Role of the India-Burma Base
With the taking of Lashio on 6 March 1945, which meant the substantial accomplishment of India-Burma Theater's combat mission, theater headquarters lost its immediate concern with combat. Its primary attention was now given to logistical support of China Theater and SEAC, which were still fighting. Logistical matters were the sphere of the SOS, but since India-Burma Theater headquarters had no longer to deal directly with combat, troop training, or strategy, the two headquarters, SOS and theater, were sharing common concerns.
Because the two were working on different but related aspects of the same problems, they both were concerned about finding men to fill the vacant spaces in Wedemeyer's theater organization, the supply and health of their own men, the best way to operate the new Ledo Road (or Stilwell Road as it came to be called), and deciding whether the Hump or the Stilwell Road should be expanded to meet the anticipated needs of China Theater. SOS for many months had primary concern in the routine but often absorbing tasks of operating its complex of ports, warehouses, pipelines, roads, and railroad at ever greater efficiency. (See Maps 1 and 2) Operations necessarily involved two things, organizations and men to operate them.
A Unified Command Structure
When the CBI Theater was split in October 1944 the relationship of India-Burma Theater headquarters and SOS was still in process of evolution. During 1944 General Covell, the SOS commander, had advanced a number of suggestions, the trend of which lay toward giving SOS all operational responsibilities in the field of logistics. It appeared that theater headquarters was willing to have SOS organize a construction service and a transportation service, which would conduct those two major activities, but it was still reluctant to divest itself of signal functions and special staff sections such as ordnance, chaplain, chemical warfare, and judge advocate. There the matter stood when the theater was split.
P-51's MOVING THROUGH THE STREETS OF KARACHI. Unloaded from Liberty ships in Karachi Harbor, these fighter planes are being hauled to Karachi Air Base.
The operational structure of SOS after the split and during the winter of 1944-45 provided:
Base Section No. 1 Centering about the port of Karachi Base Section No. 2 Centering about the port of Calcutta Intermediate Section No. 2 Headquarters at Chabua Advance Section No. 2 Headquarters at Ledo
Developments after the organization of India-Burma Theater were making the existing relationship between SOS and the theater obsolete, while the eastward course of SOS activities was forcing corresponding changes in its organization. In 1942 the Japanese had been such a threat to Calcutta that SOS activities had centered about Karachi, on the western side of India, and
shipping had been routed there. By the end of 1943 Calcutta was the principal U.S. port in India, while Karachi was operating more or less on a standby basis. By 1945 hardly one ship a month was docking at Karachi for India-Burma Theater. Inactivation of Base Section No. 1 was in order, and was accomplished on 15 May 1945. Henceforth, base activities in India were controlled by Headquarters, Base Section, at Calcutta. Inactivation of the port did not mean the end of SOS interest in the Karachi area, for Karachi Air Base was the ATC's Indian port of entry and a major center of Air Forces activity. So, though the Air Forces assumed supply responsibility, there remained in the Karachi area hospital and refrigeration facilities, such Quartermaster functions as malaria control and food inspection, the area engineer, and a rail transportation office.
With the inactivation of Base Section No. 1, renaming the sections within the SOS seemed in order, so Base Section No. 2 at Calcutta became simply Base Section, Intermediate Section No. 2 at Chabua became Intermediate Section, and Advance Section No. 3 at Ledo became Advance Section. Given the concept that all of India-Burma Theater, or IBT, was the supply base for China Theater, the Base Section thus became the port of debarkation for incoming supplies and personnel. Intermediate Section, in which lay the Hump airfields and a general depot, was the port of embarkation for China. The Advance Section now operated the ground line of communications to China, which, with its Stilwell Road, pipelines, airfields, warehouses, ordnance maintenance plants, and the like, was itself a major operation.
As for the theater headquarters--SOS division of responsibility and personnel, the question of redistributing functions was raised again shortly after the theater split. The suggestion that the Commanding General, SOS, become theater G-4 was weighed, but for the present rejected. Finally, in December 1944, the special staff sections of the two headquarters were amalgamated. The chief of each of the resulting sections then assumed a dual responsibility, as theater chief of service and as head of the SOS section. This arrangement meant that in one capacity he was technical adviser to the theater commander, and in another he bore the operational responsibilities proper to his branch of service as part of SOS. Troops released by this step were assigned to China Theater.
The actual amalgamation proceeded in a series. Thus, the theater engineer's office was consolidated with the SOS Construction Service by 11 January 1945. SOS's provost marshal became the Deputy Provost Marshal, IBT. The two Information and Education Sections merged 23 April 1945. With the special staff sections having completed amalgamation, and with the end of combat for troops under IBT control meaning that logistics would henceforth be the major theater concern, there seemed no reason to hesitate longer in merging theater and SOS headquarters. At 0001, 21 May, the
merger took effect. SOS was formally inactivated. Theater G-4 in effect was the successor of the SOS commander.
Merging the two headquarters did not bring about any conspicuous saving in manpower. The SOS historian, Lt. Col. Harry L. Mayfield, considered that the greatest benefit lay in eliminating duplication of effort. After 21 May events brought so many developments in the realm of logistics that it was fruitless to estimate whether the course of operations was better or worse than if the merger had not been effected. One of the most conspicuous events to follow on the amalgamation was that General Covell was called back to the United States to take charge of a major activity in the Office of the Quartermaster General.1
Personnel Management Problems
Without men and women to make them a reality, organizations and projects are so much paper. The personnel situation in India-Burma Theater, if not more difficult than in Europe or the Southwest Pacific, surely was the more colorful. The Americans themselves were of course a fair cross-section of the United States, drawn from many races and creeds, but all of them Americans and most of them leaving the impression that they wanted nothing better than the speediest possible return to what they half jokingly, half fondly called "Uncle Sugar."2 As individuals, the 200,000-odd Americans in India and Burma, as in any theater, offered almost as many personal situations, but their superiors who had perforce to deal in large numbers found that certain general problems clearly emerged. The most important was that of transferring men to China. Then there were rotation and replacement, minority groups in the Army, and medical problems. And, since the War Department had a policy of keeping to a minimum the number of Americans shipped to India, Indian and Burmese civilians were hired in tens of thousands.
The most important personnel problem in India and Burma was that of finding men who could be spared to join Wedemeyer in China. General Sultan, IBT commander, expressed his awareness and his policy clearly: "We must help China. That is our job. We must give, and give till it hurts." And again, "If there is a shortage we must both get on with less."3 IBT's problem in applying this policy was how not to give so much and such important manpower to China Theater as to impair its own ability to function.
Immediately after the theaters split, almost every section of theater and
SOS headquarters yielded some officers and men for China duty. As the process of amalgamation described above proceeded, surplus troops were offered to China. Among them were the theater Engineer, Quartermaster, and Chemical Warfare Sections en bloc. These transfers numbered 108 trained staff personnel. All the American troops at Ramgarh Training Center were earmarked for China Theater, and were sent there as Ramgarh reduced its activity. These were of course piecemeal transfers but every man helped.4
On 1 December 1944 China Theater called for 1,784 officers and 7,516 enlisted men. The OCTAGON Task Force, on completing its mission, was a logical source of men for the 6,800 that Wedemeyer wanted to put in the Chinese Combat Command. For the SOS Wedemeyer wanted 2,000, and there, as SOS Headquarters combed its rosters, a clash developed between the desire to help China Theater and the necessity of keeping SOS operational. One immediate source of manpower was the seven quartermaster truck companies and one medium automotive maintenance company, organized as the Lux Convoy, which had arrived in India after an abortive attempt to deliver vehicles overland from Iran via the USSR to China. Here were 1,000 officers and men, all qualified to cope with China Theater's perennial and crippling transport problem. The rest of the desired 2,000 had to be found over the months ahead. Inactivation of the Karachi base yielded 107 men.
While the search to fulfill China Theater's December request was under way, further requests continued to come in from that theater, one of them for "all key officer and enlisted personnel" at Calcutta. Granting this request would have greatly hindered the port activities on which China Theater no less than IBT depended, so it could not be met. Nonetheless, movement of personnel to China continued steadily.
Between October 1944 and May 1945, SOS was able to find 257 officers, 7 warrant officers, and 746 enlisted men from its several headquarters for service in China. In addition, it transferred to China sixteen units totaling 3,762 men. The greatest single category was four companies and one detachment of engineer petroleum distribution units. In addition a medium automotive maintenance company, an ordnance ammunition company, a convalescent camp staff, a signal repair company, plus detachments of military police, quartermaster, engineer construction, and medical supply troops, were sent.5
While some soldiers were being sent from India to China, others were earning the right to be sent home to the United States, thus another set of problems was created. Recognizing that long service in the tropics affects the health of men from temperate climes, the War Department announced a policy of rotating men back to the United States after two years overseas, provided a replacement was at hand. This decision had hardly begun to take
effect, when the steadily increasing likelihood of Germany's defeat made it necessary to set up a system for releasing men from the armed services, a step toward demobilization.
The operation of these two policies, by May 1945, was producing a backlog of men eligible for return. Those who were eligible for rotation were not to go until replacements were at hand. These were slow in coming. As of February 1945 there were 4,586 troops eligible for rotation, against a monthly quota of 1,900 men. The biggest increases in troop strength in China-Burma-India had been from mid-1943 on; plainly, the number of eligibles was about to surpass the quota by far. The point system for repatriation and prospective demobilization produced another list of impatiently waiting men. As of 12 May 1945 there were 5,000 men in IBT who had 85 or more points and were therefore eligible, if no more than 5 percent of the unit strength was involved. Another 22,000 had more than 70 points. Many of them were airmen, who were given in effect a point for every mission flown.
Replacements for these men capable of filling their posts were hard to find and slow to arrive. On arrival they sometimes proved to be untrained for the posts they were to fill, and had to be retrained in India. Nor was air travel space always available. So the backlog grew, even though, by 30 June 1945, 3,408 high-point men had been returned to the United States.
