(1) Motor Transport: The Color Routes
Of the various results of the pursuit the deficit in transportation had both an immediate impact on Allied capabilities and far-reaching effects on the workings of the entire logistic organization. It not only brought the pursuit to a halt, but deranged the entire logistic structure by forcing both combat and service echelons to abandon carefully worked out supply procedures in favor of "expedients" which upset the systematic and businesslike growth of the theater logistic organization.
Halting the pursuit brought no diminution in requirements for transportation. Fresh demands, such as the movement forward of newly arrived divisions, the redeployment of the Ninth Army from Brittany, and the winterization program, added to the standing requirements for the building of forward reserves, promised to absorb all the theater's transportation resources for weeks to come. The nature of operations in the fall made it necessary that cargo vehicles which had been withdrawn from tactical formations--particularly field artillery and antiaircraft units--be returned for use in their normal role.
Rail transportation showed steady improvement in September and October, but for a long time was unable to meet the full requirement for long-distance hauling. Motor transport consequently continued for another two months to carry large tonnages all the way from the beaches and ports to the army areas over lines of communication that stretched between three and four hundred miles. This it accomplished largely via the Red Ball Express, which had started operating on 25 August, and via additional express routes organized for similar missions.
The Red Ball Express had completed its original mission--the delivery of 75,000 tons of supplies to the Chartres-La Loupe-Dreux triangle--by 5 September. But there was no thought of discontinuing the operation on that date, and the Communications Zone gave it a new lease to operate indefinitely. On 10 September the route was altered and extended, the outgoing route diverging at Versailles, one branch bypassing Paris to the north and continuing to Soissons to serve First Army, the other continuing in an easterly direction via Melun to Sommesous in support of the Third. (Map 5) A week later the completion of a highway bridge at Chennevières, southeast of Paris, permitted a more direct routing and a saving of sixteen
miles on the southern branch. Additional extensions to Liège in the north and to Saarbruecken in the south were considered, but the final extension, made on 20 September, affected only the route serving First Army, which was extended from Soissons to Hirson. This brought the total mileage of the Red Ball route to 924, the round trip on the northern route totaling 686 miles, and on the southern route, 590.1
The Red Ball Express continued to operate for another two months and chalked up the best ton-mileage records of its second phase operations in the last week of September. In that period, with approximately 5,400 trucks assigned, it averaged 8,209 tons dispatched in 1,542 trucks each day, the average load per truck totaling 5.3 tons, and the average round trip mileage totaling 714. The average trip required 71.2 hours to complete. For the entire month an average of 6,891 tons passed through the traffic control regulating point at St. Lô every day.2
TRUCKS LOADED WITH SUPPLIES waiting to be unloaded at Soissons, terminal of the Red Ball Express route serving First Army.
At the end of September the strain on motor transport eased somewhat as a result of the establishment of rail transfer points in the Paris area. Both the extent and the better condition of the rail net northeast of Paris made it feasible to handle substantially greater tonnages by rail in that area than could be moved west of the Seine. Plans were accordingly made to transfer a minimum of 4,000 tons of supplies per day from trucks to rail cars in the Paris area for movement to army railheads, and to decrease Red Ball hauling beyond the
Highway Express Routes
September 1944-February 1945
Seine a corresponding amount. While this expedient entailed additional handling of supplies, it promised to increase the capacity of the available trucks by shortening the haul and decreasing the turnaround time.
Two transfer points were initially set up in the Paris area, one at Aubervillers la Courneuve (for First Army supplies), and one at Vincennes-Fontenay (for the Third Army). Both were well-developed yards where trucks could discharge their loads directly to empty freight cars. Aubervillers la Courneuve could accommodate 225 cars and work 20 at a time; Vincennes-Fontenay could hold 400 cars and work 115. Operations at both transfer points were organized and supervised by small detachments of officers and enlisted men working in two twelve-hour shifts, the actual transfer of cargo being carried out by a French labor force of between 300 and 350 men working in three eight-hour shifts. A third transfer point was established at Ruilly early in October to handle Ninth Army supplies. With the exception of a single crane at Vincennes, none of the yards was equipped to handle awkward or heavy lifts, hence only supplies that could be manhandled were accepted. With the inauguration of this plan a diversion point was established on the Red Ball route at Trappes, about twenty miles southwest of Paris, where manifests were examined to determine whether convoys should be routed to the transfer points or to the regulating stations serving the respective armies.
Truck-to-rail transfer was an immediate success, making it possible to discontinue much of the long-distance motor transport hauling beyond the Seine. In fact, tentative plans were made to discontinue Red Ball trucking beyond Paris entirely by 20 October. This goal was not achieved, for engineer supplies and equipment which were too heavy for transfer at Paris continued to be trucked the entire distance from the ports to the army depots beyond that date. Early in November the policy was laid down that all nontransferable items would be shipped straight through by rail and that trucks were to be used only for supplies that could be worked by hand and therefore transferred to rail at the Seine. In other words, there was to be no more long-distance hauling by truck beyond Paris.3
Less than two weeks later--on 16 November--the Red Ball Express ceased operations, its demise occurring on the same date the Normandy beaches closed down. In the course of its eighty-one days of operations the express service carried a total of 412,193 tons of supplies, some of them initially to the Chartres depot area, some directly to the armies, and in the last stages to the rail transfer points at Paris. In delivering an average of 5,088 tons per day its total ton-mileage came to nearly 122,000,000.4
Lacking precedent and experience,
RED BALL EXPRESS TRUCKS leaving a traffic regulating control point, September 1944.
the Red Ball Express was plagued by problems of control and operational procedures through most of its history. The problem of control was inevitable in an organization operated by one COMZ section whose functioning involved the crossing of sectional boundaries. The Motor Transport Brigade, which operated the Red Ball, was an ADSEC organization. But all the COMZ sections traversed by the Red Ball routes had responsibilities affecting the efficient operation of the express service, such as road maintenance, traffic control, and signal communications, and these responsibilities were not carried out uniformly by the various section commanders. Reconciling the Advance Section's authority to operate the route with that of other section commanders proved an important stumbling block and evidenced a major defect in an organization which had a COMZ-wide function to perform. Confusion and disagreement inevitably arose between the Advance Section, Normandy Base Section, Seine Section, and Loire Section over maintenance of portions of the route, and late in September both the Chief of Transportation and Seine Section complained of unauthorized diversions and of changes in consignments made by the Advance Section at truck-to-rail transfer points.
Repeated attempts to delineate the responsibilities of the sections fell short of the goal. The essential defect of the system--the anomalous position of the Motor Transport Brigade--was finally recognized early in October, when the problem was resolved by transferring the control of motor transport operating intersectionally to a higher echelon. On 5 October the Motor Transport Brigade, a provisional organization in the first place, was dissolved and its personnel consolidated with the Motor Transport Service. The latter, operating under the
Chief of Transportation at the level of the Communications Zone, then assumed the duties of the Motor Transport Brigade. Truck units of the latter were attached to the base sections, but technical supervision and operational control of intersectional hauling was thereafter exercised by the Motor Transport Service. By coincidence the dissolution of the Motor Transport Brigade came shortly after the establishment of the truck-to-rail transfer points and therefore at a time when long-distance hauling east of Paris was already on the wane. With Paris becoming the main terminus of the Red Ball convoys it had become even more illogical that the Advance Section, already operating far forward, should control motor transport operating all the way back to the Normandy base.5
Meanwhile, through trial and error, Red Ball's operating procedures were also gradually improved. On 1 October a new standing operating procedure (SOP) on convoy make-up and control was put into effect, and a few days later a more clearly defined documentation procedure was adopted to correct earlier difficulties over marking and identification. Finally, on 2 December, in anticipation of possible future express systems, responsibilities of the COMZ sections were further amended to conform with the centralized control of intersectional hauling which had been instituted.6
While Red Ball was the first of the big express systems to be organized, and the most publicized, several other "color routes" on the model of Red Ball were established to meet specific needs in the fall of 1944. The first of these was the Red Lion Route, organized in support of the joint US.-British airborne operation carried out by the 21 Army Group in Holland. Red Lion's mission was to haul 500 tons of supplies per day (largely POL) from Bayeux to Brussels for a period of thirty days.
While U.S. forces furnished and operated the trucks--eight companies for most of the period--almost all other administrative services were provided by the British.7 These included the loading and unloading of supplies, maintenance of the routes, the provision and staffing of camp sites and marshaling and control points, and the provision of medical facilities and water and rations. Vehicle maintenance was handled by two medium automotive maintenance companies, one stationed at each traffic regulating control point, where road patrols were based and repair work was performed. Each company established a small pool of 2½-ton trucks from which it could issue replacements in cases where repairs could not be carried out promptly.
Red Lion convoys began their 300-mile runs to Brussels on 16 September and continued operations until 12 October. (See Map 5.) Normandy Base Section organized and operated the service. The route turned in a somewhat better performance than the Red Ball, profiting from earlier experience and enjoying certain advantages. Trucks carried a high average load of 5.9 tons, partly because of the density of the cargo. In addition, the operation benefited from the fact that all cargo was assembled at one dump in the Caen-Bayeux area, eliminating delays in pickup and loading, and all trucks were unloaded at a single dump at the terminus of the route.
