Chapter VIII
Relations With the Occupied Countries

General Eisenhower made great efforts to strengthen the OVERLORD attack by seeking continually to get for his crusade the maximum support of the leaders and peoples of occupied Europe. In the spring of 1944 SHAEF intensified efforts, started long before D Day, to organize and direct Resistance activities. The Allied governments and SHAEF also attempted to lay the basis for smooth relationships after D Day by drawing up a series of civil affairs agreements with the governments-in-exile and by organizing SHAEF missions which would deal with these governments once they were re-established in their countries. General Eisenhower tried in particular to get the support of the French leaders-in exile, not only because much of the early fighting would be in France, but because that country was expected ultimately to furnish some ten divisions for the coming campaigns.

Allied Liaison Machinery

In establishing liaison with the governments-in-exile, SHAEF started with machinery which had been developed in the United Kingdom as early as 1939. The governments-in-exile of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Greece, and Yugoslavia had been established in London, and of Luxembourg in Canada in the period between 1939 and 1941. The French National Committee, organized by Gen. Charles de Gaulle in London in 1940, undertook to speak for the French government. Diplomatic relations were carried on with the various governments-in-exile by the British through representatives of the Foreign Office, and by the United States through Ambassador Anthony J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., former Ambassador to Poland. The British services also maintained special military liaison with the governments-in-exile, inasmuch as most of them had land, sea, or air contingents under British command. By August 1943 Belgian, Dutch, Polish, and Czech units had military liaison with 21 Army Group, Norwegian units with the 52d Division (Br.), and the French forces with the War Office. Once SHAEF appeared on the scene some change was required in the military and political liaison system.

In October 1943, at General Morgan's insistence, the British Chiefs of Staff agreed to the establishment of liaison missions by the governments-in-exile at COSSAC. Relations between such groups and Supreme Headquarters were coordinated


in January 1944 by a European Contact Section, SHAEF, under Lt. Gen. A.E. Grasett and former Ambassador Biddle, now a lieutenant colonel, his chief deputy. General Grasett proposed in March 1944 that missions from these governments be appointed to SHAEF, to 21 Army Group, and, where necessary, to 1st U.S. Army Group. Members of these missions were to give advice on all matters concerning their countries to the commanders to whom they were accredited. They were to control their own administrative personnel.1

At the time of the invasion, Norway had a liaison mission with the Allied Land Forces (Norway) commander, General Sir Andréw Thorne. The head of this mission was assigned to SHAEF. The governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and the Netherlands each had a liaison mission attached to SHAEF or to the army group to which they had assigned troops, and Poland had liaison groups with SHAEF and the U.S. and British army groups. No arrangements had been concluded with the French. In order to aid the Allied forces in France, however, approximately 150 French officers had been in training in London since November 1943 for liaison duties with tactical units. Shortly before D Day General Eisenhower asked the French Committee to supply additional officers for this purpose, indicating that some 550 would be needed.2

Also in process of development were SHAEF missions that were to be sent to France, Belgium and Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway after their governments had been restored to power. Toward the end of April 1944 General Grasett asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff to decide on the nationality of the heads of the missions, suggesting that the nation which occupied a given country during its liberation should furnish the chief of the mission there. The proposal was premature since the Prime Minister and the President had not yet come to a conclusion regarding the zones which their countries were to occupy. General Smith proposed as a temporary expedient that mission "cadres" be organized under acting chiefs and that the final selection be left until an agreement had been reached on British and U.S. zones. This agreement had not been made before D Day.3

Civil Affairs Agreements

Even before liaison arrangements had been concluded, the United States and Great Britain were negotiating civil affairs agreements with some of the governments-in-exile. These agreements were intended to govern relations between the restored governments and the Allied Expeditionary Force during the period of military control. Negotiations with Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands were prolonged for a number of months because of questions of procedure which arose between the United States and Britain. On 16 May


1944, separate agreements were signed with Norway by representatives of the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR, and with Belgium and the Netherlands by the United States and Great Britain. The conclusion of an accord with France was delayed until after the cross-Channel attack, and the agreement with Denmark could not be signed until that country and its government were liberated.

Norway, Belgium, and the Netherlands gave the Supreme Commander control in those portions of their countries which should be liberated by him until such time as he felt the military situation would permit him to turn over administrative responsibility to the national governments. Among the salient provisions of the civil affairs agreements were those which reestablished national courts, granted the Allies exclusive legal jurisdiction over members of their forces except in case of offenses against local laws, confirmed the power of the Allied commander in chief to requisition billets and supplies and make use of lands, buildings, transportation, and other services needed for military purposes, and established claims commissions. Questions not covered in these agreements were left for further negotiations; some of these were not settled until the end of the war.4

The military missions of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway were asked on 25 May 1944 to provide officers to advise the Allied military authorities on administration, intelligence, plans and operations, civil affairs, public relations, and psychological warfare in relation to the three countries. The way was thus open to simple and direct dealing with three of the five countries whose liberation SHAEF was shortly to undertake.

Troubled Relations with the
French Committee

Factors Creating Difficulties

The difficulties that arose between the French Committee and the United States and Great Britain created one of the "most acutely annoying" problems faced by General Eisenhower before D Day and during the first weeks of the invasion.5 They grew out of General de Gaulle's desire to restore France to the position of a great power with himself as the sole responsible authority. His proclamation in the summer of 1940 that the war was not lost and his prompt organization of the French National Committee in London created a rallying point for those Frenchmen who were willing to resist the Germans and the Vichy regime. Unfortunately, he and his followers alienated a number of Frenchmen both inside and outside France who felt that their efforts at resistance were being overlooked by de Gaulle. Among these were former Regular Army officers who, although they were in the area controlled by Vichy, were engaged in schemes to aid the Allies in the liberation of France. Some of the Frenchmen outside France preferred to follow the lead of Gen. Henri Honoré Giraud in his program of restoring French independence. At times these groups became so intense in their rivalry for control of the


French forces outside France that it was difficult for the Allies to know what course to follow.

The Allies' decision to make use of Admiral Jean François Darlan during the North African operations offended Frenchmen in both Giraudist and Gaullist circles and made them somewhat suspicious of Allied intentions. The de Gaulle group was further alienated by favor shown to the Giraudist group. President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull, while strongly in favor of restoring freedom to France, were not convinced that General de Gaulle or his followers represented the majority of the French people. They felt that any recognition of the French Committee of National Liberation, which Generals de Gaulle and Giraud had sponsored in June 1943 as a successor of the French National Committee, might force an unwanted regime on France. The President feared in particular that de Gaulle's desire was aimed more at gaining political control of France than at defeating the Germans. De Gaulle's threats of punishment for adherents of Marshal Henri Philippe Petain left many Allied leaders with the impression that his program in a liberated France might produce civil war.