The following is an example of the maneuvering that might arise after the arrival of a replacement who did not quite fit the post for which he was desired:6
When the Adjutant, 330th Engineer Regiment, became eligible for rotation, the replacement furnished was a captain of the Adjutant Generals Department. Unfortunately, the current Table of Organization for an Engineer General Service Regiment did not permit assigning a Captain, AGD, to such a unit.
Meanwhile, in Headquarters, Advance Section, a Captain, AGD, was eligible for rotation. However, no requisition for a replacement had been submitted, possibly because his promotion to major had been recommended, and it may have been understood that he would stay on in India.
In the Intermediate Section, a captain in the Corps of Engineers was eligible for rotation, and was awaiting arrival of a replacement.
Last of all, there was a major, of the Adjutant General's Department, in Advance Section, who had been selected for rotation.
At the cost of considerable paper work, all four of these situations were combined to find a proper adjutant for the 330th Engineer Regiment. The key man in the resulting moves was the engineer captain in the Intermediate Section. Instead of being rotated, he agreed to go to the United States for 45 days rest and recovery, which meant that he would come back to duty in India. His replacement therefore went to the 330th. The Captain AGD who had been originally scheduled for the 330th as a replacement went to Advance Section, and the Captain, AGD, in that headquarters was approved for promotion
and rotation. His promotion was charged against the vacancy left by the Major in Advance Section, who was also rotated.
Not every one of the men who went home caused so much rearrangement but, as the example suggests, the aggregate impact of the thousands of replacements was considerable.
The changes described, which have some of the aspects of a puzzle, show what can be done by G-1 when the individual's capacities and needs are rather standardized. But there were many people in or working with the Army who could not be easily categorized, and they caused problems in housing, recreation, clothing, and diet.
In large measure, the Stilwell Road was a monument to the strength, skill, and endurance of the Negro soldier.7 About 60 percent of the U.S. troops who worked on the road were Negro engineers. Their superiors considered that their morale was higher than that of the white soldiers working on the road, but that their efficiency was less. The reason for this latter, the Advance Section thought, lay in a lack of previous training, a lack of responsibility, and a lack of pride in accomplishment. If Advance Section was correct in its analysis, these traits were all remediable, and action was taken. Schools in engineering and in operation of equipment were organized, and an orientation program was instituted.
The basically healthy racial situation in the Advance Section, where most of the Negro troops were, produced a "marked absence of those incidents normally associated with inter-racial conflicts." All recreational facilities, from theaters to sports, were nondiscriminatory. One troubled area was in relations between Negro troops and the local peoples. Incidents between Negroes and Indians were out of proportion to the number of Negro troops. The explanation may be a simple one--that the Negro troops mingled more freely with the Indians than did their white comrades, and that if the numbers of contacts could be correlated, the incidents would fall into a truer proportion.
In the Calcutta base section, an error in judgment in locating recreational facilities for Negro troops at Howrah led to considerable criticism. For whatever reason the base section commander placed the recreational facilities inside a section of Calcutta which he had already declared out of bounds. Moreover, they were used for rest and recreation by Negro soldiers from the Ledo area. Troops, on leave from the Advance Section, found the facilities largely monopolized by Base Section men. And, as should have been foreseen, locating the rest camp near the brothels of Calcutta meant that the
venereal disease rate reached alarming proportions. The situation went through the course of official inquiry during the latter part of 1944. Finally, in February 1945, the rest camp was relocated in a more appropriate section of Calcutta. In the next two months the venereal disease rate dropped sharply, as did also the number of disciplinary incidents.8
The problem of finding suitable housing and recreational facilities for Negro troops, at a time when the U.S. Army still practiced racial segregation, was not unlike the problem of finding suitable living and recreational quarters for the members of the Army Nurse Corps and Women's Army Corps who were sent to India. They, too, were a minority in a system best adapted to the gregarious, easy-going young male. In the first quarter of 1945 there were 1,017 nurses and 256 Wacs in India. The nurses had been in India since 1942; the Wacs arrived in July 1944 for duty with the Tenth Air Force headquarters.9
Finding living quarters for the nurses that would allow them comfort, privacy, and security was a problem that took time to solve in India proper. In the forward areas, tents had been the rule and service a real hardship. The result, in the opinion of the Theater Surgeon General, was tension and fatigue. Finding cool, sturdy, comfortable, and attractive clothes in enough quantity to permit frequent changes was another problem, for experience revealed that the basic uniform allowances were inadequate.
Trying to profit by these earlier experiences, Tenth Air Force headquarters made elaborate preparations to receive the Wacs. But the preparations were of necessity made by men, and not every need was foreseen. Thus, no slacks were provided for evening wear during the mosquito season, nor did the clothing allowance provide enough changes. The local mosquitoes carried malaria, and the doctors insisted that the women wear slacks. Fortunately, the Wacs were near Calcutta, and the Indian tailor, with his ample store of light cottons and clever needle, soon had the girls smart and comfortable in Indian khaki.
By March 1945 the theater surgeon was ready to conclude that the two biggest problems connected with women serving in India had been the early lack of appropriate housing and the lack of co-ordinated administrative control. The second point probably reflects the fact that Army nurses were of necessity stationed about the theater in little groups, and might have been helped by a small central office co-ordinating personnel problems. The surgeon felt that women stood the physical strain of the Indian climate as well as men.
Some of the problems facing servicewomen came from the theater's marriage policy. In 1942 Stilwell had directed attention to the fact that under War Department policy marriages had to receive his prior permission. His motive in making this announcement, he explained privately, was "to prevent the mixed calamities that would develop." At that time, U.S. immigration laws would not have permitted an Indian or Anglo-Indian bride to enter the United States; diplomatic repercussions were feared if Americans were allowed to wed only British girls. In March 1944 a new policy developed when an officer about to return home asked permission to wed a British girl. Permission was granted, thus informally establishing a new policy that marriage was permitted if either party was about to leave the CBI Theater, permanently, within thirty days. Marriage was also permitted in cases of pregnancy.
Such marriage policies met with severe criticism. It was argued that they encouraged clandestine weddings, and put a premium on illegitimate pregnancies. The problem was regarded as deserving serious study, and the opinions of the theater judge advocate, chaplains, nurses, and others were obtained.
As a result, General Sultan approved a new order, effective 19 April 1945, under which two U.S. citizens could wed any time after a three-month waiting period. U.S. citizens were permitted to wed other nationalities when either person was scheduled to leave the theater within three months after the wedding.10
That the marriage question reached so high a level of command was perhaps because the number of Indians employed by the U.S. Army was high in proportion to the number of Americans stationed in India,--roughly, one Indian to every three Americans. There was also the circumstance that the Americans were in a sense guests in the Indian home. Good relations with the Indians would be a matter for the continuing attention of the theater commander. As of June 1945, over 70,000 Indians and Burmese, many of them women, were employed by the U.S. Army. The resulting scene, in supply depots and headquarters, and out along the Stilwell Road, was a picturesque one.
In a base area, for example, one might see at the door of a building the jaunty little Gurkha watchman, with small, sturdy frame, Mongolian features, ready smile, broad-brimmed hat turned up at one side, and the deadly, broadbladed knife of the Gurkha tribesman at his side. In the corridor the visitor was sure to see, squatting sadly and patiently, a black-skinned sweeper, descendant of India's first inhabitants. Behind the typewriters there would be slim Anglo-Indian girls, brown-skinned, large-eyed, often fiercely British
in speech and custom. The clerks were sophisticated young Hindus of the commercial castes and sects. Sometimes college graduates, almost always great students of the cinema, fond of debating politics and religion, they could be seen in the morning cycling to work in swarms. Among these people there moved the Americans, wearing khaki that was worn and faded at the hands of the Indian washerman, plagued by the minor complaints with which India afflicts the stranger, but bringing to their work a driving energy new to the subcontinent. Meanwhile, in the streets and bazaars, the pageant of India continued, seemingly heedless of the Western visitors, but with many of the actors determined that when the war ended India would go her own way.
In the Advance Section, building the line of communications to China made it necessary to assemble a labor force varied in the extreme. Units of the Indian Pioneer Corps worked in areas where Japanese might be encountered; elsewhere contract labor was used. The contract workers had no common tongue (though many understood a few words of Hindustani, the lingua franca of India) and shared few customs, which meant it was necessary to serve a most varied diet. These people included Mahrattas, Madrasis, Bengalis, Hindu and Moslem Punjabis, and from the tribal and hill folk, Chamars, Oryias, Bihari aborigines, Garos, Nepalis, and Gurkhas. To paraphrase a famous epigram, the labor force on the Stilwell Road was an anthropologist's dream but a mess sergeant's nightmare.
To hire these people, Advance Section filed estimates of its future needs with Eastern Army, the Indian Army headquarters for the Assam section of India Command. Eastern Army then undertook to have them on hand. Civilians for other than construction work were hired through local employment offices set up under Advance Section. General Headquarters (India)--GHQ(I)--the highest echelon of the Indian Army, co-ordinated hiring to avoid competition between Allied agencies. Pay and workmen's compensation were furnished by the Government of India under reciprocal aid. The importance of local labor can be judged by the estimate that it supplied about 7,800,000 man-days for building the Ledo Road as against the 6,618,000 of the U.S. Army engineers and 735,000 of Chinese Army engineers.11
Employment of Indians was also an experiment in social adjustment. Admittedly, generalization is difficult in so great and complicated a sphere, but some observations may be acceptable. The Indians who worked for the Americans were markedly loyal to their employers. India had strong traditions of loyalty to the immediate superior, reflecting the medieval past which never seemed far behind in that country in the early 1940's. It meant the
Indian largely identified himself with the Americans. On the other hand, the tempo of Indian life was that of the slow-moving tropics, where people conserve energy, and so to the Americans the Indians sometimes seemed lethargic and their work slipshod. The observer could also see that many of the lower-caste Indians who furnished common labor were undernourished and weakened by fever. Consequently labor gangs had to be larger than expected until steady work at good wages permitted a better diet and more energy. But when all was said and done, the Americans in India could not have done their work without the help and friendship of India's people.
