Wedemeyer Begins His Work in China
After assuming command on 31 October 1944, General Wedemeyer proceeded to estimate the situation that faced him in China. The Japanese menace was an immediate one. Considering that he had to hold the Kunming area, Wedemeyer tried to gauge the intentions of the Japanese from their strengths, disposition, and capabilities. Since Wedemeyer had no U.S. ground combat forces, any renewed Japanese drive would have to be met by the Chinese Army and the Fourteenth Air Force.
Japanese Plans in American Eyes
On arriving in Chungking, Wedemeyer began a series of conferences with senior Chinese military officials, his principal subordinates, such as General Chennault, and his own staff. From these meetings emerged a series of recommendations to the Generalissimo for strengthening the Chinese Army, an estimate of Japanese plans and intentions, and a plan to hold the vital Kunming area. Since the Japanese held the initiative in east China, the first reports from China Theater headquarters to General Marshall for the Joint Chiefs of Staff began with surveys of the Japanese position vis-à-vis the Chinese and the American forces in the Pacific. The intelligence reports used by theater headquarters, many of which come from the Forward Echelon, Z-Force, placed ten well-equipped Japanese divisions in the area between Heng-Yang and Liuchow. It seemed obvious to the Americans that such a force had been concentrated with further offensive intent in mind.1
A Japanese drive on Kunming from the Kweilin-Liuchow-Nanning area did not at first appear imminent to China Theater headquarters but the results if the Japanese should take Kunming appeared so grave that such a
move by the Japanese was an object of "urgent concern" on 6 November. Eleven days later the Japanese advance had intensified and Wedemeyer felt that he had to "move fast" to stabilize the situation in the Kweilin-Liuchow area and prepare the defense of Kunming. If Kunming fell, Wedemeyer believed it would mean the end of the Allied effort to save China and to maintain air bases in that nation. Wedemeyer warned that the loss of China would release twenty-five Japanese divisions for service elsewhere. So pessimistic an estimate necessarily assumed that the Japanese would not feel the need of more than a token occupation force in China to control a population of 400,000,000 and protect the Japanese position in North China from the USSR.2
Though Wedemeyer considered a Japanese drive on Kunming his most immediate concern, he did not believe that the Japanese were seeking to end the war in China by military pressure on the Generalissimo's regime. He thought rather that the Japanese were seeking to prepare a "continental inner-zone defense" to compensate for the loss of their island positions in the Pacific. Such a position would comprise the Japanese home islands, Formosa, and Hainan, backed by a wide belt of Asiatic mainland running from north Korea to Indochina. Within China proper, the Japanese would seek to control everything east of the line Peiping-Hankow-Nanning, inclusive, by holding the key rail lines, airfields, waterways, and highways. Within such a zone, the Japanese could in the opinion of China Theater headquarters organize a withdrawal route in coastal waters and another over the mainland of China whereby troops and matériel could be evacuated from the south, e. g., Malaya and Burma, for a final stand in the inner zone.
Effective possession of this great band of Chinese territory appeared to open many opportunities whereby the Japanese might increase their capabilities against the forces of Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur as more and more of them approached the Japanese homeland. From safe airfields deep in the interior of China, Japanese bombers could stage through coastal airfields, attack U.S. task forces, then retire again to fields beyond the range of U.S. carrier aircraft. This belt of Japanese airfields would also interpose a barrier of fighters against Chennault's aircraft if, from bases in west China, they tried to attack Japanese shipping. Japanese divisions could be shifted up and down the coastal corridor to meet any developing American invasion threat.3
Situation in China,
Lending confirmation to this belief that Japan was staking out such a continental belt was the opinion in China Theater headquarters that more Japanese divisions had arrived in east China.4
The Japanese Side of the Hill
The Japanese forces whose future plans China Theater sought to discern were organized as China Expeditionary Army, General Yasuji Okamura commanding. They numbered about 820,000 in November 1944 and were organized into 25 infantry divisions of very uneven quality, 1 armored division, 11 independent infantry brigades, 1 cavalry brigade, and 10 independent mixed brigades. Under General Okamura were three principal formations, North China Area Army, holding the north China plain from the Yellow River to the Great Wall; the 6th Area Army, which was conducting the operations against the Chinese and Americans in east China; and the 13th Army, which held the lower Yangtze valley and the great port city of Shanghai. (Map 3)
North China Area Army had three missions: training, occupying the north China plain, and watching the Soviet forces in the Far East. It had three subordinate army headquarters, the 1st, 12th, and Mongolian, and 8 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, 1 cavalry brigade, 4 independent infantry brigades, and 6 independent mixed brigades. The 8 infantry divisions were "Class C," with no artillery.
The 13th Army, with 4 divisions and 2 brigades, trained itself, occupied the Shanghai area, and prepared for the day when the Americans might try to land in the Yangtze valley.
The 6th Area Army, under Okamura himself, comprised the 11th, 20th, 23d and 34th Armies, with 13 divisions, 6 independent infantry brigades, and 3 independent mixed brigades. Here was the Japanese elite force, 3 "Class A" divisions with 36 cannon each, 5 "Class B," with 24 cannon each. This was the force whose intentions so disturbed China Theater headquarters. The 23d Army, considering itself relieved of garrison duties by an arrangement with the local Chinese commander, General Yu Han-mou, was driving north and west from the Canton-Hong Kong area with 2 divisions. The 11th Army controlled the stretch of rail and river south of Hsin-shih and Yueh-yang with 7 divisions, and was approaching Kweilin. The 34th Army, a garrison force, with 1 division and 4 brigades, held the vital Hankow area, supply base and headquarters for Okamura, against the 55 Chinese divisions of the Generalissimo's V and VI War Areas.5
The basic plan under which the Japanese now fought their war was denominated by the Japanese character SHÕ, meaning "to conquer." When, in the summer of 1944, the situation Japan faced appeared grave in the extreme, Japan's leaders resolved to launch every available resource in a great counterattack by sea, land, and air that would hit the American forces as they were engaged in the complicated and hazardous task of establishing themselves ashore somewhere in Japan's inner defense zone of the western Pacific. They called their riposte the SHÕ Operation. The Japanese estimated that any one of four different areas might be struck by the American forces, and as many variants of SHÕ were prepared. It was the supreme operation, and Imperial General Headquarters gave it first priority. Therefore, Okamura had to detach two divisions for SHÕ, while the Japanese forces in Manchuria were drawn on heavily indeed. If the Soviet Union entered the war, China Expeditionary Army would have to release from 10 to 20 more divisions.6
When SHÕ was framed, China Expeditionary Army had been engaged in occupying the east China airfields, the ICHIGO Operation. Visiting Okamura's headquarters in September 1944, Col. Takushiro Hattori of Imperial General Headquarters stated that, far from lessening ICHIGO's importance, the imminent prospect of beginning the SHÕ Operation made it ever more important to complete ICHIGO. In Hattori's opinion, which was taken by his auditors as echoing that of higher realms in Tokyo, the success of ICHIGO would--by taking the east China fields--force U.S. aircraft from China bases to confine their operations to the west until such time as SHÕ's outcome was apparent. So the 6th Area Army made detailed plans to complete ICHIGO by taking Kweilin and Liuchow, tentative date early November 1944, and hoped in the process to cut off some of the Chinese defenders. After Kweilin and Liuchow were taken, the Canton-Hankow railway would be cleared of all barriers, and the Suichuan group of airfields destroyed. This latter piece of territory was not to be held.7
In mid-October, Okamura directed that the Suichuan airfields be taken as soon as possible after occupation of Liuchow and Kweilin, though this was in compliance with Tokyo's orders rather than with local Japanese military opinion. Then the American task forces were sighted heading for Leyte, and
on 18 October Tokyo ordered the SHÕ Operation to begin.8 When Wedemeyer assumed command on 31 October, SHÕ was under way. The naval part of SHÕ had failed; the air part was failing, but the Japanese were doing their utmost to reinforce and support their Philippine garrison, and continued their efforts for many weeks.
