Air Power Rather Than Army Reform
In the months May 1942-April 1943, in compliance with War Department and JCS directives, Stilwell busied himself with plans and preparations for breaking the blockade of China and reforming the Chinese Army. While requiring a great deal of effort and preparation by Chinese, British, and Americans, these two projects had one thing in common--their results would not be apparent until 1944 if an offensive was actually begun in late 1943. True, the long-term consequences of establishing a powerful Chinese Army under the Generalissimo were incalculable, but Chennault was claiming significant achievements in the present. For example, China Air Task Force with only the most meager logistical support claimed that in 1942 it had sunk 49,600 tons of Japanese shipping and probably had sunk 11,200 tons more.1 With Stilwell's efforts showing nothing to match Chennault's claims, with his most trusted adviser pleading Chennault's case, there is little wonder that Roosevelt, in a letter to Marshall on 8 March 1943, indicated his willingness to see how much Chennault could accomplish with top priority on Hump tonnage.
In the early months of 1943 Chennault had to base his promises on what he had done in 1942, for the failure of the Hump to deliver quantities of supplies, plus Stilwell's attempt to stockpile munitions to supplement the equipment of the Y-Force divisions, meant that little reached Chennault, and his operations suffered accordingly. His aircraft were badly in need of maintenance and no replacements came forward. His supplies of gasoline, ammunition, and spare parts were low. Bad weather was a factor. The Chinese Government also contributed to Chennault's problems. In the eight months ending February 1943, 9 percent of all tonnage over the Hump, or 837 tons, was Chinese paper currency, engraved in the United States under lend-lease and flown to China.
Chennault, chafing at these restrictions, drew back from the east China bases to Yunnan, where he assumed a reluctant defensive.2
The Air War Begins Over Burma
Much better supplied, the Tenth Air Force was correspondingly more aggressive. Its mission was threefold: to defend the Hump; to attack Japanese communications and supply installations; to support any attempt to retake Burma. Twice in the fall of 1942 the Japanese 5th Air Division had revealed itself a dangerous and wily foe. It had attacked the overcrowded Dinjan airfield on 25, 26, and 28 October, destroying 2 U.S. fighters in the air, and 4 fighters and 8 transports on the ground.3
In December the Japanese bombed Calcutta, center of the industrial complex which largely sustained the Indian war effort. The attack was alarmingly successful, for 350,000 people fled the city. Had the Japanese persisted in strategic bombing of the Calcutta area they might have achieved major results. At Jamshedpur, 186 miles from Calcutta, were the great Tata steel mills, producing 800,000 tons a year. One hundred and thirty miles from Calcutta, and one hundred miles from the Tata plants, was the Steel Corporation of Bengal, with a 238,000-ton capacity. Crippling Calcutta's dock facilities would have affected the whole Allied war effort in Asia, for supplies went from them to the Assam supply and air bases.4
Fortunately for the Allies, 5th Air Division's appreciation of strategic air bombing was not shared by Burma Area Army, which insisted that the 5th Air Division make tactical air support its primary mission. Moreover, when American successes in the Solomons in November 1942 alarmed the Japanese, they diverted air strength from 5th Air Division. Indeed, Burma tended to be a low-priority area for both Japanese and Americans. Handicapped by the policies imposed by higher authority, 5th Air Division had to be content with a series of nuisance raids on Calcutta in January 1943, which RAF Beaufighters made increasingly unprofitable.5
The India-based squadrons of the Tenth Air Force entered 1943 with 67 aircraft operational--38 P-40's, 9 B-25's, and 20 B-24's. By agreement with the RAF the Tenth Air Force assumed responsibility for missions more than 250 miles away from the Allied air bases, all of which were flown without fighter escort. In addition to constant patrol and reconnaissance activity to protect the Assam Hump terminals, the Tenth's fighters gave almost daily ground support to the British 4 Corps on the India-Burma border in the Manipur area, where it was engaged in patrol and outpost warfare.
Using long-range fuel tanks, the fighters also attacked rolling stock, water tanks, repair shops, and bridges from Myitkyina to south of Katha. Lt. Col. John E. Barr found by experiment that the P-40 could stagger into the air with a 1,000-pound bomb, which made of the versatile fighter a formidable new weapon. The B-24's ranged at will from Bangkok to Rangoon and far out into the Andaman Sea to look for Japanese shipping. The medium bombers concentrated on airdromes and rail communications in the Mandalay-Lashio area. For most of this period the mediums staged through the RAF base at Agartala. Headquarters, Tenth Air Force, was unwilling to occupy Agartala and other forward RAF bases because it believed that the Japanese would be able to bomb them at will.6
However, the inadequacy of the early-warning system was just as obvious around the American base at Dinjan. On 23 February the Japanese slipped into Assam with 7 bombers and 5 fighters. Scoring surprise, they attacked Dinjan from a high altitude but inflicted only minor damage to 1 transport. Two days later they came in force with about 45 aircraft. This time the Tenth Air Force intercepted with 30 fighters which forced the attackers to jettison their bombs. A heavy toll was taken of the Japanese; only 9 were tracked out of the area by radar. There were false alarms in the following weeks, but no more attacks.
The Japanese air reaction in Burma itself was not much more effective. Operations there cost the Tenth 4 heavy bombers, 3 mediums, and 1 photo reconnaissance craft in the first five months of 1943, a small price for bombers operating alone. In that same period the Tenth's strength almost doubled and became 61 P-40's, 45 B-24's, and 45 B-25's.7
In May 1943 the coming of the monsoon failed to halt Tenth Air Force operations, for bomb tonnage delivered on enemy targets in July (750 tons) was 70 percent above June, thanks to the Tenth's meteorological experts, who became skilled in predicting holes in the overcast over profitable targets. But these operations were in a sense routine strategic bombing though the hazards of flight and enemy reaction seemed far from routine to the crews.
AIRCRAFT OF TENTH AIR FORCE, 1942. Above, medium bombers, B-25's. Note the .50 caliber machine gun mounted to protect the ship from enemy craft approaching from below and back. Below, fighter plane, P-40.
Of future importance was the fact that the British tactical airfield construction program was yielding fruit. Medium bombers were now at Kurmitola, east of Calcutta and closer to the enemy, suggesting that the safety of forward bases was by this time reasonably assured. The Second Troop Carrier Squadron, quietly bringing supplies to Allied outposts in the mountains of the Indo-Burmese border, and Numbers 31 and 194 RAF Squadrons supporting British jungle fighters, were developing techniques of air supply that were to revolutionize jungle warfare. The RAF and the Tenth Air Force had developed such efficiency that bombers could operate in the monsoon.
The effect of the RAF's and Tenth's strategic bombing on the Japanese from April 1942 to May 1943 was small. To cripple a rail system with a small force of heavy bombers is difficult, if not impossible. And few other targets of strategic importance offered themselves in Burma.8
Chiang Promises To Hold East China
When the President answered the Generalissimo in March 19439 he had made his support of Chennault and the air arm quite apparent. On 10 April the Generalissimo asked President Roosevelt to call Chennault to Washington to present the plan that he and the Generalissimo had been discussing. Protesting that Chennault was faring no better as commander of the Fourteenth Air Force than he had as commander of the China Air Task Force, Soong urged that Chennault be recalled to Washington to present his case.10
The President must have decided immediately on receipt of the Generalissimo's 10 April radio to call Chennault back, for Marshall a day or so later asked Stilwell for comment on the proposed trip. Stilwell replied that he knew nothing of any new Chennault plans, nor did he know why the Generalissimo was bypassing him and dealing directly with Chennault. Stilwell suggested that the United States tell the Generalissimo that the proposal to recall Chennault fitted in well with an American project to bring Stilwell, Bissell, and Chennault to Washington to discuss ANAKIM.11
Simultaneously, Marshall wrote to the President:
The attached message from the Generalissimo creates an embarrassing situation. To call in Chennault and ignore Stilwell, which is the probable purpose of the Generalissimo's proposal, would create such a definite division of authority in the China Theater as to necessitate Stilwell's relief and Chennault's appointment to command of ground and air, which so far as I am concerned would be a grave mistake.
As a matter of fact we were in process of arranging for Stilwell to come to Washington to talk over the ANAKIM situation. [Marshall then discusses the mechanics of such a conference.]
Under the circumstances I therefore suggest that the request of the Generalissimo be met by including Stilwell and Bissell in the party for a conference here. This would parallel the military Pacific conference just completed, and the conference about to occur in London on the special subject of ANAKIM. A draft of such a message is attached.12
Since Stilwell's suggestion was in perfect accord with his own proposal to the President, Marshall at once put it before Roosevelt. Roosevelt was unwilling to include General Bissell but did accept the Marshall-Stilwell phrasing, and the Generalissimo was answered accordingly.13 Stilwell at once contacted Chennault, who said that he had no new plan and was not aware of what the Generalissimo had in mind. The Generalissimo, therefore, was urging the basic plan that Chennault had laid before Willkie in October 1942--to destroy the Japanese Air Force in China, then attack their shipping and home islands. Chennault and Stilwell parted in anger.14
Also, bitterness accumulated between Stilwell and his Chinese superior, the Generalissimo. In 1942 Stilwell's diaries record flashes of anger, as he relieved the tensions of command, but he usually referred to the Chinese leader by name or title. And Stilwell made numerous even more disparaging references to General Wavell, while the Operations Division and the whole War Department were occasionally viewed with something less than admiration.15 Stilwell's anger increased after the Generalissimo's 8 January refusal to cross the Salween. More and more in his diaries he chose to refer to the Chinese leader by the code name originally intended for use in radio messages, PEANUT. To Stilwell, the Nationalist regime appeared a "cesspool" and the Generalissimo simply a "figurehead."16 In speaking to the Generalissimo, Stilwell was invariably courteous, if candid, but in his headquarters his caustic wit would flash out, and reports of what he had said, with purple additions, would fly back to the Chinese leader.17
The exchanges between the Generalissimo and the President, renewed pressure from Chennault's friends, and the growing personal animosity between the Generalissimo and Stilwell immediately preceded a formal bid from the Generalissimo, Supreme Commander of China Theater, for a policy rearrangement
that would change the whole American effort in Asia. Soong gave the note to Hopkins for the President on 29 April 1943:
I am instructed by the Generalissimo that after careful consideration he has concluded all resources must be concentrated in the immediate future on launching an air offensive in China. Specifically, after weighing the various claims, he now desires that the entire air transport tonnage during the months of May, June, and July be devoted to carrying into China gasoline and aviation supplies, in order to build up the required reserves for decisive offensive action. It is the Generalissimo's view that since initiation of the air effort is both most urgent and presently feasible and since the ground effort has been deferred until next Autumn, military logic demands the requested alteration in schedules.18
Parenthetically, it must be noted that 6,900 tons of ordnance, and a total of about 18,000 tons of all supplies, were to be flown into Yunnan as initial equipment for the ground offensive of which the Generalissimo spoke and to which he had agreed. These supplies were all to have been flown in, distributed, and the troops trained in their use by the time the ground dried in late October 1943. The Generalissimo was proposing to stop the import of these arms completely until 1 August. But Chennault would still need supplies after 1 August, so the entire amount of Hump tonnage after 1 August could not in turn be allotted to the ground forces. Only a tremendous increase in Hump tonnage could make up the shortage that the Y-Force would suffer, and only ninety days would be left to receive and distribute the weapons and train the Chinese in their use.19
The Generalissimo's note resumed:
It will be recalled that in past conversations the decision was taken to launch a China air offensive at the earliest possible date, and that the only obstacle to prompt action was shortage of air transport tonnage for the purpose. Since the existing capacity of the air transport line is believed to be sufficient to support an air offensive, no obstacle to prompt action now appears to remain. It is hoped, therefore, that the small quantities of needed additional planes and equipment may be allocated; that the needed supplies may move forward at once, and that the offensive may start as soon as preparations for it can be completed.20
In this paragraph the Generalissimo thus assured the President that the logistics of the proposed air offensive were well in hand. Singling out the "only obstacle" he then stated that it no longer "appears to remain." The paragraph
would seem to include the eastern line of communications from Kunming to Chennault's east China air bases.
The Generalissimo proceeded to discuss the relationship of the air and ground efforts in his China Theater:
Such a concentration of present resources on the air effort need not, in the Generalissimo's opinion, interfere with the program of ground action. The question is not whether the ground effort is to be finally sacrificed to the air effort, but whether ground supplies or air supplies are to be carried into China in the months just ahead. It will be understood that after the required reserves for the air offensive have been accumulated, the percentage of air transport tonnage into China allocated to aviation supplies can be reduced to the total needed merely to maintain the air effort. The capacity of the air transport line into China is planned to expand very rapidly; and as this expansion occurs, all needed ground supplies may also be carried into China in ample time to be on hand when called for. Indeed, the Generalissimo believes that the air offensive will not only have great strategic results, in and of itself; but also, and perhaps more importantly, will serve as a direct preparation for the ground effort by weakening the enemy air strength and attacking his main line of communication to the Southward.
The Generalissimo also wishes me to transmit to you his personal assurance that in the event the enemy attempts to interrupt the air offensive by a ground advance on the air bases, the advance can be halted by the existing Chinese forces.
