The means of hastening German surrender by other than military efforts, the government of occupied areas of Germany while the war was still in progress, and the method of dealing with Germany after the final surrender constituted problems that concerned SHAEF as well as the governments of the United States, Great Britain, the USSR, and France. The Supreme Commander and his headquarters were frequently called on for suggestions as to Allied policy in regard to Germany. Sometimes SHAEF on its own initiative outlined possible solutions for Allied consideration, and on other occasions it implemented the policy laid down by higher authority. Throughout the war, the Allied governments were slow in reaching final conclusions on a program for Germany. The reasons were not far to seek. First of all, three, and later, four, nations with somewhat disparate aims had to agree on a policy--always a slow process. Various agencies in the individual Allied nations, especially in the United States, had to be consulted on postwar policy. Finally, there were often jurisdictional disagreements among the European Advisory Commission, the Combined Civil Affairs Committee and other units set up to handle problems relating to Germany. The result of the delays was that the Supreme Commander was frequently without official policy to guide him at the time he most needed it.1
Program for Germany
Allied planners were hopeful from the start of planning for OVERLORD in the summer of 1943 that the enemy might collapse or be induced to surrender before or shortly after the invasion. It will be recalled that three RANKIN plans were outlined to deal with developments in the case of collapse, of withdrawal from the occupied areas, and of outright surrender.2 While hopes of German surrender before D Day were almost completely discarded by the first of 1944, the Allied military planners believed that the German people were weary of war and disgusted with their Nazi leaders and that a proper appeal to them might bring a revolt or at least weaken the German will to resist.
Efforts To Induce German Surrender
Unconditional Surrender FormulaIn planning propaganda appeals to the German people, the SHAEF planners found themselves handicapped by the unconditional surrender formula announced by President Roosevelt at Casablanca. He
and the Prime Minister had later issued explanatory statements which removed any suggestion of Allied terrorism or acts of vengeance directed at the whole German people, but they had not succeeded in evolving a version of the formula which Allied propagandists could use to persuade the German people to seek peace.3
SHAEF planners feared that the Germans would put up a last-ditch fight in preference to accepting unconditional surrender. General Barker, the G-l, in January 1944 held that it would be a grave mistake to treat unconditional surrender as "our irreducible demand," and General McClure, responsible for psychological warfare against the enemy, asked that he be permitted at least to distinguish between the German leaders and the people in propaganda aimed at the enemy.4
SHAEF fears were shared in Washington where Secretaries Hull and Stimson, who had already expressed disapproval of unconditional surrender terms, tried to get the President to modify his formula. Intelligence reports in Washington and London indicated in the early weeks of 1944 that enemy leaders were using fear of Allied demands to strengthen the resistance of their people. The U.S. Chiefs of Staff in March urged the President to restate his demands in a way that would reassure the German people, but Mr. Roosevelt preferred to let the matter stay as it was at the time. And there were good reasons advanced in favor of his stand. General Hilldring, War Department director of civil affairs, doubted that the United Nations could afford to bind themselves by a pact to treat the enemy in any specific manner, and Mr. John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War, suggested that it was not unconditional surrender but fear of the Red Army which kept the Germans fighting. Although it is possible that these views did not reach the President, he was probably aware of Mr. Churchill's view that the Allies should avoid any specific statement of terms which would permit the Germans later to claim they were tricked.5
In mid-April 1944, Generals Eisenhower and Smith impressed on Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., who was then in London, the need of clarifying the principle of unconditional surrender. They felt that by making clear to the German people the basis on which they would be treated after surrender the Allies could create a willingness on the part of the population to give up and perhaps also induce a German Badoglio to take steps leading to surrender. They asked for a joint statement by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union defining unconditional surrender and guaranteeing law and order in the Reich. Once a beachhead was established in northwest Europe, they added, the Supreme Commander should issue a statement recapitulating the terms of surrender and calling on the enemy to lay down his arms, If such a step was not taken, General Smith indicated, the Allies would find it impossible to exploit the advantages which would be gained from the effect of a successful landing. The President was apparently unmoved by these suggestions,
saying only that any reply should have his approval before being sent. Mr. Hull interpreted this statement to mean that the President was holding strongly to his unconditional surrender stand. Three weeks later, Mr. Roosevelt did yield to Russian and British pressure for modifications of unconditional surrender so far as it affected the German satellite countries, and agreed that some latitude could be shown in surrender settlements with Bulgaria and Romania.6
General Eisenhower, though eager to remove exaggerated fears of the German people, nonetheless believed that terms of capitulation should include the surrender of the armed forces of the Axis powers and the handing over of designated political and military leaders for trial. For the rest, he favored the declaration, "The masses of the population in the Axis countries will be expected and required to take up again their normal pursuits of peace in order that conditions of starvation and privation may be ameliorated." He recognized that any such declaration had to meet the demands of the Soviet Union, which was likely to insist on using several million Germans after the war, and that a statement to this effect would play into the hands of German propagandists. Unless the problem could be overcome in some way, he thought it best to drop the whole matter of attempting to state Allied demands.7
A statement to meet the Supreme Commander's requirements was prepared in General McClure's office in late May, touched up by Mr. Robert Sherwood and put into final shape by Mr. Phillips, political officer at SHAEF. President Roosevelt at this time agreed that a declaration could be made to the German people which would place the chief stress on the inevitability of their defeat. The British War Cabinet and the Prime Minister disapproved this suggestion. Mr. Churchill was quoted as saying that any declaration to the German people which omitted their war crimes would be subject later to enemy charges of Allied bad faith, but that listing of such crimes would be likely to terrify the Germans and lead them to fight the more fanatically. The Prime Minister on 24 May, in an address to the House of Commons, had gone as far as he cared to go with the statement that, while unconditional surrender gave the enemy no rights, it relieved the Allies of none of their duties. "Justice," he added, "will have to be done and retribution will fall upon the wicked and the cruel."8
The invasion of France thus began without any action on SHAEF's request for a concrete statement of war aims which would weaken enemy resistance to the Allied landings. The only concession by Washington and London was that something might be done later when Allied operations met with "a large measure of success."9 Plans were discussed in June
and July for the presurrender period of German occupation and for the posthostilities period, but in mid-August nothing besides "unconditional surrender" had yet been devised. An attempt by the Office of War Information to draw up a paper for guidance on long-range propaganda for Germany was challenged by the War Department on the ground that it suggested a soft treatment of the enemy. The policy of"nonfraternization" and the impression on the Germans of their war guilt were said to be the fundamental principles of War Department policy. In making this explanation, General Hilldring took exception to OWI's statement that the end of the war meant the end of German suffering and the beginning of reconstruction economically, culturally, and socially.10
From the standpoint of SHAEF's psychological warfare campaign to persuade the enemy to surrender, the situation was worsened in September 1944 when word leaked out that Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau had persuaded President Roosevelt and the Prime Minister at Quebec to approve a plan to convert Germany "into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in character." Under strong pressure from the Secretaries of State and War, the President said that he had never intended to accept a proposal for making a wholly agricultural nation out of Germany. No public statement was made to this effect and the idea continued to persist in administration circles and in German propaganda. The Voelkischer Beobachter, in a typical press reaction, warned: "The German people must realize that we are engaged in a life and death struggle which imposes on every German the duty to do his utmost for the victorious conclusion of the war and the frustration of the plans of destruction planned by these cannibals." The Berliner Morgenpost called it a "satanic plan of annihilation," and the 12 Uhr Blatt declared that the "aim of these conditions, inspired by the Jews, is the annihilation of the German people in the quickest way." The enemy henceforth was to couple these themes and those relating to unconditional surrender with claims that Allied occupation authorities in Germany were carrying out a reign of terror.