Relationships between the two groups were good. Racial prejudice, to one observer at least, was not conspicuous. Indians and Americans seemed to accept one another as individuals. The easy-going social democracy of the Americans, their generosity with their resources, personal and official, may have had a greater impact on India than could be imagined at the time. The willingness of the Americans to perform manual labor, their liking for and understanding of machinery, were suggestions that not every society insisted on rigid caste distinction, that the Americans, by Indian standards wealthy and powerful as so many lords, might have become so through their own effort and ingenuity.
Figures on the troop strength of the theater and its subordinate commands have been given above. They are deceptive, because the unsanitary environment in India produced a correspondingly high rate of malarial and intestinal infections. On any given day many men were ill, and still more, though not sick enough to stop work, were not well enough to work at full efficiency, even within the limits imposed by the heat and damp of India and Burma. Summer was the worst time for sickness. Thus in the summer of 1943 and again in summer 1944, the admission rate for the old China-Burma-India Theater soared to about 1,500 admissions per 1,000 men per year. Then, in winter, it dropped below the 1,000 mark.
Malaria control had been slow in getting under way in India and Burma. Atebrin suppressive therapy was not begun in forward areas until April 1944. Not until winter 1944-45 did large amounts of the effective insecticide, DDT, arrive. Perhaps the most powerful single influence toward remedying a health situation that severely strained the theater's personnel resources was the establishment of a Preventive Medicine Section in the Theater Surgeon's Office, 22 August 1944. Most of the theater's sicknesses came from intestinal disease and malaria, which were controllable by methods that were well understood at the time and whose rigid application was in great degree a
command problem. The new section used the method of closely supervising the preventive measures of lower echelons. Vigorous letters, with the authority of the theater commander behind them, pointed out deficiencies and suggested remedies.
In fall 1944 responsibility for malaria control was placed on unit commanders. The Medical Corps relinquished many of the operational responsibilities it had perforce assumed. These went to the troops, with the Quartermaster and Engineer Corps taking over those phases of malaria control previously allotted them by the War Department. Air spraying with DDT was continued. The most thorough and vigorous application of both suppressive and preventive measures was enjoined by theater circulars in January 1945, and commanders were held responsible for their application.
The several forms of dysentery plus fevers of unknown origin were a problem little less serious than malaria. The known causes of such complaints were attacked with a great deal more vigor than before. Thus, Sanitary Corps engineers were attached to all but the smallest subsection headquarters, and given staff responsibility for water purification. Water purification specialists were assigned to subordinate units in all sections. Water pumps and chlorinators had been in short supply, but by May 1945 this shortage was ended. Fly control was sought by screening, DDT, better garbage disposal, and proper latrine construction. The fly population could not be fully controlled, through lack of something to suppress fly breeding. Indian mess assistants were forbidden to handle foods, and ample hot water was provided, as well as a germicidal rinse for dishes. Since many troops were stationed near Indian cities, the out-of-bounds weapon was used against insanitary restaurants, while eating places that tried to meet proper medical standards were allowed to buy Quartermaster chlorine compounds.
Thanks to these steps, admission rates in India-Burma Theater dropped sharply beginning in fall 1944, the fall in the malaria rate from 320 per 1,000 to 20 per 1,000 being most dramatic. The improvement did not reflect any large withdrawal from the Assamese and Burmese jungle areas to more salubrious parts; troop strengths in those areas in August 1945 were substantially what they had been on 31 October 1944.
Preventive measures may also have averted a serious outbreak of smallpox. From October 1944 to June 1945 there were 6 cases and 4 deaths, as against 20 cases and 6 deaths in 1944. This did not seem a great number of cases, but it was quite out of line with the incidence for the U.S. Army. Attempts were made to improve clerical procedures so as to ensure accuracy in recording immunization reactions. Proper strength and uniform quality of vaccine were obtained by designating one Indian laboratory as the sole source of lymph.
The other great scourge of India, cholera, was no problem. Cholera vaccine was given to all troops, and those in the Calcutta area were given
lectures on avoiding potential sources of infection, like Indian soft drinks. Cholera statistics in the Indian press taught their daily lesson.12
Reciprocal Aid and Lend-Lease to India
The men and women who made up India-Burma Theater were, as noted above, largely fed, and almost completely clothed, by the farms and factories of India. In 1942 the War Department had proclaimed the policy of using local resources in order to conserve shipping. India had co-operated wholeheartedly, and both the American forces in India and the American-trained Chinese divisions were fed and clothed, and the Chinese paid, by the Government of India.13
Two problems involving reciprocal aid confronted IBT between December 1944 and June 1945. The first was the possibility that the volume of reciprocal aid to the Chinese and U.S. forces in India and Burma might decrease; the second, the extent of the Indian commitment to supply Chinese divisions after they had left Burma for China.
When the China-Burma-India Theater split in October 1944, the U.S. staff in New Delhi feared that certain indications from the Government of India presaged a cutback in reciprocal aid. SOS did not make the situation a major issue, but took the attitude of meeting problems as they arose in following months. Late deliveries were promptly and politely protested, while IBT's new power of screening lend-lease bids by the Indian Army and SEAC gave a potent lever. But as the months went by it became apparent that though the pronouncements of Indian officials might reveal a sense of economic strain the Government of India was actually increasing the dollar value of reciprocal aid. The explanation probably lies in the fact that the amount of petroleum, oils, and lubricants supplied grew so rapidly as to offset declines in construction, transportation, clothing, and subsistence, the categories causing the greatest burden to the civil economy. The increase in fuel and oil supplied reflected the effect of the opening of the Stilwell Road and the pipeline to China, plus the steady increase in Hump operations.
A decline in construction followed the completion of the IBT building program, while the completed deployment for the North Burma Campaign ended major troop movements. As for food and clothing, IBT stocks were now complete to the prescribed level, with reserves in hand. The cutback in reciprocal aid, so feared in mid-1944, thus took place without disturbing U.S. Army operations in India, while the Government of India met every new need as it arose in 1945.14
When in December 1944 the Chinese 14th and 22d Divisions were flown back to China, the question of their supply arose. The War Department ruled that they would be placed in regular U.S. Army supply channels for ordnance supplies. However, the Government of India had been supplying the food, pay, clothing, and some of the equipment of these units. These divisions therefore had been maintained on a scale far above that enjoyed by the rest of the Chinese Army. China Theater was not as yet prepared to maintain them from its own resources, yet Wedemeyer wanted to do so lest their morale be injured and they be unable to play their key role in China. The same treatment was desired for the remaining three divisions when they returned. So SOS IBT and China both proposed that the Government of India continue to maintain all five divisions of the Chinese Army in India under lend-lease until 31 December 1945. The British policy was that India should give food and clothing only to the 14th and 22d Divisions, and these items only until 30 June 1945.
Further discussions followed, and the Government of India agreed to maintain the five Chinese divisions until ninety days after they had returned to China. In June 1945 this stand was further modified in that India would provide for another ninety days any items which could not be obtained elsewhere. SOS made appropriate changes in requisitions on India and attempted to fill some needs by requesting supplies from British authority in London. The British would accept only a limited responsibility for supply of Chinese forces from their sources east of Suez, and the United States had to fill what gaps resulted.15
To India-Burma Theater, the problem of lend-lease to India Command and SEAC was the delicate one of giving the War Department theater views on the bids of the two commands for lend-lease. The sums involved were large, for between September 1944, when the process began, and June 1945 the U.S. authorities in New Delhi screened $277,947,252.00 of lend-lease bids. Savings to the U.S. taxpayers were of a comparable magnitude, for only 49.98 percent was recommended for approval.
Three attempts were made by British authorities to end screening of their lend-lease requisitions. On one occasion they claimed the process wasted time. To this, IBT replied that if there was delay, the trouble largely rose from reluctance or inability on the part of General Headquarters (India) to supply information justifying its requests. SEAC's records seemed to be in better shape, for its commands supplied data more promptly. On another occasion the British objected to having the scale at which they wanted to supply equipment to their men questioned by IBT. In 1942 the U.S. Army had taken the same stand, so the precedents seemed clear.16 In this case, an
attempt was made to cast the problem in terms that would not appear provocative. IBT took the position that it would limit itself to recommending what proportion of the equipment desired was to come from U.S. sources, a stand which did not challenge the right of the British to set their own scales.
In commenting on British requests, IBT had no desire to be obstructive and believed that in many cases it could speed procurement, for example, by pointing out on occasion that certain desired items were present in its own stocks. Several steps were taken to speed the progress of requisitions and to make screening a truly Allied process, whose aim would be to use Allied resources to the best and most economical advantage. In the beginning SEAC and GHQ(I) made their requests through British channels to the War Department, which sent them back to IBT. In December 1944 the process was altered. The British War Office in London began to study U.S. production figures with a view to estimating when a bid from India Command or SEAC might receive favorable attention. If such seemed likely, India Command or SEAC was so informed. British authorities in India then placed the matter before IBT, which sent its recommendations to the War Department together with the bid.
In the course of the screening process, IBT staff officers conferred with their opposite numbers in SEAC and GHQ(I) to secure appropriate data. Much was needed, on reserves on hand, estimated wastage, estimated consumption rates, transportation factors, and the like. When occasions rose on which IBT could not offer at least a reasoned estimate to the War Department, it refused to recommend approval. As a rule, SEAC and IBT were able to agree and present to the War Department a requisition that represented their combined judgment. In the opinions of the IBT staff, problems sometimes could be traced to the sheer length of time involved in passing requisitions through the different echelons of command in the British forces. In the meantime, the situation changed, and March's requisition was obsolete in August.
Given the political and organizational habits of the English-speaking peoples, there inevitably arose from these informal contacts a committee, the India Cooperation Committee, with representatives of SEAC, GHQ(I), and IBT. The committee expedited IBT requests for supporting data, followed the progress of requisitions, and checked on all delays. It was of great help in dealing with the question of scales, for the earlier compromise had done no more than place the question on a different level, at which IBT was not obliged to comment directly on whether British requests were in line with what the Americans thought a reasonable level. GHQ(I), no doubt, had its own tale to tell of some American ideas on what constituted a legitimate item of reciprocal aid.
