired, but after December 1942 ATC was independent of Stilwell. The allocation of SOS and Indian resources had not taken into account the possibility of a greatly enlarged Hump effort; the President was ordering the assignment of transports to airfields not yet completed. When Stilwell in January 1943 told Wheeler to think in terms of an expanded SOS, Wheeler in turn discussed his projects and problems with Somervell during the latter's visit to India with the Arnold-Somervell-Dill mission. These discussions were significant. Stilwell's Mission in CBI centered about the reform of the Chinese Army. Problems of supply he left to the experts in logistics: Wheeler, who was of course Stilwell's supply adviser, and Somervell, who played the same role for Marshall. Their recommendations would determine the attitude their superiors took on supply problems. In Stilwell's case, he was happy to leave supply and engineering problems to Wheeler and to concentrate on his efforts to persuade the Generalissimo to reform the Chinese Army. Stilwell's personal papers rarely mention the Ledo Road, and such casual references to the project as do appear indicate no great interest. On the other hand, references to the problems he met in attempting to reform the Chinese Army are extremely numerous, lengthy, and detailed.
Somervell directed Wheeler to propose a plan for the support of 100,000 U.S. troops in China and ultimately 500,000. This Wheeler did, assuming that
enough of north Burma would be taken by 1 February 1944 to permit work on the Ledo Road as far south as Bhamo, and that all of Burma would be reoccupied by the beginning of the 1944 monsoon. By fall of 1944 he hoped to be able to support 100,000 American ground troops in Yunnan. Until the Irrawaddy River was reopened to barge traffic, Wheeler proposed to use the Ledo Road as his principal supply route. After this brief initial period of a few months, supplies would begin moving up the Irrawaddy River from Rangoon to Bhamo, from there to go by truck into China. Wheeler planned to unload 87,750 tons a month at Rangoon, and but 18,000 tons a month at Calcutta, of which 89,250 tons would be laid down monthly at Kunming. Therefore, the plans of CBI Theater called for supporting about 90 percent of the U.S. effort in China by means of a line of communications via Rangoon. Wheeler's proposals to Army Service Forces were related to the projects involved in this planning, rather than to direct support of Chennault's current operations.72
In spring 1943 SOS in India had two major engineering projects, but was directly concerned with only one of them. This was building the Ledo Road, which was to be paralleled by a 4-inch, thin-walled pipeline carrying fuel from the Digboi refinery area of Assam. The pipeline received high priority from the CCS on 26 February 1943, but its completion would take months. The other project, building airfields in Assam to support the Hump, was sponsored by the SOS but was being executed by the British in accordance with the War Department directive that local resources would be used to the utmost. Of SOS's engineering activities and requests, all that would contribute to Chennault's operations in China was the construction of some plants in India to make steel drums in which to haul oil and gas over the Hump.73
In January 1943 ATC warned Bissell that the Assam airfields were not being completed on schedule. In replying, Bissell accepted full responsibility for their completion. Under the circumstances, this could only mean that Bissell accepted responsibility for prodding the appropriate Indian agencies. In March Stilwell listed for Marshall the failure of Wavell's engineers to complete the airfields as one of several examples of lethargy in India. Stilwell made the significant remark to Marshall that this failure was one of the factors not under United States control which materially affected American operations. Marshall then warned Dill that ATC was receiving aircraft in India faster than they would be employed, because of the bad airfield situation. Marshall would be grateful for anything Dill might do to expedite their completion. There was therefore no surprise in the War Department when on 19 April the commander of the India-China Wing, ATC, Col. Edward H. Alexander, reported that the
unpaved, incomplete runways in Assam were unusable because of rain. He had but two runways and fourteen hardstandings from which to operate 146 aircraft. The detailed survey of the progress on the airfields which he included in his letter revealed the Assam airfields would not be able to support Chennault for many months to come.74
The condition of the airfields angered Stilwell. Far from complacent about the misfortunes of the ATC, he wrote: "The base was in sorry shape. A sea of mud. No hardstandings. No access roads. Very bad storage. Forage ruined by rain. (--------, the QM storage man, incompetent.)"75 So Stilwell put pressure on Wavell: "Rushed to Delhi to squawk to Wavell, and we got action. In two days, 5,000 were at work on each airfield. . . ."76
In explanation, the SOS reported to Somervell:
Construction has for the past year been extremely slow due to British failure to place priority on task, even though during this period the U.S. was assured that such priority existed. Target dates have never even been closely approached. The airdromes, supposedly with sufficiently high priority so that materials and equipment would be forthcoming, have been deprived of both for British projects of Eastern Army. Specific instances would be ascertained only after damage was done. British assurance was always forthcoming that entire field project would be complete before the monsoon of 1943 and with such being the case American Engineers were placed in a position of waiting until completion of project did not appear possible with available resources before effective action could be taken.77
Under these conditions, Hump tonnage to China not surprisingly fell from 3,200 tons in February to 2,500 tons in April, and Chennault's allocation, of course, fell with it just when the President was directing he be given a free hand. In March, according to Stilwell's announced Hump policy, Chennault was to have received 1,000 tons. Chennault protested that he actually received only 615 tons (though ATC claimed the true figure was 807 tons). Chennault also believed that in defiance of the President's wishes Stilwell was not giving his supplies high priority. A further element of discord had been introduced by SOS in India. With such heavy political emphasis being placed on the amount of tonnage over the Hump, SOS airfield personnel frequently disregarded the priorities set by Chennault's staff and loaded aircraft as quickly as possible with whatever lay at hand, regardless of priority. Thus, when Chennault asked that 81 percent of his 1,000 tons be gasoline, of the tonnage he actually received, he
claimed only 50 percent was gasoline. ATC disputed this, but set the figure at 68 percent, still short of the 81 percent desired by Chennault.78
U.S. Forces Establish Training Centers for Y-Force
Preparation for ANAKIM in China continued at a fair pace in February-March 1943. Soong's departure for Washington and his work there on behalf of Chennault did not seem to interfere with Stilwell's progress in China. It was one of those rare and halcyon periods in wartime Sino-American relations when the Chinese were co-operative and reform of the Chinese Army was in progress. It may be surmised that, pending clarification of the American attitude, the Generalissimo co-operated with both Chennault and Stilwell.
In January 1943 after the talks with Soong and Chen indicated enough progress, Stilwell, anticipating final agreement, ordered U.S. instructors to move to Yunnan and to set up in Kunming a branch office of his Chungking headquarters under Colonel Dorn as a deputy chief of staff. Dorn's mission was to represent Stilwell in all matters involving Y-Force training and in administrative matters involving U.S. personnel. Since the Y-Force was under Chinese command, the American responsibility was limited to training and supply of lend-lease equipment.79
Stilwell's training program for Y-Force was:
Training. Training is to be carried out in training centers and in the units themselves. Officers are to attend courses of about six weeks each at the training centers of the Kunming area. After graduating, they go back to their units and become instructors in the unit schools. The unit schools are to be organized and conducted by American instructors permanently stationed with armies and divisions. This will ensure that training is continuous, progressive, and uniform. A group of American instructors will be placed with each army, and can organize the unit schools in the divisions belonging to the army, supervise instruction, and keep the army commander informed of progress.
Training centers. Training Centers for Artillery, Infantry, and signal communications are to be set up in the Kunming area. Courses should begin in February, and run for six weeks each. Graduates go back to their units and act as instructors. Each artillery class should be about 300 officers, each infantry class about 450, and each signal communications class about 150. The artillery training class will train battery officers in methods of fire and all other subjects pertaining to the battery; the infantry training class will give a thorough course in weapons and the tactics of minor units; and the signal communications training class will give a thorough course in radio, telephone, panel and air-ground communications. These training classes will be staffed and conducted by American instructors.80
The Chinese War Ministry was anxious to have direct control over the U.S. instructors and desired to disperse them among the different armies and headquarters
in Yunnan, the Generalissimo's headquarters, and the Chinese military academies. They further desired that these man be under "command" of the unit commander and the "guidance" of his chief of staff, who would approve all training undertaken. The War Ministry would control all their movements and assignments. Stilwell replied urbanely that because the number of these men was so few it would be best to use them at schools in the Kunming area, whose Chinese graduates could go forth as instructors. Stilwell disclaimed any desire to use this program as a means of interfering with Chinese organizations. The training program would be controlled by General Chen under War Ministry directives.81
Preliminary orders for the Artillery Training Center went out on 19 January. Chen's appointment as Commanding General, Chinese Expeditionary Force, was finally and formally announced on 17 February, after a period in which General Ho attempted to persuade the Generalissimo to reconsider. The Infantry and Artillery Training Centers opened their doors on 1 April 1943.82 In the case of the Artillery Center at Kan-hai-tze, of which a detailed account is extant, the doors opened after a brisk struggle with local Chinese authority and Chinese workmen that illustrated some of the difficulties in the way of giving aid to China.