The Generalissimo requested that General Chennault return to the United States to acquaint you with the detailed plans for the proposed air offensive. As General Chennault has now arrived in the United States he can explain what a relatively small number of planes and amount of equipment is needed for this purpose.21
The paragraph next to the last in the Generalissimo's message suggests his attitude toward his Army, the Japanese, and Stilwell. It implies that the Generalissimo was satisfied with his Army as it was. There was no need to rearm, reorganize, or retrain it, for the "existing Chinese forces" could stop the Japanese if they tried to seize Chennault's airfields. If the Chinese were capable of stopping up to eleven Japanese divisions, Stilwell's mission of "improving the combat efficiency of the Chinese Army" was unnecessary.
Chennault and Stilwell Present Their Cases
Between 30 April and 2 May the President interviewed the leading personalities in the controversy over the timing of a major U.S. air effort in China. It was the eve of the TRIDENT Conference of the President, the Prime Minister, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, convened in Washington to discuss the problems raised by the victory in North Africa and the approach of the date by which, under the Casablanca agreements, a decision would have to be reached on ANAKIM.
Chennault, as he told Stilwell, had no new plan. On the transport aircraft as it flew to Washington he occupied himself in making a new estimate of what he would need to carry out the proposals he had laid before Willkie the
previous October. The Fourteenth's commander estimated his requirements in tonnage per month, described the strength in aircraft he desired, assigned tentative dates to the different phases of his plan, and made an intelligence estimate of the Japanese intentions in China.22
Chennault's 30 April appraisal of the Japanese plans differed radically from that of February. Then, he had warned that a major Japanese drive in China was imminent.23 Actually, China Expeditionary Forces was contemplating only the minor Tung-ting Lake affair.24 Now, in April, Chennault reversed himself and stated, "Japan does not desire to fight in China, particularly in the air. . . . Since Japan does not desire to fight in the air over China, every effort should be exerted to make her fight there."25
The Chennault plan in its April 1943 version was closely geared to seasons when good flying weather might be expected in east China. Beginning in July 1943 his fighters would start a two months' attack to wrest air superiority from Japan's 3d Air Division. Late in August, the B-25's would move to a new field at Kweilin to begin an antishipping campaign along the Yangtze, over Haiphong harbor, off Hainan Island, and over coastal ports. During September the B-25's would widen their sweeps by covering the Formosa Strait and the South China Sea. Strategic bombing of Japanese lines of communications, especially the Indochina railways pointing toward Kunming, would follow.
Then, the B-24's would move to east China to pound Formosa and the Shanghai-Nanking-Hankow triangle. By the end of the year, Phase III, the bombing of Japan, would get under way. Aircraft requirements for the Chennault plan were now 75 P-40's, 75 P-51's, 48 B-25's, 35 B-24's, and some photo reconnaissance craft. For supply he requested 4,790 tons each month from July through September and 7,129 tons monthly thereafter.26
Chennault acknowledged the possibility of a powerful Japanese offensive to occupy central China but did not think it would be more successful than similar efforts in the past. If it was made, he thought, it would have to be in such force as seriously to reduce Japanese strength in other theaters outside China. The paper in which he presented his plan said nothing about the line of communications to his forward air bases, nor did it mention supplying lend-lease arms to the Chinese divisions in east China. Chennault's supply requirements would in any event absorb almost all Hump tonnage and, moreover, he may have shared the Generalissimo's belief that the "existing Chinese forces" could defend the east China airfields.27
In conversations with Stimson and Marshall, and in a later letter to
Marshall, Chennault filled in the bare bones of his plan and offered his views on the war in China. He believed that the Japanese would fight to the end to hold the Chinese coastal cities and Formosa, but that they would withdraw from the Yangtze valley after the Fourteenth Air Force had destroyed much of the river shipping on which they depended for their supply in that area. He believed that he could hope to sink 500,000 tons of Japanese shipping in six months, after which the Japanese would begin to withdraw from their outlying holdings. Chennault told Stimson that he needed only 4,700 tons a month over the Hump and Stilwell 1,800 tons more, with which to equip Chinese divisions. He indicated great skepticism as to the worth of the new Ledo Road. Stimson's recollection of what Chennault thought he could do to stop a Japanese advance on Kunming from Indochina was: "He asserted that they had never yet been able to advance more than 100 miles against land obstacles. All of their big advances have been made with the support of rivers and railroads."28
To Chennault's presentation of his case to Marshall, Stilwell replied:
What Chennault says about available targets is quite true. The Japs could be done considerable injury. Just one point about the whole thing and that is, as we found out last spring [Chekiang Expedition], any attempt to bomb Japan is going to bring a prompt and violent reaction on the ground and somebody has to decide how far we can sting them before that reaction appears. The Japanese army could make available for a major campaign in China one or a half million men. If we start an air campaign, they may decide they are being hurt to the extent it would be advantageous for them to take Chungking and Kunming. If that is done, we will have to fold up out there.
We have to have China to get at Japan. If we are going to bomb Japan, we will have to have the China bases. I see no way except by development of a ground force. The solution is to build up the Chinese army to the point where they can do the job. That will take considerable time. It won't be a matter of 30 or 60 divisions. I figure there should be 120. At that time the Chinese army, if supplied with proper weapons, can move into central China and maybe take a port and then seize these bases and hold them against a very serious Japanese reaction. If we go and sting them into retaliation before ready, the whole thing will fold up. It is, I admit, tempting to take advantage of these targets and hurt them if we can. I think that will have to be decided in the higher echelon here.
We are not prepared to seize the bases we need to bomb Japan. How long are we going to wait before we attempt to do it? It depends upon what we can build up in China. The Chinese might be able to hold the area outlined by General Chennault with what they have plus air support against what there is there now. In the face of an augmented Japanese force from Hankow or Canton I doubt if they could.29
Then Stilwell and Chennault had their interviews with the President. On one major point, Chennault recalled: "I replied [to the President] that if we received 10,000 tons of supplies monthly my planes would sink and severely
damage more than a million tons of shipping. He banged his fist on the desk and chortled, 'If you can sink a million tons, we'll break their backs.' "30
The President then approved two objectives for the Fourteenth Air Force. They were, "first, to draw into China and there destroy a crippling proportion of the enemy's total air strength, and second, to sink a minimum of 500,000 tons of the enemy's shipping during this summer and autumn by attacking his main sea lane along the South China coasts."31 The President also asked Chennault to write to him directly outside of military channels. This Chennault did, corresponding with the President whenever it was convenient for someone to carry a letter back to the United States. Chennault could thus address the Commander in Chief on military matters without Stilwell's or Marshall's knowledge or consent, a singular position for a subordinate commander. A copy of each letter went regularly to Hopkins.32
Stilwell's presentation of his case, which Marshall had arranged, was not effective. As at his first meeting with Stimson in 1942 Stilwell said little in his own behalf and slipped into the reserve that came so naturally to him in meeting a stranger, even though in this case it was the President and Commander in Chief on whose support so much depended. He did present orally the gist of a message from the Generalissimo to the President. The Generalissimo and the Chinese people, the message ran, could not understand why so few U.S. aircraft went to China. The Chinese were discouraged and disheartened. The prompt arrival of three fighter groups would immediately restore the situation. The Generalissimo feared that the Japanese Navy might sail right up the river to Chungking. The three groups of fighters would not only stop the Japanese but would enable the Chinese to assume the offensive. If they did not come to China, the Army might desert to the Japanese.33
Stilwell prepared a memorandum to the President, but the existence of the signed original in his papers suggests that he presented the gist of it orally.
My mission is to increase the combat effectiveness of the Chinese Army. We are attempting it progressively through (1) The Ramgarh training scheme (three divisions and corps troops) (2) The first 30-division plan (troops now in Yunnan, with training started at Kunming) and (3) The second 30-division plan (approved by CKS but not yet under way).
I consider it of prime importance to continue the program without interruption. Unless a strong ground force is developed, we shall be unable to seize and hold bases from
which Japan can be attacked from the air. A continuing flow of supplies to the Y-force is necessary to ensure that it will be ready for the ANAKIM operation. If this flow, which is on an extremely modest scale, is interrupted for three months, Chinese participation in ANAKIM will be impossible before January, 1944.
The Chinese show an increasing tendency to neglect their obligation of furnishing the man-power which we are to equip and train, and to emphasize the desirability of confining activity in China to the air area. If the latter course is followed, the effort will be entirely American and our arrival at our goal in China--the possession of bombing bases--will be indefinitely deferred. We will cause some damage, but it will not be vital to the war effort.
The only short-cut to Japan is through China. The Chinese know this and are disposed to extract from the situation every advantage possible. Unless we are prepared to accept indefinite delay, they must be held to their commitments as fully as we are holding ourselves to ours.
I strongly recommend: (a) That CKS be reminded of the reason for our presence in China and his agreement to furnish man-power and accept our assistance in training, (b) That he be urged to fully support the present training plan and arrangements for the second 30-division plan. (c) That both the British and the Chinese be held to their commitments for the retaking of Burma, as the necessary first step. (d) That the present allotment of [Hump] tonnage--3/8 for aviation, 5/8 for all other needs--remain unchanged, and that the air effort be limited to these facilities until after ANAKIM, when it can be materially increased without the great risk involved at present. (e) That a statement be made to CKS explaining to him that the military channels must be maintained and that no independence of any portion of our military establishment [i.e., the Fourteenth Air Force] will be countenanced. (f) That a corps of U.S. troops be made available as soon as possible for future operations. (g) That a general strategic plan be prepared and tied in with operations in the SWP [Southwest Pacific Area].34
Eighteen months later, Stilwell recalled warning the President that the Japanese would react to Chennault's offensive and gave the President's reply as: "In a political fight [Stilwell's italics] it's not good tactics to refrain from doing something because of something your opponent may do in return."35
The President's Decision
The issue, increasing the combat effectiveness of the Chinese Army or approving Chennault's program, was now squarely before the President. In making his decision, he could not be guided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because they did not agree among themselves. Of the four members, Admiral Leahy inclined toward Chennault, Admiral King, General Marshall, and General Arnold toward Stilwell.36 Consistent with his earlier inclinations, the President made his decision, and Marshall gave it to Stilwell on 3 May:
I talked to the President yesterday regarding China matters and found him completely set against any delay in Chennault's program. He had drawn the conclusion from his interview with you that the air activities were in effect largely to be suspended while the more tedious ground build-up was being carried on. . . .
The President accepted the proposition that necessary supplies for the Yunnan Force should be sent in, that he would handle Chiang Kai-shek on that, but stated that politically he must support Chiang Kai-shek and that in the state of Chinese morale the air program was therefore of great importance.
Your oral message and Chennault's oral message from the Generalissimo to the President, and the written message from Dr. Soong to the President, all have made their impression. The important thing is to keep out in the clear the fact, as we see it, that all communication with China will be terminated if Chinese troops in Yunnan are not adequately prepared to resist the Japanese.
As to ANAKIM the President was for this on a modified basis, that is, in the north, but not to the south, at Rangoon. Also I think he felt that nothing for ANAKIM should delay Chennault's air operations.37
Stilwell's reaction to the trend of the President's thinking, as sketched in a memorandum for Marshall, was:
Total misapprehension on the part of the Commander in Chief of the character, intentions, authority, and ability of Chiang Kai-shek.
British and Chinese complacency, delay, and obstruction. Each, for their own reasons, content to drift. Both attempting to shift all the burden to our shoulders.
CKS' desire to make it almost entirely an air war will delay the formation of an efficient ground force without which the war cannot be carried to Japan.
Any increase in air activity may draw the Jap reaction which will not only close to us all possible future bases, but also the ones we are using now.
If strategic decisions are left to CKS, the most fantastic decisions are to be expected.
CKS may attempt to exercise full control over all U.S. troops.
CKS may attempt to get rid of a U.S. representative who says "no" and put in one who will say nothing but "yes." At the least, he will probably try to have the air arm in China entirely divorced from any control but his own.
The Chinese will use the situation to milk the U.S. for CDS [China Defense Supplies, Inc., i.e., lend-lease] supplies and pile up an enormous tonnage for post-war purposes, while ignoring the needs of the present.
Insist on the military channel for all dealings with all U.S. units.
Back up decisions of representatives in China on all CDS matters. Close the White House back door.
Give the U.S. representative in China [Stilwell] a chance to bargain.
Make the U.S. Representative the personal representative of the President, and keep the Curries' and Willkies' at home.
Curtail CKS' authority over U.S. troops.
Form strategic plans in a committee that sits in Washington, with a Chinese representative, but with American control. Present a general strategic plan by steps with dates and commit CKS to it.
Put an American corps in India, but get prior commitments on its use.