On one occasion, which involved a request for 800 ¼-ton trucks, IBT
noted that the request if filled would give the units involved about 150 percent more than their Tables of Equipment required. U.S. experience in India had demonstrated that a unit could operate with 12 percent reserves and 36 percent for replacements. Since the bid was fairly small, IBT recommended filling it, but recorded its objection so that no precedent would be set. On another occasion, SEAC wanted U.S. antigas ointment instead of the British issue. IBT would not concur, on the ground that the British issue, though concededly not as good, was still adequate. Moreover, they challenged the British scale of two ointment kits per man with a 50-percent reserve. The U.S. scale was one each, and 30 percent. The War Department upheld the IBT point of view.
In appraising the importance of reciprocal aid and lend-lease screening, the IBT staff estimated that in 1944 and 1945 the two combined saved the U.S. taxpayer $2,000,000 a day, $730,000,000 a year, in addition to economizing on shipping space, raw materials, and production capacity in the United States.17
Supply Policies for China Theater Projects
The principal reason U.S. troops were in India and after October 1944 Burma was to support China. Therefore, the men whose presence in India and whose assignments created the difficulties just discussed were principally concerned with various logistical problems. In dealing with these they had to work in close co-operation with China Theater, whose communications zone they were now operating. Inevitably, agreements had to be reached between the two theaters on the division of responsibilities between them. These agreements in turn were the policy framework within which India-Burma Theater conducted routine logistical operations.18
The agreements reached in December 1944 between the theaters covered three major areas: requisition of supplies on India-Burma Theater and the United States; operation of the line of communications; and handling of lend-lease. The agreement on requisitions procedure was an SOS IBT suggestion approved by China Theater. By stipulating that all routine requisitions, such as those falling within Table of Equipment allowances, would be made by China Theater directly on the Intermediate Section's General Depot in Assam, India, the agreement underscored that IBT and China Theater in many ways functioned almost as one theater. Emergency requisitions were to go direct to SOS IBT. Requisitions which had as yet no War Department authorization were to go direct to SOS IBT with a statement that approval had been requested. Nonroutine items approved by the War Department authorization were to have their requisitions accompanied by a copy
of the Department's order. Finally, SOS in China Theater was to set its own levels of supply.19
Dividing the responsibility for operating the line of communications from Ledo to Kunming was more complicated. Since IBT's resources were far greater than China Theater's, it was much easier for the impetus of maintenance and construction of the lines of communications to come from the direction of Ledo rather than that of Kunming. But since part of that same artery was within China Theater, adjustment had to be made. General Sultan's basic directive permitted Wedemeyer and himself to accept responsibility for operations and installations in each other's theaters as necessity arose, so there was no obstacle to mutual accommodation.
Negotiated in November and December 1944, a comprehensive agreement defined the responsibilities of the two theaters:
Construction and maintenance of roads: IBT was responsible for the construction and maintenance of the Stilwell Road up to the Burma-China border in the vicinity of Wanting. The China Theater was charged with all construction and maintenance within China.
Construction, maintenance, and operation of pipelines: IBT was responsible for the construction, maintenance, and operation of pipelines to Kunming. An amendment in March 1945 added to IBT's responsibility the construction of the pipeline network connecting Kunming with the airfields lying to the east.
Signal communications along roads and pipelines: IBT was responsible for the construction and maintenance of wire communications along the Stilwell Road to Kunming and along the pipelines.
Operation of the Road: IBT was responsible for motor transport operations on the Stilwell Road as far as Kunming. The China Theater was responsible for supplementary motor transport.
Hump priority and allocation: China Theater was responsible for designating cargo for delivery to China and allocation of such cargo to users in China.
Security: IBT was to arrange with SEAC for the security of the Stilwell Road and the pipelines up to the Burma-China border. The China Theater was to arrange for the security of roads, pipelines, and wire lines within China.20
Notably, only in the matter of allocating Hump tonnage did the authority of China Theater reach into India-Burma Theater. Within the sphere of local initiative policies on Chinese lend-lease of the India-Burma and China Theaters were arrived at in December by discussions in Chungking between representatives of the two theaters plus War Department liaison personnel. Their conclusions become War Department policy in a directive of 23 January 1945.
Certain salient points emerged from the directive. In conformity with recent practice in the theaters, Chinese lend-lease for the initial equipping for the thirty-divisions-plus-10-percent program was to be shipped from the United States on the same basis as U.S. supplies and on arrival in India
would go into U.S. stockpiles. Since both Wedemeyer's supplies and lend-lease to China would be shipped from those same stockpiles the U.S. forces and the Chinese in effect drew upon one common source under their respective programs as approved by the War Department and the Munitions Assignments Board of the CCS. In accordance with the policy of pooling stocks to simplify bookkeeping and give greater flexibility, maintenance for the U.S.-sponsored Chinese divisions was to be drawn by SOS requisitions on the Los Angeles Port of Embarkation. The rule that nothing could be requisitioned unless it could be delivered in six months was reaffirmed.
In addition to U.S. lend-lease for China there were other stores in India destined for China with diverse origins and legal status that reflected the improvisations of 1941-42. Some of them were of Canadian origin; some were procured by Chinese ministries with U.S. credits or their own funds; some were bought by Chinese governmental agencies incorporated under U.S. law. These classes of matériel could only be diverted to U.S. account after notifying the War Department and obtaining the consent of General Wedemeyer, which meant that of the Chinese Government.21
In accordance with his basic mission and inherent powers as a theater commander, Wedemeyer was to determine the amounts, types, and priorities of lend-lease shipments to China. He also was to make the policy decisions in accord with which IBT would bid for initial issues under the thirty-divisions-plus-10-percent program.22 China Theater was charged with recording all transfers of supplies to the Chinese. General Sultan as Commanding General, IBT, was to control bids for and deliveries to the Chinese Army in India, and was to receive, store, and transport lend-lease within his theater and as otherwise agreed on between himself and Wedemeyer (reflecting the division of responsibility for the line of communications).23
As soon as the War Department's January directive was issued, China Theater pooled all China Defense Supplies, Inc., stocks that were intended for the Chinese Army with its own supplies. In effect, this meant that at the last depot before supplies were transported to China, IBT merged such matériel with U.S. stocks. The International Division of Army Service Forces in Washington was at once notified of each diversion so that the Chinese account in Washington could be credited accordingly. Wedemeyer's action meant that henceforth military supplies entering China became one single resource to be used by the U.S. theater commander as necessity might dictate.
India-Burma Theater delayed in pooling China Defense Supplies matériel because it had been asked by the War Department to re-examine its supply status. The point at issue was whether IBT should continue to receive supplies on the basis of semiautomatic requisitions initiated in the zone of the interior (known as Phase II supply) or whether it was now ready to requisition everything it might need. After conferences with China Theater representatives, IBT concluded it was ready to take the responsibility of planning and obtaining its own supply. The change became effective 1 May 1945. IBT then directed that all China Defense Supplies be absorbed into U.S. stockpiles, effective 15 June 1945, thus ending three years of double accounting and double handling. In retrospect, IBT concluded that "both from the supply and tactical viewpoint, the supply from two separate supply systems of two fighting forces, working toward a common goal and mutually dependent operationally, is too inflexible and cumbersome a procedure to permit efficient and integrated action."24
Ports, Pipelines, and Railroads
Once policies for requisitioning and handling supplies had been settled, the next step in the supply process was to move them to the depots and tank farms from which they would begin their trip to China. This step involved the ports that received stores in India and the railroads and pipelines that carried them from the ports to the depots in Assam. There, by air, road, or pipeline again, they would begin their journey to China.
In spring 1945 the port situation reflected the steady growth in the efficiency and capacity of Calcutta, the continuance of Karachi in the stand-by status, and the discontinuance of Bombay as a terminal for troop transports.
The U.S. port troops at Calcutta were the 497th and 508th Port Battalions and the 540th and 541st Port Companies. The Base Section commander, General Neyland, was regarded by the SOS commander, General Covell, as notably successful in raising the morale of his men. This factor, plus the fact that cargo delivered to Calcutta was usually crated and so easier to handle than bulk shipments, may explain the success of the port troops in making Calcutta first in discharge rates among all U.S. Army ports. Between 15 and 27 March 1945 about 114,000 tons were discharged; at the end of March only 889 tons remained in the transit sheds. Once port congestion had made Calcutta a major bottleneck in CBI, but now this port led the rest.25
Karachi, as noted above, was placed in stand-by status on 15 May, thereafter unloading only an occasional vessel calling with Air Forces supplies for the great Karachi air base.
Because Calcutta's port facilities were regarded as limiting the types of ships that could make their way up the Hooghly River to dockside, Bombay on the west coast of India continued to be the port of call for transports. There were certain disadvantages. After landing, troops had to move by rail across India--a long, slow, tiring journey. As a rule, three days were required to unload transports and entrain the troops. Moreover, the British were expecting the arrival of substantial troop shipments in spring and summer 1945 to replace their veterans, many of whom had arrived in India in 1942, and to repatriate Indian troops, some of whom had seen their first action in 1940 on the Egyptian frontier. So the British had asked for sole use of Bombay's facilities.
By various negotiations, IBT postponed return of the port and replacement center facilities at Bombay. The theater staff believed that Calcutta could not receive troopships of the "General" class then engaged on the run to Bombay. But the British needed Bombay, and so the War Department in January 1945 undertook to test Calcutta by sending two C-4-class troopships to that port. The ships navigated the Hooghly in safety and were unloaded in nine hours. Plainly, IBT could no longer justify its stand. SOS accordingly ordered evacuation of U.S. port personnel from Bombay by 1 June 1945. In its last month of operation, the Bombay complement moved 15,235 men through the port. Inactivation yielded thirty-two men for China service. A forty-five-man detachment remained for minor transport, procurement, finance, and censorship duties.