Red Lion convoys exceeded their target, delivering an average of 650 tons per day instead of 500, and handled a total of about 18,000 tons. Almost half of this consisted of supplies for the two U.S. airborne divisions participating in the Holland operation, a statistic often ignored by the partisans who so heatedly criticized this "diversion" of U.S. resources. Furthermore, the operation took place after the pursuit had definitely been halted and both the First and Third U.S. Armies had come up against the prepared defenses of the West Wall.8
Two other express services, one known as the White Ball Route, the other as the Green Diamond Route, were organized and placed in operation early in October. Both were relatively short hauls compared with the Red Ball and Red Lion systems. The White Ball Route was organized to take advantage of the shorter lines of communications from the newly opened ports of Le Havre and Rouen, its mission being to clear those ports, hauling supplies either directly to the armies or to rail transfer points at Paris and Reims. A quartermaster group headquarters (Transportation Corps) exercised operational control of the route, and Channel Base Section was made responsible for movement control. The White Ball Route started operating on 6 October 1944 and continued until 10 January 1945, with an average of twenty-nine truck companies participating. It handled a total of 134,067 tons of supplies on an average forward run of 113 miles.
The White Ball Route was modeled on the Red Ball Express, but performed rather poorly. Co-ordination and planning were noticeably deficient: depots were unaware of planned movements, labor was not provided at unloading points, both loading and unloading time was excessive, and neither line maintenance nor traffic control regulating points were provided until late in October. Lack of maintenance was reflected in the low rate of truck availability, only 32 of the 48 vehicles per company normally being fit for use as against the 40 expected under proper operating conditions. To make matters worse, trucks were frequently diverted for local use.9
The Green Diamond Route was organized by Normandy Base Section to
move supplies from the ports and base depots in the Cotentin area to rail transfer points at Granville and Dol, near the base of the Cherbourg Peninsula. Although plans called for the use of forty truck companies, an average of only fifteen participated. The route was in operation only three weeks, from 10 October to 1 November, and delivered a total of only 15,600 tons of supplies. The Green Diamond Route was not a model of efficiency from the point of view of either planning or command supervision. In addition, it operated under a severe handicap imposed by mud, which made it almost impossible to handle the larger tractor-trailer combinations in the depots. They could be employed only by having cargo picked up by the smaller 2½-ton trucks and then transferred to the larger vehicles, an operation which proved highly uneconomical. In a sense the Green Diamond operation hardly belongs in the category of the special express routes, for it was more of a routine trucking operation and did not adopt most of the special operational procedures which characterized the larger express services.10
One of the most highly organized and efficient motor transport express systems came into being at the end of November. The ABC Haul was organized specifically to supplement rail and water facilities in clearing the port of Antwerp and moving the supplies discharged there directly from quayside to advance depots in the Liège-Mons-Charleroi area. Antwerp lay in the British zone, and the prompt clearance of the port was imperative because of the limited storage space available to U.S. forces there.
The ABC Haul derived its name from the fact that three nationalities--American, British, and Canadian--shared many facilities in the Antwerp area. Planning the operation involved the highest degree of co-ordination with the British on such matters as highway rights-of-way, restrictions on civilian traffic, and circulation routes through cities. The basis for this co-ordination was laid in the Memorandum of Agreement of 18 October, by which British and American officials had agreed on the use of the port. In all other respects the ABC Haul was strictly American in operation.
In addition to a high degree of coordination and organization, two features characterized the operation of the ABC route: the exclusive use of 4/5-ton truck-tractors with 10-ton semitrailers, one of the most efficient combinations for long-distance hauling; and the use of a marshaling yard or "surge pool." An average of sixteen companies of the big truck-tractor-semitrailer combinations was assigned to the ABC Haul, with a ratio of approximately two trailers for every power unit. Two of the truck-tractor companies did nothing but shuttle between the Antwerp surge pool and the quays, moving empties to the piers for direct loading from either ships or warehouses, and bringing loaded trailers back. At the surge pool fourteen companies assigned to over-the-road hauling picked up loaded trailers which
TRUCK-TRACTOR AND SEMITRAILER STUCK IN THICK MUD are pulled out by a D-7 tractor, Cherbourg area.
had been formed into convoys and made the trip to the forward depots, a run which averaged ninety miles. A bivouac was established at Tirlemont, the halfway mark, where drivers were changed.
All the facilities which earlier experience had shown were necessary for efficient line-of-communications hauling were provided, including ordnance maintenance installations and road patrols, signal communications, aid stations, and so on. Control of truck movements was exercised from the Antwerp surge pool and the halfway point, and centralized control of the entire operation was achieved by having the route operated by a single base section commander--General Jacobs of Channel Base--although the route actually extended into ADSEC territory. The conflict of authority and responsibility which had plagued the Red Ball Express was therefore avoided, and long-distance truck transportation brought to a high degree of efficiency.
In January the operation was improved further by the establishment of surge pools at Liège, Mons, and Charleroi, where loaded convoys were received and then directed to forward dumps and depots in accordance with unloading capacities. This permitted a close control of movements at the receiving as well as the dispatching end, and made possible better line maintenance of equipment, a more efficient use of trucks, and a consequent saving in turnaround time.
The ABC Haul started operations on 30 November 1944 and continued until 26 March 1945. In that four-month period it cleared 245,000 tons from Antwerp,
the average load per truck totaling 8.7 tons and the average round trip requiring twenty hours. The ABC Haul, like the use of Antwerp, afforded an excellent example of a highly organized and tightly controlled operation involving the crossing of national lines of communications and the joint use of logistic facilities.11
All the trucking systems described above were organized to handle large bulk shipments of supplies. In December 1944 still another motor transport service, known as the Little Red Ball, was inaugurated to meet a very special need--the fast delivery of small quantities of items urgently needed at the front. The requirement for a motor transport organization to fill this need arose from the fact that normal rail movements from Cherbourg to Paris required three days, while trucks could make deliveries in a single day.
The Little Red Ball route ran from Carentan, at the base of the Cotentin Peninsula, to Paris, following highway N-13 all the way. The service was designed to deliver only 100 tons per day--mostly medical, signal, chemical and quartermaster Class II items--and was operated by one truck company equipped with 10-ton semitrailers. It operated slightly less than five weeks, from 15 December 1944 to 17 January 1945, delivering an average of 106 tons per day.12 A fast rail express service took its place a few days after it ceased operations.13
Independently of these various specially organized and for the most part short-lived color routes the Motor Transport Service had carried on another hauling operation of vital and continuing importance--the transportation of gasoline in bulk. The so-called POL hauls had started shortly after the Normandy landings, and were to continue without interruption till the end of hostilities. They were carried out by a special fleet of tank vehicles, consisting in the main of nine companies of 2,000-gallon semitrailers and five companies of 750-gallon tank trucks. From the beginning the Motor Transport Service, through a special POL Section, had exercised a highly centralized control over these operations, units of the tanker fleet being attached to the COMZ sections for administration only.
Most of the POL hauls were rather routine, did not involve an elaborate operating procedure, and were not favored by a special name or by publicity. Nevertheless the transportation of gasoline in bulk accounted for a high percentage of the total tonnages handled by truck. In the three-month period from October through December alone approximately 240,000 tons were forwarded from ports and pipeheads in this manner, the daily haul frequently exceeding 4,000 tons. In addition, substantial quantities of packaged gasoline and other POL products were transported
LOADED 10-TON SEMITRAILERS, Antwerp Surge Pool, waiting for the haul to forward depots, January 1945.
by ordinary cargo trucks. In March 1945 the capacity of the POL tanker fleet was augmented by the addition of three companies of 10-ton semitrailers, each trailer mounting four 750-gallon skid tanks.14
The unexpectedly heavy burden which truck transport was forced to shoulder in the summer and fall of 1944 had its inevitable consequences in the attrition of the theater's motor transport resources. Vehicles underwent rapid deterioration in the fall of 1944 as the result of the grueling pace set by such expedients as the Red Ball Express. Truck units in the combat zone shared this to some extent, for they had joined in the long-distance work. Excessive speed, overloading, reckless driving, poor discipline and control, and the sacrifice of adequate maintenance in favor of short-term gains all contributed to the tendency. The result was a tremendous increase in repairs, which had already risen to 1,500 per day at the end of September.
The root of the trouble lay in poor maintenance, particularly first and second echelon, which suffered from both driver fatigue and lack of discipline. Plans for a "service station" type of line maintenance were not put into effect, partly because Red Ball was looked upon as a temporary expedient. Accidents, rather than mechanical failures, necessitated approximately one third of all vehicle replacement issues, reflecting both reckless driving and driver fatigue.
TRUCK TRACTORS, 5-TON, HAULING 10-TON SEMITRAILERS to Liège over the ABC Route, March 1945.
In the fall General Mud stepped in to create additional hazards and hindrances in the forward areas and in many depots, causing overheated engines and shortening the life of brake systems. The available maintenance equipment was unequal to the suddenly magnified repair task. Four- and ten-ton wreckers in the heavy and medium automotive maintenance companies, for example, had to be augmented by 4-ton Diamond-T's normally used for towing.
Finally, lack of spare parts often kept vehicles deadlined. This was particularly true of tires. Overloading and lack of preventive maintenance took a heavy toll, and heavy damage was also caused by the sharp edges of the cut-off tops of C ration cans which were strewn along the roads. Theater reserves were quickly exhausted and repair facilities could not match the new demand. This deficiency was further aggravated by the lack of such supplies as camelback, an item essential in recapping.
Intensive efforts to improve maintenance were made in late 1944, particularly in the services needed along the lines of communications. These efforts eventually bore fruit in better vehicle availability, which rose from thirty per company at the end of November to thirty-five within the next month. Nevertheless, the replacement factor for cargo trucks, as in many other items of equipment, proved entirely too low for the conditions under which motor transport was used in the European theater. At the end of the year theater officials recommended that the original 2 percent factor be raised to 8 in the case of 2½-ton trucks, and 6 for the 10-ton
The Transportation Corps had continued its efforts throughout the summer and fall to acquire more of the heavier cargo units which had long since proved themselves much more efficient than the 2½-ton truck in the over-the-road hauling. The shortage of such units in the United States had forced the theater to accept substitutes, including many 2½-ton trucks, before D Day. By the end of December the Transportation Corps had succeeded in re-equipping thirty companies with the much-desired truck-tractor-semitrailer combinations, giving the theater a total of fifty companies equipped with the big 10-tonners.