Adjust the rate of exchange.38
In speaking to Marshall of a modified ANAKIM, the President reflected an earlier exchange of views in April between himself, General Marshall, and Admirals Leahy and King. The President had wondered if reducing ANAKIM might not permit accelerating preparations for European operations. The President's service chiefs agreed that canceling ANAKIM would materially increase U.S. strength in Europe, but at heavy cost in Asia. They warned that abandoning ANAKIM might cause a reverse that would force a heavy diversion of resources to the Pacific from Europe, and that a vigorous Japanese reaction to Chennault's air offensive might have disastrous effects in China. They did, however, concede that modification of ANAKIM might be essential. This might be the occupation of north Burma only, down to the Mandalay line, which Maj. Gen. Thomas T. Handy of the Operations Division estimated would permit the Ledo Road plus ATC to deliver 20,000 tons a month to China. Thus, and once again almost casually, the Ledo Road, whose construction Stilwell had undertaken as a consequence of Wavell's assigning him to the Hukawng Valley, increased in importance as a possible substitute for the line of communications north from Rangoon that Stilwell had originally proposed.39
The President's decision to give formal approval to the Chennault plan was not communicated to the Chinese at once. In answering the Generalissimo's 29 April note, the President on 4 May said that Chennault could not have all Hump tonnage and added that the matter as a whole was under study.40 Madame Chiang promptly called Assistant Secretary of War McCloy to the White House and insisted on full compliance with the Generalissimo's 29 April memorandum, pointing out that, after all, he commanded China Theater. Soong added his plea in a handwritten letter to the President on 12 May.41 That the President meant business became apparent on 9 May when he directed that Wheeler take personal charge of the U.S. part of the Assam airfield project, called the situation "extremely serious," and directed Wheeler to rush construction.42 But no hint of the decision was given to any Chinese until after Soong appeared before the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 17 May and said that China would make a separate peace with Japan unless wholehearted operations to undertake its relief and discharge the post-Casablanca "commitments" began. The Generalissimo, said Soong, commanded China Theater. So long as he was responsible, his view should prevail.43 The next morning, a week before the
end of TRIDENT, Soong was called to the White House. Reporting his conversation to the Generalissimo, Soong said:
I saw the President today, who told me he fully understands and is concerned over the military and economic crisis confronting you and is anxious that the air force be immediately strengthened to support you. He has accordingly made the following decisions:
Starting July 1, 1943, the first 4,700 tons of supplies per month flown into China over the India-China route shall be for General Chennault's air force; after this priority is fully satisfied, the next 2,000 tons per month shall be for all other purposes including ground forces; thereafter the next 300 tons per month shall also be for the air force.
President has ordered that starting September 1, the original goal of 10,000 tons per month shall be reached and even stepped up.
I asked the President for all the tonnage for the remainder of May and June 1943 on both Air Transport Command and CNAC planes for air force supplies for the 14th Air Force. The President replied that certain small exceptions might be needed for ground forces and asked me to work out this problem with the Deputy Chief of Staff of the United States Army [McNarney].44
Soong and McNarney worked out an arrangement covering Hump tonnage until 31 October 1943. In dividing the 2,000 tons a month mentioned in Soong's paragraph (1) above, 500 tons a month were allotted to the ground forces, and 1,500 tons for all other Chinese and American activities supported by ATC, such for example as the Chinese arsenal program for manufacture of small arms ammunition.45 There was no suggestion in this correspondence or in that which immediately ensued between the War Department and the White House that this was a decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff or by the President and the Prime Minister; all spoke simply of "the President's decision."
TRIDENT Decision To Take North Burma
Because the ARCADIA and Casablanca Conferences had given the Americans an appreciation of effective presentation at a full-dress international conclave, the Joint Chiefs on the eve of TRIDENT (8 May) presented a formal statement to the President in order that he might enter the conference fully acquainted with their views. In regard to ANAKIM, they said it "should be undertaken and pressed to a successful conclusion." If this was impossible, and if no adequate substitute could be agreed on, then the United States would have to expand its Pacific operations to counteract the advantage the Japanese would gain through Allied failure to support China.46
Two days later, 10 May, the Joint Chiefs resolved to lay before the Combined Chiefs of Staff proposals for a modified ANAKIM along the lines Roosevelt had been shown to favor. This was a move toward a compromise with the views of the British Chiefs of Staff, for OPD surmised the British would not want to go ahead with a full ANAKIM in the winter of 1943-44.47
The much smaller version of ANAKIM was part of the JCS Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan, which thanks to long months of work by their planners the JCS were now ready to present. In the JCS proposals, air bases in north China played a vital part. The basic concept was of American forces from the east, and British and Chinese from the west, converging on the Canton-Hong Kong area, then forcing a way into north China. From north China a massive air bombardment of Japan would be launched. So heavy an attack on Japan's industries might well decide the war. If it did not, then Japan would be invaded.48
The British confirmed the JCS's estimate of their probable intentions with the paper they circulated on 12 May, the day of the conference's opening. The British Chiefs of Staff remarked that they had proposed TRIDENT because they thought it time to carry the Casablanca views one stage farther. Expressing their adherence to the principles laid down in January 1943, the British Chiefs believed application of the Casablanca decisions needed review. They wondered if the experiences of the last few months had not led the Joint Chiefs to change their views.
The British Chiefs of Staff did not believe that the full ANAKIM operation should be undertaken in the winter of 1943-44. They presented their reasons: ANAKIM would be a major commitment at a critical period of the war with Germany; its feasibility was doubtful; no long-term plans for the defeat of Japan had been agreed upon by the CCS, so there could be no accurate estimate of how ANAKIM fitted into such long-term plans. Furthermore, if ANAKIM succeeded, it would not open a road to China before the middle of 1945.
However, though it appeared impossible to execute ANAKIM in 1943, the British Chiefs believed everything possible should be done to keep pressure on the Japanese. They suggested examining more closely long-term plans for Japan's defeat, so that the commanders-in-chief in India could plan and prepare accordingly.49
The American participants in the 12 and 14 May conferences between the President, the Prime Minister, and their service advisers plainly revealed the growing divergences in U.S. policies in China. Reform of the Chinese Army
was a War Department project; the President's lack of interest was now on the record though he had not ruled against it. ANAKIM, as a means of drawing Japanese strength from the Pacific, was the JCS's and Stilwell's suggestion for strategy. The Chennault plan was the President's favorite. The President gave formal support to ANAKIM--but the burden of the Chennault plan on the line of communications in CBI, the possibility of its prematurely provoking the Japanese, and the fact that the Chinese Government viewed U.S. air power as a desirable substitute for a powerful Chinese Army would go far to make ANAKIM impossible and would impede Stilwell's reforms.
At the 12 and 14 May conferences the President made it plain that he wanted action now in China, which could only be by air power. He feared that China might collapse and did not think the continual Chinese calls for aid were "crying 'wolf, wolf.' " The President returned to the themes of his 8 March 1943 letter to Marshall by proclaiming his great faith in the constant attrition of Japanese shipping and aircraft, and by revealing again his concern for maintaining the position and prestige of the Generalissimo. The latter, said Roosevelt, was both Chief of State and head of the Armed Forces; in a sense both Stilwell and Chennault were under him, and so, said the President, it was psychologically difficult to tell the Generalissimo that his allies did not agree with all of his ideas.
Roosevelt approached the JCS's point of view when he disagreed with Churchill's describing the bypassing of Burma to land on Sumatra as analogous to TORCH--but then the President had earlier told Marshall that he thought the Chennault plan was like TORCH.
In earlier combined discussions of ANAKIM, the principal opposition had come from Wavell's staff, whose arguments had been mostly administrative. At TRIDENT the Prime Minister, Wavell, who was now a field marshal, his subordinates, and the British Chiefs of Staff unveiled a comprehensive body of arguments against an attack on Burma based on strategic grounds as well as on the administrative difficulties of campaigning there. Churchill was eloquent in his arguments. He had once been keen on action of the ANAKIM type, but the more he weighed Wavell's plan against the results of action in Burma to date, the less did he like it. Then Churchill brought forth the idea that dominated British strategy in Asia for the next two years.
Could not Burma be bypassed? Was it really necessary to wallow about in swampy jungles where operations could be conducted only five months a year? He suggested leaving Burma to the Japanese, and instead seizing the northern tip of Sumatra as a step toward Singapore. Churchill having introduced this theme, Wavell and his commanders-in-chief for sea and air followed with elaborations on various aspects of it. The merits of the plan were obvious. The United States was about to develop its technique of bypassing major Japanese concentrations in the Pacific; the same thoughts were stirring in London. The Japanese war effort depended on the oil brought over the line of communications
that stretched from the Netherlands Indies to Japan, and here was a step toward cutting it.
The formal presentation of the British Chiefs of Staff pointed out that of the four pre-ANAKIM operations stipulated at Casablanca those in the Arakan and from Manipur State had failed. True, the Hump operation had been somewhat improved, but the British Chiefs of Staff accepted as fact that it was impossible simultaneously to build the Hump to its full potentialities and also to support ground operations into Burma. Therefore, on examining ANAKIM, the British Chiefs of Staff opposed it for the winter of 1943-44. It was a commitment they could not accept while the war against Germany was reaching its climax; they doubted its feasibility if undertaken at this time in a land so well suited to Japanese tactics; they could not assume that Burma's reconquest was essential to Japan's defeat, and they feared that even if ANAKIM succeeded, it would not reopen the Burma Road before the summer of 1945. As an alternative to ANAKIM, the British Chiefs of Staff suggested greater emphasis on U.S. air power in China. They proposed first priority for building up the Hump to support a larger Fourteenth Air Force, for they felt the Hump would bring more into China than could the Ledo Road. They favored limited land operations in Assam to contain Japanese forces, but not on a scale to compromise the Hump build-up.50
During the exposition of these views on 14 May, Stilwell and Churchill crossed swords over whether the good faith of the British Commonwealth and the United States was pledged to executing ANAKIM that coming winter, and Stilwell went on to predict that not for six months would the Hump materially better the 3,500 tons a month figure. These exchanges, though revealing, did not advance matters, and General Marshall closed the discussion by remarking that all were agreed that ANAKIM in its present form was impracticable.51
Examining the proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff to bypass Burma, the Operations Division of the War Department for General Marshall and the Joint Strategic Survey Committee for the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the British proposals not be accepted. Four reasons were advanced. Operations against Sumatra offered no help to China. The British suggestions appeared to be a tactical device to draw attention from operations in Burma, even as, in the opinion of the U.S. staff, Mediterranean operations were always being proposed to take attention from the cross-Channel assault. The resources for ANAKIM were substantially at hand in India; what little more was needed would not interfere with operations against Germany. OPD did not believe the British Chiefs of Staff could argue that the Hump route would ever support both the Fourteenth Air Force and the Chinese guarding the airfields, nor did building up the Hump route answer the problems posed by the very real
possibility of a Japanese ground attack against the Assam or Yunnan terminals from which the ATC operated.52
While these staff studies were being prepared, the President's decision to back Chennault began to shape CCS action. Without discussion, the Combined Chiefs directed the commanders-in-chief in India to give first priority to building the Assam airfields so that 7,000 tons a month could be transported to China beginning on 1 July 1943. The first of September was set as target date to increase the flow to 10,000 tons a month. Reflecting the JCS's fears of what the Chennault plan might bring in its wake, the CCS ordered Stilwell and Wavell to provide adequate defenses for the Hump airfields.53
General Marshall summed up the conclusions of the American military agencies at the final ANAKIM meeting on 20 May:
A great increase in the air route alone [the Hump] without offensive ground operations would produce a strong Japanese reaction. . . . (1) The retention of China as a base for the defeat of Japan is a vital necessity; (2) we must, therefore, maintain the flow of supplies into China, both by air and, as soon as possible, by a land route, and, therefore, it is essential that these routes be protected; and (3) aggressive action in Burma is extremely important to the success of our operations in the South and Southwest Pacific.54
The British views were restated by Gen. Sir Alan Brooke: the proper course was to expand the air route to the maximum in order to increase the strength of the air forces operating in China and provide limited maintenance of Chinese ground forces. Land operations in Burma would limit the supplies which could be transported to the airfields.55
In the discussions which followed, Marshall conceded the force of Wavell's arguments on the difficulties of fighting in Burma but countered that operations in New Guinea under very similar conditions had been successfully accomplished. He realized too that ground operations would limit what could be laid down at the Assam air terminals for shipment to the Fourteenth Air Force, but the Japanese had to be threatened on the ground and this meant hard fighting. By this time the principal fear of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with regard to Asia had clear expression: if the Allies adopted in China a policy of provoking the Japanese by an air offensive and did not match it by vigorous action on the ground--in China through training, reorganizing, and re-equipping, and in Burma by actual attack--the aroused Japanese would probably sweep over the bases in China from which the air attack was mounted and the bases in India from which it was supplied.56
With this expression of the JCS's apprehensions on record, the exchange of views was well-nigh complete, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff could proceed to the final consideration of their recommendations to the President and the Prime Minister. As a step in the evolution of a plan for the defeat of Japan, they approved the JCS suggestion, CCS 220, Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan, as a basis for study and later decision, and ordered the Combined Staff Planners to prepare a plan for the defeat of Japan based on CCS 220.57
Then, to complete the exchange of views on the problems of Asia and the Pacific, the Combined Chiefs went into closed session and agreed on the TRIDENT recommendations on China, Burma, and India:
The concentration of available resources as first priority within the Assam-Burma [sic] theater on the building up and increasing of the air route to China to a capacity of 10,000 tons a month by early Fall, and the development of air facilities in Assam with a view to
Intensifying air operations against the Japanese in Burma;
Maintaining increased American air forces in China;
Maintaining the flow of airborne supplies to China;
Vigorous and aggressive land and air operations from Assam into Burma via Ledo and Imphal, in step with an advance by Chinese forces from Yunnan, with the object of containing as many Japanese forces as possible, covering the air route to China, and as an essential step towards the opening of the Burma Road;
The capture of Akyab and Ramree Island by amphibious operations;
The interruption of Japanese sea communications into Burma.58
The gist of the CCS recommendations on China, Burma, and India was communicated to the Generalissimo after their approval by the President and Prime Minister, with the added pledge: "No limits, except those imposed by time and circumstance, will be placed on the above operations which have for their object the relief of the siege of China."59 Since the scope and objective of Mediterranean operations were at last fairly well defined by TRIDENT, it was now possible to estimate with fair accuracy what would be available for operations in Southeast Asia.