The British and U.S. Governments frequently differed in their attitudes toward de Gaulle. The British had given their backing to the first de Gaulle committee in 1940. The Prime Minister, while often stern with the French general and inclined to resent some of his views, tended to seek some understanding between the general and Mr. Roosevelt. It is probable that but for the strong opposition of the President to the French Committee the British would have recognized it as the provisional government of France before D Day--a move which would have simplified SHAEF's task in dealing with French civil affairs.

The United States in July 1942 had selected representatives to consult with General de Gaulle and the French Committee in London on all matters relative to the conduct of war which concerned the French.6 Because the President had not been attracted to de Gaulle, however, he was prepared to deal with other representatives of the French people. Mr. Roosevelt had accepted the French Committee of National Liberation with strong reservations. In August 1943 he said that he welcomed its formation, but expected it to function on the principle of collective responsibility of all its members for the active prosecution of the war and to be subject to the military requirements of the Allied commanders. The committee was recognized as a political body functioning within specific limitations during the period of the war, but not as a government. "Later on," the President said, "the people of France, in a free and untrammeled manner, will proceed in due course to select their own government and their own officials to administer it." He directed General Eisenhower to deal with the French military authorities and not with the French Committee on matters involving French forces.7 This instruction had the effect not only of reducing the governmental authority of the French Committee


but of increasing the power of General Giraud, commander in chief of the French forces. The inevitable result was to increase division among the French factions. There continued to appear in London and other capitals committees and liaison officers representing the Giraudists, Gaullists, and various splinter groups. The task of Supreme Headquarters, which needed some specific authority with which to deal on matters of French Resistance, the command of French troops, and agreements for the administration of civil affairs in liberated France, was thus made more difficult.

Civil Affairs Agreements With France

The desire of General de Gaulle to establish the authority of the French Committee of National Liberation was responsible for many difficulties which arose between the Allies and the French in 1943 and 1944. In no case was the clash over authority more evident than in the discussions of an arrangement for the administration of civil affairs in the liberated areas of France.

Early in its preparations for civil affairs administration, COSSAC stressed the need for an agreement with the French during the operations in northwest Europe. General Barker, deputy chief of COSSAC, discussed the matter in August 1943 with Secretary Hull and Mr. James C. Dunn of the State Department. They agreed that a formula should be worked out for dealing with the French. A draft agreement to this end was presented by the United States and Great Britain at the Moscow Conference in the fall of 1943. The Western Allies declared that, subject to the primary purpose of defeating Germany, the landing in France was to have the purpose of liberating the French at the earliest moment from their oppressors and of creating conditions in which a democratically constituted government might be able to take responsibility for civil administration. Until the people could make a free choice of the government which they desired, they were to be given "the largest measure of personal and political liberty compatible with military security. . . ." The civil administration under the Supreme Commander was to be restored as far as possible to the French, and a director of civil affairs was to be appointed by the Supreme Commander from the French contingent or liaison mission connected with military operations in France. A French Military Mission for Civil Affairs was to be invited to Supreme Headquarters and associated in the direction of civil affairs once operations started. To make certain that the French would have a free choice in establishing their government, the Supreme Commander was to hold the scales even between all French groups sympathetic to the Allied cause. The Allies stated categorically that the Supreme Commander would have no dealings with the Vichy regime "except for the purpose of liquidating it," and would keep no person in office who had willfully collaborated with the enemy or deliberately acted in a hostile manner toward the Allied cause.8

This proposal displeased the French Committee of National Liberation. Its members felt that they had played the major part in French Resistance and were the persons best prepared to take over the


reins of government in France once it was liberated. At the end of September 1943 they had placed all political authority of the French Committee as the future government of France in the hands of General de Gaulle. General de Gaulle, in turn, had specifically charged M. André Philip, as Commissioner of Interior, with the duty of setting up civil administration in liberated France. In October M. Philip informed Allied leaders in London of the intentions of his group. He also explained that, when a military liaison mission was appointed to SHAEF, it would represent the French Committee and not the military commander in chief. General Giraud would control French forces engaged in continental operations and any zone of the armies which might be established. As soon as possible after liberation, however, the liberated areas were to pass over to the zone of interior and would be administered by M. Philip. The Resistance groups then under the Council of Resistance would be expected to come under French political authority rather than under the French commander in chief. M. Philip indicated that one of the main duties of French Resistance forces at the time of the invasion would be to protect power stations and industrial property. He felt that, since the Germans would probably evacuate France soon after the landings, it was more important for the French Committee to concentrate on administering liberated areas rather than on taking measures against the enemy.9

This stress on political rather than military preparations strengthened Mr. Roosevelt's suspicion of General de Gaulle and the French Committee. On his way to the Cairo Conference, the President pointed out that de Gaulle would be just behind the armies when they penetrated into France and that his faction would take over as rapidly as the armies advanced. These views of French intentions were apparently responsible for President Roosevelt's insistence in November on changing the existing military plan for an emergency invasion (RANKIN), so that the United States would have no responsibility for occupying France in case of German collapse or sudden withdrawal from that country.10

The British, friendlier to the claims of the French Committee of National Liberation than the United States and seemingly more realistic about the extent to which that group represented the French people, proposed in December that the committee be placed on a governmental level with the United States and Great Britain. The State Department was willing to accept only an alternative British suggestion that the Allies draw up with the French necessary plans for civil affairs in metropolitan liberated areas. At the end of April the President reiterated his strong opposition to dealing with the French Committee on any save a military basis. "It is my desire at the present time," he told General Marshall, "that the military questions which involve the French forces be handled directly between the Allied Commander in Chief and French military authorities and not as one sovereign government in full possession of its sovereignty and another government which has no de facto sovereignty."11

The French Committee had presented a


draft agreement on civil administration to the U.S. and British representatives in Algiers on 7 September 1943. When no action had been taken by the Allies by early January 1944, the French Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, Mr. René Massigli, warned that if no agreement was made before D Day the Allies would face the alternatives of dealing with the Vichy government or establishing a regime of direct administration. Either of these, he added, would cause profound confusion among the French people.12

The Supreme Commander and his staff were thoroughly aware of the dangers involved in allowing this and other questions to drag on after the cross-Channel attack. They had been told by French sources in late December 1943 that the youth of France favored de Gaulle because they felt that he was "the reincarnation of the spirit of resistance to Germany and not because of any allegiance to him, of whose shortcomings they are fully aware." General Smith, who disavowed any pro-Gaullist sentiments, felt in early January 1944 that there was no better vehicle to use in dealing with liberated France than the French Committee. He hoped, if no agreement could be reached with it, that at least a French official would be selected who could handle civil affairs in France pending an election in that country.13