The only buildings Governor Lung Yun was willing to give the Americans were bomb damaged, and a construction and remodeling program was required. Adjoining the compound was an unused Chinese airstrip under command of a Chinese air officer with the title of Station Master. This dignitary complained of the workmen's crossing his field and arrested the contractor's subforeman. His obstructive attitude was supported by his superior in the Chinese Air Force. Wrote Brig. Gen. Jerome J. Waters, charged with organizing the Artillery Center:
Finally the contractor revealed to me that the Station Master had been insisting that he purchase all building materials from him at ridiculously exorbitant prices. As soon as I learned about this "shakedown" I informed the Station Master in no uncertain terms that the building operations would continue without interference from him even if it became necessary for armed American personnel to guard the contractor's men. The entire incident was reported to General Stilwell, and shortly afterwards Colonel Yien called to inform me that the Station Master was being removed for his stupidity.83
His successor blew out the entire electric light circuit in the center "with a crude galvanized iron wire which he ran to his house in Kan-hai-tze in the
expectation of cadging a little American electricity to light his house. Of course he merely succeeded in blowing out the entire circuit. . . ."84
The closest supervision was necessary to prevent the workmen from making off with gasoline, motor oil, and spare parts from the center's few vehicles, for the grinding poverty of China's masses, and the flourishing black market, made this very profitable. On one or two occasions drivers even drained the fluid from their trucks' brake systems and sold it in town. It was necessary to count the nails issued to carpenters and account for each one driven. When the Artillery Center opened on 1 April, gaping holes were still in the roofs and walls, but ANAKIM could not wait on that. Wrote General Waters:
The original organization of the FATC was patterned after the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. As such, it contained a small staff for administrative purposes, a Tactics Department, and a Gunnery Department. . . . When the school opened, American liaison officers were assigned to work with the various units of the school troops, and the Director of the Tactics Department was put in charge of school troop activity.85
Waters regarded the organization as very satisfactory. Twenty-three interpreters were on hand when the center opened. Considering themselves members of the superior scholar class and trying to live on fixed incomes at a time of rampant inflation, these men were a problem for the center. Fifty-six American officers and enlisted men were present for duty as classes began. Twelve Chinese officers were present also to act as assistant instructors; two of them were competent and were retained.86
School troops were to be provided by the 71st Army Artillery Battalion, with 40 officers and 348 enlisted men who arrived for duty just before the center opened. "The entire organization was undernourished and badly in need of medical attention." Center personnel at once began training the battalion, and efforts were made to bring it up to par physically. The 2d Battalion, 2d Army Field Artillery, arrived on 13 April. It was in comparatively good physical condition. The principal obstacle to training this battalion was the disinterest of the battalion commander, whose removal was finally arranged through Chinese channels. The animals of school troops were in poor condition. "The Chinese are very reluctant to graze their animals for fear of losing both the animals and the soldiers through desertion."87
When the Artillery Center began its first class on 5 April, eighty-seven Chinese officers were present as students. This number introduced "the most serious problem" of the center, which was the "failure of the Chinese to furnish students equal to the capacity of the schools. . . . The Artillery Training Center operated at approximately ¼ of its capacity. . . ." in 1943.88
The course of instruction covered eight weeks. Subjects taught were:
Hours Observed Fires 96 Firing Battery 42 Massed Fires 56 Animal Transport 36 Matériel 28 Tactics 56 Motor Transport 12 Communications 52 ----- 378
Instruction in observed fires stressed forward observer techniques, but some instruction in precision methods was given for use against pillboxes. Instruction in massed fire ran counter to the Chinese habit of using pieces singly and without attempt at cover and camouflage. The scarcity of motor transport made it advisable to concentrate on animal transport techniques.89
Brig. Gen. (then Colonel) Thomas S. Arms received a personal directive from Stilwell on 12 March 1943 on the training program for the Infantry Training Center. The center's mission was to train officers of the Y-Force in the use of infantry weapons and in tactics up to and including regimental level. Signal instruction was also to be provided for signal officers. General Arms was to be vice-commandant, in charge of training, while a Chinese colleague controlled discipline and administration. Classes of one hundred infantry and twenty-five signal officers were to enter weekly and biweekly respectively.90
The former Airplane Factory 1 at Kunming and the area adjoining were received for use by the Infantry Training Center. Opening ceremonies were held on 4 April attended by Chen and senior Chinese and U.S. officers. School troops were furnished by the Chinese authorities. General Arms described their physical condition as appalling. Seventy percent of them suffered from trachoma, scabies, colds, and intestinal disease. Ten of them died in the first three weeks of the center's existence. Analyzing the situation, Arms reported that this condition was due primarily to long-continued malnutrition and lack of medical care. Moreover, the impressment system which passed for conscription brought in only the sweepings of the villages--the men without friends, money, or influence. General Arms reported that conditions in the Chinese Army were so bad that any man who could avoid service did so.91
The first two classes received at the Infantry Training Center were not officers, for whom the instruction was designed, but officer candidates who had been attending General Tu's 5th Group Army Training Center for junior officers. Their attitude was satisfactory, but General Arms believed that, in view of
the U.S. effort involved in providing a highly qualified American instructional staff, the Chinese should be called upon to provide a representative group of qualified officer students.92 These officer candidates were receiving only two meals a day from the Chinese authorities responsible for administering the center, and at Arms' insistence meals were increased to three a day. American insistence also changed Tu's plan to send 600 of these officer candidates through the center before Y-Force officers attended, and later classes were more capable of receiving instruction. Consistent with the Chinese attitude toward the Artillery Training Center, the Chinese Army in 1943 never sent enough students to operate the Infantry Center at above five eighths capacity.93
Describing his experiences at a Chinese Army training school, Col. Walter S. Wood, commanding a U.S. liaison team with XI Group Army, wrote:
The school had all the outward aspects of a school. It had adequate buildings. It had ample training areas. It had a rifle and machine gun range. There was a Commandant, Assistant Commandant and faculty. An elaborate training schedule was on hand. There was an opening exercise and a graduating exercise and ceremonies each Sunday morning. The sad thing was that it did not teach. No one fired on the ranges. No one maneuvered on the training areas. Haphazard lectures or, to be more accurate, speeches were the order of the day. When the school was inspected by visitors there was a series of "set pieces" which were put on to convey the idea of scheduled and progressive training.
The feeling seemed to be that, so long as the opening ceremony went well, the student body remained in attendance and the graduation ceremony and banquet went smoothly, then the school was a success.94
Marshalling the Yunnan Force
By mid-March 1943 the Generalissimo's failure to create a sound command structure for Y-Force and to concentrate its divisions was the major missing portion of the Soong-Chen-Stilwell program of 28 January.95 On 7 March Stilwell reported these issues to Marshall. He explained that malnutrition, sickness, corruption, and lack of equipment made the troops in Yunnan a "terrible indictment of China's leaders."96 Of the eleven armies on hand or expected, five were good by Chinese standards, three were fair, and three were worthless. The war lord situation in Yunnan seriously hindered the logical evolution of an over-all command structure for Y-Force. (Chart 7) Neither the Indochina border armies, with their important holding mission, nor the Y-Force strategic reserves around Kunming were under General Chen's command. Instead, his Chinese Expeditionary Force faced the Burma border without any control over what happened in its rear. The only semblance of unity was Chen's influence over the Y-Force training program.
Organization of Chinese Yunnan Force (Y-Force)
The Chinese Services of Supply situation was also confused. The Generalissimo's Yunnan headquarters had its own SOS. Gen. Yu Fei-peng, whom Stilwell branded "a rascal of the first water," had the area SOS. General Chen controlled his Chinese Expeditionary Force SOS. In order to bolster Chen, Stilwell was able to obtain control of Burma Road transport and engineering organizations. This control, Stilwell hoped, would permit some restriction of the smuggling that wasted precious gasoline and debauched Chinese soldiers and politicos. Then, he proceeded to one of the larger aspects of China Theater: "From all fronts come consistent reports of fierce fighting. From observation and investigation I am convinced that they are at least 90% false. I note that they get widespread publicity in the United States. This makes my job more difficult, of course. If the Chinese Army is so full of fight and so well led, what am I here for?"97
Though he had issued orders previously for the concentration of the Y-Force, the Generalissimo once again on 23 March ordered troops and replacements to Yunnan. A week later Stilwell radioed Soong that the next problem was to have the replacements with their divisions by 31 May. Stilwell had raised the replacement issue with Soong earlier, reminding the Chinese statesman that the consolidation of troops was to have begun on 21 January but had not yet started. Stilwell pointed out that the basis of the Sino-American wartime relationship was that the United States was to contribute weapons while the Chinese were to furnish men. Then came a gentle hint pinning this reminder to the lend-lease question. If Chinese manpower was not forthcoming, said Stilwell, then munitions supplied would be largely wasted.98
Meanwhile, much to Stilwell's astonishment, the Chinese War Ministry adopted the American-proposed Tables of Organization and Equipment and ordered replacements to the units of Y-Force. The War Ministry's 23 March plan embodied:
Eleven Armies (corps) [in terms of U.S. Army strength] containing thirty-one (31) divisions are assigned to Y-Force.