Much of the new equipment was discharged at Marseille, where ordnance teams assembled the units and where companies sent down from the Communications Zone picked them up. Most of the drivers had had no experience in handling heavy equipment, and took a short training course while awaiting the assembly of their vehicles. When the trucks were ready they were driven to the quays at Marseille and loaded with supplies so that their initial lift capacity should not be wasted on the northward run. The newly equipped companies delivered these supplies to the army areas, and then proceeded to their assigned stations. Much of the equipment arriving in this manner was immediately committed to the ABC Haul out of Antwerp.16
The re-equipping program had already added materially to the capacity of the Motor Transport Service by the end of 1944. At the close of the year there were approximately 200 truck companies of all types from 2½-ton up, including tankers, refrigerator trucks, and even 2 companies of 45-ton trailers, in the Communications Zone, 84 of which came under the direct operational control of the Motor Transport Service. Under the Tables of Equipment this would have permitted an authorized strength of more than 10,000 vehicles, with about 8,300 in operation under optimum conditions. In actual practice, only about 75 percent of the authorized number was available, and a still smaller number in operable condition at any one time.
But the theater's motor transport resources were augmented steadily. By the close of the year seventy-five additional companies had been authorized for 1945, and the re-equipping program was also to continue. Early in the new year fourteen veteran companies arrived from Iran and were equipped with 10-ton diesel cargo trucks. Meanwhile other companies were shipped to the United Kingdom, where sufficient 10-ton semitrailer units were initially provided to equip and train five companies. On the Continent the Transportation Corps established a transfer pool at Chartres, where 2½-ton 6x6 companies could exchange their old equipment for the larger units.17
Approximately 30,000 men were employed in Motor Transport Service operations at the end of 1944, about three
FOUR 750-GALLON SKID TANKS mounted on 10-ton semitrailers used for transporting gasoline in bulk.
fourths of them consisting of Negro enlisted personnel. The Transportation Corps had persisted in its efforts to get additional drivers so that truck companies could operate round the clock, but was only partially successful. Some overstrengthening had been carried out before the invasion. But the shortage of drivers remained acute throughout the summer, and in the fall the Transportation Corps was still recommending a substantial augmentation in strength of all truck units.18
Beginning in November, despite the serious maintenance and replacement problem, the Transportation Corps was in a much better position to meet sudden demands for motor transport occasioned by tactical developments, largely because of better planning for such eventualities. With the experience of the pursuit in mind, General Ross's staff made detailed plans to support a breakthrough should the November offensive produce one. Truck company bivouacs were reconnoitered and selected in the Namur and Verdun areas, and eighty companies with a lift capacity equivalent to 110 of the 2½-ton type were earmarked for rapid marshaling in support of any one or all of the armies in the
12th Army Group. The plan also provided for centralized operation of truck units through a specially organized forward echelon of the Motor Transport Service headquarters, operating under the control of either the main headquarters or the Advance Section.
While the tactical successes of November did not warrant the implementation of these plans, the preparations nevertheless stood the theater in good stead at the time of the German counteroffensive a month later, and were quickly adapted to that situation. Port clearance operations at Rouen and Antwerp were immediately curtailed and motor transport was released to meet more urgent demands. On 18 December, two days after the start of the attacks, the equivalent of 274 2½-ton trucks were taken off the White Ball Route and another 258 from Seine Section to rush combat formations--principally airborne units--forward from the Reims area. On the following day the White Ball Route released another 347 trucks for use in the redeployment of Third Army units. On 20 December additional diversions, including 10-ton semitrailers from the ABC Haul, were made to the Reims area. By the end of the month more than 2,500 trucks had been temporarily withdrawn from port clearance and static operations to handle emergency troop and supply movements. In some cases they evacuated forward dumps in danger of capture, as for example at Liège, from which tank trucks removed 400,000 gallons of aviation gasoline. Throughout these operations the Motor Transport Service ensured an efficient use of truck units by exercising centralized control over all movements in co-ordination with the COMZ G-4.19
(2) The Railways
While motor transport operated with greater and greater efficiency and gave a much-desired flexibility to the theater's transportation system, it constituted no substitute for the railways in the sustained movement of large tonnages over great distances. In the long run the railroad was the main workhorse of the transportation system, handling the great bulk of the tonnages.
In mid-September the railways had not yet assumed a large portion of the transport burden, although the Allied advance had uncovered almost the entire rail system of France, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Forward of St. Lô the lines then in operation had been rehabilitated in great haste, and only a few lines tentatively reached forward from the Seine, handling but a few thousand tons per day.20 Very little additional mileage was captured in the next few months, and railway development was therefore confined almost strictly to the rehabilitation of the extensive network already in Allied hands.
At the end of September the 2d Military Railway Service, which operated the railways in the north, had under its jurisdiction approximately 2,000 miles of single track and 2,775 miles of double track lines. East of Paris three main lines of communications had been opened: one in the north to Liège via Compiègne, Cambrai, Valenciennes, Mons,
Charleroi, and Namur; one via Soissons, Laon, and Hirson to Charleroi, where it tied in with the northern line; and a third extending directly east of Paris via Sezanne and Sommesous to the Nancy-Metz-Verdun triangle. By the end of December additional lines had been opened to raise the mileage to 3,500 of single track and 5,000 of double track, which was equal to about one third of all rail mileage in France.21 (See Map 9 below.)
The condition of the lines varied greatly. By the end of December the lines in the original lodgment area and in northern Brittany were in fairly good repair. Northwest of Paris, however, where both Allied bombings and enemy demolitions had been heavy, much remained to be done. In the Paris area itself most of the bridges on either side of the city had been destroyed, forcing all traffic for some time to use the so-called "inner circle" route and the passenger stations in the very heart of the city. East of the Seine the railways had been left relatively intact, but damage was again heavy in the area where the enemy offered more determined resistance. In the north one of the two double-track lines which converged at Charleroi had several single-track sections, and beyond Charleroi only one double-track line was available to serve the railheads of the Advance Section, First Army, and Third Army at Huy, Liège, and Vise. At Liège itself only one bridge was left standing, creating a bottleneck which was not relieved until late in January. In the Metz area alone the enemy destroyed sixteen highway and five railway bridges and systematically demolished short stretches of track, making extensive use of the mechanical "track router."22
Bridge repair and reconstruction constituted by far the major task in railway rehabilitation, even though the footage destroyed averaged only 25 percent instead of the 50 percent expected. Nevertheless, by mid-November 180 damaged bridges had been repaired, and 125 had been rebuilt. Practically all this work was carried out by the Advance Section, whose engineer units were organized into groups, each with an allotted territory. Base and intermediate sections normally only carried out track work and completed marshaling yard rehabilitation.
U.S. engineers were initially dependent on British-designed bridging, produced in both the United States and the United Kingdom, for the U.S. Army had developed no military railway bridging. Shortly after the landings, however, American engineer units began to use captured rolled steel beams which the Germans had manufactured at the Hadir Steel Works in Differdange, Luxembourg, which greatly speeded bridge reconstruction. As soon as the Differdange plant was captured it began producing for the Allies and eventually provided beams for about 90 percent of all the bridges reconstructed on the Continent, including those for the Rhine, Elbe, and Danube crossings.23
Rehabilitation was only one of several
problems which had to be met in bringing the railways to maximum usefulness. The Military Railway Service was short of experienced operating and supervisory personnel to begin with because of the inability of the zone of interior to release men with such training. Less than 15 percent of the strength of the operating battalions consequently consisted of men of "operating caliber" judged by normal standards. This deficiency was later aggravated by the course of tactical developments on the Continent. The Allies had never contemplated attempting to operate the railways of liberated countries exclusively with military personnel for an indefinite period. They had planned to return facilities to the respective countries in easy stages as areas were made secure from enemy attack, as near-normal operating conditions were restored, and as civilian organizations were reconstituted. Under these plans operations in the earliest stages during which the lines were being rehabilitated, known as Phase I, were to be handled by military units, with assistance from civilians wherever possible. Phase II operations were to begin once normal operating conditions were restored in a particular area or over a given line. Military officials were to supervise operations and retain complete control in that period, but trains were to be operated by civilian crews. Complete operational responsibility was to be restored to civilian agencies within a particular area in Phase III, although military personnel were to maintain close liaison with civilian agencies, and U.S. military requirements were to have movement priority.24
The rapid advance beyond the Seine had much the same effect on rail plans as on other features of the logistic plan. Units of the Military Railway Service were suddenly extended to a much greater degree than expected. In addition, difficulties in language and in documentation of shipments under French operation, plus the fact that the Cherbourg area for a long time remained the main base of supply, made it infeasible to return the railways to French control as rapidly as planned. The northern lines into Paris, in addition to the lines to the north, east, and southeast, consequently remained under Phase I operation, spreading the available operating personnel much more thinly than planned.25
Far more serious a limiting factor was the shortage of equipment, notably in locomotives and rolling stock. Captured equipment could not be counted on to meet all Allied requirements in view of the systematic destruction to which the French railways had been subjected by the Allied air forces and in view of expected German demolitions. The Allies had therefore planned to ferry substantial quantities of motive power and rolling stock to the Continent. Allied requirements for locomotives were originally estimated at 2,724 of the 2-8-0 type, 1800 of which were intended for American use, and 680 of the 0-6-0 type, 470 of them for U.S. use, plus a smaller number of diesels of various types. By
the end of June, 1,358 of the first type and 362 of the second had been made available in the United Kingdom, leaving a requirement of about 2,000 to be met from U.S. production. Four hundred and fifty of the locomotives shipped to the United Kingdom had been temporarily loaned to the British for use in the United Kingdom with the understanding that they would be released and shipped to the Continent as they were needed there.