General McClure, trying to get a propaganda policy which would at least gain the backing of Germans in areas already occupied by Allied forces, was told by the War Department that he should follow the general line laid down by the President in an address on 22 October. In it Mr. Roosevelt insisted that there would be no bargain with "Nazi conspirators," to whom should be left no shred of control nor a single element of military power or military potential. He had brought no charge against the German race and he had assured the German people that they would not be enslaved.11
The War and State Department instructions were more valuable in getting German co-operation in areas already occupied than in helping to break the will to resist of those Germans not yet conquered. General Eisenhower explained this difference on 20 November when he asked as a matter of urgency that a means be found to reduce enemy resistance. He noted that it was based on the iron discipline of the
Wehrmacht and the stranglehold of the Nazi party, and on successful enemy propaganda which was convincing the German people that unconditional surrender meant the complete devastation of Germany and its destruction as a nation.12
At the suggestion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the President in late November proposed a statement assuring the enemy that the Allies were not seeking to devastate or destroy Germany. Reservations were then made by Prime Minister Churchill and the War Cabinet, who feared that such a statement, if made during a period of comparative stalemate, might be interpreted as a sign of Allied weakness. Mr. Churchill added that the Germans feared, not Allied occupation, but conquest by the Russians. He suggested that the Allies go along as they were until winter arrived. "In the meantime," he concluded, "I shall remain set on unconditional surrender which is where you put me." General Eisenhower, when informed of this reaction, agreed that the joint proclamation should follow an operation universally recognized as a definite success.13
After the failure of the Allies to agree in October or November 1944 on a statement regarding unconditional surrender which could be released to the German people, the British Chiefs of Staff set up a committee to discuss arrangements for a plan to break enemy morale. General McClure represented SHAEF in meetings of the group. Apparently it could arrive at no satisfactory formula. The question was later discussed at Yalta, and a statement on Allied aims was issued at the conclusion of the conference. President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill, and Marshal Stalin on 11 February 1945 declared: "It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and nazism and to insure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world .... It is not our purpose to destroy the people of Germany, but only when nazism and militarism have been extirpated will there be hope for a decent life for Germans, and a place for them in the comity of nations."14 With this explanation of the meaning of unconditional surrender, SHAEF had to be content.
Psychological Warfare Appeals to the EnemyBecause SHAEF had no success before D Day in getting a definition of"unconditional surrender" that would appeal to the German people, it had to direct its chief efforts at the German soldier. The Psychological Warfare Division made a special attempt to persuade the individual fighting man that it was no disgrace to surrender after he had fought courageously in the field.
In early propaganda activities during the static period of hedgerow fighting, teams attached to combat units aimed special appeals at groups of Germans who were outnumbered and threatened with annihilation. To persuade the enemy of his hopeless position, the teams used statements in German describing the actual tactical situation. Many of their efforts
were successful. In Brittany, the psychological warfare teams concentrated their efforts on the fortress garrisons. At St. Malo, the psychological warfare teams were directed to study various surrender appeals previously used, including the one issued to Lt. Gen. Jonathan M. Wainwright by the Japanese at Corregidor. The enemy was told that no humiliation could be attached to a surrender in the face of overwhelming odds. This particular appeal met with no success. A more effective propaganda device during the periods of heavy fighting was the Passierschein, or safe-conduct pass, which carried the signature of General Eisenhower and gave instructions on how German soldiers could surrender. This safe-conduct leaflet, which was dropped or fired into enemy lines, carried the seals of Great Britain and the United States, and declared in both German and English: "The German soldier who carries this safe conduct is using it as a sign of his genuine wish to give himself up. He is to be disarmed, to be well looked after, to receive food and medical attention as required, and to be removed from the danger zone as soon as possible." While no one can be certain of the leaflet's effectiveness in inducing the enemy to surrender, more prisoners saw it than any other propaganda leaflet and a large number who surrendered had been carrying their copies for several weeks in case they should decide to give up.15
When the Allied forces approached Germany, the Voice of SHAEF urged all foreign workers in Germany to leave factories at the earliest opportunity, to boycott those among them who were in liaison with the Germans, and to avoid any unorganized action. They were advised to remain as the German Army withdrew, to prevent the retreating forces from destroying installations if possible, and to gather information about the enemy which would be of value to the Allies. Another campaign reminded the German people that it was dangerous to remain in areas subject to bombing and warned them against committing atrocities against Allied prisoners and foreign workers.16
After the occupation of the first captured cities of Germany began, the SHAEF Psychological Warfare Division attempted to offset charges of Allied mistreatment of Germans and to dispel other fears of Allied occupation policy. To aid this program, the division used a newspaper, Aachener Nachrichten, which had been started initially by 12th Army Group's Psychological Warfare Section. This, the first newspaper published under Allied auspices in Germany, ultimately attained a circulation of 52,000.
