Appendix A
SHAEF and the Press
June 1944-May 1945

The story of public relations in the European Theater of Operations, 1944-45, is that of an attempt by SHAEF and its subordinate headquarters to keep the public informed of operational developments without compromising the security of operations. A brief summary of SHAEF's efforts in that direction makes clear the difficulties confronting any agency which tries to reconcile these opposing interests. To inform the Allied peoples of the D-Day landing, SHAEF began preparations weeks in advance to facilitate maximum coverage of the story. Col. Joseph B. Phillips and Col. (later Brig. Gen.) David Sarnoff installed special communications for the rapid transmission of news from northern France. In addition, the Press Signal Center was established at the Ministry of Information in London with direct teleprinter circuits to SHAEF (Main) and the air, ground, and naval advance headquarters. Teletype and radio links from London to Washington permitted quick transmission to the War Department. Before D Day, correspondents were permitted to file "color" stories which were censored and ready for transmission when the assault began. Early on 6 June, newsmen met at Macmillan Hall, University of London, where they were locked in the Press Room and furnished maps and background material on the attack. At 0830 Col. R. Ernest Dupuy, an American member of the SHAEF Public Relations Division (PRD), read the brief official communiqué which had been written several days previously and carefully censored to prevent the enemy from learning anything of the Allies' future plans. The correspondents then wrote their stories, had them censored, and were ready to send their copy when G-3 flashed the code word TOPFLIGHT, which was the signal for release of information. Teams of censors at the Ministry of Information, at the beachhead, and on naval assault craft passed more than 700,000 words on D Day.1

Naturally, in the initial period of the invasion, the press coverage of D Day could not be maintained. Like everything else in the beachhead, press communications were limited and many newsmen were unable to file all their copy for transmission to the United States and the United Kingdom. The opening of new transmitters in late June and early July improved the situation, but the breakthrough and rapid pursuit which followed

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put additional burdens on SHAEF, the army groups, and the armies, with the result that not until the Allies reached Paris were sufficient facilities available to meet the need of correspondents in the field. Besides attempting to equalize opportunities for transmitting copy dealing with the various armies in Normandy, SHAEF also took steps during the first week of the invasion to avoid invidious comparisons between national armies. On 13 June, the authors of SHAEF communiqués were informed that the Supreme Commander desired "that in the future references to American and British troops, as such, be held to the very minimum and the term ‘Allied troops' be used instead." As an example, they were told that a previous reference to "American" troops liberating Carentan should have read "Allied." Thus, in August, on the eve of the drive to Paris, Colonel Dupuy warned General Smith that unless the approaching American breakout was summarized and depicted as part of an integrated assault, "the importance of the British-Canadian offensive in its zone may be minimized, with resultant embarrassment to Anglo-American relations, as well as distortion of the over-all picture." He urged the chief of staff to give an interview which would put the contributions of the various armies into the proper perspective.2

Holding the view that democratic peoples must be told as much as possible concerning the accomplishments of their armies, the Supreme Commander went as far as he could, consistent with security, toward announcing full details of his forces' activities. He attempted to maintain the same policy for both British and U.S. armies, but found that the War Office was more conservative than the War Department in releasing names of units and commanding officers. In mid-July, he notified Montgomery that so far as U.S. units were concerned SHAEF would follow War Department practice.3 He acceded, however, to a British request that senior British officers be reminded that they were not adhering to a directive of 7 February 1944 regarding interviews. This forbade statements on policy and future conduct of the war without approval of the British Government, and required senior officers to get approval of the service department concerned before granting interviews.4

Despite curbs on interviews by senior officers, the way was left open for frank comments in the form of "off-the-record" statements which were not attributable to the commander concerned. These were used, in particular, for guidance to correspondents on matters which had to be kept secret but on which they wished to be able to comment intelligently once the ban of secrecy was removed. The device was also exceedingly valuable in dealing with questions of military policy which might otherwise be misunderstood. In the latter case, an interesting example was shown in the handling of reports on the reception given Allied troops in Normandy by the French. After the enthusiasm of the first week of the invasion had passed, correspondents began to report stories of French unfriendliness. Evidence of well-filled shops in Bayeux was interpreted as meaning that the French had prospered under German rule. French citizens were