Shortly after the landings in Normandy General Ross, alarmed over reported cutbacks in the production of locomotives in the United States, and over the failure of the British either to release engines on loan as scheduled or to deliver locomotives promised from U.K. production, informed the War Department that the theater would need all locomotives originally requested. The War Department, reluctant to undertake additional commitments because of interference with new tank production in the locomotive shops, asked the theater to exert all possible pressure on British officials not only to release the 450 engines loaned them, but also to make an all-out effort to meet earlier production commitments. The Army Service Forces meanwhile made similar representations to the British Ministry of Supply Mission in Washington.26
Late in August, Allied tactical successes, engendering hopes for an early victory, tended to relieve the anxieties of theater Transportation Corps officials over the adequacy of locomotives.27 But this optimism was short-lived. The rapid advance across France only aggravated the shortage of motive power. Of the locomotives found on the French railways west of the Seine only about fifty could be placed in immediate use, and it was estimated that 80 to 85 percent of those recovered would be found inoperable.28
Lack of power was partially attributable to the uneconomic use of the available locomotives which resulted from poor management at the boundaries between operating battalions in Normandy, although this was eventually corrected. For a time it was necessary to double-head some trains. This not only doubled the requirement for motive power but for engine crews as well, creating a shortage of both personnel and power. The solution to this problem was found in employing French engine crews to man the second engine; 124 crews were recruited by the end of October.29
The urgency of increasing motive power on the Continent meanwhile found expression in plans to move 500 locomotives across the Channel in September, and at the rate of 20 per day thereafter. Arrangements were made several weeks later for the gradual release and shipment of the 450 U.S. locomotives
AMERICAN LOCOMOTIVE LOWERED BY CRANE from a seatrain to the rails at Cherbourg.
then in use on the British railways.30 These schedules proved unattainable, partly because of movement difficulties, and had to be revised.31 Even more important, however, was the fact that the release of the 450 "Boleros" was closely linked with the problem of Britain's coaster fleet, the loan of the locomotives compensating in part for the extraordinarily extended retention of coaster tonnage in cross-Channel service.32
Late in November SHAEF pressed for the immediate shipment of 50 engines in the second half of December, followed by 100 per month to the end of March, holding out the hope that at least a portion of the coaster fleet might be released with the opening of Antwerp. The British agreed to release 150 locomotives by the end of December, and to prepare another 100 for dispatch in January. But they strongly indicated that the release of these and subsequent quotas might be conditioned on the return of a portion of the coaster fleet.33
At the very end of December the return of 100,000 tons of coaster shipping
led the British Chiefs of Staff to offer to dispatch 100 locomotives to the Continent during January, February, and March. Together with previous shipments, this promised to complete the release of the 450 engines which had been loaned for service on the British railways.34 At the end of the year a total of 1,500 locomotives had been moved to the Continent, and an additional 800 captured engines--French, German, and Italian--had been repaired by French and American mechanics and placed in service.35
The same considerations which had led to the planned shipment of locomotives to the Continent had also led to planning substantial importations of rolling stock. More than 57,000 cars of various types, including box, tank, refrigerator, and flat cars, and cabooses were scheduled for shipment to the Continent, approximately 20,000 of which were shipped knocked down from the United States and assembled in British shops before D Day.36
Movement difficulties--notably the lack of reception facilities on the far shore--prevented shipment of much of this rolling stock to France in the first few months. Although a substantial amount was captured, shortages began to develop as soon as the breakout from Normandy imposed the long-distance hauling mission on the railways. Neither the condition of the French railways nor military requirements lent themselves to an efficient and economical use of even the limited rolling stock available. As early as mid-August the Communications Zone took measures to eliminate an evil which plagued the operation of the railways to the end of the war--namely, the tendency to hold loaded freight cars in the forward areas, thus removing them from circulation or at best lengthening the turnaround time. The Communications Zone impressed upon all the section commanders the necessity of prompt unloading of cars in view of the shortage of rolling stock and the limited sidings available. At the same time it authorized the chief of transportation to impose embargoes and divert shipments elsewhere if congestion developed at unloading points.37
By November an average of approximately 23,000 tons of supplies was being forwarded by rail east of the Seine each day, attesting to a tremendous increase in rail hauling capacity since mid-September.38 But the very substantial increase in the number of freight cars available to the Allies by the end of November brought no final solution to the rolling stock shortage.39 In mid-November, a serious jamming up of trains began to develop in the forward area, and
quickly extended back from the railheads. By 20 November eastbound trains occupied every block from the Belgian border to Namur. Within another few days the entire Belgian rail system became so choked with traffic that it was necessary to clear selected trains from the main track at stations near the French border and release their crews and engines. Similar developments in the Verdun area, the center of a big advance depot complex, necessitated the side-tracking of cars to rear areas, resulting in congestion, delays in the spotting and unloading of cars, and the tie-up of precious rolling stock. Meanwhile rail operations at Liège, already a bottleneck because of destroyed bridges, were partially disrupted by heavy V-bomb attacks carried out in the last ten days of the month.40
Part of the freight car tie-up difficulty stemmed from the tendency of the armies to keep as high a percentage of their reserves as possible on wheels, with the result that loaded cars accumulated on available sidings and rolling stock was immobilized. The Communications Zone had repeatedly called for "drastic action" to eliminate this costly practice. A more immediate cause was the decision to ship large tonnages of supplies in bulk directly from the ports to advance depots, contrary to established doctrine. Neither ADSEC nor army installations were prepared to accept the avalanche of supplies which began to descend on them toward the end of November. Unloading and storage facilities in the forward areas, including depot personnel, sidings, and switching facilities, were always at a premium. Moreover, they were intended for the primary function of issuing supplies to using units (which entailed the storage of a relatively small portion of the theater's reserves and presumed a fairly steady flow of maintenance needs), not that of the classification and segregation of supplies shipped in bulk, a mission normally assigned to intermediate or base depots.
The opening of Antwerp at the end of November did not help matters, despite the prospect of quicker turnaround on the shorter lines of communications, for the lack of storage space in the port necessitated the prompt forwarding of supplies. On the last day of the month there were already 11,000 loaded freight cars on the rails east of Paris. Within ten days the number had risen to 14,000, which was estimated to be more than double the normal operational needs. Turnaround time for some cars was between twenty and forty days.41
The Communications Zone, recognizing the seriousness of the tie-up, on 12 December outlined a specific program to relieve the congestion. Included in the instructions to the chief of transportation and section commanders were orders to unload commodity-loaded cars
held as a rolling reserve, to reduce outloadings at Cherbourg, to build additional sidings in the ADSEC area, to stop and hold at Paris all ration trains consigned to Verdun, and to make substantial cuts in the over-all shipment of rations, which had averaged nearly 6,000 tons per day in the first days of December. To prevent this program from interfering with ship unloadings, Channel Base Section was instructed, as a temporary expedient, to continue the unloading of supplies from ships then working at Antwerp and to place them in temporary quayside storage or any suitable nearby area. Since this would in turn produce a backlog of supply stocks west of Paris and south of Antwerp, the chief of transportation was instructed to initiate a call-up system once normal shipments were resumed so that depot commanders would have some control over the daily load imposed on them.42
But the relief promised by this program was postponed. Within a few days the enemy counteroffensive in the Ardennes intervened and further aggravated congestion on the rails. Approximately 35,000 rail cars were allowed to accumulate in the forward areas and were held there against the possibility of large-scale troop and supply evacuations, with the inevitable effect of restricting port discharge and rail movements in the rear. The Communications Zone met the problem of the backlog and pressure on Antwerp partially by acquiring additional storage space from the British, partially by establishing inland holding and reconsignment points, particularly at Lille and Cambrai, which served as a cushion between the port and the depots, permitting clearance of the port to continue.43 But General Ross later estimated that the counteroffensive had had the effect of setting back car unloadings and the movement of freight by nearly 14,000 cars or thirty-five shiploads of supplies.44
Rail transportation loosened up once more with the turning back of the German drive, and by the end of January the worst effect of the setback had been overcome.45 But the control of movements and the unloading and release of rolling stock remained a thorny problem until the end of hostilities.
Damage to rail lines in the area of the December counteroffensive took the form mainly of destroyed bridges, caused by both Allied and enemy demolitions and Allied air attacks. At St. Vith the yards were completely destroyed. Outside the main battle area one major rail bridge over the Meuse had been destroyed at Namur. During an enemy air raid on 24 December a lucky hit had set off charges which Allied forces had placed in preparation for possible demolition. The bridge was immediately rebuilt,
and was opened to traffic on 5 January.46
Problems of rail development and operation in the north were substantially duplicated in the south. A good rail net existed in southern France, double-track lines running north from Marseille along both banks of the Rhône, supplemented by another double-track route branching off at Valence and extending northward via Grenoble and Besançon. From these main lines an extensive network reached into Alsace via the Belfort gap and into Lorraine.