General Eisenhower, while in Washington in early January, gained the impression that the President and War and State Department officials were willing for him to deal with the French Committee of National Liberation. On his arrival in London, he urged the Combined Chiefs of Staff to take prompt action for the crystallization of civil affairs administration in France, and requested that General de Gaulle be asked to designate individuals with whom SHAEF could enter into immediate negotiations in London. Mr. Churchill suggested caution, not only because he doubted that President Roosevelt would accept the committee as the dominant French authority, but because of his personal objection to "the crude appeal to General de Gaulle to designate individuals or groups of individuals" for negotiations in London. If the French Committee of National Liberation was to be taken into immediate partnership, the Allies should be careful about individuals selected for negotiations, and make certain they were acceptable to both sides.14

The Civil Affairs Division of the War Department in late January leaned toward the use of the French Committee of National Liberation in civil affairs matters, but in March it directed SHAEF to drop any planning based on this suggestion. In mid-March President Roosevelt sent a directive representing his views and approved by the State and War Departments to Secretary Stimson for transmittal to the Supreme Commander. The directive resembled in many respects the views on civil affairs submitted by the United States and Great Britain at the Moscow Conference. The initial proposal to appoint a French director for civil affairs was eliminated, and the Supreme Commander was empowered to decide "where, when and how the civil administration of France" should be exercised by French citizens. He


was permitted to consult with the French Committee of National Liberation and at his discretion to allow it to select and install officials needed for civil administration, subject to the distinct understanding that this action did not constitute recognition of the committee as the government of France. The Supreme Commander was to require from the French Committee of National Liberation, or from any other group with which he might negotiate, guarantees that (1) it had no intention of exercising the powers of government indefinitely, (2) it favored the re-establishment of all French liberties, and (3) it would take no action to entrench itself pending the selection of a constitutional government by free choice of the French people. The Vichy government was specifically excluded from the groups with which General Eisenhower might deal. The Supreme Commander was to be guided in all his actions by three paramount aims: (1) the prompt and complete defeat of Germany, (2) the earliest possible liberation of France, and (3)"the fostering of democratic methods and conditions under which a French government may ultimately be established according to the free choice of the French people as the government under which they wish to live." 15

In late March 1944, the President authorized Ambassador Edwin C. Wilson, who was returning from Washington to Algiers, to give General de Gaulle the following message: if General Eisenhower decided to deal 'with the French Committee of National Liberation, it was likely that he would continue that relationship provided the committee did a good job, refrained from extreme measures, kept good order, and cooperated with the military authorities. Both this statement and the earlier draft directive were unilateral actions by the President without specific British sanction. Mr. Roosevelt held, however, that the matter had been settled and was later nettled by the insistence of General Smith, General Holmes, and other SHAEF officials that a positive agreement still had to be made between the Allies and the French Committee of National Liberation. 16

The French Committee of National Liberation continued to press its claims to act as the government of liberated France. On 14 March it provided for the appointment of a delegate to exercise all regulatory and administrative powers of the French Committee in liberated French territory until the committee could handle these functions directly. Four days later General de Gaulle informed the Consultative Assembly in Algiers of the efforts to reach agreements on civil affairs with the British and U.S. Governments and added that the committee did not have a voice in foreign affairs commensurate with its obligations. Apparently weary of Allied delay, he declared on 97 March, "France, who brought freedom to the world and who has been, and still remains, its champion, does not need to consult outside opinions to reach a decision on how she will reconstitute liberty at home." A week later, he said: "Wherever they may be and whatever may happen, Frenchmen must accept


orders only from this Government from the moment they are no longer personally subjected to enemy coercion. No authority is valid unless it acts in the name of this Government." The general restated this view on 21 April when he said in an interview that the establishment of the administration of France could be assured only by the French people. "The only point open for discussion is that of the collaboration to be assured between the French Administration and the inter-Allied military authorities." 17

Apparently with an eye to allaying Allied fears as to the future intentions of the French Committee, the Consultative Assembly on 30 March adopted an ordinance providing for the election of a Constituent Assembly by universal suffrage within one year after the complete liberation of France. After elections were held in two thirds of the metropolitan departments, including the Seine, the Provisional Consultative Assembly was to become the Provisional Representative Assembly, to which the French Committee would surrender its power. These proposals were accepted by the French Committee on 21 April 1944.18 Some of the reassuring effects of this action were lost a few days later when the French Committee of National Liberation in early April gave de Gaulle final authority in matters relating to French armed forces. General Giraud, who felt that he had been reduced to the position of a figurehead, announced his intention of resigning as head of the French forces, although General Devers and Ambassador Duff Cooper tried to dissuade him. He refused the committee's proffer of the post of Inspector General of the French Armies and announced that he would go into retirement.19

Still seeking a formal agreement with the French, SHAEF was encouraged on 9 April when Secretary of State Hull declared that it was "of the utmost importance that civil authority in France should be exercised by Frenchmen, should be swiftly established, and should operate in accordance with advanced planning as fully as military operations will permit." Although the United States could not recognize the French Committee of National Liberation as the government of France, Mr. Hull added, the President was disposed "to see the French Committee for National Liberation exercise leadership to establish law and order under the supervision of the Allied Commander-in-Chief." The Prime Minister, assuming that this declaration changed previous U.S. policy, promptly approved it.20

General Koenig, who had become senior French commander in the United Kingdom in April, and General Eisenhower


saw in Hull's statement a formula that could be translated into a workable agreement. The Supreme Commander asked the Combined Chiefs of Staff for authority to initiate conversations with Koenig on such matters as civilian labor, banks and security exchanges, transfer of property, custody of enemy property, public safety, public health, civilian supply, and displaced persons. He declared that he would not go beyond the limitations set by the President, as interpreted by Secretary Hull. While waiting for action by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which he was not to get before D Day, the Supreme Commander permitted Generals Grasett and Morgan to begin informal discussions with General Koenig and his staff. At the first meeting on 25 April, General Koenig asked that questions involving the sovereignty of France be put aside until later.21 Representatives from SHAEF, 21 Army Group, 1st U.S. Army Group, AFHQ, the European Contact Section, and the French Military Mission then agreed to establish special committees to consider the numerous civil affairs problems.22

Unfortunately, the French Committee suspended these informal meetings shortly after they started. Its action was in protest against a British announcement, made for security reasons at the insistence of the British Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Commander, that from 17 April all foreign diplomatic representatives save those from the United States and Russia would be barred from sending or receiving uncensored communications.23 The French Committee of National Liberation refused to submit to this censorship. The resultant lack of communications between the French Committee in Algiers and its mission in London made virtually impossible any formal agreement before D Day. During this period, however, General de Gaulle told an American correspondent that, although he was concerned over French relations with President Roosevelt, he believed negotiations between Generals Koenig and Eisenhower would "go well because of Eisenhower's friendly disposition toward France." The French general took a conciliatory line in confining his requests for lifting the censorship to cables concerning operational preparations of interest to the French. Reassured by this attitude, President Roosevelt agreed to leave the matter to Mr. Churchill's discretion. Arrangements were made whereby British and U.S. authorities examined French cables before they were dispatched from London and then permitted them to be sent in French code on General Koenig's assurance that no change would be made in the original text.24