By April 1945 Calcutta handled troop movements as a matter of routine. "In the latter part of the month, 5,762 troops debarked from two C-2 transports. The first special train left Princep's Ghat 2½ hours after the vessels had completed mooring and all baggage and cargo [were] completely off-loaded within 18 hours." The men went to replacement depots at Kanchrapara and Camp Angus, both near Calcutta.
From the Calcutta area, railroads, pipelines, and a river barge line led north to the depots and road and air terminals of Assam. Together, they formed the Assam line of communications, as it was called in CBI. Thanks to the completion of the pipelines and the improvements in railroad operations of 1944, the Assam line of communications in 1945 could forward all cargo put down at Calcutta.26 Of this cargo, petroleum products caused the most concern in 1945. Where motor fuels and lubricants were concerned, the major problem lay in keeping stocks at an adequate level. One minor
crisis came from the diversion of some tankers from India just at the time the opening of the Stilwell Road, the expansion of Hump operations, and the British drive to Mandalay were putting a severe strain on local gasoline reserves. The diversion of the tankers in January 1945 caused a drop in anticipated receipts of some 41,000,000 gallons. Between expanded operations and diminished receipts, stocks of 100-octane gasoline in Assam dropped below the ten-day level and in the Base Section to twenty days. SOS IBT hastily appealed to the War Department, and receipts after April rose to a point that corrected the shortfall.
As IBT was looking toward the end of this minor crisis, a fuel shortage of more serious dimensions, which threatened to reduce theater activities, was developing in north Burma, and became quite apparent from March to June. The movement of motor convoys to China and the institution of ATC Hump operations from Myitkyina bore heavily upon stocks in the forward area. Coincident with this, attempts to build up stocks in China were hindered by the lack of fuel and oil containers. These were inadequate in quantity, poorly made, and often roughly handled by Indian labor at train transshipment points. All these difficulties, arising in the same few months, made gas and oil a critical problem.
The ATC's Hump operations from Myitkyina were regarded as the only marginal activity in north Burma, so ATC was warned that it would have to take the heaviest cuts in fuel allotments. All commands were ordered to maintain strict economy.
Fortunately, the crisis could not be one of long duration, because the pipeline and container program was nearing completion even as commanders in the forward area were most worried over the fuel situation. ATC operations dropped about 5 percent from March to April, while they had risen 15 percent from February to March, but permanent relief was at hand. On 31 March the first deliveries through a new six-inch pipeline from the port of Chittagong reached the Tinsukia tank farm in Assam. By 31 May a six-inch line from Tinsukia to Myitkyina was coupled, though not yet in operation. The U.S. Army in March began making its own 55-gallon containers at Tezgaon, Assam. Handling of containers in shipment was more closely supervised. The Government of India undertook to improve containers on hand by sealing their seams with melted bronze, thus sharply cutting losses from leakage.
Improvement in the fuel situation first showed itself in Assam. In late April SOS reported that the Assam valley air terminals were "saturated" with gasoline. With heavy receipts in Assam, with the six-inch pipeline to Myitkyina almost complete, the fuel shortage in north Burma was plainly to end soon.27
ARMY AIR FORCE FUEL DUMP AT ASSAM
Railway operations in the first six months of 1945 were a story of steady improvement rather than of dramatic change. The dramatic changes had come in March and April 1944 when the U.S. Military Railway Service took over the management of key sections of the Bengal and Assam Railway and began stressing movement of freight cars toward the Assam terminals; the former policy had been to balance the movement of cars up and down the line.28 The improvements of 1945 were an extensive program of siding construction, freight car construction, added watering facilities, the equipping of cars with vacuum brakes, and establishment of a tracer system to keep track of lost or mishandled shipments.
Of these several projects, building sidings was perhaps the most important. The railway authorities of the Government of India had believed that to increase the physical capacity of the Bengal and Assam Railway it would be necessary to double-track 578 miles. This would be a slow process, and a drain on Indian steel production. U.S. railwaymen believed much the same results could be obtained by construction of long sidings, each capable of taking a 100-car train. Then, two-way operation would be
permitted by sidetracking the train with the lower priority. Ultimately, double-tracking was reduced to 165 miles, for building a total of 47 miles of passing sidings at 94 different locations eliminated 360 miles of doubletracking.
Greater supplies of rolling stock were obtained by borrowing from other Indian railways, by construction in India, and by imports from the United States. By May 1945 the United States had sent 10,113 freight cars to the Bengal and Assam Railway, about 60 percent of the total increase. The motive power, by the same date, was also 60 percent American.
As a result of these improvements, the 735th Railway Operating Battalion, which operated the division with the heaviest traffic, moved 42,734 cars east in March 1945, as against 8,836 cars in February 1944, before the Military Railway Service took over. The construction of forty 125-car sidings in this one division partly explained the feat.
Operating the Line of Communications to China
Though the first full convoy from India reached Kunming, China, on 4 February 1945, its arrival signaled only that the road was open to traffic, not that it was a fully operational line of communications to China. The extent to which its capacity would be developed necessarily reflected the planning that took place before it was opened. In 1942 and until May 1943 the Ledo Road had been seen as an expedient which would serve to give more ample support to U.S. projects in China until the prewar line of communications through Rangoon could be restored. After May 1943 operations in Burma could not be agreed on beyond a limited offensive to take north Burma. That fact elevated the Ledo Road and its accompanying pipeline to new importance. Meanwhile, the Hump air line had been growing in capacity. Many, like General Chennault, Mr. Churchill, and the British Chiefs of Staff, thought it a far better investment than the Ledo Road, but the War Department always objected to diversion of transports from the main effort in Europe, while Army Service Forces had been enthusiastic in supporting the road.
When the North Burma Campaign opened in October 1943 it was at least arguable that a simultaneous attack from both sides of Burma might clear the Japanese from the trace of the Ledo Road in a few months, and open the road to China before the Japanese could make a major move there. By April 1944 the slow pace of the North Burma Campaign forced General Stilwell, then CBI Theater commander, to conclude that his mission in north Burma was now primarily to take Myitkyina so that Hump tonnage might be increased. In August 1944 British success at Imphal and his own imminent victory at Myitkyina made him think the road might still be open in
time to play a worthwhile role. All during these months, the U.S. Pacific campaign had steadily progressed, and by August an American landing in the Philippines and the opening of a Chinese port could be foreseen. In the light of these factors and of the months that had slipped past since Stilwell first suggested retaking Burma in July 1942, the theater and the War Department in summer 1944 had to fix a role for the Ledo Road.29
In August 1944 the War Department directed that the Ledo Road be completed as a two-lane highway to Myitkyina, and as a one-way road beyond Myitkyina, to Wanting, China. Operations over it were to be limited to one-way delivery of vehicles and field artillery. The motive of the War Department was to free resources for the forthcoming attack on the Philippines.30 For some months CBI Theater planning had followed similar lines as to the immediate future of road operations. Vehicles and artillery would be of use in the crisis the Americans then faced in China; more ambitious efforts might well be too late to be of help. But one-way delivery of vehicles posed a problem. Drivers had to be found for them. If Americans were used, they would have to be flown back to India. It seemed much better to train and use Chinese drivers who would be available for further service in China.
So, in the spring of 1944, CBI Theater began training Chinese drivers at Ramgarh Training Center. The program did not go smoothly, for the desertion rate was high. Center headquarters believed that Chinese newspapers had made extravagant promises to Chinese volunteer recruits which had not materialized. Conscripts arrived in poor shape physically. In August 1944 forty-four of them died after flying over the Hump. Brig. Gen. Haydon L. Boatner, then commanding the Rear Echelon of the Chinese Army in India, believed a partial solution lay in converting four Chinese tank battalions then at Ramgarh into truck units. It was not likely they would get tanks. CBI headquarters would not accept the proposal, preferring to assign added U.S. instructors to Ramgarh. In the light of these reinforcements, Ramgarh hoped to train 2,700 drivers a month.
After the theaters split, India-Burma again urged that the tank battalions be converted into truck units. On 1 January 1945 the Generalissimo agreed.
India-Burma Theater's suggestion may have reflected reports from Ramgarh, for when the new Chinese drivers took the road in February it became apparent that they were not qualified. For instance, one Chinese-manned convoy of 90 vehicles reached Pangsau Pass, 38 miles from Ledo, with only 66 operational vehicles left. General Boatner thought the Chinese driver
BRIG. GEN. HAYDON L. BOATNER, commanding Rear Echelon, Chinese Army in India, stops to speak to a wounded Chinese solider in Burma, January 1944.
program a failure. He did not think it reflected inefficiency at Ramgarh, but rather the general impossibility of training raw Chinese to the necessary standards in four weeks. To increase the difficulty, the British were pressing for the return of Ramgarh for their redeployment program. Plainly, expedients were necessary to get the convoys rolling to China.
Expedients were used, while emergency efforts were made to salvage the Chinese driver program. The Chinese 6th Motor Regiment, of lengthy Burma experience, took vehicles to Kunming and was flown back. The U.S. 330th Engineer Regiment supplied volunteers for the third, fifth, and sixth convoys, who made the trip to Kunming for a diversion while they awaited rotation. Units awaiting transfer to China drove themselves there. Volunteers were recruited from U.S. troops in IBT. Thanks to these expedients, clearly recognized as such, IBT dispatched thirty convoys in February, twenty-two of which reached China during the month; convoys dispatched after 16 February did not arrive until March.
Meanwhile, strong measures to bolster the Chinese driver program were taken. Training at Ramgarh went on round the clock, to handle some 9,844 Chinese volunteers, many of them students, who passed through the center in the first four months of 1945. Those Chinese who had graduated and some of whom had done badly were given a postgraduate course at Ledo. The four tank battalions yielded about 3,000 officers and men for motor transport duty.
These measures were no more than palliatives and IBT began to look elsewhere for drivers. Since Chinese drivers could not be obtained in quantity, and U.S. drivers were not available, there remained but one source, Indian civilian drivers, such as were then being employed successfully at SOS installations in India. IBT began to explore that possibility, with appropriate urgency.