In October 1944, seeing the unlikelihood of getting a suitable revision of the unconditional surrender formula for propaganda purposes, General McClure turned his attention to a campaign designed to get German support for Allied military government in the occupied areas. In November, the War and State Departments suggested a number of aims for SHAEF to follow in this effort. These stressed the advantage of Allied rule over that of the Nazis, the fact that responsibility for German suffering lay on the Nazis, and the assurance that the average German would be allowed to live and work without molestation if he obeyed Allied regulations and committed no crimes. SHAEF told the various Allied psychological warfare units at lower level of these aims on 16 November, adding that no appeals
were to be made to the Germans in the nonoccupied areas but that they were to be informed of the way in which Allied military government actually functioned in those German areas then occupied by the Allied armies.17
In accordance with a SHAEF directive of 20 October on "Propaganda Treatment of Military Government," General McClure and his staff now prepared thirteen broadcasts to explain the nature of military government to the Germans. Beginning on 4 December, the programs were given daily until completed by the British Broadcasting Corporation, American Broadcasting Station in Europe, and Radio Luxembourg. The broadcasts stated the major points of the Allied military government program: steps for destroying the Nazi regime, the assumption of local government by the Allied commanders, changes in economic controls, termination of oppressive laws, and the like. No effort was made to hide the severity of military occupation, but the announcements made evident an intention to establish a system in accord with "the dictates of humanity, justice, and civilized standards."18
The leaflet war against the Germans which had been carried on intensively before the invasion was greatly increased after 6 June. Making use of planes, artillery, and, occasionally, agents, the Allied psychological warfare agencies distributed newspapers and millions of leaflets to the enemy forces, as well as news sheets to the peoples in occupied countries. In June 1944, the Allied air forces dropped nearly five million copies of a newspaper for German troops, two and a half million periodicals, and approximately six million strategic and thirty-five and a half million tactical leaflets on the enemy. These did not include those fired from artillery and disseminated by hand. Copies of leaflets distributed in languages other than German totaled more than thirty-eight and a half millions.19
The Allies made a special drive in late July to distribute a bulletin reciting the details of the 20 July attempt to kill Hitler. On the evenings of 23 and 24 July, planes dropped nearly four million leaflets about the subject on the enemy front in Normandy and distributed nearly three quarters of a million newspapers giving the information. Evidence that these and other leaflets were effective was seen in efforts of German commanders to prevent their men from reading the propaganda. Radio denials and special orientation programs designed to answer the leaflets indicated that the Allied program was feared by the enemy.20
The Germans naturally retaliated with their own leaflets and radio appeals. An analysis of the line they were taking in the fall of 1944 showed that the Germans were attempting to play off the various Allies against each other, stressing particularly the coming struggle between the Russians and the West. In their efforts to counteract the effect of Allied appeals, the enemy propagandists said that by inflicting heavy casualties on the Allies the German Army would gain more favorable peace terms for the Reich. The German soldier was
told it was better to die than to live in a conquered Germany.21
In the course of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, the Psychological Warfare Division stopped its appeals for German surrender and turned instead to exaggerated statements of what the enemy expected to gain. SHAEF broadcasts emphasized that Hitler had promised to take Liege, Namur, and Verdun before Christmas. The Allies hoped thereby to magnify the disillusionment of the enemy once the counteroffensive was defeated.22
In the final days of the war, the psychological warfare agencies made new leaflet appeals to the German civilian and to foreign workers in Germany. Civilians in the battle zones were told to evacuate danger areas, to evade service in the Volkssturm, and to avoid needless destruction of their homes. Foreign workers were advised by leaflets to practice sabotage or malingering, to refuse to work in munitions factories, and to spread rumors. Instructions were given to displaced persons both in leaflets and in a four-page newspaper called SHAEF which was printed in several languages. At one time, small fuze incendiaries were dropped to foreign workers with instructions on how to use them in sabotage operations (BRADDOCK II). By the time the war ended, the Allied air forces had dropped nearly six billion leaflets. Of this number three and a quarter billions were distributed between 6 June 1944 and 8 May 1945.23
While the Allies were conducting military operations against the enemy and searching for means to induce him to surrender, they were also confronted with the task of establishing policy and procedures for governing occupied German territory during the presurrender period. It was essential to devise a program that would restore sufficient order in the occupied areas to avoid interference by the conquered populace with military operations and that would possibly offset the dire warnings of German propagandists as to the fate of their people who fell into Allied hands. Such a program was simpler than the long-range military government programs then being planned for the postwar period. Until the war's end, SHAEF and its army groups needed a program that would combat starvation and disease, destroy all vestiges of Nazi control, prevent local guerrilla warfare, and set the basic machinery of community life to functioning again.
Military Government of Germany
By the time SHAEF started to operate in January 1944, a number of agencies were already engaged in planning for Allied military government in Germany. The War Department had charged its Civil Affairs Division with the task of planning for U.S. military occupation in the Reich in both the presurrender and posthostilities periods. In Great Britain, the British Chiefs of Staff had established the Post Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee to do a similar job for them. The British, in the spring of 1944, went further and established a Control Commission Military Section under Maj. Gen. Charles A. West to provide and train the staffs of various
British missions for posthostilities work. Meanwhile, both the Foreign Office and the State Department had committees busy studying postwar problems.
As early as November 1943, Headquarters, COSSAC, had submitted to the various Allied commands in the United Kingdom a civil affairs-military government plan for Europe. Based on existing military government manuals, the outline was very general. As soon as the G-5 Division of SHAEF was formed, it continued the planning which had been started under COSSAC. A German country unit was established by the division in March 1944 to prepare a handbook on military government for the Reich. The SHAEF G-3 Division was already at work on similar matters, having established a PostHostilities Planning Sub-Section of its Plans Branch to work in liaison on these problems with the British service ministries, the U.S. advisers to the European Advisory Commission, and the appropriate agencies of ETOUSA. In the absence of a directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, this subsection and other SHAEF agencies began preparing papers on such questions as armistice terms, displaced persons, prisoners of war, disarmament, martial law, control of German courts, and co-ordination of movement and transport facilities. These papers ultimately became the bases of the so-called ECLIPSE memorandums.24 In March 1944, a SHAEF study on the armistice and posthostilities period, dealing with various problems which would confront the Supreme Commander between the end of hostilities and the termination of SHAEF, listed some thirty-eight studies either planned or in preparation for this interim period. By the end of April some seventy two studies were being made.25
Presurrender DirectiveGeneral Eisenhower, in an effort to get some positive guidance on which to base the burgeoning plans of his civil affairs agencies, asked the Combined Civil Affairs Committee in the spring of 1944 for a definitive directive on military government. The CCAC informed him that the European Advisory Commission was working on a directive and program for Germany. In view of the fact, however, that SHAEF would need some guidance before the members of the commission could reach an agreement, the CCAC initiated a directive for the presurrender period, with the understanding that it would be subject to amendment by the European Advisory Commission. The directive was approved informally by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and dispatched to the Supreme Commander on 28 April 1944. The European Advisory Commission later circulated it for Soviet examination.26
The presurrender directive for Germany and for those parts of Austria which might be overrun by the Allied Expeditionary Force granted the Supreme Commander supreme legislative, executive, and judicial authority in all areas occupied by his troops. It declared that
military government was to be an Allied undertaking and was to be administered in the interests of the United Nations. No political agencies or political representatives of Great Britain and the United States were to have part in military government, and representatives of civilian agencies of the two countries and of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) were to participate only when the Combined Chiefs of Staff should so decide on the recommendation of the Supreme Commander.27
The Allied commander in chief was directed to discourage fraternization between Allied troops and the Germans in occupied areas. He was to take sweeping measures to dissolve the Nazi organization and system of government and to eliminate the General Staff and prevent its revival. Besides maintaining law and order and restoring "normal conditions among the civilian population as soon as possible, in so far as such conditions would not interfere with military operations," he was to make clear that the occupation was intended to destroy Nazism and Fascism. On the more constructive side, the Supreme Commander was to free Allied prisoners of war and place them under military control pending other disposition; permit freedom of speech, press, and worship, subject to military exigencies and the prohibition of Nazi activities; and establish local government, making use of Germans or of Allied officials according to the decision of the Supreme Commander. If SHAEF forces entered Austrian territory, they were to follow political aims fundamentally different from those in effect in Germany, since the Allied purpose in Austria was liberation. Fraternization was to be permitted and political activity given greater latitude.28
At the end of May 1944 the presurrender directive to General Eisenhower was completed with the approval of a Financial Guide for Germany and an Economic and Relief Guide for Germany. Where possible the Supreme Commander was to work through existing German administrative and economic machinery in carrying out his program, keeping in mind the necessity of removing the Nazis from power.29
Allied Zones of OccupationWith the presurrender directive out of the way, Allied planners in the United States and Europe were able to return to the outlining of zones of occupation in Germany, a subject they had been discussing since the summer and fail of 1943. COSSAC in its initial proposals for the occupation of Europe in case of German collapse had assumed that Allied troops would have to take the responsibility for disarming enemy forces in the occupied countries and returning them to Germany. Occupation zones were outlined, therefore, in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark in addition to Germany, and the United States was made
responsible for France, Belgium, and southern Germany.30 President Roosevelt, however, as a result of his difficulties with General de Gaulle, had become reluctant to have any more political dealings with French authorities than necessary and wanted to avoid any responsibility for France. This feeling apparently influenced him, at least in part, in favor of a northern zone of occupation in Germany which would permit the United States to supply its troops through north German rather than through French ports. He also insisted that the United States should have Berlin.31 At Quebec and again at Cairo the conferees discussed these matters without reaching any final conclusions.