Even before an agreement was worked out which might permit the reopening of discussions between SHAEF and the French representatives, Mr. Hull and the President had made clear that the Hull formula of 9 April could not be interpreted as a basic change in Mr. Roosevelt's view toward de Gaulle and the French Committee. Mr. Hull defined his position on 11



May with a statement to the British Ambassador in Washington that there seemed to be a tendency of the British Government to use his speech of 9 April "exclusively as their formula for dealing with French civil affairs even though the President had declined to modify the suggested directive to General Eisenhower which was stronger than my speech in some respects. The danger of such a tendency and of employing words as a substitute formula was pointed out by me from the point of view of working relations between the Prime Minister and the President." Two days later the President reiterated to General Eisenhower his views on dealing with de Gaulle. Agreeing that the Supreme Commander had full authority to discuss matters with the French Committee on a military level, the President emphasized his personal opposition to any action at a political level, since he was unable to recognize any government of France until the French people had an opportunity to make a free choice. Alluding again to his familiar figure of speech that the French were still shell-shocked from their war experience, the President insisted, "We have no right 'to color their views or to give any group the sole right to impose one side of a case on them."25

The President's message of mid-May had been prompted by General Eisenhower's request that he be allowed to inform General Koenig of the date and place of the OVERLORD attack and that General de Gaulle be brought to London for a D Day broadcast to the French people in behalf of the Allies. The British Chiefs of Staff had objected to the first proposal as a violation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff instructions of 1 April forbidding the release of information to the French which might compromise the OVERLORD Operation. General Eisenhower, describing his position as embarrassing and "potentially dangerous," suggested that the difficulty be met by inviting General de Gaulle to London where he could be briefed on OVERLORD. President Roosevelt agreed that General de Gaulle could be briefed provided he did not return to Algiers until after the invasion had been launched. Mr. Roosevelt had then added his warning against discussions with the French chief on a political level. 26


The proposal to bring General de Gaulle to London for a briefing on OVERLORD continued to hang fire until near the end of May. After the President's statement that the French general could be briefed only if he agreed to come to London and stayed until after the invasion, the Prime Minister indicated that to invite de Gaulle under conditions he would probably regard as insulting would be unwise. Late in May, SHAEF stressed the importance of having the French general appeal to the French to support Allied Forces under the Supreme Commander, and Mr. Churchill agreed that de Gaulle should be invited to London.27


On his arrival in the United Kingdom on 4 June, General de Gaulle was shown a message the SHAEF Psychological Warfare Division had prepared for him to deliver on D Day. He agreed to speak along the lines SHAEF outlined but refused to use the prepared speech, on the grounds that it stressed too strongly French obedience to the Allied Command and made no mention of the Algiers committee. This reaction was responsible for a comic opera prelude to the invasion which saw General Smith, Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, General McClure, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, and Mr. Churchill arguing the question with the recalcitrant general. A series of cables to Washington charted the progress of the discussion with bulletins to the effect that "General de Gaulle will speak," "General de Gaulle will not speak," and "the General has changed his mind." The Allied leaders sought to convince de Gaulle that his standing in France would be damaged if it became known that he was in London and had refused to add his voice to those of the heads of the governments-in-exile who were also scheduled to speak to their peoples on the day of the attack. General de Gaulle's request that the Supreme Commander change his D-Day appeal to mention the French Committee could not be satisfied, since the text had been approved in London and Washington, and recordings had been made for broadcasting. The Allies finally agreed that General de Gaulle could make such an allusion in his speech. Despite this concession it was not until the early morning of 6 June that the French general at last agreed to speak. The final text represented a victory by General de Gaulle in that it stated that the first condition for the French was to follow the instructions


of their government and their chiefs in the battle that lay ahead and made no special effort to emphasize the authority of the Allied Command.28

Fortunately for the success of the civil affairs program in France, SHAEF and the subordinate commands had proceeded to establish working arrangements with French representatives at nonpolitical levels. A number of the officials General de Gaulle planned to use in Normandy as soon as the area was liberated were in the United Kingdom, and many of them were in contact with British and U.S. civil affairs representatives. The French liaison officers that were in training in the United Kingdom for their future assignments with the British and U.S. civil affairs detachments were concerned at the moment less with the question of political sovereignty than with their task of getting the civilian organization of the liberated areas back into operation as soon as possible after the Allies were ashore. Thus the lack of close relationship between the French Committee and the British and U.S. Governments was less serious than it might at first appear. It was perhaps especially helpful that 21 Army Group, which could be expected to reflect the British Government's willingness to make some concessions to the French Committee, was charged with responsibility for civil affairs activities during the first phase of operations in France.

The Command and Use of French Troops

Among the subjects which the French and the Allies did not settle during the pre-D-Day period was the command of French troops. Fortunately for the Supreme Commander, agreements made in early 1943 laid the basis for raising and arming French units to support Allied operations. President Roosevelt had agreed, in principle, at the Casablanca Conference to arm eight infantry and three armored divisions for the French. The eleven divisions, to be employed under the Allied commander in chief against the common enemy, were to be equipped by the United States and organized according to U.S. Tables of Organization and Equipment. The existing Gaullist forces, roughly 15,000 strong, had been equipped and supplied by the British since 1940. The British continued to maintain them until all French forces were fused in 1943. The total number of divisions to be equipped by the United States was reduced to five infantry and three armored divisions on the recommendation of General Eisenhower, who felt that the French could not provide sufficient supply units for eleven divisions organized according to U.S. models. As the divisions were equipped they were committed in the Mediterranean, five of them being employed before the summer of 1944. All plans for the invasion of southern France in 1944 relied heavily on the use of French forces, and, as a result, the Allies laid little emphasis on committing anything more than a token French force in the cross-Channel attack.29

Difficulties arose between the Allies and the French Committee of National Liberation in the winter of 1943, when the committee refused to send the 9th Colonial Infantry Division to Italy, despite orders of General Giraud, commander of French


Forces. This refusal, resulting from friction between the committee and General Giraud and not between the committee and the Allied commander in chief, still threatened to interfere with Allied operations. General Eisenhower warned General Giraud at this point that the United States would not continue to arm French units unless the committee gave assurances that its actions would be governed in the future by military rather than political considerations.30