The expedient measures for initial road operations were conducted under the routine that would be followed when drivers were available on a permanent basis. On 24 February, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Motor Transport Service, was activated and assigned to Advance Section, Ledo. Its mission was to operate the 1,079 miles of highways in Advance Section's area. Motor transport operations divided into three phases: Ledo base operations; supply of activities in north Burma; deliveries to China.
Ledo Base operations were handled by Intermediate Section troops, Indian civilian drivers, and Advance Section men, reflecting the movement of traffic to Ledo, around Ledo, and away from Ledo.
Supply operations in Burma, which averaged about 30,000 tons a month, were the sphere of Motor Transport Service. At first, 6 x 6 trucks were used exclusively. In April, 4 x 6 tractors and 10-ton semitrailers were introduced
TABLE 4--VEHICLE AND CARGO DELIVERIES TO CHINA AND BURMA BY MONTHS (1945)
Month China Burma Convoys Vehicles Trailers Gross Weighta Vehicle and Trailer Weighta Cargo Weighta Cargo Weighta Total 433 25,783 6,539 146,948 108,886 38,062 161,986 February 22 1,333 609 5,231 4,120 1,111 27,087 March 22 1,152 745 6,788 5,279 1,509 34,579 April 38 2,342 1,185 15,447 11,249 4,198 31,797 May 78 4,682 1,103 28,080 19,645 8,435 28,357 June 82 4,901 964 27,962 20,977 6,985 14,923 July 75 4,745 828 23,370 17,470 5,900 16,085 August 51 2,652 647 15,866 11,582 4,284 5,046 September 53 3,060 408 18,599 14,291 4,308 4,112 October 12 916 50 5,605 4,273 1,332 . . . . .
a Short tons.
Source: History of IBT, 1, Ch. 3, p. 147.
on the relatively level stretch from Shingbwiyang to Bhamo, cutting driver requirements for that section about 50 percent.
Convoy movements on the Burma Road were as highly organized as traffic on a railroad. There were two classes of convoys--units proceeding to China and freight convoys. Both were dispatched by the Hump Regulation Officer in accord with priorities set by the Hump Allocation Office in China. In the case of freight convoys, Intermediate Section delivered the vehicles to Makum Junction, between Chabua and Ledo, where Motor Transport drivers took the wheel. These drove to Margherita, near Ledo, bivouacked there, and next morning crossed the initial point at Ledo. All movement from Ledo was controlled by Advance Section through the Motor Transport Service.
If a unit was going to China, it was staged at Kanchrapara, near Calcutta, where it received as many extra vehicles as it could manage. The Hump Regulation Officer dispatched it from Calcutta by rail to Siliguri, or Bongaigaon in Assam, and thence by road to Chabua. Here the vehicles were inspected and repaired, and extra vehicles assigned if possible. Then the unit went to Margherita, where it bivouacked again, waiting for its final dispatch to China.
Once on the road, drivers found way stations at regular intervals. By June 1945 nine of these were operating and offered maintenance for vehicles,
TABLE 5--GASOLINE DELIVERIES BY PIPELINE TO CHINA
Month 100-octane Motor gas Total Gallons Tons Gallons Tons Gallons Tons April 122,072 439 . . . . . . . . . . 122,072 439 May 671,440 2,442 843,000 3,088 1,514,440 5,530 June 138,919 505 1,278,200 4,682 1,417,115 5,187 July 1,684,130 6,124 1,495,200 5,477 3,179,330 11,601 August 1,873,760 6,814 1,113,735 4,085 2,987,495 10,897
Source: History of IBT, II, 161.
and transient messes and bathing facilities for men. Military police detachments patrolled the road from some thirty stations. Ordnance maintenance detachments manned twenty-two repair points along the road.
Driving the road was a strain. Ten days was regarded as the ideal time for a trip from Ledo to Kunming, but twelve to fifteen was more usual. Drivers operating on the road day in and day out were affected by the many rough, dusty stretches. Increasing numbers of men with dust pneumonia, cysts, fatigue, and kidney ailments began to appear at sick call. Quartermaster truck companies were obliged to take many men off duty.
Deliveries were also affected by operating problems. A shortage of fuel along the Chinese section of the road made April deliveries fall short of the target by 800 vehicles. During the first five months of 1945 about 10 percent of vehicles dispatched were either lost by accidents en route or delayed along the way.
Despite the driver problem and operational difficulties, an increasing amount of vehicles and supplies moved along the road.31 The question soon arose: should it carry more? Road deliveries to points within Burma and to China are shown in Table 4. Pipeline deliveries to China are shown in Table 5.
The Line of Communications Reappraised
At various times the concept of the ground line of communications across north Burma had been challenged by those who thought air transport cheaper and more economical. As the years went by after 1942 the whole
strategic and logistical background of the argument was revolutionized. Where in 1942 the War Department had told Stilwell to live off the land and the White House had felt obliged to shift a handful of bombers and transports from Stilwell to support the crumbling Allied position in the Middle East, by December 1944 the Allies were far more secure, with much greater resources. Even the current desperate German offensive in the Ardennes, though disturbing, could not be compared to the menace that existed when General Erwin Rommel and the Afrika Korps were a few score miles from Alexandria. The Allies had shipping by the million tons; they had air transport, efficient ports, and lines of communications--in short, everything that had been lacking or scarce in 1942.
Army Service Forces had long been enthusiastic in support of the Ledo Road. In December 1944 Lt. Gen. Brehon B. Somervell, its commander, summoned General Covell to Washington to help him prepare recommendations on the scale at which operations on the road were to be supported in 1945. It would appear that Army Service Forces did not yet agree with the August 1944 War Department directive limiting the Stilwell Road to one-way delivery of vehicles and artillery. Projected road operations had to be weighed against Wedemeyer's 1945 requirements, and he was asked to submit them. Received 13 January 1945, they included the requirements of the projects he had earlier outlined. For April and May 1945, China Theater wanted about 77,000 tons; for June and July, about 80,000; and for August, 87,000. Here was the support for Plan BETA, 36 divisions, and two U.S. Army air forces in China.
With the Wedemeyer estimates came IBT's report of its current planning, which showed that unless transport efforts were drastically increased, deliveries to China Theater would fall short of Wedemeyer's estimates by amounts varying from 12,000 to 23,000 tons. The overland line of communications would be delivering vehicles, about 12,000 tons of gasoline, and some 2,000 tons of cargo a month.
The two agencies concerned, the India-China Wing of the Air Transport Command and the SOS IBT, submitted their estimates. The ATC believed that it could deliver 80,000 tons a month if it was reinforced by about 150 more C-54's plus reserves, an additional 968 officers and 4,326 enlisted men, and 0.7 ton of fuel for every ton of cargo scheduled.
To deliver 60,000 net tons of cargo a month, the SOS wanted for two-way operations 5,759 more 5-ton tractor-trailers; 56,500 troops, including 137 more quartermaster truck companies; and 0.6 ton of fuel for every ton of cargo scheduled. An extra 15,000 tons of maintenance supplies for the road would have to be dispatched from Ledo every month. These figures were a strong argument against the expansion of Stilwell Road operations. Moreover,
other phases of the ground line of communications were being depreciated by events. In 1942 and 1943 Stilwell had urged reopening the prewar line of communications from Rangoon to Kunming, in the belief that it could be done without asking the War Department for resources that agency had said it could not spare. Now, in 1945, IBT surveyed the same route, and dismissed it because its rehabilitation would require resources not at hand in the theater.
The pipeline project from India to China was also being reappraised in January and February. Originally, one six-inch and two four-inch pipelines had been planned. When the estimates submitted were studied by the several headquarters in IBT, China, and Washington, the feeling grew that the second four-inch line need not be completed to China. Its role would have been to support road operations. Since these were being valued on a lower scale, General Chennault suggested that the pipe and crews which would have completed the line to Kunming should instead build a line from Kunming to the Fourteenth Air Force fields. The suggestion was accepted, and set a precedent for suspending the six-inch line at Myitkyina. This left the trans-Burma pipeline project at one four-inch line to Kunming.
A decision as to the most effective and most economical use of the Hump-road-pipeline combination was needed. IBT sent the deputy theater commander, Maj. Gen. Frank D. Merrill, to Washington in February 1945 with five possible plans for deliveries to China Theater in 1945, Cases I through V. Cases I through IV would provide 64,000 tons in April 1945 and from 116,000 to 158,000 tons a month by January 1946. Case V was on a lower scale. The principal differences between the plans lay in the amount of deliveries they assigned to the ATC. Cases I through III assumed completion of the six-inch pipeline to China, and some cargo delivery over the Stilwell Road, but Cases IV and V, developed at a conference in New Delhi between officers from China and India, limited the road to one-way vehicle delivery.
Discussions in Washington during March 1945 attended by Wedemeyer, who was there to present Plan BETA for operations against Canton, led to the final recommendation, Case VI. Case VI's proposals took advantage of the imminent departure of the B-29's from their great air bases near Calcutta.
Case VI undertook to meet China Theater's needs by adding C-46's and C-54's to the Hump, by basing C-54's on the Bengal fields of the B-29's for flight to China over the lower terrain of central Burma, and by building four more airfields at Myitkyina. The Stilwell Road was to be restricted to one-way delivery of vehicles. The six-inch pipeline was not to be extended past Myitkyina. In effect, therefore, the major part of deliveries to China was to be by air. The ground line of communications would be largely devoted to
supporting the Myitkyina area. From Ledo to Myitkyina there would be a two-way, all-weather road paralleled by two pipelines. From Myitkyina to Kunming there would be a one-lane highway and one four-inch pipeline.32
There was one major assumption implicit in Case VI which if not satisfied would imperil the whole project for sharply increasing deliveries to China. Case VI assumed that C-54's would be obtainable in sufficient number. If this was indeed so, all would go well, but if it was not, China Theater plans would be adversely affected.