The President in February 1944 said that he wanted to stay out of the problems of southern Europe after the war, adding that it was out of the question for the United States to have the postwar burden of reconstructing France, Italy, and the Balkans. This he considered another reason why the United States should have a northern rather than a southern zone of occupation. Arguing that the British were far more interested than the United States in southern Europe, he saw no reason why they should not take an occupation zone in that area. He emphasized that the United States would be only "too glad" to take its troops out of all Europe as soon as the British were ready to take over. In this, he was merely repeating his statement of the previous fail that the United States' postwar occupation would probably consist of about one million troops and last for about two years.32
In mid-February 1944 General Eisenhower had suggested to the War Department that the United States refuse to take any responsibility for any specific area in Europe. Instead, he proposed that responsibility be accepted only so long as orders and policies were issued through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. In the event that Great Britain desired some specific area, the United States should withdraw its occupation forces. He justified this idea on the ground that, since the United States had to furnish a large share of the relief, it should "be strongly represented in the whole controlling system." Again at the end of March, he opposed proposals for separate U.S. and British military government administrations in Germany. He believed it practical to have British occupation troops in one zone and U.S. in another with a combined administrative body functioning in both. This view was not approved in Washington where the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff held that the United States should have the northern zone of Germany. They also had the feeling that no impression should be given to the Soviet authorities that they were being confronted with a combined British-American view before being consulted.33
General Eisenhower returned to his theme just before D Day. He believed that the President had not distinguished between a complete and arbitrary division of Europe into separate British and U.S. zones on the one hand, and a complete amalgamation of British and U.S. units on
the other. There was no question that the bulk of the forces of the two armies should be divided because of operational necessity, and because of convenience in handling supply and administration. The chief point was whether a sharp line would be drawn between the two or whether over-all Allied control should continue. General Eisenhower believed it would be easier for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to operate through an Allied commander than through independent commanders. There was also the danger that, instead of having a solid front, the British and U.S. area commanders would find themselves trying to settle all questions on a British versus U.S. basis, thus giving the Russians a chance to side with one at the expense of the other.34 This argument did not change the policy in Washington.
The President continued to sit tight in regard to occupation zones through June and July. In early August the Russians in the European Advisory Commission raised the question of zones and asked that they be settled between Britain and the United States as soon as possible. The State Department proposed that the United States accept the southern zone of Germany in exchange for British promises to take over the occupation of France, Italy, and the Balkans, if necessary, and to grant the United States sufficient ports in the Low Countries and Germany to permit supply and evacuation of U.S. troops without dependence on French ports. The State Department suggested that the northern area might have "a great many headaches" and quite a bit of shooting. The President said he was unable to understand why any discussion was necessary with the Russians since an agreement had been made that they might police that part of Germany in which they had expressed a desire to exercise control. As to the general question of the zones of occupation, he said he merely awaited an agreement by the Prime Minister that U.S. troops would police northwest Germany.35
When mid-August arrived without any final decision on the zones, General Eisenhower declared that he would have to approach the problem on a purely military basis and send his forces in with the 21 Army Group on the left. This action, of course, meant that British forces would be occupying Belgium, Holland, and northwest Germany, while U.S. forces would be in the south.36 The necessity of having some arrangement made by the European Advisory Commission before Allied forces entered Germany may have led that body to hasten its approval of the text of a protocol between the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR on 12 September providing for the boundaries of the three zones of occupation. Even the protocol did not decide whether the United States or Great Britain would have the northwest or southwest zone of Germany. It merely noted the boundaries and said that the allocation of zones would be settled by joint agreement.37
On the day that the Combined Chiefs of Staff examined the question in Quebec, Admiral Leahy explained the military reasons why the United States should have the northwest zone. Admiral King, however, took the view that it would be easier for the United States to occupy the southwest zone of Germany if at the same time arrangements could be made to evacuate American troops and to supply occupation forces through the northern German ports. The question was referred to President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. The President now agreed that the British forces would "occupy Germany west of the Rhine and east of the Rhine north of the line from Koblenz following the northern border of Hessen and Nassau to the border of the area allocated to the Soviet Government." The United States was to occupy Germany east of the Rhine and south of the British zone eastward to the Russian zone. The British zone thus included the Ruhr, the Rhineland north of Koblenz, and the northern German ports, while the Americans had Bavaria, the Saar, and the Rhineland south of Koblenz. The USSR occupied the rest of Germany with the exception of Berlin, which was to be held on a tripartite basis. At President Roosevelt's insistence, the United States received control of the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven and the necessary staging areas in their immediate vicinity. U.S. forces were also to have access to the western and northwestern seaports and passage through the British-controlled area.38 Final ratifications by the governments were not completed until 6 February 1945, by which time U.S. and British forces were already carrying out military occupation functions in western Germany. Approximately a week later, at the conclusion of the Yalta Conference, the Allies announced that France would be invited to take a zone of occupation, and that its boundaries would be worked out by the four powers through their members on the European Advisory Commission.39
Postsurrender PreparationsWhile discussions were in progress on zones of occupation, SHAEF turned its attention to the preparation of handbooks and directives for postsurrender military government of Germany. The British had already taken independent action in April and May 1944 by establishing the British Control Commission Military Section under General West to provide and train the cadres of various British missions for posthostilities work.40 General Eisenhower and his staff in June 1944 recommended that the United States take similar action, and in August the U.S. Chiefs of Staff formally established the U.S. Group Control Council (Germany) to act in close liaison with similar British and Soviet groups. Brig. Gen. Cornelius W. Wickersham, representative of SHAEF at European Advisory Commission meetings, was selected as acting deputy to the chief U.S. representative on the Control Council and placed in charge of organizing the U.S. group.41
General Eisenhower announced in late August that during the presurrender period the U.S. control group would be responsible
to him as U.S. theater commander, and the British group would be responsible to the British Government. In the initial stage after surrender, the British and U.S. control groups were to function together under the Supreme Commander-but not under SHAEF. The agreed policy of Great Britain, the United States, and the USSR was to be passed on to the Supreme Commander through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Eisenhower was to use the Control Commission/Council as his normal channel of communication to the German central authority. The SHAEF G-3 was to coordinate posthostilities planning.42