A conference on the use of French troops was held in Algiers at the end of December by British and U.S. diplomatic and military representatives and French officers in General de Gaulle's office. The way to a firm agreement was paved by General Smith's assurance that French units would play a key role in the landings in southern France and that a token French force, preferably a division, would be used in northern France, particularly in the area near Paris. On 30 December M. Massigli informed U.S. Ambassador Wilson and British representative Harold MacMillan that General Smith's statements had satisfied the chief"anxieties" of the French Committee, and that it had now decided "to put the French Forces mentioned above at the disposition of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to be used by the Allied commander in chief, in consultation with the French Command, for the execution of the operations of which the broad outlines have been given." He urged the Allied representatives to forward to their governments for speedy approval the draft directive for over-all command of French forces which he had presented three days earlier.31

The U.S. and British diplomatic representatives accepted M. Massigli's statement as settling the question of command of French forces to be used from the Mediterranean. They found it more difficult to agree to the French Committee's reservation of the right to intervene with the British and U.S. Governments and the Allied commander in chief in order to insure that the allotment of French forces should take French interests "into account as completely as possible." The Combined Chiefs of Staff refused to consider relations on a governmental level between the French Committee of National Liberation and the United States and Great Britain.32

Members of the British Government were inclined to give some backing to the French Committee's claim. President Roosevelt, who considered the tone of the French replies dictatorial, in late April instructed General Marshall to see that questions involving French forces were handled between the Allied commanders in chief and the French military authorities. In mid-May, the Combined Chiefs of Staff ordered General Wilson to present the draft, as amended by the Allies, to the French Committee of National Liberation for signature.33

The French, already offended by the suspension of the right to use their diplomatic cipher in sending messages from the


United Kingdom, were in no mood to yield on the directive. As a result no agreement for over-all command of French forces was concluded before the invasion of northwest Europe. Inasmuch as no French forces were to be committed in the assault, the lack of a formal agreement was not of immediate importance. Further, General Eisenhower had declared in North Africa that unless his orders were obeyed, the supply of French units would cease.34

French Resistance

In his efforts to guarantee the success of the D-Day landings, General Eisenhower drew on the support of the Resistance organizations which had been developed in France since 1940. Organized spontaneously inside France these groups gave their allegiance to various leaders. By D Day they were divided into five movements: L'Armée Secrète, which consisted of four groups in the northern and three in the southern zone; the Maquis, made up of young men who had fled to the mountains of the Haute-Savoie to avoid German forced labor drafts; the Francs Tireurs et Partisans, a Communist-controlled paramilitary section of the Communist Front National, which had affiliated with L'Armée Secrète; and Groupe de l'Armée, which was Giraudist in sympathy and made up largely of members of the demobilized Vichy army. L'Armée Secrète was the largest of the movements. It was governed by the Conseil National de la Résistance in Paris, under the guidance of the Bureau Central de Renseignements et d'Action (Militaire) (BCRA), which had branches in London and Algiers. The Bureau acted on orders from the French Committee in Algiers.35

The whole Resistance movement was initially encouraged and coordinated by the Special Operations Executive (SOE) set up by the British early in the war to encourage patriot movements in occupied countries throughout the world. The organization, headed by Maj. Gen. Colin Gubbins, was a responsibility of the Ministry of Economic Warfare. The British Government furnished men, transport, and material for Resistance groups, and the Special Operations Executive, the War Office, and the Admiralty controlled special operations relating to the Resistance forces.36 They dealt with L'Armée Secrète through a Gaullist-controlled bureau in London. The other units acted either directly or through missions or committees appointed by the Giraudists and other special groups.

The Special Operations Executive had initiated small-scale operations in France in the spring of 1941, but its plans for extensive use of Resistance forces in 1942


had been postponed when the projected invasion was shifted from northern France to the Mediterranean. Early in 1943, planning for the use of French Resistance forces was again emphasized. In the summer of that year, the United States established a Special Operations Branch of the Office of Strategic Services in London to aid in Resistance planning.37

COSSAC, seeing no immediate need for Resistance plans in the spring and summer of 1943, gave little supervision to the activities of the British and U.S. special operations sections before the fall of that year although these groups maintained liaison with COSSAC. After the outline plans for OVERLORD and RANKIN had been completed, General Morgan extended COSSAC's control over the work of the special operations sections. In October 1943 the British Chiefs of Staff placed under the Supreme Commander (designate) the Special Operations Executive activities in his sphere of operations, and in November the U.S. Chiefs of Staff gave him similar authority over the Special Operations Branch of the Office of Strategic Services. In the following March, the two organizations, headed by Brigadier E.F. MocklerFerryman (SOE), and Col. Joseph F. Haskell (SO), took the title of Special Force Headquarters (SFHQ).38

Steps were also taken in the spring of 944 to coordinate Allied Resistance operations with the French Committee of National Liberation and French Regular Army forces. Gen. François d'Astier de la Vigerie, who had been representing the French Committee in the United Kingdom since 1943, was directed to (1 ) participate in the planning of Resistance operations, (2) maintain liaison with the French Military Mission in London and with the Supreme Commander, (3) supervise special operations carried out in France from bases in Great Britain, (4) act as representative of the French Committee of National Liberation to the Supreme Commander in all matters concerning military administration in the northern theater of operations, and (5) act as military representative of the French Committee of National Liberation in London.39

General Koenig replaced General d'Astier de la Vigerie in March 1944. Near the end of April, Koenig announced the organization of the Supreme Command of French Forces in Great Britain and the European Theater of Operations. He created a general staff of the French Forces of the Interior and of Administrative Liaison (FILA). The staff included two executive branches, one, BCRAL, for Resistance work, and the other, Mission Militaire Liaison Administrative (MMLA), for liberated territories.

Meanwhile, the Supreme Commander on 23 March 1944 had assumed control over all special operations in his sphere of activity. A special section of SHAEF G-3 was directed to take responsibility for these operations. SHAEF's control included general direction and planning, instructions as to target priorities, reduction or increase of activities to conform to the Supreme Commander's plans, and directions


as to the effort to be expended on various activities. SHAEF's sphere of operations included Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, northwest and southern Germany, and possibly Austria. An area in southern France was suballotted to the Mediterranean commander for operations in support of the invasion of southern France.40 SHAEF-controlled operations were to be carried on mostly in France, both because they could be more effective there and because the Allies preferred passive rather than active resistance in the occupied countries outside France during the invasion period.41

SHAEF required the special operations agencies to coordinate their activities with 21 and 12th Army Groups and their associated air and naval commanders. The activities included sabotage, measures to undermine the enemy's morale, and interference with enemy military preparations. Special stress was to be placed on measures designed to aid the assault and on plans to be put into effect in case of a German withdrawal. SHAEF settled a jurisdictional dispute between the special operations and the psychological warfare agencies with its decision that the special operations groups could continue to distribute propaganda if such work did not affect adversely their other activities. Both the special operations and psychological warfare agencies were instructed to conform to basic plans prepared in accordance with SHAEF directives.42

