Chapter VI
The October Pause in Operations

At the end of the third week in September Allied offensive operations again were feeling the pinch of an unfavorable logistical situation. The battles attendant on the Holland airborne attack, the First Army drive to crack the West Wall at Aachen, and the Third Army attempt to expand the bridgehead east of the Moselle all combined to strain to breaking point the existing port facilities and the supply and communications systems in northern France. The shortage of artillery ammunition had become a critical problem, and it was only a question of time until several combat divisions would have to be "grounded" for lack of transportation, gasoline, and essential equipment. Not only did the supply situation threaten to limit the scope of those operations already in progress, but, still more important, there could be no adequate logistical preparations for the support of a final drive into Germany.1 The hope of a deep thrust across the lower Rhine and a quick drive on a narrow front into the heart of Germany had proved illusory, if, indeed, it had ever been seriously entertained by SHAEF. The fight for the Arnhem bridgehead obviously was going against the Allies.2 It now appeared that a major offensive on a broad front would be required to put the Allied armies across the Rhine; such an offensive could be mounted, but it could not be sustained unless the port of Antwerp was in operation.

On the afternoon of 22 September General Eisenhower met with his top commanders. In forthright terms he announced that he "required general acceptance of the fact that the possession of an additional major deep-water port on our north flank is an indispensable prerequisite for the final drive deep into Germany." Priority, therefore, would be given to an attack on the north flank by Montgomery's 21st Army Group with the object of clearing the Schelde approaches to Antwerp (the latter had been captured on 4 September).


Furthermore, said the Supreme Commander: "All concerned [must] differentiate clearly between the logistical requirements for attaining objectives covered by present directives, including seizing the Ruhr and breaching the Siegfried Line, and the requirements for the final drive on Berlin." In other words the current Allied main effort, "the envelopment of the Ruhr from the north by 21st Army Group, supported by the First Army," would be regarded as the paramount Allied concern and as a "matter of urgency."3

The allocation of the supplies needed to support the 21st Army Group efforts and the First Army attempt to drive through the West Wall to Cologne and Bonn would not permit the Third Army to continue the attack east of the Moselle. The drive toward the Saar always had been subsidiary to that aimed at the Ruhr. Now the priority accorded the opening of Antwerp--a priority on which the Supreme Commander and the Combined Chiefs of Staff were agreed4--would reduce still further the importance attached to the Lorraine operation. Eisenhower therefore instructed the 12th Army Group commander that the Third Army and any units of the new Ninth Army that entered the line were to take "no more aggressive action than is permitted by the maintenance situation after the full requirements of the main effort had been met."

To open the port of Antwerp was now the order of the day. Eisenhower wrote a personal letter to Montgomery, who had not attended the meeting of 22 September, and after a discussion of the over-all situation--which included a statement that the First Army might be forced to abandon the thrust eastward from Aachen--concluded: "Of course, we need Antwerp." In this same message the Supreme Commander sought to quiet Montgomery's continued protests against the diversion of troops and supplies to the Lorraine area by a reference to the 4th Armored tank battles: "Bradley has been quite successful in keeping a lot of enemy strength to the south, as is clearly indicated by the enemy concentration of armor in the Lunéville area."5 General Bradley, in turn, passed on the Supreme Commander's decision to General Patton in a personal letter apparently calculated to allay the latter's frequently expressed suspicion that he and the Third Army were the victims of subterranean maneuvers at SHAEF. After telling Patton, "It is apparent to everyone that no


major offensive by American forces can be undertaken until the port of Antwerp is opened," Bradley broke the news that only one of the American armies in the 12th Army Group could be supported in further major operations, that the Third Army would have to go over to the defensive, and that Patton would have to release the 7th Armored Division in order to reinforce the drive in the north.6

The scheduled attack by the 7th Armored to force a crossing over the Seille south of Metz was now perforce to be abandoned.7 At the same time plans were in the making to take the XV Corps from the Third Army and give it to Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers' 6th Army Group. Here again the factor of supply ruled tactical assignments. General Devers' troops were being supplied from the great harbor of Marseille. He had assured General Eisenhower on 22 September that the southern line of communications could support two more divisions in the attack. Since the Supreme Commander had ordered the continuation of the 6th Army Group attack toward Mulhouse and Strasbourg--an attack made possible by the logistical independence of the southern group of armies--and since he desired to keep as many divisions as possible on the offensive, Eisenhower now assigned the XV Corps to Devers as "the simplest solution."8 The transfer would be made on 29 September. This whittling process naturally tended to weaken the Third Army, even when on the defensive. A Letter of Instructions from Bradley's headquarters on 25 September, therefore, stated the intention to extend the Ninth Army front southward to include Metz when the Ninth Army arrived to take over a sector between the First and Third Armies.9

General Patton quite naturally was restive under the new orders forcing him to abandon the offensive. Logistical difficulties he found irritating, but in the past, when in command of smaller forces, he had shown uncanny skill in continuing his attacks despite meager supplies. Patton's unwillingness to be slowed down during the Sicilian campaign by terrain, communications, supply, Germans, or higher commands had caused Eisenhower to recommend him to General Marshall "as an army commander that you can use with [the] certainty that the troops will not be stopped by ordinary obstacles."10 Now


Third Army Front
Evening, 25 September 1944

Patton expressed his impatience with what he considered to be "a defensive attitude" on the part of SHAEF and what he derided as the "big picture" problems arising from the over-all conduct of the war on the Western Front.11 Although the Third Army would have to give up all thought of a general offensive for the time being, Patton saw a number of opportunities for continuing local attacks, and these he successfully put before General Bradley. At the same time, however, the Third Army commander hastened to carry out his new orders, moving the 7th Armored Division out of his area with the promptness which had constantly commended him to his superiors.

On 25 September General Bradley wrote a personal note to General Eisenhower and in passing set forth his agreement with the Third Army plans for local operations:

In accordance with instructions I received at your headquarters the other day, I have ordered the Third Army to assume the defensive. At the same time, however, I have authorized George to make some minor adjustments in his present lines. There are about three localities just in front of his present position which he assures me he can take from time to time as ammunition becomes available on his present allotment, and which will save many casualties in the long run. One of these localities is a woods on his right flank from which many counterattacks have been launched. These woods make a good anchor for his right flank. A couple of other places are hills which look down on his present position and furnish such excellent observation of the enemy that George believes it will be economical in the long run to take them as opportunities present themselves. I am doing this in the belief that it complies with the spirit of your directive to assume the defensive in order to save supplies for the First Army.12

These "minor adjustments" were published to Patton's general officers on the same day as a series of priorities for immediate operations to secure "a suitable line of departure so that we can move rapidly when the Supreme Commander directs us to resume the offensive."13 (Map XXII)

The first priority was to be the capture of the Forêt de Parroy in the XV Corps sector on the right wing of the army. Its seizure would bring the XV Corps abreast of the XII Corps salient east of Arracourt and reduce enemy pressure on the 4th Armored Division. The second priority was given to operations intended to drive a wedge into the concentric Metz fortifications by the capture of forts west and southwest of the city. Of these works Fort Driant


had been ticketed by the XX Corps as most important. A third priority was assigned to pushing the XII Corps main line of resistance to and beyond the villages of Donnelay, Château-Salins, and Fresnes-en-Saulnois. An advance in this area would place the XII Corps in position for a future attack toward either Morhange or Dieuze. It will be remembered, however, that on 25 September the enemy was counterattacking in this sector.14 The last priority designated the capture of the high ground northeast of the Nomény loop in the Seille River as an object for local operations by the XII Corps. The objective was named as Moncheux, four miles northeast of Delme. As yet, of course, the 80th Infantry Division had not reached the Seille line.

The local operations outlined above would lead to limited-objective attacks by elements of the Third Army through the last days of September and well into October. Although there was now to be a pause in the Third Army offensive toward the Rhine, there would, nevertheless, be extremely hard fighting.

The Initial Attacks on Fort Driant

During the first phase of the XX Corps operation against Metz, air support had been available only sporadically and in a very limited quantity. Faced with the necessity of increasing the number of European ports available to the Allies, SHAEF had decided to take much of the air force normally allotted in tactical support of the ground forces and assign it to the operation at Brest. Although the XIX Tactical Air Command and IX Bomber Command did divert squadrons to the Third Army front, such missions generally were carried out by relatively small numbers of fighter-bombers and a few medium bombers. The air operations over Brest continued from 26 August until the capitulation of the fortress on 19 September. During that time the XIX TAC, usually assigned to co-operate with the Third Army, flew the majority of its missions at Brest on twenty-three of the twenty-six days involved. Whether the decision to divert tactical air power to Brest was the part of wisdom remains a debatable question. The modern fortifications around that port were very strong and the Ninth Air Force subsequently stated: "The reports of the bombing of modern reinforced concrete emplacements were negative. These structures proved practically impervious to air attack, and there appears to be no authenticated report of one being


destroyed."15 On the other hand, the most important works in the Metz fortifications subsequently proved to be quite as resistant to attack by air as the Brest forts. The ground commanders and the troops around Metz were nevertheless as one in their conviction that air support was essential if Metz was to be taken; this would be an overriding consideration in all thinking and planning, as it became more and more apparent that the infantry-artillery team could not breach the fortress ring alone. Therefore, as the Brest operation drew to a close and the hopes for a quick armored envelopment at Metz went glimmering, the Third Army prepared for a new operation against the fortress city based on an extensive and co-ordinated attack by the Ninth Air Force and XX Corps.

On 17 September, after agreement by the staffs at 12th Army Group and the Ninth Air Force, General Walker issued a tentative and highly secret plan under the code name "Operation THUNDERBOLT." This called for a combined effort by air and ground forces and set 21 September as a target date for beginning the operation. The attack would turn inward toward Metz, generally following the axis of the Moselle, with the river tentatively marked as the boundary between the 90th and 5th Divisions, the two formations selected to make the main effort on the ground. No change was made in the mission assigned the 7th Armored Division, which, in this plan, would continue its attempts to isolate the Metz area by envelopment to the east. The projected operation was divided into three phases, of which the seizure of Fort Driant would be the first. Each phase, in turn, consisted of three stages: preparatory attacks by heavy bombers; advance by the infantry to the line of departure under cover of a bombardment by medium bombers and artillery fire; then the final infantry assault, supported by direct-fire weapons and artillery. Fighter-bombers from the XIX TAC were to furnish continuous support to the ground forces as the operation developed.16

The "Air Support Plan," prepared for the Metz attack by the G-3 Air, 12th Army Group, contained one extremely important proviso: "The assault will be based on the attack of the medium bombers and will not take place until weather permits their use." But in addition to the highly problematical condition of the weather in late September the operation would be contingent also on the priorities which might be assigned the Ninth Air Force by headquarters above the Third Army. While it was true that SHAEF had erased


the top priority given the Brest operation as early as 9 September, the limited number of planes diverted from Brest in mid-September generally had been allocated to support the First Army drive toward the West Wall. This air priority accorded the First Army was an integral part of the larger strategic plan to put the main effort on the north wing of the Allied armies. As a result the Third Army seldom could be given better than a second priority on air support from 18 September onward.

The first object in the proposed air-ground operation against Metz was the reduction of Fort Driant, a required preliminary to any further attempt to penetrate the Metz fortifications from the south or southwest. Col. Charles W. Yuill, the commanding officer of the 11th Infantry, had urged that Fort Driant could be taken by storm and seems to have been instrumental in selling this idea to the corps and army staffs. General Walker, who was not too impressed with the strength of the fortified works around Metz, made no special arrangements to reinforce the assault force earmarked for the Fort Driant attacks and proposed to use only the 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry, which had been left to contain the fort and its garrison while the main body of the 5th Division battled east of the Moselle. From 19 September onward the 2d Battalion was alerted almost daily to begin the attack. Numerous factors conspired to delay the operation, however: several days of bad flying weather; uncertainty as to the exact time when the American planes would arrive on those days when they were able to go aloft; and a continued shortage of artillery ammunition which made it impossible to support an attack east of the river and still conduct an intensive shelling at Fort Driant.

In the meantime the 90th Infantry Division had returned to the attack in the Jeanne d'Arc sector, roughly two and a half miles north of Fort Driant. In the 90th Division scheme of maneuver, planned originally as a part of "Operation THUNDERBOLT," General McLain intended that his division should execute a power drive to the east from positions south of Gravelotte, making the main effort toward the Jeanne d'Arc works. In order to shift the balance of the division and nourish this attack, the 358th was relieved on the north flank by Task Force Polk (the 3d Cavalry Group, reinforced) and on 27 September moved south around to the right flank of the 359th, where the 3d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron had been deployed. A day earlier the 3d Battalion of the 359th had commenced a fight to seize the road between Gravelotte and St. Hubert's Farm as a jumping-off point for the projected


large-scale attack. Repeated attacks by the 359th made no headway, even after the entire regiment was committed. On the evening of 27 September it was clear that the 359th had shot its bolt. The stock of artillery ammunition which had been carefully husbanded for this attack was low, with little prospect of replenishment. General McLain called off the operation, and the front lines were thinned to a containing shell in order to rotate troops to rear areas for rest and further training. When the month of September came to a close the 90th Division front was quiet, but General McLain and his staff already had sketched out "a long-range plan" for future operations which provided that the 357th Infantry should push around the north flank of the German bridgehead and capture Maizières-lès-Metz. The outline plan provided also for an assault by the 358th and 359th against the Jeanne d'Arc positions, but it contained one important and limiting proviso: "Above all, the operation is based on the prior capture of Fort Driant and our subsequent occupation and utilization of it as a flank anchor, OP and base of fire."