The Japanese in Manchuria and Korea were being used as a troop pool from which to reinforce garrisons in the central and south Pacific. In the latter half of 1944, 6 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, 2 independent mixed brigades, and most of the stock of reserve matériel were shipped out and only partially replaced by 5 newly activated divisions.9
As for China, Imperial General Headquarters had no intent to take Kunming or end the war, nor was it trying to create a continental fortress. Chinese territory did not attract the Japanese leaders. Their orders to Okamura showed that his armies would be used aggressively in a mobile role: if possible, to forestall Allied moves, as they now sought, by occupying the east China airfields, to prevent interference with SHÕ or the bombing of Japan from Chinese bases; if necessary, to counter Allied moves, as shown by the warning to Okamura that if the Soviet Union entered the war from 10 to 20 of his divisions would have to be moved to Manchuria. Therefore, the strategy of Imperial General Headquarters in November 1944 was not quite what China Theater headquarters concluded from the menacing Japanese dispositions in south China. The Japanese forces on the mainland of Asia had missions rather more limited than those with which the Americans credited them.
Wedemeyer's Reactions to the Chinese Scene
There were two points requiring Wedemeyer's immediate attention--the defense of the Kweilin airfield, if possible, and the absolutely vital holding of Kunming. On taking command, Wedemeyer lost no time in becoming acquainted with his Chinese superior, the Generalissimo, and with the Generalissimo's staff. Could Kweilin be held, Wedemeyer asked the Generalissimo and his staff. What resources could be mustered by the Chinese to stop the Japanese short of a major victory? In discussions with his staff, Chennault, and the Chinese, Wedemeyer also sought to learn why the east China fields had been lost. And he made his appraisal of China's leaders, which he reported to Marshall and the War Department.
Wedemeyer found no air of alarm or urgency in the Chinese Government. Initially, he reported the Chinese to be "apathetic and unintelligent."10 Three weeks later, he found his Chinese colleagues still in a state of apathy with regard to the Japanese. If the Chinese had more accurate information regarding Japanese intentions, they either kept it to themselves or failed to convince Wedemeyer that it was valid. He judged their apathy to be an indication of inward impotence and of confusion on the part of the Generalissimo and his advisers:
In previous radios I have suggested that the Chinese attitude was apathetic. This remains true; however, I have now concluded that the Generalissimo and his adherents realize seriousness of situation but they are impotent and confounded. They are not organized, equipped, and trained for modern war. Psychologically they are not prepared to cope with the situation because of political intrigue, false pride, and mistrust of leaders' honesty and motives. . . . Frankly, I think that the Chinese officials surrounding the Generalissimo are actually afraid to report accurately conditions for two reasons, their stupidity and inefficiency are revealed, and further the Generalissimo might order them to take positive action and they are incompetent to issue directives, make plans, and fail completely in obtaining execution by field commanders.11
The Chinese methods of making war appeared ineffective to Wedemeyer. He found that the Chinese had no one commander responsible for the conduct of operations in east China. Instead, the Chinese staff at Chungking tried to control everything. In many cases, he believed they simply assumed a situation and issued orders accordingly, even though there might be little connection between their imaginings and the actual state of affairs. And so the Chinese armies marched and countermarched futilely. The orders from Chungking were not part of any plan; indeed, to Wedemeyer it seemed that "the disorganization and muddled planning of the Chinese is beyond comprehension." Every commitment of Chinese troops to battle was made piecemeal. There was neither co-operation nor co-ordination between Chinese senior commanders in adjacent areas. As for the Chinese divisions themselves, Wedemeyer, like Stilwell, believed that at best their leadership was mediocre. Unit training appeared to be of a low standard. There was no effective replacement system. The men often lacked equipment and food.12
A few days later, Wedemeyer stated that a "sound replacement program simply does not exist for there are so many officials involved with their narrow
NATIONALIST CHINESE SOLDIERS marching to the front, Kwangsi Province, November 1944.
and unscrupulous self-interest that it has not been possible to mobilize [the Chinese] forces in an efficient manner."13
In talking to the Generalissimo and the Chinese staff, Wedemeyer found it hard to learn just what the Chinese could or would do to defend any one position or to venture attacks on limited local objectives. When Wedemeyer arrived in Chungking, the Japanese offered an imminent threat to Kweilin. It appeared possible the Chinese could hold that city with its vital airfield. The newly arrived Chinese 97th Army held what seemed strong positions above Kweilin. They were reported to be well fed and well equipped. There was plenty of time for them to dig in, and Wedemeyer on his arrival had rushed U.S. officers to the 97th Army to assist them in preparing their positions. The Generalissimo and his staff were positive that the Kweilin-Liuchow area would be held for two months if the Japanese
attacked and the Generalissimo so assured Wedemeyer "categorically." U.S. observers on the scene may have been less confident, for many years later one of them recalled having noted very bad feeling between the 97th Army and General Chang Fa-kwei, as well as faulty dispositions at Kweilin.14
While conferring with his own staff and the Chinese, Wedemeyer made his estimate of the situation within the American organization. The long-continued differences between Chennault and Stilwell had left their mark in bad feelings among their subordinates. Therefore the situation Wedemeyer found in his headquarters seemed to be "rife with dissension and disorganization." He later concluded that many members of Stilwell's old staff had had "a defeatist attitude, non-cooperative spirit and ideas of suspicion in their relations with other headquarters." In remodeling his organization, Wedemeyer attached importance to having more airmen assist him as staff officers, a clear indication of his sympathetic approach to the air force.15
Though on the eve of his assuming command Wedemeyer had expressed forebodings over the co-operation he might receive from Chennault, he lost no time in approaching the latter with a request for a conference.16 The prospects for co-operation between the two men were excellent, for the passage of time had removed many of the issues that had tended to divide Stilwell and Chennault. It was no longer possible to argue that Japan could be defeated by 137 China-based tactical aircraft.17 Nor could the Generalissimo now have such faith in his Army as to renew his promises of April 1943 that the "existing Chinese Forces" could defend the east China fields, for those airfields had fallen into Japanese hands after one battle.18 The bitter debates over who should receive what share of Hump tonnage were becoming just an unpleasant memory, for the Air Transport Command was delivering tonnage in impressive and increasing quantities.
There were also favorable factors on the personal side. For whatever reason, perhaps his customary reticence, perhaps his sharp differentiation among his many command posts in CBI, Stilwell did not take Chennault into his confidence as to what he would have liked to do in China. In such a situation, rumor and the personal interest of subordinates and outsiders seem to have flourished. Wedemeyer, making no distinction between his several roles in China, brought Chennault into many of his conferences with
CHINESE REFUGEES EVACUATING LIUCHOW
the Generalissimo and kept both Chennault and Chennault's staff fully informed of what he was recommending to the Chinese.