The British in early September proposed instead that General Eisenhower use the Control Commission/Council in framing occupation policy, referring any disagreements to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (London). The Supreme Commander indicated his willingness to have the U.S. and British control agencies represent their separate governments but preferred that they appeal disagreements to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Pending decisions by the Combined Chiefs, he added, the Supreme Commander's decision "must be binding." He reaffirmed his intention of establishing the nucleus Control Commission/Council in Berlin as soon as conditions permitted and of using it in his communications with the central German authority. He insisted, however, that no such authority could be given the Anglo-American group until stability and adequate communications had been established in Berlin.43
General Eisenhower defined his policy even more firmly in a memorandum to his army group commanders on 15 November 1944. He declared that, during the period between the surrender of Germany and the termination of combined command, he would retain ultimate responsibility in its widest sense for control of the German forces, military government, and disbandment and disarmament. To prevent any divergence of policy in the U.S. and British spheres of occupation, no agreements on policy were to be made between army groups and their respective control commissions without SHAEF's concurrence.44
The question of French participation in combined control groups for Germany arose in September when General de Gaulle indicated that he wanted French troops to take part in operations in Germany. The Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed to General Eisenhower's proposal that during the period of combined command the German occupation should be on a strictly Allied basis and that U.S., British, and French forces should be employed in accordance with military requirements and without regard to political factors. In November, the Combined Chiefs of Staff suggested that until Germany was defeated the participation of the French should be limited to forming part of the U.S. and British military government teams. Such a suggestion, Eisenhower warned, would lead to violent reactions on the part of the French. He pointed to plans then under way for conducting a French military government school under SHAEF supervision, and suggested that he be permitted to use French military government teams in
those areas occupied by the French. Apparently this permission was granted, for the French military government school was subsequently opened and its first teams were placed under 6th Army Group in mid-March 1945.45
Policy and Directives for Occupation of GermanyBy the time the Allied armies were established in the Normandy beachhead, various British and U.S. agencies were drawing up handbooks, manuals, and directives for the occupation of Germany. By June, the German country unit of SHAEF had prepared the first draft of a Handbook for Military Government in Germany, the British Control Commission Military Section had started a manual on disarmament, SHAEF G-1 was preparing a Handbook for Unit Commanders (Germany), and SHAEF G-5 was drafting a directive to guide army group commanders when they entered enemy territory. Early drafts of many of these texts were circulated in Supreme Headquarters and occasionally sent to service ministries in London and to interested branches of the State, Treasury, and War Departments in Washington. By late June, General Hilldring, War Department director of civil affairs, had seen SHAEF papers dealing with preparations for the presurrender and posthostilities periods and had reminded General Smith that the European Advisory Commission was charged with formulating recommendations for the German surrender and for the control and occupation of Germany after its defeat or surrender. He added that no agreements had yet been made as to the duration of military government in Germany or the type of organization to be established after the cessation of military government.46 In the absence of any specific directive or guidance, the SHAEF agencies and divisions continued to make plans, and in August had drafts of a handbook and directives to army group commanders for the initial stages of military occupation ready for distribution.
On 17 August, General Eisenhower warned the War Department that the Allied forces might begin their occupation of Germany sooner than had been expected. Less than a week later, after the Falaise Gap was closed and shortly before Paris fell, he called for guidance on Germany. Plans for occupation of the Reich, he said in a cable to the Combined Chiefs on 23 August, were being based on the presurrender directive, but the directive rested on the assumption that the Allies would have to fight their way into Germany and that they would have behind their lines enemy territory in which the military forces would have to re-establish law and order and be responsible for the economic well-being of the people. It also assumed that ultimately there would be a mass surrender of the German Army, and that some central authority would be left. Now, however, it appeared that no single surrender would take place and the Allied
forces might find a chaotic Germany in which guerrilla warfare and civil war could be expected. In such a case it would be impossible to control or save the economic structure of the country. If this were true, the Supreme Commander, added, he felt that he could not take responsibility for the control and support of the German economic structure.47
The Civil Affairs Division of the War Department had anticipated General Eisenhower's earlier warning of 17 August by suggesting that the Combined Civil Affairs Committee draft a statement of general policies for SHAEF's guidance if the German surrender came before a detailed postsurrender directive could be issued.48 On 23 August, representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington, recognizing the complications which had arisen from the fact that the European Advisory Commission had reached no agreement on a great number of directives, urged the Combined Chiefs of Staff to give the Supreme Commander guidance relative to the military government of Germany in the early stages of the postsurrender period. Fearing that the handbook and directives under preparation by SHAEF might conflict with Allied policies, they asked that General Eisenhower's instructions to his army groups coincide with British and U.S. postwar plans. They also requested that the Supreme Commander be instructed as to his proper relationship with the U.S. and British elements of the Group Control Council and Control Commission, suggesting that these agencies be directed to aid SHAEF in military government and in case of disagreement to submit their differences to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee (London) rather than to the main committee in Washington.49 The Combined Chiefs of Staff now proposed that General Eisenhower be told to continue his planning along the lines indicated in his cable of 23 August and noted that appropriate directives would be issued him in due course.50
Before any final arrangements could be made, President Roosevelt intervened decisively. Draft copies of the Handbook for Military Government in Germany had been submitted for comment to the Foreign Office, the Civil Affairs Division, and other government agencies. One copy had found its way to the President, apparently through the Treasury Department. Mr. Roosevelt, in a strong memorandum to Secretary Stimson on 26 August, described the handbook as "pretty bad" and directed that it be withdrawn if it had not been sent out. The handbook displeased the President because of its emphasis on seeing that the governmental machinery of Germany ran efficiently and on retaining the highly centralized German administrative system unless higher authority directed otherwise. He disliked the statements that military government officers would see to it that needed commodities and stores were imported, industrial plants converted from war to consumer goods production, essential economic activities subsidized where necessary, and German foreign trade reconstructed with priority for the needs of
the United Nations. President Roosevelt expressed displeasure because so many Americans and Englishmen held that the people of Germany were not responsible for the war, a view he insisted was not based on fact. "The German people as a whole must have it driven home to them," he declared, "that the whole nation has been engaged in a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization." If they needed food beyond what they had, to keep body and soul together, they should be fed with soup from Army kitchens, but he was unwilling to start a Works Progress Administration, a Civilian Conservation Corps, or a Public Works Administration for Germany when the Army of Occupation entered on its duties.51
This memorandum got immediate results. The War Department directed SHAEF to suspend its handbooks on Germany and its directives to army group commanders, since they were strenuously objected to on the highest United States level and were in many respects inconsistent with the presurrender directives. There were British objections as well, the War Department indicated. General Smith called attention to the difficult position in which this order left Supreme Headquarters and added that SHAEF could not do business on an informal basis in matters of such importance. He asked that instructions to suspend the handbook and directives be issued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This request had already been anticipated and instructions were on the way by the time General Smith's cable was received.52