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charged with sniping at Allied troops and giving aid to German troops. General Eisenhower found it necessary in late June to issue a special press release declaring that investigation had shown "no authenticated use of French civilian snipers." He emphasized on the contrary that French Resistance had been "a great contribution in support of Allied operations." General Koenig, aroused at what he considered a campaign in the British press to underline unfriendly gestures on the part of the French, wrote to ask the Supreme Commander for information of such incidents. Before the letter arrived, General Smith had called a meeting of the Public Relations Council of SHAEF, which included representatives of SHAEF, ETOUSA, the Department of State, the Foreign Office, and the British and U.S. information agencies, to consider press trends regarding the French. This meeting led to other conferences with the newsmen in which they were given detailed information on the situation in Normandy and fuller details on the constructive contributions of the French to the Allied advance. By the beginning of July, General McClure of the Psychological Warfare Division was able to report a changed tone in newspaper accounts of the situation in France.5

Unfavorable reactions from the Allied governments to certain types of stories were responsible for changes in SHAEF censorship rules during the early weeks of invasion. The public relations director was reminded officially of Mr. Churchill's earlier reaction to reports of the chivalrous treatment by Germans of U.S. wounded. The Prime Minister had felt that, since for one good deed they committed four hundred bad ones, there was no need of singling out the unique experience for publicity. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, equally certain of the need of curbing statements which might invite reprisals, pleaded for a stop to statements such as the one in which a U.S. officer was quoted as saying that Allied paratroopers did not take prisoners.

A strong official protest was made by the Soviet Embassy to the State Department in mid-July concerning a statement, attributed to SHAEF, which reflected on the fighting qualities of Russian troops in the German Army in Normandy. The Russian chargé described the remark as one "defaming the Soviet people and casting a shade on Soviet citizens in military service who found themselves in German captivity." After extensive correspondence between the War and State Departments and SHAEF, General Eisenhower denied that SHAEF officials had made any remarks on the subject to the Allied press. He agreed that statements similar to the ones mentioned had been included in dispatches filed by reputable correspondents, and that these had been passed by the SHAEF censors since no security question was involved. The War Department passed on this answer to the State Department, expressing its willingness to look further into the matter if such action was desired. One of the chief effects of this exchange of correspondence seems to have been the issuance of a memorandum by Headquarters, USSTAF, warning U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe of the danger of statements offensive to the Soviets which might be made to correspondents by airmen returning from Soviet

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men be impressed with the fact "that they are to say nothing critical of the Russians which might endanger our present relations with them." While the War Department apparently took no similar action, Lt. Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, Deputy Chief of Staff, regretted that Allied press representatives had not seen fit "voluntarily to limit their news dispatches, so as to avoid causing resentment on the part of the Government of a nation that is contributing so greatly to the defeat of the common enemy."6

With the liberation of Paris, the SHAEF Public Relations Division entered a new phase. Until that time, the number of correspondents permitted on the Continent had been limited, and a rotation system had been imposed on all correspondents except those from news agencies and major independent newspapers. Correspondents were subject to recall to the United Kingdom after thirty days in the combat zone. The main offices of the PRD remained in London during this period with the result that it was somewhat out of touch with the situation on the Continent. In late August the division was able to get General Smith to withdraw his usual opposition to placing SHAEF agencies in Paris and approve the establishment of PRD in the French capital, where it was possible to receive a greater number of newsmen. The Hotel Scribe, near the Opera, was reserved for billets, messing, and accommodations for Allied correspondents in addition to SHAEF censorship, briefing, and information services.

The number of correspondents accredited to SHAEF for the European Theater of Operations grew steadily after the invasion. From 530 on 7 June the number rose to 924 on 1 January 1945 and to 996 shortly before the war's end.7 Although the vast majority of this group was attached to units in the field, the task of furnishing censorship guidance, providing communications for copy filed at SHAEF, the accreditation of all correspondents for the ETO, and the outlining of broad policy for public relations throughout the theater imposed a heavy burden on SHAEF PRD.

The growing responsibilities of the division threw a heavy strain on its chief, General Davis, who had been ill for a number of weeks. He had asked in the summer to be relieved of his duties, but at the urging of General Eisenhower remained at his task while a search was made for a satisfactory replacement. One was finally found in September in the person of Brig. Gen. Frank A. Allen, Jr., then chief of intelligence of 6th Army Group.8 He assumed his post on 28 September. General Davis later improved in health and returned to the less strenuous position of adjutant general of SHAEF which he had held earlier in the year.9