ANAKIM was therefore modified into a smaller operation which did not provide for taking Rangoon in 1944. This meant the line of communications north from Rangoon to China would not be opened in 1944, and theater supply planning was adjusted to what could be brought across north Burma by air, road, and pipeline.60 Stilwell's planning for reform of the Chinese Army would not be adversely affected by this development alone if he could control Hump priorities.
What Stilwell wanted for his own plans in China was 675 tons initial equipment for each of the thirty U.S.-sponsored Chinese divisions plus 180
tons monthly maintenance.61 He was now aiming at sixty reformed Chinese divisions, a force whose equipment needs of artillery and ammunition were well within the capacity of a road across north Burma. The balance of the tonnage brought into China could go to Chennault.
Reactions to TRIDENT
Reactions to the TRIDENT decisions were varied, but no one seemed enthusiastic about them. Stimson thought the TRIDENT decisions meant nothing effective. He noted that the monsoon was delaying construction of the Assam airfields, so that the Hump was not likely to carry 6,000 tons a month, let alone 10,000 tons by early fall. This obstacle meant nothing for Stilwell, nothing for the Chinese Army. The Generalissimo, thought Stimson, would not attack Burma unless the others did, and the Generalissimo could not rebuild his Army on the basis of the trickle of 500 tons a month that the President's decision had left for the purpose.62
Churchill and General Stilwell discussed the TRIDENT decisions with candor. Churchill asked Stilwell bluntly if he thought the British in India dilatory and lacking energy, and when Stilwell told him "yes" just as bluntly, the Prime Minister agreed. Then the Prime Minister asked if Stilwell was satisfied with the decisions, aside from the question of Hump tonnage allocation. Stilwell was not, emphatically so--because there was no definite objective assigned, because the advance was not all out against Burma, and because the advance was conditional on being "kept in step." Stilwell added that a really aggressive commander could operate under the plan, but there were too many loopholes for one who did not mean business. Churchill growled that he did, indeed, mean business and was resolved to put every man he could into the battle. But the Prime Minister thought that China needed help now which only the air arm could give, thus furnishing Stilwell the chance to expound his thesis that the Generalissimo meant to sit out the war while U.S. air power won it for him, at the risk of letting his Army deteriorate beyond redemption.63
The changes in British command which Churchill's remarks suggested were not long in forthcoming. The impression which Wavell made at TRIDENT was perhaps unfair to that distinguished soldier, for his relief was discussed on the highest levels at TRIDENT. After the war, Admiral Leahy thought the necessity for a change in India's command had been as obvious to everyone as it was to him. Stilwell had long chafed at having to work in harness with Wavell; in Washington and later in London via U.S. Ambassador John Winant, Stilwell had suggested Wavell's replacement by Gen. Sir Claude J. E. Auchinleck.64 On
18 June 1943 the news agencies carried the announcement from the Prime Minister's residence that a new command, as yet unnamed, had been created to relieve the Commander-in-Chief, India, of responsibility for the conduct of operations. It was further announced that Wavell would become Viceroy of India and Auchinleck would succeed him as commander-in-chief.
The Generalissimo's initial reactions to TRIDENT were extremely restrained. Soong was sent to the White House with a list of questions for the President. Was Great Britain committed to engage her Navy in giving effective support to joint action in the Andaman Sea? Was she determined to retake Rangoon? Was the U.S. Navy providing the same support for ANAKIM that General Arnold had indicated at Chungking? How many divisions would the United States provide? Roosevelt replied orally to Soong, but the Generalissimo's formal answer to the President and to TRIDENT was postponed until 12 July.65
Reports from the British were not encouraging. Col. Frank D. Merrill of Stilwell's staff told Stilwell that Maj. Gen. A. W. S. Mallaby, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, General Headquarters (India), had warned that he could not support his British and Indian troops across the Chindwin River in Burma. Colonel Merrill agreed that without a fundamental improvement of the Assam line of communications General Mallaby definitely could not. The problem was that the ATC and the Assam airfields took so much tonnage nothing was left for anything else.66
On his way in August to join the new command whose creation Churchill had announced, General Wedemeyer of OPD stopped in London and in effect repeated Merrill's warnings, this time to Marshall. Wedemeyer wrote that the British would not undertake ANAKIM because they thought an attack on Sumatra the more realistic operation. He added that the new commander, Auchinleck, believed his men could advance only a few miles into Burma.67
In India, the contradiction of setting the 7,000-10,000 ton targets for Hump operations and calling for operations into Burma soon became apparent. The joint planners of General Headquarters (India) pointed out that the TRIDENT decisions implied movement of 4,300 tons a day over the Assam line of communications to the airfields which fed the Hump. The Assam line of communications was then carrying 1,720 tons a day. Improvements might lift this to 3,400 tons, but the only way to secure the carrying out of the airfield program to which first priority had been given was to cut the tonnage going to the Chinese troops and the American roadbuilders based on Ledo. There the matter stood, with general agreement between Stilwell's headquarters and General Headquarters (India) that land operations would be more restricted than the TRIDENT decisions directed. Contemplating the 2,500 tons he would receive,
Stilwell summed it up tersely: "They made it practically impossible for me to prepare the Y-Force, and then ordered it used in an offensive."68
The Generalissimo Weighs TRIDENT
Stilwell presented the TRIDENT proposals to the Generalissimo on 17 June 1943, as soon as the American general returned from the conference via London. As they conferred, it seemed to Stilwell that the Generalissimo was primarily interested in what his allies would supply him and what they would do for Burma's recapture. Chiang's personal reactions were distinctly noncommittal, and it was many weeks before he answered.69 The Chinese leader had reason to be hesitant. The Japanese 11th Army's drive in western Hupeh Province to seize shipping was just falling back after successes that had thoroughly alarmed the Chungking regime. While Chennault in the United States had been saying that the Japanese did not want to fight in China, the Generalissimo in China was telling Maj. Gens. Thomas T. Handy of OPD and George E. Stratemeyer of Arnold's staff that the Japanese were driving straight for Chungking. In accord with this estimate of the situation the Generalissimo ordered General Chen to leave Yunnan and return to his VI War Area near Enshih, diverted 70,000 replacements and two armies from the Y-Force, opened all Chinese Air Force supply stocks to the Fourteenth Air Force, and demanded an immediate major air effort to halt the Japanese. The Generalissimo also raised a delicate question of command by giving direct orders to a squadron of the Fourteenth Air Force. If the Supreme Commander, China Theater, could order a U.S. air unit in this instance, could he also order air support for his operations as Generalissimo against the Chinese Communists? Stilwell's chief of staff, General Hearn, took a serious view of the Japanese drive, as did Chinese and Fourteenth Air Force circles, but Stilwell appraised it correctly as one more Japanese foray.70
As the last phase of the Japanese expedition up the Yangtze drew to a close (21 May-13 June), the VI and IX War Areas had committed some seventeen to twenty divisions (102,000 men) against elements of five Japanese divisions (3d, 13th, 34th, 39th, and 40th), plus the 17th Independent Mixed Brigade and 10,000 Chinese puppet troops. The Fourteenth Air Force was active in bombing and strafing the Japanese. By 3 June the Japanese, their mission accomplished, began to sail their captured shipping down the Yangtze. Abroad, the withdrawal was hailed as "Free China's greatest victory in six weary years of war,"
but the Generalissimo could have wondered if a fresh assault might not follow soon.71
The Generalissimo may also have wished to see how Chennault's new status would affect operations in China Theater, and what the first fruits of the Chennault plan would be. Chennault prepared a report direct to the President as soon as he arrived in China:
Immediately after returning to China, I called upon the Generalissimo in Chungking and acquainted him with the plans for conducting an air offensive in China and for supporting ground troops both in China and in Burma. He was in very good spirits as a result of the decisive defeat of the Japanese forces southwest of Ichang. From the most reliable sources available, it appears that the Japanese employed about 100,000 troops of all services in the drive west of Ichang and that their objective was very probably the mountain stronghold of Shih Pai. Identification was made of the following Japanese units--the whole of the 13th, 39th, and 40th Divisions, the whole of the 17th Brigade, a part of the 3d, 6th, and 34th Divisions, and the whole of the 14th Brigade. The Japanese suffered more than 30,000 casualties, killed, wounded, and captured.72
Their defeat was due to the unexpectedly strong resistance of the Chinese ground forces and their losses were augmented by the action of both Chinese and American air forces during the retreat. They now hold very few points south of the Yangtze river and the Chinese are continuing the campaign to drive them north of the river.
I believe that this campaign bears out my statement that the Japanese are unable to supply an offensive effort capable of penetrating more than 100 miles into the interior of China in any area where they are unable to bring up supplies and reinforcements by water. We were unable to operate against their supply lines during the early part of the campaign due to lack of aviation supplies, shortage of aircraft, and unsuitable weather.
I have made a careful survey of the situation here since my return, and I find that we still lack sufficient aircraft and operational units to conduct an offensive in China, while guarding our transport terminals in Yunnan. I have only four fighter squadrons which must operate from Lashio, Burma to Hongkong and Hankow on the eastern front and Haiphong on the Southern Front. I have but one squadron of medium bombers for operation over the same area. The tonnage of supplies delivered by transport planes do not enable the four squadrons of heavy bombers to operate freely. These squadrons are required to bring in their own supplies from Assam.
The tonnage delivered by air transport from Assam is holding up surprisingly well when the difficulties under which they operate are considered. It is this fact which enables me to continue to support the Chinese ground armies in spite of other deficiencies.
My construction program, which includes airdromes and buildings for quarters and operations, in the Forward Area [of east China] has been delayed considerably. The program was prepared about April 1st, before my departure for the United States, and was in good train before I left. Unfortunately, in my absence, the issuance of contrary orders interrupted the work and as a result accomodations [sic] for the forces which I propose to send to the
Forward Area will not be ready by the date originally planned. However, I believe the delay will not be longer than two or three weeks.
The effect of all these unexpected delays will be to postpone the opening of my all-out offensive against Jap aircraft and shipping in China. I am most anxious to begin this campaign and endure these delays with the greatest impatience.
It is my hope that I can keep you advised of conditions without asking for supporting action on your part.73
Actually, Chennault was better than his word. On 14 June Col. Clinton D. Vincent, formerly Chennault's A-3, established a forward echelon headquarters of the Fourteenth Air Force at Kweilin. Chennault thus moved forward without waiting for reinforcements or an increase in Hump tonnage. Having received fifty late model P-40's in May, Vincent placed one squadron each at Heng-yang, Ling-ling, and Kweilin. The 11th Bomb Squadron (M) also displaced to Kweilin. The reinforcements promised at TRIDENT failed to arrive in India from the Mediterranean area. On 1 July, Chennault directed that shipping and port installations would be primary targets.74
Writing to Hopkins on 2 July, Chennault abandoned his claims of a decisive Chinese victory in the Yangtze valley. Though this letter was carried back to the United States with his first letter to the President, Chennault stated that he had not altered the letter to Roosevelt because he had not wanted to add to the President's worries. He wrote: "While the morale of the Chinese people was considerably raised by the recent victories in Western Hupeh, the Japanese were not signally defeated here because they still occupy approximately the same position which they held before that advance. They must, and I believe they can, be forced to evacuate the more exposed points which they have been able to hold for so long."75
On 6 July, the antishipping campaign opened off the West River estuary. On 8 July, twenty-two B-24's wasted their precious fuel when they found Haiphong shielded by bad weather. Feeling more secure over Indochina now that Chennault had more fighters in east China to keep the Japanese busy there, the B-24's of the 308th Group made their next two shipping strikes without escort. On 10 and 12 July, the bombers sank two cargo ships of 1,840 and 1,423 tons at Haiphong and Hon Gay respectively. Then they returned to accumulating supplies for the next few strikes.
Meanwhile, the reinforced Japanese 3d Air Division lashed back at the P-40 bases and temporarily forced the 23d Fighter Group to evacuate Heng-yang and Ling-ling until the damaged airfields were repaired. By mid-July the duel between the Fourteenth Air Force and the 3d Air Division settled into a pattern. In air combat, the B-24's and B-25's sought Japanese shipping while P-40's looked for Japanese aircraft over the Yangtze valley until the temporary
Comparison of Fourteenth Air Force Claims and Official Assessment of Japanese Shipping Sunk by Fourteenth Air Force: August 1942-December 1943 (Cumulative)
exhaustion of supplies forced a slowdown in operations. Then, 3d Air Division would try to bomb the Fourteenth out of its forward airfields.76 For the shipping campaign, though Fourteenth Air Force claimed 41,389 tons sunk in May, June, and July, actual sinkings were the 3,300 tons by the B-24's. Fourteenth Air Force accepted aircrew claims; its shipping claims for the balance of the war are simply tabulations of what the aircrews said they sank.77 (Chart 8.)