The Combined Civil Affairs Committee, in view of the likelihood that Allied troops would shortly be in Germany and the possibility that Germany would soon collapse, was stirred to action. It decided to inform the Supreme Commander that, if Germany surrendered before he received a directive to guide him in that contingency, he might carry on military government under the existing presurrender directive. This action was suspended, however, when the Supreme Commander requested permission to comment on the new instructions before they were issued.53 Later in the same day, the Combined Civil Affairs Committee notified General Eisenhower that he might issue presurrender interim directives based on directives of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It instructed him, however, to block out of the handbook all directives that assumed a policy of general economic or administrative rehabilitation. As for posthostilities guidance, the committee informed him that a directive to meet the needs of that period was then under consideration.54
SHAEF sent final drafts of its German directive and handbook to Washington, pointing out that they had been prepared in accordance with the presurrender directives but modified to meet the possibility that there would be chaos in Germany when the Allied armies arrived. SHAEF officials added that they had neither the
facilities nor the time to block out of the handbook passages relating to general economic provisions and rehabilitation, and suggested they be permitted to issue the handbook and directive with covering notes stating categorically that the commanders were not to apply the offending provisions.55
The Supreme Commander issued his interim directive to 21 and 12th Army Groups on 10 September 1944, delegating to Field Marshal Montgomery and General Bradley responsibility for executing his policy in their zones. As soon as they occupied any part of Germany, they were to establish military government. SHAEF was to set policy for the distribution of relief and rehabilitation supplies to Allied displaced persons in Germany and for the distribution of supplies, approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to the civil population of Germany. On request of the army group commanders, SHAEF was to furnish military government staffs, detachments, and experts. The army group commanders were empowered in their areas to enforce the terms of surrender and to take necessary steps to maintain order and wipe out the traces of Nazism.56
Meanwhile, SHAEF's draft handbook and proclamations were undergoing careful scrutiny in Washington. The U.S. members of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee felt that the handbook should be rewritten to insure that ( 1 ) no steps beyond those necessary for military purposes should be taken for the economic rehabilitation of Germany; (2) no relief supplies except the minimum necessary to prevent disease and disorder that might interfere with military operations should be imported or distributed; and (3) no Nazi, Nazi sympathizer, nor Nazi organization should be continued in office for purposes of convenience or expediency. The Supreme Commander's proposed proclamation to the German people was to be changed so as to carry no implication that Germany was to be treated as a liberated country. The Supreme Commander was informed that, if he could not hold up distribution of the handbook until changes could be made, he should issue it with a covering note to the effect that it would not be used during the postsurrender period of military government. Apparently without waiting for any further order, the SHAEF G-5 on 15 September directed the army group commanders to insert a fly leaf in all copies of the interim directive and handbook for military government stating that the three basic principles mentioned above were to be applied and adding that the directive would apply only to the presurrender period.57
SHAEF's proposed proclamation to the Germans on military government was reviewed next in Washington. The first paragraph led to considerable discussion. After some examination to make certain that the German word for "conquerors" did not give the impression that the Allies were "looters," British and U.S. officials examined the statement that the Nazi rule would be overthrown "as in other countries liberated from the horrors of Nazi tyranny." This seemed to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to leave the impression that Germany was to be treated as a liberated country. After exchanging cables with
Washington over a period of approximately two weeks, and after reprinting the proclamation three times to incorporate changes, SHAEF released it to the press on 28 September. The key paragraph now read:
The Allied Forces serving under my Command have now entered Germany. We come as conquerors, but not as oppressors. In the area of Germany occupied by the forces under my Command, we shall obliterate Nazism and German militarism. We shall overthrow the Nazi rule, dissolve the Nazi Party and abolish the cruel and oppressive and discriminatory laws and institutions which the party has created. We shall eradicate that German militarism which has so often disrupted the peace of the world. Military and party leaders, the Gestapo and others suspected of crimes and atrocities, will be tried, and if guilty, punished as they deserve.58
The proclamation permitted no doubt on the part of the Germans that Allies intended to annihilate the Hitlerian system. Although the softening phrases of the original draft had been stricken from the document, the omission of unconditional surrender from the statement permitted the Germans some hope as to the effects of the occupation.
Another question raised by the Supreme Commander concerning his occupation policy was also dealt with in September. It will be recalled that in August General Eisenhower had expressed the fear that he would be unable to support the German economic system and had asked to be relieved of his responsibility in that connection. The War Department was inclined to accept his recommendation, but the British representatives in Washington were unable to agree that collapse of the whole economic structure was inevitable. They urged that the Supreme Commander do his best to carry out the policy prescribed in the presurrender directive. In order to deal with the impasse, General Hilldring, in a message which he also sent to the British, suggested that General Eisenhower recall his original request and note that he felt the contingencies he had discussed could be adequately handled under the provisions of his presurrender directive. General Hilldring suggested that the cable be so worded that it would not require an answer. SHAEF promptly complied, thereby disposing neatly of at least one topic of transatlantic correspondence.59
The SHAEF staff was gratified to hear in September that the Combined Civil Affairs Committee was examining the text of a posthostilities directive. Unfortunately, SHAEF had to wait until the end of the fighting for specific instructions. The delays were based in particular on the inability of the British and the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to agree on the type of document which should be issued. The British representatives in the Combined Civil Affairs Committee believed, for example, that General Eisenhower could get along for some time after the defeat of Germany on the basis of his presurrender directive. Even when drafts were submitted to the committee, considerable divergence developed among the various representatives as to what should be included. It is not surprising to find, therefore, that not until late in April 1945 was a posthostilities directive approved. This had not reached SHAEF on the day the armistice was signed at
Reims. General Eisenhower reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff at that time that he was still operating under directives limited in application to the presurrender period. He considered the issuance of a new directive unnecessary, however, since policies developed under the postsurrender drafts did not differ markedly from those set down in the presurrender documents. In the absence of a new directive, he proposed to continue his current policies and directives until the termination of the combined command. On 11 May 1945, President Harry S. Truman approved the directives of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff for General Eisenhower as commander in chief of the United States Forces of Occupation regarding the military government of Germany. This document, which was to guide General Eisenhower in his activities as U.S. commander after the dissolution of SHAEF, was dispatched on 15 May 1945.60
Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter (18) * Next Chapter (20)
1. See above, Ch. IV. For relations of the European Advisory Commission and other Allied agencies, see Philip E. Mosely, "The Occupation of Germany, New Light on How the Zones were Drawn," Foreign Affairs, XXVIII (July, 1950), 580-604. Mr. Mosely was a political advisor to Ambassador John G. Winant on the European Advisory Commission from June 1944 to August 1945.