Transferring Support from SEAC to China
Though supply of the U.S. effort in China was India-Burma Theater's major mission, Sultan's theater also had commitments in Burma. While the Chinese divisions and the Tenth Air Force were in Burma, IBT had to support them. Slim's Fourteenth Army was also heavily dependent on U.S. transport aircraft. Since these Chinese and American resources were ultimately intended for support of China, to China they would have to go at some point in the Burma campaign. The choice of that point and the phasing of the departure were matters of importance and delicacy.
By mid-March 1945 the Generalissimo, Mountbatten, Wedemeyer, and Sultan were agreed that the rest of the Chinese Army in India and OCTAGON Task Force would be released to return to China, since the Chinese did not want to move farther south.33 Meanwhile, Slim's forces were heavily engaged between Mandalay and Meiktila. The difficulty in making the transfer lay in the demands on air transport that would result. The easiest, quickest, and cheapest way to move the 30th, 38th, and 50th Chinese Divisions to east China was by air. Air transport was also the obvious way to move the ground echelons of the Tenth Air Force to China. But SEAC's transports that might be needed for this movement were engaged in support of Slim's forces, and were now the major contribution of the India-Burma Theater to the Burma campaign. Indeed, 80 percent of SEAC's transports were American.
In agreeing that the three remaining Chinese divisions and OCTAGON could be released, SEAC believed it had come very close to the limit of the resources that it could spare for China. All that remained were the transports. They and their crews were being worked hard to bring ammunition, gas, and food to Meiktila. Therefore, the JCS suggestion of 16 March 1945 that the aircraft to fly OCTAGON and the Chinese divisions to east China should come from the transports supporting NCAC as well as from China Theater's own
resources and the ATC was disturbing to Mountbatten. The Joint Chiefs had softened this proposal by stating that the Chinese Army in India was not to leave Burma before Rangoon fell or 1 June, whichever was sooner, but since SEAC was already on record as anxious to have the army moved out of Burma as soon as possible to aid the supply situation, the phrasing of the JCS proposal seemed to Mountbatten to offer no solution to his problem.
China Theater, which was asking for the transfer of the Chinese divisions, did not believe it had resources to spare for the move or that it could anticipate any reinforcements from outside India and Burma. China Theater's own transports were fully engaged within China, in the ALPHA troop movements, and so its planners pointed to the 148 transports which had been supporting NCAC. Since these were NCAC troops that were coming to China, they argued, their logistical support could come with them.
Such arguments did not impress Mountbatten, who placed his case before the British Chiefs of Staff as he had in a similar instance several months before. He urged two points on them, that the Chinese divisions should be moved from Burma as soon as possible, and that no transport should be withdrawn from SEAC to move them. The British Chiefs fully endorsed Mountbatten's views. They were powerfully supported by the Prime Minister, who on 30 March sent a message to General Marshall. Churchill wrote: "As General Marshall will remember from our talks at OCTAGON [September 1944], we greatly disliked the prospect of a renewal of a large-scale campaign in the jungles of Burma and I have always had other ideas myself." Churchill pointed out that the British had loyally thrown themselves into the Burma campaign. Furthermore, the British had kept Indian divisions in Italy to permit Canadian troops to join combined operations in Germany.34
In the War Department, these representations were received in a manner to suggest that the local commanders had misunderstood the JCS 16 March message on the transfer of U.S. resources from Burma, though its phrasing did support the conclusions drawn. Since the United States had promised that it would not unilaterally jeopardize approved Fourteenth Army operations, the War Department Operation Division (OPD) had expected that the 16 March message would be interpreted accordingly. OPD expected that NCAC aircraft would be used to move OCTAGON Task Force with its two regiments, a far smaller commitment than flying back three Chinese divisions.
General Marshall, therefore, on 3 April 1945 assured the British that the United States was in fullest accord with Churchill's desire to continue Mountbatten's
offensive on to the capture of Rangoon. He relayed the JCS assurance that the transports would not be transferred before 1 June or Rangoon's capture, whichever came first. JCS reserved the general right to transfer resources to China if Rangoon did not fall before the monsoon began.35 The Chinese divisions would therefore be returned by ATC and China Theater.
Consistent with JCS policy, China Theater's next proposals for moving IBT air resources to China did not suggest the transfer of any transport squadrons until June, when two were requested. For July, China Theater wanted two fighter groups, a troop carrier group less one squadron, and miscellaneous service elements. The rest of the Tenth Air Force, which would include the last of the transports, was to be moved in September.36
When China Theater's proposals arrived at SEAC, that headquarters was making a major change in strategy. On 23 February SEAC's field commanders had been sure they could reach Rangoon overland before the monsoon broke. By 22 March, the senior ground commander, General Leese, had to point out that the advance was behind schedule, and a few days later suggested an amphibious assault on Rangoon, using some of the forces that were intended for Malaya. The monsoon's approach set a time limit; great efforts would be necessary to make an amphibious assault before then. Mountbatten's land, sea, and air forces, with veteran staffs and veteran troops, were at a stage of training and experience that permitted maximum flexibility, and so the decision was made. Rangoon was to be taken by amphibious and air assault, and by 5 May. Slim's men were now past Mandalay, moving south, and they were to continue as fast as possible. Their problem was logistical. They had to have air supply just to stay where they were, for their overland lines of communication had been improvised on the assumption that air supply would be available. Once the monsoon began they would have to be supplied through Rangoon anyway, so the best solution for Slim's logistical problem was for him to reach the port at the earliest date. These needs and the decision to take Rangoon by amphibious and air assault meant that SEAC would not want to spare one transport before Rangoon fell.37
Therefore, China Theater's initial proposals for deferring until June the movement of Tenth Air Force to China were welcome. They had hardly been received when the Japanese drive on Chihchiang in China forced Wedemeyer to make an emergency appeal for one transport squadron. He wanted to rush troops to defend the Chihchiang fields and felt that if he had the squadron by 25 April the Chinese could hold the area. General Sultan concurred,
for he believed the squadron could be found from those currently engaged in supply NCAC.
Mountbatten was willing that the squadron should go, since it was not currently engaged in central or south Burma, but he stipulated it must be regarded as coming from the June quota for China. He also asked Sultan how it was that in late April Sultan could spare a squadron for China when on 20 March he could not find one to help Slim in the battle for Mandalay. Sultan explained that in the interim enough Chinese troops had been moved from central Burma to lessen the need for air supply there, and so the squadron could be released.38
With the withdrawal of the Chinese divisions from SEAC, and the imminence of the Tenth Air Force's departure, it was possible in mid-April to forecast that the United States would soon withdraw entirely from SEAC. One reason lay in the fact that U.S. resources in SEAC were there to support China. Once Burma was retaken, SEAC would be involved in Malayan operations, in which the United States had no strategic interest, since the liberation of the Philippines plus the attack on Okinawa had already cut the Japanese oceanic line of communications to southeast Asia and the oil of the Indies. Moreover, the United States wished to avoid being in the position of supporting the re-establishment of European colonialism in southeast Asia.39
General Hull, chief of the Operations Division, discussed U.S. withdrawal from SEAC with General Marshall in April 1945. They agreed that SEAC should remain a combined headquarters so long as U.S. forces were assigned to it. On 16 May General Wheeler, who was the senior U.S. officer in SEAC, and also Principal Administrative Officer of that command, raised the issue again in a private letter to General Hull. If the United States continued as an active partner but contributed no forces, Wheeler pointed out, U.S. influence on SEAC policy would be nil. He thought it better to withdraw if no American forces were to be assigned. The Asiatic Section, OPD, described his views as "in complete accord" with theirs. But Marshall did not take too rigid a view of the existing situation. He did not permit Hull to answer until 18 June.
Hull's answer described U.S. policy on remaining in SEAC during hostilities. Hull believed that Marshall did not at this time want to raise the question of formal U.S. withdrawal. To Hull, he seemed reluctant to suggest a change because he had been a strong sponsor of the original idea of American participation on an Allied basis. Therefore, no change in the
U.S. status was likely unless the British proposed it or some significant change occurred in the meantime.40
If the British accepted Mountbatten's views they would not be apt to suggest U.S. withdrawal from SEAC. Throughout SEAC history Mountbatten had stressed the "Allied" note. He appeared to value this not merely for what additional strength the Americans might lend, but for the idea's sake as well. As the campaign in Burma drew nearer an end he suggested that SEAC remain at least formally an Anglo-American command, through the presence of some American officers at SEAC headquarters, even after all American combat forces were gone. Therefore, as the fighting drew nearer to Rangoon, and the end of the campaign, SEAC remained an Allied command in name, though the combat effort was now exerted by British, Indian, and Burmese troops, which received most of their air supply from American cargo planes, and the Royal Navy and the Royal Indian Navy.41
The Last Battles in Burma
After securing the Meiktila-Mandalay area, Slim regrouped his forces for the dash to Rangoon by putting the motorized 5th and 17th Indian Divisions plus the bulk of his armor on the road and rail line from Mandalay to Rangoon. (See Map 12) The rest of the force was switched to the Irrawaddy valley. In effect Slim was bypassing two still formidable groups of Japanese, 28th Army to the west above the Irrawaddy, and 56th Division to the east in the Shan States. Initially, Japanese resistance was stubborn, but as each Japanese position was reduced or bypassed, the daily bounds of Slim's forces grew even longer. On 6 and 7 April the Japanese 33d Army tried to hold north of Yamethin long enough to permit preparations for a major stand at Toungoo to the south. The 17th Indian Division broke up the attempt and the 33d's commander, Lt. Gen. Masaki Honda barely escaped with his life. General Honda extricated his force, and again tried to stand at Pyinmana, forty-five miles south, on 19 April. The 5th Indian Division summarily ended the attempt. When the morning of 20 April arrived, Honda and his staff, fighting as infantry, managed to break through the Indian lines, but their radio communications were destroyed and they were out of touch with their troops. Slim's men had broken the last brittle crust of Japanese resistance above Rangoon, and were fairly in the clear. By 25 April the 17th Indian Division was 144 miles from Rangoon. If the weather
AMERICAN OFFICERS, OSS DETACHMENT 101, are shown with General Sultan at an advanced ranger base in Burma, June 1945.
held, it could hope to reach Rangoon before the amphibious attack, then set for 2 May.