Slowly, the aerial struggle favored the Japanese, despite their heavier numerical losses. The sheer weight of numbers brought the Fourteenth Air Force down to the dangerously low level of 64 P-40's as July ended. With 33 fighters in east China and 31 in Yunnan, the Fourteenth Air Force was barely able to defend the Hump. Chennault's urgent demands for more supplies and more aircraft reached Stilwell, who told Marshall that no harm would be done in stopping operations from the forward area fields, for that would simply restore the situation existing before Roosevelt approved the Chennault plan. (Stopping these operations would, in effect, concede failure of the Chennault plan one month after the Fourteenth Air Force opened its offensive.) All aircraft
FLYING TIGERS of the China-based U.S. Army Fourteenth Air Force run toward their fighter planes, P-40's, after hearing an air raid signal.
belonging to the Fourteenth Air Force were being sent on into China. If the air offensive was to continue, Stilwell warned Marshall, then Chennault would need heavy reinforcements. In his diary, Stilwell wrote that the Fourteenth had tried and failed, six short months after Chennault had made his promises to drive the Japanese out of China.78
Thus, within a few weeks after Chennault opened his offensive in compliance with the President's directive, the Fourteenth Air Force was asking for help. The Fourteenth's setback did not cause abandonment of the Chennault plan, but a second attempt at vindicating Chennault's beliefs would have to wait until the CBI Theater's logistical structure improved to a point where enough tonnage could be flown to China to support a much larger air force.
While the Japanese were counting their gains from the western Hupeh affair and the Fourteenth was making its efforts to cope with heavy odds, Stilwell waited for the Generalissimo's answer to the TRIDENT proposals. It was
evident that the Japanese 11th Army drive had thoroughly alarmed the Chinese. Gen. Yu Ta-wei reported his small stocks of ammunition further depleted. General Ho asked Stilwell to send the Y-Force antitank weapons to the central China front. Reports of famine in Honan Province and of a non-Communist peasant uprising there against the Chungking regime began to seep through the Chinese censorship.79 How all this appeared to the Generalissimo is not known, but he deliberated at length and examined Stilwell on every detail of the Allied contribution to the Burma campaign, while the impatient Stilwell, increasingly bitter over the Chinese leader's methods, fumed and wrote scathing comments in his diary.
Finally, on 12 July the Generalissimo gave his consent to the TRIDENT proposals:
To your [Stilwell's] letter about the Burma operation, which I received on June 19, my reply is as follows. (1) I agree that the air facilities in the Assam area should be developed. At the same time I believe the air strength should be increased so that with complete air superiority the land and naval forces will be more sure to win. According to my judgment, the enemy will be able to put 500 planes into Burma, and increase this number, if necessary, to 800 or even 1,000. I hope at the same time that the shipment of materials into China by the air ferry will not be affected by this operation, and also that the plan of increasing the tonnage will go on as before. (2) With the plan for the use of land and air forces after the rains in attacks from Ledo, Imphal, and Paoshan simultaneously, in order to contain as much enemy force as possible, I am in complete agreement. There is no difference here from former plans. On the India side, I hope the U.S. will send strong ground units to join the effort, for in this way we will be more sure of victory. I trust you will forward this idea to the President. In conclusion, the matter of co-operation between Americans, British, and Chinese in timing the operation and the use of the air force in support of Chinese ground troops, should be discussed between the Americans, British and Chinese, in order to get concrete plans for the operation. (3) I agree with the estimate of three battleships and eight carriers as the basis of the naval force for the control of the Bay of Bengal, and also with the plans for the use of land and naval forces to get control of the Burma coast.80
"Red Letter Day," wrote Stilwell.
Now I can begin to prod a bit, and I have already started on Ho Ying-chin (July 13). Told him we'd have to push on preparations or the Chinese would lose face. British would ask embarrassing questions in conference. He insisted he was really pushing. Now I can put it on the ground that I must carry out the Gmo's orders. . . . It's a grand feeling. I am putting it all in writing and handing it to Ho as I leave [for tour of India]. Now let him sweat.81
Though Stilwell was highly pleased at the Generalissimo's agreement to take part in the Burma operations, which now bore the code name SAUCY, he did not take the Generalissimo's promises at face value. Further, and most significantly,
by June 1943 he was prepared to contemplate the exercise of command over Chinese troops in China. In December 1942 when Soong had offered Stilwell "the big gravy," Stilwell's reply said nothing of command.82 Six months later, puzzling over his problems in his faithful black copy book, Stilwell could see it as a solution.
. . . Incidentally, we have carried out our promises to him. He has not carried out his to us. We must get on a working basis now.
The only way to do it is to get tough. If he reneges on SAUCY, tell him: "Too bad. It didn't work out. You can now go to hell. We are stopping all supply to China and putting it where it will do some good. If you had done as agreed, and furnished man-power for weapons, we would have gone along. If you still want to be saved, it will be on the following terms:
"Leave War Ministry and General Staff as is. Make J. W. S. your field Chief of Staff and give him real authority to organize, train, and equip 60 divisions of Chinese troops, at war strength. Deal directly with him, and order the General Staff and War Ministry yourself to implement his decisions. Ostensibly, command will remain with you, and in the field ostensibly with Ch'en Ch'eng. General policy to be decided in a war council to be composed of you, an American representative, and as many non-voting fellers as you wish. Otherwise the U.S. and other interested nations have other plans for prosecuting the war in the Far East."
He can't refuse. It's his neck if we turn him loose. $500,000,000 talks here. And if we don't do it, we are getting nowhere. All we can hope for is a temporary slap at Jap aviation. We'll never get any farther.83
As July drew to a close, the divergent trends in U.S. policy were in the open. Reform of the Chinese Army, an augmented air effort, and recapture of Burma conflicted logistically; and though Stilwell's mission was to reform the Chinese Army, to him the Chinese appeared to see U.S. air power as a substitute for a better Chinese army. Stilwell's Commander in Chief indicated little interest in his mission, but it remained unchanged. Further complicating Stilwell's delicate position was that as Commanding General, U.S. Army Forces in CBI, and as chief of staff of the Generalissimo's China Theater he was intimately concerned with each of the three conflicting projects.
Expediting the ATC Airfield Program
A great rearrangement of resources in CBI followed after TRIDENT. The President's decision to back Chennault and to build up the ATC meant American resources had to be shifted from road building to airfield construction. Establishing a more capacious U.S. base at Calcutta was more necessary than ever. Reinforcements for Chennault had to be sent into China. The Generalissimo's approval of the TRIDENT decisions meant that somehow the training and re-equipping of the Y-Force had to be carried forward, and tactical plans for the Burma operation had to be brought up to date.
Following immediately on the President's orders of 9 May 1943 that SOS
Transportation System, 1942-1943
enter actively upon airfield construction, and that the program be greatly expedited, the President and the Prime Minister put the weight of their great authority behind the project. After the President inquired through Marshall what the SOS might need for the task, so that Roosevelt might insure its reaching General Wheeler, Stimson placed the matter before Churchill. Given first priority, Chabua, Mohanbari, Sookerating, and Jorhat fields would, Stimson thought, be completed by July. (Map 6) The reason for expanding Hump facilities, Stimson went on, was to supply arms for the Y-Force. His letter made no mention of the Fourteenth Air Force.84
On behalf of the CCS, Marshall gave the formal directive to Wheeler on 22 May. By 1 July, Chabua, Mohanbari, Sookerating, and Jorhat were to be completed in that priority, each with a minimum of twenty hardstandings. Steel landing-mat material could be used if necessary, in order to be sure that the fields could help ATC meet the July Hump goal of 7,000 tons a month. To hit the 10,000 ton target on 1 September, Wheeler was ordered further to complete a minimum of seven fields with forty hardstandings and 6,000-foot runways each. Wheeler was to be free to ask Marshall for help in getting necessary priorities from General Headquarters (India). Weekly progress reports were to be submitted. Wheeler was told to do his best to speed the movement of supplies from Calcutta to Assam, though the actual movement remained a British responsibility.85
Wheeler's instructions arrived as General Headquarters (India) was taking action. Stilwell's and Chennault's reports to the War Department at TRIDENT had led to a strong message from the British Chiefs of Staff to India. General Headquarters (India) immediately sent a committee of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief for Air, India, the SOS's Chief Engineer, and a representative of Tenth Air Force to survey the Assam fields. Just as they were completing their survey, orders came from the CCS to put Wheeler in charge.86
Remarkable changes swiftly followed as the British and Americans combined to throw their resources into the battle for more Hump tonnage. The airfield projects were removed from the jurisdiction of local British headquarters, such as Eastern Army and 4 Corps, and placed directly under General Headquarters (India). Skilled engineers were placed in key positions. The airfields received the highest priority. The project engineers had a free hand and full powers over transport, matériel, and labor. The requisition of tea garden acreage for airfields had been made easier, and so an improved design of some of the fields with resultant economies had been possible. Trucks, crushers, and rollers were being rushed with all possible speed over the Indian transport network to the airfields and to rock sources.
MAJ. GEN. RAYMOND A. WHEELER, Commanding General, Services of Supply, U.S. Army Forces in ChinaņBurmaņIndia, 1943.
The necessary trucks, bulldozers, carryalls, graders, shovels, and men were diverted from the Ledo Road. General Wheeler's role was to assume an active supervisory position, and to support the British with American engineering equipment and personnel. Wheeler, however, did not take complete charge of airfield construction because to do so would cause British withdrawal from the project, which would make its completion impossible.87
Despite the increased effort in Assam, not many weeks were needed to disclose that though the airfield facilities could be greatly improved in a short time, the 1 July targets would not be met. On 22 June Wheeler reported to Marshall that only sixty hardstandings would be complete by 1 July, as against the eighty ordered. The first reason was that the Bengal and Assam Railway of the Assam line of communications could not deliver the tonnage needed on time. The second reason was the delays inherent in organizing new procedures, in transferring personnel and equipment from distant points, and in arranging for common labor. But as of 22 June airfield construction was proceeding at a sharply accelerated rate, and matériel was being taken from the Ledo Road to speed it along. The greatest bottleneck, reported Wheeler, emphasizing his words by repetition, was the Bengal and Assam Railway.88 If Wheeler was overly optimistic regarding the sixty hardstandings for 1 July, the great Allied effort bore fruit within the month. During July the number of hardstandings jumped from 49 to 149. Unfortunately, the Chennault plan had gone into operation thirty days before, and the hardstandings were being completed as the Fourteenth Air Force was being hard pressed in China.89
In accordance with the President's February 1943 promise to the Generalissimo of 10,000 tons over the Hump, ATC had received a steady influx of men and aircraft. As Marshall had observed, men and planes came in faster than they could be supported. At the end of April and the beginning of May 1943, thirty C-46's were delivered by a group of the Trans World and the Northwest Airlines' pilots led by five ATC pilots. Others came in so fast that three more transport groups and four airways detachments were activated in India. Key personnel and vital equipment were airlifted, while fillers came by ship. All transport aircraft were being furnished with two crews, and by 4 August forty-six extra crews were on the way. All C-46 spares under construction or available in the United States were being shipped to India. Examining the ATC in India, OPD concluded in early August that maximum effort was being made to increase Hump tonnage, but that the 10,000-ton goal would not be met
until all ground facilities, including third and fourth echelon maintenance, and all air transport groups were manned and trained, probably not before December 1943.90
Improving Chennault's Position
In July and August some major changes in command plus the arrival of a few reinforcements improved Chennault's position. After the creation of the Fourteenth Air Force, Stilwell had asked for a theater air officer to command both the Tenth and Fourteenth Air Forces, but Chennault's position was such that this was politically impossible. To the War Department, the next best solution was to give Stilwell a senior and very experienced air officer to coordinate CBI's air problems. On 5 July, the President suggested to the Generalissimo that General Stratemeyer, Arnold's chief of staff, be sent to CBI with a small personal staff to "coordinate all air corps matters relating to administration, transportation, logistics of supply, maintenance, and training."91
The Generalissimo replied with major proposals of his own: that Bissell be recalled, and that Chennault become Air Chief of Staff, China Theater, on a par with and completely independent of Stilwell. Since Stilwell's views had earlier been rejected by the President, the Generalissimo's request would, if the President agreed, bring the logical result of his having earlier approved the Chennault plan, which now dominated U.S. strategy in CBI. It would give Chennault great freedom in implementing his plan and would so diminish Stilwell's authority as to make his recall inevitable.
The President was agreeable to "an independent command from Stilwell," but when he consulted Marshall, the latter objected that Chennault was not at his best handling logistics, and that he was too closely associated with the Generalissimo to represent U.S. interests.92 Marshall's loyal support of Stilwell reflected his awareness of the ominous resemblance between the Stilwell-Chennault feud and those between government agencies in wartime Washington.93 Marshall knew that Stilwell was under constant and heavy attack from political and newspaper sources allied to Chennault.94 If one theater commander was to be ruined by political intrigue, the precedent thus set would have a damaging effect upon the service, and so Marshall set his face like stone against any suggestions that Stilwell be recalled.95 The President accepted Marshall's advice and Stilwell's powers were only slightly diminished.