The 2d Reserve Division will remain an independent division.
Two divisions of the following Armies will be brought to the new proposed strength of 10,300; the third division in each of these Armies to retain only enough weapons to train, and in effect to become a replacement unit:
71st Army 6th Army 54th Army 93d Army 52d Army 8th Army
Thus the above Armies will consist of two "assault" divisions and one replacement division each.
The two divisions of the 53rd Army will be brought up to the new proposed strength of 10,300 for each division. [Stilwell did not propose to alter the composition of Army troops (8,400) at this time. Unlike the U.S. practice, Chinese artillery remained under Army command,
and was attached to organic divisions at the order of the Army commander. When it was possible to bring some 75-mm. pieces into China, Stilwell recommended personnel changes in the artillery units of the Army command].
The three divisions of the following Armies will be brought up to the new proposed strength of 10,300; each army to contain three assault divisions:
2d Army 5th Army 74th Army
The two divisions of the 60th Army (Yunnan Provincial troops) will be brought up to the present Table of Organization strength (1942) of 7,800 each. [Army troops numbered 4,200 men].
With re-organization and replacement the Y-Force will consist of twelve (12) new-type assault divisions and three (3) replacement divisions on the Western Front [Salween front]; four (4) new-type assault divisions and two (2) old-type assault divisions, and two (2) replacement divisions on the Southern Front [Indochina border]; and eight (8) new-type assault divisions and one (1) replacement division in general reserve [Kunming area],
Thus the Y-Force will consist of a total of: [See Chart 7.]
24 new-type assault divisions
2 old-type assault divisions
6 replacement divisions.99
Y-Force was understrength by 185,255 men. Nevertheless, the Chinese War Ministry's plan to provide 122,753 replacements by 10 June met with Stilwell's approval. (Table 6) Why were divisions so far understrength in a country Westerners always thought of as teeming with men? There were two reasons: First, in a peasant, small-holding economy only so many farmers can be removed from the land without causing famine. By 1943 Chinese manpower reserves were badly depleted, hence Stilwell's proposals to fill up the better-trained divisions by taking men from the poorer. Secondly, the Chinese supply and impressment systems were very bad. The central government gave cash allowances to unit commanders with which to buy rice.
Naturally a certain amount of "squeeze" is inevitable in the course of the various transactions, and the amount of food that a soldier receives [is] in direct proportion to the honesty and business acumen of his immediate commander. Often in order to secure sufficient food for his men a commander will deliberately pad his strength report. Tactically this causes considerable confusion when the unit arrives at the fighting front with only a fraction of its "paper strength." On several occasions troops at the FATC [Field Artillery Training Center] were not fed for as long as three days because the borrowing ability of the Battalion Commander was exhausted in the local villages and in several instances we were forced to despatch our own trucks for the purpose of obtaining rice, so that units stationed here would not starve to death.100
On paper, at least, with the acceptance of the Tables of Organization each Chinese army would be able to meet a Japanese division with a reasonable chance of success. Stilwell proposed during the initial phase of ANAKIM to send two Chinese armies against the lone Japanese 56th Division barring the way into
Chinese Personnel Requirements for Y-Force: 23 March 1943
Organization and Deployment Strength 23 March 1943 Shortage Replacements En route Planned Strength by 10 June Authorized Actual Total 412,600 227,345 185,255 122,753 350,098 Chinese Expeditionary Force 196,500 86,150 110,350 64,000 150,150 XI Group Army 128,200 55,550 72,650 49,000 104,550 2d Army 39,300 25,600 13,700 17,000 42,600 71st Army 39,300 18,750 20,550 9,500 28,250 93d Army 39,300 8,200 31,100 17,000 25,200 2d Reserve Division 10,300 3,000 7,300 5,500 8,500 XX Group Army 68,300 30,600 37,700 15,000 45,600 6th Army 39,300 14,700 24,600 10,500 25,200 53d Army 29,000 15,900 13,100 4,500 20,400 Yunnan-Indochina Force 98,200 54,500 43,700 21,484 75,984 I Group Army 19,600 15,650 3,950 4,650 20,300 60th Army 19,600 15,650 3,950 4,650 20,300 IX Group Army 78,600 38,850 39,750 16,834 55,684 52d Army 39,300 20,450 18,850 7,544 27,994 54th Army 39,300 18,400 20,900 9,290 27,690 Reserve 117,900 86,695 31,205 37,269 123,964 V Army Group 117,900 86,695 31,205 37,269 123,964 5th Army 39,300 33,860 5,440 18,984 52,844 8th Army 39,300 21,050 18,250 7,300 28,350 74th Army 39,300 31,785 7,515 10,985 42,770
Source: Memo, Wang Wen-hsien. Admin Dept, NMC, for Dorn, 23 Mar 43, sub: Personnel Reqmts for Y-Force. AG (Y-FOS) 320.2, KCRC.
Burma. The basic principle behind the new tables was that all Y-Force units down to the smallest should be able to operate as self-contained combat teams. (See Chart 3.) The Salween Front was over 100 air miles long, the 56th Division would be spread very thin, and the Chinese could simply flow through the inevitable gaps.
Under the new Tables of Organization, Chinese infantry regiments increased from 2,052 men to 2,922. Each rifle company would have 90 rifles and 9 machine guns, with a total of 81 machine guns in the regiment. Each company, battalion, and regiment was given increased allotments of mortars to build an adequate base of fire to support its maneuver. Some of these mortars would be the handy and light 60-mm. American weapon, new to the Chinese. Each battalion would have an antitank squad with the Boys .55-caliber rifle, a British
weapon quite capable of dealing with the thinly-armored Japanese tanks. Artillery for the Y-Force would be equal, weighed by number of weapons, to nineteen battalions, mostly with pieces of 75-mm. This force was far more than the Japanese defenders would have.
The lend-lease contribution to the Y-Force would not be great for most of the weapons were in China. The Chinese would furnish the rifles, the light machine guns, the grenade dischargers, the 82-mm. trench mortars, and 5,000 submachine guns. The United States was to fly in 2,200 submachine guns, 576 Boys antitank rifles, 900 60-mm. mortars, 558 Bren machine guns, 40 75-mm. pack howitzers, and 430 rocket launchers. These supplies, plus ammunition, totaled 6,900 tons of ordnance. Then it would be up to China to find the soldiers.101
In mid-April Stilwell was confident China would find them. He was partially satisfied with the progress being made in Y-Force. The Artillery and Infantry Training Centers for brushing Y-Force officers into shape were in operation. General Chen Cheng was co-operative beyond Stilwell's highest previous hopes. Concentration of divisions in Yunnan was proceeding. Then on 18 April 1943 Stilwell met with the Generalissimo, who "acted scared. Morale at low ebb."102 Japanese activity in central China, on the direct path to Chungking, was increasing. The result of this activity was irresistible pressure to drain men and supplies from Yunnan to the I-chang gorge area of the Yangtze, and much of the January-March progress with Y-Force was lost.
In the winter of 1942-1943 the Japanese 11th Army, garrisoning the Hankow area, had expanded its defense perimeter in the Tung-ting Lake area at the expense of Chinese Communist forces there. Using sixteen battalions, by the end of March 1943 the Japanese had scored local success at the cost of 354 dead and 890 wounded, occupied a "fertile [rice] region," and held good positions for future operations.103 At this time the Japanese shipping situation on the Yangtze, which is navigable by ocean-going ships, became acute because of reverses in the Southwest Pacific. Estimating there were some 20,000 tons of river shipping on the upper Yangtze, which had fled there to escape them, the Japanese determined on a large-scale raid to trap these vessels at their moorings and move them down river. After this, the Japanese would withdraw. The concentration of three divisions plus three detachments of approximately regimental strength began on 16 April and concluded on 4 May. These stirrings, noted in Chungking and accompanied by increased Japanese aerial activity, alarmed the Chinese and disturbed Chennault's staff. On 15 May Y-Force
suffered a blow when the Generalissimo ordered Chen Cheng to return to defend his VI War Area.104
British Operations and ANAKIM
In summing up the Calcutta discussions of February with the Arnold-Somervell-Dill mission, Wavell said that it was agreed to prepare for the fall offensive with all possible speed. His preparations were greatly influenced by the failure of his December attempt to seize the Akyab airfields.105 Wavell had wanted to make a quick amphibious seizure of Akyab to forestall Japanese reaction, but landing craft were not available, and so he had settled on an overland advance. The scheme was not hopeless, for Wavell's staff correctly estimated that but two Japanese battalions held the area. Speed in taking it before the Japanese could react was essential. Operations were under Eastern Army, Lt. Gen. N. M. S. Irwin.