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The shift of the Public Relations Division from London to Paris was made gradually, and it was not until 10 October that the first briefing conference was held in Paris. By this time three commercial transmitters, Radio France, Press Wireless, and MacKay Radio, were in operation between Paris and the United States. One commercial and two Army links were open to the United Kingdom. These facilities were augmented and improved to the extent that by the end of the month an average of nearly 60,000 words per day was being handled by the radio transmitters. In addition, air courier service took a daily average of 3,729 words to the United States and 8,120 words to the United Kingdom (part of these also went to the United States). An Army broadcasting line which connected Paris with the British Broadcasting Corporation was replaced by a BBC transmitter in the Hotel Scribe. By the end of November the daily average of copy sent from Paris to the United States and United Kingdom had risen to about 108,000 words. More facilities were added in December with the laying of a BBC submarine cable, initiation of voicecasts from the city of Luxembourg, and the installation of an additional teleprinter line to the United Kingdom. The Public Relations Division, besides sending copy to the United States by mail, also provided means for making records of interviews to be sent to broadcasting stations in the United States.10

Censorship problems arose for the Public Relations Division even before its movement to the Continent. An advance party of SHAEF censors, going into Paris shortly after the first Allied forces had entered the city, reported that six American and British correspondents had broadcast details of the liberation of the French capital without submitting their copy to Allied censors. SHAEF suspended for sixty days the right of the correspondents to remain on the Continent, but permitted them to carry out their normal duties in the United Kingdom.11

A particularly difficult assignment for PRD was that of providing censorship for the French press. France, unlike Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway, had not adopted the voluntary system of censorship. Instead, it had signed an agreement permitting the Supreme Commander to exercise strict military censorship of press, radio, cinema, and, in general, all publications in the forward zone. In the zone of interior the French authorities were required to consult SHAEF censors on all news pertaining to military operations and to carry out auxiliary censorship instructions communicated by SHAEF. French publicity services were to facilitate the task of the Supreme Commander. Forty-five SHAEF censors were allocated as liaison officers with censors in liberated countries. Of these, twenty-four were assigned to cover the French press. The first four of the group had come to France at the beginning of July, and the group steadily increased after the liberation of Paris.12

Press activities declined slightly during the period of the German counter offensive in the Ardennes as security blackouts were imposed. For the first time since D Day the

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number of words sent in a given month dropped below that of the previous month. After mid-January the volume of words began to rise and continued to increase until the end of the war. The Public Relations Division expanded its censorship services and telecommunication facilities to take care of new demands. The army groups had their own teleprinter connections to Paris and London, and by the beginning of February the Ninth Air Force and army press camps had set up five commercial mobile transmitters. The BBC had its own mobile transmitters with the British and Canadian armies, and regular Army sets with the American armies. A special short-wave transmitter was opened at Luxembourg on Christmas Day for press voicecasting and direct broadcasting to the United States. To provide for a sudden news development, such as the entry into Berlin, the Public Relations Division built flying radio stations into two flying fortresses for use to the United States and the United Kingdom.

Through the Communications Zone SHAEF also had the use of the world's largest mobile radio station, housed in seventeen vans. Under construction by a French firm for the Luftwaffe, the apparatus had been seized by American forces and completed by them. The 60-kilowatt transmitter was capable of communicating with Washington over three teletype channels, which could be used simultaneously with a fourth channel that provided voice or picture transmission. General Eisenhower's train was also fitted up with radio equipment in case it should be needed for surrender negotiations. Near the end of the war it was estimated that the facilities in Paris could send an average of 250,000 words per day. An average of nearly one million words were sent weekly by telegraph, plus an uncounted amount by courier, and an average of 150 broadcasts a week by Paris studios. During the last week of the war, two million words were telegraphed, and 200 broadcasts made from Paris.13

SHAEF continued also to send an impressive amount of material from London. Some concept of the Public Relations Division's task may be seen in a breakdown of the words censored in the two cities during the last four months of the war.

Words of Copy Submitted for Censorship
Month Paris London
January 1945 2,917,435 2,307,750
February 3,445,676 2,639,250
March 4,948,042 2,894,500
April 4,281,475 2,138,000
Photographs Submitted for Censorship
January 1945 16,133 224,103
February 22,886 226,765
March 36,691 339,537
April 27,861 148,599

These statistics do not tell the entire story, since censors were also on duty at army groups and armies, while others dealt with copy in liberated newspapers, and with amateur photographers' film. An example may be found in a busy, but not a peak, month such as February 1945 in which copy handled by censors at SHAEF and the three army groups totaled 13,075,600 words, public relations officer copy to be mailed home 9,529,345 words, scrutiny of domestic press 44,221,377 words, still pictures 208,965 feet, and amateur film 1,128,155 feet (still pictures 1,089,155 and movie 39,000 feet).14