The decision, in higher headquarters, to detach the 7th Armored Division from the XX Corps forced Patton to abandon the projected drive east of Metz. Although General Patton and General Walker disliked giving up any ground it was apparent that the 5th Division by itself could not hold the existing line east of the river and mount an assault on Fort Driant at the same time. Therefore, General Irwin was ordered to extend his right flank to take over from the 7th Armored Division, while shortening the extended front by a limited withdrawal back toward the Moselle. The relief was completed by the morning of 25 September. The 7th Armored Division began a move to Hasselt, Belgium, and the 5th Division withdrew to a new main line of resistance under a covering shell of infantry outposts. This reorganization was completed without incident, and on the night of 25-26 September the outpost line was pulled back to the main body. The new main line of resistance east of the river was held by the 11th Infantry (-) on the north wing, the 10th Infantry in the center, and the 2d Infantry on the south. The towns which had cost so much to take--Corny and Pournoy-la-Chétive--were abandoned while the line in the north and northeast was constructed. The 2d Infantry was thus freed to take over the sector formerly held by CCB, 7th Armored Division, on the high ground west of the Seille River--from Cheminot north to the Bois Jurieux. North of the 2d Infantry the 10th Infantry line swung in an arc back to the west. At Marieulles the 11th Infantry (-) sector began,


Fort Driant

following the ridges northwestward to a point opposite Novéant. The weary infantry dug in along this new main line of resistance and put out a strong outpost line.

Meanwhile the focus of attention shifted across the Moselle to Fort Driant, where the 5th Division faced a special and difficult task. By 26 September the static situation along the new main line of resistance in the 5th Division bridgehead promised a little more freedom in the use of artillery ammunition, and General Walker, more and more impatient with the delay at Fort Driant, ordered the attack to begin the following day--with or without support from the air.17

Virtually nothing was yet known of the detailed construction of Fort Driant, or the field fortifications around it. American patrols had made numerous attempts to work their way into the fort area only to be stopped each time by the enemy outposts and ranging fire from the main works. Air photos showed little but the outlines of the casemates, bunkers, connecting trenches, and the surrounding moat. However, operations both east and west of the Moselle had amply demonstrated the tactical importance of this particular fort. Fort Driant (or Kronprinz) held a dominant height from which the artillery in the other southern works of "Fortress Metz" could be directed and controlled. Its own guns covered the approaches along the Moselle and provided flanking fire in support of the Verdun group (Forts Sommy and St. Blaise) on the east bank of the river. Obviously, any attempts to wedge a way into Metz along the Moselle axis, a maneuver for which the XX Corps was now deployed, or any penetration east of Gravelotte must be contingent on capturing or at least neutralizing this fort.

Fort Driant belonged to the outer ring of the Metz fortresses, comprising the most modern and the strongest works in the system. (Map XXIII) Built in 1902, it had been modernized and further strengthened by both French and Germans.18 The main works stood on a bald-topped hill, 360 meters in height, and fringed sparsely by trees. A supply road angled north to Ars-sur-Moselle. Below the hill a thick patch of woods reached out toward the southwest slope, and in these woods the Americans assembled for their first attacks. The main


Fort Driant

defenses consisted of four casemates, with reinforced concrete walls some seven feet thick and a central fort in the shape of a pentagon, the whole connected by underground tunnels runing into the central work. Each casemate mounted a three-gun battery, of either 100- or 150-mm. caliber, while the southern side of Fort Driant was covered by a detached battery (Battery Moselle) of three 100-mm. turret guns.19 The interior of the works seemed almost a flat, bare surface, for the casemate roofs were built flush with the surface of the ground, leaving only the gun turrets, four concrete bunkers (each providing shelter for 200 to 500 men), and some armored observation posts and pillboxes above the surface. The fort faced southwest, although its main batteries were sited so as to provide fire through 360°, with a frontage of 1,000 yards and a depth of 700. The central fort was surrounded by a dry moat, 60 feet wide and as much as 30 feet deep, with wings extending out to either flank. Barbed wire to a depth of 60 feet encircled the entire fort and was further interlaced between and around the interior works. Finally, the Germans had taken care to provide the defenders with adequate water, storage space for food and ammunition, and a system of artificial ventilation in the main bunkers and tunnels underneath the ground. It is not known how large the Fort Driant garrison was at the time of the first American assault. It probably was small, but could and would be quickly reinforced by troops from Ars-sur-Moselle.

Colonel Yuill was far from satisfied by the maps available to guide his assault troops. The 1:100,000 sheets in use at the time of the Moselle crossings had been replaced by a fairly accurate series of 1:50,000 maps, but even this scale was too indefinite and too sparse in detail for a battalion attack. Members of Colonel Yuill's staff, with the aid of corps and army intelligence officers, succeeded in locating in Paris a few 1:20,000 contour maps of the Metz area. Then followed a search for detailed plans of the fortification. The trail led from Verdun to Nancy to Lyons, where engraving plates, hidden by a French officer in 1940, were uncovered. These provided a wealth of detail on the works at Fort Driant. Unfortunately the detailed ground plans did not reach the 11th Infantry until 29 September, and the troops making the first assault received only a vague briefing on the basis of inexact sketch maps of Fort Driant and its surrounding terrain.20

On the morning of 27 September the skies cleared, and General Irwin, anxious to give his air support as much time as possible, ordered the assault


battalion to jump off at 1415.21 P-47's from the XIX TAC dropped 1,000-pound bombs and napalms as a starter, coming in as low as fifty feet to make their strikes on the fort, but with negligible results. Other squadrons of P-47's followed in the early afternoon, dropping napalm and high explosive bombs on the trenches and bunkers, and strafing the interior of the fort. This effort failed to damage Fort Driant.22 The artillery, which fired two concentrations prior to H Hour, seems to have had no better luck, for the enemy guns and mortars were quieted only briefly. Fire from the 155-mm. howitzers of the 21st Field Artillery Battalion and emplaced tank destroyers, when directed against the pillboxes dotting the forward slopes, failed to penetrate or destroy these outworks.23

At H Hour E Company moved out of the woods south of the fort under cover of a smoke screen which a company of 4.2 chemical mortars had laid on the fort and the wooded draw behind it. Company G and a company of tank destroyers from the 818th Tank Destroyer Battalion followed. Short of the fort the infantry came upon a moat, or ditch, and heavy wire entanglements, the whole covered by outlying pillboxes. The enemy in the fort had been relatively quiet during the American approach, but now he opened up with small arms, machine guns, and mortars. Two platoons worked their way around to the west side of the fort, where a causeway gave entrance to the enceinte itself, but were driven to earth some three hundred yards from the moat by a hail of small arms fire. The tank destroyers, which had driven onto the open ground close behind the infantry skirmish line, engaged the outer German pillboxes and the machine gun embrasures in the main works, but, despite what appeared to be accurate laying, could not put the enemy crews out of action. The mass of wire entanglements, fire from numerous and previously undiscovered pillboxes surrounding the fort, and the inefficacy of tank destroyer fire against reinforced concrete works forbade a continuation of the action; at 1830 General Irwin gave Colonel Yuill permission to


BOMBING OF FORT DRIANT by P-47's from the XIX Tactical Air Command.


PATTON CONFERS WITH EISENHOWER on plan for reduction of Fort Driant. On left is General Patton, on right General Eisenhower.


withdraw the assault force to its original positions. Losses had been slight--only eighteen men in the two infantry companies.24

On the following day General Patton met with General Walker and General Irwin to consider the situation. The army commander himself did not press General Irwin to continue the Driant operations, but instead instructed the 5th Division commander to take advantage of the forthcoming lull in the army's operations to rotate and rest his tired division. General Walker was not so charitable. He sharply insisted that more aggressive personal leadership should have been shown by the regimental and battalion commanders responsible for the initial attack at Fort Driant. General Irwin, however, noted that the difficulties encountered by the attacking force had been greater than anticipated, and reminded the corps commander that the air photos had shown neither the intricate wire entanglements nor the large number of pillboxes around the fort.25 There was as yet no talk of abandoning the Driant enterprise, and General Irwin and his staff continued with plans based on the experience of 27 September for a systematic reduction of the fort.26 Final approval was given the operation by General Patton on 29 September, when the army commander invited a number of his ranking officers to meet General Eisenhower in the headquarters of the army at Etain. General Eisenhower here stressed the point that advantage was to be taken of the lull to get men and equipment in shape for future operations. Then General Patton directed that the plans for local operations would be carried out as supplies and artillery ammunition became available.27 General Walker immediately gave orders for the 5th Division to continue the Driant operation and, further, to make preparations for a subsequent attack on the Verdun forts east of the Moselle.

General Irwin believed that his division needed rest and training,28 and was convinced that the fort should be taken by encirclement--for which maneuver troops were lacking. Nonetheless he and his staff worked overtime to


make the next assault at Driant a success. They planned carefully, amassing ammunition and various types of new equipment which was just arriving at the army engineer depots. Two items seemed well adapted to an attack on a fortified position, the tankdozer and the "snake." The first, it was hoped, would be able to fill in the moat under fire, while the snake, a long pipe or tube filled with explosive, was designed to be pushed through barbed wire or mine fields and there exploded, somewhat in the manner of a bangalore torpedo. Both tankdozers and snakes were difficult to procure, but even more trying was the search for trained personnel to operate these machines and to make such modifications as were required for the task at hand. Although General Irwin's division was spread over a very wide front,29 with little infantry left over for the Driant attack (now scheduled for 3 October), he had been given substantial artillery support both in front of the fort and across in the bridgehead; all the corps artillery had been moved into position to support the 5th Division, leaving the 90th and 83d to rely upon their own divisional guns. An incident on 2 October, however, indicated that modern artillery was not necessarily the solution to the tactical problem of reducing even a moderately modern fort, for an 8-inch howitzer got eight direct hits on one of the turrets at Fort Driant only to have its fire returned fifteen minutes later by guns in that same turret.30

The plan of attack for 3 October was carefully worked out. The 2d Battalion of the 11th Infantry again was designated as the assault force, but this time was reinforced by B Company of the 1st Battalion, a company of combat engineers, and twelve tanks from the medium companies of the 735th Tank Battalion. Company B would attempt to gain entrance at the southwestern edge of the fort, Company E would attack at the northwestern corner, and


Company G, in reserve, would be used to exploit whichever penetration was successful. Tanks and engineers were equally divided among the three infantry companies. Air support had been promised by the IX Bombardment Division for the morning of 3 October but because of bad weather the bombers did not arrive,31 and finally at 1200, unwilling to wait any longer, General Irwin gave the order for the attack to begin.32 Corps and division artillery laid a barrage ahead of the advancing infantry, two companies of 4.2 mortars from the 81st Chemical Mortar Battalion spread a pall of smoke over the valley between Driant and Ars-sur-Moselle, and tanks ahead of the infantry line pulled and shoved to get the unwilling snakes into position against the German wire. The snakes broke almost immediately and the wire was finally cut by high explosive fired by the American artillery. The tankdozers were halted by mechanical failures. Company E was stopped at the wire by intense German artillery fire and entrenched enemy infantry.33 Company B was more successful and at 1400 had fought its way around the end of the moat, through the wire, and into the fort.34 Here the infantry and supporting tanks proceeded methodically to clear the Germans out of the ditches and bunkers, harassed the while by machine guns, mortar fire, and German riflemen who would pop out of tunnel entrances to give fire and then quickly retreat below ground. Engineer squads, working on the nearest casemates, tried again and again to blast an opening with demolition charges, but the heavy walls were as impervious to TNT as to shells and bombs.35

At dark the reserve company and its tanks came in through the gap made by B Company. Two platoons began to thread their way through the barbed wire and small arms fire to assault the two northernmost casemates, which lay clear across the fort surface. This first attack failed: the platoons were


badly shot up and forced to withdraw when the Germans came up from the tunnels and filtered into their rear.36 All through the night small groups of the enemy continued forays into the American positions. Four American tanks were knocked out by bazooka men, and by dawn the Americans in the fort were badly disorganized.

In the morning General Irwin ordered Colonel Yuill to hang on and extend his hold on top of the fort area;37 then he sent in Company K, 2d Infantry, to stabilize the line and plug up the holes left by the 110 casualties lost in the first twenty-four hours of the operation. Futile attempts were made during the day to break into the central fort, but the German snipers systematically picked off the men carrying flame throwers and explosives. The few who reached the large steel doors at the rear of the fort found them covered by protruding grillwork that made it impossible to put the charges against the doors themselves. When the second night came attempts were made to reorganize the troops who, during the day, had scattered wherever they could find shelter from the enemy fire--in abandoned pillboxes, ditches, shell holes, and open bunkers. During the night, however, the Germans again came out of the underground tunnels and threw the attackers into confusion.

As daylight came on 5 October the guns of the surrounding German forts opened a heavy fire on the troops in and around Driant. American artillery observers crawled forward and tried to locate the enemy guns, but a thick haze lay in the Moselle valley and counterbattery work brought few results. Although the stationary pieces in the casemates in Driant could not be brought to bear on the Americans in the fort area, two German howitzers finally were depressed so as to give bursts in the trees fringing the fort. Their effect was deadly. By midafternoon B and G Companies were reduced to a combined strength of less than one hundred men; K Company also was growing weaker.38 General Irwin decided to strip the division front still further, and


organized a task force under the assistant division commander, Brig. Gen. A. D. Warnock, to continue the fight. During the night of 5-6 October the 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry (minus A Company), went in under Warnock's command and relieved B and G Companies on top of Driant. Fortunately, German fire was light, for the relief was difficult, many of the original assault force having to be carried down from the fort on stretchers. At 1100 more reinforcements from the 3d Battalion, 2d Infantry (minus Companies I and K), arrived to join Task Force Warnock. With these troops in hand, plus the entire 7th Combat Engineer Battalion, General Warnock gave orders for a resumption of the attack on 7 October, his intention being to drive the Germans out of the southeast section of the fort and force an entry into the main tunnel system. Colonel Yuill had not been furnished a plan of the underground maze, but such a plan had been prepared for Task Force Warnock and showed a tunnel running from the area held by the Americans, underneath the southernmost casemates, there connecting with the main tunnel system which branched out to all the casemates, the bunkers, and the central fort.