The Japanese Begin To Threaten
The Japanese headquarters immediately responsible for operations in east China was the 6th Area Army. It in turn ordered the 11th and 23d Armies to converge on the Kweilin-Liuchow area from north and south. The 11th Army requested and obtained permission to secure the area around Kweilin, and China Expeditionary Army approved, providing "only short advances were to be made." However, 11th Army had ambitious schemes of its own.19
Japanese operations resumed over 27 and 28 October. The 11th Army, using four divisions and a company of tanks, made steady progress, and was swinging its left flank toward the south in order to cut off Kweilin from that
direction. The 23d Army, with two divisions, was coming up toward Liuchow from the south. The Japanese believed Kweilin to be defended by two armies, Liuchow, only by the 62d. After considering his situation, the aggressive commander of the 11th Army decided to take Kweilin and Liuchow simultaneously, though he had been repeatedly told that for reasons of prestige the 23d Army would take Liuchow. The Japanese were plagued with communications problems and 6th Area Army could not restrain the impetuous 11th. So, even as the Generalissimo was assuring Wedemeyer that Kweilin and Liuchow would hold two months, 11th Army was preparing to take the conduct of ICHIGO into its own hands.20
With the approach of the Japanese, the Chinese evacuated the garrisons of Kweilin and Liuchow on 10 November. Little resistance was offered, according to Wedemeyer's information, which he promptly passed to the Generalissimo.21 So much was still within the frame of ICHIGO, and within the propaganda with which the Japanese had preceded and accompanied that operation to the effect that ICHIGO was aimed only at the U.S. airfields in east China, and not at the Chinese forces.22 Taking both Kweilin and Liuchow, and leaving Lt. Gen. Shinichi Tanaka of the 23d Army to think of the glories he might have won by a more speedy advance, the 11th Army now took matters into its own hands and began a rapid advance north and west towards Kweichow Province.23
ALPHA: Beginning an Attempt To Save
Three days after the Japanese took Kweilin and Liuchow Wedemeyer had his first formal meeting with the Generalissimo and the latter's senior assistants. The approach Wedemeyer took to the formalities, the mechanics of the meeting, was characteristic, and different from Stilwell's. Stilwell had rigidly separated his post of Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander, China Theater, from his post of Commanding General, China, Burma and India Theater. The minutes of his meetings with the Generalissimo Stilwell kept to himself; usually not until the last was his U.S. staff aware of his plans for China. Wedemeyer, on the contrary, normally had his own chief of staff attend his meetings with the Generalissimo and he was always attended by other American officers. Minutes of the meetings were kept with care and instead of being isolated were filed in with the other top secret
documents of U.S. theater headquarters.24 Therefore, whatever might happen, Wedemeyer would have witnesses and records aplenty in his own headquarters to document his every word in conference with the Generalissimo, and these records would be easily accessible to every qualified seeker after information. For his part, the Generalissimo often brought T. V. Soong, who in the fall of 1944 and 1945 was Prime Minister, to attend the meetings. Often General Hurley attended on the U.S. side.
Plans and staff studies from the old CBI Theater headquarters offered the material from which Wedemeyer's staff could prepare his proposals to the Generalissimo. The geography and the contending forces were not changed by Stilwell's recall; ideas worked out by the CBI planners in the summer of 1944 were still applicable. Cols. William M. Creasy, Thomas F. Taylor, Harold C. Donnelly, and Dean Rusk, in New Delhi and Chungking, had spent many months on plans to establish a secure base in the Kunming area, then for a drive to the coast to open a port in the Canton-Hong Kong area.
Approving their suggestions, Stilwell on 18 September had urged the Generalissimo to concentrate the defeated east China divisions in the Kweiyang area for reorganization, rearming, and training, and on 22 September warned his staff and principal subordinates that he contemplated moving the victorious Chinese forces from north Burma and the Salween front to Kweiyang. Once this concentration was completed, Stilwell, assuming that he would then be field commander of the Chinese forces, had contemplated massing 63,000 redeployed Chinese troops plus 183,000 more Chinese in 30 divisions, stiffening them with a reinforced U.S. army corps and two long-range penetration groups, and driving for the coast.
Colonel Taylor, who was familiar with these plans, was Wedemeyer's G-3 in the early days of China Theater. Colonel Creasy gave copies of the old CBI plans to Wedemeyer as the latter was preparing to leave Ceylon for his new assignment in China.25
The speediest possible planning and organizing appeared necessary to theater headquarters if Kunming was to be secure against the Japanese.
Theater headquarters, in close co-operation with the President's representative, General Hurley, began drafting a series of proposals which if adopted by the Chinese would offer the chance of a more effective defense. The suggestions called for a rapid concentration of Chinese troops south and east of Kunming and for a command structure that would permit a co-ordinated defense. The code name for the operations comprised in the plan was ALPHA.26 In addition, Wedemeyer and his staff spent many hours assisting Hurley in the latter's efforts to bring about co-operation between the Chinese Government and the Communists, for they believed Communist military aid could assist materially in stopping the Japanese advance.27
Basically, the old CBI plan which had been drafted in August and September 1944 called for first priority to defense of the Kunming area, since its loss, entailing as it would loss of the Hump air terminals, would be decisive, while loss of Chungking, seat of the Generalissimo's wartime government, though deplorable and disastrous, would not be fatal.28 It was now time for General Wedemeyer, as Chief of Staff to Chiang Kai-shek, to present a tactical plan to the Chinese for their consideration. Having adopted the code name ALPHA--a term which had been applied in the CBI plan to the defense of Kunming--Wedemeyer first presented a detailed plan to the Generalissimo on 21 November 1944.29 This plan was divided into several phases. The period to 31 December 1944 was set for Phase I of ALPHA, in which the Chinese forces in contact with the Japanese in south and southeast China would try to slow their advance. The Americans would assist in demolitions, help plan prepared positions, and give the maximum of air support. American officers would fill liaison and advisory roles with the Chinese Army down through division level. Other Americans would work closely with the operations, intelligence, and supply officers of higher Chinese headquarters. Plainly, the mission of Phase I was to win time within which to complete a concentration for defense of Kunming.
In Phase II, Chinese forces would be placed across the principal avenues of approach to Kunming while a central reserve would be built up around Kunming itself. To guarantee the availability of dependable Chinese troops two divisions of the Chinese Army in India would be flown in from Burma, together with the 53d Army from the Salween front. About 87,500 troops would be brought to the Kunming area from less menaced sectors of China.
The ALPHA Plan,
The planners sought to place a Chinese force capable of meeting the most likely Japanese threat across each avenue of approach. In the Chihkiang area there would be two divisions. There would be two more at Li-ping to block the Japanese threat from Kweilin. The vital Tushan-Kweiyang area, whose possession would give the Japanese the option of attacks on Kunming or Chungking, would receive six divisions. Three divisions at Poseh (Pai-se) would have the mission of stopping a Japanese drive west from Nanning. Six divisions in southern Yunnan would complete the ring and bar any Japanese drive north from Indochina.30 Reserve forces, each of three divisions, would be placed in the Kweiyang, An-nan (Ching-lung), and Mengtzu areas. A ten-division reserve would be built up around Kunming. (Map 4)
The prospect of a favorable outcome of these recommendations was probably increased by the fact that a Chinese general of good reputation, General Tang En-po, was en route to the Kweiyang area. As a result of a series of
conferences in east China in September and October between Stilwell, Chennault, Brig. Gens. Thomas S. Timberman and Malcolm D. Lindsey, Colonel Bowman of Z-Force, Brig. Gen. Casey Vincent of the Fourteenth Air Force, and Generals Chang Fa-kwei and Pai Chung-hsi, General Pai had visited Chungking to present the consensus of the Allied field commanders to the Generalissimo. Bowman later concluded that as a result of General Pai's good offices General Tang was sent to the front.31
The command provisions of ALPHA reflected the belief long held by the staff of theater headquarters that the Chinese would benefit immeasurably if their operations were conducted by a responsible commander in the field rather than by telephone, letter, telegram, and radio from Chungking.32 ALPHA provided for a Chinese Supreme Commander and staff to command the assigned Chinese troops. U.S. officers were to act as deputies to the Supreme Commander, to the commander of each sector, and to the commander of the general reserve. Each of the American deputies would have a complete U.S. staff whose members would work with their Chinese opposite numbers. Training would be conducted by the Americans.