While Slim's men were cleaning their guns and preparing their tanks and trucks for the advance on Rangoon, off the flank, on what had been the NCAC front south of Lashio, a miniature campaign under U.S. sponsorship was developing. The NCAC move southward had been screened and guided by Burmese irregulars recruited, trained, and led by the OSS. As the campaign progressed they had grown in strength, and by late March they were taking the field in battalions. In early April OSS sought and received permission to continue south from the area of Lashio with about 3,200 men, armed with small arms, rocket launchers, machine guns, and trench mortars. On 27 April their offensive began.
The mission of the U.S.-sponsored Burmese troops, OSS Detachment 101, was to clear the Japanese from the central Shan States to the Taunggyi road. Fortunately for them, since their only support was the 60th Fighter Squadron,
Tenth Air Force, the Japanese 56th Division had orders to move south into the southern Shan States. The OSS battalions--1st, 10th, 2d, and 3d--deployed on a 75-mile front from near Maymyo on the west to the area Ke-hsi Mansam on the east. In the days that followed, they exchanged some sharp blows with the Japanese. An aggressive Japanese commander read the 1st Battalion a lesson on concentration of effort by attacking first one half, then the other, of its forces, and pushing it away from two villages. Generally, the Japanese rear guard garrisons were content to hold what they had and try to run their convoys past the OSS troops' ambushes. When, as on 8 May, the Japanese sent out punitive expeditions, the guerrillas would let the Japanese have a taste of fighting up steep wooded hillsides into machine gun fire, then withdraw when the Japanese pressure grew too heavy.
From the west, the 64th Indian Infantry Brigade was preparing to attack toward Taunggyi from the area through which Slim's task force had passed in its drive toward Rangoon. In late May and early June it met stiff resistance west of Taunggyi, where bypassed Japanese held strong defensive positions. The 64th had to fight its way up from the central Burma plain into the hills of the Shan plateau. Not until 16 June did the 64th take Heho, thirteen miles west of Taunggyi, in the area where the 1st Battalion had its setback a month before. With British forces now operating in the area, it seemed well to yield control of operations to them, and this was done as of 1 July. Not until 25 July was Taunggyi taken, by the 99th Indian Infantry Brigade, which suggests that Detachment 101 cannot claim to have cleared the area.42
In central Burma, signs of Japanese weakness were everywhere, such as railroad trains overrun in the station yards. Reading the signs aright, the Japanese-trained Burmese Army went over to the British en masse. Not only was this a most severe psychological blow to the Japanese, but the Burmans harassed Japanese rear installations and killed Japanese stragglers and small parties. On 29 April there was plain evidence that the Japanese defense of Rangoon was finally breaking. A column of some 400 prisoners of war from Rangoon, released by the Japanese, entered the lines of the 17th Indian Division. Some of them had been captured by the Japanese from the 17th in the 1942 defeat; the wheel had turned full circle. But unhappily for the 17th's hopes of being first in Rangoon, that same day the monsoon rains opened with a crash in the Pegu area. Tanks and trucks were now largely roadbound. Rangoon's occupation was left to the Royal Navy.
Beginning 27 April the several task groups for the air and amphibious assaults on Rangoon began putting to sea. Attacks on Rangoon's seaward
LT. GEN. RAYMOND A. WHEELER (right), new Commanding General, India-Burma Theater, shakes hands with his predecessor, General Sultan, during departure ceremonies for the latter at New Delhi, 23 June 1945.
defenses, including a paratroop drop, began on 1 May, and the minesweepers started up the Irrawaddy. One aerial observer reported a message painted on the roof of the Rangoon jail that the Japanese were gone. It was ignored and bombing continued, but word of the sign must have spread quickly. Next day an RAF pilot and observer saw no signs of activity at Mingaladon airfield, outside Rangoon, and decided to land there. The field was well cratered with bombing, and the plane crashed. Undaunted, the pilot walked into Rangoon, on to the jail. The Japanese were gone. Rangoon was occupied the day after, 3 May.
After Rangoon's fall, there was in effect a long cordon of British troops stretching from Mandalay to Rangoon. West of it were the remnants of the Japanese 28th Army, the veterans of the Arakan campaign. Their attempts to break through the British lines in July with some 25,000 men, assisted by the 33d Army to the east, marked the last major action of the campaign. British intelligence and reconnaissance brought clear indication
of the projected breakthrough. The 17th Indian Division sited strongpoints in the path of the breakthrough along the few practicable routes left by the monsoon floods. From these, the 17th's veterans exacted the final retribution for 1942, as the Japanese sought to make their way through heavy machine gun and artillery fire. By the time the fighting ended in August, the Japanese did get a large portion of their force between the 17th's strongpoints and across the Sittang River. Estimation of their casualties is difficult because of administrative changes and lost records, but on 20 September, the 28th Army mustered only 7,949 men for duty, had 1,919 in the hospital, and carried 4,822 as missing but expected to return. In contrast, the British lost but 95 dead and 322 wounded between 20 July and 4 August.43
The liberation of Rangoon and victory in Burma were fittingly celebrated by a victory parade in that city. While the festivities were in course, the India-Burma Theater commander, General Sultan, was surprised to receive a radio from Washington calling him back to be Chief of Engineers. His tour of duty ended 23 June 1945. For his services in India and Burma he received the Oak Leaf Cluster to the Distinguished Service Medal, the Bronze Star, and the Chinese Order of the Cloud and Banner with Special Grand Cordon. His successor was General Wheeler. Wheeler had created the SOS in CBI back in 1942, when every day was a struggle to improvise and expedite. From SOS commander he had become Principal Administrative Officer, SEAC. On Stilwell's recall in 1944 he added the title of Deputy Supreme Allied Commander. Now, he was to finish his overseas career as U.S. India-Burma Theater commander.44 The biggest task facing him was that of supporting Wedemeyer's operations against the Canton-Hong Kong area, Plan BETA.
Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter (9) * Next Chapter (11)
1. History of IBT, II, 208-16, 237-40.
2. In the phonetic alphabet used in 1944-45, the letter S was rendered as sugar, so U.S. and Uncle Sam were quickly changed to Uncle Sugar.
3. History of IBT, I, 49.
4. History of IBT, I, 50-56.
5. SOS in IBT, I, 44-50.
6. Paraphrased from SOS in IBT, I, 50-51.
7. This and the following paragraph based on SOS in IBT, App. 4.
8. SOS in IBT, I, 58-59.
9. Bringing Wacs to India was against Stilwell's wishes. See Mattie E. Treadwell, The Women's Army Corps, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1955), Ch. XXIII.
10. (1) History of IBT, II, 269-88. (2) SOS in IBT, pp. 44-66. (3) Treadwell, The Women's Army Corps, Ch. XXIII.
11. (1) Data on man-days from History of IBT, I, 194-95. (2) History of IBT, II, 279-81.
12. History of IBT, II, 298-300.
13. (1) Stilwell's Mission to China, Chapter V, describes the early days of the reciprocal aid system. (2) Chapter I, above, gives the reciprocal aid situation in October 1944.
14. History of IBT, II, 216-20.
15. History of IBT, I, 157-60.
16. Stilwell's Mission to China, p. 210.
17. History of IBT, II, 220-29.
18. See Ch. I, above.
19. History of IBT, I, 57-58.
20. History of IBT, I, 45-46.
21. (1) Stilwell's Mission to China, Chapter I, gives the background of this effort to aid China with matériel. (2) Stilwell's Command Problems, Chapter VII, describes the origin of the 1944-45 lend-lease policies.
22. This program did not include five divisions of the Chinese Army in India.
23. History of IBT, I, 161-63.
24. History of IBT, II, 233-34. Quotation from page 165.
25. For a discussion of the port problem in 1943, see Stilwell's Mission to China, pp. 143, 148, 203, 206, 314, 383.
26. (1) The transport problem of 1944 is discussed in Stilwell's Command Problems, Chapters I, VII. (2) Quotation from History of IBT, II, 402.
27. History of IBT, II, 403-13.
28. Stilwell's Command Problems, Ch. VII.
29. Stilwell's Mission to China, Chapters V, IX, and X, and Stilwell's Command Problems, Chapter X, give the War Department, Army Service Forces, and CBI Theater views on the Ledo Road. (2) Min, 2d White House Mtg, 14 May 43. Official TRIDENT Conf Bk.
30. Stilwell's Command Problems, Ch. IX.
31. (1) History of IBT, II, 359-76. (2) Joseph Bykofsky and Harold Larson, The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1957).
32. (1) History of IBT, II, 377-83. (2) History of SOS in IBT, pp. 218-24.
33. See Ch. VII, above.
34. (1) History of IBT, II, 333-36. (2) Mountbatten Report, Pt. B, pars. 459-64. (3) Prime Minister to Field Marshal Sir Henry M. Wilson, British Joint Services Mission, 022058. Folder 66, OPD Exec 10. (4) See Ch. V, above.
35. Memo, Hull for Marshall, sub: Conf with Field Marshal Wilson on CCS 452/44; Memo, Marshall for Wilson, 3 Apr 45. Cases 6/4, 6/5, OPD 452.1
36. History of IBT, II, 335-36.
37. Mountbatten Report, Pt. B, pars. 498-507.
38. History of IBT, II, 335-37.
39. See History of IBT, II, 161.
40. Ltr, Wheeler to Hull, 16 May 45; Memo for Record, 16 May 45; Ltr, Hull to Wheeler, 18 Jun 45. OPD 384 TS, Sec I (1-20).
41. History of IBT, II, 340.
42. (1) ALFSEA Record, pp. 118-19. (2) History of IBT, II, 342-49.
43. (1) Japanese Study 132. Strength tables facing pp. 77, 56. (2) Mountbatten Report, Pt B, pars. 542-48, 591-603.
44. History of IBT, II, 420.