At 1000 on 7 October the 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry, opened the attack. One rifle company slowly worked its way east and in four hours succeeded in inching forward about two hundred yards, taking three pillboxes in the process. This advance brought the lead infanty into a deadly cross fire coming from the southern casemate and Battery Moselle. Orders were given for the company to reorganize and hold on to its gains, but the ground was too hard for digging and the captured pillboxes were open on the side now exposed to the Germans. About 1615 the Germans came to the surface and counterattacked. The company commander and the two forward platoons were cut off and lost. The survivors fell back to the original positions. One platoon had been sent into the tunnel, entering at a concrete bunker which was already


in American hands. This passageway was very narrow (only three feet wide and seven feet high) and was barred close to the entrance by an iron door. Engineers blew a hole in the door, but found the other side blocked with pieces of machinery and some old cannon. This block could be moved only if the wrecked iron door was cut away, an operation that would require an acetylene torch. On such seemingly small items the fight now turned.

During the night an acetylene torch was brought up to the fort and the tunnel door cut down. Then the junk pieces were pulled out and laid on the floor of the tunnel, still further cramping the efforts of the troops in the tunnel confines. By the middle of the morning of 8 October the rubble and debris had been cleared away; it was believed that the next door ahead would lead into the southern casemate. The men in the tunnel had heard sounds of digging; fearing that the Germans were preparing to blow in the tunnel walls they rushed up a 60-pound beehive charge and exploded it. This detonation released carbide fumes and for the next two hours no one could re-enter the tunnel. Ordinary gas masks were tried but failed to protect the wearer. An engineer officer finally groped his way through the tunnel and found that the first charge had made only a small hole. When the fumes began to clear, more explosive was brought in, but the Germans opened fire with a machine gun and rifle grenades. There was nothing left to do except hastily erect a parapet of sandbags, mount a machine gun, and engage in a desultory exchange of shots.39 The Germans next set off a counterblast in the tunnel, killing some men of Company C and driving the rest into the barracks.

General Warnock, having decided earlier that more troops were needed to clear the surface of the fort area, during the previous night had moved up the 3d Battalion, 2d Infantry, to the cover of the concrete barracks. The fumes from the tunnel, seeping up into the barracks, overcame some of the men and they were forced to take turns at the firing slits in order to fill their lungs with fresh air. With many of the troops hors de combat and a general state of confusion prevailing, the attack against the two southern casemates scheduled for the night of 8-9 October was canceled.

By 9 October the situation at Fort Driant was confused beyond belief. Cpl. C. F. Wilkinson, a messenger for the 284th Field Artillery Battalion, while wandering around in search of the American command post walked


straight into the guard room of the central fort, but escaped before the astounded Germans could bring him down. Maneuver space atop the fort was far too limited to permit the full-scale and necessary reorganization of the heterogeneous units crowded into the bunkers or in such other scanty cover as could be found. Daylight attack had proved too costly in the face of the cross fire sweeping the surface, and night attacks had quickly become disorganized when the Germans erupted from the tunnels onto flank and rear. The American troops were jittery and in some companies their officers believed it questionable whether they would stick much longer. Losses thus far had been relatively high: 21 officers and 485 men killed, wounded, and missing.40

At noon on 9 October General Gay, representing the army commander, General Walker, General Irwin, and General Warnock met to discuss continuance of the operation. The task force commander candidly said that further attacks within the fort area would be far too costly and gave as his opinion that Fort Driant must be surrounded, the enemy all driven underground and there destroyed. Since this plan required an additional four battalions of infantry it was immediately rejected. General Gay ordered the fort to be evacuated and the operation abandoned, although he gave the corps commander permission to make one more attempt to blast a way through the tunnel.41 This attempt was not made; on the night of 12-13 October the last American troops left the fort without a shot being fired by the enemy.42

All of the higher American officers involved in this operation were loath to bring it to an unsuccessful conclusion. It represented the first publicized reverse suffered by the Third Army. What made it particularly depressing was that it came at the beginning of a lengthy period of quiet in which General Patton and his troops could have no opportunity to distinguish themselves by new victories. However, much had been learned concerning attacks against modern-type fortified positions. These lessons were put to immediate use during the training period in October, and would be successfully applied during the November offensive which finally saw the reduction of the Metz fort system.


The 90th Division at Maizières-lès-Metz

General Patton's desire to continue limited-objective attacks at certain points on the Third Army front was in part prompted by the necessity of securing an advantageous line of departure for a future general resumption of the offensive. In the XX Corps zone the seizure of Fort Driant would have put Third Army troops astride a direct route from the south into Metz. On the north, the shortest and most direct route into the city so far as the approaches on the west bank of the Moselle were concerned was offered by the main highway from Thionville to Metz which traverses the narrow plain between the river and the western heights.43 The September operations of the 7th Armored Division and 90th Division had cleared this avenue of approach as far south as Maizières-lès-Metz, a mining and smelting town of some five thousand population only seven miles from the center of Metz. The capture of Maizières-lès-Metz would not only plant the American forces solidly on the southern section of the Thionville-Metz highway, but would also be of considerable tactical importance in any future operation to turn the right flank of the strong German positions west of Metz.

At the end of September the 90th Division had relinquished the plan to force a penetration east of Gravelotte. The 83d Division, newly assigned to the Third Army, had assumed responsibility for protecting the north flank of the XX Corps (with Task Force Polk), thus permitting a little more tactical freedom in the employment of the left-flank elements of the 90th Division. When the weight of the 90th shifted to the south, the 357th Infantry was moved to occupy an east-west line from Talange, on the Moselle, to St. Privat, hemming in the German defenses.44 About 24 September General McLain, the 90th Division commander, suggested that the 357th make a limited-objective attack in the Maizièrès-lès-Metz sector for the purpose of training in assault tactics against fortifications and to secure a good line of departure for the coming Metz offensive. The XX Corps commander agreed to the


Fight for Maizières-lès-Metz
3-30 October 1944

plan as one means of maintaining an "active defensive" in the quieter sectors of the corps front.45

At 0430 on 3 October, the same date on which the 5th Division launched the main assault at Fort Driant, two companies of the 357th Infantry led by Maj. Jack W. Ward made a surprise attack from the Bois de l'Abbé, west of Maizières-lès-Metz, and with only four casualties gained control of a long, high slag pile which overlooked that town from the northwest.46 (Map XXIV) For three days the Americans occupied the slag pile without any serious contest, though under heavy artillery fire by the Germans. On 6 October Task Force Polk relieved some of the elements of the 357th Infantry on the division north flank, and with this limited reinforcement General McLain proceeded with his plans to capture Maizières-lès-Metz itself.47

The attack planned for the morning of 7 October called for E Company to make the initial penetration in Maizières-lès-Metz by thrusting from the west along the Bronvaux road. Company G, following on its heels, was then to swing south and begin mopping up the factory buildings west of the Thionville-Metz railroad tracks which formed a main point of enemy resistance. Fortunately, the Germans played into the hands of the 357th by making a predawn attack in force against the company on the slag pile. While these attackers were being cut down on the steep, barren slopes of the mound of slag, E Company jumped off, skirted the slag heap, and knifed through the town under cover of a concentration fired by two field artillery groups. The northern part of the town was quickly overrun and by dark the Americans had a foothold in the factory area, but further advance was stopped by S-mines (one of which caused fifteen casualties) covered by determined German riflemen and field pieces close behind them.48 That night the Germans hastened to reinforce the troops in Maizières and sent elements of the 73d Regiment, 19th VG Division, into the lines.49 Strengthened by these new arrivals, the garrison settled down to a long-drawn-out fight, house to house and block to block, punctuated by sorties and artillery duels. The houses in Maizières were strongly constructed, generally of stone, and strengthened by


wire and sandbags so as to form a succession of miniature forts which had to be reduced one by one. The pivotal point in the Maizières enceinte was formed by the heavy masonry of the Hôtel de Ville, east of the railroad tracks, around which the fighting surged indecisively.

During the next days the 2d Battalion, 357th Infantry, continued to wedge its way slowly into the factory area and the center of the town, using demolition charges and flame throwers, while field guns and tank destroyers fired constantly to interdict the German supply route leading in from Metz. The 4.2 mortars maintained a haze of smoke at the south edge of town over the slag heap that served the enemy as an observation post. A platoon of tanks was brought in from the north after the roads were cleared of mines, but there was little room for maneuver in the narrow streets--down which German bazookas and antitank guns were sighted--and the tanks played only a minor role in the fight for the town.

By 11 October optimism engendered by the success of the initial push into Maizières was considerably dissipated.50 Colonel Barth advised the division commander that two battalions of infantry should be used in the town. But although there had been some slight reshuffling of troops along the 90th Division front to take advantage of the general lull there were not two fresh battalions at hand: the best that could be done was to relieve the worn 2d Battalion by filtering the 3d Battalion, 357th, into the line on the night of 12-13 October. General McLain51 still had some hope of taking Maizières, but a new order from Third Army headquarters freezing the allotment of all artillery ammunition above 3-inch caliber put an end to the idea of continuing a full-fledged assault. The 3d Battalion turned to using the town as a training ground, setting up attack problems in which a platoon, or a squad, took a house or two each day.

The Germans apparently were quite willing to limit the fighting to such a scale, although they retaliated with a bitter shelling on 20 October when an American 155-mm. self-propelled gun was run to within 150 yards of the Hôtel de Ville and slammed ten rounds into the building. Meanwhile the Third Army completed plans for a return to the offensive in November and granted the XX Corps a special dispensation for artillery ammunition to be


AMERICAN INFANTRYMAN IN MAIZIÈRES-LÈS-METZ. By the evening of 30 October the 357th held what was left of the town.

used against Maizières, prior to the new attack on Metz. The new 90th Division commander, Brig. Gen. James A. Van Fleet,52 ordered the 357th Infantry to take Maizières by 2 November, and Colonel Barth began to set the stage for a final assault by alternately probing and battering at the Hôtel de Ville. On 26 October K Company reached the lower floor of the building but was stopped by piles of burning mattresses in the hallways; it was then driven out by flame throwers. The next day four 10-man assault teams tried again. This time three of the assault teams were checked by mines and barbed wire. The fourth crawled through a gap blasted in the wall by the 155-mm. self-propelled gun and engaged in a hand-to-hand fight inside the building, in


which all but one man were killed or wounded. The survivors managed to escape while the unwounded soldier held off the Germans.53

On 28 October three companies of infantry moved into the cover afforded by the factory buildings, while a fourth company began a diversionary attack from the north. At 0730 the next morning, with no artillery preparation to herald the main assault,54 the three companies attacked abreast across the tracks into the section of town south of the Hôtel de Ville, while two more companies swung in from the north.55 In the face of this assault, with shells smashing the houses of the town to bits and detonating the mine defenses, the Germans gave way.56

The Hôtel de Ville was made a shambles by some 240-mm. howitzers which put down their fire with remarkable accuracy seventy-five yards ahead of the advancing infantry. When the building was entered the next day it was found occupied only by German corpses. By the night of 30 October the 357th held the town and the approaches to the south, although the enemy retained an observation post on a slag heap to the southwest. Colonel Barth, the regimental commanding officer, was wounded on the first day of the attack, but the total of American casualties in this last phase amounted to only fifty-five officers and men, as contrasted with the loss of an entire German battalion. Once again it had been demonstrated that a strong town, stubbornly defended by the enemy, could be taken with a minimum of loss to the attackers if the attack was carefully planned and co-ordinated, with sufficient infantry in the assault and marked superiority in the artillery arm.

Operations on the North Wing of the XX Corps

The shift in weight of the XX Corps during the last week of September to strengthen the right wing south and southwest of Metz was made possible by the assignment of another infantry division to General Walker's command.


On 10 September the 83d Infantry Division (Maj. Gen. Robert C. Macon)57 was relieved from the VIII Corps, with which it had fought in the Brittany campaign, and began the move east to the main battle front. At General Patton's request the 83d Division was attached to the XX Corps on 21 September and, as its regiments arrived on the front, took up positions on the extreme north wing of the corps, occupying territory in Luxembourg that had been held by armor and infantry of V Corps, and by the XX Corps cavalry. Although originally General Patton had intended to send the 83d Division across the Moselle at Remich, midway between Thionville and Trier, the stalemate south of Metz and the subsequent orders from SHAEF for the Third Army to assume the defensive canceled that operation.58 General Macon's division was used only to strengthen the left wing of the XX Corps, opposite which the 36th VG Division had appeared, and to make limited-objective attacks to the east. Particular orders were given the 83d for the defense of the city of Luxembourg.