Rail operations in the south began on a very limited scale as early as 17 August (D plus 2), when small quantities of supplies were moved inland from the St. Tropez beaches on a narrow-gauge line. The first standard-gauge line was placed in operation shortly thereafter between St. Raphael and Aix-en-Provence. From the latter the single-track line north to Grenoble was then opened despite destroyed bridges across the Durance River at Meyrargues and the Buesch River at Sisteron. For a short time supplies were hauled by rail to Meyrargues and then trucked to Sisteron, where they were transferred back to rail. By mid-September temporary bridges strong enough to carry loaded rail cars, but not engines, had been completed at both points, and the line was open as far north as Bourg, 220 miles from the landing beaches. For a few weeks this route served as the principal rail line of communications, with a capacity of 1,500 tons per day.
In the meantime, the two main lines straddling the Rhône had been reconnoitered as far north as Lyon, where the headquarters of the 1st Military Railway Service, commanded by Brig. Gen. Carl R. Gray, was established on 14 September. Restoration of the line on the west bank of the river was initially ruled out, for all bridges but one had been demolished. The east bank line was in better condition, and steps were immediately taken to repair it and use it as the main supply route of the southern armies. Plans were initially made to locate the main advance depots in the Dijon area, and to extend the railways eastward from that city to Besançon and Belfort.
By 25 September the line was open as far north as Lyon with a capacity of 3,000 tons per day. By the end of the month the line was in operation north to Dijon and eastward to Besançon. Rehabilitation of the parallel eastern route north from Bourg continued, meanwhile, and was completed on 5 October, when the eastern line joined the other at Dol, halfway between Dijon and Besançon. At that time SOS Advance Headquarters at Dijon was accepting bids for the movement of 8,350 tons per day via rail. Within another week, with the acquisition of additional rolling stock and motive power, the capacity of the railways along the southern lines of communication had risen to 12,000 tons.47
By early October operational plans and the deployment of the Seventh U.S. and First French Armies dictated the
MAJ. GEN. FRANK S. ROSS, Brig. Gen. Carl R. Gray, and Brig. Gen. Clarence L. Burpee walking alongside an American locomotive.
development of rail lines northward as well as eastward. Epinal was selected as the main depot area for the support of the Seventh Army, and the rail line north from Dijon to that area was restored by the middle of the month. This gave the 6th Army Group two rail lines of communications beyond Dijon, one eastward via Besançon toward the Belfort gap, and one northeastward via Langres to Epinal in the direction of the Saverne gap. Railheads for the two armies remained in the vicinity of Besançon and Epinal for most of the following month. In mid-November the completion of a bridge over the Moselle made it possible to extend the northern line an additional thirty miles to Luneville. Meanwhile the line supporting the First French Army was extended to Clerval, approximately half the distance from Besançon to Belfort.
In December the rapid advance of the Seventh Army through the Saverne gap and the subsequent reversion to the defensive in the Colmar area had their effect on rail reconstruction priorities. The Seventh Army's capture of Strasbourg placed railheads out of comfortable reach of motor transport, creating a demand for rail support east of Luneville. The removal of track between Luneville and Sarrebourg and damage to a tunnel east of Sarrebourg presented
a formidable reconstruction task. But by extra exertions the line was restored through Sarrebourg and Saverne all the way to Strasbourg and Haguenau and opened to traffic on 21 December. At the same time engineers of the 1st Military Railway Service extended the network supporting the First French Army by restoring the line north of Besançon via Vesoul and Lure to Champagney. Progress in that area was painfully slow because of heavy demolitions on bridges and tunnels and on the rails themselves. At the end of December the passing to the defensive in the Colmar region revived the importance of the Epinal-St. Die-Strasbourg line, which was given first priority so that units fighting on the northern side of the pocket could be supported.
As in northern France, rail rehabilitation was largely a matter of reconstructing bridges, of which forty-two were rebuilt by the end of the year, although the southern forces also had to contend with blown tunnels.48
At the end of December the 1st Military Railway Service had approximately 4,000 miles of track under its jurisdiction, and this mileage did not change appreciably in the next few months. The southern lines at that time had a rated capacity of 14,000 tons per day. But this was rarely if ever realized in performance. Like the 12th Army Group in the north, the 6th Army Group allocated the available tonnage between its armies.
Railway operations in southern France were conducted under Phase II conditions almost from the start, and very little mileage was ever operated entirely by military units. As in the north, shortages of personnel, motive power, and rolling stock plagued operations. The shortage of cars was aggravated, as on the northern lines, by the failure to unload cars. Beginning in October hundreds of cars were consistently held under load as mobile reserves.
Late in December the problem began to reach critical proportions as rail operations in the south suffered additional hazards and handicaps imposed by a severe winter in mountainous terrain. Extreme cold and drifting snow, which caused power failures, maintenance difficulties, and disruption of communications, plus sickness among the French crews and a shortage of coal, seriously hampered rail operations, resulting in the further piling up of loaded cars. At its worst, eight days of supplies accumulated and awaited unloading or movement into railheads. An attempt to break the log-jam by placing a forty-eight-hour embargo on all loadings at Marseille brought only passing relief, and the pile-up continued. The worst occurred at Is-sur-Tille, the Seventh Army regulating station, where 2,000 cars accumulated. Inclement weather also held up further rail reconstruction, with the result that the blown tunnel at Champagney continued to block the Lure-Belfort line, and the damaged Dannemarie viaduct the line between Belfort and Mulhouse.
Operating conditions worsened in January, when both forward deliveries and
CONVOY OF TRUCKS CARRYING ESSENTIAL SUPPLIES for Seventh Army travels over snow-covered winding roads in the Vosges mountains.
unloadings dropped to an all-time low. At the end of the month 5,000 cars were still under load in yards and railheads of the two armies and of the Continental Advance Section. The supply of both armies reached a precarious state at that time, and led officials of the 6th Army Group and SOLOC to institute an even more rigid control over all transportation in order to ensure delivery of the minimum tonnages of essential maintenance items.
CONAD now began to allocate trains on a daily basis, specifying the exact number which were to go forward with Class I, III, and V supplies. Preparations were made to handle Class II and IV supplies almost exclusively by motor transport. For this purpose another special trucking operation, known, like that which operated briefly between Cherbourg and Dol in November, as the Green Diamond Route, was organized to operate between the CONAD depots and the armies. One thousand vehicles were drawn from Delta Base and other COMZ sections for the job, including 200 from CONAD itself. On 1 February sixteen companies, a majority of them of the 10-ton semitrailer type, and organized along the lines of the special motor transport services in the north, began shuttling critically needed supplies from Dijon, Langres, and Is-sur-Tille to Seventh Army depots and supply points.49
These measures, plus a sudden improvement in rail operations resulting from better weather and an increase in motive power, quickly relieved the critical supply situation. Within six days the backlog of rail cars at Is-sur-Tille alone was reduced from 2,242 to 928 despite unrestricted movements into the yards. In the second week of February deliveries to the armies reached an all-time record--52,034 tons by rail and 7,853 tons by truck. By mid-February the rebuilding of forward reserves had progressed so well that the special trucking operation could be terminated.50
Both the 1st and 2d Military Railway Services had experienced trying times in December and January, having been put to severe tests by both winter weather and the demands occasioned by enemy offensives. Experience in both the north and south had underscored the importance of one of the most vital aspects of military transportation--movement control. Railway operations in a theater of war can rarely be conducted on a "scheduled" basis. Requirements for transport, reflecting the requirement for supplies, are subject to frequent changes. Rail lines, yards, depots, and handling equipment are often inadequate or destroyed. It is difficult to impose penalties for hoarding loaded rail cars. Existing facilities must therefore be used to the best possible advantage if the needs of the combat elements are to be met. This means the allocation of rolling stock and the matching of facilities--loading, movement, and unloading--in such a way as to avoid waste. Movement control was far from perfect in both the north and south in the fall of 1944, as attested by the wasteful idleness of rolling stock and the choking up of rail lines.
The organization and operation of the two services differed in at least one major respect. The 2d Military Railway Service in the north was operated by the Chief of Transportation, Communications Zone, although the various operating units of which it was made up were attached to the COMZ section in which they operated. By the end of 1944 movement control had become fairly centralized. The chief of transportation normally received movement requirements each month from the COMZ G-4. In conference with the various divisions of the Office of the Chief of Transportation, a decision was made as to how to fill the various movement needs, whether by rail, water, or truck. On the basis of this decision a movement plan was then drawn up, showing the ports at which certain tonnages would originate and the depots to which they were to be shipped. The 2d Military Railway Service, having been informed of the rail requirements for the plan, then prepared a detailed movement plan which was to be carried out through the railway operating battalions in co-operation with the COMZ sections involved.
The 1st Military Railway Service, unlike the 2d, had been established as a separate subcommand of the Mediterranean theater, and enjoyed an unusual degree of autonomy. As such, it possessed
its own engineers and carried out its own rail reconstruction, procured its own supplies and equipment, had its own operating units, and had assigned to it the necessary military police units to guard and protect supplies in transit. Movement control was not centralized for all modes of transportation as in the north. Once the tonnage bids were allocated, the 1st Military Railway Service assumed control of its own movements, which it handled quite independently of the chief of transportation.
Opinions differ as to whether this type organization had any advantages over that adopted in the north. Car shortages developed just as they did in the north; backlogs developed through failure to call cars forward; and the armies held on to loaded cars as rolling reserves. Clearing up the traffic backlog in February was in fact largely attributable to the fact that the transportation officer of Continental Advance Section for the first time assumed the function of traffic regulator.51 Some of the features of the southern system nevertheless were adopted for the Military Railway System as a whole in the spring of 1945.
On 12 February 1945, when the separate Southern Line of Communications was dissolved and the northern and southern lines were finally integrated under one command, the two railway services were also brought under a central supervisory control--General Headquarters, Military Railway Service, established in Paris under General Gray, who became subordinate to General Ross as theater chief of transportation.