To provide an organization for the American liaison and training personnel who were to assist the Chinese, Wedemeyer grouped the Y-FOS and Z-FOS staffs, training groups, liaison teams, and the existing service schools into the Chinese Training and Combat Command, activated 17 November 1944, General Dorn, commanding. Dorn had been Stilwell's aide in the First Burma Campaign; his last major post had been Chief of Staff, Y-FOS, so he was the senior American staff officer on the Salween front.33
Supply and transport received careful attention, for theater headquarters believed the Chinese Army in China had suffered from Chinese neglect of such prosaic but necessary aspects of war. A Chinese was to be supply officer to the Supreme Commander, assisted by a deputy from the U.S. Services of Supply. This latter officer would control transport. In the lower echelons of command, supply problems would be handled by the Chinese commanders assisted by their American deputies.34
Having accepted ALPHA as the first step in carrying out his directive to advise and assist the Chinese, Wedemeyer turned to his next tasks--persuading the Chinese to adopt ALPHA and, once they had, persuading them to carry it out.
GENERAL DORN, commanding the new Chinese Training and Combat Command, with General Wei Li-huang (left), Commanding General, Chinese Expeditionary Forces, and General Ho Ying-chin, Commanding General, ALPHA Forces, 21 November 1944.
Chinese Reactions to ALPHA
The Chinese reaction of November-December to the complicated ALPHA plan was equally complex; some parts of it appeared to be accepted, some the Chinese modified to suit themselves, and some received formal approval only to be quietly disregarded later. That the Chinese did not accept ALPHA as a whole had its effect on operations, because the plan was as integrated as a piece of machinery; the discard or alteration of any part had its effect on the workings of the whole. So it was a mixed picture that unfolded before Wedemeyer and his staff, a blend of progress, passive acceptance, inertia, and outright rejection.
The initial discussions of 13 and 16 November, before the formal presentation of ALPHA, concerned issues of deployment and command, which had their place in ALPHA but which were also measures to meet the immediate threat to Kunming. Toward the issue of rushing troops south from the Hsian front, where considerable Nationalist forces watched the Chinese Communists,
the Generalissimo showed a certain coolness. He remarked that since Kweilin and Liuchow had fallen, and since these troops were originally intended to reinforce the garrisons of the two cities, there was no need for haste. The Kweiyang airfield, their destination, should be repaired, which he thought would take thirty days, and the men could then be flown direct to their destination rather than by way of Chanyi or Peishiyi.
Successful execution of ALPHA depended completely on whether the Chinese forces to confront the Japanese would resist. Wedemeyer regarded this as an unknown factor; "We can throw in great numbers of troops at tremendous cost logistically, but we do not know whether the Chinese will stick and fight." So Wedemeyer concluded that two of the Chinese divisions Stilwell had trained and equipped would have to be flown from Burma. He decided that nothing but what he thought the best would serve, the 22d and 38th Divisions, and requested the Generalissimo to approve their recall. The Generalissimo agreed, adding that he himself had thought of recalling two divisions. The next step was to arrange co-ordination of the transfer with Admiral Mountbatten's Southeast Asia Command, which would be affected by removing these troops.35
As for the creation of an effective command structure for China Theater, the Generalissimo agreed to the most important points, for which Stilwell had so long argued, that there should be a single responsible field commander and a combined Sino-American staff for the ALPHA troops.36
If the Generalissimo was willing to give what the Americans regarded as normal command responsibilities to whoever became field commander, that would end the Chinese practice of attempting to conduct campaigns in minutest detail from Chungking. A Sino-American staff for the ALPHA plan would mean that the Generalissimo, through his U.S. chief of staff, General Wedemeyer, would have a suitable instrument through which to exercise his responsibilities as Supreme Commander, China Theater, and that Wedemeyer, unlike Stilwell, would be permitted a Sino-American staff to help him.37 In practice, what followed were conferences, much like those of the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, which decided what agency would take action. Not for many months were staff sections created.
The Generalissimo's reaction to ALPHA's command proposals, that a most highly qualified Chinese officer be placed in charge of operations in the field and that he be responsible for their conduct, had its effect on the movements of Chinese troops, an effect some weeks in appearing. Wedemeyer had been impressed by General Chen Cheng, and suggested to the Generalissimo that he be chosen to execute the ALPHA plan. The Generalissimo told Wedemeyer he would consider appointing Chen to this vital position though he would prefer to make him Minister of War. A few days later, on 21 November, when Wedemeyer formally presented ALPHA to the Generalissimo he stressed the importance of having China's best general to execute ALPHA. In reply, the Generalissimo said he would appoint General Ho Ying-chin, the current Chief of Staff, to the post. "Asked if he realized that this was the most important job in China today and . . . if General Ho Ying-chin was his best choice, the Generalissimo said that an able United States deputy would help." Twice more the Americans asked the Generalissimo if Ho was his best choice, and each time the Chinese leader said yes.38
To Wedemeyer, the appointment was "a decided blow." Raising the matter again with the Generalissimo "as forcefully as [he] could to the Head of a State," he received the answer that Ho had been appointed because he was China's outstanding general. So Wedemeyer did what he could to bolster Ho. General McClure, Wedemeyer's new chief of staff, became Ho's deputy. The appointment of a competent Chinese, General Hsiao I-hsu, formerly chief of staff to the Chinese Salween forces, as Ho's chief of staff was arranged. General Dorn, who had worked closely with General Hsiao on the Salween, was detailed as Hsiao's adviser. Other Americans were detailed to work with Ho's projected staff, in the intelligence, operations, supply, medical, engineer, and signal sections.39
Therefore, the suggestion of China Theater headquarters that General Chen Cheng be field commander was not accepted by the Generalissimo, but the latter was willing to create the post of field commander. The significance of this step would lie in the Generalissimo's willingness to permit General Ho actually to exercise command in the field. In the past, the Generalissimo had on two occasions granted field command to an American officer, General Stilwell, then sent to the latter's Chinese subordinates a number of letters and radios countermanding Stilwell's orders, of which Stilwell learned only as his orders were disregarded. If the Generalissimo followed his past practice the result would be substantially to nullify Ho's new appointment. So the Generalissimo's actions immediately after 21
November would indicate his thoughts about ALPHA much more accurately than would his oral expression.40
Meanwhile, the Japanese supplied arguments for the speedy execution of ALPHA. Their propaganda had stressed that theirs was a limited campaign, aimed only at the east China airfields and, as has been noted, the Generalissimo himself thought that the loss of Kweilin and Liuchow ended any urgency of moving up reinforcements. Moreover, Japanese higher headquarters had specified that pursuit should not go far beyond the Kweilin-Liuchow area. Then the 11th Army began to act independently. In late November 1944 elements of its 3d and 13th Divisions drove rapidly and steadily in a northwesterly direction. About 28 November they crossed the provincial border, where they had been ordered by higher authority to halt, and kept right on into Kweichow.41
Strengthening the Chinese Forces
After proposing ALPHA to provide an effective command system for and deployment of the Chinese forces, theater headquarters suggested a number of steps to increase the resistance that the Chinese might offer a Japanese offensive aimed at Kunming or Chungking. These included the provision of replacements to bring the Chinese divisions in Kwangsi and Kweichow Provinces back to strength, better rations to end the malnutrition that so severely affected the physical capacity of the Chinese soldier to march and fight, efficient use of existing transport facilities, returning Chinese troops from Burma, suggestions to arm the Chinese Communists, and suggestions to fly a task force of Chinese Communists into Kweichow.42
The question of properly feeding the Chinese soldier arose when moving divisions into place for ALPHA was discussed with the Chinese. Showing an appreciation of the state of the Chinese Army, the Generalissimo remarked on 24 November that it would not do to attempt to march troops all the way from Hsian to Nan-cheng for there would be many desertions. In Wedemeyer's opinion, given to the Chinese a few days later, this was because the men were not being fed. If they were being well fed, he thought they would not desert.43 In a few weeks, as Wedemeyer spent more time studying the state of the Chinese Army, he became increasingly convinced
that simple failure to feed the Chinese soldier underlay most of China's military problems and that the Chinese armies needed food even more than they needed guns. Long-continued malnutrition made many Chinese soldiers too weak to march; they died along the roads. Semistarvation had to be eliminated before effective combat formations could be put into the field.