2. See above, Ch. V.
3. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, pp. 685-91; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York, 1948), Vol. II, Ch. 13.
4. Memo, Barker for McClure, 27 Jan 44, SHAEF SGS 322.01 Publicity and Psychological Warfare; Interv with Gen McClure, 29 Mar 47.
5. Hull, Memoirs, Vol. II, Ch. 13; Notes on mtg of McClure, Peake, Phillips, et al., 11 Feb 44, McClure jnl. JIC Paper, 19 Feb 44; JCS 718/1, 16 Mar 44 with atchd papers (memos by Hilldring and McCloy); Memo, JCS for President, 25 Mar 44. All in ABC 387 Germany (18 Dec 43), Sec 3.
6. Stettinius to Hull, 14 Apr 44, Diary Office CinC; Hull, Memoirs, II, 1578; Wallace Carroll, Persuade or Perish (Boston, 1948), pp. 319-20.
7. Eisenhower to CofS SHAEF, 20 May 44, Diary Office CinC. This seems at variance with the statement of Fred Smith in "The Rise and Fall of the Morgenthau Plan," United Nations World, 1 (March, 1947), 32-37, that General Eisenhower either suggested parts of the Morgenthau plan of agreed with its broad implications. (Mr. Smith was a member of Secretary Morgenthau's staff in 1944.) See Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p 287.
8. Memo prepared for PWD (unsigned), 29 May 44, with notations by Peake and Phillips, SHAEF SGS 091.412/3 Psychological Warfare Against Germany, I; Churchill, address to House of Commons, 24 May 44, text in Louise Wilhelmine Holborn, ed., War and Peace Aims of the United Nations (Boston, 1943-48), p. 497; Hull, Memoirs, II, 1580.
9. Notation by Phillips on Memo prepared for PWD (unsigned), 29 May 44, SHAEF SGS 091.412/3 Psychological Warfare Against Germany, I.
10. Ibid.; WD G-2 to CAD, 17 Aug 44, and CAD to G-2, 26 Aug 44; both in CAD 091.412 (2-25-43), Sec 1.
11. Memo, Stettinius for President, 27 Oct 44, containing statement of Winant to State Dept, 17 Oct 44, concerning PWD proposals, CAD 091.412 (2-25-43), Sec 1. McCloy to Smith, W-52734, 26 Oct 44; Smith to McCloy, S-64199, 27 Oct 44; McCloy to Smith, WX-56779, 3 Nov 44. All in SHAEF SGS 091.412/3 Psychological Warfare Against Germany, I. Carroll, Persuade or Perish, pp. 326-29.
12. Eisenhower to CCS, S-67648 (SCAF 134), 20 Nov 44, SHAEF SGS 091.412/3 Psychological Warfare Against Germany, I.
13. Marshall to Eisenhower, W-66936, 22 Nov 44; Roosevelt to AGWAR for Eisenhower, 25 Nov 44; Churchill to Eisenhower, 26 Nov 44; Eisenhower to Churchill, 26 Nov 44; Eisenhower to Marshall, CPA 90359, 27 Nov 44.All in Eisenhower personal file.
14. Br COS to JSM, 6845, 25 Nov 44; Smith to Ismay, S-68298, 25 Nov 44; Both in SHAEF SGS 091.412/3 Psychological Warfare Against Germany, I; Statement of Allied aims, February 11, 1945, War and Peace Aims of the United Nations, pp. 20-21.
15. The author has relied heavily for this and other information in this section on Psychological Warfare Division (SHAEF), An Account of Its Operations.
16. Voice of SHAEF broadcasts 27-32, 5-13 Sep 44, translation given in PWD (SHAEF), An Account of Its Operations, pp. 120-22.
17. Psychological Warfare Policy and Info memo 7, 16 Nov 44, SHAEF SGS 091.412 Propaganda; Carroll, Persuade or Perish, pp. 328-29.
18. Statements by Spokesman of Military Government, 25 Nov 44 (texts of military government proclamations), SHAEF SGS 091.412/3 Psychological Warfare Against Germany, I.
19. Psychological Warfare Rpt 7, 17 Jul 44, SHAEF SGS 091.412 Propaganda, I.
20. the Leaflet Propaganda Front, Report on Special Operations During OVERLORD (atchd to Gen McClure's communication slip of 4 Aug 44); McClure to CofS SHAEF, 29 Aug 44; Goebbels Gives Leaflet Warning, 30 Sep 44.All in SHAEF SGS 091.412 Propaganda, I.
21. See Rpt of U.S. Legation at Bern, 23 Nov 44; summaries of German propaganda in PWD news digests, SHAEF SGS 091.412 Propaganda, I.
22. PWD guidance bulletin, 20 Dec 44-1 Jan 45, SHAEF SGS 091.412 propaganda, I.
23. PWD (SHAEF), An Account of Its Operations, pp. 159, 167, 53. Of the nearly six billion leaflets, some 57 percent were dropped by U.S. air forces. For a description of their activities, see Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, III, 494-98.
24. ECLIPSE was a name given in November 1944 to posthostilities plans for Germany. The original code name, TALISMAN, was changed after it was reported to be known to the enemy.
25. Much of this section is based on Office, Chief Historian, EUCOM, Planning for the Occupation of Germany, compiled and written by Martin P. Detels, Jr., Col A.R.C. Sander, Francis Chase, and Joseph Starr, 1947, MS, OCMH files; and on [Richard M.Welling] Germany: Plans and Policies (Bk.VI of History of the Civil Affairs Division, War Department Special Staff, World War II [until March 1946]), MS, OCMH files.
26. Welling, History of the Civil Affairs Division, Bk. VI.
27. UNRRA was an organization created by the United Nations in 1943 to aid refugees and displaced persons in former Axis-occupied countries in Europe and Asia.
28. CCS Memo for SAC, 28 Apr 44, CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec I. As presented by CCAC to CCS for approval this paper carried the number CCAC 69/5. The same document when forwarded by the Combined Chiefs of Staff was given the number CCS 551.
29. Financial Guide for Germany, App. C, and Economic and Relief Guide for Germany, App. D, CCS 551/2, 24 May 44 (approved as CCS 551/3, 31 May 44), CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec I. Modifications were made in the financial guide by CCS 551/5, 31 Aug 44, SHAEF G-5 hist file, 1 (CCS) and 1A (CCS Dirs).