(3) Air Transport
No unusual developments took place in the field of air transportation in the weeks immediately after the pursuit. After achieving an average delivery of slightly more than 1,000 tons per day in the second week of September, when troop-carrier and cargo aircraft of the First Allied Airborne Army and converted B-24 bombers from U.S. Strategic Air Force plus a small contingent from the RAF combined in a final effort, supply by air fell off abruptly when planes of the First Allied Airborne Army were finally withdrawn for the Holland airborne operation.52
For about a week only B-24's were available for air supply in support of the 12th Army Group. These were used to good advantage in the transportation of gasoline in bulk from the United Kingdom. The bombers had begun to haul limited amounts of bulk POL on 9 September. Beginning on the 18th a major emergency effort was made to haul POL to three fields which the Ninth Air Force made available for the purpose on the Continent--St. Dizier, Clastres, and Florennes. The bombers could carry only 1,600 to 1,800 gallons of gas in four bomb bay tanks, and on the first day of the new effort only 11 planes, carrying 17,580 gallons, made deliveries. The next day 77 planes were dispatched to the Continent with 123,414 gallons. The lift continued until 30 September. The largest delivery was made on the 29th, when 197 planes moved 301,376 gallons. In the thirteen days of operations a total of 1,601 sorties were flown and 2,589,065 gallons of gasoline
were delivered to the Continent. About three fourths of the POL was flown to the three U.S. fields, the remainder to a British field for 21 Army Group.53
Meanwhile, on 22 September the cancellation of a portion of the planned resupply missions in Holland made an additional 30 troop-carrier aircraft available, and the First Allied Airborne Army promised to increase the transport fleet to 600 craft as quickly as they became available. During the last week of September total cargo deliveries rose to a record 1,525 tons per day, partly through the return of troop-carrier aircraft, partly through the continued use of B-24's and some British Halifaxes. Despite the constant uncertainty over the availability of transport aircraft which characterized operations throughout the month, Allied planes flew 11,000 sorties and delivered more than 30,000 tons in September. This represented 60 percent of all the tonnage transported by air since D Day.54
The Communications Zone, faced with a sizable deficit in transportation, would have liked to continue utilizing the airlift to the fullest possible extent. At the beginning of October road and rail transportation were inadequate to meet even the daily maintenance requirements of the armies, Advance Section, and the Ninth Air Force, to say nothing of moving forward the 150,000 tons of supplies required to reconstitute the seven-day supply level authorized the armies. Between 6,000 and 7,000 tons of additional lift were needed if both maintenance and reserve goals were to be met by the end of the month. General Stratton, fully aware that this requirement was beyond the capacity of the available transport aircraft, nevertheless asked the Army Group G-4, General Moses, to seek the maximum possible allocation from the SHAEF Air Priorities Board.55
Because of its relative extravagance as a means of transport, the continued large-scale employment of aircraft for supply movement was not approved. The use of bombers for this purpose had been uneconomical from the start, and at the end of September the B-24's were withdrawn completely from their supply mission. Henceforth all air supply was to be carried out by aircraft of the IX Troop Carrier Command (U.S.) and the 46 Group (British). SHAEF immediately reduced the allocation of planes for that purpose and attempted to limit their use strictly to meeting emergency needs as originally intended. Bad weather and lack of forward fields further affected the scale of air deliveries during the fall, and for about two and a half months deliveries averaged only about 675 tons per day. By allocation,
approximately two thirds of this tonnage went to the 12th Army Group.56
The administrative procedure for arranging supply by air was improved and simplified from time to time during the fall, but responsibility and authority of the various commands had to be clarified again and again. Supply SOP's specified that the armies were to state their needs and priorities and that the Army Group would establish tonnage allocations. Within those allocations the Communications Zone determined the means of delivery. Throughout the fall, however, both the armies and the Communications Zone frequently violated the intent of air supply policy. The armies requested air delivery of specific items, which was forbidden except in combat emergency, and the Communications Zone utilized air transportation for supplies no longer in critical shortage. Early in December Third Army complained that the airlift was being wasted in the shipment of gasoline, of which there was no longer a shortage, while its requests for the shipment of critical Class II and IV supplies, which it claimed were available in both the United Kingdom and Normandy, particularly signal items, had remained unfilled. Of a total of 3,227 tons of supplies received during November, it pointed out, 2,143 tons consisted of gasoline and only 250 of Class II and IV supplies, 55 of which consisted of signal items. Gasoline, it suspected, was being shipped because it happened to be on hand at U.K. airfields and was the most convenient cargo to handle.57
Early in December SHAEF further reduced the allocation of aircraft for supply and evacuation--to 150 planes from the IX Troop Carrier Command and 40 from 46 Group--the intention being to keep only a standby organization in operation at a reduced scale, but capable of immediate expansion. The major air supply effort of the month was made only a few days later, when it became necessary to resupply units isolated by the enemy break-through in the Ardennes. Between 23 and 27 December 850 planes were dispatched to Bastogne to parachute urgently needed supplies to the besieged 101st Airborne Division. Another sixty-one craft were dispatched with gliders, one of them bearing surgical teams. Although some planes were lost to enemy fire, and some supplies could not be recovered because of errors in dropping, the deliveries, totaling 850 tons and estimated to be about 95 percent effective, were considered the most successful ever made to the 101st Division.58
C-47's AIRDROPPING SUPPLIES BY PARACHUTE to an isolated unit of the 101st Airborne Division, Bastogne, 26 December 1944.
A similar attempt to supply isolated elements of the 3d Armored Division in Belgium miscarried. Of twenty-nine aircraft dispatched to the division with gasoline and medical supplies on 23 December, twenty-three dropped their loads in enemy territory as the result of a misreading of map co-ordinates, and the remainder were either diverted or lost to enemy action. Bad weather frustrated a second attempt on 24 December.59
While the resupply of airborne units at Bastogne was regarded as a very creditable performance, few of the agencies involved were properly prepared for the emergency, and sharp words were exchanged between the 12th Army Group and COMZ staffs before the operation got under way.60 After the emergency SHAEF ordered the Communications Zone to maintain balanced stocks of supplies required to support type units of airborne, armored, and infantry divisions in sufficient quantity to load all troop-carrier aircraft for a maximum two-day lift.61 Shortly thereafter the Communications Zone prepared sixteen "bricks" of supplies at various airfields in the United Kingdom and on the Continent, each containing one day of supply for a division. The basic brick was designed to meet the needs of an airborne division and weighed 270.5 tons, but could be readily augmented with prepacked 76-mm. gun and 155-mm. howitzer ammunition to meet the needs of infantry and armored divisions. One additional brick was designed and packed for a regimental combat team.62
Supply by air continued at a relatively small scale throughout the period of the Ardennes battle, partly because of persistently bad weather. Deliveries averaged only 185 tons per day in January, the tonnage being divided about equally between 12th and 21 Army Groups.63
(4) Inland Waterways
The OVERLORD planners had not considered the inland waterways on the Continent of sufficient military value to warrant a large-scale rehabilitation effort. The policy was laid down of restoring waterways only in cases where minor repairs were required and where a clear military necessity existed. Any opportunity for the advantageous utilization of inland waterways for military transportation was counted as a bonus.
By September 1944 a clear-cut need had arisen to restore certain waterways in northern France to relieve the hard-pressed railways from the burden of coal movements into the Paris area. The Communications Zone at that time appointed an Inland Waterways Committee to recommend priorities for inland waterway restoration, estimate the manpower and equipment requirements, and
act as the U.S. agent in all dealings with the French on these matters. Early in November, when the inland waterways began to assume importance in the movement of military supplies, an Inland Waterways Division was established in the Office of the Chief of Transportation.64
Four main waterways were eventually rehabilitated--the Oise, Seine, and Rhône-Saône Rivers, and the Albert Canal. None of these had been seriously damaged, with the exception of some of the locks. But all were clogged with demolished bridges, which not only obstructed barge navigation, but prevented the movement of floating equipment. French and Belgian authorities tried to salvage as many of the demolished bridges as possible, raising them and eventually restoring them to rail or highway use. Civilians carried out the bulk of the work, although U.S. troop units usually provided the skilled supervisory personnel and much of the heavy construction equipment. Practically no prisoner of war labor was employed.
First priority was given to the clearance of that portion of the Oise River system extending from the Chauny and Valenciennes coal fields to Conflans on the Seine, about thirty-five miles below Paris. Several locks, including the large one at Creil, had to be repaired, and thirty-four obstructions, mostly blown bridges, had to be removed. The 1057th Port Construction and Repair Group provided the skilled labor for this project, and also supplied the French--who performed about 60 percent of the labor--with fuel, equipment, and other supplies. The first objective, cutting a single 40-foot wide channel the entire way, was completed early in November and the first coal barges arrived in Paris on the 18th.
The Seine River, while part of the French coal distribution system, was restored primarily to facilitate the transportation of civil imports from Le Havre and Rouen. Demolished bridges and damaged locks and dams blocked traffic on the Seine as on the other waterways. The biggest single task was the repair of the locks of the Tancarville Canal, which connected Le Havre with the Seine at Tancarville, about fifteen miles up the river. The canal had been built to permit barges, loaded directly from ocean-going ships in a basin at Le Havre, to reach the Seine without traversing the mouth of the estuary, where strong tidal currents made navigation difficult. U.S. engineer units initially were too occupied with the reconstruction of Le Havre to assist in the repair of the locks, and the French port authorities therefore undertook the task unassisted. Lacking adequate salvage and engineer equipment, they made little progress. U.S. naval salvage equipment also failed to raise the sunken ebb gates, and the job was finally assigned to the 1055th Port Construction and Repair Group, which aided French contractors by furnishing the necessary equipment and trained operators. Repair of the lock was not completed until mid-March 1945.