SHAEF's Public Relations Division had the task not only of censoring stories to

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prevent breaches of security and the disturbance of good relations between Allies, but also of publicizing the exploits of various units to aid morale. This became difficult when commanders like General Patton by their personal color and their slashing advances overshadowed the hard work of other commanders and armies. SHAEF was concerned less by the disparity in coverage than by the possible harm done to the morale of units whose efforts had not been adequately recognized. General Smith reminded the Public Relations Division of this problem in early September and asked that briefing officers call especial attention to the work of General Hodges' First Army. "In other words," he said, "try to attract a little more attention to Hodges and Bradley as against Patton's colorful appeal to the press. This without detriment to Patton."15 These efforts did not succeed in gaining additional recognition for the First Army, although they may have been responsible for growing Third Army suspicion of SHAEF.

In February 1945, the director of the Public Relations Division, General Allen, suggested that the morale of armies and corps could be developed better if there was more equitable coverage of their activities. To achieve this, he proposed that briefing officers no longer refer to armies by the names of their commanders, but merely call them by their official names. After a month of experiment, the Public Relations Division admitted that the plan did not work and that the colorful commanders were still getting most of the space. The less well known commanders, now that they were not being specifically identified, were no longer being written about. Colonel Dupuy, deputy director of PRD, proposed that the old method of referring to the commander and his army be restored.16 A similar problem existed in the First French Army because the press tended to play up the exploits of the French Forces of the Interior. So strong did feeling on the subject become in late September 1944 that SHAEF had to order that communiqués and press briefings emphasize the contributions of the First French Army and "soft pedal FFI." "Emphasis placed on FFI by French press and radio to the exclusion of the French Army is producing serious situation, political and otherwise."17

From time to time the Allied correspondents protested to SHAEF because of news blackouts, delays in passing stories, failure of censors at various headquarters to follow a consistent pattern, release of information at SHAEF which army headquarters were not allowed to release, use of censorship for political rather than security purposes, and refusals to release "horrifics" and stories of reverses. Of this group of complaints, the one most frequently voiced was the lack of consistency in clearing stories. Most correspondents agreed that the news blackouts during major attacks were necessary. The complaints concerned the way in which the lifting of these blackouts was timed. Frequently, by accident, an army censor would release part of the story. As soon as this was known, the correspondents at other headquarters would demand that they be allowed to use the same material. The other censors were still bound by their

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instructions to continue the blackout until official clearance was given. Thus, sometimes a correspondent covering an action at one of the armies would find himself "scooped" by a correspondent at SHAEF and still be told by the army censor that he could not release the story. The censors struggled constantly to find a standard which all of them could use in passing copy. Considerable use of BBC broadcasts was made, since it was found that they normally contained all news released at the various headquarters. So far as delays in clearing copy were concerned, the censors were supposed to explain reasons for delays to the correspondents and to advise them of any changes in copy so that they could discuss the matter with the chief censor or carry the matter higher.18

On the question of "horrifics" and reverses, the censors acted in accord with the policy followed by both the War Department and Supreme Headquarters of passing any story which did not give information to the enemy. Statistics on casualties were issued rather regularly, although a time lag was maintained to prevent the enemy from determining the effectiveness of any current defense the Allies might be making. SHAEF applied a temporary stop to the report of more than 8,600 casualties in the 106th Division at the outset of the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes, but after a protest from the War Depart-, ment agreed that the action of the censor was a mistake.19

SHAEF censors discovered that radio broadcasting, in particular, created a number of special censorship problems. Especially serious were premature releases of information on coming attacks. In several cases the chief difficulty came not so much from actual broadcasts as from preliminary statements made by the radio reporter to his home office before his censored broadcast began. The enemy could monitor the information thus sent and be forewarned. In other cases the British Broadcasting Corporation used uncensored information in its news announcements. On the eve of a First Army attack in early January 1945, Mr. Cyril Ray of BBC announced from the Third Army headquarters that an action was shortly to take place. His accreditation was withdrawn. Shortly afterward General Devers protested strongly a BBC announcement that a number of divisions were being withdrawn from the Allied right flank, leaving the Seventh Army with an extended front. This gave information to the Germans of the attack, and alarmed the French population of the area. General Devers suggested that, if the directors of BBC could not be controlled on the basis of military security, they should be warned that they were endangering Allied relations. The censors were particularly upset because they found themselves attacked in the first instance by correspondents at the First Army headquarters who had been "scooped." The SHAEF censors finally released as much of the story as had been announced by BBC.20