30. See below, page 351, for details relating to the Russian zone of occupation.
31. Mtg, President and JCS, at sea, 19 Nov 43.
32. Ibid.; Memo by T.T.H. (Handy), 19 Nov 43, sub: RANKIN, OPD Exec 9; CCS 143d Mtg, 4 Dec 43, SEXTANT Conf Min; CCS 143d Mtg, 28 Jan 44; CCS 144th Mtg, 4 Feb 44; Memo, President for Actg Secy State, 21 Feb 44, ABC 384 Northwest Europe (20 Aug 43), Sec 1B.
33. Eisenhower to Marshall, 15 Feb 44; Handy to Eisenhower, 21 Feb 44. Both in OPD Exec 9, Bk 15. Winant to Secy State, COMEA 50, 30 Mar 44; proposed draft of cable from Marshall to Eisenhower, 2 Apr 44, CAD 210.31.
34. Memo, Eisenhower for CofS SHAEF, 20 May 44, used as basis for Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 27 May 44, Diary Office CinC. In an entry of 27 May, Captain Butcher explained that some historian might read into the general's letter a desire to continue as Allied commander in chief. He noted that, while General Eisenhower had indicated he would like the job of ridding the world of the German General Staff and all it stood for, he also wanted to get on with the war so he could "get home and go fishing." Butcher thought he was merely being consistent in urging unity of command.
35. Stettinius to President, 2 Aug 44; President to Stettinius, 3 Aug 44. Both in OPD Exec 10, Item 63c.
36. SHAEF to WD, FWD 12936, 17 Aug 44, CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 2.
37. Approval of text of protocol between U.K., U.S., and USSR on zones of occupation in Germany and administration of Greater Berlin, 12 Sep 44 (photostat of signed agreement), CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 2.
38. CCS 172d Mtg, 12 Sep 44; CCS 176th Mtg, 16 Sep 44. Both in OCTAGON Conf Min.
39. See below, pp. 464-65.
40. SHAEF G-4 Weekly Rpt 1, Administrative Planning for Post-Hostilities Period, 3 Aug 44, SHAEF G-3 312.1-2 Post Hostilities Planning, Bundle O.
41. Mtg, SHAEF G-5, 13 Jun 44; Memo by SAC, 19 Jun 44; Smith to JCS, 20 Jun 44. All in SHAEF g-5 803 Internal Affairs Branch, Military Govt in Germany, Gen Corres, Jacket 2. ETOUSA GO 80, 9 Aug 44; Rpt, U.S.Group Control Council, 1-15 Sep 44; G-5 hist file 17.05 German Country Unit and U.S. Control Council.
42. SHAEF Stf Memo 104, 23 Aug 44, SHAEF G-5 803 Internal Affairs Branch, Military Govt in Germany, Gen Corres, Jacket 2.
43. SHAEF to CCS, FWD 13854, 5 Sep 44, CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 2.
44. Eisenhower to A Gp comdrs, 15 Nov 44, SHAEF G-5 803/3 Internal Affairs Branch, Military Govt in Germany, Relationship With Control Commission/Council.
45. Eisenhower's msg and CCS reply appended to CCAC 140/2, 10 Oct 44, CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 3.CCS to Eisenhower, WX 58337 (FACS 106), 6 Nov 44; Eisenhower to CCS, S-66513 (SCAF 129), 12 Nov 44. Both in SHAEF G-5 803 Military Govt in Germany, General Correspondence, Jacket 1. For French military government units and schools, see SHAEF Mission (France) AG 091.711-1(Fr), through 30 September 1944.
46. Planning for the Occupation of Germany, OCMH files; Hilldring to Smith, 1 Jul 44, CAD 014 Germany (7-10-42), Sec 7. Among the SHAEF papers that Hilldring had seen were SHAEF/21540/1/Ops, sub: PS SHAEF (44) 10-Primary Disarmament of the German Forces, and SHAEF/21542/Ops, sub: PS SHAEF (44) 9-Preparation for the Surrender and Post-Hostilities Middle Period, 29 Apr 44.
47. SHAEF to WD, FWD 12936, 17 Aug 44, CCAC Germany (11-15-43), Sec 2; Eisenhower to CCS, FWD 13128 (SCAF 68), 23 AUG 44, SHAEF G-5 803 Internal Affairs Branch, Military Govt in Germany, General Correspondence, Jacket 2.
48. Memo by Dir CAD, CCAC 119, 15 Aug 44, CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 2.
49. Memo by Br COS representative, CCS 658, 23 Aug 44, CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 2. The proposed directive appears in the CCAC files as CCAC 119/1, 24 Aug 44.
50. Memo, CCS for CAD, 24 Aug 44, CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 2.
51. Memo, President for Secy War, 26 Aug 44, CAD 014 Germany (7-10-42), Sec 8.
52. Telephone conversation, Hilldring, Marcus, and Boettiger with Sherman, 28 Aug 44; Smith to Hilldring, FWD 13405, 30 Aug 44; Hilldring to Holmes, 30 Aug 44; WD to SHAEF, WAR 89024 (GOV 100), 29 Aug 44. All in CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 2. Hilldring to Smith, W-89243, 31 Aug 44, SHAEF AG 014.1-1 Germany, Military Govt. The War Department message of 29 August 1944, 90024 (GOV 100), was received on 31 August.
53. Notes on mtg in Mr. McCloy's office, 29 Aug 44; SHAEF to WD, FWD 13496 (SCAF 70), 1 Sep 44; CCS to SHAEF, WAR 24564 (GOV 103), 2 Sep 44. All in CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 2.
54. CCAC to Eisenhower, WAR 24569 (GOV 102), 1 Sep 44, CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 2.
55. SHAEF to CCS, FWD 13851 (SCAF 73), 5 Sep 44, CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 2.
56. SHAEF Interim Directive for Military Government of Germany, 10 Sep 44, SHAEF AG 014.1-1 Germany, Military Govt.
57. Hilldring to Holmes, W-29982, 13 Sep 44; SHAEF G-5 to A Gp comdrs and COMZ, FWD 14955, 15 Sep 44. Both in SHAEF AG 014.1-1 Germany, Military Govt.
58. SHAEF Fwd to CCS and CCAC, VOG 134, 28 Sep 44, and other correspondence and cables of 15-28 September, SHAEF AG 014.1-1 Germany Military Govt.
59. Hilldring to Holmes, WAR 31224, 15 Sep 44; SHAEF to WD, SCF 88, 18 Sep 44, CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 3.
60. SHAEF to WD, FWD 16012, 27 Sep 44, CAD 014 Germany (7-10-42), Sec 9; CCAC 45th Mtg, 12 Oct 44, CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 3; SHAEF to WD, SCAF 362, 7 May 45; IPCOG 1/4, 11 May 45; Note by Secretaries on Directive to CinC, U.S. Forces of Occupation, Regarding the Military Government of Germany, 26 Apr 45; JCS to Eisenhower, WAR 83249, 16 May 45, All in CCAC 014 Germany (11-15-43), Sec 8.