Before the arrival of the 83d Division the left flank of the XX Corps had been so sparsely held as to have courted certain disaster if the enemy had possessed sufficient reserves on the Western Front to attack such weak points in the Allied battle line. The 43d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, screening over twenty-three miles of open, rolling country, and theoretically "reinforced" by a simulated armored division, was given some limited reinforcements59 as reports of new German forces across the Moselle came in. The reinforced detachment was constituted as Task Force Polk (from the name of the 3d


83d Division
25 September-11 October 1944

Cavalry Group commander) on 19 September. By 25 September the 83d Division had a regimental combat team on the west bank across the river from Remich and Task Force Polk was enabled to shift south to the Thionville sector, freeing the 358th Infantry, in turn, for use on the right wing of the 90th Division. (Map XXV)

The mission of the 83d Division now was limited to clearing the salient west of Trier, formed by the Moselle and Sauer Rivers. This sector was not too strongly held, for the major part of the German forces in the area had withdrawn east of the Moselle and north of the Sauer; but rear guard detachments had been left in the little Luxembourg bridgehead towns to make a fight of it, particularly in Echternach on the north and Grevenmacher on the south.60 General Macon's division had lost about half its original strength in the course of the drive out of the Cotentin peninsula, the fight for St. Malo, and the subsequent operation in the Brittany peninsula. The mass of replacements needed considerable training. Therefore, although General Macon placed two regiments in the drive east, the actual fighting was carried out by one or two companies at a time, allowing the bulk of each regiment to be rotated to rear areas for training in the abandoned Maginot Line. By 1 October Company C of the 329th Infantry reached the outskirts of Grevenmacher. Here the enemy held stubbornly in the stone houses and were not driven out until the night of 5 October, after artillery and fighter-bombers jarred them loose from the village. The 3d Battalion of the 329th fought for nearly a week outside Echternach on the Sauer, which, as shown later by the American experience during the Ardennes campaign, was extremely well adapted to defense. But on the afternoon of 7 October a co-ordinated assault by infantry, tanks, and artillery broke the German resistance and took the town. On the same day the 331st Infantry drove the enemy out of Wormeldange, north of Remich, thus erasing the last enemy foothold on the west bank of the Moselle in the Luxembourg sector. All three of these villages, Echternach, Grevenmacher, and Wormeldange, were on low ground exposed to German fire coming from heights to the east. General Macon had been loath to take them, since they could readily be neutralized by American guns on top of hills to the west, and the 83d Division withdrew its main forces at once, holding the towns with outposts only. The enemy were more than willing


XII Corps
Stabilization of MLR
1-9 October 1944

to consider this a quiet sector, and it so remained until the south wing of the great German counteroffensive swept through Echternach on 16 December.61 On 11 October the 83d Division once again reverted to the VIII Corps, now with the Ninth Army, and the left boundary of the Third Army was brought south to Sierck-les-Bains. Task Force Polk took over the job of patrolling the west bank of the Moselle in this sector.62

Stabilizing the XII Corps Main Line of Resistance

When the Third Army advance was halted at the end of September, the XII Corps was generally in a position favorable to the defensive. Although the enemy breached the new main line of resistance in the 35th Division and 4th Armored sectors during the September attacks, the center and right wing of the corps were solidly re-established by 3 October. On the left wing, however, the 80th Division had been unable to close up to the natural defense line of the Seille River--on a sufficiently wide front--because the Germans held a re-entrant along the hill mass between Serrières and Moivron. (Map XXVI) General McBride's attempt to erase this salient by swinging the main weight of the 80th Division around the south, and so envelop the German positions by a drive through Moivron and Jeandelaincourt, had been frustrated by the stubborn defense put up by the 553d VG Division.63

On 1 October, consonant with General Patton's orders, the 80th Division began a series of small local attacks to wipe out the forward centers of enemy resistance west of the Seille. Here the Germans had placed their infantry, in platoon to battalion strength, in the little Lorraine villages--particularly in those which lay athwart the roads leading to the Seille. In most cases these garrisoned villages consisted of only a handful of houses; but the houses were solidly built of heavy stone which proved capable of withstanding an immense amount of battering by artillery, and they gave shelter from the heavy autumn rains. The fight for observation had now yielded priority to the fight for cover.


The 80th Division got a preview of what this fighting would be like when, on the evening of 1 October, a company of the 318th was dispatched to take Renaissance Farm. With the cluster of houses at les Quatre Fers, the farm controlled the Pont-à-Mousson-Nomény road--the boundary between the 318th and 319th. The Germans had turned the stone farm buildings into a small fortress, with port holes from which machine guns and 20-mm. antitank pieces covered all approaches. After futile attempts to work their way in close enough to engage the enemy gunners, the attackers withdrew and called for artillery; but before they could give fire direction twenty or thirty Germans, who had followed the Americans from the farm, slipped into the company area. In the melee which followed (labeled in an 80th Division message "Department of Utter Confusion") the company was disorganized and a further attack abandoned. The next morning several concentrations of artillery were laid on the farm, and a company of tank destroyers from the 808th Tank Destroyer Battalion was brought forward to blast the stone buildings at a point-blank range. A company of the 319th took the position with only slight opposition from the dazed defenders.

Most of the XII Corps front was quiet, but on 2 October the 80th Division continued to pry away at the German positions on the hill mass west of the Seille. Here a road ran across the saddle between Hill 340 and Mount Toulon, terminating in the little villages of Serrières in the north and Sivry in the south. An attack on Serrières by the 318th Infantry (Col. Lansing McVickar) was called off after heavy losses. But the 317th, which sent its 2d Battalion against Sivry, became involved in a long-drawn-out and desperate battle that cost half of the attacking force.64

The village of Sivry lay in a narrow valley close to hills that on the north were held by the Germans. Sivry therefore had to be taken by an attack from the open side, where maneuver space allowed deployment of only limited forces. Across the southern face of the town the enemy had laid a continuous mine field, still further restricting the possible avenue of advance. All through 2 October the 105-mm. howitzers of the regimental cannon company pounded Sivry, and late in the afternoon G Company (Capt. R. A. Ashbrook) began to work its way in a loop to the southwest around the mine field. By 0300 the next morning the company was in position to attack, and at 0555 the yellow flare went up signaling that the town had been reached. Early in the


fight a part of the German garrison (the 2d Battalion, 1119th Regiment, 553d VG Division) withdrew to the cover of an orchard just north of Sivry, but some of the grenadiers held on, retreating from house to house and finally falling back to the village church where they were surrounded and captured. On the morning of 4 October, about 0320, German guns in the hills opened up on Sivry, and the enemy infantry, collected for the counterattack from Serrières and Mount Toulon, swept into the town.

A platoon of Americans was gathered in the church; the rest were scattered in the houses. The company commander radioed for help but the regimental commander, Col. W. M. Lewis, dared not risk a night advance straight into Sivry across the mine field. When light came Company E went forward, circled around the mine field through a dense fog, and succeeded in reaching the houses on the edge of the village. But the enemy also was reinforcing his troops in Sivry; all through the day small groups of infantry braved the American artillery fire, interdicting the road from Serrières, to swell the counterattack (a battalion from the 8th Panzer Grenadier Regiment, 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, and a battalion of the 1121st Grenadier Regiment were involved). The American relief company could not reach the church--every street was enfiladed by machine gun fire--and General McBride finally gave the orders for withdrawal. Through the night the survivors straggled back to the regiment; 381 men had taken part in the attack but only 191 escaped from Sivry, one-half of them wounded.65

At this juncture General Eddy decided to throw in sufficient strength to win a decisive victory and firmly establish the main line of resistance on the XII Corps left wing by clearing the enemy from the area south and west of the Seille River, in accordance with Patton's orders on 25 September. The rest of the corps front was quiet and troops could be spared for such an operation. On 5 October a XII Corps Operational Directive set the date for the attack as 8 October, with the 80th Division, 6th Armored Division, and 35th Division participating. The 328th Infantry, from the 26th Division, now coming into the corps area, was also attached to the 80th Division, taking over the left flank and relieving the 319th Infantry so that the latter could take an active role in the operation. While the XII Corps was regrouping, the XIX TAC began a systematic bombing of the German strongholds, Moivron, Jeandelaincourt,


and Mount St. Jean. At the same time the American guns battered away at Moivron and Sivry, their fire reinforced by one of General Patton's favorite weapons, the 4.2 chemical mortar, firing white phosphorus. For once the XII Corps was in a position to fight an action according to a carefully prepared plan of maneuver--quite unlike the hasty improvisations common in the hurried operations of mid-September. The artillery fire plan was developed in meticulous detail, with forward observers posted only fifty yards apart in some sectors. So effective was this plan that on the day before the attack thirteen observed counterbattery missions were fired, neutralizing twelve enemy batteries. On the same day three squadrons of P-47's went to work on the German reserves and line of communications, dropping 864 fragmentation bombs on the Bois dit la Fourasse--the main enemy troop assembly area behind the hill mass--and bombing the Seille bridge at Nomény.66

At 0515 on 8 October all seventeen battalions of the XII Corps artillery reinforced by the artillery of the three attacking divisions and the 86th Chemical Mortar Battalion opened up, firing for sixty minutes prior to the armor-infantry attack. Jeandelaincourt, which had proved so tough a nut to crack in late September, received special treatment; three TOT's were fired on the town with an average of eleven field artillery battalions participating in each. When the three divisions jumped off in the attack at 0615, after fifteen minutes of artillery fire directly to their front, the massed guns raised their fire and for an hour and a quarter shelled the German battery and single-gun locations and battered the rearward enemy communications.67 The P-47's also took part in the attack, bombing and strafing the heights between Moivron and Jeandelaincourt.68 The main burden of the attack was carried by the 6th Armored Division, whose final objective was the plateau west of Létricourt.69 Possession of this high ground would block off the salient formed by the looping Seille and would inevitably force the Germans to withdraw behind the river. CCB, organized with two-thirds of the division's combat strength, formed the spearhead of the first day's attack, striking out from Leyr toward the north in three combat teams, each supported by a battalion of field artillery. Combat Team 50, on the left, had its leading tanks inside Moivron a half hour after the jump-off. Here, as elsewhere during the day, the enemy's


artillery remained virtually silent. His infantry fought much less tenaciously than in the September battles, falling back when the attack was pressed home or surrendering in groups when a position was overrun or encircled. Nevertheless, the American infantry, from the 317th, had to fight to get into Moivron and relieve the armor there.70

Combat Team 15, forming the center column, had been ordered to seize Jeandelaincourt and clear the Bois de Brasquin and the Bois d'Ajoncourt, the line of departure for the next day's operations. Part of the combat team swept on to the edge of the woods but was checked there by mortar and small arms fire until late in the afternoon, when a company of armored infantry came up and cleared the woods. The main force encircled Jeandelaincourt from the east and north while the 80th Division infantry, which had pushed forward to the reverse slope of Mount St. Jean, fired into the town. The bulk of the German garrison attempted to make a stand in a large factory building. Tanks and tank destroyers shelled the factory at point-blank range, but the finishing blow was dealt by some P-47's that made a direct strike on the factory, setting it ablaze. When the survivors broke for the open they were met by a fusillade of machine gun bullets that left only a few to surrender. Over the open radio General Grow heard Lt. Col. Embry D. Lagrew, the commander of the combat team, saying: "This beats any Fourth of July I ever saw."

Combat Team 69, advancing on the right flank of CCB toward Arraye-et-Han, was retarded in the early morning by the fog rising from the near-by Seille, but by 1300 the town was taken. To the east the 35th Division brought up its left flank along the Seille, thus extending the American line to include Ajoncourt and Fossieux.71 This squeeze play was so successful that Combat Team 15 went on to sweep the Bois de Chenicourt. The town of Chenicourt was left unoccupied, for the American armor had learned the inadvisability


of outposting a town in a valley during hours of darkness so long as the enemy still held the surrounding hills.

The left wing of the XII Corps attack now was brought forward by the 80th Division and its attached tank battalion, the 702d, quickly overrunning the German defenses on the hill masses and along the valley roads. The Germans apparently had expected a continuation of the operation which had been begun at Sivry and Serrières; indeed, on the day before the corps attack, they had aimed a propaganda broadcast at the 317th Infantry facing Mount St. Jean: "Do not attack the hill in front of you if you want to get home. If you do you will surely die." But the strength put behind this attack and the weight of the metal turned against them on the early morning of 8 October seem to have demoralized the German infantry. The 319th Infantry had a battalion on Mount Toulon by 0655; by the end of the day it held Lixières and Sivry. In the 317th Infantry sector one battalion closed on Mount St. Jean from the west while another advanced from the south, the two driving the enemy survivors into the hands of the 6th Armored Division in the valley below. The 318th Infantry also pushed closer to the Seille72 and by noon had troops in Manoncourt. This was the "black day" for the 553d VG Division, which had stubbornly contested every mile of ground as it was forced back from the Moselle line.73 The 80th Division ended the day's action with 1,264 prisoners, most of them from the 553d. The casualties suffered by the 80th Division are not known.74 The 35th Division had encountered little resistance; CCB had


lost twenty dead, sixty-one wounded, and six medium tanks (five of which were reparable).

CCA, which had been brought up close behind CCB for this operation, attacked on 9 October through the center of CCB and then fanned out by combat teams for a thrust through the Bois du Haut des Trappes and the Bois d'Aulnois which screened Létricourt, the final 6th Armored Division objective. The Germans still were disorganized and dispirited, after the weight and speed of the first day's attack and their heavy losses. The left and center columns were through to the Létricourt side of the woods shortly after noon, having been impeded more by the narrow forest trails than by the enemy. But Combat Team 44 (Lt. Col. Lewis E. McCorison), advancing in the open on the exposed right flank of the combat command, came under the enemy guns in Chenicourt and received a terrific shelling. At 1310 Colonel McCorison reported that the combat team could not continue the attack toward Létricourt because of heavy casualties and disorganization. CCB was forced to rush up reinforcements to hold the gains already made. Through the day the 80th Division infantry had kept abreast of or followed very close on the heels of the armor but darkness intervened before the 317th Infantry could reinforce Combat Team 44 for the capture of Létricourt.75 CCA's losses, mostly in Combat Team 44, had been 39 killed and 87 wounded. The 6th Armored Division had bagged 650 prisoners for the whole operation.