French civilian organizations, assisted by U.S. and British construction units, meanwhile had restored the Seine to navigation for both civil and military traffic. But that traffic for a long time was
BARGE CONVOY ON ALBERT CANAL carrying lumber from Antwerp to Liège, February 1945.
plagued by one bottleneck or another. Barge traffic was obstructed at first by two ponton bridges, which, when they were opened to clear barge traffic, interrupted vehicular traffic across the river. A more serious stricture developed at Le Manoir, where a temporary railway bridge built by British forces left insufficient clearance for barges. Raising the center span several feet in October provided no permanent solution, for the Seine reached flood stage in November and again reduced clearance below the required minimum. At the end of November flood conditions threatened to knock out the bridge, and forced a temporary stoppage of barge traffic on the river because of the danger from swift currents. A decision to remove the bridge depended on whether British supplies forwarded from the Caen-Bayeux area could be handled via Paris. The issue was finally settled on 25 December, when a tug struck the Le Manoir bridge and put it out of commission. The bridge was then removed.65
Although the restoration of the Oise and Seine Rivers and the canal system was initially undertaken to meet civilian needs, it promised important benefits to the military forces by relieving the railways, particularly in the distribution of
coal. The Albert Canal in Belgium had a more direct military value, and its rehabilitation was the principal inland waterway project jointly undertaken by U.S. and British forces. The canal, built between 1933 and 1939, connected Liège with Antwerp, a distance of eighty miles. Eight groups of locks, each group of three built to accommodate one 600-ton and two 2,000-ton barges, reduced the water level from sixty meters at Liège (on the Meuse) to sea level at Antwerp. U.S. forces were assigned responsibility for restoring the approximately fifty miles of the canal between Liège and Kwaadesmechelen, British forces the remainder.
The Advance Section initially laid out twenty-four work projects on its portion of the canal, most of them involving bridge removal or repair of locks, which would open the canal to 600-ton barges. These tasks were carried out under the supervision of the 1056th PC&R Group, with the assistance of the 355th and 332d Engineer General Service Regiments and Belgian civilian contractors, and were completed early in December, as scheduled. Delays in removing the Yserberg Bridge at Antwerp at first prevented full use of the canal, but barges could be loaded just east of that point by trucking directly from the port area. In any event, transportation on the Albert Canal got off to an unspectacular start. Ice and flood conditions created operational hazards as on the Seine, and the enemy counteroffensive completely upset transportation plans in the forward areas, forcing an embargo on barge traffic. Once these difficulties were overcome, the canal played an important role in the clearance of Antwerp, eventually handling about 50 percent of the tonnage discharged there.66
The Rhône-Saône waterway was rehabilitated almost entirely by the French. Except for some local clearance at Marseille, and a limited traffic in POL, however, the Rhône had practically no military value, largely because of the lack of high-powered tugs required for operation on the swift waters of the system.67
The four months' period after the pursuit represented a transition so far as transportation developments were concerned. Its most obvious feature was the gradual assumption of the bulk of the long-distance hauling by the railways. Motor transport, particularly in the form of the color routes, continued to provide a degree of flexibility in performing special missions. But the cutback in motor as well as air transport signaled the end of expedients necessitated by the emergency conditions in the summer of 1944 and an eventual return to more conventional means of transport.
1. Later alterations had little effect on the total route mileage. On 20 September the portion of the return route between Courville and Alençon reached such a state of disrepair that further maintenance became impracticable, and an alternate route was substituted. On 5 October the return route from Sommesous via Arcis and Nogent-sur-Seine to Fontainebleau was eliminated and the portion between Sommesous and Rozay-en-Brie opened to two-way traffic. Similarly on 11 October the return from Hirson to Château-Thierry via Reims and Epernay was also eliminated and the section between Hirson and Soissons made a two-way highway. G-4 Periodic Rpt for Quarter Ending 30 Sep 44, Tn Sec ADSEC 319.1 Supplement to G-4 Periodic Rpt; Ltr, Lt Col M. N. Drake, Stat Br OCofT, to G-4 COMZ, 18 Sep 44, sub: Supply Info, Incl to Ltr, Stratton to G-4 12 A Gp, 19 Sep 44, sub: Supply Info, 12 A Gp 400.291 Supply Information, II.
2. Memo, Maj Jerry House, ADSEC MTB Ln Off, for ADSEC Tn Off, 3 Oct 44, ADSEC 523.091 Red Ball--XYZ Routes.
3. History of TC ETO, IV, Jul-Sep 44, OCofT, p. 9; V, Oct-Dec 44, 2d MRS, p. 14, and OCofT, p. 30; Memo, ADSEC Tn Off for ADSEC G-4, 9 Oct 44; sub: Weekly Transportation Narrative, ADSEC 319.1 Weekly Narratives, Tn Sec; COMZ G-4 History, III, 31-33; Ltr, Lt Col Harold L. Mack, ACofT for Movs TC, to CofT COMZ, 1 Nov 44, sub: Semi-monthly Activity Rpt--Movs Div, EUCOM (TC) Semi-monthly Reports to CofT Washington; G-4 COMZ Plant and Communications Diary/Jnl, Summary of Br Chiefs Mtg, 27 Oct 44, ETO Adm 145C.
4. Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MTS, 12.
5. Daily Jnl, G-4 Plans and G-4 Plant and Communications, entries by Col Hansen and Col Potter, 18 and 29 Sep and 3 Oct 44, ETO Adm 145C, G-4 Plant and Communications Diary/Jnl; Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, Oct-Dec 44, I, OCofT, 67; COMZ G-4 History, III, Ch. III.
6. COMZ G-4 History, Chs. V and VI, and pp. 47-50.
7. The eight U.S. companies--six of them equipped with 2½-ton 6x6's and two with 10-ton semitrailers--were withdrawn from the Red Ball Express and replaced with provisional companies formed with vehicles from the 26th, 95th, and 104th Divisions. The provisional companies, despite the lack of training, performed well, and their convoy discipline was reported to be generally superior to that of the regular truck companies. COMZ G-4 History, III, 53; Opn, Orgn, Supply, and Svs of TC ETO, Gen Bd Rpt 122, p. 44.
8. Memo, Ravenhill for Vissering, 9 Oct 44, sub: POL Tonnage Lift, and reply, Vissering for Log Plans Br SHAEF, 12 Oct 44, SHAEF G-4 Tonnages--CI III, POL 137/5/GDP-1; Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MTS, 15-18; COMZ G-4 History, III, 52-55.
9. COMZ G-4 History, III, 55-56; Opn, Orgn, Supply, and Svs of TC ETO, Gen Bd Rpt 122, p. 44; Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MTS, 14-15.
10. Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, Normandy Base Sec, 13, and V, MTS, 22; COMZ G-4 History, III, 52; Opn, Orgn, Supply, and Svs of TC ETO, Gen Bd Rpt 122, pp. 44-45.
11. COMZ G-4 History, III, 56-59; Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MTS, 18-21; Opn, Orgn, Supply, and Svs of TC ETO, Gen Bd Rpt 122, p. 45.
12. COMZ G-4 History, III, 59; Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MTS, 13.
13. The special rail service, known as the "Toot Sweet Express," is described in Chapter XV, Section I, below.
14. Opn, Orgn, Supply, and Svs of TC ETO, Gen Bd Rpt 122, p. 44; Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MTS, 22-25, App. 7 to Ch. V, and Table 25.
15. COMZ G-4 History III, 33, 38-39, 40-43; Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MTS, 6; History of the Normandy Base Section, D Day to V-E Day, 36, 38, ETO Adm 595; COMZ G-4 Plant and Communications Diary/Jnl, 26 Sep and 16 Oct 44, ETO Adm 145C.
16. Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MTS, 3-4.
17. Ibid., 4, and App. 3 to Ch. V.
18. In November the Transportation Corps asked the War Department to increase the strength of all truck companies to 140 enlisted men. Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MTS, 7, 28.
19. Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MTS, 8-9, and V, OCofT, 31; COMZ G-4 History, III, 47, 59.
20. G-4 report for quarter ending 3 Sep 44, Tn Sec ADSEC, 26 Oct 44, ADSEC 319.1 Supplement to G-4 Periodic Rpt.
21. Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MRS, 8-10; Teletype Conf, Gross et al, in Washington with Ross in ETO, 10 Oct 44, ETO Tn, 337 ETO, Teletype Confs.
22. Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MRS, 9-10; Opn, Orgn, Supply, and Svs of TC ETO, Gen Bd Rpt 122, p. 56.
23. Final Report of the Chief Engineer, ETO, I, 282-83.
24. Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MRS, 10-11; Military Railway Service, Gen Bd Rpt 123, pp. 11-12.
25. Opn, Orgn, Supply and Svs of TC ETO, Gen Bd Rpt 122, pp. 53, 56. At the end of 1944 the 2d Military Railway Service consisted of 18 operating battalions, 4 shop battalions, 5 mobile workshop units, and 10 hospital train maintenance crews, organized into 5 grand divisions, and had a strength of 17,526 men. Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MRS, 35.
26. Ltr, Lt Col Frank R. Crom, SHAEF, to Gen Maxwell, WD G-4, 31 Jul 44, sub: Locomotives for U.S. Troops in ETO, 1st Ind, CG ASF to G-4, 29 Aug 44, and Cbl WAR-83364, ASF to CG ETO, 19 Aug 44, all in WDGDS 453.3, WDGDS A47-2, Railroad Locomotives and Rolling Stock; Ltr, Lee to Somervell, 24 Aug 44, sub: Locomotive Requirements for ETOUSA, EUCOM 453 Railway Equipment 1944.