The Japanese fell back before the advancing 14th Indian Division, and on 27 December a patrol actually reached the southern tip of the Mayu peninsula directly opposite Akyab. Then, an unfortunate delay of ten days for administrative reasons halted the advance. The pause was fatal, for when the division was set to advance again, elements of the Japanese 55th Division had dug in and were defending themselves with the accustomed stubborn valor of the Japanese. Terrain that might have been taken by marching had to be conquered.
The effort went on for months, with Indian and British brigades being fed into the Arakan district in sequence. Casualties were the only immediate result. The Indian and British soldiers could not know it, but their sacrificial courage once caused the chief of staff of the 55th Division to urge abandoning the Japanese foothold on the Mayu Peninsula to safeguard the landing of the main body of the 55th Division on Akyab. He was overruled, and the Japanese company garrisoning the key point clung to its defenses.
While 14th Indian Division was engaged on the Mayu peninsula, to its left and rear a battalion of the Japanese 33d Division was completing a long march overland from the Irrawaddy valley. Its appearance in the Kaladan valley which ran roughly parallel to the coast signaled the beginning of the end. Now present in strength, 55th Division began a series of encircling moves which took full advantage of the superior experience of its veteran troops and repeatedly cut off elements of 14th Indian Division and of 26th Indian Division, which replaced the 14th. After successive actions, during which among other reverses 6th Brigade headquarters was overrun and its commander captured and killed, in May, 14th and 26th Divisions were back in their original positions on the
Indian border. The effort cost 2,500 battle casualties. Sickness took a dreadful toll. When the first Arakan campaign was ended, observers agreed that the morale of its veterans was badly impaired.106
Well to the north of the Arakan, in central Burma, the celebrated British soldier, Brigadier Orde Charles Wingate, led an experimental foray into Burma from February to June, 1943. Wingate had been sent to Burma at Wavell's request during the First Burma Campaign. His varied career had taken him to Palestine and Ethiopia, where he had acquired a profound knowledge of guerrilla warfare and an ability to apply the principles of war to novel situations. His arrival in Burma had been too late to affect the first campaign, but he did perceive the solution to the Japanese tactical system.
The Japanese encirclement tactics were habitually directed against their enemies' lines of communications. They themselves, carrying many of their supplies in their packs, depending to a large degree on animal transport, and being trained to move swiftly through the jungle, were not road bound like the Indian divisions. Since the latter depended heavily on motor transport, the road block was a deadly hazard to Indian troops.
Wingate proposed to form units stripped of all purely formal equipment, organized into small columns with a base of fire and a maneuvering element and supplied entirely by air. Such units in the jungle would have the mobility of ships at sea, and road blocks would hold no terror for them. Indeed, they could attack Japanese lines of communications at will. The mission of these units, Wingate suggested, would be to spread disorganization behind the Japanese lines, which could be exploited by pressure from standard infantry divisions. Obtaining Wavell's approval, Wingate organized his 77th Indian Infantry Brigade. Its members were not handpicked. Rather, the brigade was made of units then available, 2d Battalion Burma Rifles, 13th Battalion the King's Regiment, the 3/2d Gurkha Rifles, and the 142d Commando. If the Generalissimo's troops had gone into Burma in March 1943, 77th Brigade would have been used to cut the Japanese lines of communications to Myitkyina and Lashio. Thus were born the famous Chindits, as they were later nicknamed after the legendary guardian of the Burman shrines.
After the Generalissimo withdrew from the March 1943 operation, the ardent Wingate asked for a chance to test his men and theories against the Japanese. Wavell agreed, and Wingate's men crossed the Chindwin in seven columns on 18 February without opposition to attack the rail line to Myitkyina in the Irrawaddy valley. Extensive damage was done to the railway, and Wingate resolved to press on across the Irrawaddy, deep into Burma.
Once across the Irrawaddy, the Chindits' operations went less smoothly, and in attempting a return to India the force had to use a prearranged method of breaking up into small groups. One of these groups went northward and
came out via Fort Hertz; another went eastward and emerged at Pao-shan in Yunnan. The 77th Brigade had spent four months in Japanese-occupied territory. At a cost of about 30 percent casualties it had gained considerable experience in the art of making deep penetrations into enemy territory. The force had done no damage to the Japanese that bombers could not have done more cheaply, but great results were to issue from Wingate's expedition.107
On the Allied side, commanders henceforth recognized that units on air supply could move in strength in Japanese rear areas. This opened a variety of interesting tactical and strategic possibilities. Not only India Command and China-Burma-India Theater, but also the Japanese headquarters in Burma, Burma Area Army as they now were, studied the operation. In 1942, the Japanese had concluded that the hills on India's border were impenetrable. Now they re-evaluated the problem in the light of Wingate's achievements and concluded that India could be invaded. They failed to observe that armies in the jungle could be supplied by air.108
The Arakan failure plus the need to prepare for ANAKIM led to some drastic changes in Wavell's India Command. The officers charged with military training and with the immediate conduct of operations in Burma were relieved. Halting all activity and training based on the defense of India, Wavell ordered concentration of effort on offensive training. The former deputy chief of staff for operations became chief of staff of an expeditionary force headquarters, with orders to organize his staff and begin training. On 31 March General Sir George Giffard assumed command of the new expeditionary force, with orders to restore the Rangoon-Lashio line of communications by 1 May 1944. General Giffard had commanded in west Africa where he had trained two African divisions with the thought that they might be used in Burma. When Giffard came to India to arrange details of the movement, Wavell, under whom he had served in 2d Division at Aldershot in England, offered him the post of army commander.
American observers in India differed in their reaction to these preparations. Col. Russell A. Osmun and his American Observer Group in New Delhi, an independent body, took a highly favorable view of them. President Roosevelt's personal representative in India, Mr. William Phillips, former Under Secretary of State, did not. Mr. Phillips was highly critical and reported to the President that it was hard to find any sign of an aggressive spirit in India, that the authorities seemed to feel their responsibilities ended at the border of Burma. General Stilwell agreed with the President's special representative.109
India's matériel needs for ANAKIM, many of which were to be met by lend-lease, were set by Wavell's staff as 182,000 tons a month for six months. When these figures arrived in Washington they were challenged by the Logistics Group, OPD, who believed that the Indian requirements submitted as the bill for ANAKIM were actually those needed to equip the forty-four divisions contemplated by India's long-range plan. For example, armored forces on the scale of those required for ANAKIM would need 165 medium tanks and 89 light tanks. There were then in India 195 light tanks, 1,320 cruiser tanks, and 315 infantry tanks, yet Wavell asked for 4,400 long tons more of tanks as a prerequisite to ANAKIM. Operations Division believed that of the 182,000 tons monthly requirement set as a prerequisite for ANAKIM, 69,000 tons were for civilian requirements in India and Ceylon, and the rest were on a scale more appropriate to forty-four divisions than to the relatively minor ANAKIM operation.110
Somervell's first reaction was that, of the 182,000 tons a month requested, 88,000 tons were definitely not needed. Then he reconsidered the next week, arguing that support of India's civil economy was equitable because of the very considerable amounts of reciprocal aid the American forces stationed there received, and because the United States was currently maintaining a very high standard of civilian living. He also observed that the American practice was to support commanders in the full with their requests for equipment even when those seemed high.111
Acidly, Stilwell compared what Wavell and himself were to receive for their parts of ANAKIM. It worked out to 180,000 tons a month for Wavell and 3,200 tons for Stilwell (for the Y-Force); an unknown number of tanks for Wavell and five for Stilwell; 12,000 trucks for Wavell, 500 for Stilwell; 3,000,000 U.S. troops for the European Theater of Operations, 1,000,000 for the Southwest Pacific Theater, and for CBI, 3,000.112
Since the 182,000-ton figure was Wavell's prerequisite for ANAKIM, there was the obvious possibility the operation might not be mounted, for in spring 1943 the German submarine offensive came closest to separating the Old
World and the New. With shipping space at a premium, Churchill observed in a minute to the British Chiefs of Staff that ANAKIM had "receded" because of the shipping shortage. In accepting an American offer to supply twenty ships for ANAKIM supply accumulation, the British Chiefs of Staff stated explicitly that their acceptance implied no commitment to do ANAKIM, that they accepted only because preparations had to be made if ANAKIM was ever to be a fact.113
American Preparations in India-Burma
As of January-April 1943 American preparations in India for Burma's reoccupation included continued training of the Chinese Ramgarh troops, air defense of the Assam Hump terminals, air harassment of the Japanese in Burma, construction of a base at Ledo, construction of the Ledo Road into Burma, and provision of medical aid to the Chinese. Training the Chinese at Ramgarh proceeded along routine lines. The air effort will be described in Chapter IX as one of the factors leading to the decisions on U.S. policy of May 1943.