This action ended the XII Corps attack and the push to the Seille. The 80th Division relieved the armor, taking the high ground which overlooked Létricourt and clearing the woods, but leaving the village in German hands. During the next two days the enemy essayed small counterattacks, without gaining any success.

The Quiet Phase76

The establishment of a new main line of resistance on the XII Corps left wing began a period of quiet along the thirty-mile corps front that lasted,


with only a few interruptions, until 8 November. At the beginning of October General Eddy received the new 26th Infantry Division as reinforcement for his corps. The 26th, a National Guard division, had reached the Continent on 7 September. The supply situation did not permit the immediate use of the division in combat; its vehicles were taken away to haul supplies and its troops were employed briefly as guards on the lines of communication. When the division finally reached the Third Army and was placed in the line it had neither a full troop complement nor all of its equipment. Maj. Gen. Willard S. Paul, the 26th Division commander, had entered military service as a private in the Colorado National Guard. After a Regular Army peacetime career in garrison and at the military schools, Paul served as G-4 with GHQ and the headquarters of the Army Ground Forces, and then activated the 75th Infantry Division. He had commanded the 26th since August 1943.

On 12 October General Paul's division relieved the 4th Armored Division, taking over the right wing of the corps. Thus far the 26th had experienced no combat as a unit. To remedy this lack, and extend the American salient east of Arracourt, a limited-objective attack was set up for 22 October. This brief but sanguinary interruption in the prevailing lull saw Paul's infantry supported by troops from the experienced 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion advancing over terrain which had been the scene of the fierce tank battles in September. The baptismal attack resulted in some very hard fighting, but at the end of the day the 26th Division had pushed forward on the rolling ground west of Moncourt. Those elements of the green division used on the 22d had fought well enough to call themselves to the attention of the Third Army commander.77 The Germans paid a real tribute when Balck commended the units


MARLENE DIETRICH, entertaining front-line soldiers of the Third Army.

who had opposed the 26th Division and the 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion for their battle against the American "shock troops."

The Germans were more than willing to leave the XII Corps front undisturbed--heavily involved as they were in the bitter fight at Aachen. With the exception of a few local sorties and the drafting of halfhearted and abortive plans for a counterattack against the north flank of the XII Corps, they contented themselves with digging and wiring and with rotating their troops through this new rest area. Earlier, on 24 September, General Eddy had begun to draw up a plan of defense and had issued instruction on the rotation of troops during the coming period of inaction. General Eisenhower, in a visit to the Third Army headquarters on 29 September, had set forth the policy of a continuing rotation of front-line and reserve battalions in order to rest the tired divisions and get them in shape for a future offensive. This policy was followed, except when the local attack program did not permit, to the extent allowed by the width of the front and the supply of billets. The


MAINTENANCE WORK IN MUDDY FIELDS. During the October lull ordnance companies were put into buildings, with a consequent increase in efficiency.


80th, 35th, and 26th were left in line--generally with two-thirds of the riflemen in battle positions. As troops came into reserve they were billeted in the shell-torn Lorraine towns and villages, given clean clothes, and--if they were lucky--trucked to Nancy, St. Nicholas, and other leave centers for a bath, a movie, or possibly attendance at Marlene Dietrich's USO show, which was even more popular than Bing Crosby's Third Army tour had been in early September. But the men in the line lived under continual rain and in seas of mud.

Quartermaster bakeries increased the issue of fresh bread and roasted green coffee to replace the bitter soluble variety in the K ration. Company cooks now found time and shelter for preparing the tons of German beef captured at Reims and Briey weeks earlier. Ordnance companies were taken out of muddy fields and put into buildings (greatly increasing their maintenance capacity), where they began overhauling vehicles and equipment that in many cases had received little or no repair since the start of the campaign in August. Also, a new type of grouser was improvised to give the American tanks flotation somewhat equivalent to that of the wide-tracked German tanks.78 The October rains gave ample evidence of the mud slogging that would be required of armor in the next campaign, and the tankers pinned great faith on the grouser. Approximately eighty tanks per day were fitted with these "duck bills."

New tanks were brought up from the communications zone to replace those which had been destroyed or irreparably damaged. In the period between 1 September and 22 October the Third Army had lost 63 light tanks and 160 mediums. The most noticeable lag in replacements had come at the end of the third week in September, when the Third Army ordnance officer reported that the army was 130 tanks short of its scheduled strength. Light armored cars, 60-mm. mortars, BAR's, tires, and tubes also had fallen into short supply during the September operations and now had to be replaced.

Gasoline rationing continued through most of October; the MP's were kept busy apprehending jeeps and command cars without authorized trip tickets. Parenthetically, it may be noted that the MP's had their hands full, for General Patton used the quiet period to refurbish the "spit and polish" discipline which characterized his administration of the Third Army. Artillery ammunition was so severely curtailed that the XII and XX Corps finally were


"Radio th' ol' man we'll be late on account of a thousand-mile detour."


reduced to firing only in retaliation against a German outburst, and to using tanks, tank destroyers, and chemical mortars, whose ammunition stocks were not so depleted as those of the field artillery battalions. The fighting in early October had drawn heavily on the Third Army allotment for the month; the total expended during October by the XII Corps alone was 12,700 tons of artillery and small-caliber ammunition. Some winter equipment came forward during October: blankets, overcoats, new-type sleeping bags, stoves, and other necessities. Most of the combat troops had three blankets and an overcoat. But in extremely wet or cold weather this issue would be insufficient to protect the soldier properly, especially in view of an acute shortage of waterproof ground sheets and raincoats. Rubber overshoes, a critical item as the Lorraine plains turned to mire in the constant fall downpour, were so scarce that they could be issued only on the basis of one pair for every four enlisted men.79 Shelter halves, woolen clothing, and socks also were lacking in sufficient quantity.

Planning and preparation for the renewal of the offensive went on apace. Sometimes these preparations took unorthodox forms as the individual units attempted to build up gasoline reserves or increase their ammunition stocks, by "hook and by crook" as their commanders enjoined them. Planning and training aimed at what was believed to be the next great obstacle, the West Wall, and officers and men studied relief models and maps of this much-vaunted position. But General Patton and his commanders were looking beyond it to the Rhine; so a floating Bailey bridge school was added to the varied collection of "schools" functioning in the back areas.

The October pause also was used to remove a potential threat to any future Third Army advance in the XII Corps zone by the destruction of the earthen dam which impounded the waters of the Etang de Lindre, just south of Dieuze. The Etang de Lindre fed the Seille River, which ran through the American forward lines. The upper valley of the Seille was to form one of the most important avenues in the initial phases of an attack to the east. The military significance of this lake-river combination had been recognized by French military engineers of the seventeenth century, who had built the dam as a part of the Vauban system for the defense of Metz. In German hands the dam could be blown and the waters of the Etang de Lindre--about thirty-three feet above the level of the Seille River--released to flood the valley and


cut off the American forward units. Therefore, it was decided to anticipate the enemy and destroy the dam. Since the Etang de Lindre was swollen considerably by recent rains the XII Corps engineers expected a flash flood; they therefore built a regular flood control system. On 20 October two squadrons of P-47's,80 using 1,000-pound bombs, made a fifteen-yard breach in the dam.81 The American positions were not flooded out, and the threat was removed.

On the heels of the Maizières-lès-Metz operation one final tactical step was taken in preparation for the ensuing Third Army offensive. During the afternoon of 1 November the 319th Infantry attacked to erase the re-entrant (in the Abaucourt-Létricourt sector) formed by the loop in the Seille on the left front of the XII Corps. The attack gained complete surprise. In an hour and a quarter the two towns were cleared and the enemy was driven back across the Seille, leaving behind 162 prisoners and 148 dead.

Plans for the Resumption of the Offensive

The Supreme Commander's decision to halt the advance of the Third Army, in the last week of September, had stemmed from an untenable logistical situation. Bradley's 12th Army Group alone needed 20,000 tons of supplies per day in order to support a "secure" offensive for bridgeheads across the Rhine. The "expectations" for the delivery of supplies during the period 1 to 15 October summed up to only 12,000 tons per day.82 Under optimum conditions the entire Allied logistical effort could support only twenty-five divisions on or at the Rhine in October. To accomplish even that much support all other troops would have to be immobilized and much of the Allied air strength would have to be diverted from strategic to supply missions.83

Faced with the apparent necessity of tailoring the suit to the cloth, General Eisenhower had continued the priority given to the attack in the north. During October Montgomery's 21st Army Group fought to clear the banks of the Schelde and thus open the water gates to the essential port of Antwerp. This crucial operation was handed over to the First Canadian Army. Montgomery's right, the Second British Army, was committed in an attempt to


BOMBING OF ETANG DE LINDRE DAM by P-47's on 20 October. The photograph was made fifteen seconds after the dam was breached.


destroy the German bridgehead west of the Meuse, but on 16 October Montgomery decided to end the Second British Army attack in order to employ all his strength against the stiffening enemy opposition along the Schelde. Meanwhile the American First Army battered away at Aachen, drawing much of the German armor away from the British and Canadian front farther north. On 21 October the conquest of Aachen was completed and the First Army turned to preparations for its part in a general Allied offensive. In the days that followed, the Canadians continued the battle to clear the Schelde estuary. By 3 November most of Walcheren Island was in Canadian hands. The following day the first mine-sweeper ships reached Antwerp. The first seaborne convoy was not to anchor in that port until 28 November, but long-range plans of supply could now be elaborated in terms of Antwerp's great tonnage capacity.

Despite the hiatus in offensive operations induced on the Third Army front by the lag in supply, General Eisenhower had not abandoned his intention to drive toward Berlin on the direct northern route while at the same time moving his flanks forward, "all in one co-ordinated, concerted operation." At the very moment that General Patton received his orders to go over to the defensive, the SHAEF G-3 (Maj. Gen. H. R. Bull) and the SHAEF Planning Staff were putting the final touches on a scheme for an advance into Germany after the capture of the Ruhr and Frankfurt.84 Admittedly this was planning for the long pull, but it was an important reaffirmation of the role intended for the Third Army--secondary though that role might be. Early in October the 12th Army Group planners drafted other proposals for a two-pronged advance to put the First Army (and the 21st Army Group) across the Rhine River in the north, while the Third Army attacked from the "Nancy salient" and crossed the river in the Frankfurt sector.

All of this planning in late September and early October was general in nature and set no precise date for reopening the Allied offensive. On 18 October, however, General Eisenhower met with his chief subordinates and issued a more detailed directive, complete with the "probable" dates on which the armies might expect to resume the attack. The top priority mission for 21st Army Group remained "the early opening of Antwerp." About 10 November the Second British Army would be ready to start a drive to the southeast, between the Meuse and the Rhine, with the mission of supporting an American


advance to and across the Rhine. The American First Army was charged with undertaking an offensive to secure a footing across the Rhine in the area south of Cologne. The probable date for the First Army attack, it was estimated, would fall between 1 and 5 November. The Ninth Army, in line between the British Second and the American First, would act initially to cover the north flank of the First Army during its push to the Rhine. Subsequently the First and Ninth Armies would have the task of encircling or capturing the Ruhr, the First Army operating south of the great industrial area and the Ninth Army operating north. No date was set for an attack by Patton's forces. The Third Army, it was agreed, would resume its advance "when logistics permit," driving in a northeasterly direction and covering the right flank of the First Army.85

On the day Aachen fell to Hodges' First Army--21 October--General Bradley dispatched detailed instructions to his army commanders, ordering preparations for an advance to the Rhine by all three armies. The target date for the attack by the First and Ninth would be 5 November; for the Third, 10 November. The axis for the Third Army drive lay in line with Frankfurt, as in previous plans. But provision was made for alternative missions: if the situation permitted, Patton was to cross the Rhine somewhere between Mainz and Worms; if a crossing could not be won immediately, Patton was to turn his army north and clear the west bank of the Rhine up to the point where that river met the Moselle.86 The role of the Allied forces on the right of the Third Army was outlined in a personal letter from General Eisenhower to General Devers, the 6th Army Group Commander. Devers' forces, supported over their own Mediterranean line of communications, would act to protect the south flank of the 12th Army Group and deploy in strength across the Rhine. Eisenhower added that once the Third Army had succeeded in crossing the Rhine it probably would move on Kassel, in which case the 6th Army Group might anticipate that its own drive east of the Rhine would aim at Nuremberg.87

This suggestion of objectives and missions east of the Rhine was still a matter of hypothesis. When, on 28 October, the Supreme Commander issued what would be his last general directive prior to the November offensive, he


foresaw three phases in the forthcoming operations: a battle to destroy the enemy west of the Rhine, during which the Allies would take advantage of "any opportunity" to seize bridgeheads across the river; a fight to win bridgeheads and deploy on the east bank; and a continuation of the advance deep into Germany. But of these three phases only the first two were outlined in detail.88

During October new American divisions had been arriving on the Continent, complicating the supply system considerably, but giving promise of additional weight behind the future Allied drive to the Rhine. General Patton had been assured that his army would receive reinforcement, and on 10 October the III Corps headquarters (Maj. Gen. John Millikin), newly arrived in Normandy, was assigned to the Third Army. As yet the III Corps commanded only a few corps troops. On 19 October Patton wrote a personal letter to Bradley, setting forth Third Army plans for a drive up to the West Wall, "in not to exceed D plus 2 days."89 Patton assured Bradley that the enemy on the Third Army front was disposed with all his strength in the front lines and that once these forces were destroyed or captured the Third Army stood a good chance of penetrating the West Wall and driving rapidly to the Rhine. Such an operation, Patton was careful to explain, would not digress from the secondary role assigned the Third Army, but would be timed so as to precede or follow an offensive by one of Bradley's other armies, thus "disjoining the German scheme of defense." The catch, as Patton saw it, was that the Third Army was the stepchild of supply. Therefore he carefully tabulated the tonnage which he and his staff reckoned to be necessary in mounting and maintaining the proposed attack.

