Appendix B
SHAEF Personnel

In the early organization of COSSAC, its British members were supplied by the Home Forces Command, while its U.S. members were provided under a plan by which the War Department allotted additional grades and ratings to Headquarters, ETOUSA, which in turn supplied officers and men to COSSAC. On 8 December 1943, the U.S. contingent at COSSAC consisted of 215 officers and 204 enlisted men and the British group consisted of 274 officers and 410 other ranks.1

The first Tables of Organization and War Establishments planned for SHAEF proper were set up in mid-January 1944 in accordance with the COSSAC form of organization and did not include personnel for G-1 or Headquarters Command. The U.S. portion was to consist of 291 officers and 459 men, and the British portion was to consist of 277 officers and 470 men for a total of 1,497.

With the formal appointment of a Supreme Commander in February 1944, steps were taken to get new allotments for his headquarters. Efforts were made to maintain a fairly equal proportion between U.S. and British personnel, although it differed sharply in the various divisions. The proportion depended in most cases on the nationality of the chief of division and the nature of the work to be performed. Thus, in G-2, headed by a British officer, the personnel was almost two to one British, whereas in the Adjutant General Division, organized completely along U.S. lines, there was only one British officer and the enlisted personnel was two to one American.

In March 1944, the British amended their existing War Establishments for COSSAC to provide more personnel for SHAEF (eight amended War Establishments were issued between the organization of COSSAC and the end of the war), and the War Department announced a Table of Organization for SHAEF (only one other U.S. Table of Organization was issued for Supreme Headquarters during the war).

The divisions of Supreme Headquarters grew rapidly as plans were pushed for the invasion, but Headquarters Command and special detachments made the chief demands for personnel. Americans constituted the greater part of the security forces, while the British provided a large

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percentage of signal troops. By 12 July 1944, Supreme Headquarters (less special detachments) numbered 1,185 officers, 101 warrant officers, and 3,628 enlisted personnel. (Table 4)2 The non-T/O increments had been added, in the case of the British, by constant amendments to the War Establishments and, in the case of the Americans, by additions from the theater non-T/O allotment granted to Headquarters, ETOUSA.

In July 1944, the War Office announced that the existing manpower shortage in the British Army made it necessary to limit the number of British personnel in Supreme Headquarters. A proposal was made to set 7,000 as the maximum British allotment to SHAEF. This number was to be cut 10 percent initially and then built up as needed to the maximum. No effort was made to discuss a similar limitation on U.S. personnel, since the Allies recognized that no limits could be set until it was known how large a staff would be needed to advise General Eisenhower in his capacity of theater commander of U.S. forces.

In early March 1944, the War Department, in issuing a non-T/O allotment for SHAEF, warned of the lack of U.S. personnel and said that the non-T/O overhead requirement then issued would be final for the theater unless additional functions were assigned by the War Department. Any increase requested for a unit, installation, or activity in the theater would have to be compensated for by decreases elsewhere. Mindful of this fact, and aware of the activities of the British to limit personnel in SHAEF, General Smith in October 1944 asked the G-1 to see if the U.S. staff of Supreme Headquarters could be reduced.

Instead of finding ways to reduce the U.S. contingent of SHAEF, the G-1 discovered a need for more men. Pointing to the inadequacy of the March 1944 allotment, General Barker indicated that whereas the British had issued several War Establishments the Americans had merely authorized overstrength. The result was a lack of ratings for many divisions. Americans remained for several months in grade, while their British opposites were being promoted one or more times. In sending this report to the War Department, the SHAEF chief of staff explained that initial personnel estimates for Supreme Headquarters failed to anticipate the growth of SHAEF and its activities. Part of the increase had become necessary when the G-6 Division was divided into the Psychological Warfare and Public Relations Divisions. A second increase had followed the formation of non-T/O operational field units which were required to aid field units. These included psychological warfare groups and units that handled Allied prisoners of war. Since these SHAEF-sponsored activities could not be transferred elsewhere, they had to remain a charge on Supreme Headquarters.

General Smith pointed out that SHAEF had been unable to solve the problem by reductions in staff and by reorganization. Instead of improving, the situation was growing worse as new demands were made for the U.S. Group Control Council, missions to liberated countries, and staffs for the control, disarmament, and demobilization of German ground forces.