The 45th U.S. Engineer Regiment and the 823d Engineer Aviation Battalion were assigned to Ledo in December 1942. With substantial and indispensable aid from the British, these troops, Negroes with white officers, prepared the warehouse areas' housing, hospitals, and roads necessary for a base area. Initially, tea sheds were used for the few supplies on hand. The new warehouses and hutments (the hutments were the famous "bashas") had bamboo frameworks with thatched roofs. The only signal facilities at first available were the commercial lines and small switchboard linking a few of the more prosperous residents of Ledo.114
In late December the 823d Engineers took over construction of the Ledo Road from the British, in accord with the Wavell-Stilwell agreement of October 1942 and consistent with Wavell's assigning the north Burma area to Stilwell. Between the road builders at Ledo and the Hukawng Valley of Burma lay 103 miles through the juncture of the Patkai and Naga Hills. (Map 6) The Patkais rise to a peak of 4,500 feet and drop to 700 feet at Shingbwiyang in Burma. They were crossed by the Refugee Trail, so called because of the unfortunates who had fled from Burma over its narrow, malarious, and leech-ridden stretches. The final report on the Ledo Road described the area as
. . . mountainous terrain, canyon sections, and narrow terraces along torrential streams. This area was unsettled and relatively unexplored. Existing maps were found to be highly inaccurate in their portrayal of ground conditions under the 150 feet of vegetation cover. . . . The soil is largely clay over a weak sedimentary rock structure broken by innumerable fault
planes and subject to frequent earth tremors. The total annual rainfall through this mountain section amounts to 150 inches but it is concentrated in the monsoon season, May to September inclusive, and the observed intensity reached 14 inches in 24 hours.
The temperature was not uniformly hot. There were "periods of penetrating cold during the winter months"; the monsoon brought "intense heat."115
General Wheeler estimated that 103 miles of an all-weather, one-lane road with turnouts could be built to reach Shingbwiyang on the far side of the Patkais by June 20.116 Wavell's engineer-in-chief was rather skeptical, estimating that forty-five miles by 1 March 1943 would be the best possible. He could not believe that the road could be through Shingbwiyang by 1 May 1943. The British engineer also observed that 600 of his own coolies had died in that area the April before, suggesting some of the medical hazards Wheeler faced. With building the road, Wheeler also assumed responsibility for defending it on 18 February 1943.117
British authority furnished swarms of laborers: Indian Pioneer Units of the Indian Army, Indian Tea Association Units organized by the tea planters of Assam, Indian State Labor Units contributed by the quasi-independent Indian States, the Civilian Transport Corps local tea garden workers, and contract labor. "At first these groups were not registered in the Base, and were responsible only to various organizations fortunate enough to get their services. It was a case of catch-as-catch can. Any organization lucky and quick enough to 'acquire' laborers got its work done." These people were used for construction, malaria control, widening and clearing the road, and handling supplies.118
Construction equipment belonged to the 45th and 823d Engineers, plus additional items transferred from the Chinese lend-lease stockpile. By 20 January construction was on a 24-hour-a-day basis. "The Road head was pushed at the expense of access roads, and maintenance operations, for it was deemed advisable to make as much forward progress as possible before the monsoon rains."119 The rate was three quarters of a mile a day of all-weather, single-track roadway with turnouts. Equipment and spare parts were in short supply, and the experience of the Christmas rains suggested that the monsoon would stop construction.
Road construction crossed the Burmese border at 1706 on 28 February 1943, about ten months to the day since the fall of Lashio. There was a little ceremony and Col. Ferdinand J. Tate, commanding the 823d Engineer Aviation Battalion, fired his pistol as the lead bulldozer lurched into Japanese-held
Burma. Protecting the roadhead was a regiment of the Chinese Army in India, one day's march ahead of the road builders.120
The ceremony, held at mile 43.2 from Ledo, unknowingly marked what was practically the end of forward progress on the road for months to come. The roadhead was beyond practical supply distance from the base. Every means of supply, from tribal porters to elephants, was tried, but to no avail. The engineer, medical, and supply personnel that the JCS had directed sent to Stilwell back in December 1942 arrived at Ledo in March, but these reinforcements were not the solution. By 11 May the monsoon halted all forward progress, about forty-seven miles from Ledo.121
The medical problem in the border of Assam and Burma had been expected to be very serious. Inspecting the area in February, 1943, Col. John M. Tamraz, the SOS surgeon, gloomily observed: "I believe the sick rate amongst the Chinese troops will run into 50-75% and amongst the Americans 20% or more." British medical authorities predicted in 1942 that the malaria rate in Assam would be 25 percent. Prewar medical experience offered much support for these forebodings. Malaria and enteric diseases are the two great sanitary problems in the hills. In Burma as a whole there were thought to be some 100,000 cases of bacillary dysentery a year. Exclusive of the Shan States, there were 120,904 deaths ascribed to "fever" in 1939, at least half of them malarial. Rounding out the picture, plague was endemic and the contamination of all water had to be assumed.122
Senior Surgeon (Lt. Col.) Victor H. Haas, of the U.S. Public Health Service, who with a number of his colleagues had been sent to Burma before Pearl Harbor to aid in building the Yunnan-Burma Railway, became Surgeon, Base Section No. 3. The 98th Station Hospital moved to Margherita, Assam, in January to care for Ledo Road personnel. It was relieved in April by the 20th General Hospital. The 98th had done yeoman work in medical rehabilitation of the Chinese veterans of the First Burma Campaign, and so was no stranger to CBI. With the 20th General Hospital there arrived the 48th and 73d Evacuation Hospitals, the 151st Medical Battalion, a platoon of the 7th Medical Depot Company, and the 1st Veterinary Company (Separate). Due to the competence and devotion of medical personnel, the precampaign malaria rate was held to 1 percent for Americans and 5 percent for Chinese.123
While road building and sanitation were going on, guerrilla activity by Kachin tribesmen of north Burma, who remained loyal to British rule, was annoying the Japanese. General Mutaguchi, commanding the Japanese 18th
Division, resolved to send small columns to Sumprabum, a British outpost some eighty air miles north of Myitkyina, and to the banks of the Tanai River in the Hukawng Valley to deal with it. Beyond Sumprabum lay the small post and airstrip of Fort Hertz, whose loss would threaten Ledo and the Hump air route. On 1 March British civil authority evacuated Sumprabum, and five days later the situation was called "serious." The Kachin tribesmen sensibly dispersed before the veteran 114th Regiment, and for some anxious days it seemed nothing could keep the Japanese from taking Fort Hertz.124
On 12 March, Stilwell ordered Chinese reinforcements to the Ledo area to meet this Japanese threat.125 Meanwhile, the other Japanese expedition was moving through the Hukawng Valley and soon struck the Indian and Kachin garrison at Hkalak Ga, ten miles northwest of Shingbwiyang, screening the building of the Ledo Road. There was great excitement; the garrison and the U.S. radio team with it burnt its supplies and withdrew. General Wheeler ordered the Seagrave medical unit some miles behind at Tagap Ga, in the Patkai Hills, to pack up and be ready to evacuate. The Chinese outposts held firmly at Nathkaw south of Tagap Ga, but radio contact with them was lost at the end of March.
The Headquarters, Rear Echelon, then buzzed with excitement and activity for the menace seemed progressively greater as the headquarters concerned was farther from the scene. Stilwell stepped in to pour some vinegar on the troubled waters, and the turmoil subsided when the Japanese fell back from the Tagap area and Fort Hertz, never taking Fort Hertz.
Allied airmen were daily strafing and bombing the trails over which the Japanese moved, making their supply situation difficult. Moreover, Wingate's 1943 expedition was now alarmingly active behind the Japanese in central Burma. The Japanese had no units readily available to meet Wingate's men; they feared he might be reinforced, and so the Japanese columns were ordered back.126
North Burma is a vast area in itself, and one Japanese division could not of course garrison all of it. Consequently, the Chinese 2d Reserve Division in Yunnan, acting on unknown motives or orders, was able to occupy Shatag Ga on 24 February and to send a regiment down the Nmai Hka Valley to within forty miles of Myitkyina. The Chinese advance was discussed among Stilwell, Wavell, and Ferris, but the occasion was not exploited, and the Chinese withdrew as quietly as they had entered Burma.127
Despite the Generalissimo's withdrawal from the spring 1943 campaign, Stilwell's hopes of preparing a powerful Chinese force able to play its part in breaking the blockade of China were not dashed. Working closely with T. V. Soong and General Chen Cheng, he was able to persuade the Chinese to set up training centers and begin the organizing of a second Chinese Expeditionary Force (or Y-Force as it was commonly known). Logistic preparations in India moved slowly, hampered by terrain, weather, and the paucity of available resources. The ultimate goal of this activity was the reopening of the line of communications from Rangoon to Kunming.
Meanwhile, the President in Washington was inclining ever more strongly to General Chennault's views. In March, he overruled his military advisers, telling General Marshall that their views on the diplomacy and strategy of coalition war in Asia were in error, that nothing should be asked of the Generalissimo in return for American support, and that Chennault should have "his chance to do what he believes he can do." The impact of this on activities in CBI was not felt immediately, for the President's decision did not affect Hump priorities.
Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter (7) * Next Chapter (9)
1. (1) The Stilwell Papers, p. 185. (2) Stilwell Diary, 18 Jan 43.