Having decided to follow Marshall's advice, the President approved a compromise
of the Generalissimo's proposal. Chennault became Chief of Staff, Chinese Air Force, thus formally obtaining direct access to the Generalissimo. General Bissell was recalled to the United States, where he became Assistant Air Chief of Staff, A-2, Headquarters, AAF, and rose to be Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff, in January 1944. Brig. Gen. Howard C. Davidson replaced Bissell in command of the Tenth Air Force on 20 July.96
General Stratemeyer, with the Generalissimo's concurrence, received the delicate and responsible position of Commanding General, Army Air Forces, India-Burma Sector. He had to give tactical and strategical air support to Stilwell's projected operations in Burma and logistical support to Chennault's air operations in China. Stratemeyer's missions were: (1) To advise the theater commander on air operations in China, Burma, and India; (2) To conduct, as commander, air operations against the enemy over Burma and in defense of India and the airline to China; (3) To assure the continued and increasing flow of supplies by air to China; (4) To co-ordinate the activities of the Air Transport Command with those of other theater agencies; (5) To train Chinese and American personnel.97
On 7 August Stratemeyer arrived in India and gave immediate attention to providing more aircraft for Chennault. The reinforcements were not arriving on schedule, and Madame Chiang had vigorously protested the nonarrival of the promised aircraft and the shortfalls in Hump tonnage. Her letter was detailed and highly technical and closed with Chennault's needs--seventy-five P-51's, a fighter group plus two squadrons, and a B-25 group--if his plan was to be successful.98 Several weeks before, Stilwell had agreed to add a fourth squadron each to the 51st and 80th Fighter Groups and to assign the former group to Chennault as soon as P-38's arrived from the Mediterranean. Unfortunately, the P-38's arrived in piecemeal fashion.
In mid-August Stratemeyer sent the 449th Squadron, 51st Group (P-38's) to China. Their arrival, however, added a new burden to the supply lines, for the twin-engined P-38 gulped down precious gasoline in quantities. And their presence precluded the activation of a B-25 group until the airlift had been further expanded.
In India, Stratemeyer put new impetus behind long-standing plans for integration into the Fourteenth Air Force of Chinese aircraft and pilots furnished and trained under lend-lease. Later known as the Chinese-American Composite Wing, the unit which resulted could trace its ancestry back to proposals in 1941. For each position in the wing, a Chinese and an American
worked together. On 27 July the War Department had authorized Stilwell to activate the Chinese-American Composite Wing at Karachi. Here, the Fourteenth Air Force assumed responsibility for an operational training unit, and preparations went forward steadily for the expected activation of the new experiment in Sino-American co-operation.99
Stratemeyer's initial efforts to bolster the Fourteenth Air Force received a blow when, on 21 August, 14 B-24's of the 308th Group failed to rendezvous with their fighter cover near Heng-yang, prior to a raid on Hankow. The escort had been delayed defending Heng-yang against 33 Japanese Zero fighters. Going on unescorted, the 308th Group lost 2 planes and had 10 badly damaged. Three days later, even though escorted by the P-38's, the B-24's lost 5 more over Hankow. With a third of its strength lost or grounded, the 308th Bombardment Group avoided central China and returned to unescorted missions over Hong Kong and French Indochina.100
Flushed with their victories over the heavy bombers, the Japanese 3d Air Division carried their attack to the 308th's Chinese airfields at Cheng-kung and Kunming in an effort to drive the heavy bombers out of China. Avoiding the P-38's, the Japanese struck with twenty-seven bombers and thirty fighters. The Emperor's airmen held superb flying formation during the bombing runs, but the defenders took heavy toll of the Zeros. As a result, the Japanese began moving better pilots and their latest model aircraft into China.101 Immediately, urgent pleas for P-51's to match the new Japanese fighters came from every U.S. squadron commander in China. Air action became general over central China, and when the hectic summer ended, the Fourteenth Air Force claimed to have downed 153 Japanese aircraft at a cost of 27 of their own. But Chennault knew that he could not press home the advantage he believed he had, because he lacked the numbers.102 Thus, the months since TRIDENT--June, July, and now August--had slipped past, and the Fourteenth Air Force still did not have the air superiority its commander had planned to have on 31 October 1943, the day his absolute priority on Hump tonnage expired.
Stilwell Shakes Up the Rear Echelon
Since early spring Stilwell had been concentrating his attention on China Theater and had devoted relatively little time to American affairs in India. Feeling the need of a survey, he sent Colonel Merrill to make a rapid inspection of U.S. activity in India. The report that Merrill submitted on 29 June led Stilwell to make a personal swing around India from 19 July to 15 September, as soon as the Generalissimo was committed to SAUCY.
The report was alarming in regard to the progress of the Ledo Road. Remarking that the now-revised schedules, which called for the road to reach Shingbwiyang by 15 February 1944, were bad enough, Merrill stated they were actually overly optimistic. The diversion of engineer troops from the road to build airfields and unload ships was a handicap, he went on, but he felt that poor organization of the project was the main fault. Brig. Gen. John C. Arrowsmith, commanding the Ledo base and the road, was severely criticized.
Reading further in Merrill's report, Stilwell learned that the great expansion program for the ATC had inspired the RAF and Tenth Air Force with a desire for more airfields, that unless persuaded otherwise these combat air arms would demand so ambitious a building program that Stilwell's plans would be handicapped.
The human factor in the ATC's inability to reach the tonnage targets set in Washington received searching examination. Merrill wrote that there had been a wonderful improvement in the food and living conditions at the ATC Polo Ground Mess at Chabua, that junior officers and enlisted men were delighted with theater headquarters' intervention to remedy an intolerable situation.
I made a particular effort to talk to as many ATC pilots as possible to get their reactions. . . . "It is not so much the work in flying that gets you but rather getting into a place late at night when you're tired and dirty, and get a dirty plate of greasy food thrown at you, have no decent bathing facilities and finally fight bugs all night and don't get a decent sleep."
I think a planned campaign to improve living conditions all over the Theater for ATC would boost their morale immensely. Nothing elaborate or expensive is required; just cleanliness and ordinary decencies. The ATC higher command are really not soldiers and don't understand these things. They live in comfortable bungalows and don't realize the conditions. It is not pure neglect; they just don't know.103
The Chinese troops protecting the Ledo base were receiving training in jungle warfare. Ramgarh had stressed the fundamentals of individual and small-unit training. In the Ledo area, said Merrill, the Chinese received instruction in jungle craft from Maga tribesmen; then company and battalion problems, stressing the infantry-artillery team in jungle combat, were conducted. Every effort was made to instill self-reliance in the Chinese troops.104
To confirm these findings and take necessary action, Stilwell after a brief holiday in Kashmir descended on his Indian installations. The Ledo Road project he found at a halt. The monsoon rains were pouring down, and the high priority given to expansion of ATC operations had diverted engineers to work on the Assam airfields, handle air cargo, and unload railway cars. Arrival of the 330th Engineers during April and May did not compensate for this. From the end of March to the middle of August 1943 the roadhead gained only three miles, from mile 47.3 out of Ledo to mile 50.7.
The road builders were constantly wet. Equipment skidded off the road into
CONSTRUCTION WORK ON THE LEDO ROAD, 1943. U.S. Army engineers supervise the building of a bridge by natives, above. Below, a curve on the road is cut into the hillside by bulldozers.
ravines and ditches. Merely transporting food and gasoline along the road was a major problem. Pack animals and porters could not handle it, and on many occasions air supply had to be used. In July the rains caused such damage that all traffic halted on advance sections of the road. The men of the Ledo Road had the misery of the battlefield, plus a considerable element of danger from malaria, dysentery, and accident, but they had none of the compensations, small though they are, of occasional excitement and a sense of defeating the enemy. Existence was a grim monotony of rain, damp, heat, mud, mildew, mould, insects, isolation, boredom, and physical effort in an obscure corner of the world previously known only to Naga headhunters and an occasional wandering trader.
After inspecting the road, Stilwell was dissatisfied with its progress. Thoroughly aware of the difficulties facing the builders, he nevertheless felt that more dynamic leadership was needed. Stilwell believed that the slowness with which the road was moving forward was jeopardizing the success of SAUCY and so he asked Wheeler to propose a replacement for Arrowsmith.105
Visiting the ATC fields in Assam, Stilwell was critical of the ATC's administration, but the ATC's semiautonomous status left little that he could do to affect its internal affairs. Checking the Chinese troops of the 38th Division in training at Likhapani, Stilwell considered their jungle training insufficient and their marksmanship below average.106 The staff of the Chinese Army in India was inspected, and the Chinese deputy chief of staff, who had put his relatives in such key positions as the radio room, and who had then begun ambitious intrigues for decoration and rank, was removed in the decorous fashion recommended by the sages and classics of Chinese antiquity.107
Apathy in Yunnan
On returning from TRIDENT, Stilwell had consolidated all American organizations working with Y-Force into a single command, YOKE-Force Operations Staff.108 Stilwell assumed command and named Colonel Dorn chief of staff. Dorn's mission, announced 18 June, was: in training, to furnish instructors for the Yunnan training centers and for certain group armies; in supply, to obtain lend-lease from SOS and turn it over to the proper Y-Force commanders; in operations, to assist Chen Cheng and Lung Yun in their planning.109
By the end of June the YOKE-Force Operations Staff reported that agreements on training and supply had been reached with the Chinese. These were
based on the staff's G-4 plan, which provided: (a) that Americans would advise the Chinese SOS organizations; (b) that 2 base depots (Kunming and Yun-nan-i), 3 intermediate depots, and 5 advance depots would be established for Salween operations; (c) that rations and forage, ammunition, gasoline, oil, and alcohol would be distributed to the intermediate and advance depots; (d) that replacements in animals and men would be provided; (e) that an evacuation system would be organized; (f) that the Burma Road would be improved and Chinese trucks provided. This G-4 plan was based on the foundation laid by the SOS's Eastern Section, Colonel Kohloss commanding. Working since December 1942, Colonel Kohloss and his small force had organized and stocked two general depots, and had reached agreement with local Chinese authority on plans for intermediate and advance depots.110 On 28 June, in addition to continuing the already established training centers, the Chinese agreed to establish and receive Joint Sino-American Traveling Instructional Groups for each of the four group armies in Yunnan. The mission of the groups was to supervise training, to inspect and enforce compliance with Chen Cheng's training orders, and to recommend improvements in training methods.111
On 7 August, Colonel Dorn reported that he was not succeeding with his mission. General Chen was very unwilling to return to Yunnan from Enshih to command the Y-Force and refused to accept any American equipment until the forces to use it had been reorganized. As of 7 August only two Chinese armies (six divisions), had begun reorganization (in accordance with the 23 March agreement).112 General Chen was unwilling to command Y-Force because the Chinese National Military Council had not provided the necessary troops, funds, and rations; and the Chinese Bureau of Operations had not settled on a strategic plan for the Salween operation. Surveying the whole scene in Yunnan, Dorn flatly warned Stilwell that it was very doubtful if the Chungking authorities would honor their July pledge to cross the Salween, for they appeared to be deliberately delaying their share of the preparations.
In six fields, the Chinese were failing to fulfill their promises: (1) failure to order the armies and artillery assigned to the operations to move to Yunnan; (2) failure to provide replacements; (3) complete failure of all SOS preparations; (4) failure to reorganize the armies as agreed; (5) delay in General Chen's return to Yunnan two months after the end of Yangtze operations; (6) dilatory manner in which students were sent to the Yunnan training centers.113
Dorn and his handful of American aides were in constant touch with their Chinese colleagues, and on social occasions the Americans received some interesting impressions:
The serious thinking officers on the Chinese Staff are very worried about the trend of events. We have discussed them frankly, both cause and effect. They are bitter about the way Chungking has let down the whole show. They do not discuss this often but when they do they are bluntly frank. As an example; when informed that members of the visiting delegation of the Ministry of Training were interested in obtaining our assistance in the re-organization of the entire Signal Corps of the Chinese Army, one of the CEF [Chinese Expeditionary Force] staff officers immediately said: "Watch out that they don't lead you on merely for the purpose of getting hold of your equipment. Their only interest is to get it away from Yunnan to scatter in the troops to the north."114
Having warned Stilwell of the Yunnan situation, Dorn placed the elements of the situation very candidly and courteously in a letter to Gen. Ho Ying-chin. Dorn pleaded for a unified Chinese command in Yunnan, and for the Chinese Bureau of Operations to make a definite strategic plan so that the Chinese commander in Yunnan might begin drafting his battle order and attack his supply problem.