In late May, SHAEF found it necessary to issue still another directive on the coordination of Resistance activities when a controversy developed between Special Force Headquarters and the commander of the Special Air Service. The latter group had been established under the control of Lt. Gen. F.A.M. Browning, commander of Airborne Troops, 91 Army Group, to furnish trained troops to stiffen Resistance organizations in France. General Browning, opposed to control of these forces by Special Force Headquarters, proposed in mid-May 1944 that a new headquarters be formed under SHAEF to coordinate the actions of Special Operations Executive, Office of Strategic Services, Political Warfare Executive, and the Special Air Service. General Eisenhower refused, saying that Resistance was a strategic weapon which would be controlled by SHAEF through Special Force Headquarters.43

SHAEF, having accepted Resistance activities as a means of aiding the cross-Channel attack, set about early in 1944 finding the means of supplying the Resistance forces with arms and sabotage material. Such a program had been outlined back in 1941 and the British special operations groups had already worked out the pattern for getting such aid to France. Initial operations had consisted of little more than the parachuting of small arms and ammunition to isolated French groups, but they gradually became more ambitious. In the fail of 1943, the Allies began to develop special units of Allied


officers and men to drop behind the enemy lines to aid in Resistance work. One type, called the "Jedburgh team," consisted of three commissioned or noncommissioned officers, one of whom was usually French. One member of each team was a radio operator and each team had its own means of communications. Another type, called an "operational group" and made up of four officers and thirty enlisted men, was set up to attack military targets and public works and to aid Resistance elements. Five of these groups from England and six from North Africa were ultimately sent. Still a third type, Special Air Service, consisted of two British regiments, two French parachute battalions, and a Belgian Independent Company, some 2,000 men in all. Troops of this service were trained either to operate unassisted by Resistance forces, to augment Resistance forces, to provide headquarters elements and junior leadership for a command organization in Resistance localities, or to provide trained specialists for Resistance forces.

In early February 1944, SHAEF became concerned over the lack of adequate airlift for the Resistance program. U.S. officers at SHAEF and in the Special Operations Branch of the Office of Strategic Services were worried in particular by the great difference in the number of British and U.S. planes assigned to supporting Resistance operations. The disparity between the eighty-five British and fourteen U.S. aircraft used for this purpose in February 1944 was increased toward the end of the month when the British assigned additional aircraft to the special operations units. Colonel Haskell, head of the Special Operations Branch, reported that, in terms of supplies and aircraft, aid to French Resistance was preponderantly British and would "quite rightly be recognized by the French as such." He contrasted delays and difficulties in getting the promised U.S. planes with British action in making available their supplementary number of thirty-two Stirlings one week after they had been allocated.44

U.S. tardiness in furnishing aircraft, which Colonel Haskell, Ambassador William Phillips, and others feared would be interpreted by the French as due to American indifference, stemmed from the difficulty of fulfilling all of the U.S. strategic bombing commitments. In mid-January, it had been found that a priority system and a careful scheduling of operations were required if the heavy demands of the Special Intelligence Services, Special Operations, Psychological Warfare, and the proposed railway bombing program were to be filled. A special committee under Lord Selborne, Minister of Economic Warfare, undertook to regularize the use of aircraft for these various activities.45

Both General Spaatz and Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory reminded SHAEF in mid-March that the POINTBLANK commitments left no additional aircraft for Resistance activities. Air Chief Marshal Tedder expressed strong doubts concerning "the merits of the SOE/SO request and the efficacy of the organization."46 Unfortunately,


General de Gaulle did not realize the factors involved in the U.S. failure to provide more aircraft. The State Department became sufficiently alarmed at his pointed references to British aid to warn General Eisenhower that the impression was being spread that the United States was opposed on political grounds to arming French Resistance forces. The Supreme Commander, at General Marshall's request, examined the situation on 1 May. He admitted that recent supplementary allotments of aircraft by the British had considerably changed the initial permanent allotment of thirty-two U.S. and twenty-two British aircraft. More British than U.S. supplies were being sent, he explained, because British stockpiles were more easily available and because British articles of issue, having been furnished Resistance forces earlier, were more acceptable to the French who were now accustomed to their use. General Eisenhower asked for more personnel and means to equalize the contributions, and added that he would try to explain the U.S. position to General Koenig.47

Despite shortages in aircraft, the special operations agencies were successful in getting considerable quantities of supplies to the Resistance groups in France. By mid April, an estimated 100,000 men had arms and ammunition. In the face of vigorous German countermeasures in 1943, and the efforts of a strong Vichy police system, estimated at 250,000, headed by Joseph Darnand, the Resistance movement continued to be active. Besides supplying information on the movement of German units, the Resistance forces conducted small-scale acts of sabotage. Their major effort was directed against the railways. Pre-D-Day intelligence reports pointed to the destruction or damage of 730 locomotives in a three-and-one-half month period.48 To deal with this problem the Germans had been forced to increase their own railway employees in France from 10,000 in January 1944 to 50,000 and to install rigid supervision of rail lines and personnel. SHAEF estimated that even with these difficulties, the enemy could carry on efforts against the Allied landings if he could maintain 100 trains per day. Since the capacity of German-controlled strategic lines was about 200 per day, the margin was still large. The Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee concluded cautiously, therefore, that the effort of the Resistance would be in the nature of a bonus which could not be determined with certainty and could not be taken into account in operational planning. The SHAEF planners asked only for a measure of delay to enemy reinforcements, pointing out that, while this might seem too small a result for such a great expenditure of lives and effort, the delay would come at "the critical period of OVERLORD when every hour is vital."49

The French drew up a series of plans in London under the general direction of the Allied special operations agencies. These plans, approved by SHAEF in the spring of 1944, included a number of specific operations against strategic railroads and highways, the electrical distribution system,


telephone and telegraph lines, munitions and gasoline dumps, and enemy headquarters.

Some weeks before D Day, special operations agencies instructed Resistance units to listen to British Broadcasting Corporation announcements at the beginning and middle of each month in order to get an alert for the commencement of operations. As soon as they received the first message, they were to remain on the alert for a second message which would give the signal. SHAEF's Message A was broadcast by BBC on 1 June and repeated the following day. On the night of 5 June all B messages were sent. On the following morning, the Resistance forces began to send detailed information on current enemy movements and started a series of attacks to forestall enemy reinforcement of the assault area.50


Table of Contents ** Previous Chapter (7) * Next Chapter (9)


1. Recommendation of Gen Morgan noted in 191 st Mtg, 18 Aug 43, COS Min (43); Morgan Memo, 24 Sep 43, COS Min (43) 575 (0); Conf, 2 Mar 44, SHAEF G-5, European Allied Contact Sec (General).

2. Memo, Grasett, 14 Apr 44, SHAEF SGS 322.01 Liaison Agreement with Allied Govts. SHAEF Memo, Policy for Future Liaison Arrangements between SHAEF and the European Allies, 25 Apr 44; Lt. Col.McFie to COSSAC, 25 Nov 43; G-3 to AFHQ, S-52398,23 May 44. All in SHAEF European Allied Contact Sec.