2. Ltr, Stimson to Stilwell, 6 Jan 43. Stilwell Personal Papers.
3. CM-IN 5492, Stilwell to Marshall, 12 Jan 43. This radio was relayed to Marshall, then at Casablanca.
4. Note, in Stilwell's hand. SNF-55. Stilwell's papers in this folder are for January-February 1943. It was Stilwell's custom to analyze his situation and prepare plans in advance of major discussions. It seems safe to date this note as January 1943.
5. Draft Memo, Stilwell for Soong, sub: Proposed Program In Case X-Y Opn Is Not Carried Out. SNF-55. There is no evidence that the memorandum was ever formally presented to the Chinese Foreign Minister to sign. Instead, its points were discussed with Soong, who recommended that they be laid before the Generalissimo. The Stilwell Papers, p. 184.
6. (1) Soong's request on CAF and quotation in Memo, Dorn for Stilwell, 7 Jan 43. SNF-21. (2) Draft Memo cited n. 5.
7. (1) CM-IN cited n. 3. (2) Rad WAR 2010, Marshall to Stilwell, 16 Jan. 43. Item 169, Bk 1, JWS Personal File.
8. (1) Memo with Incls, Conf, Chen, Soong, and Stilwell, 24 Jan 43. SNF-151. (2) The Stilwell Papers, p. 190. (3) Memo, Dorn for Stilwell, 15 Jan 43. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
9. Stilwell B&W, 10, 11 Jan 43.
10. (1) CM-IN 7220, Stilwell to AGWAR, 16 Jan 43. The principal items on the approved requisitions were 13,500 machine guns, 3,650 trench mortars, 360 75-mm. howitzers, 360 105-mm. howitzers, 96 155-mm. howitzers, 300 40-mm. antiaircraft guns, 120 90-mm. antiaircraft guns, 20,000 submachine guns, 10,000 2½-ton trucks, 10,000 ¼-ton trucks, 35,000,000 rounds per month of 7.92-mm. ammunition, and appropriate amounts of spares for all items. (2) CM-IN 14594, Stilwell to MAB, 31 Jan 43.
11. Memo, Conf, Chen, Soong, and Stilwell, 24 Jan 43. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
12. Stilwell B&W, 20 Jan 43.
13. (1) Stilwell B&W, 28 Jan 43. (2) Notes, sub: Essential Points Brought Out at Mtg of Soong, Stilwell, and Chen Cheng, Wednesday, 27 Jan 43. SNF-151.
14. Memo, Stilwell for Soong, 22 Jan 43. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
15. Memo, Stilwell [Actg as CofS] for Generalissimo, 28 Jan 43. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
16. (1) Memo, Stilwell for Soong, 3 Jan 43. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. (2) Rad CH 9, Hearn to Wheeler, 22 Jan 43. Item 182, Bk 1, JWS Personal File.
17. History of CBI, Sec. II, Ch. XIII, Staff and Administration, G-3 Section.
18. Ltr, Maj Gen Virgil L. Peterson, The Inspector General, to DCofS, 31 Dec 42. WDCSA (China), A45-466.
19. (1) Ltr, Handy to Stilwell, 31 Oct 42, sub: Transfer of ICFC to the ATC, India-China Wing. Item 348, Misc Corresp Folder (May-Dec 42), CT 23, Dr 2, KCRC. (2) Rad S 1135, Bissell to Stilwell, 24 Nov 42; Rad 1460, Stilwell to Marshall, 27 Nov 42. Items 116, 124, Bk 1, JWS Personal File.
20. (1) CM-IN 09036, Stilwell to Marshall, 20 Oct 42. (2) Rad WAR 87, Marshall to Stilwell, 21 Oct 42. WDCSA (China), A45-466. (3) CM-OUT 07429, OPD to Stilwell, 22 Oct 42. (4) MS, ICD ATC During General Stilwell's Command, Dec 42-Oct 44. History of CBI, Sec. II, Ch. VI. (5) ATC delivered 5,390 tons in September 1943 with 228 aircraft. It must be noted that the new C-46 carried 4.35 tons per flight as against 2.5 tons for the old C-47 which Stilwell had contemplated using. Of these 228 aircraft, 101 were C-46's, so Stilwell's estimate was not far off. Analysis of Transport Opns in India-China Wing, 11 Oct 42, Analysis Sec, 16th Statistical Control Unit, MATS, OSD. Statistical Serv Div, Comptroller, Andrews Field, Washington. (6) Ltr, Merrill to Stilwell, 29 Jun 43. SNF-47.
21. CCS 135, 26 Dec 42, sub: Basic Strategic Concept for 1943.
22. Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951), p. 334.
23. Min, CCS 59th Mtg, 17 Jan 43.
24. (1) CCS 153/1, 17 Jan 43. (2) CCS 154, 17 Jan 43. (3) Min, CCS 60th Mtg, 18 Jan 43. (4) JCS Casablanca Min, pp. 23-24.
25. (1) Min, CCS 60th Mtg, 18 Jan 43. (2) CCS 155/1, 19 Jan 43, sub: Conduct of War in 1943. (3) Min, CCS 65th Mtg, 21 Jan 43.
26. (1) CCS 170/2, 23 Jan 43, sub: Final Rpt to President and Prime Minister, Summarizing Decisions by CCS. (2) CCS 168, 22 Jan 43, sub: Conduct of War in Pacific Theater in 1943. (3) CCS 153, 17 Jan 43.
27. Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 693.
28. (1) CM-IN 1446, Stilwell to Marshall, 4 Jan 43. (2) CM-OUT 9105, Marshall to Stilwell, 27 Dec 42.
29. (1) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp. 681-82. (2) Somervell became Commanding General, Army Service Forces, on 12 March 1943.
30. (1) Memo, Col Horace W. Shelmire, Arnold Mission to China, for Arnold, 6 Feb 43, sub: Logistical Situation in Kunming, China, re CATF. Gen Ref Br, OCMH. (2) Ltr, Arnold to Stilwell, 7 Feb 43. Folder 1 (GMO CKS), Item 58, OPD Exec 10.
31. Arnold quotes Stilwell to that effect in CM-IN 1641, 4 Feb 43.
32. (1) CM-IN 70, Arnold to Marshall, 1 Feb 43. (2) CM-IN 1641, Arnold to Marshall, 4 Feb 43. (3) CM-IN 2033, Wedemeyer to Marshall, 4 Feb 43.
33. COS Com, India Comd, USB/7, 1 Feb 43; Min, First American-British Conf, 1 Feb 43. History of CBI, Sec. III, Ch. VII, Arnold-Somervell-Dill Mission.
34. Henry H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), p. 419.
35. See Ch. V, above.
36. (1) CM-IN 1449, Chiang to Roosevelt, 24 Nov 42. (2) Rad AMMISCA 1769, Roosevelt to Chiang, 2 Dec 42. Item 132, Bk 1, JWS Personal File. (3) CM-IN 12657, Chiang to Roosevelt, 28 Dec 42. (4) Rpt of Visit to Cheng-tu, CAF Hq, 1 Nov 42-1 Feb 43, by Mr. Kenneth M. Warder, Vultee Service Representative, to Stilwell, 1 Feb 43. Tate Folder (Nov 42-Jun 43), CT 40, Dr 3, KCRC. As a factory agent Mr. Warder made a routine survey of lend-lease aircraft at Cheng-tu. This report gives many examples of the way in which the Chinese misused U.S. technical equipment. (5) Memo, Chennault for Stilwell, 21 Jan 43. Folder, CAF Corresp (Mar-Jul 43), CT 23, Dr 2, KCRC. (6) Memo, Chennault for Stilwell, 22 Jan 43, sub: Employment of AAF Units at Chungking-1943. Item 9, Contracts with the Chinese (Jan-Jul 1943), CT 23, Dr 2, KCRC. See attchd Inds and Ltrs, Chou Chih-jou, Dir of Commission of Aeronautical Affairs, to Stilwell. On 19 March 1943 Chou stated that the Chinese Air Force could no longer defend Chungking and called on the United States for air support.
37. Arnold, Global Mission, p. 419.
38. CM-IN 2040, Arnold to Marshall, 5 Feb 43.
39. (1) Arnold, Global Mission, Ch. 23. (2) The Stilwell Papers, p. 196. (3) Ltr, Chiang to Roosevelt, 7 Feb 43. Folder 1 (GMO CKS), Item 58, OPD Exec 10.
40. Wavell's remark, Min, COS Com, India Comd, Chinese-British-American Conf, 9 Feb 43. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
41. Min cited n. 40.
42. Ltr cited n. 39(3).
43. (1) Memo, Leahy for Marshall, 30 Dec 42. WDCSA 381 China (12-30-42), A46-523. (2) Memo, Marshall for Leahy, 4 Jan 43, sub: Chennault. Item 64, OPD Exec 10.