In actual fact the Third Army had two plans for resuming the offensive, both of which were predicated on the ultimate employment of the new III Corps. Plan A called for a simultaneous attack by the XII and XX Corps in which the XII Corps would drive northeastward with Faulquemont as its objective while the XX Corps attacked from Thionville--bypassing Metz--with Boulay as its objective. The III Corps, starting from the Briey area, would advance in rearward echelon on the Third Army left. Plan B was a variant of the first scheme in which the III Corps would force the Moselle line in the Thionville sector while the XII and XX Corps advanced south of Metz.


The main problem as to the employment of the Third Army, given adequate supply, was that of timing its attack. The Supreme Commander had given no ruling except to say: "These operations will be so timed as best to assist the main effort in the north." By 1 November the logistical support of a general Allied offensive seemed assured. That afternoon Patton met with his corps commanders, representatives of the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces, and General Weyland (whose XIX TAC would co-operate with the Third Army as usual). The plans agreed on here would be the blueprint for the Third Army November offensive--except for timing. Following the First Army attack on D Day, the XII Corps would lead off for the Third Army on D plus 1. The XII Corps armor would follow up on D plus 2. In the XX Corps zone an attack would be launched on both sides of Metz. After a demonstration by the 95th Division on the afternoon of D plus 1, the 90th Division would begin to cross the Moselle north of Metz on D plus 2. The 5th Division would carry the attack south of Metz as soon as the left wing of the XII Corps had cleared some of the ground to its front. Ultimately the III Corps would be given some divisions and be set to mopping up the "Metz pocket."90

Meanwhile regrouping for the main Allied offensive in the north had been retarded by determined German resistance opposite the First Canadian Army and a series of spoiling attacks directed against the Second British Army. As a result two American divisions which had been loaned to Montgomery (the 104th Infantry Division and the 7th Armored Division) could not be released to reinforce the 12th Army Group as planned. Faced with this temporary diminution in the strength of his main effort, General Bradley visited the Third Army headquarters on 2 November and explained that the British were not yet ready to jump off and that the First Army was not prepared to attack until the two divisions were returned. Bradley posed the question: could the Third Army begin the offensive by itself? Patton answered that he would attack on twenty-four hour notice. It was agreed, therefore, that the Third Army should begin the offensive as soon as the weather permitted the air forces to soften up the enemy. If good flying weather failed, the XII Corps would attack on 8 November.91 One further decision remained. What protection could the 6th Army Group give the right flank of the Third Army as the latter advanced to the northeast? General Eisenhower had already assigned General Devers the task of denying the pivotal Lunéville area


to the enemy. Now the 6th Army Group commander assured Patton that the XV Corps would be committed in the zone south of the Third Army within two days after the Third Army began its attack.92

General Patton's command was large and well equipped on the eve of the November offensive. It included six infantry divisions and three armored divisions, as well as a high number of nondivisional units:

    1 ranger infantry battalion
    5 tank battalions
    22 antiaircraft artillery battalions
    14 tank destroyer battalions
    38 field artillery battalions
    6 cavalry reconnaissance squadrons
    3 engineer general service regiments
    4 engineer heavy ponton battalions
    15 engineer combat battalions
    11 ponton and treadway bridge companies

By dint of strenuous efforts on the part of the supply services and considerable reallocation in the distribution to the three armies in 12th Army Group, the Third Army had been given the support needed to mount its offensive. On 7 November the Third Army had a four-day reserve of rations and a five-day supply of gasoline. The only items of artillery ammunition in short supply were white phosphorus shells for the 105's and 155's. It seemed likely that the daily maintenance requirements of the Third Army could be met: 1,000 tons of rations, 2,000 tons of gasoline and oil, 2,000 tons of ammunition, and 1,000 tons of other items. The countless pieces of engineer equipment required in assaulting fortifications or making river crossings were comprised in a 10,000-ton stock of engineer supplies. The Third Army armored formations had been brought up to their normal tank strength; however, there were very few medium tanks available as replacements in the army ordnance depots.93 The troop status of the Third Army divisions was close to the assigned organizational strength; though the total casualties for the month of October numbered some 14,000, the army had received over 13,000 replacements. The effective strength of the Third Army was approximately a quarter of a million officers and men.94


Morale throughout the Third Army was high despite the mud, the rain, and the tedium of enforced inactivity. Some of the optimism which had been so marked in late August and early September had gone. Nonetheless rumors floated through the army area that the war would be over by Christmas, and there was a prevailing sense that this would be the last big push. General Patton drove up and down the area adding his voice to the optimistic prophecies of private soldiers and division commanders. A speech to the new 95th Division expressed a belief which the army commander would repeat again and again: "It is 132 miles to the Rhine from here, and if this army will attack with venom and desperate energy, it is more than probable that the war will end before we get to the Rhine. Therefore, when we attack, go like hell!"95 In the meantime army weather stations and air force liaison officers watched for a break in the seemingly interminable rains. They and the infantry who waited for the bomber planes to makes the advance easier would be disappointed. In the Nancy area, from which the Third Army attack was to begin, the month of November would bring a total of 7.2 inches of rain, as contrasted with a normal fall of 3.0 inches during this month. To the meteorologist in uniform this was merely an upward swing on a graph; to the foot soldier and tanker it meant a slow advance under enemy fire through sucking mud and over swollen, rushing streams.

German Defensive Preparations,
October and Early November 194496

While the Third Army made preparations during the October lull for a resumption of the offensive, the German forces opposite were busy with plans and preparations to meet the American attack which their intelligence predicted would begin sometime during the first half of November. General Balck and Army Group G could be given little aid and only trifling additions to the meager forces already available, since men and matériel were being shunted to the north in preparation for a great counteroffensive in the Ardennes region. In addition Army Group B was seriously menaced by the Allied operations in the north; during October a sizable part of Balck's very limited reserves was sent by OKW to the Aachen and Holland sectors. As


the result of these detachments a number of small-scale counterattacks which had been planned to regain the ground lost to the Third Army in early October were canceled. With minor exceptions the entire Army Group G front lapsed into quiet.

Twice during October Rundstedt suggested to Balck that further withdrawals should be made at those points along the front where the Americans had shown indications of aggressive intentions, in this way shortening the German lines and freeing troops for use as reserves. But Balck held firmly to the idea that no ground should be surrendered without a fight. To give ground unnecessarily under pressure, or the threat of pressure, meant only that the Americans would continue to push ahead in that same sector. Balck summed up his concept of the defensive about ten days before the opening of the Third Army November offensive when he told Rundstedt that he intended to counterattack "on the spot" against the point of any American penetration, that in the long run this would entail fewer losses and would give time to build up some defense in depth in the sector most endangered.

The relative strengths of the two armies under Army Group G gave all the advantage to the First Army. Balck estimated that of the nine divisions in the Nineteenth Army only three, by reason of strength and experience, deserved to be called divisions.97 Each of the remaining six was at best no stronger than a regiment. In the First Army, also composed of nine divisions, five were estimated as equal to ordinary "defensive" divisions, while two of these five were adjudged capable of limited use as "attack" divisions. Since the terrain in the Vosges favored the defender, and since German intelligence sources indicated that the next American offensive would be thrown not against the Nineteenth Army but against the First, Balck decided to divert such replacements and weapons as he could inveigle from the higher commands to the First Army, while hoping that the forces in Alsace could continue to hold in static defense positions. Balck had no illusions about the weakened character of the forces under his command, particularly on the Nineteenth Army front where fighting continued throughout October. On 9 October the Army Group G commander sent a personal letter to Jodl at OKW, apparently in hopes of getting some help from the man who had


Hitler's ear. After enumerating the heavy losses sustained in the battles just past, Balck appealed for replacements on the ground that the individual soldier was the decisive factor in the "jungle fighting" in the Vosges mountains and the woods of Lorraine. Further, said Balck, "If replacements are not forthcoming the time will arrive when there is no longer any front to defend. The front is already strained to the breaking point and one wonders how the few tired men can ever repair the situation." Worst of all was the situation in the Nineteenth Army. "I have never commanded such jumbled up and badly equipped troops," said Balck, "as there." He seems to have lost most of the personal optimism that had earlier recommended him to Hitler as an army group commander, for he ended this appeal to Jodl with the dark conclusion that the only thing which had saved his armies thus far was "the poor and timorous leadership" of the American and French commanders who had failed to take advantage of the critical German situation. The only reply to Balck's urgent plea was a soothing note which implied that he was not fully cognizant of the over-all situation98 and promised some replacements.

Instead of acquiring additional divisions in October, Army Group G continued to lose its best troops, receiving in return untrained infantry divisions of dubious quality.99 Three crack headquarters staffs, those of the Fifth Panzer Army, XLVII Panzer Corps, and LVIII Panzer Corps, were detached and sent north to Army Group B. On 17 October the LXXXIX Corps came in to take command in the sector, originally under the Fifth Panzer Army, astride the Marne-Rhin Canal, thus filling out the southern wing of the First Army. The loss of these well-trained staffs and their communications equipment, always a critical item, was perhaps less important than the loss of the 3d and 15th Panzer Grenadier Divisions, which were still rated as capable of use in attack and in consequence were withdrawn to the strategic reserve being formed by OKW in the Ruhr-Westphalia area. This reserve, though in the OB WEST area, was not under Rundstedt's command.

By the first week of November the major reshuffling of units along the Army Group G front was completed; the German corps and divisions were disposed approximately as they would meet the Third Army attack and the


later drive by the Seventh Army. The fronts of the German First Army and the American Third Army were nearly coterminous, although the north and south flanks of the First Army extended somewhat beyond the Third Army zone. With the addition of the battered 553d VG Division from the First Army, which had been shifted to a sector just south of the Marne-Rhin Canal, the Nineteenth Army was aligned opposite the Allied 6th Army Group. German troop lists for 1 November showed a total strength of 136,161 officers and men in Army Group G. The estimated combat strength was much lower: 92,094 officers and men. Of the total strength listed, 86,622 officers and men belonged to the First Army. Between 1 and 8 November a few hundred replacements were brought up to reinforce Army Group G; most of these went to the First Army.100

Through most of October Army Group G had rationed artillery ammunition at the rate of one to one and a half rounds per gun per day, in an attempt to build up a sufficient stock to meet the coming attack. In this matter of resupply, as in others, priority had to be given to the needs of the embattled German troops on the Aachen and Holland fronts, while hundreds of trainloads were diverted to building up supplies for the Ardennes offensive.101 As a result Balck was low on artillery ammunition when the American attack began, although he was to receive large stocks shortly thereafter. Assault guns and tank destroyers, so essential in German combat organization at this time, filtered slowly through supply channels, a half-dozen at a time. When battle finally was joined no single division had its full complement of these weapons; some divisions had none. The artillery regiments organic in the German division were in fairly good shape, although the number of field pieces in the artillery regiment generally was well below the complement of the American divisional artillery. New tanks arrived in some quantity, in view of the state of German tank production and the demands made by the creation of the OKW strategic reserve, with the result that Army Group G had some 140 tanks of all types and weights by the first week of November. The bulk of this limited armored strength, just as in the case of ammunition and infantry replacements, was earmarked for the First Army, which had a total of about a hundred tanks and assault guns when the Americans finally attacked.


Attempts to fill out the depleted ranks of the German infantry divisions had limited success. Only a few regular replacement battalions were available for Balck's command. In the main, the divisions were replenished with security and fortress battalions of indifferent worth, although the fortress machine gun battalions, whose equipment was generally good and whose personnel had been drawn from veterans of the Eastern Front, helped to stiffen the new cadres. The October lull did give occasion to regroup the German units and fit the fragmentary Kampfgruppen, some of which had not been reorganized since the invasion, into divisional frameworks. A rotation policy allowed some rest for the worn-out German soldiery and training for the green replacements, but replacement contingents came in so slowly that many received only a week or ten days of training, instead of the four- to six-week period which Balck and his commanders believed necessary. While the Americans across the line were being schooled in attacks against fortifications, the Germans concentrated on training in night fighting, since OKW had flatly ruled that Army Group G should receive no air support and since Balck's commanders were by now all too familiar with the futility of daylight operations so long as American planes held unchallenged sway over the battlefield.