3. Memo, Grasett for CofS SHAEF, 27 Apr 44; Morgan to Smith, 1 May 44; Smith handwritten memo for Morgan, undated; Morgan to Grasett, 2 May 44. All in SHAEF SGS 322.01 Liaison Agreements with Allied Govts.

4. AGWAR to SHAEF, W-32575, 5 May 44; SHAEF SGS 014.1 Belgium, Civil Affairs Dir for Belgium, I. ETOUSA to AGWAR, S-51681, 11 May 44; State Dept Rad Bull 118, 16 May 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 014.1 Norway, Civil Affairs Dir for Norway. Details of the agreements may also be found in the directives of the three governments, which are in the above SHAEF SGS Norway and Belgium files and in SHAEF SGS 014.1 Netherlands, Civil Affairs Dir for Netherlands.

5. The quoted phrase is General Eisenhower's.

6. Admiral Stark, commander of U .S. Naval Forces in Europe, represented the Navy, and Brig. Gen. Charles L. Bolte, chief of staff of Headquarters, ETOUSA, represented the Army. Through his chief of staff, General Eisenhower was made aware of French problems from the time he became the ETOUSA commander. Inasmuch as there were several changes in the Army representative, Admiral Stark and his staff provided the continuity for U.S. relations with French representatives in London.

7. Statement by Roosevelt, 26 Aug 43, ABC 334.08 French Com of National Liberation.

8. Barker to Morgan, 23 and 30 Aug 43, Barker personal file; Annex 5 to Moscow Conf Min (U.S. title "Civil Affairs for France"; British title, "Basic Scheme for Administration of Liberated France"), 1 Nov 43, OPD 337. General Hilldring and General Devers had discussed phases of this paper in cables of 11 and 23 October 1943, and General Hilldring circulated an undated and unsigned copy of the document in question These papers may be found in SHAEF SGS 014.1 France, Civil Affairs Dir for France, I.

9. "Summary of views expressed by M. André Philip in London, Oct 43," with comments by Gen Barker to Ambassador Phillips, 27 Oct 43, Barker papers.

10. Memo by T. T. H. (Handy), 19 Nov 43, sub: RANKIN; Memo by Col G. A. Lincoln, 23 Nov 43 Both in OPD Exec 9, Bks 11, 13. Mtg, President and JCS, at sea, 19 Nov 43;JCS 547/2.

11. Dunn to Phillips, 4 Dec 43, with Incl, British proposals, Barker papers; Roosevelt to Marshall, 28 Apr 44, ABC O90.771 France (6 Oct 43), Sec l-A.

12. Ltr, Massigli to Wilson, 6 Jan 44, SHAEF SGS 092 France, French Relations, I.

13. Rpt from French sources, 20 Dec 43, McClure jnl, 20 Dec 43; Smith to Hilldring, W-9500, 7 Jan 44, Eisenhower personal file.

14. Eisenhower to CCS, B-15, 19Jan 44, SHAEF SGS 014.1 France, Civil Affairs Dir for France, I; JSM to Dr COS, DON 145, 22 Jan 44, COS (44) 21st Mtg, 24 Jan 44; Minute by Prime Minister for Dr COS, COS (44) 73 (0), 25 Jan 44, SHAEF SGS 092 France, French Relations, I.

15. Ltr, Smith to Ismay, 23 Jan 44; Note, Ismay to Br COS, 24 Jan 44;JSM to Br COS, DON 145,23 Jan 44; Prime Minister to Br COS, COS (44) 73 (0), 25 Jan 44; Hilldring to Eisenhower, 233, 5 Mar 44; Marshall to Eisenhower, 324, 17 Mar 44 (original letter from Roosevelt to Secy War, 15 Mar 44, CofS 091 France). All in SHAEF SGS 092 France, French Relations, I.

16. Memo of conversation with President by Ambassador Wilson, 24 Mar 44, SHAEF SGS 092 France, French Relations, I. Interv with Gen Holmes, 13 May 47.

17. Ordinance Concerning the Exercise of Military and Civil Powers on the Territory of France as It Becomes Liberated, French Com of National Liberation, 14 Mar 44; Translations of speeches by Political Info Sec, U.S. Naval Hq, French Series 17, Plans for Future Administration of Liberated French Territory, 9 May 44. French texts approved by General de Gaulle may be seen in Charles de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, 1940-46 (Paris, 1946).

18. Draft Ordinance on Return to Republican Government in France After Liberation, SHAEF SGS 092 France, French Relations, I. The draft included comments by Mr. Charles Peake, British political officer at SHAEF, who feared that the Resistance organizations might be trying to organize a dictatorship in France.

19. Wilson to CCS, NAF 661,4 Apr 44; Wilson to CCS, NAF 662,5 Apr 44; Wilson to CCS, NAF 669, 8 Apr 44. All in SHAEF SGS 092 France, French Relations, I.

20. Memo, William Phillips for CofS SHAEF, 4 Apr 44, sub: Presidential Paper on France; Memo, Gen McClure for CofS SHAEF, 5 Apr 44, sub: Draft Dir (French); Memo, Gen McClure for CofS SHAEF, 11 Apr 44, sub: Planning With the French. All in SHAEF SGS 092 France, French Relations, I. Churchill to Roosevelt, 643, 12 Apr 44, OPD misc file. London Times April 10, 1944.

21. The original minutes translated his proposal as an agreement that the question of French sovereignty would be dealt with later on. The minutes were corrected at General Koenig's request.

22. Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 15, 20 Apr 44; SHAEF SGS to AFHQ, 8-50937,29 Apr 44; Min of Mtg at Norfolk House, 25 Apr 44, dtd 26 Apr 44, and correction of min, 9 May 44. All in SHAEF SGS 092 France, French Relations, I.

23. Brooke to Eisenhower, 17 Apr 44, SHAEF SGS 311.7/1 Stoppage of Diplomatic Communications.

24. De Gaulle interv with unnamed American reporter, cited in State Dept cbl to Eisenhower, 20 May 44, Diary Office CinC, 20 and 22 May 44. Koenig to Grasett, 16 May 44; Roosevelt to Churchill, 542, 20 May 44; Churchill note to Foreign Secy, 23 May 44. All in SHAEF SGS 092 France, French Relations, I.

25. Hull to U.S. Ambassador, London, 11 May 44, SHAEF SGS 092 France, French Relations, I. Roosevelt to Eisenhower, W-36054, 13 May 44; Marshall to Eisenhower, W-36189, 13 May 44. Both in Eisenhower personal file.