44. (1) Memo, Arnold for Marshall, 6 Jan 43, sub: Establishment and Asgmt of Mission to Separate Air Force in China; Memo, McNarney for Arnold, 18 Jan 43, sub: Separate Air Force in China. WDCSA 381 China, A46-523. (2) JCS Casablanca Min, p. 56.
45. Rad WAR 1955, Marshall to Stilwell, 5 Jan 43. Item 159, Bk 1, JWS Personal File.
46. Football phraseology was freely used by Stilwell in his communications. He was once quarterback of the West Point varsity and distinguished himself against a powerful team from the University of Chicago. Rad 25, Stilwell to Marshall, 8 Jan 43. Item 160, Bk 1, JWS Personal File.
47. Memo, Marshall for President, 18 Feb 43. WDCSA 381 China (2-18-43), A46-523.
48. (1) Ltr cited n. 39(3). (2) Memo, Comdr William L. Freseman for Maj Gen William R. Deane, 6 Mar 43; Ltr, Arnold to Stilwell, 7 Feb 43. Folder 1 (GMO CKS), Item 58, OPD Exec 10. (3) Rad WAR 2170, Marshall to Stilwell, 19 Feb 43; Rad SVC 395, Roosevelt to Chiang, 8 Mar 43. Items 212, 239, Bk 1, JWS Personal File. (4) Memo, Marshall for President, 22 Feb 43, sub: Chinese Theater. WDCSA (China), A45-466.
49. Ltr, President to Marshall, 8 Mar 43. Item 54, OPD Exec 10.
50. (1) Memo, Marshall for President, 16 Mar 43, sub: Your Note to Me of March 8th re China. WDCSA 381 China (3-16-43), A46-523. (2) Rad 345, Stilwell to Marshall, 15 Mar 43. Item 261, Bk 1, JWS Personal File.
51. Memo, Handy for Marshall, 18 Feb 43, sub: Proposed Award of Legion of Merit (degree of Chief Comdr) to Lt Gen Joseph W. Stilwell. OPD 201.52, WDCSA 201 (S). Marshall's stamp of approval is dated 16 March.
52. (1) Rad WAR 2373, Marshall to Stilwell, 27 Mar 43. Item 278, Bk 1, JWS Personal File. (2) Stilwell B&W, 19 Apr 43.
53. (1) Statement, Marshall to Robert E. Sherwood, 23 Jul 47. Sherwood interviewed Marshall while writing Roosevelt and Hopkins. A record of Marshall's statement is in the Hopkins Papers. (2) Interv with Marshall, 13 Jul 49.
54. Bks VII, IX, Hopkins Papers.
55. Ltr, with Inds, Chennault to Stilwell, 22 Feb 43, sub: Estimate of China Situation. Item 18, U.S. Opns, China Folder (Sep 42-Jul 43), CT 23, Dr 2, KCRC.
56. (1) Ibid. (2) Rad WAR 2120, Marshall to Stilwell, 19 Feb 43. Item 212, Bk 1, JWS Personal File. (3) GO 9, Hq USAF CBI, 11 Mar 43. Chennault was named a major general, AUS, on 3 March 1943.
57. (1) Time, February 15, 1943. (2) CM-IN 1651, Stilwell to Marshall, 4 Mar 43. (3) CM-IN 1749, Stilwell to Marshall, 4 Mar 43. (4) Ltr, Chennault to Stilwell, 2 Mar 43, sub: Article in Time magazine. Item 233, Bk 1, JWS Personal File.
58. (1) Ltr cited n. 55. (2) Rad AMMISCA 249, Stilwell to Marshall, 20 Mar 43; Rad WAR 2373, Marshall to Stilwell, 27 Mar 43. Items 268, 278, Bk 1, JWS Personal File.
59. (1) Ltr, Glenn to Stilwell, 31 Mar 43. Item 512A, Bk 2, JWS Personal File. (2) The Stilwell Papers, p. 202. (3) Rad AMMISCA 362, Stilwell to Marshall, 20 Apr 43; Rad WAR 2541, Marshall to Stilwell, 21 Apr 43. Items 512, 514, Bk 2, JWS Personal File.
60. Rad WAR 2373, Marshall to Stilwell, 27 Mar 43; Rad WAR 2047, Roosevelt to Chiang, 1 Apr 43. Items 278, 288, Bk 1, JWS Personal File.
61. Ltr, Stilwell to Wheeler, 1 Mar 43, sub: Policies and Estimates of Minimum Tonnages to be Moved Over Hump During Next Six Months. Secret Corresp Folder, Headquarters Y-FOS, KCRC.
62. (1) Chennault, Way of a Fighter, p. 217. (2) Ltr, Chennault to Wedemeyer, 6 Jul 45. WDCSA 091 China, 15 Aug 45.
63. Rad AD 537, Hearn to Stilwell, 29 Mar 43. Item 285, Bk 1, JWS Personal File.
64. Rad AG 271, Stilwell to Marshall, 31 Mar 43. Item 308, Bk 1, JWS Personal File.
65. For an account of the TRIDENT Conference, see Chapter IX, pages 327-33, below.
66. (1) Memo, Leahy for Marshall and Arnold, 24 Feb 43; Memo, Marshall for President, 27 Feb 43, sub: Reply to Generalissimo's Memo. Folder 1 (GMO CKS), Item 58, OPD Exec 10. (2) Ltr, Brig Gen John E. Hull, Actg ACofS, to Marshall, 14 Apr 43, sub: President's Message to Chiang, 31 March 1943. WDCSA (China), A45-466.
67. (1) Memo, 24 Feb 43, cited n. 66(1). (2) Memo, Marshall for Leahy, 30 Mar 43, sub: Coolie Route from India to China. Item 56, OPD Exec 10.
68. (1) Memo, Soong for President, 25 Feb 43, sub: Memo re Air Opns in China. Bk VII, Hopkins Papers. This memorandum is one of the most extreme communications from Soong, but during the spring of 1943, he was indefatigable, as the Hopkins Papers show, in carrying out his objective of getting more of everything for China. (2) Memo, Leahy for Marshall and Arnold, 1 Apr 43; Memo, Marshall for Stratemeyer, 18 Mar 43; Memo, Hull for Marshall, 14 Apr 43, sub: President's Msg to CKS, 31 Mar 43. WDCSA (China), A45-466.
69. Rad WAR 2373, Marshall to Stilwell, 27 Mar 43; Rad AMMISCA AG 271, Stilwell to Marshall, 31 Mar 43; Rad AG 536, Hearn to Stilwell, 28 Mar 43. Items 278, 308, 281. Bk 1, JWS Personal File.
70. Ltr with Incls, Soong to Hopkins, 29 Apr 43. Bk VII, Hopkins Papers.
71. In SOS in CBI, China Section, Appendix C, is a story of the first American SOS people in China. With no pocket guide or reference book to assist them in dealing with the Chinese, they "had to learn the hard way." p. 1.
72. Memo, Wheeler for Somervell, 8 May 43, sub: Restoration of Communication Facilities in Burma. Folder, Burma--Restoring Communications, Gen Ref Br, OCMH.
73. (1) MS 428, Army Service Forces Activities in the Supply of China, Burma, and India, 1942-1943, pp. 50-54. Gen Ref Br, OCMH. (2) Rpt, Col Frederick S. Strong, Jr., Chief Engr, SOS CBI, to Somervell, 13 Nov 43. Somervell File, Vol IV, Hq ASF, Theaters of Opns, CBI 1944, A46-257. (Hereafter, Somervell File, --) (3) Min, CCS 73d Mtg, 26 Feb 43.
74. (1) CM-IN 430, Stilwell to Marshall, 1 Apr 43. (2) Memo, Marshall for Dill, 8 Apr 43, sub: Program for India-China Wing. Item 66, OPD Exec 10. (3) Ltr, Alexander to Arnold, 19 Apr 43, with Incl, Rad NR J1339, Bissell to Alexander, 30 Jan 43. Folder, New Airdromes in India Corresp (Dec 42-May 43), CT 23, Dr 2, KCRC. (4) CM-IN 11827, Stilwell to Marshall, 27 Mar 43. (5) Ltr, Col Robert F. Tate, Air Off, Hq USAF CBI, to Stilwell, 12 Feb 43, sub: Airdrome Housing and Operational Facilities. Folder, New Airdromes in India Corresp (Dec 42-May 43), CT 23, Dr 2, KCRC.
75. Stilwell B&W, 19 Apr 43.
76. The Stilwell Papers, p. 202.
77. Notes, Lt Col Henry A. Byroade, Engr, sub: Notes for Record on Airdrome Construction and Cargo Availability for India-China Freight Line, 23 Jun 43. Somervell File, Vol III, CBI 42-43.
78. Memo with Incls, Chennault for Arnold, 4 May 43, sub: Factors Which Limit Opns of 14th Air Force. OPD 381 CTO, III, A47-30.
79. (1) Rpt, Hq Y-FOS USAF CBI, 10 Jul 44, sub: Hist Rpt for 1943. History of CBI, Sec. II, Ch. III, pp. 4-5. (2) The Stilwell Papers, p. 198.