The German decision to use an elastic defense on the First Army front and thus "hem in" the spearheads of the anticipated large-scale American attack required the construction of field fortifications in depth, for which neither sufficient time, manpower, weapons, nor construction materials were available. In view of the admitted American superiority in matériel, particularly in guns and planes, Balck fell back on a modified version of the World War I scheme of elastic defense used by Ludendorff in 1916. In this system the first line of defense was held by weak forces, which were to be withdrawn to a main line of resistance about two or three kilometers to the rear as soon as the Americans began an attack in strength. American guns and planes would dump their shells and bombs on the field fortifications in the first line--the "false positions"--or so it was assumed. Then, as the assault waves moved forward through the weakly held first line, the main German combat elements in the main line of resistance would be in position to hold and counterattack in the "maneuver ground" between the front line and the MLR. Lacking sufficient antitank weapons, the Germans were forced to rely mainly on land mines as the chief defense against tanks; these were laid by the thousands. Weak points in the main line of resistance were to be covered by the massed guns of stationary fortress antitank companies. Still further to


the rear the German field artillery was ranged in on tactical check points prepared by each division, so that a minimum of one light and one heavy field artillery battalion could be brought to bear on any main penetration. (On 1 November Hitler ordered the build-up of an "artillery line" in depth behind the First Army front. As a result the First Army received a considerable amount of army artillery, fortress artillery, and other army troops between 1 and 10 November.)

Behind the existing German main line of resistance and in front of the West Wall, attempts were made to build up an intermediate position, the West-Stellung. This line of defense lay in the rear of the First Army, its right boundary in the neighborhood of Insming and Sarre-Union, and its left just south of the Marne-Rhin Canal in the vicinity of Dieuze. Work on the West-Stellung was entrusted to Generalleutnant Bernard von Claer and a special staff in late September. But as was so often the case in the autumn of 1944 the lack of skilled labor, interference from Nazi party officials, scarcity of concrete and steel, and a general lack of agreement as to how the line should be built nullified most of the efforts of Stab General von Claer. However, a number of antitank ditches were dug by the civilian population and the main roads were mined and strewn with obstacles for ten or fifteen kilometers in front of the West-Stellung--all of which delayed the American armored columns in November.

On 4 November General Balck began the final steps to align his troops for the long-awaited American offensive and ordered radio silence to cover the German movements, except for those units in the forward defense positions. Some troops and guns were still coming up; so it was not until 6 November that the final orders were given for the disposition of reserves in the First Army sector. Each division was told to create a tactical reserve of one infantry regiment, one antitank company and two battalions of light howitzers. Actually, the divisions had neither the strength to strip their extended fronts nor the time to carry out such orders; most divisional commanders were fortunate if they had so much as a battalion in reserve when the Americans attacked on 8 and 9 November.

On 19 October OKW, with its usual lack of appreciation of the hard tactical facts of life confronting the German commanders at the front, had "advised" Balck to create an operational reserve of four infantry divisions and three panzer divisions in Army Group G. But by the beginning of November Army Group G had been so denuded of mobile or semimobile troops that


the only operational reserve free for immediate use was the 11th Panzer Division, assembled in a more or less central position behind the First Army front in the area west of St. Avold. In addition the 21st Panzer Division, holding a sector on the Nineteenth Army front, was scheduled for use as an additional mobile division for this operational reserve. Despite this plan OKW had so much trouble in finding an infantry division to relieve the 21st Panzer Division, and such difficulty with its transport, that the armored division was still deployed on the Nineteenth Army front when the Americans attacked in the north. Finally, Hitler himself intervened to give Balck some additional fire power in the very last days of the lull, ordering the 401st Volks Artillery Corps (apparently with five field artillery battalions) and a weak assault gun brigade to reinforce the First Army. These units were en route to the front when the American offensive began.

While it was clear to the German high command that General Patton would eventually resume the offensive and that this attack would be thrown against the First Army, there was somewhat less certainty as to which side of Metz the Americans would strike. After the deadly blow dealt the 553d VG Division on 8 October OB WEST and OKW believed for a time that the Americans would follow up this success sometime before the middle of November with an onslaught south of Metz. However, intelligence reports from agents behind the American lines began to indicate unusual activity opposite Thionville about the middle of October, and for some time both the American 14th Armored Division and the 4th Armored Division were carried on German situation maps as tentatively located in this area. The appearance of a new American armored division in the Metz sector, reported by agents on 28 October as "possibly the 10th Armored Division," confirmed a conclusion that the American offensive would be mounted both north and south of Metz. With the paucity of mobile reserves in Army Group G little could be done to prepare for this threat aside from shifting some artillery to the north flank of the First Army. In any event, General Balck expected that the American attack would hit hardest against the south flank of the First Army, probably between Delme Ridge and the Marne-Rhin Canal, where the terrain offered fewer obstacles to a rapid advance than in the area north and northeast of Metz. Although the Allied forces opposite the Nineteenth Army continued to make local attacks through October and early November, activity on this front was viewed as incidental to the threat poised in front of the First Army. German intelligence gave little attention to the Alsace sector until 7 November,


when increased Allied artillery fire and troop movements opposite the LXXXV Corps gave rise to the fear that the American offensive might begin simultaneously in both the Metz and Belfort sectors.

Although the deceptive devices used opposite Thionville had misled the Germans into erroneous identification of the 14th Armored Division (which in fact was not yet on the Continent when first "identified" by the enemy), most of their information on the divisions in the Third Army was quite accurate as to location and strength. Secret agents provided much of this useful information to the German headquarters. But the Americans themselves supplied German intelligence with most of it by extremely careless use of telephones and radios at the various traffic control points along the routes where troops were moving. No specific date was set by German intelligence as the day on which the American offensive would be likely to start, but it was generally anticipated that the Third Army attack would come not earlier than 3 November and not later than the second week of November. Troop movements behind the American lines on the nights just prior to 8 November had been carefully observed and apparently placed the German high command on something approaching an hour-to-hour alert. When General Patton did strike, on 8 November, Balck reported to his immediate superiors that the offensive had begun "as expected." Undoubtedly, higher German headquarters did expect the American attack about this time. But it is equally certain that the troops in the front line were taken by surprise on 8 and 9 November, and that "tactical" surprise, at the least, was achieved by the American divisions.


Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter (V) * Next Chapter (VII)


1. See Ruppenthal, Logistical Support; see also 12th A Gp Rpt of Opns V and VI.

2. On the night of 23 September the Second British Army finally authorized the withdrawal of the 1st British Airborne Division from the bridgehead; two nights later the survivors of the gallant division were brought back across the lower Rhine in assault boats.

3. Minutes of meeting at SHAEF, 22 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS File, Post OVERLORD Planning 381, I. Field Marshal Montgomery was represented at the meeting by his chief of staff.

4. For fuller discussion, see Pogue, Supreme Command.

5. Eisenhower to Montgomery, 24 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS File, Post OVERLORD Planning 381, I.

6. Bradley to Patton, 23 Sep 44, 12th A Gp File, Military Objectives 371.3, I.

7. See Chap. III, p. 173.

8. Eisenhower to 12th and 6th A Gps, FWD-15934, 26 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS File, Post OVERLORD Planning 381, I.

9. 12th A Gp Ltr of Instructions No. 9, 25 Sep 44.

10. Eisenhower to Marshall, 24 Aug 43, SHAEF Cable Log.

11. TUSA Diary, 23 Sep 44. See also the author's notes taken at the time in the Third Army headquarters.

12. Bradley to Eisenhower, 25 Sep 44, 12th A Gp File, Military Objectives 371.3, I.

13. TUSA AAR, Ltr of Instructions No. 4. This letter ends with the typical Patton touch: ". . . We only await the signal to resume our career of conquest."

14. Chapter V, p. 236.

15. AAF Historical Studies, No. 36 (Oct 45), pp. 222-231.

16. XX Corps G-3 Jnl, 17 Sep 44.

17. The XIX TAC began attacks against the Metz forts on 26 September and continued to attack daily until 30 September. However, the fighter-bomber efforts had little effect. XIX TAC Report on the Combat Operations of the XIX Tactical Air Command, 30 May 45.

18. The fort had been renamed, when the French repossessed it after World War I, in honor of the heroic Lt. Col. Driant of the 56th Battalion of Chasseurs, who had met his death in gallant fashion at Verdun in 1916.

19. MS #B-042 (Kittel).

20. 5th Div AAR, Incl 10, Sep 44.

21. The massed air attacks scheduled in the THUNDERBOLT plans had been abandoned on 25 September. General Bradley had given verbal orders to the 12th Army Group G-3 Air, Col. Sheffield Edwards, canceling the operation on the grounds that there was insufficient artillery ammunition to support an all-out ground attack against the Metz forts. Interv with Col. Edwards, Washington, 21 May 47. Thereafter bomber support was allocated on a day-to-day basis.

22. On the contrary, the morale of the German garrison was raised by these attacks, since it found that the concrete works gave adequate protection. AAF Evaluation Board, The Effect of Air Power in the Battle of Metz, 19 Jan 45.

23. The 2d Battalion attack was supported by 3 battalions of 105-mm. howitzers, 3 battalions of 155-mm. howitzers, 1 battery of 8-inch howitzers, and 1 battery of 240-mm. howitzers.

24. 11th Inf Jnl, 27 Sep 44. See also 11th Inf AAR, Incl 10, Sep 44.

25. 5th Div Telephone Jnl, 28 Sep 44.

26. The orders releasing the XV Corps from the Third Army had automatically erased the Forêt de Parroy attack as top priority of those listed by General Patton on 25 September. A new TUSA Operational Directive, issued on 28 September, gave the Metz fort first priority in the revised program for local operations.

27. TUSA Diary, 29 Sep 44.

28. The 5th Division losses during September are listed tentatively as 380 killed, 2,097 wounded, and 569 missing. 5th Div G-1 Jnl and AAR, Sep 44. These losses do not include sick and combat fatigue cases. The number of such cases was so high that on 26 September General Patton sent General Gay to make an inspection. Gay's report was favorable to the 5th Division. He noted that morale was good, that the division had taken severe losses, and that it had been fighting hard for a considerable length of time. Gay added that in his opinion any student in a military school who "attacked" a position such as the 5th Division had attacked and held would have been graded "Unsatisfactory" on his solution. Furthermore, the 5th Division was in process of absorbing and training 200 officers and 3,773 enlisted replacements who had come into the division during September. Many of these replacements saw their first fighting at Fort Driant.

29. The 5th Division held a line of approximately 19,000 meters, which, the 5th Division G-3 pointed out, was "no division front." So exposed was the 2d Battalion, 11th Infantry, that the 2d Battalion, 358th Infantry, was sent by trucks to Gorze on 3 October with orders to cover the left flank of the assault force. General Irwin asked for the use of "only" two companies of the 358th's battalion, but this request was refused by General Walker.

30. What the 500- and 1,000-pound aerial bombs failed to accomplish by direct hits could hardly be expected of a 286-pound shell.

31. Ninth AF Summary of Opns, 3 Oct 44. However, about 1245 the 358th Group of the XIX TAC arrived and dropped napalm bombs in the Driant area. The P-47's continued to give support throughout the afternoon.

32. The subsequent account of the Driant operation is taken from several sources: TF Warnock Jnl; 5th Div G-3 Jnl; 11th Inf Jnl and Inclosures; Hist Div Combat Interviews; and 5th Div AAR II, Oct 44.

33. Company E dug in on the glacis and held there under constant fire for four days; when the company withdrew it numbered 85 officers and men.

34. Pfc. Robert W. Holmlund, B Company, 11th Infantry, was awarded the DSC as a result of action at Driant during the 11th Infantry assault on 3 October. In the assault wave he drove the enemy from the first emplacements and knocked out a machine gun. When the enemy counterattacked he advanced to an exposed position and stopped the attack with his BAR. Holmlund later was killed while checking the positions held by his men.

35. Company B had four flame throwers, but only one functioned. Flame throwers were little used throughout the operation.

36. During 4 October the Third Platoon of G Company, 11th Infantry, made an assault to force one of the fort entrances. The platoon was driven back by a counterattack but was saved by the heroic action of 2d Lt. L. S. Dilello, who covered the withdrawal with fire from a BAR until he was killed by a hand grenade. Lieutenant Dilello received a posthumous award of the DSC.

37. About this time General Patton told General Walker to take Driant, saying that "if it took every man in the XX Corps, [he] could not allow an attack by this army to fail." TUSA Diary, 4 Oct 44. Actually, the Third Army commander's subsequent actions as regards Driant all show a more reasonable attitude.

38. In the late afternoon of 5 October the S-3 of the 2d Battalion, Capt. Ferris N. Church, sent back a message with a graphic report from an infantry captain on conditions at the fort: "The situation is critical a couple more barrages and another counterattack and we are sunk. We have no men, our equipment is shot and we just can't go. The trs in G are done, they are just there whats left of them. Enemy has infiltrated and pinned what is here down. We cannot advance nor can K Co, B Co is in same shape I'm in. We cannot delay any longer on replacement. We may be able to hold till dark but if anything happens this afternoon I can make no predictions. The enemy arty is butchering these trs until we have nothing left to hold with. We cannot get out to get our wounded and there is a hell of a lot of dead and missing. There is only one answer the way things stand. First either to withdraw and saturate it with hvy bombers or reinforce with a hell of a strong force. This strong force might hold here but eventually they'll get it by arty too. They have all of these places zeroed in by arty. The forts have 5-6 feet walls inside and 15 foot roofs of reinforced concrete. All our charges have been useless against this stuff. The few leaders are trying to keep what is left intact and that's all they can do. The trs are just not sufficiently trained and what is more they have no training in even basic Inf. Everything is committed and we cannot follow attack plan. This is just a suggestion but if we want this dammed fort lets get the stuff required to take it and then go. Right now you haven't got it. Gerrie, Capt., Inf." TF Warnock Jnl, 5 Oct 44.

39. When the Germans opened fire, Sgt. Dale H. Klakamp, 7th Engineer Battalion, 5th Infantry Division, sprang forward and started to build the barricade. His comrades, who had been shaken by the sudden fire, then came to his aid. Sergeant Klakamp was awarded the DSC.