27. Ltr, Michael Keith to WD G-4, 31 Aug 44, sub: Locomotives for U.S. Forces in ETO, WDGDS 453.3 WDGDS A47-2.
28. Mil Shipments Priority Mtg, SHAEF, 2 Sep 44, SHAEF AG 337-18.
29. G-4 COMZ Plant and Communications Diary/Jnl, Br Chiefs Mtg, 28 Oct 44, ETO Adm 145C.
30. Mil Shipments Priority Mtgs, 2 Sep 44, SHAEF AG 337-18; Ltr, Keith to WD G-4, 18 Oct 44, sub: Locomotives for U.S. Forces in ETO, WDGDS 453.3 WDGDS A47-2.
31. Mil Shipment Priority Mtgs, 9 Sep and 18 Nov 44.
32. See above, Ch. IV, Sec. 4.
33. Cbl S-68318, CAO to Br COS, 25 Nov 44, and Cbl 7016, Br COS to SHAEF, 30 Nov 44, SHAEF G-4 Rail Transportation 117/3 GDP-1.
34. Cbl 7635, Br COS to SHAEF, 30 Dec 44, SHAEF AG 617 Railway Case A, I.
35. Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MRS, 30-31, and App. 7.
36. Ibid., V, MRS, 26-27, and App. 7.
37. Ltr, Hq COMZ to Secs, 14 Aug 44, sub: Unloading of Rolling Stock, EUCOM 453 Railway Equipment.
38. Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MRS, App. 4.
39. On the basis of French claims, total rolling stock available to the Allies, French and Belgian combined plus 20,000 cars ferried over from the United Kingdom, should have totaled about 234,000. U.S. officials suspected that the French inventory included much rolling stock that wouldn't roll. It was advantageous to the French for purposes of compensation to include everything on wheels. Memo, Mil Railways Br G-4 SHAEF for Chief Mov and Tn G-4 SHAEF, 30 Nov 44, sub: Rail Mov of Freight and Pers to Support A Gp, SHAEF G-4, Rail Tn 117/3 GDP-1.
40. Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MRS, 14-15; Opn, Orgn, Supply, and Svs of TC ETO, Gen Bd Rpt 122, p. 56; Sgt. Joseph R. Ives, "Buzz Bombs and the Raids," Army Transportation Journal, I (September, 1945), 6-8.
41. SHAEF estimated that the total loads east of the Seine should never be greater than three times the daily unloading capacity. Under existing conditions, with an estimated unloading capacity of 2,000 cars per day, the total cars under load should not have exceeded 6,000. Memo Concerning Transportation, unsigned, 13 Dec 44, Hq ASF Official Rpt Mission to ETO 4 Dec 44-13 Jan 45, by Gen Lutes, Tab M; Min, CAO Mtg, 1 Dec 44, App. C, SHAEF AG 337.14.
42. Ltr, Lord to CofT and Sec Comdrs, 12 Dec 44, sub: Reduction of Number of Loaded Cars Between Paris and Forward Areas, EUCOM 453 Railway Equipment, 1944; COMZ G-4 History, II, 97-102; Cbl EX-75445, Lee to Base Secs, 17 Dec 44, ETO Adm 397.
43. Ltr, Lt Col R. W. Reisner of SHAEF G-4 Mov and Tn Br, to G-4, 20 Dec 44, sub: Rpt of Trip to Antwerp, SHAEF G-4 825.1 Piers . . . , 1944, V; TWXs S-73064, SHAEF to COMZ and 21 A Gp, 30 Dec 44, and EX-80904, COMZ to SHAEF, 31 Dec 44, SHAEF SGS 400.3/1 Supply Problems of Allied Advance; Channel Base Section History, I, 239; Hist Rpt of TC ETO, VI, Jan-Mar 45, Base Secs, 15.
44. COMZ Stf and Comd Conf, 5 Jan 45, EUCOM 337/3 Conferences, Staff Weekly, I.
45. Opn, Orgn, Supply, and Svs of TC ETO, Gen Bd Rpt 122, p. 56.
46. Railroad Construction and Bridging, Hist Rpt 12, CE ETO, pp. 73-74.
47. 6th A Gp G-4 AAR, Sep-Oct 44, p. 3; Hist Rpt of TC ETO, VI, MRS, 13-15; Opn, Orgn, Supply, and Svs of TC ETO, Gen Bd Rpt 122, pp. 59-60.
48. A Gp AARs, Sep-Nov, pp. 3-4, Dec, pp. 2-3; Record of Conversation, Maj. R. D. Hollis, SHAEF G-4 Sec, with Little and Lewis of G-4 Plans, 26 Oct 44, 6 A Gp, 27 Oct 44, SHAEF G-4 Diversion of Service Troops DRAGOON; Hist Rpt of TC ETO, VI, MRS, 14.
49. 6 A Gp G-4 AAR, Jan 45; CONAD History, pp. 145, 164, 167; History of SOLOC, II, TC, 21; Ltrs, Devers to Larkin, 2 Feb 45, and Larkin to Devers, 4 Feb 45, ETO, Memos for Gen Larkin; Ltr, Brig Gen S. L. Scott, Dir Planning Div ASF, to Lutes in the ETO, 12 Dec 44, sub: Shipment of Locomotive Coal from U.S. to Marseille, ASF, Official Rpt Mission to ETO, 4 Dec 44, 13 Jan 45 by Lutes.
50. CONAD History, pp. 167-68.
51. Opn, Orgn, Supply, and Svs of TC ETO, Gen Br Rpt 122, pp. 60-61; Hist Rpt of TC ETO, V, MRS, 15, and VI, MRS, 1-2.
52. See Logistical Support I, 578-83.
53. Min, Mtg, Area Petroleum Office, 14 Sep 44, USFET 463.72 Ground Force Gasoline, II; file USFET Petroleum Office, Airlift of Gasoline by Plane, Cabinet 3007, Drawer 3.
54. Ltr, Wing Comdr C. G. Cradock-Watson to Distrib, 17 Oct 44, sub: Emergency Air Lift--September 1944, SHAEF G-4 581.2 Transportation by Air of Supplies and Equipment II; TWX VX-25382, First Allied Airborne Army to SHAEF, 22 Sep 44, SHAEF G-3 Resupply by Air 24518/Ops; CATOR Weekly Load Summaries, Jun-Oct 44, AEAF A-3, 505.27-30A, Air University Library, Maxwell Airfield Base.
55. Memo, Stratton for Moses, 4, Oct 44, sub: Airlift Requirements for Supply of First, Third, and Ninth Armies for Period 9-29 October Inclusive, 12 A Gp Supply by Air, No. 133.
56. Supply and Evacuation by Air, Gen Br Rpt 26, p. 30; Memo, Whipple for G-4 SHAEF, 22 Nov 44, sub: Air Lift, SHAEF G-4 581.2 Transportation by Air of Supplies and Equipment II; 12 A Gp AAR 3, 5 Nov 44, 12 A Gp 107A Rpt General Information. On several occasions small planes were used to fly emergency supply missions to isolated units. Late in October P-47 fighter aircraft were employed in the Seventh Army area to deliver ammunition, rations, medical supplies, and signal batteries to a battalion of the 36th Division isolated in the Foret de Champ. Belly tanks were used to carry rations. In November the 95th Division used artillery liaison planes several times to evacuate wounded and to supply units cut off by the swollen Moselle and isolated during the siege of Metz. Supply and Evacuation by Air, Gen Bd Rpt 26, p. 31.
57. Memo, Muller, TUSA G-4, for Stratton, 12 Dec 44, with 14 Incls, attached to TUSA G-4 Periodic Rpt 19, 2-9 Dec 44, 12 A Gp 319.1 G-4 Rpts, I; Supply and Evacuation by Air, Gen Dd Rpt 26, pp. 15-17, 19-20.
58. About fifty tons of this total were air landed.
59. Operation REPULSE, Rpt of the IX TCC, dated 3 Jan 45, SHAEF AG 581.2-1 Supply by Air; Ltr, Hq 101st Airborne Div to CG TUSA, 11 Jan 45, sub: Rpt of Air Resupply to 101st Airborne Div at Bastogne, SHAEF G-3 24518/Ops Resupply by Air; Supply and Evacuation by Air, Gen Bd Rpt 26, pp. 32-33. The 101st Airborne Division listed only 820 planes and 42 gliders as having delivered supplies to the Bastogne area.
60. Memo, McCormack for Moses, 1 Jan 45, sub: Air Resupply of Isolated Units (location unknown).
61. Cbl S-73225, SHAEF G-4 to COMZ, 31 Dec 44, SHAEF G-3 24518/Ops Resupply by Air.
62. Cbl EX-91351, COMZ to SHAEF, 27 Jan 45, SHAEF G-3 23518/Ops.
63. See 12 A Gp Supply by Air file for statistics on deliveries; also CATOR Weekly Load Summaries AEAF A-3 505.46-7, Air University Library, Maxwell Airfield Base.
64. Final Report of the Chief Engineer, ETO, I, 277; COMZ G-4 History, III, p. 69.
65. Port Construction and Repair, Hist Rpt II, CE ETO, pp. 90-102; Final Report of the Chief Engineer ETO, I, 277; Ltr DWP to Potter, 4 Nov 44, sub: Opening of Seine to Navigation, and Summary of Br Chiefs' Mtg, 4, 16, 17, and 30 Nov 44, G-4 Plant and Communications Diary/Jnl, ETO Adm 145C.
66. Port Construction and Repair, pp. 83-90; Final Report of the Chief Engineer, ETO, I, 278; ADSEC Operational History, p. 108.
67. COMZ G-4 History, III, p. 71; Final Report of the Chief Engineer, ETO, I, 278.