80. Notes, Training for Y-Force, with Incl, Chinese text. SNF-151.
81. (1) Stipulations Concerning the Employment of the American Instructors. SNF-55. Couched in legal terms, the paper appears to be based on contracts for hired instructors. (2) Draft Memo in Stilwell's hand, for Shang Chen, NMC. SNF-55.
82. (1) The Stilwell Papers, p. 190. (2) CM-IN 8392, MA Chungking to MILID, 17 Feb 43. (3) Rad C-8, Dorn to Stilwell, 9 Feb 43. Item 207, Bk 1, JWS Personal File. (4) CM-IN 3365, Stilwell to Marshall, 6 Apr 43.
83. Rpt, Gen Waters, History of Field Artillery Training School, Incl 6, App. III, Y-Force Hist Rpt, p. 10. AG 314.7. (Hereafter, Waters Report.)
84. Waters Report.
85. Waters Report, p. 28, quotation on p. 14.
86. Waters Report, pp. 18, 69.
87. Waters Report, pp. 53-54, 66.
88. (1) Waters Report, p. 10. (2) Quotation from History of CBI, p. 138.
89. Waters Report, pp. 22, 30, 73-78.
90. Directive, Stilwell to Arms, 12 Mar 43. AG (Y-FOS) 353, KCRC.
91. (1) Jour, 1943, Hq Infantry Training Center. Gen Ref Br, OCMH. (2) Progress Rpt 1, 25 Mar-22 Apr 43, Arms to Stilwell, dated 22 Apr 43. AG (Y-FOS) 354.6, KCRC.
93. (1) Rpt cited n. 91(2). (2) History of CBI, p. 138.
94. Wood, Copy of Rpts, Tali Mil District, Yoke Force, CBI Opns 43-44, p. 4. Gen Ref Br, OCMH.
95. Memo cited n. 15.
96. CM-IN 4217, Stilwell to Marshall, 9 Mar 43.
98. (1) CM-IN 16435, Stilwell to Soong, 30 Mar 43. (2) CM-IN 10597, Stilwell to Soong, 20 Mar 43. (3) Cases 122, 126, 127, OPD 381 CTO, A47-30.
99. Memo, Wang Wen-hsien, Admin Dept, NMC, for Dorn, 23 Mar 43, sub: Personnel Reqmts for Y-Force. AG (Y-FOS) 320.2, KCRC.
100. Waters Report, pp. 65-66.
101. The General Plan of ANAKIM (Y-Force Project), 19 May 1943, is a staff study of the Y-Force role in projected Burma operations during the 1943-1944 dry season. It also contains the general scheme for re-equipping the Y-Force divisions from Chinese and U.S. contributions. Gen Ref Br, OCMH.
102. Stilwell Diary, 18 Apr 43.
103. Japanese Study 77, pp. 95-97.
104. (1) Ibid. (2) MA (China) Rpt 417, Tai-Heng Fighting, 16 Apr-28 May 43. MID Library. (3) Headquarters, USAF, CBI, was not officially informed of the seriousness of the I-chang fighting until 11 May 1943. CM-IN 12914, Hearn to Stilwell, 20 May 43.
105. See Ch. VII, p. 250, above.
106. (1) Owen, Campaign in Burma, pp. 31-38. (2) Wavell Despatch, January 1 to June 20, 1943, Supplement to The London Gazette. (3) Japanese Study 89, pp. 5-8.
107. (1) Wavell Despatch, January 1 to June 20, 1943, Supplement to The London Gazette. (2) Wingate's Rpt. Library, Hq Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Ga.
108. (1) Wavell Despatch, January 1 to June 20, 1943, Supplement to The London Gazette, pars. 24-28. (2) SEATIC Bull 240, 9 Jul 46, pp. 3-5. MID Library. (3) Japanese Study 89, p. 12.
109. (1) Ltr, Col Osmun to Brig Gen Hayes A. Kroner, Chief of Mil Int Serv, 17 Apr 43. ABC 337 TRIDENT (May 43) Sec E, A48-224. (2) CM-IN 2540, Ferris to Marshall, 4 Apr 43. (3) CM-IN 5915, Stilwell to Marshall, 10 Apr 43. (4) CM-IN 11837, Stilwell to Marshall, 23 Mar 43. (5) The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, Vol. II, p. 1494.
110. (1) Rad AMMDEL 305, Stilwell to Marshall, 10 Apr 43. Item 316, Bk 1, JWS Personal File. (2) Memo, Maj Gen LeRoy Lutes, Dir of Opns, ASF, for Somervell, 19 May 43, sub: Monthly U.S. and UK tonnage for Projected Opns in India; Memo, Chief, Strategy Sec, OPD, for Wedemeyer, 17 May 43, sub: Estimate of Tonnage Required for ANAKIM Opn; Memo, Brig Gen Patrick H. Tansey, Chief, Logistics Gp, OPD, for Wedemeyer, 17 May 43, sub: British Reqmts for India. ABC 337 TRIDENT (May 43) Sec E, A48-224.
111. Memo, Somervell for Marshall, 14 May 43, sub: Memo on Monthy Tonnage of Shipping Space Required from North Africa and UK for ANAKIM; Memo, Somervell for Wedemeyer, 23 May 43, sub: Memo on Shipts Required for Opns in India. ABC 337 TRIDENT (May 43) Sec E, A48-224.
112. In Stilwell Undated Paper 21, Stilwell continued this note by saying that the United States and China were to do things "50-50," but that "equip., instr, and $$ and backing equalled 0 plus obstruction," that of 324 divisions, 60-odd brigades, and 89 guerrilla units on the Chinese Order of Battle, the Generalissimo had been able to spare three for Stilwell. The paper probably belongs to the fall of 1943, because of its reference to the 3,000 U.S. combat troops, undoubtedly the GALAHAD Project, or Merrill's Marauders. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
113. (1) Incl to Memo, Leahy for JCS, 7 Apr 43. Item 63, OPD Exec 10. (2) Memo, Lt Gen G. N. Macready, JSM, for Marshall, 13 Apr 43. Item 60, OPD Exec 10. (3) Ltr, Macready to Marshall, 20 Apr 43. Case 131, OPD 381 CTO, A47-30. (4) Rad AG 305, Stilwell to Marshall, 10 Apr 43. Item 316, Bk 1, JWS Personal File. (5) Morison, Rising Sun in the Pacific, p. 344.
114. SOS in CBI, App. 6, Advance Section No. 3.
115. (1) History of CBI, Sec. II, Ch. II, The Ledo Road, pp. 1-9. (2) Rpt, Maj Gen Lewis A. Pick, CG, Hq Advance Sec, U.S. Forces, India-Burma Theater, 9 Aug 45, quotation on pp. 5-6. Gen Ref Br, OCMH.
116. Rad TORCH A679, Wheeler to Stilwell, 9 Jan 43. Item 163, Bk 1, JWS Personal File.
117. (1) Ltr, Engr-in-Chief, sub: Notes on Ledo Road Project. SNF-84. (2) Ltr, Gen Holcombe, Actg CG, SOS USAF CBI, to Somervell, 19 Feb 43. Somervell File, Vol III, CBI 42-43.
118. History of CBI, Sec. II, Ch. II, The Ledo Road, p. 11.
120. (1) History of CBI, Sec. II, Ch. II, The Ledo Road, p. 13. (2) Rads RA-68 and T-92, Stilwell to Wheeler and Boatner. Item 186, Bk 1, JWS Personal File.
121. History of CBI, Sec. II, Ch. II, The Ledo Road, pp. 13-14.
122. (1) Col Tamraz, Diary entry of 21 Feb 43. Office, Surgeon Gen, Hist Sec. (2) Memo, Handy for Marshall, 15 Aug 43, sub: Digest of Cables Reed from Stilwell re Burma Opns. Item 51, OPD Exec 10. (3) TB Med 77. Office, Surgeon Gen, Hist Sec.
123. (1) SOS in CBI, App. 16, Medical Section, pp. 7, 20-21. (2) Memo cited n. 122(2).
124. SEATIC Bull 247, 22 Apr 47, p. 2; Incl (B) to Naval Ln Off, Rangoon, Conf Rpt 49-46, 16 May 46. MID Library.
125. Rad AGWAR 233, Stilwell to Marshall, 12 Mar 43. Item 251, Bk 1, JWS Personal File.
126. (1) Gordon S. Seagrave, M.D., Burma Surgeon Returns (New York, 1946), p. 31. (2) G-2 Rpts, Forward Echelon, Chih Hui Pu, 1, 6, 9, 13, 22 Mar and 20 Apr 43; Sitrep, 2 May 43. Northern Combat Area Command Files, KCRC. (3) Bull and Incl cited n. 124.
127. Rad AMMDEL 151, Ferris to Stilwell, 1 Mar 43. Item 225, Bk 1, JWS Personal File.