SHAEF's requests for more personnel were granted in December 1944 although fewer high grades were made available than had been requested. Meanwhile, the British were attempting to cut their

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allotment to Supreme Headquarters. In September 1944 the ceiling of 7,000 British personnel for SHAEF had been reduced to 5,245 after more than a thousand air troops had been transferred to the 21 Army Group. On 15 December British officers at SHAEF were told that any requests for an increase of personnel in one section would be granted only if it was clear that a corresponding reduction could be made elsewhere.

When the German counteroffensive in the Ardennes threatened to prolong the war and thus impose additional strains on Allied manpower, the War Office asked that the British contingent of SHAEF consider further reductions of personnel "irrespective of present approved establishments and with recognition of the fact that standards of performance may fall." The possibility of making increased use of local sources of manpower and of reducing security units on duty in non-operational areas was suggested. In passing this information on to British officers in late December, General Morgan indicated that a minimum reduction of 5 percent should be kept in mind in making the survey.

After studying the situation, General Whiteley, deputy G–3 of SHAEF, concluded that there was little chance of reducing the British contingent. In reviewing the numbers of special troops at Supreme Headquarters, he showed that in the groups included under Headquarters Command the British furnished only seventeen officers and 268 other ranks in contrast to the 150 officers and 2,000 enlisted men provided by the Americans. The British security group at the headquarters, he continued, consisted of thirty-six men as opposed to 3,000 U.S. military police and a U.S. defense battalion of 1,000. Furthermore, in SHAEF proper a 5 percent reduction would result in a saving of only twenty-two officers and fifty-seven other ranks. He noted that it was not feasible to reduce the personnel in SHAEF by substituting liberated or co-operationist manpower since in the Car Company, one of the few places where such personnel could be used on a wide scale, there was already a dilution of up to 60 percent.

General Whiteley made clear that the initial intention of the SHAEF planners to preserve a balance between British and U.S. personnel had been changed and that any further reduction in the British contingent would upset the balance even more. He added that this was not considered to be a material factor. General Morgan in mid-January indicated that two problems were involved in the matter of staff reduction: (1) reducing personnel on the basis that the headquarters was overstaffed; and (2) releasing high-category young men who could give better service in more active employment. He asked, therefore, for further review of the possibilities of reducing the British staff and suggested a survey of U.S. personnel with the same end in mind. On 1 February, he pressed the point still further and asked that an effort be made to cut the staff by 10 percent and that young officers and men be replaced by limited service and ATS personnel. Under this directive, the divisions made reductions in their British members, with the result that General Whiteley on 26 April was able to report an 8.4 percent cut.

U.S. efforts to cut the number of military personnel in the headquarters were prompted by General Eisenhower’s order of 31 December 1944 that drastic reductions be made to release every available man for combat or purely military duty.

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On 7 January 1945, in a report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, he announced that a reserve was to be created for use against further German counterattacks, by means of an order: "(1) to comb out personnel from the Communications Zone, Line of Communications units, and Army Air Forces and to train these personnel as replacements for combat units; (2) to convert units which are the least essential to our requirements; (3) to make the maximum use of liberated manpower both for combat and rear area duties."

Under this policy, headquarters and service troops were screened for men who could be replaced or who were fitted for combat duty. When suitable limited service or female replacements were found, changes were made in the existing organization. The U.S. policy established for officers during this period was to avoid if possible the use in headquarters of officers under thirty-five years of age who were in Medical Category A. Headquarters, SHAEF, was reduced by approximately 2,300 overall in the period between 1 February and 1 April. (Tables 5 and 6)3 The reductions came, however, in special troops, since there was actually an increase of about 100 in the general and special staff sections.

After 1 April, there were no more great efforts to cut personnel. As the war reached its climax and the fall of Germany grew near, dozens of agencies had to be activated to deal with censorship, psychological warfare, prisoner of war exchange, civil affairs activities, and signal communications. The result was a mushrooming of units attached to or located near Supreme Headquarters. As early as 5 January 1945, the chief of staff had attempted to separate these agencies from the general and special staff divisions. On 19 April 1945, this goal was achieved with the announcement that SHAEF would consist of three principal components: (1) Supreme Headquarters staff-Office of the Supreme Commander, Office of the Chief of Staff, general and special staff sections, EAC Section, and political advisers; (2) special troops-Headquarters Command, British Local Administrative Appointments, and operational agencies functioning under Supreme Headquarters control; (3) liaison agencies-SHAEF missions to France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway.