In November the conversations with Chiang had been mostly about troop movements; by mid-December Wedemeyer was spending much of his time with the Generalissimo pleading with the Chinese to improve the diet of their troops. Indeed, on one occasion, his chief of staff, then acting for Wedemeyer, said that to the U.S. theater commander food seemed to be the most important Chinese military problem.44
Wedemeyer recognized four reasons for the extensive malnutrition of the Chinese forces. He thought that full responsibility had not been given to the commanders involved; that many agencies were concerned, thus diffusing responsibility; that adequate storage and transport facilities were lacking; that there was no prior planning and there were too many administrative details.45
In the immediate present, Wedemeyer believed it imperative that for the six months' period beginning 15 December all Chinese armies employed against Japan should have the best food that could be provided. In addition to his rice rations each man should have fifteen pounds of beef or pork products every month. Wedemeyer suggested to the Generalissimo that in the future, instead of collecting taxes in kind, the government pay for all rice, pork, and food furnished. He recommended further that these foodstuffs be delivered by the farmer to the Chinese SOS at roadside, these victuals then to be shipped to food subdepots. From there supplies would go by truck to divisions and armies. He suggested that two general supply bases be set up, one at Kunming and one at Chungking. So that transport for the food would be at hand, Wedemeyer proposed that the American SOS commander control all Chinese military and commercials trucks not essential to the Chinese war effort, plus all emergency air supply.46
The Generalissimo was willing to consider suggestions that the Chinese present a plan for proper feeding, a plan supported by staff studies. He agreed to consider proposals that there should be one responsible agency,
that commanders should be indoctrinated with the idea that they were responsible for the proper feeding of their troops, that feeding stations should be set up, and that there should be Sino-American supervision of the whole process.47
In retrospect, General McClure, who as chief of staff to Wedemeyer and deputy chief of staff to the Generalissimo had ample opportunity for observation, summed up the program for reform of the Chinese Army in five steps:48
- Arm and equip
- Lead well
Filling the Gaps in the Chinese Divisions
Information at the disposal of China Theater headquarters strongly indicated that the divisions on the Chinese order of battle were far understrength, and that when divisions engaged the enemy and took casualties the resulting gaps in their ranks were seldom if ever replaced. One reason for this was that commanders were given lump sums in cash for pay and rations based on the paper strength of their units; it was profitable to be understrength.49 Another reason lay in the functioning of the Chinese replacement system. The Chinese Government allotted quotas to the several provinces, whose governors in turn divided them among the local magistrates. The officials procured conscripts from among the lowest classes by methods that Wedemeyer, after many months of observing the system, described to the Generalissimo as follows: "Conscription comes to the Chinese peasant like famine or flood, only more regularly--every year twice--and claims more victims. Famine, flood, and drought compare with conscription like chicken pox with plague." Wedemeyer made it quite clear that by victims were meant those who died as a result of the abuses and inefficiencies attending the conscription process.50
Those conscripts who survived induction were examined by the local governor who selected the best for his own forces. The rest were turned over to the local war area representative of the National Military Council. The numbers he received were of course far short of the provincial quota.
Then came the process of transporting conscripts to their destination, which meant still further attrition of the sort described in the Wedemeyer memorandum. On arrival the survivors "were ready for a General Hospital rather than the General Reserve."
The fighting strength of the Chinese divisions suffered still more by the numerous exemptions permitted by the draft laws. The system was very like that in vogue in the United States in 1861-65 in that the prosperous could hire substitutes. Graduates of high schools and colleges easily arranged permanent exemption. Only sons were automatically exempt. Physical weakness was not a disqualifying factor. Therefore, those elements in the populace who should have furnished noncommissioned and junior officers, who had the education and background that would most readily enable them to learn modern techniques of warfare, were exempt.51
If the ALPHA plan was to be carried out, a number of full-strength Chinese divisions would have to be provided. So on 30 November 1944 the Generalissimo was asked to provide a grand total of 270,000 replacements by 1 April 1945. The priority with which different armies were to receive replacements was carefully worked out.
To meet the transport problem, the proposals provided for requisitioning replacements from areas near their final destinations. The Ministry of Conscription was to be notified well in advance of the number of men it was to supply, thus easing its problems. The Generalissimo approved the plan and ordered that the Ministry of Conscription plan to obtain replacements within two months.52
Plans To Break the Transport Bottleneck
The Chinese forces badly needed food, shoes, clothing, drugs, small arms ammunition, spare parts, and artillery shells, roughly in that priority.53 Priority of necessity went to the Chinese divisions facing the most imminent Japanese threat, in east China. So supplies had to be moved from the Kunming base area to east China. Any improvement in the line of communications to east China would also benefit the Fourteenth Air Force, for it too depended on the same artery. Though the traditional carrier of most Chinese goods was water transport, the pattern of the rivers and canals was not well adapted to movement of goods from west to east. Trucks had to bridge many of the gaps in the water routes.
As noted above, there were perhaps 10,000 trucks in Nationalist China,
many of them inoperable through lack of spares, inadequate or bad maintenance, overloading, the unavoidable use of alcohol instead of gasoline for fuel, the impact of poor roads on the structure of the vehicles, and accidents. Those vehicles which were in operating condition numbered perhaps 2,000. Their operational efficiency was further limited by the primitive road net, and by their dispersal among a number of Chinese agencies and private individuals.54
Some improvement in the resources available was promised by the operation of two projects approved by Stilwell's headquarters some months before. One had called for flying in 700 trucks to carry supplies east from Kunming to Chennault's airfields.55 With the gradual loss of the airfields in 1944, the supply situation was altering accordingly. The trucks were being flown in steadily and would be a welcome addition. Between April 1944 and 31 December 1944, 544 trucks arrived in China. Another project, which called for driving 500 5-ton truck-trailer combinations across the Soviet Union to China, was canceled by the Soviets on the plea of uprisings across the route of march in Sinkiang Province, and the trucks and personnel (Lux Convoy) were rerouted to India.56
On 4 December 1944 Wedemeyer in conference suggested to the Generalissimo that the Chinese SOS operate a great motor pool in which would be placed all Chinese motor vehicles. Confiscation of the trucks was not being suggested, Wedemeyer observed, but rather registering the vehicles, so that the Chinese Army would receive priority in their use.57 The Generalissimo approved the proposal in principle, so Wedemeyer a few days later submitted detailed proposals to operate Chinese motor transport.
On 8 December Wedemeyer requested the Generalissimo to place all transport and maintenance facilities directly under the control of the Commanding General, Chinese SOS, to place all the stations which checked the movement of trucks under control of the same officer, and to direct that U.S. Army personnel in conjunction with the Transportation Section, Chinese SOS, jointly control and direct the operation of all vehicles.58 In effect, Chinese and Americans would work together as members of the same transportation team.
Priorities for movements were to be determined in accordance with the directives of the combined Sino-American staff of the Generalissimo's China Theater. The motor routes were divided into four sections, of which Sections
LUX CONVOY ascending the famous twenty-one curves of the Kunming˝Kweilin road.