Because of the speed with which information from a BBC broadcast could be picked up, breaches of security by it were more helpful to the enemy than similar statements in the press. It was charged that enemy fire fell on Allied troops in seventeen minutes after a casual newscast indicated that they were entering the factory district of Aachen. As a result of this type

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of incident, field commanders and troops sometimes overlooked the very great services which the British Broadcasting Corporation was rendering the Allied cause in its services to American and British radio programs, its propaganda work, its key contribution to Resistance activities, and the tremendous achievements in the field of morale building in liberated and occupied countries.

Partly because of their mistrust of BBC, there seems to have been a readiness on the part of many American troops and correspondents to accept as genuine a fake German broadcast which purported to be a BBC attack on General Eisenhower during the battle of the Ardennes. The reaction was sufficiently strong that Mr. Brendan Bracken, British Minister of Information, felt it necessary to disavow the program and affirm the complete confidence of the British people and the BBC in General Eisenhower and the American forces.

A particularly embarrassing episode for SHAEF came in late April when the BBC made a premature announcement of the link-up of the Russians and Americans near Torgau despite elaborate precautions to have the announcement made simultaneously in Moscow, Washington, and London. In this instance, a French news agency had sent out by radio the announcement to be held for a release date. The information was monitored by BBC, which interrupted a scheduled program to announce the news. SHAEF officials submitted sharp protests to the governors of BBC as a result of this action.21

The most widely publicized breach of censorship involved an American newsman who prematurely announced the signing of the instrument of surrender at Reims. One of the seventeen correspondents to witness the signature, Mr. Edward Kennedy, chief of the Associated Press bureau in Paris, made use of an open wire from the Hotel Scribe to give the story of the surrender to the Associated Press bureau in London. Unaware that the story had not been released, the London bureau flashed it to the United States. Kennedy, who had been in difficulties with SHAEF as recently as February 1945 over a story that President Roosevelt was coming to Paris to investigate scandals in the Army's handling of the relief program for French civilians, held that the story had been broken by the German radio which was broadcasting Admiral Doenitz' orders to his forces to cease fighting.22 Since the German high command was supposedly acting under the orders of SHAEF, he felt that this action absolved him from his promise not to release the story until it had been released by SHAEF. Such an interpretation was not followed by the other sixteen correspondents at Reims nor by the other newspapermen in Europe, all of whom were aware of the surrender story. The story was branded as unofficial, and the Associated Press and its representatives in London and Paris were suspended until an investigation could be held. The Associated Press protested the suspension of its entire organization, and the War Department ruled that, since all agreements relative to censorship were made between correspondents and SHAEF, responsibility had to be placed on the individual newsman. The ban against the Associated Press was lifted despite the bitter protests

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of more than fifty correspondents at an indignation meeting in Paris on 8 May in which they attacked General Allen and the Public Relations Division of Supreme Headquarters. The G-1, SHAEF, and the Judge Advocate, ETOUSA, appointed to investigate the incident, announced on 12 May that there were no grounds for court martial proceedings but recommended that the credentials of Mr. Kennedy and his assistant, Mr. Morton Gudebrod, be withdrawn and that the two correspondents be returned to the United States. This action was carried out on 14 May, the Associated Press expressed its regrets, and on the following day SHAEF, in a statement praising the other correspondents for not releasing the story, declared the incident closed.23

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Table of Contents
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Footnotes

1. SHAEF PRD, Communications Section History; SHAEF PRD Press Censorship History; SHAEF Signals Division History.

2. Memo, SGS (for Gen Eisenhower) for G–3, 13 Jun 44; Col Dupuy to CofS SHAEF, 13 Aug 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 000.7, Policy re Release of Info to the Press, II.

3. Eisenhower to Montgomery, 17 Jul 44, Eisenhower personal file.

4. British COS to Eisenhower, COS(44) 237, 15 Jul 44, SHAEF SGS 000.7, Policy re Release of Info to the Press, I.

5. Public Relations Council Mtg, at WIDEWING, 21 Jun 44; SHAEF Press Release 46, 26 Jun 44; Koenig to Smith, 30 Jun 44; Smith to Koenig, 7 Jul 44. All in SHAEF SGS 000.7, Policy re Release of Info to the Press, I.

