OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1993
University of Wisconsin
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Scranton, Pa.
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Washington, D.C.
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U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
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U.S. Army War College
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U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
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U.S. Military Academy
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Archivist of the Army
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U.S. Military Academy
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Temple University
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Princeton University
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Harvard University
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Chief Historian | Jeffrey J. Clarke |
Chief, Histories Division | Col. Robert H. Sholly |
Editor in Chief | John W. Elsberg |
Foreword | vii | ||
The Authors | viii | ||
Preface | ix | ||
Chapter | Page | ||
PART ONE Strategy and Operations | |||
---|---|---|---|
I. | The Debate Over Southern France | 3 | |
The Protagonists | 3 | ||
TRIDENT, May 1943 | 5 | ||
Another Look at Southern France | 7 | ||
The QUADRANT Conference | 9 | ||
The Cairo and Tehran Conferences | 11 | ||
ANVIL Canceled | 13 | ||
ANVIL Restored | 17 | ||
Churchill ’s Last Stand | 21 | ||
II. | Command and Organization | 23 | |
The High-Level Command Structure | 23 | ||
The 6th Army Group and the First French Army | 26 | ||
Force 163 and the Seventh Army | 30 | ||
III. | Planning for Invasion | 35 | |
The Main Assault Force | 35 | ||
Supporting Assault Forces | 38 | ||
French Guerrillas | 41 | ||
Organization for the Assault | 42 | ||
Organization for Logistics | 46 | ||
Supply and Shipping Problems | 48 | ||
Logistics | 50 | ||
IV. | German Plans and Organization | 53 | |
German Organization and Operational Concepts | 53 | ||
German Organization and Strength | 56 | ||
The Effects of OVERLORD | 62 | ||
OB Southwest | 63 | ||
The German Nineteenth Army | 65 | ||
V. | The Plan of Assault | 71 | |
Selecting the Landing Area | 71 | ||
Operational Plans | 75 | ||
Air and Naval Support Plans | 81 | ||
Beyond D-day | 83 | ||
Allied Intelligence | 85 | ||
The Role of ULTRA | 87 | ||
Final Assault Preparations | 89 | ||
PART TWO | |||
VI. | Isolating the Target Area | 95 | |
The French Forces of the Interior | 96 | ||
Air and Naval Operations | 97 | ||
Rangers and Commandos | 98 | ||
The 1st Airborne Task Force | 101 | ||
The First German Reactions | 105 | ||
VII. | The ANVIL Beachhead | 108 | |
The 3d Division Lands | 108 | ||
The Assault in the Center | 112 | ||
The 36th Division on the Right | 113 | ||
Camel Red | 115 | ||
The 1st Airborne Task Force | 118 | ||
The Advance to the Blue Line | 120 | ||
An Appraisal | 122 | ||
VIII. | Breakout: 17-19 August | 126 | |
German Plans | 128 | ||
Pressing Westward | 128 | ||
The German Defense | 129 | ||
Task Force Butler | 132 | ||
Accelerating the Campaign | 133 | ||
The German Withdrawal | 134 | ||
Toulon and Marseille | 137 | ||
West to the Rhone | 142 | ||
IX. | The Battle of Montelimar | 144 | |
Task Force Butler | 144 | ||
The Battle Square | 147 | ||
Initial Skirmishes | 149 | ||
Reinforcing the Square | 150 | ||
The German Reaction | 153 | ||
In the Square | 154 | ||
Both Sides Reinforce | 156 | ||
The Battle of 25 August | 158 | ||
More Reinforcements | 160 | ||
Battles on the 26th | 162 | ||
The German Withdrawal | 162 | ||
End of the Battle | 166 | ||
Montelimar: Anatomy of a Battle | 167 | ||
X. | Pursuit to the North | 171 | |
Allied Plans | 171 | ||
The German Situation | 173 | ||
North to Lyon | 174 | ||
A Change in Plans | 181 | ||
Creation of the Dijon Salient | 183 | ||
The Seventh Army Attacks | 186 | ||
To the Belfort Gap | 190 | ||
An Evaluation | 194 | ||
XI. | Supporting the Campaign | 199 | |
Logistical Problems | 200 | ||
Base Development | 203 | ||
Fuel and Transportation | 205 | ||
Rations | 208 | ||
Manpower | 209 | ||
Medical Support | 211 | ||
Signal Support | 212 | ||
Air Support | 213 | ||
Close Air Support | 215 | ||
Civil Affairs | 216 | ||
Civil Affairs Operations | 217 | ||
Conclusions | 219 | ||
PART THREE | |||
XII. | Strategy and Operations | 223 | |
SHAEF’s Operational Concepts | 223 | ||
SHAEF’s Operational Strategy | 225 | ||
Patch and Truscott | 231 | ||
Tactical Transition | 232 | ||
German Plans and Deployment | 233 | ||