1 and 2 to east China would be operated under control of a combined Sino-American SOS staff at Kunming. Sections 3 and 4, which linked with the north, toward the Yellow River, would be controlled by the Sino-American Combined Staff at Chungking. Co-ordination between the different operations would be maintained over U.S. communications.
All the checking stations which Chinese governmental agencies had set up on the roads to control the vehicle flow would be placed under the Commanding General, Chinese SOS. An American enlisted man would be attached to the staff of the control station and would tabulate all traffic. His reports would be sent to a central control station.
Transportation personnel would reconnoiter areas in the communications zone and combat zone, and determine the availability of vehicles. Requests for use of these vehicles would be made in the name of the Generalissimo. No trucks would be confiscated unless the owners refused to co-operate. All maintenance and supply facilities would be placed at the disposal of the Commanding General, Chinese SOS. All stocks of fuels and lubricants were to be pooled.59
This plan, the initial recommendation of China Theater headquarters to the Generalissimo, was rejected by the Chinese. In effect, the plan would have placed Americans at every level of the operation, and this may have made it unacceptable. On 15 December another plan was presented to the Chinese. This paper suggested that the Chinese War Transport Board control and operate all Chinese Government and commercial trucks. China Theater headquarters understood that acceptance of the plan by the Chinese would give the War Transport Board complete control of trucks in both categories. SOS did not control even Chinese Army trucks, for many truck regiments were on detached service with Chinese Government agencies.60
This proposal met with partial Chinese acceptance. The Generalissimo directed that all Chinese military vehicles be placed under the control of the Chinese SOS. It was further ordered that all Chinese Government and commercial vehicles be placed under the War Transport Board. Many years later McClure felt that this step had not been too effective, and noted that trucks meant money and power to whoever controlled or drove them.61
The physical aspects of the problem could not be adequately attacked until the Ledo Road was completed and until Hump tonnage was at a more satisfactory level. In anticipation of this time, now rapidly approaching, Wedemeyer requested Army Service Forces to approve shipping 2,000 6x6 and 5,000 Dodge trucks to China.62
Attempts To Arm Hsueh Yueh
Because the line of communications that supported the Japanese divisions in east China ran through General Hsueh Yueh's IX War Area, and because two of the last airstrips from which Chennault could operate in east China were in General Hsueh's territory, Wedemeyer and Chennault shared a common interest in supplying Hsueh Yueh with arms. However, some months before, Stilwell's headquarters had received an order from the Generalissimo that only air force supplies were to go to east China, and had received the very strong impression that the Generalissimo did not trust Hsueh Yueh. At that time the Americans also received the impression that General Hsueh was one of a group of Nationalist war lords in east and southeast China whose loyalty to the Nationalist cause did not extend to the Generalissimo personally.63
During the critical months of summer 1944, when the fate of the strong Chinese city of Heng-yang was in doubt, General Chennault had repeatedly asked Stilwell to supply Hsueh Yueh with arms. Obedient to the Generalissimo's orders, Stilwell had refused. Now, in November 1944, Hsueh renewed his pleas for arms and again forwarded them through the Fourteenth Air Force. On 30 November 1944 Wedemeyer personally raised the issue with the Generalissimo. He told the Chinese leader that Hsueh had requested 3,000 rifles, 600 Bren guns, 150 mortars, and 500 grenade dischargers, with ammunition. Noting that the request had come through Fourteenth Air Force channels, Wedemeyer said he would not fill it without the Generalissimo's concurrence. In reply the Generalissimo said that Hsueh's request should be disregarded.
The Generalissimo's statement had several implications. Wedemeyer therefore asked the Generalissimo to define his policy on the issuance of American supplies to the Chinese commanders. Wedemeyer conceded that coordination between the several U.S. headquarters had not been good, for in his opinion Dorn on the Salween and Chennault in east China had become accustomed to independent action. The Generalissimo replied that he would see to it that the Chinese did not again make any approaches outside the proper channel which was through the Ordnance Department of the Ministry of War. But this reply still left unsettled the Generalissimo's attitude toward General Hsueh Yueh, and so Wedemeyer asked if Hsueh Yueh was a "loyal and effective general." The Generalissimo answered that Hsueh was "able, and had been with the Revolution a long time."64
In the same conference the question of cutting the Japanese supply lines in east China was discussed. Stretching for hundreds of miles south of Hankow through hostile territory these seemed an obvious target for Chinese attacks. But Wedemeyer told the Generalissimo he had reports that Hsueh Yueh and General Chang Fa-kwei, who commanded the IV War Area (Kwangsi), were not obeying orders to attack, while the commander of the 24th Group Army was not only not attacking the Japanese but was reported to be looting Chinese villages. The Generalissimo answered that Hsueh Yueh had been sent orders. Chang Fa-kwei seemed to be in a different category, for Chiang remarked that orders would not be enough, a special envoy would have to be sent to him.65
So, Wedemeyer told Chennault on 11 December:
Subject discussed in your CAKX 2018 was taken up with the Generalissimo two days ago. I did not get any definite commitment from him. However, he stated categorically that no supplies or equipment will be given to Chinese forces without his express approval. He apparently is adamant concerning your request to provide supplies for the Ninth War Area. If you desire to pursue this request further I suggest that the Chinese commander of the Ninth War Area make his request directly to the Generalissimo. I do not feel that I can make further representations in the near future. Theater policy concerning the airdropping of supplies was sent to you in TG 354 from Breitwiser. This policy will not be violated.66
Plans To Use the Chinese Communists
In the months preceding Stilwell's recall, the President and the Joint Chiefs had desired to see Stilwell, under the Generalissimo, command both Chinese Nationalist and Chinese Communist forces in the war against Japan. The War Department had contemplated giving lend-lease to a Chinese Army that might include Communist forces. Stilwell's recall had not changed these views, and the Japanese threat to the Kunming-Kweiyang-Chungking area suggested to the U.S. theater headquarters in China that Chinese Communist military help might do a great deal to stop the Japanese.
Wedemeyer had sought and obtained as his chief of staff General McClure, who arrived in Chungking on 20 November, assuming his new post on the 28th. He very soon took an active part in formulating plans and proposals to arm and use the Chinese Communists against the Japanese. In the week of his arrival he discussed the military and political problems of China with the President's personal envoy, General Hurley. With the resolution of the October 1944 command crisis, Hurley had turned his attention to the civil strife in China which so hampered the Chinese war effort. He reported every move to the President and received the President's approval and support
COL. DAVID D. BARRETT, Chief of the American Observer Group at Chinese Communist Headquarters in Yenan, China.