To honor the 23 March agreement, which has been discussed in Chapter VIII, Dorn asked that two armies be moved from Szechwan to Yunnan. He pointed out that the Generalissimo had promised Stilwell that the Chinese 8th Army would reach Kunming before 15 September, and the 53d Army by 10 October. The latter date, said Dorn, was much too late to train and rehabilitate these forces in time for a fall offensive (to which the Generalissimo had twice consented).115
General Ho answered with equal courtesy and illuminating candor. As regarded a commander, nothing was known; as for plans, he extended reassurances. Then he proceeded to one of the major problems of war in China, the degree of control by the Kuomintang regime over the provincial war lords. The Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army stated that it was not possible to move the 93d and 76th Armies from Szechwan Province to bolster Y-Force. That province was ruled by a very powerful war lord. Though most of the nine Szechwanese divisions would take orders from the central government, some of the nine were very hard to control. It was therefore necessary for the central government to keep its loyal 93d and 76th Armies in position to guard the rice traffic throughout Szechwan.116
Dorn's warnings brought no response from Stilwell, for in the summer of 1943 Stilwell considered himself powerless to affect the Y-Force situation. The President had decided that Stilwell could not bargain with the Chinese and had indicated a clear preference for Chennault's point of view. So, after a conference with the Chinese Minister of Communications on 6 July Stilwell wrote: "I struck a new low [in spirits] after this conference. It seems absolutely impossible to do anything. The President has undercut me and the Chinese resist manfully
every attempt to help them fight."117 Why did the Chinese obstruct Stilwell's every effort to provide the Nationalist regime with a modern, efficient army of sixty divisions? In July 1943 Stilwell told Marshall that the Generalissimo did not want the regime to have a large, efficient ground force for fear that its commander would inevitably challenge his position as China's leader.118
Though the TRIDENT decisions called for major Chinese participation in taking Burma to break the blockade of China, it was apparent by August that the inconsistencies in the decisions were making them of little meaning. Chennault was handicapped because supplies were not reaching him. Stilwell was handicapped because Chennault's priority, though not enough to support major air operations, was large enough to handicap preparations for ground operations, even assuming the Chinese wished to make them.
Japanese Reaction to Allied Preparations
Well served by their intelligence agencies, the Japanese watched the training projects in Ramgarh and in Yunnan with growing concern. The Arakan campaign of 1942-43 suggested that Wavell's forces were growing more aggressive. Then came the Wingate 1943 expeditions, which led the Japanese to re-examine their position in Burma. Weighing the several indications of a changed and more vigorous Allied policy, the Japanese in February 1943 decided that the British, Chinese, and Americans were preparing a vigorous offensive against Burma.119
To meet this anticipated offensive, the Japanese changed both their organization and their strategy. Headquarters, 15th Army, the victors of 1942, became Headquarters, Burma Area Army, and a new headquarters was activated for 15th Army. Lt. Gen. Shozo Kawabe took command of Burma Area Army, which retained control of 55th Division in the Arakan. General Mutaguchi relinquished command of the 18th Division in north Burma to assume command on 18 March 1943 of the 15th Army, which comprised the 33d, 18th, and 56th Divisions, reinforced soon after by the 31st Division.
Mutaguchi's promotion was significant, for he was now the ardent advocate of an invasion of India. When a drive into Assam had been proposed in the fall of 1942, Mutaguchi had objected. The project had been shelved, and the Japanese had relied on the terrain, malaria, and the poor communications behind the Allied lines to defend Burma. Then came Wingate's expedition in February 1943, and the Japanese opinions changed. The Japanese had long been regarded as masters of the art of moving armies through the jungle. Now, the British had performed a feat from which the Japanese had earlier recoiled. Mutaguchi became an advocate of an overland advance on India to seize the
bases from which the Allies would launch an attack on Burma. He found ready listeners in Kawabe's headquarters and in Headquarters, Southern Army, the echelon above Kawabe.
Conferences to discuss an attack on India were held at Rangoon from June to August 1943, attended by representatives of Burma Area Army, Southern Army, Japanese Expeditionary Forces, Southern Region, (the Japanese Army-Navy headquarters for Southeast Asia at Singapore), and from Imperial General Headquarters, Tokyo. War games were played to present the problems involved in such an operation. The Commander-in-Chief, Southern Army, gave his support to the project, and early in July sent his assistant chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Masazumi Inada, to lay the proposal before Imperial General Headquarters. That body approved preliminary preparations for an attack on Imphal, without committing itself irrevocably to the operation.120 As part of these preparations the 56th Division on the Salween front in the summer of 1943 began to fortify its area so that a Chinese drive from Yunnan would not interfere with the forthcoming assault on India. If and when the Chinese finally decided to cross the Salween, these fortifications would be waiting for them.121
The difference between Stilwell and Marshall on the one hand, and Chennault and the Generalissimo on the other, as to whether an air effort in China Theater should precede or follow major reforms in the Chinese Army came before the President for decision in May 1943. The President decided for air power. The TRIDENT decisions, following soon after, called for a reduced ANAKIM to take north Burma and open a land route to China. Without Chinese participation, these operations appeared to be impossible, yet the President's decision confirmed and strengthened them in their unwillingness to take the offensive anywhere in China or Burma. It was a dilemma that would have to be solved if the blockade of China was to be broken, either by land or air. The time had come for a fresh approach to the problems of coalition warfare in Asia.
Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter (8) * Next Chapter (10)
1. Probably the air task force sank only 7,000 tons of shipping in 1942, but this could not have been known at the time. U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Air Operations in China-Burma-India, World War II (Washington, 1947), page 70, gives China Air Task Force and Fourteenth Air Force claims in full and makes no attempt to correct them against Japanese sources. Two other surveys of USSBS--Joint Army-Navy Assessment Committee Report, Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses During World War II by All Causes (Washington, 1947), and The War Against Japanese Transportation, 1941-1945 (Washington, 1947)--use Japanese sources.
2. (1) Craven and Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II: IV, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944, pp. 518-19, devoted only two pages to these four months. (2) Lauchlin Currie told the President that in the eight months ending February 1943, 9 percent of Hump tonnage, or 837 tons, was simply paper money flown to China for the Chinese. The President sent Currie's note to Hopkins for information, and Hopkins in turn sent it to Soong. Soong replied that Currie was correctly informed, that approximately 840 tons of money had been flown into China, but that the situation called for concern rather than criticism. The Chinese, said Soong, were financing the war by issuing paper money, so that prices were 6,000 times higher than prewar. "If the Burma campaign is not pushed home this year," wrote Soong, "I am alarmed at the consequences." Ltr with Incl, Soong to Hopkins, 12 Apr 43. Bk VII, Hopkins Papers.
3. (1) History of the India-China Ferry under the Tenth Air Force. USAF Hist Div. (2) SOS in CBI, p. 18. (3) CM-IN 2686, Naiden to Marshall, 7 Jul 42.
4. (1) Geoffrey William Tyson, India Arms for Victory (Allahabad, 1943), pp. 75, 106. (2) Japanese Study 94. (3) CM-IN 650, New Delhi to AGWAR, 1 Jan 43. (4) SOS in CBI, pp. 38-39.
5. (1) Japanese Study 94. (2) SEATIC Publication 248, Air Hist Bull, 22 Apr 47, p. 38. MID Library. (3) RAF Narrative, The Campaigns in Far East, III, India Command, September 1939 to November 1943, p. 370. USAF Hist Div.
6. (1) Obsolescent fighters, inadequate radar, and inadequate air-ground communications sadly hampered the RAF until well into 1943. The RAF Narrative cited note 5(3) has a full description of this heartbreaking early period. (2) MS, History of the Tenth Air Force Headquarters for the Calendar Year, 1942, and from 1 January to 31 May 1943. USAF Hist Div. (3) Brief History of the AAF in India and Burma, 1941-43, pp. 63-64. File 825.01, USAF Hist Div.
7. MS cited n. 6(2).
8. (1) Narrative Histories of Tenth Air Force for June-July 1943. USAF Hist Div. (2) USSBS, The Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground Army Logistics (Washington, 1947), p. 170. This survey is rather vague on strategic bombing for the 1942-43 period.
9. See Ch. VIII, pp. 278-79, above.
10. (1) CM-IN 5919, Chiang to President, 10 Apr 43. (2) Chennault, Way of a Fighter, p. 217. (3) Ltrs, Alsop to Hopkins, 1, 3, 5, 26 Mar 43; Ltr, Soong to Hopkins, 24 Mar 43. Bk VII, Hopkins Papers.
11. Rad AMMRAM 3411, Stilwell to Marshall, 12 Apr 43. Item 321, Bk 1, JWS Personal File.
12. Memo, Marshall for President, 12 Apr 43, sub: Generalissimo's Request For Chennault To Report to Washington. WDSCA 381 (China), A46-523.
13. (1) Rad WAR 2498, Marshall to Stilwell, 14 Apr 43; Rad WAR 2500, Roosevelt to Stilwell for Chiang, 14 Apr 43. Items 324, 325, Bk 1, JWS Personal File. (2) The Stilwell Papers, p. 203.
14. (1) The Stilwell Papers, p. 203. (2) Chennault, Way of a Fighter, pp. 217-18.
15. As the Operations Division was an organ of the War Department, they cannot be officially differentiated. General Stilwell, however, chose to comment on them separately. The Stilwell Papers, pp. 120, 152.
16. In this simple code, the Generalissimo was PEANUT; Stilwell was QUARTERBACK; Madame Chiang was SNOW WHITE. Members of the National Military Council emerged as one or another of Walt Disney's seven dwarfs. See also The Stilwell Papers, pp. 190-91.
17. Interv with Merrill, 20 Apr 48, Washington; Ltr, Hearn to authors, 16 Feb 50. HIS 330.14 CBI 1948, 1950.
18. Incl to Ltr, Soong to Hopkins, 29 Apr 43. Bk VII, Hopkins Papers.
19. Between 1 January and 1 October 1943, the Chinese ground forces received 5,541 tons of lend-lease, of which 1,554 were ordnance for the Y-Force, and 3,987 tons were China Defense Supplies for the Chinese arsenal program. This latter was completely under Chinese control; the Chinese used it for the general support of their armies. The tonnage given Y-Force directly reflects the Generalissimo's request that Chennault receive the lion's share. Manifestly this tonnage would not have completed the U.S. portion to Y-Force in time for the offensive that the Generalissimo was promising the President. Stilwell was completely aware of the fact that the Generalissimo's request made equipment of the Y-Force extremely difficult. (1) The Stilwell Papers, p. 204. (2) See p. 301, above. (3) Ltr, Lt Col Frank H. Erhart, Pres, Board of Investigation, U.S. Forces, China Theater, to CG, U.S. Forces, China Theater, 1 Nov 45, sub: Hump and Hump Tonnage; Exhibit "G," sub: Tonnage Delivered to China by Type of Cargo and Consignee, 42-45. CT 40, Dr 4, KCRC.
20. Incl cited n. 18.
22. (1) Chennault, Way of a Fighter, pp. 217-22. (2) Certified true copy of Chennault's Plan of Operations in China, 30 Apr 43, Ltr, Chennault to Wedemeyer, 6 Jul 45. Item 2, Incl II of WDCSA 091 China, 15 Aug 45.
23. See Ch. VIII, pp. 283-84, above.
24. Japanese Study 77.
25. Chennault Plan cited n. 22(2).
27. (1) Ibid. (2) Quotation from Incl to Ltr, cited n. 18.
28. (1) Quotation from "Notes By SW After Conf At Woodley With Chennault, May 2, 1943." Stimson Papers. (2) Conf, CofS, Stilwell, and Chennault, 10:30 A.M., 30 Apr 43. Item 27, Msg Bk 9, OPD Exec 8. (3) Chennault's letter to Marshall is an inclosure to a letter, Stilwell to Marshall, 17 May 1943. WDCSA (China), A45-466. Stilwell saw nothing new in Chennault's letter and remarked: "Air coverage over nothing is in my opinion of little value."
29. Conf cited n. 28(2).
30. Chennault, Way of a Fighter, pp. 225-26. General Chennault describes his recollections of the interviews at length in this volume.
31. Ltr, Chennault to President, 5 Sep 43, restates these two points. Bk VII, Hopkins Papers.
32. (1) Chennault, Way of a Fighter, p. 226. (2) Ltrs, Alsop to Hopkins, 29 May, 2 Jul 43; Ltrs, Chennault to President and Hopkins, 5 Sep 43, 26 Jan 44. Bk VII, Hopkins Papers. Frequently the same returning officer of the Fourteenth Air Force would carry both Alsop's and Chennault's letters to the President and Hopkins. Alsop's letter of 1 September to Hopkins and Chennault's letter of 5 September to the President were carried by the same officer.
33. (1) Msg, Stilwell's hand, Generalissimo to President. SNF-61. (2) Interv with Marshall, 13 Jul 49. HIS 330.14 CBI 1949.
34. Memo, Stilwell for President, 1 May 43. SNF-61.
35. Stilwell's Data Notebook is of the ring-bound type in which Stilwell kept his diary of the Cairo Conference of December 1943 and the recall crisis of October 1944. The complete entry is: "Now it will come out that everything went to air. And the U.S. is to blame. FDR in May 1943 decided it. My warning was turned down. 'In a political fight. . . .' " Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library.
36. William D. Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (New York, 1950), p. 158.
37. Memo, Marshall for Stilwell, 3 May 43. Item 33, Msg Bk 9, OPD Exec 8.
38. Draft Memorandum, Stilwell for Marshall, SNF-61, possibly never presented; it gives Stilwell's reaction: "Dangers in the Situation."
39. Memo, Marshall for President, 3 Apr 43; Memo, Handy for Marshall, 31 Mar 43, sub: ANAKIM vs. BOLERO, ABC 384 Burma (8-25-42), Sec II, A48-224.