6. Chief Military Adviser (Br) to Press Censorship (Br) to PRD, 28 Jul 44; Dupuy to CofS SHAEF, 27 Jul 44; Eden to Smith, 5 Aug 44; Smith to Eden, 6 Aug 44; Ltr, Hull to Actg Secy Robert P. Patterson, 18 JuI 44, with Incl, Ltr, Russian Chargé A. Kapustin to Hull; Ltr, McNarney to Eisenhower, 22 Jul 44; Ltr, Eisenhower to McNarney, 27 Jul 44; Dupuy to Eisenhower, 27 Jul 44; USSTAF Memo, 2 Aug 44, sub: Intervs regarding Russia; Ltr, Stimson to Hull, 2 Aug 44; Ltr, McNarney to Eisenhower, 2 Aug 44. All in SHAEF SGS 000.7, Policy re Release of Info to the Press, I and II.

7. Of the 996, 362 were Americans, 349 British, 126 French, 61 Canadian, 38 Dominion, and 60 from other Allied newspapers. See lists of war correspondents accredited to SHAEF, 1 January 1945 and 25 April 1945, SHAEF SGS 000.74, Press Correspondents, II.

8. In the period during General Davis' illness, Colonel Dupuy acted as chief of PRD. On General Allen, see 1st Lt. John J. Briscoe, The Kennedy Affair (unpublished thesis, 1949, University of Missouri), and Ltr, Gen Allen to author, 23 Jun 50.

9. Surles to Smith, W-80405, 14 Aug 44; SHAEF GO 20, 24 Sep 44. Both in SHAEF SGS 322.01 PRD, Org and Personnel PRD. Butcher, My Three Years With Eisenhower, pp. 614, 640, 650.

10. SHAEF Public Relations Division War Diary, Oct, Nov, Dec 44.

11. Dupuy to Hq Comd SHAEF, FWD S-59828, 15 Sep 44; Dupuy to CofS SHAEF, 4 Sep 44; SHAEF to WD, S-59223, 6 Sep 44. All in SHAEF SGS 000.74, Press Correspondents, I.

12. Press Censorship Detachment, SHAEF, History of United States and Supreme Headquarters, AEF, Press Censorship in the European Theater of Operations, 1942-1945 (hereafter cited as History of U.S. and SHAEF Press Censorship), July 1945, pp. 147-75. For French agreement see Memo 4 in CCS Directive for Civil Affairs Administration in Continental France, 26 Aug 44, SHAEF SGS 014 France, Civil Affairs Dir for France, I.

13. SHAEF Public Relations Division War Diary, Oct, Nov, Dec 44.

14. PRD diary.

15. Smith to SHAEF Main, FWD 14009, 6 Sep 44, SHAEF SGS 000.7, Policy re Release of Info to the Press, II.

16. Director PRD to CofS SHAEF, 6 Feb 45; Allen to A Gps et al., S-78199, 7 Feb 45; Dupuy to CofS SHAEF, 9 Mar 45; SHAEF to A Gps et al., S-81730, 12 Mar 45, SHAEF cbl log.

17. SHAEF Fwd to SHAEF Main, FWD 1556, 23 Sep 44. SHAEF SGS 000.7, Policy re Release of Info to the Press, II.

18. History of U.S. and SHAEF Press Censorship, Ch. 19.

19. Smith to Marshall, 12 Jan 45, SHAEF cbl log.

20. Statement by PRD SHAEF, 11 Jan 45, SHAEF SGS 000.73, Policy and Infractions of Press Censorship, I; Devers to SHAEF, 7 Jan 45, SHAEF cbl log.

21. History of U.S. and SHAEF Press Censorship, Ch. 20. Brendan Bracken to Gen Smith, RR-15103, 10 Jan 45; SHAEF to PRD, S-74607, 11 Jan 45. Both in SHAEF cbl log.

22. Reichsminister Graf Schwerin von Krosigk announced the capitulation to the German people on 7 May.

23. For full details of the incident see folder on Kennedy case in SHAEF PRD files. See also 1st Lt. John J. Briscoe, The Kennedy Affair (unpublished thesis, 1949, University of Missouri). Mr. Kennedy's side of the story is given in his article, "I'd Do It Again," Atlantic Monthly, CLXXXII (August, 1948), 36-41. In 1948, through the aid of Senator Sheridan Downey, Mr. Kennedy's case was presented to General Eisenhower, then U.S. Army Chief of Staff, who restored the newsman's credentials as war correspondent.



Transcribed and formatted for HTML by Charles Hardinger for the HyperWar Foundation