40. This is a tentative estimate of losses for the period 3-8 October. See special report in XX Corps G-3 Jnl, 8 Oct. 44. The total casualties for the Driant operation numbered 64 killed in action, 547 wounded in action, and 187 missing in action. See Fifth Infantry Division.

41. TF Warnock Jnl, 9 Oct 44; TUSA Diary, 9 Oct 44.

42. Six tanks from the 735th Tank Battalion had to be left in the fort; they were destroyed by the American artillery.

43. Marshal Bazaine attacked north along this route in his last attempt, in October 1870, to break out of the iron ring forged by the German armies around the French at Metz. The French advanced as far as Woippy and were there defeated.

44. Activity in this sector consisted of patrolling. For his part in one such patrol on the night of 29 September, Pfc. L. G. Zehner, G Company, received the DSC. Zehner was the point man in a patrol sent to cross a footbridge at the canal near Richemont. He was well ahead of the rest of his patrol when a German voice challenged him. Zehner ran straight across the bridge, firing his BAR. On the enemy bank he captured a machine gun, silenced German rifle fire by throwing grenades into the near-by houses, and then rejoined the patrol.

45. Ltr, Gen Walker to Hist Div, 8 Oct 47.

46. Major Ward was given the DSC.

47. General McLain had hoped that seizure of the slag pile would make the town untenable to the enemy. XX Corps G-3 Jnl, 2 Oct 44.

48. 2d Bn, 357th Inf, Jnl, 7 Oct 44.

49. At the same time the First Army massed several field artillery battalions, since there was little American pressure elsewhere, and put very heavy fire on the Americans. See MS #B-214 (Mantey).

50. XX Corps G-3 Jnl, 11 Oct 44.

51. On 15 October General McLain was given command of the XIX Corps and Brig. Gen. James A. Van Fleet took over the 90th Division. Earlier General Eisenhower had credited McLain with making the 90th "a first class fighting outfit." Eisenhower to Marshall, CPA-90255, 25 Aug 44, SHAEF Cable Log.

52. General Van Fleet had assumed command of the 90th Division on 15 October, after having spent about a month as commander of the 4th Division. Van Fleet was a West Point graduate. During World War I he had participated in the Meuse-Argonne offensive as a machine gun battalion commander and had been wounded in action. An infantry officer, Van Fleet took over the 8th Infantry Regiment in 1941, trained it for amphibious operations, and led it across Utah Beach on D Day. Subsequently he was awarded the DSC for gallantry in the action of 8 June. Before his promotion to division commander Van Fleet had taken part in fighting at St.-Lô and Brest as assistant division commander of the 2d Division.

53. See 90th Div AAR for these days.

54. Instead the American artillery fired counterbattery fire before H Hour. As a result the infantry assault met little fire from German guns.

55. Lt. Col. John H. Mason, commanding the 3d Battalion, 357th Infantry, was given the DSC for gallantry displayed in this attack, as was the regimental commander, Col. George H. Barth, who was wounded while with an assault platoon.

56. The town had been carefully mapped, even down to watering troughs and laundry sheds. Each platoon in the final assault was given a block of houses as an objective, each block carefully numbered on the town plan. The 1st and 3d Battalions, 357th Infantry, participated. The 2d Battalion, 357th, feigned an attack opposite Semécourt.

57. General Macon was a graduate of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute. After his commissioning as an infantry officer in 1916, Macon served at various posts in China, the Canal Zone, and the United States. From 1940 to 1942 he trained armored infantry. During the invasion of North Africa Macon commanded the 7th Infantry Regiment. He had assumed command of the 83rd Division early in 1944.

58. On 19 September General Gay, the Third Army deputy chief of staff, made a personal reconnaissance in the Thionville sector and advised General Patton that the terrain here favored a crossing. Patton at once asked Bradley to give him the 83d Division. The following day General Bradley granted him permission for the use of the 83d. However, the logistical situation did not permit such an extension of offensive operations; the Third Army was put on the defensive and General Macon was given orders to destroy the enemy in the Remich sector, patrol to the Moselle-Sauer line, and prevent the enemy from recrossing the rivers. TUSA Diary, 19 and 20 Sep 44; Ltr, Gen Macon to Hist Div, 29 May 47.

59. The 43d Cavalry was reinforced by some artillery, the 135th Combat Engineer Battalion, a task force from the 6th Cavalry Group, and the 2d French Battalion. On 22 September, 259 men were sent to join the latter but only 22 had rifles. Colonel Fabian, liaison officer for these French forces, had great difficulty in equipping them. The men were members of the FFI, organized as a unit of the First Paris Regiment (Major Dax), and armed with French, Italian, Belgian, and German rifles. Units were attached to both the 90th Division and Task Force Polk. Used generally on patrol and security missions, the French seem to have given a good account of themselves.

60. The Germans had been pushed back into the West Wall positions east of the Moselle and north of the Sauer by the First Army during mid-September. This sector, held by the LXXX Corps, was given to the Seventh Army about this time.

61. See the 83d Div AAR, Oct 44.

62. On 14 October, 2d Lt. R. C. Downs, Troop C, 43d Cavalry, carried out a daring daylight reconnaissance on the enemy bank of the Moselle. Downs and a companion had orders to determine the location of enemy positions some 1,200 yards east of the river. They obtained the needed information but were brought under fire. The second man was lost, but Downs swam the river in full field equipment and reached his own lines. He was awarded the DSC.

63. Chapter II, p. 115.

64. This battle may be followed in the 317th Infantry S-3 Journal. Command of the 317th Infantry passed on the afternoon of 3 October to Col. Warfield M. Lewis, who relieved Col. A. D. Cameron.

65. Only forty men were left in G Company. These probably owed their escape to a rear guard action fought by Sgt. James L. Atkins. Sergeant Atkins was wounded but made his way back through the village after covering his comrades. He was awarded the DSC.

66. XII Corps Opns Rpt, Oct 44.

67. The American artillery fired 17,588 rounds (or about 600 tons of shells). XII Corps Opns Rpt, Oct 44.

68. The 510th Squadron of the XIX TAC did excellent work against the German battery emplacements.

69. See the 6th Armored Division Combat Record for this operation.

70. The 3d Battalion of the 317th Infantry had a hard time getting into Moivron and fought there most of the afternoon. 317th Inf Jnl, 8 Oct 44. However, the initial advance was made somewhat easier by effective overhead fire from the 633d Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion.

71. On 8 October, 127 prisoners were taken in Fossieux. On the morning of 9 October, 7 enemy tanks and about 140 infantry got back into Fossieux and hit the two companies there. The tanks first took cover behind a heavy wall in the north part of the town. When they finally came out, the American tank destroyers knocked out four and crippled a fifth. The infantry were able to clear the town the next day. In the course of this action 1st Lt. Frederick L. Bach, L Company, 137th Infantry, went alone into a house from which the enemy were firing and captured a German officer and fifteen men. Bach was given the DSC. (In this operation the 35th Division identified troops from the 1120th Regiment, remnants of the 73d Regiment, and part of the 103d Panzer Reconnaissance Battalion of the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division.)

72. The village of Clémery was taken during this advance. Here Sgt. Watson W. Paine, B Company, 318th Infantry, while carrying a message to a platoon leader through heavy artillery fire, was wounded in the arms and hands by shell fragments. A machine gun nest blocked his way, but he assaulted the position with rifle fire and grenades and destroyed it, got through with his message, and helped destroy another machine gun before he was evacuated. Paine was given the DSC. During the 318th Infantry fight at les Quatre Fers, Sgt. Louis A. Antal, E Company, took command of his platoon after the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and all the squad leaders had been killed or wounded. Antal reorganized the remnants of the platoon and led it in an assault which cleared the village. In the course of this action the sergeant personally knocked out a German antitank gun and captured the surviving members of its crew. Antal was awarded the DSC.

73. On 5 October the 3d Panzer Grenadier Division had been pulled out of line on the north flank of the 553d VG Division to go to the Aachen sector. The 553d was forced to extend its line to fill this gap and was badly outnumbered in the attack of 8 October. Late on 8 October Balck ordered an armored Kampfgruppe from the 11th Panzer Division, held behind the right flank of LVIII Panzer Corps, to move during the night to Delme. On the afternoon of 9 October it started some counterattacks from Abaucourt, but these were broken up by American artillery. All free German tanks and guns were rushed to the 553d sector, and plans were made to commit the 48th Division in case the American attack continued. Balck also authorized a withdrawal to the line Port-sur-Seille-Nomény-Malaucourt. On 9 Oct Army Group G KTB reported that the mass of the infantry of the 553d VG Division had been destroyed.

74. The 80th Division losses for the month of October were 382 killed, 898 wounded, and 425 missing. Most of these casualties were sustained in the period 1-8 October. 80th Div AAR, Oct 44.

75. For his part in the fight for the Bois du Haut des Trappes on 9 October, 2d Lt. James G. Schwartze, F Company, 319th Infantry, was awarded the DSC. Schwartze was severely wounded while leading his platoon, but continued in action--personally accounting for a German machine gun--until ordered by his battalion commander to go to the rear. In this same action 2d Lt. W. E. Newing led a platoon of G Company, although so badly wounded that he could not stand without assistance. Newing was awarded the DSC.

76. A detailed discussion of supply planning and problems during October and early November will be found in Ruppenthal, Logistical Support.

77. See TUSA Diary, 25 Oct 44. In the fight near Moncourt Woods, Pfc. Harry G. Gamble, Jr., Headquarters Company, 104th Infantry, volunteered to deal with a troublesome machine gun and advance alone, armed only with a demolition charge. Within a few feet of the German position he lit the charge and threw it, killing the 6-man crew and destroying the machine gun. He received the DSC. Cpl. Thomas J. Walsh of the 104th Infantry gave aid to the wounded under heavy fire until hit in both legs, then continued to drag himself about to give first aid to the critically wounded. Exhausted by loss of blood he finally crawled to a ditch where he lay for two days. He also was awarded the DSC.

Company A, 704th Tank Destroyer Battalion, was attached to the 26th Division during the attack near Bezange-la-Petite. Here 2d Lt. Charles Kollin, who was leading a platoon to reinforce the infantry attack, found himself and his platoon in a mine field under heavy artillery fire. He reorganized the platoon and went back and forth through the mine field directing evacuation of the wounded, then led the attack forward. Lieutenant Kollin was awarded the DSC. The A Company commander, 1st Lt. John J. Preneta, also was awarded the DSC. When the company was halted by the mine field he made a reconnaissance on foot, killed two snipers with his pistol, and captured two others in a pillbox. Capt. Elva Harris, 253d Armored Field Artillery Battalion, also received the DSC for his leadership near Bezange, where he rallied a rifle company that had suffered heavy losses and led it in the assault.

78. These grousers were 3½-inch pieces of reinforced 4-inch channel iron which were welded to the outer edge of the track connectors.

79. This was the established War Department basis of issue. General Patton made numerous bitter complaints and finally got a more reasonable issue.

80. From the 362d Group, XIX TAC.

81. The Army Group G reports say that the cut was 30 meters wide.

82. Ltr, Gen Moses to Gen Crawford, 2 Oct 44, SHAEF SGS File, Supply Problems of Allied Advance 400.3/1.

83. SHAEF G-3 Memo, Advance into Germany after the Occupation of the Ruhr, 24 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS File, Post OVERLORD Planning 381, I.

84. Ibid.

85. Decisions reached at Supreme Commander's conference, 18 Oct 44, SHAEF SGS File, Post OVERLORD Planning 381, II.

86. 12th A Gp AAR, V.

87. Eisenhower to Devers, 23 Oct 44, SHAEF SGS File, Post OVERLORD Planning 381, II.

88. Directive, Eisenhower to A Gp Commanders, SCAF 114, 28 Oct 44, SHAEF SGS File, Post OVERLORD Planning 381, II.

89. Patton to Bradley, 19 Oct 44, 12th A Gp File, Military Objectives 371.3, II.

90. TUSA Diary, 1 Nov 44.

91. Ibid., 2 Nov 44.

92. Ibid., 5 Nov 44.


94. TUSA G-1 Periodic Rpt, 4-11 Nov 44.

95. 95th Div G-3 Jnl, 4 Nov 44.

96. This section is based on the KTB's of Army Group G and OB WEST for October and early November, 1944. A number of situation maps in the GMDS collection show the planned defenses.

97. Not included in these nine divisions was the 30th SS Grenadier Division (Russian), which had mutinied in September and been sent to the Belfort area for reorganization. Army Group G was unwilling to use these Ost troops and had advised that they be disarmed and broken up into labor battalions. However, OB WEST refused this request--a good commentary on the dire condition of German resources in manpower at this stage of the war.

98. Apparently Balck was informed about 1 November that a great German counteroffensive was being planned. He was not entrusted with the location of the German attack, but was told that it would not be in the Army Group G sector.

99. On 9 October Balck reported to OB WEST that Army Group G had been reduced by about 28,000 men since the last days of September. Of this number 12,000 were casualties and 16,000 were in divisions which had been taken away from Army Group G.

100. OKH/Org Abt. KTB, Anlage, 1 Dec 44.

101. The lack of fuel and the constant attacks by American planes slowed up all movement by supply trains. Trains were dispatched only on orders from OB WEST so as to use all poor flying weather and hours of darkness. This remote control from higher headquarters still further ensnarled the overloaded railway system.

Transcribed and formatted by Jerry Holden for the HyperWar Foundation