of his efforts to mediate between the Nationalists and Communists. Because they thought that Communist military aid could materially assist in stopping the Japanese, Wedemeyer, McClure, and other officers of theater headquarters spent a good deal of time trying to assist Hurley in his efforts to forestall civil war and unify the Chinese.67
From the discussions in Wedemeyer's headquarters, three projects for using the Chinese Communists finally evolved. The earliest and simplest was to supply munitions to the Communists. Presented to the Generalissimo
by Wedemeyer on 27 November, it met with immediate rejection. The Generalissimo stated that the time was not ripe, but as soon as it was he would tell Wedemeyer.68
Then it became known that the head of the Office of Strategic Services, Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan, would visit China, and so McClure and Wedemeyer began to shape more comprehensive plans for presentation to General Donovan, should the Generalissimo approve them. Donovan's aid and support appeared desirable because one of the emerging plans would involve guerrilla warfare, the specialty of the OSS and an activity for which the Communists enjoyed a great reputation in the press. Moreover, Wedemeyer expected to leave for an inspection trip of his new theater and his chief of staff wanted to present the plans before Wedemeyer left.69
The first plan to emerge was suggested by Colonel Barrett of the American Observer Group in Yenan. This small party of American military personnel with two civilians from the State Department, John S. Service and Raymond P. Ludden, had been sent to Yenan in July 1944 to obtain intelligence and assist pilots in escape and evasion. Since then the men had been occupying themselves with order of battle, meteorological, and target data. Barrett's orders forbade the men to engage in political discussion, but in effect their party formed an American listening post behind the Communist lines, and offered an agency through which communications might be sent to the Communists.70 McClure accepted the plan which Barrett had drafted, and in turn presented it to Wedemeyer. Wedemeyer approved, and laid the plan before the Generalissimo on 2 December 1944.71
The plan suggested organizing three Communist infantry regiments in Yenan, a total of about 5,000 men. The force would be armed and equipped by the U.S. Services of Supply. They would then be moved into Nationalist territory, either southwest China or the Tung-kuan-Hsian area of Shensi Province, near where the Chinese Nationalists were blockading the Communists. On their arrival they were to be commanded by an American officer with ten liaison officers attached.72 The Generalissimo rejected the scheme, on the ground that the people in the area where the Communists were to operate would be actively hostile toward them.73
The other plan, prepared by McClure, called for sending U.S. airborne units of 4,000 to 5,000 well-trained technicians into Communist-held territory,
providing both the Nationalists and Communists approved. Wedemeyer approved its concepts, as presented by McClure to Donovan and himself, then left for his inspection trip. McClure set about completing the draft and seeking concurrences before the plan was presented to the Generalissimo. Since Colonel Barrett was going to Yenan on a mission for Hurley, McClure told him to ask what aid and assistance the Chinese Communists might give if the plan were to be approved. The Communists were to be told the plan could not go into effect unless both Nationalists and Communists agreed. McClure then presented the plan to Hurley, adding that he, McClure, planned later to show it to General Chen Cheng, now Minister of War. At Hurley's suggestion, McClure also showed it to China's Foreign Minister, T. V. Soong. Again McClure offered cautions, saying this presentation was only so McClure could offer a mature study at a later date, and asking Soong not to tell the Generalissimo unless Soong thought it essential.74
So, in December 1944, McClure sought reactions and concurrences from several key figures, much as he would circulate a staff paper in his own headquarters, accompanying each presentation with oral cautions. The impact of word that an agency of the United States Government contemplated steps which if successful would ultimately result in American technicians and American supplies being committed to Communist China was some weeks in appearing.
Disposition of Forces,
15 October 1944
Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter (1) * Next Chapter (3)
1. Rad CFB 26558, Wedemeyer to Marshall for JCS, 17 Nov 44. Item 6, Wedemeyer Data Book. (2) Bowman comments on draft MS of this volume.
2. (1) Rad CFB 25612, Wedemeyer to Marshall info Sultan, 6 Nov 44. Item 6 Wedemeyer Data Book. (2) Rad cited n. 1. (3) Rad CFB 25545, Wedemeyer to Chennault, 5 Nov 44. Item 29, Bk 1, ACW Personal File.
3. (1) Rad cited n. 2(1). (2) Commenting on the passage above, a group of senior Japanese officers said that Chennault's operations made it impossible for them to shift divisions about as feared by China Theater. And they planned to reinforce the south, not to evacuate it. Japanese Officers' Comments on draft MS of this volume.
4. Rad cited n. 1.
5. (1) Japanese Studies in World War II (hereafter, Japanese Study--), 129. OCMH. (2) Chinese Order of Battle. Item 13, Wedemeyer Data Book. The Order of Battle is dated 1 January 1945, but the divisions stayed where they were in 1944. (3) Ltr, Col Preston J. C. Murphy. Chief Mil Hist Soc FECOM, to Ward, 18 Nov 52. OCMH.
6. (1) The brief summary above does far less than justice to the complicated and detailed SHÕ Operation. The connection between SHÕ and Japanese operations in China in summer 1944 is outlined in Stilwell's Command Problems, Chapter XI. (2) For a longer account see Japanese Study 72, Part V. (3) For the naval side, see James A. Field, The Japanese at Leyte Gulf: the SHÕ Operation (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1947) and C. Vann Woodward, The Battle for Leyte Gulf (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947). (4) The strategy of the Pacific war will be more fully treated by Louis Morton, in Command, Strategy, and Logistics, a Pacific subseries volume in preparation in the series UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II.
7. Japanese Study 129, pp. 53-56.
8. (1) Col Takushiro Hattori, Imperial General Headquarters, Army Department, Operations Section, 1 June 1948. Statements of Japanese Officials, I, p. 324. OCMH. (See Bibliographical Note.) (2) Japanese Study 129, p. 59.
9. Japanese Study 72, p. 148.
10. Quotation from radio cited n. 1.
11. Rad CFB 28167, Wedemeyer to Marshall for JCS, 4 Dec 44. Item 6, Wedemeyer Data Book.
12. (1) Wedemeyer's first analysis of the Chinese ideas of war is in radio cited n. 2(1). It reflects a study by Colonel Taylor, G-3, 3 November 1944, sub: Reorientation of Chinese-American Effort in China. OCMH. (2) Quotation from Rad CFB 25886, Wedemeyer to Marshall, 10 Nov 44. Item 58, Bk 1, ACW Personal File.
13. Rad cited n. 12(2).
14. (1) Rad cited n. 11. (2) Bowman comments on draft MS.
15. (1) Wedemeyer's comments on the staff he inherited are in a letter, Wedemeyer to Marshall, 13 April 1945. Case 45, OPD 319.1 TS, Sec. I. (2) Rad CFB 25485, Wedemeyer to Arnold, 4 Nov 44. Item 45, Bk 1, ACW Personal File.
16. Rad CFB 25545, Wedemeyer to Chennault, 5 Nov 44. Item 29, Bk 1, ACW Personal File.
17. Maj. Gen. Claire L. Chennault, USA, Ret., Way of a Fighter: The Memoirs of Claire Lee Chennault (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1949), p. 212.
18. The Generalissimo's personal assurances to the President were in an inclosure to a letter, T. V. Soong to Harry L. Hopkins, 29 April 1943. Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. IX.
19. Japanese Study 130, pp. 2-3.
20. Japanese Study 130, pp. 24, 27, and 28.
21. Rad cited n. 11.
22. Ltr, Col Miller, Exec Officer Mil Hist Sec FECOM, to Gen Ward, 29 Apr 52, with attached papers of ex-Maj Gen Kitaru Togo, former Chief, Intel Sec, Gen Hq, China Expeditionary Army. OCMH.
23. Japanese Study 130, pp. 26 and 30.
24. In addition to keeping minutes of his conferences with the Generalissimo and other Chinese officers, Wedemeyer contined Stillwell's system of preparing, numbering, and dispatching memorandums to the Chinese on items of mutual concern. Wedemeyer, during the time he served as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo, presented over a thousand such papers. For details on Wedemeyer's file of memorandums to the Chinese, including many Chinese replies, see the Bibliographical Note.
25. (1) Stilwell's Command Problems, Chs. XI and XII. (2) Memo, Stilwell for Generalissimo, 18 Sep 44. Stilwell Documents, Hoover Library. (See Bibliographical Note.) (3) Memo, Stilwell for Stratemeyer, sub: Outline of Proposed Future Opns in China, 22 Sep 44. Folder 10, Hq AAF IBT, USAF CBI, Stratemeyer Files, KCRC. (4) Ltr, Maj Gen William M. Creasy, Chief Chemical Officer, to Col George G. O'Connor, Chief, War Histories Div, OCMH, 16 Jun 54. OCMH. (5) Ltrs, Col Taylor to Maj Gen Albert C. Smith, Chief Mil Hist, 1, 9 Jun 54. OCMH.