The pyramiding of special units assigned, attached, or located near SHAEF went on so rapidly that it is difficult to make any accurate estimate of the U.S. contingent at the end of the war. As additional officers and men were added in preparation for the activation of USFET at Frankfurt, the total number of American troops passed the 18,000 mark. The addition of air, naval, UNRRA, special missions, military government, and British personnel gave an estimated force of more than 30,000 military or Allied civilian personnel associated with Supreme Headquarters. This number in turn was swelled by displaced persons, German civilians, and prisoners of war who were used by the thousands in construction work and as drivers, clerks, housekeepers, cooks, waitresses, and janitors (six months after the dissolution of SHAEF this group employed by Headquarters Command, USFET, numbered 23,000, of whom 14,000 were civilians).

On the following pages are tables showing the size of SHAEF in July 1944 shortly before SHAEF elements moved to the Continent, in February 1945 when efforts were made to reduce the size of headquarters, and again in April 1945 when

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SHAEF was preparing the last great offensive. In interpreting these statistics it is essential to remember that many of the agencies and detachments carried on SHAEF rolls were never located at Supreme Headquarters but were attached to lower units. Press censorship detachments, psychological warfare consolidation teams, wireless sections, technical maintenance sections, and cipher sections are examples of these groups. The SHAEF missions to France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway were also located elsewhere.

Housekeeping and security detachments were considerably augmented because of the number of agencies located at or near SHAEF which had to be furnished communications and protection.

While it is almost impossible to arrive at the exact number of personnel at SHAEF at a given time, because of constant shifts in agencies and the separation of the headquarters into advance, forward, and rear echelons, one can approach an accurate figure by counting the officers and men assigned to the general and special staff sections and the Headquarters Command.

TABLE 4--AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, 12 JULY 1944

OORGANIZATION TOTAL OFFICERS WARRANT OFFICERS ENLISTED
TOTAL U.S. BRITISH U.S. BRITISH U.S. BRITISH U.S. BRITISH
Total 4,914 3,476 1,438 764 421 52 49 2,660 968
Supreme Commander, Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, Secretary General Staff 193 156 37 27 13 7 2 122 22
General Eisenhower's Personal Staff 24 24 0 11 0 1 0 12 0
European Allied Contact Section 19 10 9 4 4 0 0 6 5
Adjutant General Division 15 92 23 14 1 10 2 68 20
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 143 63 80 24 28 1 3 38 49
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 563 336 227 128 83 4 6 204 138
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 282 156 126 61 53 2 3 93 70
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 439 266 173 97 64 7 10 162 99
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 351 189 162 69 59 5 8 115 95
Psychological Warfare Division 428 361 67 118 25 2 1 241 41
Air Defense Division 48 26 22 6 6 0 1 20 15
Engineer Division 97 51 46 20 18 1 2 30 26
Signal Division 167 99 68 40 32 3 3 56 33
Medical Division 13 6 7 3 3 0 1 3 3
Local Administrative Appointments 342 0 342 0 7 0 5 0 330
Headquarters Command 1,574 1,574 0 114 0 8 0 1,452 0
Source: SHAEF SGS 320.3 T/O and WE for SHAEF.

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TABLE 5--AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, 1 FEBRUARY 1945

OORGANIZATION TOTAL OFFICERS WARRANT OFFICERS ENLISTED
TOTAL U.S. BRITISH U.S. BRITISH U.S. BRITISH U.S. BRITISH
Total 16,312 9,992 6,320 1,581 1,229 67 88 8,344 5,003

General Staff--Total 2,004 1,163 841 404 311 29 35 730 495
Supreme Commander, Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, Secretary General Staff 216 157 59 27 14 7 3 123 42
European Allied Contact Section 14 5 9 3 4 0 0 2 5
Political Advisors 4 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 1
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 142 71 71 26 26 1 4 44 41
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 494 287 207 112 77 4 5 171 125
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 284 156 128 60 54 3 3 93 71
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 500 297 203 106 76 9 12 182 115
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 350 188 162 69 59 5 8 114 95

Special Staff--Total 722 464 258 144 107 20 12 300 139
Hq Commandant (U.S.) Camp Commandant (Br.) 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Adjutant General Division 125 102 23 18 1 10 2 74 20
Engineer Division 87 41 46 16 18 1 2 24 26
Signal Division 167 99 68 40 32 3 3 56 33
Medical Division 13 6 7 3 3 0 1 3 3
Psychological Warfare Division 90 53 37 16 18 1 1 36 18
Public Relations Division 180 134 46 42 23 5 2 87 21
Air Defense Division 58 28 30 8 11 0 1 20 18