40. Msg, Roosevelt to Chiang, 4 May 43. Item 58, OPD Exec. 10.
41. (1) Memo of Interv, McCloy and Mme. Chiang, 4 May 43, OASW. ABC 336 (China), 26 Jan 42, Sec 1A, A48-224. (2) Ltr, Alsop to Hopkins, 7 May 43; Ltr, Soong to President, 12 May 43. Bk VII, Hopkins Papers.
42. CM-OUT 4042, Marshall to Wheeler, 9 May 43.
43. (1) Summary, CCS 86th Mtg, 17 May 43. (2) Summary, White House and CCS Mtgs. ABC 337 TRIDENT (26 Apr 43), A48-224. (3) Pertinent Notes Sent to the CofS on CCS 86th Mtg. ABC 337 TRIDENT (May 43) Sec B, A48-224.
44. Ltr and Incls, Soong to Hopkins, 18 May 43; Memo, Marshall for Hopkins, 19 May 43. Hopkins Papers. Copies of Ltrs and Incls in OPD 381 CTO, Case 124, A47-30. To make sure there was no misunderstanding, Soong sent a draft letter to the Generalissimo with inclosures to Hopkins, who in turn asked Marshall to comment on it. Marshall's only objection was to some comments in Soong's paragraph (5) of the same letter in regard to the extent of the Anglo-American commitment to ANAKIM, which at this date had not been settled by the TRIDENT conferees.
45. Memo, CofS for President, 18 May 43, sub: China Tonnage. WDCSA 381 (China), A46-523.
46. (1) Ray S. Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1951), Ch. XI. (2) Memo, Leahy for President, 8 May 43, sub: Recommended Line of Action at Coming Conf. ABC 337 TRIDENT (26 Apr 43), A48-224.
47. (1) JCS 297, 10 May 43, sub: Opns in Burma, 1943-44. (2) Suppl Min, 79th JCS Mtg, 10 May 43, Item 17. (3) Memo, Wedemeyer for Marshall, 10 May 43, sub: Notes on a Shift from ANAKIM to the SW Pacific; Memo, Brig Gen Carl A. Russell for Wedemeyer and Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Jr., JPS, 5 May 43, sub: ANAKIM. ABC 384 Burma (8-25-42) Sec II, A48-224.
48. CCS 220, 14 May 43, Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan. The paper was discussed at the JCS 78th and 80th Meetings, 8 and 10 May 1943.
49. Memo, prepared by British COS, 12 May 43, sub: Conduct of the War in 1943-44, App. B, pars. 9-11. ABC 337 TRIDENT (May 43) Sec E, A48-224.
50. (1) TRIDENT Revised Min, First, Second White House Mtgs, 12, 14 May 43. (2) CCS 225, 14 May 43, sub: Opns from India, 1943-44.
51. Min cited n. 50(1).
52. (1) Notes, CCS 84th Mtg, 14 May 43. ABC 337 TRIDENT (26 Apr 43) Sec E, A48-224. (2) Memo, Joint Strategic Survey Committee for Wedemeyer, 12 May 43, sub: Notes on British Proposals or Statements; Memo, Wedemeyer for Marshall, 17 May 43, sub: Comments on "Conduct of the War in 1943-44" (see n. 49); Memo, Wedemeyer for Marshall, 14 May 43, sub: British Policies as Indicated by Remarks of Prime Minister. ABC TRIDENT (26 Apr 43) Sec B, A48-224.
53. CCS 85th Mtg, 15 May 43, Item 4.
54. Notes, CCS 90th Mtg, 20 May 43. Folder 1, Item 10, OPD Exec 5.
57. (1) Min, CCS 90th Mtg, 20 May 43, Item 3. (2) CCS Paper cited n. 48.
58. Min, CCS 91st Mtg, 20 May 43.
59. Ltr, Incl A, Arnold to Hopkins, 29 Sep 43. Case 224, OPD 381 CTO.
60. Rad AG 1055, Stilwell to Marshall, 24 July 1943, points out that since the communication facilities of Burma will not be in Allied hands in 1944 as contemplated in the CBI Theater before TRIDENT, an additional pipeline from India to China to supply the Fourteenth Air Force is needed. Item 689, Bk 2, JWS Personal File.
61. CM-IN 4167, Dorn to Marshall, 6 Aug 43.
62. Comments on CCS Decision. Stimson Papers.
63. Memo, Stilwell for Stimson, 23 May 43. Item 224, Bk 3, JWS Personal File.
64. (1) Leahy, I was There, p. 172. (2) Ltr, Soong to Hopkins, 7 Jun 43. Bk VII, Hopkins Papers. (3) Stilwell Black Book, 18 Jun 43. (4) Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, p. 533.
65. Telg, Chiang to President and Prime Minister, 29 May 43. Case 144, OPD 381 CTO, A47-30.
66. Ltr, Merrill to Stilwell, 29 Jun 43. SNF-47.
67. Ltr, Wedemeyer to Marshall, 24 Aug 43. OPD 201 (Wedemeyer, A. C. (0)), A47-30.
68. (1) The Stilwell Papers, p. 204. (2) History of CBI, pp. 155-57.
69. (1) Stilwell Diary, 17 Jun 43. (2) The Stilwell Papers, pp. 212-13.
70. (1) CM-IN 10824, Chargé d'Affaires, Chungking, to G-2, WDGS, 17 May 43. (2) CM-IN 11528, Hearn to Stilwell, 18 May 43. (3) CM-IN 12914, Hearn to Stilwell, 20 May 43. (4) Notes of Confs with Generalissimo, 1100, 22 May 43, Bissell, recorder. Contracts with the Chinese (Jan-Jul 43), CT 23, Dr 2, KCRC. Generals Stratemeyer and Handy were on an inspection tour for General Marshall. (5) Rad 559, Stilwell to Marshall, 20 Jun 43. Item 578, Bk 2, JWS Personal File.
71. (1) MA Rpt 417 (China), 25 Sep 43. MID Library. (2) Japanese Study 77. (3) Leahy, I Was There, p. 165, calls it a "serious defeat," for the Japanese. (4) Time, June 14, 1943, p. 38, June 21, 1943, p. 34; Newsweek, June 14, 1943, pp. 22-23.
72. Since most of these casualties would have been suffered by the Japanese infantry involved, who are only a portion--even though the major one--of a division, Chennault in effect was claiming that approximately 50 percent of the Japanese infantry regiments engaged were casualties. Postwar Japanese reports show that between February and July 1943, 1,125 men were killed in action and 3,636 were wounded. See Japanese Study 77.
73. Ltr, Chennault to President, 18 Jun 43. Bk VII, Hopkins Papers.
74. History of the Fourteenth Air Force, MS by Ralph G. Hoxie, Frederick Ericson, and Robert T. Finney. USAF Hist Div. (Hereafter, Fourteenth AF History.)
75. Ltr, Chennault to Hopkins, 2 Jul 43. Bk VII, Hopkins Papers.
76. (1) Japanese Study 82. (2) Fourteenth AF History.
77. An examination of daily operational reports, Fourteenth Air Force Files, U.S. Air Force Historical Division, revealed that the totals claimed by the Fourteenth Air Force were arrived at by a monthly addition of pilot claims with no discounts for possible duplication or errors.
78. (1) Fourteenth AF History. (2) CM-IN 18320, Chennault to Arnold, 25 Jul 43. (3) CM-IN 20997, Hearn to Marshall, 29 Jul 43. (4) CM-IN 357, Stilwell to Marshall, 31 Jul 43. (5) Stilwell Diary, 28, 31 Jul 43.
79. (1) CM-IN 16520, Stilwell to Marshall, 23 Jul 43. (2) CM-IN 17760, Stilwell to Marshall, 17 Jun 43.
80. Rad AMMISCA 647, Stilwell to Marshall, 13 Jul 43. Item 648, Bk 2, JWS Personal File. The original letter from the Generalissimo has not been found, nor has Stilwell's letter of 19 June survived.
81. Stilwell Black Book, 13 Jul 43. Stilwell dated this entry 12 July; the Stilwell Diary records the meeting with General Ho on 13 July. It seems safe to call the copybook date a slip of the pen.
82. See Ch. VII, pp. 256-58, above.
83. Stilwell Black Book, Jun 43.
84. (1) CM-OUT 5487, Marshall to Wheeler, 13 May 43. (2) Ltr, Stimson to Churchill, 22 May 43. Folder 63, OPD Exec 10.
85. Rad WAR 2710, Marshall to Wheeler, 22 May 43.
86. Ltr, Col Strong to Somervell, 15 May 43. Somervell File, Vol III, CBI 42-43. Colonel Strong had just made an engineering survey of CBI Theater.
87. Memo, Col Byroade for the record, Airdrome Construction and Cargo Availability for Indochina Freight Line; Memo, Col Timberman, Chief, Asiatic Sec, Theater Gp, OPD, for McNarney, 10 Jun 43, sub: Progress Rpt, China Air Freight Project. WDCSA 381 (China), A46-523.
88. CM-IN 14002, Wheeler to Marshall, 22 Jun 43.
89. "Existing Agreements With Respect To Future Opns," 10 Aug 43. ABC 381 (Europe), 5 Aug 43, A48-224. This paper contains a broad survey of the existing situation on the eve of the QUADRANT Conference at Quebec in August 1943 and presumably is part of the preconference briefing process.
90. (1) Oliver La Farge, The Eagle in the Egg (Boston, 1949), p. 115. (2) Paper cited n. 89.
91. (1) Rad AMMISCA 249, Stilwell to Marshall, 20 Mar 43; Rad WAR 2373, Marshall to Stilwell, 28 Mar 43. Items 268, 278, Bk 1, JWS Personal File. (2) Quotation from Memo 601, Stilwell for Shang Chen (from Roosevelt for Chiang), 5 Jul 43. Item 613, Bk 2, JWS Personal File.
92. (1) Memo, Hopkins for Record, 15 Jul 43. Bk VII, Hopkins Papers. (2) Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 739. Quotation Hopkins'.
93. Interv with Marshall, 6 Jul 49. HIS 330.14 CBI 1949.
94. Bk VII, Hopkins Papers.
95. Interv cited n. 93.
96. Rad AD 1487, Hearn to Stilwell, 19 Jul 43; Rad 3019, Roosevelt to Chiang, 17 Jul 43; Rad 3024, Marshall to Stilwell, 20 Jul 43; Rad 3034, Marshall to Stilwell, 20 Jul 43; Rad AD 1564, Hearn to Stilwell, 25 Jul 43; Rad 669, Chiang to Roosevelt, 25 Jul 43; Rad AM 1159, Stilwell to Hearn, 28 Jul 43. Bk 2, JWS Personal File.
97. (1) Ltr, Marshall to Stilwell, 20 Jul 43. Msg Bk 11, OPD Exec 9. (2) History of CBI, Sec. II, Ch. VI.
98. (1) Fourteenth AF History. (2) Ltr, Mme. Chiang to President, 30 Jul 43. Msg Bk 11, OPD Exec 9.
99. Fourteenth AF History.
101. Japanese Studies 78, 82.
102. Chennault, Way of a Fighter, pp. 251-52.
103. Ltr, Merrill to Stilwell, 29 Jun 43. SNF-47.
105. (1) Rad, Stilwell to Wheeler, 21 Aug 43. Item 581, Bk 2, JWS Personal File. (2) The Stilwell Papers, p. 218.
106. (1) The Stilwell Papers, pp. 216-17. (2) Stilwell Black Book, Aug 43.
107. The Stilwell Papers, p. 218.
108. These organizations included Eastern Section, SOS (Colonel Kohloss), Infantry Training Center (General Arms), and Artillery Training Center (General Waters).
109. GO 9, Hq USAF CBI, 18 Jun 43.
110. Incl to Ltr, Col Kohloss to Ward, 3 May 51. HIS 330.14 CBI 1951.
111. Y-Force Hist Rpt 1943. AG (Y-FOS) 314.7, KCRC.
112. Rad RA427, Ferris to Stilwell for Dorn, 7 Aug 43. Item 718, Bk 2, JWS Personal File.
113. Ltr, Dorn to Stilwell, 9 Aug 43. SNF-16.
115. Ltr, Dorn to Ho, 17 Aug 43. SNF-16.
116. Memos, sub: Answers of Memo for Ho Ying-chin from Dorn, 2 Sep 43. SNF-16.
117. Stilwell Black Book, 6 Jul 43.
118. CM-IN 16520, Stilwell to Marshall, 23 Jul 43.
119. SEATIC Bull 240, 9 Jul 46, pp. 1-2. MID Library.
120. (1) See the statements by senior Japanese officers as collected by Southeast Asia Translation and Interrogation Center in fall 1945 and early 1946, particularly those by Lt. Gen. Takazo Numata, Southern Army; General Mutaguchi; Col. Takushiro Hattori, Chief, Operations Section, 1 Department, Imperial General Headquarters; Lt. Col. Iwaichi Fujiwara, who served in both the G-2 and G-3 Sections of 15th Army. SEATIC Bulls 240, 242, 245, 247. MID Library. (2) Japanese Comments, Sec. 1, p. 3. (See Bibliographical Note.)
121. Japanese Study 93.