26. Eisenhower to CCS, SCAF 24, 11 May 44; Roosevelt to Eisenhower, W-36054, 13 May 44; Marshall to Eisenhower, W-36189, 13 May 44; Smith to Marshall, 14 May 44. All in Eisenhower personal file.

27. Roosevelt to Churchill, 542, 20 May 44; Churchill to Foreign Secy, 23 May 44; Churchill to Foreign Secy, 26 May 44. All in SHAEF SGS 092 France, French Relations, I. London Times, May 27, 1944.

28. Intervs with Gen de Gaulle, 14 Jan 47, Sr Robert Bruce Lockhart, 18 Feb 47, Gen McClure, 29 Mar 47, and Gen Smith, 12 May 47; Gen McClure's jnl for May 44; de Gaulle, Discours et Messages, pp. 442-44 (text of speech).

29. This introductory section has been based largely on Dr. Marcel Vigneras' monograph on Rearmament of the French Forces in World War II, now in preparation in the Office of the Chief of Military History.

30. Eisenhower to Giraud, 14 Dec 43, text sent to CCS on following day, SHAEF SGS 475 France, Rearmament and Employment of French Forces, Policies and Agreements, I.

31. Algiers to War Dept, NAF 578, 4 Jan 44, cites Massigli to Wilson message, 30 Dec 43, ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43), Sec I-A.

32. Eisenhower to CCS, NAF 578, 4 Jan 44; Wilson to CCS, NAF 625, 22 Feb 44; CCS to Wilson, FAN 343,12 Mar 44. All in SHAEF SGS 475 France, Rearmament, Command and Employment of French Forces, Policies and Agreements, I.

33. JCS 804/2, 22 Apr 44; copy of French message, 3 Apr 44; Roosevelt to Prime Minister (paraphrase), 8 Apr 44; JCS 804/4, 29 Apr 44, with Incl, Note, Roosevelt to Marshall, 28 Apr 44; CCS to Wilson, FAN 343 (12 Mar 44), 18 May 44. All in ABC 091.711 France (6 Oct 43). Sec I-A.

34. Note, Gen Eisenhower, 11 Jun 51, OCMH files.

35. Mtg at Norfolk House, 9 Mar 44, dtd 28 Mar 44; Jt Int Sub-Com Rpt on French Resistance, 19 Apr 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 370.64 France, French Resistance (Guerilla Warfare), I. The various branches of the Bureau were abbreviated as BCRA, BCRAL, BCRAA. Apparently the London group at one time was also abbreviated BRAL. Since the London branch was the more important as far as SHAEF was concerned, it is that branch to which this volume will refer and the abbreviation BCRAL will be used hereafter.

36. For a discussion of SOE and its work, see Maj. Gen. Sir Colin Gubbins, "Resistance Movements in the War," Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, XCIII (May, 1948), 210-23. For a detailed study of the Resistance movement see The French Forces of the Interior, prep in French Resistance Unit, Hist Sec, ETOUSA, 1944, MS, OCMH files. The author is also indebted for comments on these and other matters dealing with the French to a special memorandum by Capt. Tracy B. Kitttedge, USNR, who read the initial draft section on French Resistance. Captain Kittredge, who as a member of Admiral Stark's staff in London served as interpreter in many interviews with the French leaders, emphasized the important role played by those Resistance units which were not controlled by the French Committee.

37. First draft of operational dir in SOE/SO, Jan 44, SHAEF G-3 Ops C 322-7, gives background information.

38. The period of 1942-44 is covered by Organization and Terms of Reference, SHAEF G-3 Ops C 322-7 (1st, 2d, and 3d covers). See, in particular, SOE/OSS Outline Plan for Supporting Operation OVERLORD, 30 Aug 43; Gen Morgan, Proposal for Control by COSSAC of SOB/SO Activities in Northwest Europe, 2 Oct 43; COS (43) 237th mtg, 15 Oct 43; Hq ETOUSA SC file 370.2/Gen, 11 Nov 43.

39. Extract of memorandum signed by General Giraud, laying down the duties of the senior French general officer in Great Britain, 24 January 1944, SHAEF SGS 092 France, French Relations, I.

40. On 20 May 1944 control of Resistance groups in southern France reverted to SHAEF by mutual agreement of the two commanders. SHAEF then issued general directives to the Mediterranean commander for action by him in support of the Normandy invasion and the proposed assault in southern France.

41. Appendix to rpt of 29 Apr 44, Resistance in Belgium, Holland, Denmark, and Norway, SHAEF SGS 370.64 France, French Resistance Groups (Guerilla Warfare), I.

42. SHAEF dir to SOE/SO, 23 Mar 44, SHAEF G-3 Ops C 322-7.

43. Ltr, Browning to Bull, 15 May 44; Lt Col J.H. Alms to Bull, 10 May 44; Bull to Browning, 22 May 44; SAC to 21 A Gp, Dir on jt opns by Resistance forces and SAS troops, 24 May 44. All in SHAEF G-3 Ops C 322-7.

44. Ltr, Haskell to Hq OSS< Washington, 22 Feb 44, SHAEF G-3 SOE/SO Ops C 322-7 Organization and Terms of Reference, 2d cover.

45. For view of Ambassador Phillips, see note of 17 Feb 44 in Memo, Bull for CofS, 18 Feb 44, SHAEF G-3 Ops C 322-7 SOE/SO Organization and Terms of Reference, 2d cover. Memo by Bull on mtg of 13 Jan 44; Marshall to Eisenhower, 8 Mar 44; Eisenhower to Marshall, B-270, 14 Mar 44; Eisenhower to Marshall, B-270, 14 Mar 44. All in SHAEF SGS 370.64 France, French Resistance Groups (Guerilla Warfare), I.

46. Bull to CHief, Plans and Opns Sec, SHAEF G-3, 9 Mar 44; Paper by Mockler-Ferryman and Haskell, 27 Mar 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 370.64 France, French Resistance Groups (Guerilla Warfare), I.

47. JCS to Eisenhower, 17 Mar 44; Eisenhower to JCS, 1 May 44. Both in SHAEF G-3 Ops 322-7 Organization and Terms of Reference, 2d cover. Marshall to Eisenhower, W-30283, 30 Apr 44, SHAEF SGS 370.64 France, French Resistance Groups (Guerilla Warfare), I.

48. JIC (44) 159, War Cabinet, Jt Intel Sub-Com Rpt, 19 Apr 44, SHAEF SGS 370.64 France, French Resistance Groups (Guerilla Warfare), I.

49. JIC (44), 159 (0), Jt. Intel Sub-Com Rpt, 19 Apr 44; SHAEF G-3 Memo, 29 Apr 44, sub: Resistance by General Public in France, SHAEF SGS 370.64 France, French Resistance Groups (Guerilla Warfare), I.

50. The French Forces of the Interior, Ch. II, pp. 387-88, OCMH.

Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Charles Hardinger for the HyperWar Foundation