Special Troops--Total 13,100 8,170 4,930 973 719 17 39 7,180 4,172
Local Administrative Appointments 763 0 763 0 17 0 6 0 740
G-1 Agencies 500 293 207 97 65 5 1 191 141
G-2 Agencies 939 49 890 16 226 0 17 33 647
G-3 Agencies 229 0 229 0 12 0 0 0 217
G-4 Agencies 285 156 129 58 49 1 2 97 78
G-5 Agencies 532 236 296 79 80 2 3 155 213
Psychological Warfare Division 1,128 878 250 219 81 1 1 658 168
Public Relations Division 456 346 110 164 40 0 0 182 70
Signal Agencies 2,692 1,577 1,115 125 69 0 0 1,452 1,046
Air Defense Division 941 0 941 0 80 0 9 0 852
European Allied Contact Section 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Liaison Agencies--Total 486 195 291 60 92 1 2 134 197
French Mission 199 129 70 39 23 1 0 89 47
Belgian Mission 85 26 59 8 30 0 0 18 29
Netherlands Mission 168 26 142 8 28 0 2 18 112
Danish Mission 34 14 20 5 11 0 0 9 9
Source: SHAEF SGS 320.3 T/O and WE for SHAEF.

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TABLE 6--AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, 1 APRIL 1945

OORGANIZATION TOTAL OFFICERS WARRANT OFFICERS ENLISTED
TOTAL U.S. BRITISH U.S. BRITISH U.S. BRITISH U.S. BRITISH
Total 14,028 8,374 6,564 1,495 1,077 61 99 6,818 4,478

General Staff--Total 1,952 1,102 850 378 314 29 35 695 501
Supreme Commander, Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, Secretary General Staff 204 148 56 24 13 7 3 117 40
European Allied Contact Section 15 5 10 3 4 0 0 2 6
Political Advisors 4 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 1
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 150 52 98 22 40 1 4 29 54
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2 495 296 199 112 75 4 5 180 119
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 261 141 120 51 46 3 3 87 71
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 472 269 203 96 76 9 12 164 115
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 351 189 162 69 59 5 8 115 95

Special Staff--Total 877 580 297 201 115 20 13 359 169
Hq Commandant (U.S.) Camp Commandant (Br.) 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Adjutant General Division 125 102 23 18 1 10 2 74 20
Engineer Division 82 36 46 15 18 0 2 21 26
Signal Division 162 94 68 38 32 3 3 53 33
Medical Division 13 6 7 3 3 0 1 3 3
Psychological Warfare Division 171 104 67 41 25 2 1 61 41
Public Relations Division 266 211 55 77 24 5 3 129 28
Air Defense Division 56 26 30 8 11 0 1 18 18

Special Troops--Total 10,339 6,378 3,961 777 473 10 36 5,591 3,452
Local Administrative Appointments 765 0 765 0 20 0 7 0 738
G-1 Agencies 543 295 248 90 83 5 0 200 165
G-2 Agencies 545 98 447 18 91 2 17 78 339
G-3 Agencies 103 0 103 0 4 0 0 0 99
G-4 Agencies 269 140 129 52 49 1 2 87 78
G-5 Agencies 15 7 8 2 2 0 0 5 6
Psychological Warfare Division 986 767 219 171 74 0 1 596 144
Public Relations Division 357 269 88 129 30 0 0 140 58
Signal Agencies 2,627 1,556 1,071 122 71 0 0 1,434 1,000
Air Defense Division 883 0 883 0 49 0 9 0 825
European Allied Contact Section 7 7 0 3 0 0 0 4 0

Liaison Agencies--Total 860 314 546 139 175 2 15 173 356
French Mission 292 204 88 74 53 2 1 128 34
Belgian Mission 208 50 158 32 42 0 6 18 110
Netherlands Mission 197 27 170 8 48 0 4 19 118
Danish Mission 163 33 130 25 32 0 4 8 94
Source: SHAEF SGS 320.3 T/O and WE for SHAEF.

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Footnotes

1. This appendix was written by the author in 1946 as a part of a short History of SHAEF. It was based on the following files: SHAEF SGS 320.3 T/O and WE for SHAEF; SHAEF SGS 322 Organization and Personnel (Fwd); SHAEF SGS 322 Organization and Personnel (Rear); and files for each general and special staff division of SHAEF under the title Organization and Personnel. Additional information was furnished the author in 1945 by Brig. Gen. Robert Q. Brown, Headquarters Commandant, and in 1946 by Lt. Col. H. J. Rothwell, his British assistant. This section was checked as to accuracy by the Office of the Headquarters Commandant in 1946

2. See below, p. 533.

3. See below, pp. 534-35.



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