26. ALPHA, as the term was used at the time and is here used, refers not only to a series of tactical plans, so designated, but to the preparatory measures adopted to support, in its successive phases, theater planning to take a major port on the China coast.
27. (1) History of China Theater, Ch. VI. (2) Gen McClure, Memo for Record. Communist File, 06104-M, 3 Nov-10 Dec 44, T-49-20 CBI, DRB AGO.
28. Memo and Ltrs cited n. 25(3), (4), (5).
29. (1) Min, Mtg 1, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo, 13 Nov 44. (2) Min, Mtg 3, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo, 21 Nov 44. Bk 1, Generalissimo Minutes.
30. (1) Rad cited n. 11. (2) Ltr, cited n. 25(4).
31. Bowman comments on draft MS.
32. Stilwell's Mission to China, Ch. V, and Stilwell's Command Problems, Part Three.
33. (1) Rpt, Gen Dorn, CG CT&CC, to Wedemeyer, 1 Jan 45, sub: Hist Rpt of CT&CC (Y-FOS and Z-Force). 25 Oct 44-31 Dec 44. OCMH. (2) Information on Dorn's role in CBI is given in Stilwell's Mission to China and Stilwell's Command Problems.
34. Rad cited n. 2(1). (2) Memo, Marshall for President, 20 Dec 44. Item 20, WDCSA 091, China (20 Dec 44). (3) Min, Mtgs 3, 5, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo, 21, 27 Nov 44. Bk 1, Generalissimo Minutes. (4) Rad CFB 27895, Wedemeyer to Marshall, 5 Dec 44. (5) History of China Theater, Ch. VI, p. 14.
35. (1) Quotation from Memo cited n. 34(2). (2) Min of Mtgs 1, 2, 4, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo, 13, 16, 24 Nov 44. Bk 1, Generalissimo Minutes. (3) Rad cited n. 34(4).
36. (1) For the Soong-Stimson accord of January 1942 on a Sino-American staff for China Theater, see Stilwell's Mission to China, Chapter II. (2) For Stilwell's views on the need for a responsible field commander and a Sino-American staff, see Stilwell's Mission to China, Chapter V.
37. (1) The Generalissimo's permission to set up a combined staff for ALPHA was given at his second formal meeting with Wedemeyer, 16 November 1944. On 24 November Wedemeyer limited its role to ALPHA. Min, Mtgs 1, 2, 4, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo, 13, 16, 24 Nov 44. Bk 1, Generalissimo Minutes. (2) Min. Combined Staff Mtgs 84, 85, on 20, 22 Jan 45. DRB AGO.
38. Min, Mtg 3, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo, 21 Nov 44. Bk 1, Generalissimo Minutes.
39. (1) Rad cited n. 34(4). (2) Wedemeyer comments on draft MS.
40. Stilwell's Command Problems, Ch. VI.
41. Japanese Study 130, pp. 26, 30.
42. (1) Memo, Barrett for Wedemeyer, 30 Nov 44, sub: Organization of Special Units of Communist Forces, Incl to Min, Mtg 11, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo; (2) Min, Mtg 11, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo. Bk 1, Generalissimo Minutes.
43. Min, Mtgs 4, 5, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo, 24, 27 Nov 44. Bk 1, Generalissimo Minutes.
44. (1) Min, Mtg 15, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo, 8 Dec 44. Bk 1, Generalissimo Minutes. (2) Memo 277, Wedemeyer for Generalissimo, 11 Dec 44, sub: Rations, Feeding Stations, and Supplemental Rations for Chinese Troops in Defense of Chungking Area. Bk 16, ACW Corresp with Chinese. (3) Min, Mtg 3, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo, 21 Nov 44. Bk 1, Generalissimo Minutes. (4) Memo 267, Wedemeyer for Generalissimo, 7 Dec 44. Bk 16, ACW Corresp with Chinese.
45. Memo cited n. 44(2).
46. Memo 264, Wedemeyer for Generalissimo, 6 Dec 44. Bk 16, ACW Corresp with Chinese.
47. Min, Mtg 17, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo, 11 Dec 44. Bk 1, Generalissimo Minutes.
48. McClure comments on draft MS. OCMH.
49. (1) Item 13. Wedemeyer Data Book. (2) McClure comments on draft MS.
50. Memo 678-7, Wedemeyer for Generalissimo, 5 Aug 45. Bk 8, ACW Corresp with Chinese. For an extended quotation from this memorandum, see pages 368-73, below.
51. (1) History of China Theater, Ch. VII, pp. 10 and 11. (2) Quotation from McClure comments on draft MS.
52. History of China Theater, Ch. VII, p. 13.
53. Wedemeyer's November and December 1944 memorandums for and conferences with the Generalissimo are the source of this conclusion.
54. History of China Theater, Ch. IV, pp. 15-17.
55. Stilwell's Command Problems, Ch. VII.
56. (1) Stilwell's Command Problems, Ch. VII. (2) Joseph Bykofsky, U.S. Army Transportation in China, Burma, India During World War II, p. 304. OCMH. (Hereafter, Bykofsky MS.)
57. Min, Mtg 13, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo, 4 Dec 44. Bk 1, Generalissimo Minutes.
58. Memo 270, Wedemeyer for Generalissimo, 8 Dec 44. Bk 16, ACW Corresp with Chinese.
60. Memo 286, McClure for Generalissimo, 15 Dec 44. Bk 16, ACW Corresp with Chinese.
61. (1) History of China Theater, Ch. IV, p. 20. (2) McClure comments on draft MS.
62. Bykofsky MS, p. 307.
63. Stilwell's Command Problems, Ch. XI.
64. (1) Min, Mtg 8, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo, 30 Nov 44. Bk 1, Generalissimo Minutes. (2) Rad CAK 2018, Chennault to Wedemeyer, 8 Dec 44. Item 164 Bk 1 ACW Personal File.
65. Min cited n. 64(1).
66. Rad CFB 28882, Wedemeyer to Chennault, 11 Dec 44. Item 172, Bk 1, ACW Personal File.
67. (1) McClure, Memo for Record. Communist File, 06104-M, 3 Nov 44-10 Dec 44, T-49-20 CBI, DRB AGO. The memorandum seems to have been written in January, certainly before 25 January 1945. (2) On Hurley's efforts, see radio, CFB 25629, Hurley to President, on 7 November 1944. Item 89, Book 1, Hurley Papers. (3) For indication of the President's support, see Item 103, Book 1, Hurley Papers, a radio in which the President authorizes Hurley to say to Chiang Kai-shek that a working arrangement between Nationalists and Communists would greatly expedite throwing the Japanese out of north China "from my point of view and also that of the Russians. You can emphasize the word 'Russians' to him." (4) For subsequent references to the Chinese Communists, see pp. 167, 249-54, 337-38, 381-85, below.
68. Min, Mtg 5, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo, 27 Nov 44. Bk 1, Generalissimo Minutes.
69. Memo cited n. 67(1).
70. Stilwell's Command Problems, Ch. X.
71. (1) Memo, Barrett for Wedemeyer, 30 Nov 44, sub: Organization of Special Units of Communist Forces. Incl to Min, Mtg 11, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo; (2) Min, Mtg 11, Wedemeyer with Generalissimo. Bk 1, Generalissimo Minutes.
72. Memo cited n. 71(1).
73. Memo cited n. 67(1).
74. (1) Memo cited n. 67(1). (2) McClure comments on draft MS. (3) Ltr, Gen Hurley to Maj Gen R. W. Stephens, Chief of Mil History, 15 Dec 56. OCMH.