XIII. | VI Corps at the Moselle | 238 | |
Allied Plans and Alignment | 238 | ||
The High Vosges | 240 | ||
The 45th Division at Epinal | 242 | ||
The 36th Division in the Center | 245 | ||
The German Reaction | 247 | ||
The 3d Division on the Moselle | 249 | ||
Results | 250 | ||
XIV. | Approaching the Gaps: Saverne | 252 | |
Allied Planning | 253 | ||
A Change in Command | 254 | ||
VI Corps Attacks | 257 | ||
XV Corps Before the Saverne Gap | 259 | ||
The German Situation in the Luneville Sector | 261 | ||
The Forest of Parroy | 263 | ||
The Forest and the Fight | 267 | ||
More Reorganizations | 269 | ||
XV. | The Road to St. Die | 272 | |
The VI Corps | 272 | ||
The German Defenses | 274 | ||
First Try for Bruyeres and Brouvelieures | 276 | ||
The 36th Division | 280 | ||
The 3d Division | 285 | ||
Relief and Redeployment | 289 | ||
The Vosges Fighting: Problems and Solutions | 291 | ||
XVI. | Approaching the Gaps: Belfort | 297 | |
The Initial French Attacks | 297 | ||
Logistical Problems | 299 | ||
French Plans | 301 | ||
The German Defense | 304 | ||
The II French Corps’ October Offensive | 305 | ||
XVII. | Into the High Vosges | 311 | |
Planning the Attack | 311 | ||
German Deployments | 315 | ||
The Preliminary Attacks | 318 | ||
The 3d Division Attacks | 319 | ||
XVIII. | The Forests of the Meurthe | 323 | |
DOGFACE Resumed | 323 | ||
The German Response | 325 | ||
The Attack Stalls | 328 | ||
The Lost Battalion | 329 | ||
XIX. | The Gates of the Vosges | 334 | |
Planning | 334 | ||
The Attack in the North | 337 | ||
German Reorganization | 338 | ||
The Attack in the South | 340 | ||
VI Corps Resumes the Attack | 341 | ||
Operation DOGFACE Ends | 342 | ||
PART FOUR | |||
XX. | Planning the November Offensive | 349 | |
General Planning | 351 | ||
The First French Army | 355 | ||
German Prospects | 360 | ||
The Final Allied Schedule | 363 | ||
XXI. | Through the Saverne Gap | 365 | |
XV Corps Plans | 365 | ||
XV Corps Attacks | 368 | ||
The Exploitation Plan | 371 | ||
Seizing the Gap | 373 | ||
The German Response | 377 | ||
Planning the Final Stage | 379 | ||
Striking for Strasbourg | 380 | ||
The Panzer Lehr Counterattack | 383 | ||
XXII. | To the Plains of Alsace | 387 | |
VI Corps Plans | 387 | ||
The German Defense | 389 | ||
The Century (100th) Division | 392 | ||
The Meurthe River Assault | 396 | ||
The 100th and 3d Divisions | 399 | ||
The 103d Division | 401 | ||
The 36th Division | 402 | ||
XXIII. | Through the Belfort Gap | 406 | |
The First French Army’s Front | 406 | ||
Defending the Gap | 409 | ||
French Plans | 412 | ||
The I Corps Assault | 412 | ||
Breakthrough | 416 | ||
The Battle of the Gap | 419 | ||
The German Counterattacks | 423 | ||
The Belfort Gap Secured | 428 | ||
XXIV. | Lost Opportunities | 433 | |
The Colmar Pocket | 434 | ||
A Dubious Decision | 437 | ||
PART FIVE | |||
XXV. | A Change in Direction | 449 | |
The XV Corps Sector | 449 | ||
The VI Corps Sector | 453 | ||
The VI Corps Advance | 455 | ||
The XV Corps Moves North | 459 | ||
An Evaluation | 462 | ||
XXVI. | On the Siegfried Line | 464 | |
The German Situation | 466 | ||
The XV Corps Offensive North | 468 | ||
The Fortresses of Bitche | 471 | ||
The VI Corps Offensive North | 475 | ||
VI Corps Attacks | 477 | ||
Drive to the West Wall | 481 | ||
Into Germany | 482 | ||
Stalemate at Colmar | 484 | ||
Epilogue | 489 | ||
XXVII. | NORTHWIND | 492 | |
Planning Operation NORTHWIND | 493 | ||
The Defense of Strasbourg | 495 | ||
Preparations for the Attack | 497 | ||
Preparations for the Defense | 499 | ||
The New Year’s Eve Attacks | 505 | ||
Command and Control | 510 | ||
XXVIII. | The Battle of Alsace | 513 | |
The VI Corps | 514 | ||
The French II Corps | 516 | ||
The XXXIX Panzer Corps Attacks | 518 | ||
The Panzer Assault | 521 | ||
The Final Attack | 523 | ||
An Analysis | 527 | ||
XXIX. | The Colmar Pocket | 533 | |
Planning the Colmar Offensive | 533 | ||
The German Defense | 537 | ||
The Initial Attacks | 539 | ||
The Bridge at Maison Rouge | 542 | ||
Reorganization | 547 | ||
The February Offensive | 550 | ||
Tactics and Techniques | 551 | ||
In Retrospect | 555 | ||
Toward the Final Offensive | 558 | ||
XXX. | Riviera to the Rhine: An Evaluation | 561 | |
The Campaigns | 561 | ||
The Soldier | 565 | ||
Allied Strategy and Operations | 573 | ||
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE | 583 | ||
BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS | |||
INDEX | 589 |
TABLE |
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1. | Tonnages Discharged at Continental Ports: June 1944-April 1945 | 576 |